Federal Regulatory Agencies
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Federal Regulatory Agencies
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USITC to Appoint Lisa Murray and Benjamin Richards as New Administrative Law Judges
WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 -- The U.S. International Trade Commission issued the following news release:
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USITC to Appoint Lisa Murray and Benjamin Richards as New Administrative Law Judges
November 3, 2026
Brett W. Doyle, Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission or USITC), announced today that Lisa A. Murray and Benjamin S. Richards have been named USITC Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Murray and Richards will manage an active litigation docket, preside over evidentiary hearings, and make initial determinations in the Commission's investigations involving unfair practices ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 -- The U.S. International Trade Commission issued the following news release: * * * USITC to Appoint Lisa Murray and Benjamin Richards as New Administrative Law Judges November 3, 2026 Brett W. Doyle, Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission or USITC), announced today that Lisa A. Murray and Benjamin S. Richards have been named USITC Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Murray and Richards will manage an active litigation docket, preside over evidentiary hearings, and make initial determinations in the Commission's investigations involving unfair practicesin import trade under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. These investigations most often involve allegations of patent and trademark infringement.
About Lisa A. Murray
Prior to her selection as ALJ, Murray served as an Administrative Patent Judge (APJ) on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from 2024 to 2026. Prior to her appointment as APJ, Murray worked as an investigative attorney in the USITC's Office of Unfair Import Investigations from 2008 to 2024, where she represented the public interest in section 337 investigations involving patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation.
Murray began her career as a judicial law clerk to the Hon. Dominick L. DiCarlo, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of International Trade, and practiced intellectual property and international trade law at various private firms before rejoining the federal government.
Murray holds a juris doctor degree, cum laude, from the University of Michigan Law School, a master of science degree in computer science from the George Washington University, a masters of arts degree in political science (world politics) from the University of Michigan, and a bachelor of arts degree, with honors, in history and music performance from Oberlin College.
About Benjamin S. Richards
Before his selection as ALJ, Richards served as Of Counsel at Winston Taylor LLP in Washington, DC. Previously, he served as an attorney-advisor in both the Office of the General Counsel and the Office of the Administrative Law Judges at the USITC. In those roles, he advised the Commission and ALJs on section 337 investigations and represented the Commission in appellate litigation before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Earlier in his career, he served as a trial attorney in the Intellectual Property Section of the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Division, where he represented the United States in patent, trademark, and copyright litigation.
He holds a juris doctor degree from the George Washington University Law School and a bachelor's degree in mathematics from the University of Utah.
About the U.S. International Trade Commission
The USITC is an independent, nonpartisan, factfinding federal agency that investigates and makes determinations in proceedings involving imports claimed to injure a domestic industry or violate U.S. intellectual property rights; provides independent analysis and information on tariffs, trade, and competitiveness to the President and the Congress; and maintains the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule.
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Original text here: https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2026/er1103_69464.htm
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USITC to Appoint Lisa Murray and Benjamin Richards as New Administrative Law Judges
November 3, 2026
Brett W. Doyle, Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission or USITC), announced today that Lisa A. Murray and Benjamin S. Richards have been named USITC Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Murray and Richards will manage an active litigation docket, preside over evidentiary hearings, and make initial determinations in the Commission's investigations involving unfair practices ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 -- The U.S. International Trade Commission issued the following news release: * * * USITC to Appoint Lisa Murray and Benjamin Richards as New Administrative Law Judges November 3, 2026 Brett W. Doyle, Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission or USITC), announced today that Lisa A. Murray and Benjamin S. Richards have been named USITC Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Murray and Richards will manage an active litigation docket, preside over evidentiary hearings, and make initial determinations in the Commission's investigations involving unfair practicesin import trade under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. These investigations most often involve allegations of patent and trademark infringement.
About Lisa A. Murray
Prior to her selection as ALJ, Murray served as an Administrative Patent Judge (APJ) on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office from 2024 to 2026. Prior to her appointment as APJ, Murray worked as an investigative attorney in the USITC's Office of Unfair Import Investigations from 2008 to 2024, where she represented the public interest in section 337 investigations involving patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation.
Murray began her career as a judicial law clerk to the Hon. Dominick L. DiCarlo, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of International Trade, and practiced intellectual property and international trade law at various private firms before rejoining the federal government.
Murray holds a juris doctor degree, cum laude, from the University of Michigan Law School, a master of science degree in computer science from the George Washington University, a masters of arts degree in political science (world politics) from the University of Michigan, and a bachelor of arts degree, with honors, in history and music performance from Oberlin College.
About Benjamin S. Richards
Before his selection as ALJ, Richards served as Of Counsel at Winston Taylor LLP in Washington, DC. Previously, he served as an attorney-advisor in both the Office of the General Counsel and the Office of the Administrative Law Judges at the USITC. In those roles, he advised the Commission and ALJs on section 337 investigations and represented the Commission in appellate litigation before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Earlier in his career, he served as a trial attorney in the Intellectual Property Section of the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Division, where he represented the United States in patent, trademark, and copyright litigation.
He holds a juris doctor degree from the George Washington University Law School and a bachelor's degree in mathematics from the University of Utah.
About the U.S. International Trade Commission
The USITC is an independent, nonpartisan, factfinding federal agency that investigates and makes determinations in proceedings involving imports claimed to injure a domestic industry or violate U.S. intellectual property rights; provides independent analysis and information on tariffs, trade, and competitiveness to the President and the Congress; and maintains the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule.
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Original text here: https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2026/er1103_69464.htm
SEC Obtains Final Judgments as to The Movie Company and Its CEO in Connection With Alleged Offering Fraud
WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release:
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. The Movie Studio, Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 0:21-cv-61686-DPG (S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 13, 2021)
On October 15, 2026, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered final judgments as to The Movie Studio, Inc., a Florida-based movie company, and its President and CEO, Gordon Scott Venters, in connection with charges that they made material misrepresentations to investors in an unregistered securities offering ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release: * * * Securities and Exchange Commission v. The Movie Studio, Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 0:21-cv-61686-DPG (S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 13, 2021) On October 15, 2026, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered final judgments as to The Movie Studio, Inc., a Florida-based movie company, and its President and CEO, Gordon Scott Venters, in connection with charges that they made material misrepresentations to investors in an unregistered securities offeringconducted over a multi-year period.
According to the SEC's complaint, The Movie Studio and Venters solicited investments from April 2017 through December 2020 using press releases and marketing materials that allegedly contained material misrepresentations and omissions concerning: (i) the company's ownership of various films; (ii) its film-production operations; (iii) its purported use of blockchain technology; and (iv) its alleged receipt of revenue from Amazon. The complaint alleged that they raised at least $1.2 million from more than 70 investors, many of whom were unsophisticated and elderly. The complaint further alleged that Venters used some investor funds for purposes unrelated to any legitimate business activity.
The Movie Studio and Venters consented to the entry of the final judgments, which permanently enjoin each from violating Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933. In addition, the final judgment as to Venters permanently enjoins him from violating Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, and orders him to pay $69,000 in disgorgement, $17,735 in prejudgment interest, and a $100,000 civil penalty.
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Resources
* SEC Complaint (https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2026/comp26683.pdf)
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Original text here: https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/litigation-releases/lr-26683
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Securities and Exchange Commission v. The Movie Studio, Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 0:21-cv-61686-DPG (S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 13, 2021)
On October 15, 2026, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered final judgments as to The Movie Studio, Inc., a Florida-based movie company, and its President and CEO, Gordon Scott Venters, in connection with charges that they made material misrepresentations to investors in an unregistered securities offering ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following litigation release: * * * Securities and Exchange Commission v. The Movie Studio, Inc. et al., Civil Action No. 0:21-cv-61686-DPG (S.D. Fla. filed Aug. 13, 2021) On October 15, 2026, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida entered final judgments as to The Movie Studio, Inc., a Florida-based movie company, and its President and CEO, Gordon Scott Venters, in connection with charges that they made material misrepresentations to investors in an unregistered securities offeringconducted over a multi-year period.
According to the SEC's complaint, The Movie Studio and Venters solicited investments from April 2017 through December 2020 using press releases and marketing materials that allegedly contained material misrepresentations and omissions concerning: (i) the company's ownership of various films; (ii) its film-production operations; (iii) its purported use of blockchain technology; and (iv) its alleged receipt of revenue from Amazon. The complaint alleged that they raised at least $1.2 million from more than 70 investors, many of whom were unsophisticated and elderly. The complaint further alleged that Venters used some investor funds for purposes unrelated to any legitimate business activity.
The Movie Studio and Venters consented to the entry of the final judgments, which permanently enjoin each from violating Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933. In addition, the final judgment as to Venters permanently enjoins him from violating Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, and orders him to pay $69,000 in disgorgement, $17,735 in prejudgment interest, and a $100,000 civil penalty.
