Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
Featured Stories
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Asia Times: Why Dropping 'Indo-Pacific' Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by senior fellow Ken Moriyasu to Asia Times:
* * *
Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy
On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM).
The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largest ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by senior fellow Ken Moriyasu to Asia Times: * * * Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM). The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largestcombatant command.
This publication reported in June 2018 that the original change "highlights the increasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking and also marks India's re-entry into the American government's 'Asia Nexus.'"
As much as New Delhi may protest, this change signals the opposite: the decreasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking - and its exit from the American government's "Asia Nexus."
There were already hints of this in US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May. "India was mentioned last," an Asian diplomat in attendance recalled.
Hegseth praised the efforts of South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam before finally turning to India.
A strong India, "acting in its own self-interest," advances a shared goal of maintaining a regional balance of power, he said - hardly a description of a core ally in a coordinated strategy.
This name change, however, does not represent a toning down of competition with Beijing. On the contrary, it clarifies where competition with China will actually be fought -- and where it will not.
The decision moves the strategy in the right direction. There are three key takeaways.
First, the fact that the Pentagon made this significant move absent any immediate trigger suggests it is sending a deliberate message: the Indian Ocean is not central to dealing with China.
That message is aimed at both allies and Beijing itself. To its allies, it signals that in a potential conflict with China, the United States will concentrate on the Taiwan Strait, operating primarily from Japan and the Philippines.
In all other regions, allies and partners will be expected to take primary responsibility for conventional defense. South Korea will deter North Korea, Europe will confront Russia and the Indian Ocean will largely fall to India to monitor and control.
Symbolically, Hegseth made no mention of "Indo-Pacific" in his Shangri-La speech, nor did he reference Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's efforts to "update" the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept championed by her mentor, the late Shinzo Abe. Japan's region-wide strategic framing may soon require a rethink.
To China, the message is equally clear: the US is laser-focused on the Taiwan Strait.
Second, the shift signals that India is being written out of the core contingency that matters most: Taiwan.
Washington believes Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed the People's Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, by 2027. The Trump administration has little patience for fence-sitters.
It is prioritizing allies such as South Korea and the Philippines - who act like they "live on the front lines," as Hegseth said. India is not aligned, and Washington is no longer hoping that one day it will be.
Third - and most intriguingly - by treating India as a normal partner rather than a strategic centerpiece, Washington gains greater flexibility in dealing with Pakistan, India's archrival.
Trump has turned to Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir as a key backchannel to Tehran, relied on him in defusing the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis and invited him to discussions on expanding the Abraham Accords.
Pakistan matters not because of India, but because of China's westward pivot.
Over the past 15 years, China has steadily reduced its reliance on maritime energy routes through Indian Ocean chokepoints, such as the Malacca and Hormuz straits, shifting instead toward overland pipelines across Central Asia.
In responding to this Chinese pivot to Eurasia, Pakistan - not India - emerges as the more relevant partner.
The return to PACOM reflects these strategic realities. It is a recognition that clarity, not geographic sprawl or vague values-based alignments, will define how the US competes with China. And it is the right move.
Read in Asia Times (https://asiatimes.com/2026/06/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-the-pentagons-china-strategy/).
* * *
At A Glance:
Ken Moriyasu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-pentagons-china-strategy-ken-moriyasu
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy
On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM).
The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largest ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by senior fellow Ken Moriyasu to Asia Times: * * * Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM). The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largestcombatant command.
This publication reported in June 2018 that the original change "highlights the increasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking and also marks India's re-entry into the American government's 'Asia Nexus.'"
As much as New Delhi may protest, this change signals the opposite: the decreasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking - and its exit from the American government's "Asia Nexus."
There were already hints of this in US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May. "India was mentioned last," an Asian diplomat in attendance recalled.
Hegseth praised the efforts of South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam before finally turning to India.
A strong India, "acting in its own self-interest," advances a shared goal of maintaining a regional balance of power, he said - hardly a description of a core ally in a coordinated strategy.
This name change, however, does not represent a toning down of competition with Beijing. On the contrary, it clarifies where competition with China will actually be fought -- and where it will not.
The decision moves the strategy in the right direction. There are three key takeaways.
First, the fact that the Pentagon made this significant move absent any immediate trigger suggests it is sending a deliberate message: the Indian Ocean is not central to dealing with China.
That message is aimed at both allies and Beijing itself. To its allies, it signals that in a potential conflict with China, the United States will concentrate on the Taiwan Strait, operating primarily from Japan and the Philippines.
In all other regions, allies and partners will be expected to take primary responsibility for conventional defense. South Korea will deter North Korea, Europe will confront Russia and the Indian Ocean will largely fall to India to monitor and control.
Symbolically, Hegseth made no mention of "Indo-Pacific" in his Shangri-La speech, nor did he reference Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's efforts to "update" the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept championed by her mentor, the late Shinzo Abe. Japan's region-wide strategic framing may soon require a rethink.
To China, the message is equally clear: the US is laser-focused on the Taiwan Strait.
Second, the shift signals that India is being written out of the core contingency that matters most: Taiwan.
Washington believes Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed the People's Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, by 2027. The Trump administration has little patience for fence-sitters.
It is prioritizing allies such as South Korea and the Philippines - who act like they "live on the front lines," as Hegseth said. India is not aligned, and Washington is no longer hoping that one day it will be.
Third - and most intriguingly - by treating India as a normal partner rather than a strategic centerpiece, Washington gains greater flexibility in dealing with Pakistan, India's archrival.
Trump has turned to Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir as a key backchannel to Tehran, relied on him in defusing the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis and invited him to discussions on expanding the Abraham Accords.
Pakistan matters not because of India, but because of China's westward pivot.
Over the past 15 years, China has steadily reduced its reliance on maritime energy routes through Indian Ocean chokepoints, such as the Malacca and Hormuz straits, shifting instead toward overland pipelines across Central Asia.
In responding to this Chinese pivot to Eurasia, Pakistan - not India - emerges as the more relevant partner.
The return to PACOM reflects these strategic realities. It is a recognition that clarity, not geographic sprawl or vague values-based alignments, will define how the US competes with China. And it is the right move.
Read in Asia Times (https://asiatimes.com/2026/06/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-the-pentagons-china-strategy/).
* * *
At A Glance:
Ken Moriyasu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-pentagons-china-strategy-ken-moriyasu
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Minneapolis Struggles as Its City Council Prioritizes Nonsense
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, June 19 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by public safety policy fellow David Zimmer:
* * *
Minneapolis struggles as its City Council prioritizes nonsense
Economic woes
News broke this week of continued dramatic decreases in downtown Minneapolis commercial building values. Council member Michael Rainville, one of the few reasonable members, reported to KSTP that this sector of real estate has dropped in value by 45% in just the past ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, June 19 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by public safety policy fellow David Zimmer: * * * Minneapolis struggles as its City Council prioritizes nonsense Economic woes News broke this week of continued dramatic decreases in downtown Minneapolis commercial building values. Council member Michael Rainville, one of the few reasonable members, reported to KSTP that this sector of real estate has dropped in value by 45% in just the pastfive years- $7.5 billion in 2021 to just $4.1 billion in 2026. "It's terrible," Rainville said of the situation.
What's worse is that the decline seems to be accelerating, despite six years having passed since the economic downturn from COVID. City data indicates the five highest valued buildings downtown saw a 20% drop in value in just the past year. The iconic IDS Center, for example, has dropped in value from $135 million to $107 million.
Earlier reporting of this trend was met by dismissive responses by a city spokesperson when asked about the impact of this declining tax base on Minneapolis homeowners.
"When one says that 'declining market values = homeowners will pay more' it can be misleading because it implies a direct, automatic shift which is not how the system works."
