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Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: NY's Quest for Universal Child Care Sounds Enticing -- But Reality Is Simply Unrealistic
NEW YORK, Jan. 16 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Jan. 14, 2026, to the New York Post:* * *
NY's Quest for Universal Child Care Sounds Enticing -- but Reality Is Simply Unrealistic
By Liena Zagare
New York's push for universal child care starts from a place most people understand, but making it a reality is a daunting challenge.
Yes, child care is expensive. Families are stretched.
Many parents want to work more but can't find care that fits their schedules or budgets.
The idea that the city or state should step in is an easy sell.
Even under ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Jan. 16 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Jan. 14, 2026, to the New York Post: * * * NY's Quest for Universal Child Care Sounds Enticing -- but Reality Is Simply Unrealistic By Liena Zagare New York's push for universal child care starts from a place most people understand, but making it a reality is a daunting challenge. Yes, child care is expensive. Families are stretched. Many parents want to work more but can't find care that fits their schedules or budgets. The idea that the city or state should step in is an easy sell. Even underoptimistic assumptions, however, a fully universal child-care system would cost more than $14 billion a year, permanently added to the state budget.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/01/14/opinion/nys-quest-for-universal-child-care-sounds-enticing-but-reality-is-simply-unrealistic)
* * *
Liena Zagare is editor of the Manhattan Institute's Bigger Apple Newsletter.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/nys-quest-for-universal-child-care-sounds-enticing-but-reality-is-simply-unrealistic
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Russia-Azerbaijan Relations Remain in State of Limbo
WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 15, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russia-Azerbaijan Relations Remain in State of Limbo
By Vasif Huseynov
Executive Summary:
* Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's decision to skip Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eurasian Economic Council meetings in December 2025 signaled renewed strain with Moscow, surprising observers who believed the October 2025 Dushanbe summit had stabilized relations after the December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) crash.
* Tensions resurfaced after Azerbaijan ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 15, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia-Azerbaijan Relations Remain in State of Limbo By Vasif Huseynov Executive Summary: * Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev's decision to skip Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eurasian Economic Council meetings in December 2025 signaled renewed strain with Moscow, surprising observers who believed the October 2025 Dushanbe summit had stabilized relations after the December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) crash. * Tensions resurfaced after Azerbaijanlearned Russia had closed the crash's criminal investigation, which contradicted Russian President Vladimir Putin's Dushanbe assurances of missile-related responsibility, legal accountability, and compensation, instead attributing the crash to weather and pilot error.
* Conflicting Russian narratives and public criticism in Azerbaijan highlight a widening gap between Moscow's political statements and legal actions, leaving normalization stalled and Russia-Azerbaijan relations suspended in distrust rather than reconciliation.
On December 22, 2025, the administration of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev denied earlier media reports stating that the president would attend the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council or the informal summit of the heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Azertag, December 22, 2025). The administration explained the decision by citing Azerbaijan's non-membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Aliyev's tight schedule.
The announcement came a day after Russian Presidential Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told the media that Aliyev was expected to attend the summit and added that a bilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin was possible (TASS, December 21, 2025). Aliyev's subsequent announcement took observers by surprise, as it had been widely believed that the Dushanbe meeting on October 9, 2025 between the two leaders had put an end to the deterioration in bilateral relations triggered by the crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) aircraft in Grozny, Russia, in December 2024 (see EDM, November 12, 2025).
In Dushanbe, where the two leaders met on the sidelines of the CIS summit, Putin had apologized for the airplane crash. The Russian president stated that, according to the investigation that was "nearing completion," the crash was caused by a combination of the presence of Ukrainian drones in Russian airspace and a technical malfunction of Russia's air defense system, whose missiles exploded near--rather than directly hitting--the aircraft (President of Azerbaijan, October 9, 2025). He claimed that the damage was most likely caused by missile debris, not a direct strike. Addressing Azerbaijan's earlier demands to prosecute those responsible for the attack and compensate the families of the victims, Putin stated that Russia would provide full assistance to the investigation and give "a legal assessment to the actions of all officials" involved (President of Azerbaijan, October 9, 2025). Putin emphasized that this process would take time but assured the case would be brought to a proper legal conclusion and that compensation would be provided to the victims' families.
That expectation was soon called into question by a statement from Azerbaijan's foreign minister, Jeyhun Bayramov. Speaking at a year-end press conference in late December 2025, Bayramov confirmed that Baku had received an official letter from Moscow regarding the investigation into the AZAL crash (Apa.az, December 26, 2025). He said that the content of the letter came as a serious surprise. According to the minister, the most troubling element was that the Russian Investigative Committee had terminated the criminal case, a step that, in his words, "raises very serious questions" and contradicts earlier assurances given at the highest political level. Azerbaijani authorities, Bayramov noted, had already sent a formal response, reiterating their expectation that the process be completed in line with Putin's statements and apology in Dushanbe.
