GAO Reports
GAO Reports
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Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Additional Actions Needed to Address Significant Risks in Verifying Provider Eligibility
WASHINGTON, April 29 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Additional Actions Needed to Address Significant Risks in Verifying Provider Eligibility
Fast Facts
The Federal Employees Health Benefits program is the largest employer-sponsored health insurance program in the United States. The Office of Personnel Management is responsible for managing fraud risks in the program.
But OPM's process for verifying whether health care providers were eligible to provide care under the program isn't always working. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Additional Actions Needed to Address Significant Risks in Verifying Provider Eligibility Fast Facts The Federal Employees Health Benefits program is the largest employer-sponsored health insurance program in the United States. The Office of Personnel Management is responsible for managing fraud risks in the program. But OPM's process for verifying whether health care providers were eligible to provide care under the program isn't always working.For example, our data analyses identified claims from providers who were deceased or excluded from other federal programs for certain violations.
Our recommendations would improve OPM's process for verifying health care provider eligibility and reduce risks to the program.
A person wearing scrubs holding a magnifying glass that says fraud and improper payments.
Highlights
What GAO Found
Limitations in control activities allowed potentially ineligible providers to participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) program. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and its Office of the Inspector General (OIG) have a variety of control activities for identifying ineligible providers. However, GAO found limitations in these control activities. GAO's data analyses identified FEHB claims from approximately 400 providers who were deceased and over 2,000 additional claims from providers who were excluded from federal programs. While such claims are a small proportion of annual FEHB claims, they represent a risk the agency could mitigate. Taking additional steps to identify providers who are deceased or excluded from other federal programs would help OPM and OPM OIG prevent fraud and improper payments in the FEHB program. For example, comparing death data with FEHB claims could help prevent improper payments or fraud in FEHB claims payments.
Selected FEHB carriers do not always comply with requirements for identifying and excluding suspended or debarred providers. GAO found that selected FEHB carriers-which operate health benefit plans-do not always notify patients that their providers are suspended or debarred, as required. Carriers also did not notify OPM OIG when providers may warrant suspension or debarment, as required by OPM OIG policy. Clarifying requirements would help OPM and OPM OIG ensure that patients are not exposed to risks related to suspended or debarred providers.
Why GAO Did This Study
The FEHB program is the largest employer-sponsored health insurance program in the United Sates. OPM is responsible for managing fraud and improper payment risks in the FEHB program, including risks associated with ineligible health care providers. Ineligible providers can increase costs and may pose safety risks to patients.
GAO was asked to review OPM's efforts to manage provider-related fraud risks in the FEHB program. This report examines the extent to which (1) program control activities allow potentially ineligible providers to participate in the FEHB program; and (2) selected FEHB carriers comply with requirements for identifying and excluding suspended or debarred providers, among other objectives.
GAO performed analyses comparing FEHB claims data with various data sets indicating that providers may be ineligible, such as data on deceased providers or providers excluded from other federal programs. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed officials from OPM, OPM OIG, and FEHB carriers. GAO compared this information with applicable regulations, guidelines, and federal standards for internal control.
Recommendations
GAO is making 15 recommendations to OPM and OPM OIG, including that OPM improve control activities for identifying deceased providers and clarify requirements for notifying patients who have seen a suspended or debarred provider. OPM and OPM OIG concurred with all our recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Office of Personnel Management The Director of OPM should improve its control activities for identifying deceased or incarcerated providers. At a minimum, this should include OPM directing FEHB carriers to regularly obtain and use death information to identify deceased providers, prevent payments to deceased providers, and engage in related recovery efforts. This might also include OPM OIG comparing death and incarceration data from DNP with the claims data they receive, as we did. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of the Inspector General The OPM Inspector General should develop a monitoring mechanism to identify providers on LEIE with roles they do not consider for debarment that are submitting claims to FEHB carriers and suspend or debar them, as appropriate. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of the Inspector General The OPM Inspector General should review the exclusions we identified on LEIE that are missing from its suspension and debarment list and (1) determine if the excluded providers should be included on its list; (2) investigate why they were not added from the LEIE files; and (3) update its suspension and debarment list with providers on LEIE in a timely manner, as appropriate. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of the Inspector General The OPM Inspector General should update its guidance documentation about which roles from the Department of Health and Human Services OIG List of Excluded Individuals and Entities (LEIE) that OPM OIG considers for debarment to include all possible roles that appear on LEIE. (Recommendation 4)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of the Inspector General The OPM Inspector General should update its guidance documentation and its written procedures to clarify when OPM OIG must conduct additional research on providers on LEIE to determine if the provider meets the criteria for debarment. (Recommendation 5)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of Personnel Management The Director of OPM should obtain additional identifying information for providers, including providers' Tax Identification Number and National Provider Identifier. To the extent appropriate, the Director of OPM should coordinate this effort with the OPM Inspector General. (Recommendation 6)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of the Inspector General The OPM Inspector General should review providers on its suspension and debarment list that we could not readily identify on the SAM exclusions list and (1) determine if the excluded providers should be included on the SAM exclusions list; (2) investigate why they were not added to the SAM exclusions list; and (3) update SAM with information on suspended and debarred providers in a timely manner, as appropriate. (Recommendation 7)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of the Inspector General The OPM Inspector General should review providers on the SAM exclusions list with OPM as the excluding agency that we could not readily identify on OPM OIG's suspension and debarment list and (1) determine if the excluded providers should be removed from the SAM exclusions list, (2) investigate why they were not removed from the SAM exclusions list, and (3) remove providers from the SAM exclusions list after OPM OIG reinstates them in a timely manner. (Recommendation 8)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of Personnel Management The Director of OPM, in coordination with the OPM Inspector General, should clarify to carriers when they must notify patients whose claims from suspended or debarred providers are denied, such as through FEHB Program Carrier Letters, OPM contracts, and OPM OIG's suspension and debarment guidelines. (Recommendation 9)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of Personnel Management The Director of OPM, in consultation with the OPM Inspector General, should take action to ensure that carriers' claims systems are designed and operating effectively to notify patients that a provider is suspended or debarred, when a claim is denied. (Recommendation 10)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of Personnel Management The Director of OPM, in coordination with the OPM Inspector General, should clarify to FEHB carriers - such as through FEHB Program Carrier Letters, OPM contracts, and OPM OIG's suspension and debarment guidelines - that carriers are permitted to search other sources, such as LEIE and the SAM exclusions list, for providers who may warrant suspension or debarment, and that carriers must notify OPM OIG when they identify such providers. (Recommendation 11)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of Personnel Management The Director of OPM, in coordination with the OPM Inspector General, should clarify to FEHB carriers - such as through FEHB Program Carrier Letters, OPM contracts, and OPM OIG's suspension and debarment guidelines - that only the OPM OIG Debarring Official is authorized to exclude providers from receiving FEHB payments. (Recommendation 12)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of Personnel Management The Director of OPM, in coordination with the OPM Inspector General, should ensure that FEHB carrier processes comply with requirements to consult with OPM OIG about provider matches from the OPM OIG suspension and debarment list before manually overriding controls to change a provider's suspension or debarment status. (Recommendation 13)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of Personnel Management The Director of OPM, in coordination with the OPM Inspector General, should improve methods of communication to ensure that information about suspended and debarred providers is more readily available to new and unknowing patients, such as by flagging suspended or debarred providers on carriers' public websites. (Recommendation 14)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Office of Personnel Management The Director of OPM, in consultation with the OPM Inspector General, should coordinate with FEHB carriers to develop and implement controls that reduce the amount of time that suspended and debarred providers can wait to submit claims and receive FEHB payments, while taking carrier filing policies into consideration. (Recommendation 15)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
See All 15 Recommendations
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108139
United Nations Renovations: Budget and Schedule Status of Selected Projects Are Mixed, and State Could Strengthen Oversight
WASHINGTON, April 29 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
United Nations Renovations: Budget and Schedule Status of Selected Projects Are Mixed, and State Could Strengthen Oversight
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Fast Facts
In the past 10 years, the UN has undertaken office construction and renovation projects that have collectively cost over $4 billion. Some projects have experienced schedule delays or gone over budget. For example, renovation of the UN's main office complex in Geneva was 10% over budget and 4 years behind schedule as of May 2025. Since the U.S. is a leading ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * United Nations Renovations: Budget and Schedule Status of Selected Projects Are Mixed, and State Could Strengthen Oversight * Fast Facts In the past 10 years, the UN has undertaken office construction and renovation projects that have collectively cost over $4 billion. Some projects have experienced schedule delays or gone over budget. For example, renovation of the UN's main office complex in Geneva was 10% over budget and 4 years behind schedule as of May 2025. Since the U.S. is a leadingfinancial contributor to the UN, the State Department monitors such projects.
We found that State could strengthen its oversight. For example, the agency lacks guidance that outlines how it should oversee large-scale UN projects.
We recommended that State develop such guidance.
Aerial view of renovations at the International Labor Organization's headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.
Aerial view of ongoing construction, including cranes and other machinery, at the International Labor Organization's headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland.
Highlights
What GAO Found
Across 11 selected UN capital projects that were completed or in progress from December 31, 2014, through December 31, 2024, seven projects were within budget and three were on schedule. For the projects that experienced budget increases and schedule delays, GAO found that multiple factors contributed to the increases and delays. For example, as of May 2025, the Strategic Heritage Plan project (SHP) was 10 percent over budget and 4 years behind schedule. COVID-19 reduced the number of workers who could be on site, causing schedule delays, and challenges coordinating construction work with contractors slowed progress, according to SHP officials. However, the Gigiri Master Plan, located in Nairobi, Kenya, is on budget and on schedule, in part because of effective project monitoring and reporting, with construction expected to be completed in 2029.
Coordinating U.S. oversight of UN capital projects is a Department of State responsibility. State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) monitors UN capital projects through mechanisms including reviewing reports, attending meetings, and engaging with UN officials. However, GAO found that opportunities exist for State to strengthen its oversight of projects. For example, State IO officials do not systematically monitor key indicators (e.g., budget and schedule) and do not have guidance that identifies indicators, triggers, or steps for taking action to address issues with capital projects. Establishing such guidance could provide a useful tool for fulfilling oversight responsibilities and could help minimize budget or schedule overruns.
To help mitigate risks, UN officials identified lessons learned, including through collaboration between project officials and on-the-job experience, and applied them to capital projects. These lessons help projects avoid design complications, increased costs, and schedule delays. They also help strengthen governance and support business continuity through use of swing space (see below). For example, the Gigiri Master Plan and other projects created steering committees to strengthen their governance structures by informing, advising, and constructively challenging the project director.
Temporary UN Workspaces Support Continued Operations During Construction
Why GAO Did This Study
In the past 10 years, the UN has undertaken several significant capital projects, collectively valued at more than $4 billion, with the aim of bringing its workspaces up to modern usability, safety, security, and environmental standards. In 2023, the U.S. was the largest financial contributor to the UN. State, the lead U.S. agency on foreign affairs, advances U.S. interests at the UN.
A House Committee Report includes a provision for GAO to review UN capital projects with a total budget of $25 million or more in the past 10 years. This report examines factors that have contributed to changes in budget and schedule for selected UN capital projects, how State monitors the progress of projects, and lessons learned, among other objectives.
