Federal Regulatory Agencies
Here's a look at documents from federal regulatory agencies
Federal Regulatory Agencies
Featured Stories
NRC Proposes $36,000 Civil Penalty Against Industrial Radiography Company for Safety Violations
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following news release:
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NRC Proposes $36,000 Civil Penalty Against Industrial Radiography Company for Safety Violations
October 23, 2026
NAPERVILLE, Ill. -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $36,000 civil penalty against Acuren Inspection Inc. for four safety violations involving industrial radiography at the company's Alaska site.
The company is licensed by the NRC to conduct industrial radiography at multiple locations.
An NRC inspection identified failures to conduct required radiation surveys, follow ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following news release: * * * NRC Proposes $36,000 Civil Penalty Against Industrial Radiography Company for Safety Violations October 23, 2026 NAPERVILLE, Ill. -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $36,000 civil penalty against Acuren Inspection Inc. for four safety violations involving industrial radiography at the company's Alaska site. The company is licensed by the NRC to conduct industrial radiography at multiple locations. An NRC inspection identified failures to conduct required radiation surveys, followradiography procedures, adequately oversee radiographic activities and provide proper instructions for responding to equipment alarms.
The NRC issued the enforcement action after reviewing the violations, the company's written response, and corrective actions the company has taken or planned to bring its activities into compliance with NRC regulations.
Acuren has 30 days to pay the fine, dispute it, or ask a neutral third party to review the case.
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Original text here: https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/news-releases/2026/26-016-iii
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NRC Proposes $36,000 Civil Penalty Against Industrial Radiography Company for Safety Violations
October 23, 2026
NAPERVILLE, Ill. -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $36,000 civil penalty against Acuren Inspection Inc. for four safety violations involving industrial radiography at the company's Alaska site.
The company is licensed by the NRC to conduct industrial radiography at multiple locations.
An NRC inspection identified failures to conduct required radiation surveys, follow ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following news release: * * * NRC Proposes $36,000 Civil Penalty Against Industrial Radiography Company for Safety Violations October 23, 2026 NAPERVILLE, Ill. -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $36,000 civil penalty against Acuren Inspection Inc. for four safety violations involving industrial radiography at the company's Alaska site. The company is licensed by the NRC to conduct industrial radiography at multiple locations. An NRC inspection identified failures to conduct required radiation surveys, followradiography procedures, adequately oversee radiographic activities and provide proper instructions for responding to equipment alarms.
The NRC issued the enforcement action after reviewing the violations, the company's written response, and corrective actions the company has taken or planned to bring its activities into compliance with NRC regulations.
Acuren has 30 days to pay the fine, dispute it, or ask a neutral third party to review the case.
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Original text here: https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/news-releases/2026/26-016-iii
FCC Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau Issues Public Notice: Bureau Highlights Cybersecurity Best Practices for Communications Service Providers
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (Docket No. DA 26-1109):
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With this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) highlights best practices for broadcasters and telecommunications service providers (collectively, communications service providers) discussed at the Commission's May 14 and 15, 2026 cybersecurity workshops./1 The workshops brought together experts from the Commission, federal ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (Docket No. DA 26-1109): * * * With this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) highlights best practices for broadcasters and telecommunications service providers (collectively, communications service providers) discussed at the Commission's May 14 and 15, 2026 cybersecurity workshops./1 The workshops brought together experts from the Commission, federalpartners, and industry to raise awareness of emerging cybersecurity risks, share and promote best practices, and highlight opportunities for public-private partnership to strengthen cybersecurity and improve incident response across the communications sector./2
I. THREAT LANDSCAPE
The communications sector is a key component of U.S. critical infrastructure and must be resilient to cyberattacks intended to disrupt communications services or exfiltrate sensitive commercial or personal data./3 Telecommunications infrastructure is of particular interest to threat actors, as it is both a target and an attack path: the Internet is the "highway" through which cyberattacks are conveyed, and the telecommunications sector undergirds other critical lifeline functions, such as energy, water, transportation, and finance./4 As a result, communications sector entities, including communications service providers, face growing dangers from criminal groups, foreign state actors, hacktivists, and insider threats./5 Criminal groups are the most likely to be disruptive or destructive to communications service providers in the near-term, while foreign state actors are more likely to "burrow in" to communications service providers' systems for strategic advantage in the future./6
There are multiple ways a threat actor can gain access to communications networks to cause operational disruptions, control systems or services, or exfiltrate data./7 For example, threat actors might engage in social engineering techniques, like impersonating a help desk employee or contractor to gather credentials (e.g., through voice phishing or "vishing"), or attempt to gain access through a compromised link in an e-mail (phishing)./8 Once access is acquired, malicious actors can use ransomware, a type of malicious software, to encrypt a target system's data before demanding a ransom or extorting the victim to decrypt it./9
For broadcasters, unauthorized access can lead to tampering with broadcasts, hijacking transmissions, and manipulating Emergency Alert System (EAS) encoders/decoders./10 The effects of a successful cyberattack can have devastating consequences for a broadcast station. A cyberattack might result in dead air or the broadcast of programming inserted by the threat actor,/11 which could include offensive, obscene, or false information and subject the broadcaster to reputational harm or potential liability./12
For telecommunications service providers, the risks include data loss and disruptions in service continuity and emergency communications./13 Small telecommunications service providers can be critical for connectivity, especially in rural areas./14 Small telecommunications service providers also often inherit the security posture of their vendors, and vulnerabilities in small providers may create risks for the entire sector. This makes robust planning, coordination, and collaboration critically important./15
II. CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES
In general, communications service providers should consult the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), which can help providers better understand, assess, prioritize, and communicate their cybersecurity risk management strategy./16 Providers should implement the below best practices to better mitigate cyber risk.
Develop a Cybersecurity Risk Management Plan. A coherent and thoughtful cybersecurity risk management plan can help shift a provider's security posture from reactive to proactive, allowing it to prioritize threats and make smarter, cost-effective security investments./17 Preparing for cyberattacks as an organization takes buy-in from all internal stakeholders, from technical teams to senior leadership, but it may also include external parties, such as trusted vendors, cyber insurance providers, outside counsel, and marketing/public relations firms./18 To guard against ransom, extortion, and harassment, a cybersecurity risk management plan may include implementing certain practices to reduce the target attack surface for threat actors, including restricting help desk password and multi-factor authentication (MFA) resets without involving a person's manager (to prevent help desk misuse) or prohibiting employees from saving personal contacts on work infrastructure (to prevent the threat actor from using them as leverage)./19
When developing a risk management plan, providers should assess their supply chain risks, including those posed by vendors and other third parties, as attackers are increasingly moving upstream from the communications service provider to target customers or other third parties whose systems are connected with those of the provider./20 Providers should engage with vendors to understand the baseline security of their products or services, potential vulnerabilities, and how they are addressing those vulnerabilities./21 Establishing a line of communication with vendors can facilitate collaboration when situations arise that affect third-party systems and require rapid restoration of the network to a trusted state./22
Conduct a Risk Assessment and Prioritize Critical Assets. Prioritizing protections based on risk can guide your organization's approach in bite-sized, attainable steps that are not overwhelming./23 First, create an inventory to understand what assets are in your network, who is responsible for them, and what their potential attack surfaces and vulnerabilities may be./24 A visual diagram or map of your systems and connections between them can help you determine what is critical, what is exposed, and where there are dependencies./25 After completing your inventory, implement risk-based security controls for each asset: compare the likelihood of a compromise and the amount of harm that could arise from that compromise./26 If the amount of harm that could arise is very high, then that asset is likely one of your "crown jewels" that you should protect at the outset./27 If an asset is highly vulnerable, but its compromise would not expose anything critical to your operations, other assets should likely be addressed first./28 In the case of older/legacy devices that are no longer able to be updated or patched, consider whether the risk of that device being compromised outweighs the cost to protect or replace it./29
Two ways to help keep up with potential vulnerabilities and mitigate risk include: (1) checking the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog to see if CISA has already identified an exploitable vulnerability "in the wild,"/30 which can help your organization understand how to take steps to address the vulnerability, and (2) using an automated vulnerability scanning system./31 It is important to assess and reassess your controls routinely after the first implementation, and to start early to prospectively build in effective protections over time./32
Practice Basic Cyber Hygiene. There are simple and accessible cybersecurity protections that all organizations, as well as individuals, can implement quickly with high impact./33 These practices contribute to traditional "perimeter-based network security," which focuses on preventing attackers from breaching the outer boundary of a network./34
Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Controls. Begin with the "low hanging fruit," such as password security. Ensure that users, services, and hardware are authenticated securely by changing default and test/configuration passwords, enabling MFA, and ensuring passwords and passphrases are complex./35 When applying basic access controls, consider what information employees should or do have access to and implement firewalls to protect against malicious traffic and restrict sensitive information to only those employees who need it./36
Software and Hardware Updates. Software and hardware should be maintained or replaced. Providers should ensure that they have adopted and documented a patch management process. Prioritize updating critical software and equipment - especially those that are exposed to the public Internet./37 Software updates should be tested before deployment to ensure they are safe and that the software operates as expected prior to use, and patches should be implemented as needed./38 For older/legacy devices that can no longer be updated or patched, consider replacing the device, as the cost of a compromise could be greater than the cost of procuring replacement equipment./39
Data Backups. For data security, use encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of network communications. Regularly back up your organization's data and test your backups to ensure they are reliable./40 Consider securely storing backups offline or offsite for additional protection.
