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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Russia Pursues Economic and Diplomatic Relations With Bolivia
WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by Sergey Sukhankin, senior fellow and advisor at Gulf State Analytics, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russia Pursues Economic and Diplomatic Relations with Bolivia
Executive Summary:
* Since 2022, Russian-Bolivian relations have become more centered on diplomatic coordination, nuclear infrastructure, and lithium projects as Russia seeks to leverage Bolivia as a political and economic foothold in South America.
* The El Alto Center for Nuclear Research and Technology represents Moscow's most ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by Sergey Sukhankin, senior fellow and advisor at Gulf State Analytics, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Pursues Economic and Diplomatic Relations with Bolivia Executive Summary: * Since 2022, Russian-Bolivian relations have become more centered on diplomatic coordination, nuclear infrastructure, and lithium projects as Russia seeks to leverage Bolivia as a political and economic foothold in South America. * The El Alto Center for Nuclear Research and Technology represents Moscow's mosttangible achievement in Bolivia, serving as a showcase for exporting high-technology infrastructure and expanding long-term institutional ties.
* Lithium cooperation reflects Russia's need for external critical resources. Moscow faces strong competition from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and remains a secondary player in Bolivia's high-stakes resource sector.
Rodrigo Paz's victory in Bolivia's presidential election in October 2025 generated unease among Russian political observers and commentators. Under previous socialist administrations, Moscow secured significant economic agreements, and the government in La Paz consistently supported Russia's foreign policy positions (TASS, April 26, 2024). Paz ran as a member of the Christian Democratic Party, a centrist or center-right party. Russian media expressed particular concern over Paz's pledge to "make agreements transparent" with Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC), including lithium development contracts (Pravda.ru, October 22, 2025). Russian concerns were partially alleviated in January 2026, following an official ceremony in Bolivia marking Russia's delivery of 1,400 tons of humanitarian grain assistance valued at approximately $2 million (Tvbrics.com, January 15). While the actual amount of the donation was insignificant, this step was positively viewed in Russia, with the Russian Embassy in Bolivia describing the shipment as "strengthening Bolivia's national food security" (RIA Novosti, January 30). Russian officials interpreted the gesture as confirmation of continuity in the bilateral strategic partnership--formally declared at that level in 2025 under former Bolivian President Luis Arce--and a hope that previously concluded agreements would remain in force regardless of Bolivia's domestic political alterations (TASS, July 6, 2025; Komsomol'skaya Pravda, January 14).
Warming Russian-Bolivian relations date back to the 2000s-2010s during the presidency of Evo Morales (2006-2019). At this time, Bolivia's leftward political shift and distancing from the United States made Russia appear a "natural" partner in anti-hegemonic discourse. Despite pompous rhetorical campaigns about friendship and closeness of positions on many global issues, the practical component of Russian-Bolivian relations before 2022 remained very limited. Since 2022, Russian-Bolivian relations have become more centered on political coordination, nuclear infrastructure, and lithium projects as Russia seeks to leverage Bolivia as a foothold in South America.
Converging narratives and Global South symbolism have contributed to political and diplomatic coordination between Russia and Bolivia. Since 2022, Bolivia's public diplomacy has increasingly emphasized the concept of a multipolar world while positioning Russia as a convenient symbolic partner. Ideologically, this has been inseparable from anti-Western and anti-U.S. rhetoric. This fully supported Moscow's agenda and made Bolivia a natural partner in Latin America (RG.ru, October 24, 2024). Russian academic literature on Bolivia noted that debates within the country framed multipolarity in terms of competition among major powers, including Russia and the PRC, which was commensurate with Kremlin-generated narratives. For Moscow, strengthening ties with Bolivia provided a diplomatic asset in Latin America, reinforcing the narrative that Russia remains a relevant and engaged actor in the region despite Western efforts to isolate it. Russian President Vladimir Putin and former Bolivian President Luis Arce had an official phone conversation in March 2023, during which they discussed trade, economic, technological, and energy partnerships, as well as scientific and educational cooperation. This conversation was followed by in-person negotiations in Russia at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2024, where Putin and Arce discussed various forms of cooperation, including Rosatom's implementation of nuclear research and technology centers in Bolivia (President of Russia, March 27, 2023, June 6, 2024; Vedomosti.ru, March 17, 2023).
Bolivia and Russia have also expanded hi-tech and "soft infrastructure" through nuclear, medical, and scientific cooperation. The most tangible and sustainable dimension of this type of cooperation is the Center for Nuclear Research and Technology in El Alto. Discussions about this project go back to 2016 when the two governments signed an intergovernmental agreement to construct the facility (Atomic-energy.ru, July 11, 2016). Following a period of slow development, in August 2022, Rosatom announced the commissioning of the center's first facilities. The project also includes plans for a research reactor, which will form the new core and be a central component of the complex (Rosatom, September 26, 2023). Russian language sources documented the opening of irradiation centers and the practical application of locally produced radiopharmaceuticals (Neftegaz.ru, October 25, 2023). Despite Bolivia's strategic priority for the center, the project faced significant delays due to international economic sanctions against Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Bolivian Agency of Nuclear Energy, November 4, 2025; RIA Novosti, February 9). Russian-language sources pointed to numerous factors that, if successfully implemented, the project would benefit from. These include the export of long-term technological services such as construction, maintenance, and training; consolidation of Rosatom's brand in Latin America with potential geographic expansion; accumulation of soft-power capital through healthcare and scientific cooperation; and the development of local professional networks and institutional linkages (Kopylova et al." February 2025).
