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Science & Tech Spotlight: New World Screwworm Eradication
WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
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Science & Tech Spotlight: New World Screwworm Eradication
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New World screwworm is a parasitic fly that could cost the U.S. cattle industry billions of dollars per year. The eggs laid by screwworm flies hatch into larvae that infect cattle, sheep, and other animals, causing painful wounds and death if untreated. Over 100 total cases have been identified in the U.S. as of November 2026. Experts are concerned that existing control capabilities, which use sterile flies, may be insufficient ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Science & Tech Spotlight: New World Screwworm Eradication * New World screwworm is a parasitic fly that could cost the U.S. cattle industry billions of dollars per year. The eggs laid by screwworm flies hatch into larvae that infect cattle, sheep, and other animals, causing painful wounds and death if untreated. Over 100 total cases have been identified in the U.S. as of November 2026. Experts are concerned that existing control capabilities, which use sterile flies, may be insufficientto combat new outbreaks.
Key Takeaways
* Ongoing research uses genetic engineering to design new systems that interrupt screwworm reproduction.
* New technologies could more rapidly reduce screwworm populations or force extinction.
* These technologies face an uncertain regulatory environment and raise ethical questions.
The Technology
What is it? Researchers are using genetic engineering to design new ways to interrupt screwworm reproduction. Two prominent approaches--genetically engineered male fly strains and gene drives--have the potential to reduce the wild population more effectively than the current technique.
How does it work? Genetic engineering aims to improvethe efficacy of the current method--sterile insect technique. With this technique, the U.S. and other nations produce New World screwworm flies in a contained facility. They use radiation to sterilize them, then release them into the wild. The sterile males mate with females from the wild population. Because females only mate once, those females produce no offspring, thereby reducing the population. This technique is inefficient, however, because it also produces females.
Genetically engineered male-only fly strains save on feed, energy, and facility resources by inserting a gene that causes female offspring to die off. As a result, only males are produced. Those males require less radiation for sterilization and more efficiently suppress the wild population.
Gene drives, by comparison, do not use sterile flies. Instead, this approach engineers flies to spread a self-propagating gene that is designed to suppress or eliminate the population (see figure 1).
Figure 1. Gene Drive Transmitting a Female Mortality Gene
How mature is it? The sterile insect technique is mature. A facility in Panama jointly funded by the U.S. releases about 100 million sterile flies per week to stop New World screwworm from spreading north from South America. However, in 2023 the pests broke through this biological barrier. In 2026, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) released sterile flies in the U.S. and Mexico to control the new outbreak.
Researchers successfully engineered male-only flies at the facility in Panama, but regulatory approvals are needed before they can be exported or deployed in the U.S. or abroad. As of November 2026, the USDA is seeking an emergency use exemption from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a strain of genetically engineered male flies.
Researchers have successfully used gene drives to reduce populations of other species of insects. For example, trials with caged mosquitoes have shown rapid spread of a gene that reduced population. For New World screwworm, Uruguay has approved gene drive trials with caged flies, but the technique has not been used in the wild.
Opportunities
* Increase efficacy. Genetic engineering could improve sterile insect technique efficacy and reduce costs.
* Help other eradication efforts. Improved genetic engineering screwworm eradication technologies might also benefit efforts to counter other parasitic or disease-carrying insects.
* Permanent solution. Driving this species extinct could eliminate the need for further control efforts.
Challenges
* Regulation. Genetic engineering faces an uncertain regulatory environment and ethical concerns over deliberately driving a species extinct. U.S. regulations do not clearly define gene drives, and agencies may regulate them differently depending on their application or use case.
* Gene drive resistance. Wild populations could develop genetic mutations that render a gene drive ineffective over time.
* Transient infections. Gene drives are spread by fertile flies. Therefore, deploying this approach initially produces some viable offspring, which would infect some animals.
Policy Context And Questions
* What factors could policymakers consider when deploying screwworm eradication technologies?
* What information might policymakers need to potentially regulate gene drives and other emerging technologies?
* How might policymakers determine that species extinction is warranted?
Selected GAO Work
Public Health Preparedness: Experts Identified Actions to Improve Surveillance for Emerging Disease Threats, GAO-26-107610.
Alternatives to Radioactive Materials: A National Strategy to Support Alternative Technologies May Reduce Risks of a Dirty Bomb, GAO-22-104113.
Science & Tech Spotlight: CRISPR Gene Editing, GAO-20-478SP.
Selected Reference
Akbari, O. "Resurgence of the New World screwworm and the future of genetic biocontrol," Trends Open, 2026, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.treopn.2026.06.015.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-109347
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Science & Tech Spotlight: New World Screwworm Eradication
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New World screwworm is a parasitic fly that could cost the U.S. cattle industry billions of dollars per year. The eggs laid by screwworm flies hatch into larvae that infect cattle, sheep, and other animals, causing painful wounds and death if untreated. Over 100 total cases have been identified in the U.S. as of November 2026. Experts are concerned that existing control capabilities, which use sterile flies, may be insufficient ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Science & Tech Spotlight: New World Screwworm Eradication * New World screwworm is a parasitic fly that could cost the U.S. cattle industry billions of dollars per year. The eggs laid by screwworm flies hatch into larvae that infect cattle, sheep, and other animals, causing painful wounds and death if untreated. Over 100 total cases have been identified in the U.S. as of November 2026. Experts are concerned that existing control capabilities, which use sterile flies, may be insufficientto combat new outbreaks.
Key Takeaways
* Ongoing research uses genetic engineering to design new systems that interrupt screwworm reproduction.
* New technologies could more rapidly reduce screwworm populations or force extinction.
* These technologies face an uncertain regulatory environment and raise ethical questions.
The Technology
What is it? Researchers are using genetic engineering to design new ways to interrupt screwworm reproduction. Two prominent approaches--genetically engineered male fly strains and gene drives--have the potential to reduce the wild population more effectively than the current technique.
How does it work? Genetic engineering aims to improvethe efficacy of the current method--sterile insect technique. With this technique, the U.S. and other nations produce New World screwworm flies in a contained facility. They use radiation to sterilize them, then release them into the wild. The sterile males mate with females from the wild population. Because females only mate once, those females produce no offspring, thereby reducing the population. This technique is inefficient, however, because it also produces females.
Genetically engineered male-only fly strains save on feed, energy, and facility resources by inserting a gene that causes female offspring to die off. As a result, only males are produced. Those males require less radiation for sterilization and more efficiently suppress the wild population.
Gene drives, by comparison, do not use sterile flies. Instead, this approach engineers flies to spread a self-propagating gene that is designed to suppress or eliminate the population (see figure 1).
Figure 1. Gene Drive Transmitting a Female Mortality Gene
How mature is it? The sterile insect technique is mature. A facility in Panama jointly funded by the U.S. releases about 100 million sterile flies per week to stop New World screwworm from spreading north from South America. However, in 2023 the pests broke through this biological barrier. In 2026, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) released sterile flies in the U.S. and Mexico to control the new outbreak.
Researchers successfully engineered male-only flies at the facility in Panama, but regulatory approvals are needed before they can be exported or deployed in the U.S. or abroad. As of November 2026, the USDA is seeking an emergency use exemption from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a strain of genetically engineered male flies.
Researchers have successfully used gene drives to reduce populations of other species of insects. For example, trials with caged mosquitoes have shown rapid spread of a gene that reduced population. For New World screwworm, Uruguay has approved gene drive trials with caged flies, but the technique has not been used in the wild.
Opportunities
* Increase efficacy. Genetic engineering could improve sterile insect technique efficacy and reduce costs.
* Help other eradication efforts. Improved genetic engineering screwworm eradication technologies might also benefit efforts to counter other parasitic or disease-carrying insects.
* Permanent solution. Driving this species extinct could eliminate the need for further control efforts.
Challenges
* Regulation. Genetic engineering faces an uncertain regulatory environment and ethical concerns over deliberately driving a species extinct. U.S. regulations do not clearly define gene drives, and agencies may regulate them differently depending on their application or use case.
* Gene drive resistance. Wild populations could develop genetic mutations that render a gene drive ineffective over time.
* Transient infections. Gene drives are spread by fertile flies. Therefore, deploying this approach initially produces some viable offspring, which would infect some animals.
Policy Context And Questions
* What factors could policymakers consider when deploying screwworm eradication technologies?
* What information might policymakers need to potentially regulate gene drives and other emerging technologies?
* How might policymakers determine that species extinction is warranted?
Selected GAO Work
Public Health Preparedness: Experts Identified Actions to Improve Surveillance for Emerging Disease Threats, GAO-26-107610.
Alternatives to Radioactive Materials: A National Strategy to Support Alternative Technologies May Reduce Risks of a Dirty Bomb, GAO-22-104113.
Science & Tech Spotlight: CRISPR Gene Editing, GAO-20-478SP.
Selected Reference
Akbari, O. "Resurgence of the New World screwworm and the future of genetic biocontrol," Trends Open, 2026, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.treopn.2026.06.015.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-109347
Veterans Crisis Line: Actions Needed to Improve Services Provided After Initial Contact
WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
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Veterans Crisis Line: Actions Needed to Improve Services Provided After Initial Contact
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Suicide prevention is a top VA priority. The department operates a 24/7 crisis line reachable by voice, text, and chat for immediate crisis support. It also facilitates additional services as needed--such as in-person emergency intervention and requests for follow-up care.
