Think Tanks
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Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Bloomberg Opinion: New York City Can't Afford Both Big Pensions and Free Buses
NEW YORK, April 7 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on April 6, 2026, by senior fellow Allison Schrager to Bloomberg Opinion:
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New York City Can't Afford Both Big Pensions and Free Buses
Cities such as New York and Chicago are in deep financial trouble. Broadly speaking, they have two options: Make the difficult but appropriate choice to raise taxes and reduce the scale of government, or continue to live in a state of denial, increasing their pension obligations while also promising their residents more services.
I am sad but not surprised to report
... Show Full Article
NEW YORK, April 7 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on April 6, 2026, by senior fellow Allison Schrager to Bloomberg Opinion:
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New York City Can't Afford Both Big Pensions and Free Buses
Cities such as New York and Chicago are in deep financial trouble. Broadly speaking, they have two options: Make the difficult but appropriate choice to raise taxes and reduce the scale of government, or continue to live in a state of denial, increasing their pension obligations while also promising their residents more services.
I am sad but not surprised to reportthat they are choosing the latter. Even though both cities -- as well as New York and Illinois -- face major budget shortfalls, high taxes and declining populations, they are doubling down on irresponsibility. Illinois has made Chicago's pension benefits more generous, and New York is considering its own version of the Illinois bill. Either these governments have become completely detached from reality, or they are counting on a federal bailout.
The numbers are sobering. Chicago faced a $1.2 billion gap in this year's $16 billion budget, and New York City is staring down a $4.5 billion gap in its $127 billion proposal for next year. And yet last year the Illinois state legislature passed a bill that will increase the pensions of Chicago firefighters and police officers hired since 2011. It's expected to increase pension costs by $11.1 billon through 2055, and would render the city's already underfunded pensions insolvent.
Continue reading the entire piece here at Bloomberg Opinion (https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-04-06/pension-costs-are-pushing-new-york-and-chicago-toward-fiscal-crisis?srnd=undefined)
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Allison Schrager is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor of City Journal.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/new-york-city-cant-afford-both-big-pensions-and-free-buses
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Cossack Organizations Suppress Ukrainian Identity in Occupied Territories
WASHINGTON, April 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 6, 2026, by Muskingum University professor Richard Arnold in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Cossack Organizations Suppress Ukrainian Identity in Occupied Territories
Executive Summary:
* Moscow is utilizing the Cossack image and organizations to suppress Ukrainian identity in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Russian bodies like Russia's Federal Nationalities Ministry (FADN) portray Cossacks in the occupied territories as a loyal military-social
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 6, 2026, by Muskingum University professor Richard Arnold in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Cossack Organizations Suppress Ukrainian Identity in Occupied Territories
Executive Summary:
* Moscow is utilizing the Cossack image and organizations to suppress Ukrainian identity in the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Russian bodies like Russia's Federal Nationalities Ministry (FADN) portray Cossacks in the occupied territories as a loyal military-socialclass aligned with Russian narratives.
* Cossack organizations in the occupied territories of Ukraine are becoming a significant part of Kremlin-managed civil society in the occupied territories of Ukraine, where they engage with other Cossack groups, security roles, and administrative functions.
* One major focus of Cossack groups in the occupied territories of Ukraine is youth indoctrination and education. Cossack groups recruit young people, shape curricula, and promote pro-Kremlin ideology, aiming to cultivate a generation that identifies with Russia rather than Ukraine.
Cossack societies are assisting Russian occupation authorities throughout Ukraine's temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. In Zaporizhzhia in January, the department for transport under the Ministry for Internal Affairs held a "working meeting" with the Chernihivka Cossack organization, where they discussed the practical aspects of Cossacks providing security at transportation hubs (Telegram/@dneprorudnoetoday, January 26). In Berdiansk, Cossacks collected humanitarian aid for a local hospital (VK/Administratsiia Berdiaskovo Gorodskovo Okruga, March 10). So too in Kherson oblast, a Cossack organization restored memorials to Soviet World War II heroes in the village of Novotroitskii (OK/Administratsiia Novotroitskovo Munitsipal'novo Okruga, May 5, 2025). Cossacks throughout the temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine are helping the Russian authorities to function.
Moscow is utilizing the Cossack image and organizations to suppress Ukrainian identity in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories. Before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, various small Cossack societies existed in the region. The role of these Cossack organizations has largely been underappreciated in the West, despite Novaya Gazeta running an article subtitled "Russia's Federal Nationalities Ministry (FADN) transformed into an agency for Cossack Affairs in the occupied territories" in 2023 (Novaya Gazeta, November 28, 2023).
