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Groundwork Polling Shows Workers Not Sold on AI in the Workplace
WASHINGTON, Aug. 3 [Category: ThinkTank] -- Groundwork Collaborative, a think tank and progressive advocacy group, posted the following news release:
* * *
New Groundwork Polling Shows Workers Not Sold on AI in the Workplace
*
Majorities believe AI implementation will make work worse, direct benefits only to the top
As artificial intelligence seeps into every aspect of daily life, new polling from Groundwork Collaborative and Ipsos finds that majorities of workers believe the benefits of the technology will be concentrated among high earners and will increase pressure on job performance, further ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 3 [Category: ThinkTank] -- Groundwork Collaborative, a think tank and progressive advocacy group, posted the following news release: * * * New Groundwork Polling Shows Workers Not Sold on AI in the Workplace * Majorities believe AI implementation will make work worse, direct benefits only to the top As artificial intelligence seeps into every aspect of daily life, new polling from Groundwork Collaborative and Ipsos finds that majorities of workers believe the benefits of the technology will be concentrated among high earners and will increase pressure on job performance, furtherexacerbating inequality and the increasingly K-shaped economy.
Three in ten workers report using AI at least once per week, but adoption and optimism varies drastically across income, education, and types of work. Nearly half of workers with college degrees believe that AI will improve their own job compared to just 19% of workers with a high school education. Sentiment about AI in the workplace diverges along racial lines as well, with Black workers far more likely than their white peers to say that AI will replace them in the workplace outright (12% vs 4%).
Across the spectrum, two-thirds of workers say AI adoption will make their work harder by eliminating jobs and increasing pressure, rather than freeing up time by automating tasks or expanding support for challenging tasks. This anxiety isn't limited to the employed; unemployed jobseekers are more likely than employed workers to say that AI is having a negative impact on their line of work (41% vs 27%).
Groundwork's Vice President of Policy, Advocacy, and Research, Elizabeth Pancotti, shared her reaction to the polling:
"Workers know bosses who say AI will make their jobs easier and allow them to be more productive are pulling a fast one. Across the board, workers report AI putting more pressure on productivity rather than supporting workers as many AI proponents claim. The benefits of AI in the workplace are not being split evenly. The workers who expect to reap the rewards of adoption are already high earners in white-collar jobs."
BACKGROUND
* Overall, 51% of workers believe that widespread use of AI at work will only or mostly benefit business owners and executives, compared to just 6% who say most or all the benefits will go to workers. One in seven workers believe it will not benefit anyone.
* Three in ten workers use AI at work at least weekly, but there are stark differences on income, education, and sector lines.
* Half of workers who earn less than $50k and without a college degree never use AI in the workplace, compared to the 80% of college graduates who use it at least occasionally.
* White-collar workers are far more likely than blue-collar workers to use AI at work at least monthly (54% vs. 21%).
* On a macro scale, two-thirds of workers expect AI to make work worse by eliminating jobs and putting greater pressure on workers, rather than improving the worker experience by freeing up time spent on repetitive tasks and assisting with more challenging work. This sentiment is consistent across race, gender, education, and income lines.
* When asked specifically about how AI will affect their own jobs, optimism is concentrated at the top.
* Nearly half of workers with a college degree (46%) and four in ten workers who earn more than $100k believe AI will help them with work and improve their job, compared to just 19% of those with a high school education.
* More than one in five workers who earn less than $50k believe AI will make their jobs worse by making tasks harder or less fulfilling, and 10% believe AI will replace their jobs altogether, compared with just 5% of high-wage workers.
* Black workers are far more likely than white workers to say AI will replace their job outright (12% vs. 4%).
* Unemployed workers are much more likely than employed workers to feel that AI is having a negative impact on their line of work (41% vs 27%), and far more likely to say the effect is very negative (17% vs 8%).
***
Original text here: https://groundworkcollaborative.org/news/new-groundwork-polling-shows-workers-not-sold-on-ai-in-the-workplace/
* * *
New Groundwork Polling Shows Workers Not Sold on AI in the Workplace
*
Majorities believe AI implementation will make work worse, direct benefits only to the top
As artificial intelligence seeps into every aspect of daily life, new polling from Groundwork Collaborative and Ipsos finds that majorities of workers believe the benefits of the technology will be concentrated among high earners and will increase pressure on job performance, further ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 3 [Category: ThinkTank] -- Groundwork Collaborative, a think tank and progressive advocacy group, posted the following news release: * * * New Groundwork Polling Shows Workers Not Sold on AI in the Workplace * Majorities believe AI implementation will make work worse, direct benefits only to the top As artificial intelligence seeps into every aspect of daily life, new polling from Groundwork Collaborative and Ipsos finds that majorities of workers believe the benefits of the technology will be concentrated among high earners and will increase pressure on job performance, furtherexacerbating inequality and the increasingly K-shaped economy.
Three in ten workers report using AI at least once per week, but adoption and optimism varies drastically across income, education, and types of work. Nearly half of workers with college degrees believe that AI will improve their own job compared to just 19% of workers with a high school education. Sentiment about AI in the workplace diverges along racial lines as well, with Black workers far more likely than their white peers to say that AI will replace them in the workplace outright (12% vs 4%).
Across the spectrum, two-thirds of workers say AI adoption will make their work harder by eliminating jobs and increasing pressure, rather than freeing up time by automating tasks or expanding support for challenging tasks. This anxiety isn't limited to the employed; unemployed jobseekers are more likely than employed workers to say that AI is having a negative impact on their line of work (41% vs 27%).
Groundwork's Vice President of Policy, Advocacy, and Research, Elizabeth Pancotti, shared her reaction to the polling:
"Workers know bosses who say AI will make their jobs easier and allow them to be more productive are pulling a fast one. Across the board, workers report AI putting more pressure on productivity rather than supporting workers as many AI proponents claim. The benefits of AI in the workplace are not being split evenly. The workers who expect to reap the rewards of adoption are already high earners in white-collar jobs."
BACKGROUND
* Overall, 51% of workers believe that widespread use of AI at work will only or mostly benefit business owners and executives, compared to just 6% who say most or all the benefits will go to workers. One in seven workers believe it will not benefit anyone.
* Three in ten workers use AI at work at least weekly, but there are stark differences on income, education, and sector lines.
* Half of workers who earn less than $50k and without a college degree never use AI in the workplace, compared to the 80% of college graduates who use it at least occasionally.
* White-collar workers are far more likely than blue-collar workers to use AI at work at least monthly (54% vs. 21%).
* On a macro scale, two-thirds of workers expect AI to make work worse by eliminating jobs and putting greater pressure on workers, rather than improving the worker experience by freeing up time spent on repetitive tasks and assisting with more challenging work. This sentiment is consistent across race, gender, education, and income lines.
* When asked specifically about how AI will affect their own jobs, optimism is concentrated at the top.
* Nearly half of workers with a college degree (46%) and four in ten workers who earn more than $100k believe AI will help them with work and improve their job, compared to just 19% of those with a high school education.
* More than one in five workers who earn less than $50k believe AI will make their jobs worse by making tasks harder or less fulfilling, and 10% believe AI will replace their jobs altogether, compared with just 5% of high-wage workers.
* Black workers are far more likely than white workers to say AI will replace their job outright (12% vs. 4%).
* Unemployed workers are much more likely than employed workers to feel that AI is having a negative impact on their line of work (41% vs 27%), and far more likely to say the effect is very negative (17% vs 8%).
***
Original text here: https://groundworkcollaborative.org/news/new-groundwork-polling-shows-workers-not-sold-on-ai-in-the-workplace/
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Ukrainian Ideas of Victory Diversify and Expand as Russia's War Drags On
WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 31, 2026, by David Traugott, office manager and program associate for Eurasian Studies, in the foundation's Jamestown Perspectives:
* * *
Ukrainian Ideas of Victory Diversify and Expand as Russia's War Drags On
Executive Summary:
* Years of loss and military deadlock have broadened Ukrainians' understanding of victory beyond the original goal of a military success that restores Ukraine's legal 1991 borders.
