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DHS Contracts: Reported Potential Cost Avoidance from Terminations Will Not Fully Materialize
WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
* * *
DHS Contracts: Reported Potential Cost Avoidance from Terminations Will Not Fully Materialize
*
#Fast Facts
In early 2025, the President directed federal agencies to review and potentially terminate contracts to reduce federal spending.
From January 2025 through September 30, the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Department of Government Efficiency, terminated 438 contracts and deobligated $92 million.
DHS estimated these terminations could avoid $10.5 billion ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * DHS Contracts: Reported Potential Cost Avoidance from Terminations Will Not Fully Materialize * #Fast Facts In early 2025, the President directed federal agencies to review and potentially terminate contracts to reduce federal spending. From January 2025 through September 30, the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Department of Government Efficiency, terminated 438 contracts and deobligated $92 million. DHS estimated these terminations could avoid $10.5 billionin current and future contract costs over the lifespan of these contracts.
However, we found DHS is unlikely to realize most of those projected savings because it can obtain many of the same services through existing contracts.
A book titled Government Contracts, on a table with pens and notebooks.
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
In the first half of 2025, the President issued a series of executive orders directing federal agency heads-in consultation with the United States DOGE Service (also known as the Department of Government Efficiency) agency team leads-to review and terminate contracts in order to reduce federal spending, among other things.
In response, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted a department-wide review of over 17,000 contracts to assess their level of importance to the agency's mission. This assessment resulted in DHS components completely or partially terminating contracts for cost savings. In addition, in March 2025, DHS began requiring approval by the Deputy Secretary for all contract terminations regardless of value and for awards of any contracts worth $25 million or more. The requirement for Deputy Secretary approval of contract terminations was rescinded in April 2026.
GAO analysis shows that from January 20, 2025, through September 30, 2025, DHS completely or partially terminated 438 contracts for convenience-meaning that termination of work under the contracts was determined to be in the federal government's interest. DHS had obligated over $1.6 billion for these contracts prior to termination. Since these contracts were terminated, GAO analysis shows that DHS deobligated a net total of over $92 million on these contracts. These funds represent cost savings in that they reduce federal obligations and may be available for other purposes. However, if DHS should subsequently obligate additional funds to perform similar work associated with terminated contracts, the amount of cost savings or avoidance would be further diminshed.
DHS publicly reported on its website that its contract terminations over this time frame could allow the department to potentially avoid over $10.5 billion in costs. However, this overstates actual costs avoided for two reasons.
* First, it represents the maximum that could be obligated on these contracts, not how much would have actually been obligated.
* Second, if DHS continues to need the goods and services covered by those contracts and meets those needs through other contracts, then those costs would not be avoided but incurred through those contracts.
In fact, GAO found that 95 percent of DHS's reported $10.5 billion in potential cost avoidance was attributable to 30 terminated indefinite delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts in place for DHS to meet information technology requirements. These contracts had a 10-year period of performance, from fiscal years 2025 through 2034. According to DHS, the agency obligated over $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2025 through existing government-wide contracts to meet those requirements. Thus, $1.7 billion in costs were not avoided but were incurred through other contracts. Additionally, any future obligations for the same requirements against the government-wide contracts in future years, through fiscal year 2034, would further reduce actual cost avoidance. As a result, DHS will not fully achieve the amount of reported potential cost avoidance.
#Why GAO Did This Study
In early 2025, the President directed the heads of federal agencies to implement a series of initiatives to reform government operations, including reviewing federal contracts and grants for termination or modification to potentially save costs. To advance these initiatives, the President established the United States DOGE Service and directed agencies to establish DOGE teams to assist in carrying out administration priorities.
GAO was asked to review DHS and DOGE efforts to terminate contracts and grant awards and make reductions to its workforce in 2025. This report, the first in a series, provides information on DHS actions to review and terminate contracts from January through September 2025, and the number and value of contracts terminated.
GAO reviewed and analyzed documents such as executive orders directing federal agencies to review and terminate contracts and agency documents directing components on how to conduct these efforts. GAO analyzed federal procurement data to determine the number of contracts terminated by DHS and dollar amounts obligated or deobligated on those contracts. GAO also interviewed officials with DHS's Offices of the Chief Procurement Officer and Chief Financial Officer about these efforts.
For more information, contact Chris Currie at CurrieC@gao.gov.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-109096
* * *
DHS Contracts: Reported Potential Cost Avoidance from Terminations Will Not Fully Materialize
*
#Fast Facts
In early 2025, the President directed federal agencies to review and potentially terminate contracts to reduce federal spending.
From January 2025 through September 30, the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Department of Government Efficiency, terminated 438 contracts and deobligated $92 million.
DHS estimated these terminations could avoid $10.5 billion ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * DHS Contracts: Reported Potential Cost Avoidance from Terminations Will Not Fully Materialize * #Fast Facts In early 2025, the President directed federal agencies to review and potentially terminate contracts to reduce federal spending. From January 2025 through September 30, the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Department of Government Efficiency, terminated 438 contracts and deobligated $92 million. DHS estimated these terminations could avoid $10.5 billionin current and future contract costs over the lifespan of these contracts.
However, we found DHS is unlikely to realize most of those projected savings because it can obtain many of the same services through existing contracts.
A book titled Government Contracts, on a table with pens and notebooks.
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
In the first half of 2025, the President issued a series of executive orders directing federal agency heads-in consultation with the United States DOGE Service (also known as the Department of Government Efficiency) agency team leads-to review and terminate contracts in order to reduce federal spending, among other things.
In response, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted a department-wide review of over 17,000 contracts to assess their level of importance to the agency's mission. This assessment resulted in DHS components completely or partially terminating contracts for cost savings. In addition, in March 2025, DHS began requiring approval by the Deputy Secretary for all contract terminations regardless of value and for awards of any contracts worth $25 million or more. The requirement for Deputy Secretary approval of contract terminations was rescinded in April 2026.
GAO analysis shows that from January 20, 2025, through September 30, 2025, DHS completely or partially terminated 438 contracts for convenience-meaning that termination of work under the contracts was determined to be in the federal government's interest. DHS had obligated over $1.6 billion for these contracts prior to termination. Since these contracts were terminated, GAO analysis shows that DHS deobligated a net total of over $92 million on these contracts. These funds represent cost savings in that they reduce federal obligations and may be available for other purposes. However, if DHS should subsequently obligate additional funds to perform similar work associated with terminated contracts, the amount of cost savings or avoidance would be further diminshed.
DHS publicly reported on its website that its contract terminations over this time frame could allow the department to potentially avoid over $10.5 billion in costs. However, this overstates actual costs avoided for two reasons.
* First, it represents the maximum that could be obligated on these contracts, not how much would have actually been obligated.
* Second, if DHS continues to need the goods and services covered by those contracts and meets those needs through other contracts, then those costs would not be avoided but incurred through those contracts.
