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Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Washington Post: America's National Parks Are Falling Apart. Congress Can Fix Them.
NEW YORK, July 21 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 20, 2026, by senior fellow Shawn Regan to the Washington Post:
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America's National Parks Are Falling Apart. Congress Can Fix Them.
Legislators should fund routine maintenance to prevent bigger problems.
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America has much to be proud of in the 250th year since its founding, but the condition of its national parks shouldn't be on the list.
The national park system faces a maintenance backlog of $24 billion in crumbling roads, aging water systems, washed-out trails and dilapidated visitor ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, July 21 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 20, 2026, by senior fellow Shawn Regan to the Washington Post: * * * America's National Parks Are Falling Apart. Congress Can Fix Them. Legislators should fund routine maintenance to prevent bigger problems. - America has much to be proud of in the 250th year since its founding, but the condition of its national parks shouldn't be on the list. The national park system faces a maintenance backlog of $24 billion in crumbling roads, aging water systems, washed-out trails and dilapidated visitorfacilities.
That is more than seven times the National Park Service's annual budget.
Continue reading the entire piece here at The Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/07/20/congress-can-fix-americas-national-parks)
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Shawn Regan is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/americas-national-parks-are-falling-apart-congress-can-fix-them
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
America's National Parks Are Falling Apart. Congress Can Fix Them.
Legislators should fund routine maintenance to prevent bigger problems.
-
America has much to be proud of in the 250th year since its founding, but the condition of its national parks shouldn't be on the list.
The national park system faces a maintenance backlog of $24 billion in crumbling roads, aging water systems, washed-out trails and dilapidated visitor ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, July 21 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 20, 2026, by senior fellow Shawn Regan to the Washington Post: * * * America's National Parks Are Falling Apart. Congress Can Fix Them. Legislators should fund routine maintenance to prevent bigger problems. - America has much to be proud of in the 250th year since its founding, but the condition of its national parks shouldn't be on the list. The national park system faces a maintenance backlog of $24 billion in crumbling roads, aging water systems, washed-out trails and dilapidated visitorfacilities.
That is more than seven times the National Park Service's annual budget.
Continue reading the entire piece here at The Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/07/20/congress-can-fix-americas-national-parks)
* * *
Shawn Regan is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/americas-national-parks-are-falling-apart-congress-can-fix-them
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Georgia's Russia-Inspired Education Reform Raises Cognitive Security Threats
WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 20, 2026, by Beka Chedia, professor of political science for the independent research institute Varieties of Democracy in the Political Science Department at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, and a political scientist from Tbilisi, Georgia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Georgia's Russia-Inspired Education Reform Raises Cognitive Security Threats
Executive Summary:
* Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party is centralizing education by standardizing textbooks, delaying English instruction, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 20, 2026, by Beka Chedia, professor of political science for the independent research institute Varieties of Democracy in the Political Science Department at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, and a political scientist from Tbilisi, Georgia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Georgia's Russia-Inspired Education Reform Raises Cognitive Security Threats Executive Summary: * Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party is centralizing education by standardizing textbooks, delaying English instruction,and including patriotic and religious content in curricula, aligning Georgia's education policy more closely with Russia's model of state-directed ideological education.
* The reforms expand the Georgian Orthodox Church's influence in public schools through values education programs, religious content, and curricula centered on national identity.
* These educational transitions strengthen state control over national identity formation and cognitive security while mirroring Russia's use of traditional values as a geopolitical and anti-Western instrument.
-
On July 3, as part of a school reform, the Georgian Ministry of Education announced that English language instruction in the country's schools would no longer begin in the first grade. Instead, it is planned to start in the second grade (Interpressnews, July 3). The change is not fundamental, as the overall number of English language instruction hours remains unchanged. It may, however, indicate shifting priorities in education policy and raise broader questions about the role assigned to foreign language learning. A similar trend can be observed in Russia, where starting from the 2026 academic year, the Ministry of Education plans to reduce the number of foreign language classes in schools (RBC, January 22). The measures differ in scope and rationale, but both developments reflect changing approaches toward foreign language education and its place within national education strategies. In Georgia's case, English education has been associated with the country's pro-Western orientation. More broadly, changes in school reform agendas raise questions about cognitive security, as education policy plays a key role in shaping societal resilience, critical thinking, and the ability to withstand external influence.
On June 30, Georgian Minister of Education Givi Mikanadze announced that, as part of the overall education reform, the content of textbooks would be completely changed (1tv.ge, June 30). All schools will now use the same textbooks, and the principle of textbook choice will be abolished. The new textbooks will be prepared by the Ministry of Education rather than by scholars. One of the key elements of the reform will be textbook covers featuring "visual elements reflecting national values" (1tv.ge, June 30). According to Mikanadze, the cover of the chemistry textbook will feature the process of winemaking, which will simultaneously symbolize a chemical process and show how Georgia is the birthplace of wine. The cover of the biology textbook will feature five ears of Georgian wheat, which, according to the minister, has occupied a unique place in the world (1tv.ge, June 30).
The form and content of the education reform initiated in Georgia not only repeat the steps Russia has taken in reforming school education. It will also almost coincide with them in terms of timing. On May 27, Russian Minister of Education Sergey Kravtsov announced that a unified set of school textbooks was being prepared in Russia (RBC, May 27). Georgia is essentially following Russia's path. At the first stage, the Georgian government adopted several laws aimed at minimizing Western influence in the country. At the current stage, they have turned to eliminating liberal content from the education system. The so-called "school constitution"--the national goals for general education--which the Georgian Parliament approved in June 2024, envisages the complete exclusion of liberal values from school education. The government made it no secret that the purpose of this document was to effectively replace the previous document on national goals for education, which, according to the minister, was "saturated with liberal values" (Imedinews.ge, December 2, 2025).
Georgia plans to place greater emphasis on the patriotic education of young people within the school system. Among Georgian education experts, this invites comparisons with the Soviet era--and more broadly, the totalitarian past--where the state actively used the education system as an instrument of ideological influence and the shaping of students' worldviews. According to Simon Janashia, an education researcher and a member of the opposition party "Freedom Square," the government is allegedly engaged in a "struggle to defend traditions," using false pathos as well as religious and nationalist texts (Radio Tavisupleba, July 2).
On June 30, Mikanadze explicitly stated that the goal of the reform is the maximum integration of national values into the educational process. He expressed confidence that "we will achieve the desired result in a few years" (1tv.ge, June 30). The ruling Georgian Dream party intends to strengthen the teaching of national values in the education system, as well as religious elements. According to Mikanadze, textbooks on history and Georgian literature will extensively include quotations from the recently deceased Patriarch Ilia II of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) (1tv.ge, June 30).
Georgian Dream seeks to use the principle "God, Homeland, Man," formulated by the late Patriarch, as the foundation of a new ideological model. It aims to shape the younger generation and strengthen a conservative value system. This process effectively indicates the beginning of the formation of an anti-liberal ideological agenda in Georgia. On May 26, during the state celebration of Georgia's Independence Day, the government used the slogan as an inscription on the military uniforms of soldiers participating in the events. Opposition politician Roman Gotsiridze called the use of this quote on military uniforms "propaganda for theocracy" and stated that Georgia is moving along the path of "Iranization" (Facebook/roman.gotsiridze, May 27).
In forming a new anti-liberal agenda, Georgian Dream assigns a special role to the GOC. In June, the Georgian government and the GOC intend to strengthen the "values education program" in schools, which was introduced in 2024 through cooperation between the Georgian Patriarchate and the Ministry of Education. The program is now gradually turning into a mass initiative. At this stage, the program, which essentially involves religious education, has expanded to include 141 schools, where so-called values education clubs have been opened, involving 4,375 pupils (EDU.aris.ge, June 16). There are a total of 2,292 schools in Georgia, and according to the government's plans, most of them may be covered by this program. An additional 129 representatives of the clergy have been trained, and new clubs are planned to be opened by the beginning of the new academic year in September (EDU.aris.ge, June 16). The program provides religious education only within the framework of the dominant Orthodox tradition. At the same time, the ministry has not yet commented on whether separate educational formats for students of other faiths will be provided as part of the initiative.
The GOC has long sought to restore Orthodox religious education in schools, which had been introduced into the Georgian school system in a largely spontaneous manner following the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the Rose Revolution of 2003 and the adoption of the Law on General Education in 2005 under the previous, more liberal government, these opportunities were significantly curtailed. The law established religious neutrality as one of the fundamental principles governing public schools (Legislative Herald of Georgia, 2005). In practice, this meant that schools were permitted to offer only introductory courses on world religions or the history of religion, rather than instruction in a specific religious denomination.
Under Georgian Dream, the GOC made several attempts to reintroduce religious education into public schools, at times under the guise of teaching religion or through subjects such as "Me and Society." Moreover, even before Georgian Dream launched its declared campaign against liberalism, the GOC had already been actively promoting revisions to the school curriculum. In 2015, following the Patriarchate's strong recommendations, terms such as "gender identity," "liberalism," and "democratic values" were removed from textbooks used in several school subjects. The Patriarchate argued that these concepts were political in nature and contributed to the political indoctrination of children (Tabula.ge, October 21, 2015). Georgian theologian Beka Mindiashvili also shared on social media in June 2026 that, in 2017, the GOC had already been developing a curriculum for a corresponding subject, and that one of the GOC's metropolitans, Ioane Gamrekeli, even demanded that the history of humanity be rewritten and aligned with biblical chronology. This initiative was not approved (Facebook/beka.mindiashvili, June 16).
