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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Rise and Growing Threat of Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by Rahim Nasar, a PhD American Studies researcher at the Area Study Centre at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor:
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Rise and Growing Threat of Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan
Executive Summary
* Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) is emerging as a serious militant threat, with the potential to rival Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The alliance has integrated fragmented jihadist factions, incorporated drone technology, developed a more sophisticated ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by Rahim Nasar, a PhD American Studies researcher at the Area Study Centre at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Rise and Growing Threat of Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan Executive Summary * Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) is emerging as a serious militant threat, with the potential to rival Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The alliance has integrated fragmented jihadist factions, incorporated drone technology, developed a more sophisticatedmedia narrative, and carried out coordinated attacks targeting state security forces.
* Beyond kinetic operations, IMP is adapting its propaganda by combining jihadist, anti-Western, and nationalist themes. This hybrid ideological narrative frames violence in moral and political terms, seeks to enhance recruitment, and aims to cultivate local support, including among economically stable segments of the population.
* IMP's emerging operational capabilities, cross-border linkages, growing rivalry with TTP, and reported coordination with Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Baloch insurgent groups point to a dangerous shift in Pakistan's militant landscape.
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Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP)--an alliance comprising the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG), Harakat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (HIIP), and Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI)--has significantly altered Pakistan's militant landscape, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Since its formation on April 11, 2025, IMP has evolved into an umbrella alliance, rather than functioning as a distinct organization. It includes fragmented militant factions that coordinate operations, share intelligence, run organized digital campaigns, publish propaganda, and use drones alongside kinetic attacks against state security forces (X/@Sameer1249134, June 28).
HGBG is the most experienced and dominant faction among the groups under IMP's umbrella. The group is directly associated with Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who is regarded as more dangerous than Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, or "Pakistani Taliban") chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud. Bahadur is known to be particularly capable of conducting high-profile operations, coordinating with allied groups for intelligence sharing, and sustaining influence. One prominent Pakistani security analyst argued that Bahadur is Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud's "master" in militant tactics and is far more dangerous (X/@AbdullahKhan333, June 30). The formation of IMP has further expanded Bahadur's influence, operational reach, and organizational infrastructure in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and adjacent borderlands.
Ideology and Operations
IMP's rhetoric deliberately combines anti-Western sentiment, nationalist framing, and jihadist ideology to create a more nuanced and effective narrative for organizational and operational purposes. Media accounts affiliated with the group's factions, particularly Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan, have actively published materials and updated audiences on IMP's activities. Posts frequently include footage of attacks, fighter training, preparatory sessions, and audio and video speeches by key figures on Islamist, jihadist, and insurgent themes (X/@IIP_media1, June 13). Despite its broader anti-Western rhetoric, IMP appears to avoid recruiting foreign jihadist elements or openly aligning with transnational militant groups. This approach may reflect an understanding with the Afghan Taliban, which remains sensitive to cross-border outreach by other militant groups.
IMP has also displayed increasingly sophisticated operational capabilities, combining integrated attacks with the dissemination of insurgent propaganda. In the first half of 2026, the group has adopted a more organized and calculated strategy to target security forces. This involved improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, rocket fire, sniper shootings, assaults on checkpoints, ambushes of security convoys, and quadcopter drone attacks (X/@PakistanPulse_N; X/@SalahddinA10994, June 28).
The group often incorporates drone-enabled attacks into its kinetic operations to gain tactical advantages against poorly equipped security forces. These drones are modified to carry and drop small explosive payloads and grenades on checkpoints and security vehicles, enabling more precise attacks. This adaptation reflects a broader regional trend in militant warfare (X/@PakistanPulse_N, June 17).
The screenshot shows an IMP claim of a quadcopter drone attack on a security checkpoint in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, in which one security personnel was reportedly killed, and the checkpoint was partially damaged.
In July 2025, IMP claimed more than 90 militant attacks against security forces across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Reports also suggest that June 2025 alone witnessed a sharp rise in militant attacks and counterterrorism operations by security forces. HGBG was the leading militant faction carrying out fatal attacks against security personnel. HGBG currently operates four suicide camps, with allied IMP factions also providing manpower to intensify attacks and expand militant influence (Khorasan Diary, January 8). Operations in 2026 have so far signaled a continuation in these trends. Most attacks carried out and claimed by IMP involve suicide bombers, coordinated armed fighters, drone use, and engagement tactics, including the following:
* On June 28, HGBG carried out a suicide attack in Mir Ali that killed 13 security personnel and wounded 29 others (Dawn News, June 28).
* On May 10, IMP released an infographic report on its 10 days of operations from April 28 to May 8, claiming that 48 security personnel were killed and 34 injured. IMP also claimed to have destroyed three security posts, three military vehicles, and one solar system in these attacks (X/@PakistanPulse_N, May 10).
* On May 19, IMP released another infographic report on its 10 days of operational activity from May 9 to May 18, claiming that 60 security personnel were killed and 25 injured (X/@PakistanPulse_N, May 19). This report also referred to an attack on a police station in Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in which more than 15 policemen were killed (Express Tribune, May 10).
Narratives and Digital Warfare
IMP is not focused solely on the kinetic front. It is also active on the digital front, where it seeks to target opponents, disseminate propaganda, strengthen its narrative, and achieve psychological superiority through a sophisticated media apparatus. Many social media accounts affiliated with IMP and its sub-factions--including Lashkar-e-Islam, Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan, and HGBG--actively post, share, and amplify examples of the group's ideology, attacks, speeches, and publications.
In May, Inqilab-e-Islami media, affiliated with Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan, shared a manifesto-style pamphlet aimed at reaching a broader audience. IMP's core ideology and narrative strongly condemn the West and depict Pakistan's army as an enemy. The pamphlet blends militant and jihadist discourse with anti-imperialism, nationalism, and populism, portraying Pakistan as a slave of the West and presenting a three-part ideological strategy to overcome the existing crisis: invitation, training, and armed jihad (X/@IIP_Media1, May 21). The document frames the group's militant activities in moral terms and seeks to justify violence.
The pamphlet also portrays the movement as a morally disciplined force, friendly to local populations, and a true ideological descendant of Indian Islamic revivalist and jihadist figures. These figures include Syed Ahmad Shaheed, an anti-colonial activist and prominent Deobandi; Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind leader Maulana Mahmud Hasan Deobandi (alias Sheikh-ul-Hind); and the Afghan Taliban's first supreme leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar. The pamphlet further presents the group's goal as the establishment of an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. Such a narrative combines homeland nationalism in Pakistan with themes of sacrifice, martyrdom, and Islamic sharia, drawing heavily from the Afghan Taliban's narrative of jihad and Islamism.
Friction within TTP
Pakistan's militant landscape is also being reshaped by emerging tensions among fragmented TTP factions. IMP's role and significance have grown as fissures within TTP became more visible. On May 20, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar's Umati group clashed with Kazim--TTP's local commander in Kurram--resulting in the deaths of around 18 Jamaat-ul-Ahrar militants, including Commander Mumtaz. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar's leadership had already blamed Mufti Noor Wali for involvement in the August 2022 assassination of Jamaat-ul-Ahrar leader Abdul Wali, also known as Omar Khalid Khorasani, in Barmal district, Paktika (BBC Urdu Service, May 22, 2022).
The latest episode in Kurram further damaged relations between TTP and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar. The latter instructed its fighters not to trust TTP and has moved closer to IMP. There is now a possibility that Jamaat-ul-Ahrar could join the IMP alliance. If this occurs, TTP could lose significant influence in Pakistan, while existing friction among militant groups could increase localized violence over influence, recruitment, resources, and dominance.
Conclusion
The emergence of IMP reveals a more lethal transformation in Pakistan's militant landscape. Militancy has become increasingly decentralized, and actors adapt drone technology and digital media in more sophisticated ways. IMP has moved beyond conventional insurgent patterns and is developing into a hybrid militant network capable of challenging state authority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's conflict-affected areas. In this context, IMP is gaining importance as a trusted alliance for fragmented and disgruntled TTP factions, enabling the group to expand its militant network, influence, and control in volatile areas of the province and beyond.
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Rahim Nasar is a PhD American Studies researcher at the Area Study Centre, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Rahim focuses on regional political, security, & strategic affairs. He also appears on National and International media as a security & political analyst.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/rise-and-growing-threat-of-ittehad-ul-mujahideen-pakistan/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Rise and Growing Threat of Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan
Executive Summary
* Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) is emerging as a serious militant threat, with the potential to rival Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The alliance has integrated fragmented jihadist factions, incorporated drone technology, developed a more sophisticated ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by Rahim Nasar, a PhD American Studies researcher at the Area Study Centre at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Rise and Growing Threat of Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan Executive Summary * Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) is emerging as a serious militant threat, with the potential to rival Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The alliance has integrated fragmented jihadist factions, incorporated drone technology, developed a more sophisticatedmedia narrative, and carried out coordinated attacks targeting state security forces.
* Beyond kinetic operations, IMP is adapting its propaganda by combining jihadist, anti-Western, and nationalist themes. This hybrid ideological narrative frames violence in moral and political terms, seeks to enhance recruitment, and aims to cultivate local support, including among economically stable segments of the population.
* IMP's emerging operational capabilities, cross-border linkages, growing rivalry with TTP, and reported coordination with Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Baloch insurgent groups point to a dangerous shift in Pakistan's militant landscape.
-
Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP)--an alliance comprising the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG), Harakat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (HIIP), and Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI)--has significantly altered Pakistan's militant landscape, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Since its formation on April 11, 2025, IMP has evolved into an umbrella alliance, rather than functioning as a distinct organization. It includes fragmented militant factions that coordinate operations, share intelligence, run organized digital campaigns, publish propaganda, and use drones alongside kinetic attacks against state security forces (X/@Sameer1249134, June 28).
HGBG is the most experienced and dominant faction among the groups under IMP's umbrella. The group is directly associated with Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who is regarded as more dangerous than Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, or "Pakistani Taliban") chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud. Bahadur is known to be particularly capable of conducting high-profile operations, coordinating with allied groups for intelligence sharing, and sustaining influence. One prominent Pakistani security analyst argued that Bahadur is Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud's "master" in militant tactics and is far more dangerous (X/@AbdullahKhan333, June 30). The formation of IMP has further expanded Bahadur's influence, operational reach, and organizational infrastructure in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and adjacent borderlands.
Ideology and Operations
IMP's rhetoric deliberately combines anti-Western sentiment, nationalist framing, and jihadist ideology to create a more nuanced and effective narrative for organizational and operational purposes. Media accounts affiliated with the group's factions, particularly Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan, have actively published materials and updated audiences on IMP's activities. Posts frequently include footage of attacks, fighter training, preparatory sessions, and audio and video speeches by key figures on Islamist, jihadist, and insurgent themes (X/@IIP_media1, June 13). Despite its broader anti-Western rhetoric, IMP appears to avoid recruiting foreign jihadist elements or openly aligning with transnational militant groups. This approach may reflect an understanding with the Afghan Taliban, which remains sensitive to cross-border outreach by other militant groups.
IMP has also displayed increasingly sophisticated operational capabilities, combining integrated attacks with the dissemination of insurgent propaganda. In the first half of 2026, the group has adopted a more organized and calculated strategy to target security forces. This involved improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, rocket fire, sniper shootings, assaults on checkpoints, ambushes of security convoys, and quadcopter drone attacks (X/@PakistanPulse_N; X/@SalahddinA10994, June 28).
The group often incorporates drone-enabled attacks into its kinetic operations to gain tactical advantages against poorly equipped security forces. These drones are modified to carry and drop small explosive payloads and grenades on checkpoints and security vehicles, enabling more precise attacks. This adaptation reflects a broader regional trend in militant warfare (X/@PakistanPulse_N, June 17).
The screenshot shows an IMP claim of a quadcopter drone attack on a security checkpoint in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, in which one security personnel was reportedly killed, and the checkpoint was partially damaged.