* Interviewees described three main visions of a victorious future: Ukraine leveraging military success ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 31, 2026, by David Traugott, office manager and program associate for Eurasian Studies, in the foundation's Jamestown Perspectives: * * * Ukrainian Ideas of Victory Diversify and Expand as Russia's War Drags On Executive Summary: * Years of loss and military deadlock have broadened Ukrainians' understanding of victory beyond the original goal of a military success that restores Ukraine's legal 1991 borders. * Interviewees described three main visions of a victorious future: Ukraine leveraging military successto strengthen its negotiating position; the successful postwar construction of a fairer, more prosperous, and more sovereign country; and the restoration of an ordinary life.
* After four and a half years of full-scale war, its end may not mean victory at all. Multiple interviewees described this future moment as instead being a "relief." Ultimate victory may happen years after the full-scale war ends, once Ukraine realizes its main long-term objectives through nonmilitary means.
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The concept of "victory" has been Ukraine's north star through the difficult years of Russia's full-scale invasion. It is the reason why Ukrainians continue to volunteer for the armed forces; civilians regularly donate their hard-earned hryvnia to military units despite widespread financial hardship; business owners maintain regular opening hours even after an overnight attack blows their windows out; and, generally, why Ukrainians insist on living "normal" lives as best they can in abnormal circumstances (Ukrainska Pravda, March 13, 2024; Kyiv Independent, May 24).
A nationwide survey conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in November 2023 suggests that a majority of Ukrainians in the opening years of the war defined victory as the restoration of Ukraine's pre-2022, or even pre-2014, borders via a military breakthrough (NDI, November 2023). [1] From the blunting of initial Russian advances to the dramatic autumn counterattacks in 2022 that liberated large swathes of occupied territory, Ukrainians had reason to believe that the war would end quickly on the back of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) (Kyiv Independent, September 13, 2022).
Russia's war against Ukraine has intensified and deadlocked since these early war successes. Its costs have mounted. According to a contemporary survey conducted by NDI in March 2026, 65 percent of Ukrainians have suffered a deterioration of both mental and physical health. Sixty-four percent have experienced an income reduction, and 50 percent are separated from family members in some way. Eighty-two percent have experienced the loss of a friend or acquaintance, and 33 percent the loss of a family member (NDI, March 2026). With no end in sight, tragedies and the cost of war continue to compound.
"Victory" is an abstract term. In the context of Ukraine, it is intensely personal and emotional. When I visited Kyiv in April, one goal of mine was to understand how years of hardship and loss have broadened the Ukrainian idea of "victory" from the country's original, unifying definition of military triumph. As such, I decided to conclude each interview by asking "what does victory mean to you?"
The question elicited the highest variety of answers out of the 30 that I asked across interview groups. Some participants paused for 15 to 20 seconds to work out their answers. It became clear from their responses that the concept of military victory still exists. They also suggest that the war's mounting costs have forced Ukrainians to wrestle with a fundamental question: what outcome is worthy of those Ukrainians who sacrificed their lives for their country? To some interviewees, such an outcome means a sovereign Ukraine that is strengthened through wartime lessons. For others, it is the opportunity to resume ordinary life in peace. As the war continues, the idea of a victorious future is diversifying, which Ukraine will have to reckon with during its postwar reconstruction.
Victory as Military Success
While the idea of military victory persists, it does so on a wider spectrum than in the initial phases of the war. One staff member at the Anti-Corruption Center Mezha (Antykoruptsiynyy tsentr mezha), a Kyiv-based nonprofit, described a successful freezing of the frontline as a best-case scenario given Ukraine's current military capabilities and level of international support (Author's Interview with Mezha Staff Members, April 17). Retired Major General and former Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Volodymyr Havrylov described "victory" as beating back Russian forces until Moscow understands that it "cannot do anything with Ukraine," and thus forcing them to view Ukraine as an equal in future negotiations (Author's Interview with Volodymyr Havrylov, April 15). Stuart Heggie, an Australian volunteer who has spent time near frontline areas in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts since 2022, still believes that the AFU can win back large portions of the Donbas and put pressure on Crimea to force Moscow into a deal that favors Kyiv (Author's Interview with Stuart Heggie, April 16).
On the other side of the military victory spectrum, interviewees discussed dramatic global changes brought about through Ukrainian military success. The president of a heavy bomber drone company explained victory as the downfall and breakdown of the Russian Federation as we know it, brought about through continuous wartime pressure (Author's Interview with Anonymous Interviewee, April 15). Robert Potter, a security expert now based in Kyiv, said the war should "end the concept of authoritarianism as a great power method of government" in both the People's Republic of China and Russia (Author's Interview with Robert Potter, April 22). To these respondents, only a fundamental geopolitical shift can eradicate the conditions that incentivized Russia to invade Ukraine in the first place. It offers the best chance at lasting security and is therefore the only meaningful way to end the full-scale invasion.
Victory as Ukrainian Sovereignty
The majority of interviewees chose to focus their answers on a future in which Ukraine harnesses its wartime experience to create a stronger, fairer, and more prosperous country. A thriving democracy, viewed as a main differentiator from Russia--and as something Ukrainians are routinely unhappy with--remained a constant throughout interviewee responses. [2] Interviewees expect postwar Ukraine to be more democratic, prosperous, and resilient, all within a sovereign territory that is defined by Ukraine's unique culture and identity. Olga Lymar, the executive director at the Kyiv-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Reanimation Package of Reforms Coalition, said that a victorious Ukraine would be able to pursue its own domestic and international policies without external interference (Author's Interview with Olga Lymar, April 17).
This vision of the future hinges on a newfound confidence in Ukraine's "selfhood" that has emerged during the full-scale war. According to Svitlana Iukhymovych, who has spent almost a decade in political and civic leadership roles at NDI Ukraine and elsewhere, some Ukrainians prior to 2022 gravitated toward either a Western or Russian version of identity, a dynamic that reflects the split of Ukrainian political elites that resulted in the Revolution of Dignity. Since 2022, however, Ukrainians have seen their armed forces effectively battle back against a much larger foe while simultaneously maintaining "cultural diplomacy, political diplomacy," and the ability "to function as a state," despite attacks against civilian targets across the country (Author's Interview with Svitlana Iukhymovych, April 14). Interview responses suggest that Russia's war has united Ukrainians around the recognition of astounding successes that they can achieve together as a country.
Ukrainian victory means taking on regional and global leadership roles with this confidence. Several participants described the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accession as no longer essential to Ukraine's security architecture. [3] As the European country most tested in large-scale conventional warfare, they now expect NATO will "want to enter Ukraine" after the war, as opposed to before, when "Ukraine wanted to enter NATO" (Author's Interview with Olga Lymar, April 17). Ukraine's global standing has already increased outside of NATO through drone technology exports during the war with Iran (see EDM, April 1; Ukrinform, April 19). Interviewees expect that Ukraine's unique wartime experience will continue to allow the country to be an integral player on the world stage, elevating its global status not only as a defense leader, but financially and culturally, too (Author's Interview with Members of Kyiv-Based NGO Active Community (Aktyvna hromada), April 20).
Victory as the Resumption of Normal Life
Finally, a third group of respondents opted not to discuss victory in the military or political realm. Instead, they talked about the raw impact that the war has had on their own lives. One interviewee from Poltava who moved to Kyiv for work in the international development sector confessed that he did not hear the term "victory... in the last probably half a year." It is hard to think about victory when you are freezing and constantly sick while enduring a Ukrainian winter without heating, when you lose friends in overnight ballistic missile attacks, and when you are separated from close family members for over four years. To him, victory means the end of killing and the resumption of normal life, in which people can once again pursue their own goals and dreams (Author's Interview with Anonymous Interviewee, April 16). As the human and material costs of this war continue to mount, more people may focus on this line of thinking.
While others did not describe their personal experiences of the full-scale war in such detail, the emphasis on the irreversible nature of the price already paid remained constant throughout the interviews. Any future victory that Ukraine achieves "will not bring back the dead," as one founder of a Ukraine-based humanitarian NGO said (Author's Interview with Anonymous Interviewee, April 23). There is a clear "before" and "after," separated by February 24, 2022. No political or military success can return the lives that people led prior to the full-scale invasion. Multiple interviewees suggested that what Ukraine can hope for is an opportunity to rebuild, on both a personal and societal level, in peace and from a position of strength.
