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Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan Deepen Strategic Partnership
WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by sinologist and policy analyst Vusal Guliyev in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan Deepen Strategic Partnership
Executive Summary:
* Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on June 22, where they signed 13 agreements expanding cooperation in energy, transport, customs, industry, and diplomacy, institutionalizing a broader strategic partnership amid shifting Eurasian dynamics.
* Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by sinologist and policy analyst Vusal Guliyev in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan Deepen Strategic Partnership Executive Summary: * Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on June 22, where they signed 13 agreements expanding cooperation in energy, transport, customs, industry, and diplomacy, institutionalizing a broader strategic partnership amid shifting Eurasian dynamics. * Azerbaijan and Turkmenistanprioritized trans-Caspian transport integration by advancing customs modernization, port cooperation, and east-west transit corridors, strengthening the Middle Corridor as demand grows for alternatives to Russian and
* Expanded energy coordination, economic cooperation, and multilateral engagement position Baku and Ashgabat as important hubs in Caspian connectivity, enhancing their role in linking Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and European markets.
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On June 22, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov paid a state visit to Azerbaijan (President of Azerbaijan, June 22). During the visit, he met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and participated in a series of bilateral meetings and signing ceremonies of agreements. The visit was another step in the continuing Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan cooperation in transportation, energy, trade, and regional connectivity. This comes at a time when alternative Eurasian transit routes are attracting increasing international attention amid Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine and persistent disruptions to global maritime trade routes.
During the visit, Aliyev and Berdimuhamedov held one-on-one and expanded-format meetings. The talks were followed by the signing of a joint statement outlining the two countries' shared commitment to deepening cooperation across multiple sectors (President of Azerbaijan, June 22). The meetings reflected the steady evolution of Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan relations from traditional neighborly ties into a more comprehensive strategic partnership encompassing economic, infrastructural, and diplomatic dimensions.
One of the major outcomes of the visit was the signing of 13 bilateral cooperation agreements covering customs cooperation, transport facilitation, energy, industry, agriculture, healthcare, labor policy, sports, food safety, and foreign policy coordination (President of Azerbaijan, June 22). The breadth of these documents demonstrated both governments' determination to institutionalize cooperation and to create new mechanisms for long-term collaboration.
Among the agreements inked during the visit were two customs-related documents. The documents seek to improve information sharing on cross-border goods and vehicles while strengthening bilateral cooperation in customs statistics (AZERTAC, June 22). These measures are expected to facilitate cross-border trade, enhance transparency, and streamline transit operations across the wider Caspian region. They are also likely to boost the efficiency and competitiveness of the Middle Corridor as a key Eurasian transport route (see EDM, June 17; Eurasianet, July 23).
The economic dimension of the partnership was further reinforced through the signing of an Agreement on the Main Directions of Development and Deepening of Economic Cooperation between the Governments of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (APA, June 22). In addition, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding to promote collaboration between Azerbaijan's Central Bank and Turkmenistan's Ministry of Finance and Economy. Industrial cooperation also featured prominently on the agenda. They also signed an agreement for a Program on Cooperation in the Field of Industry for 2026-2028 to provide a framework for closer collaboration in manufacturing and industrial development (The Gulf Observer, June 23).
Energy remains one of the most important pillars of Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan relations. The parties signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Energy to strengthen coordination in the sector, which is central to both countries' economies and regional positions (Interfax Information Group, June 22). For more than a decade, Azerbaijan's energy transit infrastructure has served as the principal westward export channel for Turkmen energy resources. Since 2010, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline has facilitated the export of millions of barrels of Turkmen crude oil to international markets via Azerbaijan (OSW, August 28, 2010; AZERTAC, November 15, 2010; Caspian Barrel, April 27, 2018; AZERTAC, January 19).
The diplomatic, social, and humanitarian dimensions of bilateral cooperation were also expanded between the two Caspian littoral states. Memoranda of understanding were signed in the areas of healthcare, labor, social protection, and sports (TAKYK, June 22). Diplomatic coordination also received additional attention through the signing of a Cooperation Program for 2026-2029 between the foreign ministries of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (Business Turkmenistan, June 22). These documents are expected to facilitate closer consultations on regional and international issues and enhance coordination within multilateral organizations.
Both leaders emphasized the importance of expanding cooperation in transport and transit. Berdimuhamedov stated that the two sides had agreed to work closely on developing transport and transit corridors along the east-west route that passes through the territories of both countries. He identified transport and transit as a priority area for bilateral cooperation, noting that the geographic locations of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan offer significant advantages for developing international transport corridors. Berdimuhamedov also called for strengthening the activities of the Turkmen-Azerbaijani Commission on Transport, Transit, and Logistics to further enhance coordination and connectivity (President of Azerbaijan, June 22).
The Afghanistan-Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkiye transport corridor was presented as a successful example of regional cooperation, while both sides reaffirmed their support for developing the Caspian Sea-Black Sea transport corridor along the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania route (President of Azerbaijan, June 22). These statements align with broader efforts by both countries to strengthen trans-Caspian connectivity and improve the efficiency of Eurasian supply channels. As the southern branch of the Middle Corridor gains momentum, connecting the People's Republic of China to European markets via Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkiye, Baku and Ashgabat are emerging as key players in the broader Caspian connectivity and trade architecture (ADY, February 10; see EDM March 17).
Bilateral transportation cooperation has intensified in recent months, with the ports of Baku and Turkmenbashi playing an increasingly important role in enhancing the efficiency of the Middle Corridor. In January and April, government officials and port representatives from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan held meetings to facilitate cooperation in the maritime transport and logistics sector (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, January 27; Embassy of Turkmenistan in Azerbaijan, April 1). These discussions mainly focused on increasing cargo flows through improved logistics coordination, enhanced digital connectivity, and expanded transport links between the two seaports as part of broader measures to stimulate trans-Caspian trade connectivity (AZERTAC, April 1).
The presidents also reaffirmed their readiness to continue cooperation within international and regional organizations and maintain close interaction through Caspian cooperation mechanisms. This commitment builds on the longstanding coordination between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan within various multilateral frameworks, including the Economic Cooperation Organization, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of Turkic States, the Middle Corridor Initiative, CASCA+ Framework, and the C6 Platform (APA, March 2, 2023; President of Azerbaijan, October 7, 2025; see EDM, January 21, 28; TREND News Agency, June 9; Organization of Turkic States, accessed June 25). Such engagements enable both countries to promote regional cooperation, multilateral dialogue, and economic connectivity across Eurasia.
The outcomes of Berdimuhamedov's visit to Azerbaijan demonstrate how Baku and Ashgabat are steadily expanding their partnership across a wide range of sectors. The combination of new economic agreements, energy cooperation, customs modernization initiatives, and commitments to enhance east-west transit connectivity suggests that both countries view deeper bilateral cooperation as an essential component of their broader regional strategies. As demand grows for efficient transcontinental transport routes linking Europe and Asia, the strengthening Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan partnership is likely to shape this connectivity across the Caspian region and the wider Eurasian space.
* * *
Vusal Guliyev is a Sinologist, TCSOL Specialist, and Policy Analyst specializing in the geopolitical affairs of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/azerbaijan-and-turkmenistan-deepen-strategic-partnership/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan Deepen Strategic Partnership
Executive Summary:
* Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on June 22, where they signed 13 agreements expanding cooperation in energy, transport, customs, industry, and diplomacy, institutionalizing a broader strategic partnership amid shifting Eurasian dynamics.
* Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by sinologist and policy analyst Vusal Guliyev in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan Deepen Strategic Partnership Executive Summary: * Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku on June 22, where they signed 13 agreements expanding cooperation in energy, transport, customs, industry, and diplomacy, institutionalizing a broader strategic partnership amid shifting Eurasian dynamics. * Azerbaijan and Turkmenistanprioritized trans-Caspian transport integration by advancing customs modernization, port cooperation, and east-west transit corridors, strengthening the Middle Corridor as demand grows for alternatives to Russian and
* Expanded energy coordination, economic cooperation, and multilateral engagement position Baku and Ashgabat as important hubs in Caspian connectivity, enhancing their role in linking Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and European markets.
-
On June 22, Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov paid a state visit to Azerbaijan (President of Azerbaijan, June 22). During the visit, he met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and participated in a series of bilateral meetings and signing ceremonies of agreements. The visit was another step in the continuing Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan cooperation in transportation, energy, trade, and regional connectivity. This comes at a time when alternative Eurasian transit routes are attracting increasing international attention amid Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine and persistent disruptions to global maritime trade routes.
During the visit, Aliyev and Berdimuhamedov held one-on-one and expanded-format meetings. The talks were followed by the signing of a joint statement outlining the two countries' shared commitment to deepening cooperation across multiple sectors (President of Azerbaijan, June 22). The meetings reflected the steady evolution of Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan relations from traditional neighborly ties into a more comprehensive strategic partnership encompassing economic, infrastructural, and diplomatic dimensions.
One of the major outcomes of the visit was the signing of 13 bilateral cooperation agreements covering customs cooperation, transport facilitation, energy, industry, agriculture, healthcare, labor policy, sports, food safety, and foreign policy coordination (President of Azerbaijan, June 22). The breadth of these documents demonstrated both governments' determination to institutionalize cooperation and to create new mechanisms for long-term collaboration.