Employee Training. Train employees and contractors on proper cyber hygiene practices. Employees should know how to perform the basic cyber hygiene tasks described above (e.g., practicing password hygiene, using MFA, avoiding phishing scams, installing equipment and software updates promptly, and backing up data consistent with company policies). Additionally, ensure employees know how to recognize common attacks and who to contact should problems arise. They should also be encouraged to reach out to those contacts as soon as possible to enable the organization to get ahead of a cyber problem or avoid it altogether./41
Scale Up: Implement a Zero Trust Strategy. While traditional perimeter security is important, recent foreign state-sponsored cyber incidents like Salt Typhoon have underscored the importance of implementing additional controls beyond basic cyber hygiene, such as a "zero trust" security strategy./42 A zero trust strategy accounts for potential "insider threats" by assuming the adversary is already inside the network and restricting accounts, programs, and systems to the bare minimum permissions needed for a user to do their job effectively (i.e., least privilege per-request)./43 In addition to least privilege per-request, network segmentation is another pillar of zero trust./44 Segmentation can make it harder for threat actors to access key data. For example, a firewall can help separate essential systems and prevent a cyber threat actor from moving laterally from one part of a network to another, causing widespread damage./45 Ultimately, when segmenting your network, think about the service provided by each specific function (e.g., corporate/backend vs. customer-facing) and whether they need to be connected, and separate those functions accordingly, where possible./46
For broadcasters, for example, segmentation can help protect the EAS encoder/decoder from cyber threats. Because Internet connectivity is required to reach the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) and for EAS servers to transmit EAS alerts, segmentation for EAS equipment can include creating a firewall that only allows the encoder/decoder to talk to CAP servers, denying all other inbound traffic./47 In accordance with a zero trust strategy, a broadcaster should secure the communications pathway between the studio and the transmitter, and can use a virtual private network (VPN) or some combination of other encryption capabilities via tunneling./48
Continuously Monitor for Indicators of Compromise. Monitoring is key to knowing when something abnormal is happening in your network./49 Continuous monitoring can also alert you when unknown devices or services have been connected to your network./50 For example, every time a user logs in, accesses a file, or makes changes to your system, they leave a digital record. Monitoring consists of logging these records, collecting the logs in a central location, and reviewing the logs in real time, or near real time, to create a clear picture of normal, baseline behavior./51 Having this baseline allows for deviations or unauthorized behavior to be quickly detected. Reducing the number of connections between critical systems can also enable your organization to better monitor those connections, with the added benefit of helping your organization save on monitoring expenses./52
III. INCIDENT RESPONSE
Develop a Cyber Incident Response Plan. Make a cyber incident response plan part of your overall cybersecurity risk management strategy, and practice implementing the plan in advance to avoid having to invent a strategy in the midst of a cyber incident./53 Your response plan should cover the lifecycle of a cyber incident, from detection to containment, investigation, mitigation, remediation, and restoration. Having a response plan in place can help ensure that evidence is preserved, a response timeline is documented, and an out-of-band option (e.g., Signal or WhatsApp) is established to communicate internally when your system might be vulnerable. All business functions (e.g., security, IT, legal, communications) should be included in your response plan. Establishing a core cyber response team can also help ensure that each function's role and responsibilities are clear to enable a rapid response./54 The incident response plan should also allow for anyone who has a stake in a particular cyber incident (e.g., human resources (HR) for an insider issue or where HR data is compromised, a person with a good relationship with a vendor where the vendor is part of the cyber issue)./55 What your organization uncovers during a cyber incident will change over time, so develop a plan that anticipates activating additional teams as needed./56
The plan may only need to be a few pages long with a quick start guide and a flow chart of what do to after detecting a potential cyber incident, but it should include triggers to escalate decision-making as soon as there is suspicion of a cyber incident; waiting for confirmation of an intrusion may be too late to effectively contain and mitigate a threat actor./57 Response planning also bolsters other cybersecurity protections to minimize disruptions to your business, especially for "zero day" attacks that leverage previously unknown vulnerabilities./58
Contain, Investigate, Mitigate. After a cyber incident has been detected, responsive action should prioritize containment (e.g., resetting credentials, isolating affected systems, implementing machine-level containment, blocking malicious traffic)./59 An investigation into the root cause of the incident is also important to find the attacker's entry point, track lateral movement, and identify any data that may have been exfiltrated or compromised. While taking an entire machine out of service may address operational concerns, failing to uncover the root cause could lead to a "whack-a-mole" issue of continuous breaches./60 During incident response, providers should keep their risk thresholds in mind, to ensure that containment and mitigation actions are taken in order of urgency. Response teams should pay attention to which parts of the network are being affected (e.g., back office vs. subscriber network), and whether customer or company devices have been affected, to inform containment and future recovery actions./61 Determining and documenting what went wrong in a post-incident forensic report can help businesses and public safety authorities prepare for similar attacks in the future. Prior collaboration and coordination can improve the effectiveness of the response, which can, in turn, increase the speed of recovery./62
Remediate and Restore. Recovering from a cyber incident includes restoring assets affected by the incident and returning to normal business operations quickly to reduce the impacts of the incident on your organization's systems and the public./63 Communications--internally, externally, and with the government--during incident response are also vitally important. Information that is shared should be as complete and accurate as possible. The initial set of facts that the response team learns about the attack is unlikely to be the same as the final set of facts, so your organization's leadership may have to make decisions with imperfect information./64 Recovery should also inform hardening activities or modernization plans to address any residual risk to protect against the incident happening again./65
Federal Assistance. Communications service providers should reach out to federal authorities to report successful cyberattacks and seek assistance as soon as they become aware of an incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or CISA can assist in tactical monitoring by sharing relevant indicators of compromise, if available./66 Companies can report an incident to the FBI through their local FBI field office,/67 or by submitting a report through the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center./68 Communications service providers can also share information with CISA through its secure cyber incident reporting portal, or contact the FCC Operations Center, which can also assist with coordination./69
Ransomware Attacks. While cybersecurity risk management and incident response plans should apply broadly, aspects of the workshops focused on ransomware attacks as one example of a common threat facing providers, especially broadcasters and small- and medium-sized telecommunications service providers./70 For many ransomware attacks, it is the ability to operate that is being held ransom, so one of the most important things a provider can do is ensure it has sufficient backups to recover its ability to operate./71 After some initial investigation, teams may need to consider whether or how to engage with a ransomware threat actor. Having a practiced incident response plan can help teams avoid shutting down a system prematurely, which could have unintended operational consequences, but may also alert a threat actor that it has been detected./72 Providers should also prepare to engage with their local FBI field office and other third parties such as their cyber insurer or auditor when considering whether to engage in negotiations with a ransomware threat actor./73 Responding to a ransomware attack should also include an evaluation of sanctions risk, which law enforcement and outside counsel can also help navigate./74
IV. CYBERSECURITY RESOURCES
Join communities and build relationships that enable your organization to learn about active cybersecurity threats and best practices to secure your systems against those threats./75 For example, the Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (COMM-ISAC) is a forum for organizations across the telecommunications industry and government to exchange threat information and share success stories of effective security implementations./76 For broadcasters, the Society of Broadcast Engineers, broadcaster associations, and other ISACs can also act as resources./77 Federal agencies, including the FCC, FBI, NIST, and CISA can also provide resources and support./78 The FBI encourages organizations to get in touch with their local field office as soon as possible if a breach occurs so they can help and share information that can assist in your organization's situation./79 Finally, various communications industry associations and groups can also offer resources and best practices./80 No matter the size or sophistication of your organization, there are resources out there to help you prepare in case an incident happens, for the sake of those who rely on your operations.
