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FCC Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau Issues Public Notice Prohibiting Importation, Marketing of Previously Authorized Covered Communications Equipment
WASHINGTON, June 27 -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (PS Docket No. 26-72):
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Introduction
By this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier./1 All such covered equipment has been publicly identified as posing "unacceptable risks
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WASHINGTON, June 27 -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (PS Docket No. 26-72):
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Introduction
By this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier./1 All such covered equipment has been publicly identified as posing "unacceptable risksto the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons"/2 for years. While importation and marketing will be prohibited, this prohibition will not affect the continued use or operation of already-purchased communications equipment. The prohibition adopted in this Public Notice also will not affect equipment added to the Covered List in 2025 or 2026, such as certain foreign-produced Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS), UAS critical components, and routers./3
Background
In November 2022, the Commission adopted rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List./4 However, the Commission did not revoke previously granted authorizations of covered equipment./5 In October 2025, the Commission adopted the EA Security Second R&O which, among other things, established a procedure to limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the underlying authorization./6 The Commission noted that its goal was to mitigate potential national security risks associated with covered equipment in the nation's supply chain that was authorized prior to a Covered List addition under 47 U.S.C. Sec. 1601(b)./7 The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to "institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List" and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the EA Security Second R&O./8
The Commission specifically directed PSHSB and OET to conduct a public interest analysis pursuant to that framework, giving "particular weight to the fact that the relevant equipment was determined to pose 'an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons."/9 Under the framework, PSHSB and OET must first issue a Public Notice with "a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized covered equipment prohibiting the importation and marketing of such."/10 The Public Notice must "specify the class, type, or other description sufficient to identify the devices, including reference to all devices included in a specific Covered List entry, targeted for potential limitations on importation and marketing."/11 The Public Notice must provide "an opportunity for public comment for a minimum of 30 days and may provide an opportunity for reply comments," and PSHSB and OET should take reasonable steps to conclude the proceeding expeditiously./12
On March 27, 2026, PSHSB and OET released a Public Notice (March 27 Public Notice) seeking comment on whether the Commission should prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized covered equipment and the relevant factors, including national security and economic and supply chain considerations, that would justify such a prohibition./13 We tentatively concluded that "prohibiting the importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment that was added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier is consistent with the public interest, because it protects American communications networks from devices specifically determined by Congress or a national security agency to 'pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.'"/14 And we further tentatively concluded that "there are no public interest factors that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed ban on import and marketing of this previously [authorized] equipment."/15
Discussion
Today, based on the record, we prohibit the continued importation and marketing of any covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier. This prohibition specifically applies to all such covered equipment that received FCC equipment authorization before the adoption of our 2022 rules and takes effect 10 days after publication in the Federal Register. As explained further below, however, the prohibition is temporarily suspended for certain equipment added to the Covered List on March 12, 2021, when used for the purpose of physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, until the Commission adopts a definition of "critical infrastructure." And the prohibition does not apply to any equipment added to the Covered List after 2024. The Commission updated the Covered List webpage to identify the covered equipment that is subject to the prohibition on importation and marketing, which is available at: https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist#importation-marketing-prohibitions.