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Resources
* SEC Complaint (https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2026/comp26683.pdf)
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Original text here: https://www.sec.gov/enforcement-litigation/litigation-releases/lr-26683
SEC Commissioner Uyeda Issues Remarks at Practicing Law Institute's 58th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation
NEW YORK, Nov. 4 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following remarks by Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda at the Practicing Law Institute's 58th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation:
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Practicing Law Institute's 58th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation
Nov. 2, 2026
On January 19, 2006, in the clear blue Florida sky, an Atlas V rocketed off from Cape Canaveral carrying a small spacecraft called New Horizons.1 This mission, planned by NASA--that is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, not the other NASAA, the North American Securities Administrators Association--exited ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Nov. 4 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following remarks by Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda at the Practicing Law Institute's 58th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation: * * * Practicing Law Institute's 58th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation Nov. 2, 2026 On January 19, 2006, in the clear blue Florida sky, an Atlas V rocketed off from Cape Canaveral carrying a small spacecraft called New Horizons.1 This mission, planned by NASA--that is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, not the other NASAA, the North American Securities Administrators Association--exitedthe Earth at more than 36,000 miles per hour for a long-term "voyage to visit the planet Pluto and then beyond."2 That same month, the Securities and Exchange Commission launched something of similar importance, at least in my view:3 its Statement Concerning Financial Penalties, also known as the "Corporate Penalty Statement."4
Announced in conjunction with two settled accounting fraud cases, one with a $50 million civil penalty and the other with no penalty,5 the Corporate Penalty Statement was issued in a unanimous, 5-0 decision under the leadership of Chairman Cox, after over 40 hours of meetings reconciling differing views amongst the Commissioners.6 The Statement is a concise document with a specific mission: to provide an analytical framework so when the Commission imposes a civil penalty on a corporate issuer, it can explain why, and that explanation should rest on what Congress authorized and why it authorized it.7 As a measure approved by Commission vote, the Statement should have a similar stature to other regulatory guidance provided by the Commission, whether in amicus briefs, adjudicatory opinions, administrative orders, interpretive releases, or otherwise.
The Corporate Penalty Statement starts with the most salient consideration on the imposition of civil penalties: the underlying statutory authority. In passing the Remedies Act of 1990, Congress gave the Commission authority to seek civil penalties against corporate issuers. In its accompanying report, the Senate Banking Committee recognized that shareholders may ultimately bear the cost. The report stated that a corporate penalty should be sought where shareholders received an improper benefit, and that in situations where they were the principal victims, the "Committee expects that the SEC, when appropriate, will seek penalties from the individual offenders acting for a corporate issuer."8
The Corporate Penalty Statement is grounded in the statute and its legislative history. The Statement identifies two principal considerations. First, whether the corporation received a direct benefit from the violation, such as reduced expenses, increased revenues, or some other unjust enrichment. The strongest case for a penalty is one in which shareholders received an improper benefit due to the violation; the weakest is one in which shareholders are the principal victims of the securities law violation. Second, the degree to which the penalty will compensate or further harm injured shareholders. The Statement then lists seven additional factors: the need to deter the particular type of offense; the extent of injury to innocent parties; whether complicity was widespread within the corporation; the level of intent; the difficulty of detecting the offense; the presence or absence of remedial steps; and the extent of cooperation with the Commission and other authorities.9
To be clear, the Corporate Penalty Statement does not take the position that corporations should never be assessed a civil penalty. Indeed, it states that "we proceed from the fundamental principle that corporate penalties are an essential part of an aggressive and comprehensive program to enforce the federal securities laws[.]"10 As Commissioner Gallagher observed, the Statement is based on an analysis of the statute itself, not a mere policy preference.11 It is a framework for judgment, not a rule of abstention.
This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the Statement - and also my twentieth year of continuous employment at the Commission. In that sense, I have had an insider's view on how the Statement has fared over those two decades. After twenty years, we ought to look back at why the Statement was needed, consider how it has fared, and then consider questions that confront the Commission today in the application of the Statement's principles.
So how has the framework fared? Like the New Horizons mission, its journey has had a number of stages. The Commission attempted, in 2007, to give the Statement practical force through a pilot program in which the Commission provided feedback to the staff on potential penalties prior to reaching a settlement with the proposed defendants.12 After all, decisions on enforcement matters are ultimately made by the Commission, not the staff who serve as attorneys for the Commission.
That approach, however, was discontinued in 2009 by Chair Schapiro.13 In the years that followed, the Corporate Penalty Statement and its factors were seldom visible in reasoning the public could see. It also started to disappear as an analytical tool internally within the SEC as well. In 2015, Commissioner Piwowar noted, "I have become concerned by the increasing number of staff recommendations that have not been accompanied by analysis of the principal factors described in the 2006 penalty statement."14
Yet, the Commission continued to impose civil penalties against corporate issuers in significant amounts. Back in 2006, then-Commissioner Atkins had warned that staff might come to measure their own performance by the size of the penalties they obtained.15 By fiscal year 2024, the Commission was announcing some of the largest financial remedies in its history.16
Upon becoming the Acting Chairman on January 20, 2025, one of my first directives was for the staff to follow the Corporate Penalty Statement, which has never been rescinded or withdrawn. Rather, it had simply been ignored, along with the principles underlying the Commission's statutory authority to impose civil penalties. This past February, when the Division of Enforcement issued substantive updates to the Enforcement Manual--the first since 2017--it included an instruction that staff consider the Corporate Penalty Statement when deciding whether, and how much, to seek in civil penalties from corporations.17 But a retrospective about the Corporate Penalty Statement that ends with "and so the framework was restored" would miss more important points.
In some ways, the Statement has parallels to the New Horizons mission. Seven months after New Horizons launched towards Pluto, while it was en route, astronomers voted that Pluto was no longer a "planet."18 The spacecraft was still headed to the same place, but the objective to which it was headed had been redefined. The Corporate Penalty Statement is in a similar position. Its principles still point in the right direction. But the world to which the Commission applies them today is not the same world in which they were written. Let's examine some of those areas, which I describe next in no particular order.
The first concerns who the shareholders are. The Statement's framework implicitly recognizes that for most public companies, shareholders are a continuously changing group.19 Thus, it discusses whether a civil penalty would be paid by shareholders who had been the principal victims of the violation and the extent to which the passage of time has resulted in shareholder turnover.20 However, the Statement does not offer guidance as to how that might work in practice, particularly given that years may elapse between when corrective disclosure is made by a corporate issuer, such as through a restatement or Form 8-K filing, and when the SEC finalizes an enforcement recommendation.
Consider a company that overstates its earnings, which has resulted in an inflated stock price. When corrective disclosure is issued, the stock price falls. In an efficient market, prices should reflect the possibility of SEC enforcement action as well as shareholder class actions. At that point, would a corporate penalty further harm injured shareholders? Some might argue that there is no further harm, because the shareholders who purchased after the corrective disclosure did so with knowledge that such penalties and other remedies might be forthcoming. But is that the right result? While it is true that the subsequent shareholders may have priced in the potential impact with respect to their purchase price, it comes at the expense of shareholders who were harmed by the original fraud and then sold their shares at the lower price that factors in potential enforcement and class action liability.
The second concerns the use of Fair Funds to compensate victims. The Fair Funds provision adds a complication that the Corporate Penalty Statement itself flagged. When funds from civil penalties are returned to harmed investors who are also shareholders of the penalized company, they are in effect paying themselves, less the cost of distribution.21 Even a well-run distribution cannot fully solve the deeper problem: identifying who was harmed when shares change hands constantly. Most shares are held in street name through brokers and other intermediaries, so reaching the beneficial owners depends on claims processes that many eligible investors never complete. A distribution can return money to some investors. It cannot reliably match the people who pay the penalty with the people who were hurt.22
The third development concerns the underlying charges and any required intent element. The Statement's intent factor assumed a meaningful distinction between deliberate fraud, such as scienter-based charges, and lesser conduct, with corporate penalties more appropriate in egregious cases. In recent years, however, the Commission has imposed significant penalties for violations that do not require intent at all. The internal accounting controls provision is one example. In 2023, the Commission imposed a $25 million penalty on a company for controls failures relating to its stock buybacks23--controls that, as Commissioner Peirce and I explained at the time, addressed a legal question rather than an accounting one.24 When a violation that requires no showing of intent carries an eight-figure penalty, the intent factor in the Corporate Penalty Statement appears to have minimal influence on the decision.
The fourth concerns new forms of organization. In 2006, special purpose acquisition companies were a niche product. A few years ago, they became a common route to the public markets. A SPAC raises money before it has a business and then merges with a private company. That structure creates a puzzle for the 2006 framework. If a SPAC is penalized for misconduct before its merger, who pays? The SPAC itself has little more than cash held in trust for its investors. In practice, the penalty may be paid only after the merger closes, which means the cost falls on the shareholders of the combined company. Those include owners of the target business, who had nothing to do with the SPAC's violations, and investors who bought after the misconduct occurred. The Corporate Penalty Statement's two principal considerations, benefit to the corporation and harm to its shareholders, were likely not written with the two-stage SPAC transaction in mind.
The fifth concerns the broader use of dual-class stock corporate structures, where a founder or controlling shareholder may direct the company with a majority of the votes while owning a smaller fraction of the equity. When such a company pays a civil penalty, the cost tends to be borne by economic ownership, not by voting power. The public shareholders who had little or no influence on how the company was run may end up shouldering most of the civil penalties, while the controlling shareholder, who might arguably be closer to the misconduct at issue, may be impacted significantly less. Whatever one thinks of dual-class structures, that is a reason to look first to the individuals responsible for the violations. As corporate structures evolve, Commission staff should be thinking about which shareholders will be impacted the most by a civil penalty. Are there ways of using Fair Fund authority to recompense non-controlling shareholders in such situations?
The sixth concerns the interaction of the civil penalty with the SEC's whistleblower program. The whistleblower program, created in 2010, pays awards of 10 to 30 percent of monetary sanctions collected in actions over $1 million, so the issuance of a penalty and its size now have consequences beyond deterrence.25 While the potential for a whistleblower award does not and should not factor into whether a corporate penalty is imposed, a greater focus on individual wrongdoers, who may lack the resources to pay, could result in smaller awards, or even possibly no award if the amount falls below the $1 million threshold, for the whistleblowers who made those cases possible. Given the public interest in encouraging reports of wrongdoing and malfeasance, are there other ways to ensure whistleblowers are meaningfully rewarded that do not depend on imposing large civil penalties borne by victimized shareholders?
