Congress
U.S. Congress
Here's a look at documents from all members of the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate
Featured Stories
Rep. Salinas's Statement on Border Patrol Arrest and Unconstitutional Treatment of Wildfire Fighter and Constituent
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 -- Rep. Andrea Salinas, D-Oregon, issued the following news release:* * *
Rep. Salinas's Statement on Border Patrol Arrest and Unconstitutional Treatment of Wildfire Fighter and Constituent
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Tualatin, OR - Today, Congresswomen Andrea Salinas (OR-06) released the following statement regarding Border Patrol officials arresting one of her constituents--a wildfire fighter dispatched to Washington State--and denying him his Constitutional rights.
"On Wednesday, U.S. Border Patrol arrested (link is external) two firefighters who were working to combat the ongoing blaze in ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 -- Rep. Andrea Salinas, D-Oregon, issued the following news release: * * * Rep. Salinas's Statement on Border Patrol Arrest and Unconstitutional Treatment of Wildfire Fighter and Constituent * Tualatin, OR - Today, Congresswomen Andrea Salinas (OR-06) released the following statement regarding Border Patrol officials arresting one of her constituents--a wildfire fighter dispatched to Washington State--and denying him his Constitutional rights. "On Wednesday, U.S. Border Patrol arrested (link is external) two firefighters who were working to combat the ongoing blaze inWashington's Olympic Peninsula. At least one of those firefighters is a constituent from Keizer, OR. During his detention, my constituent was denied his constitutional right to an attorney and a phone call.
"I'm appalled that the Trump Administration is arresting firefighters to meet their arbitrary deportation quotas. These firefighters risk their lives to keep us safe, and this is how Trump treats them. It's sick and twisted. This does not make us safer or stronger. Border Patrol should not be prowling our national forests to arrest firefighters.
"While I cannot provide the name of the firefighter, I can share additional details about his background and his unconstitutional detention. My constituent was brought to the United States when he was a young child and has lived here his entire life. The United States is the only home he knows. For the past three years, he has bravely served as a wildland firefighter, putting his life on the line to protect our communities.
"Additionally, seven years ago, my constituent and his family were victims of a federal crime. As a result of cooperating with federal officials during their investigation, my constituent and his family became eligible for a "U visa." (link is external) Their application has been pending with USCIS for the past seven years and if granted would provide them legal status and a pathway to citizenship.
"On August 27, my constituent was working to combat the Bear Gulch Wildfire when CBP stopped his crew and arrested him. Over the next nearly 48 hours, the whereabouts of my constituent were unknown. He was not entered into the ICE detainee locator.
"I have since learned that my constituent was taken to the CBP facility in Bellingham Washington. His legal team called the CBP Bellingham station. The CBP attendant refused to confirm his detention location or grant them access. When they called again, the CBP attendant confirmed that he was being transferred to ICE custody but would not grant his attorney access.
"On Friday, my constituent was moved to the Northwest ICE Processing Center in Tacoma, WA, where he was finally granted access to a phone call and called his attorneys, which is how we were able to learn his story.
"As of now, he is still not in the ICE detainee locator.
"I have also been in touch with my constituent's lawyers. I'm deeply concerned that CBP has been concealing his whereabouts and has denied him due process. I'm working with my Congressional colleagues to hold the Trump Administration accountable and demand that they immediately provide details about the arrest and failure to honor my constituent's rights.
"Immigrants deserve to be treated with dignity. Communities deserve safety from wildfires, and first responders deserve protections from federal immigration officials while they are putting their lives on the line to protect our Pacific Northwest communities."
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Original text here: https://salinas.house.gov/media/press-releases/rep-salinass-statement-border-patrol-arrest-and-unconstitutional-treatment
Points of Order, Rulings & Appeals in the Senate Topic of CRS Report
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. 98-306) on Aug. 29, 2025, entitled "Points of Order, Rulings and Appeals in the Senate" by Congress and legislative process Valerie Heitshusen:* * *
The Senate's presiding officer typically does not have responsibility for proactively ensuring that Senate consideration of matters complies with the rules. Instead, Senators may enforce the Senate's legislative rules and precedents by raising points of order whenever they believe that one of those rules or precedents is, or is about to be, violated. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. 98-306) on Aug. 29, 2025, entitled "Points of Order, Rulings and Appeals in the Senate" by Congress and legislative process Valerie Heitshusen: * * * The Senate's presiding officer typically does not have responsibility for proactively ensuring that Senate consideration of matters complies with the rules. Instead, Senators may enforce the Senate's legislative rules and precedents by raising points of order whenever they believe that one of those rules or precedents is, or is about to be, violated.Under some circumstances, a ruling by the presiding officer determines whether or not the point of order is well taken. Under others, the Senate itself decides the point of order, usually by majority vote./1
Senate Rule XX states in part that "[a] question of order may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, except when the Senate is voting or ascertaining the presence of a quorum, and, unless submitted to the Senate, shall be decided by the Presiding Officer without debate, subject to an appeal to the Senate."
Points of Order
Under most circumstances, a Senator may make a point of order against a question (whether it be a bill, amendment, motion, or something else) at any time that the question is pending before the Senate.2 The primary exception arises when the Senate is debating a question - usually an amendment or motion - under a unanimous consent agreement that limits the time for debating it.
Under this circumstance, no point of order can be made until all time for debating the question has expired or has been yielded back./3
Although Senate rules preclude debate on points of order on which the presiding officer rules, pursuant to precedent, the presiding officer retains discretion to entertain discussion./4
Rulings
In most situations, the presiding officer rules on points of order./5
Under two circumstances, however, the Senate decides the point of order. First, the presiding officer may, in rare instances, decline to rule and, instead, submit the point of order directly for the Senate to decide. The presiding officer is most likely to do so when the procedural question has not arisen before and there is no Senate rule or precedent on which to base a ruling./6
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1 In some circumstances, reaching a vote on the point of order or appeal may require a supermajority of the Senate to agree to end debate on the question. The fact that most appeals and submitted points of order are subject to extended debate in the Senate is central to recent discussions about potential changes in Senate rules and practices. For more information, see CRS Report R42929, Procedures for Considering Changes in Senate Rules, and CRS Report R43331, Majority Cloture for Nominations: Implications and the "Nuclear" Proceedings of November 21, 2013, by Valerie Heitshusen.
2 A Senator cannot raise a point of order unless he or she has the floor. See Floyd M. Riddick and Alan S. Frumin, Riddick's Senate Procedure, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., S. Doc. 101-28 (GPO, 1992) (hereinafter Riddick's), p. 993.
3 Riddick's, pp. 1356-1359.
4 Riddick's, p. 989.
5 Assuming no action has been taken on the amendment on which a point of order has been raised, the presiding officer may, by precedent, allow modification to the amendment prior to ruling on the point of order. See Riddick's, pp. 65, 988.
6 Recent examples of submitted points of order include one on December 12, 2018, and two on May 21, 2025. In each case, the point of order was submitted to the Senate for its decision after the presiding officer noted that the Senate had not "previously considered" the question raised by the point of order. See Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 164 (December 12, 2018), p. S7683; and Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 171 (May 21, 2025), pp. S3048 and S3051.
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Second, only the Senate, not its presiding officer, is empowered to decide certain points of order. Under Rule XVI, for example, the question of whether a legislative amendment to an appropriations bill is germane is usually submitted to the Senate to decide (in the form of a "defense of germaneness")./7
Also, by precedent, if a Senator makes the point of order that the question pending before the Senate is unconstitutional, then the Senate must decide that question./8
When the presiding officer submits a point of order (but not a defense of germaneness) to the whole Senate to decide, it is typically debatable under the regular rules of the Senate./9
A submitted point of order is, however, subject to a nondebatable motion to table (or kill) the matter; agreeing to the motion to table disposes of the point of order permanently and adversely./10
Finally, note that a submitted point of order is not subject to debate when the Senate is operating post-cloture, pursuant to Rule XXII.
Appeals
In most cases, rulings made by the presiding officer in response to points of order are subject to appeal./11
When the presiding officer rules on a question of order, any Senator who disagrees with the ruling may challenge it. That Senator rises and states, "Mr. President, I appeal from the decision of the Chair." Such an appeal is typically debatable, though the Senate may end the debate and dispose of the appeal by agreeing to a motion to table (or kill) it, which would uphold the ruling of the chair. Absent a successful motion to table, debate on the appeal is usually subject to extended consideration under the regular rules of the Senate.12 When the Senate is operating under cloture, however, appeals are to be decided without debate, pursuant to Rule XXII (paragraph 2)./13
In addition, debate on an appeal may also be limited in certain situations when provisions of a unanimous consent agreement limit consideration of the underlying matter, and debate of appeals made during consideration of certain budgetary measures is limited by caps on consideration of the measure (pursuant to provisions of the Budget Act)./14
If the Senate is operating under procedural circumstances that limit debate on the appeal, or has taken action (e.g., via unanimous consent or a cloture process) that limits such debate, after any debate, the Senate votes on whether "the decision of the Chair will stand as the judgment of the Senate." Senators who support the ruling vote "aye"; those who oppose it vote "no." Appeals are
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7 On such a question of germaneness to an appropriations bill, the presiding officer does not submit the point of order itself to the Senate but rather a "defense of germaneness" response to a point of order, which is not subject to debate. Agreeing to the defense of germaneness requires only a simple majority vote. Only if the defense of germaneness fails (or is tabled) does the presiding officer rule on the point of order (Riddick's, pp. 162-163). Since 1979, the presiding officer typically submits the question to the Senate for decision only if the amendment meets a minimum threshold test. See Riddick's, pp. 167-168, for additional information.
8 CRS Report R40948, Constitutional Points of Order in the Senate, by Valerie Heitshusen, provides more information on Senate rules and practices relevant to constitutional points of order as well as analysis of Senate disposition in recent cases. For a recent example, see Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 170 (April 17, 2024), p. S2803.