National security impacts. Protecting national security remains one of the Commission's primary objectives, and the focus of our analysis in this proceeding./16 Moreover, as the Commission stated in the EA Security Second R&O, "no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation."/17 Consistent with our tentative conclusions in the March 27 Public Notice, we find that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier is necessary to mitigate national security risks to the U.S. communications sector. In determining whether to adopt such prohibition, the Commission directed that PSHSB and OET "must give particular weight" to the national security determinations made concerning the targeted equipment./18 The 2021 additions to the Covered List were pursuant to a specific national security determination made by Congress, which the Commission previously found constituted a specific determination that such equipment poses an "unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons."/19 Separately, the 2024 addition of "equipment with integrated Kaspersky Lab, Inc. (or any of its successors and assignees) cybersecurity or anti-virus software" was based on a specific determination by the Department of Commerce that "Kaspersky's provision of cybersecurity and anti-virus software to U.S. persons, including through third-party entities that integrate Kaspersky cybersecurity or anti-virus software into commercial hardware or software, poses undue and unacceptable risks to U.S. national security and to the security and safety of U.S. persons."/20 We agree with CTIA that our action today will "help to mitigate clear national security risks . . . because all of the entities captured in the proposed restrictions have been found by Congress or national security agencies to be subject to the control, direction, or influence of foreign adversary countries."/21
After review of the record filed in response to the March 27 Public Notice, we reaffirm the Commission's previous finding that older models of covered equipment--many of which remain widely available in the U.S.--continue to pose an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed in the United States, not only when newly introduced to the market./22 We agree with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) that equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier "is often functionally identical to these firms' more recently banned products" that have been deemed to pose an unacceptable national security risk./23 We agree as well with FDD that authorized equipment produced by the entities subject to our prohibition "may still be sold in the United States despite the firms" that produce or provide such equipment "continuing to engage in troubling patterns of behavior," including cyberespionage./24 As FDD states, "[a]llowing them to sell and market previously authorized equipment to the American market will perpetuate vulnerabilities in U.S. telecommunications infrastructure."/25 FDD argues that we "must act to prevent adversaries from exploiting regulatory loopholes to maintain access to U.S. critical infrastructure."/26 Accordingly, we conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized equipment added in 2024 or earlier serves the public interest and is necessary to protect national security by mitigating risks to the U.S. communications sector. No commenter disputed the national security concerns associated with such equipment.
After careful consideration of the record, we also find that arguments concerning economic and supply chain harms do not overcome the preexisting national security determinations and the national security risks posed by the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment subject to our action today. We disagree with commenters who argue that the Commission should refrain from extending the prohibition to previously authorized covered equipment because doing so may impose economic costs./27 We recognize that some parties may face added compliance obligations and lost sales revenue, but those concerns do not override the Commission's responsibility to protect national security. The commenters opposing expansion of the prohibition largely focus on the financial impacts, especially on particular entities./28 However, these commenters do not meaningfully address the broader consequences of continuing to import and market devices that have been determined to pose "unacceptable risks" or provide data for us to consider on those issues, as we invited in the March 27 Public Notice./29
As CTIA notes, "the universe of equipment targeted by the [March 27 Public Notice] . . . is produced by a handful of entities," and "[i]n the period since this equipment was added to the Covered List, experience has demonstrated the availability of alternatives."/30 Moreover, devices added to the Covered List as part of the Kaspersky listing in 2024 are already prohibited from importation or marketing under Department of Commerce's rules/31 and equipment added to the Covered List in the initial 2021 listing has not received authorization since November 11, 2022, over three years ago. Thus, we conclude that the national security considerations outweigh the economic and supply chain concerns that commenters raised in the record.
