Federal Executive Branch
Here's a look at documents from the U.S. Executive Branch
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Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: 'Regional Energy Needs Planning Process (CRADA 670) Final Report'
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSLrpt) -- The U.S. Department of Energy Pacific Northwest National Laboratory issued the following report on Oct. 21, 2026, entitled "Regional Energy Needs Planning Process (CRADA 670) Final Report."
Here are excerpts:
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Abstract
The intent of this research was to convene regulators, utility stakeholders, tribes (6 Sovereigns), and the general public/consumer, in a regional analysis spanning Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington.
The novelty was that this analysis would not be conducted in a vacuum, but would be informed by a robust and representative collection ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSLrpt) -- The U.S. Department of Energy Pacific Northwest National Laboratory issued the following report on Oct. 21, 2026, entitled "Regional Energy Needs Planning Process (CRADA 670) Final Report." Here are excerpts: * * * Abstract The intent of this research was to convene regulators, utility stakeholders, tribes (6 Sovereigns), and the general public/consumer, in a regional analysis spanning Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. The novelty was that this analysis would not be conducted in a vacuum, but would be informed by a robust and representative collectionof interested parties from across the region.
Citation
Morris S.L. 2026.
Regional Energy Needs Planning Process (CRADA 670) Final Report.
Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.
PNNL-39650.
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View report at: https://www.pnnl.gov/publications/regional-energy-needs-planning-process-crada-670-final-report
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Abstract
The intent of this research was to convene regulators, utility stakeholders, tribes (6 Sovereigns), and the general public/consumer, in a regional analysis spanning Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington.
The novelty was that this analysis would not be conducted in a vacuum, but would be informed by a robust and representative collection ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSLrpt) -- The U.S. Department of Energy Pacific Northwest National Laboratory issued the following report on Oct. 21, 2026, entitled "Regional Energy Needs Planning Process (CRADA 670) Final Report." Here are excerpts: * * * Abstract The intent of this research was to convene regulators, utility stakeholders, tribes (6 Sovereigns), and the general public/consumer, in a regional analysis spanning Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. The novelty was that this analysis would not be conducted in a vacuum, but would be informed by a robust and representative collectionof interested parties from across the region.
Citation
Morris S.L. 2026.
Regional Energy Needs Planning Process (CRADA 670) Final Report.
Richland, WA: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.
PNNL-39650.
* * *
View report at: https://www.pnnl.gov/publications/regional-energy-needs-planning-process-crada-670-final-report
Justice Department Defends Army Corps' Thorough Review for CWA Permit, Paving the Way for Much Needed Housing Development in Charleston, South Carolina
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 -- The U.S. Department of Justice issued the following news release:
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Justice Department Defends Army Corps' Thorough Review for CWA Permit, Paving the Way for Much Needed Housing Development in Charleston, South Carolina
October 23, 2026
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit today affirmed the issuance by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) of a Clean Water Act Section 404 permit for the Cainhoy Plantation development in Charleston, South Carolina. The published decision paves the way for a major, long term housing initiative designed to meet the needs ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 -- The U.S. Department of Justice issued the following news release: * * * Justice Department Defends Army Corps' Thorough Review for CWA Permit, Paving the Way for Much Needed Housing Development in Charleston, South Carolina October 23, 2026 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit today affirmed the issuance by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) of a Clean Water Act Section 404 permit for the Cainhoy Plantation development in Charleston, South Carolina. The published decision paves the way for a major, long term housing initiative designed to meet the needsof one of the country's fastest growing metropolitan areas.
"Charleston's rapid growth has created a real need for responsibly planned housing," said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Adam Gustafson of ENRD. "This ruling confirms that the Corps followed the law, thoroughly evaluated alternatives, and approved a plan that supplies homes and community infrastructure while protecting the region's most valuable wetlands."
The Corps' permit authorizes carefully planned residential and mixed use development on portions of a 9,076 acre property -- an area the City of Charleston has long identified as essential to meeting regional growth and housing demand. The project will provide new housing, schools, medical facilities, and community services, all while permanently conserving thousands of acres of land.
In affirming the permit, the court recognized that the Corps conducted a thorough, data driven review of numerous alternatives before concluding that none offered a practicable path to delivering needed housing with fewer environmental impacts. The court emphasized that the Corps worked with the developers to reduce projected wetlands impacts by nearly 90%, from 1,820 acres to just 181.5 acres, after years of analysis and refinement.
Attorneys from ENRD's Environmental Defense, Natural Resources, Wildlife and Marine Resources, and Appellate Sections handled the litigation.
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Original text here: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-defends-army-corps-thorough-review-cwa-permit-paving-way-much-needed
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Justice Department Defends Army Corps' Thorough Review for CWA Permit, Paving the Way for Much Needed Housing Development in Charleston, South Carolina
October 23, 2026
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit today affirmed the issuance by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) of a Clean Water Act Section 404 permit for the Cainhoy Plantation development in Charleston, South Carolina. The published decision paves the way for a major, long term housing initiative designed to meet the needs ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 -- The U.S. Department of Justice issued the following news release: * * * Justice Department Defends Army Corps' Thorough Review for CWA Permit, Paving the Way for Much Needed Housing Development in Charleston, South Carolina October 23, 2026 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit today affirmed the issuance by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) of a Clean Water Act Section 404 permit for the Cainhoy Plantation development in Charleston, South Carolina. The published decision paves the way for a major, long term housing initiative designed to meet the needsof one of the country's fastest growing metropolitan areas.
"Charleston's rapid growth has created a real need for responsibly planned housing," said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Adam Gustafson of ENRD. "This ruling confirms that the Corps followed the law, thoroughly evaluated alternatives, and approved a plan that supplies homes and community infrastructure while protecting the region's most valuable wetlands."
The Corps' permit authorizes carefully planned residential and mixed use development on portions of a 9,076 acre property -- an area the City of Charleston has long identified as essential to meeting regional growth and housing demand. The project will provide new housing, schools, medical facilities, and community services, all while permanently conserving thousands of acres of land.
In affirming the permit, the court recognized that the Corps conducted a thorough, data driven review of numerous alternatives before concluding that none offered a practicable path to delivering needed housing with fewer environmental impacts. The court emphasized that the Corps worked with the developers to reduce projected wetlands impacts by nearly 90%, from 1,820 acres to just 181.5 acres, after years of analysis and refinement.
Attorneys from ENRD's Environmental Defense, Natural Resources, Wildlife and Marine Resources, and Appellate Sections handled the litigation.
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Original text here: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-defends-army-corps-thorough-review-cwa-permit-paving-way-much-needed
FEC Issues Digest for Week of Oct. 19-23, 2026
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest:
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Commission meetings and hearings
No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week.
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Employment opportunities
The Commission is accepting applications for the position of Senior Budget Analyst through November 5, 2026.
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Upcoming educational opportunities
November 18, 2026: The Commission is scheduled to host a Winding Down the Campaign & Post-General Reporting Webinar.
For more information on upcoming training opportunities, see the Commission's Trainings ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest: * * * Commission meetings and hearings No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week. * * * Employment opportunities The Commission is accepting applications for the position of Senior Budget Analyst through November 5, 2026. * * * Upcoming educational opportunities November 18, 2026: The Commission is scheduled to host a Winding Down the Campaign & Post-General Reporting Webinar. For more information on upcoming training opportunities, see the Commission's Trainingspage.
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Upcoming reporting due dates
December 3: 30-Day Post-General Reports are due. For more information, see the Pre- and Post-General Reporting schedule.
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Additional research materials
Contribution Limits: In addition to the current limits, the Commission has posted an archive of contribution limits that were in effect going back to the 1975-1976 election cycles.
Federal election results are available. The data was compiled from the official vote totals published by state election offices.
FEC Notify: Want to be notified by email when campaign finance reports are received by the agency? Sign up here.