In fact, GAO found that 95 percent of DHS's reported $10.5 billion in potential cost avoidance was attributable to 30 terminated indefinite delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts in place for DHS to meet information technology requirements. These contracts had a 10-year period of performance, from fiscal years 2025 through 2034. According to DHS, the agency obligated over $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2025 through existing government-wide contracts to meet those requirements. Thus, $1.7 billion in costs were not avoided but were incurred through other contracts. Additionally, any future obligations for the same requirements against the government-wide contracts in future years, through fiscal year 2034, would further reduce actual cost avoidance. As a result, DHS will not fully achieve the amount of reported potential cost avoidance.
#Why GAO Did This Study
In early 2025, the President directed the heads of federal agencies to implement a series of initiatives to reform government operations, including reviewing federal contracts and grants for termination or modification to potentially save costs. To advance these initiatives, the President established the United States DOGE Service and directed agencies to establish DOGE teams to assist in carrying out administration priorities.
GAO was asked to review DHS and DOGE efforts to terminate contracts and grant awards and make reductions to its workforce in 2025. This report, the first in a series, provides information on DHS actions to review and terminate contracts from January through September 2025, and the number and value of contracts terminated.
GAO reviewed and analyzed documents such as executive orders directing federal agencies to review and terminate contracts and agency documents directing components on how to conduct these efforts. GAO analyzed federal procurement data to determine the number of contracts terminated by DHS and dollar amounts obligated or deobligated on those contracts. GAO also interviewed officials with DHS's Offices of the Chief Procurement Officer and Chief Financial Officer about these efforts.
For more information, contact Chris Currie at CurrieC@gao.gov.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-109096
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Review Its Defense Agencies and Field Activities for Efficiency and Effectiveness
WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
* * *
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Review Its Defense Agencies and Field Activities for Efficiency and Effectiveness
*
#Fast Facts
Defense agencies and field activities are organizations within DOD that are established to provide critical supplies and services on a department-wide basis. However, DOD hasn't regularly reviewed and reported on the efficiency and effectiveness of these organizations, as required by law.
We found that DOD has only reviewed 4 of the 27 organizations since 2018 ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Defense Management: DOD Needs to Review Its Defense Agencies and Field Activities for Efficiency and Effectiveness * #Fast Facts Defense agencies and field activities are organizations within DOD that are established to provide critical supplies and services on a department-wide basis. However, DOD hasn't regularly reviewed and reported on the efficiency and effectiveness of these organizations, as required by law. We found that DOD has only reviewed 4 of the 27 organizations since 2018and didn't report the results to Congress. DOD also hasn't defined efficiency and effectiveness in formal guidance for these reviews. Additionally, we found overlap in some organizations' training programs.
Our recommendations address these and other issues.
Aerial view of the Pentagon
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has not recently met statutory requirements to review and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of its defense agencies and DOD field activities (DAFA). Between April 2023 and September 2024, DOD conducted a review of four DAFAs. However, the department did not finalize the reports based on its reviews or submit the reports to Congress as required. DOD did not have formalized guidance, such as an instruction, in place when conducting these four DAFA reviews. In May 2026, DOD issued a memorandum for future DAFA reviews that includes responsibilities and deadlines. While this is a positive step, DOD previously issued a memorandum for this effort that did not ensure the completion of the reviews. Formalizing guidance for the process would better position DOD to meet its reporting requirements and would provide Congress with better information to inform decision-making related to DOD's efficiency and effectiveness.
Timeline of Defense Agency and DOD Field Activity Reviews Since 2018
DOD has not assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of its DAFAs, including the Defense Human Resources Agency (DHRA), because the department did not clearly define measures to be used for its most recent DAFA reviews. In its May 2026 memorandum, DOD included standard measures for efficiency and effectiveness, but the memorandum lacks detail on these measures. Moreover, the measures are not clearly defined or established in formalized guidance. Clearly defining how to assess efficiency and effectiveness in formalized guidance for the DAFA reviews would enable DOD to more comprehensively assess DHRA and the other DAFAs' performance.
As part of its DAFA reviews, DOD is statutorily required to identify each activity of a DAFA that is substantially similar to, or duplicative of, an activity carried out by another organization within DOD. GAO found overlap in two training areas within the DAFAs: (1) the leader development programs at DHRA, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Washington Headquarters Services; and (2) the sexual assault prevention and response training directed by DOD and developed by the military services. However, DOD has not assessed if there are negative effects on efficiency or effectiveness resulting from this overlap. If DOD were to evaluate these training programs, it may find opportunities to streamline them and reduce any inefficient overlap.
#Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's 27 DAFAs play a critical role in supporting the department's business operations. For example, DHRA-which DOD renamed the Personnel Readiness Management Agency in June 2026-is a DOD field activity with a stated mission of enhancing the operational efficiency and effectiveness of diverse programs supporting DOD. DOD is required to conduct reviews of each DAFA's efficiency and effectiveness at least once every 4 years.
The House report accompanying a bill for the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2024 includes a provision for GAO to evaluate DOD's DAFA reviews, with a focus on DHRA. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD is reviewing and reporting on the DAFAs as required by law; (2) DOD has assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of DHRA as part of these reviews; and (3) DHRA provides training services that are duplicative, overlapping, or fragmented with other select DAFAs and the military services.
GAO reviewed DOD guidance, reports, and relevant statutory requirements and interviewed DOD officials.
#Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations to DOD, including that it formalize guidance for fulfilling statutory requirements; include clearly defined measures for efficiency and effectiveness in formalized guidance; and evaluate DAFA and military service training programs to identify inefficient overlap and take action to address it. DOD did not provide written comments on this report.
#Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director of Administration and Management develops formalized guidance for DAFA reviews in a DOD instruction or similar formalized guidance. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director of Administration and Management includes clearly defined measures for efficiency and effectiveness for DAFA reviews in formalized guidance. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for P&R assesses DHRA's Defense Civilian Emerging Leader Program against programs operated by DLA and WHS to determine the effectiveness of having multiple leader development programs and take steps to mitigate any inefficient overlap. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that P&R, through DHRA's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office and in coordination with the military services, assesses the services' curriculum development efforts for the sexual assault prevention and response training for potential efficiencies and takes steps to mitigate any inefficient overlap, as part of its ongoing review of mandatory training requirements. (Recommendation 4)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107781
* * *
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Review Its Defense Agencies and Field Activities for Efficiency and Effectiveness
*
#Fast Facts
Defense agencies and field activities are organizations within DOD that are established to provide critical supplies and services on a department-wide basis. However, DOD hasn't regularly reviewed and reported on the efficiency and effectiveness of these organizations, as required by law.
We found that DOD has only reviewed 4 of the 27 organizations since 2018 ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Defense Management: DOD Needs to Review Its Defense Agencies and Field Activities for Efficiency and Effectiveness * #Fast Facts Defense agencies and field activities are organizations within DOD that are established to provide critical supplies and services on a department-wide basis. However, DOD hasn't regularly reviewed and reported on the efficiency and effectiveness of these organizations, as required by law. We found that DOD has only reviewed 4 of the 27 organizations since 2018and didn't report the results to Congress. DOD also hasn't defined efficiency and effectiveness in formal guidance for these reviews. Additionally, we found overlap in some organizations' training programs.
