U.S. Congress
U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate
News releases, reports, statements and associated documents from all members of the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate as well as the House and Senate leadership and House and Senate committees.
Featured Stories
Wyden, Merkley, Blumenauer: Feds To Invest $715,000 Toward Proposed Move Of Mt. Hood Summit Rest Area
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Sen. Jeff Merkley, D-Oregon, issued the following news release on Jan. 30, 2023:U.S. Sens. Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley and U.S. Rep. Earl Blumenauer today announced the proposed relocation of the Mt. Hood Summit Rest Area on Highway 26 east of Government Camp has secured $715,000 in federal funds to study the move.
The resources from the Federal Lands Access Program (FLAP) follows a Oct. 7, 2021 letter that Wyden, Merkley and Blumenauer wrote to U.S. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg seeking the funds for more than two dozen organizations working closely with the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Sen. Jeff Merkley, D-Oregon, issued the following news release on Jan. 30, 2023: U.S. Sens. Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley and U.S. Rep. Earl Blumenauer today announced the proposed relocation of the Mt. Hood Summit Rest Area on Highway 26 east of Government Camp has secured $715,000 in federal funds to study the move. The resources from the Federal Lands Access Program (FLAP) follows a Oct. 7, 2021 letter that Wyden, Merkley and Blumenauer wrote to U.S. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg seeking the funds for more than two dozen organizations working closely with theU.S. Forest Service, the state of Oregon and Oregon Solutions.
The lawmakers' letter noted that the current rest area dates back to the 1950s, and that increased traffic volumes decades later make the site unsafe for recreationists, travelers, and commercial truck traffic.
"This federal investment takes a significant step on the road toward making this heavily used stop for motorists on U.S. 26 a safer spot," Wyden said. "An essential part of quality infrastructure is safety, and I'll continue teaming up with Oregonians working hard to reach the ultimate goal of ensuring this rest stop is as safe as possible."
"Mt. Hood attracts millions of visitors every year, making the safety and accessibility of the Highway 26/Highway 35 corridor crucial," said Senator Merkley. "These federal dollars will support the great work being done by local partners to find transportation and transit solutions around the mountain."
"For years, the people who live, work, and play on Mt Hood have identified this rest stop area as a safety concern. Millions of people visit Mt. Hood each year, and I'm pleased that the federal government is being a constructive partner to help evaluate safer alternatives," said Congressman Blumenauer.
"The FLAP funds are a big deal for the many partners and interests that have come together in support of making this change," said Doug Decker, Oregon Solutions Project Manager. "The grant will enable all of us to roll up our sleeves now and prepare a solution that addresses the overlapping needs that are just not met by the 1950s-era rest area. Figuring this out can be a keystone for so many positive changes for the community, the environment, and highway safety."
A web version of this release is here (https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-merkley-blumenauer-feds-to-invest-715000-toward-proposed-move-of-mt-hood-summit-rest-area) https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-merkley-blumenauer-feds-to-invest-715000-toward-proposed-move-of-mt-hood-summit-rest-area.
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Original text here: https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-merkley-blumenauer-feds-to-invest-715000-toward-proposed-move-of-mt-hood-summit-rest-area
Sen. Crapo: Weekly Column - Leveraging The Skills Of Idaho's Military Servicemember
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Sen. Mike Crapo, R-Idaho, issued the following column on Jan. 30, 2023:* * *
Leveraging The Skills Of Idaho's Military Servicemember
Supporting Idaho servicemen and women during their transition from military service back to civilian life is a meaningful way to help launch these dedicated men and women into the next phase of their lives to Idaho's great benefit. I have been a longtime advocate for more seamlessly connecting military servicemembers with Idaho employers. The recently enacted Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) takes a big step ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Sen. Mike Crapo, R-Idaho, issued the following column on Jan. 30, 2023: * * * Leveraging The Skills Of Idaho's Military Servicemember Supporting Idaho servicemen and women during their transition from military service back to civilian life is a meaningful way to help launch these dedicated men and women into the next phase of their lives to Idaho's great benefit. I have been a longtime advocate for more seamlessly connecting military servicemembers with Idaho employers. The recently enacted Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) takes a big stepin achieving this goal by permanently authorizing the SkillBridge program, which offers servicemembers in their initial stages of separation from the military the opportunity to gain experience in a career field of their interest. In Idaho, where the issue of workforce retention and recruitment has been a topic for years, SkillBridge also gives employers an opportunity to recruit from a gifted and committed pool of our citizenry.
SkillBridge connects servicemembers with industry partners through real-world job experience during their last 180 days of service. As described on the SkillBridge website (skillbridge.osd.mil), "SkillBridge matches civilian opportunities to your job training and work experience at the end of your military duty." And the SkillBridge program enables employers to "tap into the expertise" of former servicemembers.
The SkillBridge program has grown exponentially over the last three years. In 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) had approximately 150 SkillBridge partner employers, and that number grew to more than 2,500 in 2022. Mountain Home Air Force Base has accelerated use of SkillBridge, especially as opportunities for local use of the program increase.
Major Matthew Martinez, a Weapons System Officer on the F-15Es at Mountain Home Air Force Base, recently wrapped up a more than 20-year military career and set up the SkillBridge program with Silverhawk Aviation Academy that he been utilizing to help ease the transition into the civilian workforce. Maj. Martinez wrote, "SkillBridge allows servicemembers to train and work with civilian companies to learn new skills/trades while still receiving all their normal military benefits. For myself, the peace of mind this has provided is invaluable. I can focus on learning a new job without worrying about how the bills are going to get paid at the end of each month. Moreover, at the end of the program, I have a job already set up that I can seamlessly transition into while continuing to earn income. As for Silverhawk Aviation Academy (or any SkillBridge business for that matter), they get access to a new source of highly trained, reliable veteran employees. I strongly encourage any military member who is thinking about leaving, and who isn't quite sure what they're going to do when they get out, to look into companies that have SkillBridge programs set up."
In addition to permanent authorization for the DOD SkillBridge program, the FY 2023 NDAA:
Provides troops with a needed pay raise;
Ensures the Idaho Air National Guard maintains its flying mission while allowing the Air Force to divest a certain number of A-10s;
Aids the development of digital night vision technology, in which Idaho industry plays a key role;
Repeals the DOD vaccine mandate on active military personnel; and
Includes funds for the Range Craft Berthing Facility at the Navy's Acoustic Research Detachment in Bayview and $379 million for the Idaho National Laboratory.