The Combined Federal State Disclosure and Election Directory is available. This publication identifies the federal and state agencies responsible for the disclosure of campaign finances, lobbying, personal finances, public financing, candidates on the ballot, election results, spending on state initiatives, and other financial filings.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Tax Checkoff Chart provides information on balance of the Fund, monthly deposits into the Fund reported by the Department of the Treasury, payments from the Fund as certified by the FEC, and participation rates of taxpayers as reported by the Internal Revenue Service. For more information on the Presidential Public Funding Program, see the Public Funding of Presidential Elections page.
The FEC Record is available as a continuously updated online news source.
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Original text here: https://www.fec.gov/updates/week-of-october-19-23-2026/
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Commission meetings and hearings
No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week.
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Employment opportunities
The Commission is accepting applications for the position of Senior Budget Analyst through November 5, 2026.
* * *
Upcoming educational opportunities
November 18, 2026: The Commission is scheduled to host a Winding Down the Campaign & Post-General Reporting Webinar.
For more information on upcoming training opportunities, see the Commission's Trainings ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest: * * * Commission meetings and hearings No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week. * * * Employment opportunities The Commission is accepting applications for the position of Senior Budget Analyst through November 5, 2026. * * * Upcoming educational opportunities November 18, 2026: The Commission is scheduled to host a Winding Down the Campaign & Post-General Reporting Webinar. For more information on upcoming training opportunities, see the Commission's Trainingspage.
* * *
Upcoming reporting due dates
December 3: 30-Day Post-General Reports are due. For more information, see the Pre- and Post-General Reporting schedule.
* * *
Additional research materials
Contribution Limits: In addition to the current limits, the Commission has posted an archive of contribution limits that were in effect going back to the 1975-1976 election cycles.
Federal election results are available. The data was compiled from the official vote totals published by state election offices.
FEC Notify: Want to be notified by email when campaign finance reports are received by the agency? Sign up here.
The Combined Federal State Disclosure and Election Directory is available. This publication identifies the federal and state agencies responsible for the disclosure of campaign finances, lobbying, personal finances, public financing, candidates on the ballot, election results, spending on state initiatives, and other financial filings.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Tax Checkoff Chart provides information on balance of the Fund, monthly deposits into the Fund reported by the Department of the Treasury, payments from the Fund as certified by the FEC, and participation rates of taxpayers as reported by the Internal Revenue Service. For more information on the Presidential Public Funding Program, see the Public Funding of Presidential Elections page.
The FEC Record is available as a continuously updated online news source.
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Original text here: https://www.fec.gov/updates/week-of-october-19-23-2026/
FCC: COMMISSIONER GOMEZ URGES BROADCASTERS TO PUSH BACK ON ELECTION-YEAR INTIMIDATION
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSida) -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following news release:
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October 23, 2026
COMMISSIONER GOMEZ URGES BROADCASTERS TO PUSH BACK ON ELECTION-YEAR INTIMIDATION
In letter to NAB, Gomez says reporting on polls this Administration dislikes does not meet the legal bar for news distortion or broadcast hoax investigations
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WASHINGTON--FCC Commissioner Anna M. Gomez today sent a letter to National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) President and CEO Curtis LeGeyt sounding the alarm on the FCC's recent suggestion that broadcasters who air polls this ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSida) -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following news release: * * * October 23, 2026 COMMISSIONER GOMEZ URGES BROADCASTERS TO PUSH BACK ON ELECTION-YEAR INTIMIDATION In letter to NAB, Gomez says reporting on polls this Administration dislikes does not meet the legal bar for news distortion or broadcast hoax investigations - WASHINGTON--FCC Commissioner Anna M. Gomez today sent a letter to National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) President and CEO Curtis LeGeyt sounding the alarm on the FCC's recent suggestion that broadcasters who air polls thisAdministration dislikes could face a news distortion or broadcast hoax investigation. With the midterms less than two weeks away, the letter urges NAB to make sure every station understands what the law actually requires before that threat has its intended chilling effect.
"This Administration is running a coordinated, government-wide effort to reshape the media into its sanctioned messenger, and the Federal Communications Commission has become one of its most active instruments," wrote Commissioner Gomez.
The letter explains that news distortion and broadcast hoax cases require proof of deliberate distortion of a factual report or knowingly false information about a crime or catastrophe.
"Reporting the results of a poll this Administration happens to dislike does not come close to meeting those standards," Gomez added.
Commissioner Gomez also reminded broadcasters what the public interest standard means.
"This agency does not get to redefine the public interest standard as whatever happens to serve the political interests of whoever is in power. That standard was written into the law to protect the audiences these stations are licensed to serve, not the officials who regulate them."
The letter also points to other recent Commission actions on political programming and advertising affecting broadcasters.
"Your members did not sign up to serve as an arm of any political campaign, and they should not be made to choose between their license and their integrity," Commissioner Gomez concluded.
Read the full letter here (https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/gomez-letter-nab.pdf).
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426167A1.pdf
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October 23, 2026
COMMISSIONER GOMEZ URGES BROADCASTERS TO PUSH BACK ON ELECTION-YEAR INTIMIDATION
In letter to NAB, Gomez says reporting on polls this Administration dislikes does not meet the legal bar for news distortion or broadcast hoax investigations
-
WASHINGTON--FCC Commissioner Anna M. Gomez today sent a letter to National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) President and CEO Curtis LeGeyt sounding the alarm on the FCC's recent suggestion that broadcasters who air polls this ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSida) -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following news release: * * * October 23, 2026 COMMISSIONER GOMEZ URGES BROADCASTERS TO PUSH BACK ON ELECTION-YEAR INTIMIDATION In letter to NAB, Gomez says reporting on polls this Administration dislikes does not meet the legal bar for news distortion or broadcast hoax investigations - WASHINGTON--FCC Commissioner Anna M. Gomez today sent a letter to National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) President and CEO Curtis LeGeyt sounding the alarm on the FCC's recent suggestion that broadcasters who air polls thisAdministration dislikes could face a news distortion or broadcast hoax investigation. With the midterms less than two weeks away, the letter urges NAB to make sure every station understands what the law actually requires before that threat has its intended chilling effect.
"This Administration is running a coordinated, government-wide effort to reshape the media into its sanctioned messenger, and the Federal Communications Commission has become one of its most active instruments," wrote Commissioner Gomez.
The letter explains that news distortion and broadcast hoax cases require proof of deliberate distortion of a factual report or knowingly false information about a crime or catastrophe.
"Reporting the results of a poll this Administration happens to dislike does not come close to meeting those standards," Gomez added.
Commissioner Gomez also reminded broadcasters what the public interest standard means.
"This agency does not get to redefine the public interest standard as whatever happens to serve the political interests of whoever is in power. That standard was written into the law to protect the audiences these stations are licensed to serve, not the officials who regulate them."
The letter also points to other recent Commission actions on political programming and advertising affecting broadcasters.
"Your members did not sign up to serve as an arm of any political campaign, and they should not be made to choose between their license and their integrity," Commissioner Gomez concluded.
Read the full letter here (https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/gomez-letter-nab.pdf).