To address these objectives, GAO selected 11 UN capital projects with budgets of over $25 million that were either completed or ongoing in the period from December 31, 2014, through December 31, 2024. GAO analyzed UN documents, reports, and guidance related to budget, schedule, fraud mitigation, and lessons learned. GAO also interviewed State and UN officials and relevant contractors. Additionally, GAO conducted field visits and met with officials at UN headquarters in New York and at project sites in Geneva.
Recommendations
GAO is recommending that State IO develop guidance that outlines how it should oversee large-scale UN capital projects. State agreed with the recommendation.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of State The Secretary of State should ensure the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) develops guidance that outlines how it should oversee large-scale UN capital projects. Such guidance could include identifying indicators or triggers that should be monitored or steps that should be taken.
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107577
Science & Tech Spotlight: Data Centers in Space
WASHINGTON, April 28 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Science & Tech Spotlight: Data Centers in Space
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Highlights
Why This Matters
Space-based data centers would place data processing and storage systems for AI and other computing needs into satellites. This could reduce the land, electricity, and water needed for data centers on Earth. Several companies have begun development of data centers in space, but there are engineering and economic barriers to deployment.
Key Takeaways
* Placing data centers in space could reduce the demand ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 28 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Science & Tech Spotlight: Data Centers in Space * Highlights Why This Matters Space-based data centers would place data processing and storage systems for AI and other computing needs into satellites. This could reduce the land, electricity, and water needed for data centers on Earth. Several companies have begun development of data centers in space, but there are engineering and economic barriers to deployment. Key Takeaways * Placing data centers in space could reduce the demandfor resources from these facilities on Earth.
* Data centers generate excess heat, but space does not cool computing hardware efficiently. This could be a major engineering challenge.
* A significant increase in the number of satellites in orbit could be difficult to manage and cause collisions.
The Technology
What is it? Data centers house computer servers, data storage systems, and network equipment that provide digital applications and services-such as artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud computing. Space-based data centers would house similar equipment in satellites to process data in space instead of on Earth (see figure).
How does it work? Most proposals for space-based data centers use satellites deployed to low Earth orbits. These orbits allow faster communication with Earth and cost less to reach than higher ones. Some low Earth orbits (e.g., sun-synchronous) could also provide satellites with near-continuous solar energy.
Some proposals envision constellations of thousands of new satellites working together to process data.
Figure 1. Terrestrial and Hypothetical In-Space Data Centers
These might supplement or replace the use of terrestrial data centers for energy-intensive tasks such as cloud computing services or training AI models.
How mature is it? Like existing satellites, space-based data centers need support systems that provide power, cooling, and communication. These basic components rely on mature technologies, but their deployment and operation to support data centers is unproven. Smaller data centers intended to process data generated in space may be closer to maturity than larger data centers built to train AI models in space.
Large data centers have power and cooling needs that will require further engineering development, such as solar arrays that are larger than any launched and assembled in space as of April 2026. Cooling solutions at this scale are also unproven. Large data centers produce waste heat that must be dissipated into space to prevent damage to computing systems. Such cooling is challenging because heat is not easily dispersed in the near-empty vacuum of space.
Space-based data centers may need more advanced data transfer systems. These systems could transmit larger amounts of data to Earth or between networked satellites for data-intensive tasks like training AI.
Public and private projects are testing high-performance computing hardware and communications technologies in space, with deployment of some data center satellites planned by the mid-2030s. Since January 2026, the Federal Communications Commission has received three applications from U.S. companies for large satellite constellations operating as data centers. Other projects are underway in China, the European Union, and Japan.
Opportunities
* Reduce AI resource demands. The Department of Energy projects data centers will account for up to 12 percent of U.S. electrical demand by 2028, driven by AI development. Data centers in space might reduce demand for electricity, water, and physical infrastructure on Earth.
* Process data collected in space faster. Orbiting telescopes and observation satellites create large volumes of data that are currently sent to Earth for processing. Not all raw data are ultimately useful, and processing in space could reduce data transmission volume to Earth, and associated costs, and increase decision-making speed.
Challenges
* Economic viability. Manufacturing and launching satellites is expensive. Reducing the cost of space-based data centers may depend on developing solutions to electricity, cooling, and communications needs that do not add excessive size or launch weight.
* Crowded orbits. More satellites in orbit could increase collision risks, including with crewed missions, and interfere with astronomical research. Federal agencies must coordinate demand nationally and internationally for radio frequencies for data communication.
* Computing in space. Space radiation can corrupt data unpredictably and degrade hardware. Mitigation may be costly or could reduce computing performance. A data center might benefit from in-space servicing by other satellites, but this capability is underdeveloped. As a result, data centers might be decommissioned more frequently than other satellites, potentially increasing space debris or risks from atmospheric reentry.
Policy Context And Questions
* To what extent does the U.S. have adequate launch and other facilities to support a potential increase in satellites?
* What information is needed to help policymakers balance growing commercial use of space with the long-term management of space as a resource?
* How might existing laws, treaties, and other international agreements covering space or using data apply to data centers in space?
* What research is needed to predict the safety, costs, and life cycles of novel data centers, including in space?
Selected GAO Work
In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing: Benefits, Challenges, and Policy Options, GAO-25-107555.
Large Constellations of Satellites: Mitigating Environmental and Other Effects, GAO-22-105166.
Selected Reference
Ablimit Aili, Jihwan Choi, Yew Soon Ong, and Yonggang Wen. "The development of carbon-neutral data centres in space." Nature Electronics, vol. 8, no. 11 (2025): 1016-1026. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41928-025-01476-1.
For more information, contact Karen L. Howard, PhD at HowardK@gao.gov.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-109012
Department of Government Efficiency: Treasury Needs to Fully Implement Data Protection Controls
WASHINGTON, April 28 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Department of Government Efficiency: Treasury Needs to Fully Implement Data Protection Controls
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Fast Facts
The Bureau of the Fiscal Service is responsible for handling critical payments that support the nation. In January 2025, Treasury established a Department of Government Efficiency team and assigned employees to projects related to the bureau's payment systems.
We looked at the Treasury DOGE team's access between January 20 and April 11, 2025. The bureau didn't fully implement ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 28 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Department of Government Efficiency: Treasury Needs to Fully Implement Data Protection Controls * Fast Facts The Bureau of the Fiscal Service is responsible for handling critical payments that support the nation. In January 2025, Treasury established a Department of Government Efficiency team and assigned employees to projects related to the bureau's payment systems. We looked at the Treasury DOGE team's access between January 20 and April 11, 2025. The bureau didn't fully implementIT controls when managing this access. For example, the bureau gave a laptop to a DOGE team employee without ensuring that employee agreed to follow security rules or prevent data from being transmitted outside the bureau.
Our recommendations address this and other issues.
Photo of the Department of the Treasury building
Highlights
What GAO Found
The U.S. government disburses payments for various reasons (e.g., income tax refunds, benefit payments, and vendor and salary payments). The majority of federal entities process their payments through the Bureau of the Fiscal Service's (BFS) payment systems. Accordingly, the integrity and security of these systems are critical to the nation's economy.
The preliminary results of GAO's ongoing work show that one Treasury Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) team employee had access to three BFS payment systems between January 2025 and February 2025. The employee had access to view, copy, and print data for the three payment systems. In addition, the employee was inadvertently granted temporary access to create, modify, and delete data for one of the three systems, but GAO found no evidence of any changes to system data.
The bureau did not fully address three of four selected control areas for ensuring that DOGE team employees with access to BFS systems follow its IT security rules. (See table.) Specifically, BFS implemented five of the 14 selected controls within those four areas.
Extent to Which Bureau of the Fiscal Service (BFS) Implemented the Four Selected Cybersecurity Control Areas
Control area
Area rating
Control System Access (5 controls)
Partially implemented
Control System Integrity (2 controls)
Fully implemented
Control Information Confidentiality (4 controls)
Substantially implemented
Monitor System Usage (3 controls)
Substantially implemented
Source: GAO analysis of BFS documentation. | GAO-26-108131
Key: Fully implemented: BFS provided evidence that satisfied all of the related controls; Substantially implemented: BFS provided evidence that satisfied at least two-thirds, but not all, of the related controls; Partially implemented: BFS provided evidence that satisfied at least one-third, but less than two-thirds, of the related controls.
Examples of BFS not fully implementing specific controls include:
* BFS did not ensure that an employee agreed to follow the bureau's IT security rules before receiving a BFS laptop. As a result, the bureau was not well positioned to hold the employee accountable for not following those rules.
* BFS did not configure its security tools to identify and block unencrypted payment information resulting in an employee improperly transmitting payment information outside of the bureau.
In addition, the Treasury DOGE team did not always follow BFS's IT security rules. Specifically, an employee did not encrypt payment information sent to another agency DOGE team or obtain approval to share this information prior to sending it. This employee did not always follow the IT security rules because, as previously discussed, BFS did not implement all controls needed to ensure compliance with those rules. Until BFS fully implements controls for overseeing users with broad access to payment systems, this important information will be at greater risk of improper access, modification, disclosure, and misuse.
Why GAO Did This Study
The United States DOGE Service (USDS) was created by executive order to implement the President's goals to maximize government efficiency by modernizing technology. The order also calls for the heads of executive branch agencies to establish DOGE teams that work with USDS.
GAO was asked to review the efforts of Treasury DOGE staff to protect BFS systems. Its objectives were to (1) describe the DOGE team access to BFS payment systems, (2) evaluate the extent to which BFS implemented controls to ensure that the DOGE team followed the bureau's IT security rules, and (3) assess the extent that the DOGE team followed those rules.
In addressing its first objective, GAO summarized the preliminary results of its ongoing work describing access to payment systems. For the latter two objectives, GAO completed its audit work and is making recommendations. Specifically, GAO analyzed federal IT security guidance and identified 14 applicable controls in four areas related to managing system access and protecting sensitive information. GAO also analyzed BFS's IT security rules and evaluated documentation related to DOGE access to payment systems.
Recommendations
GAO is making six recommendations to BFS to fully implement controls with identified weaknesses, including to ensure staff agree to follow IT security rules and configure security tools to identify and block the transmission of unencrypted payment information.
