Federal Regulatory Agencies
Here's a look at documents from federal regulatory agencies
Featured Stories
USITC Institutes Section 337 Investigation of Certain GPU Computing Systems, Data Processing Unit Technologies, and Associated Components Thereof, and Products Containing the Same
WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The U.S. International Trade Commission issued the following news release:
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USITC Institutes Section 337 Investigation of Certain GPU Computing Systems, Data Processing Unit (DPU) Technologies, and Associated Components Thereof, and Products Containing the Same
The U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission or USITC) voted to institute an investigation of certain GPU computing systems, data processing unit (DPU) technologies, and associated components thereof, and products containing the same. The products at issue in the investigation are described in the Commission's
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WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The U.S. International Trade Commission issued the following news release:
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USITC Institutes Section 337 Investigation of Certain GPU Computing Systems, Data Processing Unit (DPU) Technologies, and Associated Components Thereof, and Products Containing the Same
The U.S. International Trade Commission (Commission or USITC) voted to institute an investigation of certain GPU computing systems, data processing unit (DPU) technologies, and associated components thereof, and products containing the same. The products at issue in the investigation are described in the Commission'snotice of investigation.
The investigation is based on a complaint filed on behalf of Xockets, Inc. of Temple, Texas, on May 8, 2026. The complaint alleges violations of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 based upon the importation into the United States and sale of certain GPU computing systems, data processing unit (DPU) technologies, and associated components thereof, and products containing the same that infringe the patents asserted by the complainant. The complainant requests that the USITC issue a limited exclusion order and cease and desist orders.
The USITC has identified the following respondents in this investigation:
* NVIDIA Corporation, Santa Clara, California
* Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington
* Amazon.com, Inc., Seattle, Washington
* Amazon Web Services, Inc., Seattle, Washington
* Annapurna Labs (U.S.), Inc., Austin, Texas
By instituting this investigation (337-TA-1505), the USITC has not yet made any decision on the merits of the case. The USITC's Chief Administrative Law Judge will assign the case to one of the USITC's administrative law judges (ALJ), who will schedule and hold an evidentiary hearing. The ALJ will make an initial determination as to whether there is a violation of section 337; that initial determination is subject to review by the Commission.
The USITC will make a final determination in the investigation at the earliest practicable time. Within 45 days after institution of the investigation, the USITC will set a target date for completing the investigation. USITC remedial orders in section 337 cases are effective when issued and become final 60 days after issuance unless disapproved for policy reasons by the U.S. Trade Representative within that 60-day period.
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Original text here: https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2026/er0609_68714.htm
NRC Modernizes Reactor Licensing Hearings, Moves Public Input Earlier in Process
WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following news release:
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NRC Modernizes Reactor Licensing Hearings, Moves Public Input Earlier in Process
ROCKVILLE, Md. -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is changing when and how it conducts mandatory hearings in reactor licensing reviews, moving them to the beginning of the licensing process and refocusing them on public engagement and information exchange. The revised policy implements requirements of Executive Order 14300 and the ADVANCE Act and represents a significant modernization of a hearing process that has
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WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following news release:
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NRC Modernizes Reactor Licensing Hearings, Moves Public Input Earlier in Process
ROCKVILLE, Md. -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is changing when and how it conducts mandatory hearings in reactor licensing reviews, moving them to the beginning of the licensing process and refocusing them on public engagement and information exchange. The revised policy implements requirements of Executive Order 14300 and the ADVANCE Act and represents a significant modernization of a hearing process that hastraditionally occurred near the end of reactor licensing reviews.
"The new approach to mandatory hearings provides meaningful opportunities for public engagement and information sharing," NRC Chairman Ho K. Nieh said. "By holding them earlier in the review process, we can give the public greater visibility into licensing decisions while improving the effectiveness of the process."
The Atomic Energy Act requires mandatory hearings (or "uncontested" hearings) as part of the licensing process for new reactors. Under the revised policy, those hearings will now occur during the early stages of a review, when public input and agency discussions can be most informative. Historically, mandatory hearings often took place near the end of a review after much of the agency's technical work had already been completed.
The policy applies immediately to reactor applications already under review and those filed in the future. The agency's "contested" hearing process, which allows formal legal challenges to license applications, is unchanged and remains in place.
Separately, the NRC has finalized a rule to increase flexibility in conducting mandatory hearings. The rule removes certain hearing requirements not mandated by the AEA and clarifies that references to hearings in the Commission's regulations apply to contested hearings, not uncontested mandatory hearings. The rule took effect in April.
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The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was created as an expert, technical agency to protect public health, safety, and security, and regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials, including enabling the deployment of nuclear power for the benefit of society. Among other responsibilities, the agency issues licenses, conducts inspections, initiates and enforces regulations, and plans for incident response. The NRC is collaborating with interagency partners to implement reforms outlined in new Executive Orders and the ADVANCE Act to streamline agency activities and enhance efficiency.