Conclusion
The complexity of this question is encapsulated in my experience asking it of the first two people I interviewed. The first interviewee looked me in the eyes and said "for humanity, true victory is if this had not happened at all" (Author's Interview with Vladyslav Shelokov, president of Kyiv-Based NGO Angels for Ukraine, April 14). Two hours later, my second interviewee contended that Ukraine had already won, as the country has preserved its sovereignty, and its people can still go to work, meet with friends, speak Ukrainian, and sit in nice restaurants (Author's Interview with Maryna Karlevits, former foreign policy advisor to Ukrainian Member of Parliament Oleksii Goncharenko, April 14).
The restoration of Ukraine's legal 1991 borders remains the ultimate objective for both the country and its people. As the war drags on without a decisive breakthrough, there is a growing recognition that this may not be achieved soon. Most respondents therefore defined victory not as an alternative to territorial liberation, but instead as a vision of the future that gives Ukrainians the motivation and courage to endure daily wartime hardships. Military success, strong democracy, greater international influence, and an end to wartime trauma and grief all center on the idea of a strong, sovereign postwar Ukraine that can effectively work toward all of its goals, including full reclamation of occupied territory. Ukraine's struggle will thus continue after the full-scale war ends. As one interviewee said, "If not now, then in 10 years. If not in 10 years, then in 100 years, when we have the resources" (Author's Interview with Svitlana Iukhymovych, April 14).
Two interviewees suggested a useful barometer for knowing when Ukraine has achieved victory: when celebrations begin in the street. Public celebrations do not seem likely when the guns fall silent. The current situation is, above all else, a generational tragedy. When the full-scale war ends, according to some respondents, it will be a relief, not necessarily a victory (Author's Interview with Mezha Staff Members, April 17). Victory, with all its accompanying celebrations, will come later.
* * *
This article is the second in a series based on data collected from 16 interviews conducted with civic, humanitarian, and political experts in Kyiv, Ukraine, from April 13-24, 2026. The goal of the project was to obtain an accurate, up-to-date snapshot of the numerous realities that comprise modern-day Ukraine. This piece examines what victory means for Ukrainians four and a half years after Russia's full-scale invasion of their country.
Individual participant views do not necessarily reflect the opinions of their respective organizations.
* * *
David Traugott is Jamestown's Office Manager and Program Associate for Eurasian Studies. David's work focuses on development, peacebuilding, and security within conflict-affected Eurasian and Sub-Saharan African states, with a recent focus on Ukraine.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/ukraines-definition-of-victory-expands-and-diversifies-as-russias-war-drags-on/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Ukrainian Ideas of Victory Diversify and Expand as Russia's War Drags On
Executive Summary:
* Years of loss and military deadlock have broadened Ukrainians' understanding of victory beyond the original goal of a military success that restores Ukraine's legal 1991 borders.
* Interviewees described three main visions of a victorious future: Ukraine leveraging military success ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 31, 2026, by David Traugott, office manager and program associate for Eurasian Studies, in the foundation's Jamestown Perspectives: * * * Ukrainian Ideas of Victory Diversify and Expand as Russia's War Drags On Executive Summary: * Years of loss and military deadlock have broadened Ukrainians' understanding of victory beyond the original goal of a military success that restores Ukraine's legal 1991 borders. * Interviewees described three main visions of a victorious future: Ukraine leveraging military successto strengthen its negotiating position; the successful postwar construction of a fairer, more prosperous, and more sovereign country; and the restoration of an ordinary life.
* After four and a half years of full-scale war, its end may not mean victory at all. Multiple interviewees described this future moment as instead being a "relief." Ultimate victory may happen years after the full-scale war ends, once Ukraine realizes its main long-term objectives through nonmilitary means.
-
The concept of "victory" has been Ukraine's north star through the difficult years of Russia's full-scale invasion. It is the reason why Ukrainians continue to volunteer for the armed forces; civilians regularly donate their hard-earned hryvnia to military units despite widespread financial hardship; business owners maintain regular opening hours even after an overnight attack blows their windows out; and, generally, why Ukrainians insist on living "normal" lives as best they can in abnormal circumstances (Ukrainska Pravda, March 13, 2024; Kyiv Independent, May 24).
A nationwide survey conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in November 2023 suggests that a majority of Ukrainians in the opening years of the war defined victory as the restoration of Ukraine's pre-2022, or even pre-2014, borders via a military breakthrough (NDI, November 2023). [1] From the blunting of initial Russian advances to the dramatic autumn counterattacks in 2022 that liberated large swathes of occupied territory, Ukrainians had reason to believe that the war would end quickly on the back of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) (Kyiv Independent, September 13, 2022).
Russia's war against Ukraine has intensified and deadlocked since these early war successes. Its costs have mounted. According to a contemporary survey conducted by NDI in March 2026, 65 percent of Ukrainians have suffered a deterioration of both mental and physical health. Sixty-four percent have experienced an income reduction, and 50 percent are separated from family members in some way. Eighty-two percent have experienced the loss of a friend or acquaintance, and 33 percent the loss of a family member (NDI, March 2026). With no end in sight, tragedies and the cost of war continue to compound.
"Victory" is an abstract term. In the context of Ukraine, it is intensely personal and emotional. When I visited Kyiv in April, one goal of mine was to understand how years of hardship and loss have broadened the Ukrainian idea of "victory" from the country's original, unifying definition of military triumph. As such, I decided to conclude each interview by asking "what does victory mean to you?"
The question elicited the highest variety of answers out of the 30 that I asked across interview groups. Some participants paused for 15 to 20 seconds to work out their answers. It became clear from their responses that the concept of military victory still exists. They also suggest that the war's mounting costs have forced Ukrainians to wrestle with a fundamental question: what outcome is worthy of those Ukrainians who sacrificed their lives for their country? To some interviewees, such an outcome means a sovereign Ukraine that is strengthened through wartime lessons. For others, it is the opportunity to resume ordinary life in peace. As the war continues, the idea of a victorious future is diversifying, which Ukraine will have to reckon with during its postwar reconstruction.
Victory as Military Success
While the idea of military victory persists, it does so on a wider spectrum than in the initial phases of the war. One staff member at the Anti-Corruption Center Mezha (Antykoruptsiynyy tsentr mezha), a Kyiv-based nonprofit, described a successful freezing of the frontline as a best-case scenario given Ukraine's current military capabilities and level of international support (Author's Interview with Mezha Staff Members, April 17). Retired Major General and former Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Volodymyr Havrylov described "victory" as beating back Russian forces until Moscow understands that it "cannot do anything with Ukraine," and thus forcing them to view Ukraine as an equal in future negotiations (Author's Interview with Volodymyr Havrylov, April 15). Stuart Heggie, an Australian volunteer who has spent time near frontline areas in Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts since 2022, still believes that the AFU can win back large portions of the Donbas and put pressure on Crimea to force Moscow into a deal that favors Kyiv (Author's Interview with Stuart Heggie, April 16).
On the other side of the military victory spectrum, interviewees discussed dramatic global changes brought about through Ukrainian military success. The president of a heavy bomber drone company explained victory as the downfall and breakdown of the Russian Federation as we know it, brought about through continuous wartime pressure (Author's Interview with Anonymous Interviewee, April 15). Robert Potter, a security expert now based in Kyiv, said the war should "end the concept of authoritarianism as a great power method of government" in both the People's Republic of China and Russia (Author's Interview with Robert Potter, April 22). To these respondents, only a fundamental geopolitical shift can eradicate the conditions that incentivized Russia to invade Ukraine in the first place. It offers the best chance at lasting security and is therefore the only meaningful way to end the full-scale invasion.
Victory as Ukrainian Sovereignty
The majority of interviewees chose to focus their answers on a future in which Ukraine harnesses its wartime experience to create a stronger, fairer, and more prosperous country. A thriving democracy, viewed as a main differentiator from Russia--and as something Ukrainians are routinely unhappy with--remained a constant throughout interviewee responses. [2] Interviewees expect postwar Ukraine to be more democratic, prosperous, and resilient, all within a sovereign territory that is defined by Ukraine's unique culture and identity. Olga Lymar, the executive director at the Kyiv-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Reanimation Package of Reforms Coalition, said that a victorious Ukraine would be able to pursue its own domestic and international policies without external interference (Author's Interview with Olga Lymar, April 17).