VA collects some data on these additional services, including on VA's attempts to contact veterans following crisis line use. But ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Veterans Crisis Line: Actions Needed to Improve Services Provided After Initial Contact * Suicide prevention is a top VA priority. The department operates a 24/7 crisis line reachable by voice, text, and chat for immediate crisis support. It also facilitates additional services as needed--such as in-person emergency intervention and requests for follow-up care. VA collects some data on these additional services, including on VA's attempts to contact veterans following crisis line use. Butit doesn't collect data on whether staff reach veterans or how many veterans get additional services from these communications.
We recommended, among other things, that VA collect such data to help ensure the crisis line's effectiveness.
Three people gathered around a desk with a computer and phone. One is taking notes on a piece of paper, one watches, and one with a headset types at the computer.
Highlights
What GAO Found
Suicide prevention is the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) stated top clinical priority. To this end, VA operates the Veterans Crisis Line (VCL), a 24/7 phone, chat, and text service. The VCL is staffed by crisis responders who support veterans and their family and friends (VA refers to users of the VCL as customers). VA offers a variety of immediate and long-term post-contact services to customers following their crisis line interactions, such as peer support and requests for follow-up from suicide prevention coordinators at local VA medical facilities.
Process for Delivering Services Following Veterans Crisis Line Interactions
VCL officials and staff at six medical facilities GAO reviewed reported challenges coordinating emergency crisis interventions. In particular, according to VCL officials, some jurisdictions will not dispatch emergency responders to VCL customers due to local challenges, such as low law enforcement availability. GAO found that VCL does not proactively identify other local emergency response resources with which the VCL could coordinate emergency responses in these jurisdictions, such as mobile crisis units. Rather, VA policy calls for VCL employees to research potential local resources in real-time. Having information on alternative resources readily available would help ensure the VCL's ability to respond in a timely manner to emergencies.
To evaluate the effectiveness of VCL post-contact services, VA researchers have conducted studies on some of these services, such as emergency crisis services and caring letters. VA also collects information on post-contact services provided after a VCL call. For instance, VA tracks whether suicide prevention coordinators at VA medical facilities attempt to contact veterans to discuss requests for follow up care at VA, as required by VA policy. However, VA does not collect and track VCL request data on the extent to which (1) the coordinators are successfully reaching veterans and (2) veterans are connecting to care in accordance with each veteran's needs and preferences. Collecting and tracking such information would provide evidence VA could use to assess its process for following up with veterans after their interactions with the VCL and to better ensure the department is supporting veterans and meeting their needs and preferences.
Why GAO Did This Study
Suicide is one of the leading causes of death in the United States and veterans suffer a disproportionately high rate of suicide compared to non-veterans. Use of the VCL has grown over the last several years, with over 1.2 million interactions in fiscal year 2025. VCL crisis responders handle initial communications with individuals and can refer customers to post-VCL contact services.
GAO was asked to review aspects of VCL post-contact services. This report (1) describes post-contact services; (2) examines challenges associated with providing post-contact services; and (3) examines the extent to which VA has evaluated the effectiveness of its post-VCL contact services.
GAO reviewed VA policies, interviewed VA officials, analyzed fiscal year 2021-2025 data on post-contact services, conducted site visits at six medical facilities selected based on complexity and geographic variation, and reviewed a non-generalized sample of medical records.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that VA (1) identify alternative crisis response resources the VCL can coordinate with in jurisdictions that have consistently declined to dispatch emergency response; and (2) systematically collect and track VCL data on the extent to which suicide prevention coordinators are successfully reaching veterans following use of the crisis line and track the extent to which such veterans are connected to care in accordance with each veteran's needs and preferences. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of Veterans AffairsThe Under Secretary for Health should direct the VCL to identify alternative crisis response resources the VCL can coordinate with in jurisdictions that have consistently declined to dispatch emergency response. (Recommendation 1)
Department of Veterans AffairsThe Under Secretary for Health should systematically collect and track VCL data on the extent to which SPCs are successfully reaching veterans following use of the crisis line and the extent to which such veterans are connected to care in accordance with each veteran's needs and preferences. (Recommendation 2)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108414 (TNSmrp)
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Veterans Crisis Line: Actions Needed to Improve Services Provided After Initial Contact
*
Suicide prevention is a top VA priority. The department operates a 24/7 crisis line reachable by voice, text, and chat for immediate crisis support. It also facilitates additional services as needed--such as in-person emergency intervention and requests for follow-up care.
VA collects some data on these additional services, including on VA's attempts to contact veterans following crisis line use. But ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Veterans Crisis Line: Actions Needed to Improve Services Provided After Initial Contact * Suicide prevention is a top VA priority. The department operates a 24/7 crisis line reachable by voice, text, and chat for immediate crisis support. It also facilitates additional services as needed--such as in-person emergency intervention and requests for follow-up care. VA collects some data on these additional services, including on VA's attempts to contact veterans following crisis line use. Butit doesn't collect data on whether staff reach veterans or how many veterans get additional services from these communications.
We recommended, among other things, that VA collect such data to help ensure the crisis line's effectiveness.
Three people gathered around a desk with a computer and phone. One is taking notes on a piece of paper, one watches, and one with a headset types at the computer.
Highlights
What GAO Found
Suicide prevention is the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) stated top clinical priority. To this end, VA operates the Veterans Crisis Line (VCL), a 24/7 phone, chat, and text service. The VCL is staffed by crisis responders who support veterans and their family and friends (VA refers to users of the VCL as customers). VA offers a variety of immediate and long-term post-contact services to customers following their crisis line interactions, such as peer support and requests for follow-up from suicide prevention coordinators at local VA medical facilities.
Process for Delivering Services Following Veterans Crisis Line Interactions
VCL officials and staff at six medical facilities GAO reviewed reported challenges coordinating emergency crisis interventions. In particular, according to VCL officials, some jurisdictions will not dispatch emergency responders to VCL customers due to local challenges, such as low law enforcement availability. GAO found that VCL does not proactively identify other local emergency response resources with which the VCL could coordinate emergency responses in these jurisdictions, such as mobile crisis units. Rather, VA policy calls for VCL employees to research potential local resources in real-time. Having information on alternative resources readily available would help ensure the VCL's ability to respond in a timely manner to emergencies.
To evaluate the effectiveness of VCL post-contact services, VA researchers have conducted studies on some of these services, such as emergency crisis services and caring letters. VA also collects information on post-contact services provided after a VCL call. For instance, VA tracks whether suicide prevention coordinators at VA medical facilities attempt to contact veterans to discuss requests for follow up care at VA, as required by VA policy. However, VA does not collect and track VCL request data on the extent to which (1) the coordinators are successfully reaching veterans and (2) veterans are connecting to care in accordance with each veteran's needs and preferences. Collecting and tracking such information would provide evidence VA could use to assess its process for following up with veterans after their interactions with the VCL and to better ensure the department is supporting veterans and meeting their needs and preferences.
Why GAO Did This Study
Suicide is one of the leading causes of death in the United States and veterans suffer a disproportionately high rate of suicide compared to non-veterans. Use of the VCL has grown over the last several years, with over 1.2 million interactions in fiscal year 2025. VCL crisis responders handle initial communications with individuals and can refer customers to post-VCL contact services.
GAO was asked to review aspects of VCL post-contact services. This report (1) describes post-contact services; (2) examines challenges associated with providing post-contact services; and (3) examines the extent to which VA has evaluated the effectiveness of its post-VCL contact services.
GAO reviewed VA policies, interviewed VA officials, analyzed fiscal year 2021-2025 data on post-contact services, conducted site visits at six medical facilities selected based on complexity and geographic variation, and reviewed a non-generalized sample of medical records.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that VA (1) identify alternative crisis response resources the VCL can coordinate with in jurisdictions that have consistently declined to dispatch emergency response; and (2) systematically collect and track VCL data on the extent to which suicide prevention coordinators are successfully reaching veterans following use of the crisis line and track the extent to which such veterans are connected to care in accordance with each veteran's needs and preferences. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of Veterans AffairsThe Under Secretary for Health should direct the VCL to identify alternative crisis response resources the VCL can coordinate with in jurisdictions that have consistently declined to dispatch emergency response. (Recommendation 1)
Department of Veterans AffairsThe Under Secretary for Health should systematically collect and track VCL data on the extent to which SPCs are successfully reaching veterans following use of the crisis line and the extent to which such veterans are connected to care in accordance with each veteran's needs and preferences. (Recommendation 2)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108414 (TNSmrp)
VA Electronic Health Record Modernization: System Deployed to 13 Sites in 2026 and Work Planned to Continue at an Accelerated Pace
WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
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VA Electronic Health Record Modernization: System Deployed to 13 Sites in 2026 and Work Planned to Continue at an Accelerated Pace
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We testified about the Department of Veterans Affairs' electronic health records modernization efforts.
Our testimony, given before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, is primarily based on ongoing work. So far, we've found that VA deployed its new health record system to 13 sites in 2026 and continues to monitor the system's performance. VA plans to ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * VA Electronic Health Record Modernization: System Deployed to 13 Sites in 2026 and Work Planned to Continue at an Accelerated Pace * We testified about the Department of Veterans Affairs' electronic health records modernization efforts. Our testimony, given before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, is primarily based on ongoing work. So far, we've found that VA deployed its new health record system to 13 sites in 2026 and continues to monitor the system's performance. VA plans todeploy it to 26 more sites in 2027.
We also provided an update on some of our related recommendations from past reports. VA has addressed some of our recommendations but still needs to address others.
A photo of the U.S. Capitol building with the text "GAO Testimony to Congress."
Highlights
What GAO Found
In 2017, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began its most recent effort to modernize its legacy electronic health records (EHR) system. After a 3-year pause to make improvements, VA deployed the new EHR to all 13 planned medical centers in 2026. The pace of these 2026 deployments (13 live sites in 6 months) was considerably faster than the deployment of the six original sites between October 2020 and March 2024. The department intends to continue this accelerated pace, with 26 system deployments planned for 2027.
Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Electronic Health Record System Deployments in 2026
The department relied on standardized processes and workflows for the accelerated deployments. According to VA officials, data from post-deployment assessments demonstrate that the four Michigan medical centers are generally meeting performance metric targets, which indicates to them that sites are generally able to serve veterans as they did prior to the deployments. However, a survey of user satisfaction is not yet complete.
From June 2020 to March 2025, GAO issued five reports on VA's efforts to implement its EHR system. In these reports, GAO made 18 recommendations. While VA has taken steps to address some recommendations, the department has not fully implemented 11 of the 18. In particular, GAO's preliminary results show that, as of November 2026, VA has not yet demonstrated that it employed leading scheduling practices for the EHR modernization program as GAO has previously recommended. It has not developed a complete integrated master schedule incorporating the entire required scope of work or detailed documentation for scheduled activities.
Fully implementing GAO's recommendations would help ensure that the program is well positioned to support its accelerated deployments. It is critically important that VA update its integrated schedule to inform decision-making and allow the department and Congress to understand tradeoffs that must be made to complete deployments by 2031.
Why GAO Did This Study
VA's health care system provides services to more than 9 million veterans. VA has been working to replace its legacy EHR system with a modernized, commercial system. In April 2023, after deploying the new system to five of its medical centers, VA paused deployments to address user concerns and ensure patient safety. In 2024, VA announced the restart of deployment activities with 13 sites in 2026, beginning with four sites in Michigan. VA plans to complete 170 site deployments by 2031.
GAO was asked to testify on VA's progress deploying its new EHR system to medical facilities in 2026 and the status of open GAO recommendations related to VA's EHR modernization.
GAO summarized the preliminary results of a draft report currently with the agency for comment that addresses, among other things, VA's progress deploying the new EHR in 2026 and VA's scheduling practices. GAO also summarized the status of VA's actions to implement recommendations made in five prior reports.
Recommendations
GAO has previously made 18 recommendations on EHR modernization in issued reports, 11 of which have not been fully implemented. GAO reiterates that VA should address the 11 recommendations previously made that have not been fully implemented, including expeditiously updating its master schedule.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-109529 (TNSmrp)
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VA Electronic Health Record Modernization: System Deployed to 13 Sites in 2026 and Work Planned to Continue at an Accelerated Pace
*
We testified about the Department of Veterans Affairs' electronic health records modernization efforts.
Our testimony, given before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, is primarily based on ongoing work. So far, we've found that VA deployed its new health record system to 13 sites in 2026 and continues to monitor the system's performance. VA plans to ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * VA Electronic Health Record Modernization: System Deployed to 13 Sites in 2026 and Work Planned to Continue at an Accelerated Pace * We testified about the Department of Veterans Affairs' electronic health records modernization efforts. Our testimony, given before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs, is primarily based on ongoing work. So far, we've found that VA deployed its new health record system to 13 sites in 2026 and continues to monitor the system's performance. VA plans todeploy it to 26 more sites in 2027.
We also provided an update on some of our related recommendations from past reports. VA has addressed some of our recommendations but still needs to address others.
A photo of the U.S. Capitol building with the text "GAO Testimony to Congress."
Highlights
What GAO Found
In 2017, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began its most recent effort to modernize its legacy electronic health records (EHR) system. After a 3-year pause to make improvements, VA deployed the new EHR to all 13 planned medical centers in 2026. The pace of these 2026 deployments (13 live sites in 6 months) was considerably faster than the deployment of the six original sites between October 2020 and March 2024. The department intends to continue this accelerated pace, with 26 system deployments planned for 2027.
Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Electronic Health Record System Deployments in 2026
The department relied on standardized processes and workflows for the accelerated deployments. According to VA officials, data from post-deployment assessments demonstrate that the four Michigan medical centers are generally meeting performance metric targets, which indicates to them that sites are generally able to serve veterans as they did prior to the deployments. However, a survey of user satisfaction is not yet complete.
From June 2020 to March 2025, GAO issued five reports on VA's efforts to implement its EHR system. In these reports, GAO made 18 recommendations. While VA has taken steps to address some recommendations, the department has not fully implemented 11 of the 18. In particular, GAO's preliminary results show that, as of November 2026, VA has not yet demonstrated that it employed leading scheduling practices for the EHR modernization program as GAO has previously recommended. It has not developed a complete integrated master schedule incorporating the entire required scope of work or detailed documentation for scheduled activities.
Fully implementing GAO's recommendations would help ensure that the program is well positioned to support its accelerated deployments. It is critically important that VA update its integrated schedule to inform decision-making and allow the department and Congress to understand tradeoffs that must be made to complete deployments by 2031.
Why GAO Did This Study
VA's health care system provides services to more than 9 million veterans. VA has been working to replace its legacy EHR system with a modernized, commercial system. In April 2023, after deploying the new system to five of its medical centers, VA paused deployments to address user concerns and ensure patient safety. In 2024, VA announced the restart of deployment activities with 13 sites in 2026, beginning with four sites in Michigan. VA plans to complete 170 site deployments by 2031.
GAO was asked to testify on VA's progress deploying its new EHR system to medical facilities in 2026 and the status of open GAO recommendations related to VA's EHR modernization.
GAO summarized the preliminary results of a draft report currently with the agency for comment that addresses, among other things, VA's progress deploying the new EHR in 2026 and VA's scheduling practices. GAO also summarized the status of VA's actions to implement recommendations made in five prior reports.
Recommendations
GAO has previously made 18 recommendations on EHR modernization in issued reports, 11 of which have not been fully implemented. GAO reiterates that VA should address the 11 recommendations previously made that have not been fully implemented, including expeditiously updating its master schedule.
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-109529 (TNSmrp)
Strategic Planning: FDA Could Further Strengthen Robust IT Modernization Plan
WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
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Strategic Planning: FDA Could Further Strengthen Robust IT Modernization Plan
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The Food and Drug Administration relies heavily on its IT systems to help protect public health and ensure the safety of medical products. FDA is funding 17 major IT investments to improve its systems and has developed an IT strategic plan to guide its efforts.
We found that this plan addresses important leading practices of strategic planning--e.g., identifying goals and metrics that align with its mission. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Strategic Planning: FDA Could Further Strengthen Robust IT Modernization Plan * The Food and Drug Administration relies heavily on its IT systems to help protect public health and ensure the safety of medical products. FDA is funding 17 major IT investments to improve its systems and has developed an IT strategic plan to guide its efforts. We found that this plan addresses important leading practices of strategic planning--e.g., identifying goals and metrics that align with its mission.But FDA could better document the ways it monitors key challenges and identifies links between its major IT investments and its goals.
We recommended FDA do so.
Pen on top of digital charts and a computer.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has developed a suite of strategic planning documentation to guide modernization of its information technology (IT) systems and support the agency's IT strategic mission. FDA's strategic plan suite identifies IT strategic goals and captures key upcoming agencywide modernization efforts. FDA's strategic plans fully address six of eight strategic planning leading practices. For example, the plan aligns to agency and department-wide missions, identifies performance measures for meeting agency IT goals, and defines roles and responsibilities for meeting the goals.
Comparison of Food and Drug Adminstration (FDA) Strategic Plan Contents Against Leading Strategic Planning Practices
However, FDA has not fully documented ways to monitor mitigation of key challenges to achieve its IT strategic goals or identified links between its major IT investments and its strategic goals, consistent with leading practices. By including these details, FDA will be able to anticipate and overcome key challenges and effectively implement its major IT investments in line with strategic goals.
For the five large major IT investments selected by GAO for review, FDA fully addressed two and partially addressed one of three leading practices for performance measurement. Specifically, FDA created performance metrics for each investment that aligned with IT strategic goals and used these metrics to track investment performance. However, FDA did not demonstrate use of these metrics in managing and improving investment performance for one of the five investments. By doing so, FDA will be able to ensure that the investment is progressing as intended.
Why GAO Did This Study
FDA relies extensively on IT to achieve its mission for protecting the public's health. GAO previously reported shortfalls in FDA's ability to develop an IT strategic plan that was comprehensive and aligned with agency goals. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, called for FDA to develop an updated IT strategic plan.
The Act also includes provisions for GAO to assess the development of FDA's IT strategic plan and the efficiency and effectiveness of its IT investments. This report examines the extent to which FDA has 1) developed a strategic plan to modernize its IT systems consistent with relevant leading practices; and 2) followed leading performance measurement practices in implementing its strategic plan for selected major IT investments.
GAO compared FDA's IT strategic planning documents against leading practices for strategic planning. GAO also compared performance metrics for the five largest FDA major IT investments against leading practices for performance measurement. GAO supplemented this information by interviewing knowledgeable FDA officials.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that FDA track key IT modernization challenges described in its IT strategic plan, align details of major IT investments and related resources to IT strategic plan goals, and demonstrate use of performance metrics in managing one of FDA's major IT investments. The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with all three recommendations and discussed steps it planned to take to implement them.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Food and Drug AdministrationThe Commissioner of FDA should ensure the Acting Director of the Office of Mission IT Services includes information on how it plans to directly track FDA's progress in mitigating the key IT modernization challenges described in its strategic plan. (Recommendation #1)
Food and Drug AdministrationThe Commissioner of FDA should ensure the Acting Director of the Office of Mission IT Services provides details on how each of its ongoing major IT investments are related to the goals, priorities, and projects identified in its IT strategic plan, and identify high-level expenditures for the projects listed in the plan. (Recommendation #2)
Food and Drug AdministrationThe Commissioner of FDA should ensure the Acting Director of the Office of Mission IT Services documents use of performance metrics in managing the performance of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) Digital Transformation IT major investment. (Recommendation #3)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108743 (TNSmrp)
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Strategic Planning: FDA Could Further Strengthen Robust IT Modernization Plan
*
The Food and Drug Administration relies heavily on its IT systems to help protect public health and ensure the safety of medical products. FDA is funding 17 major IT investments to improve its systems and has developed an IT strategic plan to guide its efforts.