Representatives of Georgian civil society and the country's non-governmental sector have expressed concerns about violations of the principle of religious neutrality in public schools. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, a new school subject entitled Homeland Studies was introduced. According to several local observers and civil society organizations, the course exhibited elements of Orthodox religious indoctrination. It extended beyond the scope of a neutral introduction to the study of religion (Tabula.ge, March 13, 2023).
The transformation of Georgia's education policy is unfolding through domestic curriculum reforms as well as through participation in Russian-led memory initiatives. In July, Georgian schoolchildren took part in the Russian-Belarusian project "Memory Train," traveling across Belarus and Russia together with students from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries along a route dedicated to the history of what Russia refers to as the "Great Patriotic War." The project was designed to cultivate a shared historical memory centered on the Soviet victory in World War II and to strengthen a common identity among participants. During the closing ceremony in Minsk, Russian Federation Council Deputy Chairman Konstantin Kosachev described the Georgian participants as future "ambassadors of goodwill" capable of restoring friendly relations between Georgia and Russia (Facebook/RuISEmbSwissGEO, July 9).
Remarkably, value-oriented and patriotic education practices were strengthened in neighboring Russia following Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2022 decree on the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values (President of Russia, November 9, 2022). On July 1 of this year, Russia announced the introduction of a new school subject, titled "Spiritual and Moral Culture of Russia" (RIA Novosti, July 1). The stated goal of the new subject is "to cultivate among schoolchildren a worldview based on traditional Russian spiritual and moral values." Such similarities create the impression that the reforms in Georgia and Russia aimed at strengthening spiritual and moral education, as well as so-called patriotic education, are based on the same set of guidelines--or even written from the same playbook.
In Georgia, the introduction of religious indoctrination into the education system is taking place amid another government initiative--the celebration of the 1,700th anniversary of the declaration of Christianity as the state religion. The official celebrations began on May 26, Georgia's Independence Day, and will continue until October 14. As part of the festivities, the government is planning large-scale educational and cultural events, culminating in a symposium on the theme "God, Homeland, Man" (Georgian State Agency for Religious Issues, May 20).
The simultaneous introduction of standardized textbooks, centralized curriculum development, and value-based education in both Russia and Georgia reflects increasing state control over education. It enables the government to shape future generations' perceptions of democracy, the West, Russia (in the case of Georgia), religion, national identity, and external threats. This suggests an effort to turn the concept of defending values into an ideological tool against the West, similar to the approach used by Russia. In Russia, the protection of traditional values has become an instrument of foreign policy, which Georgia could continue to mirror.
* * *
Dr. Beka Chedia is a political scientist from Tbilisi, Georgia. He is currently a professor of political science and a Tbilisi-based Country Expert (Georgia) for the independent research institute Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) at the Department of Political Science of the University of Gothenburg, in Sweden.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/georgias-russia-inspired-education-reform-raises-cognitive-security-threats/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Georgia's Russia-Inspired Education Reform Raises Cognitive Security Threats
Executive Summary:
* Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party is centralizing education by standardizing textbooks, delaying English instruction, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 20, 2026, by Beka Chedia, professor of political science for the independent research institute Varieties of Democracy in the Political Science Department at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, and a political scientist from Tbilisi, Georgia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Georgia's Russia-Inspired Education Reform Raises Cognitive Security Threats Executive Summary: * Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party is centralizing education by standardizing textbooks, delaying English instruction,and including patriotic and religious content in curricula, aligning Georgia's education policy more closely with Russia's model of state-directed ideological education.
* The reforms expand the Georgian Orthodox Church's influence in public schools through values education programs, religious content, and curricula centered on national identity.
* These educational transitions strengthen state control over national identity formation and cognitive security while mirroring Russia's use of traditional values as a geopolitical and anti-Western instrument.
-
On July 3, as part of a school reform, the Georgian Ministry of Education announced that English language instruction in the country's schools would no longer begin in the first grade. Instead, it is planned to start in the second grade (Interpressnews, July 3). The change is not fundamental, as the overall number of English language instruction hours remains unchanged. It may, however, indicate shifting priorities in education policy and raise broader questions about the role assigned to foreign language learning. A similar trend can be observed in Russia, where starting from the 2026 academic year, the Ministry of Education plans to reduce the number of foreign language classes in schools (RBC, January 22). The measures differ in scope and rationale, but both developments reflect changing approaches toward foreign language education and its place within national education strategies. In Georgia's case, English education has been associated with the country's pro-Western orientation. More broadly, changes in school reform agendas raise questions about cognitive security, as education policy plays a key role in shaping societal resilience, critical thinking, and the ability to withstand external influence.
On June 30, Georgian Minister of Education Givi Mikanadze announced that, as part of the overall education reform, the content of textbooks would be completely changed (1tv.ge, June 30). All schools will now use the same textbooks, and the principle of textbook choice will be abolished. The new textbooks will be prepared by the Ministry of Education rather than by scholars. One of the key elements of the reform will be textbook covers featuring "visual elements reflecting national values" (1tv.ge, June 30). According to Mikanadze, the cover of the chemistry textbook will feature the process of winemaking, which will simultaneously symbolize a chemical process and show how Georgia is the birthplace of wine. The cover of the biology textbook will feature five ears of Georgian wheat, which, according to the minister, has occupied a unique place in the world (1tv.ge, June 30).
The form and content of the education reform initiated in Georgia not only repeat the steps Russia has taken in reforming school education. It will also almost coincide with them in terms of timing. On May 27, Russian Minister of Education Sergey Kravtsov announced that a unified set of school textbooks was being prepared in Russia (RBC, May 27). Georgia is essentially following Russia's path. At the first stage, the Georgian government adopted several laws aimed at minimizing Western influence in the country. At the current stage, they have turned to eliminating liberal content from the education system. The so-called "school constitution"--the national goals for general education--which the Georgian Parliament approved in June 2024, envisages the complete exclusion of liberal values from school education. The government made it no secret that the purpose of this document was to effectively replace the previous document on national goals for education, which, according to the minister, was "saturated with liberal values" (Imedinews.ge, December 2, 2025).
Georgia plans to place greater emphasis on the patriotic education of young people within the school system. Among Georgian education experts, this invites comparisons with the Soviet era--and more broadly, the totalitarian past--where the state actively used the education system as an instrument of ideological influence and the shaping of students' worldviews. According to Simon Janashia, an education researcher and a member of the opposition party "Freedom Square," the government is allegedly engaged in a "struggle to defend traditions," using false pathos as well as religious and nationalist texts (Radio Tavisupleba, July 2).
On June 30, Mikanadze explicitly stated that the goal of the reform is the maximum integration of national values into the educational process. He expressed confidence that "we will achieve the desired result in a few years" (1tv.ge, June 30). The ruling Georgian Dream party intends to strengthen the teaching of national values in the education system, as well as religious elements. According to Mikanadze, textbooks on history and Georgian literature will extensively include quotations from the recently deceased Patriarch Ilia II of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) (1tv.ge, June 30).
Georgian Dream seeks to use the principle "God, Homeland, Man," formulated by the late Patriarch, as the foundation of a new ideological model. It aims to shape the younger generation and strengthen a conservative value system. This process effectively indicates the beginning of the formation of an anti-liberal ideological agenda in Georgia. On May 26, during the state celebration of Georgia's Independence Day, the government used the slogan as an inscription on the military uniforms of soldiers participating in the events. Opposition politician Roman Gotsiridze called the use of this quote on military uniforms "propaganda for theocracy" and stated that Georgia is moving along the path of "Iranization" (Facebook/roman.gotsiridze, May 27).
In forming a new anti-liberal agenda, Georgian Dream assigns a special role to the GOC. In June, the Georgian government and the GOC intend to strengthen the "values education program" in schools, which was introduced in 2024 through cooperation between the Georgian Patriarchate and the Ministry of Education. The program is now gradually turning into a mass initiative. At this stage, the program, which essentially involves religious education, has expanded to include 141 schools, where so-called values education clubs have been opened, involving 4,375 pupils (EDU.aris.ge, June 16). There are a total of 2,292 schools in Georgia, and according to the government's plans, most of them may be covered by this program. An additional 129 representatives of the clergy have been trained, and new clubs are planned to be opened by the beginning of the new academic year in September (EDU.aris.ge, June 16). The program provides religious education only within the framework of the dominant Orthodox tradition. At the same time, the ministry has not yet commented on whether separate educational formats for students of other faiths will be provided as part of the initiative.
The GOC has long sought to restore Orthodox religious education in schools, which had been introduced into the Georgian school system in a largely spontaneous manner following the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the Rose Revolution of 2003 and the adoption of the Law on General Education in 2005 under the previous, more liberal government, these opportunities were significantly curtailed. The law established religious neutrality as one of the fundamental principles governing public schools (Legislative Herald of Georgia, 2005). In practice, this meant that schools were permitted to offer only introductory courses on world religions or the history of religion, rather than instruction in a specific religious denomination.
Under Georgian Dream, the GOC made several attempts to reintroduce religious education into public schools, at times under the guise of teaching religion or through subjects such as "Me and Society." Moreover, even before Georgian Dream launched its declared campaign against liberalism, the GOC had already been actively promoting revisions to the school curriculum. In 2015, following the Patriarchate's strong recommendations, terms such as "gender identity," "liberalism," and "democratic values" were removed from textbooks used in several school subjects. The Patriarchate argued that these concepts were political in nature and contributed to the political indoctrination of children (Tabula.ge, October 21, 2015). Georgian theologian Beka Mindiashvili also shared on social media in June 2026 that, in 2017, the GOC had already been developing a curriculum for a corresponding subject, and that one of the GOC's metropolitans, Ioane Gamrekeli, even demanded that the history of humanity be rewritten and aligned with biblical chronology. This initiative was not approved (Facebook/beka.mindiashvili, June 16).
