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Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Wall Street Journal: How Do You Spell 'Harvard'? With an Endless Supply of A's
NEW YORK, Nov. 20 (TNSxrep) -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Nov. 18, 2025, to the Wall Street Journal:
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How Do You Spell 'Harvard'? With an Endless Supply of A's
By Jason L. Riley
A new report looks at grade inflation, a problem that is proliferating far beyond the Ivy League.
You can always tell a Harvard man, the old saying goes, but you can't tell him much. That includes, apparently, that he may not be as smart as his grades suggest.
A recent internal Harvard report found that more than 60% of grades given to undergraduates in the 2024-25
... Show Full Article
NEW YORK, Nov. 20 (TNSxrep) -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Nov. 18, 2025, to the Wall Street Journal:
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How Do You Spell 'Harvard'? With an Endless Supply of A's
By Jason L. Riley
A new report looks at grade inflation, a problem that is proliferating far beyond the Ivy League.
You can always tell a Harvard man, the old saying goes, but you can't tell him much. That includes, apparently, that he may not be as smart as his grades suggest.
A recent internal Harvard report found that more than 60% of grades given to undergraduates in the 2024-25academic year were A's--up from about 25% two decades ago. The median grade-point average at graduation, which was 3.29 in 1985, is now 3.83. Since 2016 the median GPA at Harvard has been an A, even though the number of hours that students say they spend studying has remained relatively unchanged for close to 20 years.
It's possible that these outcomes stem from Harvard admitting smarter and more diligent applicants. But Dean of Undergraduate Education Amanda Claybaugh, who authored the 25-page report, found that rampant grade inflation provides a more credible explanation. She cited an evaluation system that fails to perform "key functions" and a need to "restore the integrity of our grading." The report also noted that the problem of skyrocketing grades is an open secret on campus.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the Wall Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/opinion/how-do-you-spell-harvard-with-an-endless-supply-of-as-5d358cf4?mod=author_content_page_1_pos_1)
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Jason L. Riley is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, a columnist at The Wall Street Journal, and a Fox News commentator.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/how-do-you-spell-harvard-with-an-endless-supply-of-as
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Pro-Kremlin Analysts Acknowledge Previously Hushed-up Problems
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Pro-Kremlin Analysts Acknowledge Previously Hushed-up Problems
By Kassie Corelli
Executive Summary:
* Pro-government Russian military analysts are begging to admit that the Ukrainian economy remains afloat despite constant attacks and pressure from Moscow.
* Leaked documents from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) also show a growing skepticism toward the intentions of the People's Republic of China within Russia's counterintelligence agency.
* For the
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WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Pro-Kremlin Analysts Acknowledge Previously Hushed-up Problems
By Kassie Corelli
Executive Summary:
* Pro-government Russian military analysts are begging to admit that the Ukrainian economy remains afloat despite constant attacks and pressure from Moscow.
* Leaked documents from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) also show a growing skepticism toward the intentions of the People's Republic of China within Russia's counterintelligence agency.
* For thefirst time, war correspondents and analysts close to the Ministry of Defense acknowledge not only the absence of real success at the front, but also the illusory nature of the war against Ukraine.
At the end of October, Russian military analysts made a surprising admission. Writers at the website Military Review (Voennoe Obozrenie), which is close to the Russian Ministry of Defense, noted that the Ukrainian economy is coping with the war better than expected. In particular, they point to Ukraine's economic growth in 2023 and 2024 (2.9 percent GDP growth in 2024), its successful battle against inflation, and that Ukraine's interest rate is currently 1 percent lower than Russia's (Topwar.ru, October 27). This change in how the war is being covered highlights how it is getting more difficult to disguise how the war is negatively affecting Russian society.
The authors of this Military Review article admit that, largely due to foreign aid, both civilian and military production are growing in Ukraine. At the same time, independent journalists note that the only industrial sectors now growing in Russia are those directly connected to the war, and therefore, their development is at the expense of the civilian sector (see EDM, July 7; Topwar.ru, October 27).
This trend in Russia's economy is evident in the drone industry. Despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's declaration that its market use is in the civil sphere, private companies can build civilian unmanned aerial vehicles only if they receive orders from the military (President of Russia, April 28, 2023). Enterprises cannot simply secure financing for a single civil project without simultaneously starting military production (Verstka.media, October 17).