Russia has also pursued cooperation with Bolivia in lithium. After 2022, lithium emerged as the highest-stakes component of bilateral relations between Russia and Bolivia. This trend took concrete form in June 2023, when Rosatom subsidiary Uranium One Group signed an agreement with Bolivia's state-owned YLB for a lithium extraction project, which the media frequently described as involving hundreds of millions of dollars in investment (Vedomosti, June 29, 2023). Russian academic analysis underscores lithium's strategic importance and acknowledges limitations in Russia's domestic resource base, necessitating external partnerships (Boyarka et al., 2022).
The nascent "lithium partnership" underscored limitations of Russia's regional influence. In 2023, Russian sources reported that Rosatom lost the lithium race in Bolivia to the Chinese investor CATL Brunp & Cmoc/CDC, which the local government ultimately selected for the development of the country's lithium industry. Russian sources suggested avoiding further contestation with the PRC in this industry, given "[its] active support with hi-tech equipment provided to Russia after the outbreak of the SVO [Special Military Operation] in Ukraine" (Neftegaz.ru, January 20, 2023). Russia's defeat on the lithium front and the PRC's victory may both turn out to have a time-sensitive application. Analysis of publications by the Bolivian expert community often presents a pragmatic, and often quite critical, view of foreign participation in lithium projects. In 2025, institutions including Fundacion Jubileo and CEDIB warned that contracts with Russian and PRC companies posed "high risks" to the state, citing potential imbalances in benefits and insufficient transparency (El Deber; Fundacion Jubileo, February 4, 2025).
Russia is likely to continue strengthening its involvement in Bolivia's nuclear sector, which appears to face little domestic opposition and is not contested by other significant non-Western stakeholders--notably the PRC. The El Alto nuclear research and medical complex functions as a demonstrative project. If completed and sustainably operated, it provides Moscow with a concrete example of its ability to deliver integrated, non-military, high-technology infrastructure in Latin America (see EDM, September 19, 2025). Such a reference case strengthens Russia's credibility when negotiating similar projects elsewhere in Latin America, particularly in sectors perceived as socially beneficial and politically low risk.
Russia may need to adjust its initial Bolivia-related plans in response to internal factors, including political changes and external dynamics, particularly the PRC's growing involvement in the region. The lithium race demonstrates how Bolivia balances involvement and avoids direct competition in Latin America between Russia and the PRC. Depending on future developments, however, competition for the extraction of lithium and other critical resources could become a source of friction for Russian corporations against other foreign competitors.
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Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and an Advisor at Gulf State Analytics (Washington, D.C.).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-pursues-economic-and-diplomatic-relations-with-bolivia/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary: Conversation With Presidential Historian Tevi Troy (Part 2 of 2)
WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by Michael E. Hartmann, senior fellow and director of the Center for Strategic Giving:* * *
A conversation with presidential historian Tevi Troy (Part 2 of 2)
The Ronald Reagan Institute senior fellow talks to Michael E. Hartmann more about how the right should consider what to do about problems caused by the left's intermingling with and reliance on politicized nonprofits.
Editorial note: this essay originally appeared at The Giving Review.
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Tevi Troy understands and enjoys policy and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by Michael E. Hartmann, senior fellow and director of the Center for Strategic Giving: * * * A conversation with presidential historian Tevi Troy (Part 2 of 2) The Ronald Reagan Institute senior fellow talks to Michael E. Hartmann more about how the right should consider what to do about problems caused by the left's intermingling with and reliance on politicized nonprofits. Editorial note: this essay originally appeared at The Giving Review. * * * Tevi Troy understands and enjoys policy andpolitics--and appreciates historical context. He has knowledge and wisdom, and affably imparts both. A senior fellow at the Ronald Reagan Institute and a senior scholar at Yeshiva University's Straus Center, Troy was a deputy secretary of the Department Health and Human Services and White House domestic-policy aide during President George W. Bush's administration. He's also been a Capitol Hill policy staffer.
He has studied and written widely on particular presidents and themes surrounding the presidency in general, as well, including in his most-recent book The Power and the Money: The Epic Clashes Between American Titans of Industry and Commanders in Chief. Among other things, the book well-covers the contentious relationship between John D. Rockefeller, Sr., and President Theodore Roosevelt.
Last month, in response to a Wall Street Journal column by Barton Swaim bringing to light and lamenting "the Byzantine network of activist nonprofits created and fostered over the past decade and a half by liberal foundations and progressive billionaires," Troy penned a letter to the editor underscoring Swaim's point, though noting "it's important to point out that the problem long predates his flashpoint date of 2010."