Representatives of Georgian civil society and the country's non-governmental sector have expressed concerns about violations of the principle of religious neutrality in public schools. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, a new school subject entitled Homeland Studies was introduced. According to several local observers and civil society organizations, the course exhibited elements of Orthodox religious indoctrination. It extended beyond the scope of a neutral introduction to the study of religion (Tabula.ge, March 13, 2023).
The transformation of Georgia's education policy is unfolding through domestic curriculum reforms as well as through participation in Russian-led memory initiatives. In July, Georgian schoolchildren took part in the Russian-Belarusian project "Memory Train," traveling across Belarus and Russia together with students from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries along a route dedicated to the history of what Russia refers to as the "Great Patriotic War." The project was designed to cultivate a shared historical memory centered on the Soviet victory in World War II and to strengthen a common identity among participants. During the closing ceremony in Minsk, Russian Federation Council Deputy Chairman Konstantin Kosachev described the Georgian participants as future "ambassadors of goodwill" capable of restoring friendly relations between Georgia and Russia (Facebook/RuISEmbSwissGEO, July 9).
Remarkably, value-oriented and patriotic education practices were strengthened in neighboring Russia following Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2022 decree on the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values (President of Russia, November 9, 2022). On July 1 of this year, Russia announced the introduction of a new school subject, titled "Spiritual and Moral Culture of Russia" (RIA Novosti, July 1). The stated goal of the new subject is "to cultivate among schoolchildren a worldview based on traditional Russian spiritual and moral values." Such similarities create the impression that the reforms in Georgia and Russia aimed at strengthening spiritual and moral education, as well as so-called patriotic education, are based on the same set of guidelines--or even written from the same playbook.
In Georgia, the introduction of religious indoctrination into the education system is taking place amid another government initiative--the celebration of the 1,700th anniversary of the declaration of Christianity as the state religion. The official celebrations began on May 26, Georgia's Independence Day, and will continue until October 14. As part of the festivities, the government is planning large-scale educational and cultural events, culminating in a symposium on the theme "God, Homeland, Man" (Georgian State Agency for Religious Issues, May 20).
The simultaneous introduction of standardized textbooks, centralized curriculum development, and value-based education in both Russia and Georgia reflects increasing state control over education. It enables the government to shape future generations' perceptions of democracy, the West, Russia (in the case of Georgia), religion, national identity, and external threats. This suggests an effort to turn the concept of defending values into an ideological tool against the West, similar to the approach used by Russia. In Russia, the protection of traditional values has become an instrument of foreign policy, which Georgia could continue to mirror.
* * *
Dr. Beka Chedia is a political scientist from Tbilisi, Georgia. He is currently a professor of political science and a Tbilisi-based Country Expert (Georgia) for the independent research institute Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) at the Department of Political Science of the University of Gothenburg, in Sweden.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/georgias-russia-inspired-education-reform-raises-cognitive-security-threats/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: European Commission President Visits Armenia
WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 20, 2026, by Vasif Huseynov, senior fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations and an adjunct lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
European Commission President Visits Armenia
Executive Summary:
* On July 2, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Yerevan as part of her South Caucasus tour, meeting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to discuss the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, EU-Armenia economic integration, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 20, 2026, by Vasif Huseynov, senior fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations and an adjunct lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * European Commission President Visits Armenia Executive Summary: * On July 2, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Yerevan as part of her South Caucasus tour, meeting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to discuss the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, EU-Armenia economic integration,and support against Russian economic coercion.
* Pashinyan said Armenia aims to secure EU visa liberalization by 2029 and reiterated that Yerevan does not seek "to create a crisis" in relations with Russia as it deepens ties with Brussels.
* Regarding the U.S.-led Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), Pashinyan distinguished Armenia's bilateral cooperation with Washington from the European Union's connectivity agenda, underscoring that Brussels views the initiative positively but is not directly involved.
-
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen traveled to Yerevan on July 2 as part of her two-day South Caucasus tour. This was her second visit to the Armenian capital in two months, following the European Political Community summit and the inaugural EU-Armenia Summit in May (see EDM, May 11; Prime Minister of Armenia, July 2). Opening the joint press conference, von der Leyen praised Armenia's democratic progress, congratulating Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on his party's June 7 parliamentary election victory and stating that the vote had "shown, once again, the strength of Armenia's democracy" (European Commission, July 2).
Von der Leyen framed the June 7 election, in which Pashinyan's Civil Contract party won a majority while campaigning partly on deeper EU integration, as a mandate for Armenia's westward orientation (European Commission, July 2). She tied this political framing to the previous day's announcements in Baku, telling Pashinyan that "while Armenia is coming closer to the EU, the South Caucasus is coming closer together," and calling the initialing of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement last August "the most consequential step this region has taken in decades" (European Commission, July 2).
The public portion of the Yerevan talks did not address the key issue preventing the initialed agreement from becoming a signed and ratified peace treaty. Azerbaijan demands that Armenia amend its constitution to remove language that Baku regards as an implicit territorial claim over the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. The current Armenian constitution references the country's 1990 Declaration of Independence, which invokes a 1989 decision calling for the "reunification" of Armenia and Karabakh. Yerevan has committed to adopting a new constitution addressing the issue, with drafting expected to conclude in 2026. The process has been complicated by Civil Contract not securing a constitutional majority in the latest parliamentary elections, which is necessary to pass constitutional change through parliament (see EDM, June 22). Given that the pro-Russian parliamentary opposition opposes removing territorial claims from the constitution, the peace process appears deadlocked.
Von der Leyen reiterated the Global Gateway package announced in Baku (see EDM, July 14). She stated that the European Union aimed "to mobilize up to 2 billion euros ($2.29 billion) for strategic transport, energy, and digital projects all across the South Caucasus," with Armenian border-crossing points and road infrastructure among the projects that could benefit (European Commission, July 2). A further 20-million-euro ($22 million) "peace-fostering program" targeting border communities, covering small businesses, farming techniques, and water management was also confirmed for both Armenia and Azerbaijan (European Commission, July 2).
Discussions in Yerevan also concerned measures aimed at reducing Armenia's economic dependence on Russia. Acknowledging that Armenia "is still facing significant economic pressure from Russia--nothing short of economic coercion," von der Leyen announced that Yerevan would "soon receive an additional 18 million euros ($20 million)" to help strengthen and diversify its trade, the final tranche of a 52-million-euro ($59 million) support package first discussed in a phone call with Pashinyan in early June (European Commission, July 2). She went further, unveiling a proposal for Autonomous Trade Measures that would grant duty-free access to roughly 80 percent of Armenian exports to the EU market (OC Media, July 2). On energy, with Armenia still reliant on Russian gas and Rosatom's operation of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, von der Leyen said EU experts would help Yerevan diversify its energy imports, citing the bloc's experience assisting Ukraine and Moldova (Euronews, July 2).
Pashinyan tied his election mandate and reform agenda to a concrete timeline for EU visa liberalization, which he stated should be in place by 2029 (Prime Minister of Armenia, July 2). Von der Leyen called Armenia's progress "impressive," telling Pashinyan "you are on the right track," and confirmed that an EU assessment mission would visit the country in the fall, noting Armenia is currently the only country in an active visa-liberalization process with the bloc (Euronews, July 2).
Pashinyan was careful to signal that deepening EU ties would not mean severing relations with Moscow. When asked about Russian relations following his April 1 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan said, "We have never sought, do not seek, and do not intend to seek to create a crisis in relations with Russia." Armenia, he added, "acts in the interests of our country ... we cannot prioritize the interests of any one partner over those of Armenia" (TASS, July 2).
On the U.S.-led Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) transit project, Pashinyan distinguished Armenia's bilateral track with Washington from the European Union's connectivity role. He underscored that the European Union does not participate in the TRIPP project but views it positively (NEWS.am, July 2). Discussing connectivity, Pashinyan mentioned an alternative Armenian route running from Azerbaijan's Ghazakh district through Armenia's Ijevan, Vanadzor, Gyumri, and Akhurik to the Turkish border. He called this "the simplest way" to build the "shortest route between the East and the West," part of his Crossroads for Peace initiative (NEWS.am, July 2). The statement comes against the backdrop of Russian and Iranian opposition that has complicated the TRIPP project (see EDM, September 11, 24, October 15, 2025, May 19).
Following a high-level event in Brussels on June 23 that launched the Connectivity Platform and Eastern Partnership Investment in Connectivity (EPIC) initiative, Armenia's Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure said it would support preparatory work on the Akhurik-Kayan and Margara-Kayan road corridors, intended to connect Armenia's border crossing points on the east and west, bypassing TRIPP (Report.az, June 24). The initiative has received support from EU representatives seeking to accelerate development of the trans-Armenian branch of the Middle Corridor.
Von der Leyen's July 2026 tour of the South Caucasus demonstrated the European Union's growing role as a political and economic actor in the region (see EDM, July 14). In Azerbaijan, Brussels emphasized energy security, strategic connectivity, and support for the emerging peace agreement. In Armenia, the European Union went further, presenting deeper economic integration, visa liberalization, trade preferences, and financial assistance as tangible rewards for Yerevan's reform agenda and its gradual diversification away from Russian dependence.