The seventh concerns what constitutes a direct and material benefit to a corporation as a result of the offense. The Statement provides examples such as reduced expenses or increased revenues. Those examples make sense when a company obtains additional revenues through bribes that are prohibited by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or obtains a lower rate of interest on debt issuance based on false financial statements in SEC filings. Other cases may be harder. Is it really a corporate benefit when the company's employees, some of whom might have been involved in a fraud, are paid in stock whose price was inflated due to the fraud? Some have suggested that the company saved money by issuing fewer shares, but I am not so sure. It is possible that company executives were aware of the financial fraud and adjusted their incentive compensation awards accordingly. In any event, whatever the theoretical amounts that might have been saved, it was the shareholders who were deceived. It seems odd in those circumstances to find that the corporate insiders were the victims of the fraud and the outside shareholders the beneficiaries of the fraud.
What do these developments suggest? In my view, they indicate that additional refinements need to be made to the application of the Corporate Penalty Statement. Its central thesis--that shareholders ultimately pay corporate penalties, which must be justified with that in mind--matters as much today as when it was first published. But the framework deserves to be applied visibly and, in some areas, extended thoughtfully. The twentieth anniversary of the Corporate Penalty Statement is a fitting occasion for the Commission to consider supplementing, or revising, the Statement to address situations that were not originally contemplated.
There is one more subject to address, because it is the other half of the deliberations in Congress during the passage of the Remedies Act. A framework that asks the Commission to think carefully before penalizing shareholders is credible only if the Commission is equally willing to pursue the people responsible. The Senate Report said as much in 1990: where shareholders are the victims, the Commission should, when appropriate, look at the individual offenders.26
Corporations do not act on their own. Every misstatement in a filing was drafted, reviewed, and signed by someone. Every manipulated quarter reflects decisions made by people who likely understood what they were doing or chose not to. Corporate misconduct flows through people, and deterrence must flow back to them. That remains true even if firms rely more on algorithms and super intelligence. People decide to deploy those systems, set their parameters, supervise their output, and choose whether to override them. Automation does not break the chain of accountability.
A civil penalty paid out of the corporate treasury is too often borne by shareholders and rarely is it felt by the executives and other company insiders who caused it. Personal consequences are different. An officer who knows that misconduct could end a career in public company leadership weighs a decision differently from one who expects the company--and by extension the shareholders--to write a check to cover their misdeeds.
Congress has given the Commission tools for this purpose. Courts may bar individuals from serving as officers or directors of public companies and, since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Commission may impose those bars in its own cease-and-desist proceedings.27 The Commission may censure, suspend, or bar persons associated with broker-dealers and investment advisers, and may suspend or bar accountants or attorneys who appear and practice before it.28 Sarbanes-Oxley also requires chief executive and chief financial officers to reimburse certain bonuses and stock sale profits when misconduct leads to a restatement.29 These remedies can be calibrated. A suspension removes someone from a position of trust for a period of time. A bar protects investors from a person who has shown that he or she should not hold that trust at all.
The Commission should not be reluctant to pursue individuals and use these tools where warranted. Individual remedies can be harder to obtain. They take longer to investigate, they are litigated more often, and individuals with their livelihood at stake fight harder than corporations deciding whether to settle. Individuals are also often covered by insurance, indemnification, and expense advance provisions to fund their defense. Those are reasons to staff and support individual cases properly, not reasons to accept a corporate settlement in their place. When the choice is between a large corporate penalty and holding the responsible officers and employees accountable, the 2006 framework and common sense point in the same direction.
So what happened to New Horizons? Although its destination had changed in definition, the spacecraft kept flying anyway.30 In 2015, it reached Pluto and found a world far more complex than anyone had mapped.31 Then it kept going, and twenty years later, it is roughly 6 billion miles away from Earth, yet still sending back what it finds.32 The Corporate Penalty Statement can do the same. Its principles still point in the right direction. What it needs is what any long mission needs: course corrections where the map has changed and a clear memory of purpose--minimizing the likelihood that innocent, harmed shareholders must pay twice and making sure that we hold those individuals responsible for the misconduct accountable.
Thank you.
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1 See NASA, January 19, 2006: New Horizons Launches for Pluto (Jan. 19, 2006), available at https://www.nasa.gov/image-article/january-19-2006-new-horizons-launches-pluto/.
2 NASA's New Horizons Launches on Mission to Pluto (Jan. 14, 2015), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRgsI6_CzMw.
3 My remarks today represent my views as an individual Commissioner and not necessarily the views of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners.
4 Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties, Press Release No. 2006-4 (Jan. 4, 2006) ("2006 Corporate Penalty Statement").
5 SEC v. McAfee, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19520 (Jan. 4, 2006); In the Matter of Applix, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8651 (Jan. 4, 2006).
6 Commissioner Annette L. Nazareth, Remarks Before the ABA National Institute on Securities Fraud (Sept. 28, 2006), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/spch092806aln-remarks-aba-national-institute-securities-fraud.
7 See 2006 Corporate Penalty Statement, supra note 4.
8
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-337, at 17 (1990)).
9 Id.
10 Id. (further stating "that the availability of a corporate penalty, as one of a range of remedies, contributes to the Commission's ability to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence through its decision in a particular case.").
11 Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, Remarks at Columbia Law School Conference (Hot Topics: Leading Current Issues in Securities Regulation and Enforcement) (Nov. 15, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/2013-spch111513dmg.
12 Chairman Christopher Cox, Remarks Before the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Seventh Annual Policy Conference (Apr. 13, 2007), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/spch041207cc-remarks-mutual-fund-directors-forum-seventh-annual-policy-conference.
13 Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, Address to Practising Law Institute's 'SEC Speaks in 2009' Program (Feb. 6, 2009), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/spch020609mls-address-practising-law-institutes-sec-speaks-2009-program.
14 Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar, Remarks at the "SEC Speaks" Conference 2015: A Fair, Orderly, and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-spchcmsp.html.
15 Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, Remarks Before the SEC Speaks Conference (Mar. 3, 2006), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/spch030306psa-remarks-commissioner-paul-s-atkins-sec-speaks-conference.
16 SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024 (Nov. 22, 2024), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024-186.
17 SEC's Division of Enforcement Announces Updates to Enforcement Manual (Feb. 24, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2026-20-secs-division-enforcement-announces-updates-enforcement-manual.
18 Library of Congress, Why is Pluto no longer a planet?, available at https://www.loc.gov/everyday-mysteries/categories/astronomy/item/why-is-pluto-no-longer-a-planet/.
19 See 2006 Corporate Penalty Statement, supra note 4.
20 Id.
21 See 2006 Corporate Penalty Statement, supra note 4.
22 This can be further complicated by investors who hold positions in corporate issuers indirectly through mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. In such a situation, while the fund or ETF may continue to hold the stock of the penalized company, an investor in the fund may have already redeemed or sold the fund shares prior to the Fair Fund distribution being distributed.
23 Charter Communications to Pay $25 Million Penalty for Stock Buyback Controls Violations (Nov. 14, 2023), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023-235.
24 The SEC's Swiss Army Statute: Statement on Charter Communications, Inc. (Nov. 14, 2023), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/peirce-uyeda-statement-charter-communications-111423#_ftn4.
25 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), Sec.21F, 15 U.S.C. Sec.78u-6 (added by Dodd-Frank Act Sec. 922 (2010)).
26 See supra note 8.
27 Exchange Act Sec. 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78u(d)(2); Sec. 21C(f), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78u-3(f); Securities Act of 1933 Sec. 8A(f), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77h-1(f).
28 Exchange Act Sec. 15(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78o(b)(6); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Sec. 203(f), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 80b-3(f); Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. Sec. 201.102(e).
29 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Sec. 304, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 7243.
30 Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab'y, New Horizons: Mission Overview (last visited Oct. 30, 2026), available at https://pluto.jhuapl.edu/Mission/Where-is-New-Horizons.php#Current-Position.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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Original text here: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/uyeda-remarks-at-the-practicing-law-institute-58th-annual-institute-on-securities-regulation-110226
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Practicing Law Institute's 58th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation
Nov. 2, 2026
On January 19, 2006, in the clear blue Florida sky, an Atlas V rocketed off from Cape Canaveral carrying a small spacecraft called New Horizons.1 This mission, planned by NASA--that is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, not the other NASAA, the North American Securities Administrators Association--exited ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Nov. 4 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission issued the following remarks by Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda at the Practicing Law Institute's 58th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation: * * * Practicing Law Institute's 58th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation Nov. 2, 2026 On January 19, 2006, in the clear blue Florida sky, an Atlas V rocketed off from Cape Canaveral carrying a small spacecraft called New Horizons.1 This mission, planned by NASA--that is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, not the other NASAA, the North American Securities Administrators Association--exitedthe Earth at more than 36,000 miles per hour for a long-term "voyage to visit the planet Pluto and then beyond."2 That same month, the Securities and Exchange Commission launched something of similar importance, at least in my view:3 its Statement Concerning Financial Penalties, also known as the "Corporate Penalty Statement."4
Announced in conjunction with two settled accounting fraud cases, one with a $50 million civil penalty and the other with no penalty,5 the Corporate Penalty Statement was issued in a unanimous, 5-0 decision under the leadership of Chairman Cox, after over 40 hours of meetings reconciling differing views amongst the Commissioners.6 The Statement is a concise document with a specific mission: to provide an analytical framework so when the Commission imposes a civil penalty on a corporate issuer, it can explain why, and that explanation should rest on what Congress authorized and why it authorized it.7 As a measure approved by Commission vote, the Statement should have a similar stature to other regulatory guidance provided by the Commission, whether in amicus briefs, adjudicatory opinions, administrative orders, interpretive releases, or otherwise.
