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Treasury Dismantles Iranian Regime's Global Clandestine Currency Networks
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued the following news release on Aug. 7, 2026:
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Treasury Dismantles Iranian Regime's Global Clandestine Currency Networks
Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against multiple networks spanning several countries for enabling Iran's rahbar banking system to move hundreds of millions of dollars. Iran is desperate for foreign currency, and to make matters worse for the regime, it is losing substantial sums to corruption and mismanagement within the shadow banking system.
"Iran's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued the following news release on Aug. 7, 2026: * * * Treasury Dismantles Iranian Regime's Global Clandestine Currency Networks Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against multiple networks spanning several countries for enabling Iran's rahbar banking system to move hundreds of millions of dollars. Iran is desperate for foreign currency, and to make matters worse for the regime, it is losing substantial sums to corruption and mismanagement within the shadow banking system. "Iran'sshadow banking system is buckling under Economic Fury, and the regime is running out of ways to move money," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. "Every facilitator that keeps the regime afloat is putting a target on its own back. Treasury will continue to expose these networks and cut them off from the U.S. financial system."
As Treasury continues to expose the unreliability of the regime's most trusted facilitators, Iran loses access to key revenue streams critical to the survival of this regime's mismanaged economy, rogue armed forces, and destabilizing terrorist proxies--further undermining the regime's credibility with its own people.
Today's action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran's financial and petroleum sectors, and advances the President's National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), to impose maximum pressure on Iran. This is OFAC's eighth action in 2026 targeting Iran's shadow banking apparatus, including targeting Iranian banks and their rahbar front companies, exchange houses and their managers, major financiers, and the Iranian importers and exporters who rely on these financial networks to launder and repatriate revenues. Treasury remains committed to maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and to targeting the regime's ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds.
Shahr bank Exchange Houses
Iran's Shahr Bank--with the help of its rahbar companies, Iran-based Farab Soroush Afagh Qeshm (FSAQ) and Dubai-based HMS Trading FZE--plays a critical role in helping the Iranian regime retrieve revenue from its oil sales overseas, aiding some of Iran's most prominent exporters of petroleum, including the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Co (NICO), Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd., and Armed Forces General Staff cover company Sepher Energy Jahan.
Shahr Bank and its rahbars rely on two Dubai-based exchange house fronts in particular: Titan Exchange--which also operates under the business names Titan Land Petrochemicals Trading L.L.C and Titan Energy Petroleum Products Trading Co. L.L.C--and Alps International L.L.C-FZ (Alps International).
Titan Exchange has for years enabled transactions at the request of Shahr Bank and its sanctioned rahbar company FSAQ, and as of early 2026, Titan Exchange held tens of millions of dollars on behalf of Shahr Bank. Titan Exchange is also closely affiliated with Hossein Ghorbani Zahed, a key Iranian financier recently sanctioned for his role in supporting the Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani (Shamkhani) illicit shipping and sanctions evasion network.
FSAQ operates an illicit payment network to facilitate transactions with China- and UAE-based shell companies and collaborates closely with Alps International, which in turn executes the payments on behalf of FSAQ. A UAE-based operational team of FSAQ specialists--identified as the "Safe Group"--alongside Alps International, carries out funds transfers and handles documentation for Chinese shell companies receiving money through intermediary accounts. Alps International generates invoices on the letterhead of a shell company chosen to receive the money and then coordinates payments using the shell's bank accounts. In 2026, Alps International enabled hundreds of millions of dollars of transactions in multiple currencies.
FSAQ and HMS Trading FZE were previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy and for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shahr Bank, respectively.
Titan Exchange is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Shahr Bank. Alps International is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
Behind the scenes of this operation is a professional network of Shahr Bank and FSAQ employees, facilitators, and support staff. Iranian national Saeed Ghasempour is a Shahr Bank employee who works closely with FSAQ and Alps International and has coordinated with sanctioned Russian VTB Bank on currency conversions. Iranian nationals Shima Sharifi and Peivand Mohammad are FSAQ employees who coordinate invoices and payments to enable FSAQ's sanctions evasion activities. Iranian national Amir Hendi is an information technology specialist providing critical infrastructure support to Titan Exchange.
Extending the reach of this Iranian-run, Dubai-based network are numerous shell companies registered around the world, particularly in Hong Kong. Hong Kong-based Oviedo Overseas Company Limited has been used by FSAQ and Alps International to complete transaction orders in mid-2026 worth millions of dollars. Similarly, Singapore-based Cailafang Pte. Ltd. has been used by FSAQ and Alps International in multiple transactions since late 2025 to enable tens of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian trade.
Many of these shell and front companies work with and enable other actors throughout Iran's shadow banking apparatus. Hong Kong-based front companies Blue Dash General Trading Company Limited and Gleaming HK Trading Limited have been recurring counterparties to shadow banking activities since their establishment, facilitating transactions by Iranian exchange houses like Pedram Pirouzan and Amin Exchanges on behalf of sanctions evaders, including the Shamkhani shipping network. Aydeniz General Trading L.L.C, a Dubai-based Iranian front company, has likewise been used to facilitate transactions with Iranian exchange houses, including Sadaf Exchange, a key shadow banking entity tied to Iran's military.
Saeed Ghasempour is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shahr Bank. Peivand Mohammad is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, FSAQ. Amir Hendi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, FSAQ. Shima Sharifi, Oviedo Overseas Company Limited, Cailafang Pte. Ltd., Blue Dash General Trading Company Limited, Gleaming HK Trading Limited, and Aydeniz General Trading L.L.C are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
In furtherance of Treasury's mission to ensure Iranian malign actors and their enablers are cut off from the U.S. financial system, OFAC is also designating Basheer Abdulkadhim Alwan al-Shabbani (Al-Shabbani) pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps--Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Al-Shabbani was responsible for supporting the operations of the IRGC-QF by facilitating the transport of fighters, weapons, and money from Iran to members of the IRGC-QF and Iran-aligned militia groups operating in neighboring countries.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC's enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN's whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC's guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
Click here for more information (https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260807) on the persons designated today.
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Original text here: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0596
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Treasury Dismantles Iranian Regime's Global Clandestine Currency Networks
Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against multiple networks spanning several countries for enabling Iran's rahbar banking system to move hundreds of millions of dollars. Iran is desperate for foreign currency, and to make matters worse for the regime, it is losing substantial sums to corruption and mismanagement within the shadow banking system.
"Iran's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued the following news release on Aug. 7, 2026: * * * Treasury Dismantles Iranian Regime's Global Clandestine Currency Networks Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against multiple networks spanning several countries for enabling Iran's rahbar banking system to move hundreds of millions of dollars. Iran is desperate for foreign currency, and to make matters worse for the regime, it is losing substantial sums to corruption and mismanagement within the shadow banking system. "Iran'sshadow banking system is buckling under Economic Fury, and the regime is running out of ways to move money," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. "Every facilitator that keeps the regime afloat is putting a target on its own back. Treasury will continue to expose these networks and cut them off from the U.S. financial system."
As Treasury continues to expose the unreliability of the regime's most trusted facilitators, Iran loses access to key revenue streams critical to the survival of this regime's mismanaged economy, rogue armed forces, and destabilizing terrorist proxies--further undermining the regime's credibility with its own people.
Today's action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran's financial and petroleum sectors, and advances the President's National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), to impose maximum pressure on Iran. This is OFAC's eighth action in 2026 targeting Iran's shadow banking apparatus, including targeting Iranian banks and their rahbar front companies, exchange houses and their managers, major financiers, and the Iranian importers and exporters who rely on these financial networks to launder and repatriate revenues. Treasury remains committed to maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and to targeting the regime's ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds.
Shahr bank Exchange Houses
Iran's Shahr Bank--with the help of its rahbar companies, Iran-based Farab Soroush Afagh Qeshm (FSAQ) and Dubai-based HMS Trading FZE--plays a critical role in helping the Iranian regime retrieve revenue from its oil sales overseas, aiding some of Iran's most prominent exporters of petroleum, including the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Co (NICO), Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd., and Armed Forces General Staff cover company Sepher Energy Jahan.
Shahr Bank and its rahbars rely on two Dubai-based exchange house fronts in particular: Titan Exchange--which also operates under the business names Titan Land Petrochemicals Trading L.L.C and Titan Energy Petroleum Products Trading Co. L.L.C--and Alps International L.L.C-FZ (Alps International).