The visit highlighted the limits of the European Union's regional strategy. The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process remains stalled, while competing visions of connectivity increasingly shape regional diplomacy. Brussels' support for trans-Armenian transport projects under the Connectivity Platform and EPIC initiative aligns closely with Yerevan's Crossroads for Peace concept, while sitting uneasily with Azerbaijan's preference for opening the Zangezur corridor. Connectivity--rather than merely serving as a tool of regional cooperation--is becoming another arena of geopolitical competition.
The European Union is trying to pursue a dual-track policy--strengthening strategic cooperation with Azerbaijan while advancing Armenia's integration with European structures. Whether Brussels can maintain this balance will depend on its ability to avoid being perceived as favoring one regional agenda over another and to translate political support for peace into practical mechanisms acceptable to both Baku and Yerevan. Von der Leyen's tour underscored both the European Union's expanding influence in the South Caucasus and the fragility of the region's post-conflict order.
* * *
Dr. Vasif Huseynov is a senior fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and Adjunct Lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/european-commission-president-visits-arm/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
European Commission President Visits Armenia
Executive Summary:
* On July 2, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Yerevan as part of her South Caucasus tour, meeting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to discuss the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, EU-Armenia economic integration, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 20, 2026, by Vasif Huseynov, senior fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations and an adjunct lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * European Commission President Visits Armenia Executive Summary: * On July 2, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Yerevan as part of her South Caucasus tour, meeting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to discuss the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, EU-Armenia economic integration,and support against Russian economic coercion.
* Pashinyan said Armenia aims to secure EU visa liberalization by 2029 and reiterated that Yerevan does not seek "to create a crisis" in relations with Russia as it deepens ties with Brussels.
* Regarding the U.S.-led Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), Pashinyan distinguished Armenia's bilateral cooperation with Washington from the European Union's connectivity agenda, underscoring that Brussels views the initiative positively but is not directly involved.
-
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen traveled to Yerevan on July 2 as part of her two-day South Caucasus tour. This was her second visit to the Armenian capital in two months, following the European Political Community summit and the inaugural EU-Armenia Summit in May (see EDM, May 11; Prime Minister of Armenia, July 2). Opening the joint press conference, von der Leyen praised Armenia's democratic progress, congratulating Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on his party's June 7 parliamentary election victory and stating that the vote had "shown, once again, the strength of Armenia's democracy" (European Commission, July 2).
Von der Leyen framed the June 7 election, in which Pashinyan's Civil Contract party won a majority while campaigning partly on deeper EU integration, as a mandate for Armenia's westward orientation (European Commission, July 2). She tied this political framing to the previous day's announcements in Baku, telling Pashinyan that "while Armenia is coming closer to the EU, the South Caucasus is coming closer together," and calling the initialing of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement last August "the most consequential step this region has taken in decades" (European Commission, July 2).
The public portion of the Yerevan talks did not address the key issue preventing the initialed agreement from becoming a signed and ratified peace treaty. Azerbaijan demands that Armenia amend its constitution to remove language that Baku regards as an implicit territorial claim over the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. The current Armenian constitution references the country's 1990 Declaration of Independence, which invokes a 1989 decision calling for the "reunification" of Armenia and Karabakh. Yerevan has committed to adopting a new constitution addressing the issue, with drafting expected to conclude in 2026. The process has been complicated by Civil Contract not securing a constitutional majority in the latest parliamentary elections, which is necessary to pass constitutional change through parliament (see EDM, June 22). Given that the pro-Russian parliamentary opposition opposes removing territorial claims from the constitution, the peace process appears deadlocked.
Von der Leyen reiterated the Global Gateway package announced in Baku (see EDM, July 14). She stated that the European Union aimed "to mobilize up to 2 billion euros ($2.29 billion) for strategic transport, energy, and digital projects all across the South Caucasus," with Armenian border-crossing points and road infrastructure among the projects that could benefit (European Commission, July 2). A further 20-million-euro ($22 million) "peace-fostering program" targeting border communities, covering small businesses, farming techniques, and water management was also confirmed for both Armenia and Azerbaijan (European Commission, July 2).
Discussions in Yerevan also concerned measures aimed at reducing Armenia's economic dependence on Russia. Acknowledging that Armenia "is still facing significant economic pressure from Russia--nothing short of economic coercion," von der Leyen announced that Yerevan would "soon receive an additional 18 million euros ($20 million)" to help strengthen and diversify its trade, the final tranche of a 52-million-euro ($59 million) support package first discussed in a phone call with Pashinyan in early June (European Commission, July 2). She went further, unveiling a proposal for Autonomous Trade Measures that would grant duty-free access to roughly 80 percent of Armenian exports to the EU market (OC Media, July 2). On energy, with Armenia still reliant on Russian gas and Rosatom's operation of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, von der Leyen said EU experts would help Yerevan diversify its energy imports, citing the bloc's experience assisting Ukraine and Moldova (Euronews, July 2).
Pashinyan tied his election mandate and reform agenda to a concrete timeline for EU visa liberalization, which he stated should be in place by 2029 (Prime Minister of Armenia, July 2). Von der Leyen called Armenia's progress "impressive," telling Pashinyan "you are on the right track," and confirmed that an EU assessment mission would visit the country in the fall, noting Armenia is currently the only country in an active visa-liberalization process with the bloc (Euronews, July 2).
Pashinyan was careful to signal that deepening EU ties would not mean severing relations with Moscow. When asked about Russian relations following his April 1 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Pashinyan said, "We have never sought, do not seek, and do not intend to seek to create a crisis in relations with Russia." Armenia, he added, "acts in the interests of our country ... we cannot prioritize the interests of any one partner over those of Armenia" (TASS, July 2).
On the U.S.-led Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) transit project, Pashinyan distinguished Armenia's bilateral track with Washington from the European Union's connectivity role. He underscored that the European Union does not participate in the TRIPP project but views it positively (NEWS.am, July 2). Discussing connectivity, Pashinyan mentioned an alternative Armenian route running from Azerbaijan's Ghazakh district through Armenia's Ijevan, Vanadzor, Gyumri, and Akhurik to the Turkish border. He called this "the simplest way" to build the "shortest route between the East and the West," part of his Crossroads for Peace initiative (NEWS.am, July 2). The statement comes against the backdrop of Russian and Iranian opposition that has complicated the TRIPP project (see EDM, September 11, 24, October 15, 2025, May 19).
Following a high-level event in Brussels on June 23 that launched the Connectivity Platform and Eastern Partnership Investment in Connectivity (EPIC) initiative, Armenia's Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure said it would support preparatory work on the Akhurik-Kayan and Margara-Kayan road corridors, intended to connect Armenia's border crossing points on the east and west, bypassing TRIPP (Report.az, June 24). The initiative has received support from EU representatives seeking to accelerate development of the trans-Armenian branch of the Middle Corridor.
Von der Leyen's July 2026 tour of the South Caucasus demonstrated the European Union's growing role as a political and economic actor in the region (see EDM, July 14). In Azerbaijan, Brussels emphasized energy security, strategic connectivity, and support for the emerging peace agreement. In Armenia, the European Union went further, presenting deeper economic integration, visa liberalization, trade preferences, and financial assistance as tangible rewards for Yerevan's reform agenda and its gradual diversification away from Russian dependence.
The visit highlighted the limits of the European Union's regional strategy. The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process remains stalled, while competing visions of connectivity increasingly shape regional diplomacy. Brussels' support for trans-Armenian transport projects under the Connectivity Platform and EPIC initiative aligns closely with Yerevan's Crossroads for Peace concept, while sitting uneasily with Azerbaijan's preference for opening the Zangezur corridor. Connectivity--rather than merely serving as a tool of regional cooperation--is becoming another arena of geopolitical competition.
The European Union is trying to pursue a dual-track policy--strengthening strategic cooperation with Azerbaijan while advancing Armenia's integration with European structures. Whether Brussels can maintain this balance will depend on its ability to avoid being perceived as favoring one regional agenda over another and to translate political support for peace into practical mechanisms acceptable to both Baku and Yerevan. Von der Leyen's tour underscored both the European Union's expanding influence in the South Caucasus and the fragility of the region's post-conflict order.
* * *
Dr. Vasif Huseynov is a senior fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and Adjunct Lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/european-commission-president-visits-arm/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Use of Artificial Intelligence Lower in Eastern Germany Than in Western Germany
MUNICH, Germany, July 21 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 20, 2026:
* * *
Use of Artificial Intelligence Lower in Eastern Germany Than in Western Germany
The share of companies actively using artificial intelligence (AI) is considerably lower in eastern Germany than in western Germany. That's according to regionalized results from the ifo business surveys. "Although the use of AI also rose sharply in eastern Germany between 2023 and 2026, the share of companies for which AI is 'not an issue' is still higher here than in western Germany," says ifo researcher Robert Lehmann.
More ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, July 21 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 20, 2026: * * * Use of Artificial Intelligence Lower in Eastern Germany Than in Western Germany The share of companies actively using artificial intelligence (AI) is considerably lower in eastern Germany than in western Germany. That's according to regionalized results from the ifo business surveys. "Although the use of AI also rose sharply in eastern Germany between 2023 and 2026, the share of companies for which AI is 'not an issue' is still higher here than in western Germany," says ifo researcher Robert Lehmann. Morethan half of German companies are now actively using AI - in eastern Germany, however, the figure is only just under two-fifths, according to the ifo analysis. That puts the eastern German economy at the same level western Germany was at a year ago.
"This gap is evident across all sectors of the economy and in all eastern German states, and shows that companies are not yet taking full advantage of the opportunities AI presents to boost productivity," comments Joachim Ragnitz, co-author of the study.