BFS agreed with three of the recommendations and did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with the other three. As discussed in the report, GAO maintains the recommendations are appropriate and warranted.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Bureau of the Fiscal Service The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Commissioner of the Fiscal Service to update BFS policy to define the minimum screening requirements for obtaining broad access to Treasury payment system data. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Bureau of the Fiscal Service The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Commissioner of the Fiscal Service to update BFS policy to require employees to take IT security and privacy training before obtaining broad access to Treasury payment systems. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Bureau of the Fiscal Service The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Commissioner of the Fiscal Service to establish and implement a process for verifying that employees sign BFS IT security rules of behavior prior to receiving broad access to payment systems. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Bureau of the Fiscal Service The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Commissioner of the Fiscal Service to establish and implement a process for verifying that broad access granted to payment systems is consistent with the level approved by the authorizing official. (Recommendation 4)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Bureau of the Fiscal Service The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Commissioner of the Fiscal Service to establish and implement processes for conducting exit interviews and obtaining signatures on post-employment documentation in cases where these cannot occur before individuals with access to payment systems leave the agency. In doing so, the Commissioner should expeditiously implement this process for the anonymized former employee discussed in this report (employee B). (Recommendation 5)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Bureau of the Fiscal Service The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Commissioner of the Fiscal Service to either (1) configure BFS's data loss prevention tool to identify and block emails containing unencrypted payment information sent outside the agency, or (2) update BFS's process for reviewing emails with unencrypted payment information to include messages sent to other federal agencies and implement the updated process. (Recommendation 6)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
See All 6 Recommendations
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108131
Department Of Government Efficiency: National Labor Relations Board Detailees Did Not Access IT Systems Between April 16 and July 25, 2025
WASHINGTON, April 28 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Department Of Government Efficiency: National Labor Relations Board Detailees Did Not Access IT Systems Between April 16 and July 25, 2025
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Fast Facts
We reviewed U.S. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) access to IT systems at the National Labor Relations Board.
The Board entered into an agreement for DOGE to be detailed there from April 16-July 25, 2025. DOGE then requested and was granted access to the IT systems. We found no evidence that DOGE accessed the systems during the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 28 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Department Of Government Efficiency: National Labor Relations Board Detailees Did Not Access IT Systems Between April 16 and July 25, 2025 * Fast Facts We reviewed U.S. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) access to IT systems at the National Labor Relations Board. The Board entered into an agreement for DOGE to be detailed there from April 16-July 25, 2025. DOGE then requested and was granted access to the IT systems. We found no evidence that DOGE accessed the systems during theagreement period.
On April 14, 2025, a Board staff member told Congress that one or more DOGE personnel unlawfully accessed the IT systems in March 2025. The Board told us its Inspector General is investigating this allegation. We looked at the agreement period to avoid overlapping with the IG investigation.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) administers and enforces the National Labor Relations Act. The Act encourages the practice of collective bargaining, protects the rights of employees in this area, and seeks to eliminate unfair labor practices. To do so, the Board relies on a host of IT systems to carry out its functions, including seven human resources systems.
According to NLRB officials, the United States DOGE Service (USDS) (formerly known as the United States Digital Service and now commonly referred to as DOGE) first contacted them on April 15, 2025. Subsequently, USDS staff met with NLRB's Chairman, Acting General Counsel, and other senior Board leaders on April 16, 2025. That same day, NLRB entered into agreements for two General Services Administration employees to be detailed to NLRB as DOGE team staff. The agreements expired on July 25, 2025.
The DOGE team requested access to NLRB systems but did not use them. Specifically, both DOGE team staff requested access to all seven of the Board's human resources systems. Board staff then (1) fulfilled two of those access requests but (2) did not fulfill the other five. Specifically:
* Two fulfilled requests. According to NLRB officials, the Board created accounts on April 24, 2025, for both team members that addressed two of the seven requests for system access. However, DOGE team staff did not use the accounts to enter the systems. Specifically, as of July 25, 2025, the team staff had not picked up their NLRB laptops or activated their system accounts, according to Board officials. Accordingly, NLRB disabled the system accounts shortly after the agreements with team staff expired.
* Five requests that were not fulfilled. Requests for access to the remaining five systems were not completed because the DOGE team staff did not pick up the laptops needed for the Board to provide them with such access.
GAO found no evidence that DOGE team staff accessed any of these systems between April 16, 2025, and July 25, 2025. To determine this, GAO reviewed the sign-in activity of the logs for the DOGE team members' accounts used to access NLRB network resources and did not identify any sign-ins during the specified timeframes.
Why GAO Did This Study
USDS was created by executive order to implement the President's goals to maximize government efficiency by modernizing technology. The executive order also calls for the heads of executive branch agencies to establish DOGE teams that work with USDS.
On April 14, 2025, an NLRB IT staff member disclosed to Congress allegations that one or more DOGE team members arrived in March 2025 and unlawfully accessed the Board's case management systems and allowed potential foreign actors to exfiltrate or steal data. The following day, a news outlet publicly reported on these allegations. According to NLRB, the Board's Inspector General is investigating these allegations.
GAO was asked to review the systems and information NLRB's DOGE team accessed at the Board. This report describes the NLRB systems that the DOGE team had been provided access to and how, if at all, the team used those systems.
To address the objective, GAO focused on DOGE team access to NLRB systems between April 16, 2025, and July 25, 2025 (start and end dates for the agreements to detail DOGE team staff to NLRB). GAO did not review DOGE team access prior to April 16, 2025, to not overlap with the NLRB Inspector General's investigation.
GAO reviewed system access request forms and NLRB approval communications to determine the level of access that the DOGE team was authorized to receive for each system. GAO also interviewed NLRB staff regarding what level of access they provided for each system to the team. GAO reviewed NLRB sign-in activity of the logs for the accounts used to access agency network resources.
The NLRB did not have any comments on the report.
For more information, contact Marisol Cruz Cain at CruzCainM@gao.gov.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108774
Payment Integrity: Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186 Billion in Fiscal Year 2025
WASHINGTON, April 27 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Payment Integrity: Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186 Billion in Fiscal Year 2025
*
Fast Facts
In this Q&A, we report on improper payments-those that shouldn't have been made or were made in the incorrect amount.
In FY 2025, 15 federal agencies reported a total estimate of about $186 billion in improper payments across 64 programs, an increase of $24 billion from the prior fiscal year. Most of these improper payments were a result of overpayments.
Improper payments ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 27 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Payment Integrity: Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186 Billion in Fiscal Year 2025 * Fast Facts In this Q&A, we report on improper payments-those that shouldn't have been made or were made in the incorrect amount. In FY 2025, 15 federal agencies reported a total estimate of about $186 billion in improper payments across 64 programs, an increase of $24 billion from the prior fiscal year. Most of these improper payments were a result of overpayments. Improper paymentshave been a government-wide issue for more than 20 years, with estimates since FY 2003 at about $3 trillion.
A United States Treasury check with a one-hundred-dollar bill.
Highlights
What GAO Found
For fiscal year 2025, 15 agencies' estimated improper payments totaled about $186 billion across 64 programs. This represented about $24 billion more in improper payment estimates in fiscal year 2025 than in the prior fiscal year. Agencies reported that about $153 billion (approximately 82 percent) of this total was the result of overpayments. However, these estimates do not represent the full extent of government-wide improper payments. For instance, the $186 billion does not include certain programs that agencies have determined are susceptible to significant improper payments, such as the Department of Health and Human Services' Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Of the programs reporting improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2025, 19 reported improper payment rate estimates of at least 10 percent, including six programs whose rates exceeded 25 percent.
Programs Reporting the Largest Percentage of Government-Wide Improper Payments Estimates for Fiscal Year 2025
Note: For more details, see fig. 2 in GAO-26-108694. Percentages in the figure do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.
The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) requires the inspector general (IG) at each executive branch agency to annually report on the agency's compliance with applicable PIIA criteria. According to these IGs, half of the 24 agencies reporting the majority (99 percent) of the federal government's improper payment estimates in fiscal year 2024 fully complied with PIIA criteria and related Office of Management and Budget requirements. The IGs found that the other 12 agencies did not comply with at least one criterion in fiscal year 2024. IGs made recommendations to address noncompliance related to inadequate risk assessments for five agencies and unreliable estimates for seven agencies.
Why GAO Did This Study
Improper payments-those that should not have been made or were made in incorrect amounts-have consistently been a government-wide issue. Since fiscal year 2003, cumulative improper payment estimates by executive branch agencies have totaled about $3 trillion, though the actual amount may be much higher. Reducing improper payments is critical to safeguarding federal funds. GAO performed this audit in connection with the statutory requirement for GAO to audit the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements. This report provides an overview of federal agencies' improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2025. Additionally, it discusses agencies' compliance with requirements for reporting and managing improper payments in fiscal year 2024 as well as the recommendations that IGs made to the agencies to improve compliance.
Recommendations
GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to Congress and agencies to help reduce improper payments government-wide. For example, in March 2022, GAO recommended 10 matters for congressional consideration to enhance transparency and accountability of federal spending. As of April 2026, nine of these 10 matters remain open.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108694
Payment Integrity: Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186 Billion in Fiscal Year 2025
WASHINGTON, April 27 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Payment Integrity: Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186 Billion in Fiscal Year 2025
*
Fast Facts
In this Q&A, we report on improper payments-those that shouldn't have been made or were made in the incorrect amount.
In FY 2025, 15 federal agencies reported a total estimate of about $186 billion in improper payments across 64 programs, an increase of $24 billion from the prior fiscal year. Most of these improper payments were a result of overpayments.
Improper payments ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 27 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Payment Integrity: Agencies' Estimated Improper Payments Increased to $186 Billion in Fiscal Year 2025 * Fast Facts In this Q&A, we report on improper payments-those that shouldn't have been made or were made in the incorrect amount. In FY 2025, 15 federal agencies reported a total estimate of about $186 billion in improper payments across 64 programs, an increase of $24 billion from the prior fiscal year. Most of these improper payments were a result of overpayments. Improper paymentshave been a government-wide issue for more than 20 years, with estimates since FY 2003 at about $3 trillion.
A United States Treasury check with a one-hundred-dollar bill.
Highlights
What GAO Found
For fiscal year 2025, 15 agencies' estimated improper payments totaled about $186 billion across 64 programs. This represented about $24 billion more in improper payment estimates in fiscal year 2025 than in the prior fiscal year. Agencies reported that about $153 billion (approximately 82 percent) of this total was the result of overpayments. However, these estimates do not represent the full extent of government-wide improper payments. For instance, the $186 billion does not include certain programs that agencies have determined are susceptible to significant improper payments, such as the Department of Health and Human Services' Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Of the programs reporting improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2025, 19 reported improper payment rate estimates of at least 10 percent, including six programs whose rates exceeded 25 percent.
Programs Reporting the Largest Percentage of Government-Wide Improper Payments Estimates for Fiscal Year 2025
Note: For more details, see fig. 2 in GAO-26-108694. Percentages in the figure do not sum to 100 percent due to rounding.
The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) requires the inspector general (IG) at each executive branch agency to annually report on the agency's compliance with applicable PIIA criteria. According to these IGs, half of the 24 agencies reporting the majority (99 percent) of the federal government's improper payment estimates in fiscal year 2024 fully complied with PIIA criteria and related Office of Management and Budget requirements. The IGs found that the other 12 agencies did not comply with at least one criterion in fiscal year 2024. IGs made recommendations to address noncompliance related to inadequate risk assessments for five agencies and unreliable estimates for seven agencies.
Why GAO Did This Study
Improper payments-those that should not have been made or were made in incorrect amounts-have consistently been a government-wide issue. Since fiscal year 2003, cumulative improper payment estimates by executive branch agencies have totaled about $3 trillion, though the actual amount may be much higher. Reducing improper payments is critical to safeguarding federal funds. GAO performed this audit in connection with the statutory requirement for GAO to audit the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements. This report provides an overview of federal agencies' improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2025. Additionally, it discusses agencies' compliance with requirements for reporting and managing improper payments in fiscal year 2024 as well as the recommendations that IGs made to the agencies to improve compliance.