In July 2025, IMP claimed more than 90 militant attacks against security forces across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Reports also suggest that June 2025 alone witnessed a sharp rise in militant attacks and counterterrorism operations by security forces. HGBG was the leading militant faction carrying out fatal attacks against security personnel. HGBG currently operates four suicide camps, with allied IMP factions also providing manpower to intensify attacks and expand militant influence (Khorasan Diary, January 8). Operations in 2026 have so far signaled a continuation in these trends. Most attacks carried out and claimed by IMP involve suicide bombers, coordinated armed fighters, drone use, and engagement tactics, including the following:
* On June 28, HGBG carried out a suicide attack in Mir Ali that killed 13 security personnel and wounded 29 others (Dawn News, June 28).
* On May 10, IMP released an infographic report on its 10 days of operations from April 28 to May 8, claiming that 48 security personnel were killed and 34 injured. IMP also claimed to have destroyed three security posts, three military vehicles, and one solar system in these attacks (X/@PakistanPulse_N, May 10).
* On May 19, IMP released another infographic report on its 10 days of operational activity from May 9 to May 18, claiming that 60 security personnel were killed and 25 injured (X/@PakistanPulse_N, May 19). This report also referred to an attack on a police station in Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in which more than 15 policemen were killed (Express Tribune, May 10).
Narratives and Digital Warfare
IMP is not focused solely on the kinetic front. It is also active on the digital front, where it seeks to target opponents, disseminate propaganda, strengthen its narrative, and achieve psychological superiority through a sophisticated media apparatus. Many social media accounts affiliated with IMP and its sub-factions--including Lashkar-e-Islam, Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan, and HGBG--actively post, share, and amplify examples of the group's ideology, attacks, speeches, and publications.
In May, Inqilab-e-Islami media, affiliated with Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan, shared a manifesto-style pamphlet aimed at reaching a broader audience. IMP's core ideology and narrative strongly condemn the West and depict Pakistan's army as an enemy. The pamphlet blends militant and jihadist discourse with anti-imperialism, nationalism, and populism, portraying Pakistan as a slave of the West and presenting a three-part ideological strategy to overcome the existing crisis: invitation, training, and armed jihad (X/@IIP_Media1, May 21). The document frames the group's militant activities in moral terms and seeks to justify violence.
The pamphlet also portrays the movement as a morally disciplined force, friendly to local populations, and a true ideological descendant of Indian Islamic revivalist and jihadist figures. These figures include Syed Ahmad Shaheed, an anti-colonial activist and prominent Deobandi; Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind leader Maulana Mahmud Hasan Deobandi (alias Sheikh-ul-Hind); and the Afghan Taliban's first supreme leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar. The pamphlet further presents the group's goal as the establishment of an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. Such a narrative combines homeland nationalism in Pakistan with themes of sacrifice, martyrdom, and Islamic sharia, drawing heavily from the Afghan Taliban's narrative of jihad and Islamism.
Friction within TTP
Pakistan's militant landscape is also being reshaped by emerging tensions among fragmented TTP factions. IMP's role and significance have grown as fissures within TTP became more visible. On May 20, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar's Umati group clashed with Kazim--TTP's local commander in Kurram--resulting in the deaths of around 18 Jamaat-ul-Ahrar militants, including Commander Mumtaz. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar's leadership had already blamed Mufti Noor Wali for involvement in the August 2022 assassination of Jamaat-ul-Ahrar leader Abdul Wali, also known as Omar Khalid Khorasani, in Barmal district, Paktika (BBC Urdu Service, May 22, 2022).
The latest episode in Kurram further damaged relations between TTP and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar. The latter instructed its fighters not to trust TTP and has moved closer to IMP. There is now a possibility that Jamaat-ul-Ahrar could join the IMP alliance. If this occurs, TTP could lose significant influence in Pakistan, while existing friction among militant groups could increase localized violence over influence, recruitment, resources, and dominance.
Conclusion
The emergence of IMP reveals a more lethal transformation in Pakistan's militant landscape. Militancy has become increasingly decentralized, and actors adapt drone technology and digital media in more sophisticated ways. IMP has moved beyond conventional insurgent patterns and is developing into a hybrid militant network capable of challenging state authority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's conflict-affected areas. In this context, IMP is gaining importance as a trusted alliance for fragmented and disgruntled TTP factions, enabling the group to expand its militant network, influence, and control in volatile areas of the province and beyond.
* * *
Rahim Nasar is a PhD American Studies researcher at the Area Study Centre, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Rahim focuses on regional political, security, & strategic affairs. He also appears on National and International media as a security & political analyst.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/rise-and-growing-threat-of-ittehad-ul-mujahideen-pakistan/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Politics on Display at Overseas Chinese Affairs Conferences
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by China Brief Editor Arran Hope:
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Politics on Display at Overseas Chinese Affairs Conferences
Executive Summary:
* Two important conferences on overseas Chinese affairs work in July signaled that the Party's united front work is set to ramp up in the coming years, as Beijing aims to deepen political control over the 60 million citizens who live outside the People's Republic of China (PRC).
* On July 13, politburo standing committee member Wang Huning told the 400 assembled delegates from 140 ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by China Brief Editor Arran Hope: * * * Politics on Display at Overseas Chinese Affairs Conferences Executive Summary: * Two important conferences on overseas Chinese affairs work in July signaled that the Party's united front work is set to ramp up in the coming years, as Beijing aims to deepen political control over the 60 million citizens who live outside the People's Republic of China (PRC). * On July 13, politburo standing committee member Wang Huning told the 400 assembled delegates from 140countries and regions at 11th World Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations that they must promote national unification. Many of the delegates interviewed affirmed their plans to work to support this key Party priority upon returning to their respective countries of residence.
* At the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs Work--the first since 2017--United Front Work Department head Li Ganjie delivered Chinese leader Xi Jinping's instructions on this "long-term and strategic task of the Party and the State." These focused in particular on leveraging the talents and the commercial networks of overseas Chinese to support the domestic economic progress.
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July 2026 was an important month for the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) overseas united front work. On July 13, the 11th World Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations began in Beijing, with over 400 invitees--all leaders of overseas Chinese associations--streaming in from 140 countries and regions. The conferences were attended by both Wang Huning, who heads the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and sits on the politburo standing committee, and Li Ganjie, a member of the politburo who runs the Party's United Front Work Department (Xinhua, July 13). Two weeks later, on July 27-8, Beijing hosted another event, the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs Work. Wang and Li were both in attendance again, and both delivered remarks (Xinhua, July 28).
The confluence of these two events was "no coincidence", as commentators in the People's Republic of China (PRC) observed, yet neither has received much coverage in non-Chinese media (Shaanxi Institute of Socialism, July 30). The latter event was particularly notable. It was the first such conference held since 2017, and so the first since the 2018 organizational reforms under which the Party's united front work departments at all levels subsumed their corresponding overseas Chinese affairs offices (China Brief, April 28, 2018, October 7, 2024; People's Daily, February 18, 2017, July 27). As such, it provided a rare platform for the Party to shape overseas united front work for the years ahead, incorporating feedback canvassed from the visiting overseas Chinese leaders earlier in the month.
At these conferences, the Party leadership delivered Xi's "important instructions" on "what overseas Chinese affairs work should do and how it should be done in the new era", according to Yan Miao, Director of the United Front Work Department's Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau (People's Daily Overseas Edition, July 29). In practice, these instructions will lead to an expansion of united front work--including political work--beyond the PRC's borders, further efforts to standardize and deepen coordination between overseas organizations, and more work to make it easier for overseas Chinese to increase their commercial engagement with the PRC.
Political Work for Political Goals
The principal concern for foreign governments when it comes to overseas Chinese affairs work is that it is inherently political. While it is undoubtedly the case that a great deal of the activities of overseas Chinese organizations is legitimate and has real and positive effects in terms of providing community, resources, and services to PRC nationals living overseas, this is not the principal reason for this work.
The clearest clue to the political purpose of overseas Chinese affairs work is the involvement of the highest levels of the Party in managing it. As state media points out, Xi Jinping views overseas Chinese affairs as a "matter of great national importance" (Xinhua, July 28). And as almost every article covering the two conferences makes sure to note, overseas Chinese affairs work is a "long-term and strategic task of the Party and the State" (People's Daily, July 27). The "Regulations on the United Front Work of the CCP" also make this clear, stipulating that the main task of overseas united front work is to "strengthen ideological and political guidance" (Xinhua, January 5, 2021).
Some Chinese scholars are even more explicit about the political nature of this work, and about its increasing importance today. In an article for China Youth Daily, which is published by the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China, Wu Xingchen, a professor at Tianjin Academy of Socialism, writes that overseas Chinese affairs work is "first and foremost political work; its political nature is its primary attribute". Wu goes on to argue that this work is even more necessary in the new era, where it "must more consciously serve the central tasks of the Party and the country". In his view, this is now starting to happen. He says that this work has "already transcended the traditional meaning of managing overseas Chinese affairs, becoming an important strategic fulcrum for the united front to unite people's hearts and gather strength in the new era" (China Youth Daily, August 3).
The political benefits for the Party that could come from exerting more influence on overseas Chinese are substantial. By its own count, there are more than 60 million overseas Chinese across nearly 200 countries and regions, as well as more than 40 million "returned overseas Chinese and relatives of overseas Chinese" in the PRC. For the Party, these 100 million people constitute assets to be deployed in service of national goals: they are a "valuable resource", according to Xi, who speaks approvingly of their value for increasing the country's wealth and power, often praising the "abundant economic power, rich intellectual resources, and extensive business networks" of the "vast number of overseas Chinese" (People's Daily, July 27).
In the Party's eyes, overseas Chinese affairs work is channeled toward achieving its principal goal: realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which Xi Jinping has long evinced is "the common dream of all Chinese people at home and abroad", and from which overseas Chinese "cannot and will not be absent". To this end, overseas Chinese affairs has been tied explicitly to a number of the Party's seven national development strategies, which are enshrined in the Party Charter (Party Members Net, October 22, 2022; China Brief, September 26, 2025). The People's Daily notes that local governments and relevant departments have closely integrated the promotion of overseas Chinese affairs with the Rejuvenation through Science and Education Development Strategy, the Talent Strong Country Development Strategy, and the Innovation-Driven Development Strategy (People's Daily, July 27, [1], [2]).
One of the most concerning aspects of national rejuvenation as a policy goal is that it includes what the Party calls "China's unification", or the "unification of the ancestral homeland" as a necessary condition for its achievement (People's Daily Overseas Edition, July 29). In practice, this means the annexation of Taiwan. The Party sees Taiwan--which the PRC has never controlled--as the "core of its core interests", and unification features prominently not just in its messaging to overseas Chinese groups, but also in the messaging of those groups themselves (Xinhua, May 7). For instance, a senior official in the China Zhigong Party recently noted that Xi had emphasized the need to "actively serve the great cause of national unification", and that his party would "fully leverage its extensive overseas connections, unite overseas Chinese, returned overseas Chinese, their families, and students studying abroad" in its pursuit (People's Daily Overseas Edition, July 29). Similarly, Zhang Changbao, president of the French Association for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China, who attended the conference in July, said that the it had "strengthened his determination and confidence in promoting China's unification" (China News Network, July 17).
Building a Stronger United Front
Much of the discourse surrounding the two conferences in July focused on practical ways in which overseas Chinese affairs work could be improved. An article in Quishi lays out some current weaknesses. Noting that the grassroots workforce is relatively insufficient, it calls for strengthening coordination, innovating new working methods, and building more diverse platforms and approaches for providing services to overseas Chinese. (Qiushi, July 29). Some suggestions from the first conference focused on improving the institutions and organizations that are part of the wider united front system. For instance, Zheng Jinbiao, an overseas Chinese leader based in France, said that he planned to promote the "standardized development" of overseas Chinese associations (Europe Times, July 15). Others focused instead on attracting more talent and youth. One article says that this is a "key focus" for major overseas Chinese organizations (WeChat/Fujian Overseas Chinese Daily, July 16).
Many of the policy directives that have come out of the conferences seek to encourage overseas Chinese to do more business with the PRC. This would lead to direct economic benefits for the PRC, but it would also help to "better unite the hearts and efforts of overseas Chinese". In other words, it would create additional points of leverage for the Party (People's Daily, July 27). To this end, a lot of coverage focuses on the Foreign Investment Law and related regulations, improving support for overseas Chinese-funded enterprises, developing the Shantou Overseas Chinese Economic and Cultural Cooperation Pilot Zone in Guangdong, building industrial clusters and innovation bases catering to the overseas Chinese business community, encouraging overseas Chinese to participate in the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, and other similar proposals.