Titan Exchange has for years enabled transactions at the request of Shahr Bank and its sanctioned rahbar company FSAQ, and as of early 2026, Titan Exchange held tens of millions of dollars on behalf of Shahr Bank. Titan Exchange is also closely affiliated with Hossein Ghorbani Zahed, a key Iranian financier recently sanctioned for his role in supporting the Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani (Shamkhani) illicit shipping and sanctions evasion network.
FSAQ operates an illicit payment network to facilitate transactions with China- and UAE-based shell companies and collaborates closely with Alps International, which in turn executes the payments on behalf of FSAQ. A UAE-based operational team of FSAQ specialists--identified as the "Safe Group"--alongside Alps International, carries out funds transfers and handles documentation for Chinese shell companies receiving money through intermediary accounts. Alps International generates invoices on the letterhead of a shell company chosen to receive the money and then coordinates payments using the shell's bank accounts. In 2026, Alps International enabled hundreds of millions of dollars of transactions in multiple currencies.
FSAQ and HMS Trading FZE were previously designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy and for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shahr Bank, respectively.
Titan Exchange is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Shahr Bank. Alps International is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
Behind the scenes of this operation is a professional network of Shahr Bank and FSAQ employees, facilitators, and support staff. Iranian national Saeed Ghasempour is a Shahr Bank employee who works closely with FSAQ and Alps International and has coordinated with sanctioned Russian VTB Bank on currency conversions. Iranian nationals Shima Sharifi and Peivand Mohammad are FSAQ employees who coordinate invoices and payments to enable FSAQ's sanctions evasion activities. Iranian national Amir Hendi is an information technology specialist providing critical infrastructure support to Titan Exchange.
Extending the reach of this Iranian-run, Dubai-based network are numerous shell companies registered around the world, particularly in Hong Kong. Hong Kong-based Oviedo Overseas Company Limited has been used by FSAQ and Alps International to complete transaction orders in mid-2026 worth millions of dollars. Similarly, Singapore-based Cailafang Pte. Ltd. has been used by FSAQ and Alps International in multiple transactions since late 2025 to enable tens of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian trade.
Many of these shell and front companies work with and enable other actors throughout Iran's shadow banking apparatus. Hong Kong-based front companies Blue Dash General Trading Company Limited and Gleaming HK Trading Limited have been recurring counterparties to shadow banking activities since their establishment, facilitating transactions by Iranian exchange houses like Pedram Pirouzan and Amin Exchanges on behalf of sanctions evaders, including the Shamkhani shipping network. Aydeniz General Trading L.L.C, a Dubai-based Iranian front company, has likewise been used to facilitate transactions with Iranian exchange houses, including Sadaf Exchange, a key shadow banking entity tied to Iran's military.
Saeed Ghasempour is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shahr Bank. Peivand Mohammad is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, FSAQ. Amir Hendi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, FSAQ. Shima Sharifi, Oviedo Overseas Company Limited, Cailafang Pte. Ltd., Blue Dash General Trading Company Limited, Gleaming HK Trading Limited, and Aydeniz General Trading L.L.C are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
In furtherance of Treasury's mission to ensure Iranian malign actors and their enablers are cut off from the U.S. financial system, OFAC is also designating Basheer Abdulkadhim Alwan al-Shabbani (Al-Shabbani) pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps--Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Al-Shabbani was responsible for supporting the operations of the IRGC-QF by facilitating the transport of fighters, weapons, and money from Iran to members of the IRGC-QF and Iran-aligned militia groups operating in neighboring countries.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC's enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN's whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC's guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
Click here for more information (https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260807) on the persons designated today.
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Original text here: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0596
State Dept.: Targeting Digital Asset Exchanges Fueling the Iranian Regime
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The U.S. State Department issued the following statement on Aug. 7, 2026, by Principal Deputy Spokesperson Tommy Pigott:
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Targeting Digital Asset Exchanges Fueling the Iranian Regime
The Iranian regime launders billions of dollars by moving illicit funds through various channels, including digital assets exchanges. Today, the United States is imposing sanctions on six entities and one individual - two major digital asset exchanges the regime leverages to maintain international financial connectivity, the ringleader of a network of companies that supports illicit digital ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The U.S. State Department issued the following statement on Aug. 7, 2026, by Principal Deputy Spokesperson Tommy Pigott: * * * Targeting Digital Asset Exchanges Fueling the Iranian Regime The Iranian regime launders billions of dollars by moving illicit funds through various channels, including digital assets exchanges. Today, the United States is imposing sanctions on six entities and one individual - two major digital asset exchanges the regime leverages to maintain international financial connectivity, the ringleader of a network of companies that supports illicit digitalasset activities, and his firms in multiple jurisdictions.
We are taking these actions following Iran's attacks against commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz earlier this week. The United States will continue to deny the regime the resources it needs to threaten its neighbors and innocent vessels, support terrorism, and advance its nuclear ambitions.
Additionally, the U.S. Department of State's Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program is offering a reward of up to $15 million for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of Iran's IRGC and its various branches.
Today's action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran's financial and petroleum sectors, as well as counterterrorism authority E.O. 13224. For more information on today's action, see the Department of the Treasury's press release (https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0598) and Rewards for Justice website (https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps/).
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Original text here: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/08/targeting-digital-asset-exchanges-fueling-the-iranian-regime/
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Targeting Digital Asset Exchanges Fueling the Iranian Regime
The Iranian regime launders billions of dollars by moving illicit funds through various channels, including digital assets exchanges. Today, the United States is imposing sanctions on six entities and one individual - two major digital asset exchanges the regime leverages to maintain international financial connectivity, the ringleader of a network of companies that supports illicit digital ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The U.S. State Department issued the following statement on Aug. 7, 2026, by Principal Deputy Spokesperson Tommy Pigott: * * * Targeting Digital Asset Exchanges Fueling the Iranian Regime The Iranian regime launders billions of dollars by moving illicit funds through various channels, including digital assets exchanges. Today, the United States is imposing sanctions on six entities and one individual - two major digital asset exchanges the regime leverages to maintain international financial connectivity, the ringleader of a network of companies that supports illicit digitalasset activities, and his firms in multiple jurisdictions.
We are taking these actions following Iran's attacks against commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz earlier this week. The United States will continue to deny the regime the resources it needs to threaten its neighbors and innocent vessels, support terrorism, and advance its nuclear ambitions.
Additionally, the U.S. Department of State's Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program is offering a reward of up to $15 million for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of Iran's IRGC and its various branches.
Today's action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran's financial and petroleum sectors, as well as counterterrorism authority E.O. 13224. For more information on today's action, see the Department of the Treasury's press release (https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0598) and Rewards for Justice website (https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps/).
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Original text here: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/08/targeting-digital-asset-exchanges-fueling-the-iranian-regime/
President Trump Issues Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Polysilicon and Its Derivatives Into the U.S.
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- President Trump issued the following proclamation on Aug. 6, 2026:
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ADJUSTING IMPORTS OF POLYSILICON AND ITS DERIVATIVES INTO THE UNITED STATES
1. Polysilicon is the base material underpinning the security of America's semiconductor and solar-power supply chains. Yet for decades, America has allowed foreign countries to weaken United States producers in the polysilicon sector - eroding our economic and national security. Today, I am taking action to put a stop to these practices and revitalize the United States polysilicon sector.
2. These actions are based on advice ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- President Trump issued the following proclamation on Aug. 6, 2026: * * * ADJUSTING IMPORTS OF POLYSILICON AND ITS DERIVATIVES INTO THE UNITED STATES 1. Polysilicon is the base material underpinning the security of America's semiconductor and solar-power supply chains. Yet for decades, America has allowed foreign countries to weaken United States producers in the polysilicon sector - eroding our economic and national security. Today, I am taking action to put a stop to these practices and revitalize the United States polysilicon sector. 2. These actions are based on adviceand information I received from the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) in a report transmitted to me within the past 90 days detailing the findings of his investigation under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1862 (section 232), into the effects of imports of polysilicon and its derivative products on the national security of the United States. After evaluating the facts considered in that investigation, and taking into account the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, the Secretary found and advised me of his opinion that polysilicon and its derivative products are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States.
3. Among other things, the Secretary found that polysilicon is essential to the national security and economy of the United States. Polysilicon is the base material for semiconductors, which enable all digital products and services and provide the technical foundation for the functioning of virtually every sector of the modern economy, including the defense industrial base. For example, semiconductors are critical inputs for United States defense systems, such as radar and communication systems, electronic warfare and cybersecurity systems, and guidance and control systems for missiles and drones. Without a secure and reliable domestic supply of polysilicon, the United States cannot sufficiently produce semiconductors. Nor can the United States sufficiently scale up its domestic production of semiconductors, as I determined was necessary in Proclamation 11002 of January 14, 2026 (Adjusting Imports of Semiconductors, Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment, and Their Derivative Products Into the United States).