Recommendations
GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to Congress and agencies to help reduce improper payments government-wide. For example, in March 2022, GAO recommended 10 matters for congressional consideration to enhance transparency and accountability of federal spending. As of April 2026, nine of these 10 matters remain open.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108694
Industrial Security: Improved Risk Management and Stakeholder Engagement Needed to Help DOD Address Mission Gaps
WASHINGTON, April 24 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Industrial Security: Improved Risk Management and Stakeholder Engagement Needed to Help DOD Address Mission Gaps
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Fast Facts
DOD's Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency ensures that contractors are properly accessing and storing classified information. However, this agency conducts less than 40% of its required inspections of contractor facilities, which puts this classified information at risk.
This agency also struggles with things like a small workforce and an inadequate ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 24 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Industrial Security: Improved Risk Management and Stakeholder Engagement Needed to Help DOD Address Mission Gaps * Fast Facts DOD's Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency ensures that contractors are properly accessing and storing classified information. However, this agency conducts less than 40% of its required inspections of contractor facilities, which puts this classified information at risk. This agency also struggles with things like a small workforce and an inadequateIT system. For example, its current IT system doesn't have the analytic capabilities the agency would need to more easily identify risks and regional trends.
We made recommendations to help the agency address this and other issues to better protect national security information.
Pen over a paper stamped classified.
Highlights
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2025, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) conducted over 4,600 security reviews. The agency also documented over 800 security violations (see figure) and over 1,000 open security vulnerabilities associated with cleared contractor facilities. To conduct its industrial security mission, DCSA relied on over 470 industrial security mission personnel and spent over $160 million in fiscal year 2025.
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) Documented 815 Security Violations by Category Type, Fiscal Year 2025
Note: Security violations are incidents where a contractor fails to comply with the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual's policies and procedures that could reasonably result in the loss or compromise of classified information. For example, data spills are when classified information appears, or "spills," onto an unclassified system. Security vulnerabilities are identified weaknesses in a contractor's industrial security program that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to classified information or information systems accredited to process classified information.
DCSA has taken steps to manage risk with the industrial security mission. These include efforts to identify, assess, and respond to risk. However, DCSA has not addressed gaps to fully assess and respond to risks to its operational activities in line with DOD guidance on risk management. For example, DCSA has not identified and developed analytic capabilities to better support field operators' assessments of risk at the regional level. With such capabilities, the agency could identify the most significant regional trends affecting its overall performance objectives.
Further, DCSA began an initiative in 2019-the National Access Elsewhere Security Oversight Center (NAESOC)-aimed at mitigating risk partly through the reduction of workload on regional officials. However, participants in all 12 of the focus groups GAO conducted reported on the center's insufficient staffing, limited risk mitigation, and industry dissatisfaction. According to DCSA officials, the agency has not comprehensively assessed the NAESOC risk response effort, including identifying its resourcing needs and outcome-oriented performance goals. Doing so would be in line with DOD risk guidance to conduct regular assessments on risk responses.
Finally, DCSA identified challenges with its current industrial security data system of record and has begun developing a replacement. However, DCSA has not continuously engaged its end-users-DCSA regional and military department officials-throughout the development process, to include requirements development and other stages prior to testing. Without doing this, DCSA risks developing a replacement system with ongoing challenges.
Why GAO Did This Study
Foreign entities continue to attempt to illicitly obtain classified information and technology from industry thousands of times a year. DCSA, a Department of Defense (DOD) component, administers the DOD portion of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP), with the purpose of protecting classified information released to federal contractors, among others. DCSA has responsibility for ensuring that contractors properly access and store classified content for an estimated 90 to 95 percent of U.S. classified contracts across the federal government.
House Report 118-125 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's administration of the NISP. This report addresses (1) the funding, personnel, and training DCSA dedicates to perform its industrial security mission, and the extent to which DCSA (2) has managed risks within the NISP's core operational activities and (3) is addressing challenges with the National Industrial Security System.
GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from DCSA, the military service components, and the National Archives and Records Administration. GAO also conducted a series of focus groups with 80 selected DCSA regional personnel who conduct industrial security operations.
Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations to DOD, including that the department provide enhanced analytic tools for regional operators; assess the NAESOC risk response effort; and ensure ongoing stakeholder feedback during the development of its new system of record. DOD concurred with the recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, should ensure that the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency identifies and develops enhanced analytic tools for field operators to better support their assessments of risk at the regional level. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security implements a risk response plan with specific actions to address the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency-identified risk of a limited workforce for industrial security. Such actions could include, as appropriate, changing the periodicity of security reviews to align with DOD's overall risk appetite in the mission area, sharing more industrial security responsibilities with the military departments, or other steps that DOD deems appropriate to address the risks to industrial security. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, should ensure that the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency comprehensively assesses the NAESOC risk response effort, including identifying its resourcing and personnel needs, establishing outcome-oriented performance goals, and evaluating its organizational alignment with other directorates. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, should ensure that the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency continuously engages with relevant stakeholders-including regional DCSA, military department, and industry officials-throughout the development process for NI2, to include requirements development and other stages prior to testing. In doing so, the department should revisit the Capability Needs Statement with relevant stakeholders to validate that it meets their needs, and update it, if necessary. (Recommendation 4)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107861
Weapon System Sustainment: DOD Identified Critical Cost Growth, and the Army Should Take Action to Yield Cost Savings
WASHINGTON, April 23 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Weapon System Sustainment: DOD Identified Critical Cost Growth, and the Army Should Take Action to Yield Cost Savings
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Fast Facts
The Department of Defense spends billions of dollars annually to operate and sustain its aircraft, ships, and combat vehicles. And sustaining these weapon systems over their lifetime is costly.
We looked at DOD's sustainment reviews and related cost estimates. While DOD has taken action to address some critical cost increases, more could be done. For example, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 23 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Weapon System Sustainment: DOD Identified Critical Cost Growth, and the Army Should Take Action to Yield Cost Savings * Fast Facts The Department of Defense spends billions of dollars annually to operate and sustain its aircraft, ships, and combat vehicles. And sustaining these weapon systems over their lifetime is costly. We looked at DOD's sustainment reviews and related cost estimates. While DOD has taken action to address some critical cost increases, more could be done. For example,the Army hasn't completed a software update for all units of a weapon system mounted on combat vehicles. Updating the software on all of the units could save over $130 million and ensure they operate effectively over the next 30 years.
Our recommendation addresses this issue.
The Army's Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station Needs Software Updates
A person looking into a military machine that has a gun on top and a few different sized lenses.
Highlights
What GAO Found
Operating and support (O&S) costs are comprised of costs for repair parts, maintenance activities, contract services, and personnel. The Department of Defense (DOD) identified 14 systems with critical O&S cost growth out of 36 weapon system sustainment reviews it conducted for fiscal years 2023 and 2024. This critical O&S cost growth represents at least a 25 percent increase in the cost estimate for the remainder of a system's life cycle compared with its most recent independent cost estimate, or at least a 50 percent increase compared with the original baseline cost estimate. GAO identified common causes DOD reported for the critical O&S cost growth for the 14 systems, such as extensions to operational life.
Weapon System Sustainment Reviews with Reported Critical Operating and Support Cost Growth and Causes, Fiscal Years 2023 and 20224
Note: Weapon systems experienced critical O&S cost growth in either Category A (growth is at least 25 percent more than the estimate documented in the most recent independent cost estimate for the system) or Category B (growth is at least 50 percent more than the original baseline cost estimate for the system).
DOD has taken some actions to address critical O&S cost growth identified in fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2022. However, GAO found the Army has not fully completed a software update that it reported would remediate a top maintenance issue for its Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS). Doing so would yield cost savings that GAO estimates would be more than $130 million over the program's remaining approximately 30 years of life. Without ensuring that its units implement the software update identified in the CROWS remediation plan on a timely basis, the Army is missing an opportunity to address a top maintenance issue affecting this weapon system and to achieve a cost savings of more than $130 million over the remaining life of the program.
DOD identified challenges in conducting sustainment reviews and determining O&S cost growth. GAO found that DOD has taken steps to address challenges, such as revising guidance to correct cost estimating data deficiencies.
Why GAO Did This Study
DOD spends tens of billions of dollars to sustain its weapon systems. O&S costs are about 70 percent of a system's total life-cycle cost. In response to a statutory provision, DOD has been required to annually submit sustainment reviews that include O&S cost estimates and the reasons for any critical cost growth, although the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 eliminated the requirement for DOD to include the O&S cost growth information in its sustainment reports.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's annual sustainment reviews and O&S cost estimates through 2025. This report, the final one to be submitted under this statutory requirement, evaluates the extent to which DOD (1) identified critical O&S cost growth in its fiscal years 2023 and 2024 weapon system sustainment reviews and the causes of that growth, (2) has taken actions to address the critical O&S cost growth identified in the fiscal years 2021 and 2022 sustainment reviews, and (3) has taken steps to identify challenges and improve the sustainment review process.
GAO analyzed DOD guidance and weapon system sustainment reviews DOD conducted in fiscal years 2023 and 2024 and cost savings initiatives identified in the fiscal years 2021 and 2022 reviews and interviewed DOD officials who conducted the reviews.
Recommendations
GAO is making one recommendation to the Army to ensure that its units implement the software update identified in the Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station remediation plan on a timely basis. DOD agreed with the recommendation.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of the Army The Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Chief of Staff of the Army, should ensure that the Army's units implement the software update identified in the CROWS remediation plan on a timely basis. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108140
Federal Budget: Remaining Budget Authority from the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023
WASHINGTON, April 23 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Federal Budget: Remaining Budget Authority from the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023
*
Fast Facts
The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 authorized trillions of dollars to federal agencies to obligate-i.e., commit to pay for goods and services-during FY 2023 and beyond.
10 agencies are responsible for obligating most of this money. These agencies are the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 23 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Federal Budget: Remaining Budget Authority from the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 * Fast Facts The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 authorized trillions of dollars to federal agencies to obligate-i.e., commit to pay for goods and services-during FY 2023 and beyond. 10 agencies are responsible for obligating most of this money. These agencies are the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development,Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security Administration.
As of September 30, 2025, these agencies had obligated over 98% of these funds.
A pile of U.S. paper money of different denominations with a magnifying glass over the great seal on the back of the $1.
Highlights
What GAO Found
Every year, Congress appropriates funds to support federal activities and address national priorities. Congress generally appropriates funding, or budget authority, to an agency for use during a specific period, known as the period of availability. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 authorized trillions of dollars to federal agencies to obligate, or commit to pay for goods and services, during fiscal year 2023 and beyond.
GAO found that 156 of the 258 appropriation accounts in GAO's review of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 had budget authority available for obligation in fiscal year 2026 or later, as of September 30, 2025. These accounts had approximately $20.9 billion in unobligated budget authority, or about 1.97 percent of the approximately $1 trillion initially appropriated that had a period of availability of fiscal year 2026 or later. The unobligated budget authority is unexpired, and is comprised of multiple periods of availability (see table).