Russian President Vladimir Putin created the FADN in 2015 with a remit to "assist the realization of government policies in the sphere of inter-ethnic and ethno-confessional relations and measures aimed at strengthening the unity of the multiethnic Russian nation" (FADN, March 31, 2015). In practice, this meant combating "extremism" through internet monitoring. After the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the FADN became one of the legitimating forces for the Russian narrative inside the occupied territories. Former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and Duma Deputy Igor Baranov said, "The incompetent, and perhaps even biased formulation of national policy in Ukraine has led to the country effectively disintegrating, splintering into various components. This is precisely what forced us to launch the special military operation" (Novaya Gazeta, November 28, 2023). Baranov claimed that some Ukrainian citizens were fighting for Russia as Cossacks and the FADN should accordingly set up a system of Cossack organizations in the occupied territories (Novaya Gazeta, November 28, 2023). The FADN, to recruit more people into Cossack organizations, defines the Cossacks as a military social class (soslovie) rather than an ethnic group. Baranov's aspirations seem to be coming to fruition with the Kremlin's establishment of a "south western" department of FADN in 2023 to promote the "rebirth of the Cossacks" in the occupied territories of Ukraine (Rossiiskoe Kazachestvo, April 4, 2025).
Formal relations between the Russian authorities and the leaders of Cossack societies in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine are increasing daily. In the Russian-occupied part of Ukraine's Kherson oblast, the first village (stanista) Cossack society joined the Russian register of Cossack societies in February (VsKO, February 24). In Ukraine's Russia-occupied Luhansk oblast, the Cossack "Stone Ford" (Kamennyi Brod) society also joined the register as part of the Don Cossack Host in August 2025 (VsKO, August 8, 2025). The Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation had registered ten Cossack societies in Luhansk by March 2025 (Luganskii Informatsionyi Tsentr, March 18, 2025).
Kremlin-aligned Cossack societies and authorities in the occupied territories of Ukraine are increasing their horizontal interactions with Cossack societies inside Russia in addition to working vertically with the Russia-wide Cossack organization. The acting head of the Russian-occupied Kalanchak District in Kherson oblast met with the ataman of a Cossack society in Krasnodar on March 25 and agreed to "inter-regional cooperation and strengthening friendly ties" (Telegram/@vgakalanchak, March 25). Cossack organizations are appearing as a significant part of Kremlin-managed civil society in the occupied territories of Ukraine.
Cossack organizations in the occupied territories of Ukraine are focusing on youth recruitment and the consolidation of pro-Kremlin ideology in their ranks. Vladimir Bodachesvky, leader of the "Karachun" Cossack youth organization in Donetsk, said that the Cossack societies in occupied Donetsk should be admitted to the national Russian Cossack movement as its "14th army" (VsKO, March 2). Bodachesvky claimed that the "Novorossiya Cossacks are counting on the youth" and that Cossack societies in Ukraine's occupied Donetsk oblast are experiencing a "rapid revival." The push to popularize Cossack groups in Donetsk included trips with youth and sporting events designed to integrate them into the occupation's social fabric (VsKO, March 2). In March 2025, Cossack groups in occupied Luhansk came together to discuss the revival of Cossack youth organizations and the best way to ensure a patriotic upbringing for children (Luganskii Informatsionyi Tsentr, March 18, 2025).
Moscow is also using Cossack organizations to promote Kremlin narratives in education (see EDM, October 14, 30, 2025, January 14). University-level educational institutions in the Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are scheduled to enter the Association of Cossack Universities (VsKO, December 9, 2025). Cossack Cadets Corps organizations are also developing rapidly in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. One Luhansk Cossack Cadets Corps organization, named for Soviet Air Marshal Alexander Efimov, held a veterans day parade outside the home of a veteran from World War II in May 2025 (VK/Luganskii Informatsionnyi Tsentr, May 7, 2025). As of October 2024, the occupied territory in the Luhansk oblast had 52 Cossack classes at 28 educational institutions for a total of 1,300 students (Russian Presidential Grants, accessed March 28).
Cossack organizations in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine are growing as Russia consolidates its administrative control. They are particularly working with youth groups and education to try to raise a generation for whom Russia, and not Ukraine, is the motherland. While it is not clear whether this revival is even across all the occupied territories of Ukraine, the process of Cossack rebirth--or invention--appears to be more developed in the Luhansk oblast than in the other regions.
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Professor Richard Arnold teaches at Muskingum University and is a member of the PONARS network.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/cossack-organizations-suppress-ukrainian-identity-in-occupied-territories/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Empire Center Breaks Down Albany's Pork Barrel Spending
ALBANY, New York, April 7 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release on April 6, 2026:
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Empire Center Breaks Down Albany's Pork Barrel Spending
Albany legislators steered over $83 million in grants to 293 local projects between April and December 2025 , according to data the Empire Center recently received under a Freedom of Information Law request.
