Federal Executive Branch
Here's a look at documents from the U.S. Executive Branch
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White House Fact Sheet: Withdrawing From International Organizations
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 -- The White House issued the following fact sheet on Jan. 7, 2026:
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President Donald J. Trump Withdraws the United States from International Organizations that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States
WITHDRAWING FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum directing the withdrawal of the United States from 66 international organizations that no longer serve American interests.
* The Memorandum orders all Executive Departments and Agencies to cease participating in and funding 35 non-United Nations (UN)
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 -- The White House issued the following fact sheet on Jan. 7, 2026:
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President Donald J. Trump Withdraws the United States from International Organizations that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States
WITHDRAWING FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum directing the withdrawal of the United States from 66 international organizations that no longer serve American interests.
* The Memorandum orders all Executive Departments and Agencies to cease participating in and funding 35 non-United Nations (UN)organizations and 31 UN entities that operate contrary to U.S. national interests, security, economic prosperity, or sovereignty.
* This follows a review ordered earlier this year of all international intergovernmental organizations, conventions, and treaties that the United States is a member of or party to, or that the United States funds or supports.
* These withdrawals will end American taxpayer funding and involvement in entities that advance globalist agendas over U.S. priorities, or that address important issues inefficiently or ineffectively such that U.S. taxpayer dollars are best allocated in other ways to support the relevant missions.
RESTORING AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY: President Trump is ending U.S. participation in international organizations that undermine America's independence and waste taxpayer dollars on ineffective or hostile agendas.
* Many of these bodies promote radical climate policies, global governance, and ideological programs that conflict with U.S. sovereignty and economic strength.
* American taxpayers have spent billions on these organizations with little return, while they often criticize U.S. policies, advance agendas contrary to our values, or waste taxpayer dollars by purporting to address important issues but not achieving any real results.
* By exiting these entities, President Trump is saving taxpayer money and refocusing resources on America First priorities.
PUTTING AMERICA FIRST ON THE GLOBAL STAGE: President Trump has consistently fought to protect U.S. sovereignty and ensure international engagements serve American interests.
* Immediately upon returning to office, President Trump initiated the withdrawal of the United States from the World Health Organization and the Paris Climate Agreement.
* On Day One of his Administration, President Trump also signed a Presidential Memorandum to notify the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development that its Global Tax Deal has no force or effect in the United States, and direct an investigation into whether foreign countries have tax rules in place that are extraterritorial or disproportionately affect American companies.
* Just weeks later, President Trump signed an Executive Order withdrawing the United States from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and prohibiting any future funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency for the Near East (UNRWA).
* He has prioritized American interests by redirecting focus and resources toward domestic priorities such as infrastructure, military readiness, and border security, and acting swiftly to protect American companies from foreign interference.
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Original text here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-withdraws-the-united-states-from-international-organizations-that-are-contrary-to-the-interests-of-the-united-states/
State Department Issues Public Schedule for Jan. 7, 2026
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 -- The U.S. Department of State issued the daily public schedule for Jan. 7, 2026:
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SECRETARY MARCO RUBIO
10:00 a.m. Secretary Rubio briefs members of the Senate on Capitol Hill.
(MEDIA DETERMINED BY HOST)
11:30 a.m. Secretary Rubio briefs members of the House of Representatives on Capitol Hill.
(MEDIA DETERMINED BY HOST)
1:30 p.m. Secretary Rubio meets with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at the Department of State.
(CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP)
Call time for video cameras, still cameras, and writers is 1:00 p.m. from the 23rd Street entrance.
DEPUTY
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 -- The U.S. Department of State issued the daily public schedule for Jan. 7, 2026:
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SECRETARY MARCO RUBIO
10:00 a.m. Secretary Rubio briefs members of the Senate on Capitol Hill.
(MEDIA DETERMINED BY HOST)
11:30 a.m. Secretary Rubio briefs members of the House of Representatives on Capitol Hill.
(MEDIA DETERMINED BY HOST)
1:30 p.m. Secretary Rubio meets with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at the Department of State.
(CAMERA SPRAY AT TOP)
Call time for video cameras, still cameras, and writers is 1:00 p.m. from the 23rd Street entrance.
DEPUTYSECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER LANDAU
Deputy Secretary Landau attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES MICHAEL J. RIGAS
Deputy Secretary Rigas has no public appointments.
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ALLISON M. HOOKER
1:30 p.m. Under Secretary Hooker joins Secretary Rubio's meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at the Department of State.
BRIEFING SCHEDULE
No Department Press Briefing.