* * *
Table: Unobligated Budget Authority from the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 by Period of Availability, for Selected Agencies
Period of availability ... Budget authority provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (USD) ... Unobligated budget authority as of September 30, 2025 (USD) ... Unobligated budget authority as a proportion (%)
2026 ... $25,370,407,254 ... $1,705,579,606 ... 6.72%
2027 ... $60,291,452,000 ... $9,033,188,722 ... 14.98%
Indefinite ... $980,222,929,895 ... $10,208,442,784 ... 1.04%
Total ... $1,065,884,789,149 ... $20,947,211,112 ... 1.97%
* * *
Source: GAO analysis of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 and data from the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security Administration. | GAO-26-108476
Detailed information about the amount of unobligated budget authority by appropriation account is in a downloadable dataset, which can be accessed via a link on this page.
Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to identify any remaining budget authority provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 that is unexpired and still available for obligation. This report provides information on these amounts still available to selected agencies to obligate in fiscal year 2026 or later, and key characteristics, such as the appropriation account name; type of budget authority; and the associated programs, projects, or activities.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 to select the 10 federal agencies with the largest amount of budget authority potentially available for obligation in fiscal year 2026 or later. These agencies are the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, and the Social Security Administration, and represent 258 appropriation accounts that included budget authority available for obligation in fiscal year 2026 or later.
GAO used a data collection instrument to collect the amount of unobligated budget authority from the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 in each appropriation account and related information from the 10 selected agencies. In some cases, GAO conducted follow-up interviews with agency officials to gain additional clarity on the data and information they provided. GAO analyzed the data to calculate summary statistics and to populate a downloadable dataset.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108476
Federal Housing Finance Agency: Improvements Needed in Controls over Financial Statement Review Process
WASHINGTON, April 23 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Federal Housing Finance Agency: Improvements Needed in Controls over Financial Statement Review Process
*
Fast Facts
Each year, we audit the Federal Housing Finance Agency's financial statements.
During our 2025 audit, we found a problem with FHFA's controls that could lead to the financial statements not conforming to federal accounting standards.
Specifically, FHFA had major workforce reductions during FY 2025. We found that it didn't initially determine that related costs-such ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 23 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Federal Housing Finance Agency: Improvements Needed in Controls over Financial Statement Review Process * Fast Facts Each year, we audit the Federal Housing Finance Agency's financial statements. During our 2025 audit, we found a problem with FHFA's controls that could lead to the financial statements not conforming to federal accounting standards. Specifically, FHFA had major workforce reductions during FY 2025. We found that it didn't initially determine that related costs-suchas voluntary separation incentive payments-should be reported separately.
Better guidance can help ensure that FHFA's financial statements are accurate and reported as required. Our recommendation addresses this issue.
Federal Housing Finance Agency logo
Highlights
What GAO Found
During GAO's audits of the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) fiscal year 2025 financial statements, GAO identified a deficiency in FHFA's controls over its review of its financial statements for conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles that represents a new significant deficiency in FHFA's internal control over financial reporting. GAO also found that FHFA completed corrective actions to address seven of the nine recommendations from prior reports that remained open as of September 30, 2024. In conjunction with the recommendations it addressed, FHFA resolved the significant deficiency in controls over its review of accounts payable accruals that GAO reported as a result of its 2024 audits.
Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2026, GAO reported on the results of its audits of FHFA's fiscal year 2025 financial statements and the deficiency in FHFA's internal controls. This report presents (1) the deficiency GAO identified during its fiscal year 2025 audit, along with the related recommendation to address this deficiency, and (2) the status of FHFA's corrective actions to address recommendations related to internal control over financial reporting deficiencies identified in prior reports that remained open as of September 30, 2024. As part of its fiscal year 2025 audits, GAO reviewed FHFA policies and procedures; interviewed FHFA management and staff; observed controls in operation; and tested controls to determine whether FHFA effectively designed, implemented, and operated these controls. GAO also followed up on the status of FHFA's corrective actions to address open recommendations related to internal control over financial reporting deficiencies that GAO identified in prior reports.
Recommendations
GAO is making one recommendation. Specifically, GAO recommends that FHFA update its financial statement review procedures to include guidance to consider the potential effect of significant changes in transactions on the presentation of FHFA's financial statements. FHFA disagreed that there is a deficiency that requires revision to existing procedures. As discussed in the report, GAO maintains that its recommendation would reduce FHFA's risk of misstating its financial statements.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Housing Finance Agency The Director of FHFA should update FHFA's financial statement review procedures to include specific guidance for financial reporting personnel to consider the potential effect of significant changes in the magnitude or types of transactions on the presentation of information in FHFA's financial statements. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108895
Navy And Coast Guard Shipbuilding: A Disciplined, Strategy-Driven Approach Is Needed to Achieve Ambitious Goals
WASHINGTON, April 22 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Navy And Coast Guard Shipbuilding: A Disciplined, Strategy-Driven Approach Is Needed to Achieve Ambitious Goals
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Fast Facts
We testified before Congress on Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding challenges.
Our testimony is largely based on:
Shipbuilding and Repair: Navy Needs a Strategic Approach for Private Sector Industrial Base Investments
Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before Buying More Ships
Navy Shipbuilding: Increased Use of Leading Design Practices ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 22 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Navy And Coast Guard Shipbuilding: A Disciplined, Strategy-Driven Approach Is Needed to Achieve Ambitious Goals * Fast Facts We testified before Congress on Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding challenges. Our testimony is largely based on: Shipbuilding and Repair: Navy Needs a Strategic Approach for Private Sector Industrial Base Investments Offshore Patrol Cutter: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before Buying More Ships Navy Shipbuilding: Increased Use of Leading Design PracticesCould Improve Timeliness of Deliveries
Additionally, we shared preliminary observations from our ongoing work about the timeliness and cost of Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding efforts, and the shipbuilding trades workforce. Further, we reviewed Department of Defense and Navy investments in strengthening the submarine-building industry and recommended that DOD address issues we found.
We also reported on the Navy and Coast Guard's progress in addressing our prior shipbuilding recommendations.
The U.S. Capitol building with the text, GAO Testimony to Congress.
Highlights
What GAO Found
Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding programs have consistently fallen short of expectations over the last 2 decades. Collectively, they are billions of dollars over cost and years behind schedule. For example, the Navy's Constellation class frigate program was overcome by issues. As a result, the Navy announced a strategic shift away from the program in 2025-having previously exercised contract options valued at over $3 billion dollars. Similarly, the Coast Guard paused work on two ships and terminated two other ships in its Offshore Patrol Cutter program after a more than 5-year delay in delivering the lead ship.
Constellation Class Frigate and Offshore Patrol Cutter
Proposed solutions by federal officials have included reorganizing how shipbuilding programs are managed, increasing shipbuilder workforce wages, and finalizing ship designs before beginning construction, among others. While there is no singular solution, implementing leading practices and GAO's prior recommendations could help ensure smoother sailing.
For example, ensuring that new ship design efforts, such as the Navy's planned new attack submarine program, fully leverage ship design practices used by leading companies will be critical to long-term success. This would include practices like iterative design based on user feedback, completing ship design before beginning construction, and using digital tools. (See GAO-24-105503.)
Additionally, the shipbuilding industrial base-the private companies that build or supply the parts for ships-has not met the government's submarine construction goals in recent years. GAO's analysis of the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to invest in the submarine industrial base to improve its capacity found shortcomings. For example, DOD does not know how much funding it expects to need-beyond the more than $10 billion DOD already invested-to solve submarine industrial base challenges such as ensuring needed parts get delivered on time. Without this understanding, decision-makers may not have the information needed to balance funding for the submarine industrial base with other shipbuilding priorities. Further, DOD has not taken key steps to ensure oversight for some of its costliest submarine industrial base investments. Without improvements, such as documented project monitoring, DOD cannot ensure those taxpayer dollars are helping achieve its goals as cost effectively as possible. These findings can provide lessons learned for the Navy, Coast Guard, and other federal agencies in their efforts to build up the maritime industrial base.
Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. is in a period of heightened emphasis on improving shipbuilding to tackle pressing national security demands. The Navy and Coast Guard spend billions to procure ships each year and have ambitious plans to build new ships. GAO has reported for decades on the persistent issues that plague these shipbuilding programs and has made more than 100 recommendations to address them.
This statement addresses (1) the state of Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding; (2) key challenges the Navy and Coast Guard need to address to achieve their ambitious shipbuilding goals; and (3) DOD's efforts to support the submarine industrial base and the lessons that can be derived for future maritime industrial base investments.
This statement is based on prior and ongoing GAO work. In addition, GAO is issuing the results of its analysis of DOD's management of submarine industrial base investments in this testimony statement. To perform this work, GAO analyzed relevant Navy and Coast Guard documentation and interviewed knowledgeable officials.
Recommendations
GAO is making two new recommendations to DOD to assess the full scope of investments needed to expand the submarine industrial base in support of the Navy's construction goals and to improve oversight of these investments. DOD agreed with our recommendations.
Additionally, since 2016, GAO has made 92 recommendations to the Navy and 45 to the Coast guard to help improve their shipbuilding programs. Of these, many have yet to be addressed. GAO will continue to monitor each agency's progress in addressing the recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Submarine Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager assesses the full cost and schedule of investments expected to be needed to expand the submarine industrial base to a state that it can support the Navy's submarine construction goal of producing one Columbia and two Virginia class submarines annually. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Submarine Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment consistently document and implement oversight processes for all submarine industrial base investments. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-109068
Multimodal Freight Office: DOT Should Report to Congress on Progress Toward Meeting Statutory Requirements
WASHINGTON, April 20 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Multimodal Freight Office: DOT Should Report to Congress on Progress Toward Meeting Statutory Requirements
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Fast Facts
Reliable, timely freight transportation is vital to the U.S. economy. In 2024, 20 billion tons of freight moved over a large, interconnected network of roads, rail, waterways, pipelines, and airways.
A 2021 law created an office in the Department of Transportation to help improve freight mobility. Among other things, the law required the office to update the National ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 20 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Multimodal Freight Office: DOT Should Report to Congress on Progress Toward Meeting Statutory Requirements * Fast Facts Reliable, timely freight transportation is vital to the U.S. economy. In 2024, 20 billion tons of freight moved over a large, interconnected network of roads, rail, waterways, pipelines, and airways. A 2021 law created an office in the Department of Transportation to help improve freight mobility. Among other things, the law required the office to update the NationalFreight Strategic Plan-which it's doing. But DOT hasn't reported on the office's activities to Congress since 2023.
We recommended DOT do so to ensure Congress has the information it needs to make decisions about the office.
Freight Containers That Can Be Used on Multiple Modes of Transportation
Freight container being loaded onto a train car
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 (IIJA) required the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to establish the Office of Multimodal Freight Infrastructure and Policy (Multimodal Freight Office, or Office). Its responsibilities include coordinating with other agencies, states, and the private sector; assisting cities and states to improve freight mobility; and carrying out the goals of the national multimodal freight policy.