The Corporate Penalty Statement starts with the most salient consideration on the imposition of civil penalties: the underlying statutory authority. In passing the Remedies Act of 1990, Congress gave the Commission authority to seek civil penalties against corporate issuers. In its accompanying report, the Senate Banking Committee recognized that shareholders may ultimately bear the cost. The report stated that a corporate penalty should be sought where shareholders received an improper benefit, and that in situations where they were the principal victims, the "Committee expects that the SEC, when appropriate, will seek penalties from the individual offenders acting for a corporate issuer."8
The Corporate Penalty Statement is grounded in the statute and its legislative history. The Statement identifies two principal considerations. First, whether the corporation received a direct benefit from the violation, such as reduced expenses, increased revenues, or some other unjust enrichment. The strongest case for a penalty is one in which shareholders received an improper benefit due to the violation; the weakest is one in which shareholders are the principal victims of the securities law violation. Second, the degree to which the penalty will compensate or further harm injured shareholders. The Statement then lists seven additional factors: the need to deter the particular type of offense; the extent of injury to innocent parties; whether complicity was widespread within the corporation; the level of intent; the difficulty of detecting the offense; the presence or absence of remedial steps; and the extent of cooperation with the Commission and other authorities.9
To be clear, the Corporate Penalty Statement does not take the position that corporations should never be assessed a civil penalty. Indeed, it states that "we proceed from the fundamental principle that corporate penalties are an essential part of an aggressive and comprehensive program to enforce the federal securities laws[.]"10 As Commissioner Gallagher observed, the Statement is based on an analysis of the statute itself, not a mere policy preference.11 It is a framework for judgment, not a rule of abstention.
This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the Statement - and also my twentieth year of continuous employment at the Commission. In that sense, I have had an insider's view on how the Statement has fared over those two decades. After twenty years, we ought to look back at why the Statement was needed, consider how it has fared, and then consider questions that confront the Commission today in the application of the Statement's principles.
So how has the framework fared? Like the New Horizons mission, its journey has had a number of stages. The Commission attempted, in 2007, to give the Statement practical force through a pilot program in which the Commission provided feedback to the staff on potential penalties prior to reaching a settlement with the proposed defendants.12 After all, decisions on enforcement matters are ultimately made by the Commission, not the staff who serve as attorneys for the Commission.
That approach, however, was discontinued in 2009 by Chair Schapiro.13 In the years that followed, the Corporate Penalty Statement and its factors were seldom visible in reasoning the public could see. It also started to disappear as an analytical tool internally within the SEC as well. In 2015, Commissioner Piwowar noted, "I have become concerned by the increasing number of staff recommendations that have not been accompanied by analysis of the principal factors described in the 2006 penalty statement."14
Yet, the Commission continued to impose civil penalties against corporate issuers in significant amounts. Back in 2006, then-Commissioner Atkins had warned that staff might come to measure their own performance by the size of the penalties they obtained.15 By fiscal year 2024, the Commission was announcing some of the largest financial remedies in its history.16
Upon becoming the Acting Chairman on January 20, 2025, one of my first directives was for the staff to follow the Corporate Penalty Statement, which has never been rescinded or withdrawn. Rather, it had simply been ignored, along with the principles underlying the Commission's statutory authority to impose civil penalties. This past February, when the Division of Enforcement issued substantive updates to the Enforcement Manual--the first since 2017--it included an instruction that staff consider the Corporate Penalty Statement when deciding whether, and how much, to seek in civil penalties from corporations.17 But a retrospective about the Corporate Penalty Statement that ends with "and so the framework was restored" would miss more important points.
In some ways, the Statement has parallels to the New Horizons mission. Seven months after New Horizons launched towards Pluto, while it was en route, astronomers voted that Pluto was no longer a "planet."18 The spacecraft was still headed to the same place, but the objective to which it was headed had been redefined. The Corporate Penalty Statement is in a similar position. Its principles still point in the right direction. But the world to which the Commission applies them today is not the same world in which they were written. Let's examine some of those areas, which I describe next in no particular order.
The first concerns who the shareholders are. The Statement's framework implicitly recognizes that for most public companies, shareholders are a continuously changing group.19 Thus, it discusses whether a civil penalty would be paid by shareholders who had been the principal victims of the violation and the extent to which the passage of time has resulted in shareholder turnover.20 However, the Statement does not offer guidance as to how that might work in practice, particularly given that years may elapse between when corrective disclosure is made by a corporate issuer, such as through a restatement or Form 8-K filing, and when the SEC finalizes an enforcement recommendation.
Consider a company that overstates its earnings, which has resulted in an inflated stock price. When corrective disclosure is issued, the stock price falls. In an efficient market, prices should reflect the possibility of SEC enforcement action as well as shareholder class actions. At that point, would a corporate penalty further harm injured shareholders? Some might argue that there is no further harm, because the shareholders who purchased after the corrective disclosure did so with knowledge that such penalties and other remedies might be forthcoming. But is that the right result? While it is true that the subsequent shareholders may have priced in the potential impact with respect to their purchase price, it comes at the expense of shareholders who were harmed by the original fraud and then sold their shares at the lower price that factors in potential enforcement and class action liability.
The second concerns the use of Fair Funds to compensate victims. The Fair Funds provision adds a complication that the Corporate Penalty Statement itself flagged. When funds from civil penalties are returned to harmed investors who are also shareholders of the penalized company, they are in effect paying themselves, less the cost of distribution.21 Even a well-run distribution cannot fully solve the deeper problem: identifying who was harmed when shares change hands constantly. Most shares are held in street name through brokers and other intermediaries, so reaching the beneficial owners depends on claims processes that many eligible investors never complete. A distribution can return money to some investors. It cannot reliably match the people who pay the penalty with the people who were hurt.22
The third development concerns the underlying charges and any required intent element. The Statement's intent factor assumed a meaningful distinction between deliberate fraud, such as scienter-based charges, and lesser conduct, with corporate penalties more appropriate in egregious cases. In recent years, however, the Commission has imposed significant penalties for violations that do not require intent at all. The internal accounting controls provision is one example. In 2023, the Commission imposed a $25 million penalty on a company for controls failures relating to its stock buybacks23--controls that, as Commissioner Peirce and I explained at the time, addressed a legal question rather than an accounting one.24 When a violation that requires no showing of intent carries an eight-figure penalty, the intent factor in the Corporate Penalty Statement appears to have minimal influence on the decision.
The fourth concerns new forms of organization. In 2006, special purpose acquisition companies were a niche product. A few years ago, they became a common route to the public markets. A SPAC raises money before it has a business and then merges with a private company. That structure creates a puzzle for the 2006 framework. If a SPAC is penalized for misconduct before its merger, who pays? The SPAC itself has little more than cash held in trust for its investors. In practice, the penalty may be paid only after the merger closes, which means the cost falls on the shareholders of the combined company. Those include owners of the target business, who had nothing to do with the SPAC's violations, and investors who bought after the misconduct occurred. The Corporate Penalty Statement's two principal considerations, benefit to the corporation and harm to its shareholders, were likely not written with the two-stage SPAC transaction in mind.
The fifth concerns the broader use of dual-class stock corporate structures, where a founder or controlling shareholder may direct the company with a majority of the votes while owning a smaller fraction of the equity. When such a company pays a civil penalty, the cost tends to be borne by economic ownership, not by voting power. The public shareholders who had little or no influence on how the company was run may end up shouldering most of the civil penalties, while the controlling shareholder, who might arguably be closer to the misconduct at issue, may be impacted significantly less. Whatever one thinks of dual-class structures, that is a reason to look first to the individuals responsible for the violations. As corporate structures evolve, Commission staff should be thinking about which shareholders will be impacted the most by a civil penalty. Are there ways of using Fair Fund authority to recompense non-controlling shareholders in such situations?
The sixth concerns the interaction of the civil penalty with the SEC's whistleblower program. The whistleblower program, created in 2010, pays awards of 10 to 30 percent of monetary sanctions collected in actions over $1 million, so the issuance of a penalty and its size now have consequences beyond deterrence.25 While the potential for a whistleblower award does not and should not factor into whether a corporate penalty is imposed, a greater focus on individual wrongdoers, who may lack the resources to pay, could result in smaller awards, or even possibly no award if the amount falls below the $1 million threshold, for the whistleblowers who made those cases possible. Given the public interest in encouraging reports of wrongdoing and malfeasance, are there other ways to ensure whistleblowers are meaningfully rewarded that do not depend on imposing large civil penalties borne by victimized shareholders?
The seventh concerns what constitutes a direct and material benefit to a corporation as a result of the offense. The Statement provides examples such as reduced expenses or increased revenues. Those examples make sense when a company obtains additional revenues through bribes that are prohibited by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act or obtains a lower rate of interest on debt issuance based on false financial statements in SEC filings. Other cases may be harder. Is it really a corporate benefit when the company's employees, some of whom might have been involved in a fraud, are paid in stock whose price was inflated due to the fraud? Some have suggested that the company saved money by issuing fewer shares, but I am not so sure. It is possible that company executives were aware of the financial fraud and adjusted their incentive compensation awards accordingly. In any event, whatever the theoretical amounts that might have been saved, it was the shareholders who were deceived. It seems odd in those circumstances to find that the corporate insiders were the victims of the fraud and the outside shareholders the beneficiaries of the fraud.