Working with fellow U.S. Senator for Idaho Jim Risch and others to successfully enact these and other provisions that support servicemembers and their families was a needed part of fulfilling Congress's constitutional duty to "provide for the common defense." Idaho is made even greater by the more than 116,000 veterans, the 4,063 active-duty servicemembers and the 8,367 National Guard and Reserve members who live here. Permanency of the SkillBridge program can make it easier for them to live and thrive here in Idaho. I look forward to the future growth of this partnership program for the benefit of Idaho servicemembers, military families, employers and Idaho's economy.
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Original text here: https://www.crapo.senate.gov/news/in-the-news/weekly-column-leveraging-the-skills-of-idahos-military-servicemember
Sen. Cantwell: 16 WA Communities Will Get DOT Funding To Help Reverse The Increase In Traffic Fatalities
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Washington, issued the following news release:U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Chair of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, announced that 16 Washington communities will receive federal grants to help reverse the statewide increase in traffic fatalities. The Department of Transportation has awarded a total of $9,198,763 to communities in the State of Washington through the Safe Streets for All program.
"There were 745 fatalities on roads in the State of Washington in 2022, the most in more than 30 years," said Senator ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Sen. Maria Cantwell, D-Washington, issued the following news release: U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Chair of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, announced that 16 Washington communities will receive federal grants to help reverse the statewide increase in traffic fatalities. The Department of Transportation has awarded a total of $9,198,763 to communities in the State of Washington through the Safe Streets for All program. "There were 745 fatalities on roads in the State of Washington in 2022, the most in more than 30 years," said SenatorCantwell. "We must reverse this alarming trend. I created the Safe Streets for All Grant program which will provide 16 Washington cities and counties with this timely federal funding to improve transportation safety planning and build infrastructure that will save lives."
Sen. Cantwell steered authorization of the Safe Streets for All program through the Commerce Committee, and ensured that the program was among the transportation investments included in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. The program helps local governments carry out Vision Zero plans and other improvements to reduce crashes and fatalities.
Grants were awarded to the following 16 communities to fund the creation of comprehensive safety action plans:
1. City of Ellensburg - $160,000
2. City of Lacey - $68,000
3. City of Montesano - $200,000
4. City of Toppenish - $80,000
5. Grant County - $280,000
6. King County - $800,000
7. Kittitas County - $429,504
8. Thurston County - $264,000
9. Walla Walla County - $201,696
10. Whatcom Council of Governments - $200,000
11. Cowlitz-Wahkiakum Council of Governments - $200,000
12. Island Regional Planning Organization - $403,200
13. Northeast Washington Regional Transportation Planning Organization - $352,000
14. Puget Sound Regional Council - $4,860,363
15. Spokane Regional Transportation Council - $400,000
16. Southwest Washington Regional Transportation Council - $300,000
Thanks to Sen. Cantwell's leadership, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law will deliver an estimated $7.6 billion in transportation investments to Washington state. In the first year since the law's signing in November 2021, it funded nearly 500 transportation projects in the State of Washington.
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Original text here: https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/press-releases/16-wa-communities-will-get-dot-funding-to-help-reverse-the-increase-in-traffic-fatalities-
Hawley Introduces Bill to Protect Families from Big Pharma, Cap Insulin Prices
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Missouri, issued the following news release:U.S. Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) introduced the Cap Insulin Prices Act, new legislation to reduce the price of insulin and protect families from Big Pharma.
"Insulin was discovered more than a century ago, yet too Americans who rely on it have difficulty paying for it," said Senator Hawley. "The price of insulin is straining household budgets - at a time when inflation is already squeezing families - which can lead to rationing, and even the need for more expensive treatments down the line. Patients and their ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Missouri, issued the following news release: U.S. Senator Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) introduced the Cap Insulin Prices Act, new legislation to reduce the price of insulin and protect families from Big Pharma. "Insulin was discovered more than a century ago, yet too Americans who rely on it have difficulty paying for it," said Senator Hawley. "The price of insulin is straining household budgets - at a time when inflation is already squeezing families - which can lead to rationing, and even the need for more expensive treatments down the line. Patients and theirfamilies deserve better."
More than half a million Missourians live with diabetes, many of whom rely on insulin to manage their chronic disease.
View the bill text here: https://outreach.senate.gov/iqextranet/iqClickTrk.aspx?&cid=SenHawley&crop=14552.8136752.7301999.7849109&report_id=&redirect=https%3a%2f%2fwww.hawley.senate.gov%2fsites%2fdefault%2ffiles%2f2023-01%2fTAM23105.pdf&redir_log=735908357596445
The Cap Insulin Prices Act would:
* Set a $25 out-of-pocket cap for a monthly supply of insulin through private health plans.
* Reduce to $25 the out-of-pocket cap for a monthly supply of insulin through Medicare.
* Prohibit health plans from using prior authorization and step-therapy to steer patients to insulin products that are not best for them.
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Original text here: https://www.hawley.senate.gov/hawley-introduces-bill-protect-families-big-pharma-cap-insulin-prices
Ernst Calls Out Potential Federal Fraudsters for Double Dipping on the Dole While on the Unemployment Roll
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, issued the following news release:Over the last few years, while Iowa business owners and working families faced economic uncertainty, federal employees were fortunate to have the reliability of a government paycheck. Despite this, tens of thousands of federal employees applied for and received financial aid intended for small businesses. In addition, thousands of active federal employees may havefalsely claimed they lost their jobs as a result of the pandemic, in order to be paid twice by taxpayers.
Staff from numerous government agencies, including ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, issued the following news release: Over the last few years, while Iowa business owners and working families faced economic uncertainty, federal employees were fortunate to have the reliability of a government paycheck. Despite this, tens of thousands of federal employees applied for and received financial aid intended for small businesses. In addition, thousands of active federal employees may havefalsely claimed they lost their jobs as a result of the pandemic, in order to be paid twice by taxpayers. Staff from numerous government agencies, includingthe IRS, TSA, FEMA, the U.S. Postal Service, Amtrak, and the Secret Service,have been detected receiving jobless benefits while also being on the federal government's payroll. Some were even paid overtime while claiming to have lost wages due to the pandemic. Others actually applied for jobless benefits from their work computers.
