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FLRA Issues Decision Regarding Department of Army, Fort Huachuca, Arizona Vs. AFGE, Local 1662
WASHINGTON, Dec. 24 -- The Federal Labor Relations Authority issued the following decision (Case No. 0-AR-5989) on Dec. 22, 2025:* * *
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA (Agency)
and
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
LOCAL 1662 (Union)
0 AR 5989
DECISION
December 22, 2025
* * *
Before the Authority: Colleen Duffy Kiko, Chairman, and Anne Wagner, Member
I. Statement of the Case
The Agency denied an employee (the grievant) sick leave - and designated him absent without leave (AWOL) - because he did not provide documentation from a medical practitioner ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 24 -- The Federal Labor Relations Authority issued the following decision (Case No. 0-AR-5989) on Dec. 22, 2025: * * * UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FORT HUACHUCA, ARIZONA (Agency) and AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES LOCAL 1662 (Union) 0 AR 5989 DECISION December 22, 2025 * * * Before the Authority: Colleen Duffy Kiko, Chairman, and Anne Wagner, Member I. Statement of the Case The Agency denied an employee (the grievant) sick leave - and designated him absent without leave (AWOL) - because he did not provide documentation from a medical practitioner(medical certificate) to support his sick leave request. After the Union grieved the matter, Arbitrator Richard R. Rice issued an award finding that, although the Agency required the grievant to submit a medical certificate, the Agency did not communicate to the grievant why he must do so. Absent such an explanation, the Arbitrator found the Agency's actions violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The Agency filed exceptions to the Arbitrator's award, and the exceptions present the five questions below.
The first question is whether the Authority has jurisdiction over this case after the President's issuance of Executive Order 14,251 (the executive order),[1] which, as pertinent here, excluded certain agencies and agency subdivisions from the coverage of the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Statute (the Statute) pursuant to Sec. 7103(b)(1) of the Statute.[2] Importantly, the executive order did not exempt from the Statute's coverage "the immediate, local employing offices of any agency . . . firefighters."[3] Because the grievant is an Agency firefighter, we have jurisdiction over this dispute. Thus, the answer to the first question is yes.
The second question is whether the award is based on nonfacts. Because the Agency fails to establish that the contested findings are clearly erroneous, and for the additional reasons explained below, the answer is no.
The third question is whether the award fails to draw its essence from the agreement. The award interpreting the agreement's wording concerning medical certificates to substantiate sick leave is not irrational, unfounded, implausible, or in manifest disregard of the agreement, so the answer is no.
The fourth question is whether the award is contrary to 5 C.F.R. Sec. 630.405 (Sec. 630.405), which pertinently provides that "[a]n employee must provide . . . medical certification for a request for sick leave . . . after . . . the agency requests such medical certification."[4] The Arbitrator's finding that the Agency did not comply with the agreement is consistent with the Agency's discretion concerning medical certificate requests under Sec. 630.405, so the answer to the fourth question is no.
The fifth question is whether the award conflicts with management's rights to assign work and discipline employees, under Sec. 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute.[5] For the reasons discussed below, the award is consistent with management's rights, and the answer to the fifth question is also no.
II. Background and Arbitrator's Award
The grievant is a firefighter employed by the Agency's Directorate of Emergency Services, Fire Protection & Prevention Division. The Agency directed the grievant to attend a mandatory two day training about medical skills for active shooter incidents. The grievant requested official time to conduct Union related activities - and, in the alternative, annual leave - that would excuse him from attending the training. The Agency denied those official time and annual leave requests, and the grievant completed the first day's training.
Partway through the second day's training, the grievant reported that he felt unwell, and he asked for sick leave that would excuse him from the remainder of the training. The Agency tentatively approved the sick leave request but required the grievant, upon his return to duty, to provide a medical certificate to substantiate his sick leave request. When he returned to duty, the grievant submitted a self certification stating that he was "temporarily incapacitated," requiring his absence from the training.[6] The Agency rejected the self certification because it was not a medical certificate, and, consequently, the Agency changed the tentatively approved sick leave to AWOL.
The Union grieved the denial of sick leave and AWOL designation, and the Agency denied the grievance. The parties stipulated the following issues for arbitration: "Did the Agency violate the [agreement] or federal law when it denied sick leave to [the grievant] and marked him AWOL . . . ; and if so, what shall be the remedy?"[7]
Addressing the basis for the sick leave request, the Arbitrator credited the grievant's evidence that he has "anxiety[ ]related issues that are treated by a medical practitioner," and his testimony that his anxiety is often "resolved through coping skills, rather than a trip to the emergency room."[8] Given the grievant's "history of anxiety," the Arbitrator found that it was reasonable to believe the grievant "suffer[ed] from anxiety" due to the active shooter training, and that the grievant requested sick leave for that reason.[9]
Concerning the standards for requesting and approving sick leave, the Arbitrator identified Article 32, Section 12 (Section 12) of the agreement as the governing contract provision. That section states:
Unit employees may be required to furnish a medical certificate to substantiate a request for approval of sick leave . . . when the [A]gency determines it is necessary for legitimate reasons. Supervisors are encouraged to verbally counsel an employee about sick leave abuse prior to issuing a written warning. The employee is entitled to review medical certificate requirements with the supervisor to discuss whether or not the requirement will be continued.[10]
The Arbitrator acknowledged that, under Section 12, the Agency may require a medical certificate if the Agency finds a certificate necessary for "legitimate reasons."[11] However, the Arbitrator found that the "second part" of Section 12 "requir[es] communication with the employee to prevent sick[ ]leave abuse."[12] Based on that finding, the Arbitrator held that Section 12 "implicit[ly]" requires the Agency to communicate any legitimate reasons to the affected employee.[13]
Applying this requirement, the Arbitrator found the Agency did not communicate to the grievant any legitimate reasons for needing a medical certificate, rather than a self certification. On that basis, the Arbitrator "[did ]not find justification for the medical [certificate]; or for the rejection of the self certification."[14] Thus, the Arbitrator concluded that the requirement for a medical certificate, the denial of sick leave, and the AWOL designation violated Section 12.
The Arbitrator determined that his contractual finding was consistent with Sec. 630.405. He recognized that Sec. 630.405 authorized the Agency to either rely on an employee's self certification to support sick leave, or to determine that a medical certificate was necessary. However, he also found that this "standard must be tempered [by] some evidence supporting the request for documentation," and he faulted the Agency for "never communicat[ing] . . . to the [g]rievant" the reasons a medical certificate was necessary under the regulation.[15]
The Arbitrator sustained the grievance, directed the Agency to remove the AWOL designation, and awarded the grievant backpay for the compensation he would have received if the Agency had approved his sick leave request.