This vision of the future hinges on a newfound confidence in Ukraine's "selfhood" that has emerged during the full-scale war. According to Svitlana Iukhymovych, who has spent almost a decade in political and civic leadership roles at NDI Ukraine and elsewhere, some Ukrainians prior to 2022 gravitated toward either a Western or Russian version of identity, a dynamic that reflects the split of Ukrainian political elites that resulted in the Revolution of Dignity. Since 2022, however, Ukrainians have seen their armed forces effectively battle back against a much larger foe while simultaneously maintaining "cultural diplomacy, political diplomacy," and the ability "to function as a state," despite attacks against civilian targets across the country (Author's Interview with Svitlana Iukhymovych, April 14). Interview responses suggest that Russia's war has united Ukrainians around the recognition of astounding successes that they can achieve together as a country.
Ukrainian victory means taking on regional and global leadership roles with this confidence. Several participants described the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accession as no longer essential to Ukraine's security architecture. [3] As the European country most tested in large-scale conventional warfare, they now expect NATO will "want to enter Ukraine" after the war, as opposed to before, when "Ukraine wanted to enter NATO" (Author's Interview with Olga Lymar, April 17). Ukraine's global standing has already increased outside of NATO through drone technology exports during the war with Iran (see EDM, April 1; Ukrinform, April 19). Interviewees expect that Ukraine's unique wartime experience will continue to allow the country to be an integral player on the world stage, elevating its global status not only as a defense leader, but financially and culturally, too (Author's Interview with Members of Kyiv-Based NGO Active Community (Aktyvna hromada), April 20).
Victory as the Resumption of Normal Life
Finally, a third group of respondents opted not to discuss victory in the military or political realm. Instead, they talked about the raw impact that the war has had on their own lives. One interviewee from Poltava who moved to Kyiv for work in the international development sector confessed that he did not hear the term "victory... in the last probably half a year." It is hard to think about victory when you are freezing and constantly sick while enduring a Ukrainian winter without heating, when you lose friends in overnight ballistic missile attacks, and when you are separated from close family members for over four years. To him, victory means the end of killing and the resumption of normal life, in which people can once again pursue their own goals and dreams (Author's Interview with Anonymous Interviewee, April 16). As the human and material costs of this war continue to mount, more people may focus on this line of thinking.
While others did not describe their personal experiences of the full-scale war in such detail, the emphasis on the irreversible nature of the price already paid remained constant throughout the interviews. Any future victory that Ukraine achieves "will not bring back the dead," as one founder of a Ukraine-based humanitarian NGO said (Author's Interview with Anonymous Interviewee, April 23). There is a clear "before" and "after," separated by February 24, 2022. No political or military success can return the lives that people led prior to the full-scale invasion. Multiple interviewees suggested that what Ukraine can hope for is an opportunity to rebuild, on both a personal and societal level, in peace and from a position of strength.
Conclusion
The complexity of this question is encapsulated in my experience asking it of the first two people I interviewed. The first interviewee looked me in the eyes and said "for humanity, true victory is if this had not happened at all" (Author's Interview with Vladyslav Shelokov, president of Kyiv-Based NGO Angels for Ukraine, April 14). Two hours later, my second interviewee contended that Ukraine had already won, as the country has preserved its sovereignty, and its people can still go to work, meet with friends, speak Ukrainian, and sit in nice restaurants (Author's Interview with Maryna Karlevits, former foreign policy advisor to Ukrainian Member of Parliament Oleksii Goncharenko, April 14).
The restoration of Ukraine's legal 1991 borders remains the ultimate objective for both the country and its people. As the war drags on without a decisive breakthrough, there is a growing recognition that this may not be achieved soon. Most respondents therefore defined victory not as an alternative to territorial liberation, but instead as a vision of the future that gives Ukrainians the motivation and courage to endure daily wartime hardships. Military success, strong democracy, greater international influence, and an end to wartime trauma and grief all center on the idea of a strong, sovereign postwar Ukraine that can effectively work toward all of its goals, including full reclamation of occupied territory. Ukraine's struggle will thus continue after the full-scale war ends. As one interviewee said, "If not now, then in 10 years. If not in 10 years, then in 100 years, when we have the resources" (Author's Interview with Svitlana Iukhymovych, April 14).
Two interviewees suggested a useful barometer for knowing when Ukraine has achieved victory: when celebrations begin in the street. Public celebrations do not seem likely when the guns fall silent. The current situation is, above all else, a generational tragedy. When the full-scale war ends, according to some respondents, it will be a relief, not necessarily a victory (Author's Interview with Mezha Staff Members, April 17). Victory, with all its accompanying celebrations, will come later.
* * *
This article is the second in a series based on data collected from 16 interviews conducted with civic, humanitarian, and political experts in Kyiv, Ukraine, from April 13-24, 2026. The goal of the project was to obtain an accurate, up-to-date snapshot of the numerous realities that comprise modern-day Ukraine. This piece examines what victory means for Ukrainians four and a half years after Russia's full-scale invasion of their country.
Individual participant views do not necessarily reflect the opinions of their respective organizations.
* * *
David Traugott is Jamestown's Office Manager and Program Associate for Eurasian Studies. David's work focuses on development, peacebuilding, and security within conflict-affected Eurasian and Sub-Saharan African states, with a recent focus on Ukraine.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/ukraines-definition-of-victory-expands-and-diversifies-as-russias-war-drags-on/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Supply of Materials in Germany Improves Slightly
MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 1 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 31, 2026:
* * *
Supply of Materials in Germany Improves Slightly
Fewer companies in Germany are reporting problems in procuring intermediate products, according to a recent ifo Institute survey. In July, 13.7% of companies had material shortages. In June, the figure was still 17.2%. "The easing in the supply of materials may only be temporary," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The supply chains remain vulnerable to new disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz."
The situation has eased considerably ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 1 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 31, 2026: * * * Supply of Materials in Germany Improves Slightly Fewer companies in Germany are reporting problems in procuring intermediate products, according to a recent ifo Institute survey. In July, 13.7% of companies had material shortages. In June, the figure was still 17.2%. "The easing in the supply of materials may only be temporary," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The supply chains remain vulnerable to new disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz." The situation has eased considerablyin the chemical industry, with 13.8% of companies still reporting material shortages, down from 29.5% in the previous month. By contrast, there was only a slight change in the supply of intermediate products in mechanical engineering (14.2%) and the automotive industry (16.0%).
The supply situation remains tense for manufacturers of data processing equipment and electronic and optical products.
The share dropped from 34.2% to 30.3%. The picture is similar for manufacturers of electrical equipment, where the share fell from 27.7 to 25.2%. "Supply chains remain tense in the electronics industry," says Wohlrabe. "One possible reason is the high demand worldwide for memory chips, which is being further fueled by the expansion of AI infrastructure."
There are de facto no supply issues for intermediate products in the beverage industry and among manufacturers of leather goods, glass, and ceramics.
* * *
More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-07-31/supply-materials-germany-improves-slightly)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-31/supply-materials-germany-improves-slightly
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Supply of Materials in Germany Improves Slightly
Fewer companies in Germany are reporting problems in procuring intermediate products, according to a recent ifo Institute survey. In July, 13.7% of companies had material shortages. In June, the figure was still 17.2%. "The easing in the supply of materials may only be temporary," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The supply chains remain vulnerable to new disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz."
The situation has eased considerably ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 1 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 31, 2026: * * * Supply of Materials in Germany Improves Slightly Fewer companies in Germany are reporting problems in procuring intermediate products, according to a recent ifo Institute survey. In July, 13.7% of companies had material shortages. In June, the figure was still 17.2%. "The easing in the supply of materials may only be temporary," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The supply chains remain vulnerable to new disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz." The situation has eased considerablyin the chemical industry, with 13.8% of companies still reporting material shortages, down from 29.5% in the previous month. By contrast, there was only a slight change in the supply of intermediate products in mechanical engineering (14.2%) and the automotive industry (16.0%).
The supply situation remains tense for manufacturers of data processing equipment and electronic and optical products.