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Original text here: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/public-schedule-january-7-2026/
First Joint NOAA Killer Whale Survey Examines Endangered Southern Residents' Shift to Coast
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 -- The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration issued the following news:
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First Joint NOAA Killer Whale Survey Examines Endangered Southern Residents' Shift to Coast
Two NOAA vessels use new technologies to collect more data in less time.
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NOAA's Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary and NOAA Fisheries combined forces in a September survey of endangered Southern Resident killer whales. The survey employed new technologies to study the whales' summertime shift to Washington coastal waters.
Crew of the two NOAA boats that completed the 10-day survey were
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 -- The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration issued the following news:
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First Joint NOAA Killer Whale Survey Examines Endangered Southern Residents' Shift to Coast
Two NOAA vessels use new technologies to collect more data in less time.
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NOAA's Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary and NOAA Fisheries combined forces in a September survey of endangered Southern Resident killer whales. The survey employed new technologies to study the whales' summertime shift to Washington coastal waters.
Crew of the two NOAA boats that completed the 10-day survey werestruck by the rich ecosystem near the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The whales have increasingly spent their spring and summer months in the area. While about 100 miles from the San Juan Islands, where the whales have long frequented in summer, the coastal waters were active with killer whales. Steller sea lions, salmon, and humpback whales were also visible, likely feeding on herring, smelt, and more.
"It's a very rich area, biologically," said Candice Emmons, a research scientist at NOAA Fisheries' Northwest Fisheries Science Center, who led the survey with Marla Holt, also a research scientist at the center. Underwater bathymetry in the area shapes upwelling of deep, nutrient-rich water that fuels its productivity, explained Kwasi Addae, who captained the Sanctuary's R/V Storm Petrel , throughout the survey.
The survey sought to unravel what is behind the whales' shift to the more remote coastal waters. This is the same area where cargo ships enter shipping lanes that lead into the Salish Sea. The survey's scientific findings can help find ways for fisheries and maritime traffic to coexist with the whales and continue to contribute to the coastal economy.
Boats Support Each Other
Sanctuary crew operated the 52-foot R/V Storm Petrel while staff from NOAA Fisheries' Science Center in Seattle operated a smaller and more maneuverable 24-foot Zodiac. They worked together to locate and photograph killer whales and to collect water samples for environmental DNA (eDNA) analysis, acoustic recordings, prey and fecal samples, and more. The Storm Petrel provided a higher observation deck where spotters could watch for the whales and direct the smaller boat. It also provided greater stability in the turbulent coastal waters.
The R/V Storm Petrel also carried the equipment and skilled crew to deploy a semi-automated instrument called an Ocean Diagnostics eDNA sampler. It collects seawater samples at specific depths. Scientists will examine the samples over the winter for DNA from the skin cells, mucus, feces, and other biological material shed by whales and other marine life as they move through the water. The DNA would reveal what species it is from.
Analysis of the 15 sets of eDNA samples will help identify prey species in the area, which Holt likened to "what's on the menu" for the Southern Residents. The 28 prey and fecal samples collected from the whales will more clearly reveal which of the species on the menu the whales are eating.
"The collaboration enabled us to more than double our effort because we could work more effectively to collect more data in less time," Holt said. "We maximized the capabilities of both vessels."
Revealing Whale Diets
The larger Storm Petrel stopped to collect eDNA samples at multiple depths. Biologists on the smaller boat followed the whales to collect acoustic data, fecal samples, and bits of killer whale prey. One of the survey's key questions is what the killer whales are eating in the coastal Washington waters. Did new sources of prey draw them to the area? Researchers want to know how it compares to their salmon-dominated diet near the San Juans.
Combining the genetic data from eDNA research, underwater recordings, and prey and fecal samples will help tell that story, Holt said. "We have this wealth of information," she said. "How do they marry up, and what does that say about how they are spending their time."
The Southern Residents were once a summer fixture in and around the San Juan Islands as they pursued salmon returning to the Fraser River. The killer whales, and the area's wealth of other marine life, made the islands a whale watching hotspot from both land and sea. Washington state regulations now require vessels to stay at least 1,000 yards--half a nautical mile--from the Southern Residents.
Around the mid-2010s, the Southern Residents began spending more of the spring and summer around 100 miles to the west. They shifted to the mouth of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and along the southwest coast of Vancouver Island. That shift increased over the last decade, with research documenting their complete absence from the Salish Sea in some summer months.
Whale Populations Overlap
The shift has put the Southern Residents closer to the Northern Resident killer whales . This separate fish-eating population of resident killer whales frequents British Columbia waters in Canada. The two populations now use some of the same waters along the coast of Vancouver Island in summer months, and scientists want to know if that creates competition for prey.