4. The Secretary also found that polysilicon is essential for the production of solar products. Solar-grade polysilicon and its derivative solar products are used to support various United States defense programs and artificial intelligence (AI) innovations.
5. For decades, foreign governments -- recognizing the strategic importance of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives -- designed policies to increase the production of these products in their countries, which have come at the expense of the United States industry. These policies contributed to global oversupply in polysilicon and polysilicon derivative sectors. As the Secretary found, since 2020 alone, global production of polysilicon has grown by more than 270 percent and inventories reached a record high of 400,000 tons by the end of 2024.
6. The Secretary found that imports of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives have eroded the capacity of United States industry to produce polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives. The United States' share of global polysilicon production capacity has fallen from 50 percent in 2005 to less than 2 percent in 2024. Meanwhile, the United States' share of global semiconductor wafer fabrication capacity has decreased from 37 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2024; and in the solar sector, the United States is virtually entirely dependent on imports of solar ingots, wafers, and cells.
7. The relative lack of United States downstream solar-related polysilicon derivative production is particularly concerning for the long-term commercial viability of the United States polysilicon sector. The Secretary found that, while semiconductor-grade polysilicon was once the primary output of the polysilicon industry, global semiconductor-grade polysilicon now accounts for only 2.4 percent of global polysilicon production. The overwhelming demand for solar-grade polysilicon relative to semiconductor-grade polysilicon means that polysilicon manufacturers are increasingly dependent on the production of lower purity, solar-grade polysilicon to achieve the production volumes necessary to sustain viable unit costs of production for all polysilicon, including semiconductor-grade polysilicon. Without a financially viable market for United States solar-grade polysilicon, United States polysilicon producers cannot thrive and ensure domestic manufacturing of solar- and semiconductor-grade polysilicon and their derivatives that meets United States economic and national security requirements.
8. In light of these findings and the other findings in the Secretary's report, the Secretary recommended a range of actions to adjust imports of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security of the United States. The Secretary recommended the establishment of minimum import prices (MIP) for polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives to create a protected domestic market that allows United States producers to compete free from global distortions. The Secretary also recommended that I impose a 15 percent ad valorem rate of duty on downstream polysilicon derivatives. The Secretary recommended that these two remedies be accompanied by an onshoring program to encourage companies to build new United States polysilicon, ingot, wafer, and cell production facilities.
9. After considering the Secretary's report, the factors in section 232(d) (19 U.S.C. 1862(d)), and other relevant factors and information, I concur with the Secretary's finding that polysilicon and its derivative products are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States. In my judgment, and in light of the Secretary's report, the factors in section 232(d) (19 U.S.C. 1862(d)), and other relevant factors and information, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to adjust imports of these articles and their derivatives, as detailed below, so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security of the United States.
10. First, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to establish a MIP program to adjust imports of polysilicon and its derivatives. This will create an economic environment conducive to increasing United States production of the full range of these goods by ensuring a commercially viable market for them. If foreign trading partners that have entered into trade deals with my Administration adopt substantially equivalent import-adjusting action modeled after our MIP, I also authorize the Secretary and the United States Trade Representative (Trade Representative) to enter into arrangements that would alter the applicability of the MIP and the tariffs established in this proclamation to imported polysilicon and derivatives from these trading partners.
11. Second, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to impose a 15 percent ad valorem rate of duty on imports of polysilicon derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security of the United States. These tariffs -- combined with the MIP program -- will promote United States production of polysilicon derivatives by ensuring a commercially viable market for them. They will also replace a similar but narrower safeguard tariff on solar cells and modules that I imposed in my first term, and which expired in February 2026.
12. Third, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to offer incentives for companies investing in United States production of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives. The Secretary should have the authority to enter into company-specific deals with producers to incentivize such investments and the strengthening of the United States polysilicon supply chain.
13. In my judgment, based on current circumstances as well as the future needs of the United States, the plan of action detailed in this proclamation is necessary and appropriate to address the threatened impairment of the national security posed by imports of polysilicon and its derivative products. The plan of action in this proclamation will, among other things, help ensure the commercial viability of United States production of polysilicon and its derivatives that is necessary to meet United States economic and national security requirements. It will also enhance employment opportunities and related human resources and promote investment in the United States polysilicon industry.
14. Section 232 authorizes the President to take action to adjust the imports of an article and its derivatives that are being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.
15. Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483) (section 604), authorizes the President to embody in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) the substance of statutes affecting import treatment, and actions thereunder, including the removal, modification, continuance, or imposition of any rate of duty or other import restriction.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 232; section 604; and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, do hereby proclaim as follows:
(1)(a) The applicable minimum import prices for imported polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives shall be:
(i) $21 per kilogram for polysilicon;
(ii) $100 per kilogram for polysilicon ingots and wafers;
(iii) $0.22 per watt for solar cells; and
(iv) $0.38 per watt for solar modules.
(b) The Secretary is authorized to adjust these minimum import prices from time to time to reflect market conditions or other factors affecting the fair market value of covered products under non-distorted, free-market conditions.
(2) Effective with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern time on December 4, 2026, imports of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives specified in Annexes I and II to the proclamation shall be subject to the MIP program, as detailed in this clause.
(a) To implement the MIP program, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) shall permit importers of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives to submit documentation at entry establishing or certifying either that any first arm's-length sale of the imported merchandise (or, if applicable, downstream products made from that merchandise) in the United States will occur at or above the applicable MIP, or that any first arm's-length sale of the imported merchandise is pursuant to fixed terms in a contract entered into prior to the date of the signing of this proclamation.
(b) If an importer fails to submit the documentation referenced in subclause (a) of this clause, the imported merchandise shall be subject to a specific tariff equal to the applicable MIP.
(c) For importers that submit the documentation referenced in subclause (a) of this clause, in the event that the entered value on the entry summary of the imported merchandise is less than the MIP, the imported merchandise shall be subject to a specific tariff equal to the difference between the entered value on the entry summary and the MIP.
(3) CBP shall monitor and enforce the accuracy of importer documentation submitted pursuant to clause (2) of this proclamation. If CBP determines that an importer's documentation was materially inaccurate or that an importer has materially failed to comply with its certification, that importer and its affiliates shall permanently be prohibited from importing polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives into the United States. CBP may also impose penalties on the noncompliant importer to the extent consistent with applicable law.
(4) Effective with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern time on December 4, 2026, imports of polysilicon ingots and polysilicon derivatives specified in Annexes I and II of this proclamation shall be subject to an additional 15 percent ad valorem rate of duty, except as otherwise specified in this proclamation.
(5)(a) The duties imposed pursuant to clauses (2) and (4) of this proclamation shall continue in effect unless they are expressly reduced, modified, or terminated. These duties shall apply in addition to any other duties, taxes, fees, exactions, and charges applicable to such products, except as otherwise specified in this proclamation.
(b) For products of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, or a member nation of the European Union subject to tariffs under this proclamation, the sum of the additional section 232 tariff imposed pursuant to clause (4) of this proclamation and the applicable rate of duty under Column 1 of the HTSUS (Column 1 Duty Rate) shall be equal to 15 percent.
(c) For products of the United Kingdom subject to tariffs under this proclamation, the applicable rate of duty under clause (4) of this proclamation shall be 10 percent.
(6) The Secretary is authorized to establish a program to incentivize investment in United States production of raw polysilicon, as well as ingots, wafers, and cells (Covered Products).
(a) The Secretary is authorized to solicit and accept onshoring plans from companies. Any onshoring plan shall include: a commitment, if the plan is approved, to build, refurbish, or expand a facility in the United States that will produce Covered Products; a commitment that construction will start by January 20, 2029; and any other relevant information and analysis, including requirements set by the Secretary.
(b) The Secretary is authorized to approve onshoring plans described in subclause (a) of this clause. In determining whether an onshoring plan qualifies for approval, the Secretary, in consultation with any senior executive branch officials the Secretary deems appropriate, shall consider all relevant factors he deems appropriate, such as the anticipated start date of construction, whether the proposed plan's project timeline is commercially reasonable, whether the proposed plan's project milestones are commercially reasonable, the anticipated annual production of Covered Products from the onshoring project, whether the proposed plan's anticipated costs and Covered Product production projections are reasonable, and how the benefits of the reduced tariff rate will be allocated between the applicants of the onshoring plan. When approving onshoring plans, the Secretary shall act in a manner consistent with the need to address the national security threat found in this proclamation.