The IIJA directs the Multimodal Freight Office to administer certain policies and programs, such as developing and managing the National Freight Strategic Plan and the National Multimodal Freight Network, which connects highways, railroads, and maritime routes. DOT has taken steps toward meeting almost all of its statutory requirements. For example, DOT plans to release an updated National Freight Strategic Plan in 2026 and is updating the National Multimodal Freight Network.
U.S. National Multimodal Freight Network
DOT has not completed one of the office's statutory requirements-periodically reporting to Congress on the activities of the Multimodal Freight Office. Officials stated that the Office had not done so because it had limited staff and was focused on other activities. While the Office briefed congressional staff in 2023, without periodic reporting, Congress has limited visibility into the activities the Office has conducted since then. Having recent information is important as Congress considers how the Office could support federal surface transportation programs, and any potential legislation related to the upcoming reauthorization.
To prevent potential duplication when forming the Multimodal Freight Office, DOT formed a task force in 2023 to review multimodal freight responsibilities across the department. The task force established complementary roles between the office and other DOT administrations, according to DOT officials. DOT officials and transportation industry associations GAO met with said they found the Office helpful as a single point of contact able to respond to freight-related incidents and could help address freight issues, such as the nationwide shortage of truck parking for commercial drivers.
Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. freight transportation network is vital to the nation, moving over 20 billion tons of freight in 2024 over an extensive, interconnected network. DOT is responsible for ensuring the safe, efficient, and reliable movement of freight over this network. The IIJA included a provision for GAO to review the activities of the Multimodal Freight Office.
This report examines (1) the progress DOT has made in meeting its statutory requirements related to the Multimodal Freight Office and (2) how DOT identified and managed any areas of duplication and improved efficiency for freight issues across the department when establishing the Multimodal Freight Office.
GAO interviewed DOT officials on steps taken toward meeting the statutory requirements. GAO analyzed internal DOT documents on the agency's activities to manage any duplication and improve efficiency in multimodal freight efforts when establishing the Multimodal Freight Office. GAO also interviewed DOT operating administration officials; four stakeholders from the trucking, railroad, air, and maritime freight transportation industries; and one state transportation association on their views on activities of the office. GAO selected these stakeholders, as they represent the major modes of freight transportation in the U.S., per DOT's draft National Multimodal Freight Network.
Recommendations
GAO is making one recommendation for DOT to report to Congress with updates on the activities of the Multimodal Freight Office. DOT agreed with the recommendation.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Transportation The Secretary of Transportation should report to Congress on the activities of the Multimodal Freight Office since September 2023, including updates of descriptions of the programs and activities administered or overseen by the Office, such as freight-related grants, and current and future staffing levels. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108554
Congressional Review Act: Agencies and Congress Could Improve Implementation of 60-Day Delay for Major Rules
WASHINGTON, April 16 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Congressional Review Act: Agencies and Congress Could Improve Implementation of 60-Day Delay for Major Rules
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Fast Facts
The Congressional Review Act requires a 60-day delay before most major rules can take effect-to help ensure that Congress can review them first. The 60 days begin when the rule is published or when Congress receives a printed report from the agency that issued it, whichever is later.
We found that from January 2021 to January 2025, agencies provided less than the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 16 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Congressional Review Act: Agencies and Congress Could Improve Implementation of 60-Day Delay for Major Rules * Fast Facts The Congressional Review Act requires a 60-day delay before most major rules can take effect-to help ensure that Congress can review them first. The 60 days begin when the rule is published or when Congress receives a printed report from the agency that issued it, whichever is later. We found that from January 2021 to January 2025, agencies provided less than therequired 60-day delay for about a quarter of the major rules they issued.
Officials from the 4 agencies in our review said it was hard to set dates for rules because they were uncertain about what counts as the date Congress receives them.
Our recommendations address this.
U.S. Capitol building under a bright blue sky.
Highlights
What GAO Found
For about a quarter of the major rules issued from January 21, 2021, to January 20, 2025 (119 of 462 rules), agencies published effective dates inconsistent with the Congressional Review Act's (CRA) 60-day waiting period. The waiting period begins when the Federal Register has published the rule or the House and the Senate have received paper copies, whichever is later, and does not apply under certain exceptions, such as when agencies claim good cause.
Example of 60-Day Delay for a Major Rule
The CRA requires rules to be received by Congress but does not further define what constitutes receipt by Congress or establish what must occur for the House and the Senate to receive a rule. Officials from all four agencies described challenges with understanding what counts as the date Congress receives copies of rules. Amending the CRA to be more precise about the date of receipt, such as by specifying that receipt occurs when agencies deliver rules to an identified office or location, would help allay the confusion agencies face. Doing so would promote the CRA's goal of ensuring a specific minimum delay in the effective dates of major rules.
Department of Energy (DOE) officials told GAO that they set effective dates for some major rules at 75 days from the date of publication in the Federal Register, instead of 60 days, which allows Congress additional time to process and receive the rules. However, no department policy formalizes this practice. GAO found that both DOE and the Department of the Treasury could have increased the number of major rules with effective dates consistent with the CRA by routinely allowing this additional time.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), unlike the other selected agencies, sometimes uses a different date to start the clock on the 60-day delay period. HHS officials told GAO that for some rules, they set the effective date 60 days from the date the Federal Register displays a version of the rule for public inspection, instead of using the date of official publication, as the CRA requires. HHS officials stated they did so because these rules are long and complex and can take weeks to process for publication. As a result, Congress had less time to consider these rules before they were put into effect.
Why GAO Did This Study
Under the CRA, rules that are likely to have large economic impacts (major rules) are subject to a 60-day waiting period before they can take effect. In previous reports, GAO found that agencies frequently set effective dates (i.e., the dates when rules are to take effect) earlier than allowed by the CRA.
GAO was asked to examine agencies' implementation of the CRA's 60-day delay for major rules. This report examines, among other issues, (1) the number of major rules issued from January 21, 2021, to January 20, 2025, with stated effective dates inconsistent with the CRA; and (2) challenges selected agencies experienced in setting dates consistent with the CRA.
GAO identified rules with stated effective dates inconsistent with the CRA using its major rule reports, the Federal Register, and the Congressional Record. GAO selected four agencies with the largest number of rules that were inconsistent with the CRA-the Department of Agriculture, DOE, HHS, and Treasury. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed agency officials on their policies and challenges they may have experienced.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that Congress consider amending the CRA to specify when rules count as received. GAO also recommends that Treasury and DOE amend their policies to increase the time between the Federal Register publication date and the stated effective date of major rules and that HHS take steps to ensure its published effective dates for major rules are consistent with the CRA. DOE did not provide comments. Treasury and HHS agreed that congressional action is needed and stated they intend to take actions consistent with our recommendations.
Matter for Congressional Consideration
Matter Status Comments
Congress should consider amending the Congressional Review Act to specify when a rule is considered received by Congress for the purposes of section 801(a)(3)(A)(i), such as by stating that rules are considered received when they are delivered to a specific office or central delivery location for each House of Congress. (Matter for Consideration 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Health and Human Services The Secretary of Health and Human Services should take steps to ensure the published effective date of rules is consistent with the CRA and other applicable statutory deadlines, in lieu of basing the effective date of the rule on the public inspection date. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Energy The Secretary of Energy should adopt a department-wide policy that, when feasible, major rules should be made effective at least 75 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Treasury The Secretary of the Treasury should adopt a department-wide policy that, when feasible, major rules should be made effective at least 75 days after the date of publication in the Federal Register. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107825
VA Health Care: Efforts to Assess Mental Health Support for Veteran Caregiver Program Need Strengthening
WASHINGTON, April 16 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
VA Health Care: Efforts to Assess Mental Health Support for Veteran Caregiver Program Need Strengthening
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Fast Facts
Veterans with serious injuries or other impairments often rely on caregivers for around-the-clock care. The Department of Veterans Affairs operates a program to support caregivers' mental health. Caregiving can be very stressful and demanding-and can cause anxiety or depression.
VA advertises its Caregiver Support Program but hasn't fully assessed how effective its outreach ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 16 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * VA Health Care: Efforts to Assess Mental Health Support for Veteran Caregiver Program Need Strengthening * Fast Facts Veterans with serious injuries or other impairments often rely on caregivers for around-the-clock care. The Department of Veterans Affairs operates a program to support caregivers' mental health. Caregiving can be very stressful and demanding-and can cause anxiety or depression. VA advertises its Caregiver Support Program but hasn't fully assessed how effective its outreachis. VA also tracks how many caregivers use virtual therapy but hasn't set goals or collected data for other services. We recommended that VA set goals, collect related data, and more to better understand whether its efforts are supporting caregivers.
A woman interacts with a man in a wheelchair.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) Caregiver Support Program offers mental health support, among other benefits, to eligible caregivers who provide around the clock care for veterans with serious injuries. This includes support groups and respite care. In fiscal year 2025, VHA data show the program served about 98,000 caregivers. In addition, VHA obligated $2.6 billion to implement the program, according to officials. VHA officials told GAO the program has grown significantly since fiscal year 2021 due in part to expanded eligibility criteria that allowed more caregivers to participate as of October 1, 2020.
Caregivers Participating in Veterans Health Administration Caregiver Support Program, Fiscal Years 2021 Through 2025
VHA advertises the Caregiver Support Program through various methods, such as email updates and brochures at Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers. Some caregivers GAO interviewed said they learned about the program through these methods. However, they wished they had learned about it sooner. They also felt other caregivers did not know about the mental health support available to them through the program.
VHA established four goals to assess whether its outreach efforts are effective at increasing caregivers' awareness of the program. One goal is to increase program enrollment by 15 percent each fiscal year. However, the other three goals, such as increasing subscribers to its email updates, do not have quantitative targets and time frames. Setting targets and time frames for these goals would better enable VHA to measure its progress in increasing awareness of the program among caregivers who are not enrolled, help the agency assess how well its outreach efforts are working, and make any needed adjustments.
VHA has also taken steps to assess how the program supports caregivers by establishing a goal to increase telehealth appointments by 10 percent in fiscal year 2025. VHA collects data on these appointments, which increased by 50 percent from fiscal year 2024 to 2025. However, the agency has not established goals and collected related data for other program services, such as other types of mental health treatment. Setting goals and collecting more complete information would better position VA to assess program performance. VHA could make any needed adjustments to further support caregivers' wellbeing, allowing it to better support veterans.
Why GAO Did This Study
Several factors, including the demands of their care duties, can affect caregivers' mental health and wellbeing. Research suggests that such caregiving can be linked to high levels of stress and burden and can result in depression or anxiety.
The Senator Elizabeth Dole 21st Century Veterans Healthcare and Benefits Improvements Act includes a provision for GAO to review mental health support provided by the VHA Caregiver Support Program. This report examines VHA's efforts to make caregivers aware of the mental health support available to them and VHA's efforts to assess program performance, among other objectives.
GAO reviewed VHA documentation and data for fiscal years 2021 through 2025. GAO also interviewed VHA officials, program staff and selected caregivers at four VA medical centers, and representatives from four organizations serving veterans and caregivers. GAO selected the medical centers based on program size, geography, and rurality. GAO selected organizations that focus on caregivers and have national reach. GAO also conducted a literature search and review of relevant research.