One day, the survey team encountered the two populations less than 6 miles apart. While both appeared to be pursuing prey, they showed no interest in each other. "They were probably feeding on different things," Emmons said.
Acoustic recordings pick up clicks the whales use to track and capture prey with echolocation as well as other vocalizations unique to the population. That provides additional clues about how the whales are using the area. It builds on a record of similar recordings that NOAA scientists have collected in the area over the last two decades.
The survey illustrated the vision the sanctuary staff had for Storm Petrel when they obtained the custom-built catamaran with on-board laboratories in 2021. They hoped it would attract research partners to focus new methods on resources and species in the sanctuary, said Helene Scalliet, deputy superintendent of the sanctuary. "This is exactly the kind of research we were hoping to bring to the sanctuary," she said. "That helps us understand how the whales are using these waters, which helps inform management."
At the same time, NOAA Fisheries will gain an updated picture of how the endangered whales move through their range over the course of the year, and what they eat as they go. That is important because research has identified prey availability as one of the main threats facing the population.
"It's answering the questions, 'What are they doing out here, what are they eating, and why are they using this area now?" Holt said. "All those answers help understand what they need, and whether that is changing."
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Original text here: https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/first-joint-noaa-killer-whale-survey-examines-endangered-southern-residents-shift
Fed: Assessing Recession Risks With State-Level Data
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 -- The Federal Reserve issued the following Fed Notes article:
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Assessing Recession Risks with State-Level Data/1
By Hie Joo Ahn/2, Yunjong Eo/3, and Lucas Moyon
This note evaluates recession risks at the national and state levels using a state-of-the-art Bayesian Markov-switching model that distinguishes between full-recovery recessions (U-shaped recessions) and those that generate lasting damage, or hysteresis (L-shaped recessions). While states exhibit considerable heterogeneity in their business-cycle experiences, most saw some degree of hysteresis in the past recessions
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 -- The Federal Reserve issued the following Fed Notes article:
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Assessing Recession Risks with State-Level Data/1
By Hie Joo Ahn/2, Yunjong Eo/3, and Lucas Moyon
This note evaluates recession risks at the national and state levels using a state-of-the-art Bayesian Markov-switching model that distinguishes between full-recovery recessions (U-shaped recessions) and those that generate lasting damage, or hysteresis (L-shaped recessions). While states exhibit considerable heterogeneity in their business-cycle experiences, most saw some degree of hysteresis in the past recessionsthat occurred prior to the COVID pandemic. By contrast, the model classifies the pandemic-induced recession as a full-recovery episode with a low likelihood of hysteresis, reflecting the rapid rebound from the sharp downturn. The model suggests that the risk of a national recession has been low of late, though the state-level data reveal pockets of risk.
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The U.S. economy has seen large cyclical swings over the past five years. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic brought economic activity to an abrupt halt, but a combination of fiscal stimulus, expansionary monetary policy, and the vaccine rollout supported a swift recovery (e.g., Fleming et al., 2020; Milstein and Wessel, 2024; Romer, 2021). But was there lasting damage to the economy? Are we now at risk of another recession?
Recent research by Ahn and Eo (2025) can help answer these questions./4 Ahn and Eo examine hysteresis risks at both the aggregate and regional levels by estimating a state-of-the-art Bayesian Markov-switching model using national- and state-level nonfarm payroll employment data. The model classifies the business cycle into one of three phases--expansion, U shaped recession, and L-shaped recession--and estimates, for each point in time, the probability that each U.S. state is in one of these phases./5 In doing so, the model accounts for secular changes in aggregate and state-level employment growth that reflect long-run structural shifts in regional labor markets, while also appropriately adjusting for the unprecedented swings in the data seen during the pandemic and subsequent recovery./6
Figure 1 gives a stylized example of the three business-cycle phases we measure. The economy is in expansion when employment growth is at or above its long-run rate, and in recession when employment growth is negative for a sustained period. Recessions are further distinguished by two recovery patterns. In a U-shaped recession, employment eventually returns to the path it would have followed absent the recession (dashed blue line). In contrast, an L-shaped recession permanently lowers the level of employment, and the subsequent expansion does not restore employment to its pre-recession trajectory (solid blue line). This L-shaped recovery is referred to as hysteresis, a phenomenon in which recessionary shocks have permanent or long-lasting effects on economic activity. Hysteresis can occur following a negative demand shock if firms sharply reduce employment and productive capacity, in turn generating persistent adverse effects on the economy's productive potential (partly by destroying job-specific human capital and weakening workers' attachment to the labor market--see Blanchard, 2018).