Scope of prohibition for certain equipment. Some of the equipment on the Covered List that was added in 2024 or earlier is "covered" for all uses and purposes./32 However, as we noted in the March 27 Public Notice, certain equipment added to the Covered List on March 12, 2021, is only on the Covered List when used for specific purposes--namely, "for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes."/33 Under the approach the Commission adopted in the EA Security R&O,/34 new equipment authorization applications for covered equipment produced by entities subject to use-based restrictions (i.e., equipment that is covered when "used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes"/35) are generally prohibited until those manufacturers have submitted, and received Commission approval for, compliance plans./36 The Commission has yet to approve any such compliance plans, because the Commission's definition of critical infrastructure was the subject of litigation. In 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's Order, except for the Commission's definition of "critical infrastructure," which it vacated and remanded back to the Commission to adopt a new definition and justification that "comport[s] . . . with the statutory text."/37 In 2025, in order to address this partial remand of the EA Security R&O, the Commission sought comment on a proposed definition of critical infrastructure and noted that "adoption of this definition is a precondition to the review and approval of any compliance plans, as required under the EA Security R&O and FNPRM."/38
Given this backdrop, for any equipment that is "covered" when used for certain purposes, the prohibitions on continued importation and marketing that we adopt today will not apply to importation and marketing for non-"covered" uses. Therefore, the importation and marketing prohibitions will apply only to equipment "used for the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes."/39 We find that, as urged by two commenters,/40 permitting the importation or marketing of such already-authorized equipment is consistent with the Covered List, the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, and the Secure Equipment Act of 2021 (Secure Equipment Act)./41 Furthermore, because the Commission currently lacks a definition of, and guidance for interpreting the statutory term "critical infrastructure," we suspend the prohibition on the importation or marketing of such equipment for the purpose of physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure until the Commission adopts such definition and guidance. On the effective date of any Commission Order adopting a definition of "critical infrastructure," importation and marketing will be prohibited for the purpose of "security surveillance of critical infrastructure." Therefore, the importation and marketing of already-authorized equipment subject only to a use-based Covered List entry will only be prohibited if imported or marketed for the purpose of the following, as interpreted in the EA Security 2d R&O:
* Public safety;/42
* Government facilities;/43
* (Suspended, pending finalized definition of, and guidance for interpreting, "critical infrastructure") physical surveillance of critical infrastructure; and
* "Other national security purposes."/44
Finally, if at any point there is a new specific determination that removes the use-based limits on a Covered List entry, we retain the authority to issue another Public Notice expanding this prohibition to include the importation and marketing of that covered equipment for all purposes.
Legal Authority. Without reopening the issue of the Commission's legal authority, we nonetheless note our continued disagreement with Hikvision's arguments that we lack the statutory authority to impose prohibitions on the continued importation and marketing of already-authorized covered equipment./45 The Commission has previously made clear and explained at length that it has multiple sources of legal authority to limit existing authorizations of equipment that would no longer be eligible to receive authorizations today due to unacceptable national security risks./46
We also reject Hikvision's argument that the March 27 Public Notice fails to provide specific notice of affected authorizations under section 2.939./47 The March 27 Public Notice sufficiently identifies the devices targeted for potential limitation with specific reference to covered equipment that was added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier./48 The Covered List clearly reflects the specific equipment that was added to the Covered List, and the date such equipment was added./49
Finally, Hytera-US, Inc. (Hytera-US) and Hytera Communications Corporation Limited (HCC) contend that their land mobile radio and digital mobile radio equipment is not "video surveillance and telecommunications equipment," and therefore, in their view, is not covered equipment./50 As such, they argue that before taking any further action, the Commission must clarify that any restrictions on importing and marketing do not apply to equipment that is not covered equipment./51 In addition, Hytera-US argues the Commission must lift its hold on Hytera-US's applications for equipment authorizations./52 HCC similarly argues that the Commission should proceed with a different procedural mechanism than the framework adopted by the Commission in the EA Security 2d R&O, so that authorization holders have the ability to contest whether their equipment is subject to the Covered List prohibitions./53 These arguments do not address the proposals in the March 27 Public Notice, and therefore, we reject these arguments as unresponsive.
Implementation
Existing authorizations. As the Commission has stated, the prohibition on continued importation and marketing does not affect the continued use or operation of previously authorized covered equipment; consumers may continue to use any device or equipment that they currently possess, if the equipment was legally purchased and maintains an existing equipment authorization./54 Commenters support this approach and no commenter opposed this approach, which is consistent with the EA Security 2d R&O./55 We also note that the importation and marketing prohibitions do not apply to marketing activities that are excepted under statute and the Commission's rules/56 or for importation under the conditions listed in section 2.1204(a)(3)-(11) of the Commission's rules./57
Implementation timeline. The prohibition on importation and marketing will take effect 10 days after publication in the Federal Register. As of that date, entities will be prohibited from importing or marketing any covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier. While this approach differs from our proposal in the March 27 Public Notice, which would have required entities to cease all importation and marketing activities within 30 days of the release of this Public Notice, we believe that 10 days following Federal Register publication will create more notice to the public and federal partners. The need for expedited action is especially acute, because a delayed, but looming, prohibition would encourage importers and marketers to flood the U.S. market with covered equipment--a prospect that this proceeding is premised on preventing.