Another unpleasant revelation for the Russian military is recognition that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is trying to obtain Russian technology. It does not, however, plan to share its own with Moscow. One of the Military Review correspondents, after visiting the "Neva 2025" exhibition, shared the impression that the PRC companies represented there did not want to tell him anything about their activities, but at the same time, tried to extract as much information out of him as possible (Topwar.ru, October 22).
Western analysts have long noted that the PRC may seek to take advantage of Russia's weakened state (see EDM, December 5, 2023, June 25). Now, however, the PRC has even been considered an "enemy" in leaked Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) documents. Russian counterintelligence is worried that the PRC special services are actively trying to recruit Russian agents, gain access to secret military technologies, lure disenchanted Russian scientists, and are even "laying the groundwork for territorial claims" against Russia (The Moscow Times, June 7).
The approaching winter is yet another potential threat being discussed among Russian analysts because, given the low temperatures typical for most of Russia, "the cessation of central heating ... would mean certain death." Pro-Kremlin military analysts are advising citizens residing in multi-family buildings that, should it not be possible to find firewood, they should insulate their quarters with tape, mineral wool, or other materials, "to ensure at least a minimal level of survival." The authors admit, however, that in a really cold winter, "passive insulation" will not help (Topwar.ru, October 20).
Even analysts loyal to the Kremlin admit to serious problems in both the army and back home. Previously, reporting unpleasant truths was mostly the preserve of pro-war bloggers (see EDM, October 6). Independent investigative journalists repeatedly note that war correspondents even acknowledge instances of torture and murder in the army (YouTube/ @novayagazeta_eu, October 29). Radical proponents of the war also openly criticize the Russian government for lying about the obscure goals and progress of the so-called Special Military Operation (SVO) (YouTube/@Borovskih, October 21). Experts affiliated with the Ministry of Defense have generally taken a more reserved position.
Lately, this has begun to change. Even the above-mentioned Military Review website has started to pose uncomfortable questions for the authorities:
Why is Russia marking time? Why has the SVO, which will soon last as long as the Great Patriotic War, failed to achieve a single goal? Why are we not developing our industry? Why do we not have enough Russian cars and so few of our own aircraft? Why have we lost ground in space? Why were we not prepared for the SVO?
At the same time, the authors acknowledge that "the media portrays a picture of total offensive on all fronts, but its tempo remains moderate" (Topwar.ru, October 28).
This is the first time a propaganda site has posed such an open challenge to the official narrative, albeit even still from a pro-war perspective. Moreover, this is a challenge to the Kremlin itself and an accusation, if not of treason, then at least of incompetence. This tendency aligns with information from The National Security Journal, which notes growing dissatisfaction among army generals with Putin. According to the publication, even highly placed officers most loyal to the regime have stopped believing in the president's war strategy. Moreover, many generals believe that the Kremlin's actions are not only leading to catastrophe on the front but also destroying the Russian state itself (The National Security Journal, October 28).It is still too early to predict a possible military coup attempt in Russia. The Russian Army's command staff and a significant part of the bureaucracy have turned the war into a profitable business, and make money with no concern for soldiers' lives or Russia's fate (Verstka.media, October 28). The army is clearly demoralized at both the highest and lowest levels, however, which inevitably impacts its combat effectiveness.
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Kassie Corelli is an analyst with The Jamestown Foundation.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/pro-kremlin-analysts-acknowledge-previously-hushed-up-problems/
[Category: ThinkTank]
ICTD at the Global Digital Public Infrastructure Summit
BRIGHTON, England, Nov. 20 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news:
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ICTD at the Global Digital Public Infrastructure Summit
From November 4-6, Cape Town hosted researchers, policymakers, civil society, and industry leaders for the Global Digital Public Infrastructure Summit, a space to discuss countries' progress on DPI and how to ensure its design and governance remain safe, inclusive, and citizen-centred.
Now in its second year,
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BRIGHTON, England, Nov. 20 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news:
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ICTD at the Global Digital Public Infrastructure Summit
From November 4-6, Cape Town hosted researchers, policymakers, civil society, and industry leaders for the Global Digital Public Infrastructure Summit, a space to discuss countries' progress on DPI and how to ensure its design and governance remain safe, inclusive, and citizen-centred.
Now in its second year,the summit underscored that DPI is not only about technology, but about reshaping how governments and institutions interact with people.