The Agency filed exceptions to the award on September 20, 2024, and the Union filed an opposition on October 17, 2024.
III. Preliminary Matters
A. We have jurisdiction over this case, and we deny the Union's stay motion.
After the Agency filed its exceptions, the President issued the executive order, which excluded certain agencies and agency subdivisions - including the Department of Defense - from the coverage of the Statute.[16] Because the Agency is part of the Department of Defense, the Authority ordered the Agency to show cause why its exceptions should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.[17] The Authority also provided the Union an opportunity to reply to the Agency's response to the show cause order.[18]
In its response, the Agency cites Section 1 499 of the executive order (Section 1 499), which states, in pertinent part, "[N]othing in th[e executive order's new exclusions] shall exempt from the coverage of [the Statute] . . . the immediate, local employing offices of any agency police officers, security guards, or firefighters . . . ."[19] Relying on this wording, the Agency asserts the Authority has jurisdiction over the exceptions because the grievant is an Agency firefighter, and the arbitral remedies apply only to him.[20]
In its reply to the Agency's response, the Union moves for the Authority to stay the proceedings in this case.[21] The Union argues that: (1) the executive order's validity is at issue in pending federal court litigation;[22] (2) the Department of Defense sought declaratory relief in federal court to allow the Agency to "rescind or repudiate" the parties' agreement;[23] and (3) the executive order raises complex questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Regarding those first two considerations, the Union argues the Authority would benefit from the courts' resolution of the issues under litigation.[24] Concerning the third consideration, the Union argues the Authority would benefit from more fulsome briefing.[25] Nevertheless, the Union agrees with the Agency that this case concerns an Agency firefighter.[26]
We agree with the Agency that this case falls within the scope of Section 1 499 because the grievant is a firefighter. Additionally, the award provides relief only to him.[27] Accordingly, none of the executive order's exclusions apply so as to deprive the Authority of jurisdiction in this case.[28]
Further, the pending challenges to the executive order are not a reason to stay this case. Before the executive order issued, the Authority had jurisdiction over this dispute; in accordance with Section 1 499, the executive order does not deprive the Authority of jurisdiction. Thus, there is no basis for finding that the litigation challenging the executive order could affect the Authority's jurisdiction to decide the Agency's exceptions.
Moreover, the Department of Defense's declaratory judgment action seeking to rescind or repudiate the parties' agreement does not warrant a stay. Initially, since the parties responded to the show cause order, the federal district court dismissed, without prejudice, the declaratory judgment action for lack of jurisdiction.[29] Further, the government sought,[30] and received, a voluntary dismissal of its earlier appeal of the district court's order.[31] But because the district court's dismissal was without prejudice to refiling, the declaratory judgment action could be re filed.[32] Nevertheless, that possibility does not warrant a stay, because the Authority derives its jurisdiction to resolve arbitration exceptions from the Statute, not the parties' collective bargaining agreement.[33] Thus, even if the Agency were to rescind or repudiate that agreement, and even if such action were consistent with a declaratory judgment order, the rescission or repudiation would not affect the Authority's jurisdiction under the Statute.[34] In addition, the Authority has held that an agency's cancellation of a collective bargaining agreement did not render exceptions moot where the agreement governed the parties' relationship at the time the award was issued.[35] This precedent lends further support to a conclusion that we have jurisdiction to resolve the exceptions here.
Finally, this case does not involve complex questions of law that require further briefing. As just stated, the Authority has jurisdiction here irrespective of the results of any pending federal court litigation. We find that the parties' previously submitted briefs contain sufficient information to resolve this dispute.
In sum, we have jurisdiction over this case,[36] and we deny the Union's stay motion.
B. Sections 2425.4(c) and 2429.5 of the Authority's Regulations do not bar the Agency's management right arguments.
The Agency argues the award is contrary to its rights to assign work and discipline employees.[37] In its opposition, the Union argues the Authority should bar these arguments because "the Agency never raised the issue of management's rights . . . with the Arbitrator."[38] Under Sec.Sec. 2425.4(c) and 2429.5 of the Authority's Regulations, the Authority will not consider arguments that could have been, but were not, presented to the arbitrator.[39]
The Agency raised the management rights to assign work and discipline employees in its closing brief at arbitration.[40] Accordingly, the Authority's Regulations do not bar the Agency from relying on those same rights in its exceptions.[41]
IV. Analysis and Conclusions
A. The award is not based on nonfacts.
The Agency argues the award is based on two nonfacts, discussed further below.[42] To establish an award is based on a nonfact, the excepting party must show that a central fact underlying the award is clearly erroneous, but for which the arbitrator would have reached a different result.[43] The Authority will not find an award deficient based on the arbitrator's determination of any factual matter that the parties disputed at arbitration.[44] Further, disagreement with an arbitrator's evaluation of evidence, including the weight accorded such evidence, does not provide a basis for finding that an award is based on a nonfact.[45]
The Agency's first nonfact argument is that the Arbitrator erred in finding that the Agency never communicated the reasons the grievant needed to provide a medical certificate.[46] According to the Agency, it clearly communicated the reason in the tentative approval: "to support his request for sick leave."[47] However, Sec. 630.405 permits an agency to consider an employee's self certification to support a sick leave request.[48] Thus, under Sec. 630.405, requiring an employee to "support"[49] a sick leave request with a medical certificate is not, standing alone, a reason for requiring such a certificate. Further, the Arbitrator found that Section 12 requires the Agency to communicate its legitimate reasons to an employee when requiring medical documentation - and, as discussed below, we deny the Agency's essence exception challenging that finding. The Agency's communication did not convey why the Agency was asking the grievant to support his sick leave request. For these reasons, the Agency does not demonstrate that the Arbitrator made a clearly erroneous factual finding when he determined that the Agency never communicated the reasons the grievant needed to provide a medical certificate.[50]
The Agency's second nonfact argument is that the Arbitrator erred in finding no justification for the medical certificate requirement because the Agency explained at arbitration its reasons for insisting on a medical certificate.[51] However, even assuming this argument concerns a factual finding - rather than a contractual one - the parties disputed below whether the certificate requirement was justified,[52] and the Arbitrator found it was not.[53] This arbitral resolution of a factual dispute does not provide a basis for finding a nonfact.[54] Further, to the extent the Agency argues the Arbitrator "ignore[d] the record,"[55] contesting the Arbitrator's weighing of evidence also does not establish a nonfact.[56] Moreover, any explanation for the medical certificate requirement that the Agency provided at arbitration does not demonstrate that the Arbitrator clearly erred in finding the Agency was unjustified in requiring a medical certificate without providing any explanation to the grievant.[57]
For these reasons, we deny the nonfact exception.