Our recommendations address these and other issues.
Aerial view of the Pentagon
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has not recently met statutory requirements to review and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of its defense agencies and DOD field activities (DAFA). Between April 2023 and September 2024, DOD conducted a review of four DAFAs. However, the department did not finalize the reports based on its reviews or submit the reports to Congress as required. DOD did not have formalized guidance, such as an instruction, in place when conducting these four DAFA reviews. In May 2026, DOD issued a memorandum for future DAFA reviews that includes responsibilities and deadlines. While this is a positive step, DOD previously issued a memorandum for this effort that did not ensure the completion of the reviews. Formalizing guidance for the process would better position DOD to meet its reporting requirements and would provide Congress with better information to inform decision-making related to DOD's efficiency and effectiveness.
Timeline of Defense Agency and DOD Field Activity Reviews Since 2018
DOD has not assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of its DAFAs, including the Defense Human Resources Agency (DHRA), because the department did not clearly define measures to be used for its most recent DAFA reviews. In its May 2026 memorandum, DOD included standard measures for efficiency and effectiveness, but the memorandum lacks detail on these measures. Moreover, the measures are not clearly defined or established in formalized guidance. Clearly defining how to assess efficiency and effectiveness in formalized guidance for the DAFA reviews would enable DOD to more comprehensively assess DHRA and the other DAFAs' performance.
As part of its DAFA reviews, DOD is statutorily required to identify each activity of a DAFA that is substantially similar to, or duplicative of, an activity carried out by another organization within DOD. GAO found overlap in two training areas within the DAFAs: (1) the leader development programs at DHRA, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Washington Headquarters Services; and (2) the sexual assault prevention and response training directed by DOD and developed by the military services. However, DOD has not assessed if there are negative effects on efficiency or effectiveness resulting from this overlap. If DOD were to evaluate these training programs, it may find opportunities to streamline them and reduce any inefficient overlap.
#Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's 27 DAFAs play a critical role in supporting the department's business operations. For example, DHRA-which DOD renamed the Personnel Readiness Management Agency in June 2026-is a DOD field activity with a stated mission of enhancing the operational efficiency and effectiveness of diverse programs supporting DOD. DOD is required to conduct reviews of each DAFA's efficiency and effectiveness at least once every 4 years.
The House report accompanying a bill for the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2024 includes a provision for GAO to evaluate DOD's DAFA reviews, with a focus on DHRA. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD is reviewing and reporting on the DAFAs as required by law; (2) DOD has assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of DHRA as part of these reviews; and (3) DHRA provides training services that are duplicative, overlapping, or fragmented with other select DAFAs and the military services.
GAO reviewed DOD guidance, reports, and relevant statutory requirements and interviewed DOD officials.
#Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations to DOD, including that it formalize guidance for fulfilling statutory requirements; include clearly defined measures for efficiency and effectiveness in formalized guidance; and evaluate DAFA and military service training programs to identify inefficient overlap and take action to address it. DOD did not provide written comments on this report.
#Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director of Administration and Management develops formalized guidance for DAFA reviews in a DOD instruction or similar formalized guidance. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director of Administration and Management includes clearly defined measures for efficiency and effectiveness for DAFA reviews in formalized guidance. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for P&R assesses DHRA's Defense Civilian Emerging Leader Program against programs operated by DLA and WHS to determine the effectiveness of having multiple leader development programs and take steps to mitigate any inefficient overlap. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense should ensure that P&R, through DHRA's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office and in coordination with the military services, assesses the services' curriculum development efforts for the sexual assault prevention and response training for potential efficiencies and takes steps to mitigate any inefficient overlap, as part of its ongoing review of mandatory training requirements. (Recommendation 4)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107781
Disaster Contracting: FEMA and the Corps of Engineers Have Opportunities to Improve Local Vendor Use
WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
* * *
Disaster Contracting: FEMA and the Corps of Engineers Have Opportunities to Improve Local Vendor Use
*
#Fast Facts
Communities devastated by natural disasters rely on federal assistance for recovery efforts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and Army Corps of Engineers can award contracts for recovery activities like providing temporary housing. Awards can be prioritized for vendors located or primarily doing business in the local area of a disaster.
FEMA and the Corps have made ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Disaster Contracting: FEMA and the Corps of Engineers Have Opportunities to Improve Local Vendor Use * #Fast Facts Communities devastated by natural disasters rely on federal assistance for recovery efforts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and Army Corps of Engineers can award contracts for recovery activities like providing temporary housing. Awards can be prioritized for vendors located or primarily doing business in the local area of a disaster. FEMA and the Corps have madeprogress using local vendors but could do more. For example, contracting officers don't always know what is considered a local disaster area. Correctly identifying these areas can help jump-start local economies and help communities.
Our recommendations address this and more.
Residential Debris in Lahaina After Wildfires in Hawaii
Burned remains of a neighborhood with scorched trees, cars, and debris.
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Army Corps of Engineers have key responsibilities for disaster response and recovery activities. Contracting with local businesses-those that reside or primarily do business in declared major disaster areas-is one way to fulfill their responsibilities. Both have policies and guidance to promote local vendor use, but they do not monitor associated data on this use. As a result, they do not know the extent to which they are using local vendors or helping jump-start the local economy.
Further, the contracting officers that GAO interviewed were not always aware of how to identify the local disaster area. Under federal regulations, a major disaster area is generally defined in the official presidential disaster declaration. However, some contracting officers identified the local area incorrectly or did not understand how to do so. For example:
* FEMA. One contracting officer stated that they identified the entire state of Tennessee as the local area instead of staying within the declared disaster area in anticipation that other parts of the state might be added later.
* Corps. One contracting officer responsible for four contracts for the Maui Wildfires stated that there was not an official way to identify a local area.
Example of a Contracting Officer Incorrectly Identifying the Local Disaster Area
The Corps has taken efforts to ensure that its contracting officers correctly identify the local area, but FEMA has yet to fully address the issue. For example, its three contracting officers who identified the local area incorrectly had received training on local vendor use. This indicates a need for additional action. Until FEMA takes additional steps to ensure that its contracting officers correctly identify the local area, it could miss opportunities to both award contracts to local vendors and help communities jump-start economic recovery after a disaster.
Additionally, all the selected Corps's contracts were missing documents related to the use of local vendors. Federal regulations require contracting officers who award a post-disaster contract to a nonlocal vendor to document their justification in the contract file. Without these justifications, the Corps lacks assurance its contracting officers are making an effort to use local vendors as appropriate. Ensuring that contracting officers fully comply with federal regulations can provide the Corps with greater certainty that it is succeeding in its efforts to contract with local vendors and assist with the economic recovery of a local area.
#Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. communities devastated by natural disasters often rely on federal aid for their recovery. To meet their disaster response and recovery responsibilities, FEMA and the Corps contract with businesses to obtain some of the goods and services needed for these recovery activities. Under federal law, they are required to provide a preference for contracting with businesses defined by regulation as local-relative to the declared disaster area-to the extent feasible and practicable. This preference may help jump-start the local economy.
The American Relief Act of 2025 includes a provision for GAO to conduct work related to certain natural disasters. GAO's report assesses the extent to which (1) FEMA and the Corps promote and monitor the use of local vendors for disaster response, and (2) contracting officers followed requirements for local vendor use for selected contracts.
GAO selected three major disasters: Hurricane Helene, the Maui wildfires, and Hurricane Ian; collected, analyzed, and confirmed the reliability of relevant data; reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and guidance; interviewed agency officials and contracting officers; and assessed a nongeneralizable sample of contracts from the three selected disasters.
#Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations to FEMA and the Corps, including that they establish processes to monitor local vendor use; that FEMA ensures that its contracting officers accurately identify the local area; and that the Corps ensures that its contracting staff comply with requirements to document when they use nonlocal vendors. Both agencies concurred with the recommendations.
#Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Emergency Management Agency The FEMA Administrator should ensure the Office of the Chief Component Procurement Officer establishes a process to monitor its local vendor use, including assessing the reliability of any data used in the process. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Corps of Engineers The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works should ensure that the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers establishes a process to collect data on and monitor its use of local vendors, including assessing the reliability of any data used in the process. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Federal Emergency Management Agency The FEMA Administrator should ensure the Office of the Chief Component Procurement Officer take additional action to clearly communicate existing FAR requirements and ensure that contracting officers correctly identify the local area for disaster contracts. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Corps of Engineers The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology should ensure the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take additional action to ensure that contracting officials follow FAR documentation requirements for awarding disaster contracts to nonlocal vendors. (Recommendation 4)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108426
* * *
Disaster Contracting: FEMA and the Corps of Engineers Have Opportunities to Improve Local Vendor Use
*
#Fast Facts
Communities devastated by natural disasters rely on federal assistance for recovery efforts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and Army Corps of Engineers can award contracts for recovery activities like providing temporary housing. Awards can be prioritized for vendors located or primarily doing business in the local area of a disaster.
FEMA and the Corps have made ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Disaster Contracting: FEMA and the Corps of Engineers Have Opportunities to Improve Local Vendor Use * #Fast Facts Communities devastated by natural disasters rely on federal assistance for recovery efforts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and Army Corps of Engineers can award contracts for recovery activities like providing temporary housing. Awards can be prioritized for vendors located or primarily doing business in the local area of a disaster. FEMA and the Corps have madeprogress using local vendors but could do more. For example, contracting officers don't always know what is considered a local disaster area. Correctly identifying these areas can help jump-start local economies and help communities.
Our recommendations address this and more.
Residential Debris in Lahaina After Wildfires in Hawaii
Burned remains of a neighborhood with scorched trees, cars, and debris.
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Army Corps of Engineers have key responsibilities for disaster response and recovery activities. Contracting with local businesses-those that reside or primarily do business in declared major disaster areas-is one way to fulfill their responsibilities. Both have policies and guidance to promote local vendor use, but they do not monitor associated data on this use. As a result, they do not know the extent to which they are using local vendors or helping jump-start the local economy.
Further, the contracting officers that GAO interviewed were not always aware of how to identify the local disaster area. Under federal regulations, a major disaster area is generally defined in the official presidential disaster declaration. However, some contracting officers identified the local area incorrectly or did not understand how to do so. For example:
* FEMA. One contracting officer stated that they identified the entire state of Tennessee as the local area instead of staying within the declared disaster area in anticipation that other parts of the state might be added later.
* Corps. One contracting officer responsible for four contracts for the Maui Wildfires stated that there was not an official way to identify a local area.
Example of a Contracting Officer Incorrectly Identifying the Local Disaster Area
The Corps has taken efforts to ensure that its contracting officers correctly identify the local area, but FEMA has yet to fully address the issue. For example, its three contracting officers who identified the local area incorrectly had received training on local vendor use. This indicates a need for additional action. Until FEMA takes additional steps to ensure that its contracting officers correctly identify the local area, it could miss opportunities to both award contracts to local vendors and help communities jump-start economic recovery after a disaster.
Additionally, all the selected Corps's contracts were missing documents related to the use of local vendors. Federal regulations require contracting officers who award a post-disaster contract to a nonlocal vendor to document their justification in the contract file. Without these justifications, the Corps lacks assurance its contracting officers are making an effort to use local vendors as appropriate. Ensuring that contracting officers fully comply with federal regulations can provide the Corps with greater certainty that it is succeeding in its efforts to contract with local vendors and assist with the economic recovery of a local area.
#Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. communities devastated by natural disasters often rely on federal aid for their recovery. To meet their disaster response and recovery responsibilities, FEMA and the Corps contract with businesses to obtain some of the goods and services needed for these recovery activities. Under federal law, they are required to provide a preference for contracting with businesses defined by regulation as local-relative to the declared disaster area-to the extent feasible and practicable. This preference may help jump-start the local economy.
The American Relief Act of 2025 includes a provision for GAO to conduct work related to certain natural disasters. GAO's report assesses the extent to which (1) FEMA and the Corps promote and monitor the use of local vendors for disaster response, and (2) contracting officers followed requirements for local vendor use for selected contracts.
GAO selected three major disasters: Hurricane Helene, the Maui wildfires, and Hurricane Ian; collected, analyzed, and confirmed the reliability of relevant data; reviewed laws, regulations, policies, and guidance; interviewed agency officials and contracting officers; and assessed a nongeneralizable sample of contracts from the three selected disasters.
#Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations to FEMA and the Corps, including that they establish processes to monitor local vendor use; that FEMA ensures that its contracting officers accurately identify the local area; and that the Corps ensures that its contracting staff comply with requirements to document when they use nonlocal vendors. Both agencies concurred with the recommendations.
#Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Federal Emergency Management Agency The FEMA Administrator should ensure the Office of the Chief Component Procurement Officer establishes a process to monitor its local vendor use, including assessing the reliability of any data used in the process. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Corps of Engineers The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works should ensure that the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers establishes a process to collect data on and monitor its use of local vendors, including assessing the reliability of any data used in the process. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Federal Emergency Management Agency The FEMA Administrator should ensure the Office of the Chief Component Procurement Officer take additional action to clearly communicate existing FAR requirements and ensure that contracting officers correctly identify the local area for disaster contracts. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Corps of Engineers The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology should ensure the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take additional action to ensure that contracting officials follow FAR documentation requirements for awarding disaster contracts to nonlocal vendors. (Recommendation 4)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108426
Bank Financial Disclosures: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Information Provided to Investors
WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
* * *
Bank Financial Disclosures: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Information Provided to Investors
*
#Fast Facts
Publicly traded banks disclose their audited financial information to help investors assess risks. In spring 2023, three banks failed shortly after publishing their audited financial statements.
