Federal Regulatory Agencies
Here's a look at documents from federal regulatory agencies
Federal Regulatory Agencies
Featured Stories
SEC Obtains Final Judgment as to Cannabis Company, Its Subsidiaries, CEO, COO Charged in Fraudulent Offering
WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release (No. 2:23-cv-05379; C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 16, 2023):
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. American Patriot Brands, Inc., et al., No. 2:23-cv-05379 (C.D. Cal.) (filed Mar. 16, 2023)
On July 10, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a final judgment as to American Patriot Brands, Inc. (APB), a cannabis company, APB's CEO Robert Y. Lee, APB's COO Brian L. Pallas, and APB's subsidiaries Urban Pharms, LLC (Urban Pharms), TSL Distribution, LLC (TSL), and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release (No. 2:23-cv-05379; C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 16, 2023): * * * Securities and Exchange Commission v. American Patriot Brands, Inc., et al., No. 2:23-cv-05379 (C.D. Cal.) (filed Mar. 16, 2023) On July 10, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a final judgment as to American Patriot Brands, Inc. (APB), a cannabis company, APB's CEO Robert Y. Lee, APB's COO Brian L. Pallas, and APB's subsidiaries Urban Pharms, LLC (Urban Pharms), TSL Distribution, LLC (TSL), andDJ & S Property #1, LLC (DJ&S) in connection with previously-filed fraud charges.
The final judgment permanently enjoins APB, Urban Pharms, TSL, DJ&S, Lee, and Pallas from further violations of the antifraud provisions of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; permanently enjoins Lee and Pallas from participating in the issuance, purchase, offer, or sale of securities, except for purchases or sales for their personal accounts; prohibits Lee and Pallas from acting as an officer or director of a public company; orders APB, Urban Pharms, TSL, and DJ&S jointly and severally to pay disgorgement of $17,786,703, together with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $6,202,777; orders APB and Urban Pharms each to pay a civil penalty of $4,729,004; orders TSL to pay a civil penalty of $2,364,502; orders DJ&S to pay a civil penalty of $1,182,251; orders Lee to pay a total of $6,399,792, consisting of disgorgement of $2,687,061, prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,025,670, and a civil penalty of $2,687,061; and orders Pallas to pay a civil penalty of $472,902. The final judgment separately rules in favor of Relief Defendant Castro Business Enterprises, LLC (CBE) with respect to the Commission's claim of unjust enrichment alleged as to CBE. The final judgment follows the Court's June 16, 2025 order granting the SEC's motion for partial summary judgment and its July 10, 2026 amended order granting in part and denying in part the SEC's motion for remedies and entry of final judgment.
Previously, on March 13, 2026, the Court entered a final judgment by consent as to J. Bernard Rice, APB's alleged former CFO. The Court also previously dismissed the SEC's unjust enrichment claims as to Relief Defendants Puerto Rico One Corporation and Legion Accounting Services, Inc. pursuant to a stipulation filed by the parties.
The entry of the final judgment concludes the litigation.
The SEC's litigation was led by Eugene Hansen and Samantha Williams, substantially assisted by Senior Accountant Jamie Wohlert, and supervised by James Carlson.
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Resources
* Final Judgment (https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/litreleases/2026/judg26587.pdf)
* Amended Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Remedies and Entry of FInal Judgment (https://www.sec.gov/system/files/filefield_paths/order26587.pdf)
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Original text here: https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/litigation-releases/lr-26587
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. American Patriot Brands, Inc., et al., No. 2:23-cv-05379 (C.D. Cal.) (filed Mar. 16, 2023)
On July 10, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a final judgment as to American Patriot Brands, Inc. (APB), a cannabis company, APB's CEO Robert Y. Lee, APB's COO Brian L. Pallas, and APB's subsidiaries Urban Pharms, LLC (Urban Pharms), TSL Distribution, LLC (TSL), and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release (No. 2:23-cv-05379; C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 16, 2023): * * * Securities and Exchange Commission v. American Patriot Brands, Inc., et al., No. 2:23-cv-05379 (C.D. Cal.) (filed Mar. 16, 2023) On July 10, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered a final judgment as to American Patriot Brands, Inc. (APB), a cannabis company, APB's CEO Robert Y. Lee, APB's COO Brian L. Pallas, and APB's subsidiaries Urban Pharms, LLC (Urban Pharms), TSL Distribution, LLC (TSL), andDJ & S Property #1, LLC (DJ&S) in connection with previously-filed fraud charges.
The final judgment permanently enjoins APB, Urban Pharms, TSL, DJ&S, Lee, and Pallas from further violations of the antifraud provisions of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; permanently enjoins Lee and Pallas from participating in the issuance, purchase, offer, or sale of securities, except for purchases or sales for their personal accounts; prohibits Lee and Pallas from acting as an officer or director of a public company; orders APB, Urban Pharms, TSL, and DJ&S jointly and severally to pay disgorgement of $17,786,703, together with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $6,202,777; orders APB and Urban Pharms each to pay a civil penalty of $4,729,004; orders TSL to pay a civil penalty of $2,364,502; orders DJ&S to pay a civil penalty of $1,182,251; orders Lee to pay a total of $6,399,792, consisting of disgorgement of $2,687,061, prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $1,025,670, and a civil penalty of $2,687,061; and orders Pallas to pay a civil penalty of $472,902. The final judgment separately rules in favor of Relief Defendant Castro Business Enterprises, LLC (CBE) with respect to the Commission's claim of unjust enrichment alleged as to CBE. The final judgment follows the Court's June 16, 2025 order granting the SEC's motion for partial summary judgment and its July 10, 2026 amended order granting in part and denying in part the SEC's motion for remedies and entry of final judgment.
Previously, on March 13, 2026, the Court entered a final judgment by consent as to J. Bernard Rice, APB's alleged former CFO. The Court also previously dismissed the SEC's unjust enrichment claims as to Relief Defendants Puerto Rico One Corporation and Legion Accounting Services, Inc. pursuant to a stipulation filed by the parties.
The entry of the final judgment concludes the litigation.
The SEC's litigation was led by Eugene Hansen and Samantha Williams, substantially assisted by Senior Accountant Jamie Wohlert, and supervised by James Carlson.
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Resources
* Final Judgment (https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/litreleases/2026/judg26587.pdf)
* Amended Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Remedies and Entry of FInal Judgment (https://www.sec.gov/system/files/filefield_paths/order26587.pdf)
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Original text here: https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/litigation-releases/lr-26587
SEC Charges Ex-Director of Public Company, 3 Friends in Connection With Alleged Insider Trading
WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release (No. 2:26-cv-12451; E.D. Mich. filed July 17, 2026):
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jamal Chammout, et al., Civil Action No. 2:26-cv-12451 (E.D. Mich. filed July 17, 2026)
On July 17, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Ali El Siblani, a former senior executive and director of Desktop Metal, Inc., a then-publicly traded company, and three of El Siblani's friends, Jamal ("Jimmy") Chammout, Ali Jawad, and Rabih Rakha, all of Michigan, alleging that El Siblani's friends ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release (No. 2:26-cv-12451; E.D. Mich. filed July 17, 2026): * * * Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jamal Chammout, et al., Civil Action No. 2:26-cv-12451 (E.D. Mich. filed July 17, 2026) On July 17, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Ali El Siblani, a former senior executive and director of Desktop Metal, Inc., a then-publicly traded company, and three of El Siblani's friends, Jamal ("Jimmy") Chammout, Ali Jawad, and Rabih Rakha, all of Michigan, alleging that El Siblani's friendsunlawfully traded based on material nonpublic information in advance of an August 11, 2021 announcement that Desktop Metal would acquire The ExOne Company at a premium to the market price. El Siblani, Jawad, and Rakha have agreed to settle the SEC's charges against them.