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426167A1.pdf
FCC Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau Issues Public Notice: Bureau Highlights Cybersecurity Best Practices for Communications Service Providers
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (Docket No. DA 26-1109):
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With this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) highlights best practices for broadcasters and telecommunications service providers (collectively, communications service providers) discussed at the Commission's May 14 and 15, 2026 cybersecurity workshops./1 The workshops brought together experts from the Commission, federal ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (Docket No. DA 26-1109): * * * With this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) highlights best practices for broadcasters and telecommunications service providers (collectively, communications service providers) discussed at the Commission's May 14 and 15, 2026 cybersecurity workshops./1 The workshops brought together experts from the Commission, federalpartners, and industry to raise awareness of emerging cybersecurity risks, share and promote best practices, and highlight opportunities for public-private partnership to strengthen cybersecurity and improve incident response across the communications sector./2
I. THREAT LANDSCAPE
The communications sector is a key component of U.S. critical infrastructure and must be resilient to cyberattacks intended to disrupt communications services or exfiltrate sensitive commercial or personal data./3 Telecommunications infrastructure is of particular interest to threat actors, as it is both a target and an attack path: the Internet is the "highway" through which cyberattacks are conveyed, and the telecommunications sector undergirds other critical lifeline functions, such as energy, water, transportation, and finance./4 As a result, communications sector entities, including communications service providers, face growing dangers from criminal groups, foreign state actors, hacktivists, and insider threats./5 Criminal groups are the most likely to be disruptive or destructive to communications service providers in the near-term, while foreign state actors are more likely to "burrow in" to communications service providers' systems for strategic advantage in the future./6
There are multiple ways a threat actor can gain access to communications networks to cause operational disruptions, control systems or services, or exfiltrate data./7 For example, threat actors might engage in social engineering techniques, like impersonating a help desk employee or contractor to gather credentials (e.g., through voice phishing or "vishing"), or attempt to gain access through a compromised link in an e-mail (phishing)./8 Once access is acquired, malicious actors can use ransomware, a type of malicious software, to encrypt a target system's data before demanding a ransom or extorting the victim to decrypt it./9
For broadcasters, unauthorized access can lead to tampering with broadcasts, hijacking transmissions, and manipulating Emergency Alert System (EAS) encoders/decoders./10 The effects of a successful cyberattack can have devastating consequences for a broadcast station. A cyberattack might result in dead air or the broadcast of programming inserted by the threat actor,/11 which could include offensive, obscene, or false information and subject the broadcaster to reputational harm or potential liability./12
For telecommunications service providers, the risks include data loss and disruptions in service continuity and emergency communications./13 Small telecommunications service providers can be critical for connectivity, especially in rural areas./14 Small telecommunications service providers also often inherit the security posture of their vendors, and vulnerabilities in small providers may create risks for the entire sector. This makes robust planning, coordination, and collaboration critically important./15
II. CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES
In general, communications service providers should consult the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), which can help providers better understand, assess, prioritize, and communicate their cybersecurity risk management strategy./16 Providers should implement the below best practices to better mitigate cyber risk.
Develop a Cybersecurity Risk Management Plan. A coherent and thoughtful cybersecurity risk management plan can help shift a provider's security posture from reactive to proactive, allowing it to prioritize threats and make smarter, cost-effective security investments./17 Preparing for cyberattacks as an organization takes buy-in from all internal stakeholders, from technical teams to senior leadership, but it may also include external parties, such as trusted vendors, cyber insurance providers, outside counsel, and marketing/public relations firms./18 To guard against ransom, extortion, and harassment, a cybersecurity risk management plan may include implementing certain practices to reduce the target attack surface for threat actors, including restricting help desk password and multi-factor authentication (MFA) resets without involving a person's manager (to prevent help desk misuse) or prohibiting employees from saving personal contacts on work infrastructure (to prevent the threat actor from using them as leverage)./19
When developing a risk management plan, providers should assess their supply chain risks, including those posed by vendors and other third parties, as attackers are increasingly moving upstream from the communications service provider to target customers or other third parties whose systems are connected with those of the provider./20 Providers should engage with vendors to understand the baseline security of their products or services, potential vulnerabilities, and how they are addressing those vulnerabilities./21 Establishing a line of communication with vendors can facilitate collaboration when situations arise that affect third-party systems and require rapid restoration of the network to a trusted state./22
Conduct a Risk Assessment and Prioritize Critical Assets. Prioritizing protections based on risk can guide your organization's approach in bite-sized, attainable steps that are not overwhelming./23 First, create an inventory to understand what assets are in your network, who is responsible for them, and what their potential attack surfaces and vulnerabilities may be./24 A visual diagram or map of your systems and connections between them can help you determine what is critical, what is exposed, and where there are dependencies./25 After completing your inventory, implement risk-based security controls for each asset: compare the likelihood of a compromise and the amount of harm that could arise from that compromise./26 If the amount of harm that could arise is very high, then that asset is likely one of your "crown jewels" that you should protect at the outset./27 If an asset is highly vulnerable, but its compromise would not expose anything critical to your operations, other assets should likely be addressed first./28 In the case of older/legacy devices that are no longer able to be updated or patched, consider whether the risk of that device being compromised outweighs the cost to protect or replace it./29
Two ways to help keep up with potential vulnerabilities and mitigate risk include: (1) checking the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog to see if CISA has already identified an exploitable vulnerability "in the wild,"/30 which can help your organization understand how to take steps to address the vulnerability, and (2) using an automated vulnerability scanning system./31 It is important to assess and reassess your controls routinely after the first implementation, and to start early to prospectively build in effective protections over time./32
Practice Basic Cyber Hygiene. There are simple and accessible cybersecurity protections that all organizations, as well as individuals, can implement quickly with high impact./33 These practices contribute to traditional "perimeter-based network security," which focuses on preventing attackers from breaching the outer boundary of a network./34
Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Controls. Begin with the "low hanging fruit," such as password security. Ensure that users, services, and hardware are authenticated securely by changing default and test/configuration passwords, enabling MFA, and ensuring passwords and passphrases are complex./35 When applying basic access controls, consider what information employees should or do have access to and implement firewalls to protect against malicious traffic and restrict sensitive information to only those employees who need it./36
Software and Hardware Updates. Software and hardware should be maintained or replaced. Providers should ensure that they have adopted and documented a patch management process. Prioritize updating critical software and equipment - especially those that are exposed to the public Internet./37 Software updates should be tested before deployment to ensure they are safe and that the software operates as expected prior to use, and patches should be implemented as needed./38 For older/legacy devices that can no longer be updated or patched, consider replacing the device, as the cost of a compromise could be greater than the cost of procuring replacement equipment./39
Data Backups. For data security, use encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of network communications. Regularly back up your organization's data and test your backups to ensure they are reliable./40 Consider securely storing backups offline or offsite for additional protection.
Employee Training. Train employees and contractors on proper cyber hygiene practices. Employees should know how to perform the basic cyber hygiene tasks described above (e.g., practicing password hygiene, using MFA, avoiding phishing scams, installing equipment and software updates promptly, and backing up data consistent with company policies). Additionally, ensure employees know how to recognize common attacks and who to contact should problems arise. They should also be encouraged to reach out to those contacts as soon as possible to enable the organization to get ahead of a cyber problem or avoid it altogether./41
Scale Up: Implement a Zero Trust Strategy. While traditional perimeter security is important, recent foreign state-sponsored cyber incidents like Salt Typhoon have underscored the importance of implementing additional controls beyond basic cyber hygiene, such as a "zero trust" security strategy./42 A zero trust strategy accounts for potential "insider threats" by assuming the adversary is already inside the network and restricting accounts, programs, and systems to the bare minimum permissions needed for a user to do their job effectively (i.e., least privilege per-request)./43 In addition to least privilege per-request, network segmentation is another pillar of zero trust./44 Segmentation can make it harder for threat actors to access key data. For example, a firewall can help separate essential systems and prevent a cyber threat actor from moving laterally from one part of a network to another, causing widespread damage./45 Ultimately, when segmenting your network, think about the service provided by each specific function (e.g., corporate/backend vs. customer-facing) and whether they need to be connected, and separate those functions accordingly, where possible./46
For broadcasters, for example, segmentation can help protect the EAS encoder/decoder from cyber threats. Because Internet connectivity is required to reach the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) and for EAS servers to transmit EAS alerts, segmentation for EAS equipment can include creating a firewall that only allows the encoder/decoder to talk to CAP servers, denying all other inbound traffic./47 In accordance with a zero trust strategy, a broadcaster should secure the communications pathway between the studio and the transmitter, and can use a virtual private network (VPN) or some combination of other encryption capabilities via tunneling./48