We found that this plan addresses important leading practices of strategic planning--e.g., identifying goals and metrics that align with its mission. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Strategic Planning: FDA Could Further Strengthen Robust IT Modernization Plan * The Food and Drug Administration relies heavily on its IT systems to help protect public health and ensure the safety of medical products. FDA is funding 17 major IT investments to improve its systems and has developed an IT strategic plan to guide its efforts. We found that this plan addresses important leading practices of strategic planning--e.g., identifying goals and metrics that align with its mission.But FDA could better document the ways it monitors key challenges and identifies links between its major IT investments and its goals.
We recommended FDA do so.
Pen on top of digital charts and a computer.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has developed a suite of strategic planning documentation to guide modernization of its information technology (IT) systems and support the agency's IT strategic mission. FDA's strategic plan suite identifies IT strategic goals and captures key upcoming agencywide modernization efforts. FDA's strategic plans fully address six of eight strategic planning leading practices. For example, the plan aligns to agency and department-wide missions, identifies performance measures for meeting agency IT goals, and defines roles and responsibilities for meeting the goals.
Comparison of Food and Drug Adminstration (FDA) Strategic Plan Contents Against Leading Strategic Planning Practices
However, FDA has not fully documented ways to monitor mitigation of key challenges to achieve its IT strategic goals or identified links between its major IT investments and its strategic goals, consistent with leading practices. By including these details, FDA will be able to anticipate and overcome key challenges and effectively implement its major IT investments in line with strategic goals.
For the five large major IT investments selected by GAO for review, FDA fully addressed two and partially addressed one of three leading practices for performance measurement. Specifically, FDA created performance metrics for each investment that aligned with IT strategic goals and used these metrics to track investment performance. However, FDA did not demonstrate use of these metrics in managing and improving investment performance for one of the five investments. By doing so, FDA will be able to ensure that the investment is progressing as intended.
Why GAO Did This Study
FDA relies extensively on IT to achieve its mission for protecting the public's health. GAO previously reported shortfalls in FDA's ability to develop an IT strategic plan that was comprehensive and aligned with agency goals. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, called for FDA to develop an updated IT strategic plan.
The Act also includes provisions for GAO to assess the development of FDA's IT strategic plan and the efficiency and effectiveness of its IT investments. This report examines the extent to which FDA has 1) developed a strategic plan to modernize its IT systems consistent with relevant leading practices; and 2) followed leading performance measurement practices in implementing its strategic plan for selected major IT investments.
GAO compared FDA's IT strategic planning documents against leading practices for strategic planning. GAO also compared performance metrics for the five largest FDA major IT investments against leading practices for performance measurement. GAO supplemented this information by interviewing knowledgeable FDA officials.
Recommendations
GAO recommends that FDA track key IT modernization challenges described in its IT strategic plan, align details of major IT investments and related resources to IT strategic plan goals, and demonstrate use of performance metrics in managing one of FDA's major IT investments. The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with all three recommendations and discussed steps it planned to take to implement them.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Food and Drug AdministrationThe Commissioner of FDA should ensure the Acting Director of the Office of Mission IT Services includes information on how it plans to directly track FDA's progress in mitigating the key IT modernization challenges described in its strategic plan. (Recommendation #1)
Food and Drug AdministrationThe Commissioner of FDA should ensure the Acting Director of the Office of Mission IT Services provides details on how each of its ongoing major IT investments are related to the goals, priorities, and projects identified in its IT strategic plan, and identify high-level expenditures for the projects listed in the plan. (Recommendation #2)
Food and Drug AdministrationThe Commissioner of FDA should ensure the Acting Director of the Office of Mission IT Services documents use of performance metrics in managing the performance of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) Digital Transformation IT major investment. (Recommendation #3)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108743 (TNSmrp)
Medicare: HHS and CMS Should Better Manage Fraud Risks
WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
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Medicare: HHS and CMS Should Better Manage Fraud Risks
*
Medicare is the largest federal health program. It has been on our High Risk List for federal programs that are especially susceptible to fraud, mismanagement, and improper payments since 1990.
We found that Medicare could improve its process for managing fraud risks in its Fee-for-Service program. For example, we found that medical equipment suppliers could potentially circumvent the program's enrollment screening process--leaving ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Medicare: HHS and CMS Should Better Manage Fraud Risks * Medicare is the largest federal health program. It has been on our High Risk List for federal programs that are especially susceptible to fraud, mismanagement, and improper payments since 1990. We found that Medicare could improve its process for managing fraud risks in its Fee-for-Service program. For example, we found that medical equipment suppliers could potentially circumvent the program's enrollment screening process--leavingit susceptible to fraud.
Aligning this process with our Fraud Risk Framework could help reduce fraud and protect taxpayer dollars. Our recommendations address this and other issues.
Fraud risk management papers
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--and its various contractors oversee the traditional Medicare Fee-for-Service program (Medicare). CMS reported spending nearly $481 billion on benefits for about 34 million Medicare beneficiaries in 2025.
CMS uses the Vulnerability Management (VM) Process within the Center for Program Integrity (CPI) to manage fraud risks. However, this process is broader in scope and does not fully reflect the range of fraud risks facing Medicare. Without fully identifying and assessing fraud risks consistent with leading fraud risk management practices, CPI is missing opportunities to fully mitigate fraud risks before they materialize into significant fraud in Medicare. As shown below, based on its review of Inspector General reports, GAO identified fraud risks affecting Medicare that CPI did not identify or assess as part of its VM Process.
Fraud Risks That CPI Did Not Identity or Assess in Its Risk Assessment
Further, CPI's VM Process does not align with other leading practices that would help it strategically manage Medicare fraud risks. Specifically, the VM Process does not include an assessment of the likelihood and impact of fraud risks or examine the suitability of existing mitigating fraud controls for Medicare. For example, CPI identified a vulnerability associated with the supplier enrollment screening process, which GAO identified as a significant fraud risk, given its association with cases of alleged Medicare fraud. However, CPI's risk assessment did not assess the likelihood and impact of this vulnerability as a fraud risk. Without including such an assessment, CPI risks overlooking the full scope and impact of fraud risks.
Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare is the largest federal health program. The Medicare program was first included in GAO's High Risk List in 1990 and remains on the list due to its size, complexity, effect on the federal budget and health care sector, and continued susceptibility to fraud, mismanagement, and improper payments. GAO was asked to review HHS's efforts to prevent and minimize fraud in Medicare. This report evaluates, among other things, the extent to which HHS has assessed fraud risks in Medicare.
GAO reviewed documentation related to risk assessments for Medicare and related guidance. GAO also analyzed HHS Inspector General reports, federal court documents, and interviews from various contractors to identify Medicare fraud risks. GAO interviewed and reviewed information reported from HHS's Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources, CMS, and CPI. GAO compared this information against relevant leading practices from GAO's Fraud Risk Framework and internal control requirements.
Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations to HHS, including that it update and finalize risk management guidance to include designing and regularly performing comprehensive fraud risk assessments consistent with leading practices and internal control requirements. HHS agreed with three recommendations and did not agree with one recommendation. GAO maintains that all four recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Assistant Secretary of Financial Resources and the Administrator of CMS to establish a mechanism for CPI to effectively and regularly report identified Medicare fraud risks and corresponding antifraud efforts to ASFR. (Recommendation 1)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Administrator of CMS to ensure that CPI finalizes its Medicare Fee-for Service Risk Management Framework guidance that is currently in draft, consistent with leading fraud risk management practices and internal control requirements discussed in this report. (Recommendation 2)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Administrator of CMS to ensure that CPI updates, completes, and finalizes its risk assessments and vulnerability summaries that are currently in draft, consistent with the leading fraud risk management practices and internal control requirements discussed in this report. (Recommendation 3)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Administrator of CMS to ensure that CPI updates its VM Process Overview Document to include designing and regularly performing comprehensive assessments of fraud risks facing the Medicare program that are consistent with leading fraud risk management practices and internal control requirements discussed in this report. (Recommendation 4)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-109072 (TNSmrp)
* * *
Medicare: HHS and CMS Should Better Manage Fraud Risks
*
Medicare is the largest federal health program. It has been on our High Risk List for federal programs that are especially susceptible to fraud, mismanagement, and improper payments since 1990.
We found that Medicare could improve its process for managing fraud risks in its Fee-for-Service program. For example, we found that medical equipment suppliers could potentially circumvent the program's enrollment screening process--leaving ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Medicare: HHS and CMS Should Better Manage Fraud Risks * Medicare is the largest federal health program. It has been on our High Risk List for federal programs that are especially susceptible to fraud, mismanagement, and improper payments since 1990. We found that Medicare could improve its process for managing fraud risks in its Fee-for-Service program. For example, we found that medical equipment suppliers could potentially circumvent the program's enrollment screening process--leavingit susceptible to fraud.
Aligning this process with our Fraud Risk Framework could help reduce fraud and protect taxpayer dollars. Our recommendations address this and other issues.
Fraud risk management papers
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--and its various contractors oversee the traditional Medicare Fee-for-Service program (Medicare). CMS reported spending nearly $481 billion on benefits for about 34 million Medicare beneficiaries in 2025.