- Minneapolis City Spokesperson to KSTP April 1, 2026
That response didn't age well, given recent reports that the percentage of property taxes that Minneapolis homeowners are now responsible for has increased by 6.2% since 2021 - now approaching 56%.
These taxbase woes add to a worsening city financial crisis - one in which the city is facing a $30 million dollar budget deficit going into 2027.
Minneapolitans can be thankful that Councilmember Rainville is showing concern over the issue. The same doesn't seem to be true for the Council as a whole.
"Priorities"
The real story seems to be this - a City Council comprised of too many 20 and 30 something councilmembers who lack real world experience and who have focused too much energy on nonsense.
Here's an "off the top of my head" list of things the Minneapolis City Council has prioritized while its commercial real estate market has collapsed - it by no means captures all of the nonsense:
* Reducing main roadways like Hennepin Ave to one lane in each direction and eliminating parking to enhance bike and mass transit access. It has hastened the demise of once bustling areas like Uptown.
* Legalizing and promoting bathhouses catering to anonymous gay sex.
* Resisting Mayor Frey's policy to prohibit homeless encampments. The ongoing human tragedy playing out under the highway 55 bridge at Cedar Ave, and elsewhere, is inexcusable.
* Spending time and resources on proclamations and resolutions denouncing a variety of federal policies involving for example Cuba, Gaza, or ICE enforcement.
* Entered into a $1.4 million contract with a firm to provide coaching and counseling between councilmembers and the mayors office to help these "leaders" govern more civilly.
* Opposed former police chief Brian O'Hara at nearly every step, despite his hiring being primarily to carry out the terms of the consent decrees that the Council sought to have in place. O'Hara's recent resignation, coupled with the Council's opposition to Community Safety Commissioner Toddrick Barnette, makes it unlikely the position will be viewed favorably by many quality candidates.
* Opposed a community supported plan to re-open 38th and Chicago, referred to as George Floyd Square, to regular traffic after six years of studies and plans to "transform" the intersection.
* Opposed multiple plans to rebuild the burned-out 3rd Precinct police station which was firebombed by rioters during the 2020 "uprising."
* Opposed ordinances or enforcement of livability issues, such as loitering, begging, spitting on sidewalks, possessing drug paraphernalia, and "urban camping."
* Proposed allowing homeless individuals with cars to legally sleep in designated parking lots throughout the city.
* Hosted the first ever transgender "drag show" in Minneapolis City Hall in honor of Pride month 2026.
Takeaway
When the city's leaders are mired in high-profile infighting and symbolic social activism, they lose the ability to focus on the issues that matter - providing for public safety, establishing a business-friendly environment, and ultimately enhancing the tax base.
Minneapolis voters are facing the direct consequences of the progressive council members they have repeatedly elected.
* * *
David Zimmer is a Public Safety Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
David.Zimmer@americanexperiment.org
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/minneapolis-struggles-as-its-city-council-prioritizes-nonsense/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Minneapolis struggles as its City Council prioritizes nonsense
Economic woes
News broke this week of continued dramatic decreases in downtown Minneapolis commercial building values. Council member Michael Rainville, one of the few reasonable members, reported to KSTP that this sector of real estate has dropped in value by 45% in just the past ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, June 19 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by public safety policy fellow David Zimmer: * * * Minneapolis struggles as its City Council prioritizes nonsense Economic woes News broke this week of continued dramatic decreases in downtown Minneapolis commercial building values. Council member Michael Rainville, one of the few reasonable members, reported to KSTP that this sector of real estate has dropped in value by 45% in just the pastfive years- $7.5 billion in 2021 to just $4.1 billion in 2026. "It's terrible," Rainville said of the situation.
What's worse is that the decline seems to be accelerating, despite six years having passed since the economic downturn from COVID. City data indicates the five highest valued buildings downtown saw a 20% drop in value in just the past year. The iconic IDS Center, for example, has dropped in value from $135 million to $107 million.
Earlier reporting of this trend was met by dismissive responses by a city spokesperson when asked about the impact of this declining tax base on Minneapolis homeowners.
"When one says that 'declining market values = homeowners will pay more' it can be misleading because it implies a direct, automatic shift which is not how the system works."
- Minneapolis City Spokesperson to KSTP April 1, 2026
That response didn't age well, given recent reports that the percentage of property taxes that Minneapolis homeowners are now responsible for has increased by 6.2% since 2021 - now approaching 56%.
These taxbase woes add to a worsening city financial crisis - one in which the city is facing a $30 million dollar budget deficit going into 2027.
Minneapolitans can be thankful that Councilmember Rainville is showing concern over the issue. The same doesn't seem to be true for the Council as a whole.
"Priorities"
The real story seems to be this - a City Council comprised of too many 20 and 30 something councilmembers who lack real world experience and who have focused too much energy on nonsense.
Here's an "off the top of my head" list of things the Minneapolis City Council has prioritized while its commercial real estate market has collapsed - it by no means captures all of the nonsense:
* Reducing main roadways like Hennepin Ave to one lane in each direction and eliminating parking to enhance bike and mass transit access. It has hastened the demise of once bustling areas like Uptown.
* Legalizing and promoting bathhouses catering to anonymous gay sex.
* Resisting Mayor Frey's policy to prohibit homeless encampments. The ongoing human tragedy playing out under the highway 55 bridge at Cedar Ave, and elsewhere, is inexcusable.
* Spending time and resources on proclamations and resolutions denouncing a variety of federal policies involving for example Cuba, Gaza, or ICE enforcement.
* Entered into a $1.4 million contract with a firm to provide coaching and counseling between councilmembers and the mayors office to help these "leaders" govern more civilly.
* Opposed former police chief Brian O'Hara at nearly every step, despite his hiring being primarily to carry out the terms of the consent decrees that the Council sought to have in place. O'Hara's recent resignation, coupled with the Council's opposition to Community Safety Commissioner Toddrick Barnette, makes it unlikely the position will be viewed favorably by many quality candidates.
* Opposed a community supported plan to re-open 38th and Chicago, referred to as George Floyd Square, to regular traffic after six years of studies and plans to "transform" the intersection.
* Opposed multiple plans to rebuild the burned-out 3rd Precinct police station which was firebombed by rioters during the 2020 "uprising."
* Opposed ordinances or enforcement of livability issues, such as loitering, begging, spitting on sidewalks, possessing drug paraphernalia, and "urban camping."
* Proposed allowing homeless individuals with cars to legally sleep in designated parking lots throughout the city.
* Hosted the first ever transgender "drag show" in Minneapolis City Hall in honor of Pride month 2026.
Takeaway
When the city's leaders are mired in high-profile infighting and symbolic social activism, they lose the ability to focus on the issues that matter - providing for public safety, establishing a business-friendly environment, and ultimately enhancing the tax base.
Minneapolis voters are facing the direct consequences of the progressive council members they have repeatedly elected.
* * *
David Zimmer is a Public Safety Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
David.Zimmer@americanexperiment.org
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/minneapolis-struggles-as-its-city-council-prioritizes-nonsense/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Iran Won the Negotiation, Even Though It Lost the War
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Emily Harding, director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the CSIS Defense and Security Department:
* * *
Iran Won the Negotiation, Even Though It Lost the War
The full text of the framework agreement with Iran is now public, and it is lopsided.