Continuously Monitor for Indicators of Compromise. Monitoring is key to knowing when something abnormal is happening in your network./49 Continuous monitoring can also alert you when unknown devices or services have been connected to your network./50 For example, every time a user logs in, accesses a file, or makes changes to your system, they leave a digital record. Monitoring consists of logging these records, collecting the logs in a central location, and reviewing the logs in real time, or near real time, to create a clear picture of normal, baseline behavior./51 Having this baseline allows for deviations or unauthorized behavior to be quickly detected. Reducing the number of connections between critical systems can also enable your organization to better monitor those connections, with the added benefit of helping your organization save on monitoring expenses./52
III. INCIDENT RESPONSE
Develop a Cyber Incident Response Plan. Make a cyber incident response plan part of your overall cybersecurity risk management strategy, and practice implementing the plan in advance to avoid having to invent a strategy in the midst of a cyber incident./53 Your response plan should cover the lifecycle of a cyber incident, from detection to containment, investigation, mitigation, remediation, and restoration. Having a response plan in place can help ensure that evidence is preserved, a response timeline is documented, and an out-of-band option (e.g., Signal or WhatsApp) is established to communicate internally when your system might be vulnerable. All business functions (e.g., security, IT, legal, communications) should be included in your response plan. Establishing a core cyber response team can also help ensure that each function's role and responsibilities are clear to enable a rapid response./54 The incident response plan should also allow for anyone who has a stake in a particular cyber incident (e.g., human resources (HR) for an insider issue or where HR data is compromised, a person with a good relationship with a vendor where the vendor is part of the cyber issue)./55 What your organization uncovers during a cyber incident will change over time, so develop a plan that anticipates activating additional teams as needed./56
The plan may only need to be a few pages long with a quick start guide and a flow chart of what do to after detecting a potential cyber incident, but it should include triggers to escalate decision-making as soon as there is suspicion of a cyber incident; waiting for confirmation of an intrusion may be too late to effectively contain and mitigate a threat actor./57 Response planning also bolsters other cybersecurity protections to minimize disruptions to your business, especially for "zero day" attacks that leverage previously unknown vulnerabilities./58
Contain, Investigate, Mitigate. After a cyber incident has been detected, responsive action should prioritize containment (e.g., resetting credentials, isolating affected systems, implementing machine-level containment, blocking malicious traffic)./59 An investigation into the root cause of the incident is also important to find the attacker's entry point, track lateral movement, and identify any data that may have been exfiltrated or compromised. While taking an entire machine out of service may address operational concerns, failing to uncover the root cause could lead to a "whack-a-mole" issue of continuous breaches./60 During incident response, providers should keep their risk thresholds in mind, to ensure that containment and mitigation actions are taken in order of urgency. Response teams should pay attention to which parts of the network are being affected (e.g., back office vs. subscriber network), and whether customer or company devices have been affected, to inform containment and future recovery actions./61 Determining and documenting what went wrong in a post-incident forensic report can help businesses and public safety authorities prepare for similar attacks in the future. Prior collaboration and coordination can improve the effectiveness of the response, which can, in turn, increase the speed of recovery./62
Remediate and Restore. Recovering from a cyber incident includes restoring assets affected by the incident and returning to normal business operations quickly to reduce the impacts of the incident on your organization's systems and the public./63 Communications--internally, externally, and with the government--during incident response are also vitally important. Information that is shared should be as complete and accurate as possible. The initial set of facts that the response team learns about the attack is unlikely to be the same as the final set of facts, so your organization's leadership may have to make decisions with imperfect information./64 Recovery should also inform hardening activities or modernization plans to address any residual risk to protect against the incident happening again./65
Federal Assistance. Communications service providers should reach out to federal authorities to report successful cyberattacks and seek assistance as soon as they become aware of an incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or CISA can assist in tactical monitoring by sharing relevant indicators of compromise, if available./66 Companies can report an incident to the FBI through their local FBI field office,/67 or by submitting a report through the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center./68 Communications service providers can also share information with CISA through its secure cyber incident reporting portal, or contact the FCC Operations Center, which can also assist with coordination./69
Ransomware Attacks. While cybersecurity risk management and incident response plans should apply broadly, aspects of the workshops focused on ransomware attacks as one example of a common threat facing providers, especially broadcasters and small- and medium-sized telecommunications service providers./70 For many ransomware attacks, it is the ability to operate that is being held ransom, so one of the most important things a provider can do is ensure it has sufficient backups to recover its ability to operate./71 After some initial investigation, teams may need to consider whether or how to engage with a ransomware threat actor. Having a practiced incident response plan can help teams avoid shutting down a system prematurely, which could have unintended operational consequences, but may also alert a threat actor that it has been detected./72 Providers should also prepare to engage with their local FBI field office and other third parties such as their cyber insurer or auditor when considering whether to engage in negotiations with a ransomware threat actor./73 Responding to a ransomware attack should also include an evaluation of sanctions risk, which law enforcement and outside counsel can also help navigate./74
IV. CYBERSECURITY RESOURCES
Join communities and build relationships that enable your organization to learn about active cybersecurity threats and best practices to secure your systems against those threats./75 For example, the Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (COMM-ISAC) is a forum for organizations across the telecommunications industry and government to exchange threat information and share success stories of effective security implementations./76 For broadcasters, the Society of Broadcast Engineers, broadcaster associations, and other ISACs can also act as resources./77 Federal agencies, including the FCC, FBI, NIST, and CISA can also provide resources and support./78 The FBI encourages organizations to get in touch with their local field office as soon as possible if a breach occurs so they can help and share information that can assist in your organization's situation./79 Finally, various communications industry associations and groups can also offer resources and best practices./80 No matter the size or sophistication of your organization, there are resources out there to help you prepare in case an incident happens, for the sake of those who rely on your operations.
The information shared in this Public Notice can also be found in the Bureau's Cybersecurity Best Practices Guide, available at https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/CybersecurityBestPracticesGuide102026.pdf. Additional information about the FCC's cybersecurity workshops is available by following these links: Telecommunications Carrier Workshop: https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2026/05/cybersecurity-workshop-telecommunications-carriers; Broadcaster Workshop: https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2026/05/cybersecurity-workshop-broadcasters.
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Original text plus footnotes here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1109A1.pdf
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With this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) highlights best practices for broadcasters and telecommunications service providers (collectively, communications service providers) discussed at the Commission's May 14 and 15, 2026 cybersecurity workshops./1 The workshops brought together experts from the Commission, federal ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau issued the following public notice (Docket No. DA 26-1109): * * * With this Public Notice, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) highlights best practices for broadcasters and telecommunications service providers (collectively, communications service providers) discussed at the Commission's May 14 and 15, 2026 cybersecurity workshops./1 The workshops brought together experts from the Commission, federalpartners, and industry to raise awareness of emerging cybersecurity risks, share and promote best practices, and highlight opportunities for public-private partnership to strengthen cybersecurity and improve incident response across the communications sector./2
I. THREAT LANDSCAPE
The communications sector is a key component of U.S. critical infrastructure and must be resilient to cyberattacks intended to disrupt communications services or exfiltrate sensitive commercial or personal data./3 Telecommunications infrastructure is of particular interest to threat actors, as it is both a target and an attack path: the Internet is the "highway" through which cyberattacks are conveyed, and the telecommunications sector undergirds other critical lifeline functions, such as energy, water, transportation, and finance./4 As a result, communications sector entities, including communications service providers, face growing dangers from criminal groups, foreign state actors, hacktivists, and insider threats./5 Criminal groups are the most likely to be disruptive or destructive to communications service providers in the near-term, while foreign state actors are more likely to "burrow in" to communications service providers' systems for strategic advantage in the future./6
There are multiple ways a threat actor can gain access to communications networks to cause operational disruptions, control systems or services, or exfiltrate data./7 For example, threat actors might engage in social engineering techniques, like impersonating a help desk employee or contractor to gather credentials (e.g., through voice phishing or "vishing"), or attempt to gain access through a compromised link in an e-mail (phishing)./8 Once access is acquired, malicious actors can use ransomware, a type of malicious software, to encrypt a target system's data before demanding a ransom or extorting the victim to decrypt it./9
For broadcasters, unauthorized access can lead to tampering with broadcasts, hijacking transmissions, and manipulating Emergency Alert System (EAS) encoders/decoders./10 The effects of a successful cyberattack can have devastating consequences for a broadcast station. A cyberattack might result in dead air or the broadcast of programming inserted by the threat actor,/11 which could include offensive, obscene, or false information and subject the broadcaster to reputational harm or potential liability./12
For telecommunications service providers, the risks include data loss and disruptions in service continuity and emergency communications./13 Small telecommunications service providers can be critical for connectivity, especially in rural areas./14 Small telecommunications service providers also often inherit the security posture of their vendors, and vulnerabilities in small providers may create risks for the entire sector. This makes robust planning, coordination, and collaboration critically important./15
II. CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES
In general, communications service providers should consult the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), which can help providers better understand, assess, prioritize, and communicate their cybersecurity risk management strategy./16 Providers should implement the below best practices to better mitigate cyber risk.