The governor and state legislators hand-picked the grantees for more than $72 million, under a program that allows them to direct money borrowed by the state Dormitory Authority to capital projects. Authority
... Show Full Article
ALBANY, New York, April 7 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release on April 6, 2026:
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Empire Center Breaks Down Albany's Pork Barrel Spending
Albany legislators steered over $83 million in grants to 293 local projects between April and December 2025 , according to data the Empire Center recently received under a Freedom of Information Law request.
The governor and state legislators hand-picked the grantees for more than $72 million, under a program that allows them to direct money borrowed by the state Dormitory Authority to capital projects. Authorityfor the grants comes from the State and Municipal Facilities Program (SAM), a slush fund created in 2013 that lets individual lawmakers and the governor choose grant recipients.
The so-called pork-barrel grants are not awarded on a competitive or transparent basis, and most get disbursed outside the normal budget process, meaning state lawmakers never vote on the individual recipients.
The largest grant during this period was a $3 million award to Brooklyn Public Library for the "purchase and installation of an HVAC system and renovations to the Flatlands Branch". This comes in the face of a $380 million system-wide maintenance backlog that the Brooklyn library system reported in 2024.
The New York City Board of Education was the recipient of the largest number of grants during this period, receiving $5.5 million for 23 projects. Some of the projects include a $650,000 grant for rooftop renovation at PS 130, The Parkside School; a $500,000 grant for renovation of Athletic Field at Bayside High School; and a $500,000 grant for renovation of culinary and Activities of Daily Living (ADL) rooms at PS 177Q.
Among other top agencies, the Brooklyn Public Library received a total of $4.4 million for five grants, while the New York City Parks and Recreation received $3.1 million for nine grants.
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Chart: Recipients of New York's Largest Pork Barrel Spending
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Among the counties, New York County (Manhattan), received the largest amount - almost $17 million for 30 grants. This includes $2.3million to the New York City Housing Authority for the "purchase and installation of CCTV security cameras and related equipment" and a $2.2 million grant to Pace University for a Healthcare Simulation lab secured through the office of Senate Majority Leader Andrea Stewart-Cousins.
Among upstate counties, agencies in Albany County received $5.4 million for 11 grants, while 16 agencies in Erie County received $3.8 million.
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Map: New York's 2025 Pork Barrel
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Some of the notable large projects include:
* $2.5 million to the city of Middletown for renovation of a building to be used as a community center, funded by the Capital Assistance Program (CAP).
* $2 million to Colonie Senior Service Centers, Inc. for the construction of a senior resident facility. This is the largest amount granted to a non-profit in the new data.
* $1.78 million to the Goddard Riverside Community Center covering a range of maintenance for private residential housing operated by a non-profit organization.
* $1 million to the Hempstead Union Free School District for the purchase of vehicles and parking lot paving. This allocation for non-instructional infrastructure occurs while the district is under state-appointed fiscal monitoring and faces a reported $34 million budget deficit.
In addition to the above, the dataset also includes many small grants that lawmakers have steered towards private organizations. Some of these include:
* $1 million to the Bank Street College of Education for a roof guardrail, rain wastewater system replacement, and a "new awning and sign".
* $400,000 to Homebound Chesed, Inc. in Brooklyn for the purchase of four vehicles, including GPS, cameras, two-way radios, and "vehicle wraps".
* $250,000 to Odell House Rochambeau Headquarters in Hartsdale, Westchester County, for the construction of museum exhibits.
* $125,000 to Rattlestick Productions, Inc. for renovations to a private theater in New York City.
* $78,000 to the Women's League Community Residences, Inc. in Brooklyn for vehicle purchase for the private residential facility.
* $55,000 to the Queens Legal Services Corporation for the purchase and installation of automatic door openers for restrooms.
The Empire Center, based in Albany, is an independent, not-for-profit, non-partisan think tank dedicated to promoting policies that can make New York a better place to live, work and raise a family.
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Original text here: https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/empire-center-breaks-down-albanys-pork-barrel-spending/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: How Minnesota's Property Taxes Make Life Less Affordable
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 7 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 6, 2026, by economist John Phelan:
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How Minnesota's property taxes make life less affordable
How property tax hikes squeeze affordability
*
Property taxes are a large and growing source of concern for many Minnesotans.
KSTP recently ran a story titled "Valuations up, sale prices down for some metro homeowners;" KAAL ran another titled "Minnesotans see significant increases in property value
... Show Full Article
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 7 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 6, 2026, by economist John Phelan:
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How Minnesota's property taxes make life less affordable
How property tax hikes squeeze affordability
*
Property taxes are a large and growing source of concern for many Minnesotans.
KSTP recently ran a story titled "Valuations up, sale prices down for some metro homeowners;" KAAL ran another titled "Minnesotans see significant increases in property valueassessments," which notes:
"In LeRoy, a man named Harlan Olson said he's now paying $1000 more in property taxes after the value of that property unexpectedly increased on a home that has remained the same for years."
""$238,600, that's almost a $50,000 increase in one year," Olson said.