Recommendations
GAO is making two recommendations to VA to implement key performance management practices for the Caregiver Support Program, including setting quantitative targets and time frames for outreach goals, and setting goals and collecting relevant data to assess services the program offers to support caregivers' mental health. VA concurred with the recommendations and identified steps VHA plans to take to implement them.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Veterans Affairs The Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs should ensure the Under Secretary for Health implements key performance management practices to increase the awareness of the Caregiver Support Program by (1) establishing quantitative targets and time frames for all of its program goals, such as increasing the number of program inquiries, and (2) using these data to assess program performance and make adjustments as appropriate. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Veterans Affairs The Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs should ensure the Under Secretary for Health implements key performance management practices to assess the mental health support offered by the Caregiver Support Program by (1) establishing goals with quantitative targets and time frames for all of the mental health support offered through the program, including referrals for mental health care provided at VA medical facilities; (2) collecting performance information to measure progress towards meeting these goals, and (3) using these data to assess program performance and make adjustments as appropriate. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108070
Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Request: U.S. Government Accountability Office
WASHINGTON, April 15 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Request: U.S. Government Accountability Office
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Fast Facts
In fiscal year 2025, GAO's work yielded $62.7 billion in financial benefits for the federal government.
In this testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Legislative Branch Appropriations, Acting U.S. Comptroller General Orice Williams Brown discusses GAO's FY 2027 budget request.
Our budget request will enable GAO to continue to meet key areas of importance to Congress and the nation including fraud ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 15 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Request: U.S. Government Accountability Office * Fast Facts In fiscal year 2025, GAO's work yielded $62.7 billion in financial benefits for the federal government. In this testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Legislative Branch Appropriations, Acting U.S. Comptroller General Orice Williams Brown discusses GAO's FY 2027 budget request. Our budget request will enable GAO to continue to meet key areas of importance to Congress and the nation including fraudprevention, national security, science and technology, cybersecurity, and health care costs. These resources will also support GAO's IT evolution and critical building maintenance needs.
The U.S. Capitol and the words GAO Testimony to Congress.
Highlights
What GAO Found
GAO's work continues to make an impact. Executive branch agencies use GAO's work to improve their operations, performance, and efficiency, and Congress uses it to inform key legislative decisions. For example, consistent with GAO's recommendation to Congress, the Ending Improper Payments to Deceased People Act requires the Social Security Administration to permanently share its Death Master File with the Department of the Treasury to help prevent payments to deceased individuals. This will save millions of dollars each year.
To meet congressional demand for GAO's work, GAO is requesting $860 million in appropriated dollars for fiscal year (FY) 2027. This is a 5.9 percent increase over the FY 2026 enacted level. GAO's FY 2027 budget request also uses $50 million in offsetting receipts, for $910 million in total budget authority for the fiscal year. The FY 2027 budget request will support 3,210 full-time equivalents, a reduction of 4.2 percent compared to FY 2026 and 10.2 percent since the end of FY 2024.
With these resources, GAO will continue to focus on the priority needs of the Congress, including five key areas of importance: advancing efforts to address fraud, waste, and abuse in federal programs; evaluating national security activities; assessing the impacts of emerging science and technology issues; assessing efforts to address evolving cybersecurity threats; and analyzing health care spending.
GAO also plans to make targeted, critical investments in its information technology systems, advanced analytic capabilities, and cybersecurity. To help drive efficiency, an important focus will be increasing the use of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence.
Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's mission is to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. GAO's work spans the full breadth and scope of the federal government's responsibilities.
Congress relies on GAO's nonpartisan, objective, and high-quality work to help inform congressional deliberations as well as oversight of the executive branch. GAO routinely conducts work for the Chairs or Ranking Members of over 90 percent of all standing committees.
Since 2002, GAO's work has resulted in over $1.51 trillion in financial benefits and almost 30,800 program and operational benefits that helped create or change laws, improve public safety and other services, and promote better management throughout the government.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-900719
Combating Fraud: Challenges in Managing Fraud Risks in Federally Funded, State-Administered Programs
WASHINGTON, April 15 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Combating Fraud: Challenges in Managing Fraud Risks in Federally Funded, State-Administered Programs
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Fast Facts
We testified on managing fraud risks in federally funded, state-administered programs before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Operations.
It is based primarily on the following reports:
Fraud Risk in Federal Programs: Continuing Threat from Organized Groups Since COVID-19
COVID-19 Relief: Consequences of Fraud and Lessons ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 15 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Combating Fraud: Challenges in Managing Fraud Risks in Federally Funded, State-Administered Programs * Fast Facts We testified on managing fraud risks in federally funded, state-administered programs before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Operations. It is based primarily on the following reports: Fraud Risk in Federal Programs: Continuing Threat from Organized Groups Since COVID-19 COVID-19 Relief: Consequences of Fraud and Lessonsfor Prevention
COVID-19: Insights and Actions for Fraud Prevention
We've previously made over 200 recommendations to better manage fraud risks, but many still need to be addressed.
The U.S. Capitol building with the words GAO Testimony to Congress.
Highlights
What GAO Found
All federal programs and operations are at risk of fraud, regardless of whether they provide financial or nonfinancial benefits or delivery takes place at the federal, state, or local level. Understanding the scope of the problem is critical to combating fraud. In 2024, GAO estimated total direct annual financial losses to the government from fraud at between $233 billion and $521 billion, based on fiscal year 2018 through 2022 data. The estimate captures losses that occur at the state, local, tribal, or other government level if those losses included a federal investigative, administrative, or related action. State agencies administer federal programs, making payment, eligibility, and other decisions. In fiscal year 2025, the federal government provided an estimated $1.2 trillion to state and local governments in federal grants. The programs vary in size, but some, such as Medicaid, involve millions of beneficiaries. Decentralized program delivery such as through distributed payment and eligibility decisions can heighten the risk of fraud.
GAO has previously reported that federal and state program managers' efforts to manage fraud risks have been challenged by weak control environments, data and system limitations, and limited capacity to manage risks. For example, one state agency administering a federally funded program reported it is restricted by state and federal laws from sharing information with other programs in the state, such as information on individuals and their use of state services. This hindered the agency's ability to prevent and detect fraud within and across programs.
Federal programs, including those administered at the state level, are inherently subject to fraud risks from various entities and individuals (see fig.).
Types of Organized Fraud Groups Targeting Government Programs
Decentralized program delivery-where federal funds are distributed to grantees, subrecipients, contractors, and subcontractors-creates vulnerabilities to different types of fraud. For example, inspectors general previously reported that the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant to states faced an increased risk of fraud because of limited visibility and control over expenditures at the award recipient and subrecipient levels. Other GAO reporting has shown that, given the opportunity, organized criminal organizations, businesses, and individuals from all walks of life have sought to defraud federal programs. Certain risk factors-such as program design, culture, and personal motivation-can also increase the risk that fraudsters will target a program.
Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. federal government is one of the world's largest and most complex entities, spending trillions of dollars across a broad array of programs and operations, with a substantial percentage of this spending administered by the states. The size, scope, and complexity of the federal government create inherent risks that need to be recognized and managed properly.
Fraud is one such risk that must be managed to ensure that program delivery and taxpayer dollars are safeguarded. Every dollar or resource diverted to fraudsters hinders the federal government's ability to achieve its goals. Financial losses also place an increased burden on the government's financial outlook. Fraud also erodes public trust in government and hinders agencies' efforts to execute their missions.
This statement focuses on fraud in federally funded, state-administered programs by (1) outlining the scope of the problem and fraud risk landscape, (2) examining challenges facing federal and state agencies in combating fraud, and (3) examining fraud threats the government faces and why it is difficult to combat them. This statement is based on a body of work of selected reports that GAO issued between 2010 and 2026.
Recommendations
GAO is not making recommendations at this time. As of April 2026, GAO has made 215 recommendations to federal agencies and programs to better manage fraud risks, of which about 40 percent remain open.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-109093
Combating Fraud: Challenges in Managing Fraud Risks in Federally Funded, State-Administered Programs
WASHINGTON, April 15 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Combating Fraud: Challenges in Managing Fraud Risks in Federally Funded, State-Administered Programs
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Fast Facts
We testified on managing fraud risks in federally funded, state-administered programs before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Operations.
It is based primarily on the following reports:
Fraud Risk in Federal Programs: Continuing Threat from Organized Groups Since COVID-19
COVID-19 Relief: Consequences of Fraud and Lessons ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 15 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Combating Fraud: Challenges in Managing Fraud Risks in Federally Funded, State-Administered Programs * Fast Facts We testified on managing fraud risks in federally funded, state-administered programs before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Operations. It is based primarily on the following reports: Fraud Risk in Federal Programs: Continuing Threat from Organized Groups Since COVID-19 COVID-19 Relief: Consequences of Fraud and Lessonsfor Prevention
COVID-19: Insights and Actions for Fraud Prevention
We've previously made over 200 recommendations to better manage fraud risks, but many still need to be addressed.
The U.S. Capitol building with the words GAO Testimony to Congress.
Highlights
What GAO Found
All federal programs and operations are at risk of fraud, regardless of whether they provide financial or nonfinancial benefits or delivery takes place at the federal, state, or local level. Understanding the scope of the problem is critical to combating fraud. In 2024, GAO estimated total direct annual financial losses to the government from fraud at between $233 billion and $521 billion, based on fiscal year 2018 through 2022 data. The estimate captures losses that occur at the state, local, tribal, or other government level if those losses included a federal investigative, administrative, or related action. State agencies administer federal programs, making payment, eligibility, and other decisions. In fiscal year 2025, the federal government provided an estimated $1.2 trillion to state and local governments in federal grants. The programs vary in size, but some, such as Medicaid, involve millions of beneficiaries. Decentralized program delivery such as through distributed payment and eligibility decisions can heighten the risk of fraud.
GAO has previously reported that federal and state program managers' efforts to manage fraud risks have been challenged by weak control environments, data and system limitations, and limited capacity to manage risks. For example, one state agency administering a federally funded program reported it is restricted by state and federal laws from sharing information with other programs in the state, such as information on individuals and their use of state services. This hindered the agency's ability to prevent and detect fraud within and across programs.
Federal programs, including those administered at the state level, are inherently subject to fraud risks from various entities and individuals (see fig.).
Types of Organized Fraud Groups Targeting Government Programs
Decentralized program delivery-where federal funds are distributed to grantees, subrecipients, contractors, and subcontractors-creates vulnerabilities to different types of fraud. For example, inspectors general previously reported that the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant to states faced an increased risk of fraud because of limited visibility and control over expenditures at the award recipient and subrecipient levels. Other GAO reporting has shown that, given the opportunity, organized criminal organizations, businesses, and individuals from all walks of life have sought to defraud federal programs. Certain risk factors-such as program design, culture, and personal motivation-can also increase the risk that fraudsters will target a program.
Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. federal government is one of the world's largest and most complex entities, spending trillions of dollars across a broad array of programs and operations, with a substantial percentage of this spending administered by the states. The size, scope, and complexity of the federal government create inherent risks that need to be recognized and managed properly.