Develop a Cybersecurity Risk Management Plan. A coherent and thoughtful cybersecurity risk management plan can help shift a provider's security posture from reactive to proactive, allowing it to prioritize threats and make smarter, cost-effective security investments./17 Preparing for cyberattacks as an organization takes buy-in from all internal stakeholders, from technical teams to senior leadership, but it may also include external parties, such as trusted vendors, cyber insurance providers, outside counsel, and marketing/public relations firms./18 To guard against ransom, extortion, and harassment, a cybersecurity risk management plan may include implementing certain practices to reduce the target attack surface for threat actors, including restricting help desk password and multi-factor authentication (MFA) resets without involving a person's manager (to prevent help desk misuse) or prohibiting employees from saving personal contacts on work infrastructure (to prevent the threat actor from using them as leverage)./19
When developing a risk management plan, providers should assess their supply chain risks, including those posed by vendors and other third parties, as attackers are increasingly moving upstream from the communications service provider to target customers or other third parties whose systems are connected with those of the provider./20 Providers should engage with vendors to understand the baseline security of their products or services, potential vulnerabilities, and how they are addressing those vulnerabilities./21 Establishing a line of communication with vendors can facilitate collaboration when situations arise that affect third-party systems and require rapid restoration of the network to a trusted state./22
Conduct a Risk Assessment and Prioritize Critical Assets. Prioritizing protections based on risk can guide your organization's approach in bite-sized, attainable steps that are not overwhelming./23 First, create an inventory to understand what assets are in your network, who is responsible for them, and what their potential attack surfaces and vulnerabilities may be./24 A visual diagram or map of your systems and connections between them can help you determine what is critical, what is exposed, and where there are dependencies./25 After completing your inventory, implement risk-based security controls for each asset: compare the likelihood of a compromise and the amount of harm that could arise from that compromise./26 If the amount of harm that could arise is very high, then that asset is likely one of your "crown jewels" that you should protect at the outset./27 If an asset is highly vulnerable, but its compromise would not expose anything critical to your operations, other assets should likely be addressed first./28 In the case of older/legacy devices that are no longer able to be updated or patched, consider whether the risk of that device being compromised outweighs the cost to protect or replace it./29
Two ways to help keep up with potential vulnerabilities and mitigate risk include: (1) checking the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog to see if CISA has already identified an exploitable vulnerability "in the wild,"/30 which can help your organization understand how to take steps to address the vulnerability, and (2) using an automated vulnerability scanning system./31 It is important to assess and reassess your controls routinely after the first implementation, and to start early to prospectively build in effective protections over time./32
Practice Basic Cyber Hygiene. There are simple and accessible cybersecurity protections that all organizations, as well as individuals, can implement quickly with high impact./33 These practices contribute to traditional "perimeter-based network security," which focuses on preventing attackers from breaching the outer boundary of a network./34
Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Controls. Begin with the "low hanging fruit," such as password security. Ensure that users, services, and hardware are authenticated securely by changing default and test/configuration passwords, enabling MFA, and ensuring passwords and passphrases are complex./35 When applying basic access controls, consider what information employees should or do have access to and implement firewalls to protect against malicious traffic and restrict sensitive information to only those employees who need it./36
Software and Hardware Updates. Software and hardware should be maintained or replaced. Providers should ensure that they have adopted and documented a patch management process. Prioritize updating critical software and equipment - especially those that are exposed to the public Internet./37 Software updates should be tested before deployment to ensure they are safe and that the software operates as expected prior to use, and patches should be implemented as needed./38 For older/legacy devices that can no longer be updated or patched, consider replacing the device, as the cost of a compromise could be greater than the cost of procuring replacement equipment./39
Data Backups. For data security, use encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of network communications. Regularly back up your organization's data and test your backups to ensure they are reliable./40 Consider securely storing backups offline or offsite for additional protection.
Employee Training. Train employees and contractors on proper cyber hygiene practices. Employees should know how to perform the basic cyber hygiene tasks described above (e.g., practicing password hygiene, using MFA, avoiding phishing scams, installing equipment and software updates promptly, and backing up data consistent with company policies). Additionally, ensure employees know how to recognize common attacks and who to contact should problems arise. They should also be encouraged to reach out to those contacts as soon as possible to enable the organization to get ahead of a cyber problem or avoid it altogether./41
Scale Up: Implement a Zero Trust Strategy. While traditional perimeter security is important, recent foreign state-sponsored cyber incidents like Salt Typhoon have underscored the importance of implementing additional controls beyond basic cyber hygiene, such as a "zero trust" security strategy./42 A zero trust strategy accounts for potential "insider threats" by assuming the adversary is already inside the network and restricting accounts, programs, and systems to the bare minimum permissions needed for a user to do their job effectively (i.e., least privilege per-request)./43 In addition to least privilege per-request, network segmentation is another pillar of zero trust./44 Segmentation can make it harder for threat actors to access key data. For example, a firewall can help separate essential systems and prevent a cyber threat actor from moving laterally from one part of a network to another, causing widespread damage./45 Ultimately, when segmenting your network, think about the service provided by each specific function (e.g., corporate/backend vs. customer-facing) and whether they need to be connected, and separate those functions accordingly, where possible./46
For broadcasters, for example, segmentation can help protect the EAS encoder/decoder from cyber threats. Because Internet connectivity is required to reach the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) and for EAS servers to transmit EAS alerts, segmentation for EAS equipment can include creating a firewall that only allows the encoder/decoder to talk to CAP servers, denying all other inbound traffic./47 In accordance with a zero trust strategy, a broadcaster should secure the communications pathway between the studio and the transmitter, and can use a virtual private network (VPN) or some combination of other encryption capabilities via tunneling./48
Continuously Monitor for Indicators of Compromise. Monitoring is key to knowing when something abnormal is happening in your network./49 Continuous monitoring can also alert you when unknown devices or services have been connected to your network./50 For example, every time a user logs in, accesses a file, or makes changes to your system, they leave a digital record. Monitoring consists of logging these records, collecting the logs in a central location, and reviewing the logs in real time, or near real time, to create a clear picture of normal, baseline behavior./51 Having this baseline allows for deviations or unauthorized behavior to be quickly detected. Reducing the number of connections between critical systems can also enable your organization to better monitor those connections, with the added benefit of helping your organization save on monitoring expenses./52
III. INCIDENT RESPONSE
Develop a Cyber Incident Response Plan. Make a cyber incident response plan part of your overall cybersecurity risk management strategy, and practice implementing the plan in advance to avoid having to invent a strategy in the midst of a cyber incident./53 Your response plan should cover the lifecycle of a cyber incident, from detection to containment, investigation, mitigation, remediation, and restoration. Having a response plan in place can help ensure that evidence is preserved, a response timeline is documented, and an out-of-band option (e.g., Signal or WhatsApp) is established to communicate internally when your system might be vulnerable. All business functions (e.g., security, IT, legal, communications) should be included in your response plan. Establishing a core cyber response team can also help ensure that each function's role and responsibilities are clear to enable a rapid response./54 The incident response plan should also allow for anyone who has a stake in a particular cyber incident (e.g., human resources (HR) for an insider issue or where HR data is compromised, a person with a good relationship with a vendor where the vendor is part of the cyber issue)./55 What your organization uncovers during a cyber incident will change over time, so develop a plan that anticipates activating additional teams as needed./56
The plan may only need to be a few pages long with a quick start guide and a flow chart of what do to after detecting a potential cyber incident, but it should include triggers to escalate decision-making as soon as there is suspicion of a cyber incident; waiting for confirmation of an intrusion may be too late to effectively contain and mitigate a threat actor./57 Response planning also bolsters other cybersecurity protections to minimize disruptions to your business, especially for "zero day" attacks that leverage previously unknown vulnerabilities./58