CMS uses the Vulnerability Management (VM) Process within the Center for Program Integrity (CPI) to manage fraud risks. However, this process is broader in scope and does not fully reflect the range of fraud risks facing Medicare. Without fully identifying and assessing fraud risks consistent with leading fraud risk management practices, CPI is missing opportunities to fully mitigate fraud risks before they materialize into significant fraud in Medicare. As shown below, based on its review of Inspector General reports, GAO identified fraud risks affecting Medicare that CPI did not identify or assess as part of its VM Process.
Fraud Risks That CPI Did Not Identity or Assess in Its Risk Assessment
Further, CPI's VM Process does not align with other leading practices that would help it strategically manage Medicare fraud risks. Specifically, the VM Process does not include an assessment of the likelihood and impact of fraud risks or examine the suitability of existing mitigating fraud controls for Medicare. For example, CPI identified a vulnerability associated with the supplier enrollment screening process, which GAO identified as a significant fraud risk, given its association with cases of alleged Medicare fraud. However, CPI's risk assessment did not assess the likelihood and impact of this vulnerability as a fraud risk. Without including such an assessment, CPI risks overlooking the full scope and impact of fraud risks.
Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare is the largest federal health program. The Medicare program was first included in GAO's High Risk List in 1990 and remains on the list due to its size, complexity, effect on the federal budget and health care sector, and continued susceptibility to fraud, mismanagement, and improper payments. GAO was asked to review HHS's efforts to prevent and minimize fraud in Medicare. This report evaluates, among other things, the extent to which HHS has assessed fraud risks in Medicare.
GAO reviewed documentation related to risk assessments for Medicare and related guidance. GAO also analyzed HHS Inspector General reports, federal court documents, and interviews from various contractors to identify Medicare fraud risks. GAO interviewed and reviewed information reported from HHS's Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources, CMS, and CPI. GAO compared this information against relevant leading practices from GAO's Fraud Risk Framework and internal control requirements.
Recommendations
GAO is making four recommendations to HHS, including that it update and finalize risk management guidance to include designing and regularly performing comprehensive fraud risk assessments consistent with leading practices and internal control requirements. HHS agreed with three recommendations and did not agree with one recommendation. GAO maintains that all four recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Assistant Secretary of Financial Resources and the Administrator of CMS to establish a mechanism for CPI to effectively and regularly report identified Medicare fraud risks and corresponding antifraud efforts to ASFR. (Recommendation 1)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Administrator of CMS to ensure that CPI finalizes its Medicare Fee-for Service Risk Management Framework guidance that is currently in draft, consistent with leading fraud risk management practices and internal control requirements discussed in this report. (Recommendation 2)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Administrator of CMS to ensure that CPI updates, completes, and finalizes its risk assessments and vulnerability summaries that are currently in draft, consistent with the leading fraud risk management practices and internal control requirements discussed in this report. (Recommendation 3)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Administrator of CMS to ensure that CPI updates its VM Process Overview Document to include designing and regularly performing comprehensive assessments of fraud risks facing the Medicare program that are consistent with leading fraud risk management practices and internal control requirements discussed in this report. (Recommendation 4)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-109072 (TNSmrp)
Cybersecurity: Agencies Need to Fully Address Federal Guidance as They Refine Zero Trust Architecture
WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
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Cybersecurity: Agencies Need to Fully Address Federal Guidance as They Refine Zero Trust Architecture
*
As cyberattacks increase, federal agencies are adopting a zero trust architecture approach to cybersecurity. This approach authenticates and authorizes every interaction between a network and a user or device. It also evolves as the IT landscape changes.
Almost all of the 22 agencies we reviewed had fully developed plans to implement this approach. But only 5 addressed all federal guidance ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Cybersecurity: Agencies Need to Fully Address Federal Guidance as They Refine Zero Trust Architecture * As cyberattacks increase, federal agencies are adopting a zero trust architecture approach to cybersecurity. This approach authenticates and authorizes every interaction between a network and a user or device. It also evolves as the IT landscape changes. Almost all of the 22 agencies we reviewed had fully developed plans to implement this approach. But only 5 addressed all federal guidanceon zero trust implementation and IT planning. This includes identifying actors or assets on agency-wide systems. The remaining agencies are at a higher risk of cyberattacks that could interrupt operations.
Our recommendations address these and other issues.
Illustration of a digital-style padlock on top of a photo of a laptop keyboard with a hand over the mousepad
Highlights
What GAO Found
A zero trust architecture (ZTA) is a set of cybersecurity principles that state that organizations must verify everything that attempts to access their systems and services. Almost all of the 22 agencies in this review had plans for zero trust architectures in their information technology (IT) environments. ZTA implementation will evolve over time as technology changes. As of August 2026, five agencies had addressed guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in their ZTA planning. However, 17 agencies had not fully done so.
Extent to Which 22 Civilian Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 Agencies Addressed Selected Federal Guidance in Their Zero Trust Implementation Plans
Agency officials provided numerous reasons, including limited staffing and funding, for not fully addressing federal guidance. Nevertheless, agencies continue to implement zero trust on their systems. However, until these agencies address selected ZTA guidance in their zero trust implementation plans, they may risk not having what they need to fully establish and maintain zero trust architectures. For instance, agency management may not be able to adequately apply resources where they are needed to continue zero trust implementation. As a result, agencies may risk not being able to effectively employ a more modern, robust way of securing their assets. Agencies would therefore be at increased risk of cyberattacks that could interrupt operations or otherwise compromise agency resources.
Why GAO Did This Study
To protect federal information and systems, the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requires federal agencies to protect the information and systems that support the agencies' operations and assets. One approach is to implement ZTA principles founded on the concept that no actor, system, network, or service operating outside of, or within, an organization's security perimeter should be trusted.
FISMA also includes a provision for GAO to periodically report to Congress on agencies' implementation of the act. This report examines the extent to which agencies' plans to implement zero trust architecture addressed selected federal guidance.
GAO assessed plans to implement zero trust architecture from 22 civilian Chief Financial Officer Act of 1990 agencies and assessed the agencies' compliance with selected OMB and NIST guidance, relevant to ZTA implementation and IT project planning. GAO also interviewed cognizant agency officials to better understand their zero trust planning efforts and to better understand the guidance they developed.
Recommendations
GAO is making a total of 40 recommendations to 17 agencies to address selected guidance. Thirteen agencies agreed with the recommendations, and several described planned actions to implement them. Four agencies neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of AgricultureThe Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 1)
Department of AgricultureThe Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of fully identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 2)
Department of CommerceThe Secretary of Commerce should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 3)
Department of CommerceThe Secretary of Commerce should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of expanding the zero trust architecture. (Recommendation 4)
Department of CommerceThe Secretary of Commerce should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 5)
Department of CommerceThe Secretary of Commerce should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document the implementation process. (Recommendation 6)
Department of EducationThe Secretary of Education should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of fully identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 7)
Department of EnergyThe Secretary of Energy should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates its zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 8)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully documents an enterprise-wide implementation plan for zero trust architecture that incorporates guidance from the Office of Management and Budget. (Recommendation 9)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully addresses the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment as it documents its enterprise-wide plan. (Recommendation 10)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully addresses the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying assets within its IT environment as it documents its enterprise-wide plan. (Recommendation 11)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully addresses the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of expanding the zero trust architecture in documenting the department's enterprise-wide plan. (Recommendation 12)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully addresses the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts in documenting the department's enterprise-wide plan. (Recommendation 13)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully addresses the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document the implementation process as it documents its enterprise-wide plan. (Recommendation 14)
Department of Homeland SecurityThe Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully documents the maturity levels for all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 15)
Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentThe Secretary of Housing and Urban Development should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 16)
Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentThe Secretary of Housing and Urban Development should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology migration step of identifying assets within its IT environment. (Recommendation 17)
Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentThe Secretary of Housing and Urban Development should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document the implementation process for its zero trust architecture. (Recommendation 18)
Department of the InteriorThe Secretary of the Interior should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels for all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 19)
Department of the InteriorThe Secretary of the Interior should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 20)
Department of the InteriorThe Secretary of the Interior should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of expanding the zero trust architecture. (Recommendation 21)
Department of the InteriorThe Secretary of Interior should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 22)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels for all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 23)
Department of StateThe Secretary of State should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels for all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 24)
Department of StateThe Secretary of State should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 25)
Department of StateThe Secretary of State should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 26)
Department of the TreasuryThe Secretary of the Treasury should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully documents the maturity levels of all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 27)
Department of the TreasuryThe Secretary of the Treasury should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of fully identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 28)
Department of the TreasuryThe Secretary of the Treasury should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust architecture. (Recommendation 29)
Environmental Protection AgencyThe Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency should ensure that the agency's Chief Information Officer updates the agency's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of fully identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 30)
Environmental Protection AgencyThe Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency should ensure that the agency's Chief Information Officer updates the agency's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice of documenting project management roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 31)
National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationThe Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should ensure that the administration's Chief Information Officer fully documents the maturity levels of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 32)
Nuclear Regulatory CommissionThe Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should ensure that the commission's Chief Information Officer updates the commission's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 33)
Nuclear Regulatory CommissionThe Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should ensure that the commission's Chief Information Officer updates the commission's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 34)
National Science FoundationThe Director of the National Science Foundation should ensure that the foundation's Chief Information Officer updates the foundation's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 35)
Office of Personnel ManagementThe Director of the Office of Personnel Management should ensure that the office's Chief Information Officer updates the office's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 36)
Office of Personnel ManagementThe Director of the Office of Personnel Management should ensure that the office's Chief Information Officer updates the office's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying assets within its IT environment. (Recommendation 37)
Office of Personnel ManagementThe Director of the Office of Personnel Management should ensure that the office's Chief Information Officer updates the office's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of expanding the zero trust architecture. (Recommendation 38)
Office of Personnel ManagementThe Director of the Office of Personnel Management should ensure that the office's Chief Information Officer updates the office's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 39)
Small Business AdministrationThe Director of the Small Business Administration should ensure that the administration's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels of all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 40)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108661 (TNSmrp)
* * *
Cybersecurity: Agencies Need to Fully Address Federal Guidance as They Refine Zero Trust Architecture
*
As cyberattacks increase, federal agencies are adopting a zero trust architecture approach to cybersecurity. This approach authenticates and authorizes every interaction between a network and a user or device. It also evolves as the IT landscape changes.