ICTD was represented by Fabrizio Santoro, Rhiannon McCluskey, and Lucia Rossel, as well as Moyo Arewa from the Local Government Revenue Initiative. Over the three days, they shared ICTD's work on digitalisation and taxation and gathered insights on emerging priorities, challenges, and innovations across the DPI landscape.
Shaping the DPI and Tax Conversation
At the summit, ICTD shared its latest policy brief, "Digital Public Infrastructure and Tax: High Stakes, High Rewards," which outlines why the intersection of DPI and taxation is a critical frontier of digital reform. The brief highlights how DPI's three foundational pillars (digital ID, digital payments, and secure data exchange) can make tax systems more efficient, transparent, and inclusive, particularly in low- and middle-income countries.
Across our engagements, ICTD emphasised that taxation can play a key role in strengthening DPI by driving adoption, supporting interoperability, and contributing to long-term sustainability. Conversely, well-designed DPI can benefit tax administration by improving identification, easing compliance, and reinforcing taxpayer trust through strong governance and privacy safeguards.
Throughout the summit, our team met with representatives from Tanzania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Dominican Republic, and others. These conversations helped us understand country priorities in strengthening revenue systems and identify promising opportunities for collaboration on digital ID integration, payment interoperability, data sharing, and inclusive digitalisation.
Participating in the Dialogue
On November 6th, the ICTD team joined the session "Doing More with Less: What a DPI Approach to Government Expenditure and Revenue Can Do," organised by the Gates Foundation, Public Digital, and Civic Data Lab.
The session was designed as an interactive discussion, bringing together government officials, civil society, and technical experts. Participants worked through a series of thought-provoking questions, debating issues such as whether ministries of finance should establish unified standards for local financial-management tools and how to balance investments between core systems and frontline services.
The ICTD team contributed insights on taxation, drawing on our research on digitalisation, digital IDs, payments, and data sharing. Throughout the discussion, we emphasised that trust and inclusion must underpin any digital transformation of tax systems, and that DPI and tax reforms should reinforce fairness and transparency rather than undermine them.
Looking Ahead: Our Research on DPI and Tax
The summit reinforced that the journey toward safe, inclusive digital public infrastructure is still unfolding. Through our DPI and Tax Programme, we aim to contribute to this work by generating practical, evidence-based insights for governments and partners navigating this rapidly evolving field.
We look forward to continuing the conversations begun at the summit and deepening our research on how DPI can strengthen revenue systems while promoting trust, transparency, and inclusion.
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Original text here: https://www.ictd.ac/news/ictd-global-digital-public-infrastructure-summit/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Why are Property Taxes Rising? Part Two
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Nov. 20 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2025:
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Why are property taxes rising? Part Two
By John Phelan
On Monday, I wrote about the coming hikes to property taxes in Minnesota. What is causing this?
Yesterday, I looked at the pressures coming from federal government action and what we could do to mitigate them short of hiking property taxes. Today, I'll look at the pressures coming from state government.
Problems
"In Ramsey
... Show Full Article
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Nov. 20 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2025:
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Why are property taxes rising? Part Two
By John Phelan
On Monday, I wrote about the coming hikes to property taxes in Minnesota. What is causing this?
Yesterday, I looked at the pressures coming from federal government action and what we could do to mitigate them short of hiking property taxes. Today, I'll look at the pressures coming from state government.
Problems
"In RamseyCounty, which approved a levy hike of 9.75%, or $38.6 million," Alex Derosier reports for the Pioneer Press,
"...the biggest drivers of expenses were unfunded mandates from the state of Minnesota, employee compensation and "directing resources to our core services and improving our organizational performance," County Manager Ling Becker said in September."
What are these "unfunded mandates"?
As former Triton Schools Superintendent Craig Schlichting explained in the Dodge County Independent in February:
"An unfunded mandate is any policy or requirement that is created by legislation without sufficient funding to cover the cost of implementation."
"One example of an unfunded mandate is summer unemployment for hour wage-earners who do not work year-round. For the first two years, the state allocated $135M toward unemployment payments for these staff, which was not enough to cover the projected expense until 2027 as the money has already been estimated to run out before this next summer is over. This will end up costing the Triton School District about $50,000 each year.
"Public school employees contribute to the Teachers Retirement Association for all certified and licensed staff. The contribution rate is increasing from 8.75% to 9.5%, with no state aid to help pay for it. For Triton this cost will be about $45,000 each year.