Azerbaijan's ambassador to Russia also delivered the protest. In late December 2025, Ambassador Rahman Mustafayev, meeting with Deputy Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Galuzin, underscored that the October 2025 Dushanbe meeting between Aliyev and Putin had been perceived in Baku as a turning point toward normalization after the plane crash (Azertag, December 30, 2025). Mustafayev stressed the importance of promptly implementing the understandings reached at that meeting, particularly Putin's pledge that Russia would ensure compensation and a fair legal assessment of the actions of all responsible officials. The Azerbaijani side made it clear that no procedural decisions could substitute for the fulfillment of those political commitments.
On January 6, the situation took on a new dimension when the letter from the Russian Investigative Committee was leaked to the media (Qafqazinfo.az, January 6). Signed by the Committee's chairman, Alexander Bastrykin, and addressed to Azerbaijan's Prosecutor General, the document presented a version of events that diverged sharply from what had been said in Dushanbe. The letter attributed the crash to adverse weather conditions and unsuccessful landing attempts in Grozny, concluding that the aircraft collided with the ground during its approach to Aktau. Notably absent were any references to Ukrainian drones, air defense malfunctions, missile launches, or shrapnel damage--the elements Putin explicitly mentioned in Dushanbe.
This discrepancy raised eyebrows in Baku. Azerbaijani officials and commentators pointed out that Bastrykin's account directly contradicts Putin's detailed explanation in Dushanbe, where the Russian president stated that missiles detonated near the aircraft and debris damaged its fuselage (Caliber.az; The Caspian Post, January 7). The coexistence of two mutually exclusive narratives has deepened doubts about Moscow's readiness to translate political acknowledgment into legal responsibility, undermining trust at a sensitive moment in bilateral relations.
Public reaction in Azerbaijan was swift and increasingly vocal. The National Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) issued an open letter to Russia's ambassador in Baku, describing the closure of the investigation as "incomprehensible and unacceptable" (News.az, January 7). The forum accused the Russian Investigative Committee of attempting to leave the tragedy unpunished and stressed that the incident constitutes a violation of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation. Echoing official concerns, the NGOs emphasized that Bastrykin's position contradicts Putin's statements and demanded clarity on who represents Russia's official stance.
The broader Azerbaijani media echoed this sentiment. Commentaries across major outlets framed the episode as evidence of a persistent gap between Moscow's political rhetoric and institutional practice (Report.az; Qafqazinfo.az, January 6). While Putin's remarks in Dushanbe had briefly raised hopes for a reset, the leaked letter revived skepticism and reinforced the perception that normalization remains incomplete and fragile.
The AZAL crash continues to cast a long shadow over Russia-Azerbaijan relations. The episode illustrates that symbolic gestures and verbal acknowledgments, however important, are insufficient without consistent legal follow-through. Until Moscow aligns its investigative conclusions with its political commitments, the normalization anticipated after Dushanbe is likely to remain elusive, keeping bilateral ties in a state of uneasy suspension rather than genuine reconciliation.
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Dr. Vasif Huseynov is a senior fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and Adjunct Lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-azerbaijan-relations-remain-in-state-of-limbo/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Russia Leverages Venezuela to Expand Influence in Western Hemisphere
WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 15, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russia Leverages Venezuela to Expand Influence in Western Hemisphere
By Sergey Sukhankin
Executive Summary:
* Moscow has condemned the U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro while avoiding substantive retaliation, demonstrating both symbolic solidarity and an unwillingness to jeopardize relations with Washington.
* The Kremlin's relationship with Venezuela enables Moscow to project power beyond Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, access Venezuela's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 15, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Leverages Venezuela to Expand Influence in Western Hemisphere By Sergey Sukhankin Executive Summary: * Moscow has condemned the U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro while avoiding substantive retaliation, demonstrating both symbolic solidarity and an unwillingness to jeopardize relations with Washington. * The Kremlin's relationship with Venezuela enables Moscow to project power beyond Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, access Venezuela'soil reserves, and cultivate an alliance aligned with an anti-Western agenda.
* Russian energy firms have gained oil stakes and repayment-in-kind options for investments in Venezuela, while joint financial ventures and Venezuela's crypto experiments have served as testing grounds for sanctions-evasion mechanisms later adapted by Russia.
* Arms transfers, military-industrial collaboration, and media partnerships through RT, Sputnik, and TeleSur expanded Russia's military footprint and narrative reach in the Western Hemisphere, though the financial return on Russian investments remains limited and challenged by U.S. pushback.
Russian state media and political commentators have had mixed responses to the U.S. capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro. Official Kremlin sources strongly condemned U.S. actions as "military aggression" and a violation of Venezuelan sovereignty, calling for Maduro's release and convening the UN Security Council (Interfax, January 5). The Russian Foreign Ministry expressed "concern" and solidarity with Venezuela. Pro-Kremlin media and military bloggers criticized the United States for "piracy" and "neocolonialism" (RTVI, January 3). Moscow's relatively restrained reaction may be to avoid worsening relations with Washington amid negotiations about Ukraine, reflecting a mix of ideologically-grounded rhetoric and pragmatism in Russian information narratives (RTVI, January 3). Despite the geopolitical benefits Moscow has gained from long-term relations with Caracas, the economic rewards have not always been evident. Russia does not appear ready to face U.S. wrath if it decides to harden its position on Maduro's ouster.