B. The award draws its essence from the agreement.
The Agency argues the award fails to draw its essence from the parties' agreement because the Arbitrator erroneously required the Agency to communicate legitimate reasons for requiring a medical certificate.[58] The Authority will find that an award fails to draw its essence from a collective bargaining agreement when the excepting party establishes the award: (1) cannot in any rational way be derived from the agreement; (2) is so unfounded in reason and fact and so unconnected with the wording and purposes of the agreement as to manifest an infidelity to the obligation of the arbitrator; (3) does not represent a plausible interpretation of the agreement; or (4) evidences a manifest disregard of the agreement.[59]
In its first essence argument, the Agency contends the Arbitrator's imposition of a requirement to communicate its legitimate reasons to an employee when requiring medical documentation is irrational and implausible because Section 12 does not contain such a requirement.[60] However, the Arbitrator found this requirement was "implicit" in Section 12, observing that the "second part of Section 12 requir[es] communication with the employee to prevent sick leave abuse."[61] Section 12 requires supervisors to verbally counsel employees, to review medical certificate requirements with employees, and to discuss with employees whether medical certificate requirements will be continued.[62] In other words, Section 12 contains several requirements for supervisors to communicate with employees about sick leave usage - and medical certificates, in particular. Further, Section 12 authorizes the Agency to require a medical certificate "for legitimate reasons," but it would be impossible for the grievant to know whether the Agency had "legitimate reasons" for requiring a medical certificate unless the Agency communicated such reasons to him.[63] Consequently, it was not irrational, unfounded, implausible, or in manifest disregard of the parties' agreement for the Arbitrator to conclude that Section 12 required the Agency to communicate to the grievant its legitimate reasons for requiring a medical certificate.[64]
In its second essence argument, the Agency asserts the Arbitrator's interpretation of Section 12 disregards Article 35, Section 1(b)(1) (Section 1(b)(1)) - a provision that addresses when firefighters must provide medical certificates to support sick leave.[65] Section 1(b)(1) states, in pertinent part, "Operations firefighters who take sick leave . . . [,] when the [A]gency determines it is necessary for legitimate reasons[,] must provide a medical certificate . . . ."[66] However, this provision contains the same wording as Section 12 regarding the Agency's need to have legitimate reasons for requiring a medical certificate. Thus, for the same reason identified in the Section 12 discussion above - the Agency's failure to communicate any legitimate reasons to the grievant - the Agency does not show that the award is irrational, unfounded, implausible, or in manifest disregard of Section 1(b)(1).[67]
We deny the essence exception.
C. The award is consistent with Sec. 630.405.
The Agency argues the award is contrary to Sec. 630.405 because that regulation does not require the Agency to justify a medical certificate requirement when evaluating sick leave requests.[68] When exceptions involve an award's consistency with law, the Authority reviews any question of law raised by the exceptions and the award de novo.[69] In applying the standard of de novo review, the Authority assesses whether an arbitrator's legal conclusions are consistent with the applicable standard of law.[70] In making that assessment, the Authority defers to the arbitrator's underlying factual findings, unless the excepting party establishes they are based on nonfacts.[71]
Section 630.405(a) says, in relevant part, "An agency may also require a medical certificate . . . as to the reason for an absence . . . when the agency determines it is necessary."[72] Further, Sec. 630.405(b) says, in pertinent part, "An employee must provide administratively acceptable evidence or medical certification for a request for sick leave . . . after the date the agency requests such medical certification."[73]
Emphasizing the word "must" in Sec. 630.405(b), the Agency asserts that, once it requests a medical certificate, an employee is obligated to furnish one.[74] The Agency "essentially argues that it has an unreviewable right to determine that medical documentation is necessary."[75] But the Authority has previously held that an arbitrator may scrutinize whether an agency "properly determined that medical documentation was necessary," without running afoul of Sec. 630.405(b).[76] In doing so, the arbitrator may examine whether the determination was "reasonable" or an "abuse[ of] discretion."[77] Thus, the Authority has rejected the proposition that such determinations are unreviewable.
Further, the Authority has recognized that Sec. 630.405 permits parties to negotiate, to the extent of an agency's discretion, over the circumstances in which the agency will require medical certificates.[78] Here, the parties negotiated the conditions set forth in Section 12, and the Arbitrator found that one of those conditions required the Agency to communicate to the grievant its legitimate reasons for requiring a medical certificate.[79]
In short, Sec. 630.405 does not provide the Agency with unlimited or unreviewable discretion to determine when it will require a medical certificate; the parties bargained over the conditions that apply to such a requirement; and the Arbitrator remedied the Agency's failure to comply with one of those conditions. Under Authority precedent, the Arbitrator's interpretation of the parties' agreement is consistent with the Agency's discretion under Sec. 630.405, and we reject the Agency's argument to the contrary.
D. The Arbitrator enforced an appropriate arrangement, so the award is consistent with management's rights.
The Agency argues that, by limiting its ability to require the grievant to provide a medical certificate to substantiate his sick leave, the award interferes with management's rights to assign work and discipline employees,[80] under Sec. 7106(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the Statute.[81] The Union contends any such interference is lawful because Section 12 - which the Arbitrator enforced - is an appropriate arrangement under Sec. 7106(b)(3) of the Statute.[82] In Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Authority revised its test for resolving management rights exceptions in cases where an arbitrator found a collective bargaining agreement violation.[83] We apply CFPB here.