What do these developments suggest? In my view, they indicate that additional refinements need to be made to the application of the Corporate Penalty Statement. Its central thesis--that shareholders ultimately pay corporate penalties, which must be justified with that in mind--matters as much today as when it was first published. But the framework deserves to be applied visibly and, in some areas, extended thoughtfully. The twentieth anniversary of the Corporate Penalty Statement is a fitting occasion for the Commission to consider supplementing, or revising, the Statement to address situations that were not originally contemplated.
There is one more subject to address, because it is the other half of the deliberations in Congress during the passage of the Remedies Act. A framework that asks the Commission to think carefully before penalizing shareholders is credible only if the Commission is equally willing to pursue the people responsible. The Senate Report said as much in 1990: where shareholders are the victims, the Commission should, when appropriate, look at the individual offenders.26
Corporations do not act on their own. Every misstatement in a filing was drafted, reviewed, and signed by someone. Every manipulated quarter reflects decisions made by people who likely understood what they were doing or chose not to. Corporate misconduct flows through people, and deterrence must flow back to them. That remains true even if firms rely more on algorithms and super intelligence. People decide to deploy those systems, set their parameters, supervise their output, and choose whether to override them. Automation does not break the chain of accountability.
A civil penalty paid out of the corporate treasury is too often borne by shareholders and rarely is it felt by the executives and other company insiders who caused it. Personal consequences are different. An officer who knows that misconduct could end a career in public company leadership weighs a decision differently from one who expects the company--and by extension the shareholders--to write a check to cover their misdeeds.
Congress has given the Commission tools for this purpose. Courts may bar individuals from serving as officers or directors of public companies and, since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Commission may impose those bars in its own cease-and-desist proceedings.27 The Commission may censure, suspend, or bar persons associated with broker-dealers and investment advisers, and may suspend or bar accountants or attorneys who appear and practice before it.28 Sarbanes-Oxley also requires chief executive and chief financial officers to reimburse certain bonuses and stock sale profits when misconduct leads to a restatement.29 These remedies can be calibrated. A suspension removes someone from a position of trust for a period of time. A bar protects investors from a person who has shown that he or she should not hold that trust at all.
The Commission should not be reluctant to pursue individuals and use these tools where warranted. Individual remedies can be harder to obtain. They take longer to investigate, they are litigated more often, and individuals with their livelihood at stake fight harder than corporations deciding whether to settle. Individuals are also often covered by insurance, indemnification, and expense advance provisions to fund their defense. Those are reasons to staff and support individual cases properly, not reasons to accept a corporate settlement in their place. When the choice is between a large corporate penalty and holding the responsible officers and employees accountable, the 2006 framework and common sense point in the same direction.
So what happened to New Horizons? Although its destination had changed in definition, the spacecraft kept flying anyway.30 In 2015, it reached Pluto and found a world far more complex than anyone had mapped.31 Then it kept going, and twenty years later, it is roughly 6 billion miles away from Earth, yet still sending back what it finds.32 The Corporate Penalty Statement can do the same. Its principles still point in the right direction. What it needs is what any long mission needs: course corrections where the map has changed and a clear memory of purpose--minimizing the likelihood that innocent, harmed shareholders must pay twice and making sure that we hold those individuals responsible for the misconduct accountable.
Thank you.
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1 See NASA, January 19, 2006: New Horizons Launches for Pluto (Jan. 19, 2006), available at https://www.nasa.gov/image-article/january-19-2006-new-horizons-launches-pluto/.
2 NASA's New Horizons Launches on Mission to Pluto (Jan. 14, 2015), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRgsI6_CzMw.
3 My remarks today represent my views as an individual Commissioner and not necessarily the views of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners.
4 Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties, Press Release No. 2006-4 (Jan. 4, 2006) ("2006 Corporate Penalty Statement").
5 SEC v. McAfee, Inc., Litigation Release No. 19520 (Jan. 4, 2006); In the Matter of Applix, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8651 (Jan. 4, 2006).
6 Commissioner Annette L. Nazareth, Remarks Before the ABA National Institute on Securities Fraud (Sept. 28, 2006), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/spch092806aln-remarks-aba-national-institute-securities-fraud.
7 See 2006 Corporate Penalty Statement, supra note 4.
8
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-337, at 17 (1990)).
9 Id.
10 Id. (further stating "that the availability of a corporate penalty, as one of a range of remedies, contributes to the Commission's ability to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence through its decision in a particular case.").
11 Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, Remarks at Columbia Law School Conference (Hot Topics: Leading Current Issues in Securities Regulation and Enforcement) (Nov. 15, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/2013-spch111513dmg.
12 Chairman Christopher Cox, Remarks Before the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Seventh Annual Policy Conference (Apr. 13, 2007), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/spch041207cc-remarks-mutual-fund-directors-forum-seventh-annual-policy-conference.
13 Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, Address to Practising Law Institute's 'SEC Speaks in 2009' Program (Feb. 6, 2009), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/spch020609mls-address-practising-law-institutes-sec-speaks-2009-program.
14 Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar, Remarks at the "SEC Speaks" Conference 2015: A Fair, Orderly, and Efficient SEC (Feb. 20, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015-spchcmsp.html.
15 Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, Remarks Before the SEC Speaks Conference (Mar. 3, 2006), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/spch030306psa-remarks-commissioner-paul-s-atkins-sec-speaks-conference.
16 SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2024 (Nov. 22, 2024), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024-186.
17 SEC's Division of Enforcement Announces Updates to Enforcement Manual (Feb. 24, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2026-20-secs-division-enforcement-announces-updates-enforcement-manual.
18 Library of Congress, Why is Pluto no longer a planet?, available at https://www.loc.gov/everyday-mysteries/categories/astronomy/item/why-is-pluto-no-longer-a-planet/.
19 See 2006 Corporate Penalty Statement, supra note 4.
20 Id.
21 See 2006 Corporate Penalty Statement, supra note 4.
22 This can be further complicated by investors who hold positions in corporate issuers indirectly through mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. In such a situation, while the fund or ETF may continue to hold the stock of the penalized company, an investor in the fund may have already redeemed or sold the fund shares prior to the Fair Fund distribution being distributed.
23 Charter Communications to Pay $25 Million Penalty for Stock Buyback Controls Violations (Nov. 14, 2023), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023-235.
24 The SEC's Swiss Army Statute: Statement on Charter Communications, Inc. (Nov. 14, 2023), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/peirce-uyeda-statement-charter-communications-111423#_ftn4.
25 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), Sec.21F, 15 U.S.C. Sec.78u-6 (added by Dodd-Frank Act Sec. 922 (2010)).
26 See supra note 8.
27 Exchange Act Sec. 21(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78u(d)(2); Sec. 21C(f), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78u-3(f); Securities Act of 1933 Sec. 8A(f), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77h-1(f).
28 Exchange Act Sec. 15(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 78o(b)(6); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Sec. 203(f), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 80b-3(f); Rule 102(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. Sec. 201.102(e).
29 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Sec. 304, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 7243.
30 Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab'y, New Horizons: Mission Overview (last visited Oct. 30, 2026), available at https://pluto.jhuapl.edu/Mission/Where-is-New-Horizons.php#Current-Position.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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Original text here: https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/uyeda-remarks-at-the-practicing-law-institute-58th-annual-institute-on-securities-regulation-110226
MSPB Issues Board Decision Involving Department of Homeland Security Vs. Appellant Denyzio Laboy
WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 -- The Merit Systems Protection Board issued the following case report on a board decision involving the Department of Homeland Security and appellant Denyzio Laboy on Oct. 30, 2026:
* * *
BOARD DECISIONS
Appellant: Denyzio Laboy
Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Decision Number: 2026 MSPB 10
Docket Number: DC-752P-26-0928-R-1
Issuance Date: October 22, 2026
JURISDICTION
EXCEPTED SERVICE
On November 6, 2023, the agency appointed the appellant to an excepted-service position subject to a 2-year trial period. Before the end of the 2-year trial period, the President ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 -- The Merit Systems Protection Board issued the following case report on a board decision involving the Department of Homeland Security and appellant Denyzio Laboy on Oct. 30, 2026: * * * BOARD DECISIONS Appellant: Denyzio Laboy Agency: Department of Homeland Security Decision Number: 2026 MSPB 10 Docket Number: DC-752P-26-0928-R-1 Issuance Date: October 22, 2026 JURISDICTION EXCEPTED SERVICE On November 6, 2023, the agency appointed the appellant to an excepted-service position subject to a 2-year trial period. Before the end of the 2-year trial period, the Presidentissued Executive Order (EO) 14284, entitled "Strengthening Probationary Periods in the Federal Service." Among other things, the EO added Civil Service Rule XI, which "supersede[d]" 5 C.F.R. part 315, subpart H, and required agencies to "affirmatively determine that the continued employment of individuals serving probationary or trial periods would benefit the Federal service before such appointments are finalized."
On November 6, 2025, the agency issued the appellant a termination notice, effective that date, informing him that it did not certify his continued employment and would not retain him beyond his trial period. The appellant appealed to the Board. The administrative judge found that the appellant was an "employee" subject to Chapter 75 protections, and because he did not receive those protections, the administrative judge reversed the action. The Board reopened the initial decision on its own motion, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7701(e)(1).
Holding: Civil Service Rule XI requires some affirmative agency action to extend or convert an initial appointment beyond the probationary or trial period.