The SEC's complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleges that from at least June through August 2021, Desktop Metal entrusted El Siblani with highly sensitive information about its proposed acquisition of ExOne, including the significant premium the company planned to pay ExOne shareholders. According to the complaint, rather than keeping this material non-public information to himself--as required under Desktop Metal's internal policies--El Siblani breached his fiduciary duty to Desktop Metal and its shareholders by tipping his close friends Chammout, Jawad, and Rakha before the acquisition was publicly announced. The SEC's complaint alleges that shortly after communicating with El Siblani, each of the tippees simultaneously started building substantial positions in ExOne securities and kept buying stock right up until the announcement. After the acquisition was publicly announced, the tippees are alleged to have quickly sold off their ExOne positions and obtained illicit profits in the amounts of: $218,036 for Chammout, $218,082 for Jawad, and $61,006 for Rakha.
The SEC's complaint charges El Siblani, Chammout, Jawad, and Rakha with violating the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The SEC's complaint seeks permanent injunctive relief and civil penalties against all defendants, disgorgement with prejudgment interest against Chammout, Jawad, and Rakha, and an order barring El Siblani from service as an officer or director of a public company.
Without admitting the allegations in the SEC's complaint, El Siblani, Jawad, and Rakha have agreed to the entry of final judgments, subject to court approval, that would permanently enjoin them from violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, order El Siblani to pay a civil penalty of $497,124, and prohibit him for four years following entry of the judgment from serving as an officer or director of a public company, order Jawad to pay disgorgement of $218,082, prejudgment interest of $72,364, and a civil penalty of $218,082, and order Rakha to pay disgorgement of $61,006, prejudgment interest of $20,243, and a civil penalty of $61,006.
The SEC's investigation was conducted by Taryn Lewis and Nicolas Magena and supervised by Brian Fagel of the SEC's Chicago Regional Office. The SEC's litigation will be led by Timothy Leiman and Jonathan Polish and supervised by Eric Phillips, also of the Chicago Regional Office. The SEC appreciates the assistance of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
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Resources
* SEC Complaint (https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2026/comp26589.pdf)
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Original text here: https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/litigation-releases/lr-26589
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jamal Chammout, et al., Civil Action No. 2:26-cv-12451 (E.D. Mich. filed July 17, 2026)
On July 17, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Ali El Siblani, a former senior executive and director of Desktop Metal, Inc., a then-publicly traded company, and three of El Siblani's friends, Jamal ("Jimmy") Chammout, Ali Jawad, and Rabih Rakha, all of Michigan, alleging that El Siblani's friends ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release (No. 2:26-cv-12451; E.D. Mich. filed July 17, 2026): * * * Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jamal Chammout, et al., Civil Action No. 2:26-cv-12451 (E.D. Mich. filed July 17, 2026) On July 17, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Ali El Siblani, a former senior executive and director of Desktop Metal, Inc., a then-publicly traded company, and three of El Siblani's friends, Jamal ("Jimmy") Chammout, Ali Jawad, and Rabih Rakha, all of Michigan, alleging that El Siblani's friendsunlawfully traded based on material nonpublic information in advance of an August 11, 2021 announcement that Desktop Metal would acquire The ExOne Company at a premium to the market price. El Siblani, Jawad, and Rakha have agreed to settle the SEC's charges against them.
The SEC's complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleges that from at least June through August 2021, Desktop Metal entrusted El Siblani with highly sensitive information about its proposed acquisition of ExOne, including the significant premium the company planned to pay ExOne shareholders. According to the complaint, rather than keeping this material non-public information to himself--as required under Desktop Metal's internal policies--El Siblani breached his fiduciary duty to Desktop Metal and its shareholders by tipping his close friends Chammout, Jawad, and Rakha before the acquisition was publicly announced. The SEC's complaint alleges that shortly after communicating with El Siblani, each of the tippees simultaneously started building substantial positions in ExOne securities and kept buying stock right up until the announcement. After the acquisition was publicly announced, the tippees are alleged to have quickly sold off their ExOne positions and obtained illicit profits in the amounts of: $218,036 for Chammout, $218,082 for Jawad, and $61,006 for Rakha.
The SEC's complaint charges El Siblani, Chammout, Jawad, and Rakha with violating the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The SEC's complaint seeks permanent injunctive relief and civil penalties against all defendants, disgorgement with prejudgment interest against Chammout, Jawad, and Rakha, and an order barring El Siblani from service as an officer or director of a public company.
Without admitting the allegations in the SEC's complaint, El Siblani, Jawad, and Rakha have agreed to the entry of final judgments, subject to court approval, that would permanently enjoin them from violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, order El Siblani to pay a civil penalty of $497,124, and prohibit him for four years following entry of the judgment from serving as an officer or director of a public company, order Jawad to pay disgorgement of $218,082, prejudgment interest of $72,364, and a civil penalty of $218,082, and order Rakha to pay disgorgement of $61,006, prejudgment interest of $20,243, and a civil penalty of $61,006.
The SEC's investigation was conducted by Taryn Lewis and Nicolas Magena and supervised by Brian Fagel of the SEC's Chicago Regional Office. The SEC's litigation will be led by Timothy Leiman and Jonathan Polish and supervised by Eric Phillips, also of the Chicago Regional Office. The SEC appreciates the assistance of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
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Resources
* SEC Complaint (https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2026/comp26589.pdf)
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Original text here: https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/litigation-releases/lr-26589
NRC Accepts Ginna Subsequent License Renewal Application for Review
WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following news release:
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NRC Accepts Ginna Subsequent License Renewal Application for Review
ROCKVILLE, Md. -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has accepted for review Constellation's application to extend the operating license of the R.E. Ginna nuclear power plant in Ontario, New York, by 20 years, from 60 to 80 years total.
What: NRC staff determined the application has sufficient technical and environmental information to begin a full safety and environmental review, including audits, ahead of a licensing decision. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following news release: * * * NRC Accepts Ginna Subsequent License Renewal Application for Review ROCKVILLE, Md. -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has accepted for review Constellation's application to extend the operating license of the R.E. Ginna nuclear power plant in Ontario, New York, by 20 years, from 60 to 80 years total. What: NRC staff determined the application has sufficient technical and environmental information to begin a full safety and environmental review, including audits, ahead of a licensing decision.
When: If approved, Ginna could operate through Sept. 18, 2049. The plant was first licensed in 1969 for 40 years and renewed in 2004 for 20 more, extending its license to 2029.
How: The NRC will publish a hearing notice within days, opening a 60-day window for the public to request a legal hearing on the application.
Background: Constellation filed the application June 17. Copies of the application are available at Lyons Public Library, 122 Broad St., Lyons, New York, and online.
More on the renewal process: www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal.html
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Original text here: https://www.nrc.gov/sites/default/files/cdn/doc-collection-news/2026/26-021-a.pdf
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NRC Accepts Ginna Subsequent License Renewal Application for Review
ROCKVILLE, Md. -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has accepted for review Constellation's application to extend the operating license of the R.E. Ginna nuclear power plant in Ontario, New York, by 20 years, from 60 to 80 years total.
What: NRC staff determined the application has sufficient technical and environmental information to begin a full safety and environmental review, including audits, ahead of a licensing decision. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following news release: * * * NRC Accepts Ginna Subsequent License Renewal Application for Review ROCKVILLE, Md. -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has accepted for review Constellation's application to extend the operating license of the R.E. Ginna nuclear power plant in Ontario, New York, by 20 years, from 60 to 80 years total. What: NRC staff determined the application has sufficient technical and environmental information to begin a full safety and environmental review, including audits, ahead of a licensing decision.
When: If approved, Ginna could operate through Sept. 18, 2049. The plant was first licensed in 1969 for 40 years and renewed in 2004 for 20 more, extending its license to 2029.
How: The NRC will publish a hearing notice within days, opening a 60-day window for the public to request a legal hearing on the application.
Background: Constellation filed the application June 17. Copies of the application are available at Lyons Public Library, 122 Broad St., Lyons, New York, and online.
More on the renewal process: www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal.html
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Original text here: https://www.nrc.gov/sites/default/files/cdn/doc-collection-news/2026/26-021-a.pdf
FEC Issues Digest for Week of July 13-17, 2026
WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest:
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Commission meetings and hearings
No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week.