The information shared in this Public Notice can also be found in the Bureau's Cybersecurity Best Practices Guide, available at https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/CybersecurityBestPracticesGuide102026.pdf. Additional information about the FCC's cybersecurity workshops is available by following these links: Telecommunications Carrier Workshop: https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2026/05/cybersecurity-workshop-telecommunications-carriers; Broadcaster Workshop: https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2026/05/cybersecurity-workshop-broadcasters.
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Original text plus footnotes here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1109A1.pdf
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With this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) highlights best practices for broadcasters and telecommunications service providers (collectively, communications service providers) discussed at the Commission's May 14 and 15, 2026 cybersecurity workshops./1 The workshops brought together experts from the Commission, federal ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (Docket No. DA 26-1109): * * * With this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) highlights best practices for broadcasters and telecommunications service providers (collectively, communications service providers) discussed at the Commission's May 14 and 15, 2026 cybersecurity workshops./1 The workshops brought together experts from the Commission, federalpartners, and industry to raise awareness of emerging cybersecurity risks, share and promote best practices, and highlight opportunities for public-private partnership to strengthen cybersecurity and improve incident response across the communications sector./2
I. THREAT LANDSCAPE
The communications sector is a key component of U.S. critical infrastructure and must be resilient to cyberattacks intended to disrupt communications services or exfiltrate sensitive commercial or personal data./3 Telecommunications infrastructure is of particular interest to threat actors, as it is both a target and an attack path: the Internet is the "highway" through which cyberattacks are conveyed, and the telecommunications sector undergirds other critical lifeline functions, such as energy, water, transportation, and finance./4 As a result, communications sector entities, including communications service providers, face growing dangers from criminal groups, foreign state actors, hacktivists, and insider threats./5 Criminal groups are the most likely to be disruptive or destructive to communications service providers in the near-term, while foreign state actors are more likely to "burrow in" to communications service providers' systems for strategic advantage in the future./6
There are multiple ways a threat actor can gain access to communications networks to cause operational disruptions, control systems or services, or exfiltrate data./7 For example, threat actors might engage in social engineering techniques, like impersonating a help desk employee or contractor to gather credentials (e.g., through voice phishing or "vishing"), or attempt to gain access through a compromised link in an e-mail (phishing)./8 Once access is acquired, malicious actors can use ransomware, a type of malicious software, to encrypt a target system's data before demanding a ransom or extorting the victim to decrypt it./9
For broadcasters, unauthorized access can lead to tampering with broadcasts, hijacking transmissions, and manipulating Emergency Alert System (EAS) encoders/decoders./10 The effects of a successful cyberattack can have devastating consequences for a broadcast station. A cyberattack might result in dead air or the broadcast of programming inserted by the threat actor,/11 which could include offensive, obscene, or false information and subject the broadcaster to reputational harm or potential liability./12
For telecommunications service providers, the risks include data loss and disruptions in service continuity and emergency communications./13 Small telecommunications service providers can be critical for connectivity, especially in rural areas./14 Small telecommunications service providers also often inherit the security posture of their vendors, and vulnerabilities in small providers may create risks for the entire sector. This makes robust planning, coordination, and collaboration critically important./15
II. CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES
In general, communications service providers should consult the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), which can help providers better understand, assess, prioritize, and communicate their cybersecurity risk management strategy./16 Providers should implement the below best practices to better mitigate cyber risk.
Develop a Cybersecurity Risk Management Plan. A coherent and thoughtful cybersecurity risk management plan can help shift a provider's security posture from reactive to proactive, allowing it to prioritize threats and make smarter, cost-effective security investments./17 Preparing for cyberattacks as an organization takes buy-in from all internal stakeholders, from technical teams to senior leadership, but it may also include external parties, such as trusted vendors, cyber insurance providers, outside counsel, and marketing/public relations firms./18 To guard against ransom, extortion, and harassment, a cybersecurity risk management plan may include implementing certain practices to reduce the target attack surface for threat actors, including restricting help desk password and multi-factor authentication (MFA) resets without involving a person's manager (to prevent help desk misuse) or prohibiting employees from saving personal contacts on work infrastructure (to prevent the threat actor from using them as leverage)./19
When developing a risk management plan, providers should assess their supply chain risks, including those posed by vendors and other third parties, as attackers are increasingly moving upstream from the communications service provider to target customers or other third parties whose systems are connected with those of the provider./20 Providers should engage with vendors to understand the baseline security of their products or services, potential vulnerabilities, and how they are addressing those vulnerabilities./21 Establishing a line of communication with vendors can facilitate collaboration when situations arise that affect third-party systems and require rapid restoration of the network to a trusted state./22
Conduct a Risk Assessment and Prioritize Critical Assets. Prioritizing protections based on risk can guide your organization's approach in bite-sized, attainable steps that are not overwhelming./23 First, create an inventory to understand what assets are in your network, who is responsible for them, and what their potential attack surfaces and vulnerabilities may be./24 A visual diagram or map of your systems and connections between them can help you determine what is critical, what is exposed, and where there are dependencies./25 After completing your inventory, implement risk-based security controls for each asset: compare the likelihood of a compromise and the amount of harm that could arise from that compromise./26 If the amount of harm that could arise is very high, then that asset is likely one of your "crown jewels" that you should protect at the outset./27 If an asset is highly vulnerable, but its compromise would not expose anything critical to your operations, other assets should likely be addressed first./28 In the case of older/legacy devices that are no longer able to be updated or patched, consider whether the risk of that device being compromised outweighs the cost to protect or replace it./29
Two ways to help keep up with potential vulnerabilities and mitigate risk include: (1) checking the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog to see if CISA has already identified an exploitable vulnerability "in the wild,"/30 which can help your organization understand how to take steps to address the vulnerability, and (2) using an automated vulnerability scanning system./31 It is important to assess and reassess your controls routinely after the first implementation, and to start early to prospectively build in effective protections over time./32
Practice Basic Cyber Hygiene. There are simple and accessible cybersecurity protections that all organizations, as well as individuals, can implement quickly with high impact./33 These practices contribute to traditional "perimeter-based network security," which focuses on preventing attackers from breaching the outer boundary of a network./34
Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Controls. Begin with the "low hanging fruit," such as password security. Ensure that users, services, and hardware are authenticated securely by changing default and test/configuration passwords, enabling MFA, and ensuring passwords and passphrases are complex./35 When applying basic access controls, consider what information employees should or do have access to and implement firewalls to protect against malicious traffic and restrict sensitive information to only those employees who need it./36
Software and Hardware Updates. Software and hardware should be maintained or replaced. Providers should ensure that they have adopted and documented a patch management process. Prioritize updating critical software and equipment - especially those that are exposed to the public Internet./37 Software updates should be tested before deployment to ensure they are safe and that the software operates as expected prior to use, and patches should be implemented as needed./38 For older/legacy devices that can no longer be updated or patched, consider replacing the device, as the cost of a compromise could be greater than the cost of procuring replacement equipment./39
Data Backups. For data security, use encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of network communications. Regularly back up your organization's data and test your backups to ensure they are reliable./40 Consider securely storing backups offline or offsite for additional protection.