The share dropped from 34.2% to 30.3%. The picture is similar for manufacturers of electrical equipment, where the share fell from 27.7 to 25.2%. "Supply chains remain tense in the electronics industry," says Wohlrabe. "One possible reason is the high demand worldwide for memory chips, which is being further fueled by the expansion of AI infrastructure."
There are de facto no supply issues for intermediate products in the beverage industry and among manufacturers of leather goods, glass, and ceramics.
* * *
More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-07-31/supply-materials-germany-improves-slightly)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-31/supply-materials-germany-improves-slightly
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute Dresden Branch Executive Directors Ragnitz, Thum Issue Statement on Business Climate Index for Eastern Germany
MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 1 -- ifo Institute issued the following statement on July 31, 2026, by Joachim Ragnitz and Marcel Thum, executive directors of the Dresden Branch, on the Business Climate Index for Eastern Germany:
* * *
ifo Business Climate Eastern Germany: Heat Carries Through to Midsummer (July 2026)
The ifo Business Climate Index for Eastern Germany brightened somewhat in July compared the previous month. The barometer of business sentiment for the regional economy in Eastern Germany rose from 88.1 points in June to 89.1 points in July. The eastern German companies surveyed slightly ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 1 -- ifo Institute issued the following statement on July 31, 2026, by Joachim Ragnitz and Marcel Thum, executive directors of the Dresden Branch, on the Business Climate Index for Eastern Germany: * * * ifo Business Climate Eastern Germany: Heat Carries Through to Midsummer (July 2026) The ifo Business Climate Index for Eastern Germany brightened somewhat in July compared the previous month. The barometer of business sentiment for the regional economy in Eastern Germany rose from 88.1 points in June to 89.1 points in July. The eastern German companies surveyed slightlylowered their assessment of current business and were at the same time noticeably more optimistic about future business.
In eastern German manufacturing, the business climate improved considerably in July. The manufacturing companies surveyed reported a considerable improvement in their business situation and at the same time significantly raised their business expectations for the coming months.
In eastern Germany's service sector, the business climate cooled down slightly in July. The service companies surveyed reported a somewhat worse business situation than in June and were marginally more confident regarding future business expectations.
In eastern German trade, the business climate brightened up considerably in July. While wholesalers slightly improved their assessment of the situation compared with the previous month, retailers noticeably raised their assessment of their current business situation. Companies in wholesale were considerably more optimistic about future business development than in the previous month, while retail companies significantly raised their expectations.
In eastern German construction, the business climate was a lot brighter in July. The construction companies surveyed assessed the current business situation as marginally better than in June and raised their outlook noticeably for the coming months.
ifo Business Climate Eastern Germany (July 2026) (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-07-31/ifo-business-climate-eastern-germany-heat-carries-through-midsummer-july-2026)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-31/ifo-business-climate-eastern-germany-heat-carries-through-midsummer-july
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
ifo Business Climate Eastern Germany: Heat Carries Through to Midsummer (July 2026)
The ifo Business Climate Index for Eastern Germany brightened somewhat in July compared the previous month. The barometer of business sentiment for the regional economy in Eastern Germany rose from 88.1 points in June to 89.1 points in July. The eastern German companies surveyed slightly ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 1 -- ifo Institute issued the following statement on July 31, 2026, by Joachim Ragnitz and Marcel Thum, executive directors of the Dresden Branch, on the Business Climate Index for Eastern Germany: * * * ifo Business Climate Eastern Germany: Heat Carries Through to Midsummer (July 2026) The ifo Business Climate Index for Eastern Germany brightened somewhat in July compared the previous month. The barometer of business sentiment for the regional economy in Eastern Germany rose from 88.1 points in June to 89.1 points in July. The eastern German companies surveyed slightlylowered their assessment of current business and were at the same time noticeably more optimistic about future business.
In eastern German manufacturing, the business climate improved considerably in July. The manufacturing companies surveyed reported a considerable improvement in their business situation and at the same time significantly raised their business expectations for the coming months.
In eastern Germany's service sector, the business climate cooled down slightly in July. The service companies surveyed reported a somewhat worse business situation than in June and were marginally more confident regarding future business expectations.
In eastern German trade, the business climate brightened up considerably in July. While wholesalers slightly improved their assessment of the situation compared with the previous month, retailers noticeably raised their assessment of their current business situation. Companies in wholesale were considerably more optimistic about future business development than in the previous month, while retail companies significantly raised their expectations.
In eastern German construction, the business climate was a lot brighter in July. The construction companies surveyed assessed the current business situation as marginally better than in June and raised their outlook noticeably for the coming months.
ifo Business Climate Eastern Germany (July 2026) (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-07-31/ifo-business-climate-eastern-germany-heat-carries-through-midsummer-july-2026)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-31/ifo-business-climate-eastern-germany-heat-carries-through-midsummer-july
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Hoover Institution: Abe's Final Victory - Japan's Defense Revolution and the End of Postwar Pacifism
WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 31, 2026, by Miles Yu, director and senior fellow of the China Center, to the Hoover Institution:
* * *
Abe's Final Victory: Japan's Defense Revolution and the End of Postwar Pacifism
For nearly eighty years after World War II, Japan defined security by what it refused to become. It would not wage war. It would not project military power. It would not possess offensive weapons. It would rely on the United States to ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 31, 2026, by Miles Yu, director and senior fellow of the China Center, to the Hoover Institution: * * * Abe's Final Victory: Japan's Defense Revolution and the End of Postwar Pacifism For nearly eighty years after World War II, Japan defined security by what it refused to become. It would not wage war. It would not project military power. It would not possess offensive weapons. It would rely on the United States tofight while Japan concentrated on defending its homeland. Article 9 of the Constitution became not merely a legal constraint but a national identity.
That Japan no longer exists.
Without formally rewriting the Constitution, Japan has quietly carried out the most profound transformation of its defense doctrine since 1945. The revolution began under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, accelerated under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and is now being fully implemented by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. The cumulative result is nothing less than a complete redefinition of Japan's military purpose.
The catalyst was not abstract constitutional theory. It was China.
Abe understood earlier than almost any democratic leader that China's challenge was fundamentally different from the traditional threats Japan had prepared for throughout the Cold War. North Korea could launch missiles. Russia remained dangerous in the north. But neither possessed the economic, industrial, technological, and military capacity to overturn the strategic balance in East Asia. China did.
This recognition changed everything.
For decades, Japanese defense planning revolved around protecting Japanese territory against invasion. Today, the central strategic objective is preventing Chinese aggression before it begins. Deterrence--not passive defense--has become the organizing principle of Japanese military planning.
This is Abe's greatest legacy.
The first pillar of this revolution is intellectual. Japan has effectively designated China--not North Korea, not Russia--as its principal long-term national security challenge. That conclusion may appear obvious today, but it represented a dramatic departure from decades of strategic thinking.
Abe understood what many Western governments only gradually accepted: China's rise was not simply the emergence of another great power. It was the rise of an authoritarian state determined to alter the regional order through military modernization, economic coercion, technological dominance, and increasingly aggressive behavior in the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea.
Once China became the central threat, every other aspect of Japanese defense policy had to change accordingly.
The second pillar is resources.
For decades Japan informally limited defense expenditures to roughly one percent of GDP, an almost sacred political ceiling reflecting postwar restraint. That era has ended. Japan has embarked on the largest defense buildup in its modern history, committing itself to defense spending approaching NATO standards.
The significance extends well beyond larger budgets.
Japan is no longer purchasing security. It is building military power.
This distinction matters enormously. The objective is not simply to buy more tanks, ships, or aircraft, but to rebuild an indigenous defense industrial base capable of sustaining prolonged high-intensity conflict. The Ukraine war demonstrated that modern warfare is ultimately an industrial competition. Stockpiles matter. Production rates matter. Manufacturing resilience matters.
Japan has absorbed that lesson.
Equally revolutionary is Japan's overhaul of weapons procurement.
Traditional procurement emphasized small quantities of extraordinarily sophisticated--and extraordinarily expensive--platforms. That model is rapidly giving way to mass production of cheaper, expendable autonomous systems: drones, unmanned surface vessels, autonomous underwater vehicles, AI-enabled reconnaissance systems, electronic warfare platforms, and more importantly rail guns and other next-generation weapons.
The emphasis has shifted from exquisite platforms to scalable capability.