Relations between Moscow and Caracas warmed in the early 2000s, when Hugo Chavez sought a counterweight to Washington's influence and support from states advocating a "multipolar world." Russia noticed this alignment and saw an opportunity to return to Latin America as a trading partner and geopolitical force (Russian International Affairs Council, March 17, 2015). Between 2008 and 2010, former presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Chavez signed cooperation documents in energy, oil and gas, finance, and the military-technical sphere (RIA Novosti, September 26, 2008; Vesti.ru, October 15, 2010). For Russia, strengthening ties with Venezuela was important in three main ways. First, it has allowed Russia to go beyond alliance with Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, demonstrating that it could form anti-U.S. linkages in Washington's "backyard." Second, it has granted Russia access to the world's largest oil reserves and the ability to diversify its own exports by gaining stakes in Venezuelan energy and mineral projects (Vedomosti, August 8, 2017). Third, it has provided Moscow with an allied vote in international organizations in line with its increasingly anti-Western agenda (Russian International Affairs Council, March 14, 2025).
Moscow's ties with Caracas help it to build the "rogue" oil axis. Venezuela possesses the world's largest proven oil reserves at approximately 47 billion tons, which is significantly more than any other country (Financi, January 3). The Russian-Venezuelan alliance enabled Russian companies, primarily Rosneft, to acquire stakes in several joint enterprises in Venezuela. For example, at various points, Rosneft held shares in Petromonagas, Petrovictoria, Petroperija, Boqueron, and Petromiranda, including in the Orinoco Belt (Oil Exp, accessed January 10). Russian experts argue that this structure allowed Moscow to convert political support for Caracas into a long-term flow of oil--Russia received physical oil in exchange for loans that would be resold on world markets with spread margins (TRT Na Russkom, January 9).
Russia has worked with Venezuela to build non-Western financial systems and model sanctions evasion. For example, Russia's VTB and Gazprombank held a controlling stake in a joint Russian-Venezuelan bank featuring $4 billion in charter capital (Finam, September 10, 2009). Russia gained invaluable lessons in bypassing or mitigating Western sanctions by closely studying Venezuela's financial workarounds and alternative oil trading routes (Russian International Affairs Council, accessed January 9).
Collaboration with Caracas also provided Russia with lessons in navigating new non-Western payment methods. Venezuela, for instance, was among the first states to attempt a sovereign cryptocurrency, dubbed the petro, formally backed by its immense natural resources (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 20, 2018). At that time, Russian analysts and subject experts theorized that it would be beneficial for Russia to take part in petro development as a means to gain experience for future alternative payment systems (Gazeta.ru, April 27, 2018). Although the petro essentially collapsed by 2024, the Kremlin clearly took note of cryptocurrencies and other alternative payment methods as a workable sanctions-evasion mechanism (see EDM, June 5, 2024). By 2025, Russian oil companies were using digital assets to convert yuan and rupees into rubles, bypassing U.S.-controlled financial channels (SIA, March 14, 2025).
In 2006, Russia rushed to fill the military-industrial vacuum left after the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on Venezuela and halted maintenance of its F-16 fleet (TASS, December 16, 2014). Since 2006, Russia has fulfilled several large military contracts with Venezuela. In 2006, Rosoboronexport signed a contract for 24 Russian Su-30MK2 fighters valued at roughly $1.5 billion; delivery was completed by 2008. Venezuela demonstrated its Su-30MK2 aircrafts--armed with Kh-31 missiles--during the September 2025 "Sovereign Caribbean 200" exercises in response to U.S. naval activity in the Caribbean (1.ru, September 21, 2025). Russia also constructed facilities for licensed AK-103 production and ammunition, along with purchases of tanks, artillery, and air-defense systems such as the S-300 and short-range complexes (Vslukh.ru, September 12, 2009). Russian defense experts believe that these exports helped sustain Russia's defense-industrial base and demonstrated its capacity to work with "politically toxic" regimes. Russia's military-industrial relationship with Venezuela provided Moscow with a roadmap for dealing with similar regime clients in Asia and Africa (Russian International Affairs Council, March 17, 2015).
Russia also benefited from working with Venezuela to spread anti-Western narratives. After its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia embarked on a steady expansion of its media influence in the Spanish-speaking world through RT en Espanol and Sputnik. RT has demonstrated steady audience growth in Venezuela, where it is carried by local cable operators and competes with Western networks (Cyberleninka, accessed January 7). Russia's collaboration with Venezuela's TeleSur, which produces Russian-driven English and Spanish-language narratives about Latin America, was one of the Kremlin's most successful projects in the Western hemisphere's information environment (Golos Ameriki, November 29, 2023). Venezuela serves as a launchpad to spread pro-Russian, anti-U.S. narratives across the region. In 2024, Venezuela's Ministry of Communication and the Russian Sputnik agency signed an exchange agreement, and Sputnik journalists began appearing regularly on Maduro's television programs, institutionalizing informational cooperation (Libertador, November 26, 2024).