"Eastern Germany's structural gap in adopting new technologies is thus also evident when it comes to AI."
In his opinion, whether this gap will narrow in the future depends primarily on smaller and medium-sized enterprises.
* * *
Publication
2026 Article in Journal
Kunstliche Intelligenz in ost- und westdeutschen Unternehmen: Nutzung steigt, Abstand bleibt
Robert Lehmann, Joachim Ragnitz, Marcel Thum
ifo Dresden berichtet, 2026, 33, Nr. 04 vorab
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/article-journal/kunstliche-intelligenz-ost-und-westdeutschen-unternehmen-nutzung)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-20/use-artificial-intelligence-lower-eastern-germany-western-germany
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Use of Artificial Intelligence Lower in Eastern Germany Than in Western Germany
The share of companies actively using artificial intelligence (AI) is considerably lower in eastern Germany than in western Germany. That's according to regionalized results from the ifo business surveys. "Although the use of AI also rose sharply in eastern Germany between 2023 and 2026, the share of companies for which AI is 'not an issue' is still higher here than in western Germany," says ifo researcher Robert Lehmann.
More ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, July 21 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 20, 2026: * * * Use of Artificial Intelligence Lower in Eastern Germany Than in Western Germany The share of companies actively using artificial intelligence (AI) is considerably lower in eastern Germany than in western Germany. That's according to regionalized results from the ifo business surveys. "Although the use of AI also rose sharply in eastern Germany between 2023 and 2026, the share of companies for which AI is 'not an issue' is still higher here than in western Germany," says ifo researcher Robert Lehmann. Morethan half of German companies are now actively using AI - in eastern Germany, however, the figure is only just under two-fifths, according to the ifo analysis. That puts the eastern German economy at the same level western Germany was at a year ago.
"This gap is evident across all sectors of the economy and in all eastern German states, and shows that companies are not yet taking full advantage of the opportunities AI presents to boost productivity," comments Joachim Ragnitz, co-author of the study.
"Eastern Germany's structural gap in adopting new technologies is thus also evident when it comes to AI."
In his opinion, whether this gap will narrow in the future depends primarily on smaller and medium-sized enterprises.
* * *
Publication
2026 Article in Journal
Kunstliche Intelligenz in ost- und westdeutschen Unternehmen: Nutzung steigt, Abstand bleibt
Robert Lehmann, Joachim Ragnitz, Marcel Thum
ifo Dresden berichtet, 2026, 33, Nr. 04 vorab
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/article-journal/kunstliche-intelligenz-ost-und-westdeutschen-unternehmen-nutzung)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-20/use-artificial-intelligence-lower-eastern-germany-western-germany
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Free Press: What the U.S. and Iran Are Fighting Over
WASHINGTON, July 21 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 19, 2026, by Michael Doran, director and senior fellow at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, to the Free Press:
* * *
What the U.S. and Iran Are Fighting Over
The terms of a deal to end the war are being thrashed out in the skies above the Strait of Hormuz.
-
General Ahmad Vahidi has a talent for getting under Donald Trump's skin. "I don't want to deal with them anymore," President Trump recently ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 21 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 19, 2026, by Michael Doran, director and senior fellow at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, to the Free Press: * * * What the U.S. and Iran Are Fighting Over The terms of a deal to end the war are being thrashed out in the skies above the Strait of Hormuz. - General Ahmad Vahidi has a talent for getting under Donald Trump's skin. "I don't want to deal with them anymore," President Trump recentlysaid of the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and his colleagues. "They're scum. They're sick people. . . .As far as I'm concerned, it's over. It's just a waste of time dealing with them."
But of course it isn't over. On Friday, Iranian ballistic missiles and drones slammed into Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, killing two American service members, leaving a third missing, and wounding four others. The IRGC claimed responsibility within hours.
Vahidi launched the attack not simply to answer Trump. He was also sending a message to Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the officials negotiating with Washington. You may sit across the table from the Americans, the strike in Jordan signaled to them, but I am the man really calling the shots.
Vahidi is a die-hard jihadi. For him, men like Ghalibaf and Araghchi have their uses, but they also need to know their place. They serve the Islamic Republic as infidel handlers: officials who translate the demands of the IRGC into language acceptable to Western diplomats. Their proximity to foreign power, however, can breed illusions of their own importance. To remind them who rules, Vahidi occasionally speaks in the language he knows best--violence.
That was also the purpose of the attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz that triggered the latest round of escalation. The IRGC struck ships that transited the waterway without coordinating with it and failed to follow its prescribed routes. These attacks were not mere acts of terrorism. They enforced Vahidi's interpretation of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in mid-June between Trump and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian.
According to Trump's interpretation, the MOU established a 60-day negotiating period during which the United States would suspend its embargo, allowing Iran to resume oil exports. In return, Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and treat it, as before the war, as an international waterway rather than a sovereign asset.
Vahidi never accepted that view. According to his interpretation, Iran had merely agreed to suspend tolls during the negotiations. Commercial shipping would still acknowledge Iranian sovereignty by coordinating with the IRGC and following routes designated by it.
Araghchi and Ghalibaf almost certainly understood this gap. As experienced infidel handlers, they negotiated language that deliberately papered over the competing interpretations. Whether they believed they could eventually persuade Vahidi to accept Trump's understanding or instead hoped to wear down the Americans through prolonged negotiations remains unclear. In either case, the ambiguity was the document's central feature.
President Trump responded to Vahidi's escalation by rescinding the waiver permitting Iranian oil sales, restoring the embargo, and ordering military strikes against IRGC targets. Many pundits therefore declared the MOU dead. Reports of its demise, however, are greatly exaggerated.
Rather than return to major combat operations, Trump has opted for a campaign of calibrated escalation designed to force Vahidi to accept the American definition of the MOU. His strikes have focused on coastal military infrastructure around Bandar Abbas and associated logistics links--such as bridges near Bandar Khamir--seeking to impose enough pain to make the status quo untenable without igniting a wider regional war.
The strategy reflects the same logic that originally informed the MOU. Trump seeks to combine military pressure with economic pressure. Superior American firepower sustains an embargo that Iran cannot indefinitely survive. Access to markets--and eventually to money--becomes the reward for compliance.
The theory is hardly implausible. It comports with the views of Tehran's diplomatic establishment. President Pezeshkian and his allies point to looming water shortages, soaring unemployment, and an economy buckling under sanctions as evidence that the regime cannot afford prolonged war.
But the theory expects Vahidi to place the welfare of Iranian society above the institutional interests of the IRGC.
For decades, many Iran analysts assumed that the Islamic Republic differed fundamentally from, say, Bashar al-Assad's Syria, where no meaningful compact between ruler and ruled existed.
During the Syrian civil war, in every city regime loyalists painted a slogan on the walls: "Assad, or we will burn the country." Recognize Assad as leader, or we will destroy everything. They meant it. With the assistance of the Russians and the IRGC, Assad's forces turned Syrian cities to rubble and drove millions of people from their homes.
Would Vahidi tolerate Syrian levels of devastation inside Iran simply to preserve the IRGC's grip on power? No one can answer with certainty. But Vahidi doubts he will ever face such a drastic choice. Unlike Assad, he possesses powerful tools of dissuasion in the form of missiles and drones.
Trump's ongoing campaign centered on Bandar Abbas, the port city that guards the narrowest point of the Strait of Hormuz, will hurt the IRGC and impose additional economic costs, but it is unlikely to eliminate the drone threat. Iran does not need to mine the Strait of Hormuz continuously or deploy swarms of fast-attack craft to close it. Intermittent drone attacks on commercial shipping are enough to drive insurers from the market and achieve severe disruption.
Nor is shipping the only target. Vahidi recently struck a desalination plant in Kuwait and, with ballistic missiles that are also hard to eradicate, he has now killed American soldiers in Jordan. Vahidi's confidence rests not only on belief in his holy cause but also on military reality. His strategy assumes that the United States cannot eliminate Iran's remaining missile and drone capabilities without launching a regime-change invasion--and that assumption points to a much larger lesson.
The American debate about the war has yet to catch up with battlefield realities. Despite the largest U.S. military buildup in the Middle East since the Iraq War, American and Israeli forces have failed to fully neutralize Iran's ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz or threaten debilitating escalation against Gulf States. Critics cite this outcome as evidence of flawed decision-making. They mistake symptoms for causes.
The resilience of the IRGC's missile and drone forces reveals how profoundly warfare has changed. These are not simply Iranian capabilities. They are increasingly coalition capabilities. Chinese technology and space-based services have become integral to Iran's precision-strike complex, while Russian operational experience and military cooperation continue to shape its evolution. Affordable precision-guided systems, agile unmanned platforms, and hardened underground facilities have eroded the assumptions of American military dominance that shaped strategy after the Cold War. The era in which U.S. airpower could rapidly neutralize a regional adversary at acceptable cost is ending. It is being replaced by a more contested, attritional environment in which weaker states can buy time and impose significant costs.
These battlefield realities are already reshaping American strategy. Washington will increasingly prize allies that possess battle-tested militaries, functioning defense industries, advanced intelligence, and practical experience defeating missiles, drones, and hardened targets. It will prize, above all, allies that help the United States understand and counter the emerging Sino-Russian-Iranian military system. Israel meets those criteria. Very few others do.
Vahidi understands this perfectly. He knows that Trump will seek to remain within predictable limits, applying steadily increasing pressure while avoiding a wider war if possible.
That leaves four plausible outcomes. The least likely is a return to sustained, large-scale combat. More plausible is a prolonged low-level conflict that stretches through the American midterm elections. More plausible still is an accommodation under which Washington effectively accepts a degree of IRGC authority over commercial navigation in the strait.