"Paid Family Medical Leave will be paid for through an employment tax of 0.7% on wages, with the costs allowed to be shared between the employers and employees. There is no state aid to support this increase for employers. For Triton School District, this increase will cost about $28,000 each year.
"There are several new curriculum requirements for school districts to adopt and implement, including personal finance, Civics, Mental Health, Ethnic Studies, Holocaust and Genocide, and Cannabis Use and Substance Abuse. There is no state aid to support the costs of curriculum materials and teacher training. The cost of those could easily reach $50,000 or more.
"...
"When you start to look at the combined impact of all those mandates and increased expenses as a district, we have no other choice than to cut staff, and to ask the legislature for help. The cost of the mandates for our district adds up to about $300,000, which is not offset by the increases in funding that we received."
In Scott County, which is proposing a roughly 10% hike in property tax levies, Deputy County Administrator Dan Lenz told the Star Tribune that "the county has to cover about $864,000 in higher costs from the state due to the new paid family leave law and changes in social service programs." This is in addition to "another $510,000 after the federal government passed down more costs, including those related to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), also known as food stamps."
Solutions
An obvious solution is to ditch these things. Failing that, those who make these mandates legal commitments ought to be responsible for appropriating the funding necessary to finance their provision.
At present, state politicians can have their cake and eat it. Those who passed this tidal wave of unfunded mandates have been able to tout their role in providing paid family and medical leave or unemployment insurance for part time workers, while it has been people at the county level who have been tasked with finding a way to pay for it. The opprobrium for hiking property taxes is falling, unjustly, to a large degree, on them.
If we want to bring property taxes in Minnesota under control, we need to ensure that those who propose expansion of local government spending incur the political costs -- or benefits -- of financing it. When state policymakers internalize that cost, Minnesota's hard pressed property tax payers might catch a break.
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John Phelan is an Economist at the Center of the American Experiment.
john.phelan@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/why-are-property-taxes-rising-part-two/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center: Tides Advocacy Reports Big Bumps in Revenue and Grants Paid
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2025:
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Tides Advocacy reports big bumps in revenue and grants paid
The left-center advocacy nonprofit reported a big revenue jump to $92.5 million and paid out grants totaling $29.7 million.
By Robert Stilson
Tides Advocacy, the 501(c)(4) activist group associated with (though legally separate from) the family of Tides nonprofits which collectively comprise one of the largest left-of-center funding and fiscal sponsorship networks in the country, recently released its 2024 Form 990 detailing
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WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2025:
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Tides Advocacy reports big bumps in revenue and grants paid
The left-center advocacy nonprofit reported a big revenue jump to $92.5 million and paid out grants totaling $29.7 million.
By Robert Stilson
Tides Advocacy, the 501(c)(4) activist group associated with (though legally separate from) the family of Tides nonprofits which collectively comprise one of the largest left-of-center funding and fiscal sponsorship networks in the country, recently released its 2024 Form 990 detailingits financials from that year.
Tides Advocacy's total revenues jumped from $65.8 million in 2023 to $92.5 million in 2024. Its total expenses similarly increased from $74.1 million to $93.2 million, including a rise in grants paid from $13.1 million to $29.7 million. At the end of 2024 it reported net assets of $28.1 million, down from $34 million in 2023.
Subject to applicable IRS restrictions, 501(c)(4) nonprofits such as Tides Advocacy are allowed to be openly political and to engage in partisan electoral activities. It is therefore unsurprising to see such groups receive a financial boost during election years, particularly presidential ones. In 2020, Tides Advocacy's total revenues exploded to $153.8 million from just $53 million in 2019, while from 2021 to 2022 they increased (much more modestly) from $78.5 million to $89.2 million. In 2024, Tides Advocacy reported making $16.8 million in political campaign activity expenditures, compared to $5.3 million in 2023.
Tides Advocacy's ideological orientation angles decidedly to the left. It describes itself as "a fearless partner for people fighting for social justice, helping them mobilize communities, build political power and change policy." It does this through both grantmaking and fiscal sponsorship. Some notable 501(c)(4) projects that are fiscally sponsored by Tides Advocacy include the AAPI Victory Alliance, Dream Defenders, Flip the Vote, the Movement for Black Lives Action Fund, Smart Justice California, and Voices for Progress.