Employee Training. Train employees and contractors on proper cyber hygiene practices. Employees should know how to perform the basic cyber hygiene tasks described above (e.g., practicing password hygiene, using MFA, avoiding phishing scams, installing equipment and software updates promptly, and backing up data consistent with company policies). Additionally, ensure employees know how to recognize common attacks and who to contact should problems arise. They should also be encouraged to reach out to those contacts as soon as possible to enable the organization to get ahead of a cyber problem or avoid it altogether./41
Scale Up: Implement a Zero Trust Strategy. While traditional perimeter security is important, recent foreign state-sponsored cyber incidents like Salt Typhoon have underscored the importance of implementing additional controls beyond basic cyber hygiene, such as a "zero trust" security strategy./42 A zero trust strategy accounts for potential "insider threats" by assuming the adversary is already inside the network and restricting accounts, programs, and systems to the bare minimum permissions needed for a user to do their job effectively (i.e., least privilege per-request)./43 In addition to least privilege per-request, network segmentation is another pillar of zero trust./44 Segmentation can make it harder for threat actors to access key data. For example, a firewall can help separate essential systems and prevent a cyber threat actor from moving laterally from one part of a network to another, causing widespread damage./45 Ultimately, when segmenting your network, think about the service provided by each specific function (e.g., corporate/backend vs. customer-facing) and whether they need to be connected, and separate those functions accordingly, where possible./46
For broadcasters, for example, segmentation can help protect the EAS encoder/decoder from cyber threats. Because Internet connectivity is required to reach the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) and for EAS servers to transmit EAS alerts, segmentation for EAS equipment can include creating a firewall that only allows the encoder/decoder to talk to CAP servers, denying all other inbound traffic./47 In accordance with a zero trust strategy, a broadcaster should secure the communications pathway between the studio and the transmitter, and can use a virtual private network (VPN) or some combination of other encryption capabilities via tunneling./48
Continuously Monitor for Indicators of Compromise. Monitoring is key to knowing when something abnormal is happening in your network./49 Continuous monitoring can also alert you when unknown devices or services have been connected to your network./50 For example, every time a user logs in, accesses a file, or makes changes to your system, they leave a digital record. Monitoring consists of logging these records, collecting the logs in a central location, and reviewing the logs in real time, or near real time, to create a clear picture of normal, baseline behavior./51 Having this baseline allows for deviations or unauthorized behavior to be quickly detected. Reducing the number of connections between critical systems can also enable your organization to better monitor those connections, with the added benefit of helping your organization save on monitoring expenses./52
III. INCIDENT RESPONSE
Develop a Cyber Incident Response Plan. Make a cyber incident response plan part of your overall cybersecurity risk management strategy, and practice implementing the plan in advance to avoid having to invent a strategy in the midst of a cyber incident./53 Your response plan should cover the lifecycle of a cyber incident, from detection to containment, investigation, mitigation, remediation, and restoration. Having a response plan in place can help ensure that evidence is preserved, a response timeline is documented, and an out-of-band option (e.g., Signal or WhatsApp) is established to communicate internally when your system might be vulnerable. All business functions (e.g., security, IT, legal, communications) should be included in your response plan. Establishing a core cyber response team can also help ensure that each function's role and responsibilities are clear to enable a rapid response./54 The incident response plan should also allow for anyone who has a stake in a particular cyber incident (e.g., human resources (HR) for an insider issue or where HR data is compromised, a person with a good relationship with a vendor where the vendor is part of the cyber issue)./55 What your organization uncovers during a cyber incident will change over time, so develop a plan that anticipates activating additional teams as needed./56
The plan may only need to be a few pages long with a quick start guide and a flow chart of what do to after detecting a potential cyber incident, but it should include triggers to escalate decision-making as soon as there is suspicion of a cyber incident; waiting for confirmation of an intrusion may be too late to effectively contain and mitigate a threat actor./57 Response planning also bolsters other cybersecurity protections to minimize disruptions to your business, especially for "zero day" attacks that leverage previously unknown vulnerabilities./58
Contain, Investigate, Mitigate. After a cyber incident has been detected, responsive action should prioritize containment (e.g., resetting credentials, isolating affected systems, implementing machine-level containment, blocking malicious traffic)./59 An investigation into the root cause of the incident is also important to find the attacker's entry point, track lateral movement, and identify any data that may have been exfiltrated or compromised. While taking an entire machine out of service may address operational concerns, failing to uncover the root cause could lead to a "whack-a-mole" issue of continuous breaches./60 During incident response, providers should keep their risk thresholds in mind, to ensure that containment and mitigation actions are taken in order of urgency. Response teams should pay attention to which parts of the network are being affected (e.g., back office vs. subscriber network), and whether customer or company devices have been affected, to inform containment and future recovery actions./61 Determining and documenting what went wrong in a post-incident forensic report can help businesses and public safety authorities prepare for similar attacks in the future. Prior collaboration and coordination can improve the effectiveness of the response, which can, in turn, increase the speed of recovery./62
Remediate and Restore. Recovering from a cyber incident includes restoring assets affected by the incident and returning to normal business operations quickly to reduce the impacts of the incident on your organization's systems and the public./63 Communications--internally, externally, and with the government--during incident response are also vitally important. Information that is shared should be as complete and accurate as possible. The initial set of facts that the response team learns about the attack is unlikely to be the same as the final set of facts, so your organization's leadership may have to make decisions with imperfect information./64 Recovery should also inform hardening activities or modernization plans to address any residual risk to protect against the incident happening again./65
Federal Assistance. Communications service providers should reach out to federal authorities to report successful cyberattacks and seek assistance as soon as they become aware of an incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or CISA can assist in tactical monitoring by sharing relevant indicators of compromise, if available./66 Companies can report an incident to the FBI through their local FBI field office,/67 or by submitting a report through the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center./68 Communications service providers can also share information with CISA through its secure cyber incident reporting portal, or contact the FCC Operations Center, which can also assist with coordination./69
Ransomware Attacks. While cybersecurity risk management and incident response plans should apply broadly, aspects of the workshops focused on ransomware attacks as one example of a common threat facing providers, especially broadcasters and small- and medium-sized telecommunications service providers./70 For many ransomware attacks, it is the ability to operate that is being held ransom, so one of the most important things a provider can do is ensure it has sufficient backups to recover its ability to operate./71 After some initial investigation, teams may need to consider whether or how to engage with a ransomware threat actor. Having a practiced incident response plan can help teams avoid shutting down a system prematurely, which could have unintended operational consequences, but may also alert a threat actor that it has been detected./72 Providers should also prepare to engage with their local FBI field office and other third parties such as their cyber insurer or auditor when considering whether to engage in negotiations with a ransomware threat actor./73 Responding to a ransomware attack should also include an evaluation of sanctions risk, which law enforcement and outside counsel can also help navigate./74
IV. CYBERSECURITY RESOURCES
Join communities and build relationships that enable your organization to learn about active cybersecurity threats and best practices to secure your systems against those threats./75 For example, the Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (COMM-ISAC) is a forum for organizations across the telecommunications industry and government to exchange threat information and share success stories of effective security implementations./76 For broadcasters, the Society of Broadcast Engineers, broadcaster associations, and other ISACs can also act as resources./77 Federal agencies, including the FCC, FBI, NIST, and CISA can also provide resources and support./78 The FBI encourages organizations to get in touch with their local field office as soon as possible if a breach occurs so they can help and share information that can assist in your organization's situation./79 Finally, various communications industry associations and groups can also offer resources and best practices./80 No matter the size or sophistication of your organization, there are resources out there to help you prepare in case an incident happens, for the sake of those who rely on your operations.