(c) If the Secretary approves a company's onshoring plan, the Secretary shall allow the company to import necessary production equipment and Covered Products, in volumes the Secretary deems commensurate with the company's newly committed investment, without paying applicable section 232 duties. These benefits shall be tied to the facility's construction period, shall be contingent on the company making sufficient progress under its approved onshoring plan, and may vary depending on whether the imports use United States polysilicon.
(d) The Secretary is authorized to take all actions that he deems appropriate to implement and effectuate this program, including, consistent with applicable law, the issuance of regulations, rules, guidance, and procedures. All approved onshoring plans shall be subject to monitoring and enforcement by the Secretary. The Secretary may require that companies with approved onshoring plans submit reports to the Department of Commerce to ensure compliance with domestic manufacturing commitments, and he may require that such reports be audited by external auditing firms. Should the Secretary determine that a company is substantially failing to meet its agreed-upon commitments that are the basis for granting tariff offsets or other tariff incentives, the Secretary is authorized to cease and rescind those benefits. In cases where the executive branch assesses that a company engaged in fraud or deliberately misled the United States Government with respect to onshoring commitments, the rescission of tariff benefits can be retroactive to the extent permitted by law, and the Commissioner of CBP may collect the additional tariffs owed because of the retroactive rescission of the tariff benefits and impose any appropriate fines and penalties to the extent consistent with applicable law.
(7) Any product subject to duties pursuant to this proclamation, except those eligible for admission under "domestic status" as described in 19 C.F.R. 146.43, that is admitted into a United States foreign trade zone on or after the effective date of this proclamation may be admitted only under "privileged foreign status" as described in 19 C.F.R. 146.41, and any product admitted in "privileged foreign status" prior to the effective date of this proclamation will be subject upon entry for consumption to any duties related to the classification under the applicable HTSUS subheading.
(8) Manufacturing drawback claims made in accordance with subsections (a) and (b) of section 313 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1313(a)-(b), shall be available with respect to the duties imposed pursuant to this proclamation on articles that meet the following conditions:
(a) the article is not of a type of merchandise subject to an antidumping or countervailing duty order, without regard to whether the article is from the country or countries listed in the order or orders;
(b) the article is a product of Trade Agreement Partners, composed of the United Kingdom, the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Canada, and any trading partner with which the United States concludes a trade and security agreement; and
(c) the polysilicon content of the article is composed entirely of polysilicon from a Trade Agreement Partner country.
(9) The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Trade Representative, the Chairman of the United States International Trade Commission, and any other senior executive branch official the Secretary deems appropriate, shall determine whether any modifications to the HTSUS are necessary to effectuate or implement this proclamation or any actions taken pursuant to this proclamation, and shall make such modifications through notice in the Federal Register, including any technical correction to Annex I or Annex II to this proclamation.
(10) The Secretary shall monitor actions taken by our trading partners to establish minimum import prices for polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives. Should the Secretary, in consultation with the Trade Representative and the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, determine that a trading partner has established a substantially equivalent minimum import price, then the Secretary may alter the applicability of the MIP and the tariffs established in this proclamation to polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives from that trading partner.
(11) The Secretary shall continue to monitor imports of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives. If the Secretary determines that a company is stockpiling polysilicon or polysilicon derivatives before the date in clauses (2) and (4) of this proclamation, the Secretary shall take action in coordination with CBP to restrict imports by the company and its affiliates. The Secretary also shall, from time to time, in consultation with any senior executive branch officials the Secretary deems appropriate, review the status of such imports with respect to the national security. The Secretary shall inform the President of any circumstances that, in the Secretary's opinion, might indicate the need for further action by the President under section 232. The Secretary shall also inform the President of any circumstance that, in the Secretary's opinion, might indicate that the remedies provided for in this proclamation are no longer necessary.
(12) The Secretary and the Secretary of Homeland Security are directed and authorized to take all actions to implement and effectuate this proclamation -- including, consistent with applicable law, through temporary suspension or amendment of regulations or through notices in the Federal Register and by adopting rules, regulations, or guidance -- and to employ all powers granted to the President, including by section 232, as may be necessary to implement this proclamation. The head of each executive department and agency (agency) is authorized to and shall take all appropriate measures within the agency's authority to implement this proclamation. The head of each agency may, consistent with applicable law, including 3 U.S.C. 301, redelegate the authority to take such appropriate measures within the agency.
(13) The Secretary, in consultation with any senior executive branch officials he deems appropriate, may issue rules, regulations, and guidance consistent with this proclamation, including to address operational necessity and prevent circumvention and evasion, including through manipulation of related-party transactions or transfers of foreign subsidies.
(14) CBP may take any appropriate measures, consistent with applicable law, to administer the tariffs and MIPs imposed by this proclamation.
(15) Any provision of previous proclamations and Executive Orders that is inconsistent with this proclamation is superseded to the extent of such inconsistency.
(16) If any provision of this proclamation or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any individual or circumstance is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its provisions to any other individual or circumstance shall not be affected. If any fee, duty, tariff, or program described in this proclamation is held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder shall continue in effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this sixth day of August, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fifty-first.
ANNEX I (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ANNEX-I.pdf)
ANNEX II (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Annex-II.pdf)
DONALD J. TRUMP
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Original text here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/08/adjusting-imports-of-polysilicon-and-its-derivatives-into-the-united-states/
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ADJUSTING IMPORTS OF POLYSILICON AND ITS DERIVATIVES INTO THE UNITED STATES
1. Polysilicon is the base material underpinning the security of America's semiconductor and solar-power supply chains. Yet for decades, America has allowed foreign countries to weaken United States producers in the polysilicon sector - eroding our economic and national security. Today, I am taking action to put a stop to these practices and revitalize the United States polysilicon sector.
2. These actions are based on advice ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- President Trump issued the following proclamation on Aug. 6, 2026: * * * ADJUSTING IMPORTS OF POLYSILICON AND ITS DERIVATIVES INTO THE UNITED STATES 1. Polysilicon is the base material underpinning the security of America's semiconductor and solar-power supply chains. Yet for decades, America has allowed foreign countries to weaken United States producers in the polysilicon sector - eroding our economic and national security. Today, I am taking action to put a stop to these practices and revitalize the United States polysilicon sector. 2. These actions are based on adviceand information I received from the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) in a report transmitted to me within the past 90 days detailing the findings of his investigation under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1862 (section 232), into the effects of imports of polysilicon and its derivative products on the national security of the United States. After evaluating the facts considered in that investigation, and taking into account the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security, the Secretary found and advised me of his opinion that polysilicon and its derivative products are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States.
3. Among other things, the Secretary found that polysilicon is essential to the national security and economy of the United States. Polysilicon is the base material for semiconductors, which enable all digital products and services and provide the technical foundation for the functioning of virtually every sector of the modern economy, including the defense industrial base. For example, semiconductors are critical inputs for United States defense systems, such as radar and communication systems, electronic warfare and cybersecurity systems, and guidance and control systems for missiles and drones. Without a secure and reliable domestic supply of polysilicon, the United States cannot sufficiently produce semiconductors. Nor can the United States sufficiently scale up its domestic production of semiconductors, as I determined was necessary in Proclamation 11002 of January 14, 2026 (Adjusting Imports of Semiconductors, Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment, and Their Derivative Products Into the United States).
4. The Secretary also found that polysilicon is essential for the production of solar products. Solar-grade polysilicon and its derivative solar products are used to support various United States defense programs and artificial intelligence (AI) innovations.
5. For decades, foreign governments -- recognizing the strategic importance of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives -- designed policies to increase the production of these products in their countries, which have come at the expense of the United States industry. These policies contributed to global oversupply in polysilicon and polysilicon derivative sectors. As the Secretary found, since 2020 alone, global production of polysilicon has grown by more than 270 percent and inventories reached a record high of 400,000 tons by the end of 2024.
6. The Secretary found that imports of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives have eroded the capacity of United States industry to produce polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives. The United States' share of global polysilicon production capacity has fallen from 50 percent in 2005 to less than 2 percent in 2024. Meanwhile, the United States' share of global semiconductor wafer fabrication capacity has decreased from 37 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2024; and in the solar sector, the United States is virtually entirely dependent on imports of solar ingots, wafers, and cells.