Figure 1. Illustration of L- and U-shaped recessions
In this note, we extend Ahn and Eo (2025)'s estimates using data from 1960:Q1 to 2025:Q4 and assess both the risk of hysteresis stemming from the COVID-19 recession and national and regional recession probabilities in recent years./7
Figure 2 displays the probabilities of U-shaped and L-shaped recessions estimated using national-level payroll employment growth (Panel A) and real GDP growth (Panel B)./8 The recession probabilities closely align with the NBER recession dates. In addition, using payroll employment yields higher probabilities of L-shaped recessions, suggesting that hysteresis effects are stronger in the labor market than in aggregate output./9 A prominent example is the Great Recession: The employment-based estimate classifies this period as an L shaped recession, but the GDP-based estimate classifies it as a U-shaped recession with a prolonged recovery./10
Figure 2. National-Level Recession Probabilities
State-level payroll employment data reveal rich heterogeneity in regional business cycles that is not apparent in national aggregates. Figure 3 presents heatmaps of recession probabilities for the two types of recessions (U-shaped in Panel A and L-shaped in Panel B). Although all the states generally experienced economic downturns at similar times--across states, the elevated recession probabilities line up with NBER recessions--the magnitudes of these recessions varied considerably across states. Some states also experienced idiosyncratic downturns not observed in other areas. For example, Louisiana faced a recession with both U-shaped and L shaped characteristics in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina, and North Dakota underwent an L shaped recession in 2015 following the boom and subsequent bust in shale oil production.
Figure 3. Probabilities of L- and U-shaped Recessions across States over Time
It is notable that, across states, U-shaped recessions became less common after the 1990s (Panel B of Figure 3), making L-shaped recoveries the dominant feature of recessions during this period. This pattern reflects pervasive jobless recoveries and varying degrees of hysteresis in regional labor markets.
Focusing on the pandemic recession and recovery (2020 onward), the model classifies the recession as U-shaped in the aggregate as well as across states, consistent with the swift rebound that followed (Figures 2 and 3). Nonetheless, some states--such as New York and New Jersey--exhibit somewhat elevated probabilities of an L-shaped recession, suggesting lasting damage./11
In recent years (2023-2025), the likelihood that the U.S. economy is in a recession has remained low, with state-level recession probabilities ranging from zero to 10 percent. While most states' probabilities are close to zero, Massachusetts and Rhode Island exhibit U-shaped recession probabilities near 10 percent, which are low but not negligible. Consistent with this pattern, evidence from the Federal Reserve's August 2025 Beige Book indicates that the New England economy is faring worse than the national economy, and the November 2025 Beige Book indicates that the level of employment in that region had edged lower due to weakened demand (but without major layoffs)./12 Thus, while the U.S. economy is unlikely to have entered a recession, the state-level data point to pockets of risk./13
Although the Bayesian Markov-switching model is effective for interpreting history, predicting a recession in advance still remains as a challenging task and is an ongoing research topic among economists./14
According to previous research, measures such as initial unemployment claims, layoffs, the slope of yield curve, and the credit spread carry signals about future recessions (e.g., Berge, 2015)./15 These measures, as shown in Figure 4, generally do not indicate an elevated risk of economic recession in the near future: Initial claims and layoff indicators remain low (Panel A), and financial market measures--reflected in the positive slope of the yield curve (the treasury spread) and low credit spreads--suggest that recession risks are low by historical standards (Panel B)./16 Similarly, heuristic or model-based indicators--including the Sahm Rule, the rule proposed by Michaillat and Saez (2025), the Cleveland Fed's sentiment-based model, and the San Francisco Fed's Labor Market Stress Indicator--all signal a low probability of an imminent recession./17
Figure 4. Macroeconomic indicators of recessions
Overall, macroeconomic data and a range of recession-prediction methods indicate that the risk of a national recession remains low. However, given pockets of recession risk in some regions and uncertainty surrounding the U.S. economy's current cyclical position, it remains important to closely monitor economic conditions across different parts of the economy.
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References
Abraham, Katharine G., John Haltiwanger, Kristin Sandusky, and James R. Spletzer (2013). "Exploring Differences in Employment between Household and Establishment Data." Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 31 (April), S129-S172.
Ahn, Hie Joo and Yunjong Eo (2025). "Hysteresis and the Role of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity: Evidence from U.S. States," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2025-062, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.
Antolin-Diaz, Juan and Paolo Surico (2025). "The Long-Run Effects of Government Spending," American Economic Review, vol. 115 (July), pp. 2376-2413.