9 Riddick's, pp. 716, 736. Only a majority vote is required to sustain a submitted point of order, but in this circumstance, ending debate on the point of order (so that a vote may occur) may require a three-fifths vote to invoke cloture. See CRS Report RL30360, Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate, for discussion of the operation of the cloture provisions of Rule XXII.
10 Riddick's, pp. 52-54, 989.
11 By precedent, decisions of the presiding officer concerning recognition of Senators are not subject to appeal. See Riddick's, p. 147.
12 Riddick's, p. 725. Under this circumstance, while a majority vote is required to overturn the ruling of the chair, ending debate on the appeal may require a three-fifths vote to invoke cloture, pursuant to Rule XXII.
13 The appeal may also be decided without debate in certain circumstances when made in connection with a nondebatable question. See Riddick's, p. 725, 726. Also see CRS Report R43331, Majority Cloture for Nominations: Implications and the "Nuclear" Proceedings of November 21, 2013, by Valerie Heitshusen.
14 Riddick's, pp.1356-1359, and the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344, 2 U.S.C. Sec.Sec.601-661). For recent examples, see Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 171 (June 30, 2025), pp. S4040S4041.
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usually decided by simple majority vote. A three-fifths vote of the entire Senate - 60 if no more than one vacancy - is needed to overturn rulings by the presiding officer on most budget process points of order./15
In addition, certain points of order against the content of a conference report can also be waived by a three-fifths vote of the Senate./16
Precedents
Rulings by the presiding officer invariably reflect the advice that the Senate Parliamentarian gives based on an examination of how presiding officers decided similar questions in the past./17
The presiding officer follows these precedents, and in similar fashion, new rulings become precedents on which presiding officers will rely in the future.
By the same token, when the presiding officer submits a point of order for the Senate to decide, or when the Senate decides a point of order by overruling the decision of the chair on appeal, that decision of the Senate also becomes a guiding precedent. In both 2013 and 2017, for example, the Senate overturned a ruling of the chair in regard to the required vote threshold for cloture on certain nominations./18
Twice in 2019, the Senate overturned the ruling of the chair in regard to the post-cloture limitation on consideration for certain nominations./19
Nevertheless, although it is not unusual for Senators to appeal the rulings of the chair, the Senate infrequently overturns the rulings of its presiding officer./20
To routinely do so would undermine the continuity of Senate rules and the consistency of rule interpretation essential to legislative work.
The most authoritative precedents are those established by vote of the Senate itself. Rulings of the chair on which the Senate does not vote are of somewhat less probative value. Still weaker as precedents are statements and opinions by presiding officers in reply to parliamentary inquiries. A parliamentary inquiry is a question posed by a Senator to the chair about the Senate's procedures or the current procedural situation. The presiding officer's reply is not a ruling, so it is not subject to appeal. In addition, successful motions to waive a Budget Act point of order do not establish precedents. A successful motion to table would likewise not establish a precedent, because the Senate would not have voted directly on the question or appeal. It could, however, have precedential value if it allowed a ruling of the chair to stand.
For additional information, see Riddick's Senate Procedure (GPO, 1992), especially pages 145149 ("Appeals") and 987-996 ("Points of Order")./21 In using Riddick's, care should be exercised in distinguishing between references supported by footnotes using the phrase see or see also and those that do not use such terms. Footnotes with see or see also refer to statements by the chair in response to parliamentary inquiries. Footnotes without such terms refer to rulings of the chair or decisions of the Senate by vote in response to points of order.
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15 Certain budget process points of order can be waived by a three-fifths vote of the Senate. The three-fifths threshold for overturning rulings of the chair corresponds to the cases for which a three-fifths vote is required for a waiver. For more information on budget points of order and the vote threshold necessary for a waiver, see CRS Report R47413, Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process, by James V. Saturno and Megan S. Lynch.
16 See Senate Rule XXVIII and Senate Rule XLIV, paragraph 8. See also CRS Report CRS Report RS22733, Senate Rules Restricting the Content of Conference Reports, by Elizabeth Rybicki.
17 In addition, rulings on certain budget points of order require examination of estimates supplied by the Senate Budget Committee, which monitors the compliance of measures with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended (Titles I-IX of P.L. 93-344; 2 U.S.C. Sec.Sec.601-688). For an example, see Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 171 (June 30, 2025), pp. S4040-S4041.
18 See CRS Report R43331, Majority Cloture for Nominations: Implications and the "Nuclear" Proceedings of November 21, 2013, and CRS Report R44819, Senate Proceedings Establishing Majority Cloture for Supreme Court Nominations: In Brief, both by Valerie Heitshusen.
19 See CRS Report RL31980, Senate Consideration of Presidential Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure, by Elizabeth Rybicki, for a brief description of these proceedings. Also see Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 165 (April 3, 2019), pp. S2220, S2225-S2226.
20 See CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Senate Decisions Reversing a Ruling of the Presiding Officer, 1965-July 11, 2025, by Elizabeth Rybicki and Valerie Heitshusen (available to congressional clients on request from the authors).
21 Senate staff may also consult the Electronic Senate Precedents, an unofficial catalog of additional precedents (many established since the publication of Riddick's) compiled by the Office of the Parliamentarian.
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The report is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RS/PDF/98-306/98-306.18.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
High Court Rejects Private Challenges to Medicaid Provider Requirements Topic of White Paper From CRS
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following Legal Sidebar white paper (No. LSB11351) on Aug. 25, 2025, by legislative attorneys Wen W. Shen and Jennifer A. Staman:* * *
High Court Rejects Private Challenges to Medicaid Provider Requirements
In June 2025, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, holding that private litigants cannot sue under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (Section 1983) to challenge a state's decision to exclude health care providers that offer certain abortion services from participation in a state's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following Legal Sidebar white paper (No. LSB11351) on Aug. 25, 2025, by legislative attorneys Wen W. Shen and Jennifer A. Staman: * * * High Court Rejects Private Challenges to Medicaid Provider Requirements In June 2025, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, holding that private litigants cannot sue under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (Section 1983) to challenge a state's decision to exclude health care providers that offer certain abortion services from participation in a state'sMedicaid program. In Medina, the Supreme Court held that Section 1983, a federal statute that allows a person to sue state government actors based on a deprivation of constitutional or federal rights, cannot be used to enforce violations of Medicaid's so-called "any-qualified-provider" provision, as the Medicaid provision does not confer a privately enforceable "right." This Legal Sidebar provides background on the Medicaid program and Section 1983, discusses the Court's decision in Medina, and concludes with selected legal considerations for Congress.
Background
Medicaid
The Medicaid program is a joint federal-state program that provides medical assistance for a diverse group of low-income individuals. To participate in Medicaid and receive federal funding, a state must have a plan for medical assistance approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), and, in general, this plan must comply with a wide array of federal standards. Among these standards, states must cover specified groups of individuals and provide particular types of health benefits to these individuals. If a state fails to meet these requirements, the federal government may withhold the state's federal Medicaid funds.
Relevant to the Medina litigation, the Medicaid statute generally restricts states' ability to exclude certain providers from program participation. More specifically, under the so-called "any-qualified-provider" requirement (sometimes referred to as the "freedom of choice" provision), state plans must allow Medicaid beneficiaries to obtain medical assistance "from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required." As the Supreme Court previously described, this provision gives Medicaid beneficiaries "the right to choose among a range of qualified providers, without government interference." While the Medicaid statute imposes various requirements on providers participating in state Medicaid programs, the statute does not specifically define the term "qualified."
In recent years, some states have sought to exclude health care providers that perform elective abortions from receiving Medicaid reimbursement for any covered items or services on the basis that these providers are not qualified Medicaid providers. Federal appropriations restrictions generally limit the use of federal Medicaid funds to pay for abortions directly, subject to limited exceptions. However, in an effort to prevent any indirect support of abortion services, these state measures generally have aimed to prohibit all program funding for health care providers that perform abortions that are not covered by Medicaid, even where the providers offer other covered services. In response, Medicaid beneficiaries have challenged these provider restrictions in court.
Section 1983 Actions
Although there are administrative appeals processes for program enrollees and Medicaid-participating providers within the Medicaid program, the Medicaid statute does not expressly allow private parties to sue state officials based on alleged noncompliance with program requirements, and beneficiaries and other private parties desiring to challenge state implementation of Medicaid requirements have sought to use Section 1983 to bring their claims. Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Section 1983 generally permits individuals to seek damages against state actors who deprive them of "rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws." While the Supreme Court has recognized that noncompliance with a federal statute may be enforceable under Section 1983, not all violations of federal statutes create liability under the Section. The Court has explained that, because Section 1983 "speaks in terms of 'rights, privileges, or immunities" and not violations of federal law, private suits are available only if a state actor violated a "federal right." Additionally, should a court determine that such a federal right exists, this right will be unenforceable if a defendant demonstrates that Congress did not intend for the statute at issue to be enforceable under this section. In particular, the Court has recognized these broad limits on the availability of Section 1983 for statutes enacted based on Congress's spending power, in which the federal government provides federal funds to states or private entities that agree to meet specified conditions. A key reason for such limits, the Court has explained in multiple decisions, is that the "typical remedy" crafted by Congress for violations of spending conditions is the withholding of federal funds, not private lawsuits.
The Supreme Court has addressed the circumstances in which federal spending legislation gives individuals the right to sue under Section 1983 in several instances, and the way in which the Court has examined this issue has evolved over time. To illustrate, in the 1990 case Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, the Court held that health care providers seeking to challenge Virginia's setting of Medicaid reimbursement rates (as inappropriately low, in violation of the federal Boren Amendment that was repealed in 1997) had a right to sue under Section 1983. As the Court explained, the health care providers had this right to sue because, among other things, they were the "intended beneficiaries" of the federal provision. Further, the Court viewed this provision, which was "cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms," to impose "a binding obligation on States participating in the Medicaid program to adopt reasonable and adequate rates." Seven years later, in Blessing v. Freestone, the Court declined to find an enforceable right under Section 1983 related to the provision of child support services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. In Blessing, the Court articulated a three-prong test for determining the existence of a right: (1) Congress intended the statutory provision to benefit the plaintiff; (2) the asserted right is not so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial competence; and (3) the provision couched the asserted right in mandatory rather than precatory terms.