7. The relative lack of United States downstream solar-related polysilicon derivative production is particularly concerning for the long-term commercial viability of the United States polysilicon sector. The Secretary found that, while semiconductor-grade polysilicon was once the primary output of the polysilicon industry, global semiconductor-grade polysilicon now accounts for only 2.4 percent of global polysilicon production. The overwhelming demand for solar-grade polysilicon relative to semiconductor-grade polysilicon means that polysilicon manufacturers are increasingly dependent on the production of lower purity, solar-grade polysilicon to achieve the production volumes necessary to sustain viable unit costs of production for all polysilicon, including semiconductor-grade polysilicon. Without a financially viable market for United States solar-grade polysilicon, United States polysilicon producers cannot thrive and ensure domestic manufacturing of solar- and semiconductor-grade polysilicon and their derivatives that meets United States economic and national security requirements.
8. In light of these findings and the other findings in the Secretary's report, the Secretary recommended a range of actions to adjust imports of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security of the United States. The Secretary recommended the establishment of minimum import prices (MIP) for polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives to create a protected domestic market that allows United States producers to compete free from global distortions. The Secretary also recommended that I impose a 15 percent ad valorem rate of duty on downstream polysilicon derivatives. The Secretary recommended that these two remedies be accompanied by an onshoring program to encourage companies to build new United States polysilicon, ingot, wafer, and cell production facilities.
9. After considering the Secretary's report, the factors in section 232(d) (19 U.S.C. 1862(d)), and other relevant factors and information, I concur with the Secretary's finding that polysilicon and its derivative products are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States. In my judgment, and in light of the Secretary's report, the factors in section 232(d) (19 U.S.C. 1862(d)), and other relevant factors and information, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to adjust imports of these articles and their derivatives, as detailed below, so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security of the United States.
10. First, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to establish a MIP program to adjust imports of polysilicon and its derivatives. This will create an economic environment conducive to increasing United States production of the full range of these goods by ensuring a commercially viable market for them. If foreign trading partners that have entered into trade deals with my Administration adopt substantially equivalent import-adjusting action modeled after our MIP, I also authorize the Secretary and the United States Trade Representative (Trade Representative) to enter into arrangements that would alter the applicability of the MIP and the tariffs established in this proclamation to imported polysilicon and derivatives from these trading partners.
11. Second, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to impose a 15 percent ad valorem rate of duty on imports of polysilicon derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security of the United States. These tariffs -- combined with the MIP program -- will promote United States production of polysilicon derivatives by ensuring a commercially viable market for them. They will also replace a similar but narrower safeguard tariff on solar cells and modules that I imposed in my first term, and which expired in February 2026.
12. Third, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to offer incentives for companies investing in United States production of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives. The Secretary should have the authority to enter into company-specific deals with producers to incentivize such investments and the strengthening of the United States polysilicon supply chain.
13. In my judgment, based on current circumstances as well as the future needs of the United States, the plan of action detailed in this proclamation is necessary and appropriate to address the threatened impairment of the national security posed by imports of polysilicon and its derivative products. The plan of action in this proclamation will, among other things, help ensure the commercial viability of United States production of polysilicon and its derivatives that is necessary to meet United States economic and national security requirements. It will also enhance employment opportunities and related human resources and promote investment in the United States polysilicon industry.
14. Section 232 authorizes the President to take action to adjust the imports of an article and its derivatives that are being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.
15. Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483) (section 604), authorizes the President to embody in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) the substance of statutes affecting import treatment, and actions thereunder, including the removal, modification, continuance, or imposition of any rate of duty or other import restriction.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 232; section 604; and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, do hereby proclaim as follows:
(1)(a) The applicable minimum import prices for imported polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives shall be:
(i) $21 per kilogram for polysilicon;
(ii) $100 per kilogram for polysilicon ingots and wafers;
(iii) $0.22 per watt for solar cells; and
(iv) $0.38 per watt for solar modules.
(b) The Secretary is authorized to adjust these minimum import prices from time to time to reflect market conditions or other factors affecting the fair market value of covered products under non-distorted, free-market conditions.
(2) Effective with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern time on December 4, 2026, imports of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives specified in Annexes I and II to the proclamation shall be subject to the MIP program, as detailed in this clause.
(a) To implement the MIP program, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) shall permit importers of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives to submit documentation at entry establishing or certifying either that any first arm's-length sale of the imported merchandise (or, if applicable, downstream products made from that merchandise) in the United States will occur at or above the applicable MIP, or that any first arm's-length sale of the imported merchandise is pursuant to fixed terms in a contract entered into prior to the date of the signing of this proclamation.
(b) If an importer fails to submit the documentation referenced in subclause (a) of this clause, the imported merchandise shall be subject to a specific tariff equal to the applicable MIP.
(c) For importers that submit the documentation referenced in subclause (a) of this clause, in the event that the entered value on the entry summary of the imported merchandise is less than the MIP, the imported merchandise shall be subject to a specific tariff equal to the difference between the entered value on the entry summary and the MIP.
(3) CBP shall monitor and enforce the accuracy of importer documentation submitted pursuant to clause (2) of this proclamation. If CBP determines that an importer's documentation was materially inaccurate or that an importer has materially failed to comply with its certification, that importer and its affiliates shall permanently be prohibited from importing polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives into the United States. CBP may also impose penalties on the noncompliant importer to the extent consistent with applicable law.
(4) Effective with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern time on December 4, 2026, imports of polysilicon ingots and polysilicon derivatives specified in Annexes I and II of this proclamation shall be subject to an additional 15 percent ad valorem rate of duty, except as otherwise specified in this proclamation.
(5)(a) The duties imposed pursuant to clauses (2) and (4) of this proclamation shall continue in effect unless they are expressly reduced, modified, or terminated. These duties shall apply in addition to any other duties, taxes, fees, exactions, and charges applicable to such products, except as otherwise specified in this proclamation.
(b) For products of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, or a member nation of the European Union subject to tariffs under this proclamation, the sum of the additional section 232 tariff imposed pursuant to clause (4) of this proclamation and the applicable rate of duty under Column 1 of the HTSUS (Column 1 Duty Rate) shall be equal to 15 percent.
(c) For products of the United Kingdom subject to tariffs under this proclamation, the applicable rate of duty under clause (4) of this proclamation shall be 10 percent.
(6) The Secretary is authorized to establish a program to incentivize investment in United States production of raw polysilicon, as well as ingots, wafers, and cells (Covered Products).
(a) The Secretary is authorized to solicit and accept onshoring plans from companies. Any onshoring plan shall include: a commitment, if the plan is approved, to build, refurbish, or expand a facility in the United States that will produce Covered Products; a commitment that construction will start by January 20, 2029; and any other relevant information and analysis, including requirements set by the Secretary.
(b) The Secretary is authorized to approve onshoring plans described in subclause (a) of this clause. In determining whether an onshoring plan qualifies for approval, the Secretary, in consultation with any senior executive branch officials the Secretary deems appropriate, shall consider all relevant factors he deems appropriate, such as the anticipated start date of construction, whether the proposed plan's project timeline is commercially reasonable, whether the proposed plan's project milestones are commercially reasonable, the anticipated annual production of Covered Products from the onshoring project, whether the proposed plan's anticipated costs and Covered Product production projections are reasonable, and how the benefits of the reduced tariff rate will be allocated between the applicants of the onshoring plan. When approving onshoring plans, the Secretary shall act in a manner consistent with the need to address the national security threat found in this proclamation.
(c) If the Secretary approves a company's onshoring plan, the Secretary shall allow the company to import necessary production equipment and Covered Products, in volumes the Secretary deems commensurate with the company's newly committed investment, without paying applicable section 232 duties. These benefits shall be tied to the facility's construction period, shall be contingent on the company making sufficient progress under its approved onshoring plan, and may vary depending on whether the imports use United States polysilicon.
(d) The Secretary is authorized to take all actions that he deems appropriate to implement and effectuate this program, including, consistent with applicable law, the issuance of regulations, rules, guidance, and procedures. All approved onshoring plans shall be subject to monitoring and enforcement by the Secretary. The Secretary may require that companies with approved onshoring plans submit reports to the Department of Commerce to ensure compliance with domestic manufacturing commitments, and he may require that such reports be audited by external auditing firms. Should the Secretary determine that a company is substantially failing to meet its agreed-upon commitments that are the basis for granting tariff offsets or other tariff incentives, the Secretary is authorized to cease and rescind those benefits. In cases where the executive branch assesses that a company engaged in fraud or deliberately misled the United States Government with respect to onshoring commitments, the rescission of tariff benefits can be retroactive to the extent permitted by law, and the Commissioner of CBP may collect the additional tariffs owed because of the retroactive rescission of the tariff benefits and impose any appropriate fines and penalties to the extent consistent with applicable law.