Troy was kind enough to join me for a recorded conversation last week. In the first part of our discussion, which is here, we talk about left's nonprofit problem and its history, origins, and effects, and how the right should consider doing something about it.
The just more than 11-minute, edited video below is the second part, during which we further discuss how to best respond to problems caused by the left's close intermingling with and reliance on politicized nonprofits.
Joseph "Schumpeter talked about this problem of capitalists funding their own destruction, and that was what 75 years ago or 80 years ago," Troy tells me.
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So this is not a new problem, and it is part of the system. I think the question we need to ask is, "What's the alternative, and how can we reform the system without losing these great things that we do get out of philanthropy?" ... I don't like the naked partisanship of the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation, these other foundations--and I think there has to be a fix, but I have not yet identified what the fixes that will not redound more problematically on the conservative side.
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Addressing some attempted and contemplated policy change in this area, Troy says,
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Right now, we have a Republican administration, and maybe it's better to do those rules administratively while you have an administration that is perhaps so inclined to do it. This administration uses a meat axe or a cleaver, when sometimes the scalpel would be appropriate--but again, I'd rather have them writing the rules than, let's say, the Kamala Harris Administration writing rules on this particular subject.
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Acknowledging there's partisan-driven philanthropy on the right, as well, he says that's objectionable, too. There are "rules against partisanship in philanthropy, and I don't think you should use philanthropic dollars, which are tax-protected dollars" for those purposes. "They should not go to partisan political purposes. I don't want to support the Democratic Party with those tax payments, just like someone else doesn't want to support the Republican Party with those dollars.
"But we do agree as a society that philanthropy is a good thing," Troy continues, "and we should be out there supporting foundations that promote education and health care" and other charitable purposes. "All those are good things, and there's a reason why we, unlike many other nations, have this charitable culture. I think it hurts everyone when those dollars are used for partisan political purposes."
He believes public accountability and, if and when necessary, outside pressure should be brought to bear on philanthropy, of and from both the right and left. "We should raise public voices in ways that put pressure on these organizations to make them better."
And Troy urges continued attention on the right to preserving and protecting donor intent. "If you are so inclined as to give money to a foundation, you had better make sure that they don't move" away from your intent," he concludes. "You can do it a.) by hiring the right people to begin with, but b.) you want to create bylaws and restrictions that make sure that your money goes to something that you approve of even after you are long gone. I think that's another part of the equation."
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Michael E. Hartmann is CRC's senior fellow and director of the Center for Strategic Giving, providing analysis of and commentary about philanthropy and giving. He also co-edits The Giving Review, a joint project of Philanthropy Daily and the Center for Strategic Giving.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/a-conversation-with-presidential-historian-tevi-troy-part-2-of-2/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Supreme Court's IEEPA Tariff Ruling and What Comes Next
WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by William Alan Reinsch, Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program:* * *
The Supreme Court's IEEPA Tariff Ruling and What Comes Next
Well, it's finally here. The moment trade wonks everywhere have been waiting for--the Supreme Court's decision on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs. There is still a lot of dust to settle, but this column will get into the middle of it and look at three things: the decision itself, what might happen next ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by William Alan Reinsch, Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program: * * * The Supreme Court's IEEPA Tariff Ruling and What Comes Next Well, it's finally here. The moment trade wonks everywhere have been waiting for--the Supreme Court's decision on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs. There is still a lot of dust to settle, but this column will get into the middle of it and look at three things: the decision itself, what might happen nextdomestically, and how foreign governments might react.
The court's decision was clear, although the justices' reasoning differed--the argument over which rationale to use to come to the same conclusion took up many of the 170 pages in opinions by seven justices. That probably explains the delay in issuing the decision. Justice Neil Gorsuch's 46-page concurrence, for example, was longer than the majority's opinion. In the end, six justices agreed on a relatively simple outcome: IEEPA does not permit tariffs.
The more conservative justices (Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Amy Coney Barrett) referred to the "major questions" doctrine, which holds that if Congress is going to delegate authority in a major case, it should do so with language that clearly defines the authority and limits the president's ability to go beyond it. The more liberal justices (Justice Elena Kagan, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson), who apparently are not fans of that doctrine, argued that a simple interpretation of the plain text of IEEPA led to the same conclusion. In an amusing irony, Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote the opinion for the court, pointed out in some detail that Trump's frequent assertions of how important the tariffs were and how much money they were raising essentially validated the argument that this was, indeed, a major question. In other words, Trump helped dig his own hole.
One important conclusion the court made is that there is a distinction between taxation and regulation, and that taxation is reserved solely to Congress and not to the president. And, of course, tariffs are taxes.