Among the agreements inked during the visit were two customs-related documents. The documents seek to improve information sharing on cross-border goods and vehicles while strengthening bilateral cooperation in customs statistics (AZERTAC, June 22). These measures are expected to facilitate cross-border trade, enhance transparency, and streamline transit operations across the wider Caspian region. They are also likely to boost the efficiency and competitiveness of the Middle Corridor as a key Eurasian transport route (see EDM, June 17; Eurasianet, July 23).
The economic dimension of the partnership was further reinforced through the signing of an Agreement on the Main Directions of Development and Deepening of Economic Cooperation between the Governments of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (APA, June 22). In addition, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding to promote collaboration between Azerbaijan's Central Bank and Turkmenistan's Ministry of Finance and Economy. Industrial cooperation also featured prominently on the agenda. They also signed an agreement for a Program on Cooperation in the Field of Industry for 2026-2028 to provide a framework for closer collaboration in manufacturing and industrial development (The Gulf Observer, June 23).
Energy remains one of the most important pillars of Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan relations. The parties signed an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Energy to strengthen coordination in the sector, which is central to both countries' economies and regional positions (Interfax Information Group, June 22). For more than a decade, Azerbaijan's energy transit infrastructure has served as the principal westward export channel for Turkmen energy resources. Since 2010, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline has facilitated the export of millions of barrels of Turkmen crude oil to international markets via Azerbaijan (OSW, August 28, 2010; AZERTAC, November 15, 2010; Caspian Barrel, April 27, 2018; AZERTAC, January 19).
The diplomatic, social, and humanitarian dimensions of bilateral cooperation were also expanded between the two Caspian littoral states. Memoranda of understanding were signed in the areas of healthcare, labor, social protection, and sports (TAKYK, June 22). Diplomatic coordination also received additional attention through the signing of a Cooperation Program for 2026-2029 between the foreign ministries of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (Business Turkmenistan, June 22). These documents are expected to facilitate closer consultations on regional and international issues and enhance coordination within multilateral organizations.
Both leaders emphasized the importance of expanding cooperation in transport and transit. Berdimuhamedov stated that the two sides had agreed to work closely on developing transport and transit corridors along the east-west route that passes through the territories of both countries. He identified transport and transit as a priority area for bilateral cooperation, noting that the geographic locations of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan offer significant advantages for developing international transport corridors. Berdimuhamedov also called for strengthening the activities of the Turkmen-Azerbaijani Commission on Transport, Transit, and Logistics to further enhance coordination and connectivity (President of Azerbaijan, June 22).
The Afghanistan-Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkiye transport corridor was presented as a successful example of regional cooperation, while both sides reaffirmed their support for developing the Caspian Sea-Black Sea transport corridor along the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania route (President of Azerbaijan, June 22). These statements align with broader efforts by both countries to strengthen trans-Caspian connectivity and improve the efficiency of Eurasian supply channels. As the southern branch of the Middle Corridor gains momentum, connecting the People's Republic of China to European markets via Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkiye, Baku and Ashgabat are emerging as key players in the broader Caspian connectivity and trade architecture (ADY, February 10; see EDM March 17).
Bilateral transportation cooperation has intensified in recent months, with the ports of Baku and Turkmenbashi playing an increasingly important role in enhancing the efficiency of the Middle Corridor. In January and April, government officials and port representatives from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan held meetings to facilitate cooperation in the maritime transport and logistics sector (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, January 27; Embassy of Turkmenistan in Azerbaijan, April 1). These discussions mainly focused on increasing cargo flows through improved logistics coordination, enhanced digital connectivity, and expanded transport links between the two seaports as part of broader measures to stimulate trans-Caspian trade connectivity (AZERTAC, April 1).
The presidents also reaffirmed their readiness to continue cooperation within international and regional organizations and maintain close interaction through Caspian cooperation mechanisms. This commitment builds on the longstanding coordination between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan within various multilateral frameworks, including the Economic Cooperation Organization, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of Turkic States, the Middle Corridor Initiative, CASCA+ Framework, and the C6 Platform (APA, March 2, 2023; President of Azerbaijan, October 7, 2025; see EDM, January 21, 28; TREND News Agency, June 9; Organization of Turkic States, accessed June 25). Such engagements enable both countries to promote regional cooperation, multilateral dialogue, and economic connectivity across Eurasia.
The outcomes of Berdimuhamedov's visit to Azerbaijan demonstrate how Baku and Ashgabat are steadily expanding their partnership across a wide range of sectors. The combination of new economic agreements, energy cooperation, customs modernization initiatives, and commitments to enhance east-west transit connectivity suggests that both countries view deeper bilateral cooperation as an essential component of their broader regional strategies. As demand grows for efficient transcontinental transport routes linking Europe and Asia, the strengthening Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan partnership is likely to shape this connectivity across the Caspian region and the wider Eurasian space.
* * *
Vusal Guliyev is a Sinologist, TCSOL Specialist, and Policy Analyst specializing in the geopolitical affairs of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/azerbaijan-and-turkmenistan-deepen-strategic-partnership/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Material Shortages in German Manufacturing Worsen
MUNICH, Germany, July 7 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
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Material Shortages in German Manufacturing Worsen
More and more companies in Germany are reporting problems in procuring intermediate products. In June, 17.2% of companies had to contend with material shortages. In May, the figure was still 15.9%. "Although the Strait of Hormuz is navigable again, the effects of the disruptions can still be felt," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "It will probably be a while before international supply chains are completely back to normal again."
The situation is especially ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, July 7 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Material Shortages in German Manufacturing Worsen More and more companies in Germany are reporting problems in procuring intermediate products. In June, 17.2% of companies had to contend with material shortages. In May, the figure was still 15.9%. "Although the Strait of Hormuz is navigable again, the effects of the disruptions can still be felt," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "It will probably be a while before international supply chains are completely back to normal again." The situation is especiallytense in the chemical industry, with almost a third (29.5%) of companies reporting material shortages. The situation for manufacturers of data processing equipment and electronic and optical products worsened considerably:
The share rose from 25.5 to 34.2%. Shortages also continued to worsen for manufacturers of electrical equipment and reached 2.7%. The situation in mechanical engineering remained virtually unchanged at 15.6%. In the automotive industry, the share of companies affected rose from 10.0 to 15.7%.
The situation for manufacturers of rubber and plastic products, on the other hand, has eased somewhat, with the share of companies with material shortages falling from 23.7 to 11.3%. Manufacturers in the beverage industry continued to report no shortages.
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More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-07-07/material-shortages-german-manufacturing-worsen)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-07/material-shortages-german-manufacturing-worsen
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Material Shortages in German Manufacturing Worsen
More and more companies in Germany are reporting problems in procuring intermediate products. In June, 17.2% of companies had to contend with material shortages. In May, the figure was still 15.9%. "Although the Strait of Hormuz is navigable again, the effects of the disruptions can still be felt," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "It will probably be a while before international supply chains are completely back to normal again."
The situation is especially ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, July 7 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Material Shortages in German Manufacturing Worsen More and more companies in Germany are reporting problems in procuring intermediate products. In June, 17.2% of companies had to contend with material shortages. In May, the figure was still 15.9%. "Although the Strait of Hormuz is navigable again, the effects of the disruptions can still be felt," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "It will probably be a while before international supply chains are completely back to normal again." The situation is especiallytense in the chemical industry, with almost a third (29.5%) of companies reporting material shortages. The situation for manufacturers of data processing equipment and electronic and optical products worsened considerably:
The share rose from 25.5 to 34.2%. Shortages also continued to worsen for manufacturers of electrical equipment and reached 2.7%. The situation in mechanical engineering remained virtually unchanged at 15.6%. In the automotive industry, the share of companies affected rose from 10.0 to 15.7%.
The situation for manufacturers of rubber and plastic products, on the other hand, has eased somewhat, with the share of companies with material shortages falling from 23.7 to 11.3%. Manufacturers in the beverage industry continued to report no shortages.
* * *
More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-07-07/material-shortages-german-manufacturing-worsen)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-07/material-shortages-german-manufacturing-worsen
[Category: ThinkTank]
Heritage Expert on Smithsonian Report: National Museum of American History Has Become Wholly Un-American
WASHINGTON, July 7 (TNSrep) -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release on July 6, 2026:
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Heritage Expert on New Smithsonian Report: The National Museum of American History Has Become Wholly Un-American
Following an executive order calling for a complete audit of the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History, the Trump administration released a sweeping report (https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/07/saving-americas-story/) with thousands of examples of how the museum is failing its basic task of showcasing American history.
Using the museum leaders' own words, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 (TNSrep) -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release on July 6, 2026: * * * Heritage Expert on New Smithsonian Report: The National Museum of American History Has Become Wholly Un-American Following an executive order calling for a complete audit of the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History, the Trump administration released a sweeping report (https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/07/saving-americas-story/) with thousands of examples of how the museum is failing its basic task of showcasing American history. Using the museum leaders' own words,the report clearly documents how the museum has shifted its mission from history to woke activism, with exhibits that:
* Reject America's heritage and reframe history through a DEI agenda
* Fail to showcase America's Founding era, except for castigating the Founders as slaveowners
* Promote sexual images and inappropriate material for young children
* Promote pro-abortion messaging
* Demand the abolishment of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency
* Refuse to celebrate America's 250th birthday or America's Founders
Mike Gonzalez, the Angeles T. Arredondo E Pluribus Unum senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation, made the following statement:
"The timely report makes clear why we have Marxist politicians like Zohran Mamdani, Pramila Jayapal, and Katie Wilson. They and their voters have been taught by institutions such as the Smithsonian to despise America's history and heritage.