(7) Any product subject to duties pursuant to this proclamation, except those eligible for admission under "domestic status" as described in 19 C.F.R. 146.43, that is admitted into a United States foreign trade zone on or after the effective date of this proclamation may be admitted only under "privileged foreign status" as described in 19 C.F.R. 146.41, and any product admitted in "privileged foreign status" prior to the effective date of this proclamation will be subject upon entry for consumption to any duties related to the classification under the applicable HTSUS subheading.
(8) Manufacturing drawback claims made in accordance with subsections (a) and (b) of section 313 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1313(a)-(b), shall be available with respect to the duties imposed pursuant to this proclamation on articles that meet the following conditions:
(a) the article is not of a type of merchandise subject to an antidumping or countervailing duty order, without regard to whether the article is from the country or countries listed in the order or orders;
(b) the article is a product of Trade Agreement Partners, composed of the United Kingdom, the European Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Canada, and any trading partner with which the United States concludes a trade and security agreement; and
(c) the polysilicon content of the article is composed entirely of polysilicon from a Trade Agreement Partner country.
(9) The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Trade Representative, the Chairman of the United States International Trade Commission, and any other senior executive branch official the Secretary deems appropriate, shall determine whether any modifications to the HTSUS are necessary to effectuate or implement this proclamation or any actions taken pursuant to this proclamation, and shall make such modifications through notice in the Federal Register, including any technical correction to Annex I or Annex II to this proclamation.
(10) The Secretary shall monitor actions taken by our trading partners to establish minimum import prices for polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives. Should the Secretary, in consultation with the Trade Representative and the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, determine that a trading partner has established a substantially equivalent minimum import price, then the Secretary may alter the applicability of the MIP and the tariffs established in this proclamation to polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives from that trading partner.
(11) The Secretary shall continue to monitor imports of polysilicon and polysilicon derivatives. If the Secretary determines that a company is stockpiling polysilicon or polysilicon derivatives before the date in clauses (2) and (4) of this proclamation, the Secretary shall take action in coordination with CBP to restrict imports by the company and its affiliates. The Secretary also shall, from time to time, in consultation with any senior executive branch officials the Secretary deems appropriate, review the status of such imports with respect to the national security. The Secretary shall inform the President of any circumstances that, in the Secretary's opinion, might indicate the need for further action by the President under section 232. The Secretary shall also inform the President of any circumstance that, in the Secretary's opinion, might indicate that the remedies provided for in this proclamation are no longer necessary.
(12) The Secretary and the Secretary of Homeland Security are directed and authorized to take all actions to implement and effectuate this proclamation -- including, consistent with applicable law, through temporary suspension or amendment of regulations or through notices in the Federal Register and by adopting rules, regulations, or guidance -- and to employ all powers granted to the President, including by section 232, as may be necessary to implement this proclamation. The head of each executive department and agency (agency) is authorized to and shall take all appropriate measures within the agency's authority to implement this proclamation. The head of each agency may, consistent with applicable law, including 3 U.S.C. 301, redelegate the authority to take such appropriate measures within the agency.
(13) The Secretary, in consultation with any senior executive branch officials he deems appropriate, may issue rules, regulations, and guidance consistent with this proclamation, including to address operational necessity and prevent circumvention and evasion, including through manipulation of related-party transactions or transfers of foreign subsidies.
(14) CBP may take any appropriate measures, consistent with applicable law, to administer the tariffs and MIPs imposed by this proclamation.
(15) Any provision of previous proclamations and Executive Orders that is inconsistent with this proclamation is superseded to the extent of such inconsistency.
(16) If any provision of this proclamation or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any individual or circumstance is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its provisions to any other individual or circumstance shall not be affected. If any fee, duty, tariff, or program described in this proclamation is held to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder shall continue in effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this sixth day of August, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fifty-first.
ANNEX I (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ANNEX-I.pdf)
ANNEX II (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Annex-II.pdf)
DONALD J. TRUMP
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Original text here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/08/adjusting-imports-of-polysilicon-and-its-derivatives-into-the-united-states/
President Trump Issues Executive Order on Ending Birth Tourism
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- President Trump issued the following executive order on Aug. 6, 2026:
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ENDING BIRTH TOURISM
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. Purpose. United States citizenship is among the greatest inheritances the Nation can bestow. It embodies a sacred bond between the American people and the Nation in which they live, and carries profound rights, privileges, and responsibilities reflective of the enduring allegiance of citizens to the United States and our Constitution. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- President Trump issued the following executive order on Aug. 6, 2026: * * * ENDING BIRTH TOURISM By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered: Section 1. Purpose. United States citizenship is among the greatest inheritances the Nation can bestow. It embodies a sacred bond between the American people and the Nation in which they live, and carries profound rights, privileges, and responsibilities reflective of the enduring allegiance of citizens to the United States and our Constitution.Citizenship is not a commodity to be acquired through calculated exploitation and evasion of the immigration laws, such as by entering the United States on a nonimmigrant visa for the purpose of giving birth within the Nation's borders.
Birth tourism operators use deceptive advertisements and inducements to entice foreign nationals to travel to the United States for the purpose of giving birth on American soil. They promise citizenship; access to public benefits; and short-term stays in specialized facilities, hotels, or rentals, but often fail to deliver on these promises. These operators coach their clients to misrepresent the purpose and duration of their travel to consular and border officials to obtain visas authorizing entry into the United States. Failure to appropriately combat these schemes has resulted in thriving industries around the world that profit by enabling the evasion of American immigration laws to obtain citizenship and other immigration benefits for foreign visitors, and the exploitation of the women who travel here for purposes of giving birth.
The immigration laws of the United States establish discrete categories of temporary nonimmigrant visas to allow foreign visitors into the United States for study, exchange, temporary employment, tourism, and other transitory activities that are now exploited by birth tourism operators. Participants in birth tourism schemes abuse these categories to establish a permanent foothold in the United States by securing the advantage of citizenship for their children and then potentially for themselves.
Birth tourism, defined in section 3 of this order, undermines the integrity of the Nation's immigration system by enabling foreign nationals to exploit their temporary admission to obtain permanent immigration-related benefits. Birth tourism also diverts limited consular inspection and enforcement resources away from legitimate visa applicants, erodes public confidence in the faithful enforcement of the immigration laws, and impairs the executive branch's ability to protect the national security.
The United States has a compelling interest in ensuring that each visa category is used only for the purpose for which it was established. Foreign nationals seeking temporary admission into the United States must adhere to the purposes for which the Congress has authorized their temporary admission, and cannot be permitted to circumvent the immigration laws in an attempt to vest themselves and their children with lasting benefits that are irreconcilable with their nonimmigrant status.
It is therefore the policy of the United States to promote the integrity of its immigration system, to ensure that nonimmigrant visa classifications are used only for their lawful and intended purposes, and to prevent the exploitation of those classifications by persons engaging in birth tourism.
Sec. 2. Authorities. Pursuant to section 301 of title 3, United States Code, the authority granted to the President under section 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1185(a), is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to the extent necessary to implement this order, including the authority to issue or adopt rules, policies, operational guidance, or other guidance to carry out this order.
Sec. 3. Definition. For purposes of this order, "birth tourism" is defined as:
(a) the entry of any foreign national into the United States via a nonimmigrant visa for the purpose of giving birth on American soil; or
(b) any effort by any foreign national to facilitate the entry of any foreign national into the United States via a nonimmigrant visa for the purpose of giving birth on American soil.
Sec. 4. Scope and Implementation. (a) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such actions and update any rules, policies, operational guidance, or other guidance as necessary to effectuate the policy set forth in this order. Such actions may include, within the Secretaries' respective discretion and authority, appropriate action to prevent the entry into the United States of, or the granting of any visa or other travel authorization to, any alien entering or attempting to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in birth tourism; revoking the visa or travel authorization and permanently barring entry of any alien who enters or attempts to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in birth tourism; denial of entry to, or removal of, any alien who previously engaged or plans to engage in birth tourism; or other appropriate action against entities, organizations, or individuals, within or outside of the United States, responsible for facilitating or enabling birth tourism in any manner.
(b) All other relevant executive departments and agencies shall provide such records and information as are necessary for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement the terms of this order and the rules, policies, operational guidance, or other guidance issued pursuant to it, subject to applicable law.
Sec. 5. Exemptions. Notwithstanding the restrictions imposed by this order, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security may exempt a foreign national from actions taken pursuant to this order on humanitarian grounds or when the foreign national's entry is in the national interest, as determined by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
(d) If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of any of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
(e) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Homeland Security.