The information shared in this Public Notice can also be found in the Bureau's Cybersecurity Best Practices Guide, available at https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/CybersecurityBestPracticesGuide102026.pdf. Additional information about the FCC's cybersecurity workshops is available by following these links: Telecommunications Carrier Workshop: https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2026/05/cybersecurity-workshop-telecommunications-carriers; Broadcaster Workshop: https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2026/05/cybersecurity-workshop-broadcasters.
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Original text plus footnotes here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1109A1.pdf
FCC Issues Notice of Violation to BMG Billings
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has issued a notice of violation entitled "In the Matter of BMG Billings, LLC" (File No.: EB-FIELDWR-24-00037341), following an inspection that uncovered multiple Emergency Alert System infractions at four radio stations in Billings, Montana.
The action targets BMG Billings, LLC, the licensee operating KEWF, KRPM, KYSX, and KRSQ. An agent from the Denver Office visited the facilities at 1302 Avenue D, Suite 103, on July 29, 2026, after receiving a complaint.
During the site check, investigators identified ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has issued a notice of violation entitled "In the Matter of BMG Billings, LLC" (File No.: EB-FIELDWR-24-00037341), following an inspection that uncovered multiple Emergency Alert System infractions at four radio stations in Billings, Montana. The action targets BMG Billings, LLC, the licensee operating KEWF, KRPM, KYSX, and KRSQ. An agent from the Denver Office visited the facilities at 1302 Avenue D, Suite 103, on July 29, 2026, after receiving a complaint. During the site check, investigators identifiedthree specific compliance failures. First, the stations monitored a secondary Emergency Alert System source not assigned to them or listed in the State of Montana Emergency Alert System Plan. Second, the licensee failed to provide signed logs demonstrating that required emergency tests were conducted in accordance with federal rules and operating handbooks. Third, the chief operator failed to take required corrective measures to stop the stations from using the unapproved emergency monitoring source.
Federal officials emphasized that the Emergency Alert System serves a vital public safety role and expects full adherence from broadcast licensees. Issuing this notice does not prevent the agency from taking additional enforcement actions, such as imposing financial penalties.
BMG Billings must submit a written statement within 20 days of the release date. The response must explain the circumstances of each infraction, detail corrective actions taken to prevent repeat occurrences, and provide a timeline for ongoing remedies. Federal regulations require an authorized officer to support the filing with an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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BMG Billings LLC is based in Cherry Hills Village, Colorado.
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URL: BMG Billings LLC
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1148A1.pdf
The action targets BMG Billings, LLC, the licensee operating KEWF, KRPM, KYSX, and KRSQ. An agent from the Denver Office visited the facilities at 1302 Avenue D, Suite 103, on July 29, 2026, after receiving a complaint.
During the site check, investigators identified ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has issued a notice of violation entitled "In the Matter of BMG Billings, LLC" (File No.: EB-FIELDWR-24-00037341), following an inspection that uncovered multiple Emergency Alert System infractions at four radio stations in Billings, Montana. The action targets BMG Billings, LLC, the licensee operating KEWF, KRPM, KYSX, and KRSQ. An agent from the Denver Office visited the facilities at 1302 Avenue D, Suite 103, on July 29, 2026, after receiving a complaint. During the site check, investigators identifiedthree specific compliance failures. First, the stations monitored a secondary Emergency Alert System source not assigned to them or listed in the State of Montana Emergency Alert System Plan. Second, the licensee failed to provide signed logs demonstrating that required emergency tests were conducted in accordance with federal rules and operating handbooks. Third, the chief operator failed to take required corrective measures to stop the stations from using the unapproved emergency monitoring source.
Federal officials emphasized that the Emergency Alert System serves a vital public safety role and expects full adherence from broadcast licensees. Issuing this notice does not prevent the agency from taking additional enforcement actions, such as imposing financial penalties.
BMG Billings must submit a written statement within 20 days of the release date. The response must explain the circumstances of each infraction, detail corrective actions taken to prevent repeat occurrences, and provide a timeline for ongoing remedies. Federal regulations require an authorized officer to support the filing with an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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BMG Billings LLC is based in Cherry Hills Village, Colorado.
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URL: BMG Billings LLC
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1148A1.pdf
FCC Wireline Competition Bureau Issues Public Notice: Comments Invited on Section 214 Applications to Discontinue Domestic Telecommunications Services as Part of Technology Transition
WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket Nos. 26-259, 26-260, 26-261, 26-262, 26-277):
* * *
Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix.
The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in section 63.71 of the Commission's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket Nos. 26-259, 26-260, 26-261, 26-262, 26-277): * * * Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix. The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in section 63.71 of the Commission'srules./1 The application requests authority, under section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,/2 and section 63.71 of the Commission's rules,/3 to discontinue, reduce, or impair certain domestic telecommunications service(s) (Affected Service(s)) in specified geographic areas (Service Area(s)) as applicable and as fully described in each application.
In accordance with section 63.71(f) of the Commission's rules, the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed in the Appendix will be deemed granted automatically on November 22, 2026, the 31st day after the release date of this public notice, unless the Commission notifies any applicant(s) that their grant will not be automatically effective./4 We note that the date on which an application for Commission authorization is deemed granted may be different from the date on which applicants are authorized to discontinue service ("Authorized Date"). Any applicant whose application has been deemed granted may discontinue their Affected Service(s) in their Service Area(s) on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) specified in the Appendix, in accordance with their filed representations. Accordingly, pursuant to section 63.71(f), and the terms outlined in each application, absent further Commission action, each applicant may discontinue the Affected Service(s) in the Service Area(s) described in their application on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) listed in the Appendix for that application. For purposes of computation of time when filing a petition for reconsideration, application for review, or petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision(s), the date of "public notice" shall be the later of the auto grant date stated above in this Public Notice, or the release date(s) of any further public notice(s) or order(s) announcing final Commission action, as applicable. Should no petitions for reconsideration, applications for review, or petitions for judicial review be timely filed, the proceeding(s) listed in this Public Notice shall be terminated, and the docket(s) will be closed.
Comments objecting to the application listed in the Appendix must be filed with the Commission on or before November 6, 2026. Comments should refer to the specific WC Docket No. and Comp. Pol. File No. listed in the Appendix for the Section 214 Discontinuance Application. Comments should include specific information about the impact of the proposed discontinuance on the commenter, including any inability to acquire reasonable substitute service. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Filers should follow the instructions provided on the Web site for submitting comments. Generally, only one copy of an electronic submission must be filed. In completing the transmittal screen, filers should include their full name, U.S. Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket number./5
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing. Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission. Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building. Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
This proceeding shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose" proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules./6 Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
For further information, please see the contact(s) for the specific discontinuance proceeding you are interested in as listed in the Appendix. For further information on procedures regarding section 214 please visit https://www.fcc.gov/general/domestic-section-214-discontinuance-service.