Following Blessing, the Court decided Gonzaga University v. Doe, a case particularly relevant to the Medina decision. In Gonzaga, the Court concluded that Section 1983 can be invoked to enforce a federal statutory right only when that right has been "unambiguously conferred" by Congress. Gonzaga involved a provision of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), which generally denies federal funds to educational institutions with policies or procedures that allow student records to be released to unauthorized parties. The Court held that the FERPA provision did not confer an enforceable right under Section 1983. In its decision, the Court clarified the first prong of the Blessing test, holding that to support a cause of action under the Section, plaintiffs must demonstrate that Congress clearly intended to create a federal right and that "vaguer 'benefits' or 'interests'" do not trigger the ability to bring a private lawsuit under the statute. Further, the Court explained, the FERPA provisions had no "rights-creating language" and instead focused on the program in the "aggregate" rather than the needs of particular individuals.
Additionally, in a 2023 decision, Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, the Court examined provisions of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA), an act that contains several requirements for Medicaid-participating nursing facilities. The act's requirements include those "relating to residents' rights," which encompass "[t]he right to be free from ... any physical or chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience," and certain "[t]ransfer and discharge rights," which provide that a nursing home "must permit each resident to remain in the facility and must not transfer or discharge the resident from the facility" except in specified circumstances. In Talevski, the Court reaffirmed that spending-clause statutes may be enforced in "atypical cases" under Section 1983. Relying on Gonzaga and other cases, the Court also held that, based on the relevant text of FNHRA, Congress had unambiguously conferred Section 1983-enforceable federal rights. As the Court described, the provisions "'use clear 'rights-creating language,' speak 'in terms of the persons benefited,' and have an 'unmistakable focus on the benefited class'" and were thus presumptively enforceable. The Court further held that nothing in FNHRA overcame this presumption, as the Court found nothing in the act's enforcement scheme that precluded these private lawsuits.
The Medina Case
The Medina lawsuit stems from a 2018 executive order issued by the Governor of South Carolina instructing the state's Health and Human Services Department to deem "abortion clinics ... enrolled in the Medicaid program" as unqualified to provide Medicaid-covered services and to terminate their Medicaid enrollment agreements. In response, Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, a health care provider offering a range of medical services, including abortion services, and a Medicaid beneficiary sued the State of South Carolina under Section 1983, seeking to block enforcement of the executive order as applied to Planned Parenthood.
The district court sided with the plaintiffs and found that the Medicaid any-qualified-provider requirement creates a private right of action enforceable through Section 1983. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision. South Carolina then appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated the Fourth Circuit's decision in light of Talevski and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the Fourth Circuit again found that the plaintiffs could sue under Section 1983. South Carolina again petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and the Court agreed to hear the case. At the time the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in Medina, there was a circuit split on whether private individuals may bring Section 1983 actions to enforce Medicaid's any-qualified-provider requirements. Most of the U.S. Courts of Appeals (referenced here only by jurisdiction and "Circuit") that considered the question (including the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits) held that such a private right of action was available under Section 1983, while the Eighth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's judgment, holding that the Medicaid any-qualified-provider requirement did not convey individual rights enforceable under Section 1983. In an opinion by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court first addressed the appropriate test for determining whether a statutory provision gives private persons the right to sue under Section 1983. The Court clarified that Gonzaga establishes the proper method for making this determination (also reflected in post-Gonzaga cases, such as Talevski). In doing so, the Court rejected any reliance on pre-Gonzaga caselaw (including Wilder and Blessing) to the extent they suggest that "spending-power legislation can give rise to an enforceable right under Sec. 1983 so long as the legislation is 'intended to benefit the putative plaintiff' and the plaintiff's interest in the statute is not 'too vague and amorphous.'" According to the Court, to confer a right to sue under Section 1983, the relevant law must "clearly and unambiguously use[] rights-creating terms" and "display an unmistakable focus on individuals like the plaintiff" (citations and quotations omitted). The Court further explained that, even if the Gonzaga test is met, Section 1983 actions may not be available if Congress provided "a more specific remedy."
In describing the rationale behind the rigorous analysis, particularly for spending legislation, the Court traced the history of Congress's use of its spending power, recounting the rise of federal funding to states during the New Deal. When disputes about grant conditions first arose during that period, the Court observed that it relied on contract and treaty analogies to guide its analysis. Applying those same principles--which are grounded in voluntary and knowing agreement between contracting parties--to the Section 1983 context, the Court reiterated that the availability of a Section 1983 enforcement suit depends on whether the relevant spending-power legislation provides "'unmistakable' notice" that "suffices to alert grantees that they might be subject to private suits ... whenever they fail to comply with a federal funding condition" (internal quotations omitted). While the Court acknowledged that it had "admittedly ... briefly experimented with a different approach" that "took a broad view of its authority to confer new rights"--as reflected in cases like Wilder and Blessing--the Court advised that lower courts now "should resist the impulse" to rely on those cases and must now find an unambiguously conferred individual right before permitting a Section 1983 claim to proceed.
The Court then addressed the any-qualified-provider requirement and concluded that the provision lacked the necessary, clear language to confer on private individuals an enforceable right under Section 1983. Describing Talevski as "supply[ing] the only reliable yardstick against which to measure whether spending-power legislation confers a privately enforceable right," the Court distinguished the Medicaid requirement from the FNHRA provision at issue in that case. In the Court's view, the any-qualified-provider provision "looks nothing" like the FHNRA provisions outlining individual residents' rights, because the any-qualified-provider provision speaks to what states must do for Medicaid participation. Additionally, the Court pointed to the fact that the any-qualified-provider provision is in the middle of a section of the Medicaid statute that lays out a wide array of requirements that states must meet in order to secure program reimbursement. The Court observed that the FNHRA provisions at issue in Talevski, in contrast, were set apart by Congress from other provisions, "help[ing] to alert grantees that accepting federal funds comes with a duty to answer private suits."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas expressed support for the case's outcome but a desire for the Court to revisit its Section 1983 jurisprudence, including its application to spending clause statutes. Additionally, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. The dissent agreed that "the unambiguous-conferral test" is "the touchstone" for the inquiry but concluded that the any-qualified-provider requirement "easily satisfies" that test. The dissent highlighted, for instance, that the provision that refers to "an individual eligible for medical assistance" is phrased in terms of the persons benefited. Additionally, the original session law title "Free Choice by Individuals Eligible for Medical Assistance" reflected language the dissent viewed as "classically associated with establishing rights." The dissent also indicated the provision's use of mandatory terms (i.e., "must") "reinforced [Congress's] rights-creating intent." In the dissent's view, the majority's approach, which looks to FNHRA as "the only reliable yardstick," turns the analysis from whether Congress has "manifested an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights" to whether Congress has "manifest[ed] an unambiguous intent to imitate FHNRA." This approach, the dissent asserted, "distorts the unambiguous-conferral test beyond recognition" and "warps [the Court's] reasoning in Talevski," which did not "single out FNHRA as the sole or definitive model for conferring individual rights."
Considerations for Congress
In Medina, the Court clarified the applicability of Section 1983 in the context of the Medicaid any-qualified-provider requirement. By holding that Medicaid beneficiaries do not have a private right of action under Section 1983 to enforce this requirement, the decision, as a practical matter, leaves the enforcement of this provision primarily in the hands of the HHS Secretary. Should the Secretary determine that a state is out of "substantial" compliance with this requirement, the agency could take steps to withhold state funding, and states have the ability to appeal such determinations.
Since Medina, Congress passed the P.L. 119-21, the FY2025 Reconciliation Law, which contains a provision relevant to the scope of qualified Medicaid providers. In particular, Section 71113 of the law imposes a one-year funding restriction prohibiting Medicaid payments to certain providers and their affiliates that furnish elective abortion services and meet other specified criteria. Planned Parenthood, another provider, and a group of more than 20 states have filed separate suits challenging the constitutionality of this federal funding restriction. As of the date of publication of this Sidebar, a Massachusetts district court has granted Planned Parenthood's motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the government from enforcing Section 71113's restrictions against Planned Parenthood and its members.
With respect to the Court's Section 1983 jurisprudence, Medina clarified the applicable standard for determining when legislation confers an individually enforceable right under Section 1983 in at least two ways. First, the decision expressly rejects reliance on some of the Court's pre-Gonzaga cases that directed courts to consider more broadly a statute's intended beneficiaries in deciding whether Congress intended to confer an individual right. In Medina, the Court explained that the focus should be on whether the law in question "clearly and unambiguously uses rights-creating terms" (alterations removed) - a standard the Court emphasized as setting a "demanding bar."
Second, the Court indicated that, in analyzing whether that "demanding bar" is met, the FNHRA provisions at issue in Talevski may serve as the "yardstick," particularly in the spending-power context. This characterization potentially signals that, when evaluating whether spending-power legislation provides an individually enforceable right, future courts may focus on the legislation's similarity to the FHNRA provisions - including whether the law in question, like the FHNRA provisions, expressly refers to specific individual "rights" and whether the statutory context in which such "rights" are placed provides notice to funding recipients of potential private suits. This potential focus by courts on the FHNRA provisions may have implications for Congress. Even if Congress intended certain existing spending-power program requirements to be enforceable under Section 1983 by individual program beneficiaries, going forward, courts may be unlikely to interpret spending-power program requirements as conferring such rights unless the provisions are comparable to the FHNRA provisions. To the extent Congress determines it appropriate to clarify the existence of such rights, it may amend the relevant provisions and consider the FHNRA provisions as a model. More broadly, Medina suggests that whenever Congress is considering spending-power legislation and intends for private suits to be available as an additional mechanism of enforcement for certain program requirements, it may seek to employ language that is at least as specific as the FNHRA provisions.