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Litigation
Bernegger v. FEC (Case No. 25-4072) On July 6, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Order Directing the Clerk to Enter Default Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), or in the Alternative, for Entry of Default by the Court in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Campaign Legal Center v. FEC (Case No. 26-1559) On July 10, the Commission filed an Answer in the U.S. District Court ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest: * * * Commission meetings and hearings No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week. * * * Litigation Bernegger v. FEC (Case No. 25-4072) On July 6, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Order Directing the Clerk to Enter Default Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), or in the Alternative, for Entry of Default by the Court in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Campaign Legal Center v. FEC (Case No. 26-1559) On July 10, the Commission filed an Answer in the U.S. District Courtfor the District of Columbia.
CREW v. FEC (Case No. 22-35) On July 15, the U.S. Court for the District of Columbia issued a Minute Order directing the Clerk of Court to terminate this case from the active docket in light of the Joint Stipulation of Dismissal filed by the parties on July 9.
DCCC v. FEC (Case No. 24-2935) On July 16, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a Minute Order that the parties shall appear before the court on July 22, 2026, for a status conference to discuss the need for and scope of any further briefing on the pending motions.
Esrati v. FEC (Case No. 26-1498) On July 10, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Commission's Motion to Dismiss in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
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Reports Due in 2026
The Commission has posted the 2026 Congressional Pre-Election Reporting Dates. Reporting schedules for all filers in 2026 are also available.
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Election Dates
The Commission has posted a list of 2026 Congressional Primary Dates.
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Upcoming educational opportunities
For more information on upcoming training opportunities, see the Commission's Trainings page.
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Upcoming reporting due dates
July 20: July Monthly Reports are due. For more information, see the 2026 Monthly Reporting schedule.
The Commission has posted information regarding reporting deadlines as some states reschedule congressional primary elections to account for redistricting.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the Georgia 13th District Special General Election, scheduled for July 28, 2026, and Special Runoff Election (if necessary), scheduled for August 25, 2026.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the California 14th District Special Runoff Election, scheduled for August 18, 2026.
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Additional research materials
Contribution Limits: In addition to the current limits, the Commission has posted an archive of contribution limits that were in effect going back to the 1975-1976 election cycles.
Federal election results are available. The data was compiled from the official vote totals published by state election offices.
FEC Notify: Want to be notified by email when campaign finance reports are received by the agency? Sign up here.
The Combined Federal State Disclosure and Election Directory is available. This publication identifies the federal and state agencies responsible for the disclosure of campaign finances, lobbying, personal finances, public financing, candidates on the ballot, election results, spending on state initiatives, and other financial filings.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Tax Checkoff Chart provides information on balance of the Fund, monthly deposits into the Fund reported by the Department of the Treasury, payments from the Fund as certified by the FEC, and participation rates of taxpayers as reported by the Internal Revenue Service. For more information on the Presidential Public Funding Program, see the Public Funding of Presidential Elections page.
The FEC Record is available as a continuously updated online news source.
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Original text here: https://www.fec.gov/updates/week-of-july-13-17-2026/
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Commission meetings and hearings
No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week.
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Litigation
Bernegger v. FEC (Case No. 25-4072) On July 6, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Order Directing the Clerk to Enter Default Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), or in the Alternative, for Entry of Default by the Court in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Campaign Legal Center v. FEC (Case No. 26-1559) On July 10, the Commission filed an Answer in the U.S. District Court ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest: * * * Commission meetings and hearings No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week. * * * Litigation Bernegger v. FEC (Case No. 25-4072) On July 6, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Order Directing the Clerk to Enter Default Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), or in the Alternative, for Entry of Default by the Court in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Campaign Legal Center v. FEC (Case No. 26-1559) On July 10, the Commission filed an Answer in the U.S. District Courtfor the District of Columbia.
CREW v. FEC (Case No. 22-35) On July 15, the U.S. Court for the District of Columbia issued a Minute Order directing the Clerk of Court to terminate this case from the active docket in light of the Joint Stipulation of Dismissal filed by the parties on July 9.
DCCC v. FEC (Case No. 24-2935) On July 16, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a Minute Order that the parties shall appear before the court on July 22, 2026, for a status conference to discuss the need for and scope of any further briefing on the pending motions.
Esrati v. FEC (Case No. 26-1498) On July 10, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Commission's Motion to Dismiss in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
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Reports Due in 2026
The Commission has posted the 2026 Congressional Pre-Election Reporting Dates. Reporting schedules for all filers in 2026 are also available.
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Election Dates
The Commission has posted a list of 2026 Congressional Primary Dates.
* * *
Upcoming educational opportunities
For more information on upcoming training opportunities, see the Commission's Trainings page.
* * *
Upcoming reporting due dates
July 20: July Monthly Reports are due. For more information, see the 2026 Monthly Reporting schedule.
The Commission has posted information regarding reporting deadlines as some states reschedule congressional primary elections to account for redistricting.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the Georgia 13th District Special General Election, scheduled for July 28, 2026, and Special Runoff Election (if necessary), scheduled for August 25, 2026.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the California 14th District Special Runoff Election, scheduled for August 18, 2026.
* * *
Additional research materials
Contribution Limits: In addition to the current limits, the Commission has posted an archive of contribution limits that were in effect going back to the 1975-1976 election cycles.
Federal election results are available. The data was compiled from the official vote totals published by state election offices.
FEC Notify: Want to be notified by email when campaign finance reports are received by the agency? Sign up here.
The Combined Federal State Disclosure and Election Directory is available. This publication identifies the federal and state agencies responsible for the disclosure of campaign finances, lobbying, personal finances, public financing, candidates on the ballot, election results, spending on state initiatives, and other financial filings.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Tax Checkoff Chart provides information on balance of the Fund, monthly deposits into the Fund reported by the Department of the Treasury, payments from the Fund as certified by the FEC, and participation rates of taxpayers as reported by the Internal Revenue Service. For more information on the Presidential Public Funding Program, see the Public Funding of Presidential Elections page.
The FEC Record is available as a continuously updated online news source.
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Original text here: https://www.fec.gov/updates/week-of-july-13-17-2026/
FCC Settles Supply Chain Certification Probe With Central Louisiana Cellular
WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has entered into a settlement agreement with Central Louisiana Cellular LLC, resolving an investigation into whether the company provided inaccurate information regarding national security network upgrades. The action is detailed in an order under regulatory designation (In the Matter of Central Louisiana Cellular, LLC, File No.: EB-FD-26-00040704).
The investigation centered on the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program, an initiative established under federal law to remove, replace, and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has entered into a settlement agreement with Central Louisiana Cellular LLC, resolving an investigation into whether the company provided inaccurate information regarding national security network upgrades. The action is detailed in an order under regulatory designation (In the Matter of Central Louisiana Cellular, LLC, File No.: EB-FD-26-00040704). The investigation centered on the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program, an initiative established under federal law to remove, replace, anddispose of communications equipment deemed to pose national security risks. Providers participating in the program are required to permanently eliminate covered infrastructure manufactured by foreign entities such as Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation. Program rules require a final certification via a regulatory document known as Form 5640, verifying that all covered equipment has been completely removed and destroyed.
According to regulatory filings, Central Louisiana Cellular participated in the program and filed a final certification stating that it had completed the permanent removal and disposal of all covered equipment. However, the Enforcement Bureau subsequently determined that the company had lost track of specific pieces of covered equipment that were active on its network when funding applications were submitted between January and May 2022. Because this equipment was missing, the company could not verify its physical destruction.
Federal rules strictly prohibit telecommunications entities from submitting incorrect or misleading factual statements during agency proceedings. While Central Louisiana Cellular initially failed to mention the missing components in its certification, the company did not request federal funds for disposing of those items. When confronted by agency investigators, company representatives cooperated fully, provided information, and volunteered to amend the final certification to accurately reflect the status of the unverified equipment.
To resolve the matter without further administrative proceedings, Central Louisiana Cellular entered into a consent decree with the Enforcement Bureau on July 17, 2026. Under the terms of the settlement, the company admits to the factual background of the case and has agreed to pay a $10,000 voluntary contribution to the United States Treasury within 30 days.