Contain, Investigate, Mitigate. After a cyber incident has been detected, responsive action should prioritize containment (e.g., resetting credentials, isolating affected systems, implementing machine-level containment, blocking malicious traffic)./59 An investigation into the root cause of the incident is also important to find the attacker's entry point, track lateral movement, and identify any data that may have been exfiltrated or compromised. While taking an entire machine out of service may address operational concerns, failing to uncover the root cause could lead to a "whack-a-mole" issue of continuous breaches./60 During incident response, providers should keep their risk thresholds in mind, to ensure that containment and mitigation actions are taken in order of urgency. Response teams should pay attention to which parts of the network are being affected (e.g., back office vs. subscriber network), and whether customer or company devices have been affected, to inform containment and future recovery actions./61 Determining and documenting what went wrong in a post-incident forensic report can help businesses and public safety authorities prepare for similar attacks in the future. Prior collaboration and coordination can improve the effectiveness of the response, which can, in turn, increase the speed of recovery./62
Remediate and Restore. Recovering from a cyber incident includes restoring assets affected by the incident and returning to normal business operations quickly to reduce the impacts of the incident on your organization's systems and the public./63 Communications--internally, externally, and with the government--during incident response are also vitally important. Information that is shared should be as complete and accurate as possible. The initial set of facts that the response team learns about the attack is unlikely to be the same as the final set of facts, so your organization's leadership may have to make decisions with imperfect information./64 Recovery should also inform hardening activities or modernization plans to address any residual risk to protect against the incident happening again./65
Federal Assistance. Communications service providers should reach out to federal authorities to report successful cyberattacks and seek assistance as soon as they become aware of an incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or CISA can assist in tactical monitoring by sharing relevant indicators of compromise, if available./66 Companies can report an incident to the FBI through their local FBI field office,/67 or by submitting a report through the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center./68 Communications service providers can also share information with CISA through its secure cyber incident reporting portal, or contact the FCC Operations Center, which can also assist with coordination./69
Ransomware Attacks. While cybersecurity risk management and incident response plans should apply broadly, aspects of the workshops focused on ransomware attacks as one example of a common threat facing providers, especially broadcasters and small- and medium-sized telecommunications service providers./70 For many ransomware attacks, it is the ability to operate that is being held ransom, so one of the most important things a provider can do is ensure it has sufficient backups to recover its ability to operate./71 After some initial investigation, teams may need to consider whether or how to engage with a ransomware threat actor. Having a practiced incident response plan can help teams avoid shutting down a system prematurely, which could have unintended operational consequences, but may also alert a threat actor that it has been detected./72 Providers should also prepare to engage with their local FBI field office and other third parties such as their cyber insurer or auditor when considering whether to engage in negotiations with a ransomware threat actor./73 Responding to a ransomware attack should also include an evaluation of sanctions risk, which law enforcement and outside counsel can also help navigate./74
IV. CYBERSECURITY RESOURCES
Join communities and build relationships that enable your organization to learn about active cybersecurity threats and best practices to secure your systems against those threats./75 For example, the Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center (COMM-ISAC) is a forum for organizations across the telecommunications industry and government to exchange threat information and share success stories of effective security implementations./76 For broadcasters, the Society of Broadcast Engineers, broadcaster associations, and other ISACs can also act as resources./77 Federal agencies, including the FCC, FBI, NIST, and CISA can also provide resources and support./78 The FBI encourages organizations to get in touch with their local field office as soon as possible if a breach occurs so they can help and share information that can assist in your organization's situation./79 Finally, various communications industry associations and groups can also offer resources and best practices./80 No matter the size or sophistication of your organization, there are resources out there to help you prepare in case an incident happens, for the sake of those who rely on your operations.
The information shared in this Public Notice can also be found in the Bureau's Cybersecurity Best Practices Guide, available at https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/CybersecurityBestPracticesGuide102026.pdf. Additional information about the FCC's cybersecurity workshops is available by following these links: Telecommunications Carrier Workshop: https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2026/05/cybersecurity-workshop-telecommunications-carriers; Broadcaster Workshop: https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/events/2026/05/cybersecurity-workshop-broadcasters.
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Original text plus footnotes here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1109A1.pdf
FCC Issues Notice of Violation to BMG Billings
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has issued a notice of violation entitled "In the Matter of BMG Billings, LLC" (File No.: EB-FIELDWR-24-00037341), following an inspection that uncovered multiple Emergency Alert System infractions at four radio stations in Billings, Montana.
The action targets BMG Billings, LLC, the licensee operating KEWF, KRPM, KYSX, and KRSQ. An agent from the Denver Office visited the facilities at 1302 Avenue D, Suite 103, on July 29, 2026, after receiving a complaint.
During the site check, investigators identified ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has issued a notice of violation entitled "In the Matter of BMG Billings, LLC" (File No.: EB-FIELDWR-24-00037341), following an inspection that uncovered multiple Emergency Alert System infractions at four radio stations in Billings, Montana. The action targets BMG Billings, LLC, the licensee operating KEWF, KRPM, KYSX, and KRSQ. An agent from the Denver Office visited the facilities at 1302 Avenue D, Suite 103, on July 29, 2026, after receiving a complaint. During the site check, investigators identifiedthree specific compliance failures. First, the stations monitored a secondary Emergency Alert System source not assigned to them or listed in the State of Montana Emergency Alert System Plan. Second, the licensee failed to provide signed logs demonstrating that required emergency tests were conducted in accordance with federal rules and operating handbooks. Third, the chief operator failed to take required corrective measures to stop the stations from using the unapproved emergency monitoring source.
Federal officials emphasized that the Emergency Alert System serves a vital public safety role and expects full adherence from broadcast licensees. Issuing this notice does not prevent the agency from taking additional enforcement actions, such as imposing financial penalties.
BMG Billings must submit a written statement within 20 days of the release date. The response must explain the circumstances of each infraction, detail corrective actions taken to prevent repeat occurrences, and provide a timeline for ongoing remedies. Federal regulations require an authorized officer to support the filing with an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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BMG Billings LLC is based in Cherry Hills Village, Colorado.
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URL: BMG Billings LLC
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1148A1.pdf
The action targets BMG Billings, LLC, the licensee operating KEWF, KRPM, KYSX, and KRSQ. An agent from the Denver Office visited the facilities at 1302 Avenue D, Suite 103, on July 29, 2026, after receiving a complaint.
During the site check, investigators identified ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau has issued a notice of violation entitled "In the Matter of BMG Billings, LLC" (File No.: EB-FIELDWR-24-00037341), following an inspection that uncovered multiple Emergency Alert System infractions at four radio stations in Billings, Montana. The action targets BMG Billings, LLC, the licensee operating KEWF, KRPM, KYSX, and KRSQ. An agent from the Denver Office visited the facilities at 1302 Avenue D, Suite 103, on July 29, 2026, after receiving a complaint. During the site check, investigators identifiedthree specific compliance failures. First, the stations monitored a secondary Emergency Alert System source not assigned to them or listed in the State of Montana Emergency Alert System Plan. Second, the licensee failed to provide signed logs demonstrating that required emergency tests were conducted in accordance with federal rules and operating handbooks. Third, the chief operator failed to take required corrective measures to stop the stations from using the unapproved emergency monitoring source.
Federal officials emphasized that the Emergency Alert System serves a vital public safety role and expects full adherence from broadcast licensees. Issuing this notice does not prevent the agency from taking additional enforcement actions, such as imposing financial penalties.
BMG Billings must submit a written statement within 20 days of the release date. The response must explain the circumstances of each infraction, detail corrective actions taken to prevent repeat occurrences, and provide a timeline for ongoing remedies. Federal regulations require an authorized officer to support the filing with an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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BMG Billings LLC is based in Cherry Hills Village, Colorado.