Caracas has become one of Russia's key partners in Latin America (Russian International Affairs Council, November 14, 2025). Venezuela also became a venue for collaboration between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia in the region. Until now, Russia and the PRC have largely managed to avoid competition in the Caribbean basin, dividing roles. While Beijing mainly engaged through finance and infrastructure, Moscow focused on military and energy. Both posed a range of challenges to the United States and its interests in the region. The PRC and Russia's influence, however, have reportedly been damaged by Maduro's ouster, at least in the short term (Eurasia Today, January 8). Despite limited financial return on investments for Russia's state, and Russian elite profits difficult to measure, cooperation with Venezuela delivered geopolitical benefits for Russia and, perhaps even more so, to the PRC (RBC, October 18, 2018). Russia's engagement with Venezuela demonstrates that even with very limited resources, a powerful outsider can build strategic footholds near U.S. borders.
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Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and an Advisor at Gulf State Analytics (Washington, D.C.).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-leverages-venezuela-to-expand-influence-in-western-hemisphere/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center: Further Thoughts on Philanthropy From The Giving Review's 'Conversations' in Second Half of 2025
WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Jan. 15, 2026, to the Giving Review:* * *
Further thoughts on philanthropy from The Giving Review's "Conversations" in second half of 2025
A compilation of interesting and insightful thinking from the last four of nine recorded discussions since July about grantmaking and giving.
By Michael E. Hartmann
Editorial note: this essay originally appeared at The Giving Review.
***
Illegality, asymmetry, neutrality, intentionality, and liability
The definition of "illegal" "is straightforward," but "things that ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Jan. 15, 2026, to the Giving Review: * * * Further thoughts on philanthropy from The Giving Review's "Conversations" in second half of 2025 A compilation of interesting and insightful thinking from the last four of nine recorded discussions since July about grantmaking and giving. By Michael E. Hartmann Editorial note: this essay originally appeared at The Giving Review. *** Illegality, asymmetry, neutrality, intentionality, and liability The definition of "illegal" "is straightforward," but "things thatare against public policy also run afoul of the doctrine against illegality. ... The classic example is a school for pickpockets. It's certainly legal to operate a school, but that's clearly not going to be in the public interest and it's not something that should be subsidized through the tax code or through the way that charities are addressed under state law."
...
Conservative and free-market foundations "don't tend to have relationships with community-organizing-type groups. They don't tend to have relationships or fund groups that engage in direct action. They don't tend to fund or have relationships with groups that operate in areas overseas that are controlled by foreign terrorists.
"And so there really is this asymmetry, where there is this whole set of potential illegality issues that is, I think, a very serious matter for a lot of the progressive philanthropic movement, but doesn't necessarily have a lot of resonance on the other side of the fence, just because they pursue different strategies."
Might that plausibly lead one to conclude there's ideologically motivated enforcement or application of the law? "It's really an application of neutral principles because it's always been the principle that ... charitable funds shouldn't be used for unlawful conduct. ... It's not something, I think, that's appropriate for a charity to do--to turn a blind eye to grant recipients using the money, resources, connections, and so forth to carry out unlawful activities. I think there's been this nonchalance among a lot of the progressive-philanthropy community, kind of just looking the other way or laughing it off."
...
If a "foundation simply gave money to a group that subsequently happened to be involved in some sort of criminal activity, those bare facts alone would never support criminal liability. That's just not the way that it works.
"Generally, there has to be a greater intent that is involved. So at a minimum, that's going to be knowledge." In the case of federal criminal charges, "there has to be some nexus to something that's a federal crime and then, particularly" in the contexts of "charities and foundations, you've got this overlay of federal tax law. There's this interesting interaction where if their grantees are undertaking unlawful activities, the fact that a foundation or a charity knew about that, that might support--and I may be going out on a limb here--but it might support some sort of tax-fraud charge, where something like that ... arguably, that could be an improper use of charitable assets. And it might well lead to an improper reporting of the use of charitable assets.
...
"For groups that find themselves now facing potential risk" of investigation or prosecution "over funding decisions they've made, of course their response is going to be this is an attack on civil society, whereas for groups that have been carrying out their missions, and paying attention to their obligations under law, and not doing things that are potentially subject to criminal liability--which is the vast swath of civil society--this is not really going to be part of their risk profile."
- Andrew Grossman, from "A conversation with BakerHostetler's Andrew Grossman (Part 1 of 2)," October 20, 2025, and "A conversation with BakerHostetler's Andrew Grossman (Part 2 of 2)," October 21, 2025
***
Civil terrorism and nonprofit status
"If you're using your nonprofit status to organize unlawful activity, you are abusing the implicit deal that I talked about earlier, about using your special nonprofit status for good to advance the public welfare through robust and informed discussion of speech. I don't think that there's anything inherent in our nonprofit system that says that you should be able to organize crimes, even if you think that those crimes advance the public welfare in some way. That seems like a pretty crazy reading of our nonprofit system."
Civil terrorism is different than the civil disobedience of protests during the civil-rights era. "For the most part, civil disobedience" in that era "was meant to draw attention to the injustice of the law being violated. No one thinks that there's anything on just about laws blocking highways or preventing vandalism, at least not for now."
Plus, more largely, "those who engaged in civil disobedience did not have access to the democratic process. That was precisely what they were protesting against. "Their ability to vote was actually hampered, and they had to express ... their will as a cohort of American citizens by other means.