Given all this, today, U.S. Senator Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) - a top Republican on the Senate Small Business Committee - is asking the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PACE), which coordinates the efforts to detect abuse of COVID-19 programs, to identify every federal employee who wrongfully received unemployment payments, recover the money that was ripped off, and grant each of those who took advantage of taxpayers by collecting jobless benefits their wish to be unemployed.
In her letter to PACE, Ernst writes: "It is appalling for anyone fortunate enough to have the reliability of a government paycheck to take advantage of financial assistance intended to provide a lifeline to Americans who lost their jobs or were unable to work as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. These misbehaved bureaucrats have also tarnished the reputation of the other dedicated civil servants, many of whom worked long hours in essential jobs during the pandemic. I look forward to reviewing PACE's findings regarding the number of federal employees who wrongfully received SBA loans when the project is completed and once again encourage you to conduct a similar review to identify how many federal employees applied for and received pandemic unemployment and lost wages assistance for which they were not eligible."
Ernst is also awarding her January 2023 Squeal Award to the fraudsters within the federal workforce who double dipped by being on both the government's dole and the unemployment roll.
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Original text here: https://www.ernst.senate.gov/news/press-releases/ernst-calls-out-potential-federal-fraudsters-for-double-dipping-on-the-dole-while-on-the-unemployment-roll
Congressman Wesley Hunt Condemns Terrorist Attack On Synagogue In Jerusalem
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Rep. Wesley Hunt, R-Texas, issued the following news release on Jan. 30, 2023: Congressman Wesley Hunt strongly condemned the terrorist attack on a synagogue in Jerusalem. "On Holocaust Remembrance Day, a synagogue in Jerusalem was attacked by a Palestinian terrorist. Worshippers celebrating the Jewish Sabbath were butchered. Why?
Because they were Jewish. All leaders must, in the strongest terms, condemn attacks against Israel and the Jewish people. Emily and I are praying for the victims, their families, and for the people of Israel.
"Today, we should be honoring the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- Rep. Wesley Hunt, R-Texas, issued the following news release on Jan. 30, 2023: Congressman Wesley Hunt strongly condemned the terrorist attack on a synagogue in Jerusalem. "On Holocaust Remembrance Day, a synagogue in Jerusalem was attacked by a Palestinian terrorist. Worshippers celebrating the Jewish Sabbath were butchered. Why? Because they were Jewish. All leaders must, in the strongest terms, condemn attacks against Israel and the Jewish people. Emily and I are praying for the victims, their families, and for the people of Israel. "Today, we should be honoring thesacred memory of those who perished at the hands of the Nazis. Instead, we are mourning the dead of another act of terrorism motivated by more hate and antisemitism.
"Enough is enough.
"America stands with Israel," said Hunt.
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Original text here: https://hunt.house.gov/media/press-releases/congressman-wesley-hunt-condemns-terrorist-attack-synagogue-jerusalem
Congressional Research Service: 'United Arab Emirates - Issues for U.S. Policy' (Part 2 of 2)
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. RS21852) on Jan. 30, 2023, entitled "The United Arab Emirates: Issues for U.S. Policy:" (Continued from Part 1 of 2)
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Foreign Policy and Defense Issues
The United States is arguably the UAE's most important security partner (see below). U.S. troops are stationed on Emirati soil (at the invitation of the UAE government); the UAE military procures sophisticated U.S. military equipment; and the security partnership has been, since 1994, delineated by a "Defense Cooperation Agreement" that promotes ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. RS21852) on Jan. 30, 2023, entitled "The United Arab Emirates: Issues for U.S. Policy:" (Continued from Part 1 of 2) * * * Foreign Policy and Defense Issues The United States is arguably the UAE's most important security partner (see below). U.S. troops are stationed on Emirati soil (at the invitation of the UAE government); the UAE military procures sophisticated U.S. military equipment; and the security partnership has been, since 1994, delineated by a "Defense Cooperation Agreement" that promotesU.S.-UAE interoperability (see below).
For the past decade, the UAE government has asserted greater independence from U.S. foreign policy amid the growing influence of other foreign actors (Russia, China, Turkey/(Turkiye, and France) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and as the UAE officials have bemoaned what they describe as U.S. disengagement from the MENA region./43 Though the Biden Administration, like its predecessors, has denied that the United States has reduced its security commitment to the region,/44 one observer has asserted, "The perception of U.S. disengagement with the region has led countries to reconsider alliances and rivalries."/45 The UAE, like other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, has appeared to pursue a foreign policy strategy of hedging against its close U.S. relationship by expanding ties to Russia, China, and other countries./46
According to statements by Anwar Gargash, a senior advisor to the UAE's president, "The UAE has no interest in choosing sides between great powers.... Trade relations increasingly look to the East while our primary security and investment relations (are) in the West."/47 President Biden's summer 2022 visit to the Middle East may have come, in part, to disprove notions about a reduced U.S. commitment to Gulf security. President Biden said at the GCC + 3 Summit Meeting:
'Let me state clearly that the United States is going to remain an active, engaged partner in the Middle East. As the world grows more competitive and the challenges we face more complex, it is only becoming clearer to me that - how closely interwoven America's interests are with the successes of the Middle East. We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran. And we'll seek to build on this moment with active, principled American leadership.'/48
Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Global Oil Prices
Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has affected U.S.-UAE relations. From the outset of the conflict, the UAE has largely resisted "siding" with the United States and European countries while quietly benefitting from some of the war's repercussions - most notably, higher global oil prices and Russian capital transfer from the West to Dubai. Shortly after the invasion, the UAE (which was a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council at the time) abstained from a February 25, 2022, draft U.N. Security Council resolution denouncing Russia's actions. Two days later, it again abstained from a vote to convene the emergency special session of the General Assembly.
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43 Phil Steward, "In Middle East, U.S. General Hears Concerns about American Commitment," Reuters, May 13, 2022.
44 "State Dept: Narrative that US Leaving MENA 'wholly incorrect,'" Al Mayadeen, June 7, 2022.