Almost all of the 22 agencies we reviewed had fully developed plans to implement this approach. But only 5 addressed all federal guidance ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Cybersecurity: Agencies Need to Fully Address Federal Guidance as They Refine Zero Trust Architecture * As cyberattacks increase, federal agencies are adopting a zero trust architecture approach to cybersecurity. This approach authenticates and authorizes every interaction between a network and a user or device. It also evolves as the IT landscape changes. Almost all of the 22 agencies we reviewed had fully developed plans to implement this approach. But only 5 addressed all federal guidanceon zero trust implementation and IT planning. This includes identifying actors or assets on agency-wide systems. The remaining agencies are at a higher risk of cyberattacks that could interrupt operations.
Our recommendations address these and other issues.
Illustration of a digital-style padlock on top of a photo of a laptop keyboard with a hand over the mousepad
Highlights
What GAO Found
A zero trust architecture (ZTA) is a set of cybersecurity principles that state that organizations must verify everything that attempts to access their systems and services. Almost all of the 22 agencies in this review had plans for zero trust architectures in their information technology (IT) environments. ZTA implementation will evolve over time as technology changes. As of August 2026, five agencies had addressed guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in their ZTA planning. However, 17 agencies had not fully done so.
Extent to Which 22 Civilian Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 Agencies Addressed Selected Federal Guidance in Their Zero Trust Implementation Plans
Agency officials provided numerous reasons, including limited staffing and funding, for not fully addressing federal guidance. Nevertheless, agencies continue to implement zero trust on their systems. However, until these agencies address selected ZTA guidance in their zero trust implementation plans, they may risk not having what they need to fully establish and maintain zero trust architectures. For instance, agency management may not be able to adequately apply resources where they are needed to continue zero trust implementation. As a result, agencies may risk not being able to effectively employ a more modern, robust way of securing their assets. Agencies would therefore be at increased risk of cyberattacks that could interrupt operations or otherwise compromise agency resources.
Why GAO Did This Study
To protect federal information and systems, the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requires federal agencies to protect the information and systems that support the agencies' operations and assets. One approach is to implement ZTA principles founded on the concept that no actor, system, network, or service operating outside of, or within, an organization's security perimeter should be trusted.
FISMA also includes a provision for GAO to periodically report to Congress on agencies' implementation of the act. This report examines the extent to which agencies' plans to implement zero trust architecture addressed selected federal guidance.
GAO assessed plans to implement zero trust architecture from 22 civilian Chief Financial Officer Act of 1990 agencies and assessed the agencies' compliance with selected OMB and NIST guidance, relevant to ZTA implementation and IT project planning. GAO also interviewed cognizant agency officials to better understand their zero trust planning efforts and to better understand the guidance they developed.
Recommendations
GAO is making a total of 40 recommendations to 17 agencies to address selected guidance. Thirteen agencies agreed with the recommendations, and several described planned actions to implement them. Four agencies neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of AgricultureThe Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 1)
Department of AgricultureThe Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of fully identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 2)
Department of CommerceThe Secretary of Commerce should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 3)
Department of CommerceThe Secretary of Commerce should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of expanding the zero trust architecture. (Recommendation 4)
Department of CommerceThe Secretary of Commerce should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 5)
Department of CommerceThe Secretary of Commerce should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document the implementation process. (Recommendation 6)
Department of EducationThe Secretary of Education should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of fully identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 7)
Department of EnergyThe Secretary of Energy should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates its zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 8)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully documents an enterprise-wide implementation plan for zero trust architecture that incorporates guidance from the Office of Management and Budget. (Recommendation 9)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully addresses the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment as it documents its enterprise-wide plan. (Recommendation 10)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully addresses the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying assets within its IT environment as it documents its enterprise-wide plan. (Recommendation 11)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully addresses the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of expanding the zero trust architecture in documenting the department's enterprise-wide plan. (Recommendation 12)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully addresses the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts in documenting the department's enterprise-wide plan. (Recommendation 13)
Department of Health and Human ServicesThe Secretary of Health and Human Services should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully addresses the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document the implementation process as it documents its enterprise-wide plan. (Recommendation 14)
Department of Homeland SecurityThe Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully documents the maturity levels for all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 15)
Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentThe Secretary of Housing and Urban Development should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 16)
Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentThe Secretary of Housing and Urban Development should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology migration step of identifying assets within its IT environment. (Recommendation 17)
Department of Housing and Urban DevelopmentThe Secretary of Housing and Urban Development should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document the implementation process for its zero trust architecture. (Recommendation 18)
Department of the InteriorThe Secretary of the Interior should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels for all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 19)
Department of the InteriorThe Secretary of the Interior should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 20)
Department of the InteriorThe Secretary of the Interior should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of expanding the zero trust architecture. (Recommendation 21)
Department of the InteriorThe Secretary of Interior should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 22)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels for all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 23)
Department of StateThe Secretary of State should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels for all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 24)
Department of StateThe Secretary of State should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 25)
Department of StateThe Secretary of State should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 26)
Department of the TreasuryThe Secretary of the Treasury should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer fully documents the maturity levels of all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 27)
Department of the TreasuryThe Secretary of the Treasury should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of fully identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 28)
Department of the TreasuryThe Secretary of the Treasury should ensure that the department's Chief Information Officer updates the department's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust architecture. (Recommendation 29)
Environmental Protection AgencyThe Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency should ensure that the agency's Chief Information Officer updates the agency's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of fully identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 30)
Environmental Protection AgencyThe Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency should ensure that the agency's Chief Information Officer updates the agency's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice of documenting project management roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 31)
National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationThe Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should ensure that the administration's Chief Information Officer fully documents the maturity levels of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 32)
Nuclear Regulatory CommissionThe Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should ensure that the commission's Chief Information Officer updates the commission's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 33)
Nuclear Regulatory CommissionThe Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should ensure that the commission's Chief Information Officer updates the commission's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 34)
National Science FoundationThe Director of the National Science Foundation should ensure that the foundation's Chief Information Officer updates the foundation's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 35)
Office of Personnel ManagementThe Director of the Office of Personnel Management should ensure that the office's Chief Information Officer updates the office's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying actors within its IT environment. (Recommendation 36)
Office of Personnel ManagementThe Director of the Office of Personnel Management should ensure that the office's Chief Information Officer updates the office's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of identifying assets within its IT environment. (Recommendation 37)
Office of Personnel ManagementThe Director of the Office of Personnel Management should ensure that the office's Chief Information Officer updates the office's plan to implement zero trust architecture to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology zero trust migration step of expanding the zero trust architecture. (Recommendation 38)
Office of Personnel ManagementThe Director of the Office of Personnel Management should ensure that the office's Chief Information Officer updates the office's zero trust architecture implementation plan to fully address the National Institute of Standards and Technology practice to document roles and responsibilities for its zero trust efforts. (Recommendation 39)
Small Business AdministrationThe Director of the Small Business Administration should ensure that the administration's Chief Information Officer documents the maturity levels of all of its high-value assets and high-impact systems based on the zero trust maturity model developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (Recommendation 40)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108661 (TNSmrp)
Space Supply Chains: Additional DOD Actions Could Strengthen Its Enterprise Approach for Managing Risks
WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
* * *
Space Supply Chains: Additional DOD Actions Could Strengthen Its Enterprise Approach for Managing Risks
*
The Department of Defense relies on the U.S. space industrial base--the companies providing hardware and raw materials--to build and launch satellites for its missions. Until recently, these missions depended on small numbers of large satellites that adversaries could target. To reduce that risk, DOD is building networks of hundreds of smaller satellites, which are harder to disrupt.
But ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Space Supply Chains: Additional DOD Actions Could Strengthen Its Enterprise Approach for Managing Risks * The Department of Defense relies on the U.S. space industrial base--the companies providing hardware and raw materials--to build and launch satellites for its missions. Until recently, these missions depended on small numbers of large satellites that adversaries could target. To reduce that risk, DOD is building networks of hundreds of smaller satellites, which are harder to disrupt. Butas DOD and the commercial sector's demand grows for satellites, so does the strain on the supply chain. As a result, DOD has faced challenges getting the satellite parts it needs.
DOD is working to address this issue. We made recommendations that could help.
Network of lasers connected to satellites in space over Earth
Highlights
What GAO Found
To help maintain space-power superiority, the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on satellites in Earth's orbit that provide important capabilities to the warfighter. The space industrial base and associated supply chains consist of a global network of companies that provide the hardware and software for space technologies and are critical to DOD's ability to buy and use these satellites.
The three Space Force programs that GAO reviewed reported various supply chain risks such as challenges with manufacturing capability or capacity for some critical satellite components. Recent DOD efforts are underway to address risks more broadly across the space industrial base. These early efforts include initiating a study on supply chain risks facing proliferated constellations in low-Earth orbit and providing investments to increase manufacturing capacity.
