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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor:
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Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary
Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal
Executive Summary
* The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system.
* Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice.
* Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership sought ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal Executive Summary * The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system. * Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice. * Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership soughtspokesman candidates there from 2019, while personnel in Yemen were linked to provincial media, central media structures, communications, and the Somalia network.
* The April 2025 killing of Abu Zaid and the September raid that killed al-Ansari exposed a Yemen-based network of media personnel and communications infrastructure. Irregularities in IS media output after al-Ansari's death raise questions about how much of the group's wider media system had come to rely on Yemen.
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On September 1, Yemen's Central State Security Agency announced that a raid in Say'un, Hadramawt, had killed Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, the official spokesman of the Islamic State (IS) (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). Yemeni counterterrorism forces and coalition special forces had located him in a residential house and attempted to arrest him before he opened fire and was fatally wounded (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). The operation also detained a man with him and recovered an explosive belt, two laptops, two tablets, and five phones (South24; Long War Journal, September 1).
The raid killed more than IS's public spokesman. Yemeni jihadist sources and news outlets identify al-Ansari as Mithaq Thabit Haytham al-Hujayli, a Yemeni from Lahj who had simultaneously governed IS's Yemen province since 2020 under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (Sheba Intelligence; Jerusalem Post, September 1; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025). He had survived the destruction of the group's stronghold in Qayfa, al-Bayda, escaped to Marib with a small number of survivors, and rebuilt the province after much of its senior leadership was killed or captured (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, June 26, 2019; Yemen Agency Press, August 14, 2020; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023).
Al-Hujayli's dual role helps explain a larger dynamic. IS-Yemen had almost disappeared as a battlefield province, but Yemen had not disappeared from the IS's organization. Daniel Milton found that the branch's last recorded attack in al-Naba occurred in summer 2022, after 174 reported operations since summer 2018 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Instead, Yemen had become increasingly important to the group's media functions beyond the country. In February 2025, the UN Monitoring Team assessed that the weakened branch--then estimated at only 100-150 fighters--nevertheless retained an "experienced media and propaganda wing" and had played a role in advocating that IS's overall leader be located outside the Iraq-Syria theater (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025). A year later, the Monitoring Team reported that "key [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] ISIL media figures were in Yemen coordinating with ISIL-Somalia" and that the killing of one former core-media official had disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The province supplied IS's global spokesman, housed media-linked personnel, and remained tied to Somali-based financial and communication networks (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17-18, 2025; CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4). Al-Ansari's death therefore exposed a media role that attack statistics had largely concealed.
Yemen Becomes a Media Sanctuary
IS began looking to Yemen for media personnel before the province lost Qayfa. Sources familiar with IS-Yemen's internal communications say that as early as 2019, central leadership asked the province to nominate potential spokesmen and provide biographies and recordings of their sermons (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17-18, 2025). The request came as IS was losing its territorial center and senior leadership in Iraq and Syria. Founder and the first leader of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in October 2019, followed roughly a day later by then-spokesman Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir (Reuters, October 28, 2019). Yemen was therefore already being considered as a source of personnel for central media functions as pressure on the organization's core intensified.
That role survived the branch's military collapse. In August 2020, Houthi forces overran IS positions in Wald Rabi' and Qayfa, killing much of the remaining leadership and fighters (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 5, 2020; Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). Under al-Hujayli, IS-Yemen became smaller and less visible, with Yemeni sources describing a deliberate effort to rebuild away from the attrition of its earlier territorial presence.
The province nevertheless remained tied to the wider organization. IS central leaders appeared to direct the Somalia-based al-Karrar office to fund IS nodes in Yemen through the Umm al-Qura regional office, while UN reporting later highlighted Yemen's facilitation and financial links to al-Karrar across the Red Sea (United Nations Security Council, July 15, 2022; CTC Sentinel, September 2024). Yemen had lost territorial weight, but it retained access to funding, central structures, and inter-provincial networks--assets that gave it importance beyond its local attack tempo.
Al-Ansari Was More Than the Spokesman
Al-Hujayli combined religious credentials, security experience, and provincial leadership before becoming IS's global spokesman. He joined IS in 2015, served in IS-Yemen's Sharia apparatus, and later became deputy security official in Qayfa (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025; Okaz; South24, September 1). He had also studied Quranic recitation and held certifications in several readings (authors' interviews with one of al-Hujayli's relatives and other IS-Yemen members, March 2, 2024). An official 2018 release shows him delivering an Eid sermon in al-Bayda (Bayda, Islamic State, Wilayat al-Bayda, "Days of Thanks and Remembrance," 2018). After Qayfa collapsed, al-Hujayli emerged from the surviving leadership of a province weakened by internal divisions (Long War Journal, December 23, 2025). Sources say that despite the presence of older, more experienced candidates, he combined religious and security credentials with broader acceptance among competing elements, leading the central leadership to appoint him governor under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen members, April 15, 2023, and December 20, 2025).
In August 2023, the provincial governor became IS's global spokesman. After Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham captured Abu Umar al-Muhajir in Syria, al-Hujayli appeared as Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in an al-Furqan recording announcing the death of Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi and the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (Counter Extremism Project, August 3, 2023; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi; Middle East Forum, August 4, 2023; Enab Baladi, September 28, 2023; United Nations Security Council, January 31, 2024). In his February 21 address, al-Hujayli directed messaging toward multiple theaters (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He called for attacks against Syria's transitional government, praised attacks including New Orleans and Bondi Beach, and discussed IS campaigns in Somalia, Nigeria, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He also emphasized the importance of both official IS propaganda and unofficial supporter media while warning unofficial outlets not to depart from official ideology and guidance (Counter Extremism Project, February 23).
"Spokesman" therefore understates his position. Al-Hujayli simultaneously governed IS-Yemen and served as the organization's authorized global voice, directly linking a marginal battlefield province to a central IS media function (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17, 2025; authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025 and April 4; Counter Extremism Project, February 23; Sheba Intelligence, September 1).
Keeping Yemen Quiet
The province's post-Qayfa strategy helped create the environment in which that function could operate. One element was reducing confrontation with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). A member who carried communications between al-Hujayli and other leaders said he indicated that he did not want renewed fighting with AQAP (authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member, September 4, 2025). Internally, al-Hujayli continued to regard AQAP as an ideological enemy but argued that circumstances required suspending the confrontation (authors' interview with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025, and April 15, 2023). Indeed, there have been no reported clashes between IS-Yemen and AQAP since February 2020 despite continued hostile rhetoric (ACLED, December 14, 2020; April 6, 2023).
Finance also became less visible. Sources inside the province say IS-Yemen turned to kidnapping for ransom and conducted operations without claiming them publicly (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with Yemeni jihadist sources along with leaked IS-Yemen documents, April 17, 2023). NewsYemen linked the June 2022 kidnapping in Tarim of the son of a Hadrami businessman Abdullah al-Junayd, known as al-Maher, to IS and described the kidnapping as part of the branch's effort to find new revenue after severe financial losses (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022). Sources say proceeds from the ransom and other operations were used to repay debts and finance vehicles, explosives-related materials, and training (Yemen Agency Press, June 20, 2022; NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025).
Public reporting consequently captured only part of the province's activity. Milton noted that IS-Yemen's last recorded attack was in summer 2022 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Yet Yemeni sources describe continued financing, training, procurement, and organizational activity during that period (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025; United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). The province was fading from IS's public battlefield while becoming more useful behind its media front.
The Network Behind the Voice
Al-Hujayli was not the only media-linked figure operating from Yemen. Sources identify Khalid Ahmad Ali al-Ariqi, known as Abu Zaid al-Muhajir, as IS-Yemen's media official and link part of the organization's broader media activity to the province (information provided in 2022 by a jihadist security source; subsequently corroborated by authors' interviews with multiple IS-Yemen jihadist sources, September 4, 2025; Yemen News Now, October 5, 2025). Yemen also had an established media role: an IS image from al-Bayda shows al-Naba being produced locally, while an April 2020 IS-Yemen production addressed al-Qaeda's positions in Yemen, Afghanistan, Mali, and elsewhere, demonstrating propaganda activity beyond the local battlefield (Long War Journal, May 4, 2020).
Al-Ariqi was killed in an April 2025 airstrike in Ataq, Shabwa, which Yemeni security sources attribute to the United States (Yemen Window, April 3, 2025; authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025; Barran Press, April 12, 2025). The UN Monitoring Team later described an "Abu Zaid" killed that month as a former head of IS's core media office and a communications node between senior leader Abu Khadija and IS-Somalia, assessing that his death disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The alias and date correspond, although the UN report does not provide a full name.
The strike also exposed the infrastructure around the network. Hours later, security forces raided an apartment al-Ariqi had reportedly visited (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemeni security sources say U.S. counterterrorism personnel focused heavily on laptops, phones, and other electronics (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Another media- and communications-linked IS member, Humam Harhara, described by sources as involved in external communications and official media activity, reportedly tried to destroy equipment before he was killed, while another member was detained and surviving devices were seized (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemen's significance therefore extended beyond al-Ansari: the province contained media personnel, communications infrastructure, and inter-provincial links serving the wider IS network (CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4).
Al-Ansari's death may already be testing how much of that media system depended on Yemen. On September 13, Caleb Weiss, a researcher focused on jihadism in Africa and who tracks IS propaganda, observed that IS media output had become limited and sporadic and that al-Naba releases were appearing on a delayed schedule since al-Ansari's death (X/@caleb_weiss7, September 13). Al-Naba has not stopped publishing--Jihadology records issues 563 and 564 on September 3 and 10--but the broader output has become less regular (Jihadology, September 3; September 10).
Conclusion
Al-Ansari's death exposed IS-Yemen's trajectory after losing Qayfa. Its battlefield decline concealed another kind of importance: the province remained connected to central leadership and inter-provincial networks while hosting personnel who served IS's global media apparatus. UN reporting in 2025 and 2026 identified IS-Yemen as a media and propaganda hub linked to IS-Somalia and to the group's wider media apparatus (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). Al-Hujayli's simultaneous roles as provincial governor and global spokesman placed Yemen directly inside that system.
That concentration also helps explain renewed counterterrorism attention to IS personnel in Yemen. Yemeni security sources attribute the April 2025 Ataq strike that killed Abu Zaid to the United States, while follow-on operations reached communications personnel, electronic devices, and supporting infrastructure (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources April 12, 2025; authors' interviews with a defected IS-Yemen leader who also confirmed the information, October 4, 2025; subsequent corroboration by pro-IS channels). The September Say'un raid then reached al-Hujayli himself. The pattern suggests that IS-Yemen's value as a target increasingly lay not in its ability to hold territory or generate attacks, but in the central functions and personnel operating from the province.
The implications extend beyond Yemen. A province can become militarily marginal while remaining important to IS's global organization as central functions are dispersed across geographically distant branches. The limited and irregular media output observed after al-Ansari's death is too early to establish direct dependence, particularly because al-Naba has continued to appear, but it still indicates possible disruption within a system already shown to have significant personnel in Yemen. More broadly, the case shows the limits of judging an IS province primarily by attacks, manpower, or territorial control. Organizational importance may instead lie in functions such as media, communications, finance, or leadership support that serve the movement across theaters. IS-Yemen's attack tempo made it appear peripheral; its media role showed that it had become part of the infrastructure through which IS sustained a global organization and spoke to a global audience.
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Dr. Sara Harmouch is the CEO of H9 Defense, a research and advisory consultancy specializing in national security, counterterrorism, geopolitical risk, threat assessments, and open-source intelligence (OSINT). A counterterrorism expert and national security researcher, she focuses on political violence, terrorism, militancy, armed groups, Islamist militant organizations, irregular warfare, non-state actor behavior, alliance dynamics, and the conditions under which militant groups shift from domestic to international violence.