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Appendix
1) Applicant(s): Consolidated Communications of Illinois Company, LLC d/b/a Consolidated Communications and Fidium
WC Docket No. 26-259, Comp. Pol. File No. 2205
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226259%22))
Affected Service(s) - legacy voice service
Service Area(s) - at locations in three exchanges in Illinois that are passed by fiber, as specified in the application
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 1, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
2) Applicant(s): Consolidated Communications of Texas Company, LLC d/b/a Consolidated Communications and Fidium
WC Docket No. 26-260, Comp. Pol. File No. 2206
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226260%22))
Affected Service(s) - legacy voice service
Service Area(s) - at locations in two exchanges in Texas that are passed by fiber, as specified in the application
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 1, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
3) Applicant(s): Consolidated Communications of Pennsylvania Company, LLC d/b/a Consolidated Communications and Fidium
WC Docket No. 26-261, Comp. Pol. File No. 2207
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226261%22))
Affected Service(s) - legacy voice service
Service Area(s) - at locations in two exchanges in Pennsylvania that are passed by fiber, as specified in the application
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 1, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
4) Applicant(s): Consolidated Communications of Vermont Company, LLC d/b/a Consolidated Communications and Fidium
WC Docket No. 26-262, Comp. Pol. File No. 2208
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226262%22))
Affected Service(s) - legacy voice service
Service Area(s) - at locations in two exchanges in Vermont that are passed by fiber, as specified in the application
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 1, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
5) Applicant(s): Consolidated Communications of Northern New England Company, LLC d/b/a Consolidated Communications and Fidium
WC Docket No. 26-277, Comp. Pol. File No. 2215
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226277%22))
Affected Service(s) - legacy voice service
Service Area(s) - at locations in five exchanges in Maine and seven exchanges in New Hampshire that are passed by fiber, as specified in the application
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 1, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
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Footnotes:
1/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
2/ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 214.
3/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
4/ See 47 CFR Sec. 63.71(f)(1) (stating, in relevant part, that an application filed by "any carrier meeting the requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this section shall be automatically granted on the 31st day... unless the Commission has notified the applicant that the grant will not be automatically effective."); see also 47 CFR Sec. 63.71(f)(2)(ii) (stating that "[a]n application to discontinue, reduce, or impair an existing retail service as part of a technology transition, as defined in Sec. 63.60(i), may be automatically granted only if: ...The applicant (A) Offers a stand-alone interconnected VoIP service, as defined in Sec. 9.3 of this chapter, throughout the affected service area, and (B) At least one other alternative stand-alone facilities-based wireline or wireless voice service is available from another unaffiliated provider throughout the affected service area."); Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, WC Docket No. 17-84, Order, DA 25-248, para. 6 (WCB Mar. 20, 2025) (waiving the "stand-alone" requirement for a period of two years when a carrier seeks to discontinue a legacy voice service pursuant to section 214(a), thereby allowing carriers to satisfy both prongs of the Alternative Options Test with a bundled service) (Standalone Waiver Order)).
5/ Please note that Commission staff may share filed comments with the applicant(s), along with the commenter's contact information, in order to allow applicant(s) to identify affected customers in the proposed discontinuance area and fully respond.
6/ 47 CFR Sec. 1.1200 et seq.
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1138A1.pdf
* * *
Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix.
The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in section 63.71 of the Commission's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket Nos. 26-259, 26-260, 26-261, 26-262, 26-277): * * * Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix. The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in section 63.71 of the Commission'srules./1 The application requests authority, under section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,/2 and section 63.71 of the Commission's rules,/3 to discontinue, reduce, or impair certain domestic telecommunications service(s) (Affected Service(s)) in specified geographic areas (Service Area(s)) as applicable and as fully described in each application.
In accordance with section 63.71(f) of the Commission's rules, the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed in the Appendix will be deemed granted automatically on November 22, 2026, the 31st day after the release date of this public notice, unless the Commission notifies any applicant(s) that their grant will not be automatically effective./4 We note that the date on which an application for Commission authorization is deemed granted may be different from the date on which applicants are authorized to discontinue service ("Authorized Date"). Any applicant whose application has been deemed granted may discontinue their Affected Service(s) in their Service Area(s) on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) specified in the Appendix, in accordance with their filed representations. Accordingly, pursuant to section 63.71(f), and the terms outlined in each application, absent further Commission action, each applicant may discontinue the Affected Service(s) in the Service Area(s) described in their application on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) listed in the Appendix for that application. For purposes of computation of time when filing a petition for reconsideration, application for review, or petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision(s), the date of "public notice" shall be the later of the auto grant date stated above in this Public Notice, or the release date(s) of any further public notice(s) or order(s) announcing final Commission action, as applicable. Should no petitions for reconsideration, applications for review, or petitions for judicial review be timely filed, the proceeding(s) listed in this Public Notice shall be terminated, and the docket(s) will be closed.
Comments objecting to the application listed in the Appendix must be filed with the Commission on or before November 6, 2026. Comments should refer to the specific WC Docket No. and Comp. Pol. File No. listed in the Appendix for the Section 214 Discontinuance Application. Comments should include specific information about the impact of the proposed discontinuance on the commenter, including any inability to acquire reasonable substitute service. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Filers should follow the instructions provided on the Web site for submitting comments. Generally, only one copy of an electronic submission must be filed. In completing the transmittal screen, filers should include their full name, U.S. Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket number./5
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing. Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission. Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building. Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
This proceeding shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose" proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules./6 Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
For further information, please see the contact(s) for the specific discontinuance proceeding you are interested in as listed in the Appendix. For further information on procedures regarding section 214 please visit https://www.fcc.gov/general/domestic-section-214-discontinuance-service.
* * *
Appendix
1) Applicant(s): Consolidated Communications of Illinois Company, LLC d/b/a Consolidated Communications and Fidium
WC Docket No. 26-259, Comp. Pol. File No. 2205
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226259%22))
Affected Service(s) - legacy voice service
Service Area(s) - at locations in three exchanges in Illinois that are passed by fiber, as specified in the application
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 1, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
2) Applicant(s): Consolidated Communications of Texas Company, LLC d/b/a Consolidated Communications and Fidium
WC Docket No. 26-260, Comp. Pol. File No. 2206
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226260%22))
Affected Service(s) - legacy voice service
Service Area(s) - at locations in two exchanges in Texas that are passed by fiber, as specified in the application
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 1, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
3) Applicant(s): Consolidated Communications of Pennsylvania Company, LLC d/b/a Consolidated Communications and Fidium
WC Docket No. 26-261, Comp. Pol. File No. 2207
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226261%22))
Affected Service(s) - legacy voice service
Service Area(s) - at locations in two exchanges in Pennsylvania that are passed by fiber, as specified in the application
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 1, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
4) Applicant(s): Consolidated Communications of Vermont Company, LLC d/b/a Consolidated Communications and Fidium
WC Docket No. 26-262, Comp. Pol. File No. 2208
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226262%22))
Affected Service(s) - legacy voice service
Service Area(s) - at locations in two exchanges in Vermont that are passed by fiber, as specified in the application
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 1, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
5) Applicant(s): Consolidated Communications of Northern New England Company, LLC d/b/a Consolidated Communications and Fidium
WC Docket No. 26-277, Comp. Pol. File No. 2215
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226277%22))
Affected Service(s) - legacy voice service
Service Area(s) - at locations in five exchanges in Maine and seven exchanges in New Hampshire that are passed by fiber, as specified in the application
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 1, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
* * *
Footnotes:
1/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
2/ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 214.
3/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
4/ See 47 CFR Sec. 63.71(f)(1) (stating, in relevant part, that an application filed by "any carrier meeting the requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this section shall be automatically granted on the 31st day... unless the Commission has notified the applicant that the grant will not be automatically effective."); see also 47 CFR Sec. 63.71(f)(2)(ii) (stating that "[a]n application to discontinue, reduce, or impair an existing retail service as part of a technology transition, as defined in Sec. 63.60(i), may be automatically granted only if: ...The applicant (A) Offers a stand-alone interconnected VoIP service, as defined in Sec. 9.3 of this chapter, throughout the affected service area, and (B) At least one other alternative stand-alone facilities-based wireline or wireless voice service is available from another unaffiliated provider throughout the affected service area."); Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, WC Docket No. 17-84, Order, DA 25-248, para. 6 (WCB Mar. 20, 2025) (waiving the "stand-alone" requirement for a period of two years when a carrier seeks to discontinue a legacy voice service pursuant to section 214(a), thereby allowing carriers to satisfy both prongs of the Alternative Options Test with a bundled service) (Standalone Waiver Order)).
5/ Please note that Commission staff may share filed comments with the applicant(s), along with the commenter's contact information, in order to allow applicant(s) to identify affected customers in the proposed discontinuance area and fully respond.