"No one today claims that the activists who blocked the Golden Gate Bridge or vandalized Columbia University's property are being denied access to the democratic process and are unable to vote their will and express it that way. They're just choosing not to use those lawful, wonderful means to advance their ends. They are choosing law-breaking where law-breaking is not the only option.
...
"[T]here is not an enormous history of grantors being held liable, civilly or criminally, for the actions of their grantees. But theoretically, a grantor who knows that their grants are going to organize Illegal activity--what are known under the racketeering statutes as predicate acts--if you know that your money is going to fund organize, develop, predicate criminal actions, it is plausible that you could be prosecuted for conspiring to advance those acts.
"It's not really a novel legal theory. It would be novel in its application--which is not to say that it would be the first time that a nonprofit, faced criminal liability. It would take things to the next level. That might be what's warranted here. ... I think that is probably the greatest vulnerability in terms of the criminal law that nonprofits face in the civil-terrorism space."
...
It's "not a total coincidence that malevolent actors would settle into the nonprofit space. It offers a kind of legitimacy and comfort and shield from transparency that bad actors would necessarily want. It's kind of a sweet spot to be a fiscally sponsored entity where you can avoid talking about where your money comes from even as your donations are treated as tax-deductible.
"I don't think we should be shocked that there's some abuse of the nonprofit system going on. It's only natural. I say to those who want to preserve our robust civil society and the nonprofit sector, you need to reinforce those boundaries. You're going to lose the nonprofit sector entirely if you cannot get it under control.
"Americans are not going to stand for tax deductions subsidizing domestic terrorism, nor should they. That's preposterous. We need to be able to trust the system, and that requires enforcing the rules that keep it honest and accountable to the American people. I say to those to those who want to preserve the nonprofit sector, I'm with you 100%. I am. That requires enforcing the rules."
- Tal Fortgang, from "A conversation with the Manhattan Institute's Tal Fortgang (Part 1 of 2)," October 23, 2025, and "A conversation with the Manhattan Institute's Tal Fortgang (Part 2 of 2)," October 24, 2025
***
The nonprofit crisis
"I've always basically worked in the nonprofit sector and so, to me, ... the crisis for the nonprofit sector is ebbing trust in nonprofits. I think that trust, in fact, is the essential ingredient that makes these things go. Without trust, you can't get individuals to donate, you can't get people to volunteer, you can't get the staff to do the work, you can't get the board members to trust the leadership. So I wrote the book to try to focus the attention--I mean, it's written for a general audience, but it's also written specifically for nonprofit leaders, to try to encourage them to focus on this problem.
...
"Nonprofits would be making a mistake if they focus all their energies on responding to the Trump administration's threat without seeing what I think is the core problem underlying and leading to the threat."
...
"One of the big problems that I think that the sector has to address is an utter failure to--for part of the sector, at least--... even use language that's intelligible to something like half of the American public. I do think that there is kind of a reset happening and people are starting to take seriously the problem," however, "and you see both foundations and, to a lesser extent, NGOs starting to grapple with the problem of hyper-partisanship and political polarization and the role that they may have played over the past decade or so in fueling that. ... I think that's a step in the right direction for the field.
...
Philanthropically supported nonprofits are "in so many respects downstream of philanthropy and to the extent that the critique of nonprofits as out of touch with mainstream American thinking, unaccountable to any kind of interest other than their own operations, using language that ordinary Americans can't understand, arrogant, speaking down to people, yeah, sure those things are much, much worse in philanthropy than they are" among the supported nonprofit groups.
...
"[P]laces like the Sierra Club have done themselves a huge disservice over the past decade by losing their narrow focus on, or exclusive focus on, what their core mission is."
- Greg Berman, from "A conversation with The Nonprofit Crisis author Greg Berman (Part 1 of 2),"December 1, 2025, and "A conversation with The Nonprofit Crisis author Greg Berman (Part 2 of 2)," December 2, 2025
***
The practicality, politics, and possibilities of philanthropic reform
In defending private foundations' existing required payout of five percent of assets, they and those associations that speak for them "have gotten into this mode of, We're in the business of helping foundations exist for perpetuity and any payout above five percent is going to damage those chances," Masaoka says. "Why is perpetuity the purpose of policy? Isn't it helping charities?"
...
"If you have a hundred million dollars in a donor-advised fund, not only did you get a tax deduction for that in the year that you made the donation, but you can also deploy the assets. You can also say whether your assets are at a community foundation or Fidelity. You can say, I want $50 million invested in my best friend's company, or a company that I want to have some influence with, or at that I want to have become a customer of mine, right? I think that idea of using assets for private gain and for private influence is not as well understood .... Now, I don't know what to do about that. That's where the smart guys come in.
...
"The fundraising industrial complex right now is telling everybody that" DAFs are "a new source of revenue." There are "all these webinars now on how to raise money from donor-advised funds, which is sort of to me like having a webinar on how to raise money from Wells Fargo checking accounts."
...
Offering an analogy, "Agribusiness has been very smart about holding up the image of the family farm. So when people think about farming, they think about Mom and Pop with a pitchfork and two pigs, you know? And instead, it's literally hundreds of thousands of acres under machine-based cultivation with undocumented people from Mexico picking strawberries. So I think we need to do a better job of saying, We're trying to regulate big business, but ... we intend to protect family farms."