The most favorable outcome for the United States--and the one on which Trump has currently placed his bets--would see sustained military and economic pressure eventually compel Vahidi to accept the American interpretation of the MOU.
That scenario is why Bandar Abbas has become, for the moment at least, the center of gravity in the conflict. It is the place where two competing visions of regional order collide. Trump is trying to prove that the United States--not the IRGC--sets the rules governing the Gulf's most important waterway. Vahidi is trying to prove the opposite.
The real negotiation, therefore, is about who establishes the political facts that the memorandum will eventually ratify. Vahidi believes he has discovered the limits of American coercion. Trump believes those limits can still be pushed. Until one of them proves the other wrong, every missile strike, drone attack, and American retaliation around Bandar Abbas will be less an abandonment of the MOU than an argument over what it means.
Read in the Free Press (https://www.thefp.com/p/what-the-us-and-iran-are-fighting-michael-doran).
* * *
Michael Doran, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/what-us-iran-are-fighting-over-michael-doran
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
What the U.S. and Iran Are Fighting Over
The terms of a deal to end the war are being thrashed out in the skies above the Strait of Hormuz.
-
General Ahmad Vahidi has a talent for getting under Donald Trump's skin. "I don't want to deal with them anymore," President Trump recently ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 21 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 19, 2026, by Michael Doran, director and senior fellow at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, to the Free Press: * * * What the U.S. and Iran Are Fighting Over The terms of a deal to end the war are being thrashed out in the skies above the Strait of Hormuz. - General Ahmad Vahidi has a talent for getting under Donald Trump's skin. "I don't want to deal with them anymore," President Trump recentlysaid of the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and his colleagues. "They're scum. They're sick people. . . .As far as I'm concerned, it's over. It's just a waste of time dealing with them."
But of course it isn't over. On Friday, Iranian ballistic missiles and drones slammed into Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, killing two American service members, leaving a third missing, and wounding four others. The IRGC claimed responsibility within hours.
Vahidi launched the attack not simply to answer Trump. He was also sending a message to Speaker Mohammad Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the officials negotiating with Washington. You may sit across the table from the Americans, the strike in Jordan signaled to them, but I am the man really calling the shots.
Vahidi is a die-hard jihadi. For him, men like Ghalibaf and Araghchi have their uses, but they also need to know their place. They serve the Islamic Republic as infidel handlers: officials who translate the demands of the IRGC into language acceptable to Western diplomats. Their proximity to foreign power, however, can breed illusions of their own importance. To remind them who rules, Vahidi occasionally speaks in the language he knows best--violence.
That was also the purpose of the attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz that triggered the latest round of escalation. The IRGC struck ships that transited the waterway without coordinating with it and failed to follow its prescribed routes. These attacks were not mere acts of terrorism. They enforced Vahidi's interpretation of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in mid-June between Trump and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian.
According to Trump's interpretation, the MOU established a 60-day negotiating period during which the United States would suspend its embargo, allowing Iran to resume oil exports. In return, Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and treat it, as before the war, as an international waterway rather than a sovereign asset.
Vahidi never accepted that view. According to his interpretation, Iran had merely agreed to suspend tolls during the negotiations. Commercial shipping would still acknowledge Iranian sovereignty by coordinating with the IRGC and following routes designated by it.
Araghchi and Ghalibaf almost certainly understood this gap. As experienced infidel handlers, they negotiated language that deliberately papered over the competing interpretations. Whether they believed they could eventually persuade Vahidi to accept Trump's understanding or instead hoped to wear down the Americans through prolonged negotiations remains unclear. In either case, the ambiguity was the document's central feature.
President Trump responded to Vahidi's escalation by rescinding the waiver permitting Iranian oil sales, restoring the embargo, and ordering military strikes against IRGC targets. Many pundits therefore declared the MOU dead. Reports of its demise, however, are greatly exaggerated.
Rather than return to major combat operations, Trump has opted for a campaign of calibrated escalation designed to force Vahidi to accept the American definition of the MOU. His strikes have focused on coastal military infrastructure around Bandar Abbas and associated logistics links--such as bridges near Bandar Khamir--seeking to impose enough pain to make the status quo untenable without igniting a wider regional war.
The strategy reflects the same logic that originally informed the MOU. Trump seeks to combine military pressure with economic pressure. Superior American firepower sustains an embargo that Iran cannot indefinitely survive. Access to markets--and eventually to money--becomes the reward for compliance.
The theory is hardly implausible. It comports with the views of Tehran's diplomatic establishment. President Pezeshkian and his allies point to looming water shortages, soaring unemployment, and an economy buckling under sanctions as evidence that the regime cannot afford prolonged war.
But the theory expects Vahidi to place the welfare of Iranian society above the institutional interests of the IRGC.
For decades, many Iran analysts assumed that the Islamic Republic differed fundamentally from, say, Bashar al-Assad's Syria, where no meaningful compact between ruler and ruled existed.
During the Syrian civil war, in every city regime loyalists painted a slogan on the walls: "Assad, or we will burn the country." Recognize Assad as leader, or we will destroy everything. They meant it. With the assistance of the Russians and the IRGC, Assad's forces turned Syrian cities to rubble and drove millions of people from their homes.
Would Vahidi tolerate Syrian levels of devastation inside Iran simply to preserve the IRGC's grip on power? No one can answer with certainty. But Vahidi doubts he will ever face such a drastic choice. Unlike Assad, he possesses powerful tools of dissuasion in the form of missiles and drones.
Trump's ongoing campaign centered on Bandar Abbas, the port city that guards the narrowest point of the Strait of Hormuz, will hurt the IRGC and impose additional economic costs, but it is unlikely to eliminate the drone threat. Iran does not need to mine the Strait of Hormuz continuously or deploy swarms of fast-attack craft to close it. Intermittent drone attacks on commercial shipping are enough to drive insurers from the market and achieve severe disruption.
Nor is shipping the only target. Vahidi recently struck a desalination plant in Kuwait and, with ballistic missiles that are also hard to eradicate, he has now killed American soldiers in Jordan. Vahidi's confidence rests not only on belief in his holy cause but also on military reality. His strategy assumes that the United States cannot eliminate Iran's remaining missile and drone capabilities without launching a regime-change invasion--and that assumption points to a much larger lesson.
The American debate about the war has yet to catch up with battlefield realities. Despite the largest U.S. military buildup in the Middle East since the Iraq War, American and Israeli forces have failed to fully neutralize Iran's ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz or threaten debilitating escalation against Gulf States. Critics cite this outcome as evidence of flawed decision-making. They mistake symptoms for causes.
The resilience of the IRGC's missile and drone forces reveals how profoundly warfare has changed. These are not simply Iranian capabilities. They are increasingly coalition capabilities. Chinese technology and space-based services have become integral to Iran's precision-strike complex, while Russian operational experience and military cooperation continue to shape its evolution. Affordable precision-guided systems, agile unmanned platforms, and hardened underground facilities have eroded the assumptions of American military dominance that shaped strategy after the Cold War. The era in which U.S. airpower could rapidly neutralize a regional adversary at acceptable cost is ending. It is being replaced by a more contested, attritional environment in which weaker states can buy time and impose significant costs.
These battlefield realities are already reshaping American strategy. Washington will increasingly prize allies that possess battle-tested militaries, functioning defense industries, advanced intelligence, and practical experience defeating missiles, drones, and hardened targets. It will prize, above all, allies that help the United States understand and counter the emerging Sino-Russian-Iranian military system. Israel meets those criteria. Very few others do.
Vahidi understands this perfectly. He knows that Trump will seek to remain within predictable limits, applying steadily increasing pressure while avoiding a wider war if possible.
That leaves four plausible outcomes. The least likely is a return to sustained, large-scale combat. More plausible is a prolonged low-level conflict that stretches through the American midterm elections. More plausible still is an accommodation under which Washington effectively accepts a degree of IRGC authority over commercial navigation in the strait.
The most favorable outcome for the United States--and the one on which Trump has currently placed his bets--would see sustained military and economic pressure eventually compel Vahidi to accept the American interpretation of the MOU.
That scenario is why Bandar Abbas has become, for the moment at least, the center of gravity in the conflict. It is the place where two competing visions of regional order collide. Trump is trying to prove that the United States--not the IRGC--sets the rules governing the Gulf's most important waterway. Vahidi is trying to prove the opposite.
The real negotiation, therefore, is about who establishes the political facts that the memorandum will eventually ratify. Vahidi believes he has discovered the limits of American coercion. Trump believes those limits can still be pushed. Until one of them proves the other wrong, every missile strike, drone attack, and American retaliation around Bandar Abbas will be less an abandonment of the MOU than an argument over what it means.
Read in the Free Press (https://www.thefp.com/p/what-the-us-and-iran-are-fighting-michael-doran).
* * *
Michael Doran, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/what-us-iran-are-fighting-over-michael-doran
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Ending Forced Labor - Comparing EU and U.S. Approaches
WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 20, 2026, by non-resident senior adviser Samira Rafaela and Kelly Fay Rodriguez, former special representative for International Labor Affairs at the U.S. Department of State:
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Ending Forced Labor: Comparing EU and U.S. Approaches
Forced labor is pervasive in the global economy. In 2022, more than 17.3 million people were exploited by forced labor in the private sector worldwide, and another 3.9 million people were subjected to state-imposed forced labor. As the United States ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 20, 2026, by non-resident senior adviser Samira Rafaela and Kelly Fay Rodriguez, former special representative for International Labor Affairs at the U.S. Department of State: * * *. Ending Forced Labor: Comparing EU and U.S. Approaches Forced labor is pervasive in the global economy. In 2022, more than 17.3 million people were exploited by forced labor in the private sector worldwide, and another 3.9 million people were subjected to state-imposed forced labor. As the United Statesescalates global trade pressure over forced labor, Europe's Forced Labor Regulation (FLR), which entered into force on December 14, 2024, faces a critical test: Will the new regulation achieve its ambition or fall short in practice?