There is one piece of good news: Washington and Tehran are publicly describing the same deal. Previous purported agreements in this conflict featured wildly different accounts ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Emily Harding, director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the CSIS Defense and Security Department: * * * Iran Won the Negotiation, Even Though It Lost the War The full text of the framework agreement with Iran is now public, and it is lopsided. There is one piece of good news: Washington and Tehran are publicly describing the same deal. Previous purported agreements in this conflict featured wildly different accountsof what had supposedly been settled, a classic tactic for backing an opponent into a corner publicly in hopes of extracting concessions they never actually made. This time, the two sides agree on what they agreed to. That is a real signal that both sides are ready to be done with the fighting, at least for now.
That is where the good news ends. The deal itself is horrifically lopsided. Iran gets most of what it wants, and it gets it up front--before negotiations on a final deal even start. The United States gets very little. Israel gets even less. And there are still a great many trap doors through which Iran can escape, or through which the whole thing can fall apart.
What Iran Got
The list is long. The framework calls for an end to all military operations, including in Lebanon, which shows up three times in the agreement's first paragraph alone. Most astonishingly, the text commits the parties to "ensuring the territorial integrity of Lebanon"--language Israel will not honor until Hezbollah is fully dismantled and the Lebanese Armed Forces actually control the southern border. That goal is still a long way off, which makes this pledge read more like a wish than a plan.
Israel, notably, is implicitly included in this agreement. The text says the United States, Iran, "and their allies" agree to its terms. But did Israel actually agree to this? This dynamic is a wobbly three-legged stool: The United States wants this over, Iran wants to survive and call it a win, and Israel would prefer to see Iran neutralized and internally divided. These interests are not aligned.
Iran also wins a pledge of noninterference in its internal affairs. Iran always assumes the United States and Israel are working to undermine the regime, so they will have insisted on this line. It gets the immediate end of the U.S. naval blockade, with the American pullback required to be complete within 30 days--meaning Iranian oil starts flowing out and cash starts flowing in almost immediately, with an expectation of roughly status quo ante shipping. Withdrawal of U.S. troops is a bigger one still, even though it belongs to the eventual final deal rather than this interim one: The United States agrees to pull its forces from "the proximity of" Iran within 30 days of that final agreement.
Then there's the money. Iran is in line for an estimated $300 billion in "reconstruction and economic development" funds. This is a tough pill to swallow. But if Iran has any hope of a stable future, some real structural problems need fixing--Tehran is, quite literally, running out of water because of decades of neglected infrastructure. Sanctions relief is a similar story: The United States "undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions," with that one hedge word, "undertakes," doing a lot of work, given how tangled the sanctions regime has become over 20 years. Sanctions relief belongs to the final deal, not this one. Immediate waivers letting Iran sell oil, though, do not wait--more cash for Tehran, starting now. Same with the release of frozen assets, which the text says must be "made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of [Iran]."
What the United States Got
By comparison, this is a short list. Commercial vessels get to transit the Strait of Hormuz "with no charge for 60 days only," and the strait will be cleared of "technical and military obstacles." So, no more threat to commercial shipping--at least for now. The Gulf allies will be thrilled about this one.
Iran also "reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons." But the world has every right to be skeptical of such promises, which have proven hollow in the past.
Then there's the disposition of the enriched uranium, which has long been a U.S. redline. The framework's "minimum methodology" is "downblending on site," meaning Iran keeps control of both the material and the process--including who gets in to help and how. If past International Atomic Energy Agency inspection fights are any indication, this is going to be a mess.
So, What's Left to Negotiate? Plenty.
Once the framework is signed, all fighting stops, including in Lebanon. The naval blockade ends. Shipping moves freely through the strait. Oil waivers go into effect. Frozen assets may or may not start moving. Only then does the 60-day negotiation clock start, and there is still much to negotiate:
* How does the fighting in Lebanon actually end? Can the Lebanese Armed Forces push Hezbollah out of the south--an Israeli redline--and will Israel withdraw all the way up to the Litani River?
* What counts as U.S. troops in the "proximity" of Iran? Does that mean the entire region? Kuwait? Qatar? Does the Fifth Fleet pull out of Bahrain?
* How will the $300 billion in "reconstruction" be spent? There is plenty of room for that money to land in the pockets of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders, who run security in Iran and also happen to own most of its profitable businesses.
* What happens to the enriched uranium, and what does a sustainable end to Iran's nuclear program actually look like? What do inspections look like? Who gets to participate?
* What are the actual "procedures" for releasing frozen Iranian assets?
* How does the UN Security Council pass a binding resolution? Here, again, the United States seems to be speaking for all of the council's permanent members--which may be a rather large assumption. Russia could play spoiler with its veto. And the United States has spent decades insisting it will only be loosely bound by whatever the United Nations decides. In an odd way, this is a retreat for Washington.
The Bottom Line
The United States does get two important things that don't show up anywhere in the text. First, hope for a global economic recovery before the November midterm elections. The administration's political advisers can clearly see the that Americans are feeling gas prices and inflation. Second, Washington patched up its relationship with the Gulf royals. This conflict has been a major loss for them, in lost oil exports now and in the long term. This is the second oil shock in five years, which might be enough to push the world to take real, permanent steps toward renewables.
Iran lost the war but won the negotiation and won it convincingly. Tehran used every economic lever it had and walked away with a phenomenal deal. The next round is the real test: Does Iran try to extract more, or does it negotiate in good faith? Does it use the first exchange of fire in Lebanon as an excuse to walk away, or does it play it well enough to quietly widen the gap between the United States and Israel? The framework answers none of that. Only the opaque decisionmaking of a scattered Iranian regime will decide.
* * *
Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-won-negotiation-even-though-it-lost-war
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Iran Won the Negotiation, Even Though It Lost the War
The full text of the framework agreement with Iran is now public, and it is lopsided.
There is one piece of good news: Washington and Tehran are publicly describing the same deal. Previous purported agreements in this conflict featured wildly different accounts ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Emily Harding, director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the CSIS Defense and Security Department: * * * Iran Won the Negotiation, Even Though It Lost the War The full text of the framework agreement with Iran is now public, and it is lopsided. There is one piece of good news: Washington and Tehran are publicly describing the same deal. Previous purported agreements in this conflict featured wildly different accountsof what had supposedly been settled, a classic tactic for backing an opponent into a corner publicly in hopes of extracting concessions they never actually made. This time, the two sides agree on what they agreed to. That is a real signal that both sides are ready to be done with the fighting, at least for now.
That is where the good news ends. The deal itself is horrifically lopsided. Iran gets most of what it wants, and it gets it up front--before negotiations on a final deal even start. The United States gets very little. Israel gets even less. And there are still a great many trap doors through which Iran can escape, or through which the whole thing can fall apart.
What Iran Got
The list is long. The framework calls for an end to all military operations, including in Lebanon, which shows up three times in the agreement's first paragraph alone. Most astonishingly, the text commits the parties to "ensuring the territorial integrity of Lebanon"--language Israel will not honor until Hezbollah is fully dismantled and the Lebanese Armed Forces actually control the southern border. That goal is still a long way off, which makes this pledge read more like a wish than a plan.
Israel, notably, is implicitly included in this agreement. The text says the United States, Iran, "and their allies" agree to its terms. But did Israel actually agree to this? This dynamic is a wobbly three-legged stool: The United States wants this over, Iran wants to survive and call it a win, and Israel would prefer to see Iran neutralized and internally divided. These interests are not aligned.
Iran also wins a pledge of noninterference in its internal affairs. Iran always assumes the United States and Israel are working to undermine the regime, so they will have insisted on this line. It gets the immediate end of the U.S. naval blockade, with the American pullback required to be complete within 30 days--meaning Iranian oil starts flowing out and cash starts flowing in almost immediately, with an expectation of roughly status quo ante shipping. Withdrawal of U.S. troops is a bigger one still, even though it belongs to the eventual final deal rather than this interim one: The United States agrees to pull its forces from "the proximity of" Iran within 30 days of that final agreement.