We agree with CTIA that "several factors significantly mitigate any potential supply chain or economic impacts" that may occur as a result of this action, "including previous efforts under the Commission's 'Rip and Replace' program and the long period of time since any equipment produced by the relevant entities has been eligible to be authorized."/58 As CTIA notes, several alternatives have been brought to market since this equipment was added to the Covered List and "participants in the ICT ecosystem can effectively serve the U.S. market without this equipment in their networks or these producers in their supply chains."/59
We disagree with commenters like NCTA and USTelecom who contend (without specific data to support their arguments)/60 that we should adopt longer and more flexible transition periods to account for supply chain considerations, in-transit equipment, existing inventory, and contractual obligations and reject calls for a "phased implementation."/61 We also disagree with HCC's suggestion that we should broadly exempt from the prohibition "equipment that is used for spare parts, updates and replacements" for existing devices or otherwise "provide a process for reimbursement . . . to allow users to replace the affected equipment."/62 Allowing imports and marketing replacements for existing covered equipment would defeat the entire purpose of this prohibition. As we concluded above, the national security risks of allowing covered equipment to continue to be imported and marketed in the U.S. far outweigh the potential economic impacts and supply chain disruptions that may occur as a result of this prohibition, and the national security demand for urgent action to avoid flooding the market outweighs any disruption.
Finally, we defer consideration of CTIA's suggestions regarding how to weigh future proceedings placing limitations on the importation or marketing of existing authorizations./63
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Original text plus footnotes here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-635A1.pdf
SEC Obtains Final Consent Judgment as to Sales Manager Charged in Alleged Fraudulent Oil and Gas Offering
WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release (No. 3:22-cv-1415; N.D. Tex. filed June 30, 2022):
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Michael Bowen and Chol Kim a/k/a Brandon Kim, No. 3:22-cv-1415 (N.D. Tex. filed June 30, 2022)
On June 8, 2026, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas entered a final judgment by consent as to Michael Bowen, whom the SEC previously charged with making false and misleading statements related to the offer and sale of Cannon Operating Company LLC's securities.
According to
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WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release (No. 3:22-cv-1415; N.D. Tex. filed June 30, 2022):
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Michael Bowen and Chol Kim a/k/a Brandon Kim, No. 3:22-cv-1415 (N.D. Tex. filed June 30, 2022)
On June 8, 2026, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas entered a final judgment by consent as to Michael Bowen, whom the SEC previously charged with making false and misleading statements related to the offer and sale of Cannon Operating Company LLC's securities.
According tothe SEC's first amended complaint, between January 2018 and September 2020, Cannon and William Glen Baker fraudulently raised approximately $2,182,687 from at least 140 investors through the unregistered offer and sale of working interests in oil and gas wells in Oklahoma. The complaint alleged that, from April 2016 through September 2018, Bowen served as Cannon's chief operating officer and sales manager. The complaint further alleged that, for one of Cannon's offerings, the company's offering materials, which Bowen helped draft, misrepresented the performance of Cannon's prior wells in the same field, failed to disclose sales commissions, and otherwise misstated how investor funds would be used. According to the complaint, Bowen also directed and concealed the payment of the undisclosed sales commissions and acted as an unregistered broker.
Without admitting the allegations in the complaint, Bowen consented to the entry of the final judgment that permanently enjoins him from violating Sections 5 and 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and from participating in the issuance, purchase, offer, or sale of any security except for purchases or sales of securities listed on a national securities exchange for his own personal accounts. In addition, the final judgment orders Bowen to pay disgorgement in the amount of $106,000, prejudgment interest in the amount of $48,827.18, and a civil penalty in the amount of $150,000.
The SEC's litigation was led by Jason Rose and supervised by Keefe Bernstein of the SEC's Fort Worth Regional Office.