The Enforcement Bureau found that adopting the settlement serves the public interest and officially terminated the investigation. In the absence of further evidence, the agency stated it will not pursue additional proceedings or question the baseline qualifications of Central Louisiana Cellular to retain its federal operating authorizations.
The settlement comes as Central Louisiana Cellular winds down operations. The company, which previously functioned as an eligible telecommunications carrier providing commercial broadband services across Louisiana, reports no current operating income and expects to completely terminate its business activities by the end of 2026.
Copies of the final order were transmitted to Jonathan Foxman, the authorized representative for Central Louisiana Cellular in Wayne, Pennsylvania, and to David LaFuria, legal counsel for the firm in Tysons, Virginia.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-675A1.pdf
The investigation centered on the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program, an initiative established under federal law to remove, replace, and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has entered into a settlement agreement with Central Louisiana Cellular LLC, resolving an investigation into whether the company provided inaccurate information regarding national security network upgrades. The action is detailed in an order under regulatory designation (In the Matter of Central Louisiana Cellular, LLC, File No.: EB-FD-26-00040704). The investigation centered on the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program, an initiative established under federal law to remove, replace, anddispose of communications equipment deemed to pose national security risks. Providers participating in the program are required to permanently eliminate covered infrastructure manufactured by foreign entities such as Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation. Program rules require a final certification via a regulatory document known as Form 5640, verifying that all covered equipment has been completely removed and destroyed.
According to regulatory filings, Central Louisiana Cellular participated in the program and filed a final certification stating that it had completed the permanent removal and disposal of all covered equipment. However, the Enforcement Bureau subsequently determined that the company had lost track of specific pieces of covered equipment that were active on its network when funding applications were submitted between January and May 2022. Because this equipment was missing, the company could not verify its physical destruction.
Federal rules strictly prohibit telecommunications entities from submitting incorrect or misleading factual statements during agency proceedings. While Central Louisiana Cellular initially failed to mention the missing components in its certification, the company did not request federal funds for disposing of those items. When confronted by agency investigators, company representatives cooperated fully, provided information, and volunteered to amend the final certification to accurately reflect the status of the unverified equipment.
To resolve the matter without further administrative proceedings, Central Louisiana Cellular entered into a consent decree with the Enforcement Bureau on July 17, 2026. Under the terms of the settlement, the company admits to the factual background of the case and has agreed to pay a $10,000 voluntary contribution to the United States Treasury within 30 days.
The Enforcement Bureau found that adopting the settlement serves the public interest and officially terminated the investigation. In the absence of further evidence, the agency stated it will not pursue additional proceedings or question the baseline qualifications of Central Louisiana Cellular to retain its federal operating authorizations.
The settlement comes as Central Louisiana Cellular winds down operations. The company, which previously functioned as an eligible telecommunications carrier providing commercial broadband services across Louisiana, reports no current operating income and expects to completely terminate its business activities by the end of 2026.
Copies of the final order were transmitted to Jonathan Foxman, the authorized representative for Central Louisiana Cellular in Wayne, Pennsylvania, and to David LaFuria, legal counsel for the firm in Tysons, Virginia.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-675A1.pdf
FCC Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau Issues Public Notice: Seeking Comment on Prohibiting Importation, Marketing of Certain Covered UAS, UAS Critical Components
WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (PS Docket No. 26-184):
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Introduction
By this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to "pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons" (covered equipment)./1 Such prohibitions ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (PS Docket No. 26-184): * * * Introduction By this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to "pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons" (covered equipment)./1 Such prohibitionswould apply to the advertising, distribution, and sale of such equipment./2 In particular, we propose to apply such prohibitions to certain previously-authorized foreign-produced uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components, and certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025 NDAA), added to the Covered List in December 2025./3 This would encompass all covered equipment produced by the following entities and their affiliates, subsidiaries, and other partners: Cogito Tech Company, Limited (Cogito); Fikaxo Technology Inc. (Fikaxo); Lyno Dynamics LLC (Lyno Dynamics); Skyhigh Tech LLC (Skyhigh Tech); Spatial Hover Inc (Spatial Hover); SZ Knowact Robot Technology Co., Ltd. (SZ Knowact); WaveGo Tech LLC (WaveGo); Xtra Technology LLC (Xtra); and Guangzhou Xaircraft Technology Co. Ltd (XAG). These prohibitions would not apply to any importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development. Moreover, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect continued use or operation of already-purchased covered equipment. We seek comment on these proposals and the relevant factors, including national security and economic and supply chain considerations, that would justify prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of such previously authorized covered equipment.
Background
In November 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) adopted rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List./4 However, the Commission did not revoke previously granted authorizations of covered equipment./5 In October 2025, the Commission adopted the EA Security Second R&O which, among other things, established a procedure to limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the underlying authorization./6 The Commission noted that its goal is to mitigate potential national security risks associated with covered equipment in the nation's supply chain that was authorized prior to a Covered List addition under 47 U.S.C Sec. 1601(b)./7 The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to "institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List" and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the EA Security Second R&O./8 The Commission gave specific directives to PSHSB and OET regarding how to analyze and implement the new procedures./9
On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List./10 PSHSB also added communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA to the Covered List./11 This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that such equipment and services pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons./12
On January 7, 2026, the Commission received a subsequent National Security Determination from the Department of War (DoW) stating that certain equipment should be removed from the Covered List because it does not pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons./13 Accordingly, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt: UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) Blue UAS Cleared List until January 1, 2027; and UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard (48 CFR Sec. 25.101(a)), until January 1, 2027.
Both National Security Determinations provided that the identified UAS and UAS critical components should be included on the Covered List, unless DoW or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given UAS or class of UAS, or a specific UAS critical component, does not pose risks to U.S. national security. The FCC established a process for entities to request individual Conditional Approvals for their covered UAS and UAS critical components by submitting the required information, and DoW has granted several such Conditional Approvals./14 Additionally, on June 15, 2026, based on a National Security Determination from DoW, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt "Toy Drones" as defined in the National Security Determination and "Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components."/15
On March 27, 2026, PSHSB and OET released a Public Notice (March 27 Public Notice) seeking comment on a proposal to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of equipment that had been placed on the Covered List in 2024 or earlier but was originally authorized prior to the adoption of the Commission's 2022 equipment authorization and national security rules./16 The March 27 Public Notice explained that those additions to the Covered List were made pursuant to a specific national security determination made by Congress, which the Commission found constituted a "specific determination that such equipment poses an 'unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.'"/17 PSHSB and OET sought comment on whether maintaining such authorizations would undermine the Commission's national security framework and whether prohibiting continued importation and marketing would better serve the public interest./18
On June 26, 2026, after review of the record, PSHSB and OET issued a second Public Notice (June 26 Public Notice) summarizing the comments received, evaluating the technical, economic, and national security considerations raised by commenters, and assessing the public interest implications of the proposed prohibition./19 The June 26 Public Notice concluded that continued importation and marketing of equipment authorized before the adoption of the Commission's 2022 rules posed unacceptable risks to national security when imported or marketed in the United States./20 The Commission therefore determined that adoption of the prohibition was warranted and announced that the prohibition would become effective 10 days after publication in the Federal Register./21 The June 26 Public Notice emphasized that expedited action was necessary because a delayed but impending prohibition could incentivize importers and markets to accelerate shipments of covered equipment into the U.S market, which is a result that is directly contrary to the purpose of the Notice./22 Following the release of the June 26 Public Notice, the Commission updated its website to reflect the newly adopted prohibitions./23 These prohibitions went into effect on July 16, 2026.