Under the four part CFPB framework, the first question is whether the excepting party establishes the arbitrator's interpretation and application of the parties' agreement, or the awarded remedy, affects a management right.[84] In CFPB, the Authority stated that "if it is clear that the [collective bargaining agreement] provision is enforceable under Sec. 7106(b), then the Authority may assume, without deciding, that the interpretation and application of the [agreement] and/or the awarded remedy 'affects' a management right."[85] As explained further below, Authority precedent establishes that Section 12, as interpreted and applied by the Arbitrator, is an appropriate arrangement under Sec. 7106(b)(3). Thus, we assume, without deciding, that the Arbitrator's interpretation and application of Section 12 affect management's rights under Sec. 7106(a).[86]
Under CFPB's second question, the Authority determines whether the arbitrator correctly found, or the opposing party demonstrates, that the pertinent contract language - as interpreted and applied by the arbitrator - is enforceable under Sec. 7106(b).[87] As the Arbitrator did not address Sec. 7106, we examine whether the Union demonstrates that Section 12, as interpreted and applied by the Arbitrator, is enforceable.[88] The Union argues that, in the event the Agency conditions sick-leave approval on the employee's production of a medical certificate, the Arbitrator's interpretation and application of Section 12 requires the Agency to communicate the reasons for this requirement.[89] The Authority has previously recognized that "provisions addressing the circumstances in which management can deny leave requests ameliorate the adverse [e]ffects flowing from management's right to deny leave requests."[90] Thus, the Union has shown that Section 12, as interpreted and applied by the Arbitrator, is an "arrangement" under Sec. 7106(b)(3).[91]
Arrangements are "appropriate" within the meaning of Sec. 7106(b)(3) when they do not "excessively interfere" with management rights - that is, when the "benefit to employees outweighs the . . . burden on the exercise of the management right involved."[92] The Union argues that Section 12 - as interpreted and applied by the Arbitrator - ensures that an employee understands why management has exercised its discretion to require a medical certificate so the employee can take the necessary steps to obtain approval for sick leave.[93] The Union argues this benefit is particularly important when management requires a medical certificate in circumstances that are "contrary to the normal practice."[94] Further, the Union argues the burden on management is slight because a supervisor need only tell the employee what the legitimate reasons are for requiring a medical certificate.[95]
The Authority "has determined that agreement pro[visions] that address requesting and granting sick leave . . . constitute appropriate arrangements within the meaning of [Sec. ]7106(b)(3) of the Statute,"[96] as long as they "afford[] management sufficient notice to make appropriate adjustments in the scheduling of work" and do "not require management to grant leave for any unsubstantiated reason."[97] Here, the Arbitrator's interpretation and application of Section 12 require only that the Agency (1) have a legitimate reason for requiring a medical certificate and (2) communicate that reason to the affected employee. The Agency fails to identify a management interest in either requiring a medical certificate without a legitimate reason or refusing to disclose its legitimate reason to the grievant. Moreover, the Arbitrator's interpretation and application of Section 12 do "not require management to grant leave for any unsubstantiated reason."[98] Accordingly, we find the Union has established that Section 12, as interpreted and applied by the Arbitrator, is an enforceable appropriate arrangement.[99]
CFPB's third question asks whether the excepting party challenges the remedy separate and apart from the underlying violation.[100] In this case, the Agency does not separately challenge the remedy.[101] Therefore, the CFPB analysis ends, and we need not reach the fourth question.[102]
Because the Union has established that Section 12 is enforceable under Sec. 7106(b)(3), the award is not contrary to management's rights. Consequently, we deny the contrary to law exception.
V. Decision
We have jurisdiction over this case. We deny the Union's stay motion and the Agency's exceptions.
* * *
Footnotes:
[1] Exclusions from Federal Labor Management Relations Programs, Exec. Order No. 14,251 (Mar. 27, 2025) (EO 14,251), 90 Fed. Reg. 14553 (Apr. 3, 2025) (amending Executive Order 12,171, 44 Fed. Reg. 66565 (Nov. 19, 1979)).
[2] 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7103(b)(1).
[3] EO 14,251, sec. 2(b), Sec. 1 499, 90 Fed. Reg. at 14554.
[4] 5 C.F.R. Sec. 630.405(b).
[5] 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7106(a)(2)(A), (B).
[6] Opp'n, Attach. 3, Self-Certification at 1.
[7] Award at 2.
[8] Id. at 6.
[9] Id. at 6 7.
[10] Id. at 3 (quoting Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) Art. 32, Sec. 12).
[11] Id. at 5 (quoting CBA Art. 32, Sec. 12).
[12] Id. at 7.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. (emphasis omitted).
[15] Id. at 6.
[16] EO 14,251, sec. 2(b), Sec. 1 402, 90 Fed. Reg. at 14553.
[17] Order to Show Cause at 1.
[18] Id.
[19] EO 14,251, sec. 2(b), Sec. 1 499, 90 Fed. Reg. at 14554.
[20] Resp. at 1.
[21] Reply at 1.
[22] Id. at 1 2.
[23] Id. at 2 (citing U.S. DOD v. AFGE, AFL CIO, Dist. 10, 792 F. Supp. 3d 711, 726 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (dismissing case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), appeal voluntarily dismissed, No. 25 50784 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025)).
[24] Id. at 2 3.
[25] Id. at 3.
[26] Id.
[27] We need not address whether Section 1 499 would apply if the award provided broader relief, because that circumstance is not currently before us.
[28] EO 14,251, sec. 2(b), Sec. 1 499, 90 Fed. Reg. at 14554.
[29] U.S. DOD, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 726.
[30] Consent Mot. to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal, U.S. DOD, No. 25 50784 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025), Dkt. No. 11.
[31] Clerk's Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss Appeal Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b), U.S. DOD, No. 25 50784 (5th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025), Dkt. No. 12.
[32] Id.
[33] See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7122 (granting the Authority power to review arbitration awards when exceptions are filed); cf. NTEU, Chapter 208, 4 FLRA 215, 216 (1980) ("[The Authority's negotiability] jurisdiction . . . cannot in any way be expanded by an agreement between the parties . . . ."); IRS, Wash., D.C., 47 FLRA 1091, 1106 (1993) (finding that parties' agreement to include unfair labor practice (ULP) allegations within the scope of their negotiated grievance procedure could not deprive the Authority of jurisdiction under the Statute to address ULP charges filed by a party to that agreement); U.S. Dep't of VA, Med. Ctr., Danville, Ill., 34 FLRA 131, 135 36 (1990) (where agency entered into agreement with employees as an exercise of discretion, rather than pursuant to a collective bargaining obligation under the Statute, Authority had no jurisdiction to consider exceptions to an arbitration award that arose from that agreement); LaBoube v. Dep't of the Treasury, 105 M.S.P.R. 337, 340 (2007) ("[P]arties cannot confer [Merit Systems Protection] Board jurisdiction by agreement where it is otherwise lacking.").
[34] Cf. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, BEP, Wash., D.C., 41 FLRA 860, 865 66 (1991) (holding that agency's cancellation of collective bargaining agreement provided no reason to find an award deficient, where the "agreement governed the parties' relationship at the time the award was issued").
[35] Id.