While this is an important decision limiting presidential power, the economic impact may be modest. The president said frequently that he has a plan B to reimpose the tariffs using other statutes, and in a press conference following the decision, he rolled out the first part of it, invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to deal with a large and serious balance of payments deficit, which allowed him to impose a 10 percent tariff for 150 days (which he raised to 15 percent a day later, continuing the confusion). That will give him breathing room to decide what else to do. The other laws in play--primarily Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974--have procedural requirements that will slow down their implementation but may ultimately permit him to reimpose most of the tariffs. That will certainly be litigated, but the courts so far have allowed the tariffs to remain in effect while the lawsuits are pending, so companies should not look for immediate relief. Instead, they should expect more confusion, with new tariffs coming and going, as the administration scrambles to come up with patches to replace the tariffs the court tossed out.
The other issue for the business community is refunds. The law seems to require them, and there is an established procedure for obtaining them, but it has never been employed at the potential scale here--some $170 billion in refunds. The government can make this hard or easy and will probably choose the former. Regardless, the first move belongs to companies that will have to file paperwork claiming refunds and provide supporting documentation. Companies that sit back and wait for a payment will be disappointed, and even those who do it properly should be prepared for a long wait before they actually get their money back. The case has been sent back to the U.S. Court of International Trade to address these details, so expect more litigation, as Trump predicted.
Finally, foreign governments have to think about their next move. The administration is arguing that the trade agreements it made remain in effect, with the tariffs that were agreed to remaining in force, but the other governments must be thinking that, since their concessions were essentially forced by the tariffs, with that tool now undermined, perhaps they should rethink what they agreed to. That will be easier for countries that have not concluded and signed an agreement, and we may see those negotiations slowing down. Countries that have their own legislative procedures to approve an agreement may slow-roll them while they decide what to do. One bellwether in that regard will be the European Parliament, which is slated to take up the European Union's trade agreement with the United States in the next few weeks.
China is in a different situation, since many of the tariffs on its exports are based on Section 232 or Section 301 authority and are not affected by the court's decision. Even so, as his meeting with Trump approaches, Xi Jinping may well view the court's decision as removing an important tool for Trump and putting him in a weaker position. Trump, of course, is already making strenuous efforts to demonstrate that this perception is not true.
If countries are prudent, they will not rush to judgment on next steps since they know Trump's willingness to retaliate for every slight, real or imagined, but they likely cannot help but conclude that the court's decision puts the United States in a weaker position than it was the day before, if only because it makes Trump's threats of large new tariffs hollow.
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William A. Reinsch is senior adviser and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/supreme-courts-ieepa-tariff-ruling-and-what-comes-next
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Revitalizing U.S.-Pacific Ties Through Kava Diplomacy
WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by John Auge, program manager for the Australia Chair, and Hugh Grant-Chapman, fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business:* * *
Revitalizing U.S.-Pacific Ties Through Kava Diplomacy
Introduction
Under the second Trump administration, the United States has shifted its international development agenda to align with an "America First" policy framework. This shift has included cuts to foreign aid spending, the folding of the U.S. Agency for ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by John Auge, program manager for the Australia Chair, and Hugh Grant-Chapman, fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business: * * * Revitalizing U.S.-Pacific Ties Through Kava Diplomacy Introduction Under the second Trump administration, the United States has shifted its international development agenda to align with an "America First" policy framework. This shift has included cuts to foreign aid spending, the folding of the U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID), and the imposition of tariffs on U.S. trading partners. The Pacific Islands, which comprise the most aid-dependent region in the world, have been severely affected by the reduction in U.S. foreign assistance--undermining Washington's explicit goal of reprioritizing relations with these countries.
Despite these challenges, opportunities remain for the United States to deepen its engagement with Pacific Island nations within the bounds of its "trade, not aid" foreign policy approach. Such opportunities are exemplified by the growing commercial promise of kava, a plant grown across the Pacific used to make a beverage of the same name. Global demand for kava continues to increase at a rapid pace, channeling financial resources toward kava exporters and promoting economic development in regions that grow it. As such, kava trade offers a case study for how Pacific Island countries can unlock economic growth through commercial engagement with overseas export markets and how U.S. policymakers can further their strategic goals through commercial diplomacy.
Background
Kava (Piper methysticum) is an edible plant native to the South Pacific. Kava is typically prepared by harvesting the plant's root, drying it, grinding it into powder, mixing it with water, and straining it into a beverage. Most kava exports come from Vanuatu and Fiji; the Solomon Islands, Samoa, and Tonga also grow and export the dried plant in smaller volumes. Kava is culturally significant to many Pacific Island communities. In Vanuatu, for example, kava is drunk socially in kava bars (known as nakamals), while in Samoa, the drink is often consumed in ceremonial contexts. Additionally, drinking kava is an integral part of a traditional community dialogue practice known as talanoa.
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Figure 1: Vanuatu and Fiji Dominate Kava Exports
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The production of kava supports the livelihoods of many Pacific Islanders. Fiji alone is home to more than 10,000 kava farmers. In 2025, some estimates valued the global kava market between $2.2 billion and $3 billion. Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Secretary General Baron Waqa described kava as the "Pacific's Green Gold," and noted that kava production in Fiji accounts for 82 percent of household income--with comparable numbers in Tonga and Vanuatu. In addition to its economic impact, kava consumption is associated with health benefits like improved sleep, reduced anxiety, and help with daily stress. Given its regional importance, the PIF launched its 2024-2028 Regional Kava Development Strategy with the objective of strengthening local kava value chains and promoting kava exports overseas.