DONALD J. TRUMP
* * *
Original text here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/08/ending-birth-tourism/
* * *
ENDING BIRTH TOURISM
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. Purpose. United States citizenship is among the greatest inheritances the Nation can bestow. It embodies a sacred bond between the American people and the Nation in which they live, and carries profound rights, privileges, and responsibilities reflective of the enduring allegiance of citizens to the United States and our Constitution. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- President Trump issued the following executive order on Aug. 6, 2026: * * * ENDING BIRTH TOURISM By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered: Section 1. Purpose. United States citizenship is among the greatest inheritances the Nation can bestow. It embodies a sacred bond between the American people and the Nation in which they live, and carries profound rights, privileges, and responsibilities reflective of the enduring allegiance of citizens to the United States and our Constitution.Citizenship is not a commodity to be acquired through calculated exploitation and evasion of the immigration laws, such as by entering the United States on a nonimmigrant visa for the purpose of giving birth within the Nation's borders.
Birth tourism operators use deceptive advertisements and inducements to entice foreign nationals to travel to the United States for the purpose of giving birth on American soil. They promise citizenship; access to public benefits; and short-term stays in specialized facilities, hotels, or rentals, but often fail to deliver on these promises. These operators coach their clients to misrepresent the purpose and duration of their travel to consular and border officials to obtain visas authorizing entry into the United States. Failure to appropriately combat these schemes has resulted in thriving industries around the world that profit by enabling the evasion of American immigration laws to obtain citizenship and other immigration benefits for foreign visitors, and the exploitation of the women who travel here for purposes of giving birth.
The immigration laws of the United States establish discrete categories of temporary nonimmigrant visas to allow foreign visitors into the United States for study, exchange, temporary employment, tourism, and other transitory activities that are now exploited by birth tourism operators. Participants in birth tourism schemes abuse these categories to establish a permanent foothold in the United States by securing the advantage of citizenship for their children and then potentially for themselves.
Birth tourism, defined in section 3 of this order, undermines the integrity of the Nation's immigration system by enabling foreign nationals to exploit their temporary admission to obtain permanent immigration-related benefits. Birth tourism also diverts limited consular inspection and enforcement resources away from legitimate visa applicants, erodes public confidence in the faithful enforcement of the immigration laws, and impairs the executive branch's ability to protect the national security.
The United States has a compelling interest in ensuring that each visa category is used only for the purpose for which it was established. Foreign nationals seeking temporary admission into the United States must adhere to the purposes for which the Congress has authorized their temporary admission, and cannot be permitted to circumvent the immigration laws in an attempt to vest themselves and their children with lasting benefits that are irreconcilable with their nonimmigrant status.
It is therefore the policy of the United States to promote the integrity of its immigration system, to ensure that nonimmigrant visa classifications are used only for their lawful and intended purposes, and to prevent the exploitation of those classifications by persons engaging in birth tourism.
Sec. 2. Authorities. Pursuant to section 301 of title 3, United States Code, the authority granted to the President under section 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1185(a), is hereby delegated to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to the extent necessary to implement this order, including the authority to issue or adopt rules, policies, operational guidance, or other guidance to carry out this order.
Sec. 3. Definition. For purposes of this order, "birth tourism" is defined as:
(a) the entry of any foreign national into the United States via a nonimmigrant visa for the purpose of giving birth on American soil; or
(b) any effort by any foreign national to facilitate the entry of any foreign national into the United States via a nonimmigrant visa for the purpose of giving birth on American soil.
Sec. 4. Scope and Implementation. (a) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such actions and update any rules, policies, operational guidance, or other guidance as necessary to effectuate the policy set forth in this order. Such actions may include, within the Secretaries' respective discretion and authority, appropriate action to prevent the entry into the United States of, or the granting of any visa or other travel authorization to, any alien entering or attempting to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in birth tourism; revoking the visa or travel authorization and permanently barring entry of any alien who enters or attempts to enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in birth tourism; denial of entry to, or removal of, any alien who previously engaged or plans to engage in birth tourism; or other appropriate action against entities, organizations, or individuals, within or outside of the United States, responsible for facilitating or enabling birth tourism in any manner.
(b) All other relevant executive departments and agencies shall provide such records and information as are necessary for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement the terms of this order and the rules, policies, operational guidance, or other guidance issued pursuant to it, subject to applicable law.
Sec. 5. Exemptions. Notwithstanding the restrictions imposed by this order, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security may exempt a foreign national from actions taken pursuant to this order on humanitarian grounds or when the foreign national's entry is in the national interest, as determined by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
(d) If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of any of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
(e) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Homeland Security.
DONALD J. TRUMP
* * *
Original text here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/08/ending-birth-tourism/
JAY VAN DER WERFF APPOINTED REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR FEMA REGION 7
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency issued the following news release on Aug. 7, 2026:
* * *
JAY VAN DER WERFF APPOINTED REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR FEMA REGION 7
KANSAS CITY, Mo. - The regional office of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on Monday welcomed its new regional administrator, Jay Van Der Werff, following his recent appointment to the position by the Trump administration.
Van Der Werff joined FEMA Region 7 in 2019, as the National Preparedness Division Director and Federal Preparedness Coordinator.
He ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency issued the following news release on Aug. 7, 2026: * * * JAY VAN DER WERFF APPOINTED REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR FEMA REGION 7 KANSAS CITY, Mo. - The regional office of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on Monday welcomed its new regional administrator, Jay Van Der Werff, following his recent appointment to the position by the Trump administration. Van Der Werff joined FEMA Region 7 in 2019, as the National Preparedness Division Director and Federal Preparedness Coordinator. Heretired from the Marine Corps after 23 years of active-duty service. After his military career, he held leadership roles at Garmin International, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Farm Service Agency, and Army University's faculty development program.
Dr. Van Der Werff holds a BA from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, an MS in Management from Liberty University, and a PhD in Adult and Continuing Education from Kansas State University.
As Region 7 administrator, Van Der Werff will oversee a Kansas City-based office of over 300 staff and a four-state region that covers Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20260807/jay-van-der-werff-appointed-regional-administrator-fema-region-7
* * *
JAY VAN DER WERFF APPOINTED REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR FEMA REGION 7
KANSAS CITY, Mo. - The regional office of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on Monday welcomed its new regional administrator, Jay Van Der Werff, following his recent appointment to the position by the Trump administration.
Van Der Werff joined FEMA Region 7 in 2019, as the National Preparedness Division Director and Federal Preparedness Coordinator.
He ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency issued the following news release on Aug. 7, 2026: * * * JAY VAN DER WERFF APPOINTED REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR FEMA REGION 7 KANSAS CITY, Mo. - The regional office of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on Monday welcomed its new regional administrator, Jay Van Der Werff, following his recent appointment to the position by the Trump administration. Van Der Werff joined FEMA Region 7 in 2019, as the National Preparedness Division Director and Federal Preparedness Coordinator. Heretired from the Marine Corps after 23 years of active-duty service. After his military career, he held leadership roles at Garmin International, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Farm Service Agency, and Army University's faculty development program.
Dr. Van Der Werff holds a BA from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, an MS in Management from Liberty University, and a PhD in Adult and Continuing Education from Kansas State University.
As Region 7 administrator, Van Der Werff will oversee a Kansas City-based office of over 300 staff and a four-state region that covers Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20260807/jay-van-der-werff-appointed-regional-administrator-fema-region-7
FEC Issues Digest for Week of Aug. 3-7, 2026
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest:
* * *
Commission meetings and hearings
No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week.
* * *
Litigation
Campbell v. FEC (Case No. 26-10849) On August 3, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued an Order Granting Unopposed Motion for Leave to File a Response.
Lewicki, et al. v. FEC (Case No. 24-2505) On August 3, Plaintiffs filed a Combined Reply in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest: * * * Commission meetings and hearings No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week. * * * Litigation Campbell v. FEC (Case No. 26-10849) On August 3, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued an Order Granting Unopposed Motion for Leave to File a Response. Lewicki, et al. v. FEC (Case No. 24-2505) On August 3, Plaintiffs filed a Combined Reply in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Schaefer v. FEC (Case No. 26-2117) On June 15, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Seegers v. FEC (Case No. 26-276) On July 28, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment Against the FEC, a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, and a Declaration in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
* * *
Outreach
On August 3, Debbie Chacona, Assistant Staff Director, and Kristin Roser, Compliance Branch Chief of the Reports Analysis Division, spoke at the Republican National Committee's 2026 Legal Compliance Seminar in Washington, DC.
* * *
Public Disclosure
On August 5, the Office of the Inspector General made public its report on Evaluation of the FEC's DATA Act Compliance.
* * *
Reports Due in 2026
The Commission has posted the 2026 Congressional Pre-Election Reporting Dates. Reporting schedules for all filers in 2026 are also available.