Mohammad Bin Faisal is a journalist and researcher specializing in Islamist extremist groups, with a focus on the ideological and organizational dimensions of extremism and terrorism in Yemen, the Middle East, and East Africa.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/yemen-becomes-the-islamic-states-media-sanctuary/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary
Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal
Executive Summary
* The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system.
* Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice.
* Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership sought ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal Executive Summary * The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system. * Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice. * Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership soughtspokesman candidates there from 2019, while personnel in Yemen were linked to provincial media, central media structures, communications, and the Somalia network.
* The April 2025 killing of Abu Zaid and the September raid that killed al-Ansari exposed a Yemen-based network of media personnel and communications infrastructure. Irregularities in IS media output after al-Ansari's death raise questions about how much of the group's wider media system had come to rely on Yemen.
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On September 1, Yemen's Central State Security Agency announced that a raid in Say'un, Hadramawt, had killed Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, the official spokesman of the Islamic State (IS) (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). Yemeni counterterrorism forces and coalition special forces had located him in a residential house and attempted to arrest him before he opened fire and was fatally wounded (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). The operation also detained a man with him and recovered an explosive belt, two laptops, two tablets, and five phones (South24; Long War Journal, September 1).
The raid killed more than IS's public spokesman. Yemeni jihadist sources and news outlets identify al-Ansari as Mithaq Thabit Haytham al-Hujayli, a Yemeni from Lahj who had simultaneously governed IS's Yemen province since 2020 under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (Sheba Intelligence; Jerusalem Post, September 1; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025). He had survived the destruction of the group's stronghold in Qayfa, al-Bayda, escaped to Marib with a small number of survivors, and rebuilt the province after much of its senior leadership was killed or captured (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, June 26, 2019; Yemen Agency Press, August 14, 2020; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023).
Al-Hujayli's dual role helps explain a larger dynamic. IS-Yemen had almost disappeared as a battlefield province, but Yemen had not disappeared from the IS's organization. Daniel Milton found that the branch's last recorded attack in al-Naba occurred in summer 2022, after 174 reported operations since summer 2018 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Instead, Yemen had become increasingly important to the group's media functions beyond the country. In February 2025, the UN Monitoring Team assessed that the weakened branch--then estimated at only 100-150 fighters--nevertheless retained an "experienced media and propaganda wing" and had played a role in advocating that IS's overall leader be located outside the Iraq-Syria theater (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025). A year later, the Monitoring Team reported that "key [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] ISIL media figures were in Yemen coordinating with ISIL-Somalia" and that the killing of one former core-media official had disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The province supplied IS's global spokesman, housed media-linked personnel, and remained tied to Somali-based financial and communication networks (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17-18, 2025; CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4). Al-Ansari's death therefore exposed a media role that attack statistics had largely concealed.
Yemen Becomes a Media Sanctuary
IS began looking to Yemen for media personnel before the province lost Qayfa. Sources familiar with IS-Yemen's internal communications say that as early as 2019, central leadership asked the province to nominate potential spokesmen and provide biographies and recordings of their sermons (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17-18, 2025). The request came as IS was losing its territorial center and senior leadership in Iraq and Syria. Founder and the first leader of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in October 2019, followed roughly a day later by then-spokesman Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir (Reuters, October 28, 2019). Yemen was therefore already being considered as a source of personnel for central media functions as pressure on the organization's core intensified.
That role survived the branch's military collapse. In August 2020, Houthi forces overran IS positions in Wald Rabi' and Qayfa, killing much of the remaining leadership and fighters (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 5, 2020; Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). Under al-Hujayli, IS-Yemen became smaller and less visible, with Yemeni sources describing a deliberate effort to rebuild away from the attrition of its earlier territorial presence.
The province nevertheless remained tied to the wider organization. IS central leaders appeared to direct the Somalia-based al-Karrar office to fund IS nodes in Yemen through the Umm al-Qura regional office, while UN reporting later highlighted Yemen's facilitation and financial links to al-Karrar across the Red Sea (United Nations Security Council, July 15, 2022; CTC Sentinel, September 2024). Yemen had lost territorial weight, but it retained access to funding, central structures, and inter-provincial networks--assets that gave it importance beyond its local attack tempo.
Al-Ansari Was More Than the Spokesman
Al-Hujayli combined religious credentials, security experience, and provincial leadership before becoming IS's global spokesman. He joined IS in 2015, served in IS-Yemen's Sharia apparatus, and later became deputy security official in Qayfa (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025; Okaz; South24, September 1). He had also studied Quranic recitation and held certifications in several readings (authors' interviews with one of al-Hujayli's relatives and other IS-Yemen members, March 2, 2024). An official 2018 release shows him delivering an Eid sermon in al-Bayda (Bayda, Islamic State, Wilayat al-Bayda, "Days of Thanks and Remembrance," 2018). After Qayfa collapsed, al-Hujayli emerged from the surviving leadership of a province weakened by internal divisions (Long War Journal, December 23, 2025). Sources say that despite the presence of older, more experienced candidates, he combined religious and security credentials with broader acceptance among competing elements, leading the central leadership to appoint him governor under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen members, April 15, 2023, and December 20, 2025).
In August 2023, the provincial governor became IS's global spokesman. After Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham captured Abu Umar al-Muhajir in Syria, al-Hujayli appeared as Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in an al-Furqan recording announcing the death of Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi and the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (Counter Extremism Project, August 3, 2023; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi; Middle East Forum, August 4, 2023; Enab Baladi, September 28, 2023; United Nations Security Council, January 31, 2024). In his February 21 address, al-Hujayli directed messaging toward multiple theaters (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He called for attacks against Syria's transitional government, praised attacks including New Orleans and Bondi Beach, and discussed IS campaigns in Somalia, Nigeria, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He also emphasized the importance of both official IS propaganda and unofficial supporter media while warning unofficial outlets not to depart from official ideology and guidance (Counter Extremism Project, February 23).
"Spokesman" therefore understates his position. Al-Hujayli simultaneously governed IS-Yemen and served as the organization's authorized global voice, directly linking a marginal battlefield province to a central IS media function (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17, 2025; authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025 and April 4; Counter Extremism Project, February 23; Sheba Intelligence, September 1).
Keeping Yemen Quiet
The province's post-Qayfa strategy helped create the environment in which that function could operate. One element was reducing confrontation with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). A member who carried communications between al-Hujayli and other leaders said he indicated that he did not want renewed fighting with AQAP (authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member, September 4, 2025). Internally, al-Hujayli continued to regard AQAP as an ideological enemy but argued that circumstances required suspending the confrontation (authors' interview with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025, and April 15, 2023). Indeed, there have been no reported clashes between IS-Yemen and AQAP since February 2020 despite continued hostile rhetoric (ACLED, December 14, 2020; April 6, 2023).
Finance also became less visible. Sources inside the province say IS-Yemen turned to kidnapping for ransom and conducted operations without claiming them publicly (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with Yemeni jihadist sources along with leaked IS-Yemen documents, April 17, 2023). NewsYemen linked the June 2022 kidnapping in Tarim of the son of a Hadrami businessman Abdullah al-Junayd, known as al-Maher, to IS and described the kidnapping as part of the branch's effort to find new revenue after severe financial losses (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022). Sources say proceeds from the ransom and other operations were used to repay debts and finance vehicles, explosives-related materials, and training (Yemen Agency Press, June 20, 2022; NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025).
Public reporting consequently captured only part of the province's activity. Milton noted that IS-Yemen's last recorded attack was in summer 2022 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Yet Yemeni sources describe continued financing, training, procurement, and organizational activity during that period (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025; United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). The province was fading from IS's public battlefield while becoming more useful behind its media front.
The Network Behind the Voice
Al-Hujayli was not the only media-linked figure operating from Yemen. Sources identify Khalid Ahmad Ali al-Ariqi, known as Abu Zaid al-Muhajir, as IS-Yemen's media official and link part of the organization's broader media activity to the province (information provided in 2022 by a jihadist security source; subsequently corroborated by authors' interviews with multiple IS-Yemen jihadist sources, September 4, 2025; Yemen News Now, October 5, 2025). Yemen also had an established media role: an IS image from al-Bayda shows al-Naba being produced locally, while an April 2020 IS-Yemen production addressed al-Qaeda's positions in Yemen, Afghanistan, Mali, and elsewhere, demonstrating propaganda activity beyond the local battlefield (Long War Journal, May 4, 2020).
Al-Ariqi was killed in an April 2025 airstrike in Ataq, Shabwa, which Yemeni security sources attribute to the United States (Yemen Window, April 3, 2025; authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025; Barran Press, April 12, 2025). The UN Monitoring Team later described an "Abu Zaid" killed that month as a former head of IS's core media office and a communications node between senior leader Abu Khadija and IS-Somalia, assessing that his death disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The alias and date correspond, although the UN report does not provide a full name.
The strike also exposed the infrastructure around the network. Hours later, security forces raided an apartment al-Ariqi had reportedly visited (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemeni security sources say U.S. counterterrorism personnel focused heavily on laptops, phones, and other electronics (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Another media- and communications-linked IS member, Humam Harhara, described by sources as involved in external communications and official media activity, reportedly tried to destroy equipment before he was killed, while another member was detained and surviving devices were seized (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemen's significance therefore extended beyond al-Ansari: the province contained media personnel, communications infrastructure, and inter-provincial links serving the wider IS network (CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4).
Al-Ansari's death may already be testing how much of that media system depended on Yemen. On September 13, Caleb Weiss, a researcher focused on jihadism in Africa and who tracks IS propaganda, observed that IS media output had become limited and sporadic and that al-Naba releases were appearing on a delayed schedule since al-Ansari's death (X/@caleb_weiss7, September 13). Al-Naba has not stopped publishing--Jihadology records issues 563 and 564 on September 3 and 10--but the broader output has become less regular (Jihadology, September 3; September 10).
Conclusion
Al-Ansari's death exposed IS-Yemen's trajectory after losing Qayfa. Its battlefield decline concealed another kind of importance: the province remained connected to central leadership and inter-provincial networks while hosting personnel who served IS's global media apparatus. UN reporting in 2025 and 2026 identified IS-Yemen as a media and propaganda hub linked to IS-Somalia and to the group's wider media apparatus (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). Al-Hujayli's simultaneous roles as provincial governor and global spokesman placed Yemen directly inside that system.
That concentration also helps explain renewed counterterrorism attention to IS personnel in Yemen. Yemeni security sources attribute the April 2025 Ataq strike that killed Abu Zaid to the United States, while follow-on operations reached communications personnel, electronic devices, and supporting infrastructure (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources April 12, 2025; authors' interviews with a defected IS-Yemen leader who also confirmed the information, October 4, 2025; subsequent corroboration by pro-IS channels). The September Say'un raid then reached al-Hujayli himself. The pattern suggests that IS-Yemen's value as a target increasingly lay not in its ability to hold territory or generate attacks, but in the central functions and personnel operating from the province.
The implications extend beyond Yemen. A province can become militarily marginal while remaining important to IS's global organization as central functions are dispersed across geographically distant branches. The limited and irregular media output observed after al-Ansari's death is too early to establish direct dependence, particularly because al-Naba has continued to appear, but it still indicates possible disruption within a system already shown to have significant personnel in Yemen. More broadly, the case shows the limits of judging an IS province primarily by attacks, manpower, or territorial control. Organizational importance may instead lie in functions such as media, communications, finance, or leadership support that serve the movement across theaters. IS-Yemen's attack tempo made it appear peripheral; its media role showed that it had become part of the infrastructure through which IS sustained a global organization and spoke to a global audience.