"This report is therefore a clarion call for the Board of Regents to fire the Institution's Secretary Lonnie Bunch III and the entire leadership. Congress, which appropriates more than $1.08 billion a year for the Smithsonian, must now act."
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Background Information:
Smithsonian's Woke Leadership Must Go Before America's 250th (https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/commentary/smithsonians-woke-leadership-must-go-americas-250th)
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Original text here: https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-expert-new-smithsonian-report-the-national-museum-american-history-has-become-wholly
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Heritage Expert on New Smithsonian Report: The National Museum of American History Has Become Wholly Un-American
Following an executive order calling for a complete audit of the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History, the Trump administration released a sweeping report (https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/07/saving-americas-story/) with thousands of examples of how the museum is failing its basic task of showcasing American history.
Using the museum leaders' own words, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 (TNSrep) -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release on July 6, 2026: * * * Heritage Expert on New Smithsonian Report: The National Museum of American History Has Become Wholly Un-American Following an executive order calling for a complete audit of the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History, the Trump administration released a sweeping report (https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/07/saving-americas-story/) with thousands of examples of how the museum is failing its basic task of showcasing American history. Using the museum leaders' own words,the report clearly documents how the museum has shifted its mission from history to woke activism, with exhibits that:
* Reject America's heritage and reframe history through a DEI agenda
* Fail to showcase America's Founding era, except for castigating the Founders as slaveowners
* Promote sexual images and inappropriate material for young children
* Promote pro-abortion messaging
* Demand the abolishment of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency
* Refuse to celebrate America's 250th birthday or America's Founders
Mike Gonzalez, the Angeles T. Arredondo E Pluribus Unum senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation, made the following statement:
"The timely report makes clear why we have Marxist politicians like Zohran Mamdani, Pramila Jayapal, and Katie Wilson. They and their voters have been taught by institutions such as the Smithsonian to despise America's history and heritage.
"This report is therefore a clarion call for the Board of Regents to fire the Institution's Secretary Lonnie Bunch III and the entire leadership. Congress, which appropriates more than $1.08 billion a year for the Smithsonian, must now act."
* * *
Background Information:
Smithsonian's Woke Leadership Must Go Before America's 250th (https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/commentary/smithsonians-woke-leadership-must-go-americas-250th)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-expert-new-smithsonian-report-the-national-museum-american-history-has-become-wholly
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary: Ranked Choice Voting is Down, But Not Out
WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by investigative researcher Parker Thayer:
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Ranked choice voting is down, but not out
Ranked choice voting (RCV) was once promoted as the exciting new solution to all of America's polarization problems; a magic cure for the excesses of the two-party system that would restore sanity and fairness.
In the simplest form of an RCV election, all candidates, regardless of party, are placed in one pool and voters rank them in order of preference. If no candidate secures a majority of first place ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by investigative researcher Parker Thayer: * * * Ranked choice voting is down, but not out Ranked choice voting (RCV) was once promoted as the exciting new solution to all of America's polarization problems; a magic cure for the excesses of the two-party system that would restore sanity and fairness. In the simplest form of an RCV election, all candidates, regardless of party, are placed in one pool and voters rank them in order of preference. If no candidate secures a majority of first placeballots, then the candidate with the fewest first place ballots is removed from consideration, and the rankings on those ballots are reassigned. Voters who placed the removed candidate as their first choice have their second choice promoted as their top remaining (i.e.: first) choice. This process repeats until one candidate survives as the top remaining choice for the majority of the voters.
Getting ranked choice voting actually approved by those voters has been another matter. In the past few years a wave of overwhelming rejections has relegated RCV to a political fad. The RCV camp has suffered expensive defeats, failed signature drives, multiple statewide bans, and losses in court while securing only a handful of wins; mostly local wins affecting small jurisdictions.
RCV in 2024
In November 2024 voters simultaneously rejected RCV or RCV-adjacent policies in Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Arizona, while voters in Missouri approved a constitutional amendment codifying a formal ban on ranked-choice voting.
These weren't just small losses; they were devastating routs. In deep-blue Colorado, Proposition 131, which would have replaced partisan primaries with "jungle" primaries and implemented RCV in general elections, failed despite a massive $14 million fundraising haul, making it one of the most expensive ballot measures in state history. Similar to Proposition 131, Question 3 in Nevada would have created chaotic top-five primaries and ranked-choice general elections that included the five best finishers from the primaries. Things initially looked good, since the proposal had passed once in 2022, but it needed to pass again in 2024 to become law. The measure failed the second time around, making Nevada an especially devastating loss because it proved that voters who had once been open to the concept of RCV had reversed course completely when faced with the reality of RCV.
Idaho's Proposition 1, which proposed top-four primaries and ranked-choice general elections, was rejected by an astounding 70 percent of voters. Oregon's Measure 117, which would have adopted RCV in federal and state elections, also failed. Arizona's Proposition 140, while not a strictly RCV-only proposal, would have created a "jungle" primary structure and introduced the possibility of RCV in future general elections. Even the possibility of RCV was undesirable for voters, though, and the proposal went down 41 percent to 59 percent. Missouri's Amendment 7, which proposed the combined package of codified voter ID requirements and an RCV ban, also passed with flying colors, garnering nearly 70 percent of the vote.
RCV in 2025 and 2026
Following a spectacular string of losses at the ballot box in 2024, the RCV movement went on to lose in the legislatures.
In 2025, Arkansas, Kansas, North Dakota, Wyoming, and West Virginia passed and signed legislation banning the use of RCV in local, state, and federal elections, joining Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Mississippi, which had all done the same in 2024.
RCV's first loss in 2026 was neither at the ballot box nor in the legislature because it didn't make it that far. The Rank MI Vote campaign, which aimed to put a constitutional amendment to bring ranked-choice voting to Michigan elections on the 2026 ballot, failed to get the necessary signatures. Rank MI Vote did not give up, though, promising to try again for the 2028 ballot. Then, in March 2026, Rank MI Vote activists were heckled and unceremoniously expelled from the Michigan GOP amid cries of "shame" and "communists." Needless to say, it was not the shot in the arm that RCV needed.
In February 2026, Indiana became the 18th state to ban RCV by passing SB0012. One month later, Ohio became the 19th when Governor Mike DeWine signed Senate Bill 63, prohibiting the use of RCV, even in city or township elections, and imposing the threat of a loss of funding to any city or county that continued to use RCV.
RCV is still holding on
The forecast is not good for ranked choice voting--in fact, it's about as bad as it can be. But RCV did manage to hold its ground and even make a few small gains amid all the losing.
The most important recent win was in Alaska, where voters very narrowly rejected Ballot Measure 2, an effort to repeal the state's open-primary and ranked-choice general-election system, by less than 1,000 votes. By winning, RCV managed to hang on to the state that has been its crown jewel since RCV was first instituted by ballot measure in 2020. A razor-thin margin like that hardly inspires confidence, but RCV supporters also managed to pick up another win in Washington, D.C., where voters overwhelmingly approved Initiative 83, setting a course for the city to begin using it in the 2026 primary.
In other words, RCV is fading fast, but it's not dead yet. And with Alaska putting a repeal of RCV on the ballot again in 2026, the movement will probably have to make its last stand. Without Alaska, RCV will be reduced to a fad that clings to the edges of urban progressive areas, low-salience local elections, and enclaves where the activist class propping up RCV can focus its resources.
The donors keeping RCV on life support
Through all the highs and (mostly) lows, the RCV movement has been kept alive by a small network of left-leaning donors and activists who have refused to give up on the dream that once allowed Alaska to elect a Democrat in a statewide election. That fleeting victory seems to have created an addiction, and many donors are still happily forking over cash to the floundering cause.
The most notable backer of RCV is probably Unite America, a Denver-based political action committee (PAC) that promotes open primaries and ranked-choice voting as a cure-all for America's political and cultural woes. In Colorado, Unite America gave roughly $4.7 million to support Proposition 131. The proposition's individual backers included former DaVita CEO Kent Thiry, Walmart heir Ben Walton, Netflix co-founder Reed Hastings, video game magnate Marc Merrill, and Fox heiress Kathryn Murdoch.
The same donor network showed up again in Nevada and Alaska. In Alaska, the 2024 campaign to keep RCV alive raised more than $12 million, while the campaign to end it raised barely $120,000. Unite America was again one of the top donors and was joined by Article IV, a Virginia-based nonprofit, and Action Now Initiative, a Texas-based "dark money" group funded by hedge fund manager John Arnold. Even with that 100-to-1 funding advantage provided by out-of-state groups, RCV was only able to hold on by less than one percent.
Nevada followed the same pattern: the pro-Question 3 campaign was once again funded heavily by Article IV and Unite America. Interestingly, one of the leading donors to the anti-Question 3 campaign was the Nevada Alliance, another left-leaning group. Opposing RCV is becoming a bipartisan policy.