45 David Siddhartha Patel, "A Changing Middle East: The View from Israel: A Conversation with Chuck Freilich," Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February 9, 2022. See also, David Ignatius, "The unintended consequences of U.S. disengagement in the Middle East," Washington Post, August 14, 2018.
46 Danielle Pletka, "The Qatarization of the Middle East," Foreign Policy, May 4, 2022.
47 "UAE won't take sides in 'great power' standoff: senior official," Agence France Presse, November 14, 2022.
48 White House, Remarks by President Biden at the GCC + 3 Summit Meeting, July 16, 2022.
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According to some observers, the UAE's abstentions were an expression of its displeasure over the U.S. response to drone and missile attacks against it emanating from Iranian-backed groups./49 In March 2022, the UAE voted yes on two U.N. General Assembly resolutions condemning aggression against Ukraine; in October 2022, it voted in favor of a U.N. General Assembly resolution that condemned Russia's "illegal so-called referendums" in regions within Ukraine./50
As a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC--when combined with Russia, and some other oil producing countries, collectively known as OPEC+51), the UAE has come under U.S. and European pressure to increase production quotas in order to stabilize oil prices. Spare crude production capacity in the MENA region and globally is generally concentrated in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. After the October 5, 2022, OPEC+ decision to cut oil production quotas by 2.0 mbd starting in November, the Biden Administration and some lawmakers have called for a reassessment of U.S.-Saudi relations./52 For its part, the UAE appears to be balancing its ongoing commitment to OPEC+ while trying to maintain cordial relations with the United States. As a result, several reports suggest that, before OPEC+ made its final production cut decisions, UAE officials advocated privately for "a one-month delay in line with U.S. requests."/53 Reportedly, MBZ's brother, National Security Advisor Shaykh Tahnoun bin Zayed al Nahyan, visited Saudi Arabia in a September 2022 attempt to dissuade Saudi officials "from pushing an oil-production cut."/54
Although the UAE is balancing its commitment to OPEC+ alongside sensitivity to U.S. policy, the UAE has not enacted economic sanctions against the Russian government or Russian officials; on the contrary, reports suggest that the UAE has benefitted significantly from the flight of Russian capital to Dubai. According to one London consultancy's June 2022 estimate, in 2022, the UAE had the potential to attract a net inflow of 4,000 millionaires, many of whom hail from Russia./55 As a result, U.S. Treasury officials have called on the UAE to maintain its commitment to combating money laundering while maintaining "vigilance and proactive action" in countering Russian sanctions evasion./56
Though Emirati-Russian relations have received much media attention since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the Emirati government is attempting to improve bilateral ties with Ukraine. The UAE has shipped medical supplies and food to Ukraine and provided relief to Ukrainian refugees in Poland and Moldova. Reportedly, trade talks between both countries have resumed, as the UAE imports the second-most amount of its annual wheat imports from Ukraine./57
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49 Barak Ravid, "UAE abstained from UN Security Council vote due to U.S. response to Houthi attacks," Axios, March 2, 2022.
50 See https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3990400?ln=en.
51 The formation of OPEC+ dates back to the "Declaration of Cooperation" in 2016 between OPEC and 11 other oil exporters, including Russia.
52 "Biden vows consequences for Saudi Arabia after OPEC+ decision," Reuters, October 12, 2022.
53 Summer Said, Benoit Faucon, Dion Nissenbaum, and Stephen Kalin, "Saudis Spurned Biden On Call to Delay Oil Cuts," Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2022.
54 Summer Said and Dion Nissenbaum, "U.A.E. Envoy Secretly Urged Saudis Not to Cut Oil Output," Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2022.
55 Ben Bartenstein, "World's Wealthy Flock to UAE as War Spurs Russian Capital Flight," Bloomberg, June 14, 2022.
56 Simeon Kerr and Laura Pitel, "US reminds UAE of vigilance to combat Russian sanctions evasion," Financial Times, June 23, 2022.
57 Simeon Kerr, "UAE and Ukraine open trade talks," Financial Times, December 5, 2022.
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At times, the UAE has acted as an interlocutor between the United States and its rivals. In the case of Russia, the UAE (and Saudi Arabia) claimed to have played a successful role in mediating the release of American citizen and professional basketball player Brittney Griner./58 Upon her release from Russian authorities in a prisoner swap, a private Emirati plane flew Griner from Moscow to Bateen Airport (an executive airport) in Abu Dhabi, where she was taken safely into U.S. protection. Afterward, President Biden thanked "the UAE for helping us facilitate Brittney's return, because that's where she landed."/59
UAE-China Relations
As the UAE invests heavily in various technologies to gradually diversify its economy away from hydrocarbon production, the UAE has expanded commercial ties to the People's Republic of China, a worrisome development for U.S. officials seeking to maintain and expand longstanding U.S.-Emirati defense ties. In August 2022 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf stated that the Biden Administration has "concerns with Chinese inroads in the UAE's tech sector."/60 According to the UAE government, the UAE is China's largest non-oil trading partner in the Middle East and North Africa, with a bilateral trade volume over $50 billion./61 The PRC telecom company Huawei provides domestic network services in the UAE. In October 2022, Omar Sultan al Olama, the UAE's minister of state for artificial intelligence, digital economy and remote work applications, said in an interview that the UAE is open to using PRC-origin technology, noting, "As long as it makes economic sense, we will use it."/62 A month later, National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk stated at a security conference in Bahrain that "there are certain partnerships with China that would create a ceiling to what we can do."/63
In November 2021, the Biden Administration reportedly warned the UAE government that Chinese construction of a possible military facility at Khalifa port, where PRC-based company Cosco operates a commercial container terminal, could damage U.S.-UAE ties; construction was subsequently halted./64 Nevertheless, U.S. concerns about PRC-owned firms' operations at the port appear to have contributed to the 2021 suspension of U.S.-UAE talks on a proposed sale of F-35 aircraft./65 PRC-owned firms' role in operating 5G communications technology in the UAE could allow China to discern sensitive operating information about the F-35 and other U.S.-origin platforms.
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58 WAM News Agency (UAE), "Success of joint Emirati-Saudi mediation regarding release and exchange of prisoners between United States and Russian Federation," December 8, 2022.