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Resources
* Final Judgment - Michael Bowen (https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/litreleases/2026/judg26575.pdf)
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Original text here: https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/litigation-releases/lr-26575
FDIC Publishes May Enforcement Actions
WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued the following news release:
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FDIC Publishes May Enforcement Actions
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) today published a list of orders of administrative enforcement actions taken against banks and individuals in May 2026. There are no administrative hearings scheduled for July 2026.
The FDIC issued 22 orders and one adjudicated decision and order in May 2026. The administrative enforcement actions in those orders consisted of one order to pay civil money penalty; one consent order; five orders terminating
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WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued the following news release:
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FDIC Publishes May Enforcement Actions
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) today published a list of orders of administrative enforcement actions taken against banks and individuals in May 2026. There are no administrative hearings scheduled for July 2026.
The FDIC issued 22 orders and one adjudicated decision and order in May 2026. The administrative enforcement actions in those orders consisted of one order to pay civil money penalty; one consent order; five orders terminatingconsent orders; one combined order of prohibition and order for restitution; seven orders of prohibition; six orders terminating a total of 102 Section 19 waiver orders; one order of acceptance of voluntary termination of insured status; and one decision and order.
To view orders, adjudicated decisions and notices and the administrative hearing details online, please visit the FDIC's web page by clicking the link below.
May Enforcement Decisions and Orders
Contact(s)
MediaRequests@fdic.gov
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Original text here: https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2026/fdic-publishes-may-enforcement-actions
CPSC Issues Recall Alert Involving Raychy Children's Light Sneakers Unisex
WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert:
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Name of Product: Raychy Children's Light Sneakers Unisex
Hazard: The recalled sneakers violate the mandatory standard for consumer products with button cell and coin batteries because the lithium coin batteries can be accessed easily by children, posing an ingestion hazard. Additionally, the packaging and product do not have the warnings required under Reese's Law. When button cell or coin batteries are swallowed, the ingested batteries can cause serious injuries, internal chemical burns, and
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WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert:
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Name of Product: Raychy Children's Light Sneakers Unisex
Hazard: The recalled sneakers violate the mandatory standard for consumer products with button cell and coin batteries because the lithium coin batteries can be accessed easily by children, posing an ingestion hazard. Additionally, the packaging and product do not have the warnings required under Reese's Law. When button cell or coin batteries are swallowed, the ingested batteries can cause serious injuries, internal chemical burns, anddeath.
Remedy: Refund
Recall Date: June 25, 2026
Units: About 500
Consumer Contact: Carina and Rambo by email at raychyrecall@outlook.com.
Recall Details
Description: This recall involves Raychy Children's Light Sneakers Unisex. The sneakers are available in red, black, and blue, each featuring a distinctive spiderweb-patterned on top of the sneakers and soles that light up when walking. The shoes bear the "Fashion" label printed on the tongue.
Remedy: Consumers should stop using the sneakers immediately and contact Carina and Rambo for a refund. Consumers will be asked to cut the shoe tongue, write "RECALLED" on both sides of the sneakers using a permanent marker, and provide a photo of disposal to raychyrecall@outlook.com in order to receive the refund.
Note: Button cell and coin batteries are hazardous. Batteries should be disposed of or recycled by following local hazardous waste procedures.
Incidents/Injuries: None reported
Sold Online At: Amazon.com in January 2026 for about $28.
Importer(s): Shenzhen Qicheng Trading Co., Ltd., dba Carina and Rambo, of China
Manufactured In: China
Recall number: 26-578
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Original text here: https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2026/Raychy-Childrens-Light-Sneakers-Recalled-Due-to-Risk-of-Serious-Injury-or-Death-from-Battery-Ingestion-Violate-Mandatory-Standard-for-Consumer-Products-with-Coin-Batteries-Imported-by-Carina-and-Rambo
CPSC Issues Recall Alert Involving Lomi Roll-On Waxing Kits
WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert:
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Name of Product: Lomi Roll-On Waxing Kits
Hazard: The roll-on warmers' power cord can overheat and short circuit, posing a risk of serious injury or death from fire, burn and electrical shock hazards.