Notional Depiction of Proliferated Satellites
Although the Space Force has taken steps to address its space industrial base risks, it has not yet fully coordinated these efforts across the national security space portfolio. For example, the Air Force issued a memorandum in April 2026 to announce an enterprise risk management service. This service is intended to provide a bird's eye view of space supply chain risks, among other things. From that vantage point, the Space Force could use this information to support decision-making at a higher level. The memorandum, however, does not identify a lead agency or official to manage the service or clearly define roles and responsibilities--key elements supporting effective enterprise risk management and interagency collaboration. Establishing a clear leadership structure with defined roles and responsibilities would better ensure that management of this new service can effectively support decision-making--at the enterprise level--for the national space portfolio.
In April 2026, Space Systems Command created a guide to establish a process for identifying and addressing space supply chain risks across the national security space portfolio. However, the guide cannot be enforced for stakeholders outside of the Space Force, such as the National Reconnaissance Office. Establishing formal agreements could strengthen stakeholder participation, enhance accountability, and help ensure that all risks are identified and managed as this space portfolio grows and continues to strain the supply chain.
Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's shift to constellations of smaller satellites in greater numbers, along with a similar shift in the private sector, is straining the space industrial base and its supply chain. This strain poses a risk to the Space Force's--organized under the Department of the Air Force--ability to procure the necessary technologies it plans to use to carry out future missions. The space industrial base is a subset of DOD's broader defense industrial base, which GAO monitors as part of its High Risk Series.
A Senate report includes a provision for GAO to assess the military space industrial base and supply chains. GAO's report addresses (1) the supply chain risks that programs and DOD identified and the efforts to address these risks, and (2) the extent to which DOD has coordinated its approach to addressing supply chain risks.
GAO reviewed program risk documentation and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also compared recent Space Force enterprise risk management efforts to GAO's essential elements for enterprise risk management and GAO's leading practices for enhanced interagency collaboration.
Recommendations
GAO is making three recommendations to DOD, including that it establishes: (1) a coordinated enterprise approach with formal agreements providing authority, support, and decision-making across the national security space portfolio, (2) a clear leadership structure with defined roles and responsibilities, and (3) formal guidance for its enterprise-level risk management service. DOD concurred with all three recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of DefenseThe Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office jointly establish a coordinated enterprise approach that includes formal agreements and provides the authority, support, and decision-making capabilities to manage the space industrial base and supply chain risks across the national security space portfolio. (Recommendation 1)
Department of the Air ForceThe Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the Service Acquisition Executive for Space Systems and Programs establishes a leadership structure with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for managing its enterprise-level risk management service across the Space Force's national security space programs. (Recommendation 2)
Department of the Air ForceThe Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the Service Acquisition Executive for Space Systems and Programs establishes formal guidance for implementing the enterprise-level risk management service that is broadly applicable to the Space Force's national security space programs. (Recommendation 3)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108683 (TNSmrp)
* * *
Space Supply Chains: Additional DOD Actions Could Strengthen Its Enterprise Approach for Managing Risks
*
The Department of Defense relies on the U.S. space industrial base--the companies providing hardware and raw materials--to build and launch satellites for its missions. Until recently, these missions depended on small numbers of large satellites that adversaries could target. To reduce that risk, DOD is building networks of hundreds of smaller satellites, which are harder to disrupt.
But ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Space Supply Chains: Additional DOD Actions Could Strengthen Its Enterprise Approach for Managing Risks * The Department of Defense relies on the U.S. space industrial base--the companies providing hardware and raw materials--to build and launch satellites for its missions. Until recently, these missions depended on small numbers of large satellites that adversaries could target. To reduce that risk, DOD is building networks of hundreds of smaller satellites, which are harder to disrupt. Butas DOD and the commercial sector's demand grows for satellites, so does the strain on the supply chain. As a result, DOD has faced challenges getting the satellite parts it needs.
DOD is working to address this issue. We made recommendations that could help.
Network of lasers connected to satellites in space over Earth
Highlights
What GAO Found
To help maintain space-power superiority, the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on satellites in Earth's orbit that provide important capabilities to the warfighter. The space industrial base and associated supply chains consist of a global network of companies that provide the hardware and software for space technologies and are critical to DOD's ability to buy and use these satellites.
The three Space Force programs that GAO reviewed reported various supply chain risks such as challenges with manufacturing capability or capacity for some critical satellite components. Recent DOD efforts are underway to address risks more broadly across the space industrial base. These early efforts include initiating a study on supply chain risks facing proliferated constellations in low-Earth orbit and providing investments to increase manufacturing capacity.
Notional Depiction of Proliferated Satellites
Although the Space Force has taken steps to address its space industrial base risks, it has not yet fully coordinated these efforts across the national security space portfolio. For example, the Air Force issued a memorandum in April 2026 to announce an enterprise risk management service. This service is intended to provide a bird's eye view of space supply chain risks, among other things. From that vantage point, the Space Force could use this information to support decision-making at a higher level. The memorandum, however, does not identify a lead agency or official to manage the service or clearly define roles and responsibilities--key elements supporting effective enterprise risk management and interagency collaboration. Establishing a clear leadership structure with defined roles and responsibilities would better ensure that management of this new service can effectively support decision-making--at the enterprise level--for the national space portfolio.
In April 2026, Space Systems Command created a guide to establish a process for identifying and addressing space supply chain risks across the national security space portfolio. However, the guide cannot be enforced for stakeholders outside of the Space Force, such as the National Reconnaissance Office. Establishing formal agreements could strengthen stakeholder participation, enhance accountability, and help ensure that all risks are identified and managed as this space portfolio grows and continues to strain the supply chain.
Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's shift to constellations of smaller satellites in greater numbers, along with a similar shift in the private sector, is straining the space industrial base and its supply chain. This strain poses a risk to the Space Force's--organized under the Department of the Air Force--ability to procure the necessary technologies it plans to use to carry out future missions. The space industrial base is a subset of DOD's broader defense industrial base, which GAO monitors as part of its High Risk Series.
A Senate report includes a provision for GAO to assess the military space industrial base and supply chains. GAO's report addresses (1) the supply chain risks that programs and DOD identified and the efforts to address these risks, and (2) the extent to which DOD has coordinated its approach to addressing supply chain risks.
GAO reviewed program risk documentation and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also compared recent Space Force enterprise risk management efforts to GAO's essential elements for enterprise risk management and GAO's leading practices for enhanced interagency collaboration.
Recommendations
GAO is making three recommendations to DOD, including that it establishes: (1) a coordinated enterprise approach with formal agreements providing authority, support, and decision-making across the national security space portfolio, (2) a clear leadership structure with defined roles and responsibilities, and (3) formal guidance for its enterprise-level risk management service. DOD concurred with all three recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of DefenseThe Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Secretary of the Air Force and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office jointly establish a coordinated enterprise approach that includes formal agreements and provides the authority, support, and decision-making capabilities to manage the space industrial base and supply chain risks across the national security space portfolio. (Recommendation 1)
Department of the Air ForceThe Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the Service Acquisition Executive for Space Systems and Programs establishes a leadership structure with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for managing its enterprise-level risk management service across the Space Force's national security space programs. (Recommendation 2)
Department of the Air ForceThe Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the Service Acquisition Executive for Space Systems and Programs establishes formal guidance for implementing the enterprise-level risk management service that is broadly applicable to the Space Force's national security space programs. (Recommendation 3)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108683 (TNSmrp)
Federal Prisons: Improved Reviews of Natural Deaths and Communications with Families Needed
WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report:
* * *
Federal Prisons: Improved Reviews of Natural Deaths and Communications with Families Needed
*
From 2016-2025, about 3,000 people died from natural causes while in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
The Bureau must investigate most deaths and notify family members, including sharing the circumstances surrounding the death. But it doesn't define what it means by circumstances of a death--so Bureau staff didn't always know what information to share with families.
Additionally, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Federal Prisons: Improved Reviews of Natural Deaths and Communications with Families Needed * From 2016-2025, about 3,000 people died from natural causes while in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Bureau must investigate most deaths and notify family members, including sharing the circumstances surrounding the death. But it doesn't define what it means by circumstances of a death--so Bureau staff didn't always know what information to share with families. Additionally,the Bureau may identify issues during an investigation that contributed to a death, like delayed medical appointments. But it doesn't always track those issues or if they were resolved.
Our recommendations address such concerns.
A person is laying on a medical gurney while several people wearing medical scrubs push the gurney down a hallway.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) reported that about 3,000 people died from natural causes while in its custody in fiscal years 2016 through 2025. GAO reviewed death investigation records for the natural deaths in BOP custody in fiscal year 2024. The documents showed that BOP identified health care deficiencies in 45 percent of these deaths, and that some of these deficiencies contributed to the natural deaths. BOP identified deficiencies such as delayed offsite medical appointments, failures to order necessary medical tests, and shortcomings in emergency responses.
After a death in custody, BOP requires staff to notify the decedent's emergency contacts and next of kin. However, BOP could not confirm how many of these individuals received such notifications because it did not require that staff document (nor require that BOP management monitor) that these notifications took place. To help address this issue, in May 2026, BOP began requiring staff to document attempts to notify next of kin. However, BOP did not require staff to document attempts to notify emergency contacts or require management to monitor notifications. By taking these steps, BOP management can better ensure that emergency contacts and next of kin receive notifications.
BOP policy requires staff to share the circumstances surrounding a death with the emergency contacts and next of kin. However, BOP policy does not define what is meant by circumstances surrounding a death, and as a result, staff do not have a consistent understanding of what information to share during death notifications. In addition, GAO found that staff do not always share this information even when it is immediately available or when it becomes available later. Monitoring whether staff share the circumstances, and better defining circumstances surrounding a death for staff, would reduce the risk that families will not receive this consequential information from BOP.