59 White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Release of Brittney Griner, December 8, 2022.
60 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, August 4, 2022 61 Ali Obaid Al Dhaheri, Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the People's Republic of China, "Op-Ed: UAE-China Ties a Model of Global Cooperation," Emirates News Agency, February 4, 2021.
62 Nesreen Bakheit, "UAE open to China AI despite U.S. concerns: minister," Nikkei Asia, October 15, 2022.
63 Zainab Fattah, "U.S. Tells Gulf Allies Certain China Ties Would Cap Cooperation," Bloomberg, November 20, 2022. At the same conference, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Colin Kahl, said, "In the Middle East, the PRC has no interest in mutually beneficial coalitions, and Beijing has neither the intent nor the capability to integrate the region's security architecture.... The PRC pursues ties based on its narrow transactional, commercial, and geopolitical interests. Period." See Aaron Mehta, "Kahl to Gulf states: Why work with Russia when it is funding Iran?" Breaking Defense, November 18, 2022.
64 Gordon Lubold and Warren P. Strobel, "China Move in U.A.E. Thwarted--U.S. Rang Alarm about Building of Suspected Military Facility at Port on Mideast Ally's Turf," Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2021.
65 Mohammed Soliman, "The Gulf has a 5G conundrum and Open RAN is the key to its tech sovereignty," Middle East Institute, January 12, 2022.
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Following the suspension of the F-35 talks, UAE officials announced plans to proceed with cooperation with Huawei on telecommunications and other technology projects. The UAE also announced plans to purchase 12 light-attack training aircraft from a PRC-owned defense company, with the option for 36 additional aircraft./66 Additionally, the UAE has reportedly bought armed UAVs from China and has used them for strikes in Libya./67
Congress also has expressed concern regarding UAE-PRC relations and possible implications for U.S. security. Section 704 of P.L. 117-103, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2022, required the Director of National Intelligence to report to Congress within 60 days of enactment on, among other things, the cooperation between China and the UAE regarding "defense, security, technology, and other strategically sensitive matters that implicate the national security interests of the United States."
Iran
U.S. policy toward Iran has been a consistent focus of UAE leaders in relations with their U.S. counterparts. The UAE has pursued a policy of limited engagement with Iran while maintaining its strategic defense cooperation with the United States. The UAE cautiously supported the Biden Administration's efforts to reengage Iran on nuclear talks./68 At the July 2022 GCC + 3 Summit, the UAE signed on to a joint statement that "affirmed their support for ensuring that the Arab Gulf region is free from all weapons of mass destruction, underscoring the centrality of diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon."/69 During President Biden's visit, UAE officials publicly stated that while the Emirates have "serious issues" with Iran, they did not support constructing regional collective security alliances targeting Iran; additionally, the UAE officials announced that they were in the process of appointing and sending an ambassador to Iran./70
The emirate of Dubai has often advocated that the federation emphasize engagement with Iran - a stance that might stem partly from Dubai's significant Iranian-origin community and the extensive Iranian commercial presence there. According to the Financial Times, in 2021, the UAE was the top source for Iran's imports and the fourth largest destination for Iran's non-oil exports./71 The business ties have included some illicit purchases by UAE firms of Iranian oil and jet fuel, exports of proliferation-related technology to Iran, and the use of some UAE financial institutions by Iranian entities. Numerous UAE-based entities have been sanctioned by the United States for these activities./72
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66 Emirates News Agency, "Ministry of Defence intends to buy 12 L15 Chinese aircraft," February 23, 2022.
67 "UAE Allegedly Using Chinese Drones for Deadly Airstrikes in Libya," Defense News, May 2, 2019.
68 U.S. Department of State, U.S. GCC Iran Working Group Statement, Office of the Spokesperson, November 17, 2021.
69 White House, Joint Statement Following the Summit of the Leaders of the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), July 16, 2022.
70 "UAE Working to Send Envoy to Iran, against anti-Iran Axis - Official," Reuters, July 15, 2022.
71 Najmeh Bozorgmehr and Simeon Kerr, "UAE spy chief in Iran to improve ties," Financial Times, December 6, 2021.
72 See CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, updated February 2, 2022.
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Israel and the Abraham Accords
In 2020, the UAE and Israel normalized relations, the first of the "Abraham Accords," negotiated by the UAE, Israel, and the United States. The three countries jointly negotiated the Israel-UAE diplomatic normalization agreement during summer 2020 in the wake of statements by then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that publicly floated the idea of formally annexing parts of the West Bank. According to the UAE Ambassador to the United States, the Accords were "about preventing annexation" and "saving the two-state solution."/73 In support of the first bilateral normalization agreement, the Trump Administration pledged to sell to the UAE the advanced F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and armed drones./74
By early 2021, Israel had reached Abraham Accords agreements to normalize or improve its relations with three other members of the Arab League: Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan./75 The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements and, as with the UAE deal, provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the countries in question./76
Since the signing of the 2020 Israel-UAE diplomatic normalization agreement, Israeli-Emirati trade, military, and diplomatic ties have expanded significantly. In May 2022, Israel and the UAE signed a free trade agreement. The deal, once ratified, would loosen restrictions on bilateral trade and could reportedly boost annual Israel-UAE trade volume from around $1 billion to $10 billion within five years./77 The UAE is now purchasing arms from and engaging in joint arms development projects with Israel, including various air and missile defense systems (see Table 1 for selected examples).
With the formation of Israel's more right-wing government in December 2022, there is a possibility for greater tension in the Israeli-Emirati diplomatic relationship. After the early January 2023 visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif in Jerusalem by Minister of National Security Itamar Ben Gvir, the UAE government issued a press statement that "strongly condemned the storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque courtyard by an Israeli minister under the protection of Israeli forces."/78
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73 Jacob Magid, "UAE ambassador: 'Abraham Accords were about preventing annexation,'" Times of Israel, February 2, 2021.
74 See CRS Report R46580, Israel's Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, October 26, 2020.
75 Steps toward Israel-Sudan normalization appear to be on hold following the Sudanese military's seizure of power in October 2021. See testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, "Sudan's Imperiled Transition: U.S. Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup," Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.
76 These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco's claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan's removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its agreement to recognize Israel. See Max Bearak and Naba Mohieddin, "U.S. Takes Sudan off Terrorism List, Reintegrating it into the Global Economy," Washington Post, December 15, 2020.