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Original text here: https://www.nrc.gov/sites/default/files/cdn/doc-collection-news/2026/26-062.pdf
NRC Finds No Significant Environmental Impact From Proposed Crane Clean Energy Center Restart
WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following news release:
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NRC Finds No Significant Environmental Impact from Proposed Crane Clean Energy Center Restart
ROCKVILLE, Md. - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has determined that restarting Crane Clean Energy Center in Middletown, Pennsylvania would have no significant environmental impacts. The action marks a key milestone in the federal review of the plant's proposed return to service.
The draft environmental assessment, now open for public comment, clears an important hurdle for Constellation Energy Generation's
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WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued the following news release:
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NRC Finds No Significant Environmental Impact from Proposed Crane Clean Energy Center Restart
ROCKVILLE, Md. - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has determined that restarting Crane Clean Energy Center in Middletown, Pennsylvania would have no significant environmental impacts. The action marks a key milestone in the federal review of the plant's proposed return to service.
The draft environmental assessment, now open for public comment, clears an important hurdle for Constellation Energy Generation'srestart proposal that would bring more than 800 megawatts of electricity back to the nation's grid.
"Our review of the Crane Clean Energy Center environmental requirements demonstrates the NRC's focus on core mission delivery, ensuring both regulatory efficiency and absolute safety," NRC Executive Director for Operations Mike King said. "The staff is applying a disciplined, thorough approach to this restart review, executing our safety and environmental oversight without unnecessary duplication or delay."
The assessment draws on Constellation's own reporting as well as input from federal and state agencies. Members of the public can submit comments until July 8 by following the instructions in the Federal Register notice.
After the comment period closes, the NRC will finalize the environmental assessment. In parallel, the agency is conducting safety reviews and on-site inspections of restart-related activities at the plant. A final decision on the restart request is expected in 2027.
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The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was created as an expert, technical agency to protect public health, safety, and security, and regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials, including enabling the deployment of nuclear power for the benefit of society. Among other responsibilities, the agency issues licenses, conducts inspections, initiates and enforces regulations, and plans for incident response. The NRC is collaborating with interagency partners to implement reforms outlined in new Executive Orders and the ADVANCE Act to streamline agency activities and enhance efficiency.
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Original text here: https://www.nrc.gov/sites/default/files/cdn/doc-collection-news/2026/26-061.pdf
In Latest 'Bad Labs' Move, FCC Chairman Carr Announces Enforcement Action Against Test Lab Responsible for False Test Results
WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following news release on June 9, 2026:
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In Latest 'Bad Labs' Move, Chairman Carr Announces Enforcement Action Against Test Lab Responsible for False Test Results
Test lab submitted numerous false test reports with copy-and-pasted test reports
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Since last year, the FCC has been taking concrete steps to protect America's communications networks by kicking 'bad labs' out of the FCC's equipment authorization system. Before any electronic device can be marketed or sold in the U.S., it must be tested at a lab recognized
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WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Federal Communications Commission issued the following news release on June 9, 2026:
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In Latest 'Bad Labs' Move, Chairman Carr Announces Enforcement Action Against Test Lab Responsible for False Test Results
Test lab submitted numerous false test reports with copy-and-pasted test reports
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Since last year, the FCC has been taking concrete steps to protect America's communications networks by kicking 'bad labs' out of the FCC's equipment authorization system. Before any electronic device can be marketed or sold in the U.S., it must be tested at a lab recognizedby the FCC. But many of those labs could present national security risks or otherwise fail to conduct trustworthy testing. That is why the FCC has been increasing its scrutiny of all labs.
Today, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr announced that the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) instituted proceedings to withdraw recognition from a test lab that apparently willfully and repeatedly provided false equipment test results in connection with equipment authorization applications. Specifically, SLG-CPC Test Laboratory Co., Ltd. based in Dongguan, China, admitted to having submitted numerous test reports with data copied-and-pasted from other reports.
Chairman Carr issued the following statement:
"Today's action is essential to maintaining the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization system. Falsifying test data plainly undermines trust in the FCC's equipment authorization process and threatens the security of U.S. communications networks and U.S persons. The Commission will continue to scrutinize our test labs and lab accreditation bodies to ensure all entities involved in our equipment authorizations adhere to FCC rules."
Additional Background Information:
To import, market, or sell electronic devices in the United States, device makers generally must get their devices tested and certified in FCC-recognized test labs and telecommunications certification bodies (TCBs). These entities play a vital role in ensuring that devices operate at safe power levels, on appropriate spectrum bands that do not create harmful interference and adhere to U.S. government national security rules. Through its investigation, OET discovered that 33 separate FCC IDs (see list below) had apparently relied on identical test reports prepared by SLG-CPC, often for wholly different products. When confronted, SLG-CPC conceded that it had submitted falsified reports, which it blamed on "inadequate, non-systematic review procedures carried out by the review staff."