BOP policy requires staff to investigate every death that occurs in BOP facilities, excluding legal executions. However, GAO found that BOP does not record all recommendations resulting from these investigations or whether a facility has implemented them. Doing so would give BOP a more complete picture of deficiencies in its health care delivery and enhance its ability to analyze and address deficiencies, while potentially reducing the government's liabilities.
GAO Findings from Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Investigations of Natural Deaths in Custody
Why GAO Did This Study
Federal law enforcement agencies reported that nearly 4,000 people died in their custody in fiscal years 2016 through 2023. Most of these deaths were reported by BOP (85 percent). BOP is responsible for the care and custody of about 155,000 incarcerated people.
GAO was asked to review BOP's efforts to investigate natural deaths in custody and notify families of these deaths. This report examines what BOP data show about people who died in BOP custody (i.e., in its facilities) from natural causes in fiscal years 2016 through 2025; what deficiencies in care BOP identified that contributed to natural deaths; the extent to which BOP ensures facilities notify families consistently and in a timely manner; and the extent to which BOP investigated natural deaths in its custody.
GAO reviewed BOP policies and documents, and BOP data on deaths in custody. In addition, GAO selected three BOP facilities and interviewed their leadership and staff. GAO selected locations based on variation in the type of facility (penitentiaries versus medical centers) and number of natural deaths. GAO also interviewed BOP headquarters officials responsible for overseeing death investigations and family notifications.
Recommendations
GAO is making 13 recommendations to DOJ, including to ensure BOP tracks and monitors family notifications, defines and monitors the sharing of circumstances surrounding a death, and records all recommendations from death investigations. BOP concurred with our recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director clarifies whom staff are to contact during the initial notification phone call following a death in custody. (Recommendation 1)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director issues guidance on how staff are to locate the next of kin. (Recommendation 2)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director directs staff to track notifications to both emergency contacts and next of kin after an in custody death--including the time and method of notification, as well as unsuccessful and successful attempts to make contact. (Recommendation 3)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director directs management to monitor staff compliance with this requirement to document attempts to contact emergency contacts and next of kin following a death in custody. (Recommendation 4)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director defines the phrase "circumstances surrounding a death" included in the Bureau's family notification policy. (Recommendation 5)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director monitors whether the circumstances of a death in custody are shared with emergency contacts and next of kin. This includes monitoring whether information is immediately shared with emergency contacts and next of kin, when possible, or shared at a later date when the information becomes available. (Recommendation 6)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director develops an information-sharing mechanism that includes guidance and resources to help inform families about BOP processes following a death in custody. (Recommendation 7)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director takes steps to better assist families in obtaining medical records after the death of an individual in custody. (Recommendation 8)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should direct the BOP Director to develop and implement a corrective action plan that addresses the root causes of facility mortality reviews not being completed within the timeframes required by BOP policy or the timeframes required by a waiver. (Recommendation 9)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure that the BOP Director records recommendations from facility mortality reviews and whether a facility has implemented them. (Recommendation 10)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director updates its standard operating procedures for a recurring bureau-wide trend analysis of deaths in custody, to include procedures for identifying nationwide patterns in deficiencies and issuing recommendations. (Recommendation 11)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director tracks when a warden requests an autopsy and whether the request is denied by a state or local authority. (Recommendation 12)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director issues guidance to clarify that facilities may pursue an autopsy if a request is denied by a state or local authority, including guidance about possible actions facilities may take after a denial. (Recommendation 13)
***
Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108744 (TNSmrp)
* * *
Federal Prisons: Improved Reviews of Natural Deaths and Communications with Families Needed
*
From 2016-2025, about 3,000 people died from natural causes while in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
The Bureau must investigate most deaths and notify family members, including sharing the circumstances surrounding the death. But it doesn't define what it means by circumstances of a death--so Bureau staff didn't always know what information to share with families.
Additionally, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 (TNSLrpt) -- The Government Accountability Office issued the following report: * * * Federal Prisons: Improved Reviews of Natural Deaths and Communications with Families Needed * From 2016-2025, about 3,000 people died from natural causes while in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Bureau must investigate most deaths and notify family members, including sharing the circumstances surrounding the death. But it doesn't define what it means by circumstances of a death--so Bureau staff didn't always know what information to share with families. Additionally,the Bureau may identify issues during an investigation that contributed to a death, like delayed medical appointments. But it doesn't always track those issues or if they were resolved.
Our recommendations address such concerns.
A person is laying on a medical gurney while several people wearing medical scrubs push the gurney down a hallway.
Highlights
What GAO Found
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) reported that about 3,000 people died from natural causes while in its custody in fiscal years 2016 through 2025. GAO reviewed death investigation records for the natural deaths in BOP custody in fiscal year 2024. The documents showed that BOP identified health care deficiencies in 45 percent of these deaths, and that some of these deficiencies contributed to the natural deaths. BOP identified deficiencies such as delayed offsite medical appointments, failures to order necessary medical tests, and shortcomings in emergency responses.
After a death in custody, BOP requires staff to notify the decedent's emergency contacts and next of kin. However, BOP could not confirm how many of these individuals received such notifications because it did not require that staff document (nor require that BOP management monitor) that these notifications took place. To help address this issue, in May 2026, BOP began requiring staff to document attempts to notify next of kin. However, BOP did not require staff to document attempts to notify emergency contacts or require management to monitor notifications. By taking these steps, BOP management can better ensure that emergency contacts and next of kin receive notifications.
BOP policy requires staff to share the circumstances surrounding a death with the emergency contacts and next of kin. However, BOP policy does not define what is meant by circumstances surrounding a death, and as a result, staff do not have a consistent understanding of what information to share during death notifications. In addition, GAO found that staff do not always share this information even when it is immediately available or when it becomes available later. Monitoring whether staff share the circumstances, and better defining circumstances surrounding a death for staff, would reduce the risk that families will not receive this consequential information from BOP.
BOP policy requires staff to investigate every death that occurs in BOP facilities, excluding legal executions. However, GAO found that BOP does not record all recommendations resulting from these investigations or whether a facility has implemented them. Doing so would give BOP a more complete picture of deficiencies in its health care delivery and enhance its ability to analyze and address deficiencies, while potentially reducing the government's liabilities.
GAO Findings from Bureau of Prisons (BOP) Investigations of Natural Deaths in Custody
Why GAO Did This Study
Federal law enforcement agencies reported that nearly 4,000 people died in their custody in fiscal years 2016 through 2023. Most of these deaths were reported by BOP (85 percent). BOP is responsible for the care and custody of about 155,000 incarcerated people.
GAO was asked to review BOP's efforts to investigate natural deaths in custody and notify families of these deaths. This report examines what BOP data show about people who died in BOP custody (i.e., in its facilities) from natural causes in fiscal years 2016 through 2025; what deficiencies in care BOP identified that contributed to natural deaths; the extent to which BOP ensures facilities notify families consistently and in a timely manner; and the extent to which BOP investigated natural deaths in its custody.
GAO reviewed BOP policies and documents, and BOP data on deaths in custody. In addition, GAO selected three BOP facilities and interviewed their leadership and staff. GAO selected locations based on variation in the type of facility (penitentiaries versus medical centers) and number of natural deaths. GAO also interviewed BOP headquarters officials responsible for overseeing death investigations and family notifications.
Recommendations
GAO is making 13 recommendations to DOJ, including to ensure BOP tracks and monitors family notifications, defines and monitors the sharing of circumstances surrounding a death, and records all recommendations from death investigations. BOP concurred with our recommendations.
Recommendations for Executive Action
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director clarifies whom staff are to contact during the initial notification phone call following a death in custody. (Recommendation 1)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director issues guidance on how staff are to locate the next of kin. (Recommendation 2)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director directs staff to track notifications to both emergency contacts and next of kin after an in custody death--including the time and method of notification, as well as unsuccessful and successful attempts to make contact. (Recommendation 3)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director directs management to monitor staff compliance with this requirement to document attempts to contact emergency contacts and next of kin following a death in custody. (Recommendation 4)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director defines the phrase "circumstances surrounding a death" included in the Bureau's family notification policy. (Recommendation 5)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director monitors whether the circumstances of a death in custody are shared with emergency contacts and next of kin. This includes monitoring whether information is immediately shared with emergency contacts and next of kin, when possible, or shared at a later date when the information becomes available. (Recommendation 6)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director develops an information-sharing mechanism that includes guidance and resources to help inform families about BOP processes following a death in custody. (Recommendation 7)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director takes steps to better assist families in obtaining medical records after the death of an individual in custody. (Recommendation 8)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should direct the BOP Director to develop and implement a corrective action plan that addresses the root causes of facility mortality reviews not being completed within the timeframes required by BOP policy or the timeframes required by a waiver. (Recommendation 9)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure that the BOP Director records recommendations from facility mortality reviews and whether a facility has implemented them. (Recommendation 10)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director updates its standard operating procedures for a recurring bureau-wide trend analysis of deaths in custody, to include procedures for identifying nationwide patterns in deficiencies and issuing recommendations. (Recommendation 11)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director tracks when a warden requests an autopsy and whether the request is denied by a state or local authority. (Recommendation 12)
Department of JusticeThe Attorney General should ensure the BOP Director issues guidance to clarify that facilities may pursue an autopsy if a request is denied by a state or local authority, including guidance about possible actions facilities may take after a denial. (Recommendation 13)
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Original text here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-27-108744 (TNSmrp)