* * *
Dr. Sara Harmouch is the CEO of H9 Defense, a research and advisory consultancy specializing in national security, counterterrorism, geopolitical risk, threat assessments, and open-source intelligence (OSINT). A counterterrorism expert and national security researcher, she focuses on political violence, terrorism, militancy, armed groups, Islamist militant organizations, irregular warfare, non-state actor behavior, alliance dynamics, and the conditions under which militant groups shift from domestic to international violence.
Mohammad Bin Faisal is a journalist and researcher specializing in Islamist extremist groups, with a focus on the ideological and organizational dimensions of extremism and terrorism in Yemen, the Middle East, and East Africa.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/yemen-becomes-the-islamic-states-media-sanctuary/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Turkiye Expands Its Security Strategy in Libya
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor:
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Turkiye Expands its Security Strategy in Libya
Brian G. Karamuka
Executive Summary:
* Turkiye is broadening its Libya strategy by cultivating partnerships with rival government factions and shifting from intervention to long-term security brokerage.
* Ankara is anchoring its position in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean through military cooperation, maritime agreements, and economic engagement.
* Turkiye's expanding role challenges regional rivals ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Turkiye Expands its Security Strategy in Libya Brian G. Karamuka Executive Summary: * Turkiye is broadening its Libya strategy by cultivating partnerships with rival government factions and shifting from intervention to long-term security brokerage. * Ankara is anchoring its position in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean through military cooperation, maritime agreements, and economic engagement. * Turkiye's expanding role challenges regional rivalsand carries significant implications for U.S. interests, European energy security, and North African stability.
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In late May, Turkiye hosted military training exercises that brought together personnel from Libya's rival armed factions for the first time since the country's post-2011 civil war began. The exercises saw the unprecedented participation of soldiers aligned with both the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) and the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) under a single Libyan flag (RFI, May 23). The initiative signals Ankara's evolving approach to Libya; one that goes beyond supporting a single faction and positions Turkiye as a security broker capable of engaging both of the country's power centers. By cultivating both power centers, Ankara could gain greater leverage over any future political settlement and security architecture.
Since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, Libya has remained divided between two competing governments and military establishments. The GNU, headquartered in Tripoli and recognized by the United Nations, controls much of western Libya with political and military support from the European Union. In contrast, General Khalifa Haftar's LNA dominates eastern Libya and much of the country's oil-rich interior, relying on support from Egypt, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (Council on Foreign Relations, June 3). External support has enabled both factions to consolidate control over their respective territories, but neither side yet possesses sufficient capability to defeat the other (Geopolitical Intelligence Services, November 13, 2025).
Turkiye's military intervention in Libya marked a turning point in both the country's civil war and Ankara's regional security strategy. After General Haftar's 2019 offensive against Tripoli, Ankara intervened on behalf of the Government of National Accord (GNA)--Libya's interim governing structure between 2015 and 2021--preventing the collapse of the UN-recognized government and altering the conflict's trajectory (Al-Jazeera, June 5, 2020). Beyond preserving a friendly government in Tripoli, the intervention established Turkiye as one of Libya's most influential external security actors. It demonstrated Ankara's willingness to use military power to advance its geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkiye initially relied on military advisers, intelligence support, drones, and other defense assistance to halt the LNA's advance; however, as the balance of power shifted in favor of Tripoli, Ankara institutionalized its presence through a series of defense and maritime agreements with the GNA, including the landmark 2019 Turkey-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, focused on security cooperation and Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries (The New Arab, September 30, 2025).
The intervention later evolved into a permanent military footprint, shifting Ankara's role from an external supporter to a long-term security partner (Nordic Monitor, December 25, 2025). Turkiye established a naval presence at the Port of Misrata, expanded operations from Al-Watiya Air Base after its recapture from Haftar's forces, deployed advanced military systems--including Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and air defense assets--and provided extensive training, logistical, and technical support to Libyan forces.
Turkiye's interest in Libya extends well beyond stabilizing its internal conflict. Situated at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Sahel, Libya serves as a critical gateway linking Europe and Africa. It holds some of the continent's largest proven oil and natural gas reserves (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 18, 2020). For Ankara, securing a long-term foothold in Libya has therefore become central not only to its North Africa policy but also to its broader ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Building on the defense agreements signed in 2019, Turkiye and the Tripoli-based government concluded a maritime Memorandum of Understanding establishing an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that cuts across waters also claimed by Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt (United Nations, 2019).
The maritime agreement also gave Turkiye a legal and political framework to contest competing maritime claims, while granting Turkish firms preferential access to future offshore energy projects (Middle East Forum, April 12). The region's considerable hydrocarbon potential underpins these ambitions. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Eastern Mediterranean contains approximately 107 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, making control over maritime access increasingly consequential for regional competition (USGS, March 2010). By anchoring its military presence in Libya to expansive maritime claims, Ankara has enhanced its ability to pursue offshore energy exploration, project power across the Eastern Mediterranean, and shape Europe's evolving energy landscape.
Turkiye's expanding role in Libya is driven by objectives that extend well beyond preserving the Tripoli-based government. By establishing itself as a long-term security partner, Ankara has sought to counter the influence of regional rivals--including Greece, Cyprus, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt--who maintain interests in Libya (Libya Tribune, June 10, 2025). A sustained military presence also reinforces Turkiye's position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by enhancing its role on the Alliance's increasingly contested southern flank, where terrorism, migration, and great power competition are becoming central security concerns. At the same time, Ankara has begun recalibrating its Libya strategy. Rather than remaining exclusively aligned with the UN-recognized GNU, Turkiye has gradually expanded engagement with the LNA. Relations began improving in late 2023, culminating in the reopening of Turkiye's consulate in Benghazi in 2024 and high-level meetings between Turkish military officials and Haftar in 2025 (Turkish Minute, August 26, 2025).
Turkiye's military diplomacy has mirrored Libya's political reality. In 2025, Turkish naval vessels made port calls in both Tripoli and Benghazi during the same deployment--the first such engagement involving both rival administrations. The visits included naval training activities and consultations with defense officials from eastern and western Libya, including Major General Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the LNA, on future military cooperation under the banner of "One Libya, One Army" (DefenseNews, August 26, 2025). Together, these developments suggest Turkiye is transitioning from backing a single faction to positioning itself as a security broker capable of shaping Libya's military and political future.
This rapprochement gained momentum following Haftar's April 2025 visit to Ankara, where the LNA's Chief of Staff of Land Forces met with senior Turkish military officials to discuss expanding defense cooperation (Libya Tribune, September 26, 2025). Reports indicate the two sides have since negotiated agreements covering joint naval exercises, military training, advisory support, and the potential provision of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (Libya Tribune, September 27, 2025). By replicating the security partnerships it has built in eastern Libya, Ankara seeks to broaden support for the 2019 Turkiye-Libya maritime agreement, reinforce its long-term military presence, and strengthen the political legitimacy of its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The rapprochement has produced tangible political and military outcomes. Most notably, the LNA has reportedly considered ratifying the 2019 maritime Memorandum of Understanding originally signed by the Tripoli-based GNU. This move would significantly strengthen the agreement's political legitimacy. Military cooperation has likewise accelerated. Earlier this year, personnel from Libya's rival military factions participated together in Turkiye's Efes-2026 multinational exercise, marking the first time both sides trained under a single Libyan flag (DefenseNews, May 6, 2025).
Turkiye's engagement in Libya forms part of a broader strategy to establish a network of military and commercial footholds along Africa's most strategically important maritime corridors. Ankara has prioritized partnerships with Libya, Somalia, and Sudan, viewing their ports as gateways to the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, respectively. By expanding its presence at facilities such as Somalia's Mogadishu Port, Sudan's Suakin Port, and key Libyan ports, Turkiye has sought to strengthen its influence over critical maritime trade routes while advancing its energy and security interests (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025). A growing military footprint has reinforced this maritime strategy. Turkiye's two principal African bases are in Somalia and Libya, giving Ankara forward operating positions on both the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Opened in 2017, the TURKSOM military base in Mogadishu is Turkiye's largest overseas military installation and serves as the centerpiece of its security partnership with Somalia (Evrensel, July 29, 2025). The facility reportedly hosts more than 1,000 Turkish personnel and can train over 10,000 Somali troops, while providing logistics, operational support, and military assistance (Turkish Minute, August 6, 2025).
Turkiye has increasingly sought to differentiate itself from Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) by presenting itself as a flexible, responsive, and operationally capable security partner for African states confronting insurgencies, Islamist militant groups, and separatist movements (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 8, 2025). This approach has been particularly evident in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, where Ankara has paired defense cooperation with economic engagement to deepen its regional influence. Turkiye has also aligned with Morocco's Atlantic Initiative, which aims to give landlocked Sahelian states access to the Atlantic Ocean, signaling Ankara's support for emerging regional connectivity projects. Beyond security cooperation, Turkiye continues to expand its economic footprint through maritime and infrastructure investments, including supplying a modern tugboat to Kenya and supporting port and infrastructure development in Tanzania and Senegal (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025).
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Brian G. Karamuka is a graduate student at the Institute of World Politics (IWP). He has worked with several organizations in the DC area, focusing on U.S.-Africa relations, great power competition in Africa, as well as security and governance issues on the continent.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/turkiye-expands-its-security-strategy-in-libya/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Turkiye Expands its Security Strategy in Libya
Brian G. Karamuka
Executive Summary:
* Turkiye is broadening its Libya strategy by cultivating partnerships with rival government factions and shifting from intervention to long-term security brokerage.
* Ankara is anchoring its position in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean through military cooperation, maritime agreements, and economic engagement.
* Turkiye's expanding role challenges regional rivals ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Turkiye Expands its Security Strategy in Libya Brian G. Karamuka Executive Summary: * Turkiye is broadening its Libya strategy by cultivating partnerships with rival government factions and shifting from intervention to long-term security brokerage. * Ankara is anchoring its position in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean through military cooperation, maritime agreements, and economic engagement. * Turkiye's expanding role challenges regional rivalsand carries significant implications for U.S. interests, European energy security, and North African stability.
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In late May, Turkiye hosted military training exercises that brought together personnel from Libya's rival armed factions for the first time since the country's post-2011 civil war began. The exercises saw the unprecedented participation of soldiers aligned with both the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) and the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) under a single Libyan flag (RFI, May 23). The initiative signals Ankara's evolving approach to Libya; one that goes beyond supporting a single faction and positions Turkiye as a security broker capable of engaging both of the country's power centers. By cultivating both power centers, Ankara could gain greater leverage over any future political settlement and security architecture.
Since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, Libya has remained divided between two competing governments and military establishments. The GNU, headquartered in Tripoli and recognized by the United Nations, controls much of western Libya with political and military support from the European Union. In contrast, General Khalifa Haftar's LNA dominates eastern Libya and much of the country's oil-rich interior, relying on support from Egypt, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (Council on Foreign Relations, June 3). External support has enabled both factions to consolidate control over their respective territories, but neither side yet possesses sufficient capability to defeat the other (Geopolitical Intelligence Services, November 13, 2025).