Today's action follows a series of Commission actions against "bad labs" in our equipment authorization program. Last May, the FCC adopted rules to prohibit the recognition of test labs owned by, or subject to the direction or control of, a foreign adversary country. Since these rules went into effect, the Commission has denied recognition to, or withdrawn recognition from, 23 such test labs. In April of this year, the FCC proposed to restore reciprocity to lab testing by withdrawing recognition from any test lab based in a country that lacks a reciprocal agreement with the U.S.
33 FCC IDs:
FCC IDs 2AZDD-AIRFIT and 2BRYI-NLT-30; 2A7J2HKTWS, 2BDLPR1002TOF, 2A6QO-XP-G480B, 2A692-T205, and 2BRYI-TAG; 2A692-S001, 2BDWD-G58, and 2A6QO-XP-G480B; 2A9LY-BT-M1 and 2AO94-MKGW4; 2A692-T205 and 2A7J2HKTWS; 2A7KW-HS12 and 2A9HV-AUT213; 2AO94-MKL110BC and 2A3ZU-SPNYH02; 2A6X7-CVS03 and 2BBOI-CO708; 2BAJS-AMLSPKR and 2BBOI-ST200; 2AO94-LW003 and 2AO94-S05T; 2AHP7-T21BEACON and 2BACY-THSB1; 2A9RHS4T01, 2A95WK3Q-01, and 2A95YX3B-01; 2A9YZMXLC and 2A9YXTFLC; 2A5TW-T86 and 2A7IE-YL761.
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-422289A1.pdf
FDIC Chairman Hill Issues Speech at an Event at Chamber of Commerce
WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued the following speech on June 9, 2026, by Chairman Travis Hill, at an event at the Chamber of Commerce:
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Rethinking Resolution Readiness: Learning from Experience and Sharpening Focus
Introduction
Thank you to the Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to speak with you today. Over the past several months, the FDIC has devoted significant time to considering potential improvements to our approach for resolving failed banks. Today, I will provide an update on several of these workstreams.
IDI Rule
For the vast majority
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WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued the following speech on June 9, 2026, by Chairman Travis Hill, at an event at the Chamber of Commerce:
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Rethinking Resolution Readiness: Learning from Experience and Sharpening Focus
Introduction
Thank you to the Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to speak with you today. Over the past several months, the FDIC has devoted significant time to considering potential improvements to our approach for resolving failed banks. Today, I will provide an update on several of these workstreams.
IDI Rule
For the vast majorityof failures managed by the FDIC, the failed bank is relatively small and simple, and the FDIC has a runway leading up to failure. In other words, the bank is a small institution with a small number of business lines, a relatively simple and homogenous balance sheet, and a limited number of platforms and systems with small data sets that can be reconciled relatively quickly. And prior to failure, there is typically a period of weeks or months to gather information from the bank and market the institution under a traditional weekend-sale model. In these cases, ex ante resolution planning is generally unnecessary, as the FDIC is able to obtain and process the information needed once it becomes clear that failure is approaching.
By contrast, advance planning is particularly valuable when neither of those characteristics is present: the institution is not small and simple, and the FDIC has a short or nonexistent runway. Additionally, larger institutions are more likely to fail with shorter runways, given greater public scrutiny and a higher likelihood of liquidity-induced failures./1 In these cases, analyzing and understanding a bank's systems, infrastructure, and data in order to market and sell the institution is very difficult in a short period of time, given the volume and complexity of data sets and IT systems.
While advance planning in such scenarios is valuable, the FDIC's historical approach to resolution planning for large insured depository institutions (IDIs) needs to be fundamentally reexamined, reoriented, and rationalized. As I have described in the past, I am skeptical of the value of requiring institutions to prepare lengthy narrative plans discussing proposed resolution strategies and hypothetical failure scenarios./2 Instead, our focus should be on maximizing an optimal resolution outcome while being prepared in the event that option proves unavailable.
In that vein, we have been working to propose a new approach that would contain two related parts. First, the IDI Rule would be significantly slimmed down to focus more narrowly on key operational information most pertinent to the FDIC's ability to execute an orderly resolution. Second, the FDIC would establish a new "resolution readiness adjustment" to our deposit insurance assessment framework for larger banks, which would allow any bank subject to the large bank scorecard to qualify for a downward adjustment to its quarterly assessment if the bank (1) demonstrates its ability to populate a virtual data room (VDR) in a short period of time and/or (2) provides the FDIC with temporary access to the bank's third-party service provider(s) and/or internal system(s) to enable the FDIC to build IT infrastructure to quickly access data in the event of failure. Fundamentally, an ability to quickly populate a VDR and/or providing the FDIC with advance systems access is likely to lower the cost of a bank's failure, and therefore should result in a lower deposit insurance assessment.