* * *
Election Dates
The Commission has posted a list of 2026 Congressional Primary Dates.
* * *
Upcoming educational opportunities
September 16, 2026: The Commission is scheduled to host a webinar on Independent Expenditures and Pre-Election Communications.
For more information on upcoming training opportunities, see the Commission's Trainings page.
* * *
Upcoming reporting due dates
August 20: August Monthly Reports are due. For more information, see the 2026 Monthly Reporting schedule.
The Commission has posted information regarding reporting deadlines as some states reschedule congressional primary elections to account for redistricting.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the California 14th District Special Runoff Election, scheduled for August 18, 2026.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the Georgia 13th District Special Runoff Election, scheduled for August 25, 2026.
* * *
Additional research materials
Contribution Limits: In addition to the current limits, the Commission has posted an archive of contribution limits that were in effect going back to the 1975-1976 election cycles.
Federal election results are available. The data was compiled from the official vote totals published by state election offices.
FEC Notify: Want to be notified by email when campaign finance reports are received by the agency? Sign up here.
The Combined Federal State Disclosure and Election Directory is available. This publication identifies the federal and state agencies responsible for the disclosure of campaign finances, lobbying, personal finances, public financing, candidates on the ballot, election results, spending on state initiatives, and other financial filings.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Tax Checkoff Chart provides information on balance of the Fund, monthly deposits into the Fund reported by the Department of the Treasury, payments from the Fund as certified by the FEC, and participation rates of taxpayers as reported by the Internal Revenue Service. For more information on the Presidential Public Funding Program, see the Public Funding of Presidential Elections page.
The FEC Record is available as a continuously updated online news source.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.fec.gov/updates/week-of-august-3-7-2026/
* * *
Commission meetings and hearings
No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week.
* * *
Litigation
Campbell v. FEC (Case No. 26-10849) On August 3, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued an Order Granting Unopposed Motion for Leave to File a Response.
Lewicki, et al. v. FEC (Case No. 24-2505) On August 3, Plaintiffs filed a Combined Reply in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest: * * * Commission meetings and hearings No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week. * * * Litigation Campbell v. FEC (Case No. 26-10849) On August 3, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan issued an Order Granting Unopposed Motion for Leave to File a Response. Lewicki, et al. v. FEC (Case No. 24-2505) On August 3, Plaintiffs filed a Combined Reply in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Schaefer v. FEC (Case No. 26-2117) On June 15, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Seegers v. FEC (Case No. 26-276) On July 28, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment Against the FEC, a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, and a Declaration in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
* * *
Outreach
On August 3, Debbie Chacona, Assistant Staff Director, and Kristin Roser, Compliance Branch Chief of the Reports Analysis Division, spoke at the Republican National Committee's 2026 Legal Compliance Seminar in Washington, DC.
* * *
Public Disclosure
On August 5, the Office of the Inspector General made public its report on Evaluation of the FEC's DATA Act Compliance.
* * *
Reports Due in 2026
The Commission has posted the 2026 Congressional Pre-Election Reporting Dates. Reporting schedules for all filers in 2026 are also available.
* * *
Election Dates
The Commission has posted a list of 2026 Congressional Primary Dates.
* * *
Upcoming educational opportunities
September 16, 2026: The Commission is scheduled to host a webinar on Independent Expenditures and Pre-Election Communications.
For more information on upcoming training opportunities, see the Commission's Trainings page.
* * *
Upcoming reporting due dates
August 20: August Monthly Reports are due. For more information, see the 2026 Monthly Reporting schedule.
The Commission has posted information regarding reporting deadlines as some states reschedule congressional primary elections to account for redistricting.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the California 14th District Special Runoff Election, scheduled for August 18, 2026.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the Georgia 13th District Special Runoff Election, scheduled for August 25, 2026.
* * *
Additional research materials
Contribution Limits: In addition to the current limits, the Commission has posted an archive of contribution limits that were in effect going back to the 1975-1976 election cycles.
Federal election results are available. The data was compiled from the official vote totals published by state election offices.
FEC Notify: Want to be notified by email when campaign finance reports are received by the agency? Sign up here.
The Combined Federal State Disclosure and Election Directory is available. This publication identifies the federal and state agencies responsible for the disclosure of campaign finances, lobbying, personal finances, public financing, candidates on the ballot, election results, spending on state initiatives, and other financial filings.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Tax Checkoff Chart provides information on balance of the Fund, monthly deposits into the Fund reported by the Department of the Treasury, payments from the Fund as certified by the FEC, and participation rates of taxpayers as reported by the Internal Revenue Service. For more information on the Presidential Public Funding Program, see the Public Funding of Presidential Elections page.
The FEC Record is available as a continuously updated online news source.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.fec.gov/updates/week-of-august-3-7-2026/
FCC Wireline Competition Bureau Issues Public Notice: Comment Due Dates Set for the Build America - Eliminating Barriers to Wireline Deployments Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket No. 25-253):
* * *
By this Public Notice, the Wireline Competition Bureau announces that comments in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice) in the Build America: Eliminating Barriers to Wireline Deployments proceeding are due no later than September 21, 2026, and the reply comments are due no later than November 5, 2026./1
In the Notice, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes and seeks comment on rules that would prevent ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket No. 25-253): * * * By this Public Notice, the Wireline Competition Bureau announces that comments in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice) in the Build America: Eliminating Barriers to Wireline Deployments proceeding are due no later than September 21, 2026, and the reply comments are due no later than November 5, 2026./1 In the Notice, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes and seeks comment on rules that would preventcertain state and local statutes, regulations, and legal requirements from having a prohibitive effect on the provision of wireline telecommunications services in violation of Section 253 of the Communications Act./2
The Notice set deadlines for filing comments and reply comments at 45 and 90 days after the date of publication of the summary of the Notice in the Federal Register./3
The Federal Register published a summary of the Notice on August 7, 2026./4 Complete filing instructions are contained in the Notice and the Federal Register Notice./5
* * *
Footnotes:
1/ Build America: Eliminating Barries to Wireline Deployments, WC Docket No. 25-253, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 26-40 (June 26, 2026) (Notice). This document is available on the Commission's website at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-40A1.pdf. The document is also available electronically via the Commission's Electronic Document Management System (EDOCS) website at https://www.fcc.gov/edocs (by FCC Number, FCC 26-40) or via the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS) website at https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/ (by docket number, WC Docket No. 25-253).
2/ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 253.
3/ See Notice at 43, para. 84.
4/ FCC, Build America: Eliminating Barries to Wireline Deployments, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 91 Fed. Reg. 51121 (Aug. 7, 2026) (Federal Register Notice).
5/ Notice at 42, para. 76; Federal Register Notice at 51121.
* * *
Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-829A1.pdf
* * *
By this Public Notice, the Wireline Competition Bureau announces that comments in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice) in the Build America: Eliminating Barriers to Wireline Deployments proceeding are due no later than September 21, 2026, and the reply comments are due no later than November 5, 2026./1
In the Notice, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes and seeks comment on rules that would prevent ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket No. 25-253): * * * By this Public Notice, the Wireline Competition Bureau announces that comments in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Notice) in the Build America: Eliminating Barriers to Wireline Deployments proceeding are due no later than September 21, 2026, and the reply comments are due no later than November 5, 2026./1 In the Notice, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) proposes and seeks comment on rules that would preventcertain state and local statutes, regulations, and legal requirements from having a prohibitive effect on the provision of wireline telecommunications services in violation of Section 253 of the Communications Act./2
The Notice set deadlines for filing comments and reply comments at 45 and 90 days after the date of publication of the summary of the Notice in the Federal Register./3
The Federal Register published a summary of the Notice on August 7, 2026./4 Complete filing instructions are contained in the Notice and the Federal Register Notice./5
* * *
Footnotes:
1/ Build America: Eliminating Barries to Wireline Deployments, WC Docket No. 25-253, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 26-40 (June 26, 2026) (Notice). This document is available on the Commission's website at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-40A1.pdf. The document is also available electronically via the Commission's Electronic Document Management System (EDOCS) website at https://www.fcc.gov/edocs (by FCC Number, FCC 26-40) or via the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS) website at https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/ (by docket number, WC Docket No. 25-253).
2/ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 253.
3/ See Notice at 43, para. 84.
4/ FCC, Build America: Eliminating Barries to Wireline Deployments, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 91 Fed. Reg. 51121 (Aug. 7, 2026) (Federal Register Notice).
5/ Notice at 42, para. 76; Federal Register Notice at 51121.
* * *
Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-829A1.pdf