Remedy: Refund
Recall Date: June 25, 2026
Units: About 14,700 (Southern Telecom previously recalled the waxing kits on June 13, 2024)
Consumer Contact: Southern Telecom toll-free at 888-959-0944 from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. ET Monday through Friday, email at support@customersupport123.com, or online
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WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert:
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Name of Product: Lomi Roll-On Waxing Kits
Hazard: The roll-on warmers' power cord can overheat and short circuit, posing a risk of serious injury or death from fire, burn and electrical shock hazards.
Remedy: Refund
Recall Date: June 25, 2026
Units: About 14,700 (Southern Telecom previously recalled the waxing kits on June 13, 2024)
Consumer Contact: Southern Telecom toll-free at 888-959-0944 from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. ET Monday through Friday, email at support@customersupport123.com, or onlineat https://southerntelecom.com/recall-2026-05-14/ or www.southerntelecom.com and click on "Recall: LOMB2004PK Roll-On Waxing Kit" at the top of the page for more information.
Recall Details
Description: This recall involves the Lomi Roll-On Waxing Kit with Wax Cartridge & Wax Strips, model numbers LOMB2003PK and LOMB2004PK. The recalled boxed kits included a handheld wax warmer, a wax cartridge, wax strips, a power cord and a user's manual. The Lomi logo is printed on the front of the white and pink warmer and on the outside of the product packaging. The model number is printed on a label on the bottom of the wax warmer.
Remedy: Consumers should stop using the recalled waxing kits immediately and contact Southern Telecom for a full refund. Consumers will be asked to destroy the kits by unplugging the warmer's electrical cord, cutting it in half, and upload a photo of the destroyed product, showing the cut electrical cord, to https://support.customersupport123.com/hc/en-us/requests/new. Consumers should then dispose of the destroyed product.
Incidents/Injuries: Southern Telecom has received two additional reports of the warmer power cord overheating. No injuries have been reported.
Sold At: Ross, DD's, Variety Wholesalers and Burlington stores nationwide from February 2025 through December 2025 for about $13.
Importer(s): Southern Telecom Inc., of New York
Manufactured In: China
Recall number: 26-576
Fast Track Recall
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Original text here: https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2026/Southern-Telecom-Expands-Recall-of-Lomi-Waxing-Kits-Due-to-Risk-of-Serious-Injury-or-Death-from-Fire-and-Burn-Hazards-Additional-Model-and-Reported-Incidents
CPSC Issues Recall Alert Involving Honlyne LED Party Favors
WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert:
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Name of Product: Honlyne LED Party Favors
Hazard: The LED party favors violate the mandatory safety standard for consumer products because the battery compartment within the light-up products contains button cell batteries that can be easily accessed by children. When button cell or coin batteries are swallowed, the ingested batteries can cause serious injuries, internal chemical burns and death.
Remedy: Refund
Recall Date: June 25, 2026
Units: About 13,400
Consumer Contact: Huizhou Rongheng
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert:
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Name of Product: Honlyne LED Party Favors
Hazard: The LED party favors violate the mandatory safety standard for consumer products because the battery compartment within the light-up products contains button cell batteries that can be easily accessed by children. When button cell or coin batteries are swallowed, the ingested batteries can cause serious injuries, internal chemical burns and death.
Remedy: Refund
Recall Date: June 25, 2026
Units: About 13,400
Consumer Contact: Huizhou RonghengNetwork Technology by email at joeyrong@vip.sina.com.
Recall Details
Description: This recall involves Honlyn LED party favors. The party favors include 20 LED hair fiber optic clips, 16 LED glasses, 16 foam glow sticks, 10 light-up flower crowns, 40 finger lights and 200 glow sticks. "Light Up Party Toy" is printed on the front of the product packaging. "Brand: Honlyne," "Product Name: Glow in the Dark Party Supplies" and "Mo. Number: HON-302HE" are printed on back of the product packaging. One side of the packaging bears several hazard warnings for small parts and button cell batteries.