1. Civil Service Rule XI provides that "an employee's service terminates before the end of the tour of duty on the last day of their probationary or trial period unless their agency certifies within the 30 days prior to that date that finalizing their appointment advances the public interest." Because there was no dispute that the agency did not make the requisite certification pursuant to Civil Service Rule XI, the Board found that the appellant's appointment expired at the end of his tour of duty on November 5, 2025. Because the appellant did not become an "employee" under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) or (ii), the Board dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Civil Service Rule XI also provides that the agency "shall" notify an employee serving a probationary or trial period in writing as to the effective date of the action before it terminates such service. Here, the agency did not issue such notice until November 6, 2025 and it erroneously stated that the appellant's appointment expired on that date. Nevertheless, the Board found that nothing in Civil Service Rule XI indicates that an agency's failure to provide this prior notice would invalidate the automatic termination of a probationer or an employee serving a trial period at the end of the tour of duty on the last day of his probationary or trial period.
Holding: The Board lacks the authority to consider whether the issuance of Civil Service Rule XI violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
1. The Board rejected the appellant's argument that the agency could not rely on Civil Service Rule XI because OPM failed to comply with the APA's notice and comment rulemaking procedures under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(b). The Board found that it does not have jurisdiction under the APA to review OPM regulations for the purpose of determining whether they exceed the statutory grant of authority to that agency. The Board held that a contrary statement in Jonson v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 122M.S.P.R. 454,
10 (2015), was dictum and that APA challenges must be made in Federal court.
2. The Board explained that the President issued EO 14284 and created Civil Service Rule XI pursuant to his authority under 5 U.S.C. Sec.Sec. 3301 and 3302. Those statutes grant the President significant authority over the civil service, including the authority to "prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that service," and to prescribe rules governing the competitive service. The Board held that the appellant had not persuasively demonstrated that the President's exercise of such authority was improper.
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COURT DECISIONS
NONPRECEDENTIAL:
Lee v. Department of Homeland Security, No. 2026-1602 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 23, 2026). The court affirmed the Board's remand final decision sustaining the petitioner's removal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the petitioner's lack of candor and unauthorized use of the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) was serious misconduct that was motivated by personal gain, that the agency had not improperly treated comparable employees more favorably, and that the petitioner lacked rehabilitation potential.
Goodwin v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, No. 2026-1616 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 26, 2026). The court affirmed the Board's final decision denying corrective action in the petitioner's individual right of action (IRA) appeal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions against the petitioner absent her protected disclosures. The court rejected the petitioner's arguments that she was denied due process and deprived of an opportunity to respond to the initial decision.
Camacho v. Department of the Army, No. 2026-1728 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 26, 2026). The court affirmed the Board's final decision denying corrective action in the petitioner's IRA appeal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions against the petitioner absent her protected disclosures. The court also held that the petitioner's discovery-related arguments failed to establish an abuse of discretion or reversible error in the Board's decision.
Myles v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026 WL 3231995 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2026). The court denied the petitioner's petition for review of the Board's final decision denying corrective action in her IRA appeal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions against the petitioner absent her protected disclosures.
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Original text here: https://www.mspb.gov/decisions/case_reports/Case_Report_October_30_2026_4191308.pdf
* * *
BOARD DECISIONS
Appellant: Denyzio Laboy
Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Decision Number: 2026 MSPB 10
Docket Number: DC-752P-26-0928-R-1
Issuance Date: October 22, 2026
JURISDICTION
EXCEPTED SERVICE
On November 6, 2023, the agency appointed the appellant to an excepted-service position subject to a 2-year trial period. Before the end of the 2-year trial period, the President ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 -- The Merit Systems Protection Board issued the following case report on a board decision involving the Department of Homeland Security and appellant Denyzio Laboy on Oct. 30, 2026: * * * BOARD DECISIONS Appellant: Denyzio Laboy Agency: Department of Homeland Security Decision Number: 2026 MSPB 10 Docket Number: DC-752P-26-0928-R-1 Issuance Date: October 22, 2026 JURISDICTION EXCEPTED SERVICE On November 6, 2023, the agency appointed the appellant to an excepted-service position subject to a 2-year trial period. Before the end of the 2-year trial period, the Presidentissued Executive Order (EO) 14284, entitled "Strengthening Probationary Periods in the Federal Service." Among other things, the EO added Civil Service Rule XI, which "supersede[d]" 5 C.F.R. part 315, subpart H, and required agencies to "affirmatively determine that the continued employment of individuals serving probationary or trial periods would benefit the Federal service before such appointments are finalized."
On November 6, 2025, the agency issued the appellant a termination notice, effective that date, informing him that it did not certify his continued employment and would not retain him beyond his trial period. The appellant appealed to the Board. The administrative judge found that the appellant was an "employee" subject to Chapter 75 protections, and because he did not receive those protections, the administrative judge reversed the action. The Board reopened the initial decision on its own motion, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7701(e)(1).
Holding: Civil Service Rule XI requires some affirmative agency action to extend or convert an initial appointment beyond the probationary or trial period.
1. Civil Service Rule XI provides that "an employee's service terminates before the end of the tour of duty on the last day of their probationary or trial period unless their agency certifies within the 30 days prior to that date that finalizing their appointment advances the public interest." Because there was no dispute that the agency did not make the requisite certification pursuant to Civil Service Rule XI, the Board found that the appellant's appointment expired at the end of his tour of duty on November 5, 2025. Because the appellant did not become an "employee" under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) or (ii), the Board dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Civil Service Rule XI also provides that the agency "shall" notify an employee serving a probationary or trial period in writing as to the effective date of the action before it terminates such service. Here, the agency did not issue such notice until November 6, 2025 and it erroneously stated that the appellant's appointment expired on that date. Nevertheless, the Board found that nothing in Civil Service Rule XI indicates that an agency's failure to provide this prior notice would invalidate the automatic termination of a probationer or an employee serving a trial period at the end of the tour of duty on the last day of his probationary or trial period.
Holding: The Board lacks the authority to consider whether the issuance of Civil Service Rule XI violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
1. The Board rejected the appellant's argument that the agency could not rely on Civil Service Rule XI because OPM failed to comply with the APA's notice and comment rulemaking procedures under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(b). The Board found that it does not have jurisdiction under the APA to review OPM regulations for the purpose of determining whether they exceed the statutory grant of authority to that agency. The Board held that a contrary statement in Jonson v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 122M.S.P.R. 454,
10 (2015), was dictum and that APA challenges must be made in Federal court.
2. The Board explained that the President issued EO 14284 and created Civil Service Rule XI pursuant to his authority under 5 U.S.C. Sec.Sec. 3301 and 3302. Those statutes grant the President significant authority over the civil service, including the authority to "prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil service in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that service," and to prescribe rules governing the competitive service. The Board held that the appellant had not persuasively demonstrated that the President's exercise of such authority was improper.
* * *
COURT DECISIONS
NONPRECEDENTIAL:
Lee v. Department of Homeland Security, No. 2026-1602 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 23, 2026). The court affirmed the Board's remand final decision sustaining the petitioner's removal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the petitioner's lack of candor and unauthorized use of the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) was serious misconduct that was motivated by personal gain, that the agency had not improperly treated comparable employees more favorably, and that the petitioner lacked rehabilitation potential.
Goodwin v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, No. 2026-1616 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 26, 2026). The court affirmed the Board's final decision denying corrective action in the petitioner's individual right of action (IRA) appeal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions against the petitioner absent her protected disclosures. The court rejected the petitioner's arguments that she was denied due process and deprived of an opportunity to respond to the initial decision.
Camacho v. Department of the Army, No. 2026-1728 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 26, 2026). The court affirmed the Board's final decision denying corrective action in the petitioner's IRA appeal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions against the petitioner absent her protected disclosures. The court also held that the petitioner's discovery-related arguments failed to establish an abuse of discretion or reversible error in the Board's decision.
Myles v. Department of Homeland Security, 2026 WL 3231995 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2026). The court denied the petitioner's petition for review of the Board's final decision denying corrective action in her IRA appeal. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions against the petitioner absent her protected disclosures.
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Original text here: https://www.mspb.gov/decisions/case_reports/Case_Report_October_30_2026_4191308.pdf
FCC Wireline Competition Bureau Issues Public Notice: Comments Invited on Section 214 Application to Grandfather Domestic Non-Dominant Carrier Telecommunications Services
WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket No. 26-292):
* * *
Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix.
The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in Section 63.71 of the Commission's rules, as applicable at the time ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket No. 26-292): * * * Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix. The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in Section 63.71 of the Commission's rules, as applicable at the timeof filing./1 The application(s) request authority, under section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,/2 and section 63.71 of the Commission's rules,/3 to discontinue, reduce, or impair certain domestic telecommunications service(s) (Affected Service(s)) in specified geographic areas (Service Area(s)) as applicable and as fully described in each application.
In accordance with section 63.71(f) of the Commission's rules, the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed in the Appendix will be deemed granted automatically on December 4, 2026, the 31st day after the release date of this public notice, unless the Commission notifies any applicant(s) that their grant will not be automatically effective./4 We note that the date on which an application for Commission authorization is deemed granted may be different from the date on which applicants are authorized to discontinue service ("Authorized Date"). Any applicant whose application has been deemed granted may discontinue their Affected Service(s) in their Service Area(s) on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) specified in the Appendix, in accordance with their filed representations. Accordingly, pursuant to section 63.71(f), and the terms outlined in each application, absent further Commission action, each applicant may discontinue the Affected Service(s) in the Service Area(s) described in their application on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) listed in the Appendix for that application. For purposes of computation of time when filing a petition for reconsideration, application for review, or petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision(s), the date of "public notice" shall be the later of the auto grant date stated above in this Public Notice, or the release date(s) of any further public notice(s) or order(s) announcing final Commission action, as applicable. Should no petitions for reconsideration, applications for review, or petitions for judicial review be timely filed, the proceeding(s) listed in this Public Notice shall be terminated, and the docket(s) will be closed. Comments objecting to the application(s) listed in the Appendix must be filed with the Commission on or before November 18, 2026. Comments should refer to the specific WC Docket No. and Comp. Pol. File No. listed in the Appendix for the Section 214 Discontinuance Application.