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The white paper is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11351/LSB11351.1.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
Financial Data Transparency Act - Implementation Status of Data Standards & Related Data Collection Issues Topic of White Paper From CRS
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF13093) on Aug. 25, 2025.The white paper is written by government organization and management analyst Natalie R. Ortiz, financial economics specialist Darryl E. Getter and research assistant Graham C. Tufts:
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Financial Data Transparency Act: Implementation Status of Data Standards and Related Data Collection Issues
The Financial Data Transparency Act (FDTA, P.L. 117-263 Sec.5801 [136 Stat. 3421]), enacted in 2022, requires agencies that oversee the activities of financial ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF13093) on Aug. 25, 2025. The white paper is written by government organization and management analyst Natalie R. Ortiz, financial economics specialist Darryl E. Getter and research assistant Graham C. Tufts: * * * Financial Data Transparency Act: Implementation Status of Data Standards and Related Data Collection Issues The Financial Data Transparency Act (FDTA, P.L. 117-263 Sec.5801 [136 Stat. 3421]), enacted in 2022, requires agencies that oversee the activities of financialinstitutions to adopt data standards to govern the collection of information from such financial institutions. The FDTA defines data standard as "a standard that specifies rules or formats by which data is described and recorded" (12 U.S.C. Sec.5334(a)(3)).
Proponents of such data standards argue that they can improve the electronic collection of data, particularly from multiple data providers that use different information technologies. For example, in a 2024 letter urging financial regulatory agencies to adopt the data standards required by the FDTA, several Members of Congress stated that implementation
'will alleviate regulatory reporting burdens and will improve the accessibility, uniformity, and usefulness of federal financial data for the public... It will also improve the collection and dissemination of federal financial data. This will spur innovation and facilitate the responsible use of technology to fully utilize the publicly available data [covered] agencies publish.'
This In Focus informs Congress on the progress of the FDTA's implementation to date. It identifies the covered federal financial agencies implementing the data standards and summarizes the standards they have proposed, including an identifier for financial entities. The In Focus also discusses a certain data standard for some financial data reporting that is already underway. The distinction between data formats and definitions, which is also discussed, is important to consider. Many data collections must be tailored to specific policy mandates, possibly limiting the extent to which data standards can be jointly implemented.
Implementation of Data Standards
The FDTA builds upon requirements in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) for data collection, analysis, and standardization. Specifically, the FDTA amends Title I of the act, the Financial Stability Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. Sec.Sec.5311-5374) and directs most agency heads comprising the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to jointly issue a final rule that establishes joint data standards for two types of data collections: (1) collections by each agency from their regulated entities and (2) collections on behalf of FSOC (12 U.S.C. Sec.5334(b)).
Covered Federal Financial Regulators
FSOC was established to monitor and identify risks to national financial stability. FSOC members include the Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve System, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), National Credit Union Administration, Federal Housing Finance Agency, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Although the FDTA refers to these agencies as covered agencies, it does not specify the CFTC as a covered agency for its purposes. However, FDTA permits the Treasury Department to designate any other primary financial regulatory agency a covered agency (12 U.S.C. Sec.5334(a)(1)(I)), which it did of CFTC.
The covered agencies must adopt joint data standards, resulting in each agency using and applying the same rules and formats to the applicable data it collects from the entities it regulates. The promulgation of joint data standards, therefore, is to seek interoperability, enabling financial regulatory data to be jointly used by FSOC's member agencies (12 U.S.C. Sec.5334(c)(2)(B)). These joint data standards are to take effect not more than two years after promulgation of the final rule. On August 22, 2024, the covered agencies published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) of the joint data standards. As of August 2025, a final rule has not been published.
Legal Entity Identifier
At a minimum, the FDTA requires the joint data standards to include a nonproprietary legal entity identifier (LEI), which uniquely identifies legal entities that participate in financial transactions. In the wake of the financial crisis, regulators and financial firms were unable to quickly identify market participants that were exposed to above-normal financial risks. An LEI is intended to alleviate some of the challenges with that identification. The covered agencies propose that all legal financial entities with reporting requirements use the LEI developed by the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation.
eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL)
Prior to enactment of the FDTA, some of the covered agencies were using a specific data standard known as XBRL for certain data reported by their regulated entities. When electronically reporting data to an agency that uses XBRL, an entity assigns a predefined label, or identifier tag, to each reported data element. Tags enable machine-readability, meaning that computers can process and understand the data without a person needing to intervene. (The FDTA's definition of machine-readable is given at 44 U.S.C. Sec.3502(18)). Adopting a data standard, such as XBRL, can reduce an agency's data processing costs and increase the usability of reported data, as the SEC noted in a December 2024 report to Congress.
In 2005, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (an interagency group of federal financial regulators) required banks to submit quarterly Reports of Condition and Income (known as call reports) using the XBRL standard. In 2009, the SEC adopted a rule requiring corporations to file and submit required forms electronically using XBRL via its Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. In 2022, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, which oversees the municipal bond markets and its participants, launched an innovation sandbox that allowed financial reporting in XBRL. Although the covered agencies do not explicitly propose the sole and specific use of XBRL, the NPRM says XBRL could satisfy certain properties of the data standards specified in the FDTA.
Issues Standardizing Financial Data
The covered agencies presently interpret the FDTA's requirements for data standards to cover only regulated entities' reporting requirements. The FDTA states that the data standards should - to the extent practicable - use schemas with accompanying taxonomy or ontology models. Schemas are used to delineate relationships either between data elements or between datasets, resulting in a structure, organization, and format that can be used when electronically sending and receiving data for reporting purposes. A taxonomy (or ontology under certain circumstances) is generally used as a categorization system that creates and controls the relationships among data based on its semantic meaning. For example, financial assets can be classified in numerous ways, such as by product type (e.g., mortgage loan, commercial loan, bond, derivative), type of issuer, or type of risks (e.g., prepayment, default, liquidity).
The FDTA states that the adoption of standardized schemas and taxonomies should be, "to the extent practicable," giving regulators discretion to determine the practicability of features mentioned in statute. In the NPRM, the covered agencies note that not all FSOC agencies currently use schemas or taxonomies for reporting and that such standards may be inappropriate in some cases. Thus, the financial regulators are not proposing to adopt standardized taxonomies and schemas.
Reporting compliance is frequently linked to certain statutory requirements. For example, regulated entities engage in different types of financial activities that may be covered by specific policy mandates and require specific data reporting requirements. Because even similar financial entities, such as lending institutions, differ in size and lending strategies, reporting requirements are tailored to these differences. Furthermore, some reporting must follow calculation guidelines specified by different accounting definitions or by regulators that enforce different policy mandates. Additionally, while some data may have conceptual similarities (e.g., call reports for banks compared to those for credit unions), actual differences in the data may be important to preserve under separate policy and reporting regimes.
Independent of the FDTA's implementation, regulators may establish comparability among certain terms (i.e., variables) that have been defined (using different legislative authorities) to satisfy multiple statutory purposes when possible. For example, banking regulators and the CFPB harmonized the definitions of small business and small farm for reporting compliance with Section 1071 of Dodd-Frank under the Community Reinvestment Act (P.L. 95-128). The alignment of standardized data semantics to satisfy multiple regulatory purposes prior to being electronically reported can reduce reporting burdens and facilitate data interoperability.
Although the FDTA does not confer to the covered agencies any new authority to collect new data, regulated entities have raised cost concerns associated with adopting data standards. In 2023, the SEC noted that small filers typically paid between $1,500 and $5,000 annually for third-party compliance services, which may include software costs, while larger filers typically pay between $5,000 and $30,000 annually. Although the adoption of data standards (as noted by the SEC in December 2024) reduces the aggregation, processing, and reporting costs for regulators, regulated entities still incur costs. Some entities (e.g., credit unions) question the need to adopt data standards if their data will still be used predominantly by their primary regulators rather than other regulators. Furthermore, some regulated entities are also concerned about incurring future costs to respond to new requirements, such as having to adopt new variable definitions, if the financial regulators plan to adopt specific taxonomies or schemas under the FDTA in the future.
The SEC notes that compliance costs can sometimes be measured in terms of burden because the underlying data collections (i.e., forms) are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). The PRA requires federal agencies to minimize the time and resources it takes for the public to provide data to the government. By definition, burden includes the acquisition and use of technology needed to provide data to an agency (44 U.S.C. Sec.3502(2)(B)). Thus, under the PRA, the federal financial regulators must remain mindful of the compliance costs even when adopting data standards for information collections.
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The white paper is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13093/IF13093.1.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management Topic of White Paper From CRS
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF12768) on Aug. 25, 2025, by natural resources policy analyst Anthony R. Marshak.Here are excerpts:
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Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management
Ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM; Figure 1) is a systems-level management approach for living marine resources (LMRs) that accounts for an ecosystem's physical, biological, economic, and social components. This approach to fisheries management aims to maintain ecosystems and their dependent fisheries in healthy, productive, and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF12768) on Aug. 25, 2025, by natural resources policy analyst Anthony R. Marshak. Here are excerpts: * * * Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management Ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM; Figure 1) is a systems-level management approach for living marine resources (LMRs) that accounts for an ecosystem's physical, biological, economic, and social components. This approach to fisheries management aims to maintain ecosystems and their dependent fisheries in healthy, productive, andresilient conditions to ensure they can provide services to human and biological communities. EBFM provides various benefits to complement traditional single-species (or single-stock) fisheries management, according to some experts. For example, EBFM may provide additional information regarding how ecosystems function and how ecosystems may respond to multiple stressors and their cumulative impacts. EBFM also may provide insight into trade-offs among different stakeholder priorities for LMRs and their fisheries. This information can inform fisheries management decisions. Experts also have identified challenges regarding EBFM and its implementation (e.g., potential lack of resonation with stakeholders). Congress continues to be interested in LMR management that includes considerations for marine ecosystems. Congress has authorized the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to manage U.S. LMRs under multiple mandates, such as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA; 16 U.S.C. Sec.Sec.1807-1891d) and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (16 U.S.C. Sec.Sec.1361-1423h). In these laws, Congress has included directives for LMR management to account for species' roles in marine ecosystems.
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Figure 1. Various Levels of Ecosystem Management
Source: CRS, modified from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).