RCV activists get around quite a lot. The top donor to the failed Rank MI Vote campaign, for example, was Doug Robbins, who was formerly a pro-RCV activist in Alaska before he packed up and began to champion the cause in Michigan. Robbins contributed $100,000 to the Rank MI Vote committee. It seems like RCV might need him back in Alaska before long, so only time will tell if he remains a Michigander long enough to try and put RCV on the ballot in 2028.
It's time to let RCV go into the light
Voters don't like RCV. Legislators don't like RCV. RCV has been overwhelmingly rejected in nearly every state and territory where it has been on the ballot, which isn't a complete political oddity. It doesn't seem to have any meaningful grassroots support. So why does this pipedream keep sticking around?
Because there are donors who want it.
As with many seemingly popular political causes, the whole operation is little more than a few donors pulling the strings of an apparently wide array of groups. Together, these donors are keeping a long-since dead fad on life support when the humane thing to do would be to pull the plug.
* * *
Parker Thayer is an Investigative Researcher at Capital Research Center. A native of Michigan, he recently graduated from Hillsdale College.
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/ranked-choice-voting-is-down-but-not-out/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Ranked choice voting is down, but not out
Ranked choice voting (RCV) was once promoted as the exciting new solution to all of America's polarization problems; a magic cure for the excesses of the two-party system that would restore sanity and fairness.
In the simplest form of an RCV election, all candidates, regardless of party, are placed in one pool and voters rank them in order of preference. If no candidate secures a majority of first place ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by investigative researcher Parker Thayer: * * * Ranked choice voting is down, but not out Ranked choice voting (RCV) was once promoted as the exciting new solution to all of America's polarization problems; a magic cure for the excesses of the two-party system that would restore sanity and fairness. In the simplest form of an RCV election, all candidates, regardless of party, are placed in one pool and voters rank them in order of preference. If no candidate secures a majority of first placeballots, then the candidate with the fewest first place ballots is removed from consideration, and the rankings on those ballots are reassigned. Voters who placed the removed candidate as their first choice have their second choice promoted as their top remaining (i.e.: first) choice. This process repeats until one candidate survives as the top remaining choice for the majority of the voters.
Getting ranked choice voting actually approved by those voters has been another matter. In the past few years a wave of overwhelming rejections has relegated RCV to a political fad. The RCV camp has suffered expensive defeats, failed signature drives, multiple statewide bans, and losses in court while securing only a handful of wins; mostly local wins affecting small jurisdictions.
RCV in 2024
In November 2024 voters simultaneously rejected RCV or RCV-adjacent policies in Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Arizona, while voters in Missouri approved a constitutional amendment codifying a formal ban on ranked-choice voting.
These weren't just small losses; they were devastating routs. In deep-blue Colorado, Proposition 131, which would have replaced partisan primaries with "jungle" primaries and implemented RCV in general elections, failed despite a massive $14 million fundraising haul, making it one of the most expensive ballot measures in state history. Similar to Proposition 131, Question 3 in Nevada would have created chaotic top-five primaries and ranked-choice general elections that included the five best finishers from the primaries. Things initially looked good, since the proposal had passed once in 2022, but it needed to pass again in 2024 to become law. The measure failed the second time around, making Nevada an especially devastating loss because it proved that voters who had once been open to the concept of RCV had reversed course completely when faced with the reality of RCV.
Idaho's Proposition 1, which proposed top-four primaries and ranked-choice general elections, was rejected by an astounding 70 percent of voters. Oregon's Measure 117, which would have adopted RCV in federal and state elections, also failed. Arizona's Proposition 140, while not a strictly RCV-only proposal, would have created a "jungle" primary structure and introduced the possibility of RCV in future general elections. Even the possibility of RCV was undesirable for voters, though, and the proposal went down 41 percent to 59 percent. Missouri's Amendment 7, which proposed the combined package of codified voter ID requirements and an RCV ban, also passed with flying colors, garnering nearly 70 percent of the vote.
RCV in 2025 and 2026
Following a spectacular string of losses at the ballot box in 2024, the RCV movement went on to lose in the legislatures.
In 2025, Arkansas, Kansas, North Dakota, Wyoming, and West Virginia passed and signed legislation banning the use of RCV in local, state, and federal elections, joining Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Mississippi, which had all done the same in 2024.
RCV's first loss in 2026 was neither at the ballot box nor in the legislature because it didn't make it that far. The Rank MI Vote campaign, which aimed to put a constitutional amendment to bring ranked-choice voting to Michigan elections on the 2026 ballot, failed to get the necessary signatures. Rank MI Vote did not give up, though, promising to try again for the 2028 ballot. Then, in March 2026, Rank MI Vote activists were heckled and unceremoniously expelled from the Michigan GOP amid cries of "shame" and "communists." Needless to say, it was not the shot in the arm that RCV needed.
In February 2026, Indiana became the 18th state to ban RCV by passing SB0012. One month later, Ohio became the 19th when Governor Mike DeWine signed Senate Bill 63, prohibiting the use of RCV, even in city or township elections, and imposing the threat of a loss of funding to any city or county that continued to use RCV.
RCV is still holding on
The forecast is not good for ranked choice voting--in fact, it's about as bad as it can be. But RCV did manage to hold its ground and even make a few small gains amid all the losing.
The most important recent win was in Alaska, where voters very narrowly rejected Ballot Measure 2, an effort to repeal the state's open-primary and ranked-choice general-election system, by less than 1,000 votes. By winning, RCV managed to hang on to the state that has been its crown jewel since RCV was first instituted by ballot measure in 2020. A razor-thin margin like that hardly inspires confidence, but RCV supporters also managed to pick up another win in Washington, D.C., where voters overwhelmingly approved Initiative 83, setting a course for the city to begin using it in the 2026 primary.
In other words, RCV is fading fast, but it's not dead yet. And with Alaska putting a repeal of RCV on the ballot again in 2026, the movement will probably have to make its last stand. Without Alaska, RCV will be reduced to a fad that clings to the edges of urban progressive areas, low-salience local elections, and enclaves where the activist class propping up RCV can focus its resources.
The donors keeping RCV on life support
Through all the highs and (mostly) lows, the RCV movement has been kept alive by a small network of left-leaning donors and activists who have refused to give up on the dream that once allowed Alaska to elect a Democrat in a statewide election. That fleeting victory seems to have created an addiction, and many donors are still happily forking over cash to the floundering cause.
The most notable backer of RCV is probably Unite America, a Denver-based political action committee (PAC) that promotes open primaries and ranked-choice voting as a cure-all for America's political and cultural woes. In Colorado, Unite America gave roughly $4.7 million to support Proposition 131. The proposition's individual backers included former DaVita CEO Kent Thiry, Walmart heir Ben Walton, Netflix co-founder Reed Hastings, video game magnate Marc Merrill, and Fox heiress Kathryn Murdoch.
The same donor network showed up again in Nevada and Alaska. In Alaska, the 2024 campaign to keep RCV alive raised more than $12 million, while the campaign to end it raised barely $120,000. Unite America was again one of the top donors and was joined by Article IV, a Virginia-based nonprofit, and Action Now Initiative, a Texas-based "dark money" group funded by hedge fund manager John Arnold. Even with that 100-to-1 funding advantage provided by out-of-state groups, RCV was only able to hold on by less than one percent.
Nevada followed the same pattern: the pro-Question 3 campaign was once again funded heavily by Article IV and Unite America. Interestingly, one of the leading donors to the anti-Question 3 campaign was the Nevada Alliance, another left-leaning group. Opposing RCV is becoming a bipartisan policy.
RCV activists get around quite a lot. The top donor to the failed Rank MI Vote campaign, for example, was Doug Robbins, who was formerly a pro-RCV activist in Alaska before he packed up and began to champion the cause in Michigan. Robbins contributed $100,000 to the Rank MI Vote committee. It seems like RCV might need him back in Alaska before long, so only time will tell if he remains a Michigander long enough to try and put RCV on the ballot in 2028.
It's time to let RCV go into the light
Voters don't like RCV. Legislators don't like RCV. RCV has been overwhelmingly rejected in nearly every state and territory where it has been on the ballot, which isn't a complete political oddity. It doesn't seem to have any meaningful grassroots support. So why does this pipedream keep sticking around?
Because there are donors who want it.
As with many seemingly popular political causes, the whole operation is little more than a few donors pulling the strings of an apparently wide array of groups. Together, these donors are keeping a long-since dead fad on life support when the humane thing to do would be to pull the plug.
* * *
Parker Thayer is an Investigative Researcher at Capital Research Center. A native of Michigan, he recently graduated from Hillsdale College.
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/ranked-choice-voting-is-down-but-not-out/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Make the Ankara Summit About European Defense Autonomy
WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by Max Bergmann, director of the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies, and Otto Svendsen, associate fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program:
* * *
Make the Ankara Summit About European Defense Autonomy
When NATO convenes in Ankara this week, it will do so at a low point in the alliance's modern history. The transatlantic relationship has already careened toward a breaking point on multiple occasions in 2026. The lowest ebb came earlier ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by Max Bergmann, director of the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies, and Otto Svendsen, associate fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program: * * * Make the Ankara Summit About European Defense Autonomy When NATO convenes in Ankara this week, it will do so at a low point in the alliance's modern history. The transatlantic relationship has already careened toward a breaking point on multiple occasions in 2026. The lowest ebb came earlierthis year when the United States threatened to seize Greenland, the territory of a fellow NATO country.