Then there's the money. Iran is in line for an estimated $300 billion in "reconstruction and economic development" funds. This is a tough pill to swallow. But if Iran has any hope of a stable future, some real structural problems need fixing--Tehran is, quite literally, running out of water because of decades of neglected infrastructure. Sanctions relief is a similar story: The United States "undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions," with that one hedge word, "undertakes," doing a lot of work, given how tangled the sanctions regime has become over 20 years. Sanctions relief belongs to the final deal, not this one. Immediate waivers letting Iran sell oil, though, do not wait--more cash for Tehran, starting now. Same with the release of frozen assets, which the text says must be "made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of [Iran]."
What the United States Got
By comparison, this is a short list. Commercial vessels get to transit the Strait of Hormuz "with no charge for 60 days only," and the strait will be cleared of "technical and military obstacles." So, no more threat to commercial shipping--at least for now. The Gulf allies will be thrilled about this one.
Iran also "reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons." But the world has every right to be skeptical of such promises, which have proven hollow in the past.
Then there's the disposition of the enriched uranium, which has long been a U.S. redline. The framework's "minimum methodology" is "downblending on site," meaning Iran keeps control of both the material and the process--including who gets in to help and how. If past International Atomic Energy Agency inspection fights are any indication, this is going to be a mess.
So, What's Left to Negotiate? Plenty.
Once the framework is signed, all fighting stops, including in Lebanon. The naval blockade ends. Shipping moves freely through the strait. Oil waivers go into effect. Frozen assets may or may not start moving. Only then does the 60-day negotiation clock start, and there is still much to negotiate:
* How does the fighting in Lebanon actually end? Can the Lebanese Armed Forces push Hezbollah out of the south--an Israeli redline--and will Israel withdraw all the way up to the Litani River?
* What counts as U.S. troops in the "proximity" of Iran? Does that mean the entire region? Kuwait? Qatar? Does the Fifth Fleet pull out of Bahrain?
* How will the $300 billion in "reconstruction" be spent? There is plenty of room for that money to land in the pockets of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders, who run security in Iran and also happen to own most of its profitable businesses.
* What happens to the enriched uranium, and what does a sustainable end to Iran's nuclear program actually look like? What do inspections look like? Who gets to participate?
* What are the actual "procedures" for releasing frozen Iranian assets?
* How does the UN Security Council pass a binding resolution? Here, again, the United States seems to be speaking for all of the council's permanent members--which may be a rather large assumption. Russia could play spoiler with its veto. And the United States has spent decades insisting it will only be loosely bound by whatever the United Nations decides. In an odd way, this is a retreat for Washington.
The Bottom Line
The United States does get two important things that don't show up anywhere in the text. First, hope for a global economic recovery before the November midterm elections. The administration's political advisers can clearly see the that Americans are feeling gas prices and inflation. Second, Washington patched up its relationship with the Gulf royals. This conflict has been a major loss for them, in lost oil exports now and in the long term. This is the second oil shock in five years, which might be enough to push the world to take real, permanent steps toward renewables.
Iran lost the war but won the negotiation and won it convincingly. Tehran used every economic lever it had and walked away with a phenomenal deal. The next round is the real test: Does Iran try to extract more, or does it negotiate in good faith? Does it use the first exchange of fire in Lebanon as an excuse to walk away, or does it play it well enough to quietly widen the gap between the United States and Israel? The framework answers none of that. Only the opaque decisionmaking of a scattered Iranian regime will decide.
* * *
Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-won-negotiation-even-though-it-lost-war
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum: Quadrupling the Stock Buyback Tax - What Are the Implications?
WASHINGTON, June 19 [Category: ThinkTank] (TNSbrep) -- The American Action Forum issued the following news release:
* * *
Quadrupling the Stock Buyback Tax: What Are the Implications?
*
Senators Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Ron Wyden (D-OR), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) recently introduced legislation to raise the stock repurchase excise tax established in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. In a new insight, Director of Fiscal Policy Jordan Haring explains how the tax works and discusses the implications of the Stock Buyback Accountability Act of 2026.
Key points:
* The Stock Buyback Accountability ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 [Category: ThinkTank] (TNSbrep) -- The American Action Forum issued the following news release: * * * Quadrupling the Stock Buyback Tax: What Are the Implications? * Senators Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Ron Wyden (D-OR), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) recently introduced legislation to raise the stock repurchase excise tax established in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. In a new insight, Director of Fiscal Policy Jordan Haring explains how the tax works and discusses the implications of the Stock Buyback Accountability Act of 2026. Key points: * The Stock Buyback AccountabilityAct of 2026 would quadruple the excise tax rate to four percent.
* Supporters argue that increasing the tax rate on stock repurchases would raise additional federal revenue and incentivize businesses to prioritize productive investments over stock buybacks, but this argument misrepresents the role stock repurchases play in capital markets and fails to acknowledge the significant distortions a higher tax rate would create.
* Quadrupling the tax rate could reduce economic efficiency, discourage productive investment, impair capital allocation, and weaken the means through which capital flows to its highest value uses.
* While the policy would generate additional revenue in the short run, it could come at the expense of productivity and economic growth in the long run.
Read the analysis (https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/quadrupling-the-stock-buyback-tax-what-are-the-implications/).
***
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/press-release/quadrupling-the-stock-buyback-tax-what-are-the-implications/
* * *
Quadrupling the Stock Buyback Tax: What Are the Implications?
*
Senators Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Ron Wyden (D-OR), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) recently introduced legislation to raise the stock repurchase excise tax established in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. In a new insight, Director of Fiscal Policy Jordan Haring explains how the tax works and discusses the implications of the Stock Buyback Accountability Act of 2026.
Key points:
* The Stock Buyback Accountability ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 [Category: ThinkTank] (TNSbrep) -- The American Action Forum issued the following news release: * * * Quadrupling the Stock Buyback Tax: What Are the Implications? * Senators Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Ron Wyden (D-OR), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) recently introduced legislation to raise the stock repurchase excise tax established in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. In a new insight, Director of Fiscal Policy Jordan Haring explains how the tax works and discusses the implications of the Stock Buyback Accountability Act of 2026. Key points: * The Stock Buyback AccountabilityAct of 2026 would quadruple the excise tax rate to four percent.
* Supporters argue that increasing the tax rate on stock repurchases would raise additional federal revenue and incentivize businesses to prioritize productive investments over stock buybacks, but this argument misrepresents the role stock repurchases play in capital markets and fails to acknowledge the significant distortions a higher tax rate would create.
* Quadrupling the tax rate could reduce economic efficiency, discourage productive investment, impair capital allocation, and weaken the means through which capital flows to its highest value uses.
* While the policy would generate additional revenue in the short run, it could come at the expense of productivity and economic growth in the long run.
Read the analysis (https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/quadrupling-the-stock-buyback-tax-what-are-the-implications/).
***
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/press-release/quadrupling-the-stock-buyback-tax-what-are-the-implications/
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: End to AI Competition? Senator Sanders' Plan
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Competition Policy Director Fred Ashton:
* * *
An End to AI Competition? Senator Sanders' Plan
Executive Summary
* Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced the American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act, a sweeping legislative proposal that would levy a tax equal to a 50-percent equity stake in artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced robotics firms with gross receipts exceeding $200 million - likely expanding beyond the industry's leading firms.
* The proposed legislation builds on a growing, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Competition Policy Director Fred Ashton: * * * An End to AI Competition? Senator Sanders' Plan Executive Summary * Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced the American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act, a sweeping legislative proposal that would levy a tax equal to a 50-percent equity stake in artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced robotics firms with gross receipts exceeding $200 million - likely expanding beyond the industry's leading firms. * The proposed legislation builds on a growing,bipartisan narrative - shared by President Donald Trump - suggesting that direct government stakes in these firms could both benefit taxpayers and encourage more responsible management of these companies.