This reflects an uncomfortable but unavoidable reality: any future conflict with China would be fought against the world's largest industrial manufacturing base. Quantity matters almost as much as quality.
Yet perhaps the most consequential transformation concerns targeting.
For decades Japan's Self-Defense Forces were designed almost exclusively for homeland defense. Offensive strike capability remained politically taboo. Military doctrine assumed Japan would absorb an attack while American forces conducted offensive operations.
That assumption has disappeared.
Japan is now developing long-range cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, precision-guided strike systems, and counterstrike capabilities specifically intended to reach military targets deep inside China's strategic rear.
This is not a cosmetic doctrinal adjustment. It overturns one of the central assumptions of postwar Japanese defense policy.
The purpose of these systems is neither retaliation nor punishment. Their purpose is deterrence through denial. Chinese planners must now calculate that aggression against Taiwan or Japan could expose command centers, logistics hubs, missile bases, naval facilities, airfields, and critical military infrastructure on the Chinese mainland to immediate and devastating counterstrikes.
For the first time since 1945, Japan intends to impose direct military costs on any aggressor before aggression succeeds. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his successors have successfully convinced the Japanese nation that offensive deterrence is necessary while continuing Japan's constitutional requirement of avoiding offensive militarism.
Just as significant is Japan's redefinition of its alliance with the United States.
The postwar alliance rested upon an implicit division of labor. America would fight. Japan would support.
That arrangement reflected the strategic realities of the Cold War, but it became increasingly obsolete as China's military power expanded and America's demand for burden-sharing increased.
Beginning with Abe's reinterpretation of collective self-defense in 2015, Japan fundamentally altered that relationship. The alliance is no longer organized around America defending Japan alone. It increasingly envisions Japanese and American forces fighting together to preserve regional security.
This seemingly subtle distinction fundamentally changes the alliance's character.
Japan is no longer merely a protected ally. It has become an indispensable strategic partner capable of contributing directly to coalition operations throughout the Indo-Pacific.
This evolution perfectly complements Abe's broader vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. He understood that preserving regional order required capable democracies acting together rather than depending exclusively upon American power.
Japan has therefore become not only a consumer of security but also a producer of security.
The final element of this doctrinal revolution may prove the most innovative.
Japanese planners increasingly recognize that China's military modernization contains important structural weaknesses.
The People's Liberation Army possesses impressive missile inventories and rapidly expanding naval forces. Yet it also suffers from serious vulnerabilities: relatively limited combat aviation range over the Pacific, dependence upon fragile command-and-control networks, uncertain combat experience, logistical challenges beyond the First Island Chain, and engineering weaknesses that accompany rapid weapons development.
Rather than matching China platform for platform, Japan's emerging Unified Integrated Defense System seeks to exploit precisely those vulnerabilities.
Integrated air and missile defense, space-based surveillance, cyber operations, electronic warfare, unmanned systems, distributed maritime operations, resilient command networks, and long-range precision fires are being combined into a single operational architecture designed to disrupt the PLA's strengths while magnifying its weaknesses.
This is classic Japanese strategy. Unable to match China's numerical superiority, Japan seeks instead to make Chinese military operations prohibitively difficult, prohibitively expensive, and ultimately prohibitively unsuccessful.
In doing so, Japan has quietly abandoned perhaps the defining assumption of its postwar security policy--that peace can be preserved primarily through military restraint.
Abe offered a different philosophy.
Peace requires strength. Peace requires preparedness. Above all, peace requires convincing potential aggressors that war cannot succeed.
History may ultimately remember Shinzo Abe not simply as the architect of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the Quad, or the revitalized U.S.-Japan alliance. Those were monumental achievements.
His greatest accomplishment may have been something even more enduring. He changed the way Japan thinks about war.
For generations, Japan believed that avoiding offensive capability was the surest path to peace. Abe concluded that in an age of revisionist authoritarian powers, peace depends not upon the absence of military power but upon the credible ability to use it. Kishida institutionalized that insight. Takaichi is implementing it.
Together, they have completed a strategic revolution that no previous postwar Japanese government dared even contemplate.
The irony is striking.
The nation once constitutionally committed to renouncing war has become one of the Indo-Pacific's strongest advocates of deterrence through strength. Not because Japan abandoned pacifism, but because China made passive pacifism strategically obsolete.
That is Abe's final victory. It is also likely to become the defining military legacy of postwar Japan.
Read in the Hoover Institution (https://www.hoover.org/research/abes-final-victory-japans-defense-revolution-and-end-postwar-pacifism).
* * *
At A Glance:
Miles Yu is a senior fellow and director of the China Center at Hudson Institute.
* * *
URL: Hoover Institution
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/abes-final-victory-japans-defense-revolution-end-postwar-pacifism-miles-yu
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Abe's Final Victory: Japan's Defense Revolution and the End of Postwar Pacifism
For nearly eighty years after World War II, Japan defined security by what it refused to become. It would not wage war. It would not project military power. It would not possess offensive weapons. It would rely on the United States to ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 31, 2026, by Miles Yu, director and senior fellow of the China Center, to the Hoover Institution: * * * Abe's Final Victory: Japan's Defense Revolution and the End of Postwar Pacifism For nearly eighty years after World War II, Japan defined security by what it refused to become. It would not wage war. It would not project military power. It would not possess offensive weapons. It would rely on the United States tofight while Japan concentrated on defending its homeland. Article 9 of the Constitution became not merely a legal constraint but a national identity.
That Japan no longer exists.
Without formally rewriting the Constitution, Japan has quietly carried out the most profound transformation of its defense doctrine since 1945. The revolution began under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, accelerated under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and is now being fully implemented by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. The cumulative result is nothing less than a complete redefinition of Japan's military purpose.
The catalyst was not abstract constitutional theory. It was China.
Abe understood earlier than almost any democratic leader that China's challenge was fundamentally different from the traditional threats Japan had prepared for throughout the Cold War. North Korea could launch missiles. Russia remained dangerous in the north. But neither possessed the economic, industrial, technological, and military capacity to overturn the strategic balance in East Asia. China did.
This recognition changed everything.
For decades, Japanese defense planning revolved around protecting Japanese territory against invasion. Today, the central strategic objective is preventing Chinese aggression before it begins. Deterrence--not passive defense--has become the organizing principle of Japanese military planning.
This is Abe's greatest legacy.
The first pillar of this revolution is intellectual. Japan has effectively designated China--not North Korea, not Russia--as its principal long-term national security challenge. That conclusion may appear obvious today, but it represented a dramatic departure from decades of strategic thinking.
Abe understood what many Western governments only gradually accepted: China's rise was not simply the emergence of another great power. It was the rise of an authoritarian state determined to alter the regional order through military modernization, economic coercion, technological dominance, and increasingly aggressive behavior in the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea.
Once China became the central threat, every other aspect of Japanese defense policy had to change accordingly.
The second pillar is resources.
For decades Japan informally limited defense expenditures to roughly one percent of GDP, an almost sacred political ceiling reflecting postwar restraint. That era has ended. Japan has embarked on the largest defense buildup in its modern history, committing itself to defense spending approaching NATO standards.
The significance extends well beyond larger budgets.
Japan is no longer purchasing security. It is building military power.
This distinction matters enormously. The objective is not simply to buy more tanks, ships, or aircraft, but to rebuild an indigenous defense industrial base capable of sustaining prolonged high-intensity conflict. The Ukraine war demonstrated that modern warfare is ultimately an industrial competition. Stockpiles matter. Production rates matter. Manufacturing resilience matters.
Japan has absorbed that lesson.
Equally revolutionary is Japan's overhaul of weapons procurement.
Traditional procurement emphasized small quantities of extraordinarily sophisticated--and extraordinarily expensive--platforms. That model is rapidly giving way to mass production of cheaper, expendable autonomous systems: drones, unmanned surface vessels, autonomous underwater vehicles, AI-enabled reconnaissance systems, electronic warfare platforms, and more importantly rail guns and other next-generation weapons.
The emphasis has shifted from exquisite platforms to scalable capability.
This reflects an uncomfortable but unavoidable reality: any future conflict with China would be fought against the world's largest industrial manufacturing base. Quantity matters almost as much as quality.
Yet perhaps the most consequential transformation concerns targeting.