77 Patrick Kingsley, "Trade Accord with U.A.E. Would Be Israel's Broadest Yet with an Arab Country," New York Times, June 1, 2022.
78 UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, "UAE condemns storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque courtyard by Israeli Minister," January 3, 2023.
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Table 1. Selected Israeli Defense Deals with the UAE
Source: Jane's Defence.
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Afghanistan/79
The UAE was one of three countries (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the others) that recognized the Taliban during 1996-2001 as the government of Afghanistan. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the UAE allowed the United States to use its military facilities for U.S. operations against targets in Afghanistan, and it deployed a 250-person contingent, supported by six UAE F-16s, in Afghanistan's restive south until 2014./80 The risks of this involvement were evident in January 2017 when five UAE diplomats were killed in an attack on the governor's compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The UAE also donated significant aid to post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Following the August 2021 Taliban takeover, the UAE permitted former Afghan president Ashraf Ghani to live in exile in the Emirates. The UAE also took in Afghan air force pilots who had flown their aircraft to Uzbekistan as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. More broadly, after the Taliban takeover, thousands of Afghan refugees fled to the UAE, where they have been housed in temporary facilities known as the Emirates Humanitarian City.
As many of these refugees have waited months for determinations on their future status, some have protested against their indefinite detention and uncertain resettlement prospects. According to one report, "The United States is prioritizing those who had visas or applications to go the United States but ... the facility includes people who have no clear pathway to be resettled in the United States or a third country."/81 As of December 2022 according to one report, around 2,000 Afghans remain at Emirates Humanitarian City./82
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79 CRS Report R45818, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas.
80 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed 'Little Sparta,'" The Washington Post, November 9, 2014.
81 "Afghan Refugees in UAE Protest Months-Long Wait for Resettlement," Reuters, February 10, 2022.
82 Hayatullah Amanat, "'Kept in a golden cage': Afghan families share their experience of life in refugee camps," CTV News, December 28, 2022.
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The UAE is providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan; in April 2022, the UAE sent 30 metric tons of food and relief supplies. According to Issa Salem Al Dhaheri, the UAE Ambassador to Afghanistan, "During the period from September to December of 2021, the UAE established a relief airlift of 21 aircraft that carried about 500 tonnes of food and medical supplies to meet the essential needs of more than half a million people, most of whom are women and children."/83
The UAE is seeking to maintain influence in Afghanistan, while keeping rival GCC states like Qatar from enhancing their own role there./84 In 2022, the Taliban chose an Emirati company, GAAC Holding, to operate Afghanistan's airports, reportedly over several other bids from Qatari and Turkish competitors. In December 2022, Mullah Yaqoob, the Taliban's acting defense minister, met with MBZ in Abu Dhabi.
UAE Involvement in the Middle East and North Africa
The Emirati-Saudi "Alliance"
The UAE has sought to influence regional affairs using its significant financial resources, as well as the expertise and equipment gained in its security partnership with the United States. Within the GCC, the UAE has been most closely aligned with Saudi Arabia. Many observers attribute close Saudi-Emirati relations to personal ties between MBZ and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, who is nearly 24 years younger than his Emirati counterpart./85 Both leaders have cooperated on various regional endeavors, such as the blockade of Qatar (2017-2021), the ongoing war in Yemen (2015-present), and support to counter Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist-affiliated movements, popular Shia uprisings, and democratic reform efforts in the Middle East and Africa (e.g., in Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, and Sudan). Though the UAE and Saudi Arabia are not always closely aligned on either regional or oil-policy matters, and often appear to compete globally for status on the world's stage, they are similarly threatened by Iran's own regional ambitions and rely heavily on the United States as their primary security partner.
Yemen
In 2014, the northern Yemeni-based Houthi movement launched a military offensive that seized large swaths of northern Yemen, culminating in their capture of the capital Sana'a in September 2014. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab partners, including the UAE, and launched a military offensive aimed at dislodging Houthis from the capital and major cities. In 2022, the Houthis conducted ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks against UAE territory.
After almost eight years of conflict in Yemen, an April 2022 truce appeared to offer the first hope for an end to the fighting. The truce resulted in six months of reduced conflict and the formation of a new Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). However, by late 2022, the truce had expired, the PLC was beset by infighting, Iran had continued its activities in the region, and the Houthis had resumed longer-range strikes against domestic energy facilities in government-held areas.
* * *
83 Emirates News Agency (WAM), "UAE Provides 30 Tonnes of Food, Relief Supplies to Afghanistan," April 19, 2022.
84 "Taliban acting defence minister holds talks with UAE president," Reuters, December 5, 2022.
85 Arwa Ibrahim, "MBS-MBZ: A special bond between two Gulf princes," Al Jazeera, March 17, 2020.
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Though the UAE formally withdrew its main military contingent from Yemen in 2019, it has retained a small military presence while working with allied non-state groups in southern Yemen, notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The STC advocates for an independent southern Yemen and controls the government's interim capital city of Aden. According to the United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, the UAE "retains an outsized political role ... mostly through providing political, financial and military support to the Joint Forces on the West Coast, as well as political support" to the STC./86 In 2021, the panel concluded that the UAE "support to the Southern Transitional Council undermines the Government of Yemen."/87 UAE support to the STC appears to stem at least partly from a UAE interest in countering ties between the former internationally recognized government and the Yemeni Islah party. The UAE views Islah as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which UAE leaders consider to be a significant domestic and transnational threat./88
At times, some U.S. lawmakers have called on the UAE to contribute additional funds to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen./89 According to the Emirati government, from 2015 to 2021, the UAE has provided over $6 billion for various government support and relief efforts./90 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), in 2022, described the UAE as the eighth largest donor to the U.N. humanitarian appeal for Yemen with a commitment of $40 million (as of December 2022)./91 In spring 2022, the U.S. State Department praised the UAE government for a $1 billion pledge to the Central Bank of Yemen based in Aden./92
Syria
In Syria, the GCC states initially supported the 2011 uprising against President Bashar Al Asad, in part to oust a strong ally of Iran. Over the past few years, there has been a concerted Emirati attempt to reconcile with Asad. The UAE reopened its embassy in Damascus in December 2018, claiming that doing so would help counter Iran's influence in Syria./93 In March 2022, the UAE hosted a visit by Asad, his first to an Arab country since the uprising, signaling UAE intent to help reintegrate Asad into the regional fold. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress criticized the UAE decision to host Asad./94
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86 United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, "Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)," U.N. Document S/2022/50, January 26, 2022.