[36] See U.S. Dep't of the Navy, Commander Navy Region Nw., Fire & Emergency Servs., 74 FLRA 286, 288 (2025) (holding the executive order did not deprive Authority of jurisdiction over arbitration exceptions where there was no dispute that agency was "the immediate, local employing office of firefighters").
[37] See Exceptions Br. at 4 5.
[38] Opp'n Br. at 10.
[39] 5 C.F.R. Sec.Sec. 2425.4(c), 2429.5.
[40] Exceptions, Encl. 8, Agency's Arb. Closing Br. (Agency's Arb. Closing Br.) at 3 4 (arguing Arbitrator would interfere with management's rights to assign work and discipline employees if he held Agency could not require grievant to provide medical certificate).
[41] See, e.g., U.S. DOJ, Fed. BOP, Fed. Corr. Inst., Ashland, Ky., 74 FLRA 13, 15 (2024) (finding Sec.Sec. 2425.4(c) and 2429.5 did not bar an exception because the party raised the same argument in its post hearing brief at arbitration).
[42] Exceptions Br. at 5.
[43] NTEU, Chapter 46, 73 FLRA 654, 655 56 (2023) (Chapter 46) (citing AFGE, Loc. 4156, 73 FLRA 588, 590 (2023)).
[44] Id. (citing Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Loc. 290, 72 FLRA 586, 588 & n.28 (2021); AFGE, Loc. 1698, 70 FLRA 96, 99 (2016)).
[45] Id. (citing AFGE, Loc. 12, 70 FLRA 582, 583 (2018)).
[46] Exceptions Br. at 5.
[47] Id.
[48] 5 C.F.R. Sec. 630.405(a) ("An agency may consider an employee's self certification as to the reason for his or her absence as administratively acceptable evidence, regardless of the duration of the absence."); see also Award at 6 (finding "an employer may rely upon an employee's self-certification" (citing 5 C.F.R. Sec. 630.405(a))).
[49] Exceptions Br. at 5.
[50] See Chapter 46, 73 FLRA at 655 57 (rejecting nonfact argument because party did not demonstrate clear factual error).
[51] Exceptions Br. at 5.
[52] Award at 5 (stating Union argued medical certificate requirement was "arbitrary and discriminatory"); Agency's Arb. Closing Br. at 4 (asserting Agency had legitimate reason for requiring medical certificate).
[53] Award at 7 ("[T]his Arbitrator cannot find justification for the medical documentation [requirement]; or for the rejection of the self-certification.").
[54] See Chapter 46, 73 FLRA at 656 (rejecting nonfact challenge to arbitral resolution of disputed factual issue).
[55] Exceptions Br. at 5.
[56] See Chapter 46, 73 FLRA at 656; U.S. Dep't of VA, Puget Sound Health Care Sys., Seattle, Wash., 72 FLRA 441, 443 (2021) (Chairman DuBester concurring) (denying nonfact argument that a finding "ignore[d] the record").
[57] See Chapter 46, 73 FLRA at 655 57 (rejecting nonfact argument because party did not demonstrate clear factual error).
[58] Exceptions Br. at 6 7.
[59] NLRB Union, 74 FLRA 230, 234 (2025).
[60] Exceptions Br. at 7.
[61] Award at 7.
[62] Id. at 3.
[63] Id. (quoting CBA Art. 32, Sec. 12).
[64] See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, IRS, Greensboro, N.C., 61 FLRA 103, 105 (2005) (Member Armendariz concurring in part and dissenting in part on other grounds) (denying essence challenge to award in which arbitrator interpreted contractually required "counseling" about performance deficiencies as necessitating "verbal discussions," not merely written notices).
[65] Exceptions Br. at 6 7.
[66] Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting CBA Art. 35, Sec. 1(b)(1)).
[67] See U.S. Dep't of the Army, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., 65 FLRA 442, 445 (2011) (relying on arbitrator's interpretation of one contract provision to find that award drew its essence from "functionally identical" wording in another provision of the same agreement).
[68] Exceptions Br. at 3 4 (citing 5 C.F.R. Sec. 630.405).
[69] U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, IRS, 73 FLRA 888, 889 (2024) (IRS); see U.S. DHS, CBP, 69 FLRA 579, 581 (2016) (analyzing argument that award was contrary to government wide regulation using contrary to law framework).
[70] IRS, 73 FLRA at 889.
[71] U.S. Dep't of the Navy, Naval Med. Ctr. Camp Lejeune, Jacksonville, N.C., 73 FLRA 137, 140 (2022).
[72] 5 C.F.R. Sec. 630.405(a).
[73] Id. Sec. 630.405(b).
[74] Exceptions Br. at 4.
[75] U.S. DOJ, Fed. BOP, U.S. Penitentiary Marion, Ill., 59 FLRA 811, 813 (2004) (Member Pope dissenting in part on other grounds).
[76] Id. (emphasis added). The pertinent wording of Sec. 630.405 previously appeared in 5 C.F.R. Sec. 630.403, and older Authority decisions cited Sec. 630.403 for that reason.
[77] Id.
[78] See U.S. Dep't of the Navy, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va., 55 FLRA 1103, 1105 (1999) (Navy) (arbitrator's finding that agreement permitted sick leave restricted employee to rely on self certification to substantiate sick leave usage for recurring medical condition was not contrary to Sec. 630.403); NAGE, SEIU, Loc. R1 134, 47 FLRA 675, 682 (1993) (arbitrator's finding that agreement permitted agency to question the reasonableness of grievant's medical certificate was consistent with Sec. 630.403); AFGE, AFL CIO, Loc. 2052, 30 FLRA 837, 841 (1987) (finding parties could lawfully negotiate a proposal that prohibited supervisors from asking or ordering employees who requested sick leave to disclose their medical diagnoses because "Sec. 630.403 does not require employees to provide reasons in addition to the employee's certification as to the basis for sick[ ]leave usage").
[79] See Award at 6 7.
[80] Exceptions Br. at 4 5.
[81] 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7106(a)(2)(A), (B).
[82] Opp'n Br. at 13 (citing 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7106(b)(3)).
[83] 73 FLRA 670, 676 81 (2023).
[84] Id. at 676 77.
[85] Id. at 681 n.123.
[86] See, e.g., U.S. DHS, U.S. CBP, 74 FLRA 6, 10 (2024) (assuming effect on Sec. 7106(a) rights where Authority found provision interpreted and applied by arbitrator was enforceable as procedure under Sec. 7106(b)(2)).
[87] 73 FLRA at 677 80.