Tides Advocacy's political/ideological priorities are broadly reflected in its largest 2024 grantees, most of which have InfluenceWatch profiles available. Groups to which Tides Advocacy reported making grants of at least $300,000 in 2024 include:
* Local Jobs and Economic Development Fund: $3,445,100
* Conservatives for a Clean Energy Future: $1,525,000
* League of Conservation Voters: $1,075,000
* Working Families Organization (also known as Working Families Power): $925,000
* Sixteen Thirty Fund: $750,000
* Black Voters Matter Fund: $617,000
* Alacrity Institute: $500,000
* DemocracyFIRST: $500,000
* Center for Empowered Politics: $415,000
* Alliance for Youth Action: $396,000
* NDN Action Network: $375,000
* Make the Road Action: $350,000
* Native Peoples Action: $350,000
* Texas Future Action Fund: $350,000
* People's Action: $346,000
* Living United for Change in Arizona (LUCHA): $330,000
* Ohio Women's Alliance Action Fund: $309,000
* Mijente: $300,000
The 2024 Form 990s for the associated Tides 501(c)(3) nonprofits--most notably the Tides Foundation and the Tides Center--should be available soon, and will be interesting to compare.
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Robert runs several of CRC's specialized projects.
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URL: TNSlist 14930/251119
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/tides-advocacy-reports-big-bumps-in-revenue-and-grants-paid/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Force Design for the Twenty-First Century Fight - U.S. Cyber Force Lessons From China's Strategic Support Forces
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2025:
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Force Design for the Twenty-First Century Fight: U.S. Cyber Force Lessons from China's Strategic Support Forces
By Lauryn Williams
In 2018, Vice President and National Space Council Chair Mike Pence heralded a new era of "American dominance in space," which would be led by a new U.S. Space Force. The service, eventually established in late 2019, would be a manifestation of the U.S. government's heightened awareness that space was a domain of "national security significance,"
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2025:
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Force Design for the Twenty-First Century Fight: U.S. Cyber Force Lessons from China's Strategic Support Forces
By Lauryn Williams
In 2018, Vice President and National Space Council Chair Mike Pence heralded a new era of "American dominance in space," which would be led by a new U.S. Space Force. The service, eventually established in late 2019, would be a manifestation of the U.S. government's heightened awareness that space was a domain of "national security significance,"as opposed to simply scientific exploration. This development acknowledged that the old, decentralized way of doing things--dispersing space professionals across the existing services--was no longer sufficient. Advocates argued that consolidating forces within a single service, led by empowered Pentagon leadership, was necessary to effectively recruit and organize, train, and equip personnel to meet the adversary space threats of a new day.
Enter 2025, and discussions are actively underway among U.S. experts about the need for a U.S. Cyber Force to own force generation for offensive, defensive, and cyber intelligence personnel. Advocates argue that a standalone Cyber Force, like the Space Force, would address acute challenges today in "recruiting, training, and retaining personnel for key cyber work roles and missions." Skeptics question whether a new bureaucratic structure will resolve them. They argue that cyberspace operations are unique to each service and existing forces should remain integrated.
Today, the United States is debating taking another step toward a significant force design transformation to tackle twenty-first-century multi-domain challenges. Yet, China has been making moves of its own since 2015 to shape the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for modern warfare. The Pentagon's 2016 annual report on Chinese military power first mentioned these changes: In late 2015, a then-new Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established under the Central Military Commission (CMC). Importantly, the SSF included space systems, network systems, and information warfare departments, which demonstrated the PLA's desire for a single command structure dedicated to multi-domain warfare. The network systems department served as the hub for cyber forces pulled together from previously disparate parts of the PLA. Then, in April 2024, less than nine years after it began, the PLA abruptly dissolved the SSF. With the SSF structure eliminated, the newly renamed Aerospace (ASF), Cyberspace (CSF), and Information Support Forces (ISF) were shifted directly under the CMC.
Among Western PLA watchers, these developments immediately raised big questions. Had the less-than-a-decade-old SSF experiment failed? Had its leadership fallen out of favor? Was the SSF merely intended as a transient 'incubator" for nascent space and cyber command structures that successfully achieved maturity in 2024? Was it some combination of these factors? Amid active debate regarding a prospective Cyber Force,
U.S. experts would benefit from learning the lessons of China's experiences to inform debates surrounding our own military evolution.