Turkiye's military intervention in Libya marked a turning point in both the country's civil war and Ankara's regional security strategy. After General Haftar's 2019 offensive against Tripoli, Ankara intervened on behalf of the Government of National Accord (GNA)--Libya's interim governing structure between 2015 and 2021--preventing the collapse of the UN-recognized government and altering the conflict's trajectory (Al-Jazeera, June 5, 2020). Beyond preserving a friendly government in Tripoli, the intervention established Turkiye as one of Libya's most influential external security actors. It demonstrated Ankara's willingness to use military power to advance its geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkiye initially relied on military advisers, intelligence support, drones, and other defense assistance to halt the LNA's advance; however, as the balance of power shifted in favor of Tripoli, Ankara institutionalized its presence through a series of defense and maritime agreements with the GNA, including the landmark 2019 Turkey-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, focused on security cooperation and Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries (The New Arab, September 30, 2025).
The intervention later evolved into a permanent military footprint, shifting Ankara's role from an external supporter to a long-term security partner (Nordic Monitor, December 25, 2025). Turkiye established a naval presence at the Port of Misrata, expanded operations from Al-Watiya Air Base after its recapture from Haftar's forces, deployed advanced military systems--including Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and air defense assets--and provided extensive training, logistical, and technical support to Libyan forces.
Turkiye's interest in Libya extends well beyond stabilizing its internal conflict. Situated at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Sahel, Libya serves as a critical gateway linking Europe and Africa. It holds some of the continent's largest proven oil and natural gas reserves (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 18, 2020). For Ankara, securing a long-term foothold in Libya has therefore become central not only to its North Africa policy but also to its broader ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Building on the defense agreements signed in 2019, Turkiye and the Tripoli-based government concluded a maritime Memorandum of Understanding establishing an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that cuts across waters also claimed by Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt (United Nations, 2019).
The maritime agreement also gave Turkiye a legal and political framework to contest competing maritime claims, while granting Turkish firms preferential access to future offshore energy projects (Middle East Forum, April 12). The region's considerable hydrocarbon potential underpins these ambitions. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Eastern Mediterranean contains approximately 107 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, making control over maritime access increasingly consequential for regional competition (USGS, March 2010). By anchoring its military presence in Libya to expansive maritime claims, Ankara has enhanced its ability to pursue offshore energy exploration, project power across the Eastern Mediterranean, and shape Europe's evolving energy landscape.
Turkiye's expanding role in Libya is driven by objectives that extend well beyond preserving the Tripoli-based government. By establishing itself as a long-term security partner, Ankara has sought to counter the influence of regional rivals--including Greece, Cyprus, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt--who maintain interests in Libya (Libya Tribune, June 10, 2025). A sustained military presence also reinforces Turkiye's position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by enhancing its role on the Alliance's increasingly contested southern flank, where terrorism, migration, and great power competition are becoming central security concerns. At the same time, Ankara has begun recalibrating its Libya strategy. Rather than remaining exclusively aligned with the UN-recognized GNU, Turkiye has gradually expanded engagement with the LNA. Relations began improving in late 2023, culminating in the reopening of Turkiye's consulate in Benghazi in 2024 and high-level meetings between Turkish military officials and Haftar in 2025 (Turkish Minute, August 26, 2025).
Turkiye's military diplomacy has mirrored Libya's political reality. In 2025, Turkish naval vessels made port calls in both Tripoli and Benghazi during the same deployment--the first such engagement involving both rival administrations. The visits included naval training activities and consultations with defense officials from eastern and western Libya, including Major General Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the LNA, on future military cooperation under the banner of "One Libya, One Army" (DefenseNews, August 26, 2025). Together, these developments suggest Turkiye is transitioning from backing a single faction to positioning itself as a security broker capable of shaping Libya's military and political future.
This rapprochement gained momentum following Haftar's April 2025 visit to Ankara, where the LNA's Chief of Staff of Land Forces met with senior Turkish military officials to discuss expanding defense cooperation (Libya Tribune, September 26, 2025). Reports indicate the two sides have since negotiated agreements covering joint naval exercises, military training, advisory support, and the potential provision of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (Libya Tribune, September 27, 2025). By replicating the security partnerships it has built in eastern Libya, Ankara seeks to broaden support for the 2019 Turkiye-Libya maritime agreement, reinforce its long-term military presence, and strengthen the political legitimacy of its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The rapprochement has produced tangible political and military outcomes. Most notably, the LNA has reportedly considered ratifying the 2019 maritime Memorandum of Understanding originally signed by the Tripoli-based GNU. This move would significantly strengthen the agreement's political legitimacy. Military cooperation has likewise accelerated. Earlier this year, personnel from Libya's rival military factions participated together in Turkiye's Efes-2026 multinational exercise, marking the first time both sides trained under a single Libyan flag (DefenseNews, May 6, 2025).
Turkiye's engagement in Libya forms part of a broader strategy to establish a network of military and commercial footholds along Africa's most strategically important maritime corridors. Ankara has prioritized partnerships with Libya, Somalia, and Sudan, viewing their ports as gateways to the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, respectively. By expanding its presence at facilities such as Somalia's Mogadishu Port, Sudan's Suakin Port, and key Libyan ports, Turkiye has sought to strengthen its influence over critical maritime trade routes while advancing its energy and security interests (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025). A growing military footprint has reinforced this maritime strategy. Turkiye's two principal African bases are in Somalia and Libya, giving Ankara forward operating positions on both the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Opened in 2017, the TURKSOM military base in Mogadishu is Turkiye's largest overseas military installation and serves as the centerpiece of its security partnership with Somalia (Evrensel, July 29, 2025). The facility reportedly hosts more than 1,000 Turkish personnel and can train over 10,000 Somali troops, while providing logistics, operational support, and military assistance (Turkish Minute, August 6, 2025).
Turkiye has increasingly sought to differentiate itself from Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) by presenting itself as a flexible, responsive, and operationally capable security partner for African states confronting insurgencies, Islamist militant groups, and separatist movements (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 8, 2025). This approach has been particularly evident in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, where Ankara has paired defense cooperation with economic engagement to deepen its regional influence. Turkiye has also aligned with Morocco's Atlantic Initiative, which aims to give landlocked Sahelian states access to the Atlantic Ocean, signaling Ankara's support for emerging regional connectivity projects. Beyond security cooperation, Turkiye continues to expand its economic footprint through maritime and infrastructure investments, including supplying a modern tugboat to Kenya and supporting port and infrastructure development in Tanzania and Senegal (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025).
* * *
Brian G. Karamuka is a graduate student at the Institute of World Politics (IWP). He has worked with several organizations in the DC area, focusing on U.S.-Africa relations, great power competition in Africa, as well as security and governance issues on the continent.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/turkiye-expands-its-security-strategy-in-libya/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Russians' Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Russians' Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize
Alyssa Dowling
Executive Summary:
* Fears of a new mobilization wave following Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have not materialized, but the Kremlin has introduced new taxes and raised utility prices.
* Declining contract recruitment, heavy battlefield losses, and expanding military registration infrastructure have fueled concerns about another mobilization wave. A formal call-up ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russians' Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize Alyssa Dowling Executive Summary: * Fears of a new mobilization wave following Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have not materialized, but the Kremlin has introduced new taxes and raised utility prices. * Declining contract recruitment, heavy battlefield losses, and expanding military registration infrastructure have fueled concerns about another mobilization wave. A formal call-upremains unlikely, but tighter conscription enforcement and regional mobilization drills suggest preparations for expanded recruitment.
* The Kremlin is likely to rely on contract recruitment rather than risk another politically damaging mobilization. Regional quotas incentivize authorities to pressure vulnerable Russians into military service, allowing Moscow to replenish its forces while obscuring responsibility for and the widespread existence of forced enlistment.
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Rumors that a new formal wave of mobilization would follow the September 18-20 State Duma elections saturated the Russian media space for months. These fears now seem unlikely to materialize soon (Vazhnye Istorii, June 24). Russian society has come to expect unpopular measures after elections. Russian President Vladimir Putin established a pattern over 20 years of making unwelcome decisions when society is least able to express discontent, including at the ballot box (Verstka, July 27). Putin provoked his first mass protests just a few months after the presidential elections in 2004 by choosing to reduce economic benefits for tens of millions of Russians, mostly pensioners. In 2018, he raised the retirement age after his reelection. Many Russians have accordingly expected unpopular measures to follow September's election. In the first Duma election after the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the primary Kremlin party, United Russia, gained a record of more than 77 percent of seats in parliament in the most tightly managed and falsified election of the Putin era (see EDM, September 21).
Putin framed these latest elections as a referendum on Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Critics of the war have expressed worry that Putin would use the elections to justify a new wave of mobilization because of heavy Russian losses on the battlefield and the Kremlin's desire to hasten territorial gains. Putin first announced a partial mobilization of reservists in September 2022, setting a goal to call up 300,000 for service. In October 2022, then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that the target had been met (RBC, October 28, 2022). This was Russia's first mobilization since World War II, and the Kremlin has not formally ended its legal basis (Radio Svoboda, October 31, 2022).
According to Vazhnye Istorii, high-level Russian officials denied new mobilization wave rumors 17 times between June 1 and September 15, including Putin dismissing reports from Ukrainian intelligence that the Kremlin was considering mobilization from Ukraine as "nonsense" designed to sow panic (Telegram/@istories_media, September 15). These adamant repudiations demonstrate how politically damaging the idea of another mobilization remains. On September 28, Putin signed a decree increasing the size of the armed forces by 15,500 soldiers, which will likely be achieved through increased contract and volunteer recruitment. This is the fourth increase in the size of the Russian army in 2026, compared to just three such increases in the first four years of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Meduza, September 28).
Separate unpopular measures have materialized in the three weeks since the elections. The Russian Ministry of Finance proposed a package of new taxes just four days after the vote, despite Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov saying on September 9 that increases should not be expected in the near future (Interfax, September 9; Meduza, September 24; The Bell, September 27). Asked about this discrepancy, Peskov skirted the question, saying that it is better to get explanations about the budget from the Kremlin's "economic bloc" (Kommersant, September 27). Utility prices also increased after the election because the Kremlin moved a planned increase from July 1 to October 1, just 11 days after the vote (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 23). Some other fears and reported conversations from the Kremlin, such as seizure of individuals' deposits, stricter exit visa laws, and fees for international internet traffic, have not come to fruition but remain possibilities (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 23).
Fears of another wave of mobilization are driven by the high casualty rates for Russian soldiers, the dwindling supply of Russians willing to sign a contract, and several anonymous reports from Russian authorities about Kremlin considerations of the step (Meduza; Telegram/@svobodnieslova, June 24). The principal way that the Kremlin has filled its armed forces--contract recruitment--has been falling since 2025. The reported quality of many new soldiers is low, from health to age to criminal record, and many units at the front lines are understaffed.
Mobilization rumors are also grounded in the build-up of logistical and legal infrastructure that could support the process, along with reports of regional mobilization drills. After the first wave of mobilization, the Kremlin created a unified military register, which could provide a more complete picture of which reservists are eligible for mobilization, send summons more quickly and gradually, and increase general administrative efficiency compared to the reported confusion and errors of the first wave (Vazhnye Istorii, December 22).
On February 15, the Russian Federal Chamber of Notaries sent a letter to regional chambers, though only Kaliningrad's receipt has been confirmed, instructing them to require potential conscripts to provide their draft registration papers before they can take out a mortgage, buy property, or start a business. Conscription is Russia's routine draft of eligible men aged 18-30 for one year of service, including during peacetime, who nominally do not serve in combat situations. It is legally separate from mobilization, but conscripts are often pressured into signing contracts for combat service, and there are reports of their deployment to Ukraine. Tightening enforcement for young men registering for conscription is therefore a sign that Moscow is trying to ramp up recruitment (The Insider, October 4). Additionally, regional administrations in Volzhsky and military groupings in Kaliningrad held mobilization logistics exercises over the summer, further fueling rumors (Radio Svoboda, June 19; The Moscow Times, August 23).