Assessments
In addition to proposing to add a resolution readiness adjustment to the assessments framework, we are also considering additional changes to the existing assessments regulations.
A perennial challenge that deposit insurance funds face is that bank failures are not evenly distributed over time and can be highly correlated. As a result, losses may be very modest for extended periods, and then explode during crises. This creates a challenging balancing act in determining the appropriate size of the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF or Fund). On the one hand, we want to build up the DIF to minimize the likelihood of needing to procyclically raise assessments during a crisis, as occurred during both the 1980s crises/3 and the 2008 financial crisis./4 On the other hand, we are mindful of the costs of assessments, which, among other costs, effectively take funds away from lending and investing in the real economy and divert them to financing the federal government./5
Following the 2008 financial crisis, which plunged the DIF into negative territory, the FDIC spent a number of years rebuilding the Fund, finally exceeding the statutory minimum reserve ratio/6 of 1.35 percent in the third quarter of 2018./7 Since then, the DIF fell back below the statutory minimum in 2020 due to the unprecedented COVID-era stimulus, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the denominator of the reserve ratio. Subsequently, the FDIC raised assessments by two basis points across the entire industry in 2022,/8 followed shortly thereafter by substantial losses for the DIF due to the 2023 bank failures./9 The reserve ratio returned above 1.35 percent last year and currently sits at 1.43 percent, which is the highest the reserve ratio has been since the 1960s, though well below the reserve ratio that would have been needed to have avoided turning negative during the 1980s or 2008 crises.
With this context in mind, we expect to propose several changes to the assessments framework. First, we plan to raise and index the threshold for banks subject to the large bank scorecard, which is currently set at $10 billion, so that the threshold better reflects the scale, complexity, and risk profile of institutions for which the large bank scorecard is designed. Second, we plan to reduce assessments, recognizing the progress that has been made in growing the Fund. For banks subject to the small bank scorecard, we expect to reduce the assessment rate by a full two basis points. For banks subject to the large bank scorecard, we expect to reduce the assessment rate by a smaller amount across the board, but large banks would be able to achieve a comparable overall reduction if they opt in to the resolution readiness adjustment, which would not be available for (and would be unnecessary to offer to) small banks. In any event, we expect to continue to build up the DIF and proceed towards the FDIC's long-term target of 2 percent, at a pace that resembles that of the pre-2022 trajectory.
Finally, we have also been working on modernizing the large bank scorecard, which establishes the risk-based formula that determines assessments for larger banks and has not been materially updated since 2011. I expect any potential amendments to the scorecard would be proposed at a later date than the other changes mentioned above.
Part 370 Recordkeeping Rule
In 2016, the FDIC finalized a new set of IT and recordkeeping requirements for banks with more than two million deposit accounts, codified at Part 370 of the FDIC's regulations./10 The rule requires institutions to configure their IT systems so they are able to calculate the insured and uninsured amount in each deposit account, and maintain information needed by the FDIC to determine deposit insurance coverage with respect to each deposit account.
Prior to the Part 370 rulemaking, in 2008, the FDIC finalized a separate rule, codified at 12 C.F.R. Sec. 360.9, which provides insight into a bank's funding and promotes providing deposit information in a standardized format./11 Today, when an institution crosses two million deposit accounts, it "graduates" from Sec. 360.9 to Part 370.
A key motivation behind Part 370 was that, at the time, there were significant concerns about the FDIC's capability to process very large volumes of deposit account records quickly enough after a bank failure to support timely deposit insurance determinations. In other words, the original problem was, in large part, an FDIC systems-capacity issue. Part 370 intended to mitigate that concern by shifting substantial data and systems obligations to the largest banks. Consequently, covered institutions were required to build and maintain internal capabilities to support rapid deposit insurance determinations.
Since then, however, the FDIC has significantly enhanced its claims processing and deposit insurance determination capabilities, particularly following system modernization work implemented in 2021. We have recently conducted several tests to verify the ability of our systems to ingest, process, aggregate, and determine deposit insurance coverage for larger volumes of accounts. The FDIC also has plans to further expand those capabilities going forward.
These improvements in our internal capacity raise the question of whether the FDIC should continue to require large institutions to build and maintain separate insurance determination systems. The FDIC is actively considering an alternative approach that would, for institutions currently subject to Part 370, replace Part 370 with a modified version of Sec. 360.9 that would (1) preserve certain streamlined requirements related to maintaining depositor records in a standardized format, while (2) relieving banks of the requirements to build and maintain independent insurance determination systems, which has proven operationally burdensome. Ultimately, the FDIC is responsible for making deposit insurance determinations in the event of failure; the FDIC maintains existing systems to apply deposit insurance rules, process depositor data, and coordinate the release of funds; and it seems sensible that our rules would reflect that.
Qualified Financial Contracts (QFC) Regulation
Another resolution-related rulemaking that we have been reviewing closely is the FDIC's Part 371 QFC recordkeeping rule.