"Olson has lived in LeRoy since 2021 after moving his family from Adams. Between buying his home and land, the total cost was around $30,000 -- nearly 90% less than what the county says his property is currently valued at just five years later.
""Now they're saying this land according to them was valued at a quarter million dollars. Now how can that happen?" Olson said.
"Between 2024 and 2025, Olson's property value increased by $50,000 and has gone up another $20,000 this year despite no recent renovations. The increase is reflected in his property taxes.
""[They were] around 3000 last year. Now they're right around 4000," Olson said."
Property tax hikes are another source of the squeeze Minnesotans are feeling on the affordability of their lives. "According to the Minnesota Department of Revenue," KAAL reports, "the certified property tax levies for all local governments in 2026 is nearly $14 billion -- a 6.8% increase from last year."
The process of setting property tax rates is rather opaque -- perhaps by design -- and it doesn't help that local governments don't do much to explain it. KAAL reports that "County assessors follow statewide practices when setting these property taxes. ABC 6 News reached out to multiple county assessors in our area, but none were available to discuss the property assessment process."
The process basically works like this:
Step 1
First, as Dakota County outlines, "Each taxing district sets their levy." As the League of Minnesota Cities explains:
"Each year, the city, county, school district, and any special property taxing authorities must establish how much property tax they want to collect in the following year by Dec. 28."
"For cities, the property tax levy is set after the consideration of all other revenues, including state aids like local government aid (LGA).
"1. That is: [city budget] - [all non-property tax revenues] = [city levy]
"For many cities within the seven-county Twin Cities metropolitan and on the Iron Range, the levies are reduced by an amount of property tax revenue derived from the metropolitan and range area fiscal disparities programs."
Step 2
Second, as Dakota County puts it, "The tax rate is determined by spreading the levy over the tax base." We have the levy from the previous equation. To calculate the tax base, the League of Minnesota Cities explains:
"Assessors try to determine the approximate selling price of each parcel of property based on current market conditions."
"A property class is also assigned to each parcel of property based on the use of the property. For example, property that is owner-occupied as a personal residence is classified as a residential homestead.
"The classification is important because the Minnesota system assigns a weight to each class of property. Generally, properties associated with income production (e.g., commercial and industrial properties) have a higher classification weight than other properties.
"The tax capacity of each parcel is a percentage of each parcel's market value.
"2) That is: [parcel market value] * [class rate] = [parcel tax capacity]
"For example, a $75,000 home classified as a residential homestead has a class rate of 1.0% and therefore a tax capacity of $75,000 x .01 or $750.
"Doing this for every property in the jurisdiction and adding the results together gives us the "taxable tax capacity," or tax base."
Step 3
So now we have to spread the levy from Step 1 by the tax base from Step 2. The League of Minnesota Cities explains that:
"The county calculates the city tax rate by dividing the city levy (minus the fiscal disparities distribution levy, if applicable) by the taxable tax capacity."
"3) That is: [city levy] / [taxable tax capacity] = [city tax rate]. The tax rate is expressed as a percentage.
"This same calculation is completed for the county based on the county's levy and tax base, the school district, and all special taxing authorities. The sum of the tax rates for all taxing authorities that levy against a single property produces the total local tax rate. The county uses the total local tax rate to determine the overall tax burden for each parcel of property."
Step 4
Nearly there.
Finally, as Dakota County explains, "Your tax bill is calculated by multiplying your property's taxable value by the total tax rate for your location." "That is," as the League of Minnesota Cities puts it:
"4) [parcel tax capacity] * [total local tax rate] = [tax capacity tax bill]"
"The tax statement for each individual parcel itemizes the taxes for the county, municipality, school district, and any special taxing authorities."
To make this clearer, Table 1 lays out the process for a hypothetical town with 5,000 properties all of the same value:
Table 1: Hypothetical property tax calculation
But what really sends that property tax payment up and squeezes affordability for Minnesotans? We'll look at that tomorrow.
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John Phelan is an Economist at the Center of the American Experiment.
john.phelan@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/how-minnesotas-property-taxes-make-life-less-affordable/
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Section 232 Pharmaceutical Tariffs Are Not a Health Policy Tool
WASHINGTON, April 7 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on April 6, 2026, by Health Care Policy Director Michael Baker:
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Section 232 Pharmaceutical Tariffs Are Not a Health Policy Tool
Executive Summary
* The Trump Administration announced a new Section 232 tariff regime targeting patented pharmaceuticals and associated pharmaceutical ingredients, tying the policy to both manufacturing onshoring and most-favored-nation pricing metrics.
* The proclamation establishes a default 100 percent tariff on identified patented drugs and related inputs, a 20 percent tariff
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 7 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on April 6, 2026, by Health Care Policy Director Michael Baker:
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Section 232 Pharmaceutical Tariffs Are Not a Health Policy Tool
Executive Summary
* The Trump Administration announced a new Section 232 tariff regime targeting patented pharmaceuticals and associated pharmaceutical ingredients, tying the policy to both manufacturing onshoring and most-favored-nation pricing metrics.