The Securities and Exchange Commission reviews most public companies' disclosures. But the unusual corporate structure of 11 public banks-and 2 that failed in spring 2023-puts them ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Bank Financial Disclosures: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Information Provided to Investors * #Fast Facts Publicly traded banks disclose their audited financial information to help investors assess risks. In spring 2023, three banks failed shortly after publishing their audited financial statements. The Securities and Exchange Commission reviews most public companies' disclosures. But the unusual corporate structure of 11 public banks-and 2 that failed in spring 2023-puts themunder federal banking regulators' review, instead of SEC's. Those reviews are less investor-focused than SEC's, and we suggested that Congress consider reassessing this oversight.
We also recommended providing guidance to companies to improve disclosures for certain risks.
A magnifying glass lying on a desk surrounded by a laptop computer, papers, and pens.
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) require public companies to disclose information that investors would find important when making investment decisions. Disclosures include an annual audited financial statement and a description of risk factors and financial performance. Accounting firms that audit public companies must register with the nonprofit Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which Congress created in 2002 to focus on audit quality. Certain auditor responsibilities-such as evaluating a company's accounting estimates and ability to continue as a going concern-can be particularly challenging in bank audits, according to PCAOB staff, auditors, and others.
SEC is required by law to review public companies' disclosures. However, 11 public banks-including two with more than $80 billion in assets-are not subject to SEC review because they operate without a corporate parent known as a bank holding company. (Two of the three banks that failed in spring 2023 operated without a holding company. Shareholders lost more than $29 billion in investments in these two banks between the end of 2022 and May 2023.) For those banks, Congress charged banking regulators with certain functions and duties of SEC. However, GAO found that banking regulators' review processes, unlike SEC's, do not assess disclosures for investors' benefit. Reassessing disclosure review authority could help Congress determine whether changes are needed to strengthen investor protection.
Comparison of Federal Regulators' Processes for Annual Disclosure Reviews
Note: Annual disclosures include details on a company's business, its risks, and operating and financial results.
GAO reviewed 2021 and 2022 disclosures for the three banks that failed in spring 2023 to analyze the information they provided about interest rate and liquidity risks. GAO and banking regulators previously found that weak management of these risks contributed to the banks' failures. Although each bank described setting thresholds for interest rate or liquidity risk, they did not disclose when thresholds were breached or how they addressed the breaches. SEC also identified other banks whose disclosures on these risk topics could be improved. However, SEC staff have not provided public guidance on how companies could assess whether breaches of interest rate or liquidity risk tolerances are material to investors. Such guidance could help companies assess the materiality of these details and may provide investors with the information they need to make informed decisions.
#Why GAO Did This Study
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and federal regulations require public companies to provide investors with periodic disclosures about business risks and financial results. Three of the 30 largest U.S. banks failed in spring 2023, shortly after their financial statement audits were completed. Some observers raised questions about whether auditors had properly fulfilled their roles and whether the banks had clearly disclosed material information.
GAO was asked to review oversight of bank financial disclosures and external audits. Among other objectives, this report examines auditing standards relevant for bank audits; oversight of audit quality; SEC and banking regulators' reviews of public companies' annual disclosures; and the failed banks' disclosures about selected risks before they failed.
GAO reviewed PCAOB auditing standards, SEC and banking regulators' disclosure review processes, SEC public comments to bank holding companies, and the failed banks' annual disclosures. GAO also interviewed staff from SEC, banking regulators, PCAOB, and accounting firms, among others.
#Recommendations
GAO recommends that Congress consider reassessing the authority for reviewing annual financial disclosures for public banks without holding companies. GAO also recommends that SEC staff provide guidance to help companies assess the materiality of information related to interest rate and liquidity risks. SEC disagreed with the recommendation, noting that staff provides post-disclosure feedback as warranted. GAO maintains SEC should implement the recommendation.
#Matter for Congressional Consideration
Matter Status Comments
Congress should consider reassessing the authority for reviewing annual financial disclosures of public banks without holding companies for investor protection purposes. (Matter for Consideration 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
#Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
United States Securities and Exchange Commission The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission should ensure that the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance provides informal staff guidance, such as through Corporation Finance Interpretations or another public source, on how companies should assess whether breaches of interest rate risk and liquidity risk tolerance levels are material information for investors, particularly during periods of rising interest rates. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107719
* * *
Bank Financial Disclosures: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Information Provided to Investors
*
#Fast Facts
Publicly traded banks disclose their audited financial information to help investors assess risks. In spring 2023, three banks failed shortly after publishing their audited financial statements.
The Securities and Exchange Commission reviews most public companies' disclosures. But the unusual corporate structure of 11 public banks-and 2 that failed in spring 2023-puts them ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Bank Financial Disclosures: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Information Provided to Investors * #Fast Facts Publicly traded banks disclose their audited financial information to help investors assess risks. In spring 2023, three banks failed shortly after publishing their audited financial statements. The Securities and Exchange Commission reviews most public companies' disclosures. But the unusual corporate structure of 11 public banks-and 2 that failed in spring 2023-puts themunder federal banking regulators' review, instead of SEC's. Those reviews are less investor-focused than SEC's, and we suggested that Congress consider reassessing this oversight.
We also recommended providing guidance to companies to improve disclosures for certain risks.
A magnifying glass lying on a desk surrounded by a laptop computer, papers, and pens.
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) require public companies to disclose information that investors would find important when making investment decisions. Disclosures include an annual audited financial statement and a description of risk factors and financial performance. Accounting firms that audit public companies must register with the nonprofit Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which Congress created in 2002 to focus on audit quality. Certain auditor responsibilities-such as evaluating a company's accounting estimates and ability to continue as a going concern-can be particularly challenging in bank audits, according to PCAOB staff, auditors, and others.
SEC is required by law to review public companies' disclosures. However, 11 public banks-including two with more than $80 billion in assets-are not subject to SEC review because they operate without a corporate parent known as a bank holding company. (Two of the three banks that failed in spring 2023 operated without a holding company. Shareholders lost more than $29 billion in investments in these two banks between the end of 2022 and May 2023.) For those banks, Congress charged banking regulators with certain functions and duties of SEC. However, GAO found that banking regulators' review processes, unlike SEC's, do not assess disclosures for investors' benefit. Reassessing disclosure review authority could help Congress determine whether changes are needed to strengthen investor protection.
Comparison of Federal Regulators' Processes for Annual Disclosure Reviews
Note: Annual disclosures include details on a company's business, its risks, and operating and financial results.
GAO reviewed 2021 and 2022 disclosures for the three banks that failed in spring 2023 to analyze the information they provided about interest rate and liquidity risks. GAO and banking regulators previously found that weak management of these risks contributed to the banks' failures. Although each bank described setting thresholds for interest rate or liquidity risk, they did not disclose when thresholds were breached or how they addressed the breaches. SEC also identified other banks whose disclosures on these risk topics could be improved. However, SEC staff have not provided public guidance on how companies could assess whether breaches of interest rate or liquidity risk tolerances are material to investors. Such guidance could help companies assess the materiality of these details and may provide investors with the information they need to make informed decisions.