Bauer, Lauren, Kristen E. Broady, Wendy Edelberg, and Jimmy O'Donnell (2020). "Ten Facts about COVID-19 and the U.S. Economy." The Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Berge, Travis J. (2015). "Predicting Recessions with Leading Indicators: Model Averaging and Selection over the Business Cycle." Journal of Forecasting, vol. 34, pp. 455-471, https://doi.org/10.1002/for.2345.
Berge, Travis J., and Damjan Pfajfar (forthcoming). "The Shape of the Business Cycle: The View from U.S. States." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics.
Bewley, Truman F. (1999). Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Blanchard, Olivier (2018). "Should We Reject the Natural Rate Hypothesis?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pp. 97-120, Winter.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2025a). The Beige Book, August 2025. Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2025b). The Beige Book, November 2025. Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors.
Cerra, Valerie, Antonio Fatas, and Sweta C. Saxena (2023). "Hysteresis and Business Cycles," Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 61 (March), pp. 181-225.
Dupraz, Stephane Dupraz, Emi Nakamura, and Jon Steinsson (2025). "A plucking model of business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 152 (June).
Eo, Yunjong, and James Morley (2022). "Why Has the U.S. Economy Stagnated since the Great Recession?" Review of Economics and Statistics, 104 (March), pp. 246-258.
Eo, Yunjong, and James Morley (2023). "Does the Survey of Professional Forecasters Help Predict the Shape of Recessions in Real Time?" CAMA Working Paper 24/2023 (May), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4451874.
Fleming, Michael, Asani Sarkar, and Peter Van Tassel (2020). "The COVID-19 pandemic and the Fed's response," Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics, April.
Francis, Neville, Laura E. Jackson, and Michael T. Owyang (2018). "Countercyclical Policy and the Speed of Recovery after Recessions." Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 50 (April), pp. 675-704.
Fukui, Masao, Emi Nakamura, and Jon Steinsson (2023). "Women, Wealth Effects, and Slow Recoveries," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 15 (January), pp. 269-313.
Furlanetto, Francesco, Antoine Lepetit, 0rjan Robstad, Juan Rubio-Ramirez, and Pal Ulvedal (2025). "Estimating Hysteresis Effects." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 17 (January), pp. 35-70.
Garciga, Christian, and James Mitchell (2025). "Forecasting U.S. Recessions in Real Time Using Regional Economic Sentiment." Economic Commentary, No. 2025-13. Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, November.
Garimella, Rohit, Oscar Jorda, and Sanjay R. Singh (2025). "Tracking Labor Market Stress." FRBSF Economic Letter, 2025-19. San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, August.
Hall, Nick, and Osborne Jackson (2025). "New England Economic Conditions through November 18, 2025." New England Economic Conditions. Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, November.
Hamilton, James D. (1989). "A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonstationary Time Series and the Business Cycle." Econometrica, 57 (March), pp. 357-384.
Hamilton, James D., and Michael T. Owyang (2012). "The Propagation of Regional Recessions." Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 94 (November), pp. 935-947.
Hammond, Bill, and McCall Zeutzius (2025). "New York's population is struggling to recover from COVID-19," Empire Center for Public Policy.
Lenza, Michele, and Giorgio E. Primiceri (2022). "How to Estimate a Vector Autoregression after March 2020." Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 37 (March), pp. 688-699.
Michaillat, Pascal, and Emmanuel Saez (2025). "Has the Recession Started?" Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 87 (December), pp. 1047-1058, https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12685.
Milstein, Eric, and David Wessel (2024). "What did the Fed do in response to the COVID-19 crisis?" Brookings Institution, January.
Romer, Christina D. (2021). "The fiscal policy response to the pandemic." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, pp. 89-110.