A new wave of mobilization is unlikely to resemble Putin's September 2022 televised announcement. The legal justification for mobilization remains, and the unified registration system means that the Kremlin has the information necessary to gradually mobilize reservists without generating the widespread panic of 2022, which led to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians. Forced contract signing, what some analysts call "hidden" or "covert" mobilization, remains prevalent in the regions of Russia and in the occupied territories of Ukraine, targeting vulnerable members of society who are more susceptible to pressure because of economic circumstances, criminal status, or social standing (Radio Svoboda, October 7). The Kremlin sets contract recruitment goals for the regions to avoid another unpopular mobilization, creating incentives for regional authorities and municipalities to meet those goals by any means necessary, and pushing pressure to find contract soldiers down the administrative hierarchy.
Regional administrations have quotas for contract soldiers. Russian human rights organizations received reports of forced detentions and coercion, including police beatings, to sign a military contract from at least 17 regions of Russia in just July and August (Verstka, August 24). Because regions provide the money for signing bonuses, which are becoming more expensive as supply decreases, poorer regions are more likely to use force to meet their quotas. In the Penza oblast, there have been many recent reports of police detaining men on the streets, in cars, and on public transport, then taking them to sign military contracts (Verstka, June 19). In the Ryazan oblast, Governor Pavel Malkov reportedly even established military contract quotas for employers in proportion to the size of their workplace (Gazeta.ru, April 2; see EDM, June 4).
According to The Bell, the number of people seeking information from human rights organizations about how to leave Russia has increased by 50 percent between fall and spring (The Bell, September 29). This spike demonstrates Russians' fear of another formal mobilization wave. The massive unpopularity of the 2022 partial mobilization, made clear through a protest movement of the mobilizeds' mothers and wives and the mass exodus of eligible men to avoid summonses, however, means that the Kremlin is less likely to obtain new soldiers for its ranks in that manner. Putin is more likely to continue to decentralize the dirty work of forcible military recruitment to keep new soldiers nominally "voluntary," diffuse responsibility for this process, and quietly feed his war machine.
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Alyssa Dowling is the deputy editor for the Eurasia Daily Monitor at The Jamestown Foundation. She brings experience in both policy and programmatic work, having previously served as a Program Associate on the Eurasia team at the National Democratic Institute and as a Project Specialist in the federal government.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russians-post-election-fears-partially-materialize/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Russians' Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize
Alyssa Dowling
Executive Summary:
* Fears of a new mobilization wave following Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have not materialized, but the Kremlin has introduced new taxes and raised utility prices.
* Declining contract recruitment, heavy battlefield losses, and expanding military registration infrastructure have fueled concerns about another mobilization wave. A formal call-up ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russians' Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize Alyssa Dowling Executive Summary: * Fears of a new mobilization wave following Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have not materialized, but the Kremlin has introduced new taxes and raised utility prices. * Declining contract recruitment, heavy battlefield losses, and expanding military registration infrastructure have fueled concerns about another mobilization wave. A formal call-upremains unlikely, but tighter conscription enforcement and regional mobilization drills suggest preparations for expanded recruitment.
* The Kremlin is likely to rely on contract recruitment rather than risk another politically damaging mobilization. Regional quotas incentivize authorities to pressure vulnerable Russians into military service, allowing Moscow to replenish its forces while obscuring responsibility for and the widespread existence of forced enlistment.
-
Rumors that a new formal wave of mobilization would follow the September 18-20 State Duma elections saturated the Russian media space for months. These fears now seem unlikely to materialize soon (Vazhnye Istorii, June 24). Russian society has come to expect unpopular measures after elections. Russian President Vladimir Putin established a pattern over 20 years of making unwelcome decisions when society is least able to express discontent, including at the ballot box (Verstka, July 27). Putin provoked his first mass protests just a few months after the presidential elections in 2004 by choosing to reduce economic benefits for tens of millions of Russians, mostly pensioners. In 2018, he raised the retirement age after his reelection. Many Russians have accordingly expected unpopular measures to follow September's election. In the first Duma election after the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the primary Kremlin party, United Russia, gained a record of more than 77 percent of seats in parliament in the most tightly managed and falsified election of the Putin era (see EDM, September 21).
Putin framed these latest elections as a referendum on Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Critics of the war have expressed worry that Putin would use the elections to justify a new wave of mobilization because of heavy Russian losses on the battlefield and the Kremlin's desire to hasten territorial gains. Putin first announced a partial mobilization of reservists in September 2022, setting a goal to call up 300,000 for service. In October 2022, then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that the target had been met (RBC, October 28, 2022). This was Russia's first mobilization since World War II, and the Kremlin has not formally ended its legal basis (Radio Svoboda, October 31, 2022).
According to Vazhnye Istorii, high-level Russian officials denied new mobilization wave rumors 17 times between June 1 and September 15, including Putin dismissing reports from Ukrainian intelligence that the Kremlin was considering mobilization from Ukraine as "nonsense" designed to sow panic (Telegram/@istories_media, September 15). These adamant repudiations demonstrate how politically damaging the idea of another mobilization remains. On September 28, Putin signed a decree increasing the size of the armed forces by 15,500 soldiers, which will likely be achieved through increased contract and volunteer recruitment. This is the fourth increase in the size of the Russian army in 2026, compared to just three such increases in the first four years of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Meduza, September 28).
Separate unpopular measures have materialized in the three weeks since the elections. The Russian Ministry of Finance proposed a package of new taxes just four days after the vote, despite Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov saying on September 9 that increases should not be expected in the near future (Interfax, September 9; Meduza, September 24; The Bell, September 27). Asked about this discrepancy, Peskov skirted the question, saying that it is better to get explanations about the budget from the Kremlin's "economic bloc" (Kommersant, September 27). Utility prices also increased after the election because the Kremlin moved a planned increase from July 1 to October 1, just 11 days after the vote (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 23). Some other fears and reported conversations from the Kremlin, such as seizure of individuals' deposits, stricter exit visa laws, and fees for international internet traffic, have not come to fruition but remain possibilities (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 23).
Fears of another wave of mobilization are driven by the high casualty rates for Russian soldiers, the dwindling supply of Russians willing to sign a contract, and several anonymous reports from Russian authorities about Kremlin considerations of the step (Meduza; Telegram/@svobodnieslova, June 24). The principal way that the Kremlin has filled its armed forces--contract recruitment--has been falling since 2025. The reported quality of many new soldiers is low, from health to age to criminal record, and many units at the front lines are understaffed.
Mobilization rumors are also grounded in the build-up of logistical and legal infrastructure that could support the process, along with reports of regional mobilization drills. After the first wave of mobilization, the Kremlin created a unified military register, which could provide a more complete picture of which reservists are eligible for mobilization, send summons more quickly and gradually, and increase general administrative efficiency compared to the reported confusion and errors of the first wave (Vazhnye Istorii, December 22).
On February 15, the Russian Federal Chamber of Notaries sent a letter to regional chambers, though only Kaliningrad's receipt has been confirmed, instructing them to require potential conscripts to provide their draft registration papers before they can take out a mortgage, buy property, or start a business. Conscription is Russia's routine draft of eligible men aged 18-30 for one year of service, including during peacetime, who nominally do not serve in combat situations. It is legally separate from mobilization, but conscripts are often pressured into signing contracts for combat service, and there are reports of their deployment to Ukraine. Tightening enforcement for young men registering for conscription is therefore a sign that Moscow is trying to ramp up recruitment (The Insider, October 4). Additionally, regional administrations in Volzhsky and military groupings in Kaliningrad held mobilization logistics exercises over the summer, further fueling rumors (Radio Svoboda, June 19; The Moscow Times, August 23).
A new wave of mobilization is unlikely to resemble Putin's September 2022 televised announcement. The legal justification for mobilization remains, and the unified registration system means that the Kremlin has the information necessary to gradually mobilize reservists without generating the widespread panic of 2022, which led to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians. Forced contract signing, what some analysts call "hidden" or "covert" mobilization, remains prevalent in the regions of Russia and in the occupied territories of Ukraine, targeting vulnerable members of society who are more susceptible to pressure because of economic circumstances, criminal status, or social standing (Radio Svoboda, October 7). The Kremlin sets contract recruitment goals for the regions to avoid another unpopular mobilization, creating incentives for regional authorities and municipalities to meet those goals by any means necessary, and pushing pressure to find contract soldiers down the administrative hierarchy.
Regional administrations have quotas for contract soldiers. Russian human rights organizations received reports of forced detentions and coercion, including police beatings, to sign a military contract from at least 17 regions of Russia in just July and August (Verstka, August 24). Because regions provide the money for signing bonuses, which are becoming more expensive as supply decreases, poorer regions are more likely to use force to meet their quotas. In the Penza oblast, there have been many recent reports of police detaining men on the streets, in cars, and on public transport, then taking them to sign military contracts (Verstka, June 19). In the Ryazan oblast, Governor Pavel Malkov reportedly even established military contract quotas for employers in proportion to the size of their workplace (Gazeta.ru, April 2; see EDM, June 4).
According to The Bell, the number of people seeking information from human rights organizations about how to leave Russia has increased by 50 percent between fall and spring (The Bell, September 29). This spike demonstrates Russians' fear of another formal mobilization wave. The massive unpopularity of the 2022 partial mobilization, made clear through a protest movement of the mobilizeds' mothers and wives and the mass exodus of eligible men to avoid summonses, however, means that the Kremlin is less likely to obtain new soldiers for its ranks in that manner. Putin is more likely to continue to decentralize the dirty work of forcible military recruitment to keep new soldiers nominally "voluntary," diffuse responsibility for this process, and quietly feed his war machine.
* * *
Alyssa Dowling is the deputy editor for the Eurasia Daily Monitor at The Jamestown Foundation. She brings experience in both policy and programmatic work, having previously served as a Program Associate on the Eurasia team at the National Democratic Institute and as a Project Specialist in the federal government.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russians-post-election-fears-partially-materialize/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor:
* * *
Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support
Javad Heiran-Nia
Executive Summary:
* Security-minded figures within Iran's power structure will ensure Iran pursues the Look East policy and engages more forcefully with the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the conflict with the United States and Israel.
* The PRC's cautious wartime response has sparked serious debates over future relations with Beijing, as many in Tehran view it as prioritizing ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support Javad Heiran-Nia Executive Summary: * Security-minded figures within Iran's power structure will ensure Iran pursues the Look East policy and engages more forcefully with the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the conflict with the United States and Israel. * The PRC's cautious wartime response has sparked serious debates over future relations with Beijing, as many in Tehran view it as prioritizingties with Arab states and dialogue with the United States to protect energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.
* This debate has intensified reformist-conservative divisions and strengthened the influence of security institutions, which prefer operational independence over restrictive alliances.
-
Iran's Look East policy is rooted in the ideological ideals of the 1979 Revolution, which, with the slogan "Neither East Nor West," sought to establish an order independent of the two power blocs. Over time--and under sanctions and international isolation--this slogan gave way to practical convergence with Eastern powers, especially Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1]
Across different presidential periods, this policy has pursued varying objectives. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tenure, the Look East policy took on an ideological, confrontational tone toward the West. Under Hassan Rouhani's administration, this policy complemented engagement with the West and operated within the framework of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. Under Ebrahim Raisi's government and thereafter, however, Look East has transformed into an exclusive strategy and a substitute for engagement with the West, materialized through documents such as the 25-year agreement with the PRC and accession to organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Middle East Council, September 2023). [2] This approach, rather than being based purely on economic interests, reflects the security-oriented, conservative outlook emphasized by Iran's security and military institutions (Khayrion, June 6, 2024).