In the philanthropy context, reform advocates "have not made that differentiation very clearly."
...
The "right of speech, freedom of religion, freedom to assemble peaceably, freedom to petition, the government--these are all made real through the nonprofit sector. ...
"[I]f we got rid of the tax deduction, we would keep the all-volunteer organizations," which are 70% of the nonprofit groups in America, and we would keep the big, national, heavily government-funded nonprofits, but "we would lose the mid-level, locally based organizations and I think those are really important."
- Jan Masaoka, from "A conversation with the Philanthropy Project's Jan Masaoka (Part 1 of 2)," December 3, 2025, and "A conversation with the Philanthropy Project's Jan Masaoka (Part 2 of 2)," December 4, 2025
* * *
Michael E. Hartmann is CRC's senior fellow and director of the Center for Strategic Giving, providing analysis of and commentary about philanthropy and giving. He also co-edits The Giving Review, a joint project of Philanthropy Daily and the Center for Strategic Giving.
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/further-thoughts-on-philanthropy-from-the-giving-reviews-conversations-in-second-half-of-2025/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: From Fraud to the Frontlines - Scam Centers Caught in the Cambodia-Thailand Conflict
WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 15, 2026:* * *
From Fraud to the Frontlines: Scam Centers Caught in the Cambodia-Thailand Conflict
By Julia Dickson and Japhet Quitzon
In July 2025, a long-standing border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand escalated into direct armed confrontation. The fighting lasted five days and ended in a fragile ceasefire brokered by Malaysia and the United States. But that truce was short-lived. On December 7, the fighting resumed, with both governments accusing the other of provoking ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 15, 2026: * * * From Fraud to the Frontlines: Scam Centers Caught in the Cambodia-Thailand Conflict By Julia Dickson and Japhet Quitzon In July 2025, a long-standing border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand escalated into direct armed confrontation. The fighting lasted five days and ended in a fragile ceasefire brokered by Malaysia and the United States. But that truce was short-lived. On December 7, the fighting resumed, with both governments accusing the other of provokingrenewed clashes. A second ceasefire, signed on December 27, is already on shaky ground.
What distinguishes this latest phase of the conflict is the choice of targets. Thailand bombed several Cambodian casino and hotel complexes that it claims functioned as scam centers--repurposed casinos and hotels, often in remote border regions, where trafficked laborers are forced to defraud victims around the world, generating billions of dollars annually for transnational organized crime groups. Thai officials alleged these sites were also being used by the Cambodian military. While the military use of these sites remains contested, their targeting highlights the intersection of two seemingly distinct regional problems: a border dispute and the proliferation of scam centers.
Q1: What roles do Cambodia and Thailand play in scam center operations?
A1: Cambodia has emerged as a central hub of this illicit economy. The country hosts more than 50 scam centers, and the revenue from these operations exceeds $12.5 billion annually, roughly half the country's formal GDP. According to the 2025 U.S. Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, senior Cambodian government officials and business elites are reportedly involved in and benefit from scam operations, helping explain their continued proliferation despite growing international scrutiny. For instance, Chen Zhi--a Chinese-Cambodian national who the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned for "[operating] a transnational criminal empire through online investment scams"--served as an adviser to both current Prime Minister Hun Manet and former-Prime Minister Hun Sen, as well as other senior Cambodian government figures.
Thailand plays a different role, serving as a major transit hub for human trafficking victims recruited to scam centers. Recruiters lure victims from around the world with fraudulent job postings, fly them to Thailand, then smuggle them across international borders to scam compounds often in Cambodia or Myanmar. According to the 2025 U.S. TIP Report, corrupt Thai immigration and law enforcement officials facilitate this trafficking by accepting bribes at borders and international airports, transporting victims across borders, and bypassing visa and other documentation controls.
At the same time, scam centers are costly to Thailand, both financially and reputationally. In 2024, Thai citizens were defrauded out of an estimated $17.2 billion, equivalent to 3.4 percent of the country's GDP. Beyond the economic impact, the perception that Thailand tolerates or is complicit in scam activity threatens to damage the country's international reputation. This reputational harm has already weakened the country's tourism sector. Chinese tourist arrivals to Thailand, one of the largest tourism markets, for example, fell 30 percent between January and September 2025. Heightened concerns about human trafficking and scams drove the decline, intensifying after a Chinese actor was trafficked through Thailand to a scam center in Myanmar in January 2025.
In response to these growing financial and reputational costs, Bangkok has faced mounting pressure, both domestically and internationally, to take action against scam centers. With one of the most effective and well-funded armed forces in the region, it is conceptually well-positioned to respond. Direct military action, however, may not be the most effective or sustainable path forward, and the government has historically employed non-kinetic measures such as cutting off power, water, and internet to scam centers along its border with Myanmar and seizing assets tied to transnational organized crime groups.
Q2: Which scam centers did Thailand target, and what factors motivated Thailand's decision to carry out these operations?