#Why GAO Did This Study
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and federal regulations require public companies to provide investors with periodic disclosures about business risks and financial results. Three of the 30 largest U.S. banks failed in spring 2023, shortly after their financial statement audits were completed. Some observers raised questions about whether auditors had properly fulfilled their roles and whether the banks had clearly disclosed material information.
GAO was asked to review oversight of bank financial disclosures and external audits. Among other objectives, this report examines auditing standards relevant for bank audits; oversight of audit quality; SEC and banking regulators' reviews of public companies' annual disclosures; and the failed banks' disclosures about selected risks before they failed.
GAO reviewed PCAOB auditing standards, SEC and banking regulators' disclosure review processes, SEC public comments to bank holding companies, and the failed banks' annual disclosures. GAO also interviewed staff from SEC, banking regulators, PCAOB, and accounting firms, among others.
#Recommendations
GAO recommends that Congress consider reassessing the authority for reviewing annual financial disclosures for public banks without holding companies. GAO also recommends that SEC staff provide guidance to help companies assess the materiality of information related to interest rate and liquidity risks. SEC disagreed with the recommendation, noting that staff provides post-disclosure feedback as warranted. GAO maintains SEC should implement the recommendation.
#Matter for Congressional Consideration
Matter Status Comments
Congress should consider reassessing the authority for reviewing annual financial disclosures of public banks without holding companies for investor protection purposes. (Matter for Consideration 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
#Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
United States Securities and Exchange Commission The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission should ensure that the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance provides informal staff guidance, such as through Corporation Finance Interpretations or another public source, on how companies should assess whether breaches of interest rate risk and liquidity risk tolerance levels are material information for investors, particularly during periods of rising interest rates. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-107719
Secret Service: Protection Policies Should be Consistently Updated to Better Ensure Protectee Safety
WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
* * *
Secret Service: Protection Policies Should be Consistently Updated to Better Ensure Protectee Safety
*
#Fast Facts
The Secret Service protects the President, Vice President, visiting foreign dignitaries, and others. Recent attacks and threats against some of these people have highlighted the importance of the Secret Service.
We reviewed all Secret Service protection policies and found:
Secret Service personnel aren't required to document their rationale when they determine incidents didn't ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Secret Service: Protection Policies Should be Consistently Updated to Better Ensure Protectee Safety * #Fast Facts The Secret Service protects the President, Vice President, visiting foreign dignitaries, and others. Recent attacks and threats against some of these people have highlighted the importance of the Secret Service. We reviewed all Secret Service protection policies and found: Secret Service personnel aren't required to document their rationale when they determine incidents didn'twarrant a policy change
Policies aren't reviewed and updated within required time frames
Joint security guidance with the State Department hasn't been updated in over 30 years
Our recommendations address these issues to protect leaders from emerging threats.
A dark colored SUV driving with two small flags on the front and blue and red lights in the front grill.
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
The Secret Service protects the President, Vice President, visiting foreign dignitaries, and others. From fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025, the Secret Service's budget increased while the number of its protectees fluctuated, particularly around changes in presidential administrations. During this time, there were 83 security incidents. The Secret Service updated its protection policies in response to 25 of them.
Secret Service Policy Changes in Response to Incidents, Fiscal Years 2015-2025
Secret Service policy does not require that personnel document their rationale when they determine an incident does not warrant a protection policy update. However, Secret Service officials told GAO that doing so would be important because it shows an incident was fully reviewed. In the absence of this information, it is sometimes unclear why the Secret Service maintained the status quo. For example, the Secret Service encountered drone incidents from 2015 to 2021, but did not update its policies to address civilian use of drones prior to July 2024, when a shooter used a drone in an assassination attempt of then-former President Trump. Revising its policy to require personnel to document the rationale for not making policy changes after incidents would provide the Secret Service with more complete information when considering protection policy updates to mitigate future threats.
Further, the Secret Service has not reviewed and updated protection policies in a timely manner. These policies are to be reviewed and updated within 4 years of issuance, but the Secret Service has not reviewed or updated eight of 22 protection policies within the required time frame. Secret Service officials said they try to make timely updates but are not always able to identify personnel available to do so. Revising its policy to assign responsibility to specific positions for updating protection policies within required time frames could help the Secret Service incorporate the most current techniques into advance planning.
Finally, since 1991, the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service, the protective division within the Department of State, have not updated a key memorandum of understanding that delineates the two entities' roles and responsibilities for securing the President and others traveling abroad, and foreign dignitaries traveling to the United States. Much has changed over the intervening years, such as the emergence of drone threats, and updating the memorandum would provide the two entities an opportunity to respond to evolving roles, responsibilities, and advance techniques.
#Why GAO Did This Study
Recent attacks and threats of violence against Secret Service protectees highlight the importance of the Secret Service's protective mission. These incidents include the July 2024 assassination attempt of then-former President Trump, the alleged assassination attempt of President Trump at the April 2026 White House Correspondents' Dinner, and the shooting near Vice President Vance's motorcade in May 2026.
GAO was asked to examine the Secret Service's protection policies. This report addresses, among other things, (1) how the Secret Service protection budget and number of protectees changed from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025; and (2) the extent to which the Secret Service has updated its protection policies.
GAO analyzed data and reviewed documentation related to protection policies for the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025. GAO also conducted interviews with officials from the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service, as well as eight other selected federal, state, and local entities with protection responsibilities.
#Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations, including two to revise current Secret Service policies to (1) require that personnel document why protection policy updates are not needed after incidents, and (2) assign responsibility for policy updates, and one each to the Secret Service and the Department of State to update their memorandum of understanding. The Department of Homeland Security, which includes the Secret Service, and the Department of State concurred with the recommendations.
#Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
United States Secret Service The Director of the U.S. Secret Service should revise its policy on security incident reporting to require its personnel to document their rationale in the standard form when they decide a security incident (i.e., unusual protective event) does not warrant a protection policy change. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
United States Secret Service The Director of the U.S. Secret Service should revise its policy on issuing, maintaining, and organizing protection processes to assign responsibility to specific positions within the relevant offices for consistently reviewing and updating protection policies within required time frames. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
United States Secret Service The Director of the U.S. Secret Service, in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, should review and update the 1991 memorandum of understanding that delineates separate and joint roles and responsibilities for securing the President and other full-time protectees traveling abroad, and foreign dignitaries traveling to the U.S. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of State The Secretary of State should direct the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, in collaboration with the Director of the U.S. Secret Service, to review and update the 1991 memorandum of understanding that delineates separate and joint roles and responsibilities for securing the President and other full-time protectees traveling abroad, and foreign dignitaries traveling to the U.S. (Recommendation 4)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108455
* * *
Secret Service: Protection Policies Should be Consistently Updated to Better Ensure Protectee Safety
*
#Fast Facts
The Secret Service protects the President, Vice President, visiting foreign dignitaries, and others. Recent attacks and threats against some of these people have highlighted the importance of the Secret Service.