* Injecting the federal government into the boardroom promises to create a perverse set of incentives, ultimately robbing consumers and businesses of new products while dampening the current rapid pace of innovation.
-
Introduction
The rapid ascent of artificial intelligence (AI) has sparked a growing public backlash - in part, over anxiety about potential job displacement and the perceived concentration of wealth. Seizing the moment, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced the American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act, a sweeping proposal that would impose a tax equal to a 50-percent equity stake in AI and advanced robotics firms with gross receipts exceeding $200 million - likely expanding beyond the industry's leading firms.
The legislation comes just weeks after Senator Sanders penned an opinion piece in The New York Times previewing his idea for the United States to take equity stakes in AI companies.
The proposed legislation builds on a growing, bipartisan narrative - shared by President Donald Trump - suggesting that government involvement in these firms could both benefit taxpayers and encourage more responsible management of these companies.
Injecting the federal government into the boardroom promises to create a perverse set of incentives that could rob consumers and businesses of new products while slowing the current rapid pace of innovation.
American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act
Senator Sanders introduced the American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act just weeks after penning an opinion piece in which he called for the United States to take equity stakes in AI companies.
The legislation would create an excise tax on what is called "systemically important AI activity" in the amount of 50 percent of all outstanding equity interest to be remitted to the Department of the Treasury. Fulfilling this tax, however, cannot come from the existing stock of equity. To satisfy the mandate, the equity interest remitted to Treasury "shall be equity interests newly issued by the applicable AI company."
How it works in practice is not as straightforward. A company with 100 outstanding equity shares cannot simply transfer 50 shares to Treasury. Instead, the firm must mint 100 new shares and hand them to Treasury, doubling the total amount of shares outstanding to 200. Moreover, this tax would be applicable to all classes of shares and any new equity issuance from the company. While the government's stake would be permanently fixed at 50 percent, creating new shares would dilute existing shareholders, effectively shrinking the ownership share. To enforce this, the legislation would preempt company bylaws that determine how new shares are issued, overriding corporate boards or shareholder votes typically required to issue new equity. The government would also ignore repurchased or redeemed shares when calculating the amount to be remitted.
The legislation would subject to the tax firms with more than $200 million in gross receipts engaged in "trade or business" activities related to AI data centers, AI computing infrastructure, AI services, and companies researching, producing, or manufacturing advanced robotics.
To collect the equity interest tax, the legislation would establish the American A.I. Sovereign Wealth Fund within the Treasury managed by Independent Commission for Democratic AI - consisting of seven commissioners appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate - to manage the fund and exercise all voting and governance rights attached to the equity interests. The legislation instructs the commission to work with the Secretary of Labor to "effectively promote the goals of worker welfare, public safety, fair competition...environmental sustainability, and financial solvency."
The commission would also designate individuals to represent the fund on the board of directors at each of the AI companies in which the fund holds an equity interest. These representatives are required to advance the goals of the commission, "even where doing so conflicts with the financial interests of the company or its other equity holders." Furthermore, the representatives - as well as agreeing non-government board members - are immune from liability for advancing these goals. In other words, they cannot be held liable by shareholders for what could traditionally be thought of as a breach of fiduciary duty.
Effects on Competition
The proposal would advance the ongoing displacement of markets for state-directed capitalism. Beginning with the acquisition of a "golden share" in Nippon/U.S. Steel as a condition of the merger, the Trump Administration has taken direct equity positions in more than a dozen companies. The creation of a sovereign wealth fund and accompanying mandates outlined in the Sanders legislation makes it clear that these equity stakes can, and will likely, be used to advance political agendas rather than serving a traditional corporate board's role in promoting the interest of the company, its shareholders, and its customers.
As American Action Forum (AAF) has previously discussed, government equity stakes would likely poison the well of innovation. Allocating capital based on the merits of new ideas and technologies would be replaced by the government picking winners and losers. It would also likely translate into regulatory capture and corporate cronyism. Firms could use the government's board position to advocate for regulatory barriers to prevent new competitors from entering the market or provide an inside track to government contracts.
Competing on the merits for customers would also be compromised. Firms seeking contracts with AI firms may change their criteria from "who has the best product?" to "who has the best relationship with the White House?"
The commission and representatives would be mandated to promote government objectives, even when those objectives conflict with typical business operations. This could have undue influence on the entire corporate board. For instance, fear of potential government retribution could lead non-government board members to change their stances on corporate proposals, potentially to the detriment of the firm, its customers, or even the taxpayers.
Furthermore, broad government investment in the across the AI sector would introduce a structural hazard of common ownership - an arrangement which is generally illegal under federal law. The Sanders' legislation confers on federal company representatives a common agenda, which would translate to similar voting patterns in each of these individual companies. The potential for this activity is why Congress created Section 8 of the Clayton Act - which prohibits individuals from serving as an officer or director of two competing firms, known as interlocking directorates. A government agent in boardrooms across the entire AI industry could lead to widespread coordination, despite the legislation prohibiting the commission from using its voting or governance rights to "coordinate" competitive conduct of such companies. It is unclear how such a provision would be enforced when the mandated goals of each representative are the same.
Conclusion
The expansive scope of Senator Sanders' American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act and the trend of government-corporate joint enterprises is cause for concern. In an industry as dynamic as AI, the danger of government dictates could create a perverse set of incentives that undermine competition, slow innovation, and rob consumers and businesses of new products.
* * *
Fred Ashton is the Director of Competition Policy at the American Action Forum.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/an-end-to-ai-competition-senator-sanders-plan/
[Category: Think Tank]
* * *
An End to AI Competition? Senator Sanders' Plan
Executive Summary
* Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced the American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act, a sweeping legislative proposal that would levy a tax equal to a 50-percent equity stake in artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced robotics firms with gross receipts exceeding $200 million - likely expanding beyond the industry's leading firms.
* The proposed legislation builds on a growing, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Competition Policy Director Fred Ashton: * * * An End to AI Competition? Senator Sanders' Plan Executive Summary * Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced the American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act, a sweeping legislative proposal that would levy a tax equal to a 50-percent equity stake in artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced robotics firms with gross receipts exceeding $200 million - likely expanding beyond the industry's leading firms. * The proposed legislation builds on a growing,bipartisan narrative - shared by President Donald Trump - suggesting that direct government stakes in these firms could both benefit taxpayers and encourage more responsible management of these companies.
* Injecting the federal government into the boardroom promises to create a perverse set of incentives, ultimately robbing consumers and businesses of new products while dampening the current rapid pace of innovation.
-
Introduction
The rapid ascent of artificial intelligence (AI) has sparked a growing public backlash - in part, over anxiety about potential job displacement and the perceived concentration of wealth. Seizing the moment, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced the American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act, a sweeping proposal that would impose a tax equal to a 50-percent equity stake in AI and advanced robotics firms with gross receipts exceeding $200 million - likely expanding beyond the industry's leading firms.
The legislation comes just weeks after Senator Sanders penned an opinion piece in The New York Times previewing his idea for the United States to take equity stakes in AI companies.
The proposed legislation builds on a growing, bipartisan narrative - shared by President Donald Trump - suggesting that government involvement in these firms could both benefit taxpayers and encourage more responsible management of these companies.
Injecting the federal government into the boardroom promises to create a perverse set of incentives that could rob consumers and businesses of new products while slowing the current rapid pace of innovation.