Comments should include specific information about the impact of the proposed discontinuance on the commenter, including any inability to acquire reasonable substitute service. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Filers should follow the instructions provided on the Web site for submitting comments. Generally, only one copy of an electronic submission must be filed. In completing the transmittal screen, filers should include their full name, U.S. Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket number./5
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing. Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission. Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building. Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
This proceeding(s) shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose" proceeding(s) in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules./6 Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding(s) should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
For further information, please see the contact(s) for the specific discontinuance proceeding you are interested in as listed in the Appendix. For further information on procedures regarding section 214 please visit https://www.fcc.gov/general/domestic-section-214-discontinuance-service.
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Appendix
1) Applicant: Broadwing Communications, LLC, CenturyLink Communications, LLC, Level 3 Communications, LLC, Level 3 Telecom, TelCove Operations, LLC and WilTel Communications, LLC (Lumen)
WC Docket No. 26-292, Comp. Pol. File No. 2219
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226292%22))
Affected Service(s) - VoIP Enhanced Local Service (ELS), Local Inbound Service (LI), Lumen Hosted VoIP, and Lumen IQ SIP Voice (IQ SIP Trunk/Lumen SIP Trunking), as specified in the application
Service Area(s) - in all 50 states, Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 4, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
Note - Lumen states that it plans to grandfather the Affected Services as follows: on or after the Authorized Date(s), the Affected Services will no longer be available for new orders for new or existing customers and will no longer be available for automatic renewal for existing customers. Lumen will only accept certain service change requests in limited situations, including, but not limited to, service disconnects. In addition, contracts for ELS and LI will convert to month-to month when current terms expire; contracts for Lumen Hosted VoIP and Lumen IQ SIP Voice, subject to the provisions of individual contracts, will terminate when current terms expire.
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Footnotes:
1/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
2/ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 214.
3/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
4/ See 47 CFR Sec. 63.71(f)(1) (stating, in relevant part, that an application filed by a non-dominant carrier "shall be automatically granted on the 31st day... unless the Commission has notified the applicant that the grant will not be automatically effective."); see also Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, WC Docket No. 17-84, Order, DA 25-251, para. 6 (WCB Mar. 20, 2025) (granting blanket authority for carriers to grandfather any legacy voice or data service covered by sections 63.71(k)-(l) and waiving the associated requirement to file an application pursuant to the Commission's discontinuance rules) (Grandfathering Waiver Order).
5/ Please note that Commission staff may share filed comments with the applicant(s), along with the commenter's contact information, in order to allow applicant(s) to identify affected customers in the proposed discontinuance area and fully respond.
6/ 47 CFR Sec. 1.1200 et seq.
* * *
Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1189A1.pdf
* * *
Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix.
The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in Section 63.71 of the Commission's rules, as applicable at the time ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket No. 26-292): * * * Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix. The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in Section 63.71 of the Commission's rules, as applicable at the timeof filing./1 The application(s) request authority, under section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,/2 and section 63.71 of the Commission's rules,/3 to discontinue, reduce, or impair certain domestic telecommunications service(s) (Affected Service(s)) in specified geographic areas (Service Area(s)) as applicable and as fully described in each application.
In accordance with section 63.71(f) of the Commission's rules, the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed in the Appendix will be deemed granted automatically on December 4, 2026, the 31st day after the release date of this public notice, unless the Commission notifies any applicant(s) that their grant will not be automatically effective./4 We note that the date on which an application for Commission authorization is deemed granted may be different from the date on which applicants are authorized to discontinue service ("Authorized Date"). Any applicant whose application has been deemed granted may discontinue their Affected Service(s) in their Service Area(s) on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) specified in the Appendix, in accordance with their filed representations. Accordingly, pursuant to section 63.71(f), and the terms outlined in each application, absent further Commission action, each applicant may discontinue the Affected Service(s) in the Service Area(s) described in their application on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) listed in the Appendix for that application. For purposes of computation of time when filing a petition for reconsideration, application for review, or petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision(s), the date of "public notice" shall be the later of the auto grant date stated above in this Public Notice, or the release date(s) of any further public notice(s) or order(s) announcing final Commission action, as applicable. Should no petitions for reconsideration, applications for review, or petitions for judicial review be timely filed, the proceeding(s) listed in this Public Notice shall be terminated, and the docket(s) will be closed. Comments objecting to the application(s) listed in the Appendix must be filed with the Commission on or before November 18, 2026. Comments should refer to the specific WC Docket No. and Comp. Pol. File No. listed in the Appendix for the Section 214 Discontinuance Application.
Comments should include specific information about the impact of the proposed discontinuance on the commenter, including any inability to acquire reasonable substitute service. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Filers should follow the instructions provided on the Web site for submitting comments. Generally, only one copy of an electronic submission must be filed. In completing the transmittal screen, filers should include their full name, U.S. Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket number./5
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing. Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission. Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building. Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
This proceeding(s) shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose" proceeding(s) in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules./6 Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding(s) should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
For further information, please see the contact(s) for the specific discontinuance proceeding you are interested in as listed in the Appendix. For further information on procedures regarding section 214 please visit https://www.fcc.gov/general/domestic-section-214-discontinuance-service.
* * *
Appendix
1) Applicant: Broadwing Communications, LLC, CenturyLink Communications, LLC, Level 3 Communications, LLC, Level 3 Telecom, TelCove Operations, LLC and WilTel Communications, LLC (Lumen)
WC Docket No. 26-292, Comp. Pol. File No. 2219
Link - https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/search/search-filings/results?q=(proceedings.name:(%2226292%22))
Affected Service(s) - VoIP Enhanced Local Service (ELS), Local Inbound Service (LI), Lumen Hosted VoIP, and Lumen IQ SIP Voice (IQ SIP Trunk/Lumen SIP Trunking), as specified in the application
Service Area(s) - in all 50 states, Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico
Authorized Date(s) - on or after December 4, 2026
Contact(s) - Kimberly Jackson, (202) 418-7393 (voice), Kimberly.Jackson@fcc.gov, of the Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau
Note - Lumen states that it plans to grandfather the Affected Services as follows: on or after the Authorized Date(s), the Affected Services will no longer be available for new orders for new or existing customers and will no longer be available for automatic renewal for existing customers. Lumen will only accept certain service change requests in limited situations, including, but not limited to, service disconnects. In addition, contracts for ELS and LI will convert to month-to month when current terms expire; contracts for Lumen Hosted VoIP and Lumen IQ SIP Voice, subject to the provisions of individual contracts, will terminate when current terms expire.
* * *
Footnotes:
1/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
2/ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 214.
3/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
4/ See 47 CFR Sec. 63.71(f)(1) (stating, in relevant part, that an application filed by a non-dominant carrier "shall be automatically granted on the 31st day... unless the Commission has notified the applicant that the grant will not be automatically effective."); see also Accelerating Wireline Broadband Deployment by Removing Barriers to Infrastructure Investment, WC Docket No. 17-84, Order, DA 25-251, para. 6 (WCB Mar. 20, 2025) (granting blanket authority for carriers to grandfather any legacy voice or data service covered by sections 63.71(k)-(l) and waiving the associated requirement to file an application pursuant to the Commission's discontinuance rules) (Grandfathering Waiver Order).
5/ Please note that Commission staff may share filed comments with the applicant(s), along with the commenter's contact information, in order to allow applicant(s) to identify affected customers in the proposed discontinuance area and fully respond.
6/ 47 CFR Sec. 1.1200 et seq.