[88] See, e.g., U.S. DOJ, Fed. BOP, Fed. Corr. Inst., Seagoville, Tex., 74 FLRA 40, 43 44 (2024) (where arbitrator did not address Sec. 7106(b), Authority assessed whether opposing party demonstrated that contract provision, as interpreted and applied by arbitrator, was enforceable under Sec. 7106(b)).
[89] Opp'n Br. at 12 13; see also Award at 7 (finding Agency violated Section 12 by denying the grievant's sick-leave request on the basis of the inadequacy of the grievant's self certification without communicating any legitimate reasons to the grievant justifying the need for a medical certificate).
[90] SSA, 65 FLRA 339, 342 (2010) (citing NTEU, 45 FLRA 696, 724 (1992)).
[91] See, e.g., SSA, 65 FLRA at 342. We presume that this amelioration is tailored to the grievant's circumstances because the Agency does not attempt to rebut that presumption. CFPB, 73 FLRA at 680 ("[I]n the arbitration context, we will not separately conduct a tailoring analysis; we will presume that the tailoring requirement is met. However, that presumption is rebuttable: If a party argues that the tailoring requirement is not met for some reason, then we will consider that argument in conducting our Sec. 7106(b)(3) analysis.").
[92] AFGE, Council 220, 74 FLRA 114, 116 (2024).
[93] Opp'n Br. at 13.
[94] Id.
[95] Id.
[96] Navy, 55 FLRA at 1105 (citing NAGE, SEIU, AFL CIO, 40 FLRA 657, 678 82 (1991) (NAGE)).
[97] NAGE, 40 FLRA at 681 82 (finding lawful a provision that established "substantive criteria governing management's decision to grant leave to employees for reasons of illness or medical treatment" because the provision did "not preclude management from requiring documentation" or "require management to grant leave for any unsubstantiated reason," and because the provision "afford[ed] management sufficient notice to make appropriate adjustments in the scheduling of work").
[98] Id. at 681.
[99] See Navy, 55 FLRA at 1105; NAGE, 40 FLRA at 681 82. As such, we need not address the Union's argument that Section 12 - as interpreted and applied by the Arbitrator - is an enforceable procedure under Sec. 7106(b)(2) of the Statute. Opp'n Br. at 11 12; see U.S. Dep't of VA, James A. Haley Veterans Hosp. & Clinics, 73 FLRA 880, 885 n.85 (2024) (then Member Kiko concurring) (citing CFPB, 73 FLRA at 679 (explaining that opposing party need demonstrate only "that one of the subsections of Sec. 7106(b) applies")).
[100] 73 FLRA at 680 81.
[101] See, e.g., Exceptions Br. at 5 ("The Arbitrator cannot render a CBA interpretation that varies from law . . . .").
[102] 73 FLRA at 681 ("Does the excepting party challenge the remedy separate and apart from the underlying CBA violation? If no, then the Authority will deny the exception.").
* * *
Original text here: https://www.flra.gov/decisions/v74/74-52
FCC Wireline Competition Bureau Issues Public Notice: Comments Invited on Section 214 Application to Discontinue Domestic Non-Dominant Carrier Telecommunications Services
WASHINGTON, Dec. 24 -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket No. 25-350) on Dec. 22, 2025:* * *
Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix.
The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in Section 63.71 of the Commission's rules./1 The application(s) ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 24 -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket No. 25-350) on Dec. 22, 2025: * * * Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix. The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in Section 63.71 of the Commission's rules./1 The application(s)request authority, under section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,/2 and section 63.71 of the Commission's rules,/3 to discontinue, reduce, or impair certain domestic telecommunications service(s) (Affected Service(s)) in specified geographic areas (Service Area(s)) as applicable and as fully described in each application.
In accordance with section 63.71(f) of the Commission's rules, the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed in the Appendix will be deemed granted automatically on January 22, 2026, the 31st day after the release date of this public notice, unless the Commission notifies any applicant(s) that their grant will not be automatically effective./4 We note that the date on which an application for Commission authorization is deemed granted may be different from the date on which applicants are authorized to discontinue service ("Authorized Date"). Any applicant whose application has been deemed granted may discontinue their Affected Service(s) in their Service Area(s) on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) specified in the Appendix, in accordance with their filed representations. Accordingly, pursuant to section 63.71(f), and the terms outlined in each application, absent further Commission action, each applicant may discontinue the Affected Service(s) in the Service Area(s) described in their application on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) listed in the Appendix for that application. For purposes of computation of time when filing a petition for reconsideration, application for review, or petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision(s), the date of "public notice" shall be the later of the auto grant date stated above in this Public Notice, or the release date(s) of any further public notice(s) or order(s) announcing final Commission action, as applicable. Should no petitions for reconsideration, applications for review, or petitions for judicial review be timely filed, the proceeding(s) listed in this Public Notice shall be terminated, and the docket(s) will be closed.
Comments objecting to the application(s) listed in the Appendix must be filed with the Commission on or before January 6, 2026. Comments should refer to the specific WC Docket No. and Comp. Pol. File No. listed in the Appendix for the Section 214 Discontinuance Application. Comments should include specific information about the impact of the proposed discontinuance on the commenter, including any inability to acquire reasonable substitute service. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Filers should follow the instructions provided on the Web site for submitting comments. Generally, only one copy of an electronic submission must be filed. In completing the transmittal screen, filers should include their full name, U.S. Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket number.
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing. Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission. Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building. Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
This proceeding(s) shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose" proceeding(s) in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules./5 Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding(s) should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
For further information, please see the contact(s) for the specific discontinuance proceeding you are interested in as listed in the Appendix. For further information on procedures regarding section 214 please visit https://www.fcc.gov/general/domestic-section-214-discontinuance-service.
* * *
Footnotes:
1/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
2/ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 214.
3/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
4/ See 47 CFR Sec. 63.71(f)(1) (stating, in relevant part, that an application filed by a non-dominant carrier "shall be automatically granted on the 31st day... unless the Commission has notified the applicant that the grant will not be automatically effective.").
5/ 47 CFR Sec. 1.1200 et seq.
* * *
Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-1098A1.pdf
USITC Makes Determinations in Five-Year (Sunset) Reviews Concerning Lightweight Thermal Paper from China
WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 -- The U.S. International Trade Commission issued the following news release:* * *
USITC Makes Determinations in Five-Year (Sunset) Reviews Concerning Lightweight Thermal Paper from China
*
Bulletin 25-079
Inv. No(s). 701-TA-451, 731-TA-1126
Contact: Jennifer Andberg, 202-205-1819
The U.S. International Trade Commission has made affirmative determinations in its expedited five-year (sunset) reviews concerning lightweight thermal paper from China.