Beijing hopes that by extending these preferential policies, it can then "leverage geographical and kinship advantages" to pursue its strategic goals domestically, and externally that it can "guide" overseas Chinese to "convey China's voice well" by toeing the Party's propaganda line (CPPCC, November 10, 2025; People's Daily, July 27).
Conclusion
The 11th World Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations and the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs were landmark events in the development of the Party's overseas united front work. All indicators from these events of the last few weeks point toward an aggressive expansion of this work in the months and years ahead. The readouts of the conferences and related commentaries are unambiguous in portraying overseas Chinese affairs work as political work on behalf of the Party and in support of its broader strategic ambitions.
That neither of these events have received attention outside of the PRC suggests that much of the Party's overseas influence work continues to operate without an appropriate level of scrutiny. The Party believes that all overseas Chinese are unofficial ambassadors for the PRC, are "committed to high-level scientific and technological self-reliance and innovation", and must present a "trustworthy, lovable, and respectable image of China. The Party does not speak for all of those individuals, and Xi Jinping's "China Dream" is not shared as widely as he might wish. For now, however, he appears to feel as though the Party's efforts are paying off.
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Arran Hope is the editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation, where he also has responsibility for additional China-related publications and programming. His writings analyzing political developments in the People's Republic of China have informed U.S. government reports and appear on university course syllabi. He has also appeared on panels at the Hudson Institute and has testified in front of U.S. state senators.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/politics-on-display-at-overseas-chinese-affairs-conferences/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Politics on Display at Overseas Chinese Affairs Conferences
Executive Summary:
* Two important conferences on overseas Chinese affairs work in July signaled that the Party's united front work is set to ramp up in the coming years, as Beijing aims to deepen political control over the 60 million citizens who live outside the People's Republic of China (PRC).
* On July 13, politburo standing committee member Wang Huning told the 400 assembled delegates from 140 ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by China Brief Editor Arran Hope: * * * Politics on Display at Overseas Chinese Affairs Conferences Executive Summary: * Two important conferences on overseas Chinese affairs work in July signaled that the Party's united front work is set to ramp up in the coming years, as Beijing aims to deepen political control over the 60 million citizens who live outside the People's Republic of China (PRC). * On July 13, politburo standing committee member Wang Huning told the 400 assembled delegates from 140countries and regions at 11th World Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations that they must promote national unification. Many of the delegates interviewed affirmed their plans to work to support this key Party priority upon returning to their respective countries of residence.
* At the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs Work--the first since 2017--United Front Work Department head Li Ganjie delivered Chinese leader Xi Jinping's instructions on this "long-term and strategic task of the Party and the State." These focused in particular on leveraging the talents and the commercial networks of overseas Chinese to support the domestic economic progress.
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July 2026 was an important month for the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) overseas united front work. On July 13, the 11th World Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations began in Beijing, with over 400 invitees--all leaders of overseas Chinese associations--streaming in from 140 countries and regions. The conferences were attended by both Wang Huning, who heads the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and sits on the politburo standing committee, and Li Ganjie, a member of the politburo who runs the Party's United Front Work Department (Xinhua, July 13). Two weeks later, on July 27-8, Beijing hosted another event, the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs Work. Wang and Li were both in attendance again, and both delivered remarks (Xinhua, July 28).
The confluence of these two events was "no coincidence", as commentators in the People's Republic of China (PRC) observed, yet neither has received much coverage in non-Chinese media (Shaanxi Institute of Socialism, July 30). The latter event was particularly notable. It was the first such conference held since 2017, and so the first since the 2018 organizational reforms under which the Party's united front work departments at all levels subsumed their corresponding overseas Chinese affairs offices (China Brief, April 28, 2018, October 7, 2024; People's Daily, February 18, 2017, July 27). As such, it provided a rare platform for the Party to shape overseas united front work for the years ahead, incorporating feedback canvassed from the visiting overseas Chinese leaders earlier in the month.
At these conferences, the Party leadership delivered Xi's "important instructions" on "what overseas Chinese affairs work should do and how it should be done in the new era", according to Yan Miao, Director of the United Front Work Department's Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau (People's Daily Overseas Edition, July 29). In practice, these instructions will lead to an expansion of united front work--including political work--beyond the PRC's borders, further efforts to standardize and deepen coordination between overseas organizations, and more work to make it easier for overseas Chinese to increase their commercial engagement with the PRC.
Political Work for Political Goals
The principal concern for foreign governments when it comes to overseas Chinese affairs work is that it is inherently political. While it is undoubtedly the case that a great deal of the activities of overseas Chinese organizations is legitimate and has real and positive effects in terms of providing community, resources, and services to PRC nationals living overseas, this is not the principal reason for this work.
The clearest clue to the political purpose of overseas Chinese affairs work is the involvement of the highest levels of the Party in managing it. As state media points out, Xi Jinping views overseas Chinese affairs as a "matter of great national importance" (Xinhua, July 28). And as almost every article covering the two conferences makes sure to note, overseas Chinese affairs work is a "long-term and strategic task of the Party and the State" (People's Daily, July 27). The "Regulations on the United Front Work of the CCP" also make this clear, stipulating that the main task of overseas united front work is to "strengthen ideological and political guidance" (Xinhua, January 5, 2021).
Some Chinese scholars are even more explicit about the political nature of this work, and about its increasing importance today. In an article for China Youth Daily, which is published by the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China, Wu Xingchen, a professor at Tianjin Academy of Socialism, writes that overseas Chinese affairs work is "first and foremost political work; its political nature is its primary attribute". Wu goes on to argue that this work is even more necessary in the new era, where it "must more consciously serve the central tasks of the Party and the country". In his view, this is now starting to happen. He says that this work has "already transcended the traditional meaning of managing overseas Chinese affairs, becoming an important strategic fulcrum for the united front to unite people's hearts and gather strength in the new era" (China Youth Daily, August 3).
The political benefits for the Party that could come from exerting more influence on overseas Chinese are substantial. By its own count, there are more than 60 million overseas Chinese across nearly 200 countries and regions, as well as more than 40 million "returned overseas Chinese and relatives of overseas Chinese" in the PRC. For the Party, these 100 million people constitute assets to be deployed in service of national goals: they are a "valuable resource", according to Xi, who speaks approvingly of their value for increasing the country's wealth and power, often praising the "abundant economic power, rich intellectual resources, and extensive business networks" of the "vast number of overseas Chinese" (People's Daily, July 27).
In the Party's eyes, overseas Chinese affairs work is channeled toward achieving its principal goal: realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which Xi Jinping has long evinced is "the common dream of all Chinese people at home and abroad", and from which overseas Chinese "cannot and will not be absent". To this end, overseas Chinese affairs has been tied explicitly to a number of the Party's seven national development strategies, which are enshrined in the Party Charter (Party Members Net, October 22, 2022; China Brief, September 26, 2025). The People's Daily notes that local governments and relevant departments have closely integrated the promotion of overseas Chinese affairs with the Rejuvenation through Science and Education Development Strategy, the Talent Strong Country Development Strategy, and the Innovation-Driven Development Strategy (People's Daily, July 27, [1], [2]).
One of the most concerning aspects of national rejuvenation as a policy goal is that it includes what the Party calls "China's unification", or the "unification of the ancestral homeland" as a necessary condition for its achievement (People's Daily Overseas Edition, July 29). In practice, this means the annexation of Taiwan. The Party sees Taiwan--which the PRC has never controlled--as the "core of its core interests", and unification features prominently not just in its messaging to overseas Chinese groups, but also in the messaging of those groups themselves (Xinhua, May 7). For instance, a senior official in the China Zhigong Party recently noted that Xi had emphasized the need to "actively serve the great cause of national unification", and that his party would "fully leverage its extensive overseas connections, unite overseas Chinese, returned overseas Chinese, their families, and students studying abroad" in its pursuit (People's Daily Overseas Edition, July 29). Similarly, Zhang Changbao, president of the French Association for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China, who attended the conference in July, said that the it had "strengthened his determination and confidence in promoting China's unification" (China News Network, July 17).
Building a Stronger United Front
Much of the discourse surrounding the two conferences in July focused on practical ways in which overseas Chinese affairs work could be improved. An article in Quishi lays out some current weaknesses. Noting that the grassroots workforce is relatively insufficient, it calls for strengthening coordination, innovating new working methods, and building more diverse platforms and approaches for providing services to overseas Chinese. (Qiushi, July 29). Some suggestions from the first conference focused on improving the institutions and organizations that are part of the wider united front system. For instance, Zheng Jinbiao, an overseas Chinese leader based in France, said that he planned to promote the "standardized development" of overseas Chinese associations (Europe Times, July 15). Others focused instead on attracting more talent and youth. One article says that this is a "key focus" for major overseas Chinese organizations (WeChat/Fujian Overseas Chinese Daily, July 16).
Many of the policy directives that have come out of the conferences seek to encourage overseas Chinese to do more business with the PRC. This would lead to direct economic benefits for the PRC, but it would also help to "better unite the hearts and efforts of overseas Chinese". In other words, it would create additional points of leverage for the Party (People's Daily, July 27). To this end, a lot of coverage focuses on the Foreign Investment Law and related regulations, improving support for overseas Chinese-funded enterprises, developing the Shantou Overseas Chinese Economic and Cultural Cooperation Pilot Zone in Guangdong, building industrial clusters and innovation bases catering to the overseas Chinese business community, encouraging overseas Chinese to participate in the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, and other similar proposals.
Beijing hopes that by extending these preferential policies, it can then "leverage geographical and kinship advantages" to pursue its strategic goals domestically, and externally that it can "guide" overseas Chinese to "convey China's voice well" by toeing the Party's propaganda line (CPPCC, November 10, 2025; People's Daily, July 27).
Conclusion
The 11th World Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations and the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs were landmark events in the development of the Party's overseas united front work. All indicators from these events of the last few weeks point toward an aggressive expansion of this work in the months and years ahead. The readouts of the conferences and related commentaries are unambiguous in portraying overseas Chinese affairs work as political work on behalf of the Party and in support of its broader strategic ambitions.
That neither of these events have received attention outside of the PRC suggests that much of the Party's overseas influence work continues to operate without an appropriate level of scrutiny. The Party believes that all overseas Chinese are unofficial ambassadors for the PRC, are "committed to high-level scientific and technological self-reliance and innovation", and must present a "trustworthy, lovable, and respectable image of China. The Party does not speak for all of those individuals, and Xi Jinping's "China Dream" is not shared as widely as he might wish. For now, however, he appears to feel as though the Party's efforts are paying off.
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Arran Hope is the editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation, where he also has responsibility for additional China-related publications and programming. His writings analyzing political developments in the People's Republic of China have informed U.S. government reports and appear on university course syllabi. He has also appeared on panels at the Hudson Institute and has testified in front of U.S. state senators.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/politics-on-display-at-overseas-chinese-affairs-conferences/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: NRF's Potential to Launch an Anti-Taliban Counterinsurgency
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by analyst Andrea Serino in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor:
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NRF's Potential to Launch an Anti-Taliban Counterinsurgency
Executive Summary:
* Under Ahmad Masoud, the National Resistance Front (NRF) has expanded beyond its Tajik origins and now aims to unify anti-Taliban Afghans through international efforts such as the Vienna Process.
* The NRF seeks to exploit the Taliban's internal ideological fractures, costly conflicts with Pakistan, and international backlash over oppressive women's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by analyst Andrea Serino in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * NRF's Potential to Launch an Anti-Taliban Counterinsurgency Executive Summary: * Under Ahmad Masoud, the National Resistance Front (NRF) has expanded beyond its Tajik origins and now aims to unify anti-Taliban Afghans through international efforts such as the Vienna Process. * The NRF seeks to exploit the Taliban's internal ideological fractures, costly conflicts with Pakistan, and international backlash over oppressive women'spolicies.
* The NRF faces challenges from the Taliban's growing diplomatic normalization with neighboring states, while controversies over Masoud's legacy hinder a stabilizing political solution.