A2: The Thai military targeted at least six casino and hotel complexes that are known to be associated with scam activity. Among them was the O'Smach Resort, which Thai forces shelled, killing a security guard and wounding at least five others, including Chinese and Myanmar nationals. Notably, in September 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned the O'Smach Resort and its owner, Ly Yong Phat, for "their role in serious human rights abuse related to the treatment of trafficked workers subjected to forced labor in online scam centers." Thai forces also reported strikes on the Royal Hill Resort, which the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime recognized as a scam center in May 2025, and a hotel and casino compound in Cambodia's Pursat Province, which the U.S. government linked to virtual currency scams in September 2025.
The Thai military noted that it targeted these compounds because it believed the Cambodian military was using them for drone launches, troop deployments, and weapons depots, making them military targets. For its part, the Cambodian Information Ministry responded to the attacks, claiming the complexes housed only hotels and casinos, which were not used for either scam or military purposes. However, independent confirmation of either story is lacking.
Some analysts note military use of scam centers is plausible, as scam compounds often represent the most substantial infrastructure along otherwise less developed border areas. Further, the same political connections that shield scam center operations from prosecution may also compel scam compound owners to comply with Cambodian state demands, including military use of their facilities. However, public reporting has not independently verified use by Cambodia's armed forces.
Thai military statements have also framed the strikes as a "war against the Scam Army." Such framing may be a way for the Thai government to show that it is acting against scam centers, reassuring both domestic and international audiences that the government is taking decisive action. At the same time, this narrative helps deflect criticism of official complicity or inaction against scam networks while advancing domestic political objectives, legitimizing its actions abroad.
Domestically, the campaign against scam centers serves clear political objectives. The Bhumjaithai Party, led by Prime Minister Anutin Chanvirakul, may try to capitalize on rising nationalist sentiment to boost its popularity ahead of the upcoming February snap elections. The conservative, military establishment in Thailand, with Anutin's Bhumjaithai Party as its key organizer, views the scam centers and border conflict as a means to help anchor Anutin's image as a strong leader, thereby securing political gains and limiting the influence of reformist parties like the People's Party.
Internationally, targeting scam centers allows Bangkok to assert moral leverage over Cambodia by portraying the country as an untrustworthy neighbor while framing Thai operations as a defense of national sovereignty. During the recent border skirmishes, Thai media and online discourse have villainized Cambodia as "Scambodia," linking scam activity to the ruling Hun family. This narrative recasts Thailand's kinetic strikes as a moral and security struggle, not just a territorial dispute, helping justify Thailand's actions to an international audience and amplify pressure on Phnom Penh.
Q3: What concerns arise from Thailand's strategy of targeting scam centers?
A3: Targeting scam centers raises serious humanitarian concerns due to the presence of trafficked victims within these facilities. An estimated 150,00 people have been trafficked and are being held in scam compounds across Cambodia. Eyewitness accounts from the bombing in O'Smach, for example, report that "foreign workers were not allowed to leave" during the strikes and were even forced to continue working as explosions landed close enough to shake their building. Following the strikes, foreign trafficking victims joined crowds moving through the town of O'Smach toward Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital. Videos circulating on social media reportedly show hundreds of people fleeing scam centers near O'Smach and walking along roads carrying their belongings.
Q4: What are the prospects for long-term peace and efforts to combat scam centers, given the intersection of border disputes and transnational organized crime?
A4: The two countries agreed to a shaky ceasefire on December 27, ending almost three weeks of border clashes. Two days later, the two countries' foreign ministers met and committed to taking stronger measures to combat transnational crimes, including scams. Despite these agreements, however, the prospects for long-term peace and robust action against scam centers remain uncertain. The tenuous peace has already been tested by accusations from both sides alleging ceasefire violations.
Further, given the strong nationalistic sentiment on both sides, it is unlikely that either government can disengage from the conflict entirely without losing face. In Thailand, the Anutin administration adopted an aggressive military posture during the December clashes, a stance believed to be an effort to harness nationalist public sentiment and boost domestic support ahead of the upcoming February elections.
In Cambodia, meanwhile, the Hun family may not have sufficient incentive to decouple from family connections that benefit from these scam centers. This calculus, however, may be changing under growing international pressure. On January 6, Cambodia arrested Chen Zi, a Chinese-Cambodian billionaire who allegedly built and operated at least 10 scam centers in Cambodia, and extradited him to China. Cambodia also suspended the operations of Prince Bank, a subsidiary of Chen's Prince Group, and extradited two other Chinese nationals. As Chen had close ties to the Hun family, his extradition may signal recognition within the ruling elite that it must distance itself from scam centers amid international scrutiny and escalating tensions with Thailand.
Experts warn, however, that Cambodia's scam industry is highly resilient and such enforcement actions could push scam operators to relocate elsewhere. The transnational organized crime groups behind scam centers are sophisticated and capable of rapidly relocating or setting up new scam centers elsewhere. For example, scam networks previously moved their compounds from Myanmar to Cambodia to evade law enforcement crackdowns, and scam centers have since appeared in countries such as Timor-Leste and Peru. As a result, destroying physical buildings and targeting a very limited number of criminals is unlikely to have a meaningful or lasting impact on the broader scam problem.