* The proclamation establishes a default 100 percent tariff on identified patented drugs and related inputs, a 20 percent tariffrate for companies with Department of Commerce-approved plans to onshore production, and lower rates for other nations with already signed trade deals.
* While tariffs may be able to coerce behavior, they are a poor instrument to address affordability concerns and onshore pharmaceutical production; given the administration's regularly shifting trade policies, they are especially ill-suited to an industry as costly, complex, and internationally integrated as pharmaceuticals.
Introduction
On April 2, 2026, the Trump Administration announced a new Section 232 tariff regime targeting patented pharmaceuticals and associated pharmaceutical ingredients, presenting the policy as both a national-security intervention and a means of reducing prescription drug prices. The proclamation establishes a default 100 percent tariff on identified patented drugs and related inputs. For certain companies, the tariffs take effect on July 31, 2026; for others, they begin on September 29, 2026. The White House has described this bifurcation as a staggered implementation window of 120 days for some larger firms and 180 days for smaller ones. There is variability beyond the default rate for companies that adhere to pharmaceutical pricing and manufacturing policies preferred by the administration.
The particulars of the announcement make clear the administration does not merely seek to reorient supply chains or encourage domestic production. It is attempting to use tariff policy as a vehicle for industrial policy, pricing policy, and geopolitical leverage all at once. These new tariffs are simultaneously intended to reduce domestic drug prices, compel companies to join most-favored-nation (MFN) pricing accords and onshore pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities, and lead trading partners to make concessions to the administration.
There is a fundamental conceptual problem: Tariffs are a poor instrument for addressing concerns about drug pricing, and they are especially ill-suited to an industry as costly, complex, and internationally integrated as pharmaceuticals.
A Circular Policy Problem
The proclamation articulates a highly conditional framework, structured around country-specific treatment, firm-specific concessions, and future policy negotiations. Companies that have executed MFN agreements with the U.S. government, which include both onshoring and pricing commitments, will have no tariffs associated with this action until 2029. Companies with Department of Commerce-approved plans to onshore production but without MFN-style pricing concessions may qualify for a 20 percent tariff rate, though that reduced rate is scheduled to rise to 100 percent on April 2, 2030. Products from the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein are generally subject to a 15 percent rate, while products from the United Kingdom face a 10 percent rate, with the possibility of falling to zero if a future bilateral pricing arrangement so provides.
The proclamation also provides an exemption for several specialized product categories, including drugs for which the approved indications are entirely orphan-designated, nuclear medicines, plasma-derived therapies, fertility treatments, cell and gene therapies, antibody-drug conjugates, certain medical countermeasures, and some animal-health products, subject to the administration's criteria. It also excludes generic drugs, biosimilars, and their associated ingredients for the time being, while directing Commerce to revisit whether a separate generic tariff action may be warranted within a year.
The administration's approach creates a kind of policy catch-22 because the three levers it is pulling operate on three different actors, none of which directly controls the others. Tariffs are imposed on manufacturers and importers, forcing companies to absorb higher costs or alter supply chains. MFN pricing, however, is fundamentally a function of foreign government reimbursement systems, formularies, and price-setting institutions - matters well beyond the unilateral control of the firms being pressured. Onshoring, meanwhile, depends not simply on corporate will, but on whether U.S. domestic policy makes large-scale pharmaceutical manufacturing commercially and operationally viable through permitting, regulatory predictability, tax treatment, infrastructure, and labor conditions.
The result is a framework in which companies are punished for pricing decisions made abroad and for production choices shaped by domestic policy constraints at home. Rather than aligning incentives, the policy disperses responsibility among actors with different authorities, making it far more difficult for any single lever to achieve the outcome it is ostensibly designed to produce.
Tying One Bad Policy to Another
Centering the tariff regime on MFN pricing as the main pathway toward relief reveals the misguided nature of this policy. Companies that qualify for the onshoring pathway and also enter into MFN pricing agreements with the Department of Health and Human Services may receive an exemption through January 20, 2029. The administration is therefore not simply attempting to encourage domestic pharmaceutical production, but conditioning tariff relief on compliance with an externally anchored drug-pricing framework using Section 232 as leverage to extract both manufacturing commitments and pricing concessions from firms.
The problem begins with the mismatch between the administration's diagnosis and its chosen instrument. If the policy concern is that foreign governments pay less for innovative medicines than the United States, then the source of that disparity lies in foreign reimbursement systems: reference pricing, national formularies, budget constraints, administrative negotiation, and state-driven price suppression. A tariff imposed at the U.S. border does not alter any of those policies. It does not require another country to revise its reimbursement rules. It does not compel foreign health systems to bear a greater share of global biopharmaceutical costs. It merely taxes the importation of a product into the United States. To describe that as a remedy for MFN pricing is to conflate foreign pricing distortion with domestic import taxation.