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URL: BMG Billings LLC
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1148A1.pdf
FCC Issues Daily Digest for Oct. 23
WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following Daily Digest (Vol. 45, No. 204) on Oct. 23, 2026:
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THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE DATED AND RELEASED TODAY:
PUBLIC NOTICES
Report No: TEL-02693NS. Released: 2026-10-23. NON STREAMLINED INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS/PETITIONS ACCEPTED FOR FILING - ITC. (DA No. 26-1149). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1149A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1149A1.pdf) DA-26-1149A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1149A1.txt)
Report No: SCL-00644S. Released: 2026-10-23. STREAMLINED ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following Daily Digest (Vol. 45, No. 204) on Oct. 23, 2026: * * * THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE DATED AND RELEASED TODAY: PUBLIC NOTICES Report No: TEL-02693NS. Released: 2026-10-23. NON STREAMLINED INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS/PETITIONS ACCEPTED FOR FILING - ITC. (DA No. 26-1149). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1149A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1149A1.pdf) DA-26-1149A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1149A1.txt) Report No: SCL-00644S. Released: 2026-10-23. STREAMLINEDSUBMARINE CABLE LANDING LICENSE APPLICATIONS - SCL. (DA No. 26-1151). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1151A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1151A1.pdf) DA-26-1151A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1151A1.txt)
Report No: SCL-00645NS. Released: 2026-10-23. NON-STREAMLINED SUBMARINE CABLE LANDING LICENSE APPLICATIONS - SCL. (DA No. 26-1153). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1153A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1153A1.pdf) DA-26-1153A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1153A1.txt)
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-3-261023-01. Released: 2026-10-23. PLEADINGS. MB. DOC-426143A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426143A1.pdf) DOC-426143A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426143A1.txt)
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-2-261023-01. Released: 2026-10-23. ACTIONS. MB. DOC-426142A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426142A1.pdf) DOC-426142A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426142A1.txt)
Report No: SAT-02049. Released: 2026-10-23. SATELLITE LICENSING DIVISION AND SATELLITE PROGRAMS AND POLICY DIVISION INFORMATION - SAT - ACTIONS TAKEN. (DA No. 26-1147). SB. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1147A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1147A1.pdf) DA-26-1147A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1147A1.txt)
Report No: ISP-00004. Released: 2026-10-23. SECTION 310(B) PETITIONS FOR DECLARATORY RULING - ISP. (DA No. 26-1152). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1152A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1152A1.pdf) DA-26-1152A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1152A1.txt)
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-1-261023-01. Released: 2026-10-23. APPLICATIONS. MB. DOC-426141A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426141A1.pdf) DOC-426141A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426141A1.txt)
Report No: TEL-02694S. Released: 2026-10-23. STREAMLINED INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS ACCEPTED FOR FILING - ITC. (DA No. 26-1150). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1150A1.pdf DA-26-1150A1.txt
Released: 2026-10-23. PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU HIGHLIGHTS CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS. (DA No. 26-1109). (Dkt No 18-99). PSHSB. DA-26-1109A1.docx DA-26-1109A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1150A1.pdf) DA-26-1109A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1150A1.txt)
Released: 2026-10-23. EX PARTE PRESENTATIONS AND POST-REPLY COMMENT PERIOD FILING IN PERMIT-BUT-DISCLOSURE PROCEEDINGS RECEIVED ON 10-22-26. OMD. Contact: Kenneth Hill, 202-418-7521. DOC-426144A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1150A1.pdf) DOC-426144A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426144A1.txt)
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TEXTS
TELNYX, LLC INTERNATIONAL SIGNALING POINT CODE APPLICATIONS, FILE NOS. SPC-NEW-20260420-00003, SPC-NEW-20260430-00004, SPC-NEW-20260430-00005. OIA grant of Telnyx, LLC's applications for three International Signaling Point Codes and provisional assignment of two codes for use in Chicago. IL and one code for use in Ashburn, VA.. Action by: Office of International Affairs/Telecommunications and Analysis Division. by LETTER. (DA No. 26-1143). OIA. Contact: OIA, Arthur Lechtman and Stacey Ashton. DA-26-1143A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1143A1.pdf) DA-26-1143A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1143A1.txt)
IN THE MATTER OF BMG BILLINGS, LLC -- BILLINGS, MONTANA. Notice of Violation issued for violation(s) as noted in the attached.. by NOV. (DA No. 26-1148). EB. DA-26-1148A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1148A1.docx) DA-26-1148A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1148A1.pdf) DA-26-1148A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1148A1.txt)
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ADDENDA: THE FOLLOWING ITEMS, RELEASED OCTOBER 22, 2026, DID NOT APPEAR IN DIGEST NO. 203:
SUNSHINE NOTICE
FCC TO HOLD OPEN COMMISSION MEETING THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2026. Sunshine Notice. DOC-426131A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426131A1.docx) DOC-426131A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426131A1.pdf) DOC-426131A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426131A1.txt)
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NEWS RELEASES
FCC BLOCKS TWO DEVICES CONTAINING FOREIGN SURVEILLANCE CHIPS. The FCC prevented two devices (a dashboard camera and a wireless video transmitter) from being marketed or sold in the United States.. by News Release. News Media Contact: MediaRelations@fcc.gov (202) 418-0500. OMR OET. DOC-426130A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426130A1.docx) DOC-426130A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426130A1.pdf) DOC-426130A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426130A1.txt)
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PUBLIC NOTICES
Released: 2026-10-22. PSHSB ANNOUNCES REGION 42 (VIRGINIA) RPCS TO HOLD 700 MHZ AND 800 MHZ MEETINGS. (DA No. 26-1144). (Dkt No 23-237 02-378). Announces Region 42 (VA) RPC Meetings for 700 MHZ and 800 MHZ. PSHSB. Contact: Diana Coho (717) 338-2848. News Media Contact: John Evanoff (202) 418- 0848. Action by: PSHSB. DA-26-1144A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1144A1.docx) DA-26-1144A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1144A1.pdf) DA-26-1144A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1144A1.txt)
Released: 2026-10-22. DOMESTIC SECTION 214 APPLICATION FILED FOR THE ACQUISITION OF ASSETS AND TRANSFERS OF CONTROL BY AND TO ADAMS TELEPHONE CO-OPERATIVE AND ADAMS TELSYSTEMS, INC. (DA No. 26-1139). (Dkt No 26-268). Comments Due: 2026-11-05. Reply Comments Due: 2026-11-12. WCB OIA OGC. Contact: Megan Danner, Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at (202) 418-1151.. DA-26-1139A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1139A1.docx) DA-26-1139A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1139A1.pdf) DA-26-1139A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1139A1.txt)
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TEXTS
421 NE 6TH ST LLC -- FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA. NOHI for radio interference to City of Fort Lauderdale's public safety system. Action by: Regional Director, Region Two. by NOHI. (DA No. 26-1141). EB. DA-26-1141A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1141A1.docx) DA-26-1141A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1141A1.pdf) DA-26-1141A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1141A1.txt)
DALE E. WILLIFORD -- SILSBEE, TEXAS. Notice of Violation issued for violation(s) as noted in the attached.. by NOV. (DA No. 26-1140). EB. DA-26-1140A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1140A1.docx) DA-26-1140A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1140A1.pdf) DA-26-1140A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1140A1.txt)
INTEL CORPORATION PETITION FOR EXPEDITED WAIVER TO PERMIT CONTINUED USE AND MAINTENANCE OF CERTAIN AUTOMATED GUIDED VEHICLES. By this Order we grant the request of Intel Corporation ("Intel") for an Expedited Waiver of Sections 2.932 and 2.1043 of the Commission's rules to permit the continued utilization of specific Automated Guided Vehicles ("AGVs") for a period of one year. . Action by: By the Office of Engineering and Technology. Adopted: 2026-10-22 by ORDER. (DA No. 26-1146). OET. DA-26-1146A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1146A1.docx) DA-26-1146A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1146A1.pdf) DA-26-1146A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1146A1.txt)