Finally, the disputed border regions themselves present additional challenges. Government presence is weakest in these areas, creating environments ripe for transnational criminal activity. The turmoil unleashed by the clashes risks deepening discord in places already experiencing weak pull from their governments. In such environments, enforcement of any initiatives would require significant buy-in from both sides and earnest government efforts. But the cross-border collaboration required for success is likely not yet possible given the fraught bilateral Thailand-Cambodia relationship. Addressing scam centers and border integrity is therefore intertwined, necessitating frank and sustained bilateral dialogue to solve this two-part problem.
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Julia Dickson is an associate fellow for the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Japhet Quitzon is an associate fellow for the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/fraud-frontlines-scam-centers-caught-cambodia-thailand-conflict
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: Governors Should Opt In to the Federal Education Tax Credit Now--Parents' Desires are Clear
WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:* * *
Governors Should Opt In to the Federal Education Tax Credit Now--Parents' Desires are Clear
Momentum is building quickly for the Federal Education Tax Credit, created under the Working Families Tax Cut Act, with governors in multiple states--including Virginia, Missouri, and Colorado--taking steps to opt in or publicly signaling their intent to participate, underscoring growing national support for expanding educational opportunity through private giving. With growing bipartisan participation, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * Governors Should Opt In to the Federal Education Tax Credit Now--Parents' Desires are Clear Momentum is building quickly for the Federal Education Tax Credit, created under the Working Families Tax Cut Act, with governors in multiple states--including Virginia, Missouri, and Colorado--taking steps to opt in or publicly signaling their intent to participate, underscoring growing national support for expanding educational opportunity through private giving. With growing bipartisan participation,the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) encourages governors nationwide to opt in and ensure families in their states can benefit.
Public support for the Education Freedom Tax Credit is overwhelming. A recent national poll by Napolitan News Service shows that Americans strongly support this initiative. More than 70 percent of registered voters want their governor to opt in to the credit, with a plurality saying the governor should do immediately. And, among respondents with school-aged children at home, 78 percent say they are likely to apply for a scholarship.
Starting in 2027, individuals can claim up to $1,700 in dollar-for-dollar tax credits for donations to scholarship granting organizations (SGOs) that award scholarships to K-12 children. But SGOs can only receive donations in states that formally opt in.
The Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service recently announced that states can formally participate by filling out Form 15714. Governors simply need to complete this form; no legislation is required. If states do not elect to participate, donors seeking to claim the federal credit will direct their charitable contributions to participating states instead--meaning families and students in non-participating states could miss out on new educational opportunities funded by private giving.
AFPI's Chair for Education Freedom, Erika Donalds, encouraged governors to seize this opportunity to support charitable donations and educational innovation in their states:
"Parents are demanding greater control over their children's education, and the public strongly supports the education freedom tax credit. Governors have a simple choice: opt in and deliver new opportunities for families, or delay and allow education dollars to flow to other states."
AFPI has also issued a formal letter to governors encouraging them to submit their state's election promptly so that families are not left behind as the tax credit moves forward.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/governors-should-opt-in-to-the-federal-education-tax-credit-nowparents-desires-are-clear
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: Blackwell Statement on Supreme Court Decision Allowing Challenge to Illinois Mail-In Ballot Law
WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on Jan. 15, 2026:* * *
Blackwell Statement on Supreme Court Decision Allowing Challenge to Illinois Mail-In Ballot Law
The America First Policy Institute's Election Integrity Initiative welcomed today's Supreme Court decision allowing a challenge to Illinois' mail-in ballot law to move forward, reaffirming that candidates for federal office have a legitimate interest in the rules governing how votes are counted.
The Honorable J. Kenneth Blackwell, Chair of Election Integrity at the America First Policy ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on Jan. 15, 2026: * * * Blackwell Statement on Supreme Court Decision Allowing Challenge to Illinois Mail-In Ballot Law The America First Policy Institute's Election Integrity Initiative welcomed today's Supreme Court decision allowing a challenge to Illinois' mail-in ballot law to move forward, reaffirming that candidates for federal office have a legitimate interest in the rules governing how votes are counted. The Honorable J. Kenneth Blackwell, Chair of Election Integrity at the America First PolicyInstitute, issued the following statement in response to the Court's ruling in Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections:
"Today's Supreme Court decision is a critical affirmation that candidates for federal office have a legitimate and protectable interest in the rules that govern how votes are counted in their elections.
By recognizing that candidates have standing to challenge election procedures that affect the integrity of the electoral process, the Court reaffirmed a fundamental principle: election laws must be clear, consistent, and subject to judicial review before--not after--public confidence is undermined.
Illinois' policy allowing ballots cast on or before Election Day to be counted weeks after polls close raises serious questions about transparency, uniformity, and adherence to federal election law. While today's ruling does not decide the merits of that policy, it rightly ensures that these questions will be examined in court.
Election integrity is not a partisan issue. It is the foundation of self-government. Americans deserve elections where the rules are set in advance, applied equally, and enforced faithfully. Today's decision is an important step toward restoring trust in our democratic process."
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/blackwell-statement-on-supreme-court-decision-allowing-challenge-to-illinois-mail-in-ballot-law
[Category: ThinkTank]