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1./ Disclaimer: FEDS Notes are articles in which Board staff offer their own views and present analysis on a range of topics in economics and finance. These articles are shorter and less technically oriented than FEDS Working Papers and IFDP papers. We gratefully acknowledge useful comments and suggestions from Stephanie Aaronson, Gianni Amisano, Travis Berge, Andrew Figura, Glenn Follette, Norm Morin and Jeremy Rudd. All errors in this note are our own. Return to text
2./ Ahn and Moyon: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20551, U.S.A. Return to text
3./ Eo: Department of Economics, Korea University, Seoul 02841, South Korea. Return to text
4./ Recent research has increasingly emphasized hysteresis and differences in recession recoveries (e.g., Cerra et al., 2023; Fukui et al., 2023; Furlanetto et al., 2025; Antolin-Diaz and Surico, 2025; Dupraz et al., 2025). Ahn and Eo (2025) provide a comprehensive review of the related literature. Return to text
5./ Eo and Morley (2022) develop a statistical model with three business-cycle states, estimated via maximum likelihood using aggregate GDP growth. Our analysis extends the framework of Eo and Morley (2022) by using state-level data, by using nonfarm payroll employment to help identify the national cycle, and by employing a Bayesian estimation approach. Return to text
6./ See Section 3 of Ahn and Eo (2025) for details on the statistical model and its estimation. The unprecedented swing in economic activity caused by the pandemic influences the model's parameter estimates in ways that fundamentally change its assessment of historical business-cycle phases--an issue noted by other authors, including Lenza and Primiceri (2022) and Eo and Morley (2023). Following these studies, we incorporate a discount function that activates at the onset of the pandemic (2020:Q2) and reduces the influence of the large swings in real activity that follow; this adjustment is then gradually phased out in subsequent periods. Return to text
7./ For 2025:Q4, we use the average growth rate of national payroll employment in October and November. State-level nonfarm payroll employment growth is available through August; for 2025:Q3, we use the average of July and August. Return to text
8./ Figure 2 reports the smoothed probability estimates, which incorporate information from the entire sample period, as our goal is to assess historical business-cycle phases rather than the real-time performance of the model. Return to text
9./ Historically, employment exhibits dynamics during recession recoveries that differ from those of real GDP, underscoring the importance of considering both output and labor-market data when assessing hysteresis. Return to text
10./ Consistent with this assessment, the employment-to-population ratio did not return to its pre-recession level until 2019. Return to text
11./ Indeed, New York and New Jersey experienced more Covid-related deaths than other states in April 2020 (Bauer et al., 2020). Consistent with the model estimates, New York state's population remained lower in 2024 than in 2020 (Hammond and Zeutzius, 2025). In addition, both New York and New Jersey show lower-than-average post-pandemic GDP growth relative to the national average. Return to text
12./ See pages 1 and 2 of the August 2025 Beige Book and page 2 of the November 2025 Beige Book. Additional evidence for labor market weakness in New England comes from Hall and Jackson (2025), who note that initial and continued claims for unemployment insurance in these states outpace national trends. Return to text
13./ A reduced labor supply from immigration this year contributed to the slower payroll growth, but the model does not view this reduced pace as indicative of an economic downturn. Return to text
14./ See, for example, Hamilton (1989), Hamilton and Owyang (2012), Francis et al. (2018), Eo and Morley (2022), Berge and Pfajfar (forthcoming). Return to text
15./ Additional empirical evidence has been found by research at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq#/overview). Return to text
16./ The slope of the yield curve, measured by the spread between 3-month and 10-year Treasury yields, was negative in 2023 and 2024 but a recession did not materialize during these years. Return to text
17./ The Sahm Rule recession indicator, is a real-time measure [SAHMREALTIME] that was retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis's FRED database (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SAHMREALTIME, downloaded December 11, 2025). Return to text
Please cite this note as:
Ahn, Hie Joo, Yunjong Eo, and Lucas Moyon (2026). "Assessing Recession Risks with State-Level Data," FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 7, 2026, https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.3992.
Disclaimer: FEDS Notes are articles in which Board staff offer their own views and present analysis on a range of topics in economics and finance. These articles are shorter and less technically oriented than FEDS Working Papers and IFDP papers.
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Original text here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/assessing-recession-risks-with-state-level-data-20260107.html
Carrot Top Kitchens of Bridgeport Issues a Class II Recall of Hummus Containing Undeclared Sesame
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 -- The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration issued the following recall notice:
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Carrot Top Kitchens of Bridgeport (formerly Redding) Issues a Class II Recall of Hummus Containing Undeclared Sesame
Summary
Company Announcement Date: January 06, 2026
FDA Publish Date: January 07, 2026
Product Type: Food & Beverages
Reason for Announcement: Potential or Undeclared Allergen - Sesame
Company Name: Carrot Top Kitchens
Brand Name: Carrot Top Kitchens
Product Description: Hummus Varieties
Government Agency Partner Announcement
HARTFORD
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 -- The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration issued the following recall notice:
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Carrot Top Kitchens of Bridgeport (formerly Redding) Issues a Class II Recall of Hummus Containing Undeclared Sesame
Summary
Company Announcement Date: January 06, 2026
FDA Publish Date: January 07, 2026
Product Type: Food & Beverages
Reason for Announcement: Potential or Undeclared Allergen - Sesame
Company Name: Carrot Top Kitchens
Brand Name: Carrot Top Kitchens
Product Description: Hummus Varieties
Government Agency Partner Announcement
HARTFORD-- The Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection Food and Standards Division is warning the public that Carrot Top Country Kitchens LLC, DBA Carrot Top Kitchens of Bridgeport (formerly Redding), is recalling 5 varieties of hummus due to undeclared sesame.