* * *
Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1189A1.pdf
FCC Issues Daily Digest for Nov. 3
WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following Daily Digest (Vol. 45, No. 211) on Nov. 3, 2026:
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THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE DATED AND RELEASED TODAY:
PUBLIC NOTICES
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-3-261103-01. Released: 2026-11-03. PLEADINGS. MB. DOC-426412A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426412A1.pdf) DOC-426412A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426412A1.txt)
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-2-261103-01. Released: 2026-11-03. ACTIONS. MB. DOC-426411A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426411A1.pdf) DOC-426411A1.txt ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following Daily Digest (Vol. 45, No. 211) on Nov. 3, 2026: * * * THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE DATED AND RELEASED TODAY: PUBLIC NOTICES Report No: REPORT NO. PN-3-261103-01. Released: 2026-11-03. PLEADINGS. MB. DOC-426412A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426412A1.pdf) DOC-426412A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426412A1.txt) Report No: REPORT NO. PN-2-261103-01. Released: 2026-11-03. ACTIONS. MB. DOC-426411A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426411A1.pdf) DOC-426411A1.txt(https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426411A1.txt)
Report No: 3222. Released: 2026-11-03. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY REFERENCE INFORMATION CENTER PETITION FOR RULEMAKING FILED. (Dkt No RM-12029 RM-12030 RM-12031 RM-12032 RM-12033). OMD. DOC-426262A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426262A1.docx) DOC-426262A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426262A1.pdf) DOC-426262A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426262A1.txt)
Released: 2026-11-03. EX PARTE PRESENTATIONS AND POST-REPLY COMMENT PERIOD FILING IN PERMIT-BUT-DISCLOSURE PROCEEDINGS RECEIVED ON 11-2-26. OMD. Contact: Kenneth Hill, 202-418-7521. DOC-426425A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426425A1.pdf) DOC-426425A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426425A1.txt)
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-1-261103-01. Released: 2026-11-03. APPLICATIONS. MB. DOC-426410A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426410A1.pdf) DOC-426410A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426410A1.txt)
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TEXTS
ORDER EXTENDING THE 2026 IPCS MANDATORY DATA COLLECTION FILING DEADLINE FOR INCARCERATED PEOPLE'S COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS. The Order grants in part a motion to extend the filing deadline for IPCS providers' Mandatory Data Collection submissions by 45 days to February 4, 2027.. (Dkt No 23-62 12-375). Action by: Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau and Deputy Chief, Office of Economics and Analytics. Adopted: 2026-11-03 by ORDER. (DA No. 26-1187). WCB OEA. DA-26-1187A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1187A1.docx) DA-26-1187A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1187A1.pdf) DA-26-1187A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1187A1.txt)
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ADDENDA: THE FOLLOWING ITEMS, RELEASED NOVEMBER 2, 2026, DID NOT APPEAR IN DIGEST NO. 210:
PUBLIC NOTICES
Released: 2026-11-02. DOMESTIC SECTION 214 APPLICATION GRANTED FOR THE TRANSFER OF CONTROL OF HOOPER TELEPHONE COMPANY DBA WESTEL SYSTEMS AND ITS SUBSIDIARY, HTC COMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C., TO NORTHEAST NEBRASKA TELEPHONE COMPANY . (DA No. 26-1186). (Dkt No 26-206). WCB. Contact: Dennis Johnson, Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at dennis.johnson@fcc.gov; or Audra Hale-Maddox, Telecommunications Access Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at audra.hale-maddox@fcc.gov. DA-26-1186A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1186A1.docx) DA-26-1186A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1186A1.pdf) DA-26-1186A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1186A1.txt)
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TEXTS
VOICE TELEPHONE SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2025. Office of Economics and Analytics Releases Data on Voice Telephone Services as of December 31, 2025. Action by: DA. by REPORT. OEA. DOC-426408A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426408A1.pdf) DOC-426408A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426408A1.txt)
INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2025. Office of Economics and Analytics Releases Data on Internet Access Services as of December 31, 2025. Action by: DA. by REPORT. OEA. DOC-426406A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426406A1.pdf) DOC-426406A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426406A1.txt)
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Original text here: https://www.fcc.gov/edocs/daily-digest/2026/11/03
* * *
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE DATED AND RELEASED TODAY:
PUBLIC NOTICES
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-3-261103-01. Released: 2026-11-03. PLEADINGS. MB. DOC-426412A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426412A1.pdf) DOC-426412A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426412A1.txt)
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-2-261103-01. Released: 2026-11-03. ACTIONS. MB. DOC-426411A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426411A1.pdf) DOC-426411A1.txt ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following Daily Digest (Vol. 45, No. 211) on Nov. 3, 2026: * * * THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE DATED AND RELEASED TODAY: PUBLIC NOTICES Report No: REPORT NO. PN-3-261103-01. Released: 2026-11-03. PLEADINGS. MB. DOC-426412A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426412A1.pdf) DOC-426412A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426412A1.txt) Report No: REPORT NO. PN-2-261103-01. Released: 2026-11-03. ACTIONS. MB. DOC-426411A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426411A1.pdf) DOC-426411A1.txt(https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426411A1.txt)
Report No: 3222. Released: 2026-11-03. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY REFERENCE INFORMATION CENTER PETITION FOR RULEMAKING FILED. (Dkt No RM-12029 RM-12030 RM-12031 RM-12032 RM-12033). OMD. DOC-426262A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426262A1.docx) DOC-426262A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426262A1.pdf) DOC-426262A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426262A1.txt)
Released: 2026-11-03. EX PARTE PRESENTATIONS AND POST-REPLY COMMENT PERIOD FILING IN PERMIT-BUT-DISCLOSURE PROCEEDINGS RECEIVED ON 11-2-26. OMD. Contact: Kenneth Hill, 202-418-7521. DOC-426425A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426425A1.pdf) DOC-426425A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426425A1.txt)
Report No: REPORT NO. PN-1-261103-01. Released: 2026-11-03. APPLICATIONS. MB. DOC-426410A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426410A1.pdf) DOC-426410A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426410A1.txt)
* * *
TEXTS
ORDER EXTENDING THE 2026 IPCS MANDATORY DATA COLLECTION FILING DEADLINE FOR INCARCERATED PEOPLE'S COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS. The Order grants in part a motion to extend the filing deadline for IPCS providers' Mandatory Data Collection submissions by 45 days to February 4, 2027.. (Dkt No 23-62 12-375). Action by: Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau and Deputy Chief, Office of Economics and Analytics. Adopted: 2026-11-03 by ORDER. (DA No. 26-1187). WCB OEA. DA-26-1187A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1187A1.docx) DA-26-1187A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1187A1.pdf) DA-26-1187A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1187A1.txt)
* * *
ADDENDA: THE FOLLOWING ITEMS, RELEASED NOVEMBER 2, 2026, DID NOT APPEAR IN DIGEST NO. 210:
PUBLIC NOTICES
Released: 2026-11-02. DOMESTIC SECTION 214 APPLICATION GRANTED FOR THE TRANSFER OF CONTROL OF HOOPER TELEPHONE COMPANY DBA WESTEL SYSTEMS AND ITS SUBSIDIARY, HTC COMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C., TO NORTHEAST NEBRASKA TELEPHONE COMPANY . (DA No. 26-1186). (Dkt No 26-206). WCB. Contact: Dennis Johnson, Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at dennis.johnson@fcc.gov; or Audra Hale-Maddox, Telecommunications Access Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at audra.hale-maddox@fcc.gov. DA-26-1186A1.docx (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1186A1.docx) DA-26-1186A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1186A1.pdf) DA-26-1186A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1186A1.txt)
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TEXTS
VOICE TELEPHONE SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2025. Office of Economics and Analytics Releases Data on Voice Telephone Services as of December 31, 2025. Action by: DA. by REPORT. OEA. DOC-426408A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426408A1.pdf) DOC-426408A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426408A1.txt)
INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2025. Office of Economics and Analytics Releases Data on Internet Access Services as of December 31, 2025. Action by: DA. by REPORT. OEA. DOC-426406A1.pdf (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426406A1.pdf) DOC-426406A1.txt (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-426406A1.txt)
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Original text here: https://www.fcc.gov/edocs/daily-digest/2026/11/03
FCC Approves Channel 9 Retention for St. George Television Station
WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission has issued a final decision allowing television station KMYU in St. George, Utah, to remain on its current channel rather than transitioning to a previously planned frequency.
According to the Federal Communications Commission (DA 26-1188) (MB Docket No. 26-195), KUTV Licensee, LLC sought to abandon plans to shift its operations from VHF channel 9 to UHF channel 21. The station originally secured approval for the channel change in May 2021, but pending engineering matters and business considerations prompted the operator to ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission has issued a final decision allowing television station KMYU in St. George, Utah, to remain on its current channel rather than transitioning to a previously planned frequency. According to the Federal Communications Commission (DA 26-1188) (MB Docket No. 26-195), KUTV Licensee, LLC sought to abandon plans to shift its operations from VHF channel 9 to UHF channel 21. The station originally secured approval for the channel change in May 2021, but pending engineering matters and business considerations prompted the operator toreverse course and request a return to its established parameters on channel 9.
An outside party, Steven Quinn Singleton, filed comments questioning the procedural documentation and the lack of public explanation regarding the operational shift, though the filing raised no direct objections to the channel substitution itself. The regulatory agency dismissed these comments, pointing out that economic circumstances are not factored into public interest findings regarding channel adjustments and that staff adequately reviewed the necessary technical filings.
The agency concluded that keeping KMYU on channel 9 fulfills all technical and interference standards while protecting continuous broadcast coverage for 174,066 local viewers. The decision takes effect immediately upon publication in the Federal Register to prevent any interruption in service. Under the ruling, the broadcaster must withdraw its pending construction permit application for channel 21 and submit updated licensing schedules within ten days.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1188A1.pdf
According to the Federal Communications Commission (DA 26-1188) (MB Docket No. 26-195), KUTV Licensee, LLC sought to abandon plans to shift its operations from VHF channel 9 to UHF channel 21. The station originally secured approval for the channel change in May 2021, but pending engineering matters and business considerations prompted the operator to ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 (TNSdock) -- The Federal Communications Commission has issued a final decision allowing television station KMYU in St. George, Utah, to remain on its current channel rather than transitioning to a previously planned frequency. According to the Federal Communications Commission (DA 26-1188) (MB Docket No. 26-195), KUTV Licensee, LLC sought to abandon plans to shift its operations from VHF channel 9 to UHF channel 21. The station originally secured approval for the channel change in May 2021, but pending engineering matters and business considerations prompted the operator toreverse course and request a return to its established parameters on channel 9.
An outside party, Steven Quinn Singleton, filed comments questioning the procedural documentation and the lack of public explanation regarding the operational shift, though the filing raised no direct objections to the channel substitution itself. The regulatory agency dismissed these comments, pointing out that economic circumstances are not factored into public interest findings regarding channel adjustments and that staff adequately reviewed the necessary technical filings.
The agency concluded that keeping KMYU on channel 9 fulfills all technical and interference standards while protecting continuous broadcast coverage for 174,066 local viewers. The decision takes effect immediately upon publication in the Federal Register to prevent any interruption in service. Under the ruling, the broadcaster must withdraw its pending construction permit application for channel 21 and submit updated licensing schedules within ten days.
-- Vidhi Gianani, Targeted News Service
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-1188A1.pdf