Compounding the political turbulence is a sobering military reality: Serious doubts persist about Europe's ability to deter, let alone repel, a Russian act of aggression on the alliance's eastern flank. As the Ankara summit may be the last annual NATO gathering for some time, now is the moment to chart a more sustainable path for Europe's defense--a path that allows Europe to take charge of the continent's conventional defense and become a more capable ally to the United States.
The End of Wishful Thinking
European leaders should recognize that a return to the previous status quo is unlikely. Even under a more accommodating administration, the structural forces behind Washington pushing Europe to take responsibility for its own defense will grow. The Iran war has badly depleted U.S. stockpiles of air defense interceptors and precision munitions, and the Pentagon will likely spend years prioritizing replenishment over foreign military sales to European partners. Strategic competition with China continues to animate U.S. trade, technology, and defense policy across both parties, and the Indo-Pacific theater, as well as other theaters, will absorb a growing share of Washington's attention. Moreover, the Trump administration's hostile approach to Europe will likely continue, whether on defense, technology, or economic policy.
Europe should therefore move with urgency to prepare for a future in which the United States plays a minimal role in the conventional defense of the continent. Rather than approaching Ankara as another exercise in placating President Trump with symbolic communique language and short-term concessions, NATO's European allies should make clear that they are ready to take the reins. Doing so requires more than the headline defense spending pledges of recent summits, whose effects on Europe's readiness to fight remain unclear and whose implementation continues to assume substantial U.S. enabling support.
European allies should instead aim to advance three overarching priorities in Ankara.
Develop a Transition Plan to Implement Burden Shifting
First, European allies should present the Trump administration with a comprehensive burden-shifting plan for transatlantic defense. Europe needs a credible roadmap to assume responsibility for its own conventional defense, with clear timelines and milestones for taking over the critical enablers that currently underwrite NATO operations (for example, command and control, intelligence and targeting capabilities that facilitate long-range strike, airborne early warning capabilities, and aerial refueling). These capabilities cannot be developed in a crisis, and the United States has signaled that it will not indefinitely provide them.
One pragmatic option, as recently presented by Luis Simon and Stephen G. Brooks in Foreign Affairs, entails a structured arrangement through which European allies cofinance the U.S. enabling infrastructure underpinning NATO's collective defense. Payments delivered in phases, conditioned on continued full U.S. provision, would literally raise the cost of disengagement: Cutting off Europe would mean forfeiting a lucrative long-term funding stream. Integrating subregional coalitions of European countries into NATO's command structure would also be a worthwhile agenda item in Ankara to hedge against U.S. disengagement.
A Roaring European Defense Industrial Base
Second, Europe's major powers should use the Ankara summit to formalize a political compact placing the European defense industrial base on a wartime footing. Defense industry executives have been clear about what they need to expand capacity at the speed required: long-term contracts that justify capital investment, predictable demand signals across multiple budget cycles, and government action to shore up supply chains for critical raw materials and components. Crucially, this effort must truly incentivize consolidation through European capitals ceding some national control over procurement, as national biases have been a key driver of inefficient spending. Europe's highly fragmented defense industry has thus produced a myriad of duplicative platforms, making it difficult to achieve speed, affordability, and interoperability at scale. For example, analysis by McKinsey suggests that supply chain consolidation of four critical upstream segments could deliver Euros45 billion in cumulative savings by 2030.
For the most acute capability gaps, such as in air defense munitions and long-range precision fires, Europe should leverage the latent organizational and fiscal capacity of the European Union to launch crash production programs. A burden-shifting roadmap should also include long-term European commitments to Ukraine's defense and economic recovery, with particular emphasis on building Ukraine's domestic defense industry and integrating it with the European defense industrial base. Ukrainian production lines, hardened by three years of war, represent an opportunity Europe cannot forgo.
This kind of political agreement among the continent's principal military powers would do more than any communique to convince industry, allies, and adversaries alike that Europe is serious and committed to a cohesive and coordinated rearmament process. It would also send a useful signal to Washington: European leaders are not seeking to prolong a dependency Americans increasingly resent, but to manage its unwinding responsibly.
Address the Turkey-EU Question
Third, Ankara itself offers a natural venue to address the question that Turkey poses to European defense, which has long been an obstacle to deeper European defense integration. In particular, tensions between Turkey and Cyprus remain a key obstacle to more productive NATO-EU relations.
Allies should revisit the Berlin Plus agreement, which provides the foundation for cooperation between the European Union and NATO in crisis management and enables limited use of NATO structures by EU member states. Berlin Plus was negotiated in the aftermath of the 1999 Washington summit, when the United States was reluctant to engage in military operations in the Balkans and the sense was that Europe might need to act independently. Not wanting the European Union to recreate or duplicate NATO command structures, it was agreed that the bloc could draw on NATO military assets for crisis management missions.
However, the current Berlin Plus framework is no longer fit for purpose. It is a nonbinding political declaration adopted chiefly with out-of-area peacekeeping operations in mind, provides NATO a de facto "right of first refusal," and requires unanimous NATO approval for the use of alliance resources in EU operations. Turkey's vetoes through NATO have previously delayed the use of alliance assets in EU military operations on several occasions, such as in the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) Afghanistan and the EU-led Operation Concordia.
One potential plan B for Europe if the United States is not fully committed to NATO is obvious: to provide EU member states greater access to NATO structures, with or without the United States, for a broader range of military scenarios. In a crisis contingency, NATO assets could prove crucial to a military operation that the United States doesn't want to engage in.
Accounting for undue duplication of crisis management resources in the NATO-EU relationship has mostly been very sensible. But the need for unanimous NATO agreement to enable the European Union to take greater responsibility for European defense needs to be addressed. NATO should also be much more coordinated and engaged in EU defense initiatives, for example by ensuring that the European Union's institutional advantage in funding and military mobility schemes is leveraged to its full potential. Finally, NATO and the European Union should be able to share classified information to a far greater extent--a prospect that remains opposed by some nonmember states in both organizations.
Show of Resolve
None of this amounts to capitulation to the Trump administration or wishful nostalgia for a pre-2016 alliance. These priorities would, rather, serve as a concrete program for the accelerated burden shifting that leaders on both sides of the Atlantic now privately acknowledge is necessary. They would also offer European leaders, many of whom are contending with restive electorates and accusations of strategic drift, a tangible demonstration of resolve and effectiveness.
Through a series of minor crises, NATO's European members have so far managed to avoid a catastrophic and potentially irreversible rupture with Washington. By not developing a backup plan to defend themselves, they are pushing their luck. Moreover, the Trump administration should recognize that Secretary General Mark Rutte's deferential overtures toward President Trump are undermining efforts to deliver on burden shifting.
The Ankara summit is, in all likelihood, Europe's last opportunity to shape an orderly transition of responsibility for the defense of Europe--rather than have one imposed on it by a revisionist Washington.
* * *
Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Otto Svendsen is an associate fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he provides research and analysis on political, economic, and security developments in Europe.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/make-ankara-summit-about-european-defense-autonomy
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Make the Ankara Summit About European Defense Autonomy
When NATO convenes in Ankara this week, it will do so at a low point in the alliance's modern history. The transatlantic relationship has already careened toward a breaking point on multiple occasions in 2026. The lowest ebb came earlier ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by Max Bergmann, director of the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies, and Otto Svendsen, associate fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program: * * * Make the Ankara Summit About European Defense Autonomy When NATO convenes in Ankara this week, it will do so at a low point in the alliance's modern history. The transatlantic relationship has already careened toward a breaking point on multiple occasions in 2026. The lowest ebb came earlierthis year when the United States threatened to seize Greenland, the territory of a fellow NATO country.
Compounding the political turbulence is a sobering military reality: Serious doubts persist about Europe's ability to deter, let alone repel, a Russian act of aggression on the alliance's eastern flank. As the Ankara summit may be the last annual NATO gathering for some time, now is the moment to chart a more sustainable path for Europe's defense--a path that allows Europe to take charge of the continent's conventional defense and become a more capable ally to the United States.
The End of Wishful Thinking
European leaders should recognize that a return to the previous status quo is unlikely. Even under a more accommodating administration, the structural forces behind Washington pushing Europe to take responsibility for its own defense will grow. The Iran war has badly depleted U.S. stockpiles of air defense interceptors and precision munitions, and the Pentagon will likely spend years prioritizing replenishment over foreign military sales to European partners. Strategic competition with China continues to animate U.S. trade, technology, and defense policy across both parties, and the Indo-Pacific theater, as well as other theaters, will absorb a growing share of Washington's attention. Moreover, the Trump administration's hostile approach to Europe will likely continue, whether on defense, technology, or economic policy.
Europe should therefore move with urgency to prepare for a future in which the United States plays a minimal role in the conventional defense of the continent. Rather than approaching Ankara as another exercise in placating President Trump with symbolic communique language and short-term concessions, NATO's European allies should make clear that they are ready to take the reins. Doing so requires more than the headline defense spending pledges of recent summits, whose effects on Europe's readiness to fight remain unclear and whose implementation continues to assume substantial U.S. enabling support.