Given Congress' frosty reception to codifying MFN, the tariff regime could also be understood as a possible effort to extend MFN-style pricing discipline without legislative action. The proclamation conditions tariff treatment on MFN pricing agreements. Companies are (forcibly) encouraged to treat MFN not as a transient political demand, but as part of a longer-lived commercial environment. That is what makes the linkage so consequential: It looks less like ordinary trade policy than an attempt to give MFN staying power through executive design that Congress has - thankfully - been hesitant to codify directly.
Raising Taxes Does Not Inherently Lower Prices
Whatever political rhetoric may accompany them, tariffs' economic incidence does not disappear because the product in question is a medicine rather than a machine part or consumer appliance. Research on prior U.S. tariff actions found that the burden of many tariffs fell substantially on domestic purchasers, rather than being wholly absorbed by foreign exporters. More recent pharmaceutical-specific modeling points in the same direction. A Health Affairs Scholar analysis of tariffs on imported active pharmaceutical ingredients used in domestically produced generics estimated that a 100 percent worldwide tariff could raise average finished-drug prices by roughly 30 percent under baseline assumptions, while a blended tariff scenario could still generate meaningful price increases. The precise magnitude may differ across branded and patented products, but the operative logic remains unchanged: When government taxes imported pharmaceutical inputs or finished products, the domestic supply chain becomes more expensive.
That point becomes even more serious when placed in the context of the industry the administration has chosen to tax. Pharmaceuticals are not a low-cost sector with large idle profit margins waiting to absorb a major new trade burden. They are a research-intensive, capital-intensive, compliance-intensive industry characterized by large upfront investment, long development timelines, manufacturing complexity, and extensive regulatory obligations. The Congressional Budget Office has found that pharmaceutical firms devoted an average of roughly 19 percent of net revenues to research and development over the prior two decades. The administration's proclamation also acknowledges that the United States remains heavily reliant on foreign production: As of 2025, approximately 53 percent of patented pharmaceutical products distributed domestically were produced outside the country, while only 15 percent of patented active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) by volume were domestically produced for the U.S. market.
That is the central contradiction at the heart of the policy. The administration purports to be lowering prices by imposing a tax on an industry it simultaneously recognizes as both expensive to sustain and substantially dependent on imported production and inputs. That is not disciplined economic reasoning. It is policy inversion. Instead of addressing the foreign pricing mechanisms said to be the problem, the government has chosen to raise domestic costs in the hope that coercive pressure on manufacturers will somehow yield lower prices for U.S. patients. Such a strategy is neither intellectually defensible nor stable. It compresses firms from both sides: higher supply-side costs through tariffs, and lower revenue expectations through MFN pricing pressure. That may produce compliance in the short term, but it is not effective and durable reform.
A credible pharmaceutical manufacturing policy agenda would emphasize predictable permitting, regulatory modernization, targeted incentives for critical inputs and advanced production, more reliable procurement, and a thoughtful assessment of where strategic domestic capacity is genuinely necessary. A credible drug-pricing agenda would focus on competition, market structure, formulary incentives, benefit design, faster generic and biosimilar uptake, and the other distortions that shape U.S. pharmaceutical spending. And a credible response to foreign underpayment would proceed through trade negotiations and diplomatic channels aimed directly at the reimbursement practices in question. The administration instead has collapsed all three objectives into a single tariff announcement and asks observers to believe that this amalgam constitutes durable, deeply considered policy decisions.
And durable policy, it is not. It reflects impatience with policy discipline itself. Section 232 pharmaceutical tariffs are being marketed as though they can simultaneously re-shore production, discipline foreign governments, and reduce prices at home. But a tariff is not transformed into a precise affordability instrument merely because it is attached to medicines. It remains a tax, and in a sector as intricate and cost-intensive as pharmaceuticals, new taxes tend to reverberate long before they directly impact their intended policy target.
Conclusion
Tariffs may be able to coerce behavior, but they are a poor substitute for coherent drug-pricing reform. If the goal is domestic manufacturing resilience, policymakers should use targeted onshoring incentives, regulatory modernization, and procurement tools. If the goal is to address pricing concerns, policymakers should accelerate biosimilar and generic competition, reduce anti-competitive contracting and rebate distortions, increase net-price transparency where feasible, and make benefit design protect patients from high cost-sharing without importing foreign price controls as a statutory crutch. What the administration should not do is pretend that a tax on imported medicines and inputs is somehow a direct and defensible consumer price-reduction strategy. It is not. It is more likely to raise costs, distort launch decisions, and confuse industrial policy with health policy.