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Original text here: https://www.fcc.gov/edocs/daily-digest/2026/10/23
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THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE DATED AND RELEASED TODAY:
PUBLIC NOTICES
Report No: TEL-02693NS. Released: 2026-10-23. NON STREAMLINED INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS/PETITIONS ACCEPTED FOR FILING - ITC. (DA No. 26-1149). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1149A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1149A1.pdf) DA-26-1149A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1149A1.txt)
Report No: SCL-00644S. Released: 2026-10-23. STREAMLINED ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following Daily Digest (Vol. 45, No. 204) on Oct. 23, 2026: * * * THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE DATED AND RELEASED TODAY: PUBLIC NOTICES Report No: TEL-02693NS. Released: 2026-10-23. NON STREAMLINED INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS/PETITIONS ACCEPTED FOR FILING - ITC. (DA No. 26-1149). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1149A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1149A1.pdf) DA-26-1149A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1149A1.txt) Report No: SCL-00644S. Released: 2026-10-23. STREAMLINEDSUBMARINE CABLE LANDING LICENSE APPLICATIONS - SCL. (DA No. 26-1151). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1151A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1151A1.pdf) DA-26-1151A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1151A1.txt)
Report No: SCL-00645NS. Released: 2026-10-23. NON-STREAMLINED SUBMARINE CABLE LANDING LICENSE APPLICATIONS - SCL. (DA No. 26-1153). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1153A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1153A1.pdf) DA-26-1153A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1153A1.txt)
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-3-261023-01. Released: 2026-10-23. PLEADINGS. MB. DOC-426143A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426143A1.pdf) DOC-426143A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426143A1.txt)
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-2-261023-01. Released: 2026-10-23. ACTIONS. MB. DOC-426142A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426142A1.pdf) DOC-426142A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426142A1.txt)
Report No: SAT-02049. Released: 2026-10-23. SATELLITE LICENSING DIVISION AND SATELLITE PROGRAMS AND POLICY DIVISION INFORMATION - SAT - ACTIONS TAKEN. (DA No. 26-1147). SB. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1147A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1147A1.pdf) DA-26-1147A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1147A1.txt)
Report No: ISP-00004. Released: 2026-10-23. SECTION 310(B) PETITIONS FOR DECLARATORY RULING - ISP. (DA No. 26-1152). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1152A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1152A1.pdf) DA-26-1152A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1152A1.txt)
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-1-261023-01. Released: 2026-10-23. APPLICATIONS. MB. DOC-426141A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426141A1.pdf) DOC-426141A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426141A1.txt)
Report No: TEL-02694S. Released: 2026-10-23. STREAMLINED INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS ACCEPTED FOR FILING - ITC. (DA No. 26-1150). OIA. Contact: ICFSinfo@fcc.gov. DA-26-1150A1.pdf DA-26-1150A1.txt
Released: 2026-10-23. PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU HIGHLIGHTS CYBERSECURITY BEST PRACTICES FOR COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS. (DA No. 26-1109). (Dkt No 18-99). PSHSB. DA-26-1109A1.docx DA-26-1109A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1150A1.pdf) DA-26-1109A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1150A1.txt)
Released: 2026-10-23. EX PARTE PRESENTATIONS AND POST-REPLY COMMENT PERIOD FILING IN PERMIT-BUT-DISCLOSURE PROCEEDINGS RECEIVED ON 10-22-26. OMD. Contact: Kenneth Hill, 202-418-7521. DOC-426144A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1150A1.pdf) DOC-426144A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426144A1.txt)
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TEXTS
TELNYX, LLC INTERNATIONAL SIGNALING POINT CODE APPLICATIONS, FILE NOS. SPC-NEW-20260420-00003, SPC-NEW-20260430-00004, SPC-NEW-20260430-00005. OIA grant of Telnyx, LLC's applications for three International Signaling Point Codes and provisional assignment of two codes for use in Chicago. IL and one code for use in Ashburn, VA.. Action by: Office of International Affairs/Telecommunications and Analysis Division. by LETTER. (DA No. 26-1143). OIA. Contact: OIA, Arthur Lechtman and Stacey Ashton. DA-26-1143A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1143A1.pdf) DA-26-1143A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1143A1.txt)
IN THE MATTER OF BMG BILLINGS, LLC -- BILLINGS, MONTANA. Notice of Violation issued for violation(s) as noted in the attached.. by NOV. (DA No. 26-1148). EB. DA-26-1148A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1148A1.docx) DA-26-1148A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1148A1.pdf) DA-26-1148A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1148A1.txt)
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ADDENDA: THE FOLLOWING ITEMS, RELEASED OCTOBER 22, 2026, DID NOT APPEAR IN DIGEST NO. 203:
SUNSHINE NOTICE
FCC TO HOLD OPEN COMMISSION MEETING THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2026. Sunshine Notice. DOC-426131A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426131A1.docx) DOC-426131A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426131A1.pdf) DOC-426131A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426131A1.txt)
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NEWS RELEASES
FCC BLOCKS TWO DEVICES CONTAINING FOREIGN SURVEILLANCE CHIPS. The FCC prevented two devices (a dashboard camera and a wireless video transmitter) from being marketed or sold in the United States.. by News Release. News Media Contact: MediaRelations@fcc.gov (202) 418-0500. OMR OET. DOC-426130A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426130A1.docx) DOC-426130A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426130A1.pdf) DOC-426130A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426130A1.txt)
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PUBLIC NOTICES
Released: 2026-10-22. PSHSB ANNOUNCES REGION 42 (VIRGINIA) RPCS TO HOLD 700 MHZ AND 800 MHZ MEETINGS. (DA No. 26-1144). (Dkt No 23-237 02-378). Announces Region 42 (VA) RPC Meetings for 700 MHZ and 800 MHZ. PSHSB. Contact: Diana Coho (717) 338-2848. News Media Contact: John Evanoff (202) 418- 0848. Action by: PSHSB. DA-26-1144A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1144A1.docx) DA-26-1144A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1144A1.pdf) DA-26-1144A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1144A1.txt)
Released: 2026-10-22. DOMESTIC SECTION 214 APPLICATION FILED FOR THE ACQUISITION OF ASSETS AND TRANSFERS OF CONTROL BY AND TO ADAMS TELEPHONE CO-OPERATIVE AND ADAMS TELSYSTEMS, INC. (DA No. 26-1139). (Dkt No 26-268). Comments Due: 2026-11-05. Reply Comments Due: 2026-11-12. WCB OIA OGC. Contact: Megan Danner, Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at (202) 418-1151.. DA-26-1139A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1139A1.docx) DA-26-1139A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1139A1.pdf) DA-26-1139A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1139A1.txt)
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TEXTS
421 NE 6TH ST LLC -- FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA. NOHI for radio interference to City of Fort Lauderdale's public safety system. Action by: Regional Director, Region Two. by NOHI. (DA No. 26-1141). EB. DA-26-1141A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1141A1.docx) DA-26-1141A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1141A1.pdf) DA-26-1141A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1141A1.txt)
DALE E. WILLIFORD -- SILSBEE, TEXAS. Notice of Violation issued for violation(s) as noted in the attached.. by NOV. (DA No. 26-1140). EB. DA-26-1140A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1140A1.docx) DA-26-1140A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1140A1.pdf) DA-26-1140A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1140A1.txt)
INTEL CORPORATION PETITION FOR EXPEDITED WAIVER TO PERMIT CONTINUED USE AND MAINTENANCE OF CERTAIN AUTOMATED GUIDED VEHICLES. By this Order we grant the request of Intel Corporation ("Intel") for an Expedited Waiver of Sections 2.932 and 2.1043 of the Commission's rules to permit the continued utilization of specific Automated Guided Vehicles ("AGVs") for a period of one year. . Action by: By the Office of Engineering and Technology. Adopted: 2026-10-22 by ORDER. (DA No. 26-1146). OET. DA-26-1146A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1146A1.docx) DA-26-1146A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1146A1.pdf) DA-26-1146A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1146A1.txt)
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Original text here: https://www.fcc.gov/edocs/daily-digest/2026/10/23