For decades Japan's Self-Defense Forces were designed almost exclusively for homeland defense. Offensive strike capability remained politically taboo. Military doctrine assumed Japan would absorb an attack while American forces conducted offensive operations.
That assumption has disappeared.
Japan is now developing long-range cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, precision-guided strike systems, and counterstrike capabilities specifically intended to reach military targets deep inside China's strategic rear.
This is not a cosmetic doctrinal adjustment. It overturns one of the central assumptions of postwar Japanese defense policy.
The purpose of these systems is neither retaliation nor punishment. Their purpose is deterrence through denial. Chinese planners must now calculate that aggression against Taiwan or Japan could expose command centers, logistics hubs, missile bases, naval facilities, airfields, and critical military infrastructure on the Chinese mainland to immediate and devastating counterstrikes.
For the first time since 1945, Japan intends to impose direct military costs on any aggressor before aggression succeeds. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his successors have successfully convinced the Japanese nation that offensive deterrence is necessary while continuing Japan's constitutional requirement of avoiding offensive militarism.
Just as significant is Japan's redefinition of its alliance with the United States.
The postwar alliance rested upon an implicit division of labor. America would fight. Japan would support.
That arrangement reflected the strategic realities of the Cold War, but it became increasingly obsolete as China's military power expanded and America's demand for burden-sharing increased.
Beginning with Abe's reinterpretation of collective self-defense in 2015, Japan fundamentally altered that relationship. The alliance is no longer organized around America defending Japan alone. It increasingly envisions Japanese and American forces fighting together to preserve regional security.
This seemingly subtle distinction fundamentally changes the alliance's character.
Japan is no longer merely a protected ally. It has become an indispensable strategic partner capable of contributing directly to coalition operations throughout the Indo-Pacific.
This evolution perfectly complements Abe's broader vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. He understood that preserving regional order required capable democracies acting together rather than depending exclusively upon American power.
Japan has therefore become not only a consumer of security but also a producer of security.
The final element of this doctrinal revolution may prove the most innovative.
Japanese planners increasingly recognize that China's military modernization contains important structural weaknesses.
The People's Liberation Army possesses impressive missile inventories and rapidly expanding naval forces. Yet it also suffers from serious vulnerabilities: relatively limited combat aviation range over the Pacific, dependence upon fragile command-and-control networks, uncertain combat experience, logistical challenges beyond the First Island Chain, and engineering weaknesses that accompany rapid weapons development.
Rather than matching China platform for platform, Japan's emerging Unified Integrated Defense System seeks to exploit precisely those vulnerabilities.
Integrated air and missile defense, space-based surveillance, cyber operations, electronic warfare, unmanned systems, distributed maritime operations, resilient command networks, and long-range precision fires are being combined into a single operational architecture designed to disrupt the PLA's strengths while magnifying its weaknesses.
This is classic Japanese strategy. Unable to match China's numerical superiority, Japan seeks instead to make Chinese military operations prohibitively difficult, prohibitively expensive, and ultimately prohibitively unsuccessful.
In doing so, Japan has quietly abandoned perhaps the defining assumption of its postwar security policy--that peace can be preserved primarily through military restraint.
Abe offered a different philosophy.
Peace requires strength. Peace requires preparedness. Above all, peace requires convincing potential aggressors that war cannot succeed.
History may ultimately remember Shinzo Abe not simply as the architect of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the Quad, or the revitalized U.S.-Japan alliance. Those were monumental achievements.
His greatest accomplishment may have been something even more enduring. He changed the way Japan thinks about war.
For generations, Japan believed that avoiding offensive capability was the surest path to peace. Abe concluded that in an age of revisionist authoritarian powers, peace depends not upon the absence of military power but upon the credible ability to use it. Kishida institutionalized that insight. Takaichi is implementing it.
Together, they have completed a strategic revolution that no previous postwar Japanese government dared even contemplate.
The irony is striking.
The nation once constitutionally committed to renouncing war has become one of the Indo-Pacific's strongest advocates of deterrence through strength. Not because Japan abandoned pacifism, but because China made passive pacifism strategically obsolete.
That is Abe's final victory. It is also likely to become the defining military legacy of postwar Japan.
Read in the Hoover Institution (https://www.hoover.org/research/abes-final-victory-japans-defense-revolution-and-end-postwar-pacifism).
* * *
At A Glance:
Miles Yu is a senior fellow and director of the China Center at Hudson Institute.
* * *
URL: Hoover Institution
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/abes-final-victory-japans-defense-revolution-end-postwar-pacifism-miles-yu
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues InfluenceWatch Wrapup on July 31, 2026
WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- he Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on July 31, 2026, by Jonathan Harsh:
* * *
InfluenceWatch, a project of Capital Research Center, is a comprehensive and ever-evolving compilation of our research into the numerous advocacy groups, foundations, and donors working to influence the public policy process. The website offers transparency into these influencers' funding, motives, and connections while providing insight often neglected by other watchdog groups.
The information compiled in InfluenceWatch gives news outlets and other interested ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- he Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on July 31, 2026, by Jonathan Harsh: * * * InfluenceWatch, a project of Capital Research Center, is a comprehensive and ever-evolving compilation of our research into the numerous advocacy groups, foundations, and donors working to influence the public policy process. The website offers transparency into these influencers' funding, motives, and connections while providing insight often neglected by other watchdog groups. The information compiled in InfluenceWatch gives news outlets and other interestedparties research to use in reporting on significant topics that are often overlooked by the American public.
CRC is pleased to present some of the most significant additions to InfluenceWatch in the past week:
* Futures Without Violence is an advocacy and training group based in San Francisco that works to reduce gender-based and domestic violence. In 2020, the group was identified as one of 116 organizations that received a portion of a $1.7 billion round of donations from MacKenzie Scott, the ex-wife of Amazon founder and former CEO Jeff Bezos. Futures Without Violence has also received funding from the Ford Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and federal grants from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
* Gender Action is a left-of-center advocacy group that pressures international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to adopt Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)-type criteria in their operations. According to its website, Gender Action has received funding from several groups including the Libra Foundation, the Tides Foundation, and the United Nations Development Programme. It has also co-produced reports with the Heinrich Boll Foundation, an organization associated with the German Green Party.
* Ann and Gordon Getty Foundation is a private foundation that provides funding for educational, environmental, and other causes in the San Francisco area and across the United States. It has supported left-of-center environmentalist groups such as the World Wildlife Fund, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Greenpeace Fund, and the Ocean Conservancy. Other policy-based groups that have received funding include the Tides Foundation, the Center for American Progress, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and Planned Parenthood.
* Arab Gulf States Institute is a Washington D.C.-based think tank that produces research based on developing political and economic ties between the United States and the Gulf region in the Middle East. The group has previously received funding from the Smith Richardson Foundation, Donor Advised Charitable Giving, the American Online Giving Foundation, and the Fidelity Investments Charitable Gift Fund. Listed corporate partners from 2022 included Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, Aramco, and General Electric.
* National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) was a labor union founded in 1962 by labor activists Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, and Gilbert Padilla to organize farm workers in California. In 1966, it merged with the AFL-CIO-funded Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee to form the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, which would become the United Farm Workers of America labor union in 1972. In 2026, the late Cesar Chavez was accused of sexual assault and misconduct against multiple women and underage girls, including during his time leading the NFWA. Huerta was among his alleged victims.
* * *
Jonathan Harsh holds a master's degree in political science from James Madison University and a bachelor's degree in political science from Beloit College.
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/influencewatch-friday-07-31-2026/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
InfluenceWatch, a project of Capital Research Center, is a comprehensive and ever-evolving compilation of our research into the numerous advocacy groups, foundations, and donors working to influence the public policy process. The website offers transparency into these influencers' funding, motives, and connections while providing insight often neglected by other watchdog groups.
The information compiled in InfluenceWatch gives news outlets and other interested ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- he Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on July 31, 2026, by Jonathan Harsh: * * * InfluenceWatch, a project of Capital Research Center, is a comprehensive and ever-evolving compilation of our research into the numerous advocacy groups, foundations, and donors working to influence the public policy process. The website offers transparency into these influencers' funding, motives, and connections while providing insight often neglected by other watchdog groups. The information compiled in InfluenceWatch gives news outlets and other interestedparties research to use in reporting on significant topics that are often overlooked by the American public.