American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act
Senator Sanders introduced the American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act just weeks after penning an opinion piece in which he called for the United States to take equity stakes in AI companies.
The legislation would create an excise tax on what is called "systemically important AI activity" in the amount of 50 percent of all outstanding equity interest to be remitted to the Department of the Treasury. Fulfilling this tax, however, cannot come from the existing stock of equity. To satisfy the mandate, the equity interest remitted to Treasury "shall be equity interests newly issued by the applicable AI company."
How it works in practice is not as straightforward. A company with 100 outstanding equity shares cannot simply transfer 50 shares to Treasury. Instead, the firm must mint 100 new shares and hand them to Treasury, doubling the total amount of shares outstanding to 200. Moreover, this tax would be applicable to all classes of shares and any new equity issuance from the company. While the government's stake would be permanently fixed at 50 percent, creating new shares would dilute existing shareholders, effectively shrinking the ownership share. To enforce this, the legislation would preempt company bylaws that determine how new shares are issued, overriding corporate boards or shareholder votes typically required to issue new equity. The government would also ignore repurchased or redeemed shares when calculating the amount to be remitted.
The legislation would subject to the tax firms with more than $200 million in gross receipts engaged in "trade or business" activities related to AI data centers, AI computing infrastructure, AI services, and companies researching, producing, or manufacturing advanced robotics.
To collect the equity interest tax, the legislation would establish the American A.I. Sovereign Wealth Fund within the Treasury managed by Independent Commission for Democratic AI - consisting of seven commissioners appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate - to manage the fund and exercise all voting and governance rights attached to the equity interests. The legislation instructs the commission to work with the Secretary of Labor to "effectively promote the goals of worker welfare, public safety, fair competition...environmental sustainability, and financial solvency."
The commission would also designate individuals to represent the fund on the board of directors at each of the AI companies in which the fund holds an equity interest. These representatives are required to advance the goals of the commission, "even where doing so conflicts with the financial interests of the company or its other equity holders." Furthermore, the representatives - as well as agreeing non-government board members - are immune from liability for advancing these goals. In other words, they cannot be held liable by shareholders for what could traditionally be thought of as a breach of fiduciary duty.
Effects on Competition
The proposal would advance the ongoing displacement of markets for state-directed capitalism. Beginning with the acquisition of a "golden share" in Nippon/U.S. Steel as a condition of the merger, the Trump Administration has taken direct equity positions in more than a dozen companies. The creation of a sovereign wealth fund and accompanying mandates outlined in the Sanders legislation makes it clear that these equity stakes can, and will likely, be used to advance political agendas rather than serving a traditional corporate board's role in promoting the interest of the company, its shareholders, and its customers.
As American Action Forum (AAF) has previously discussed, government equity stakes would likely poison the well of innovation. Allocating capital based on the merits of new ideas and technologies would be replaced by the government picking winners and losers. It would also likely translate into regulatory capture and corporate cronyism. Firms could use the government's board position to advocate for regulatory barriers to prevent new competitors from entering the market or provide an inside track to government contracts.
Competing on the merits for customers would also be compromised. Firms seeking contracts with AI firms may change their criteria from "who has the best product?" to "who has the best relationship with the White House?"
The commission and representatives would be mandated to promote government objectives, even when those objectives conflict with typical business operations. This could have undue influence on the entire corporate board. For instance, fear of potential government retribution could lead non-government board members to change their stances on corporate proposals, potentially to the detriment of the firm, its customers, or even the taxpayers.
Furthermore, broad government investment in the across the AI sector would introduce a structural hazard of common ownership - an arrangement which is generally illegal under federal law. The Sanders' legislation confers on federal company representatives a common agenda, which would translate to similar voting patterns in each of these individual companies. The potential for this activity is why Congress created Section 8 of the Clayton Act - which prohibits individuals from serving as an officer or director of two competing firms, known as interlocking directorates. A government agent in boardrooms across the entire AI industry could lead to widespread coordination, despite the legislation prohibiting the commission from using its voting or governance rights to "coordinate" competitive conduct of such companies. It is unclear how such a provision would be enforced when the mandated goals of each representative are the same.
Conclusion
The expansive scope of Senator Sanders' American AI Sovereign Wealth Fund Act and the trend of government-corporate joint enterprises is cause for concern. In an industry as dynamic as AI, the danger of government dictates could create a perverse set of incentives that undermine competition, slow innovation, and rob consumers and businesses of new products.
* * *
Fred Ashton is the Director of Competition Policy at the American Action Forum.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/an-end-to-ai-competition-senator-sanders-plan/
[Category: Think Tank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Bicameral ROAD to Housing
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Financial Services Policy Director Thomas Kingsley:
* * *
A Bicameral ROAD to Housing
Executive Summary
* House and Senate lawmakers have released the text of a compromise, bicameral ROAD to Housing bill after months of negotiations over competing approaches to federal housing reform.
* The final framework preserves a largely supply-side approach while de-emphasizing more controversial investor-focused provisions in favor of regulatory reform, program modernization, and production incentives. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Financial Services Policy Director Thomas Kingsley: * * * A Bicameral ROAD to Housing Executive Summary * House and Senate lawmakers have released the text of a compromise, bicameral ROAD to Housing bill after months of negotiations over competing approaches to federal housing reform. * The final framework preserves a largely supply-side approach while de-emphasizing more controversial investor-focused provisions in favor of regulatory reform, program modernization, and production incentives.
* Despite The ROAD to Housing framework marking a welcome shift from demand-side housing policy toward addressing housing scarcity through supply-side reforms, its largely incremental federal changes can only go so far in overcoming the local zoning and land-use restrictions that remain the primary constraints on housing production.
-
Introduction
With housing affordability continuing to rank among the most significant economic concerns facing American households, congressional lawmakers have spent the past year developing competing proposals to address the nation's persistent housing shortage. Last week, House and Senate negotiators released a bicameral ROAD to Housing text that consolidates dozens of previously introduced bills into a single package. While the agreement reflects compromise on several contentious issues, particularly the role of institutional investors in housing markets, the final text demonstrates a growing bipartisan consensus that increasing housing supply--rather than simply subsidizing housing demand--must be at the center of federal housing policy. While the direction is positive, however, Congress simply lacks the tools to meaningfully address housing production and the impacts of the bill will require local and state implementation.
Two Bills, One Diagnosis
Both the House and Senate packages were shaped by the same macro-level concern: housing supply has not kept pace with demand for an extended period, contributing to sustained price and rent pressures across most major metropolitan areas. That imbalance has increasingly been linked to structural constraints on housing production rather than cyclical demand conditions.
Accordingly, both chambers converged on a broadly similar policy toolkit. The House package leaned more heavily on targeted production incentives, competitive funding mechanisms, and reforms designed to reward jurisdictions that expand housing supply. The Senate package was broader in scope, emphasizing modernization of federal housing programs, streamlining of administrative requirements, and changes to environmental review and permitting processes intended to reduce development timelines.
Across both vehicles, the substantive policy content was consistent: streamlining of National Environmental Policy Act-related requirements for certain housing projects, adjustments to HUD program requirements to improve throughput and reduce compliance friction, expanded use of grants and financing tools tied to zoning and permitting reforms, and efforts to facilitate denser development in transit-accessible and high-opportunity areas. Demand-side interventions were present but remained secondary to the central objective of expanding supply.
The Investor Question
The principal policy area of divergence between the two chambers centered on institutional investment in the single-family housing market and whether it should be addressed directly within federal housing policy.
The House included a more explicit set of investor-focused provisions, reflecting concern that institutional acquisition of single-family homes--particularly in high-growth metropolitan areas--has altered competitive dynamics in entry-level housing markets. These provisions generally sought to constrain or disincentivize large-scale investor participation through targeted policy mechanisms tied to federal housing programs, financing channels, or eligibility structures.