Rise and Fall of the PLA Strategic Support Force
As part of a broader PLA overhaul in 2015, the SSF was initially established to bring space, cyber, and information warfare strategic capabilities under a single organizational umbrella. China's 2015 Military Strategy stated it would "expedite the development of a cyber force and enhance its capabilities of cyberspace situation[al] awareness, cyber defense, [and] support for the country's endeavors in cyberspace." In January 2016, the Ministry of National Defense heralded the SSF as an entity "conducive for optimizing the military's force structure and improving integrated support capabilities," emphasizing the growing understanding within China (and globally among great powers) that integrating space, cyber, and the broader information domains is essential to modern victories.
When, in 2024, the previously centralized command structure dissolved into three new forces, the Pentagon opined that the development raised suspicions about operational effectiveness and leadership issues among SSF top leadership, including likely corruption. Alternatively, some U.S. PLA watchers believed the new structure showed the CMC's interest in directly controlling the most critical strategic capabilities, while also exposing that the aerospace and cyberspace divisions had still operated relatively independently even under the SSF structure. These same analysts believe the original intent could have been for the SSF to serve as a temporary "incubator" for the previously immature and incohesive strategic forces until they reached the maturity required of independent joint forces.
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Table 1: People's Republic of China and United States Cyber and Space Forces Command Structures
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Lessons for U.S. Force Design?
Time may reveal the SSF's lasting legacy following realignment of its component space, cyberspace, and information warfare forces under the CMC. However, with the benefit of some hindsight, the United States can learn lessons from the PLA's significant strategic changes over the past decade for our own efforts to adapt force structures to the realities of modern, multi-domain warfare.
Lesson 1: Establishing a Strategic Support Force Was Revolutionary in and of Itself
The standup of the SSF represented a sea-change--a "great refocusing"--in China's military strategy. It demonstrated the PLA's keen understanding that strategic forces are central to modern warfare and the new organization would "accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force." If some analysts' perspectives prove accurate over time, ultimately, the SSF structure provided a temporary holding ground to help shape previously separate divisions into cohesive operational forces that could then be shifted under centralized CMC authority.
Today, the United States similarly acknowledges the strategic importance of space and cyberspace as critical differentiators in conflict. Cyberattacks (including those attributed to China-linked cyber actors Volt and Salt Typhoon) continue to threaten U.S. critical infrastructure and sensitive data. Space systems are essential not only to modern military operations but also to civilian life. However, they are uniquely vulnerable to cross-domain threats, including cyberattacks. National Reconnaissance Office Director Chris Scolese recently identified cyber as his "number one concern" in space. These intrusions can target satellites to manipulate the public information space, for example, by broadcasting political messages, as Ukrainian citizens experienced earlier this year. Such real-world dynamics underscore the urgent need to understand and strategically integrate space, cyber, and information domains in conflict.
The former SSF has now taken a different shape in China; however, the PLA's initial decision to interconnect these capabilities offers a valuable insight for the United States. Staying ahead of our adversaries depends on U.S. policy and military leadership appreciating and organizing forces around cross-domain interdependencies.
Lesson 2: A Standalone Force Does Not Automatically Mean Better Integration
While establishing the SSF reflected foresight about the need for integrated strategic capabilities, it did not automatically foster operational connectivity between the space, cyber, and information warfare divisions. One key theory behind the 2024 SSF shakeup is the lack of cohesion across them. The PLA's eventual restructuring reveals a deliberate effort to identify the right bureaucratic home for its strategic forces.
As the United States considers creating a Cyber Force, decisionmakers should weigh the pros and cons of different bureaucratic models. One option they may follow is the Space Force model--which sits alongside the Air Force within the Department of the Air Force--and houses a Cyber Force under a military department like the Army. Leaders could also develop a completely different model altogether. Regardless of where a Cyber Force sits structurally, China's experience highlights that getting after cross-domain threats requires clear connective mechanisms across domain-specific services.
A newly-established Cyber Force would need to mature quickly alongside six services with long-established practices and cultures. Given the unique cross-domain challenges, it would need to coordinate especially closely with a six-year-old Space Force still finding its own bureaucratic identity.
The SSF's trajectory demonstrates that military structure can be transitional by design. It also demonstrates that change takes time, especially when that change requires building a new Service structure and developing a culture. Ultimately, the SSF restructuring emphasizes that selecting and implementing a new force design alone is not enough and is just the beginning of the process. True, effective integration takes time and requires sustained, deliberate effort to ensure strategic capabilities are interoperable across domains.