Customers who have an allergy or severe sensitivity to sesame are vulnerable to serious or life-threatening allergic reactions if affected products are consumed.
Hummus varieties included in the recall are:
* Lemon Garlic Hummus
* Lime Ginger Hummus
* White Truffle Hummus
* Sundried Tomato and Caper Hummus
* Cherry Pepper Hummus
The affected hummus varieties can be identified through the labeled flavor displayed on the plastic container, weighing 8oz (226g).
The recalled products were distributed to Rochambeau Farm Store (Bedford, NY). The product has also been sold at farmers markets in Connecticut.
No illnesses have been reported to date.
Consumers who purchased the affected hummus from Carrot Top Kitchens are urged to return them to the place of purchase for a full refund. Consumers with questions may contact the company at 203-313-4549.
Sesame was officially added as the 9th major food allergen in the U.S. by the FDA in 2021, following the enactment of the FASTER Act, with mandatory labeling required starting January 1, 2023, under the Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act (FALCPA).
Consumers who would like to file a complaint with the Department of Consumer Protection can email DCP.FoodandStandards@ct.gov
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Original text here: https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/carrot-top-kitchens-bridgeport-formerly-redding-issues-class-ii-recall-hummus-containing-undeclared
BLS: Unemployment Rates Higher in 275 Metro Areas Over the Year Ended September 2025
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 (TNSLrpt) -- The U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics issued the following document on Jan. 7, 2026, from Economics Daily:
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Unemployment rates higher in 275 metro areas over the year ended September 2025
Unemployment rates were higher in September 2025 than a year earlier in 275 of the 387 metropolitan areas, lower in 83 areas, and unchanged in 29 areas. A total of 45 areas had jobless rates of less than 3.0 percent and 8 areas had rates of at least 8.0 percent.
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Chart: Metropolitan area unemployment rates, September 2025, not seasonally adjusted
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... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 (TNSLrpt) -- The U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics issued the following document on Jan. 7, 2026, from Economics Daily:
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Unemployment rates higher in 275 metro areas over the year ended September 2025
Unemployment rates were higher in September 2025 than a year earlier in 275 of the 387 metropolitan areas, lower in 83 areas, and unchanged in 29 areas. A total of 45 areas had jobless rates of less than 3.0 percent and 8 areas had rates of at least 8.0 percent.
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Chart: Metropolitan area unemployment rates, September 2025, not seasonally adjusted
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In September, Sioux Falls, South Dakota-Minnesota, had the lowest unemployment rate, 1.8 percent. El Centro, California, had the highest rate, 21.5 percent. A total of 245 areas had September jobless rates below the U.S. rate of 4.3 percent, 127 areas had rates above it, and 15 areas had rates equal to that of the nation.
The largest over-the-year unemployment rate increase in September occurred in Brownsville-Harlingen, Texas (+2.2 percentage points). Fifty-one other areas had rate increases of at least 1.0 percentage point. Kahului-Wailuku, Hawaii, and Kokomo, Indiana, had the largest over-the-year rate decreases in September (-1.5 percentage points each).
These data are from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics program and are not seasonally adjusted. Data for the most recent month are preliminary. To learn more, see "Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment -- September 2025." Also see charts related to the latest "Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment" news release.
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SUGGESTED CITATION
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, The Economics Daily, Unemployment rates higher in 275 metro areas over the year ended September 2025 at https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2026/unemployment-rates-higher-in-275-metro-areas-over-the-year-ended-september-2025.htm (visited January 08, 2026).
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View original text plus charts and tables here: https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2026/unemployment-rates-higher-in-275-metro-areas-over-the-year-ended-september-2025.htm
BLS - Northeast Region Issues Report Entitled 'Business Employment Dynamics in Maine - First Quarter 2025'
NEW YORK, Jan. 8 (TNSLrpt) -- The U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics - Northeast Regional Information Office issued a report on Jan. 7, 2026, entitled "Business Employment Dynamics in Maine - First Quarter 2025":
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From December 2024 to March 2025, gross job gains from opening and expanding private-sector establishments in Maine were 40,436, while gross job losses from closing and contracting private-sector establishments were 34,390, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Acting Regional Commissioner Michael G. Phinney noted that the difference between the
... Show Full Article
NEW YORK, Jan. 8 (TNSLrpt) -- The U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics - Northeast Regional Information Office issued a report on Jan. 7, 2026, entitled "Business Employment Dynamics in Maine - First Quarter 2025":
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From December 2024 to March 2025, gross job gains from opening and expanding private-sector establishments in Maine were 40,436, while gross job losses from closing and contracting private-sector establishments were 34,390, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Acting Regional Commissioner Michael G. Phinney noted that the difference between thenumber of gross job gains and the number of gross job losses yielded a net employment gain of 6,046 jobs in the private sector during first quarter of 2025. (See table 1.) During the previous quarter, gross job losses exceeded gross job gains by 923. (See chart 1.)