87 See United Nations Panel of Experts on Yemen, "Letter dated 22 January 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council," U.N. Document, S/2021/79, January 25, 2021.
88 "A Moment of Truth for Yemen's Truce," International Crisis Group, September 30, 2022.
89 House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism, Hearing on Yemen's Humanitarian and Political Crises, December 6, 2022.
90 Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the United States, Foreign Aid, at https://www.uae-embassy.org/discoveruae/foreign-policy/foreign-aid.
91 UNOCHA, Financial Tracking Service, Yemen, accessed December 8, 2022.
92 U.S. State Department, Welcoming Saudi Arabia and the UAE's Economic and Humanitarian Support for Yemen, April 7, 2022.
93 "UAE reopens Syria embassy in boost for Assad," Reuters, December 27, 2018.
94 U.S. Department of State, Press Briefing, March 21, 2022. See also Sarakshi Rai, "Top Democrat knocks UAE's welcome for 'brutal murderer Assad,'" The Hill, March 21, 2022.
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During 2014-2015, as a member of the U.S.-led coalition combatting the Islamic State organization, the UAE sent pilots to conduct and even command some coalition air strikes against Islamic State positions in Syria. The UAE also hosted other forces participating in the anti-Islamic State effort, including French jets stationed at Al Dhafra Air Base and 600 forces from Australia./95 None of the GCC states conducted anti-Islamic State air operations in Iraq.
Libya
In Libya, the UAE joined several Gulf states in conducting air strikes to help armed Libyan rebels overthrow Muammar Qadhafi in 2011./96 Since then, the UAE, in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban arms transfers to Libya, reportedly has sent weapons to and conducted air operations in support of eastern Libya-based Khalifa Hafter's Libyan National Army (LNA)./97 Hafter, a former commander in the Libyan armed forces, has sought to undermine the U.N.-backed government based in Tripoli. According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the UAE also may have financially supported the operations of Russian mercenaries, such as those employed by the Wagner Group, in Libya./98
Since the end of the last round of major hostilities in Libya (2019-2020), which witnessed a significant Turkish intervention against the LNA, the UAE has been more conciliatory due to its rapprochement with Turkey./99 In December 2022, the UAE government stated that it will "continue to demand the gradual, balanced, and parallel withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters, and mercenaries" from Libya and called for support to the U.N. Special Representative's efforts "to enable Libya to hold parliamentary and presidential elections, thus ending the transitional period."/100
U.S. Trade, Military Cooperation, and Arms Sales
The UAE is one of the top 30 trading partners of the United States globally and the third-largest by value in the MENA region (after Israel and Saudi Arabia)./101 According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the UAE has been the top U.S. export market in the MENA region for the past 12 years and is a "global hub for over 1,500 American companies."/102
As of 2021, the United States deployed about 3,500 U.S. military personnel at several UAE facilities including Jebel Ali port (between Dubai and Abu Dhabi), Al Dhafra Air Base (near Abu Dhabi), and naval facilities at Fujairah./103 Jebel Ali, which is capable of handling aircraft carriers, and other UAE ports collectively host more U.S. Navy ships for visits than any other port outside the United States./104 U.S. forces in the UAE support U.S. operations in the region, including deterring Iran, countering terrorist groups, and intercepting illicit shipments of weaponry or technology.
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95 "Islamic State Crisis: Australia to Send 600 Troops to UAE," BBC News, September 14, 2014.
96 "Militant Forces Got Arms Meant for Libya Rebels," New York Times, December 6, 2012.
97 United Nations, "Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya Established pursuant to Resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/2021/229, March 21, 2021.
98 U.S. Department of Defense, Lead Inspector General, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation, July 1, 2020 September 30, 2020.
99 Emadeddin Badi, "The UAE is making a precarious shift in its Libya policy. Here's why," MENASource, Atlantic Council, October 27, 2022.
100 Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations, UAE Statement at the UN Security Council on the Situation in Libya, December 16, 2022.
101 U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods with United Arab Emirates, 2021.
102 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Country Commercial Guide, United Arab Emirates.
103 U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Security Cooperation with the United Arab Emirates," Fact Sheet, June 25, 2021.
104 Factbox: U.S. forces in Gulf region and Iraq, Reuters, January 8, 2020.
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According to the U.S. State Department, in 2021, the United States had $29.3 billion in active government-to-government sales cases with the UAE under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Since 2016, the United States had also authorized the permanent export of over $11.3 billion in defense articles to the UAE via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process, primarily launch vehicles, aircraft, munitions, and military electronics./105
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
The United States and the UAE have established a "Defense Cooperation Framework" to develop joint approaches to regional conflicts and to promote U.S.-UAE interoperability. A "Joint Military Dialogue" (JMD) meets periodically. On May 15, 2017, the United States and the UAE confirmed that they had concluded negotiations on a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with a 15-year duration, which came into force as of May 30, 2019./106
The DCA is not a mutual defense treaty. Throughout 2022, particularly after Houthi rocket attacks targeted UAE soil in January, multiple reports suggested that the UAE has advocated for a legally binding mutual defense treaty with the United States./107 On November 14, 2022, Anwar Gargash, senior advisor to the UAE's president, called for a security relationship with the United States that is defined by "clear, codified and unambivalent commitments."/108
The Possible Sale of the F-35/109
On November 10, 2020, the Trump Administration notified Congress of a $23 billion arms sale to the UAE, to include F-35s, drones, and various munitions. As mentioned above, the sale was proposed to support UAE-Israel diplomatic normalization. An effort to block the proposed sale in the Senate failed to garner the required votes (S.J.Res. 77 and S.J.Res. 78). In the last hours of the Trump presidency, the UAE signed a Letter of Acceptance (not a contract) to purchase up to 50 F35s and 18 MQ-9 Reaper drones from the United States./110 The Biden Administration temporarily paused the sale for review upon taking office. Later, a State Department spokesperson told journalists in April 2021 that the Administration plans to proceed with the sale.111 The UAE would become the first Arab country to purchase the F-35 system.