Fully applicable to EU member states in December 2027, the FLR will prohibit the sale of products made with forced labor on the EU market. In doing so, the EU joins the United States in restricting trade linked to forced labor--an approach the U.S. has enshrined in law since the Tariff Act of 1930.
Yet it was not until the last decade that the U.S. government began to finally enforce preexisting legislation, along with new legislative and executive measures. Since the passage of the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), U.S. authorities have detained nearly $3.9 billion in goods made with forced labor. Importantly, the UFLPA shifted the burden of proof onto importers seeking to bring goods made with inputs from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or from designated entities into the U.S. market. That region is where Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities have been subjected to state-imposed forced labor, which has been described by both President Trump and President Biden as a genocide.
Given the scale and systemic nature of forced labor in global supply chains, the European Union and United States--alongside firms and worker organizations--must take coordinated, strategic action to eliminate the risk of forced labor for workers. At the root of the problem is a structural imbalance: Multinational buyers often demand low prices and fast production, pushing risk and cost onto suppliers--and ultimately onto workers. Shein's fast fashion is just one clear example of this dynamic, where the company's timely and strenuous demands on production practically ensures forced labor occurs in the manufacturing of their goods.
The new European FLR is product-based and focuses exclusively on preventing goods produced--in whole or in part--under forced labor conditions from entering into, circulating within, or being exported from the EU market. All companies--irrespective of size, revenue, or location--will be subject to this regulation. Companies must prepare immediately and develop meaningful and proactive due diligence processes and remediation efforts. This must include taking affirmative steps to safeguard freedom of association and labor rights, and engaging trade unions early to ensure effective remediation.
The FLR also has an underappreciated strength: It creates a single, European Union-wide market access rule that can reduce fragmentation across member states and increase leverage with global suppliers. By applying at the border and within the internal market--and by covering exports as well as imports--it can help prevent the rerouting of tainted goods and give companies a clear compliance signal to invest in traceability, supplier engagement, and remediation before enforcement actions begin.
More robust and effective corporate human rights due diligence will help ensure EU FLR enforcement and impact by mitigating existing incentives to resort to forced labor in supply chains. For that reason, effective implementation of the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive will also be critical to reinforce the FLR's impact and focus. If more companies enact effective and comprehensive human rights due diligence in global supply chains, then EU FLR implementing authorities may better prioritize the more reticent or resistant cases where forced labor persists. Indeed, the urgency and widespread scale of forced labor requires action by public and private sector actors alike.
The most significant difference between the EU and U.S. approaches lies in enforcement--and this is where the European Union risks falling short. In the United States, if a petitioner provides evidence amounting to a "reasonable suspicion" that goods were produced through forced labor, it can trigger an investigation by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Upon concluding the investigation, CBP may issue a Withhold Release Order, blocking or detaining the goods at any port of entry until the importer can demonstrate that no forced labor was involved in production. The process, therefore, places the evidentiary burden on the party best positioned to access supply-chain information. In contrast, the European Union requires "substantiated concerns" to initiate an investigation and places the burden on petitioners--primarily civil society advocates--and competent authorities to establish that a good was made with forced labor. This higher threshold may constrain the FLR's effectiveness, particularly where documentation is scarce and supply chains are complex.
Another significant difference between the two approaches relates to state-imposed forced labor. Unlike the U.S. UFLPA, the EU FLR does not create a rebuttable presumption of forced labor for goods from regions associated with state-imposed forced labor, which is a key element of the UFLPA. Instead, the regulation provides for the creation of a database of high-risk areas and products--an important tool, but not a substitute for a presumption when state coercion makes verification exceptionally difficult.
Over the last decade, U.S. trade policy has substantially increased its prioritization of labor issues compared to past trade practices. U.S.-based labor stakeholders have advocated for prior administrations to leverage more effective economic tools to incentivize respect for labor rights and deter abuses, such as violence against workers, union-busting, and forced labor. Last month, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) published a report on investigations into over 60 of the United States' largest trading partners--including the European Union, China, Canada, Mexico, India, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, and Australia--determining that all countries failed to impose or effectively enforce bans on the importation of goods produced with forced labor, which constitutes an unreasonable or discriminatory trade practice that burdens U.S. commerce. While some countries have begun to take steps, USTR has received numerous recommendations to improve implementation and enforcement from stakeholders, including academics, practitioners, and advocates.
The effectiveness of this effort is questionable and the motivations behind the action appear pretextual, because the White House is looking to replace the tariffs that were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court and such forced labor enforcement could be a more legally persuasive justification. In addition, other actions by the administration eliminated federal capacity and proven efforts to combat forced labor, such as canceling over $700,000 in global labor rights grants addressing forced labor overseas in 2025. Nevertheless, these investigations mark the most expansive use of trade law by any country to address labor abuses to date.
Neither the United States nor the European Union adequately centers workers or guarantees meaningful remedies for survivors, though the United States has ensured compensation for survivors in discrete cases. Further, neither model centers on worker organizations or trade unions throughout the process. Meaningful engagement with workers and unions is necessary to ensure respect for labor rights and secure justice for harm suffered.
Robust government enforcement of all these measures is critical. Labor nongovernmental organizations and trade unions play a critical role in effective enforcement, particularly in workplaces governed by collective bargaining agreements or international framework agreements. Independent and democratic labor unions reduce the risk of forced labor in supply chains by improving labor standards and safeguarding workers against abuses, exploitation, and retaliation. In workplaces where unions do not already exist, sectoral or global union federations can serve as critical stakeholders for companies developing risk assessments, mitigation plans, and remedy tools, such as grievance mechanisms across supply chains.
The relatively lower unionization rate in the United States compared to many European countries, coupled with common European practices of industrial relations, should suggest a greater willingness from European governments and private sector actors to engage with trade unions in implementation of the EU FLR. But time will tell. No doubt, global labor union federations representing workers in various sectors across the Global South and North could certainly help strengthen EU FLR implementation efforts by assessing risks and ensuring effective remedies.
Government enforcement must also remain independent and shielded from political influence or undue interference from perpetrators, with safeguards to protect whistleblowers and vulnerable workers. Enforcement authorities must also account for stakeholder power imbalances that make it difficult to document forced labor in many countries worldwide and can undermine effective enforcement.
Civil society and worker organizations also require sustained resources to be able to raise awareness of rights, support credible reporting, and help ensure the law is implemented effectively. Workers, labor organizations, and civil society organizations are often the only trusted actors offering support to victims and workers on raising awareness of rights, gathering documentation, and providing legal advice. Terminated grants previously administered by the U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Department of State sustained nongovernmental organization activities critical for law enforcement, and they also supported partner governments with technical assistance to conduct inspections and compliance activities on the ground. In addition, greater alignment between governments--through shared data, coordinated enforcement, and more consistent standards--would strengthen global efforts to eliminate forced labor and enable training and peer learning on effective practices.
Eliminating forced labor from global supply chains is both achievable and urgent. The EU FLR and U.S. import controls can be mutually reinforcing--but only if enforcement is credible, evidence pathways are workable, and worker voice is integrated into prevention and remediation. If the European Union and United States coordinate implementation and pair trade tools with worker-centered accountability, they have an opportunity to raise expectations across markets and deliver meaningful protections for workers.
* * *
Samira Rafaela is a senior adviser (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., a former Member of the European Parliament, and lead negotiator of the EU Forced Labor Regulation. Kelly Fay Rodriguez is the former Special Representative for International Labor Affairs in the U.S. Department of State.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ending-forced-labor-comparing-eu-and-us-approaches
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *.
Ending Forced Labor: Comparing EU and U.S. Approaches
Forced labor is pervasive in the global economy. In 2022, more than 17.3 million people were exploited by forced labor in the private sector worldwide, and another 3.9 million people were subjected to state-imposed forced labor. As the United States ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 20, 2026, by non-resident senior adviser Samira Rafaela and Kelly Fay Rodriguez, former special representative for International Labor Affairs at the U.S. Department of State: * * *. Ending Forced Labor: Comparing EU and U.S. Approaches Forced labor is pervasive in the global economy. In 2022, more than 17.3 million people were exploited by forced labor in the private sector worldwide, and another 3.9 million people were subjected to state-imposed forced labor. As the United Statesescalates global trade pressure over forced labor, Europe's Forced Labor Regulation (FLR), which entered into force on December 14, 2024, faces a critical test: Will the new regulation achieve its ambition or fall short in practice?
Fully applicable to EU member states in December 2027, the FLR will prohibit the sale of products made with forced labor on the EU market. In doing so, the EU joins the United States in restricting trade linked to forced labor--an approach the U.S. has enshrined in law since the Tariff Act of 1930.
Yet it was not until the last decade that the U.S. government began to finally enforce preexisting legislation, along with new legislative and executive measures. Since the passage of the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), U.S. authorities have detained nearly $3.9 billion in goods made with forced labor. Importantly, the UFLPA shifted the burden of proof onto importers seeking to bring goods made with inputs from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or from designated entities into the U.S. market. That region is where Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities have been subjected to state-imposed forced labor, which has been described by both President Trump and President Biden as a genocide.