Fraud is one such risk that must be managed to ensure that program delivery and taxpayer dollars are safeguarded. Every dollar or resource diverted to fraudsters hinders the federal government's ability to achieve its goals. Financial losses also place an increased burden on the government's financial outlook. Fraud also erodes public trust in government and hinders agencies' efforts to execute their missions.
This statement focuses on fraud in federally funded, state-administered programs by (1) outlining the scope of the problem and fraud risk landscape, (2) examining challenges facing federal and state agencies in combating fraud, and (3) examining fraud threats the government faces and why it is difficult to combat them. This statement is based on a body of work of selected reports that GAO issued between 2010 and 2026.
Recommendations
GAO is not making recommendations at this time. As of April 2026, GAO has made 215 recommendations to federal agencies and programs to better manage fraud risks, of which about 40 percent remain open.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-109093
DOD Financial Management: Navy Needs to Fully Address Strategic Planning and Systems Migration Leading Practices
WASHINGTON, April 14 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
DOD Financial Management: Navy Needs to Fully Address Strategic Planning and Systems Migration Leading Practices
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Fast Facts
The Navy has spent billions of dollars on obsolete IT systems. Modernizing its financial management systems is critical to DOD's goal of getting a "clean" audit opinion-i.e., when financial statements are presented fairly and consistent with accounting principles.
The Navy has made progress, but hasn't fully followed leading strategic and system migration planning ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 14 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * DOD Financial Management: Navy Needs to Fully Address Strategic Planning and Systems Migration Leading Practices * Fast Facts The Navy has spent billions of dollars on obsolete IT systems. Modernizing its financial management systems is critical to DOD's goal of getting a "clean" audit opinion-i.e., when financial statements are presented fairly and consistent with accounting principles. The Navy has made progress, but hasn't fully followed leading strategic and system migration planningpractices. For example, it didn't have a complete approach for executives to monitor issues that contribute to delays-which could make it harder to modernize systems on time.
Our recommendations address this and more.
An aircraft carrier in the ocean with jets overhead and other ships nearby
Highlights
What GAO Found
In response to its December 2020 acknowledgment that it had wasted billions of dollars sustaining redundant and obsolete IT systems, the Department of the Navy initiated an effort to modernize, consolidate, and retire its systems. The Navy reports that this initiative has resulted in terminating at least 11 legacy systems and saved more than $100 million. In addition, the Navy announced in January 2026 that it had completed its effort to migrate remaining Navy commands to Navy Enterprise Resource Planning, its financial system of record.
Fully adhering to leading practices for strategic and migration planning could strengthen the Navy's systems modernization. Regarding strategic planning, the Navy met two of three leading practices and partially met one. For example, the Navy demonstrated that the portion of its Navy Financial Management Strategy associated with financial management systems aligned with relevant Navy and DOD-level strategic plans. However, the Navy did not fully implement performance measurement approaches for seven of the nine fiscal year 2025 metrics that it identified for this portion of its financial management strategy.
GAO's Assessment of Navy Financial Management Systems Modernization Strategic Planning
Leading practices
GAO assessment
Align with the overall strategic plan
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Identify results-oriented goals and performance metrics
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Identify and implement performance measurement approaches
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* Met = The Navy addressed all elements of the corresponding leading practice.
* Partially met = The Navy addressed some, but not all, elements of the corresponding leading practice.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-26-107119
Regarding migration planning, the Navy met one and partially met three of four leading practices. For example, the Navy's executive management uses Systems Consolidation Action Plans to obtain status reports and monitor system consolidations. Navy actions to fully comply with the remaining migration leading practices could further reduce modernization risks.
GAO's Assessment of Navy Financial Management Systems Modernization Migration Planning
Leading practices
GAO assessment
Develop an enterprise roadmap
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Provide a mechanism for executive management to monitor the migration effort
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Schedule periodic reviews
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Establish a tracking system for executive management to manage progress, issues, and other action items
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* Met = The Navy addressed all elements of the corresponding leading practice.
* Partially met = The Navy addressed some, but not all, elements of the corresponding leading practice.
Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. | GAO-26-107119
In reviewing the extent to which the Navy established a tracking system to manage progress, issues, and action items, GAO identified at least 111 changes to Navy consolidation plans, including at least 49 system schedule delays. These slippages may limit the Navy's ability to fully support DOD's auditability goals.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) remains the only major federal agency to not achieve an unmodified (clean) audit opinion. Modernizing and consolidating the Department of the Navy's financial management systems is critical to its ability to support DOD's goal of a clean opinion by the end of 2028. Attaining that goal would enable informed department officials to be accountable stewards of scarce federal resources needed for readiness and the warfighter.
This report was developed in connection with GAO's audit of the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements. It examines the extent to which the Navy's consolidation and modernization of its financial management systems (1) are consistent with strategic planning leading practices and (2) align with migration planning leading practices.
GAO compared key Navy strategic planning documentation and associated evidence to leading practices in strategic planning. In addition, GAO compared Navy transition plans to migration planning leading practices and agency guidance. GAO also interviewed key Navy program officials.
Recommendations
GAO is making five recommendations to the Navy: four on strategic and migration planning and one on the magnitude of schedule delays and their impact on the critical path to achieving a clean opinion. The Navy concurred with one recommendation; partially concurred with two; and did not concur with two. As discussed in the report, GAO maintains that all five recommendations are warranted.
For more information, Vijay A. D'Souza at dsouzav@gao.gov or Asif Khan at khana@gao.gov.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of the Navy The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) and other Navy entities, as appropriate, to ensure that it identifies and follows through on an approach to collect actual performance results for its financial systems goals. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Navy The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) and other Navy entities, as appropriate, to ensure that the Navy develops an enterprise roadmap to guide its audit-relevant financial system migration efforts and ensure that it develops and uses an enterprise roadmap that fully addresses leading practices. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Navy The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) and other Navy entities, as appropriate, to ensure that the Navy prioritizes its efforts to more closely monitor its audit-relevant system migrations by resuming more frequent Systems Consolidation Action Plan updates and ensuring these updates are provided to senior leadership and stakeholders. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Navy The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) and other Navy entities, as appropriate, to ensure that the Navy develops and follows through with a process to track and manage issues and other action items associated with its audit-relevant system migration efforts. This process should include a mechanism to monitor identified issues and action items, evaluate the results, and remediate identified deficiencies on a timely basis. (Recommendation 4)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Navy The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) and other Navy entities, as appropriate, to ensure that the Navy takes steps to identify the magnitude of schedule delays to audit-relevant systems and their impact to systems that are on the critical path for achieving a clean audit opinion by the end of 2028. (Recommendation 5)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
See All 5 Recommendations
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107119
Airport Financial Reporting: FAA Should Implement Controls to Improve Data Quality
WASHINGTON, April 14 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:* * *
Airport Financial Reporting: FAA Should Implement Controls to Improve Data Quality
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Fast Facts
Every year, about 500 airports must report data to the Federal Aviation Administration about how they collect and spend funds. Stakeholders, such as industry associations and researchers, use this data to analyze things like airports' financial performance.
We found that most of these airports submitted data to FAA. However, it's hard for FAA to track whether the airports did so on time. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 14 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Airport Financial Reporting: FAA Should Implement Controls to Improve Data Quality * Fast Facts Every year, about 500 airports must report data to the Federal Aviation Administration about how they collect and spend funds. Stakeholders, such as industry associations and researchers, use this data to analyze things like airports' financial performance. We found that most of these airports submitted data to FAA. However, it's hard for FAA to track whether the airports did so on time.The data in these reports also have anomalies and potential errors.
We made 3 recommendations, including that FAA improve the quality of the data on its website.
A flying airplane viewed from the window of an airport seating area.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) created the Certification Activity Tracking System (CATS) website for officials at commercial service airports to file and certify their annual financial data, such as operating expenses and revenues. This database is the only centralized source of airport financial data. FAA, industry stakeholders, and researchers have used the data for multiple purposes. For example, a researcher used CATS data on airport revenues and expenses to develop policy options for Congress to improve airport financing.
Most airports required to submit data to CATS did so, but the extent of the timeliness and accuracy of CATS data is unknown. Airports that receive certain federal grants, provide commercial service, and had at least 2,500 passenger boardings in the prior year are required to submit data. Most of these airports did so for fiscal year 2023 (the most recent data available at the time of GAO's review), but some of the smallest airports did not, for reasons that included staff turnover. Limitations in CATS make it difficult for FAA to track whether airports meet reporting deadlines. Moreover, airports must report data within a certain period after the end of their fiscal year, which varies by airport. As a result, CATS users must wait almost a year to obtain data for a particular fiscal year. Further, CATS data have anomalies and potential errors, such as data from airports that were not required to file, which can affect totals for a given year.
Airport Financial Reports Submitted to FAA by Airport Category, Fiscal Year 2023
Note: While 506 airports were required to submit data, FAA allowed two airport sponsors to consolidate multiple airports into a single submission, resulting in 446 expected airport submissions.
FAA has taken some steps to improve CATS data quality, such as performing occasional data checks. However, FAA does not have sufficient data controls to ensure the quality of CATS data. For example, FAA does not have a procedure to consistently identify airports newly required to submit data due to increased passenger boardings. FAA officials told GAO they planned to update the CATS website, which could add this and other functions, but that the update had been delayed. Implementing data controls would result in better quality data to inform policy and other decisions. Additionally, FAA has not communicated specific data limitations to users. For example, information about the number of airports that submitted their financial data for a particular fiscal year could help users understand the completeness of the data and qualify the data for their purposes.
Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, approximately 500 commercial service airports must submit their financial data to FAA, within the Department of Transportation. These reporting requirements were enacted in 1994 to enable FAA to evaluate airports' compliance with revenue-use requirements and inform the public on how airports collect and spend funds, according to FAA. These airports are generally publicly owned and rely on a mix of revenue sources, such as airline payments, parking revenue, and federal grants.
The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review airport financial reporting. This report examines (1) how FAA and stakeholders have used CATS data; (2) the extent to which CATS data are complete, timely, and accurate; and (3) the extent to which FAA has taken actions to improve CATS data quality and communicated any data limitations to users.
GAO reviewed CATS data for fiscal years 2019 through 2023; FAA guidance; and publications that cited CATS, identified through a literature search. GAO interviewed officials from FAA headquarters and nine regions; 12 industry stakeholders and researchers; and officials from 10 airports, selected at random but to reflect a range of sizes and regions. GAO also compared CATS data quality policies with federal data standards.
Recommendations
GAO is making three recommendations to FAA, including that FAA implement controls to improve the quality of CATS data and disclose known limitations of the data on the CATS website. The Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Aviation Administration The Administrator of FAA, either through a CATS update or other means, should implement controls to improve the quality of CATS data, such as identifying airports required to submit data, tracking submission history, and identifying errors and anomalies. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Federal Aviation Administration The Administrator of FAA should clearly define the roles and responsibilities between headquarters and regional office staff in ensuring airports' compliance with CATS requirements, including clarifying the staff responsible for following up with airports to submit data. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Federal Aviation Administration The Administrator of FAA should disclose on the CATS website the known limitations of CATS data, such as the number of airports that have submitted financial information out of the total that were required to do so and the fact that airport sponsors may update their data over time. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107938