On March 30, 2026, the Enforcement Bureau (EB) opened an investigation and issued a Letter of Inquiry (LOI) to Xtra,/24 based on publicly available information that Xtra was producing hardware copies of certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, and that code from the equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA was copied and pasted into Xtra devices./25 On May 8, 2026, EB opened an investigation and issued LOIs to Cogito, Fikaxo, Lyno Dynamics, Skyhigh Tech, Spatial Hover, SZ Knowact, and WaveGo,/26 based on publicly available information that such companies produce UAS and UAS critical components that contain hardware copies of communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA./27 All of these companies failed to respond to EB's March and May 2026 LOIs as directed in violation of Commission rules. On July 10, 2026, OET temporarily deferred the grantee codes of these companies based on publicly available information that these companies are producing covered equipment, which is prohibited from receiving equipment authorization, and for the failure to respond to the LOIs./28
On April 9, 2026, EB issued an LOI to XAG, a company that produces UAS and UAS critical components in a foreign country,/29 based on XAG's failure to provide updated U.S. agent for service of process information pursuant to Section 2.929(c) of the Commission's rules and granted XAG's request for extension of time to respond to the LOI to May 26, 2026./30 On May 21, 2026, XAG requested another 60-day extension of time concerning responses to two questions on the grounds that the information may be subject to export controls by the People's Republic of China (PRC), and XAG needed time to seek an official determination from the PRC Ministry of Commerce regarding whether XAG was permitted to respond to FCC inquiries under PRC law./31 On July 16, 2026, OET temporarily deferred XAG's grantee code based on XAG's failure to provide updated U.S. agent for service of process information pursuant to Section 2.929(c) of the Commission's rules./32
Today, we initiate another proceeding to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2025.
Discussion
The Commission has legal authority to review an existing authorization for covered equipment, and to revoke such authorization pursuant to current rules./33 Under section 2.939(a), the Commission may "revoke . . . any equipment authorization" for various reasons, including "conditions coming to the attention of the Commission which would warrant it in refusing to grant an original application."/34 Likewise, under section 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET "may place limitations on an existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit continued importation or marketing" of such equipment./35
Scope. Pursuant to section 2.939(e), we propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized covered equipment referenced above. We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment. Specifically, we propose to apply prohibitions to the following covered equipment:
(1) foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components and white-labeled devices listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA produced by the following entities:
o Cogito, including FCC IDs 2BCHV-TQFDUB2, 2BCHV-GL3323, 2BCHV- TQFDUB1;
o Fikaxo, including FCC IDs 2BRQB-FKABZF and 2BRQB-YZABFI;
o Lyno Dynamics, including FCC IDs 2BQ98-LD2202508, 2BQ98-LD220RC, and 2BQ98-LD220RD;
o Skyhigh Tech, including FCC IDs 2BLZI-T60X2411 and 2BLZI-YKBP22411;
o Spatial Hover, including FCC IDs 2BQAI-S3T and 2BQAI-NRC01;
o SZ Knowact, including FCC IDs 2BMUV-ARDCF25 and 2BMUV-AUDAFV25; and
o WaveGo LLC, including FCC IDs 2BPFE-DD001 and 2BPFE-RC001;
(2) communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 produced by Xtra, to include FCC IDs 2BQH2-XCAMA01, 2BQH2-XCAMB01, 2BQH2-XCAMC01, 2BQH2-XCAMD01, and 2BQH2-XCAME01; and
(3) foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components produced by XAG, to include UAS and UAS critical components with FCC IDs beginning with the 2A46G grantee code.
We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment. As stated above, public reporting indicates that equipment listed in categories (1) and (2) are exact hardware copies of certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA./36 Even if the equipment is not an exact hardware copy, equipment that relies on substantial design, manufacture, assembly, or development by entities listed in section 1709 could still be considered "produced by" such entities./37 Additionally, as reflected in the materials submitted as part of the application for certification, three companies--Lyno Dynamics, Spatial Hover, and Skyhigh Tech--submitted equipment certification applications that still display branding of or reference companies listed in section 1709./38 Even if not produced by an entity named in section 1709, the equipment listed in categories (1) and (2) might still be produced by a "partner," or entity "to which [a] named entity has a technology sharing or licensing agreement," given the closeness of the designs./39 Moreover, publicly available equipment authorization records indicate that several of the UAS and UAS critical components in category (1) are in any event produced abroad, rendering them covered equipment even apart from the section 1709 connection./40 Equipment listed in category 3 is equipment produced in a foreign country. For example, XAG identified in its response to EB's April 9, 2026 LOI that its manufacturing facilities are located in a foreign country./41
For reasons discussed below, this prohibition on importation and marketing would not apply to any other already-authorized covered equipment, including UAS or UAS critical components or other communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. It would also only apply to covered UAS and UAS critical components and would therefore not apply to any UAS or UAS critical components that are exempt from the Covered List--including UAS and UAS critical components identified on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA's) Blue UAS Cleared List; UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR Sec. 25.101(a); and UAS and UAS critical components granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS. Furthermore, this prohibition would not apply to importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development. Finally, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect the continued use or operation of already-purchased UAS or UAS critical components that were foreign produced or communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA.
We seek comment on our tentative conclusions that the above-referenced equipment is covered equipment. We invite commenters to provide specific evidence in response to our tentative conclusions. Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized "covered" equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment serves the public interest.
National security impacts. We start with national security concerns, because, as the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O, "[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation."/42 In the EA Security Second R&O, the Commission stated that older models of covered equipment, which are still widely sold in the U.S., pose an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed in the United States, "not only when such equipment is new to the market."/43 The Commission agreed with commenters who pointed out that certain previously authorized devices that are now considered covered equipment "likely remain[] marketable in the United States" and "may present continuing national security threats."/44
Subject to exceptions,/45 an Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise, including appropriate national security agencies, one of whom was the DoW,/46 specifically determined that UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries and communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA "pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons."/47 This determination of "unacceptable risks" was based on an assessment of "threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential threats to the homeland."/48 We believe this determination included all already-authorized covered equipment described in this Public Notice, which are UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries and/or communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA./49 We tentatively accept this determination and "give [it] particular weight," as the Commission directed./50
Therefore, based on the EA Security Second R&O and the December 21, 2025, National Security Determination, we tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered UAS and UAS critical components and communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA as described above is necessary to protect national security by mitigating risks to the U.S. communications sector.
Economic and supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the potential economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of the above-referenced already authorized covered equipment. How would this proposed action affect the financial interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in the communications sector? As the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O, it may consider "countervailing economic concerns when implementing the prohibitions for already-authorized devices."/51 What are the economic or supply chain considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide data that we should consider in our analysis.
We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have substantial economic and supply chain impacts, especially given that the devices subject to our proposed limitation comprise a very small share of the market. None of the companies whose equipment is identified in this Public Notice-- Cogito; Fikaxo; Lyno Dynamics; Skyhigh Tech; Spatial Hover; SZ Knowact; WaveGo; XAG; or Xtra-- appear in major industry market analyses or rankings./52 Do commenters agree that economic and supply chain impacts are relatively minor? Could other equipment fill any gaps created by this proposed prohibition? Has the Conditional Approval process provided an adequate source for trusted equipment now or in the future? Would this proposal be cost-effective for the public in terms of obtaining trusted equipment? Would providers' compliance costs decrease as they replace covered equipment with trusted equipment? We strongly encourage commenters to supply data and other specific evidence of economic costs to this prohibition.
On the other hand, we seek comment on any economic benefits that might arise as a result of these prohibitions. We note that after the initial update to the Covered List, billions of dollars have already been raised by domestic UAS producers, creating thousands of U.S. manufacturing jobs./53 Additionally, billions more have been committed for domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components, which are expected to generate additional jobs./54 These investments include capital from domestic investors as well as foreign investors supporting U.S. manufacturing./55 We tentatively conclude that if the proposed prohibitions of the previously authorized covered equipment subject to this Public Notice generated economic harm by noticeably reducing supply, such prohibition would spur investments in domestic production that would generate a countervailing positive economic impact. Do commenters agree? We seek comment on the economic effects of the likely investment in U.S. production that this proposed prohibition would yield.