Remedy: Consumers should stop using the recalled party favors immediately and contact Huizhou Rongheng Network Technology for a full refund. Consumers will be asked to take a clear photo of the recalled products in the trash and email the photo to joeyrong@vip.sina.com to receive a refund. Upon verification, Huizhou Rongheng Network Technology will issue a refund.
Note: Button cell batteries are hazardous. Batteries should be disposed of or recycled by following local hazardous waste procedures.
Incidents/Injuries: None reported
Sold Online At: Amazon.com from June 2024 through December 2025 for about $49 per set.
Importer(s): ABGA Advanced Trading Co., Ltd., of Walnut, California
Retailer: Huizhou Rongheng Network Technology, of China
Manufactured In: China
Recall number: 26-580
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Original text here: https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2026/Honlyne-LED-Party-Favors-Recalled-Due-to-Risk-of-Serious-Injury-or-Death-from-Battery-Ingestion-Violate-Mandatory-Standard-for-Consumer-Products-with-Button-Cell-Batteries-Sold-by-Huizhou-Rongheng-Network-Technology
CPSC Issues Recall Alert Involving Amana Window-Room-Air-Conditioners
WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert:
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Name of Product: Amana Window-Room-Air-Conditioners (WRAC) and Through the Wall (TTW) air conditioners or heat pumps
Hazard: The heating element can remain energized during a ground fault, despite being turned off, posing a risk of fire or burn injury to consumers.
Remedy: Refund
Recall Date: June 25, 2026
Units: About 13,514 (In addition, about 53 were sold in Canada)
Consumer Contact: DCT toll-free at 855-812-8989 from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. CT Monday through Friday or online at www.amana-ptac.com/amana-ttw-wrac-recall
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 26 -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert:
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Name of Product: Amana Window-Room-Air-Conditioners (WRAC) and Through the Wall (TTW) air conditioners or heat pumps
Hazard: The heating element can remain energized during a ground fault, despite being turned off, posing a risk of fire or burn injury to consumers.
Remedy: Refund
Recall Date: June 25, 2026
Units: About 13,514 (In addition, about 53 were sold in Canada)
Consumer Contact: DCT toll-free at 855-812-8989 from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. CT Monday through Friday or online at www.amana-ptac.com/amana-ttw-wrac-recallor www.amana-ptac.com and click on "Product Recall" at the bottom right of the page for more information.
Recall Details
In Conjunction With:
Description: This recall involves certain Amana brand Window-Room-Air-Conditioners and Through the Wall air conditioners or heat pumps. The products are white-colored, and the brand name is printed on most of the units' control covers. The units are used to provide room climate control. They most often are installed at hotels, apartment buildings, and commercial spaces.
The model number is located on the front of the unit on the front edge of the base pan on a white sticker. Recalled units have a model number beginning with PB, AH or AE. The serial number is under the bar code that is under the model number. The model numbers in the recall include: [View table in the link at bottom.]
Remedy: Consumers should stop using the recalled products immediately and contact Daikin Comfort Technologies Manufacturing, Inc. (DCT) to submit a request for a full refund. Consumers will be required to provide their contact information, cut the product's cord, and then upload a photo of the product's serial number and cut cord in order to receive a full refund of the unit.
Incidents/Injuries: DCT has received one report of plastic on the unit melting. No injuries have been reported.
Sold At: Through direct sales and heating and cooling dealers nationwide from April 2025 through December 2025 for between $850 and $1,500.
Importer(s): Daikin Comfort Technologies Manufacturing, Inc., of Houston, Texas
Manufactured In: India
Recall number: 26-581
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Original text here: https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2026/Daikin-Comfort-Technologies-Manufacturing-Recalls-Amana-Air-Conditioners-and-Heat-Pumps-Due-to-Risk-of-Serious-Injury-from-Fire-and-Burns