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Chart 1. Private-sector gross job gains and losses in Maine, March 2020-March 2025, seasonally adjusted
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The change in the number of jobs over time is the net result of increases and decreases in employment that occur at all private businesses in the economy. Business Employment Dynamics (BED) statistics track these changes in employment at private-sector establishments from the third month of one quarter to the third month of the next. The difference between the number of gross job gains and the number of gross job losses is the net change in employment. (See the Business Employment Dynamics Technical Note.)
Gross job gains
In the first quarter of 2025, gross job gains represented 7.4 percent of private-sector employment in Maine; nationally, gross job gains accounted for 5.6 percent of private-sector employment. (See chart 2.) Gross job gains are the sum of increases in employment due to expansions at existing establishments and the addition of new jobs at opening establishments. In Maine, gross job gains at expanding establishments totaled 29,030 in the first quarter of 2025, a decrease of 61 jobs compared to the previous quarter. Opening establishments accounted for 11,406 jobs gained in the first quarter of 2025, an increase of 2,818 jobs from the previous quarter.
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Chart 2. Private-sector gross job gains as a percent of employment, United States and Maine, March 2020-March 2025, seasonally adjusted
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Gross job losses
In the first quarter of 2025, gross job losses represented 6.3 percent of private-sector employment in Maine; nationally, gross job losses accounted for 5.4 percent of private-sector employment. (See chart 3.) Gross job losses are the result of contractions in employment at existing establishments and the loss of jobs at closing establishments. In Maine, contracting establishments lost 27,708 jobs in the first quarter of 2025, a decrease of 2,967 jobs from the prior quarter. Closing establishments lost 6,682 jobs, a decrease of 1,245 jobs from the previous quarter.
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Chart 3. Private-sector gross job losses as a percent of employment, United States and Maine, March 2020-March 2025, seasonally adjusted
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Industries
Gross job gains exceeded gross job losses in 4 of the 9 published industry sectors in Maine in the first quarter of 2025. Retail trade had the largest over-the-quarter net job gain, with an increase of 1,823 jobs. This was the result of 5,184 gross job gains and 3,361 gross job losses. Construction had a net gain of 1,059 jobs, and education and health services had a net gain of 758 jobs. The professional and business services industry showed a net loss of 1,172 jobs.
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Revisions to Business Employment Dynamics (BED) Data
Data in this release contain annual revisions in accordance with standard procedures. These revisions include the previous four quarters of not seasonally adjusted data and five years of seasonally adjusted data.
Federal Government Shutdown
Publication of first quarter 2025 data was delayed by more than 6 weeks because of a lapse in federal appropriations. Collection of first quarter Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages data - which Business Employment Dynamics data is based upon - had been completed in accordance with our normal schedule prior to the federal government shutdown.
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For more information
The BED data series include gross job gains and gross job losses by industry subsector, for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, as well as gross job gains and gross job losses at the firm level by employer size class. BED data for the states have been included in table 2 of this release. Additional information is available online at the Business Employment Dynamics Home.
The Business Employment Dynamics for Second Quarter 2025 are scheduled to be released on Thursday, February 26, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. (ET).
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Technical Note
The Business Employment Dynamics (BED) data are a product of a federal-state cooperative program known as Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). The BED data are compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from existing QCEW records.
More information on formal definitions of the data used in this release, along with coverage, concepts, and methodology, can be found in the Business Employment Dynamics Technical Note.
Information in this release will be made available to individuals with sensory impairments upon request. Voice phone: (202) 691-5200; Telecommunications Relay Service: 7-1-1.
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Table 1. Private-sector gross job gains and losses by industry, Maine, seasonally adjusted
Table 2. Private-sector gross job gains and losses as a percent of total employment by state, seasonally adjusted
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View original text plus charts and tables here: https://www.bls.gov/regions/northeast/news-release/2026/businessemploymentdynamics_maine_20260107.htm