Public interest analysis. We tentatively conclude that prohibiting the importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment subject to this Public Notice is consistent with the public interest, because it protects American communications networks from devices specifically determined by an Executive Branch interagency body to "pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons."/56 We also tentatively conclude that there are no public interest factors that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed ban on import and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment. We seek comment on this public interest analysis. Do commenters agree that the national security benefits outweigh any negative economic or supply chain factors? Are there any other public interest considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide any information that would assist the Commission in its balancing of the need to address the national security risks posed by the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment in communications networks with the impact of the proposed prohibitions on government partners, consumers, industry, and the public at large.
Implementation
Existing authorizations. We clarify that, if this prohibition is adopted, the continued use or operation of previously-authorized UAS and UAS critical components that are foreign-produced and communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA that are the subject of this Public Notice that are already in the hands of users would remain authorized. This is consistent with the approach that the Commission adopted in the EA Security Second R&O./57 The limitation on existing authorizations would not result in the revocation of an existing authorization of covered equipment and, therefore, would not affect the continued use or operation of devices that consumers already possess.
Implementation timeline. We propose that all parties must cease all importation and marketing activities within 30 days after publication in the Federal Register. We believe that this timeline is reasonable and strikes the appropriate balance between addressing the national security concerns and minimizing any potential adverse economic or supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the proposed timeline and invite input from responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and other interested entities. Specifically, we request that commenters address implementation considerations including the quantity of devices that have already been imported into the U.S. and are available for or being held for marketing or sale, new or recently updated device models that are en route to the U.S. or pending shipment, and devices that are subject to executed distribution, marketing, or sales agreements, but have not yet entered the supply chain.
Procedural Matters
Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR Sec.Sec. 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS).
* Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs.
* Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing.
* Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
* Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building.
* Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
* Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
The proceeding this Public Notice initiates shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose" proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules./58 Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
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Original text plus footnotes here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-742A1.pdf
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Introduction
By this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to "pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons" (covered equipment)./1 Such prohibitions ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (PS Docket No. 26-184): * * * Introduction By this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been determined to "pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons" (covered equipment)./1 Such prohibitionswould apply to the advertising, distribution, and sale of such equipment./2 In particular, we propose to apply such prohibitions to certain previously-authorized foreign-produced uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components, and certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025 NDAA), added to the Covered List in December 2025./3 This would encompass all covered equipment produced by the following entities and their affiliates, subsidiaries, and other partners: Cogito Tech Company, Limited (Cogito); Fikaxo Technology Inc. (Fikaxo); Lyno Dynamics LLC (Lyno Dynamics); Skyhigh Tech LLC (Skyhigh Tech); Spatial Hover Inc (Spatial Hover); SZ Knowact Robot Technology Co., Ltd. (SZ Knowact); WaveGo Tech LLC (WaveGo); Xtra Technology LLC (Xtra); and Guangzhou Xaircraft Technology Co. Ltd (XAG). These prohibitions would not apply to any importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development. Moreover, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect continued use or operation of already-purchased covered equipment. We seek comment on these proposals and the relevant factors, including national security and economic and supply chain considerations, that would justify prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of such previously authorized covered equipment.
Background
In November 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) adopted rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List./4 However, the Commission did not revoke previously granted authorizations of covered equipment./5 In October 2025, the Commission adopted the EA Security Second R&O which, among other things, established a procedure to limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the underlying authorization./6 The Commission noted that its goal is to mitigate potential national security risks associated with covered equipment in the nation's supply chain that was authorized prior to a Covered List addition under 47 U.S.C Sec. 1601(b)./7 The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to "institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List" and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the EA Security Second R&O./8 The Commission gave specific directives to PSHSB and OET regarding how to analyze and implement the new procedures./9
On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List./10 PSHSB also added communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA to the Covered List./11 This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that such equipment and services pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons./12
On January 7, 2026, the Commission received a subsequent National Security Determination from the Department of War (DoW) stating that certain equipment should be removed from the Covered List because it does not pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons./13 Accordingly, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt: UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA) Blue UAS Cleared List until January 1, 2027; and UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard (48 CFR Sec. 25.101(a)), until January 1, 2027.
Both National Security Determinations provided that the identified UAS and UAS critical components should be included on the Covered List, unless DoW or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given UAS or class of UAS, or a specific UAS critical component, does not pose risks to U.S. national security. The FCC established a process for entities to request individual Conditional Approvals for their covered UAS and UAS critical components by submitting the required information, and DoW has granted several such Conditional Approvals./14 Additionally, on June 15, 2026, based on a National Security Determination from DoW, PSHSB updated the Covered List to exempt "Toy Drones" as defined in the National Security Determination and "Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components."/15
On March 27, 2026, PSHSB and OET released a Public Notice (March 27 Public Notice) seeking comment on a proposal to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of equipment that had been placed on the Covered List in 2024 or earlier but was originally authorized prior to the adoption of the Commission's 2022 equipment authorization and national security rules./16 The March 27 Public Notice explained that those additions to the Covered List were made pursuant to a specific national security determination made by Congress, which the Commission found constituted a "specific determination that such equipment poses an 'unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.'"/17 PSHSB and OET sought comment on whether maintaining such authorizations would undermine the Commission's national security framework and whether prohibiting continued importation and marketing would better serve the public interest./18
On June 26, 2026, after review of the record, PSHSB and OET issued a second Public Notice (June 26 Public Notice) summarizing the comments received, evaluating the technical, economic, and national security considerations raised by commenters, and assessing the public interest implications of the proposed prohibition./19 The June 26 Public Notice concluded that continued importation and marketing of equipment authorized before the adoption of the Commission's 2022 rules posed unacceptable risks to national security when imported or marketed in the United States./20 The Commission therefore determined that adoption of the prohibition was warranted and announced that the prohibition would become effective 10 days after publication in the Federal Register./21 The June 26 Public Notice emphasized that expedited action was necessary because a delayed but impending prohibition could incentivize importers and markets to accelerate shipments of covered equipment into the U.S market, which is a result that is directly contrary to the purpose of the Notice./22 Following the release of the June 26 Public Notice, the Commission updated its website to reflect the newly adopted prohibitions./23 These prohibitions went into effect on July 16, 2026.
On March 30, 2026, the Enforcement Bureau (EB) opened an investigation and issued a Letter of Inquiry (LOI) to Xtra,/24 based on publicly available information that Xtra was producing hardware copies of certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, and that code from the equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA was copied and pasted into Xtra devices./25 On May 8, 2026, EB opened an investigation and issued LOIs to Cogito, Fikaxo, Lyno Dynamics, Skyhigh Tech, Spatial Hover, SZ Knowact, and WaveGo,/26 based on publicly available information that such companies produce UAS and UAS critical components that contain hardware copies of communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA./27 All of these companies failed to respond to EB's March and May 2026 LOIs as directed in violation of Commission rules. On July 10, 2026, OET temporarily deferred the grantee codes of these companies based on publicly available information that these companies are producing covered equipment, which is prohibited from receiving equipment authorization, and for the failure to respond to the LOIs./28
On April 9, 2026, EB issued an LOI to XAG, a company that produces UAS and UAS critical components in a foreign country,/29 based on XAG's failure to provide updated U.S. agent for service of process information pursuant to Section 2.929(c) of the Commission's rules and granted XAG's request for extension of time to respond to the LOI to May 26, 2026./30 On May 21, 2026, XAG requested another 60-day extension of time concerning responses to two questions on the grounds that the information may be subject to export controls by the People's Republic of China (PRC), and XAG needed time to seek an official determination from the PRC Ministry of Commerce regarding whether XAG was permitted to respond to FCC inquiries under PRC law./31 On July 16, 2026, OET temporarily deferred XAG's grantee code based on XAG's failure to provide updated U.S. agent for service of process information pursuant to Section 2.929(c) of the Commission's rules./32
Today, we initiate another proceeding to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2025.