The Senate approach placed less emphasis on direct investor restrictions, instead treating institutional activity as a secondary effect of broader supply constraints. Under this view, investor participation tends to intensify in markets where housing production is already insufficient, amplifying competition for a limited stock of available homes rather than functioning as a primary driver of scarcity.
This distinction ultimately shaped the negotiation dynamic.
A Supply-side Compromise
The resulting agreement remains anchored in a shared supply-side framework, combining elements of both chambers' approaches.
House priorities are most visible in provisions that tie federal funding and incentives to local policy changes, particularly zoning and permitting reforms intended to unlock additional housing production. Senate priorities are reflected in the emphasis on administrative simplification, program modernization, and procedural reforms across federal housing and community development programs.
Across both, the core policy logic is consistent: reduce friction in the development process, shorten timelines, and increase the responsiveness of housing supply to market demand. This includes efforts to streamline environmental review for qualifying housing projects, standardize and modernize HUD program administration, and improve coordination between federal, state, and local housing entities.
Investor-focused provisions were narrowed or de-emphasized in the bicameral text, with the final framework prioritizing measures aimed at expanding total housing supply rather than reallocating existing stock between buyer types. The text preserves many of the House's restrictions on institutional investment (most significantly the restriction barring institutional investors who own more than 350 homes from buying more properties) while dropping the single aspect that caused the most discussion--Senate-approved provision that would have forced these investors to sell these properties within seven years or face financial penalties that had already led to a chilling effect on the build-to-rent market.
The Limits of Federal Housing Reform
The economic significance of the legislation lies less in any individual provision than in the broader shift in policy thinking it represents.
For much of the past two decades, federal housing debates have focused primarily on financing mechanisms, affordability assistance, and other demand-side interventions. The Road to Housing framework instead treats housing scarcity as the central problem and housing production as the principal solution. That is a notable, and welcome, shift in emphasis.
At the same time, the likely effects of the legislation should be viewed realistically. Many of the reforms are incremental. Streamlined permitting processes may reduce delays. Administrative modernization may lower compliance costs. Improved incentives may encourage some jurisdictions to adopt more housing-friendly policies. These changes could collectively improve housing market outcomes over time.
None, however, directly addresses the most significant barriers to housing production: local land-use restrictions. Height limits, minimum lot sizes, parking mandates, density caps, and other zoning requirements remain the primary determinants of housing supply in many communities. Federal policymakers can encourage reform through incentives and conditional funding, but they possess limited authority to compel it.
Conclusion
The release of a bicameral ROAD to Housing text suggests Congress has largely settled on a common diagnosis of the nation's housing challenges. The debate is no longer principally whether housing affordability stems from inadequate supply, but rather which federal policies can most effectively encourage additional production. That is a meaningful, and welcome, development. Yet the legislation also illustrates the limits of federal action. The package contains a range of sensible reforms that may reduce costs, shorten timelines, and improve the operation of housing programs, but its ultimate success will depend on whether states and localities respond by permitting substantially more housing construction. The ROAD to Housing framework may represent the most comprehensive federal housing reform effort in years; whether it materially changes housing outcomes will depend largely on decisions made beyond Washington.
* * *
Thomas Kingsley is the Director of Financial Services Policy at the American Action Forum.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/a-bicameral-road-to-housing/
[Category: Think Tank]
* * *
A Bicameral ROAD to Housing
Executive Summary
* House and Senate lawmakers have released the text of a compromise, bicameral ROAD to Housing bill after months of negotiations over competing approaches to federal housing reform.
* The final framework preserves a largely supply-side approach while de-emphasizing more controversial investor-focused provisions in favor of regulatory reform, program modernization, and production incentives. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Financial Services Policy Director Thomas Kingsley: * * * A Bicameral ROAD to Housing Executive Summary * House and Senate lawmakers have released the text of a compromise, bicameral ROAD to Housing bill after months of negotiations over competing approaches to federal housing reform. * The final framework preserves a largely supply-side approach while de-emphasizing more controversial investor-focused provisions in favor of regulatory reform, program modernization, and production incentives.
* Despite The ROAD to Housing framework marking a welcome shift from demand-side housing policy toward addressing housing scarcity through supply-side reforms, its largely incremental federal changes can only go so far in overcoming the local zoning and land-use restrictions that remain the primary constraints on housing production.
-
Introduction
With housing affordability continuing to rank among the most significant economic concerns facing American households, congressional lawmakers have spent the past year developing competing proposals to address the nation's persistent housing shortage. Last week, House and Senate negotiators released a bicameral ROAD to Housing text that consolidates dozens of previously introduced bills into a single package. While the agreement reflects compromise on several contentious issues, particularly the role of institutional investors in housing markets, the final text demonstrates a growing bipartisan consensus that increasing housing supply--rather than simply subsidizing housing demand--must be at the center of federal housing policy. While the direction is positive, however, Congress simply lacks the tools to meaningfully address housing production and the impacts of the bill will require local and state implementation.
Two Bills, One Diagnosis
Both the House and Senate packages were shaped by the same macro-level concern: housing supply has not kept pace with demand for an extended period, contributing to sustained price and rent pressures across most major metropolitan areas. That imbalance has increasingly been linked to structural constraints on housing production rather than cyclical demand conditions.
Accordingly, both chambers converged on a broadly similar policy toolkit. The House package leaned more heavily on targeted production incentives, competitive funding mechanisms, and reforms designed to reward jurisdictions that expand housing supply. The Senate package was broader in scope, emphasizing modernization of federal housing programs, streamlining of administrative requirements, and changes to environmental review and permitting processes intended to reduce development timelines.
Across both vehicles, the substantive policy content was consistent: streamlining of National Environmental Policy Act-related requirements for certain housing projects, adjustments to HUD program requirements to improve throughput and reduce compliance friction, expanded use of grants and financing tools tied to zoning and permitting reforms, and efforts to facilitate denser development in transit-accessible and high-opportunity areas. Demand-side interventions were present but remained secondary to the central objective of expanding supply.
The Investor Question
The principal policy area of divergence between the two chambers centered on institutional investment in the single-family housing market and whether it should be addressed directly within federal housing policy.
The House included a more explicit set of investor-focused provisions, reflecting concern that institutional acquisition of single-family homes--particularly in high-growth metropolitan areas--has altered competitive dynamics in entry-level housing markets. These provisions generally sought to constrain or disincentivize large-scale investor participation through targeted policy mechanisms tied to federal housing programs, financing channels, or eligibility structures.
The Senate approach placed less emphasis on direct investor restrictions, instead treating institutional activity as a secondary effect of broader supply constraints. Under this view, investor participation tends to intensify in markets where housing production is already insufficient, amplifying competition for a limited stock of available homes rather than functioning as a primary driver of scarcity.
This distinction ultimately shaped the negotiation dynamic.
A Supply-side Compromise
The resulting agreement remains anchored in a shared supply-side framework, combining elements of both chambers' approaches.
House priorities are most visible in provisions that tie federal funding and incentives to local policy changes, particularly zoning and permitting reforms intended to unlock additional housing production. Senate priorities are reflected in the emphasis on administrative simplification, program modernization, and procedural reforms across federal housing and community development programs.
Across both, the core policy logic is consistent: reduce friction in the development process, shorten timelines, and increase the responsiveness of housing supply to market demand. This includes efforts to streamline environmental review for qualifying housing projects, standardize and modernize HUD program administration, and improve coordination between federal, state, and local housing entities.