Lesson 3: The United States May Not Need to Get It Right the First Time
A final lesson from the SSF experience is to embrace an evolving force design--especially when it comes to warfighting domains where cutting-edge technology is advancing by the day. At its height, the former SSF was an objectively large organization, likely numbering between 200 and 250 thousand service members according to U.S. estimates. Whether in China or in the United States, effecting change in a bureaucracy of that size is a daunting task. In this context, the PLA's apparent trial period for the SSF is especially instructive.
In considering the most effective force design to tackle today's and tomorrow's cyber and space threats, the U.S. military must welcome trial and error, as well as refinement, if a chosen approach is not effective. This is not a foreign concept for the United States. The United States Air Force provides just one of many examples from military history. From the dawn of the aviation age to the standup of a separate service decades later in 1947, the form and function of military bureaucracy have changed along with advances in technology--a fact today's Department of the Air Force notes with pride.
The United States has already shaken up its force design in recent years with the Space Force. Today, cyberspace operations are conducted through a unified U.S. Cyber Command. Therefore, establishing a U.S. Cyber Force would be the most significant development to date to address current challenges in fielding the best-trained and equipped cyber warriors. However, as the PLA example demonstrates, the greatest mistake may be a lack of willingness to periodically assess how well a chosen solution is addressing the very challenges it was designed to fix. Rather than rigidity, agility and adaptation in the face of ever-changing threats should be the essential ingredients in military force design.
Looking Ahead
U.S. policymakers, military officers, and expert analysts should be actively asking critical questions to shape the Armed Forces for cross-domain challenges in the twenty-first century and beyond. The PLA Strategic Support Forces experience lends to several important questions for U.S. experts as they determine how to best address entrenched bureaucratic challenges facing U.S. cyber operators today:
* How can a standalone U.S. Cyber Force address existing challenges that reforming existing structures cannot? What can be done to ensure a new service contributes to more agility in conflict?
* How should the United States address the competitive recruitment, development, and retention of top talent in a Cyber Force?
* How can a U.S. Cyber Force avoid siloing cyber capabilities and ensure they remain integrated across domains?
* How should a Cyber Force best be integrated into joint operations? How should it maintain alignment and integration with space and other related operations?
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Lauryn Williams is the deputy director and senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/force-design-twenty-first-century-fight-us-cyber-force-lessons-chinas-strategic-support
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Crypto Firms' Ongoing Push Toward the Banking Perimeter - Chartering Efforts and Regulatory Tension
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2025:
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Crypto Firms' Ongoing Push Toward the Banking Perimeter: Chartering Efforts and Regulatory Tension
By Thomas Kingsley
Executive Summary
* Crypto firms continue the pursuit of national bank and state trust charters to access payment rails, supervisory clarity, and institutional credibility; regulators remain cautious however, due to unresolved concerns around liquidity risk, operational resilience, and the fit of digital-asset activities within prudential frameworks.
* State trust charters
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Nov. 20 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2025:
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Crypto Firms' Ongoing Push Toward the Banking Perimeter: Chartering Efforts and Regulatory Tension
By Thomas Kingsley
Executive Summary
* Crypto firms continue the pursuit of national bank and state trust charters to access payment rails, supervisory clarity, and institutional credibility; regulators remain cautious however, due to unresolved concerns around liquidity risk, operational resilience, and the fit of digital-asset activities within prudential frameworks.
* State trust chartershave emerged as the most achievable entry point, yet they raise questions about supervisory consistency, regulatory arbitrage, and when trust-charter activities become functionally equivalent to banking, and thus warrant federal oversight.
* The prolonged back-and-forth between applicants and regulators reflects broader policy tensions--innovation versus safety and soundness--and will ultimately shape how, and whether, digital-asset business models can be responsibly integrated into the U.S. banking system.
Introduction
While market, regulatory, and public dynamics continue to shift, crypto firms are moving forward with efforts to integrate more formally into the U.S. banking system. Crypto firms have found that approval under state charters is likely to be the most achievable entry point. Important concerns remain, however, about supervisory consistency, regulatory arbitrage, and when trust-charter activities become functionally equivalent to banking--warranting federal oversight.