Kava Within Broader U.S. Posture Toward the Pacific Islands
Opportunities for expanded kava trade come at a critical juncture in the United States' relationship with Pacific Island nations. The dismantling of USAID--formerly the flagship vehicle for U.S.-Pacific Islands economic engagement--has badly damaged U.S. credibility in the region and left it with few avenues for deepening ties with these Pacific partners. The ensuing mantra of "trade, not aid" encourages commercial engagement as a way to promote regional economic development. Yet this strategy was immediately muddied by the "Liberation Day" tariff hikes applied to most Pacific Island countries, with Fiji receiving the highest rate of 32 percent. Though this rate has since been lowered, the whiplash has left some Pacific partners questioning the future of the U.S.-Pacific relationship.
Amid these diplomatic stumbles, kava trade has been a bright spot in U.S. relations with countries that export it. Kava has emerged as the top agricultural export of Fiji and Vanuatu, two of its biggest growers, who respectively exported $17.1 million and $34.4 million of the crop in 2023. These and other producers have tapped into a growing U.S. market, which is home to over 350 kava bars. Kava exports to the United States have grown steadily, providing cash flows to farmers and helping new consumers discover the beverage.
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Figure 2: U.S.-Bound Kava Exports Continue to Rise
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These trade flows do not happen automatically. Entering a new market requires aligning with complex regulatory standards, establishing logistics systems, building relationships with distributors, and tailoring products to match local tastes. Overcoming these hurdles can take years. In the case of kava exports, regulatory challenges have been especially steep. Until recently, U.S. authorities did not recognize kava as a conventional food, which severely limited its ability to be sold in supermarkets or restaurants. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a notice clarifying this in December 2025, opening the pathway for further market expansion.
This policy change is a positive sign for engagement with Pacific Island countries, but far more work remains to rebuild lost economic ties. For one, if kava trade is to serve as a meaningful driver of broader economic development, its industry players will need to grow and scale production. This feat is challenging in an industry where most businesses are family-run operations, and it risks creating disruptive social and environmental impacts if not carefully managed. Second, regulatory trade barriers remain in place with many other potential kava importers, such as European and Asian markets. Even in the United States, receiving a regulatory greenlight is only the first step toward broader market access; kava sellers must find distribution networks, secure reliable consumer demand, and navigate the logistical complexities of the U.S. food system. Third, a kava-based economic development strategy is only relevant for kava-growing countries. Other channels of engagement will need to be identified for Pacific nations whose economic strengths lie elsewhere, and similar challenges of scaling and logistics will need to be overcome.
More broadly, the FDA's kava policy change and the years of advocacy leading up to it illustrate how regulatory minutiae can create major trade barriers for small exporters hoping to access the U.S. market. This is hardly a unique challenge to the Pacific Islands; similar complaints have been raised by small businesses in Africa and other developing economies hoping to deepen their engagement with the U.S. economy. If the Trump administration's "trade, not aid" slogan is to materialize into meaningful commercial ties with the developing world, more resources must be directed toward identifying and addressing these kinds of hurdles.
For a region as aid-dependent and climate-vulnerable as the Pacific Islands, commercial revenue alone will not be sufficient to meet its development needs. However, targeted growth in niche industries such as kava can help lay critical financial foundations by generating income, strengthening export capacity, and attracting investment. In doing so, these sectors can also spur improvements in economic infrastructure, such as ports, transportation networks, financial services, and regulatory capacity, that can help other industries grow.
Recommendations
U.S. policymakers have identified deeper engagement with the Pacific Islands as a strategic priority. Kava trade presents the United States with a case study on the type of opportunity available for the United States to reestablish itself as a meaningful commercial partner in the region while supporting Pacific Islanders' economic development goals. Policymakers can advance these strategic objectives through targeted policy support from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and other development assistance mechanisms.
MCC's unique focus on grant-based development support makes it an ideal mechanism for promoting kava-based commercial ties between the United States and the Pacific Islands, and policymakers have specifically highlighted its centrality to U.S. strategic engagement in the region. As a U.S. government-funded economic development agency, MCC structures its development promotion strategy around five-year partnership programs with eligible countries--known as "compacts"--and smaller-scale agreements known as "threshold programs." Countries that establish a compact or threshold program with MCC receive financial and technical support to unlock growth in key sectors. MCC programs commonly support agriculture financing, transportation infrastructure, climate-resilient infrastructure, farmer education initiatives, and technical support for land rights management--all mechanisms that would directly support the growth of kava businesses.