The security establishment has consistently emphasized that countries such as Russia and the PRC are Iran's strategic partners. With this argument, they condemn relations with the West and advocate placing exclusive emphasis on relations with Eastern partners, which, from their perspective, represent the new poles of the international system (Khamenei.ir, July 22, 2022).
The current conflict with the United States and Israel has led to the emergence of serious and important debates on future relations with the PRC. The core debate centers on the fact that the PRC has not provided direct military support to Iran during the conflict. Beijing's response has largely been limited to diplomatic calls for de-escalation and respect for national sovereignty, which many assessed as a "balanced" and "conservative" approach (Foreign Affairs, April 17). This has disappointed many in Iran and raised questions about the PRC's commitment and reliability as a strategic partner.
Iran's Perception of the Relationship with PRC
A serious theoretical debate has emerged in Iran over two divergent pathways for the future of cooperation with the PRC. Reformists believe Iran should follow the PRC's economic development model--one based on a productive economy, openness to the world, and attracting foreign investment. In this view, the PRC is an ideal partner for revitalizing Iran's economy and breaking out of isolation, but it should not be seen as Iran's strategic partner in future confrontation.
Many Iranian experts advocate for focusing on economic relations with the PRC. From this perspective, adopting a Cold War mindset and expecting military support from the PRC misreads Beijing's foreign policy. In their view, the PRC does not fundamentally subscribe to an international order based on military alliances (Tabnak, May 12). Accordingly, they argue that the PRC should not be criticized for its lack of military support for Iran, as its foreign policy focuses on mutual non-alignment and non-alliance. This principle means the PRC is not committed to entering a war if Iran is attacked (Tabnak, May 12).
Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi, Secretary of Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, argued that the PRC and Russia interact with the United States within the "great power management" model (Iran International, May 29). Therefore, the PRC and Russia have adopted a policy of positive neutrality toward the conflict--one that requires them to maintain a baseline of strategic relations with all countries involved. Russia and the PRC's decision to abstain from, rather than veto, UN Security Council Resolution 2817 condemning Iranian attacks against regional neighbors fits within this policy framework (UN Security Council, March 11).
In contrast, conservatives--and, at their forefront, military-security groups--are more inclined to expand relations with the PRC along the Russian model: strengthening military capability, relying on oil revenues, and confronting the West. One of the reasons for Iranian conservatives' opposition to relations with the West, particularly the United States, is the cultural impact such relations would have on Iranian society and, consequently, on their revolutionary slogans, leading to delegitimization and diminished acceptance of their revolutionary and ideological principles among the Iranian public (Middle East Institute, September 25, 2023).
Impact on the Domestic Balance of Power
Despite internally recognizing Beijing's lack of direct support, Iran is likely to continue its turn toward the PRC. Iran's military-security apparatus is the most significant variable in policymaking. Over 45 years, the security organizations have determined the "big game" of Iran's foreign policy to the detriment of successive presidential administrations. Presidents can engage in a "small game" of foreign policy maneuvers, provided they do not disrupt the overall power structure (Manara, February 21, 2022). Beijing's support for security-affiliated groups in Iran limits the pathway for reformists and moderates to gain power within Iran's power structure and further strengthens the IRGC's position within it. Accordingly, rather than relying on Iran's formal state institutions, the PRC is coordinating with IRGC-affiliated operational networks that control a substantial share of Iran's economy and security (Strategic Analysis Network, May 28).
Discussions have also emerged about fully implementing the two countries' 25-year strategic cooperation agreement. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described his visit to the PRC--the first visit by an Iranian official to the PRC since the start of the conflict--as one of the most significant trips in Iran's history (International Institute for Iranian Studies, May 17). During this visit, Araghchi emphasized Iran's trust in the PRC. This trust creates a favorable environment to pursue the objectives outlined in the 25-year agreement (Al Jazeera, May 6). This visit, rather than announcing a new position on the document, sought to redefine Iran's standing with the PRC after the war and secure trust for subsequent steps in implementing the agreement. This visit, therefore, should be seen as a prelude to more serious discussions on operationalizing 25-year cooperation in a post-conflict era.
Iran's approach frames ties with the PRC as part of a broader strategy to position itself in the emerging global order. The most significant indicator of this approach is the appointment of Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf--a prominent conservative figure and Speaker of Parliament--as Iran's special representative for PRC affairs. This appointment, proposed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and approved by Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, demonstrates unprecedented coordination among power institutions and the executive, legislative, and leadership branches in prioritizing relations with the PRC (Tasnimnews.ir, May 17).
Ali Larijani, the late Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, previously held this position and played a key role in signing the 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between Iran and the PRC (Fars News, May 17). Ghalibaf's appointment signals a determination to revive and implement this document. Beyond his parliamentary role, Ghalibaf is a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander and currently leads Iran's negotiating team with the United States. This tripartite role enables him to coordinate effectively across military, political, and economic systems and remove obstacles hindering cooperation with the PRC. By entrusting the PRC portfolio to Ghalibaf, Iran has effectively linked negotiations with Washington to cooperation with Beijing, using this as a lever to increase bargaining power against U.S. pressure.
These developments suggest that the 25-year Iran-PRC agreement--which envisions Chinese investment in infrastructure, oil, and military sectors in exchange for discounted oil--may be implemented more rapidly. Following de-escalation, therefore, the PRC could become the primary reconstructor of Iran's damaged infrastructure.
Conclusion
Iran's Look East approach has evolved from a purely economic strategy. Rooted in the country's strategic literature, Iran's approach rests on the belief that the U.S. unipolar order is declining and the world is moving toward multipolarity. Iran defines itself as an emerging power in this landscape and argues it needs "strategic alignment" with Eastern powers to consolidate its position. Sanctions and international isolation have made the PRC and Russia Tehran's only serious partners. From Iran's perspective, these collaborations can raise the costs of confrontation for Washington.
Iran's relations with the East are defined on a new model of cooperation without commitment. Many in Iran have recognized that the conflict has revealed the limitations of the PRC's support. The PRC and Russia have offered rhetorical and limited political support to Iran as a partner, but have not provided security guarantees or practical support. This approach, however, aligns fully with Iran's military-security institutions, which prefer operational independence over restrictive alliances. Iranian leaders have therefore concluded that these partnerships, despite any limitations, are the best and only available options for survival.
* * *
Javad Heiran-Nia, Ph.D., International Relations, Director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies, Tehran, Iran. He was the Current Affairs Analyst at Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/iran-to-deepen-prc-ties-despite-lack-of-military-support/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support
Javad Heiran-Nia
Executive Summary:
* Security-minded figures within Iran's power structure will ensure Iran pursues the Look East policy and engages more forcefully with the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the conflict with the United States and Israel.
* The PRC's cautious wartime response has sparked serious debates over future relations with Beijing, as many in Tehran view it as prioritizing ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support Javad Heiran-Nia Executive Summary: * Security-minded figures within Iran's power structure will ensure Iran pursues the Look East policy and engages more forcefully with the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the conflict with the United States and Israel. * The PRC's cautious wartime response has sparked serious debates over future relations with Beijing, as many in Tehran view it as prioritizingties with Arab states and dialogue with the United States to protect energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.
* This debate has intensified reformist-conservative divisions and strengthened the influence of security institutions, which prefer operational independence over restrictive alliances.
-
Iran's Look East policy is rooted in the ideological ideals of the 1979 Revolution, which, with the slogan "Neither East Nor West," sought to establish an order independent of the two power blocs. Over time--and under sanctions and international isolation--this slogan gave way to practical convergence with Eastern powers, especially Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1]
Across different presidential periods, this policy has pursued varying objectives. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tenure, the Look East policy took on an ideological, confrontational tone toward the West. Under Hassan Rouhani's administration, this policy complemented engagement with the West and operated within the framework of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. Under Ebrahim Raisi's government and thereafter, however, Look East has transformed into an exclusive strategy and a substitute for engagement with the West, materialized through documents such as the 25-year agreement with the PRC and accession to organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Middle East Council, September 2023). [2] This approach, rather than being based purely on economic interests, reflects the security-oriented, conservative outlook emphasized by Iran's security and military institutions (Khayrion, June 6, 2024).
The security establishment has consistently emphasized that countries such as Russia and the PRC are Iran's strategic partners. With this argument, they condemn relations with the West and advocate placing exclusive emphasis on relations with Eastern partners, which, from their perspective, represent the new poles of the international system (Khamenei.ir, July 22, 2022).
The current conflict with the United States and Israel has led to the emergence of serious and important debates on future relations with the PRC. The core debate centers on the fact that the PRC has not provided direct military support to Iran during the conflict. Beijing's response has largely been limited to diplomatic calls for de-escalation and respect for national sovereignty, which many assessed as a "balanced" and "conservative" approach (Foreign Affairs, April 17). This has disappointed many in Iran and raised questions about the PRC's commitment and reliability as a strategic partner.
Iran's Perception of the Relationship with PRC
A serious theoretical debate has emerged in Iran over two divergent pathways for the future of cooperation with the PRC. Reformists believe Iran should follow the PRC's economic development model--one based on a productive economy, openness to the world, and attracting foreign investment. In this view, the PRC is an ideal partner for revitalizing Iran's economy and breaking out of isolation, but it should not be seen as Iran's strategic partner in future confrontation.
Many Iranian experts advocate for focusing on economic relations with the PRC. From this perspective, adopting a Cold War mindset and expecting military support from the PRC misreads Beijing's foreign policy. In their view, the PRC does not fundamentally subscribe to an international order based on military alliances (Tabnak, May 12). Accordingly, they argue that the PRC should not be criticized for its lack of military support for Iran, as its foreign policy focuses on mutual non-alignment and non-alliance. This principle means the PRC is not committed to entering a war if Iran is attacked (Tabnak, May 12).
Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi, Secretary of Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, argued that the PRC and Russia interact with the United States within the "great power management" model (Iran International, May 29). Therefore, the PRC and Russia have adopted a policy of positive neutrality toward the conflict--one that requires them to maintain a baseline of strategic relations with all countries involved. Russia and the PRC's decision to abstain from, rather than veto, UN Security Council Resolution 2817 condemning Iranian attacks against regional neighbors fits within this policy framework (UN Security Council, March 11).
In contrast, conservatives--and, at their forefront, military-security groups--are more inclined to expand relations with the PRC along the Russian model: strengthening military capability, relying on oil revenues, and confronting the West. One of the reasons for Iranian conservatives' opposition to relations with the West, particularly the United States, is the cultural impact such relations would have on Iranian society and, consequently, on their revolutionary slogans, leading to delegitimization and diminished acceptance of their revolutionary and ideological principles among the Iranian public (Middle East Institute, September 25, 2023).
Impact on the Domestic Balance of Power
Despite internally recognizing Beijing's lack of direct support, Iran is likely to continue its turn toward the PRC. Iran's military-security apparatus is the most significant variable in policymaking. Over 45 years, the security organizations have determined the "big game" of Iran's foreign policy to the detriment of successive presidential administrations. Presidents can engage in a "small game" of foreign policy maneuvers, provided they do not disrupt the overall power structure (Manara, February 21, 2022). Beijing's support for security-affiliated groups in Iran limits the pathway for reformists and moderates to gain power within Iran's power structure and further strengthens the IRGC's position within it. Accordingly, rather than relying on Iran's formal state institutions, the PRC is coordinating with IRGC-affiliated operational networks that control a substantial share of Iran's economy and security (Strategic Analysis Network, May 28).