Note to users: This bulletin will be replaced by the news release when the release is available. News releases are ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 -- The U.S. International Trade Commission issued the following news release: * * * USITC Makes Determinations in Five-Year (Sunset) Reviews Concerning Lightweight Thermal Paper from China * Bulletin 25-079 Inv. No(s). 701-TA-451, 731-TA-1126 Contact: Jennifer Andberg, 202-205-1819 The U.S. International Trade Commission has made affirmative determinations in its expedited five-year (sunset) reviews concerning lightweight thermal paper from China. Note to users: This bulletin will be replaced by the news release when the release is available. News releases aregenerally issued approximately three hours after a Commission vote.
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Original text here: https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2025/er1223_67898.htm
Statement of Acting Chairman Peter A. Feldman on Auto-Mark V. CPSC
BETHESDA, Maryland, Dec. 23 -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following statement by Acting Chairman Peter A. Feldman:* * *
Statement of Acting Chairman Peter A. Feldman on Auto-Mark v. CPSC
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) appreciates the clarification provided by the federal court in Auto-Mark v. CPSC (D. Minn.) regarding the proper scope of the Portable Fuel Container Safety Act (PFCSA). The court's decision in Auto-Mark makes clear that the Commission's efforts under the Biden Administration to regulate fuel additives under the PFCSA expanded the agency's ... Show Full Article BETHESDA, Maryland, Dec. 23 -- The Consumer Product Safety Commission issued the following statement by Acting Chairman Peter A. Feldman: * * * Statement of Acting Chairman Peter A. Feldman on Auto-Mark v. CPSC The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) appreciates the clarification provided by the federal court in Auto-Mark v. CPSC (D. Minn.) regarding the proper scope of the Portable Fuel Container Safety Act (PFCSA). The court's decision in Auto-Mark makes clear that the Commission's efforts under the Biden Administration to regulate fuel additives under the PFCSA expanded the agency'sregulatory reach beyond what Congress authorized. This ruling is a win for American businesses and consumers alike.
The government has elected not to appeal the court's ruling. The Commission's prior position on fuel additives exceeded the agency's authority under the statute, was unsupported by incident data, and imposed significant and unnecessary costs on products. Such an approach threatened both the availability of lawful products and the viability of the businesses that manufacture them.
Consistent with this decision, CPSC will make permanent any necessary regulatory clarifications to ensure the agency's rules fully align with the agency's statutory authorization. In the interim, the Commission will continue to exercise appropriate regulatory discretion consistent with the text of the PFCSA.
President Trump's CPSC will continue to foster a regulatory environment that encourages safety, affordability, and the growth of American businesses without imposing unlawful rules on them. We remain committed to focusing CPSC enforcement and regulatory resources on legitimate safety issues, where the evidence shows federal intervention is necessary to protect Americans from harmful consumer products, while following the important limits Congress has placed on the agency's authority.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cpsc.gov/About-CPSC/Chairman/Peter-A-Feldman/Statement/Statement-of-Acting-Chairman-Peter-A-Feldman-on-Auto-Mark-v-CPSC
NCUA Announces Second Round of Deregulation Proposals
ALEXANDRIA, Virginia, Dec. 23 -- The National Credit Union Administration issued the following news release:* * *
NCUA Announces Second Round of Deregulation Proposals
*
Stakeholders Are Encouraged to Review Notice of Proposed Rulemakings and Submit Comments
ALEXANDRIA, VA (December 23, 2025) - The National Credit Union Administration today announced the second round of proposed regulatory changes associated with NCUA's Deregulation Project. The project is an ongoing review of NCUA's regulations to ensure regulations are focused on credit unions' safety, soundness, and resilience. The agency ... Show Full Article ALEXANDRIA, Virginia, Dec. 23 -- The National Credit Union Administration issued the following news release: * * * NCUA Announces Second Round of Deregulation Proposals * Stakeholders Are Encouraged to Review Notice of Proposed Rulemakings and Submit Comments ALEXANDRIA, VA (December 23, 2025) - The National Credit Union Administration today announced the second round of proposed regulatory changes associated with NCUA's Deregulation Project. The project is an ongoing review of NCUA's regulations to ensure regulations are focused on credit unions' safety, soundness, and resilience. The agencyis focused on removing or revising regulations that are: obsolete; overly burdensome; duplicative of other requirements; or guidance.
With today's announcement, NCUA is requesting comments on four proposals that would clarify agency guidance or eliminate unduly burdensome or obsolete requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations.
The four proposals include:
* Changes for Surety and Guarantor Requirements - 12 CFR 701.20(c)(3) and 701.20(d)
* NCUA is proposing changes to segregated deposit and collateral requirements.
* For more information on this proposal, please see: This is an external link to a website belonging to another federal agency, private organization, or commercial entity. https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/2025-23857/suretyship-and-guaranty-segregated-deposit-and-collateral (Opens new window)
* Changes for Limits on Loans to Other Credit Unions - 12 CFR 701.25(b)
* NCUA is proposing to remove a requirement that is duplicative of statute and unduly burdensome regarding loans to credit unions.
* For more information on this proposal, please see: This is an external link to a website belonging to another federal agency, private organization, or commercial entity. https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/2025-23855/limits-on-loans-to-other-credit-unions (Opens new window)
* Changes for Catastrophic Reporting - 12 CFR 748.1(b)
* NCUA is proposing changes related to catastrophic act reporting.
* For more information on this proposal, please see: This is an external link to a website belonging to another federal agency, private organization, or commercial entity. https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/2025-23856/catastrophic-act-reporting (Opens new window)
* Changes for Accuracy of Advertising and Notice of Insured Status - 12 CFR 740.0 and 740.5
* NCUA is proposing to remove overly prescriptive, obsolete requirements related to advertising.