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The National Resistance Front (NRF) traces its origins to the Northern Alliance, which was led by the well-known Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Masoud. Masoud was one of the key figures in the campaign against the Taliban in the 1990s. The movement was originally mostly ethnically homogeneous, as its membership was largely composed of Tajik tribesmen (E-ir.info, July 8, 2022). During the offensive phase against the Taliban after October 2001, however, the movement expanded its membership to include non-Tajik members. The Northern Alliance responded to ethno-regional political dynamics but was largely shaped by Tajik-centric interests. Its main regional sponsor was also Tajikistan, although Dushanbe's posture was always more cautious than that of other Central Asian countries because of its fragile internal security conditions (see The Monitor, November 9, 2000; January 11, 2001).
Masoud's son, Ahmad Masoud, began his political and militant career as CEO of the Masoud Foundation in 2016 (Asia Plus, July 7, 2022). In 2019, however, he officially launched his own political movement to oppose the Taliban (Stars and Stripes, September 5, 2019). Unlike his father, the younger Masoud has been able to extend his organization beyond a Tajik-centric paradigm by presenting himself as a unifying figure for anti-Taliban Afghans inside and outside the country (see Militant Leadership Monitor, December 5, 2022). In this role, he could serve as a focal point for efforts to unify different factions of the Afghan diaspora into a broader political framework for a post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Internationalizing the Anti-Taliban Struggle
This process of internationalizing the anti-Taliban struggle reached a new phase with the birth of the Vienna Process for a Democratic Afghanistan in April 2022. This event brought together several members of the Afghan diaspora and opposition leaders "to discuss together about human rights, women's education and democratic perspectives," according to the initiative's website. This episode contributed significantly to Masoud's political career by making him the de facto leader of the Afghan resistance (Arab News, June 22, 2024; Afghanistan International, April 22, 2025).
Masoud's political role is likely to grow because of the Taliban's own internal weaknesses in Afghanistan. A few fault lines present current opportunities for exploitation. First, rather than being a monolithic movement, the Taliban is a movement marked by tribal and ideological fractures. The most famous of these is the Akhundzada-Haqqani divide, which has important implications for Taliban leadership (Military & Security, March 17, 2023). Second, the de facto Taliban government is currently engaged in an asymmetric confrontation with Pakistan, a conflict that has thus far proved considerably more costly for the Afghan side (BBC, May 12). Third, international pressure on the Taliban's restrictive policies toward women is intensifying after the fatal shootings of two demonstrators in Herat and the arrest of 30 women, also in Herat, for allegedly violating the Taliban's dress codes for women (UN News, June 11). The NRF may view these crises as opportunities to consolidate its political power and establish itself as a viable opposition force.
Assessing Taliban Control
At the same time, the Taliban's control of Afghanistan appears to be more stable than it was in the past. Unlike 20 years ago, the group maintains stable diplomatic relations with all its neighbors. Central Asian countries have gradually normalized their relations with the Islamic Emirate, especially through joint economic initiatives and infrastructure projects. The culmination of this steady normalization is the Afghanistan-Central Asia Consultative initiative, which aims to enhance regional exchanges and mobility (Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 5). Although Central Asian states still do not treat Afghanistan as an entirely stable or reliable country, their pragmatic posture is a significant shift compared to the past. Russia is the only country that has officially recognized the Taliban thus far, however, and Moscow appears to be seeking to enhance its military partnership with the Islamic Emirate (amu.tv, May 28; Economics & Energy, May 28).
The Masouds' Legacy and Legitimacy
Ahmad Shah Masoud's controversial legacy poses concrete threats to the younger Masoud's legitimacy inside Afghanistan. While the Masoud name provides an immediate basis for anti-Taliban mobilization, it also evokes memories of abuses and war crimes committed against specific Afghan communities--such as the Hazara--during the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 (Human Rights Watch, January 1, 2005; Hazara International, January 30, 2011).
No formal apology has yet been issued by Masoud's son, which raises questions about his ability to reconcile the political needs of the Afghan diaspora with those of Afghanistan's inhabitants. Furthermore, Masoud's ability to contain the threat from other jihadist groups remains to be seen. It is difficult to establish, for example, whether the NRF has the capacity and resources to contain Islamic State in Khorasan Province's (ISKP) attacks (KabulNow, July 30).
Conclusion
The NRF appears to be the only Afghan political movement actively challenging the Taliban. It has not, however, demonstrated that it can provide a long-standing and stabilizing political solution for the country. No Afghan opposition organization has yet developed a sufficiently unifying posture, continuing to weaken any anti-Taliban political strategy.
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Andrea Serino is an independent analyst who holds an active collaboration with the Pakistani geopolitical platform TheKhorasanDiary. He holds a Master's degree in Philosophy from the University of Turin, specializing in Political Philosophy and its intersections with Geopolitical Developments in the Broader Middle East. His research focuses on jihadist movements, exploring both Western political thought and the intellectual traditions of the Eastern world.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/nrfs-potential-to-launch-an-anti-taliban-counterinsurgency/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
NRF's Potential to Launch an Anti-Taliban Counterinsurgency
Executive Summary:
* Under Ahmad Masoud, the National Resistance Front (NRF) has expanded beyond its Tajik origins and now aims to unify anti-Taliban Afghans through international efforts such as the Vienna Process.
* The NRF seeks to exploit the Taliban's internal ideological fractures, costly conflicts with Pakistan, and international backlash over oppressive women's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by analyst Andrea Serino in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * NRF's Potential to Launch an Anti-Taliban Counterinsurgency Executive Summary: * Under Ahmad Masoud, the National Resistance Front (NRF) has expanded beyond its Tajik origins and now aims to unify anti-Taliban Afghans through international efforts such as the Vienna Process. * The NRF seeks to exploit the Taliban's internal ideological fractures, costly conflicts with Pakistan, and international backlash over oppressive women'spolicies.
* The NRF faces challenges from the Taliban's growing diplomatic normalization with neighboring states, while controversies over Masoud's legacy hinder a stabilizing political solution.
-
The National Resistance Front (NRF) traces its origins to the Northern Alliance, which was led by the well-known Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Masoud. Masoud was one of the key figures in the campaign against the Taliban in the 1990s. The movement was originally mostly ethnically homogeneous, as its membership was largely composed of Tajik tribesmen (E-ir.info, July 8, 2022). During the offensive phase against the Taliban after October 2001, however, the movement expanded its membership to include non-Tajik members. The Northern Alliance responded to ethno-regional political dynamics but was largely shaped by Tajik-centric interests. Its main regional sponsor was also Tajikistan, although Dushanbe's posture was always more cautious than that of other Central Asian countries because of its fragile internal security conditions (see The Monitor, November 9, 2000; January 11, 2001).
Masoud's son, Ahmad Masoud, began his political and militant career as CEO of the Masoud Foundation in 2016 (Asia Plus, July 7, 2022). In 2019, however, he officially launched his own political movement to oppose the Taliban (Stars and Stripes, September 5, 2019). Unlike his father, the younger Masoud has been able to extend his organization beyond a Tajik-centric paradigm by presenting himself as a unifying figure for anti-Taliban Afghans inside and outside the country (see Militant Leadership Monitor, December 5, 2022). In this role, he could serve as a focal point for efforts to unify different factions of the Afghan diaspora into a broader political framework for a post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Internationalizing the Anti-Taliban Struggle
This process of internationalizing the anti-Taliban struggle reached a new phase with the birth of the Vienna Process for a Democratic Afghanistan in April 2022. This event brought together several members of the Afghan diaspora and opposition leaders "to discuss together about human rights, women's education and democratic perspectives," according to the initiative's website. This episode contributed significantly to Masoud's political career by making him the de facto leader of the Afghan resistance (Arab News, June 22, 2024; Afghanistan International, April 22, 2025).
Masoud's political role is likely to grow because of the Taliban's own internal weaknesses in Afghanistan. A few fault lines present current opportunities for exploitation. First, rather than being a monolithic movement, the Taliban is a movement marked by tribal and ideological fractures. The most famous of these is the Akhundzada-Haqqani divide, which has important implications for Taliban leadership (Military & Security, March 17, 2023). Second, the de facto Taliban government is currently engaged in an asymmetric confrontation with Pakistan, a conflict that has thus far proved considerably more costly for the Afghan side (BBC, May 12). Third, international pressure on the Taliban's restrictive policies toward women is intensifying after the fatal shootings of two demonstrators in Herat and the arrest of 30 women, also in Herat, for allegedly violating the Taliban's dress codes for women (UN News, June 11). The NRF may view these crises as opportunities to consolidate its political power and establish itself as a viable opposition force.
Assessing Taliban Control
At the same time, the Taliban's control of Afghanistan appears to be more stable than it was in the past. Unlike 20 years ago, the group maintains stable diplomatic relations with all its neighbors. Central Asian countries have gradually normalized their relations with the Islamic Emirate, especially through joint economic initiatives and infrastructure projects. The culmination of this steady normalization is the Afghanistan-Central Asia Consultative initiative, which aims to enhance regional exchanges and mobility (Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 5). Although Central Asian states still do not treat Afghanistan as an entirely stable or reliable country, their pragmatic posture is a significant shift compared to the past. Russia is the only country that has officially recognized the Taliban thus far, however, and Moscow appears to be seeking to enhance its military partnership with the Islamic Emirate (amu.tv, May 28; Economics & Energy, May 28).
The Masouds' Legacy and Legitimacy
Ahmad Shah Masoud's controversial legacy poses concrete threats to the younger Masoud's legitimacy inside Afghanistan. While the Masoud name provides an immediate basis for anti-Taliban mobilization, it also evokes memories of abuses and war crimes committed against specific Afghan communities--such as the Hazara--during the civil war that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 (Human Rights Watch, January 1, 2005; Hazara International, January 30, 2011).
No formal apology has yet been issued by Masoud's son, which raises questions about his ability to reconcile the political needs of the Afghan diaspora with those of Afghanistan's inhabitants. Furthermore, Masoud's ability to contain the threat from other jihadist groups remains to be seen. It is difficult to establish, for example, whether the NRF has the capacity and resources to contain Islamic State in Khorasan Province's (ISKP) attacks (KabulNow, July 30).
Conclusion
The NRF appears to be the only Afghan political movement actively challenging the Taliban. It has not, however, demonstrated that it can provide a long-standing and stabilizing political solution for the country. No Afghan opposition organization has yet developed a sufficiently unifying posture, continuing to weaken any anti-Taliban political strategy.
* * *
Andrea Serino is an independent analyst who holds an active collaboration with the Pakistani geopolitical platform TheKhorasanDiary. He holds a Master's degree in Philosophy from the University of Turin, specializing in Political Philosophy and its intersections with Geopolitical Developments in the Broader Middle East. His research focuses on jihadist movements, exploring both Western political thought and the intellectual traditions of the Eastern world.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/nrfs-potential-to-launch-an-anti-taliban-counterinsurgency/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Exit Controls Anchor Beijing's Closed-Door Strategy
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by non-resident fellow Christopher Nye and policy analyst Charles Sun in the foundation's China Brief Notes:
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Exit Controls Anchor Beijing's Closed-Door Strategy
Executive Summary:
* On July 31, the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC) issued the Regulations on Exit and Entry Administration, effective September 15. It adds three grounds for barring citizens from leaving, using a catch-all clause in its parent statute for its legal basis.
* The regulations tighten exit restrictions ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by non-resident fellow Christopher Nye and policy analyst Charles Sun in the foundation's China Brief Notes: * * * Exit Controls Anchor Beijing's Closed-Door Strategy Executive Summary: * On July 31, the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC) issued the Regulations on Exit and Entry Administration, effective September 15. It adds three grounds for barring citizens from leaving, using a catch-all clause in its parent statute for its legal basis. * The regulations tighten exit restrictionsin three ways: officials can refuse travel documents, impose a formal exit ban, or dissuade a traveler at the border.
* Preventing people from leaving the PRC is a precondition for controlling the flow of other factors, such as capital, technology, and data. Under the new regulations, the exit ban for violating export controls and technology trade rules carries no time limit.
* Exit control also serves transnational repression. Beijing uses it against targets abroad by holding their relatives at home, and against naturalized U.S. citizens and foreigners inside the country.