The QFC rule/12 requires certain banks in "troubled condition" (generally a CAMELS composite rating of 3 or worse) to maintain comprehensive data related to QFCs./13 Once an institution is deemed to be in troubled condition, the rule provides an institution with 270 days/14 to come into compliance. However, firms have generally struggled to come into compliance within this timeframe, and many have taken well over a year. Given that large banks may fail rapidly after becoming, or without ever becoming, deemed "troubled" for purposes of the QFC rule, this framework is problematic. Furthermore, a bank's condition may improve to the point at which it is released from the rule soon after making the investments to come into compliance, further calling into question the utility of the rule.
On top of that, the data that the FDIC eventually does receive is of marginal value to achieve the objective of the rule. The purpose of the rule is to equip the FDIC with information to decide whether to terminate a bank's QFC positions in the first 24 hours following a failure. But the data provided does not yield that type of insight; for example, it fails to provide insight into the impact of terminating positions on the value of associated assets or the bank's franchise value, or any broader knock-on effects. In 2023, the FDIC faced the decision of whether to repudiate QFCs following the failures of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank. Although the QFC portfolios were relatively small, and neither bank was subject to Part 371,/15 the detailed information required by Part 371 would not have been actionable in deciding whether to terminate positions./16
We are actively considering revamping the rule to require a narrower set of information that banks can realistically produce in a short period of time, that is less of a data dump and more targeted to inform our decision-making. Additionally, the FDIC is considering whether we can leverage QFC transaction data that is already reported to various data repositories maintained by other agencies.
Resolution Contracting
A critical part of resolution readiness is ensuring that the FDIC can leverage top private sector services as part of the resolution process to maximize recoveries and minimize losses to the DIF. However, the FDIC's current procurement process presents significant challenges for resolutions, where speed and expertise are critical. Many procurement efforts take far too long, and top firms either are excluded from participating due to inflexible FDIC policies or choose not to participate because the process is too difficult, rigid, lengthy, or opaque.
One example is the FDIC's contracts for financial advisors who advise on marketing and selling failed institutions. The FDIC currently has a roster of several firms approved to provide services. While the FDIC has had positive experiences with some of these firms in the past, many of the most highly regarded firms have either not been invited to participate due to internal FDIC policies or chose not to participate because of the costly, time-consuming process. Given the critically important role such advisors play in a large bank failure, the FDIC plans to issue a new solicitation to a broader set of firms in the coming weeks.
More broadly, to address these issues, we have been working on a modified procurement process for resolution-related contracts. The goals are to increase competition, reduce timelines, and allow for greater flexibility in the overall process, so that we can contract with top industry participants and reduce overall costs to the DIF.
Least Cost Test
Under the FDI Act, the FDIC is required to choose the resolution option that is least costly to the DIF./17 The only exception to this least cost requirement is the systemic risk determination, which is generally only available when large banks fail, and provides a complete exception from the statutory least cost requirement./18
Over the last three years, there have been three failures in which uninsured depositors took losses. The difference between the winning insured deposit-only bid and the lowest cost all-deposit bid for the three failures were $754,000, $1.2 million, and $3.6 million./19 By contrast, the current estimate for covering uninsured deposits at Silicon Valley Bank is $16.6 billion. To put that in perspective, the cost of choosing transactions that covered uninsured deposits at all of those three small banks would have cost less than one twentieth of one percent of the cost of covering uninsured deposits at SVB, and less than one 200th of one percent of the DIF's net worth.
While this state of affairs raises larger questions related to deposit insurance reform and the FDIC's emergency authorities, and the FDIC has been engaged with congressional offices on such reforms, a smaller, more targeted reform that Congress could consider in the interim is providing a de minimis exception to the least cost requirement, which would enable the FDIC to choose a resolution option that is not the least costly option, if either on a dollar or percentage basis, the difference is very small.
Primarily, this would help mitigate the perception of a two-tier deposit insurance regime, where uninsured depositors take losses at small banks but not large banks, by allowing the FDIC to choose an all-deposit bid when the difference in cost to the DIF is essentially a rounding error in the overall cost of bank resolutions. Imposing losses in such cases can have a material impact on a local community, and on community banking as a business model, while saving tiny amounts for the DIF. In addition, there are certain costs to the DIF that the FDIC cannot consider as part of the least cost analysis, such as future cost to the DIF due to contagion, and a de minimis exception could enable the FDIC to consider such costs in certain limited circumstances while still imposing fiscal discipline on the agency.
Nonbank Participation in Failed Bank Bidding Process
We also continue to take steps to increase the participation of private capital from outside the banking sector in the failed bank bidding process, in order to increase competition in the process and reduce costs to the DIF. This can take the form of a nonbank (1) setting up a shelf charter to purchase a failed back outright; (2) partnering with bank bidders in an "alliance bid," which can allow a smaller bank to bid on a larger institution; or (3) purchasing pools of a failed bank's assets at the time of failure.