Discussion
The Commission has legal authority to review an existing authorization for covered equipment, and to revoke such authorization pursuant to current rules./33 Under section 2.939(a), the Commission may "revoke . . . any equipment authorization" for various reasons, including "conditions coming to the attention of the Commission which would warrant it in refusing to grant an original application."/34 Likewise, under section 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET "may place limitations on an existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit continued importation or marketing" of such equipment./35
Scope. Pursuant to section 2.939(e), we propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized covered equipment referenced above. We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment. Specifically, we propose to apply prohibitions to the following covered equipment:
(1) foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components and white-labeled devices listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA produced by the following entities:
o Cogito, including FCC IDs 2BCHV-TQFDUB2, 2BCHV-GL3323, 2BCHV- TQFDUB1;
o Fikaxo, including FCC IDs 2BRQB-FKABZF and 2BRQB-YZABFI;
o Lyno Dynamics, including FCC IDs 2BQ98-LD2202508, 2BQ98-LD220RC, and 2BQ98-LD220RD;
o Skyhigh Tech, including FCC IDs 2BLZI-T60X2411 and 2BLZI-YKBP22411;
o Spatial Hover, including FCC IDs 2BQAI-S3T and 2BQAI-NRC01;
o SZ Knowact, including FCC IDs 2BMUV-ARDCF25 and 2BMUV-AUDAFV25; and
o WaveGo LLC, including FCC IDs 2BPFE-DD001 and 2BPFE-RC001;
(2) communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 produced by Xtra, to include FCC IDs 2BQH2-XCAMA01, 2BQH2-XCAMB01, 2BQH2-XCAMC01, 2BQH2-XCAMD01, and 2BQH2-XCAME01; and
(3) foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components produced by XAG, to include UAS and UAS critical components with FCC IDs beginning with the 2A46G grantee code.
We tentatively conclude that such equipment is covered equipment. As stated above, public reporting indicates that equipment listed in categories (1) and (2) are exact hardware copies of certain communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA./36 Even if the equipment is not an exact hardware copy, equipment that relies on substantial design, manufacture, assembly, or development by entities listed in section 1709 could still be considered "produced by" such entities./37 Additionally, as reflected in the materials submitted as part of the application for certification, three companies--Lyno Dynamics, Spatial Hover, and Skyhigh Tech--submitted equipment certification applications that still display branding of or reference companies listed in section 1709./38 Even if not produced by an entity named in section 1709, the equipment listed in categories (1) and (2) might still be produced by a "partner," or entity "to which [a] named entity has a technology sharing or licensing agreement," given the closeness of the designs./39 Moreover, publicly available equipment authorization records indicate that several of the UAS and UAS critical components in category (1) are in any event produced abroad, rendering them covered equipment even apart from the section 1709 connection./40 Equipment listed in category 3 is equipment produced in a foreign country. For example, XAG identified in its response to EB's April 9, 2026 LOI that its manufacturing facilities are located in a foreign country./41
For reasons discussed below, this prohibition on importation and marketing would not apply to any other already-authorized covered equipment, including UAS or UAS critical components or other communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. It would also only apply to covered UAS and UAS critical components and would therefore not apply to any UAS or UAS critical components that are exempt from the Covered List--including UAS and UAS critical components identified on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA's) Blue UAS Cleared List; UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR Sec. 25.101(a); and UAS and UAS critical components granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS. Furthermore, this prohibition would not apply to importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development. Finally, while importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect the continued use or operation of already-purchased UAS or UAS critical components that were foreign produced or communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA.
We seek comment on our tentative conclusions that the above-referenced equipment is covered equipment. We invite commenters to provide specific evidence in response to our tentative conclusions. Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized "covered" equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment serves the public interest.
National security impacts. We start with national security concerns, because, as the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O, "[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation."/42 In the EA Security Second R&O, the Commission stated that older models of covered equipment, which are still widely sold in the U.S., pose an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed in the United States, "not only when such equipment is new to the market."/43 The Commission agreed with commenters who pointed out that certain previously authorized devices that are now considered covered equipment "likely remain[] marketable in the United States" and "may present continuing national security threats."/44
Subject to exceptions,/45 an Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise, including appropriate national security agencies, one of whom was the DoW,/46 specifically determined that UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries and communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA "pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons."/47 This determination of "unacceptable risks" was based on an assessment of "threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential threats to the homeland."/48 We believe this determination included all already-authorized covered equipment described in this Public Notice, which are UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries and/or communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA./49 We tentatively accept this determination and "give [it] particular weight," as the Commission directed./50
Therefore, based on the EA Security Second R&O and the December 21, 2025, National Security Determination, we tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered UAS and UAS critical components and communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA as described above is necessary to protect national security by mitigating risks to the U.S. communications sector.
Economic and supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the potential economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of the above-referenced already authorized covered equipment. How would this proposed action affect the financial interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in the communications sector? As the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O, it may consider "countervailing economic concerns when implementing the prohibitions for already-authorized devices."/51 What are the economic or supply chain considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide data that we should consider in our analysis.
We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have substantial economic and supply chain impacts, especially given that the devices subject to our proposed limitation comprise a very small share of the market. None of the companies whose equipment is identified in this Public Notice-- Cogito; Fikaxo; Lyno Dynamics; Skyhigh Tech; Spatial Hover; SZ Knowact; WaveGo; XAG; or Xtra-- appear in major industry market analyses or rankings./52 Do commenters agree that economic and supply chain impacts are relatively minor? Could other equipment fill any gaps created by this proposed prohibition? Has the Conditional Approval process provided an adequate source for trusted equipment now or in the future? Would this proposal be cost-effective for the public in terms of obtaining trusted equipment? Would providers' compliance costs decrease as they replace covered equipment with trusted equipment? We strongly encourage commenters to supply data and other specific evidence of economic costs to this prohibition.
On the other hand, we seek comment on any economic benefits that might arise as a result of these prohibitions. We note that after the initial update to the Covered List, billions of dollars have already been raised by domestic UAS producers, creating thousands of U.S. manufacturing jobs./53 Additionally, billions more have been committed for domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components, which are expected to generate additional jobs./54 These investments include capital from domestic investors as well as foreign investors supporting U.S. manufacturing./55 We tentatively conclude that if the proposed prohibitions of the previously authorized covered equipment subject to this Public Notice generated economic harm by noticeably reducing supply, such prohibition would spur investments in domestic production that would generate a countervailing positive economic impact. Do commenters agree? We seek comment on the economic effects of the likely investment in U.S. production that this proposed prohibition would yield.
Public interest analysis. We tentatively conclude that prohibiting the importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment subject to this Public Notice is consistent with the public interest, because it protects American communications networks from devices specifically determined by an Executive Branch interagency body to "pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons."/56 We also tentatively conclude that there are no public interest factors that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed ban on import and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment. We seek comment on this public interest analysis. Do commenters agree that the national security benefits outweigh any negative economic or supply chain factors? Are there any other public interest considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide any information that would assist the Commission in its balancing of the need to address the national security risks posed by the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered equipment in communications networks with the impact of the proposed prohibitions on government partners, consumers, industry, and the public at large.
Implementation
Existing authorizations. We clarify that, if this prohibition is adopted, the continued use or operation of previously-authorized UAS and UAS critical components that are foreign-produced and communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA that are the subject of this Public Notice that are already in the hands of users would remain authorized. This is consistent with the approach that the Commission adopted in the EA Security Second R&O./57 The limitation on existing authorizations would not result in the revocation of an existing authorization of covered equipment and, therefore, would not affect the continued use or operation of devices that consumers already possess.
Implementation timeline. We propose that all parties must cease all importation and marketing activities within 30 days after publication in the Federal Register. We believe that this timeline is reasonable and strikes the appropriate balance between addressing the national security concerns and minimizing any potential adverse economic or supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the proposed timeline and invite input from responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and other interested entities. Specifically, we request that commenters address implementation considerations including the quantity of devices that have already been imported into the U.S. and are available for or being held for marketing or sale, new or recently updated device models that are en route to the U.S. or pending shipment, and devices that are subject to executed distribution, marketing, or sales agreements, but have not yet entered the supply chain.