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The State Council released the Regulations on Exit and Entry Administration on July 31. Also known as Order No. 841, the regulations derive their legal authority from the 2012 Exit and Entry Administration Law, and will be effective as of September 15 (National Immigration Administration [NIA], June 30, 2012; Xinhua, State Council, July 31). The new rules are part of a growing set of instruments that seek to tighten control over the movement of people across the borders of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In this case, they create additional grounds for barring citizens from leaving the PRC mainland.
Citizens have never had the legal right to leave the PRC; it has always been a permission granted by the state (China Brief, May 29). This is despite the 1954 Constitution guaranteeing citizens "freedom of residence and freedom to change their residence"--a provision that disappeared from later versions (Constitution of the PRC, 1954; 2019). Beijing is prioritizing control of departures more than the movement of money or technology, since limiting personal mobility has the simultaneous effect of limiting monetary and technological mobility (China Brief, May 15). Exit controls are also exploited for transnational repression, and raise the risk of travel for anyone Beijing deems problematic.
Document Checks, Exit Bans, and Dissuasion Tighten Controls
When a citizen attempts to leave the PRC, they are siphoned through three administrative checkpoints. Order No. 841 tightens all of them (Xinhua, July 31). First, authorities may demand documents, materials, and electronic data to verify that an applicant's stated purpose for travel is "true and lawful", according to Article 3. If officials find falsehoods, they may reject the document or disallow the applicant's departure. Truthfulness is left undefined and there are no recourse mechanisms.
Second, the state can formally exit ban individuals. Article 4 of the new regulations lays out three kinds of exit bans. Under the first provision, fraudulently obtaining a travel document, illegally exiting, or entering the country will lead to a ban of between six months and three years after an administrative detention. [1] The next kind of ban applies to citizens who "engage in" activities overseas that the state deems to be illegal or as harming the PRC's national security and interests. The ban is also between six months and three years and starts from the date of their return. No foreign conviction or domestic legal case is required, but the vague definitions are likely to encompass lawful advocacy on sensitive issues like Xinjiang or Tibet, or online criticism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[2]
The other reason for imposing an exit ban is for violations of export controls and technology trade rules that may harm industrial or technological security. Such actions can lead to an indefinite ban, to be decided on by the Ministry of Commerce. Article 12 of the Exit and Entry Administration Law already allowed such bans on national security grounds, and Articles 16 and 17 of State Council orders No. 834 and 835, respectively, list exit bans among measures against organizations and individuals, foreign nationals included, who fail to meet supply chain security obligations or resist countersanctions enforcement, with no judicial process or criminal predicate required (Xinhua, April 7, April 13).
Third, the state will actively dissuade citizens from attempting to leave the country. Article 2 of the new regulations directs immigration officers to remind citizens bound for high-risk destinations to exercise caution and, where necessary, to dissuade them. This duty falls on the officer, whose decision cannot be refused. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), and overseas diplomatic missions are tasked with issuing alerts for dissuading travel to certain destinations, but the regulations provide no guidance on how to rate potential destinations.
Political considerations are likely to inform decision-making. For instance, the MCT in November 2025 advised against travel to Japan, days after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told the Diet that a Taiwan contingency could threaten Japan's survival (MCT, November 15, 2025). The MFA reaffirmed that warning on March 26 (MFA, March 26). Russia, by contrast, has drawn no travel caution guidance, notwithstanding its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, even though Article 2 of the regulations names war and armed conflict as the first risk factor.
Outbound Controls Used to Coerce Foreigners
Controlling the movement of people is what makes Beijing's other outbound controls work. The Regulations on Outbound Investment, effective July 1, attach jurisdiction to an investor's place of residence, which keeps offshore assets in reach (State Council, June 1; China Brief, July 11). By ensuring that an investor is physically present in the PRC, authorities can much more easily control the flow of other goods. For instance, Article 13 of the outbound investment regulations bars investors from moving controlled goods, technology, services, and data abroad, and treats the cross-border dispatch of technical personnel, overseas work assignments, remote technical guidance, and cross-border training as forms of transfer. By expanding the state's ability to restrict people from leaving the PRC, the new regulations further empower the state to control those other flows.
Personnel control has transnational implications, and can be used to coerce those beyond PRC borders. A U.S. State Department advisory states that relatives of those under investigation, including minors, may face exit bans, and family members unaware of the proceedings can become entangled (U.S. Department of State, November 27, 2024). In one case, Chinese police at Shanghai's airport in August 2022 prevented a woman, Xie Fang, from leaving the country. They told her that while she was innocent, she could not leave until her husband, a former bookseller in Florida suspected of writing articles online that were critical of the CCP, returned to the PRC (AP, January 31, 2023).
Foreign nationals are not protected. Cynthia and Victor Liu, both U.S. citizens, were barred from exiting the PRC from June 2018 until September 2021, in an effort to force their fugitive father's return (BBC, September 28, 2021). The MFA defended those bans by saying that anyone suspected of crimes, whatever their nationality, may be stopped from leaving (CNN, September 28, 2021). Beijing does not recognize dual nationality, and Mao Chenyue, a Wells Fargo managing director barred from leaving the PRC in July 2025, is a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Shanghai (MFA, July 21, 2025).
The new regulations are most dangerous for PRC citizens holding U.S. permanent residence. One who returns and is deemed to have harmed national security abroad faces an exit ban of at least six months. An absence that long disrupts the continuous residence required for U.S. naturalization, and an absence of a year or more invalidates the green card as a travel document (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, September 12, 2025).
Conclusion
The PRC's new Regulations on Exit and Entry Administration strengthen Beijing's controls on outbound capital, technology, and data by keeping individuals inside the PRC. They expand previous legal powers in further coercive ways. The U.S. State Department has repeatedly issued travel advisories regarding the PRC. Caution is especially warranted now, as anyone who enters the country can be held there, regardless of citizenship, though people of Chinese descent face the highest exposure, whatever passport they carry.
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Christopher Nye is a Non-Resident Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He previously served as a Professor and directed a university think tank in China. He holds a Ph.D. in Law and specializes in Chinese legal institutions, elite politics, U.S.-China technology competition, and local governance.
Charles Sun is a China-focused policy analyst specializing in technology governance and the political economy of elite-state relations. He is a Yale Sinovation Fellow at the Yale School of Management and was a visiting fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University. His Stanford research introduced the Proactive Elite Alignment Theory (PEAT) framework for analyzing anticipatory compliance in China's tech sector. He holds master's degrees from Stanford University and Columbia University.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/exit-controls-anchor-beijings-closed-door-strategy/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Exit Controls Anchor Beijing's Closed-Door Strategy
Executive Summary:
* On July 31, the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC) issued the Regulations on Exit and Entry Administration, effective September 15. It adds three grounds for barring citizens from leaving, using a catch-all clause in its parent statute for its legal basis.
* The regulations tighten exit restrictions ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by non-resident fellow Christopher Nye and policy analyst Charles Sun in the foundation's China Brief Notes: * * * Exit Controls Anchor Beijing's Closed-Door Strategy Executive Summary: * On July 31, the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC) issued the Regulations on Exit and Entry Administration, effective September 15. It adds three grounds for barring citizens from leaving, using a catch-all clause in its parent statute for its legal basis. * The regulations tighten exit restrictionsin three ways: officials can refuse travel documents, impose a formal exit ban, or dissuade a traveler at the border.
* Preventing people from leaving the PRC is a precondition for controlling the flow of other factors, such as capital, technology, and data. Under the new regulations, the exit ban for violating export controls and technology trade rules carries no time limit.
* Exit control also serves transnational repression. Beijing uses it against targets abroad by holding their relatives at home, and against naturalized U.S. citizens and foreigners inside the country.
-
The State Council released the Regulations on Exit and Entry Administration on July 31. Also known as Order No. 841, the regulations derive their legal authority from the 2012 Exit and Entry Administration Law, and will be effective as of September 15 (National Immigration Administration [NIA], June 30, 2012; Xinhua, State Council, July 31). The new rules are part of a growing set of instruments that seek to tighten control over the movement of people across the borders of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In this case, they create additional grounds for barring citizens from leaving the PRC mainland.
Citizens have never had the legal right to leave the PRC; it has always been a permission granted by the state (China Brief, May 29). This is despite the 1954 Constitution guaranteeing citizens "freedom of residence and freedom to change their residence"--a provision that disappeared from later versions (Constitution of the PRC, 1954; 2019). Beijing is prioritizing control of departures more than the movement of money or technology, since limiting personal mobility has the simultaneous effect of limiting monetary and technological mobility (China Brief, May 15). Exit controls are also exploited for transnational repression, and raise the risk of travel for anyone Beijing deems problematic.
Document Checks, Exit Bans, and Dissuasion Tighten Controls
When a citizen attempts to leave the PRC, they are siphoned through three administrative checkpoints. Order No. 841 tightens all of them (Xinhua, July 31). First, authorities may demand documents, materials, and electronic data to verify that an applicant's stated purpose for travel is "true and lawful", according to Article 3. If officials find falsehoods, they may reject the document or disallow the applicant's departure. Truthfulness is left undefined and there are no recourse mechanisms.
Second, the state can formally exit ban individuals. Article 4 of the new regulations lays out three kinds of exit bans. Under the first provision, fraudulently obtaining a travel document, illegally exiting, or entering the country will lead to a ban of between six months and three years after an administrative detention. [1] The next kind of ban applies to citizens who "engage in" activities overseas that the state deems to be illegal or as harming the PRC's national security and interests. The ban is also between six months and three years and starts from the date of their return. No foreign conviction or domestic legal case is required, but the vague definitions are likely to encompass lawful advocacy on sensitive issues like Xinjiang or Tibet, or online criticism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).[2]
The other reason for imposing an exit ban is for violations of export controls and technology trade rules that may harm industrial or technological security. Such actions can lead to an indefinite ban, to be decided on by the Ministry of Commerce. Article 12 of the Exit and Entry Administration Law already allowed such bans on national security grounds, and Articles 16 and 17 of State Council orders No. 834 and 835, respectively, list exit bans among measures against organizations and individuals, foreign nationals included, who fail to meet supply chain security obligations or resist countersanctions enforcement, with no judicial process or criminal predicate required (Xinhua, April 7, April 13).
Third, the state will actively dissuade citizens from attempting to leave the country. Article 2 of the new regulations directs immigration officers to remind citizens bound for high-risk destinations to exercise caution and, where necessary, to dissuade them. This duty falls on the officer, whose decision cannot be refused. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT), and overseas diplomatic missions are tasked with issuing alerts for dissuading travel to certain destinations, but the regulations provide no guidance on how to rate potential destinations.
Political considerations are likely to inform decision-making. For instance, the MCT in November 2025 advised against travel to Japan, days after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told the Diet that a Taiwan contingency could threaten Japan's survival (MCT, November 15, 2025). The MFA reaffirmed that warning on March 26 (MFA, March 26). Russia, by contrast, has drawn no travel caution guidance, notwithstanding its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, even though Article 2 of the regulations names war and armed conflict as the first risk factor.
Outbound Controls Used to Coerce Foreigners
Controlling the movement of people is what makes Beijing's other outbound controls work. The Regulations on Outbound Investment, effective July 1, attach jurisdiction to an investor's place of residence, which keeps offshore assets in reach (State Council, June 1; China Brief, July 11). By ensuring that an investor is physically present in the PRC, authorities can much more easily control the flow of other goods. For instance, Article 13 of the outbound investment regulations bars investors from moving controlled goods, technology, services, and data abroad, and treats the cross-border dispatch of technical personnel, overseas work assignments, remote technical guidance, and cross-border training as forms of transfer. By expanding the state's ability to restrict people from leaving the PRC, the new regulations further empower the state to control those other flows.
Personnel control has transnational implications, and can be used to coerce those beyond PRC borders. A U.S. State Department advisory states that relatives of those under investigation, including minors, may face exit bans, and family members unaware of the proceedings can become entangled (U.S. Department of State, November 27, 2024). In one case, Chinese police at Shanghai's airport in August 2022 prevented a woman, Xie Fang, from leaving the country. They told her that while she was innocent, she could not leave until her husband, a former bookseller in Florida suspected of writing articles online that were critical of the CCP, returned to the PRC (AP, January 31, 2023).