Discussions have also emerged about fully implementing the two countries' 25-year strategic cooperation agreement. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described his visit to the PRC--the first visit by an Iranian official to the PRC since the start of the conflict--as one of the most significant trips in Iran's history (International Institute for Iranian Studies, May 17). During this visit, Araghchi emphasized Iran's trust in the PRC. This trust creates a favorable environment to pursue the objectives outlined in the 25-year agreement (Al Jazeera, May 6). This visit, rather than announcing a new position on the document, sought to redefine Iran's standing with the PRC after the war and secure trust for subsequent steps in implementing the agreement. This visit, therefore, should be seen as a prelude to more serious discussions on operationalizing 25-year cooperation in a post-conflict era.
Iran's approach frames ties with the PRC as part of a broader strategy to position itself in the emerging global order. The most significant indicator of this approach is the appointment of Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf--a prominent conservative figure and Speaker of Parliament--as Iran's special representative for PRC affairs. This appointment, proposed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and approved by Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, demonstrates unprecedented coordination among power institutions and the executive, legislative, and leadership branches in prioritizing relations with the PRC (Tasnimnews.ir, May 17).
Ali Larijani, the late Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, previously held this position and played a key role in signing the 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between Iran and the PRC (Fars News, May 17). Ghalibaf's appointment signals a determination to revive and implement this document. Beyond his parliamentary role, Ghalibaf is a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander and currently leads Iran's negotiating team with the United States. This tripartite role enables him to coordinate effectively across military, political, and economic systems and remove obstacles hindering cooperation with the PRC. By entrusting the PRC portfolio to Ghalibaf, Iran has effectively linked negotiations with Washington to cooperation with Beijing, using this as a lever to increase bargaining power against U.S. pressure.
These developments suggest that the 25-year Iran-PRC agreement--which envisions Chinese investment in infrastructure, oil, and military sectors in exchange for discounted oil--may be implemented more rapidly. Following de-escalation, therefore, the PRC could become the primary reconstructor of Iran's damaged infrastructure.
Conclusion
Iran's Look East approach has evolved from a purely economic strategy. Rooted in the country's strategic literature, Iran's approach rests on the belief that the U.S. unipolar order is declining and the world is moving toward multipolarity. Iran defines itself as an emerging power in this landscape and argues it needs "strategic alignment" with Eastern powers to consolidate its position. Sanctions and international isolation have made the PRC and Russia Tehran's only serious partners. From Iran's perspective, these collaborations can raise the costs of confrontation for Washington.
Iran's relations with the East are defined on a new model of cooperation without commitment. Many in Iran have recognized that the conflict has revealed the limitations of the PRC's support. The PRC and Russia have offered rhetorical and limited political support to Iran as a partner, but have not provided security guarantees or practical support. This approach, however, aligns fully with Iran's military-security institutions, which prefer operational independence over restrictive alliances. Iranian leaders have therefore concluded that these partnerships, despite any limitations, are the best and only available options for survival.
* * *
Javad Heiran-Nia, Ph.D., International Relations, Director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies, Tehran, Iran. He was the Current Affairs Analyst at Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/iran-to-deepen-prc-ties-despite-lack-of-military-support/
[Category: ThinkTank]
ICTD Researchers at Africa's Largest Tax Research Gathering, Rwanda
BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 10 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news:
* * *
ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda
Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month.
Hosted by the ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 10 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news: * * * ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month. Hosted by theAfrican Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) under the theme Contemporary Taxation Issues in Africa, this year's Congress, co-hosted with the Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA), focused on critical issues facing revenue services today including digitalisation and artificial intelligence (AI), tax incentives and expenditure governance, international tax cooperation, and environmental taxation.
Strengthening African tax research capacity
Participation in the ATRN Congress reflects ICTD's long-standing commitment to strengthening tax research capacity in Africa, and its partnership with ATAF has been a key part of that.
In an interview with ATAF during the three-day event, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni highlighted the important role ATRN has played in expanding both the quantity and quality of tax research produced in Africa.
"Up to a decade ago, about the time when the ATRN was established, there were very few studies on taxation in African countries. So, when African governments had to take decisions, oftentimes they would resort to evidence from elsewhere, from high-income countries ... and obviously that doesn't always translate," she said.
Mascagni added: "Having that context-specific research has been incredibly important. Having a platform ... for researchers to talk about it, improve the quality, receive feedback, and to sensitise policymakers to the importance of research - all of that has been invaluable, and it's exactly the platform that the ATRN provides."
Exploring AI and the future of tax administration
ICTD Senior Research Fellow Fabrizio Santoro participated in a plenary session examining opportunities and challenges presented by AI and automation in African tax administrations. The discussion explored how AI is increasingly being used for a range of administrative functions, such as taxpayer risk profiling and compliance management, while also raising important questions around governance, transparency, taxpayer rights, and institutional capacity.
Drawing on ICTD's ongoing research programme on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and Tax, Santoro joined representatives from ATAF, the Rwanda Revenue Authority, the South African Revenue Service, and academia to discuss how African revenue authorities can harness new technologies while ensuring their adoption remains effective, accountable, and responsive to local contexts.
Three panellists seated on stage with green background at ATRN 2026. Middle person is Fabrizio Santoro, ICTD.
Courtesy of ATAF
Later that day, Santoro also presented his research paper, 'Tax Implications of Cashless Payments: Micro Evidence from African Counties', co-authored with ICTD Research Affiliate Lucia Rossel, which examines how the growing use of digital payment systems may affect tax administration and revenue mobilisation across the continent.
Advancing debate on tax incentives and expenditure reform
The next day, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni delivered a presentation during the plenary session on 'Tax Incentives and Expenditure: From Fiscal Drain to Strategic Governance'. The session examined how African governments can strengthen oversight and management of tax expenditures, improve transparency, and ensure that tax incentives better support development objectives.
Seven panellists seated on stage with green background showing ATAF logo and title of the session. The audience is also visible. Photo taken at ATRN 2026.
Courtesy of RRA
Mascagni's contribution drew on the work emerging from the Coalition on Tax Expenditure Reform (COATE), which ICTD helped establish following the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in 2025.
The discussion addressed growing concerns about the scale of revenue foregone through poorly monitored tax incentives, as well as the new opportunities created by global efforts to strengthen tax expenditure reporting and reform.
Building capacity on environmental taxation
Finally, ICTD Senior Research Fellow Giovanni Occhiali facilitated a masterclass on environmental taxation in lower-income countries (see ICTD's work on climate and environmental taxation). The session explored the role of environmental taxes and incentives, alongside the institutional considerations that shape their design and implementation.
The masterclass reflected growing interest among policymakers and researchers in how fiscal instruments can support climate and environmental objectives while remaining feasible within lower-income country contexts.
Strengthening African tax research and policy dialogue
The 11th ATRN Congress took place at a time when African governments face mounting pressure to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation amidst declining development assistance, evolving international tax rules, and rapid technological change. It presents a unique opportunity for researchers to present their work to an audience of decision-makers in ministries of finance, tax administrations and civil society organisations, as well as to academic researchers and tax practitioners. Throughout the three-day event, participants examined how research can help bridge the gap between knowledge and policymaking while supporting more effective and equitable tax systems across the continent.
9 October 2026
* * *
Original text here: https://ictd.ac/general/ictd-researchers-at-africas-largest-tax-research-gathering-rwanda/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda
Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month.
Hosted by the ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 10 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news: * * * ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month. Hosted by theAfrican Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) under the theme Contemporary Taxation Issues in Africa, this year's Congress, co-hosted with the Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA), focused on critical issues facing revenue services today including digitalisation and artificial intelligence (AI), tax incentives and expenditure governance, international tax cooperation, and environmental taxation.
Strengthening African tax research capacity
Participation in the ATRN Congress reflects ICTD's long-standing commitment to strengthening tax research capacity in Africa, and its partnership with ATAF has been a key part of that.
In an interview with ATAF during the three-day event, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni highlighted the important role ATRN has played in expanding both the quantity and quality of tax research produced in Africa.
"Up to a decade ago, about the time when the ATRN was established, there were very few studies on taxation in African countries. So, when African governments had to take decisions, oftentimes they would resort to evidence from elsewhere, from high-income countries ... and obviously that doesn't always translate," she said.
Mascagni added: "Having that context-specific research has been incredibly important. Having a platform ... for researchers to talk about it, improve the quality, receive feedback, and to sensitise policymakers to the importance of research - all of that has been invaluable, and it's exactly the platform that the ATRN provides."
Exploring AI and the future of tax administration
ICTD Senior Research Fellow Fabrizio Santoro participated in a plenary session examining opportunities and challenges presented by AI and automation in African tax administrations. The discussion explored how AI is increasingly being used for a range of administrative functions, such as taxpayer risk profiling and compliance management, while also raising important questions around governance, transparency, taxpayer rights, and institutional capacity.
Drawing on ICTD's ongoing research programme on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and Tax, Santoro joined representatives from ATAF, the Rwanda Revenue Authority, the South African Revenue Service, and academia to discuss how African revenue authorities can harness new technologies while ensuring their adoption remains effective, accountable, and responsive to local contexts.
Three panellists seated on stage with green background at ATRN 2026. Middle person is Fabrizio Santoro, ICTD.
Courtesy of ATAF
Later that day, Santoro also presented his research paper, 'Tax Implications of Cashless Payments: Micro Evidence from African Counties', co-authored with ICTD Research Affiliate Lucia Rossel, which examines how the growing use of digital payment systems may affect tax administration and revenue mobilisation across the continent.
Advancing debate on tax incentives and expenditure reform
The next day, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni delivered a presentation during the plenary session on 'Tax Incentives and Expenditure: From Fiscal Drain to Strategic Governance'. The session examined how African governments can strengthen oversight and management of tax expenditures, improve transparency, and ensure that tax incentives better support development objectives.
Seven panellists seated on stage with green background showing ATAF logo and title of the session. The audience is also visible. Photo taken at ATRN 2026.
Courtesy of RRA
Mascagni's contribution drew on the work emerging from the Coalition on Tax Expenditure Reform (COATE), which ICTD helped establish following the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in 2025.
The discussion addressed growing concerns about the scale of revenue foregone through poorly monitored tax incentives, as well as the new opportunities created by global efforts to strengthen tax expenditure reporting and reform.
Building capacity on environmental taxation
Finally, ICTD Senior Research Fellow Giovanni Occhiali facilitated a masterclass on environmental taxation in lower-income countries (see ICTD's work on climate and environmental taxation). The session explored the role of environmental taxes and incentives, alongside the institutional considerations that shape their design and implementation.
The masterclass reflected growing interest among policymakers and researchers in how fiscal instruments can support climate and environmental objectives while remaining feasible within lower-income country contexts.
Strengthening African tax research and policy dialogue
The 11th ATRN Congress took place at a time when African governments face mounting pressure to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation amidst declining development assistance, evolving international tax rules, and rapid technological change. It presents a unique opportunity for researchers to present their work to an audience of decision-makers in ministries of finance, tax administrations and civil society organisations, as well as to academic researchers and tax practitioners. Throughout the three-day event, participants examined how research can help bridge the gap between knowledge and policymaking while supporting more effective and equitable tax systems across the continent.
9 October 2026
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Original text here: https://ictd.ac/general/ictd-researchers-at-africas-largest-tax-research-gathering-rwanda/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Fraud Trials Begin and End in Federal Court This Week
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
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Fraud trials begin and end in federal court this week
Written by Bill Glahn | October 8, 2026
Yesterday afternoon, your correspondent took in a couple of hours of Feeding Our Future jury trial No. 3, at the federal courthouse in downtown Minneapolis.