In furtherance of these objectives, the FDIC (1) rescinded the 2009 Statement of Policy that established a number of restrictions on the ability of private investors to participate in failed bank purchases;20 (2) has been engaged with the OCC and Federal Reserve on establishing an emergency exception to create a rapid shelf charter after a sudden failure;21 and (3) has been conducting a pilot22 to qualify a group of non-IDI investors to bid on asset pools from certain failed banks at the time of failure and be eligible for seller financing. We expect to open the pre-qualification process later this year to additional nonbanks that satisfy certain criteria. The intent of this pre-qualification process is to enable the FDIC to sell assets more quickly and increase overall recoveries.
Conclusion
The topics discussed today constitute several areas upon which we have been focused to improve our resolution preparedness. In addition, we continue to (1) work with the Federal Financing Bank to establish a permanent facility to quickly monetize receivership assets23 and (2) explore reforms to the Title I resolution planning process, among other areas.
Thank you for your time today.
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1/ By contrast, small banks can linger on death's door for months or years with little public attention.
2/ See, e.g., Travis Hill, Recent Bank Failures and the Path Ahead (April 12, 2023) ("I tend to be skeptical of requiring, as part of resolution planning, detailed descriptions of hypothetical failure scenarios that are extremely unlikely to happen and extensive proposals for how the bank will be resolved."). See also Travis Hill, View from the FDIC: Update on Key Policy Issues (April 8, 2025).
3/ See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, A Brief History of Deposit Insurance in the United States (PDF) (1988), p. 51 ("Effective assessment rates generally ranged under 4 basis points during the 1970s. Thereafter, rates grew rapidly as insurance losses mounted throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. When the full statutory rate of one-twelfth of 1 percent (8.3 basis points) proved too low, Congress mandated an increase to 12 basis points in 1990 and gave the FDIC board more flexibility to raise rates. With losses continuing at record levels, rates were increased twice in 1991, first to 19.5 basis points and then to 23 basis points.").
4/ See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008-2013 (PDF) (2017) pp. 156-158.
5/ The DIF's funds must be invested in U.S. Treasury securities. See 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(a) and 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(4)(A)(iii).
6/ The reserve ratio is currently defined as the net worth of the DIF divided by insured deposits.
7/ See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Update of Projected Deposit Insurance Fund Losses, Income, and Reserve Ratios for the Restoration Plan (PDF) (Nov. 30, 2018).
8/ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Assessments, Revised Deposit Insurance Assessment Rates (PDF), 87 Fed. Reg. 64314 (Oct. 24, 2022).
9/ Losses to the DIF's net worth were primarily a result of the failure of First Republic, as most of the losses from the failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank were recovered by the special assessment, which did not impact the DIF's net worth or the reserve ratio. In effect, the 2023 failures returned the DIF to a trajectory for restoring the reserve ratio above the statutory minimum that was comparable to the trajectory prior to the pre-two basis point increase in 2022.
10/ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Recordkeeping Requirements for Timely Deposit Insurance Determination (PDF), 81 Fed. Reg. 87734 (Dec. 5, 2016).
11/ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Large-Bank Deposit Insurance Determination Modernization (PDF), 73 Fed. Reg. 41180 (July 17, 2008).
12 /Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Recordkeeping Requirements for Qualified Financial Contracts (PDF), 73 Fed. Reg. 78162 (Dec. 22, 2008).
13 /QFCs include derivative contracts and repurchase agreements, among other similar exposures.
14 /For certain smaller institutions, there is a 60-day compliance date, but most institutions who have been subject to the rule have had 270 days to comply.
15 /Nor was First Republic Bank. That none of these banks were subject to Part 371 is itself noteworthy...
16/ For decisions that occur after the first 24 hours, having detailed data in advance of failure is less important because the FDIC will have time post-failure to obtain the necessary data.
17/ 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(c)(4).
18/ 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(c)(4)(G).
19/ The total uninsured deposits of these three failed banks at closing were $4.1 million, $2.8 million, and $26.9 million, respectively.
20/ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Rescission of the Statement of Policy on Qualifications for Failed Bank Acquisitions (PDF), 91 Fed. Reg. 13847 (March 23, 2026).
21/ See Travis Hill, An Update on Reforms to the Regulatory Toolkit (March 11, 2026) ("[W]e are exploring with the other banking agencies the possibility of establishing an emergency exception that would enable a nonbank to rapidly set up a shelf charter to bid on a failed institution following a sudden failure.").
22/ See Travis Hill, Resolution Readiness and Lessons Learned from Recent Large Bank Failures (Oct. 15, 2025) ("On a go-forward basis, we have developed a pre-qualification process for nonbank bidders, with the intent of qualifying nonbank bidders in advance of any offering. The FDIC plans to pilot this qualification process with bidders who participated in the bidding process for the April 2024 failure of Republic First Bank and the 2023 asset sales following the failure of Signature Bank, as well as with other nonbank firms that have expressed interest in pre-failure loan sales. This pilot process will start in January 2026 and will be revised based on feedback.").