CRC is pleased to present some of the most significant additions to InfluenceWatch in the past week:
* Futures Without Violence is an advocacy and training group based in San Francisco that works to reduce gender-based and domestic violence. In 2020, the group was identified as one of 116 organizations that received a portion of a $1.7 billion round of donations from MacKenzie Scott, the ex-wife of Amazon founder and former CEO Jeff Bezos. Futures Without Violence has also received funding from the Ford Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and federal grants from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
* Gender Action is a left-of-center advocacy group that pressures international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to adopt Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)-type criteria in their operations. According to its website, Gender Action has received funding from several groups including the Libra Foundation, the Tides Foundation, and the United Nations Development Programme. It has also co-produced reports with the Heinrich Boll Foundation, an organization associated with the German Green Party.
* Ann and Gordon Getty Foundation is a private foundation that provides funding for educational, environmental, and other causes in the San Francisco area and across the United States. It has supported left-of-center environmentalist groups such as the World Wildlife Fund, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Greenpeace Fund, and the Ocean Conservancy. Other policy-based groups that have received funding include the Tides Foundation, the Center for American Progress, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and Planned Parenthood.
* Arab Gulf States Institute is a Washington D.C.-based think tank that produces research based on developing political and economic ties between the United States and the Gulf region in the Middle East. The group has previously received funding from the Smith Richardson Foundation, Donor Advised Charitable Giving, the American Online Giving Foundation, and the Fidelity Investments Charitable Gift Fund. Listed corporate partners from 2022 included Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, Aramco, and General Electric.
* National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) was a labor union founded in 1962 by labor activists Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, and Gilbert Padilla to organize farm workers in California. In 1966, it merged with the AFL-CIO-funded Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee to form the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, which would become the United Farm Workers of America labor union in 1972. In 2026, the late Cesar Chavez was accused of sexual assault and misconduct against multiple women and underage girls, including during his time leading the NFWA. Huerta was among his alleged victims.
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Jonathan Harsh holds a master's degree in political science from James Madison University and a bachelor's degree in political science from Beloit College.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/influencewatch-friday-07-31-2026/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary: Democratic Socialists of America's $5.2 Million Windfall
WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on July 31, 2026, by senior research analyst Robert Stilson:
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The Democratic Socialists of America's $5.2 million windfall
Recently on the precipice of a fiscal crisis, DSA collects windfall equal to 80 percent of its 2024 total revenue.
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The Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) continues to feature prominently in the national political conversation, and it is natural to ask how the group is funded. Generally, this is a simple question to answer: the DSA is largely supported by membership dues. These ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on July 31, 2026, by senior research analyst Robert Stilson: * * * The Democratic Socialists of America's $5.2 million windfall Recently on the precipice of a fiscal crisis, DSA collects windfall equal to 80 percent of its 2024 total revenue. - The Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) continues to feature prominently in the national political conversation, and it is natural to ask how the group is funded. Generally, this is a simple question to answer: the DSA is largely supported by membership dues. Theseaccounted for 87.5 percent of the group's total 2024 revenues. The DSA's affiliated 501(c)(3) Democratic Socialists of America Fund received a handful of five-figure grants from donor-advised funds that year as well, but this money represents a relatively minor component of the DSA's broader financial picture.
A recent court ruling, however, has added a rather large asterisk to this understanding. Earlier this week, Bloomberg Law reported that a federal judge had declared the DSA to be the legal beneficiary of a retirement account held by a longtime New York University sociology professor (David. F. Greenberg) who passed away in 2024. Greenberg was himself a DSA member for many years and paid at least $1,815 in dues to the group during his life.
The dispute involving Greenberg's estate centered on whether DSA was the successor to an earlier leftist organization called the New American Movement. As InfluenceWatch explains, the New American Movement was one of two preexisting groups (alongside the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee) which merged in 1982 to form the DSA. In 1975, prior to this merger, Greenberg had designated the New American Movement or "any successor thereof" as the contingent beneficiary of his retirement account. Because the primary beneficiaries of Greenberg's account had predeceased him, the DSA asserted its right to the money. The judge agreed with the DSA, finding that the "wall of evidence" produced though discovery "conclusively establishes that DSA is [the New American Movement's] 'successor.'"
Greenberg's retirement account was valued at more than $5.2 million, which is equivalent to approximately 80 percent of the DSA's total 2024 revenue of $6.38 million, and exceeds the group's total net assets that year. For a nonprofit of the DSA's size, it is an enormous windfall. Though it now claims an all-time high membership count of 120,000, it was just over two years ago that membership declines--combined with unrealistic spending commitments--had placed the DSA on the precipice of a fiscal crisis.
Whether the DSA uses this unexpected bounty to insulate itself from future financial downturns, or spends it in accordance with the "abundance mindset" that some of the groups more clear-eyed members have warned permeates the organization's budgetary process, remains to be seen. Prudence and sound judgment are not virtues one would typically assign to the socialists.
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Robert Stilson, Senior Research Analyst
Robert runs several of CRC's specialized projects. Originally from Indiana, he has a B.A. from Hanover College and a J.D. from University of Richmond School of Law, where he graduated...
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/the-democratic-socialists-of-americas-5-2-million-windfall/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
The Democratic Socialists of America's $5.2 million windfall
Recently on the precipice of a fiscal crisis, DSA collects windfall equal to 80 percent of its 2024 total revenue.
-
The Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) continues to feature prominently in the national political conversation, and it is natural to ask how the group is funded. Generally, this is a simple question to answer: the DSA is largely supported by membership dues. These ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 1 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on July 31, 2026, by senior research analyst Robert Stilson: * * * The Democratic Socialists of America's $5.2 million windfall Recently on the precipice of a fiscal crisis, DSA collects windfall equal to 80 percent of its 2024 total revenue. - The Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) continues to feature prominently in the national political conversation, and it is natural to ask how the group is funded. Generally, this is a simple question to answer: the DSA is largely supported by membership dues. Theseaccounted for 87.5 percent of the group's total 2024 revenues. The DSA's affiliated 501(c)(3) Democratic Socialists of America Fund received a handful of five-figure grants from donor-advised funds that year as well, but this money represents a relatively minor component of the DSA's broader financial picture.
A recent court ruling, however, has added a rather large asterisk to this understanding. Earlier this week, Bloomberg Law reported that a federal judge had declared the DSA to be the legal beneficiary of a retirement account held by a longtime New York University sociology professor (David. F. Greenberg) who passed away in 2024. Greenberg was himself a DSA member for many years and paid at least $1,815 in dues to the group during his life.
The dispute involving Greenberg's estate centered on whether DSA was the successor to an earlier leftist organization called the New American Movement. As InfluenceWatch explains, the New American Movement was one of two preexisting groups (alongside the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee) which merged in 1982 to form the DSA. In 1975, prior to this merger, Greenberg had designated the New American Movement or "any successor thereof" as the contingent beneficiary of his retirement account. Because the primary beneficiaries of Greenberg's account had predeceased him, the DSA asserted its right to the money. The judge agreed with the DSA, finding that the "wall of evidence" produced though discovery "conclusively establishes that DSA is [the New American Movement's] 'successor.'"
Greenberg's retirement account was valued at more than $5.2 million, which is equivalent to approximately 80 percent of the DSA's total 2024 revenue of $6.38 million, and exceeds the group's total net assets that year. For a nonprofit of the DSA's size, it is an enormous windfall. Though it now claims an all-time high membership count of 120,000, it was just over two years ago that membership declines--combined with unrealistic spending commitments--had placed the DSA on the precipice of a fiscal crisis.
Whether the DSA uses this unexpected bounty to insulate itself from future financial downturns, or spends it in accordance with the "abundance mindset" that some of the groups more clear-eyed members have warned permeates the organization's budgetary process, remains to be seen. Prudence and sound judgment are not virtues one would typically assign to the socialists.
* * *
Robert Stilson, Senior Research Analyst
Robert runs several of CRC's specialized projects. Originally from Indiana, he has a B.A. from Hanover College and a J.D. from University of Richmond School of Law, where he graduated...
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/the-democratic-socialists-of-americas-5-2-million-windfall/
[Category: ThinkTank]