Procedural Matters
Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR Sec.Sec. 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS).
* Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs.
* Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing.
* Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
* Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building.
* Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
* Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
The proceeding this Public Notice initiates shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose" proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules./58 Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
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Original text plus footnotes here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-742A1.pdf
FCC Enforcement Bureau Settles Investigation Over Texas 10 Supply Chain Certification
WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has officially settled an investigation into Texas 10 LLC regarding accurate reporting within a federal telecom supply chain cleanup initiative. The federal action, officially titled In the Matter of Texas 10, LLC (DA 26-674), resolves allegations that the company made incorrect statements during the final compliance phase of a national security program.
Under the terms of the settlement, the company admits it could not verify the proper destruction of certain national security risk components, despite certifying that ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has officially settled an investigation into Texas 10 LLC regarding accurate reporting within a federal telecom supply chain cleanup initiative. The federal action, officially titled In the Matter of Texas 10, LLC (DA 26-674), resolves allegations that the company made incorrect statements during the final compliance phase of a national security program. Under the terms of the settlement, the company admits it could not verify the proper destruction of certain national security risk components, despite certifying thatit had done so. To resolve the liability, the business has agreed to pay a $10,000 voluntary contribution to the United States Treasury and accept strict compliance terms as it prepares to dissolve its operations later this year.
The enforcement action stems from the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, which lawmakers enacted on March 12, 2020. The law designed a framework to protect the domestic communications infrastructure from foreign espionage risks by requiring the removal of suspect hardware. The law directed the federal regulator to compile a list of covered communications equipment and services deemed to present an unacceptable risk to national security. The resulting list prominently featured technology produced by Huawei Technologies Company and ZTE Corporation.
To assist service providers burdened by the mandate, the government established the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program. This program provided federal funds to offset reasonable expenses incurred by companies as they permanently removed, replaced, and discarded prohibited equipment from their active commercial networks.
Participation in the multi-billion-dollar program carried strict administrative obligations. Every participating network operator had to submit a final certification via a specific federal document known as Form 5640 within 10 days of completing their project timeline. This document required participants to explicitly confirm whether they had finished the permanent removal, replacement, and disposal of all covered items present in their infrastructure when they first applied for funding.
Texas 10, LLC operated as an Eligible Telecommunications Carrier providing commercial broadband services across the state of Texas. The provider entered the reimbursement program to purge its infrastructure of the banned components. Between January and May of 2022, the company filed its initial funding applications and subsequent amendments to participate in the security initiative. Records show the company chose to remove the restricted equipment from its operating grid but opted not to replace the components with substitute gear.
The regulatory issue arose when the company submitted its final project completion papers. The company checked a box indicating that all prohibited hardware had been permanently removed, replaced, and destroyed. However, an internal accounting gap existed. Certain pieces of covered hardware, which were present in the network when the initial funding request occurred, were misplaced. The company could not locate this gear prior to the decommissioning phase and therefore could not verify that it had been properly destroyed according to federal rules.
Although the provider did not initially highlight the missing hardware in its initial completion filing, the business did not seek federal reimbursement cash for the disposal or removal of those specific lost items. When federal investigators discovered the discrepancy and requested specific information regarding the missing assets, company representatives were cooperative. The entity offered to revise its final certification documents to accurately reflect that the final whereabouts and destruction of the lost items could not be validated.
Enforcement Bureau Chief Patrick Webre signed the adopting order on July 17, 2026, officially terminating the active investigation. The bureau determined that accepting the consent decree and ending the inquiry served the public interest by avoiding the expenditure of additional public resources. The regulator affirmed that, barring the discovery of subsequent material evidence, the agency will not use these specific facts to initiate separate proceedings against the entity or question its basic qualifications to hold operational licenses.
The settlement comes at a time when the Texas provider is preparing to exit the marketplace entirely. According to the case text, the company currently generates no operating income and expects to wind down its remaining business functions by the conclusion of 2026.
The $10,000 penalty must be delivered electronically to the United States Treasury within 30 calendar days of the order. The agreement states that failure to submit the funds on time triggers an immediate default, allowing the government to add interest charges calculated using the United States Prime Rate plus an additional 4.75 percent, along with collections fees and litigation costs. Legal notices regarding the order were dispatched to corporate representative Jonathan Foxman in Wayne, Pennsylvania, and legal counsel David LaFuria in Tysons, Virginia.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-674A1.pdf
Under the terms of the settlement, the company admits it could not verify the proper destruction of certain national security risk components, despite certifying that ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has officially settled an investigation into Texas 10 LLC regarding accurate reporting within a federal telecom supply chain cleanup initiative. The federal action, officially titled In the Matter of Texas 10, LLC (DA 26-674), resolves allegations that the company made incorrect statements during the final compliance phase of a national security program. Under the terms of the settlement, the company admits it could not verify the proper destruction of certain national security risk components, despite certifying thatit had done so. To resolve the liability, the business has agreed to pay a $10,000 voluntary contribution to the United States Treasury and accept strict compliance terms as it prepares to dissolve its operations later this year.
The enforcement action stems from the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, which lawmakers enacted on March 12, 2020. The law designed a framework to protect the domestic communications infrastructure from foreign espionage risks by requiring the removal of suspect hardware. The law directed the federal regulator to compile a list of covered communications equipment and services deemed to present an unacceptable risk to national security. The resulting list prominently featured technology produced by Huawei Technologies Company and ZTE Corporation.
To assist service providers burdened by the mandate, the government established the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program. This program provided federal funds to offset reasonable expenses incurred by companies as they permanently removed, replaced, and discarded prohibited equipment from their active commercial networks.
Participation in the multi-billion-dollar program carried strict administrative obligations. Every participating network operator had to submit a final certification via a specific federal document known as Form 5640 within 10 days of completing their project timeline. This document required participants to explicitly confirm whether they had finished the permanent removal, replacement, and disposal of all covered items present in their infrastructure when they first applied for funding.
Texas 10, LLC operated as an Eligible Telecommunications Carrier providing commercial broadband services across the state of Texas. The provider entered the reimbursement program to purge its infrastructure of the banned components. Between January and May of 2022, the company filed its initial funding applications and subsequent amendments to participate in the security initiative. Records show the company chose to remove the restricted equipment from its operating grid but opted not to replace the components with substitute gear.
The regulatory issue arose when the company submitted its final project completion papers. The company checked a box indicating that all prohibited hardware had been permanently removed, replaced, and destroyed. However, an internal accounting gap existed. Certain pieces of covered hardware, which were present in the network when the initial funding request occurred, were misplaced. The company could not locate this gear prior to the decommissioning phase and therefore could not verify that it had been properly destroyed according to federal rules.
Although the provider did not initially highlight the missing hardware in its initial completion filing, the business did not seek federal reimbursement cash for the disposal or removal of those specific lost items. When federal investigators discovered the discrepancy and requested specific information regarding the missing assets, company representatives were cooperative. The entity offered to revise its final certification documents to accurately reflect that the final whereabouts and destruction of the lost items could not be validated.
Enforcement Bureau Chief Patrick Webre signed the adopting order on July 17, 2026, officially terminating the active investigation. The bureau determined that accepting the consent decree and ending the inquiry served the public interest by avoiding the expenditure of additional public resources. The regulator affirmed that, barring the discovery of subsequent material evidence, the agency will not use these specific facts to initiate separate proceedings against the entity or question its basic qualifications to hold operational licenses.
The settlement comes at a time when the Texas provider is preparing to exit the marketplace entirely. According to the case text, the company currently generates no operating income and expects to wind down its remaining business functions by the conclusion of 2026.
The $10,000 penalty must be delivered electronically to the United States Treasury within 30 calendar days of the order. The agreement states that failure to submit the funds on time triggers an immediate default, allowing the government to add interest charges calculated using the United States Prime Rate plus an additional 4.75 percent, along with collections fees and litigation costs. Legal notices regarding the order were dispatched to corporate representative Jonathan Foxman in Wayne, Pennsylvania, and legal counsel David LaFuria in Tysons, Virginia.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-674A1.pdf