* For more information on this proposal, please see: This is an external link to a website belonging to another federal agency, private organization, or commercial entity. https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/2025-23854/accuracy-of-advertising-and-notice-of-insured-status (Opens new window)
Proposed Regulation Change Obsolete Regulations Overly Burdensome Requirements Duplicative of Statute Guidance
Proposed Regulation Change
12 CFR 701.20(c)(3), 701.20(d) Surety and Guarantor Requirements
Obsolete Regulations
Yes
Overly Burdensome Requirements
Yes
Duplicative of Statute
Guidance
Proposed Regulation Change
12 CFR 701.25(b) Limits on Loans to Other Credit Unions
Obsolete Regulations
Overly Burdensome Requirements
Yes
Duplicative of Statute
Yes
Guidance
Proposed Regulation Change
12 CFR 748.1(b) Catastrophic Act Reporting
Obsolete Regulations
Overly Burdensome Requirements
Yes
Duplicative of Statute
Guidance
Proposed Regulation Change
12 CFR 740.0 and 740.5 Accuracy of Advertising and Notice of Insured Status
Obsolete Regulations
Yes
Overly Burdensome Requirements
Yes
Duplicative of Statute
Guidance
To submit comments, type or paste the docket numbers into the search on the This is an external link to a website belonging to another federal agency, private organization, or commercial entity. Federal Rulemaking Portal (Opens new window).
For more information about the NCUA Deregulation Project, visit: https://ncua.gov/news/deregulation-project
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Original text here: https://ncua.gov/newsroom/press-release/2025/ncua-announces-second-round-deregulation-proposals
FCC COMMISSIONER GOMEZ ON ALARMING REPORTS OF EDITORIAL INTERFERENCE AT 60 MINUTES
WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following statement on Dec. 22, 2025:* * *
FCC COMMISSIONER GOMEZ ON ALARMING REPORTS OF EDITORIAL INTERFERENCE AT 60 MINUTES
FCC Commissioner Anna M. Gomez issued the following statement in response to reports that CBS News delayed a 60 Minutes segment following the federal government's refusal to respond to thoroughly vetted, independent reporting:
"Against the backdrop of increased government pressure, reports that CBS News interfered with the editorial judgment of 60 Minutes are deeply alarming and strike at the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following statement on Dec. 22, 2025: * * * FCC COMMISSIONER GOMEZ ON ALARMING REPORTS OF EDITORIAL INTERFERENCE AT 60 MINUTES FCC Commissioner Anna M. Gomez issued the following statement in response to reports that CBS News delayed a 60 Minutes segment following the federal government's refusal to respond to thoroughly vetted, independent reporting: "Against the backdrop of increased government pressure, reports that CBS News interfered with the editorial judgment of 60 Minutes are deeply alarming and strike at theheart of press freedom. When the FCC withheld approval of Paramount's transaction to extract sweeping concessions, I warned that allowing the government to wield regulatory leverage in newsroom decision-making would inevitably threaten independent journalism. We are now seeing the real-world consequences of blurring the line between regulatory authority and editorial independence.
"A free press cannot function if the government is able to exercise veto power over critical reporting simply by refusing to engage. That is fundamentally incompatible with the First Amendment and the role of journalists in holding those in power to account. These concerns are only heightened when a media company seeking favorable action on future regulatory approvals tempers or delays coverage critical of this Administration, raising serious questions about whether editorial decisions are being influenced by external pressure rather than journalistic judgment.
"The public has the right to question how CBS will ensure the independence and integrity of its journalism going forward, concerns which are only compounded by the existence of a government-imposed media monitor at CBS, a deeply flawed and unprecedented form of government involvement in editorial affairs. In the days ahead, I hope CBS provides its viewers with a clear accounting of how this decision was made and demonstrates how it will safeguard the independence of its newsroom."
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-416848A1.pdf
EEOC Sues U.S. Steel for Pregnancy Discrimination and Retaliation
WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 -- The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued the following news release:* * *
EEOC Sues U.S. Steel for Pregnancy Discrimination and Retaliation
*
Federal agency charges steelmaker failed to accommodate pregnant employee
MINNEAPOLIS - U.S. Steel, a multinational steel and iron mining company, violated federal law when it failed to provide an employee with a reasonable accommodation for her pregnancy, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charged in a lawsuit announced today.
According to the lawsuit, an experienced mining equipment operator ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 -- The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued the following news release: * * * EEOC Sues U.S. Steel for Pregnancy Discrimination and Retaliation * Federal agency charges steelmaker failed to accommodate pregnant employee MINNEAPOLIS - U.S. Steel, a multinational steel and iron mining company, violated federal law when it failed to provide an employee with a reasonable accommodation for her pregnancy, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charged in a lawsuit announced today. According to the lawsuit, an experienced mining equipment operatorat U.S. Steel's Minntac mine in northern Minnesota needed to avoid working on the most physically jarring machinery as an accommodation during her high-risk pregnancy. Instead of temporarily allowing her to do other work within her job description, U.S. Steel placed her on an involuntary leave for several weeks. Although the company later let her come back to work, it first assigned her to work inconsistent with her medical restrictions and then removed her from her normal role altogether. She spent the rest of her pregnancy in a menial office job with reduced earning potential.
The lawsuit further alleged that U.S. Steel retaliated against her after her pregnancy, by denying her higher-paying assignments and sending her to more difficult and less desirable jobs in remote areas of the mine.
"It is important that employers understand that the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act created new and meaningful legal protections for pregnant workers," Catherine Eschbach, acting EEOC General Counsel. "Employers should promptly review and update their workplace policies and practices to ensure they comply with the law."
Such alleged conduct violates the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), which requires employers, absent undue hardship, to provide reasonable accommodations for known limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions. The PWFA also prohibits punishing an employee for requesting such accommodations or for reporting PWFA violations to the EEOC. The EEOC filed suit (EEOC v. U.S. Steel, Case No. 0:25-cv-04721) in U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota after first attempting to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its administrative conciliation process.
The PWFA went into effect on June 27, 2023. Resources for employees, employers, and healthcare providers are available at: https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-pregnant-workers-fairness-act.
For more information on pregnancy discrimination, please visit https://www.eeoc.gov/pregnancy-discrimination. For more information on retaliation, please visit https://www.eeoc.gov/retaliation.
The EEOC's Chicago District Office has jurisdiction over Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and North and South Dakota, with Area Offices in Milwaukee and Minneapolis.
The EEOC is the sole federal agency authorized to investigate and litigate against businesses and other private sector employers for violations of federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. For public sector employers, the EEOC shares jurisdiction with the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division; the EEOC is responsible for investigating charges against state and local government employers before referring them to DOJ for potential litigation. The EEOC also is responsible for coordinating the federal government's employment antidiscrimination effort. More information about the EEOC is available at www.eeoc.gov. Stay connected with the latest EEOC news by subscribing to our email updates.
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Original text here: https://www.eeoc.gov/newsroom/eeoc-sues-us-steel-pregnancy-discrimination-and-retaliation