European allies should instead aim to advance three overarching priorities in Ankara.
Develop a Transition Plan to Implement Burden Shifting
First, European allies should present the Trump administration with a comprehensive burden-shifting plan for transatlantic defense. Europe needs a credible roadmap to assume responsibility for its own conventional defense, with clear timelines and milestones for taking over the critical enablers that currently underwrite NATO operations (for example, command and control, intelligence and targeting capabilities that facilitate long-range strike, airborne early warning capabilities, and aerial refueling). These capabilities cannot be developed in a crisis, and the United States has signaled that it will not indefinitely provide them.
One pragmatic option, as recently presented by Luis Simon and Stephen G. Brooks in Foreign Affairs, entails a structured arrangement through which European allies cofinance the U.S. enabling infrastructure underpinning NATO's collective defense. Payments delivered in phases, conditioned on continued full U.S. provision, would literally raise the cost of disengagement: Cutting off Europe would mean forfeiting a lucrative long-term funding stream. Integrating subregional coalitions of European countries into NATO's command structure would also be a worthwhile agenda item in Ankara to hedge against U.S. disengagement.
A Roaring European Defense Industrial Base
Second, Europe's major powers should use the Ankara summit to formalize a political compact placing the European defense industrial base on a wartime footing. Defense industry executives have been clear about what they need to expand capacity at the speed required: long-term contracts that justify capital investment, predictable demand signals across multiple budget cycles, and government action to shore up supply chains for critical raw materials and components. Crucially, this effort must truly incentivize consolidation through European capitals ceding some national control over procurement, as national biases have been a key driver of inefficient spending. Europe's highly fragmented defense industry has thus produced a myriad of duplicative platforms, making it difficult to achieve speed, affordability, and interoperability at scale. For example, analysis by McKinsey suggests that supply chain consolidation of four critical upstream segments could deliver Euros45 billion in cumulative savings by 2030.
For the most acute capability gaps, such as in air defense munitions and long-range precision fires, Europe should leverage the latent organizational and fiscal capacity of the European Union to launch crash production programs. A burden-shifting roadmap should also include long-term European commitments to Ukraine's defense and economic recovery, with particular emphasis on building Ukraine's domestic defense industry and integrating it with the European defense industrial base. Ukrainian production lines, hardened by three years of war, represent an opportunity Europe cannot forgo.
This kind of political agreement among the continent's principal military powers would do more than any communique to convince industry, allies, and adversaries alike that Europe is serious and committed to a cohesive and coordinated rearmament process. It would also send a useful signal to Washington: European leaders are not seeking to prolong a dependency Americans increasingly resent, but to manage its unwinding responsibly.
Address the Turkey-EU Question
Third, Ankara itself offers a natural venue to address the question that Turkey poses to European defense, which has long been an obstacle to deeper European defense integration. In particular, tensions between Turkey and Cyprus remain a key obstacle to more productive NATO-EU relations.
Allies should revisit the Berlin Plus agreement, which provides the foundation for cooperation between the European Union and NATO in crisis management and enables limited use of NATO structures by EU member states. Berlin Plus was negotiated in the aftermath of the 1999 Washington summit, when the United States was reluctant to engage in military operations in the Balkans and the sense was that Europe might need to act independently. Not wanting the European Union to recreate or duplicate NATO command structures, it was agreed that the bloc could draw on NATO military assets for crisis management missions.
However, the current Berlin Plus framework is no longer fit for purpose. It is a nonbinding political declaration adopted chiefly with out-of-area peacekeeping operations in mind, provides NATO a de facto "right of first refusal," and requires unanimous NATO approval for the use of alliance resources in EU operations. Turkey's vetoes through NATO have previously delayed the use of alliance assets in EU military operations on several occasions, such as in the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) Afghanistan and the EU-led Operation Concordia.
One potential plan B for Europe if the United States is not fully committed to NATO is obvious: to provide EU member states greater access to NATO structures, with or without the United States, for a broader range of military scenarios. In a crisis contingency, NATO assets could prove crucial to a military operation that the United States doesn't want to engage in.
Accounting for undue duplication of crisis management resources in the NATO-EU relationship has mostly been very sensible. But the need for unanimous NATO agreement to enable the European Union to take greater responsibility for European defense needs to be addressed. NATO should also be much more coordinated and engaged in EU defense initiatives, for example by ensuring that the European Union's institutional advantage in funding and military mobility schemes is leveraged to its full potential. Finally, NATO and the European Union should be able to share classified information to a far greater extent--a prospect that remains opposed by some nonmember states in both organizations.
Show of Resolve
None of this amounts to capitulation to the Trump administration or wishful nostalgia for a pre-2016 alliance. These priorities would, rather, serve as a concrete program for the accelerated burden shifting that leaders on both sides of the Atlantic now privately acknowledge is necessary. They would also offer European leaders, many of whom are contending with restive electorates and accusations of strategic drift, a tangible demonstration of resolve and effectiveness.
Through a series of minor crises, NATO's European members have so far managed to avoid a catastrophic and potentially irreversible rupture with Washington. By not developing a backup plan to defend themselves, they are pushing their luck. Moreover, the Trump administration should recognize that Secretary General Mark Rutte's deferential overtures toward President Trump are undermining efforts to deliver on burden shifting.
The Ankara summit is, in all likelihood, Europe's last opportunity to shape an orderly transition of responsibility for the defense of Europe--rather than have one imposed on it by a revisionist Washington.
* * *
Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Otto Svendsen is an associate fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he provides research and analysis on political, economic, and security developments in Europe.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/make-ankara-summit-about-european-defense-autonomy
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: How the Iran War Weighs on the U.S.-Saudi Partnership and Prospects for Normalization With Israel
WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by senior adviser Michael Ratney and Abdullah Alhenaki, a consultant with the Middle East Program:
* * *
How the Iran War Weighs on the U.S.-Saudi Partnership and Prospects for Normalization with Israel
The Iran war was a conflict Saudi Arabia had not sought and on which it had not been meaningfully consulted. It began with frustratingly little clarity about the United States' shifting goals, much less assurances about the U.S. commitment to protect the kingdom, even while ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by senior adviser Michael Ratney and Abdullah Alhenaki, a consultant with the Middle East Program: * * * How the Iran War Weighs on the U.S.-Saudi Partnership and Prospects for Normalization with Israel The Iran war was a conflict Saudi Arabia had not sought and on which it had not been meaningfully consulted. It began with frustratingly little clarity about the United States' shifting goals, much less assurances about the U.S. commitment to protect the kingdom, even whileit had profound implications for Saudi security and its economy--far more profound for Saudi Arabia and its neighbors, in fact, than for the United States. In that sense, the war was a test case for the recently enhanced U.S.-Saudi security partnership.
It was the looming prospect of war with Iran that had motivated Saudi Arabia to pursue a stronger security partnership with the United States, one that would bring the clarity and assurances they would need if such a conflict came to pass. In fact, security guarantees were of such importance that the Saudi leadership had been willing to contemplate something as controversial among the Saudi population as normalizing relations with Israel as the price of a formal treaty relationship with the United States.
The experience of the Iran war has now colored these calculations, and weighs on Saudi perceptions of its partnership with the United States and on the desirability of a relationship with Israel. This war also came as some of the United States' Middle Eastern partners were already doubting the reliability of the United States as their principal defense partner (and questioning the United States' ability to restrain Israel), even leading Saudi Arabia to sign a mutual defense treaty with Pakistan in September 2025.
The U.S.-Saudi Security Partnership: Unsettled, but Enduring
The U.S.-Saudi security partnership dates to the 1950s, and has endured and expanded through the vicissitudes of the region and the bilateral relationship. During the Biden administration, the United States and Saudi Arabia pursued a significant upgrade in that partnership, including the negotiation of a formal mutual defense treaty. That deal foundered in the aftermath of the Gaza war and because of Israel's refusal to support a path to Palestinian statehood, but Saudi Arabia's desire for an upgraded partnership endured.
When the Saudi crown prince visited Washington in November 2025, he didn't get a mutual defense treaty, but short of that, he did extraordinarily well. Saudi Arabia came away with designation as a major non-NATO ally, signed a new strategic defense agreement, and extracted a U.S. commitment to sell Saudi Arabia the F-35, the most sophisticated fighter jet currently in production. The kingdom arguably advanced into the top tier of U.S. defense partners, and that happened without paying the political price of normalizing with Israel.
That bolstered status still didn't stop the United States from launching a war that implicated Saudi Arabia very directly, but with little consultation with the Saudi leadership on its timing or objectives, and with no clarity on how it might help Saudi Arabia protect itself from inevitable Iranian reprisals. Even more disconcerting, media reports suggested that Washington quickly began struggling to keep up with the defense needs of its Gulf partners. The United States was at that point enmeshed in a conflict that was going on longer than expected and found itself facing a scarcity of critical defense articles for its own war effort. This led Riyadh and other Gulf states to seek cheaper and more readily available systems, such as counter-unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) from Ukraine. In doing this, Saudi Arabia was not simply hedging; it was making rational decisions about its urgent operational requirements during wartime.