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Michael Baker is the Director of Health Care Policy at the American Action Forum
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/section-232-pharmaceutical-tariffs-are-not-a-health-policy-tool/
[Category: Think Tank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Highlights of President Trump's FY 2027 Budget
WASHINGTON, April 7 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on April 6, 2026, by Fiscal Policy Director Jordan Haring:
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Highlights of President Trump's FY 2027 Budget
Executive Summary
* The Trump Administration has released the president's budget for fiscal year (FY) 2027 budget, which details its proposals for defense and nondefense discretionary spending for FY 2027; the budget does not include any proposed changes to mandatory spending or revenue, nor does it include any estimates about how its proposals would affect federal deficits or debt over the next decade.
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WASHINGTON, April 7 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on April 6, 2026, by Fiscal Policy Director Jordan Haring:
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Highlights of President Trump's FY 2027 Budget
Executive Summary
* The Trump Administration has released the president's budget for fiscal year (FY) 2027 budget, which details its proposals for defense and nondefense discretionary spending for FY 2027; the budget does not include any proposed changes to mandatory spending or revenue, nor does it include any estimates about how its proposals would affect federal deficits or debt over the next decade.
*The budget proposes $1.81 trillion of base discretionary budget authority (BA) for FY 2027, including $1.15 trillion of base defense BA and $660 billion of base nondefense BA.
* After including the effects of $350 billion of defense funding the administration assumes will be enacted by Congress through a budget reconciliation package, the budget proposes $2.16 trillion of base discretionary BA, including $1.5 trillion of base defense BA and $660 billion of base nondefense BA.
* The proposed spending increases are concentrated in the Departments of War, Energy, Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; most other departments and agencies would see their funding decreased relative to their FY 2026 enacted levels.
* The budget also includes a set of economic projections that are more optimistic than those from other forecasters.
Introduction
The Trump Administration has released the president's budget for fiscal year (FY) 2027 which details its proposals for defense and nondefense discretionary spending for FY 2027. The budget does not include any proposed changes to mandatory spending or revenue, nor does it include any estimates about how its proposals would affect federal deficits or debt over the next decade.
The president's budget proposes $1.81 trillion of base discretionary budget authority (BA), which is a $178 billion (10.9 percent) increase from the FY 2026 enacted level of $1.64 trillion. The budget proposes $1.15 trillion of base defense BA and $660 billion of base nondefense BA. The base defense request is $251 billion (27.8 percent) larger than the FY 2026 enacted level of $903 billion and the base nondefense request is $73 billion (10.0 percent) smaller than the FY 2026 enacted level of $733 billion.
The president's budget requests that $350 billion of supplemental base defense funding for FY 2027 be enacted by Congress in a budget reconciliation package. In FY 2026, the One Big Beautiful Bill provided $155 billion of supplemental defense funding. As a result, total base defense funding is $1.06 trillion for FY 2026 and the president's budget proposes $1.50 trillion for FY 2027 - a $446 billion (42.2 percent) increase.
The proposed spending increases are concentrated in the Departments of War, Energy, Justice, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs, which get 43.7 percent ($440.9 billion), 1.8 percent ($0.9 billion), 13.0 percent ($4.7 billion), 6.2 percent ($1.6 billion), and 8.7 percent ($11.7 billion) increases, respectively. The increased Department of War funding would go toward developing the Golden Dome, expanding U.S. shipbuilding capacity, funding the F-47 fighter jet, boosting servicemember pay by 5-7 percent depending on rank, and making investments in critical munitions, critical minerals, and artificial intelligence, among other things. The additional Department of Energy funding would go toward refilling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, strengthening nuclear and energy-water security, and boosting domestic production of critical minerals, among other things. The increased Department of Justice funding would be used to combat violent crime in the nation's cities (efforts have already been undertaken in Washington, D.C. and Memphis), hire 300 additional Drug Enforcement Administration agents, support the newly established National Fraud Division, fund the rebuilding of Alcatraz, and provide additional resources to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, among other things. The additional Department of Transportation funding would go toward enhancing Federal Aviation Administration facilities and operations, Nationally Significant Multimodal Freight and Highway Projects grants, and enhanced shipbuilding and port infrastructure. Finally, the increased Department of Veterans Affairs funding would go toward health care services and facilities for veterans and electronic health record modernization at Veterans Affairs.
Almost all other departments and agencies would see their funding decreased relative to their FY 2026 enacted level due to consolidations and the elimination of programs within the agency or department. For example, the 30-percent reduction in Department of State and international programs funding would come from eliminating Food for Peace and cutting funding for the National Endowment for Democracy, international disaster assistance, migration and refugee assistance, global health programs, and international organizations. The nearly 26-percent reduction in Department of Labor funding would come from eliminating Job Corps, the Senior Community Service Employment Program, and reforming worker protection agencies and other entities within the department.