As of December 2022, a contract between the UAE and Lockheed Martin for the F-35 has yet to be reached or approved by the Biden Administration. As previously mentioned, UAE-China ties have stalled progress on completing the sale. On December 3, 2021, during French President Emmanuel Macron's visit to the UAE, the UAE agreed to purchase the F4 version of French aircraft manufacturer Dassault's Rafale fighter class, in one of France's largest ever fighter aircraft export deals ($19 billion). For over a decade, the UAE and France have been negotiating replacements for the UAE's fleet of French Mirage fighters.
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105 Op.cit., Fact Sheet.
106 Department of Defense, "SecDef Meets with UAE's Crown Prince," May 15, 2017; "UAE-US defence agreement kicks in as John Bolton visits Abu Dhabi," The National, May 30, 2019.
107 See Sylvia Westall and Ben Bartenstein, "Gulf Oil Powers Seek U.S. Security Treaty After Yemen Strikes, Bloomberg, March 30, 2022.
108 See "UAE official calls for 'unambivalent' US security commitment," Reuters, November 14, 2022.
109 For more detail on the F-35 sale to the UAE, see CRS Report R46580, Israel's Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
110 Mike Stone, "UAE Signs Deal with U.S. to Buy 50 F-35 Jets and up to 18 Drones: Sources," Reuters, January 20, 2021.
111 U.S. Department of State, "Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability," Remarks to the Press, January 27, 2021; "Joe Biden Is Proceeding with Donald Trump's Biggest Arms Deal," Huffington Post, April 13, 2021.
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Money Laundering and U.S. Concern
How the UAE addresses money laundering and terrorism financing attracts U.S. attention. The UAE Central Bank's Financial Intelligence Unit is credited in State Department terrorism reports with providing training programs to UAE financial institutions on money laundering and terrorism financing, and making mandatory the registration of informal financial transmittal networks (hawalas). During 2018 and 2019, the Emirati government enacted and issued implementing regulations for updated anti-money laundering laws./112 However, in April 2020, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) found that the United Arab Emirates was not doing enough to prevent money laundering, despite recent progress, and risked being including in the body's watch list of countries found to have "strategic deficiencies" in Antiterrorism Financing and Money Laundering (AMF/CFT) - the so-called "gray list."/113 In March 2022, the FATF formally placed the UAE on the gray list, subjecting the country to increased monitoring of its efforts to correct the deficiencies the FATF identified./114
Since 2012, there has been an FBI Legal Attache office at the U.S. consulate in Dubai to assist with joint efforts against terrorism and terrorism financing. Some financial networks based in the UAE have been sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for facilitating transactions for Iran and pro-Iranian regional factions in furtherance of Iran's "malign activities" in the region.
Outlook and Considerations for Congress
If global economic activity remains robust and contributes to elevated global oil prices during 2023, the UAE may continue to experience strong economic growth, which would enable it to keep investing both in non-oil sectors at home and in accumulating assets abroad. The degree to which the UAE may leverage its "soft power" in ways that are beneficial to U.S. interests remains to be seen.
The UAE is to host COP28 in November 2023 and may use its status as host nation to promote the expansion of climate adaptation aid to the developing world. The UAE and the United States are to implement their Partnership for Accelerating Clean Energy (PACE) program. The UAE may also accelerate investment in domestic renewables to meet its 2050 target of carbon neutrality. At the same time, with Russia's continued invasion of Ukraine straining global natural gas supplies, the UAE also may increase investment to expand its liquefied natural gas export capacity. Furthermore, some speculate that the UAE may leave OPEC in order to increase daily production capacity immediately, which would help improve U.S. ties./115
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112 Fact sheet provided by UAE embassy representatives, October 31, 2018; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019, June 24, 2020.
113 "UAE at risk of landing on watchlist over money laundering," Al Jazeera, April 30, 2020.
114 "UAE is placed on money laundering watchdog's 'gray list,'" CNBC, March 5, 2022.
115 UAE will look to a world beyond OPEC," Reuters, December 19, 2022.
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Geopolitically, the UAE appears likely to continue to pursue an independent and assertive foreign policy and seeks to strengthen its diplomatic, economic, security, and cultural ties to a diverse set of partner countries. In 2022, public and private Emirati entities invested globally, with particular focus on Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Mediterranean, and East Africa. Trade with China, the Emirates' largest trading partner, is expected to grow, posing a continued challenge for U.S. policymakers seeking to expand U.S.-UAE defense ties. Nevertheless, many analysts anticipate the fundamentals of the U.S.-UAE relationship to remain unchanged. According to one account, "The United States continues to consider the UAE a strong and capable - though perhaps somewhat less reliable - partner in an unstable region. For its part, the UAE continues to need its U.S. partner and the security umbrella it provides, even as the UAE seeks to diversify its relationships."/116
For Congress, Members may continue to balance U.S. strategic support to a partner vulnerable to Iranian regional meddling against some concern for UAE ties to China, UAE-based illicit financial transactions, and the UAE's human rights record. As the war in Yemen continues, some lawmakers continue to press for more accountability regarding the UAE's use of U.S. supplied-military equipment in Yemen. A 2022 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report noted that "despite several reports that airstrikes and other attacks by Saudi Arabia and UAE have caused extensive civilian harm in Yemen, DOD [Department of Defense] has not reported and State [Department of State] could not provide evidence that it investigated any incidents of potential unauthorized use of equipment transferred to Saudi Arabia or UAE."/117
UAE participation in the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords has received broad bipartisan support, and Members may seek ways of further advancing trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Emirati partnerships. For example, Section 1658 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for FY2023 mandates U.S. cooperation with allies and partners in the Middle East with respect to developing a strategy for implementing an integrated air and missile defense architecture to protect against attacks from Iran and groups linked to Iran.
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116 Dina Esfandiary, "The Ukraine Strain in the U.S.-UAE Partnership," Lawfare Blog, June 5, 2022.
117 Government Accountability Office, Yemen: State and DOD Need Better Information on Civilian Impacts of U.S. Military Support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, GAO-22-105988, June 15, 2022.
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The report is posted at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21852
[Category: CRSCRS]