Notes: Illustration of the various hierarchical levels of ecosystem management, particularly focused on the fisheries sector. From bottom to top, it depicts management of fisheries and other sectors in a marine ecosystem, building from (1) single species fisheries management of a particular stock in a fishery management plan (FMP) to (2) an ecosystem approach to fisheries management accounting for environmental effects (i.e., climate, habitat, ecology) on an individual stock (also in an FMP), to (3) ecosystem-based fisheries management, accounting for multispecies interactions and environmental drivers (in a fishery ecosystem plan; FEP), and to (4) ecosystem-based management of the fisheries sector, together with all other ocean-use sectors, as captured in a regional ocean plan.
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NMFS assesses and manages more than 500 regulated fishery stocks and stock complexes, over 100 marine mammal species, and approximately 100 threatened and endangered species, some of which are marine mammals. Over the past decade, NMFS and partners (e.g., Regional Fishery Management Councils [FMCs]) have worked toward implementing EBFM in consideration of these simultaneous mandates and multiple species, including through the incorporation of ecosystem considerations into management actions and assessments.
NMFS Policy, Road Map, and Implementation Plans
With the goal of addressing its LMR mandates in a broader ecosystem context, NMFS produced an EBFM policy and implementation "road map" in 2016; both underwent updates in 2024. The NMFS policy defines EBFM and includes six EBFM guidelines for the agency:
* Implement ecosystem-level planning (e.g., support development of fishery ecosystem plans (FEPs) by FMCs; incorporate EBFM goals and objectives into the agency's research and its operational and strategic planning);
* Advance scientific understanding of ecosystem processes;
* Prioritize vulnerabilities and risks to ecosystems (e.g., through climate vulnerability assessments)
* Explore and address trade-offs within an ecosystem (e.g., through the use of management strategy evaluations that provide ecosystem-level analyses to inform management decisions);
* Implement ecosystem considerations into management;
* Support ecosystem resilience via monitoring and adjusting of management actions.
NMFS's EBFM policy aligns with other ecosystem-guided efforts by NOAA and NMFS collectively intended to improve and modernize fisheries management and assessments, such as NOAA's Integrated Ecosystem Assessment Program and its associated regional ecosystem status reports (ESRs), the NMFS Climate Science Strategy and associated regional action plans, among other NMFS plans and strategies.
In 2019, NMFS released nine EBFM implementation plans (i.e., seven regional plans, one NMFS headquarters plan, and one plan for Atlantic highly migratory species management) in accordance with its EBFM road map. Each plan includes specific milestones over a five-year period for implementing EBFM in a given location, including information on current ecosystem approaches, and planned EBFM practices and engagement strategies for that location. For example, the Alaska EBFM implementation plan includes information on coordinated EBFM actions by NMFS and the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC), such as continuing ESRs for Alaskan regions to inform NPFMC actions; the recent development of a Climate Action Module in the Bering Sea FEP; and joint efforts to advance the understanding of Alaskan ecosystems through the Alaska Climate Integrated Modeling project. According to NMFS scientists, progress on implementing NMFS's EBFM "road map" has varied among its regions.
Selected Efforts by NMFS and Partners
With support from NMFS, some FMCs have developed, or are in the process of finalizing, FEPs for their respective geographic areas of authority (Table 1). According to NMFS, FEPs provide a comprehensive description and understanding of the ecosystems in which fisheries are managed; direct how that information should be used in the context of fishery management plans; and set policies that guide fishery management.
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Table 1. Fishery Ecosystem Plans (FEPs) Produced or in Development by Regional Fishery Management Councils (FMCs)
Sources: NOAA, NMFS, "Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management Implementation Plans--Fishery Ecosystem Plans"; Sennai Habtes, Ecosystem Based Technical Advisory Panel Report, CFMC, Presentation at the 184th General Meeting, April 23, 2024, p. 5; and NEFMC, "Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management Committee."
Notes: CFMC = Caribbean FMC; GFMC = Gulf FMC; NEFMC = New England FMC; NPFMC = North Pacific FMC; PFMC = Pacific FMC; SAFMC = South Atlantic FMC; TBD = to be determined; WPFMC = Western Pacific Regional FMC. Several FEPs have been amended since their initial release dates. The GFMC produced a draft FEP in March 2022. The Mid-Atlantic FMC uses an Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management Guidance Document (i.e., not an FEP per se). Pelagic Fisheries refers to fisheries for species in the western Pacific region that live in the water column (i.e., do not live on the sea bottom).
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NMFS and partners have included ecosystem considerations in some fishery management actions and LMR assessments. For example, NMFS and the NPFMC implement a 2 million metric ton annual limit for all groundfish in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area. This limit has been in effect for decades to achieve sustainable catch levels and is intended to preserve ecosystem function. As another example, to facilitate EBFM in the U.S. Caribbean, NMFS and the Caribbean FMC implemented three island-based FMPs in 2019 to replace fishery-specific FMPs. In another example, NMFS and partners are working to develop Ecosystem-Level Reference Points (ELRPs) that account for ecosystem benchmarks and thresholds and that can help with setting aggregate harvest limits in consideration of an entire ecosystem (e.g., ratio of total catch to total fisheries biomass). Further, some experts have found that NMFS has incorporated ecosystem considerations (e.g., habitat, predation) into approximately 25% of its fishery stock assessments as part of its progress toward EBFM.
Considerations for Congress
Over the past three decades, Congress has taken certain actions related to EBFM and fisheries ecosystem research. Actions included directing the Secretary of Commerce, in the Sustainable Fisheries Act (P.L. 104-297), to establish the Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel. The panel provided recommendations to Congress about FEP contents, some of which FMCs implemented. Also, MSA amendments in 2007 authorized the Secretary to support regional pilot projects to implement the panel's recommendations into FEPs and to examine ways to integrate ecosystem considerations into regional fishery management. Congress may evaluate related actions, such as the advantages and disadvantages of specifying EBFM as a type of management approach for FMCs and NMFS in MSA. Congress also may continue to evaluate the level of funding and resources to support EBFM approaches, including for ecosystem modeling, surveys, assessments, and regional operational capacity. Congress also could consider the pros and cons of directing NMFS and FMCs to enhance system-level considerations in management, such as through efforts that address elements of the ecosystem (e.g., forage fish, non-target catch, habitat, oceanic factors) jointly, including with potential applications to developing ELRPs. Some of these considerations and approaches are proposed in H.R. 3718 in the 119th Congress. (Similar appeared in H.R. 8788 and H.R. 8862 in the 118th Congress, and in H.R. 59 and H.R. 4690 in the 117th Congress.) Congress also may assess how elements of Executive Order 14276, "Restoring American Seafood Competitiveness," may align with regulating fisheries via EBFM approaches.
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The white paper is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12768/IF12768.5.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
DOD Replicator Initiative - Background & Issues for Congress Topic of White Paper From CRS
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF12611) on Aug. 25, 2025, by Kelley M. Sayler, advanced technology and global security specialist:* * *
DOD Replicator Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
Replicator, unveiled on August 28, 2023, is a Department of Defense (DOD) initiative, led by DOD's Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), to field thousands of uncrewed systems by August 2025. Replicator's first line of effort ("Replicator 1") is to field all-domain, attritable autonomous (ADA2) systems. Attritable ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF12611) on Aug. 25, 2025, by Kelley M. Sayler, advanced technology and global security specialist: * * * DOD Replicator Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress Introduction Replicator, unveiled on August 28, 2023, is a Department of Defense (DOD) initiative, led by DOD's Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), to field thousands of uncrewed systems by August 2025. Replicator's first line of effort ("Replicator 1") is to field all-domain, attritable autonomous (ADA2) systems. Attritablesystems are comparatively low-cost systems with which DOD tolerates a greater degree of risk of system loss. In a September 27, 2024, memo, then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced that Replicator's second line of effort ("Replicator 2") is to focus on countering small uncrewed aerial systems (C-sUAS). A key issue facing Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify DOD's funding requests for Replicator, and whether Congress has adequate information about Replicator to assess its merits and conduct effective oversight of the initiative.
Background
DOD officials state that the Replicator initiative draws from lessons learned in the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict, in which Ukraine has leveraged large numbers (estimated by observers to be as many as 10,000 per month) of low-cost attritable systems to counter the Russian military's advantage in force strength. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks has stated that Replicator is intended to "help [the United States] overcome [the Chinese military's] advantage in mass: more ships, more missiles, more forces."
DOD officials describe Replicator 1 as an all-domain initiative that could include autonomous aerial, ground, surface, sub-surface, and/or space systems representing a range of capabilities and mission sets. For example, former Deputy Secretary Hicks stated that Replicator could include "distributed pods of self-propelled ADA2 [sensor] systems" to provide near-real time intelligence, "fleets of ground-based ADA2 systems delivering novel logistics support ... or securing DOD infrastructure," or space-based ADA2 systems to provide resilient communications.
Intent
Replicator 1 is to deploy uncrewed systems en masse, allowing the U.S. military to disperse combat power over a large number of relatively inexpensive systems. Replicator 1 is intended to
* avoid concentrating U.S. combat power into a smaller number of individually more expensive platforms (i.e., help avoid putting too many eggs into one basket);
* make it harder for an adversary to target and neutralize U.S. capabilities; and
* create an unfavorable cost-exchange ratio for the adversary, meaning a situation in which the adversary would need to use a countermeasure, such as an interceptor missile, that has a much higher cost than the Replicator system against which it is directed.
Some observers have stated that, depending on the capabilities of Replicator systems, the Replicator initiative could lead to the development of new military concepts of operation, such as swarming. Swarming is a form of cooperative behavior in a group of uncrewed systems, in which the uncrewed systems autonomously coordinate with one another to accomplish a mission. Swarming would likely require further advancements in artificial intelligence and/or networked communications to be deployed.
DOD officials state that, in contrast to large and individually expensive systems such as aircraft carriers, Replicator systems are intended to be built and deployed more quickly, and to be used for significantly shorter periods of time before being replaced by successor designs. (They emphasize, however, that Replicator is intended to supplement - not replace - more exquisite systems.) These officials state that Replicator is thus intended to improve DOD's processes for rapidly scaling, fielding, and innovating new capabilities. They note that Replicator is also intended to accelerate the development of the U.S. drone industrial base.