Foreign nationals are not protected. Cynthia and Victor Liu, both U.S. citizens, were barred from exiting the PRC from June 2018 until September 2021, in an effort to force their fugitive father's return (BBC, September 28, 2021). The MFA defended those bans by saying that anyone suspected of crimes, whatever their nationality, may be stopped from leaving (CNN, September 28, 2021). Beijing does not recognize dual nationality, and Mao Chenyue, a Wells Fargo managing director barred from leaving the PRC in July 2025, is a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Shanghai (MFA, July 21, 2025).
The new regulations are most dangerous for PRC citizens holding U.S. permanent residence. One who returns and is deemed to have harmed national security abroad faces an exit ban of at least six months. An absence that long disrupts the continuous residence required for U.S. naturalization, and an absence of a year or more invalidates the green card as a travel document (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, September 12, 2025).
Conclusion
The PRC's new Regulations on Exit and Entry Administration strengthen Beijing's controls on outbound capital, technology, and data by keeping individuals inside the PRC. They expand previous legal powers in further coercive ways. The U.S. State Department has repeatedly issued travel advisories regarding the PRC. Caution is especially warranted now, as anyone who enters the country can be held there, regardless of citizenship, though people of Chinese descent face the highest exposure, whatever passport they carry.
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Christopher Nye is a Non-Resident Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He previously served as a Professor and directed a university think tank in China. He holds a Ph.D. in Law and specializes in Chinese legal institutions, elite politics, U.S.-China technology competition, and local governance.
Charles Sun is a China-focused policy analyst specializing in technology governance and the political economy of elite-state relations. He is a Yale Sinovation Fellow at the Yale School of Management and was a visiting fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University. His Stanford research introduced the Proactive Elite Alignment Theory (PEAT) framework for analyzing anticipatory compliance in China's tech sector. He holds master's degrees from Stanford University and Columbia University.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/exit-controls-anchor-beijings-closed-door-strategy/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Just Under Half of Self-Employed in Germany Complain of Lack of Orders
MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 8 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on Aug. 7, 2026:
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Just Under Half of Self-Employed in Germany Complain of Lack of Orders
About one in two self-employed in Germany (47.3%) report a lack of orders, according to the latest ifo survey. "Many self-employed feel that their customers are holding back on awarding projects," says ifo expert Katrin Demmelhuber. "At the same time, private consumer demand remains subdued."
More than one-fifth (21.2%) of the solo self-employed and microenterprises see their own economic survival acutely at risk. Financing ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 8 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on Aug. 7, 2026: * * * Just Under Half of Self-Employed in Germany Complain of Lack of Orders About one in two self-employed in Germany (47.3%) report a lack of orders, according to the latest ifo survey. "Many self-employed feel that their customers are holding back on awarding projects," says ifo expert Katrin Demmelhuber. "At the same time, private consumer demand remains subdued." More than one-fifth (21.2%) of the solo self-employed and microenterprises see their own economic survival acutely at risk. Financingproblems are to blame, and come on top of the lack of orders, as reported by one in ten self-employed. "The solo self-employed and microenterprises often lack the financial reserves to weather prolonged lean periods," explains Demmelhuber.
Despite this uncertain situation, the "Jimdo-ifo Business Climate Index" rose in July from -25.9 to -22.6 points. However, that means the level remains very low.
The self-employed are less negative about their current business and less pessimistic regarding their expectations.
The ifo Institute has been publishing the Jimdo-ifo Business Climate Index for solo self-employed persons and microenterprises (with fewer than nine employees) since August 2021. As in the composite index, all sectors of the economy are taken into account. However, its main focus is the service sector.
* * *
2026 Journal (Complete Issue)
ifo Konjunkturperspektiven 07/2026
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/journal-complete-issue/ifo-konjunkturperspektiven-072026)
-
More Information
Survey results (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-08-07/just-under-half-self-employed-germany-complain-lack-orders)
Survey "Jimdo-ifo Business Climate Index for the Self-Employed" (https://www.ifo.de/en/survey/jimdo-ifo-business-climate-index-self-employed)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-08-07/just-under-half-self-employed-germany-complain-lack-orders
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Just Under Half of Self-Employed in Germany Complain of Lack of Orders
About one in two self-employed in Germany (47.3%) report a lack of orders, according to the latest ifo survey. "Many self-employed feel that their customers are holding back on awarding projects," says ifo expert Katrin Demmelhuber. "At the same time, private consumer demand remains subdued."
More than one-fifth (21.2%) of the solo self-employed and microenterprises see their own economic survival acutely at risk. Financing ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 8 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on Aug. 7, 2026: * * * Just Under Half of Self-Employed in Germany Complain of Lack of Orders About one in two self-employed in Germany (47.3%) report a lack of orders, according to the latest ifo survey. "Many self-employed feel that their customers are holding back on awarding projects," says ifo expert Katrin Demmelhuber. "At the same time, private consumer demand remains subdued." More than one-fifth (21.2%) of the solo self-employed and microenterprises see their own economic survival acutely at risk. Financingproblems are to blame, and come on top of the lack of orders, as reported by one in ten self-employed. "The solo self-employed and microenterprises often lack the financial reserves to weather prolonged lean periods," explains Demmelhuber.
Despite this uncertain situation, the "Jimdo-ifo Business Climate Index" rose in July from -25.9 to -22.6 points. However, that means the level remains very low.
The self-employed are less negative about their current business and less pessimistic regarding their expectations.
The ifo Institute has been publishing the Jimdo-ifo Business Climate Index for solo self-employed persons and microenterprises (with fewer than nine employees) since August 2021. As in the composite index, all sectors of the economy are taken into account. However, its main focus is the service sector.
* * *
2026 Journal (Complete Issue)
ifo Konjunkturperspektiven 07/2026
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/journal-complete-issue/ifo-konjunkturperspektiven-072026)
-
More Information
Survey results (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-08-07/just-under-half-self-employed-germany-complain-lack-orders)
Survey "Jimdo-ifo Business Climate Index for the Self-Employed" (https://www.ifo.de/en/survey/jimdo-ifo-business-climate-index-self-employed)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-08-07/just-under-half-self-employed-germany-complain-lack-orders
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Pencils and Papers - Parents Plan to Spend More Money on Back-to-school Supplies This Year Than Last
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Aug. 8 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by policy fellow Josiah Padley:
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New pencils and papers: parents plan to spend more money on back-to-school supplies this year than last
A family is a significant investment, and sometimes an expensive one. As back-to-school season begins, parents are combing through their school district's packing lists, rifling through growing children's closets, and pulling out the budget sheets to see ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Aug. 8 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by policy fellow Josiah Padley: * * * New pencils and papers: parents plan to spend more money on back-to-school supplies this year than last A family is a significant investment, and sometimes an expensive one. As back-to-school season begins, parents are combing through their school district's packing lists, rifling through growing children's closets, and pulling out the budget sheets to seehow the entire period will impact their monthly balance.
According to a 2026 PWC survey, families plan to spend $922 this year on back-to-school shopping. Almost half (47 percent) plan to spend more than they did last year.
That price tag doesn't just reflect school supplies. Families mentioned that they also plan to spend money on clothing, technology, and activity equipment. On average, parents planned to spend $122 specifically on school supplies.
In Minnesota, the school supply price tag might vary. The Anoka-Hennepin Adams Elementary School's third grade supply list contained modest basics like corded headphones, glue sticks, and colored pencils. A purchase of all the supply list items from name brands would run about $155. Parents who shop sales or store-brand items would find it easy to bring that total down.
Minnesota has many resources available for parents looking for free back-to-school supplies. Events in many districts supply items like backpacks, school supplies, immunizations, shoes, or even haircuts.
Other costs, like clothing or locker decorations, might be rising as family dynamics shift. A majority (61 percent) of families let children add items directly to an online cart, either through adding items directly to a parent cart or through their own attached amount. Children naturally drawn to name brands or exciting items might benefit from adult supervision, lest they bankrupt Mom and Dad with fun-smelling pencils.
But children might find themselves scoring big with a large back-to-school cart this year, as the majority (58 percent) of parents named "child preferences" as a factor influencing purchases. "Child preferences" was a more popular purchase factor than school-provided supply lists, sales and discounts, or online reviews. In a trend-based, social media-driven school ecosystem, it seems that parents are prepared to loosen the pursestrings so that children can feel fully satisfied with their possessions.
Back-to-school season allows Minnesotans to showcase their famously generous spirit. National polling from Morning Consult suggests that about 1 in 3 parents of school-age children donate to K-12 education, and about 1 in 5 adults also donate. About three fourths of all school donations are earmarked for public schools. Minnesotans should attempt to raise those numbers by donating their money, resources, or time to their local school.
Parents in certain states may see their bill for after-school activities disappear in the future. The new federal tax credit scholarship opens up significant avenues of new funding to public and private school students, as it incentivizes private donations to scholarship granting organizations. Those scholarships could easily cover the cost of activities like band, football, and drama for students at public and private schools. However, Minnesota has not yet agreed to allow scholarship granting organizations to operate, leaving a potential $400 million to flow to other states.
As students get back on the bus this fall, families might feel excitement, curiosity, or even a bit of sadness. Within all those feelings, they shouldn't have to have anxiety about the school supply bill, especially as costs continue to rise elsewhere. Minnesota's government should work to allow scholarship granting organizations, just as Minnesota's generous homes should continue providing opportunities for donated school supplies. Let's take the financial burden off young families as much as possible.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/new-pencils-and-papers-parents-plan-to-spend-more-money-on-back-to-school-supplies-this-year-than-last/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
New pencils and papers: parents plan to spend more money on back-to-school supplies this year than last
A family is a significant investment, and sometimes an expensive one. As back-to-school season begins, parents are combing through their school district's packing lists, rifling through growing children's closets, and pulling out the budget sheets to see ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Aug. 8 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by policy fellow Josiah Padley: * * * New pencils and papers: parents plan to spend more money on back-to-school supplies this year than last A family is a significant investment, and sometimes an expensive one. As back-to-school season begins, parents are combing through their school district's packing lists, rifling through growing children's closets, and pulling out the budget sheets to seehow the entire period will impact their monthly balance.
According to a 2026 PWC survey, families plan to spend $922 this year on back-to-school shopping. Almost half (47 percent) plan to spend more than they did last year.
That price tag doesn't just reflect school supplies. Families mentioned that they also plan to spend money on clothing, technology, and activity equipment. On average, parents planned to spend $122 specifically on school supplies.
In Minnesota, the school supply price tag might vary. The Anoka-Hennepin Adams Elementary School's third grade supply list contained modest basics like corded headphones, glue sticks, and colored pencils. A purchase of all the supply list items from name brands would run about $155. Parents who shop sales or store-brand items would find it easy to bring that total down.
Minnesota has many resources available for parents looking for free back-to-school supplies. Events in many districts supply items like backpacks, school supplies, immunizations, shoes, or even haircuts.
Other costs, like clothing or locker decorations, might be rising as family dynamics shift. A majority (61 percent) of families let children add items directly to an online cart, either through adding items directly to a parent cart or through their own attached amount. Children naturally drawn to name brands or exciting items might benefit from adult supervision, lest they bankrupt Mom and Dad with fun-smelling pencils.
But children might find themselves scoring big with a large back-to-school cart this year, as the majority (58 percent) of parents named "child preferences" as a factor influencing purchases. "Child preferences" was a more popular purchase factor than school-provided supply lists, sales and discounts, or online reviews. In a trend-based, social media-driven school ecosystem, it seems that parents are prepared to loosen the pursestrings so that children can feel fully satisfied with their possessions.
Back-to-school season allows Minnesotans to showcase their famously generous spirit. National polling from Morning Consult suggests that about 1 in 3 parents of school-age children donate to K-12 education, and about 1 in 5 adults also donate. About three fourths of all school donations are earmarked for public schools. Minnesotans should attempt to raise those numbers by donating their money, resources, or time to their local school.