Investor-focused provisions were narrowed or de-emphasized in the bicameral text, with the final framework prioritizing measures aimed at expanding total housing supply rather than reallocating existing stock between buyer types. The text preserves many of the House's restrictions on institutional investment (most significantly the restriction barring institutional investors who own more than 350 homes from buying more properties) while dropping the single aspect that caused the most discussion--Senate-approved provision that would have forced these investors to sell these properties within seven years or face financial penalties that had already led to a chilling effect on the build-to-rent market.
The Limits of Federal Housing Reform
The economic significance of the legislation lies less in any individual provision than in the broader shift in policy thinking it represents.
For much of the past two decades, federal housing debates have focused primarily on financing mechanisms, affordability assistance, and other demand-side interventions. The Road to Housing framework instead treats housing scarcity as the central problem and housing production as the principal solution. That is a notable, and welcome, shift in emphasis.
At the same time, the likely effects of the legislation should be viewed realistically. Many of the reforms are incremental. Streamlined permitting processes may reduce delays. Administrative modernization may lower compliance costs. Improved incentives may encourage some jurisdictions to adopt more housing-friendly policies. These changes could collectively improve housing market outcomes over time.
None, however, directly addresses the most significant barriers to housing production: local land-use restrictions. Height limits, minimum lot sizes, parking mandates, density caps, and other zoning requirements remain the primary determinants of housing supply in many communities. Federal policymakers can encourage reform through incentives and conditional funding, but they possess limited authority to compel it.
Conclusion
The release of a bicameral ROAD to Housing text suggests Congress has largely settled on a common diagnosis of the nation's housing challenges. The debate is no longer principally whether housing affordability stems from inadequate supply, but rather which federal policies can most effectively encourage additional production. That is a meaningful, and welcome, development. Yet the legislation also illustrates the limits of federal action. The package contains a range of sensible reforms that may reduce costs, shorten timelines, and improve the operation of housing programs, but its ultimate success will depend on whether states and localities respond by permitting substantially more housing construction. The ROAD to Housing framework may represent the most comprehensive federal housing reform effort in years; whether it materially changes housing outcomes will depend largely on decisions made beyond Washington.
* * *
Thomas Kingsley is the Director of Financial Services Policy at the American Action Forum.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/a-bicameral-road-to-housing/
[Category: Think Tank]
AFPI Report: Iran Was China's 'Counter-Pivot' - And Operation Epic Fury Just Dismantled It
WASHINGTON, June 19 (TNSrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on June 18, 2026:
* * *
New AFPI Report: Iran Was China's "Counter-Pivot" -- And Operation Epic Fury Just Dismantled It
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released a new report contending that China spent two decades using Iran as a tool to keep the United States distracted from the Pacific -- and that Operation Epic Fury has now broken that architecture, handing Washington a lasting strategic advantage over Beijing.
The report, "Iran as China's 'Counter-Pivot': The Strategic Implications ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 (TNSrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on June 18, 2026: * * * New AFPI Report: Iran Was China's "Counter-Pivot" -- And Operation Epic Fury Just Dismantled It The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released a new report contending that China spent two decades using Iran as a tool to keep the United States distracted from the Pacific -- and that Operation Epic Fury has now broken that architecture, handing Washington a lasting strategic advantage over Beijing. The report, "Iran as China's 'Counter-Pivot': The Strategic Implicationsof Operation Epic Fury for America's Competition with China," was authored by Piero A. Tozzi, Senior Director for China Policy at AFPI, and Adam Savit, Director for China Policy at AFPI.
It finds that discounted Iranian oil, dual-use tech transfers, and tacit support for Tehran's proxy network let China extract outsized strategic value at minimal cost -- and that Epic Fury has disrupted that model, with Beijing now having failed to defend two partners, Venezuela and Iran, in two months.
"Operation Epic Fury broke the tool Beijing relied on for twenty years," said Tozzi. "China couldn't protect Iran, just like it couldn't protect Venezuela. That's a strategic opening for the United States, allowing us to finally pivot to Asia."
The report urges the U.S. to consolidate allies' shift toward U.S. LNG, press its informational advantage against CCP and PLA leadership, and accelerate domestic critical minerals production.
Tozzi will lead a related discussion on Tuesday, June 23, at AFPI's fireside chat with Frederick H. Fleitz, "Confronting the North Korean Nuclear Threat & Stability in the Indo-Pacific," featuring Fleitz's newest book, North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship, and the Oval Office. Interested members of the press can register here (https://forms.cloud.microsoft/pages/responsepage.aspx?id=56dYYP9PjEWO08DmFPeOezvqpWvm4iJBoBFIdeZPo-RUMk1ZT1RIWVc4MTNSVVpHVENXTjJTNVo4RC4u&route=shorturl).
* * *
REPORT: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/assets/uploads/files/Iran_as_China_s_%E2%80%9CCounter-Pivot%E2%80%9D-_The_Strategic_Implications_of_Operation_Epic_Fury_for_America%E2%80%99s_Competition_with_China.pdf
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/new-afpi-report-iran-was-chinas-counter-pivot-and-operation-epic-fury-just-dismantled-it
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
New AFPI Report: Iran Was China's "Counter-Pivot" -- And Operation Epic Fury Just Dismantled It
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released a new report contending that China spent two decades using Iran as a tool to keep the United States distracted from the Pacific -- and that Operation Epic Fury has now broken that architecture, handing Washington a lasting strategic advantage over Beijing.
The report, "Iran as China's 'Counter-Pivot': The Strategic Implications ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 (TNSrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on June 18, 2026: * * * New AFPI Report: Iran Was China's "Counter-Pivot" -- And Operation Epic Fury Just Dismantled It The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released a new report contending that China spent two decades using Iran as a tool to keep the United States distracted from the Pacific -- and that Operation Epic Fury has now broken that architecture, handing Washington a lasting strategic advantage over Beijing. The report, "Iran as China's 'Counter-Pivot': The Strategic Implicationsof Operation Epic Fury for America's Competition with China," was authored by Piero A. Tozzi, Senior Director for China Policy at AFPI, and Adam Savit, Director for China Policy at AFPI.
It finds that discounted Iranian oil, dual-use tech transfers, and tacit support for Tehran's proxy network let China extract outsized strategic value at minimal cost -- and that Epic Fury has disrupted that model, with Beijing now having failed to defend two partners, Venezuela and Iran, in two months.
"Operation Epic Fury broke the tool Beijing relied on for twenty years," said Tozzi. "China couldn't protect Iran, just like it couldn't protect Venezuela. That's a strategic opening for the United States, allowing us to finally pivot to Asia."
The report urges the U.S. to consolidate allies' shift toward U.S. LNG, press its informational advantage against CCP and PLA leadership, and accelerate domestic critical minerals production.
Tozzi will lead a related discussion on Tuesday, June 23, at AFPI's fireside chat with Frederick H. Fleitz, "Confronting the North Korean Nuclear Threat & Stability in the Indo-Pacific," featuring Fleitz's newest book, North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship, and the Oval Office. Interested members of the press can register here (https://forms.cloud.microsoft/pages/responsepage.aspx?id=56dYYP9PjEWO08DmFPeOezvqpWvm4iJBoBFIdeZPo-RUMk1ZT1RIWVc4MTNSVVpHVENXTjJTNVo4RC4u&route=shorturl).
* * *
REPORT: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/assets/uploads/files/Iran_as_China_s_%E2%80%9CCounter-Pivot%E2%80%9D-_The_Strategic_Implications_of_Operation_Epic_Fury_for_America%E2%80%99s_Competition_with_China.pdf
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/new-afpi-report-iran-was-chinas-counter-pivot-and-operation-epic-fury-just-dismantled-it
[Category: ThinkTank]