Specific Replicator Capabilities and Systems
DOD has released only limited information about specific Replicator capabilities or systems due to what DOD states are operational security concerns. Former Deputy Secretary Hicks has stated that DOD intends to reveal details about the Replicator initiative, including information about specific capabilities and systems, "at a time and place and manner of our choosing." To date, DOD officials have confirmed the selection of AeroVironment's Switchblade 600 loitering munition, Anduril's Altius-600 and Ghost-X UAS, and Performance Drone Works' C-100 UAS, as well as unspecified "uncrewed surface vehicles, uncrewed aerial systems, and counter-uncrewed aerial systems of various sizes and payloads." Anduril's Dive-LD uncrewed undersea vehicle is reportedly also among those selected. In addition, DOD has selected seven companies to provide software support for Replicator's autonomy and command and control.
Status
DOD has reportedly completed the second tranche of selections for Replicator 1 (i.e., Replicator 1.2). These two tranches, one official stated, are likely to focus on software to enable system collaboration "to create lethal effects and respond to a very dynamic environment against different threats and ... different adversary platforms." In addition, DOD reportedly selected finalists for Replicator 2 in July 2025.
Although Replicator was intended to field thousands of uncrewed systems by summer 2025, one former defense official noted that DOD had fielded only hundreds by that time.
Issues for Congress
Potential issues for Congress regarding the Replicator initiative include but are not necessarily limited to the following.
Adequacy of Information Available to Congress
One key issue is whether Congress has adequate information about Replicator to assess its merits and conduct effective oversight of the initiative. Some Members of Congress have stated that it has been difficult for them to obtain information about Replicator, and have asked DOD to brief them with further details about Replicator capabilities, systems, and concepts of operation. DOD is reportedly in the process of providing such briefings.
Lack of information on Replicator, either in the classified or unclassified realms, has the potential to raise doubts about whether DOD has adequately analyzed the initiative in terms of capabilities and costs. Congress has the option, as part of its action on annual DOD budget requests, to legislate reporting requirements for the Replicator initiative or direct the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review and evaluate DOD's Replicator activities.
Cost and Sources of Funding
Another issue is how much the Replicator initiative might cost, and how DOD intends to finance that cost. DOD submitted a $300 million FY2023 reprogramming request for Replicator, suggesting that the department may be reducing funding for other programs, and additionally secured $200 million in FY2024 appropriations. DOD requested $500 million for Replicator in FY2025.
Little information is available publicly about Replicator's potential total cost and the impact that funding requirements for Replicator could have on funding for other DOD programs. Some observers have expressed concern that funding Replicator could reduce funding for other Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) priorities, such as munitions and long-range anti-ship missiles.
Some observers have argued to Congress that providing funding that is not tied to a single fiscal year would be critical to Replicator's success, as doing so would expand the number of funding sources available to the initiative. Others might argue that providing such funding could weaken Congress's constitutional power of the purse by reducing Congress's control over annual DOD spending.
Effectiveness of Selected Systems
Another issue is whether the specific missions (e.g., C-sUAS) and systems selected for Replicator are likely to meet DOD's stated objectives for the initiative. Within this issue, one question concerns the ability of Replicator systems to meet the operational needs of INDOPACOM, particularly in terms of systems operating at the extended ranges needed to contribute to combat operations in the Indo-Pacific. Another consideration affecting effectiveness is the ability of selected systems to operate in adverse weather conditions unique to potential theaters of operation. Congress may review the conclusions of an ongoing DOD inspector general investigation - announced in July 2024 - into these matters.
Technical, Schedule, and Cost Risk
Another issue concerns technical, schedule, and cost risk in the Replicator initiative. Military analyst Bill Greenwalt testified before a House Armed Services Committee hearing on October 19, 2023, that "the Pentagon's acquisition system is simply not capable of acting on the proposed timelines contemplated in the Replicator program, except in very limited circumstances ... and then only when conducted outside the normal rules of acquisition budgeting."
Skeptics might argue that DOD historically has often struggled to overcome the so-called "valley of death" between the development of a system prototype and the deployment of that system in the field. Although DOD states that it is currently refining its acquisition strategy for Replicator, some potential industry partners have expressed concerns about DOD's approach, calling it "very disorganized and confusing."
Ethical Principles and International Commitments
Another issue is whether Replicator efforts would be executed in a manner consistent with DOD's ethical principles and international commitments, which are outlined in DOD documents such as Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway; Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy; and DOD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems.
Military Personnel and Force Structure
Another issue concerns the potential implications of Replicator systems for military personnel and force structure. Within this issue, specific matters include the number of personnel that might be needed to operate thousands of uncrewed systems (and the resulting impact on numbers of personnel available for meeting other DOD needs), the training requirements for personnel operating Replicator systems, and whether fielding Replicator systems would require making changes in DOD and service organization. For example, some observers have proposed the establishment of specialized drone branches within the services.
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CRS Products
CRS Report R47188, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Roles, Missions, and Future Concepts, by Kelley M. Sayler and Michael E. DeVine.
CRS Report R46458, Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
CRS In Focus IF11150, Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, by Kelley M. Sayler.
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The white paper is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12611/IF12611.9.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
Dismissals of Members of Puerto Rico's Financial Oversight & Management Board Topic of White Paper From CRS
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following Insight white paper (No. IN12598) on Aug. 25, 2025, by economic policy analyst D. Andrew Austin:* * *
Dismissals of Members of Puerto Rico's Financial Oversight and Management Board
On Friday, August 1, 2025, President Trump dismissed five of the seven members of Puerto Rico's Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB or Oversight Board): Arthur J. Gonzalez, Cameron McKenzie, Betty A. Rosa, Juan A. Sabater, and Luis A. Ubinas. On August 13, 2025, a week after FOMB member Andrew G. Biggs described the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following Insight white paper (No. IN12598) on Aug. 25, 2025, by economic policy analyst D. Andrew Austin: * * * Dismissals of Members of Puerto Rico's Financial Oversight and Management Board On Friday, August 1, 2025, President Trump dismissed five of the seven members of Puerto Rico's Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB or Oversight Board): Arthur J. Gonzalez, Cameron McKenzie, Betty A. Rosa, Juan A. Sabater, and Luis A. Ubinas. On August 13, 2025, a week after FOMB member Andrew G. Biggs described thedismissals as a "setback for Puerto Rico," he received a notice of dismissal from the White House, according to an Oversight Board statement. John E. Nixon is the sole remaining member of the Oversight Board at present.
The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA, P.L. 114-187), enacted in June 2016, established the Oversight Board and created processes for restructuring Puerto Rico's public debts, among other provisions. PROMESA Title III established a bankruptcy-like process that has been used for most debt restructuring cases. Title VI established a process similar to sovereign debt workout procedures. The federal district court overseeing Title III cases ordered the board to report on its status by August 25, 2025.
How Are Board Members Appointed?
Members, including those purportedly terminated, are appointed through a process established in Section 101(e) of PROMESA. In that process, six of the seven board members are appointed by the President from lists submitted by congressional leaders. For the original members, the Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader each submitted two lists for the appointments of two members (four members total). The House Minority Leader and the Senate Minority Leader each submitted one list for one appointment. The President appointed a seventh member in his sole discretion. Each Oversight Board vacancy thereafter is filled in the same manner in which the original member was appointed.
PROMESA (48 U.S.C. Sec.2121) also allows the President to send board member nominations to the Senate for confirmation. Thus, if the President chooses to fulfill a vacancy via Senate confirmation, he need not select from a list.
Four of the dismissed Oversight Board members, according to media reports, were nominated by Democratic leaders. House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries nominated former chair of the board Arthur Gonzalez for his latest appointment. Then-Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer had put forward Betty Rosa and Luis Ubinas. President Biden had used his discretion to appoint Juan Sabater, and Speaker Mike Johnson nominated Cameron McKenzie. Then-Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell put forward Andrew Biggs in 2016 and for reappointment in 2020.
Issues Regarding Dismissals of Board Members
PROMESA authorizes the President to remove members "for cause" (48 U.S.C. Sec.2121(e)(5)(B)), although at time of this writing no cause has been articulated in publicly available official documents. The dismissal notices sent to Oversight Board members, according to media reports, likewise articulated no cause. Some contend that those members could challenge the dismissals, although reportedly no member has yet said that a challenge was planned. Andrew Biggs indicated that he was unlikely to challenge the dismissal.
In other media reports, others complained that the board's outlays on consultants and legal teams were high. Unnamed White House officials were quoted as endorsing criticisms of the board's efforts to cut debts of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority through the PROMESA Title III process. White House officials were also quoted as claiming that the board "has been run inefficiently and ineffectively by its governing members for far too long and it's time to restore common sense leadership."
What Can the Oversight Board Do Now?
Provisions of PROMESA and bylaws established by the Oversight Board circumscribe what actions the board may take.
PROMESA itself requires no quorum for convening meetings of the Oversight Board and conducting its basic business. PROMESA (48 U.S.C. Sec.2121(h)) does require a minimum number of votes for some of the board's core functions.
For components of Puerto Rico's public sector that the Oversight Board designates as "covered instrumentalities," the board approves fiscal plans (48 U.S.C. Sec.2141) and budgets (48 U.S.C. Sec.2142) submitted by the governor of Puerto Rico. The Oversight Board can demand changes to those submissions, and if a revised submission does not meet PROMESA requirements, the board can develop and submit its own fiscal plan or budget for a given public sector component. In addition, if the governor and legislature pass a law that the Oversight Board finds incompatible with a fiscal plan or PROMESA's requirements, the board can act to prevent the enforcement or application of the law (48 U.S.C. Sec.2144).
PROMESA requires a majority vote of the Oversight Board's full appointed membership to approve a fiscal plan or a budget or to prevent application of a law. The board may also conduct business in executive session upon a majority vote of the Oversight Board's full voting membership. Entering one of Puerto Rico's public entities into the Title III debt restructuring process requires votes of at least five board members. Title VI does not appear to have similar voting requirements as those in Title III.