Parents in certain states may see their bill for after-school activities disappear in the future. The new federal tax credit scholarship opens up significant avenues of new funding to public and private school students, as it incentivizes private donations to scholarship granting organizations. Those scholarships could easily cover the cost of activities like band, football, and drama for students at public and private schools. However, Minnesota has not yet agreed to allow scholarship granting organizations to operate, leaving a potential $400 million to flow to other states.
As students get back on the bus this fall, families might feel excitement, curiosity, or even a bit of sadness. Within all those feelings, they shouldn't have to have anxiety about the school supply bill, especially as costs continue to rise elsewhere. Minnesota's government should work to allow scholarship granting organizations, just as Minnesota's generous homes should continue providing opportunities for donated school supplies. Let's take the financial burden off young families as much as possible.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/new-pencils-and-papers-parents-plan-to-spend-more-money-on-back-to-school-supplies-this-year-than-last/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Brussels vs. Brussels - EU's Data Act and the DMA's Clash Over Cloud
WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by Christopher Gundermann, fellow in the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business:
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Brussels vs. Brussels: The EU's Data Act and the DMA's Clash Over Cloud
On June 24, for the first time, the European Commission turned its Digital Markets Act (DMA) on cloud infrastructure by preliminarily designating Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure as gatekeepers, although neither firm met the law's quantitative thresholds. The move was also unusual ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by Christopher Gundermann, fellow in the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business: * * * Brussels vs. Brussels: The EU's Data Act and the DMA's Clash Over Cloud On June 24, for the first time, the European Commission turned its Digital Markets Act (DMA) on cloud infrastructure by preliminarily designating Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure as gatekeepers, although neither firm met the law's quantitative thresholds. The move was also unusualbecause cloud services regulation was previously thought to fall under the European Union's Data Act, rather than the DMA. Serious regulatory differences between the two acts could put AWS and Microsoft in the position of trying to follow two regulatory regimes that differ on topics including enforcement, timelines, and data portability. And while European concerns around sovereignty and market concentration are valid, such regulatory uncertainty risks stifling Europe's cloud buildout, handicapping its economy, and entrenching its cloud dependence on the United States.
The Acts in Question
The DMA entered into force with much fanfare on November 1, 2022. Using ex ante regulations designed to ensure competition in European digital markets, the act empowers the commission to designate a company as a gatekeeper if it "provide[s] an important gateway between businesses and consumers in relation to core platform services" and requires that designated firms not favor their own services and allow interoperability with third parties.
The European Union's Data Act, in turn, started to come into force on January 11, 2024, with key provisions of the act subsequently becoming applicable in stages. Among other objectives, the Data Act mandates greater access and transferability of data, reshapes data ownership and monetization strategies, and--of particular relevance here--"allows consumers to easily transfer data and switch between cloud providers."
There are a number of broad philosophical and functional differences between the DMA and the Data Act. The Data Act requires providers to ensure data portability and interoperability, while the DMA's primary focus is preventing dominant companies from using their position to lock out competitors or self-preference their own products. Also noteworthy is that the Data Act is heavily focused on business-to-business (B2B) dynamics, while the DMA is oriented around the relationship between gatekeepers and individual consumers. But most importantly, the Data Act applies to all relevant firms operating in the European Union regardless of size and market position, while the DMA applies only to designated gatekeepers.
The Issue: Conflicting Rules, No Guidance
In the European Commission's report preliminarily designating AWS and Microsoft as gatekeepers, the commission noted that the two companies' "cloud computing services . . . have achieved significant turnover" and that "[t]hey both have vast and entrenched user bases and appear to benefit from lock-in effects and high switching costs, in addition to a large ecosystem. . . .Whilst AI is significantly increasing the demand for cloud-related services, AWS and Azure appear to retain a large proportion of this increased demand within their respective ecosystems."
Pushback against the preliminary designations falls largely into two buckets. First, while the commission is not legally mandated to follow the DMA's quantitative guidance when designating gatekeepers, it almost always has in the past. The guidelines provide clear, objective guidance about when firms would be considered eligible for gatekeeper status. Departing from that guidance exposes the commission to allegations of a politically motivated, predetermined outcome. Other analyses explore whether AWS and Azure even fit the qualitative metrics the commission relies on and note that neither AWS nor Azure holds the 40-plus percent market share needed to be considered dominant under EU competition law. But beyond that, the DMA's quantitative metrics were designed for consumer-facing platforms rather than cloud computing, which is primarily B2B and characterized by enterprise sales. Applying a consumer-centric framework to determine whether a primarily B2B firm qualifies as a gatekeeper presents a fundamental structural mismatch, akin to deciding the results of a 100-meter sprint by the runner's bench press.
The second objection concerns the usage of the DMA to regulate cloud service providers at all. As an AWS spokesperson said following the release of the preliminary determination, "The EU already has comprehensive cloud regulation through the Data Act." The Data Act expressly addresses cloud computing issues such as switching costs, interoperability, and egress fees, among others. And although the DMA and the Data Act largely pursue similar goals, they diverge in meaningful ways that impose conflicting compliance obligations on cloud providers and create significant investment uncertainty.
For instance, under the Data Act, enforcement is delegated to member state authorities, while DMA enforcement is centralized under the European Commission. And while key Data Act provisions phase in gradually until 2027--giving businesses time to plan compliance--DMA obligations attach immediately upon gatekeeper designation, giving firms a maximum of six months to comply. In addition, while the Data Act requires cloud providers to allow data to move between different data spaces, building the pipelines required by its interoperability mandates may require processing personal data in ways that conflict with DMA consent requirements and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) data minimization principles--a conflict that the commission itself has acknowledged. More broadly, the commission's willingness to abandon its quantitative designation process leaves every cloud provider uncertain of whether it could be designated as a gatekeeper and then face two regulatory regimes without guidance for how to satisfy one without violating the other.
The Impacts of Conflicting Cloud Regulation
The costs of regulatory overlap are not lost on European policymakers. The famous September 2024 Draghi Report argued that the European Union's "inconsistent and restrictive regulations" harm the bloc's competitiveness, innovation, and growth, using overlaps between the GDPR and the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) as an example. Following the report, the European Parliament sought proposals to simplify EU digital economy laws and reduce companies' administrative burdens. In October 2025, the European Parliament published a report assessing the overlaps between the AI Act and other pieces of EU digital legislation, including the Data Act, and found that "their interplay creates significant regulatory complexity." There are three likely consequences of the regulatory confusion caused by the overlap between the Data Act and DMA on European cloud capability: slowed buildout, entrenched foreign market leadership, and foreign dependence.
* * *
Figure 1: U.S. Firms Build Majority of New EU Datacenters
* * *
The Draghi Report illustrates clearly how duplicative regulation can stifle innovation and competitiveness. Designating AWS and Azure as gatekeepers would subject two of the three largest investors in Europe's data center buildout to contradictory obligations under separate regulatory frameworks. As AWS noted in its statement, the preliminary rulings "risk deterring European investment and innovation." AWS's warning is more than corporate posturing--a large body of academic scholarship shows that policy uncertainty makes firms more cautious about large capital commitments and can delay such investments. Closer to home, the European Investment Report for 2024 and 2025 found that 74 percent of firms cited regulatory inconsistency as a barrier to expanding their business in the European Union. If AWS and Microsoft scale back their European investment, the European Union's ambitious plan to triple data center capacity in five to seven years would become even more difficult.
Duplicative regulation could also reduce the availability of cutting-edge services to European businesses while suppressing adoption of those that do reach the market. European regulations have already prompted U.S. firms to delay or withhold new products from the European market, leaving businesses without tools available to their global competitors. One study found that 11 percent of advanced large language model releases were delayed or withheld from the European Union compared to the United States due to regulatory reasons. European AI firms may avoid the most capable and cost-competitive cloud services offered by AWS and Azure to sidestep regulatory uncertainty. Pushed toward domestic alternatives, they would face more limited cloud AI infrastructure capacity, further widening the competitiveness gap with their foreign counterparts.
Consequence 2: Entrenching the Leaders
A second consequence of the commission's decision could, ironically, be to cement AWS's and Azure's leading positions in the European market. Regulatory compliance is expensive, and large firms are generally better positioned to absorb its costs than smaller competitors. This dynamic occurred during the European Union's implementation of the GDPR, when U.S. firms gained European market share while European firms lost it, owing to U.S. firms' ability to pay the regulation's fines. In FY 2025, AWS reported revenue of $128.7 billion; Microsoft reported over $75 billion from Azure alone. SAP and Deutsche Telekom, the two European cloud service providers with the largest share of the European market, reported cloud revenue of Euros21 billion and Euros4.1 billion, respectively. If compliance with both the DMA and the Data Act becomes a battle of resources, AWS and Microsoft are better equipped than European firms. While the commission is unlikely to subject SAP or Deutsche Telecom to gatekeeper status, the ambiguity surrounding its qualitative threshold approach means European firms cannot be certain. Faced with that uncertainty, they may avoid the aggressive growth strategies that could bring them within the commission's sights.
The preliminary designations could entrench AWS and Azure's advantage in a second, more subtle way: Regardless of the designation's outcome, AWS and Azure will soon have defined regulatory obligations and the resources to meet them. European enterprises, navigating an uncertain and overlapping regulatory environment, may come to see that defined compliance position as a competitive advantage favoring AWS and Azure over less-resourced European alternatives. The cumulative effect could be a European cloud market more concentrated around the very U.S. incumbents that EU digital sovereignty policy is designed to counterbalance against.
Consequence 3: A Lack of Domestic European Alternatives and Foreign Dependence
Limiting the growth of U.S. hyperscalers could make sense if there were European providers able to fill the investment vacuum. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that there is not. European providers' share of the European cloud computing market declined from 29 percent in 2017 to 15 percent in 2022 and remained there until 2025, and it is unclear whether European firms have the resources necessary to reverse this trend. Additionally, European providers are ill-equipped to provide the AI-specific infrastructure necessary to meet Europe's rapidly growing cloud demand. Without viable European alternatives, European firms dependent on cloud infrastructure could find themselves increasingly reliant on providers based outside the European Union. The result could be the opposite of digital sovereignty: deeper European dependence on non-EU providers at a moment when geopolitical ties are fraying. And while the European Union has stated its goal to triple total data center capacity within five to seven years, many independent analysts consider the target unrealistic. Moreover, the European Union's plans rely largely on private investment to reach that goal, and European cloud providers lack the balance sheets to supply the estimated Euros200 billion the European Union is targeting for its AI buildout.
Policy Suggestions
Cloud computing is a quickly evolving technology that is foundational for competitiveness in the new AI economy. In the face of such dramatic economic change, the European Commission is implementing new tools such as the Data Act and others to mitigate possible harms. The commission should give its new tools a chance to combat the negative externalities they were designed to prevent and use traditional antitrust powers to ensure competitive markets if necessary. Likewise, the commission should encourage the growth of European cloud providers to address sovereignty concerns. However, if the commission decides to proceed with gatekeeper designations for AWS and Azure, below are two possible recommendations to mitigate regulatory friction between the DMA and the Data Act.
* Provide DMA and Data Act Implementation Guidance: In the short term, the commission should release joint implementation guidance clarifying how cloud service providers designated as gatekeepers can meet their obligations under both the DMA and Data Act. Such guidance could focus on four specific policy areas: (1) compliance timeline conflicts between egress fees and switching and interoperability requirements under the two laws; (2) guidance regarding ongoing data interoperability standards-setting discussions; (3) details about how national authorities and the commission will coordinate enforcement; and (4) the specific quantitative and qualitative factors the commission will use in weighing future cloud service provider gatekeeper designations. Issuing such guidance now, prior to the final designation decisions, would benefit all parties. AWS and Azure could begin their compliance preparation, and European cloud providers would receive a regulatory roadmap to follow while building out their own capabilities.