We reviewed all Secret Service protection policies and found:
Secret Service personnel aren't required to document their rationale when they determine incidents didn't ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Secret Service: Protection Policies Should be Consistently Updated to Better Ensure Protectee Safety * #Fast Facts The Secret Service protects the President, Vice President, visiting foreign dignitaries, and others. Recent attacks and threats against some of these people have highlighted the importance of the Secret Service. We reviewed all Secret Service protection policies and found: Secret Service personnel aren't required to document their rationale when they determine incidents didn'twarrant a policy change
Policies aren't reviewed and updated within required time frames
Joint security guidance with the State Department hasn't been updated in over 30 years
Our recommendations address these issues to protect leaders from emerging threats.
A dark colored SUV driving with two small flags on the front and blue and red lights in the front grill.
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
The Secret Service protects the President, Vice President, visiting foreign dignitaries, and others. From fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025, the Secret Service's budget increased while the number of its protectees fluctuated, particularly around changes in presidential administrations. During this time, there were 83 security incidents. The Secret Service updated its protection policies in response to 25 of them.
Secret Service Policy Changes in Response to Incidents, Fiscal Years 2015-2025
Secret Service policy does not require that personnel document their rationale when they determine an incident does not warrant a protection policy update. However, Secret Service officials told GAO that doing so would be important because it shows an incident was fully reviewed. In the absence of this information, it is sometimes unclear why the Secret Service maintained the status quo. For example, the Secret Service encountered drone incidents from 2015 to 2021, but did not update its policies to address civilian use of drones prior to July 2024, when a shooter used a drone in an assassination attempt of then-former President Trump. Revising its policy to require personnel to document the rationale for not making policy changes after incidents would provide the Secret Service with more complete information when considering protection policy updates to mitigate future threats.
Further, the Secret Service has not reviewed and updated protection policies in a timely manner. These policies are to be reviewed and updated within 4 years of issuance, but the Secret Service has not reviewed or updated eight of 22 protection policies within the required time frame. Secret Service officials said they try to make timely updates but are not always able to identify personnel available to do so. Revising its policy to assign responsibility to specific positions for updating protection policies within required time frames could help the Secret Service incorporate the most current techniques into advance planning.
Finally, since 1991, the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service, the protective division within the Department of State, have not updated a key memorandum of understanding that delineates the two entities' roles and responsibilities for securing the President and others traveling abroad, and foreign dignitaries traveling to the United States. Much has changed over the intervening years, such as the emergence of drone threats, and updating the memorandum would provide the two entities an opportunity to respond to evolving roles, responsibilities, and advance techniques.
#Why GAO Did This Study
Recent attacks and threats of violence against Secret Service protectees highlight the importance of the Secret Service's protective mission. These incidents include the July 2024 assassination attempt of then-former President Trump, the alleged assassination attempt of President Trump at the April 2026 White House Correspondents' Dinner, and the shooting near Vice President Vance's motorcade in May 2026.
GAO was asked to examine the Secret Service's protection policies. This report addresses, among other things, (1) how the Secret Service protection budget and number of protectees changed from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025; and (2) the extent to which the Secret Service has updated its protection policies.
GAO analyzed data and reviewed documentation related to protection policies for the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2025. GAO also conducted interviews with officials from the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service, as well as eight other selected federal, state, and local entities with protection responsibilities.
#Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations, including two to revise current Secret Service policies to (1) require that personnel document why protection policy updates are not needed after incidents, and (2) assign responsibility for policy updates, and one each to the Secret Service and the Department of State to update their memorandum of understanding. The Department of Homeland Security, which includes the Secret Service, and the Department of State concurred with the recommendations.
#Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Affected Recommendation Status
United States Secret Service The Director of the U.S. Secret Service should revise its policy on security incident reporting to require its personnel to document their rationale in the standard form when they decide a security incident (i.e., unusual protective event) does not warrant a protection policy change. (Recommendation 1)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
United States Secret Service The Director of the U.S. Secret Service should revise its policy on issuing, maintaining, and organizing protection processes to assign responsibility to specific positions within the relevant offices for consistently reviewing and updating protection policies within required time frames. (Recommendation 2)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
United States Secret Service The Director of the U.S. Secret Service, in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, should review and update the 1991 memorandum of understanding that delineates separate and joint roles and responsibilities for securing the President and other full-time protectees traveling abroad, and foreign dignitaries traveling to the U.S. (Recommendation 3)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of State The Secretary of State should direct the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, in collaboration with the Director of the U.S. Secret Service, to review and update the 1991 memorandum of understanding that delineates separate and joint roles and responsibilities for securing the President and other full-time protectees traveling abroad, and foreign dignitaries traveling to the U.S. (Recommendation 4)
Open Actions to satisfy the intent of the recommendation have not been taken or are being planned.
When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108455
VA Electronic Health Record Modernization: Actions Needed to Sustain Accelerated System Deployments
WASHINGTON, Sept. 2 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
* * *
VA Electronic Health Record Modernization: Actions Needed to Sustain Accelerated System Deployments
*
#Fast Facts
We testified on the Department of Veterans' Affairs electronic health records modernization efforts before the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs. It is based primarily on the following reports:
Electronic Health Records: VA Making Incremental Improvements in New System but Needs Updated Cost Estimate and Schedule
Electronic Health Records: VA Needs to Address Management ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 2 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * VA Electronic Health Record Modernization: Actions Needed to Sustain Accelerated System Deployments * #Fast Facts We testified on the Department of Veterans' Affairs electronic health records modernization efforts before the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs. It is based primarily on the following reports: Electronic Health Records: VA Making Incremental Improvements in New System but Needs Updated Cost Estimate and Schedule Electronic Health Records: VA Needs to Address ManagementChallenges with New System
Electronic Health Records: VA Needs to Address Data Management Challenges for New System
VA has addressed 4 of our 18 recommendations but still needs to fully address 14 recommendations, including 12 priority recommendations.
A white building, the U.S. Capitol, with a dome and a flag on top and text saying GAO Testimony to Congress.
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
After three unsuccessful attempts over two decades, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) undertook a fourth effort in 2017-the Electronic Health Record Modernization (EHRM) program-to modernize its legacy health information system. GAO has previously reported on the challenges VA has experienced with this effort. In these reports, GAO made 18 recommendations to improve cost estimating, schedule, program management, user adoption and satisfaction, and operational testing. GAO deemed 12 of these as priority recommendations because of their criticality to successful future deployments. As of August 2026, VA has not yet fully implemented 14 of the 18 recommendations.