Given the scale and systemic nature of forced labor in global supply chains, the European Union and United States--alongside firms and worker organizations--must take coordinated, strategic action to eliminate the risk of forced labor for workers. At the root of the problem is a structural imbalance: Multinational buyers often demand low prices and fast production, pushing risk and cost onto suppliers--and ultimately onto workers. Shein's fast fashion is just one clear example of this dynamic, where the company's timely and strenuous demands on production practically ensures forced labor occurs in the manufacturing of their goods.
The new European FLR is product-based and focuses exclusively on preventing goods produced--in whole or in part--under forced labor conditions from entering into, circulating within, or being exported from the EU market. All companies--irrespective of size, revenue, or location--will be subject to this regulation. Companies must prepare immediately and develop meaningful and proactive due diligence processes and remediation efforts. This must include taking affirmative steps to safeguard freedom of association and labor rights, and engaging trade unions early to ensure effective remediation.
The FLR also has an underappreciated strength: It creates a single, European Union-wide market access rule that can reduce fragmentation across member states and increase leverage with global suppliers. By applying at the border and within the internal market--and by covering exports as well as imports--it can help prevent the rerouting of tainted goods and give companies a clear compliance signal to invest in traceability, supplier engagement, and remediation before enforcement actions begin.
More robust and effective corporate human rights due diligence will help ensure EU FLR enforcement and impact by mitigating existing incentives to resort to forced labor in supply chains. For that reason, effective implementation of the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive will also be critical to reinforce the FLR's impact and focus. If more companies enact effective and comprehensive human rights due diligence in global supply chains, then EU FLR implementing authorities may better prioritize the more reticent or resistant cases where forced labor persists. Indeed, the urgency and widespread scale of forced labor requires action by public and private sector actors alike.
The most significant difference between the EU and U.S. approaches lies in enforcement--and this is where the European Union risks falling short. In the United States, if a petitioner provides evidence amounting to a "reasonable suspicion" that goods were produced through forced labor, it can trigger an investigation by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Upon concluding the investigation, CBP may issue a Withhold Release Order, blocking or detaining the goods at any port of entry until the importer can demonstrate that no forced labor was involved in production. The process, therefore, places the evidentiary burden on the party best positioned to access supply-chain information. In contrast, the European Union requires "substantiated concerns" to initiate an investigation and places the burden on petitioners--primarily civil society advocates--and competent authorities to establish that a good was made with forced labor. This higher threshold may constrain the FLR's effectiveness, particularly where documentation is scarce and supply chains are complex.
Another significant difference between the two approaches relates to state-imposed forced labor. Unlike the U.S. UFLPA, the EU FLR does not create a rebuttable presumption of forced labor for goods from regions associated with state-imposed forced labor, which is a key element of the UFLPA. Instead, the regulation provides for the creation of a database of high-risk areas and products--an important tool, but not a substitute for a presumption when state coercion makes verification exceptionally difficult.
Over the last decade, U.S. trade policy has substantially increased its prioritization of labor issues compared to past trade practices. U.S.-based labor stakeholders have advocated for prior administrations to leverage more effective economic tools to incentivize respect for labor rights and deter abuses, such as violence against workers, union-busting, and forced labor. Last month, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) published a report on investigations into over 60 of the United States' largest trading partners--including the European Union, China, Canada, Mexico, India, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, and Australia--determining that all countries failed to impose or effectively enforce bans on the importation of goods produced with forced labor, which constitutes an unreasonable or discriminatory trade practice that burdens U.S. commerce. While some countries have begun to take steps, USTR has received numerous recommendations to improve implementation and enforcement from stakeholders, including academics, practitioners, and advocates.
The effectiveness of this effort is questionable and the motivations behind the action appear pretextual, because the White House is looking to replace the tariffs that were struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court and such forced labor enforcement could be a more legally persuasive justification. In addition, other actions by the administration eliminated federal capacity and proven efforts to combat forced labor, such as canceling over $700,000 in global labor rights grants addressing forced labor overseas in 2025. Nevertheless, these investigations mark the most expansive use of trade law by any country to address labor abuses to date.
Neither the United States nor the European Union adequately centers workers or guarantees meaningful remedies for survivors, though the United States has ensured compensation for survivors in discrete cases. Further, neither model centers on worker organizations or trade unions throughout the process. Meaningful engagement with workers and unions is necessary to ensure respect for labor rights and secure justice for harm suffered.
Robust government enforcement of all these measures is critical. Labor nongovernmental organizations and trade unions play a critical role in effective enforcement, particularly in workplaces governed by collective bargaining agreements or international framework agreements. Independent and democratic labor unions reduce the risk of forced labor in supply chains by improving labor standards and safeguarding workers against abuses, exploitation, and retaliation. In workplaces where unions do not already exist, sectoral or global union federations can serve as critical stakeholders for companies developing risk assessments, mitigation plans, and remedy tools, such as grievance mechanisms across supply chains.
The relatively lower unionization rate in the United States compared to many European countries, coupled with common European practices of industrial relations, should suggest a greater willingness from European governments and private sector actors to engage with trade unions in implementation of the EU FLR. But time will tell. No doubt, global labor union federations representing workers in various sectors across the Global South and North could certainly help strengthen EU FLR implementation efforts by assessing risks and ensuring effective remedies.
Government enforcement must also remain independent and shielded from political influence or undue interference from perpetrators, with safeguards to protect whistleblowers and vulnerable workers. Enforcement authorities must also account for stakeholder power imbalances that make it difficult to document forced labor in many countries worldwide and can undermine effective enforcement.
Civil society and worker organizations also require sustained resources to be able to raise awareness of rights, support credible reporting, and help ensure the law is implemented effectively. Workers, labor organizations, and civil society organizations are often the only trusted actors offering support to victims and workers on raising awareness of rights, gathering documentation, and providing legal advice. Terminated grants previously administered by the U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Department of State sustained nongovernmental organization activities critical for law enforcement, and they also supported partner governments with technical assistance to conduct inspections and compliance activities on the ground. In addition, greater alignment between governments--through shared data, coordinated enforcement, and more consistent standards--would strengthen global efforts to eliminate forced labor and enable training and peer learning on effective practices.
Eliminating forced labor from global supply chains is both achievable and urgent. The EU FLR and U.S. import controls can be mutually reinforcing--but only if enforcement is credible, evidence pathways are workable, and worker voice is integrated into prevention and remediation. If the European Union and United States coordinate implementation and pair trade tools with worker-centered accountability, they have an opportunity to raise expectations across markets and deliver meaningful protections for workers.
* * *
Samira Rafaela is a senior adviser (non-resident) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., a former Member of the European Parliament, and lead negotiator of the EU Forced Labor Regulation. Kelly Fay Rodriguez is the former Special Representative for International Labor Affairs in the U.S. Department of State.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ending-forced-labor-comparing-eu-and-us-approaches
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: U.S. and Panama Partner to Strengthen Security in Western Hemisphere
WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 20, 2026:
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U.S. and Panama Partner to Strengthen Security in Western Hemisphere
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released the following statement from Joshua Trevino, senior fellow for the Western Hemisphere Initiative, in response to the Department of War's partnership with Panama to protect the Western Hemisphere:
"I congratulate President Trump and Secretary Hegseth on strengthening America's partnerships with liberty-loving nations to secure the Western Hemisphere.
The return ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 20, 2026: * * * U.S. and Panama Partner to Strengthen Security in Western Hemisphere The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released the following statement from Joshua Trevino, senior fellow for the Western Hemisphere Initiative, in response to the Department of War's partnership with Panama to protect the Western Hemisphere: "I congratulate President Trump and Secretary Hegseth on strengthening America's partnerships with liberty-loving nations to secure the Western Hemisphere. The returnof the Jungle Operations Training Course to aeronaval base Cristobal Colon marks an important step toward restoring America's military presence and partnerships in our own hemisphere.
Training alongside our Panamanian hosts will strengthen U.S. combat readiness, deepen regional security cooperation, and help ensure that the Panama Canal remains secure, open, and protected from hostile influence."
Read more about AFPI's work to secure the Western Hemisphere here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/initiative/western-hemisphere-initiative).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/u.s-and-panama-partner-to-strengthen-security-in-western-hemisphere
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
U.S. and Panama Partner to Strengthen Security in Western Hemisphere
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released the following statement from Joshua Trevino, senior fellow for the Western Hemisphere Initiative, in response to the Department of War's partnership with Panama to protect the Western Hemisphere:
"I congratulate President Trump and Secretary Hegseth on strengthening America's partnerships with liberty-loving nations to secure the Western Hemisphere.
The return ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 21 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 20, 2026: * * * U.S. and Panama Partner to Strengthen Security in Western Hemisphere The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released the following statement from Joshua Trevino, senior fellow for the Western Hemisphere Initiative, in response to the Department of War's partnership with Panama to protect the Western Hemisphere: "I congratulate President Trump and Secretary Hegseth on strengthening America's partnerships with liberty-loving nations to secure the Western Hemisphere. The returnof the Jungle Operations Training Course to aeronaval base Cristobal Colon marks an important step toward restoring America's military presence and partnerships in our own hemisphere.
Training alongside our Panamanian hosts will strengthen U.S. combat readiness, deepen regional security cooperation, and help ensure that the Panama Canal remains secure, open, and protected from hostile influence."
Read more about AFPI's work to secure the Western Hemisphere here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/initiative/western-hemisphere-initiative).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/u.s-and-panama-partner-to-strengthen-security-in-western-hemisphere
[Category: ThinkTank]