A ceasefire was announced in April 2026, by which point it had become exceedingly clear that Washington's ill-conceived objective of regime change would not materialize. Saudi Arabia's preoccupation then became avoiding a return to open conflict, which it believed would inevitably bring renewed Iranian attacks on Saudi targets. Saudi Arabia was so concerned about possible Iranian retaliation that when President Trump announced in May 2026--again, apparently without consulting partners in the region--that the U.S. Navy would escort commercial ships under "Operation Freedom," the kingdom reportedly denied overflight and basing rights to U.S. forces. This led the United States to abandon the operation only two days later, after which Saudi Arabia reportedly restored permissions to the U.S. military.
Was the troubled Iran war experience the beginning of the end of the U.S.-Saudi defense partnership? The short answer is no, but the implications of the Iran war are nonetheless paradoxical. Saudi Arabia's desire for a U.S. security partnership was premised, in significant part, on the notion that alignment with Washington would reduce rather than amplify its exposure to Iranian threats. The 2026 war has inverted that logic. Riyadh now finds itself absorbing the consequences of a military campaign it neither chose nor endorsed. The United States is thus perceived in Saudi strategic calculations not only as the kingdom's primary security partner, but now also as a source of considerable risk. In these circumstances, Saudi leadership might reasonably be asking itself whether a mutual defense treaty would have made any of this better.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia's exposure to Iranian missile and drone bombardment created an acute and immediate demand for advanced air defense systems, intelligence sharing, and access, basing, and overflight arrangements with U.S. forces. Only the United States could reliably supply these critical war-fighting elements at the scale and speed the threat environment demanded. Each Iranian strike on Saudi infrastructure would generate a new operational requirement that in theory would draw Riyadh closer to Washington's operational architecture. In that sense, the Iran war experience should not only validate the existing logic of U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, but could also accelerate its operational depth, including the basing decisions, procurement agreements, and real-time intelligence-sharing that are at the operational heart of bilateral security cooperation. Add to that the long history of bilateral military collaboration, and there is no easy substitute for the United States, as frustrating as Washington might be to work with. It is also difficult to imagine an alternative partner, whether Pakistan or China, that could tip the balance militarily in a conflict between Saudi Arabia and its principal antagonist, Iran.
Saudi Normalization with Israel: Complicated, Unlikely, but Not Impossible
According to conventional wisdom, the recent experiences with Iran, including Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel in April and October 2024, the "12-day war" of 2025, and the Iran war that began in February 2026, should have demonstrated the value of an integrated regional defense and therefore incentivized Saudi Arabia to move closer to Israel. But the logic of normalization was always partly constructed around the premise that alignment with Israel would--like the security partnership with the United States--confer strategic benefits, including reduced vulnerability to external attacks, access to advanced U.S. technology, and regional stability, that offset the reputational cost of association.
The Iran war may actually have dismantled this premise--the more Saudi Arabia was associated with Israeli war objectives, the greater was its exposure to Iranian attacks. It would not have been lost on Saudi leaders that the United Arab Emirates, which has strong relations with Israel and brought the Israeli Iron Dome to Abu Dhabi along with Israeli military personnel to operate it, was targeted more than any other Gulf country. And, ironically, if the war were truly successful on Israeli terms--a long-term Iranian strategic weakening or even a chance of regime change resulting in a more moderate Iranian government less hostile to Israel and the region--it would actually reduce the normalization incentive. Why, after all, pay the political price of a public relationship with Israel if the shared Iranian threat was disappearing? So, if an association with Israel is only seen as increasing the threats to Saudi Arabia, the Saudi case for normalization comes out of the Iran war weaker than before.
Israel's conduct during the Gaza war has also influenced Saudi Arabia's normalization calculus, as has Israel's continued refusal to accept a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and effect a full withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Gaza. Saudi Arabia's official threshold for normalization has been stated repeatedly, and conditions recognition of Israel on Israel's commitment to pursue a path to Palestinian statehood. Saudi Arabia had also been issuing increasingly pointed statements, often jointly with other Arab and Muslim countries, criticizing Israeli actions in the West Bank.
Israeli official positions, meanwhile, have definitively ruled out Palestinian statehood. The Israeli stance means the Palestinian question offers little room for creative ambiguity: Either Palestinian statehood is credibly advanced, or Saudi normalization does not occur. No amount of U.S. pressure, economic inducement, or promise of a regional air defense has altered that calculus. Even during his November 2025 meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office, the Saudi crown prince gave no ground on this issue.
Aggravating this is the sense that the Iran war of 2026, along with Israel's military conduct in Gaza, its unprecedented airstrike on Hamas leadership in Qatar, its campaign in Lebanon, and its decision to establish military outposts in Syria, has created an unfortunate new narrative in the Arab world: Israel, and not Iran, is increasingly seen as the principal destabilizing force in the region. None of this is to say that Saudi Arabia won't decide at some opportune moment to pursue relations with Israel. But that would require very different regional circumstances and a very different Israeli approach to Palestinians.
Conclusion: Two Paths, Not Yet Converging
The Iran war exposed both the strengths and the limitations of Saudi Arabia's security partnership with the United States, underscoring its enduring centrality while raising difficult questions about U.S. predictability and the costs of unilateral U.S. military action. The U.S.-Saudi relationship is not at a point of rupture, but that doesn't mean the war hasn't frayed it. When the dust has settled on the Iran war, it will be worth investing in stabilizing the partnership. As CENTCOM planners will emphasize, this is a relationship the United States needs in the volatile region into which it is continuously, even inevitably, drawn.
Meanwhile, the conflict eroded the strategic rationale for Saudi normalization with Israel by increasing its perceived risks without addressing the political conditions that Riyadh has consistently identified as prerequisites for recognition. While certainly off the table in the near term, normalization might still be possible if a future Israeli government eventually chooses to support Palestinian statehood. That is a possibility worth working toward because the value of a truly integrated region to U.S. security is only going to grow.
* * *
Michael Ratney served for over three decades as a U.S. diplomat, most recently as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He is currently a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Abdullah Alhenaki is a consultant with the CSIS Middle East Program. He recently received his doctorate in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-iran-war-weighs-us-saudi-partnership-and-prospects-normalization-israel
[Category: ThinkTank]
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How the Iran War Weighs on the U.S.-Saudi Partnership and Prospects for Normalization with Israel
The Iran war was a conflict Saudi Arabia had not sought and on which it had not been meaningfully consulted. It began with frustratingly little clarity about the United States' shifting goals, much less assurances about the U.S. commitment to protect the kingdom, even while ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 6, 2026, by senior adviser Michael Ratney and Abdullah Alhenaki, a consultant with the Middle East Program: * * * How the Iran War Weighs on the U.S.-Saudi Partnership and Prospects for Normalization with Israel The Iran war was a conflict Saudi Arabia had not sought and on which it had not been meaningfully consulted. It began with frustratingly little clarity about the United States' shifting goals, much less assurances about the U.S. commitment to protect the kingdom, even whileit had profound implications for Saudi security and its economy--far more profound for Saudi Arabia and its neighbors, in fact, than for the United States. In that sense, the war was a test case for the recently enhanced U.S.-Saudi security partnership.
It was the looming prospect of war with Iran that had motivated Saudi Arabia to pursue a stronger security partnership with the United States, one that would bring the clarity and assurances they would need if such a conflict came to pass. In fact, security guarantees were of such importance that the Saudi leadership had been willing to contemplate something as controversial among the Saudi population as normalizing relations with Israel as the price of a formal treaty relationship with the United States.
The experience of the Iran war has now colored these calculations, and weighs on Saudi perceptions of its partnership with the United States and on the desirability of a relationship with Israel. This war also came as some of the United States' Middle Eastern partners were already doubting the reliability of the United States as their principal defense partner (and questioning the United States' ability to restrain Israel), even leading Saudi Arabia to sign a mutual defense treaty with Pakistan in September 2025.
The U.S.-Saudi Security Partnership: Unsettled, but Enduring
The U.S.-Saudi security partnership dates to the 1950s, and has endured and expanded through the vicissitudes of the region and the bilateral relationship. During the Biden administration, the United States and Saudi Arabia pursued a significant upgrade in that partnership, including the negotiation of a formal mutual defense treaty. That deal foundered in the aftermath of the Gaza war and because of Israel's refusal to support a path to Palestinian statehood, but Saudi Arabia's desire for an upgraded partnership endured.
When the Saudi crown prince visited Washington in November 2025, he didn't get a mutual defense treaty, but short of that, he did extraordinarily well. Saudi Arabia came away with designation as a major non-NATO ally, signed a new strategic defense agreement, and extracted a U.S. commitment to sell Saudi Arabia the F-35, the most sophisticated fighter jet currently in production. The kingdom arguably advanced into the top tier of U.S. defense partners, and that happened without paying the political price of normalizing with Israel.
That bolstered status still didn't stop the United States from launching a war that implicated Saudi Arabia very directly, but with little consultation with the Saudi leadership on its timing or objectives, and with no clarity on how it might help Saudi Arabia protect itself from inevitable Iranian reprisals. Even more disconcerting, media reports suggested that Washington quickly began struggling to keep up with the defense needs of its Gulf partners. The United States was at that point enmeshed in a conflict that was going on longer than expected and found itself facing a scarcity of critical defense articles for its own war effort. This led Riyadh and other Gulf states to seek cheaper and more readily available systems, such as counter-unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) from Ukraine. In doing this, Saudi Arabia was not simply hedging; it was making rational decisions about its urgent operational requirements during wartime.