6/ 47 CFR Sec. 1.1200 et seq.
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1138A1.pdf
FCC Fines Massachusetts Man $20,000 for Unauthorized Radio Station Operations
WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has issued a $20,000 fine against Shane Kelly for engaging in unauthorized pirate radio broadcasting in Hyannis, Massachusetts. The penalty follows an investigation into an unlicensed station operating under the moniker "87.9 The Test," according to official agency documents in the matter of Shane Kelly, Hyannis, Massachusetts (File No.: EB-FIELDSCR-23-00034960).
Under the terms of the agency action, the FCC affirmed its proposed penalty after determining that Kelly willfully and knowingly operated an unlicensed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has issued a $20,000 fine against Shane Kelly for engaging in unauthorized pirate radio broadcasting in Hyannis, Massachusetts. The penalty follows an investigation into an unlicensed station operating under the moniker "87.9 The Test," according to official agency documents in the matter of Shane Kelly, Hyannis, Massachusetts (File No.: EB-FIELDSCR-23-00034960). Under the terms of the agency action, the FCC affirmed its proposed penalty after determining that Kelly willfully and knowingly operated an unlicensedbroadcast station on frequency 87.9 MHz on June 6, 2023. The Chief of the Enforcement Bureau released the decision following a review of Kelly's response to an earlier notice proposing the fine.
According to the FCC, unauthorized spectrum operations pose risks to the public by interfering with licensed broadcasts, public safety communications, and official Emergency Alert System transmissions. Under the Preventing Illegal Radio Abuse Through Enforcement Act (PIRATE Act), codified as section 511 of the Communications Act of 1934, illegal broadcasting carries potential statutory penalties up to $2,000,000, with daily limits subject to inflation adjustments.
The action stems from field monitoring conducted by agents from the FCC's Boston Field Office. On June 6, 2023, agents used direction-finding equipment to trace an unauthorized signal on 87.9 MHz directly to a residential property on Lincoln Road in Hyannis. Signal measurements demonstrated that the transmissions exceeded low-power limits permitted for unlicensed equipment under Part 15 regulations.
Public records confirmed Kelly as the property owner. During an in-person meeting on July 11, 2023, Kelly acknowledged operating the station, identifying it as an intermittent hobby, and confirmed he lacked an FCC license to broadcast on any frequency. Subsequent monitoring by field agents on December 12, 2023, detected no active transmissions originating from the location.
The FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture on April 26, 2024, proposing the $20,000 monetary penalty. Kelly filed a response on May 19, 2024, admitting to operating the station and stating he would refrain from future illegal broadcasting. In his submission, he requested dismissal or leniency, stating that he had shut down the operations and disposed of the transmission equipment.
In its final determination, the Enforcement Bureau declined to cancel or reduce the fine. The agency noted that Kelly provided no supporting documentation or specific evidence demonstrating the complete disposal of his equipment. Consequently, officials concluded that the circumstances did not warrant a reduction based on statutory factors, such as voluntary disclosure or history of compliance.
Kelly has been ordered to pay the full $20,000 penalty within 30 days of the release date using approved electronic payment methods, including credit card, Automated Clearing House debit, or wire transfer. The agency noted that unpaid fines may be referred to the United States Department of Justice for court enforcement.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1132A1.pdf
Under the terms of the agency action, the FCC affirmed its proposed penalty after determining that Kelly willfully and knowingly operated an unlicensed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has issued a $20,000 fine against Shane Kelly for engaging in unauthorized pirate radio broadcasting in Hyannis, Massachusetts. The penalty follows an investigation into an unlicensed station operating under the moniker "87.9 The Test," according to official agency documents in the matter of Shane Kelly, Hyannis, Massachusetts (File No.: EB-FIELDSCR-23-00034960). Under the terms of the agency action, the FCC affirmed its proposed penalty after determining that Kelly willfully and knowingly operated an unlicensedbroadcast station on frequency 87.9 MHz on June 6, 2023. The Chief of the Enforcement Bureau released the decision following a review of Kelly's response to an earlier notice proposing the fine.
According to the FCC, unauthorized spectrum operations pose risks to the public by interfering with licensed broadcasts, public safety communications, and official Emergency Alert System transmissions. Under the Preventing Illegal Radio Abuse Through Enforcement Act (PIRATE Act), codified as section 511 of the Communications Act of 1934, illegal broadcasting carries potential statutory penalties up to $2,000,000, with daily limits subject to inflation adjustments.
The action stems from field monitoring conducted by agents from the FCC's Boston Field Office. On June 6, 2023, agents used direction-finding equipment to trace an unauthorized signal on 87.9 MHz directly to a residential property on Lincoln Road in Hyannis. Signal measurements demonstrated that the transmissions exceeded low-power limits permitted for unlicensed equipment under Part 15 regulations.
Public records confirmed Kelly as the property owner. During an in-person meeting on July 11, 2023, Kelly acknowledged operating the station, identifying it as an intermittent hobby, and confirmed he lacked an FCC license to broadcast on any frequency. Subsequent monitoring by field agents on December 12, 2023, detected no active transmissions originating from the location.
The FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture on April 26, 2024, proposing the $20,000 monetary penalty. Kelly filed a response on May 19, 2024, admitting to operating the station and stating he would refrain from future illegal broadcasting. In his submission, he requested dismissal or leniency, stating that he had shut down the operations and disposed of the transmission equipment.
In its final determination, the Enforcement Bureau declined to cancel or reduce the fine. The agency noted that Kelly provided no supporting documentation or specific evidence demonstrating the complete disposal of his equipment. Consequently, officials concluded that the circumstances did not warrant a reduction based on statutory factors, such as voluntary disclosure or history of compliance.
Kelly has been ordered to pay the full $20,000 penalty within 30 days of the release date using approved electronic payment methods, including credit card, Automated Clearing House debit, or wire transfer. The agency noted that unpaid fines may be referred to the United States Department of Justice for court enforcement.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1132A1.pdf
CPSC Issues Recall Alert Involving VQQQ Natural Gas Patio Heaters
WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert:
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Name of Product: VQQQ Natural Gas Patio Heaters
Hazard: Components on the recalled patio heaters can malfunction causing gas to be released, posing a risk of serious injury or death from fire and burn hazards.
Remedy: Refund
Recall Date: October 22, 2026
Units: About 100
Consumer Contact: VQQQ by email at vqqqrecall@163.com
Recall Details
Description: This recall involves VQQQ-branded natural gas patio heaters, models VQQQ-A1 and VQQQ-001. They have a bronze pole with a round ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert: * * * Name of Product: VQQQ Natural Gas Patio Heaters Hazard: Components on the recalled patio heaters can malfunction causing gas to be released, posing a risk of serious injury or death from fire and burn hazards. Remedy: Refund Recall Date: October 22, 2026 Units: About 100 Consumer Contact: VQQQ by email at vqqqrecall@163.com Recall Details Description: This recall involves VQQQ-branded natural gas patio heaters, models VQQQ-A1 and VQQQ-001. They have a bronze pole with a roundbase and a silver mushroom-shaped top with an adjustable height of 55 inches to 78 inches. A 24-foot-long gray gas hose is attached to the heater's base. The brand and model numbers are printed on the product's purchase receipt.
Remedy: Consumers should stop using the recalled patio heaters immediately, shut the valve at the portable gas source, disconnect the gas hose and contact VQQQ for a full refund. Consumers will be asked to write in permanent marker "Recalled" on the heater's base and send a photo of the marked heater to vqqqrecall@163.com. Consumers should then dispose of the recalled product.
Incidents/Injuries: None reported
Sold Online At: Amazon.com from July 2024 through August 2026 for about $346.