23/ See id. ("[T]he FDIC has engaged with the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) to implement a rapid process for securitizing assets assumed from large failed IDIs. These assets could include purchase money notes used (1) to cover asset/liability mismatches of a failed IDI or (2) to provide leverage for asset purchases to facilitate the sale of large complex transactions. In 2023, the FDIC twice securitized positions through the FFB, but the first did not occur until six months after the failures. Securitizing assets through the FFB represents a lower-cost option than borrowing from the Federal Reserve to meet significant liquidity demands - if it can be done much more quickly than in 2023. In the meantime, the FDIC appreciates the ongoing constructive dialogue with the FFB.").
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Original text here: https://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/2026/rethinking-resolution-readiness-learning-experience-and-sharpening-focus
FCC Wireline Competition Bureau Issues Public Notice: Comments Invited on Section 214 Application to Discontinue Domestic Non-Dominant Carrier Telecommunications Services
WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket No. 26-128):
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Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix.
The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in Section 63.71 of the Commission's rules./1 The application(s) request authority,
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Federal Communications Commission's Wireline Competition Bureau issued the following public notice (WC Docket No. 26-128):
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Unless otherwise specified, the following procedures and dates apply to the application(s) (the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s)) listed in the Appendix.
The Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau), upon initial review, has found the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed herein to be acceptable for filing and subject to the procedures set forth in Section 63.71 of the Commission's rules./1 The application(s) request authority,under section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,/2 and section 63.71 of the Commission's rules,/3 to discontinue, reduce, or impair certain domestic telecommunications service(s) (Affected Service(s)) in specified geographic areas (Service Area(s)) as applicable and as fully described in each application.
In accordance with section 63.71(f) of the Commission's rules, the Section 214 Discontinuance Application(s) listed in the Appendix will be deemed granted automatically on July 10, 2026, the 31st day after the release date of this public notice, unless the Commission notifies any applicant(s) that their grant will not be automatically effective./4 We note that the date on which an application for Commission authorization is deemed granted may be different from the date on which applicants are authorized to discontinue service ("Authorized Date"). Any applicant whose application has been deemed granted may discontinue their Affected Service(s) in their Service Area(s) on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) specified in the Appendix, in accordance with their filed representations. Accordingly, pursuant to section 63.71(f), and the terms outlined in each application, absent further Commission action, each applicant may discontinue the Affected Service(s) in the Service Area(s) described in their application on or after the authorized discontinuance date(s) listed in the Appendix for that application. For purposes of computation of time when filing a petition for reconsideration, application for review, or petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision(s), the date of "public notice" shall be the later of the auto grant date stated above in this Public Notice, or the release date(s) of any further public notice(s) or order(s) announcing final Commission action, as applicable. Should no petitions for reconsideration, applications for review, or petitions for judicial review be timely filed, the proceeding(s) listed in this Public Notice shall be terminated, and the docket(s) will be closed.
Comments objecting to the application(s) listed in the Appendix must be filed with the Commission on or before June 24, 2026. Comments should refer to the specific WC Docket No. and Comp. Pol. File No. listed in the Appendix for the Section 214 Discontinuance Application. Comments should include specific information about the impact of the proposed discontinuance on the commenter, including any inability to acquire reasonable substitute service. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Filers should follow the instructions provided on the Web site for submitting comments. Generally, only one copy of an electronic submission must be filed. In completing the transmittal screen, filers should include their full name, U.S. Postal Service mailing address, and the applicable docket number.
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing. Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission. Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building. Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
This proceeding(s) shall be treated as a "permit-but-disclose" proceeding(s) in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules./5 Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding(s) should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
People with Disabilities: To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
For further information, please see the contact(s) for the specific discontinuance proceeding you are interested in as listed in the Appendix. For further information on procedures regarding section 214 please visit https://www.fcc.gov/general/domestic-section-214-discontinuance-service.
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Footnotes:
1/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
2/ 47 U.S.C. Sec. 214.
3/ 47 CFR Sec. 63.71.
4/ See 47 CFR Sec. 63.71(f)(1) (stating, in relevant part, that an application filed by a non-dominant carrier "shall be automatically granted on the 31st day... unless the Commission has notified the applicant that the grant will not be automatically effective.").
5/ 47 CFR Sec. 1.1200 et seq.