The 19-percent decrease in Department of Agriculture funding comes from reducing National Institute of Food and Agriculture Formula Grants, eliminating the Rural Business Service, the Agricultural Marketing Service, the McGovern-Dole Food for Education Program, and reforming Community Facilities Grant Earmarks.
The nearly 13-percent reduction in Department of Housing and Urban Development funding would come from transitioning federal rental assistance programs to state-based formula grants, eliminating the Community Development Block Grant program, the HOME Investment Partnerships Program, the Continuum of Care program, the Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS program, the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant program, the Fair Housing Initiatives Program, and the Pathways to Removing Obstacles Housing Program, among other changes.
The more than 12-percent decrease in Department of Health and Human Services funding would come from eliminating the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program and the Community Services Block Grant program, reducing and reforming spending for the Refugee and Unaccompanied Alien Children Programs, and restructuring the National Institutes of Health, among other changes.
On the agency front, the over 67-percent reduction in Small Business Administration funding would come from eliminating several entrepreneurial development programs, including the Service Corps of Retired Executives program and the Community Navigator Pilot Program, as well as imposing an administrative fee on lenders participating in the agency's guaranteed business lending programs.
Economic Assumptions in the President's FY 2027 Budget
A budget's economic assumptions underscore every estimate it provides. While the president's budget does not propose any changes to mandatory spending or revenues, it does propose changes to FY 2027 discretionary spending. The budget's projections of discretionary spending over the subsequent nine years (FY 2028-2036) are based on a set of economic assumptions that are overall more optimistic than those of other forecasters.
On a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter basis, the budget forecasts 3.5-percent real gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2026, 3.1 percent in 2027 through 2029, 3.0 percent in 2030, and 2.9 percent thereafter. Meanwhile, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates 2.2-percent real GDP growth in 2026 and 1.8 percent growth each year thereafter, and the Federal Reserve forecasts 2.4-percent growth in 2026, 2.3 percent in 2027, 2.1 percent in 2028, and 2.0 percent each year thereafter.
The budget estimates inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) on a fourth-quarter over fourth-quarter basis, would fall from 2.4 percent today to 2.3 percent by the end of the year. CPI inflation would remain at 2.3 percent in 2027 before declining to 2.2 percent in 2028 and remaining at that level each year thereafter. CBO forecasts 2.8-percent CPI inflation in 2026, 2.4 percent in 2027, and 2.3 percent in 2028 and beyond. The Federal Reserve's preferred measure of inflation - the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) price index - is projected to be 2.7 percent in 2026 and 2.2 percent in 2027. The Federal Reserve expects PCE inflation to fall to its 2.0 percent target in 2028 and remain at that level thereafter.
OMB expects the unemployment rate to fall from 4.3 percent today to 3.7 percent by the end of this year and remain at that level each year thereafter. CBO expects unemployment to tick up to 4.6 percent by the end of this year, fall to 4.5 percent in 2028, and then stabilize at 4.2 percent by the end of 2032.
Last, under the president's budget, the average interest rate on 10-year Treasury notes is projected to average 3.7 percent in 2026 and average 3.4 percent over the subsequent decade. CBO estimates an average interest rate of 4.1 percent in 2026 and 4.3 percent over the 2027-2036 period.
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Jordan Haring is the Director of Fiscal Policy at the American Action Forum
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/highlights-of-president-trumps-fy-2027-budget/
[Category: Think Tank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to National Review: Sasse, Zinsmeister, and Republican Virtue
NEW YORK, April 7 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on April 5, 2026, by senior fellow Andy Smarick to National Review:
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Sasse, Zinsmeister, and Republican Virtue
Two conservative public servants facing the fight of their lives have shown us the best of American leadership.
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Two remarkably talented, independent-minded, service-oriented conservatives are in knock-down, drag-out fights with cancer. They've been models of courage and good cheer in their battles, but they were also models of American republican virtue in their professional lives. Our
... Show Full Article
NEW YORK, April 7 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on April 5, 2026, by senior fellow Andy Smarick to National Review:
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Sasse, Zinsmeister, and Republican Virtue
Two conservative public servants facing the fight of their lives have shown us the best of American leadership.
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Two remarkably talented, independent-minded, service-oriented conservatives are in knock-down, drag-out fights with cancer. They've been models of courage and good cheer in their battles, but they were also models of American republican virtue in their professional lives. Ournation must find ways to identify and elevate more people like them instead of the hot-tempered, partisan commentators who now dominate the public square yet never serve in public capacities.
Beyond their dire diagnoses in middle age (and willingness to discuss their struggles in public), Ben Sasse and Karl Zinsmeister share a great deal. Both had relatively brief but influential tenures at the ...
Continue reading the entire piece here at National Review (https://www.nationalreview.com/2026/04/sasse-zinsmeister-and-republican-virtue)
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Andy Smarick is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. Follow him on Twitter here.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/sasse-zinsmeister-and-republican-virtue
[Category: ThinkTank]