A ceasefire was announced in April 2026, by which point it had become exceedingly clear that Washington's ill-conceived objective of regime change would not materialize. Saudi Arabia's preoccupation then became avoiding a return to open conflict, which it believed would inevitably bring renewed Iranian attacks on Saudi targets. Saudi Arabia was so concerned about possible Iranian retaliation that when President Trump announced in May 2026--again, apparently without consulting partners in the region--that the U.S. Navy would escort commercial ships under "Operation Freedom," the kingdom reportedly denied overflight and basing rights to U.S. forces. This led the United States to abandon the operation only two days later, after which Saudi Arabia reportedly restored permissions to the U.S. military.
Was the troubled Iran war experience the beginning of the end of the U.S.-Saudi defense partnership? The short answer is no, but the implications of the Iran war are nonetheless paradoxical. Saudi Arabia's desire for a U.S. security partnership was premised, in significant part, on the notion that alignment with Washington would reduce rather than amplify its exposure to Iranian threats. The 2026 war has inverted that logic. Riyadh now finds itself absorbing the consequences of a military campaign it neither chose nor endorsed. The United States is thus perceived in Saudi strategic calculations not only as the kingdom's primary security partner, but now also as a source of considerable risk. In these circumstances, Saudi leadership might reasonably be asking itself whether a mutual defense treaty would have made any of this better.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia's exposure to Iranian missile and drone bombardment created an acute and immediate demand for advanced air defense systems, intelligence sharing, and access, basing, and overflight arrangements with U.S. forces. Only the United States could reliably supply these critical war-fighting elements at the scale and speed the threat environment demanded. Each Iranian strike on Saudi infrastructure would generate a new operational requirement that in theory would draw Riyadh closer to Washington's operational architecture. In that sense, the Iran war experience should not only validate the existing logic of U.S.-Saudi security cooperation, but could also accelerate its operational depth, including the basing decisions, procurement agreements, and real-time intelligence-sharing that are at the operational heart of bilateral security cooperation. Add to that the long history of bilateral military collaboration, and there is no easy substitute for the United States, as frustrating as Washington might be to work with. It is also difficult to imagine an alternative partner, whether Pakistan or China, that could tip the balance militarily in a conflict between Saudi Arabia and its principal antagonist, Iran.
Saudi Normalization with Israel: Complicated, Unlikely, but Not Impossible
According to conventional wisdom, the recent experiences with Iran, including Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel in April and October 2024, the "12-day war" of 2025, and the Iran war that began in February 2026, should have demonstrated the value of an integrated regional defense and therefore incentivized Saudi Arabia to move closer to Israel. But the logic of normalization was always partly constructed around the premise that alignment with Israel would--like the security partnership with the United States--confer strategic benefits, including reduced vulnerability to external attacks, access to advanced U.S. technology, and regional stability, that offset the reputational cost of association.
The Iran war may actually have dismantled this premise--the more Saudi Arabia was associated with Israeli war objectives, the greater was its exposure to Iranian attacks. It would not have been lost on Saudi leaders that the United Arab Emirates, which has strong relations with Israel and brought the Israeli Iron Dome to Abu Dhabi along with Israeli military personnel to operate it, was targeted more than any other Gulf country. And, ironically, if the war were truly successful on Israeli terms--a long-term Iranian strategic weakening or even a chance of regime change resulting in a more moderate Iranian government less hostile to Israel and the region--it would actually reduce the normalization incentive. Why, after all, pay the political price of a public relationship with Israel if the shared Iranian threat was disappearing? So, if an association with Israel is only seen as increasing the threats to Saudi Arabia, the Saudi case for normalization comes out of the Iran war weaker than before.
Israel's conduct during the Gaza war has also influenced Saudi Arabia's normalization calculus, as has Israel's continued refusal to accept a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and effect a full withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Gaza. Saudi Arabia's official threshold for normalization has been stated repeatedly, and conditions recognition of Israel on Israel's commitment to pursue a path to Palestinian statehood. Saudi Arabia had also been issuing increasingly pointed statements, often jointly with other Arab and Muslim countries, criticizing Israeli actions in the West Bank.
Israeli official positions, meanwhile, have definitively ruled out Palestinian statehood. The Israeli stance means the Palestinian question offers little room for creative ambiguity: Either Palestinian statehood is credibly advanced, or Saudi normalization does not occur. No amount of U.S. pressure, economic inducement, or promise of a regional air defense has altered that calculus. Even during his November 2025 meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office, the Saudi crown prince gave no ground on this issue.
Aggravating this is the sense that the Iran war of 2026, along with Israel's military conduct in Gaza, its unprecedented airstrike on Hamas leadership in Qatar, its campaign in Lebanon, and its decision to establish military outposts in Syria, has created an unfortunate new narrative in the Arab world: Israel, and not Iran, is increasingly seen as the principal destabilizing force in the region. None of this is to say that Saudi Arabia won't decide at some opportune moment to pursue relations with Israel. But that would require very different regional circumstances and a very different Israeli approach to Palestinians.
Conclusion: Two Paths, Not Yet Converging
The Iran war exposed both the strengths and the limitations of Saudi Arabia's security partnership with the United States, underscoring its enduring centrality while raising difficult questions about U.S. predictability and the costs of unilateral U.S. military action. The U.S.-Saudi relationship is not at a point of rupture, but that doesn't mean the war hasn't frayed it. When the dust has settled on the Iran war, it will be worth investing in stabilizing the partnership. As CENTCOM planners will emphasize, this is a relationship the United States needs in the volatile region into which it is continuously, even inevitably, drawn.
Meanwhile, the conflict eroded the strategic rationale for Saudi normalization with Israel by increasing its perceived risks without addressing the political conditions that Riyadh has consistently identified as prerequisites for recognition. While certainly off the table in the near term, normalization might still be possible if a future Israeli government eventually chooses to support Palestinian statehood. That is a possibility worth working toward because the value of a truly integrated region to U.S. security is only going to grow.
* * *
Michael Ratney served for over three decades as a U.S. diplomat, most recently as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He is currently a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Abdullah Alhenaki is a consultant with the CSIS Middle East Program. He recently received his doctorate in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-iran-war-weighs-us-saudi-partnership-and-prospects-normalization-israel
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Launches Biblical Foundations Website
WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 6, 2026:
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AFPI Launches Biblical Foundations Website
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) launched the Biblical Foundations website, a new resource designed to equip religious leaders, churches, and people of faith with biblically grounded language and tools to engage today's most pressing cultural and policy issues.
This new website will house video series, recent publications, and curriculum on issues important to the faith community as well as a place to connect with the Biblical ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 6, 2026: * * * AFPI Launches Biblical Foundations Website Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) launched the Biblical Foundations website, a new resource designed to equip religious leaders, churches, and people of faith with biblically grounded language and tools to engage today's most pressing cultural and policy issues. This new website will house video series, recent publications, and curriculum on issues important to the faith community as well as a place to connect with the BiblicalFoundations team.
Through this initiative, AFPI seeks to encourage "faith in action" by helping faith leaders and congregations across the nation understand and apply biblical truth in America. For those seeking clear and practical resources, this new website will serve as a place to strengthen the connection between biblical principles and public life.
"Biblical Foundations is committed to restoring the truth that God's Word speaks into every area of life," said Dr. Rich Rogers, AFPI's Vice Chair for American Values. "At a time when our culture is searching for clarity and conviction, this initiative points back to timeless biblical principles that strengthen families, churches, and communities."
To explore the new Biblical Foundations website, click here (https://afpifaith.com/).
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-launches-biblical-foundations-website
[Category: ThinkTank]
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AFPI Launches Biblical Foundations Website
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) launched the Biblical Foundations website, a new resource designed to equip religious leaders, churches, and people of faith with biblically grounded language and tools to engage today's most pressing cultural and policy issues.
This new website will house video series, recent publications, and curriculum on issues important to the faith community as well as a place to connect with the Biblical ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 7 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 6, 2026: * * * AFPI Launches Biblical Foundations Website Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) launched the Biblical Foundations website, a new resource designed to equip religious leaders, churches, and people of faith with biblically grounded language and tools to engage today's most pressing cultural and policy issues. This new website will house video series, recent publications, and curriculum on issues important to the faith community as well as a place to connect with the BiblicalFoundations team.
Through this initiative, AFPI seeks to encourage "faith in action" by helping faith leaders and congregations across the nation understand and apply biblical truth in America. For those seeking clear and practical resources, this new website will serve as a place to strengthen the connection between biblical principles and public life.
"Biblical Foundations is committed to restoring the truth that God's Word speaks into every area of life," said Dr. Rich Rogers, AFPI's Vice Chair for American Values. "At a time when our culture is searching for clarity and conviction, this initiative points back to timeless biblical principles that strengthen families, churches, and communities."
To explore the new Biblical Foundations website, click here (https://afpifaith.com/).
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-launches-biblical-foundations-website
[Category: ThinkTank]