Muna Fidhin, 45 of Burnsville, is Feeding Our Future defendant No. 75 (out of 81) and operated the M5 Cafe and related M5 Care nonprofit. She operated ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * Fraud trials begin and end in federal court this week Written by Bill Glahn | October 8, 2026 Yesterday afternoon, your correspondent took in a couple of hours of Feeding Our Future jury trial No. 3, at the federal courthouse in downtown Minneapolis. Muna Fidhin, 45 of Burnsville, is Feeding Our Future defendant No. 75 (out of 81) and operated the M5 Cafe and related M5 Care nonprofit. She operatedfree-food distribution sites through both the Feeding Our Future (FOF) and Partners in Nutrition (PIN) nonprofit networks. Prosecutors say she received $656,000 from the free-food program.
In the trial session I attended yesterday, the 14 jurors and alternates heard testimony from state Dept. of Education official Emily Horner. She testified on the basics of the federal child nutrition programs and gave an overview of the FOF and PIN operations. For Horner and presiding judge Nancy Brasel, this is their third time through this material, following the courtroom trials of 2024 and 2025.
Later, Horner and the prosecutor dug into the specifics of the application submitted by Fidhin for M5's participation in the free-food program. The trial began on Monday and is expected to run for two additional weeks.
Meanwhile, over in downtown St. Paul at the federal courthouse, another, unrelated fraud trial was wrapping up. Lou Raguse of KARE-11 reports,
- St. Paul woman convicted in first Housing Stabilization Services fraud case to go to trial:
- She was found guilty on three counts of health care fraud, but not guilty on two other counts in federal court.
From KARE-11,
- Sharmaine Meadows, owner of Cradle of Love, was accused of swindling Medicaid out of nearly $3.7 million between August 2020 and October 2025.
The Dept. of Justice put out a press release, which includes some of the evidence introduced..
Sentencing for Meadows will be held at a later date.
* * *
Bill Glahn is a Policy Fellow with Center of the American Experiment.
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/fraud-trials-begin-and-end-in-federal-court-this-week/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Fraud trials begin and end in federal court this week
Written by Bill Glahn | October 8, 2026
Yesterday afternoon, your correspondent took in a couple of hours of Feeding Our Future jury trial No. 3, at the federal courthouse in downtown Minneapolis.
Muna Fidhin, 45 of Burnsville, is Feeding Our Future defendant No. 75 (out of 81) and operated the M5 Cafe and related M5 Care nonprofit. She operated ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * Fraud trials begin and end in federal court this week Written by Bill Glahn | October 8, 2026 Yesterday afternoon, your correspondent took in a couple of hours of Feeding Our Future jury trial No. 3, at the federal courthouse in downtown Minneapolis. Muna Fidhin, 45 of Burnsville, is Feeding Our Future defendant No. 75 (out of 81) and operated the M5 Cafe and related M5 Care nonprofit. She operatedfree-food distribution sites through both the Feeding Our Future (FOF) and Partners in Nutrition (PIN) nonprofit networks. Prosecutors say she received $656,000 from the free-food program.
In the trial session I attended yesterday, the 14 jurors and alternates heard testimony from state Dept. of Education official Emily Horner. She testified on the basics of the federal child nutrition programs and gave an overview of the FOF and PIN operations. For Horner and presiding judge Nancy Brasel, this is their third time through this material, following the courtroom trials of 2024 and 2025.
Later, Horner and the prosecutor dug into the specifics of the application submitted by Fidhin for M5's participation in the free-food program. The trial began on Monday and is expected to run for two additional weeks.
Meanwhile, over in downtown St. Paul at the federal courthouse, another, unrelated fraud trial was wrapping up. Lou Raguse of KARE-11 reports,
- St. Paul woman convicted in first Housing Stabilization Services fraud case to go to trial:
- She was found guilty on three counts of health care fraud, but not guilty on two other counts in federal court.
From KARE-11,
- Sharmaine Meadows, owner of Cradle of Love, was accused of swindling Medicaid out of nearly $3.7 million between August 2020 and October 2025.
The Dept. of Justice put out a press release, which includes some of the evidence introduced..
Sentencing for Meadows will be held at a later date.
* * *
Bill Glahn is a Policy Fellow with Center of the American Experiment.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/fraud-trials-begin-and-end-in-federal-court-this-week/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: 16 Minnesota School Districts Face Legal Challenge Over Sexual Identity Policies
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
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16 Minnesota school districts face legal challenge over sexual identity policies
Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026
The Upper Midwest Law Center (UMLC), a local public interest law firm, recently sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights requesting an investigation -- and enforcement action, if necessary -- into 16 Minnesota school districts over alleged Title ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * 16 Minnesota school districts face legal challenge over sexual identity policies Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026 The Upper Midwest Law Center (UMLC), a local public interest law firm, recently sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights requesting an investigation -- and enforcement action, if necessary -- into 16 Minnesota school districts over alleged TitleIX violations.
The September letter argues that the districts' sexual identity policies violate Title IX, the U.S. Constitution, and federal executive orders.
According to UMLC, the firm also sent letters to the 16 districts and the Minnesota State High School League (MSHSL), alleging that they were likely violating the same provisions.
- The letters target policies that UMLC says allow boys to participate in girls' sports, use girls' restrooms and locker rooms, and share overnight accommodations with girls based on their stated sexual identity preference. UMLC also argues that several districts allow or require schools to socially transition students through name and pronoun changes without parental notice or consent.
The 16 school districts named by UMLC, and links to the policies challenged by the law firm, are provided below.
* Anoka-Hennepin School District
* Bloomington Public Schools
* Burnsville-Eagan-Savage School District
* Duluth Public Schools
* Hopkins Public Schools
* Minneapolis Public Schools
* Moorhead Area Public Schools
* North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale School District
* Osseo Area Schools
* Richfield Public Schools
* Robbinsdale Public Schools
* Rochester Public Schools
* Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public Schools
* St. Louis Park Public Schools
* St. Paul Public Schools
* White Bear Lake Area School District
State and federal conflict
In February 2025, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sent a letter to the MSHSL stating that adherence to federal executive orders on the issue would "violate" the Minnesota Human Rights Act. His position implied that the league should continue allowing biological males to participate in girls' sports. UMLC argues Ellison's position "is contrary to federal law, has created confusion for school districts, and makes federal enforcement action more urgent."
Ellison also sued the Trump administration in spring 2025 over its interpretation of Title IX. A federal judge rejected most of the claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Tenth Amendment.
In spring 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Education and MSHSL, alleging that the two organizations "have engaged in sex-based discrimination by requiring girls to compete against boys in athletic competitions that are designated exclusively for girls and allowing boys to invade intimate spaces designated exclusively for girls, such as multi-person locker rooms and bathrooms."
According to the DOJ, the policies undermine the very protections Title IX was enacted to guarantee. The lawsuit is still pending.
Efforts to change MSHSL sports policy
The timing of UMLC's letters coincides with a grassroots effort called Make It Fair MN, which is focused primarily on sports participation. The group is informing Minnesota schools that they can change sports policy "without waiting for another legislative session, another election, or years of additional litigation."
The MSHSL has allowed transgender students to participate on sports teams consistent with their gender identity since 2014, when its board adopted the policy. Make It Fair MN contends that the policy was adopted by the MSHSL board rather than through a vote of the League's member schools. Under MSHSL's constitution, each of the 509 member schools can propose and vote on bylaw amendments through their two appointed representatives.
Make It Fair MN has circulated a proposed amendment that would define eligibility for sex-separated sports based on biological sex at birth. The change, according to Make It Fair MN, could also address issues raised in the DOJ lawsuit.
The amendment's success depends on action by MSHSL member schools and their representatives. Make It Fair MN says changing the policy would restore "equal protection and fair competition" in Minnesota school sports.
UMLC is also looking for potential plaintiffs affected by the policies. Anyone with information about the policies or who believes they may be affected can contact UMLC at legal@umlc.org.
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Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment. catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/16-minnesota-school-districts-face-legal-challenge-over-sexual-identity-policies/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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16 Minnesota school districts face legal challenge over sexual identity policies
Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026
The Upper Midwest Law Center (UMLC), a local public interest law firm, recently sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights requesting an investigation -- and enforcement action, if necessary -- into 16 Minnesota school districts over alleged Title ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * 16 Minnesota school districts face legal challenge over sexual identity policies Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026 The Upper Midwest Law Center (UMLC), a local public interest law firm, recently sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights requesting an investigation -- and enforcement action, if necessary -- into 16 Minnesota school districts over alleged TitleIX violations.
The September letter argues that the districts' sexual identity policies violate Title IX, the U.S. Constitution, and federal executive orders.
According to UMLC, the firm also sent letters to the 16 districts and the Minnesota State High School League (MSHSL), alleging that they were likely violating the same provisions.
- The letters target policies that UMLC says allow boys to participate in girls' sports, use girls' restrooms and locker rooms, and share overnight accommodations with girls based on their stated sexual identity preference. UMLC also argues that several districts allow or require schools to socially transition students through name and pronoun changes without parental notice or consent.
The 16 school districts named by UMLC, and links to the policies challenged by the law firm, are provided below.
* Anoka-Hennepin School District
* Bloomington Public Schools
* Burnsville-Eagan-Savage School District
* Duluth Public Schools
* Hopkins Public Schools
* Minneapolis Public Schools
* Moorhead Area Public Schools
* North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale School District
* Osseo Area Schools
* Richfield Public Schools
* Robbinsdale Public Schools
* Rochester Public Schools
* Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public Schools
* St. Louis Park Public Schools
* St. Paul Public Schools
* White Bear Lake Area School District
State and federal conflict
In February 2025, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sent a letter to the MSHSL stating that adherence to federal executive orders on the issue would "violate" the Minnesota Human Rights Act. His position implied that the league should continue allowing biological males to participate in girls' sports. UMLC argues Ellison's position "is contrary to federal law, has created confusion for school districts, and makes federal enforcement action more urgent."
Ellison also sued the Trump administration in spring 2025 over its interpretation of Title IX. A federal judge rejected most of the claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Tenth Amendment.
In spring 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Education and MSHSL, alleging that the two organizations "have engaged in sex-based discrimination by requiring girls to compete against boys in athletic competitions that are designated exclusively for girls and allowing boys to invade intimate spaces designated exclusively for girls, such as multi-person locker rooms and bathrooms."
According to the DOJ, the policies undermine the very protections Title IX was enacted to guarantee. The lawsuit is still pending.
Efforts to change MSHSL sports policy
The timing of UMLC's letters coincides with a grassroots effort called Make It Fair MN, which is focused primarily on sports participation. The group is informing Minnesota schools that they can change sports policy "without waiting for another legislative session, another election, or years of additional litigation."
The MSHSL has allowed transgender students to participate on sports teams consistent with their gender identity since 2014, when its board adopted the policy. Make It Fair MN contends that the policy was adopted by the MSHSL board rather than through a vote of the League's member schools. Under MSHSL's constitution, each of the 509 member schools can propose and vote on bylaw amendments through their two appointed representatives.
Make It Fair MN has circulated a proposed amendment that would define eligibility for sex-separated sports based on biological sex at birth. The change, according to Make It Fair MN, could also address issues raised in the DOJ lawsuit.
The amendment's success depends on action by MSHSL member schools and their representatives. Make It Fair MN says changing the policy would restore "equal protection and fair competition" in Minnesota school sports.
UMLC is also looking for potential plaintiffs affected by the policies. Anyone with information about the policies or who believes they may be affected can contact UMLC at legal@umlc.org.
* * *
Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment. catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/16-minnesota-school-districts-face-legal-challenge-over-sexual-identity-policies/
[Category: ThinkTank]