The timing is ideal for deeper MCC engagement with the burgeoning kava sector. In August 2025, MCC selected Fiji and Tonga as eligible to establish a compact and a threshold program, respectively. At the time of writing, these countries are likely working to design their engagement programs, presenting an obvious opportunity to capitalize on kava growth opportunities. In February 2026, MCC officials visited Vanuatu to assess the impacts of prior investment and potentially signal expanded interest in future programmatic support there. The Solomon Islands, meanwhile, is wrapping up a threshold program launched in 2022 and may become eligible for a compact in the future. Of the major kava-growing Pacific Island countries, only Samoa has not received recent attention from MCC--though it could make for an appealing investment destination in the future.
How can MCC programs in these regions support kava production? In Fiji, Tonga, and elsewhere, the kava industry is supply-constrained, meaning that structural factors are preventing kava growers from fully meeting growing demand. CSIS researchers spoke with Pacific Islanders to understand the most significant barriers they face to growing their businesses. The top four challenges, identified below, are strong candidates for MCC support.
1. Kava farmers lack access to credit and financing mechanisms. Most kava is grown in small, family-run businesses in rural communities, where access to financial institutions is limited. If a crop fails due to extreme weather or disease (both of which are increasingly common), farmers may face a cash flow shortfall that prevents them from replanting a crop for the next growing season. This is exacerbated by kava's long time to maturity--kava typically grows for three to five years before it can be harvested. By expanding access to agriculture financing, MCC can smooth risk and promote growth in the industry.
2. Droughts, cyclones, flooding, and other weather-related shocks pose a serious challenge to kava production. The destructive effects of extreme weather were illustrated vividly in 2021, when Cyclone Yasa destroyed more than 50 percent of Fiji's kava crops. These impacts are poised to worsen over time as climate change increases the frequency and severity of extreme weather events. Yet climate-resilient agriculture technologies can help mitigate these risks. Climate-resilient greenhouses are one specific way to shield plants early in their growing cycle, improving their survival rate once transplanted into a field. These and other technologies are key candidates for MCC investment.
3. Kava production is constrained by limited transportation infrastructure and high transportation costs. In Fiji and Vanuatu, for instance, kava production is concentrated in outer islands, after which it must be shipped to the capitals for export. Farmers in bothcountries cite that poor-quality roads and costly interisland shipping eat into their margins and discourage further scaling. MCC grants can ease these burdens by identifying cost-effective ways to improve infrastructure quality and reliability.
4. Kava exporters face barriers to accessing global markets. The FDA ruling cited above is a clear example of how aligning with regulatory standards can help unlock new markets, but these measures are challenging to navigate without external trade facilitation expertise, which MCC can support. Near-term goals include support for kava producers seeking Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) certification, a food safety management system that identifies and controls risks throughout food supply chains. Recently, Ariana Kava Trading became the first Tongan company to receive this certification, allowing it to export kava to new commercial markets. Regulatory hurdles are not the only barrier to finding new markets overseas. Marketing and information campaigns also play a critical role in socializing a new product like kava and contextualizing its social and cultural significance. Yet farmers report a lack of resources in this area, leading to lost commercial opportunities. MCC programming can partner with kava exporters to help navigate both of these challenges.
These measures all position kava growers to scale their businesses and meet unmet demand. Economies of scale offer the commercial benefits of driving down unit costs and increasing marginal returns, as well as attracting the interest of larger distribution networks. In addition, larger business operations can position kava producers to pursue investments from other U.S. agencies, namely the DFC. Unlike the MCC's grant-based programming approach, the DFC supports economic development through debt- and equity-based financing. These tools are well-positioned to expand credit access to growing kava businesses.
Commercial-scale kava production offers several benefits for Pacific Island economies, but it also requires careful consideration of sustainability concerns. The Pacific Islands are home to fragile ecosystems, which are being strained by the threat of climate change. Policy incentives for kava production and exports must be paired with measures that protect the natural context in which kava is produced. These include crop rotation patterns, preservation of genetic diversity in cultivars, sustainable irrigation and fertilizing practices, and protection of undeveloped land. Preservation of kava's unique cultural context is also critical, and any efforts to promote growth in the kava industry must be led by traditional Pacific Island kava growers themselves.
As a final point, it is important to note that efforts to grow U.S.-Pacific Island commercial ties are undermined by the deployment of tariffs against Pacific Island imports. Most Pacific Island countries now face tariff rates of 10 or 15 percent on exports to the United States. This threatens the profitability of kava exporters and deters market entry due to perceptions of risk and unpredictability. Moreover, the United States gains little from these tariffs. Pacific Island exports to the United States are exceedingly small and do not compete with existing U.S. industries. U.S. policymakers should consider whether these minuscule fiscal benefits raised by tariffs on these goods justify the symbolic and reputation costs of keeping tariffs in place on would-be Pacific Island partners.
Conclusion
With the United States shifting its foreign policy from aid to trade, kava offers a practical example of how this approach can take root in the Pacific Islands. Kava's regional significance and global appeal make it a promising pathway to economic growth and stronger geopolitical ties. By leveraging institutions such as the MCC and DFC to support market access and private-sector growth, Washington can not only advance Pacific-led development goals but also reinforce its strategic presence in a region where economic partnerships increasingly define influence.