Retailer(s): Shanxi Yuhe Sheng Maoyi Youxian Gongsi, dba VQQQ, of China
Manufactured In: China
Recall number: 27-039
Fast Track Recall
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Original text here: https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2027/VQQQ-Gas-Patio-Heaters-Recalled-Due-to-Risk-of-Serious-Injury-or-Death-from-Fire-and-Burn-Hazards
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Name of Product: VQQQ Natural Gas Patio Heaters
Hazard: Components on the recalled patio heaters can malfunction causing gas to be released, posing a risk of serious injury or death from fire and burn hazards.
Remedy: Refund
Recall Date: October 22, 2026
Units: About 100
Consumer Contact: VQQQ by email at vqqqrecall@163.com
Recall Details
Description: This recall involves VQQQ-branded natural gas patio heaters, models VQQQ-A1 and VQQQ-001. They have a bronze pole with a round ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert: * * * Name of Product: VQQQ Natural Gas Patio Heaters Hazard: Components on the recalled patio heaters can malfunction causing gas to be released, posing a risk of serious injury or death from fire and burn hazards. Remedy: Refund Recall Date: October 22, 2026 Units: About 100 Consumer Contact: VQQQ by email at vqqqrecall@163.com Recall Details Description: This recall involves VQQQ-branded natural gas patio heaters, models VQQQ-A1 and VQQQ-001. They have a bronze pole with a roundbase and a silver mushroom-shaped top with an adjustable height of 55 inches to 78 inches. A 24-foot-long gray gas hose is attached to the heater's base. The brand and model numbers are printed on the product's purchase receipt.
Remedy: Consumers should stop using the recalled patio heaters immediately, shut the valve at the portable gas source, disconnect the gas hose and contact VQQQ for a full refund. Consumers will be asked to write in permanent marker "Recalled" on the heater's base and send a photo of the marked heater to vqqqrecall@163.com. Consumers should then dispose of the recalled product.
Incidents/Injuries: None reported
Sold Online At: Amazon.com from July 2024 through August 2026 for about $346.
Retailer(s): Shanxi Yuhe Sheng Maoyi Youxian Gongsi, dba VQQQ, of China
Manufactured In: China
Recall number: 27-039
Fast Track Recall
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Original text here: https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2027/VQQQ-Gas-Patio-Heaters-Recalled-Due-to-Risk-of-Serious-Injury-or-Death-from-Fire-and-Burn-Hazards
CPSC Issues Recall Alert Involving Lithonia Lighting RSX Luminaires With AASP, AARP, AAWB, AAWSC Adjustable Tilt Arm Mountings Used for Commercial Outdoor Lighting
WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert:
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Name of Product: Lithonia Lighting RSX Luminaires with AASP, AARP, AAWB, and AAWSC Adjustable Tilt Arm Mountings used for commercial outdoor lighting.
Hazard: The knuckle of the recalled adjustable tilt arm mountings can fail, allowing the luminaire to fall from the mounting arm, posing a risk of serious injury due to impact hazard.
Remedy: Repair
Recall Date: October 22, 2026
Units: About 11,532
Consumer Contact: Lithonia Lighting toll-free at 855-307-2454 between 8 a.m. and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert: * * * Name of Product: Lithonia Lighting RSX Luminaires with AASP, AARP, AAWB, and AAWSC Adjustable Tilt Arm Mountings used for commercial outdoor lighting. Hazard: The knuckle of the recalled adjustable tilt arm mountings can fail, allowing the luminaire to fall from the mounting arm, posing a risk of serious injury due to impact hazard. Remedy: Repair Recall Date: October 22, 2026 Units: About 11,532 Consumer Contact: Lithonia Lighting toll-free at 855-307-2454 between 8 a.m. and5 p.m. ET Monday through Friday, online at https://lithonia.acuitybrands.com/ and click on "Recalls" at the bottom of the page for more information.
Recall Details
Description: This recall involves Luminaires with certain adjustable tilt mounting arms manufactured between August 2019 to July 2020 and August 2024 to April 2026: AASP, AARP, AAWB, and AAWSC. The adjustable tilt arm mounts the RSX luminaire to a square pole, round pole, wall bracket or wall bracket with surface mount conduit. The arm mount allows the luminaire to be tilted from 0 degrees to 90 degrees above horizontal. Consumers should contact Lithonia Lighting to confirm their Luminaire with adjustable tilt mounting arms are included in the recall.
Remedy: Consumers should keep clear of the area directly beneath the Luminaire and contact Lithonia Lighting to schedule a free repair. Lithonia Lighting will arrange for a qualified professional to replace the recalled adjustable tilt arm mount with a new complete adjustable arm assembly.
Incidents/Injuries: The firm has received 13 reports of adjustable tilt arm mountings breaking. There have been four reports of the fixtures falling. No injuries have been reported.
Sold At: Commercial distributors nationwide including Turtle & Hughes Inc. and Consolidated Electrical Distributors for commercial outdoor lighting applications from August 2019 to August 2026 for between $400 and $2200.
Manufacturer(s): Lithonia Lighting, of Atlanta, Georgia
Manufactured In: United States and Mexico
Recall number: 27-041
Fast Track Recall
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Original text here: https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2027/Lithonia-Lighting-Recalls-RSX-Luminaires-with-Adjustable-Tilt-Arm-Mountings-Due-to-Risk-of-Serious-Injury-from-Impact-Hazard
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Name of Product: Lithonia Lighting RSX Luminaires with AASP, AARP, AAWB, and AAWSC Adjustable Tilt Arm Mountings used for commercial outdoor lighting.
Hazard: The knuckle of the recalled adjustable tilt arm mountings can fail, allowing the luminaire to fall from the mounting arm, posing a risk of serious injury due to impact hazard.
Remedy: Repair
Recall Date: October 22, 2026
Units: About 11,532
Consumer Contact: Lithonia Lighting toll-free at 855-307-2454 between 8 a.m. and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 23 (TNSdock) -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following recall alert: * * * Name of Product: Lithonia Lighting RSX Luminaires with AASP, AARP, AAWB, and AAWSC Adjustable Tilt Arm Mountings used for commercial outdoor lighting. Hazard: The knuckle of the recalled adjustable tilt arm mountings can fail, allowing the luminaire to fall from the mounting arm, posing a risk of serious injury due to impact hazard. Remedy: Repair Recall Date: October 22, 2026 Units: About 11,532 Consumer Contact: Lithonia Lighting toll-free at 855-307-2454 between 8 a.m. and5 p.m. ET Monday through Friday, online at https://lithonia.acuitybrands.com/ and click on "Recalls" at the bottom of the page for more information.
Recall Details
Description: This recall involves Luminaires with certain adjustable tilt mounting arms manufactured between August 2019 to July 2020 and August 2024 to April 2026: AASP, AARP, AAWB, and AAWSC. The adjustable tilt arm mounts the RSX luminaire to a square pole, round pole, wall bracket or wall bracket with surface mount conduit. The arm mount allows the luminaire to be tilted from 0 degrees to 90 degrees above horizontal. Consumers should contact Lithonia Lighting to confirm their Luminaire with adjustable tilt mounting arms are included in the recall.
Remedy: Consumers should keep clear of the area directly beneath the Luminaire and contact Lithonia Lighting to schedule a free repair. Lithonia Lighting will arrange for a qualified professional to replace the recalled adjustable tilt arm mount with a new complete adjustable arm assembly.
Incidents/Injuries: The firm has received 13 reports of adjustable tilt arm mountings breaking. There have been four reports of the fixtures falling. No injuries have been reported.
Sold At: Commercial distributors nationwide including Turtle & Hughes Inc. and Consolidated Electrical Distributors for commercial outdoor lighting applications from August 2019 to August 2026 for between $400 and $2200.
Manufacturer(s): Lithonia Lighting, of Atlanta, Georgia
Manufactured In: United States and Mexico
Recall number: 27-041
Fast Track Recall
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Original text here: https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2027/Lithonia-Lighting-Recalls-RSX-Luminaires-with-Adjustable-Tilt-Arm-Mountings-Due-to-Risk-of-Serious-Injury-from-Impact-Hazard