The Oversight Board's bylaws, however, require a quorum to conduct the business of the board and for all other purposes. With some exceptions, actions of the Oversight Board require an affirmative vote of no fewer than four members. Appointment or removal of the board's executive director or the general counsel requires a vote of the board chair and four other members.
If the board members number five or fewer, actions require a majority of appointed members. Appointment of an executive director or a general counsel, however, requires votes of the chair and at least three other members. Removal of the board's executive director or the general counsel would presumably still require consent of the chair and three other members.
Amending or repealing the board's bylaws also requires a vote of at least four members. The bylaws were last amended on April 19, 2024.
PREPA Debt Restructuring
On August 8, 2025, the federal district court handling PROMESA Title III cases suspended deadlines and ordered the Oversight Board to report on the "status of its membership and what effect, if any, the recent events will have on its participation in matters pending before the Court" by August 25, 2025.
The PROMESA Title III case for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) is the last major remaining debt restructuring process. In December 2022, the Oversight Board proposed a settlement via a plan of adjustment, which was followed by several revisions. The Board estimated its recent offers would provide $2.6 billion to creditors. Bondholders, however, challenged the board's assessment of terms of the underlying bond agreement. In November, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in a revised decision largely sided with creditors' claims. The district court handling the case repeatedly has urged the board and creditors to continue negotiations.
A coalition claiming to hold about 60% of PREPA bonds argued that electric rates should be set high enough to pay the utility's indebtedness, which they estimate to total $12 billion.
The Oversight Board had also engaged in contentious negotiations with New Fortress Energy (NFE). The board held up a new long-term contract for natural gas after raising concerns that it could undermine "market competition and limit[] flexibility." The NFE subsidiary Genera has been taking over operations of Puerto Rico's electric generation plants.
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The white paper is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12598/IN12598.1.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
Defense Primer - Department of the Navy Topic of White Paper From CRS
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF10484) on Aug. 25, 2025, by naval affairs specialist Ronald O'Rourke:* * *
Defense Primer: Department of the Navy
One Military Department with Two Military Services
The Department of the Navy (DON) is a single military department that includes two military services - the Navy and the Marine Corps. As such, DON has a single civilian leader, the Secretary of the Navy, and two four-star military service chiefs - an admiral whose title is the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF10484) on Aug. 25, 2025, by naval affairs specialist Ronald O'Rourke: * * * Defense Primer: Department of the Navy One Military Department with Two Military Services The Department of the Navy (DON) is a single military department that includes two military services - the Navy and the Marine Corps. As such, DON has a single civilian leader, the Secretary of the Navy, and two four-star military service chiefs - an admiral whose title is the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), anda general whose title is the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Although the title "Secretary of the Navy" includes only the term "Navy," the secretary serves as the civilian leader for both the Navy and Marine Corps. The CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). As of August 25, 2025, the Secretary of the Navy is John Phelan, the CNO is Admiral Daryl Caudle, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps is General Eric Smith.
"Naval" Refers to Both the Navy and Marine Corps
Although the term "naval" is often used to refer specifically to the Navy, it more properly refers to both the Navy and Marine Corps, because both the Navy and Marine Corps are naval services. Even though the Marine Corps sometimes operates for extended periods as a land fighting force (as it did, for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq), and is often thought of as the country's second land army, it nevertheless is, by law, a naval service. 10 U.S.C. 8001(a)(3) states that "The term 'member of the naval service' means a person appointed or enlisted in, or inducted or conscripted into, the Navy or the Marine Corps." DON officials sometimes refer to the two services as the Navy-Marine Corps team. See also the section below entitled "The Naval Service."
"Navy" in DOD Budget Documents Can Mean DON
DOD budget documents that divide the DOD budget into four military departments often label those departments as Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense-Wide. In using data from such documents, it is important to remember that the category called "Navy" in these cases refers to the Department of the Navy, and thus includes funding for both the Navy and Marine Corps.
"Blue Dollars" and "Green Dollars" in DON Budget
People who work with the DON budget sometimes refer to "blue dollars," meaning funding in the DON budget for the Navy, and "green dollars," meaning funding in the DON budget for the Marine Corps. Of the more than two dozen appropriation accounts that form DON's budget, many contain funding specifically for either the Navy or Marine Corps. For example, the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN), appropriation account contains operation and maintenance funding primarily for the Navy, while the Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps (OMMC), appropriation account contains operation and maintenance funding for the Marine Corps.
A few DON appropriation accounts include funding for both the Navy and Marine Corps, even though their titles refer only to the Navy. For example, the Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN) appropriation account funds the procurement of both Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, and the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy (RDTEN) account includes research and development funding for both the Navy and Marine Corps.
The Navy's shipbuilding account, known formally as the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account, funds the procurement of various types of ships, including amphibious ships. Although amphibious ships are Navy ships operated by Navy crews, the primary function of amphibious ships is to transport Marine Corps personnel and equipment and support Marine Corps ship-to-shore movements and Marine Corps operations ashore. The Navy's amphibious ships are sometimes referred to informally as the "Gator Navy," a shortening of the term alligator.
DON Budget
The Department of Defense (DOD) characterizes its FY2026 budget submission as including funding requested from two sources: H.R. 1/P.L. 119-21 of July 4, 2025, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (aka reconciliation bill, aka megabill), and the FY2026 DOD Appropriations Act. DON states that its FY2026 budget submission includes about $43.3 billion requested for H.R. 1/P.L. 119-21, and about $248.9 billion requested for the FY2026 DOD Appropriations Act, for a combined requested total of about $292.2 billion. The $43.3 billion requested for H.R. 1/P.L. 119-21 equates to about 14.8% of the combined total of about $292.2 billion.
Within the requested total of about $292.2 billion, about $235.0 billion (80.4%) is for the Navy and the rest is for the Marine Corps. In terms of appropriation groups, within the $292.2 billion, about $61.9 billion (22.7%) is for military personnel, $93.7 billion (32.1%) is for operations and maintenance, $95.3 billion (32.6%) is for procurement, $29.2 billion (10.0%) is for research and development, $7.4 billion (2.5%) is for military construction, and $0.4 billion (0.1%) is for revolving funds.
Within the figure of about $43.3 billion requested for DON for H.R. 1/P.L. 119-21, about $41.0 billion (94.7%) is for the Navy, and more specifically, about $26.5 billion (61.3%) is requested for the Navy's shipbuilding account, known formally as the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.
DON Personnel
DON's FY2026 budget submission requests a total of 830,089 personnel, including 516,900 active-duty uniformed personnel, 91,100 reserve personnel, and 222,089 civilian personnel. The submission requested a total of 603,219 Navy personnel (344,600 active-duty, 57,500 reserve, and 201,119 civilian), and a total of 226,870 Marine Corps personnel (172,300 active-duty, 33,600 reserve, and 20,970 civilian).
Coast Guard in Relation to DON
Unlike DON, which is covered (along with other parts of DOD) in the U.S. Code primarily in Title 10, the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is covered primarily in Title 14. Even though the Coast Guard is not part of DOD, Title 14 states that the Coast Guard "shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times." (14 U.S.C. 101) Title 14 states that the Coast Guard "shall be a service in the Department of Homeland Security, except when operating as a service in the Navy" (14 U.S.C. 103(a)), and that
'Upon the declaration of war if Congress so directs in the declaration or when the President directs, the Coast Guard shall operate as a service in the Navy, and shall so continue until the President, by Executive order, transfers the Coast Guard back to the Department of Homeland Security. While operating as a service in the Navy, the Coast Guard shall be subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy, who may order changes in Coast Guard operations to render them uniform, to the extent such Secretary deems advisable, with Navy operations." (14 U.S.C. 103(b))'
The last time the Coast Guard operated as a service in the Navy was during World War II. The possibility that the Coast Guard might at some point operate as a service in the Navy is why legislation concerning the Coast Guard sometimes uses phrases such as "the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating."
The four-star admiral who heads the Coast Guard, called the Commandant of the Coast Guard, is not a member of the JCS. As of August 25, 2025, the Acting Commandant of the Coast Guard is Admiral Kevin E. Lunday. Unlike the DOD services, the Coast Guard is not only a military service and a branch of the Armed Forces, but also a law enforcement agency. For this reason, Navy ships whose operations create a distinct possibility of encountering potential law enforcement situations (such as those relating to drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and enforcement of fisheries laws) sometimes embark detachments of Coast Guard personnel.
The Coast Guard's budget is funded primarily through the annual DHS appropriations act. DON's budget sometimes includes small amounts of funding to support the Coast Guard's national defense mission. In addition, the procurement of one of the Coast Guard's polar icebreakers (Healy) was funded primarily with FY1990 SCN funding, 33 of the Coast Guard's 49 Island-class 110-foot patrol boats were procured under a Navy contract that included FY1990 SCN funding, and $300 million of the funding that has been appropriated for the Coast Guard's new Polar Security Cutter (aka polar icebreaker) program was appropriated through the SCN account ($150 million each in FY2017 and FY2018). The Coast Guard's reserve end strength (but not its active end strength) is authorized in the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The Navy and Coast Guard have mechanisms, including a Navy and Coast Guard (NAVGARD) Board, to coordinate matters of joint interest. The Navy and Coast Guard on at least three occasions (2002, 2006, and 2013) have issued National Fleet policy statements on the coordination of their procurement and operational activities.
The Sea Services and the Naval Service
The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are sometimes referred to collectively as the sea services. A tri-service strategy document released in December 2020, entitled Advantage at Sea, Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, states that the three services are "collectively known as the Naval Service," and defines the term naval service in its glossary as meaning the three services. The April 2020 edition of a tri-service doctrine publication, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, states "The United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps, and the United States Coast Guard collectively form the nation's Naval Service." The Coast Guard, however, is not frequently referred to as a naval service in annual Navy or Coast Guard documents submitted to Congress, and the U.S. Code does not specifically define the Coast Guard as a naval service (as opposed to a military service or a branch of the Armed Forces) in 10 U.S.C. 8001(a)(3), 14 U.S.C. 101, 14 U.S.C. 103(a), or other provisions.