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John Auge is the program manager for the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.Hugh Grant-Chapman is a fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/revitalizing-us-pacific-ties-through-kava-diplomacy
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to Duluth News Tribune: Mining Built Minnesota's Past - It Can Help Build Our Future, Too
WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by Executive Director Zach Freimark, and Ted Ellis, campaign director of Power America and deputy director of energy and environment, to Duluth News Tribune:* * *
Mining Built Minnesota's Past - It Can Help Build Our Future, Too
Washington has put a "Do Not Enter" sign on northern Minnesota, and it's time to take it down. For generations, the Iron Range has been the backbone of Minnesota, building our communities and forging the steel that built America. Yet today, a federal ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by Executive Director Zach Freimark, and Ted Ellis, campaign director of Power America and deputy director of energy and environment, to Duluth News Tribune: * * * Mining Built Minnesota's Past - It Can Help Build Our Future, Too Washington has put a "Do Not Enter" sign on northern Minnesota, and it's time to take it down. For generations, the Iron Range has been the backbone of Minnesota, building our communities and forging the steel that built America. Yet today, a federalban threatens to lock away the very resources that could secure our future prosperity. A misguided 20-year moratorium on mining in the Superior National Forest is not just holding back our region; it is actively undermining our nation's security and economic future.
This ban, enacted during the Biden administration, drives a false choice between mining and a healthy human environment. Fortunately, Minnesotans know better, and are fighting to restore common sense. One proposal to end the ban is the Congressional Review Act (CRA) resolution, introduced by Congressman Pete Stauber. The CRA passed in the U.S. House in January and is now under consideration in the Senate. The goal of the CRA is simple: stop treating an entire region like a no-go zone and restore the traditional rule of law.
Let's be clear about what the CRA does, and what it doesn't do. It doesn't "approve a mine." It doesn't waive environmental laws, and it doesn't silence anyone's concerns. It does restore the basic American expectation that proposals should be judged on evidence, through a real permitting process, with a real decision at a predictable end date.
Read the full op-ed on Duluth News Tribune (https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/opinion/columns/local-view-mining-built-minnesota-and-can-help-build-our-future-too).
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Zach Freimark, Executive Director, America First Minnesota
Ted Ellis is the Campaign Director of Power America, and Deputy Director of Energy and Environment at AFPI, where he spearheads strategic initiatives to strengthen America's energy dominance.
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/mining-built-minnesotas-past-it-can-help-build-our-future-too
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to California Globe: America First Year of Results for California
WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Feb. 22, 2026, by Chairman Mike Garcia to California Globe:* * *
An America First Year of Results for California
As President Donald Trump prepares to deliver the 2026 State of the Union address on February 24, Americans will look to this annual moment for a clear accounting of the nation's progress, its remaining challenges, and the path forward. For Californians, that reflection carries particular weight. The strength of the Union is not measured in speeches delivered in Washington, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Feb. 22, 2026, by Chairman Mike Garcia to California Globe: * * * An America First Year of Results for California As President Donald Trump prepares to deliver the 2026 State of the Union address on February 24, Americans will look to this annual moment for a clear accounting of the nation's progress, its remaining challenges, and the path forward. For Californians, that reflection carries particular weight. The strength of the Union is not measured in speeches delivered in Washington,but in the safety of neighborhoods, the resilience of communities, and the economic security families experience every day. "Security" is the great unifying word.
Over the past year, the America First policy priorities implemented by the Trump administration have delivered tangible benefits to Californians in areas ranging from border security and record military recruiting to public safety, disaster recovery, health affordability, and family financial stability. In fact, 300 days into the term, 90.8 percent of our America First Agenda federal recommendations were either implemented or advanced by the Trump administration.
Read full op-ed in California Globe 9https://californiaglobe.com/fr/an-america-first-year-of-results-for-california/)
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Mike Garcia, Chairman, America First California
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/an-america-first-year-of-results-for-california
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: 'Professor' Malofeev Underlines Fascistization of Russian Education
WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by Muskingum University professor Richard Arnold in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
"Professor" Malofeev Underlines Fascistization of Russian Education
Executive Summary:
* Konstantin Malofeev, an ultra-conservative media owner with no relevant academic credentials, has begun teaching "History of Empire" at Moscow State University, promoting a civilizational worldview that mirrors fascist and Russian nationalist thinker Aleksandr Dugin's ideology.
* Malofeev holds ties to nationalist paramilitary ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 24 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Feb. 23, 2026, by Muskingum University professor Richard Arnold in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * "Professor" Malofeev Underlines Fascistization of Russian Education Executive Summary: * Konstantin Malofeev, an ultra-conservative media owner with no relevant academic credentials, has begun teaching "History of Empire" at Moscow State University, promoting a civilizational worldview that mirrors fascist and Russian nationalist thinker Aleksandr Dugin's ideology. * Malofeev holds ties to nationalist paramilitarygroups and spreads antisemitic conspiracy theories. His rising influence in Russia signals state endorsement of embedding ultranationalist doctrine within higher education.