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Original text here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-565A1.pdf
FCC Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau Issues Public Notice: Grant of Certification for Nagish to Provide Internet Protocol Captioned Telephone Service, Internet Protocol Relay Service
WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Federal Communications Commission Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau issued the following public notice (CG Docket No. 03-123):
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By the Chief, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau:
Certification is granted to Nagish, Inc. (Nagish), to provide Internet Protocol Captioned Telephone Service (IP CTS)/1 and Internet Protocol Relay Service (IP Relay)/2 on a fully automated basis. Both services are supported by the Interstate Telecommunications Relay Services Fund (TRS Fund)./3 With this action, Nagish, which currently holds conditional certifications to provide
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 10 -- The Federal Communications Commission Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau issued the following public notice (CG Docket No. 03-123):
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By the Chief, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau:
Certification is granted to Nagish, Inc. (Nagish), to provide Internet Protocol Captioned Telephone Service (IP CTS)/1 and Internet Protocol Relay Service (IP Relay)/2 on a fully automated basis. Both services are supported by the Interstate Telecommunications Relay Services Fund (TRS Fund)./3 With this action, Nagish, which currently holds conditional certifications to provideboth IP CTS/4 and IP Relay/5 on a fully automated basis is eligible to receive TRS Fund compensation for a period of five years ending on June 9, 2031. This grant of full certification authorizes Nagish to offer fully automated IP CTS using automatic speech recognition (ASR) and fully automated IP Relay using ASR and text-to-speech (TTS) technology to all eligible consumers.
Background
The Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau (Bureau) granted conditional certification to Nagish to provide fully automated IP CTS on January 4, 2024, for a period of two years./6 Subsequently, on December 23, 2024, the Bureau granted Nagish conditional certification to provide fully automated IP Relay through December 23, 2026./7 Because Nagish relied solely on fully automated technologies and was a new applicant, the Bureau determined that collecting additional information through observing its actual operating experience was necessary to confirm compliance with mandatory minimum standards./8
On October 16, 2025, Nagish filed a request for full certification to provide both IP CTS and IP Relay./9 To ensure uninterrupted service while the Bureau completed its review, Nagish's conditional IP CTS certification was extended through June 18, 2026./10 Nagish has since filed an annual report demonstrating its continued compliance with the Commission's rules./11
Discussion
Internet-based TRS providers must be certified by the Federal Communication Commission (Commission) to be eligible for TRS Fund support./12 Certification is granted upon a determination that the provider will meet all applicable minimum TRS standards and has adequate procedures and remedies for ensuring compliance with Commission rules./13 After certification, Internet-based TRS providers file annual reports to update the information in their applications and demonstrate continuing compliance with the Commission's mandatory minimum TRS standards./14
Nagish's IP CTS and IP Relay Qualifications. Based on our review of Nagish's application and supplemental filings, we find that Nagish has sufficiently provided the information required by the Commission's Internet-based TRS certification rules, including: (1) a description of the service to be provided;/15 (2) a detailed description of how Nagish will meet all mandatory minimum standards applicable to IP CTS and IP Relay;/16 (3) a description of Nagish's organizational structure, including the names of its 10 percent or more equity interest holders, the names of persons with the power to vote 10 percent or more of the securities of Nagish, and the names of its executives, officers and members of its board;/17 (4) a confidential list, by position, of the number of full-time and part-time employees involved in Nagish's IP CTS and IP Relay operations;/18 (5) a confidential list of all sponsorship arrangements relating to the provision of Internet-based TRS;/19 (6) a description of measures taken to ensure that the provider does not and will not request or collect payment from the TRS Fund for service to consumers who do not satisfy the registration and certification requirements;/20 (7) a description of Nagish's complaint procedures;/21 (8) a statement that Nagish will file annual compliance reports demonstrating continued compliance with the rules;/22 and (9) certification by Nagish's CEO confirming the accuracy and completeness of the information contained in the application./23
Based on our review of the application, amendments, and annual reports,/24 we find that Nagish has sufficiently established that it will provide IP CTS and IP Relay in compliance with the applicable mandatory minimum TRS standards and has adequate procedures to ensure compliance and remedy noncompliance with the minimum standards and the certification requirements of section 64.606. Therefore, we certify Nagish as eligible to receive compensation from the Fund for the provision of IP CTS and IP Relay./25 This certification shall remain in effect for a period of five years./26
Preventing Misuse. We emphasize that Nagish must continue to operate in compliance with all applicable Commission rules and orders. The Commission may investigate compliance and take enforcement action, including suspension or revocation of this certification./27 This may include unannounced on-site visits to Nagish's headquarters, offices, and other facilities for the purpose of ensuring continued compliance with the certification requirements and the Commission's rules./28
Certification Renewal. When applying for renewal of its certification, Nagish must file documentation with the Commission at least 90 days prior to the expiration of its full certification, March 11, 2031./29
Conclusion
Accordingly, we find that the public interest and the objectives of section 225 are served by authorizing Nagish to provide IP CTS and IP Relay supported by the TRS Fund. For these reasons, the Bureau grants Nagish certification to provide IP CTS and IP Relay for a period not to exceed five years from the date of this Public Notice. This Public Notice shall be effective immediately upon release.
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Original text plus footnotes here: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-566A1.pdf