The three services in recent years have from to time issued joint maritime strategy documents, including, most recently, the previously mentioned document entitled Advantage at Sea, Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power.
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Relevant Statutes
Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle C - Navy and Marine Corps
Title 14, U.S. Code, Chapter 1 - Establishment and Duties of the Coast Guard
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Other Resources
Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2026 Budget, 2024, 144 pp.
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2026, Congressional Justification, undated, 174 pp.
U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, Advantage at Sea, Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, December 2020, 29 pp.
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The white paper is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10484/IF10484.46.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
Constitution Day & Citizenship Day Topic of CRS Fact Sheet
WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following fact sheet (No. R48174) on Aug. 25, 2025, by Senior Knowledge Management Librarian Kelly M. Hoffman:* * *
Constitution Day and Citizenship Day: Fact Sheet
Contents
Introduction ... 1
Background ... 1
Legislation ... 2
Related CRS ... 2
Selected Congressional Statements and Remarks ... 3
Selected Presidential Proclamations and Remarks ... 3
Government Resources ... 4
Contacts
Author Information ... 4
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Introduction
Constitution Day and Citizenship Day is a federal commemoration observed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following fact sheet (No. R48174) on Aug. 25, 2025, by Senior Knowledge Management Librarian Kelly M. Hoffman: * * * Constitution Day and Citizenship Day: Fact Sheet Contents Introduction ... 1 Background ... 1 Legislation ... 2 Related CRS ... 2 Selected Congressional Statements and Remarks ... 3 Selected Presidential Proclamations and Remarks ... 3 Government Resources ... 4 Contacts Author Information ... 4 * * * Introduction Constitution Day and Citizenship Day is a federal commemoration observedannually on September 17 by encouraging citizens to learn about their civic responsibilities and opportunities.
This fact sheet is designed to assist congressional offices with work related to Constitution Day and Citizenship Day. It provides authoritative information resources, including links to legislation, CRS reports, sample speeches and remarks from the Congressional Record, and presidential proclamations and remarks. It also links to additional government resources and selected advocacy, educational, and cultural organizations.
Background
On September 17, 1787, delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, PA, signed the U.S. Constitution, beginning a process of state-by-state ratification that lasted until 1790. The approval of nine states was needed to ratify the Constitution, and it was formally adopted on July 2, 1788, after the Confederation Congress learned that New Hampshire had ratified it./1
Commemorations of the Constitution's signing date back to 1861, when residents of Philadelphia, PA, used the anniversary to publicly affirm their allegiance to the Union against the backdrop of the Civil War./2
In 1887, President Grover Cleveland added presidential recognition to the commemoration by attending the city of Philadelphia's centennial celebration of the Constitution's signing, referring to the "glorious promise of the Constitution through centuries to come" and remarking that "every American citizen should on this centennial day rejoice in his citizenship."/3
A late 1930s campaign to honor new citizens of the United States advocated by William Randolph Hearst led to public celebrations of U.S. citizenship in some cities across the country./4
In Los Angeles, CA, this celebration took the form of an event to advocate for a federal law establishing "I Am An American Day."/5
On May 3, 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt signed a joint resolution making the third Sunday in May "I Am An American Citizenship Day."/6
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1 National Archives and Records Administration, "Constitution of the United States - A History," https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/more-perfect-union.
2 Jane M. Hatch, ed., The American Book of Days 3rd ed. (New York, NY: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1978), pp. 850-851, https://archive.org/embed/americanbookofda00hatc.
3 U.S. President (Cleveland), "Remarks At The Commercial Exchange, Philadelphia, During The Centennial Celebration Of The Adoption Of The Constitution, September 16, 1887," The Public Papers of Grover Cleveland, 22nd President of U.S., Mar. 4, 1885 to Mar. 4 1889 (1889), p. 262, https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t66.d71.pr2202-2?accountid=12084.
4 John Whitmer, "Observing Constitution Day," Social Studies Review, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 77-79, https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/observing-constitution-day/docview/199542865/se-2.
5 Olivia B. Waxman, "Citizenship Day used to be called 'I Am an American Day.' Here's how it came to be--and why it changed," Time Magazine, September 17, 2019, https://time.com/5677862/citizenship-day-history/.
6 U.S. Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on S.J.Res. 233 and H.J.Res. 437, Citizenship Day, hearing on S.J.Res. 233 and H.J.Res. 437, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., March 25, 1940, https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1940-sjs-0003?accountid=12084.
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In his accompanying proclamation, President Roosevelt described the purpose of the day to be so "the sovereign citizens of our Nation be prepared for the responsibilities and impressed with the significance of their status in our self-governing Republic."/7
In 1952, I Am An American Citizenship Day was renamed to Citizenship Day and the observance date was moved from May 3 to September 17 to coincide with the anniversary of the Constitution's signing./8
In 1956, September 17-25 was designated as Constitution Week./9
In November 2004, Congress renamed the September 17 observance to "Constitution Day and Citizenship Day" and directed educational institutions that receive federal funding to hold related educational programs./10
Legislation
H.J.Res. 437, 76th Congress (1940): "Authorizing the President of the United States of America to proclaim I Am An American Citizenship Day, for the recognition, observance, and commemoration of American citizenship."
P.L. 82-261 (1952): "Designating September 17 of each year as 'Citizenship Day'."
P.L. 84-915 (1956): "Authorizing the President of the United States to designated the period beginning September 17 and ending September 23 of each year as Constitution Week."
P.L. 108-447, Division J, Title I, Sec.111, Stat. 3345 (2004): "Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005." This act established the requirement that federal agencies and educational institutions receiving federal funds provide an educational program on the U.S. Constitution on September 17 and changed the name of the observance to Constitution Day and Citizenship Day.
70 Federal Register 29727 (May 24, 2005): "Notice of Implementation of Constitution Day and Citizenship Day on September 17 of Each Year." To implement the above provision of P.L. 108447, the Department of Education issued this notice informing the qualifying institutions of this new educational requirement, along with lists of educational resources.
36 U.S.C. 106: Constitution Day and Citizenship Day.
Related CRS Products
CRS Report R48065, Congressional Recognition of Commemorative Days, Weeks, and Months: Background and Current Practice, by Jacob R. Straus
CRS Report R45020, Primer on U.S. Immigration Policy, by Holly Straut-Eppsteiner
CRS Report R48021, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS): Operations and Issues for Congress, by William A. Kandel
CRS Report R43366, U.S. Naturalization Policy, by Holly Straut-Eppsteiner
Constitution Annotated: Analysis and Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution
Our Constitution Podcast
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7 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation 2402 "I Am An American Day" 1940, May 3, 1940, accessed August 15, 2024, https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t67.d72.1940-pr-2402?accountid=12084.
8 36 U.S.C. Sec.106; P.L. 82-261, 66 Stat. 9 (1952), accessed July 26, 2024, https://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=66&page=9.
9 36 U.S.C. Sec.108; P.L. 84-915, 70 Stat. 932 (1956), accessed July 26, 2024, https://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=70&page=932.
10 P.L. 108-447, Division J, Title I, Sec.111, 118 Stat. 3344 (2004), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW108publ447/pdf/PLAW-108publ447.pdf.
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Selected Congressional Statements and Remarks
Some Members of Congress make floor statements, give speeches, issue press releases, or enter Extensions of Remarks into the Congressional Record to recognize holidays and observances. The following are some examples that may be of assistance in preparing such statements:
Representative John F. Kennedy, "Remarks of Representative John F. Kennedy at an 'I Am An American Day' Program, Mineola, New York," speech, May 18, 1947.
Representative Mike Pence, "Celebrating the 215th Anniversary of the Constitution," remarks in the House, September 17, 2002.
Senator Robert Byrd, "Celebrating the Constitution," remarks in the Senate in support of making Constitution Day a national holiday, September 20, 2004.
Senator Robert Byrd, "On the Importance of the U.S. Constitution," lecture, September 16, 2005.
Senator Orrin Hatch, "Constitution Day," remarks in the Senate, September 17, 2018.
Representative Russell Fry, "Expressing Appreciation for Constitution Day," extensions of remarks in the Senate, September 16, 2024.
Representative Greg Lopez, "Constitution Day," remarks in the House, September 18, 2024.
Selected Presidential Proclamations and Remarks
One of the many uses of a presidential proclamation or presidential remarks is to ceremoniously honor a group or call attention to certain issues or events. Some recent remarks and proclamations commemorating Constitution Day and Citizenship Day from the Compilation of Presidential Documents include the following:
* Presidential Documents - Donald J. Trump (2025-)/11
* Presidential Documents - Joseph R. Biden (2021-2025)
* Presidential Documents - Donald J. Trump (2017-2021)/12
* Presidential Documents - Barack H. Obama (2009-2017)
* Presidential Documents - George W. Bush (2001-2009)
Older proclamations and remarks of historical interest include the following:
* President Grover Cleveland, "Remarks at the Commercial Exchange, Philadelphia, During the Centennial Celebration of the Adoption of the Constitution," September 16, 1887
8 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Greeting to New Citizens," May 6, 1940
* President Harry S. Truman, "Proclamation 2984 - Citizenship Day, 1952"
Other remarks (including selected audio and video clips) are available through The American Presidency Project, established by the University of California, Santa Barbara.
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11 Link provides access to proclamations and remarks made by President Trump during both of his nonconsecutive terms, where available.
12 Link provides access to proclamations and remarks made by President Trump during both of his nonconsecutive terms, where available.
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Government Resources
Library of Congress, Constitution Day Teacher Resources
Library of Congress, Constitution of the United States: Primary Documents in American
History National Archives and Records Administration, Educator Resources: Observing Constitution Day
National Endowment for the Humanities, Teacher's Guide: Commemorating Constitution Day
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Citizenship Resource Center
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration and Citizenship Data
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics
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The fact sheet is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48174/R48174.6.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]