As crypto firms engage in the charter application process, the back-and-forth with regulators show a broader tension between innovation and institutional safety and soundness. How this tension is resolved will resolve how--or whether--digital-asset business models can be integrated into the banking system. While none of these initiatives has yet redefined the financial regulatory landscape, the sector's persistence underscores a deeper policy challenge: how to integrate novel financial technologies into a system designed around balance sheets, liquidity risk and traditional payments infrastructure.
The Policy Problem
Crypto firms' interest in bank and trust charters is not merely symbolic. Full-service charters provide clearer supervisory expectations and access to payment rails, while trust charters offer a more attainable regulatory foothold for custody and settlement activities. Regulators remain wary. Digital-asset activities present operational, market, and liquidity risks that do not map cleanly onto existing prudential frameworks. This mismatch has prompted a series of slow-moving, heavily negotiated applications in which agencies request increasingly granular information on governance, risk modeling, and compliance functions.
The resulting dynamic--industry insistence on clarity versus regulatory caution--has produced a prolonged and often opaque chartering process that has implications for market structure, consumer protection, and competitive neutrality.
Regulatory Landscape and Supervisory Constraints
To date, chartering activity has fallen into three primary categories:
Applications for National Bank Charters
Some crypto firms have sought national trust or full-service charters as a means of accessing federal oversight and, ultimately, the Federal Reserve's payments system. These applications tend to stall on questions of operational resilience, separation of custodial assets, and the capacity to manage liquidity under stress. Regulators are particularly sensitive to the prospect of maturity transformation occurring inside institutions whose core assets may exhibit extreme volatility.
State Trust Charters as a Parallel Pathway
State-level trust charters--especially in jurisdictions with digital-asset-specific frameworks--offer a more attainable route. They allow firms to provide custody, clearing, and settlement without full banking authorities. Yet these charters raise questions about supervisory consistency and the potential for regulatory arbitrage. As these entities attempt to expand their services, federal agencies must assess whether their activities approach the functional boundary of banking.
Special-purpose Charters and the Limits of Innovation Policy
The debate over special-purpose charters continues to reflect broader tensions around regulatory modernization. While industry advocates promote them as vehicles for innovation, federal agencies have taken a narrower view, emphasizing statutory limits and the risk of creating institutions that benefit from federal privileges without satisfying prudential obligations.
The existence of these separate pathways to banking access should not imply that crypto firms have had any measure of success. While applications have skyrocketed, the number of successful applications in any category remains extremely low. Anchorage Digital became the first crypto entity to receive a national bank charter in 2021; it remains the only crypto firm to have done so.
Industry Motivations: Access, Credibility, and Scale
For crypto firms, the logic of pursuing charters remains compelling. Direct integration into the Federal Reserve's infrastructure would reduce reliance on third-party banks and mitigate counterparty risk. A charter--federal or state--offers a more predictable supervisory environment than money-transmission licensure scattered across multiple states. Perhaps the key attractions, however, are credibility and scale-institutional clients increasingly demand bank-level governance, risk management, and operational controls; for stablecoin issuers in particular, a banking framework provides a pathway to expand issuance while satisfying evolving regulatory expectations.
These incentives explain why firms continue refining and resubmitting applications even after encountering significant supervisory friction.
Implications for Market Structure
The continued push for charters signals the growing pressure to integrate crypto infrastructure into the existing financial system. Yet it also highlights the structural obstacles standing in the way of that integration. Divergent state and federal approaches create uncertainty for both firms and policymakers. Traditional banks argue that crypto firms seek access to banking privileges without assuming the full burden of prudential regulation. But the key concern for regulators remains systemic risk. Premature or inadequately supervised integration of digital-asset activities could introduce new vulnerabilities into critical financial-market infrastructure.
Conclusion
The dream is simple: Perform bank-like activities with limited bank-like supervision, regulation, or capital requirements. Crypto firms' efforts to secure bank and trust charters represent a persistent, strategic attempt to bridge the divide between digital-asset innovation and traditional banking regulation. While regulators remain cautious, industry demand for clearer supervisory pathways is unlikely to diminish. The outcome of this prolonged engagement will shape not only the market for digital-asset services but also the broader evolution of the U.S. regulatory framework as it confronts technologies that challenge long-standing definitions of banking, trust services, and financial intermediation.
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Thomas Kingsley is the Director of Financial Services Policy at the American Action Forum.
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/crypto-firms-ongoing-push-toward-the-banking-perimeter-chartering-efforts-and-regulatory-tension/
[Category: Think Tank]