* Establish a Sovereignty Certification Framework: To mitigate the sovereignty concerns raised by reliance on U.S. companies, the European Commission could expand the sovereignty risk-tiered framework introduced in the proposed Cloud and Development AI Act beyond its current scope into a certification framework explicitly cross-referenced with DMA and Data Act obligations. This expansion could be accompanied by formal guidance clarifying what partitioned hyperscaler infrastructure does and does not achieve at each sovereignty tier and matching task categories to the appropriate tier. Such a framework would give both providers and cloud consumers a clear map of where sovereignty concerns apply and where they do not, offering AWS and Microsoft the regulatory certainty needed to continue their European infrastructure investment. Such clarity would also incentivize European providers to invest specifically in the highest sensitivity tiers where U.S.-headquartered providers raise insurmountable sovereignty issues.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/brussels-vs-brussels-eus-data-act-and-dmas-clash-over-cloud
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Brussels vs. Brussels: The EU's Data Act and the DMA's Clash Over Cloud
On June 24, for the first time, the European Commission turned its Digital Markets Act (DMA) on cloud infrastructure by preliminarily designating Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure as gatekeepers, although neither firm met the law's quantitative thresholds. The move was also unusual ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 7, 2026, by Christopher Gundermann, fellow in the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business: * * * Brussels vs. Brussels: The EU's Data Act and the DMA's Clash Over Cloud On June 24, for the first time, the European Commission turned its Digital Markets Act (DMA) on cloud infrastructure by preliminarily designating Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure as gatekeepers, although neither firm met the law's quantitative thresholds. The move was also unusualbecause cloud services regulation was previously thought to fall under the European Union's Data Act, rather than the DMA. Serious regulatory differences between the two acts could put AWS and Microsoft in the position of trying to follow two regulatory regimes that differ on topics including enforcement, timelines, and data portability. And while European concerns around sovereignty and market concentration are valid, such regulatory uncertainty risks stifling Europe's cloud buildout, handicapping its economy, and entrenching its cloud dependence on the United States.
The Acts in Question
The DMA entered into force with much fanfare on November 1, 2022. Using ex ante regulations designed to ensure competition in European digital markets, the act empowers the commission to designate a company as a gatekeeper if it "provide[s] an important gateway between businesses and consumers in relation to core platform services" and requires that designated firms not favor their own services and allow interoperability with third parties.
The European Union's Data Act, in turn, started to come into force on January 11, 2024, with key provisions of the act subsequently becoming applicable in stages. Among other objectives, the Data Act mandates greater access and transferability of data, reshapes data ownership and monetization strategies, and--of particular relevance here--"allows consumers to easily transfer data and switch between cloud providers."
There are a number of broad philosophical and functional differences between the DMA and the Data Act. The Data Act requires providers to ensure data portability and interoperability, while the DMA's primary focus is preventing dominant companies from using their position to lock out competitors or self-preference their own products. Also noteworthy is that the Data Act is heavily focused on business-to-business (B2B) dynamics, while the DMA is oriented around the relationship between gatekeepers and individual consumers. But most importantly, the Data Act applies to all relevant firms operating in the European Union regardless of size and market position, while the DMA applies only to designated gatekeepers.
The Issue: Conflicting Rules, No Guidance
In the European Commission's report preliminarily designating AWS and Microsoft as gatekeepers, the commission noted that the two companies' "cloud computing services . . . have achieved significant turnover" and that "[t]hey both have vast and entrenched user bases and appear to benefit from lock-in effects and high switching costs, in addition to a large ecosystem. . . .Whilst AI is significantly increasing the demand for cloud-related services, AWS and Azure appear to retain a large proportion of this increased demand within their respective ecosystems."
Pushback against the preliminary designations falls largely into two buckets. First, while the commission is not legally mandated to follow the DMA's quantitative guidance when designating gatekeepers, it almost always has in the past. The guidelines provide clear, objective guidance about when firms would be considered eligible for gatekeeper status. Departing from that guidance exposes the commission to allegations of a politically motivated, predetermined outcome. Other analyses explore whether AWS and Azure even fit the qualitative metrics the commission relies on and note that neither AWS nor Azure holds the 40-plus percent market share needed to be considered dominant under EU competition law. But beyond that, the DMA's quantitative metrics were designed for consumer-facing platforms rather than cloud computing, which is primarily B2B and characterized by enterprise sales. Applying a consumer-centric framework to determine whether a primarily B2B firm qualifies as a gatekeeper presents a fundamental structural mismatch, akin to deciding the results of a 100-meter sprint by the runner's bench press.
The second objection concerns the usage of the DMA to regulate cloud service providers at all. As an AWS spokesperson said following the release of the preliminary determination, "The EU already has comprehensive cloud regulation through the Data Act." The Data Act expressly addresses cloud computing issues such as switching costs, interoperability, and egress fees, among others. And although the DMA and the Data Act largely pursue similar goals, they diverge in meaningful ways that impose conflicting compliance obligations on cloud providers and create significant investment uncertainty.
For instance, under the Data Act, enforcement is delegated to member state authorities, while DMA enforcement is centralized under the European Commission. And while key Data Act provisions phase in gradually until 2027--giving businesses time to plan compliance--DMA obligations attach immediately upon gatekeeper designation, giving firms a maximum of six months to comply. In addition, while the Data Act requires cloud providers to allow data to move between different data spaces, building the pipelines required by its interoperability mandates may require processing personal data in ways that conflict with DMA consent requirements and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) data minimization principles--a conflict that the commission itself has acknowledged. More broadly, the commission's willingness to abandon its quantitative designation process leaves every cloud provider uncertain of whether it could be designated as a gatekeeper and then face two regulatory regimes without guidance for how to satisfy one without violating the other.
The Impacts of Conflicting Cloud Regulation
The costs of regulatory overlap are not lost on European policymakers. The famous September 2024 Draghi Report argued that the European Union's "inconsistent and restrictive regulations" harm the bloc's competitiveness, innovation, and growth, using overlaps between the GDPR and the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) as an example. Following the report, the European Parliament sought proposals to simplify EU digital economy laws and reduce companies' administrative burdens. In October 2025, the European Parliament published a report assessing the overlaps between the AI Act and other pieces of EU digital legislation, including the Data Act, and found that "their interplay creates significant regulatory complexity." There are three likely consequences of the regulatory confusion caused by the overlap between the Data Act and DMA on European cloud capability: slowed buildout, entrenched foreign market leadership, and foreign dependence.
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Figure 1: U.S. Firms Build Majority of New EU Datacenters
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The Draghi Report illustrates clearly how duplicative regulation can stifle innovation and competitiveness. Designating AWS and Azure as gatekeepers would subject two of the three largest investors in Europe's data center buildout to contradictory obligations under separate regulatory frameworks. As AWS noted in its statement, the preliminary rulings "risk deterring European investment and innovation." AWS's warning is more than corporate posturing--a large body of academic scholarship shows that policy uncertainty makes firms more cautious about large capital commitments and can delay such investments. Closer to home, the European Investment Report for 2024 and 2025 found that 74 percent of firms cited regulatory inconsistency as a barrier to expanding their business in the European Union. If AWS and Microsoft scale back their European investment, the European Union's ambitious plan to triple data center capacity in five to seven years would become even more difficult.
Duplicative regulation could also reduce the availability of cutting-edge services to European businesses while suppressing adoption of those that do reach the market. European regulations have already prompted U.S. firms to delay or withhold new products from the European market, leaving businesses without tools available to their global competitors. One study found that 11 percent of advanced large language model releases were delayed or withheld from the European Union compared to the United States due to regulatory reasons. European AI firms may avoid the most capable and cost-competitive cloud services offered by AWS and Azure to sidestep regulatory uncertainty. Pushed toward domestic alternatives, they would face more limited cloud AI infrastructure capacity, further widening the competitiveness gap with their foreign counterparts.
Consequence 2: Entrenching the Leaders
A second consequence of the commission's decision could, ironically, be to cement AWS's and Azure's leading positions in the European market. Regulatory compliance is expensive, and large firms are generally better positioned to absorb its costs than smaller competitors. This dynamic occurred during the European Union's implementation of the GDPR, when U.S. firms gained European market share while European firms lost it, owing to U.S. firms' ability to pay the regulation's fines. In FY 2025, AWS reported revenue of $128.7 billion; Microsoft reported over $75 billion from Azure alone. SAP and Deutsche Telekom, the two European cloud service providers with the largest share of the European market, reported cloud revenue of Euros21 billion and Euros4.1 billion, respectively. If compliance with both the DMA and the Data Act becomes a battle of resources, AWS and Microsoft are better equipped than European firms. While the commission is unlikely to subject SAP or Deutsche Telecom to gatekeeper status, the ambiguity surrounding its qualitative threshold approach means European firms cannot be certain. Faced with that uncertainty, they may avoid the aggressive growth strategies that could bring them within the commission's sights.
The preliminary designations could entrench AWS and Azure's advantage in a second, more subtle way: Regardless of the designation's outcome, AWS and Azure will soon have defined regulatory obligations and the resources to meet them. European enterprises, navigating an uncertain and overlapping regulatory environment, may come to see that defined compliance position as a competitive advantage favoring AWS and Azure over less-resourced European alternatives. The cumulative effect could be a European cloud market more concentrated around the very U.S. incumbents that EU digital sovereignty policy is designed to counterbalance against.
Consequence 3: A Lack of Domestic European Alternatives and Foreign Dependence
Limiting the growth of U.S. hyperscalers could make sense if there were European providers able to fill the investment vacuum. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that there is not. European providers' share of the European cloud computing market declined from 29 percent in 2017 to 15 percent in 2022 and remained there until 2025, and it is unclear whether European firms have the resources necessary to reverse this trend. Additionally, European providers are ill-equipped to provide the AI-specific infrastructure necessary to meet Europe's rapidly growing cloud demand. Without viable European alternatives, European firms dependent on cloud infrastructure could find themselves increasingly reliant on providers based outside the European Union. The result could be the opposite of digital sovereignty: deeper European dependence on non-EU providers at a moment when geopolitical ties are fraying. And while the European Union has stated its goal to triple total data center capacity within five to seven years, many independent analysts consider the target unrealistic. Moreover, the European Union's plans rely largely on private investment to reach that goal, and European cloud providers lack the balance sheets to supply the estimated Euros200 billion the European Union is targeting for its AI buildout.
Policy Suggestions
Cloud computing is a quickly evolving technology that is foundational for competitiveness in the new AI economy. In the face of such dramatic economic change, the European Commission is implementing new tools such as the Data Act and others to mitigate possible harms. The commission should give its new tools a chance to combat the negative externalities they were designed to prevent and use traditional antitrust powers to ensure competitive markets if necessary. Likewise, the commission should encourage the growth of European cloud providers to address sovereignty concerns. However, if the commission decides to proceed with gatekeeper designations for AWS and Azure, below are two possible recommendations to mitigate regulatory friction between the DMA and the Data Act.
* Provide DMA and Data Act Implementation Guidance: In the short term, the commission should release joint implementation guidance clarifying how cloud service providers designated as gatekeepers can meet their obligations under both the DMA and Data Act. Such guidance could focus on four specific policy areas: (1) compliance timeline conflicts between egress fees and switching and interoperability requirements under the two laws; (2) guidance regarding ongoing data interoperability standards-setting discussions; (3) details about how national authorities and the commission will coordinate enforcement; and (4) the specific quantitative and qualitative factors the commission will use in weighing future cloud service provider gatekeeper designations. Issuing such guidance now, prior to the final designation decisions, would benefit all parties. AWS and Azure could begin their compliance preparation, and European cloud providers would receive a regulatory roadmap to follow while building out their own capabilities.
* Establish a Sovereignty Certification Framework: To mitigate the sovereignty concerns raised by reliance on U.S. companies, the European Commission could expand the sovereignty risk-tiered framework introduced in the proposed Cloud and Development AI Act beyond its current scope into a certification framework explicitly cross-referenced with DMA and Data Act obligations. This expansion could be accompanied by formal guidance clarifying what partitioned hyperscaler infrastructure does and does not achieve at each sovereignty tier and matching task categories to the appropriate tier. Such a framework would give both providers and cloud consumers a clear map of where sovereignty concerns apply and where they do not, offering AWS and Microsoft the regulatory certainty needed to continue their European infrastructure investment. Such clarity would also incentivize European providers to invest specifically in the highest sensitivity tiers where U.S.-headquartered providers raise insurmountable sovereignty issues.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/brussels-vs-brussels-eus-data-act-and-dmas-clash-over-cloud
[Category: ThinkTank]