* New educational initiatives, including behavior grades and ideological pilot programs, amid rising youth violence and growing neo-Nazi activity suggest a systemic effort to cultivate obedience and normalize fascist narratives within Russia's schools and universities.
In early 2026, Konstantin Malofeev assumed a position as a political science lecturer at Moscow State University in another sign of the fascistization of Russian higher education (see EDM, October 14, 2025, January 14; Meduza, February 12). The "Orthodox Oligarch" is lecturing second-year students on a new course titled "History of Empire." A journalist from Russian news outlet Kommersant attended a first lesson of this course on February 12 and reported that Malofeev lectured students about the "millennia-long struggle between the Empire and Canaan" (Kommersant, February 12). Malofeev, who owns the ultra-conservative Tsargrad TV station and website, holds no official academic degree, but has recently published his third book in a quasi-historical series titled "Empire." The core concepts at the heart of Malofeev's philosophy are two types of civilization: "Empire," ruled by a tsar who is accountable only to God, and "Canaan," the preserve of merchants and traders. Russia epitomizes the first kind, and, according to him, Carthage, the Venetian Republic, and the United States the second (Meduza, January 30). In this, there are clear traces of Russian nationalist thinker Aleksandr Dugin's thoughts and the division between "thassalocracies" and "tellurocracies" (see, for instance, Marlene Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, 2008, Woodrow Wilson Center Press). The investiture of such a course tracks with other developments embedding the ideology of fascism in Russian higher education.
Malofeev was born in 1974 in a town near Moscow and graduated from high school with honors. Finishing a law degree at Moscow State University in 1996, he became interested in Russian Orthodoxy. After a failed business venture in Ukraine in 2005, he founded Marshall Capital Partners, which invested in transport, technology, retail, food production, and real estate. By 2012, the fund managed some $1.5 billion in assets, including Rostelecom. Malofeev founded the "safe internet league" in 2010, and then, in 2015, Tsargrad TV (Secret Firmy, accessed February 7).
It is not unreasonable to call Malofeev a fascist. First, he has recorded links to national paramilitary groups in Russia such as the Cossacks, the Russian Community, Rusich, the Russian Imperial Movement, and the Wagner Group (Inside Story, August 12, 2020; Homeland Security Affairs, June 2023; see EDM, October 15, 2024). Second, his ideology echoes the interwar fascism of the 20th century. Malofeev published an article on February 7 in Tsargrad in which he claims, "almost the entire Western world has submitted to the Zionist will. The United States, Britain, and the European Union--previously Christian countries--have ceased to be Christian. Ordinary people still go to church, but the elites act contrary to their national interests" (Tsargrad, February 7). The article goes on to allege that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is a sleeper agent who would oversee the creation of laboratories in Ukraine, making designer babies (Tsargrad, February 7).
There is evidence that Russia's children are becoming more violent (see EDM, September 24, 2024). In its review of the previous school year, the banned non-governmental organization (NGO) SOVA reported:
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The level of violence in 2025 increased less significantly than in the previous year, but a qualitative deterioration in the situation was observed: the brutality of attacks increased, the number of murders began to rise, and children were among the victims- including those slain.
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At the same time, SOVA reports, "the number of hate-motivated vandalism incidents has doubled in a year. The proportion of more dangerous acts, such as arson and explosions, has also increased" (SOVA, January 21).
Even as Russian soldiers are moving into their fourth year of a war to "denazify" Ukraine, neo-Nazi ideas and groups are emerging stronger than ever in Russia itself. These sentiments are no doubt part of a reaction to the general ambience of violence and fascist thinking which pervades Russian society. This is present among Russian youth. For example, a 15-year-old neo-Nazi was arrested after using a knife to attack students from India and Africa while shouting racist slogans at Bashkiria State Medical University (see EDM, February 19). According to reports, the teenager known as Alexander S. also tried to set fire to the dormitory (SOVA, February 7). In January, a 13-year-old who was fascinated with extreme right ideology attacked a school in Tatarstan, injuring one of the cleaning workers (SOVA, February 3). According to reports, there is a pilot project in seven regions to monitor and incentivize children's good behavior through grades--like in Soviet times--this academic year, but the scheme will go nationwide in September. The pilot scheme is aimed only at children in grades 5-8. Leader of the teachers' union, Dmitry Kazakov, called it "an attempt to find a magic wand," which is unlikely to lead to better results in Russia's education system (RBC, January 16).The seeming state endorsement of Malofeev's intellectual qualifications and ideas is no surprise. Malofeev's star in the Kremlin has been rising recently, not least because of his marriage to Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, who the International Criminal Court has indicted (RBC, September 9, 2024). Malofeev's new course on empires alongside changes to the Russian education system, such as the introduction of behavior grades for children in schools, seem designed to cultivate obedience to authority (see EDM, October 14, 2025). With such educators and changes to Russia's education system, the fascist orientation of Russia's youth seems overdetermined.
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Professor Richard Arnold teaches at Muskingum University and is a member of the PONARS network.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/professor-malofeev-underlines-fascistization-of-russian-education/
[Category: ThinkTank]