Implementation Status of GAO Electronic Health Record System-Related Recommendations to the Department of Veterans Affairs as of August 2026
Report
Total number of recommendations
Number of priority recommendations
Implementation status of recommendations
GAO-25-106874
(March 2025)
3
2
2 priority open (not implemented)
1 closed (implemented)
GAO-23-106731
(May 2023)
10
10
6 priority open (not implemented)
4 priority open (partially implemented)
GAO-22-103718
(February 2022)
2
0
1 open (not implemented)
1 closed (implemented)
GAO-21-224
(February 2021)
2
0 2 closed (implemented)
GAO-20-473
(June 2020)
1 0
1 open (not implemented)
Source: GAO reports. I GAO-26-109393
In March 2025, GAO reported that VA had made improvements at five initial sites but noted that the department's actions to address challenges had impacted the program's total cost estimate and schedule. Accordingly, GAO made two priority recommendations to update the cost estimate and schedule. Senate and House Authorizing and Appropriations Committees subsequently sent a letter to VA requesting a detailed cost estimate and schedule before September 30, 2025. While VA has delivered a notional schedule to congressional committees, it has not provided a cost estimate or detailed documentation of its schedule necessary to determine the extent to which it is consistent with leading practices.
In May 2023, GAO reported that users expressed dissatisfaction with the new system and VA did not adequately identify and address system issues. GAO made 10 priority recommendations to address user satisfaction, system trouble ticket, and independent operational assessment deficiencies. As of August 2026, VA has not yet fully addressed the 10 recommendations.
Until VA fully implements the recommendations, future deployments risk prolonging management challenges like those experienced in the initial deployments and users will likely not be positioned to achieve optimal usage of the new electronic health record (EHR) system.
#Why GAO Did This Study
VA depends on its EHR system to manage health care for its patients. Since 2017, the department's EHRM program has undertaken efforts to replace its legacy EHR system with a modernized, commercial system.
VA first deployed its new EHR system in 2020 and followed up with further deployments to four additional sites in 2022. However, in 2023, it halted future system deployments due to feedback from veterans and clinicians that the new system was not meeting expectations. In December 2024, VA announced plans to restart deployments beginning with four facilities in Michigan. The department plans for nine additional site deployments in 2026. VA plans to accelerate deployments to complete approximately 170 sites by 2031.
GAO has previously designated VA health care as a High-Risk area for the federal government, in part due to its challenges implementing EHRM initiatives.
GAO was asked to testify on its key prior reports and related recommendations to improve VA's EHRM program. GAO summarized the results of five prior reports from June 2020 through March 2025 and followed up with VA on its actions to implement GAO's recommendations.
#Recommendations
GAO has made a total of 18 recommendations in prior reports to VA to improve its EHRM efforts, 12 of which GAO has deemed priority recommendations. As of August 2026, the department has fully implemented four of the 18 recommendations and partially implemented four priority recommendations, but has not fully addressed 10, including the remaining priority recommendations.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-109393
* * *
VA Electronic Health Record Modernization: Actions Needed to Sustain Accelerated System Deployments
*
#Fast Facts
We testified on the Department of Veterans' Affairs electronic health records modernization efforts before the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs. It is based primarily on the following reports:
Electronic Health Records: VA Making Incremental Improvements in New System but Needs Updated Cost Estimate and Schedule
Electronic Health Records: VA Needs to Address Management ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 2 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * VA Electronic Health Record Modernization: Actions Needed to Sustain Accelerated System Deployments * #Fast Facts We testified on the Department of Veterans' Affairs electronic health records modernization efforts before the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs. It is based primarily on the following reports: Electronic Health Records: VA Making Incremental Improvements in New System but Needs Updated Cost Estimate and Schedule Electronic Health Records: VA Needs to Address ManagementChallenges with New System
Electronic Health Records: VA Needs to Address Data Management Challenges for New System
VA has addressed 4 of our 18 recommendations but still needs to fully address 14 recommendations, including 12 priority recommendations.
A white building, the U.S. Capitol, with a dome and a flag on top and text saying GAO Testimony to Congress.
#Highlights
#What GAO Found
After three unsuccessful attempts over two decades, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) undertook a fourth effort in 2017-the Electronic Health Record Modernization (EHRM) program-to modernize its legacy health information system. GAO has previously reported on the challenges VA has experienced with this effort. In these reports, GAO made 18 recommendations to improve cost estimating, schedule, program management, user adoption and satisfaction, and operational testing. GAO deemed 12 of these as priority recommendations because of their criticality to successful future deployments. As of August 2026, VA has not yet fully implemented 14 of the 18 recommendations.
Implementation Status of GAO Electronic Health Record System-Related Recommendations to the Department of Veterans Affairs as of August 2026
Report
Total number of recommendations
Number of priority recommendations
Implementation status of recommendations
GAO-25-106874
(March 2025)
3
2
2 priority open (not implemented)
1 closed (implemented)
GAO-23-106731
(May 2023)
10
10
6 priority open (not implemented)
4 priority open (partially implemented)
GAO-22-103718
(February 2022)
2
0
1 open (not implemented)
1 closed (implemented)
GAO-21-224
(February 2021)
2
0 2 closed (implemented)
GAO-20-473
(June 2020)
1 0
1 open (not implemented)
Source: GAO reports. I GAO-26-109393
In March 2025, GAO reported that VA had made improvements at five initial sites but noted that the department's actions to address challenges had impacted the program's total cost estimate and schedule. Accordingly, GAO made two priority recommendations to update the cost estimate and schedule. Senate and House Authorizing and Appropriations Committees subsequently sent a letter to VA requesting a detailed cost estimate and schedule before September 30, 2025. While VA has delivered a notional schedule to congressional committees, it has not provided a cost estimate or detailed documentation of its schedule necessary to determine the extent to which it is consistent with leading practices.
In May 2023, GAO reported that users expressed dissatisfaction with the new system and VA did not adequately identify and address system issues. GAO made 10 priority recommendations to address user satisfaction, system trouble ticket, and independent operational assessment deficiencies. As of August 2026, VA has not yet fully addressed the 10 recommendations.
Until VA fully implements the recommendations, future deployments risk prolonging management challenges like those experienced in the initial deployments and users will likely not be positioned to achieve optimal usage of the new electronic health record (EHR) system.
#Why GAO Did This Study
VA depends on its EHR system to manage health care for its patients. Since 2017, the department's EHRM program has undertaken efforts to replace its legacy EHR system with a modernized, commercial system.
VA first deployed its new EHR system in 2020 and followed up with further deployments to four additional sites in 2022. However, in 2023, it halted future system deployments due to feedback from veterans and clinicians that the new system was not meeting expectations. In December 2024, VA announced plans to restart deployments beginning with four facilities in Michigan. The department plans for nine additional site deployments in 2026. VA plans to accelerate deployments to complete approximately 170 sites by 2031.
GAO has previously designated VA health care as a High-Risk area for the federal government, in part due to its challenges implementing EHRM initiatives.
GAO was asked to testify on its key prior reports and related recommendations to improve VA's EHRM program. GAO summarized the results of five prior reports from June 2020 through March 2025 and followed up with VA on its actions to implement GAO's recommendations.
#Recommendations
GAO has made a total of 18 recommendations in prior reports to VA to improve its EHRM efforts, 12 of which GAO has deemed priority recommendations. As of August 2026, the department has fully implemented four of the 18 recommendations and partially implemented four priority recommendations, but has not fully addressed 10, including the remaining priority recommendations.
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-109393