Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
Think Tanks
Featured Stories
How USAID cuts are devastating HIV services in Uganda
BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 9 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Institute of Development Studies, an organization that conducts research, learning and teaching that aims to transform the knowledge, action and leadership needed for equitable and sustainable development globally, posted the following news:
* * *
How USAID cuts are devastating HIV services in Uganda
*
The sudden collapse of USAID in 2025 sent shockwaves through Uganda's HIV response and the people hardest hit are those the system was already failing.
Listen to this episode on your favourite podcast provider:
Acast | Spotify | Apple ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 9 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Institute of Development Studies, an organization that conducts research, learning and teaching that aims to transform the knowledge, action and leadership needed for equitable and sustainable development globally, posted the following news: * * * How USAID cuts are devastating HIV services in Uganda * The sudden collapse of USAID in 2025 sent shockwaves through Uganda's HIV response and the people hardest hit are those the system was already failing. Listen to this episode on your favourite podcast provider: Acast | Spotify | Apple| YouTube | Soundcloud
When Elon Musk bragged on social media that "USAID had been put through the woodchipper", the consequences for millions of people living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa were immediate - and potentially irreversible.
That is the warning from researchers and community advocates speaking on the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Between the Lines podcast. With an estimated loss in funding of over US$300 million, and while a new US$2.3 billion five-year health cooperation agreement was signed in December 2025, the abrupt reductions have severely impacted health services.
In the new podcast episode, Chris Stevenson, International Editor at the Independent, Megan Schmidt-Sane, Research Fellow at IDS, and Kyomya Macklean, Executive Director of the Alliance of Women Advocating for Change (AWAC) in Uganda examine what the impacts have been on community-based HIV services and vulnerable communities.
#Listen now
A system built on trust now in freefall, Uganda was long considered a gold standard in global HIV care. Decades of internationally funded work had established free clinics, peer outreach networks, community-based support, and medication access for some of the country's most marginalised populations -sex workers, LGBTQ+ people, and men who inject drugs.
Megan Schmidt-Sane says, "You could walk in, get your counselling for free, medication refills for free. That showed up in the gains Uganda had in reducing new HIV infections and keeping people on treatment. That progress is now in serious jeopardy."
The moment aid cuts were announced, chaos followed. HIV service providers were forced into impossible choices: fund antiretroviral medication keeping people alive, or fund the community outreach work home deliveries, peer support, trust-building that ensures people actually stay on treatment. Most cut the community side. The results have been devastating.
Megan Schmidt-Sane continues, "We've heard reports of young men sharing pills with their colleagues because they're not sure about getting refills. In the worst cases, they're skipping doses, making decisions based on uncertainty. That will have implications we'll see for years to come."
AWAC, which previously served over 11,000 female sex worker clients through its drop-in clinic, now struggles to reach even 15 a month with health services. Kyomya Macklean says, "It's sometimes very painful when I share this. funding really lifted grassroots communities. It gave us hope, courage, inspiration -even when you're living with HIV, you could still set your goals, give birth to children who are safe. Then all of a sudden, that ladder just drops."
#Bilateral deals leave the most vulnerable behind
The Trump administration's shift to government-to-government bilateral agreements has compounded the crisis for marginalised groups. Unlike the previous funding model which could flow directly to community organisations, the new approach explicitly excludes civil society groups working with sex workers, LGBTQ+ communities, and people who use drugs.
For organisations that have spent years building trust with communities that fear and avoid government health facilities due to criminalisation, stigma, and discrimination this is not a bureaucratic inconvenience. It is an existential threat.
In Uganda, sex work is criminalised. LGBTQ+ people face the Anti-Homosexuality Act. Walking into a government clinic carries real legal risk. The community organisations now being defunded were the bridge between these populations and life-saving care. Without them, people are disappearing underground.
#Innovation in the face of abandonment
Rather than wait to be rescued, community organisations are creating their own solutions establishing "community circles," pooling resources, and even planning community-run health facilities in partnership with other affected organisations.
This self-reliance is born of necessity, not choice. But it carries a powerful message to donors, governments, and researchers: community-led innovation works and it deserves investment, not charity.
As Kyomya Macklean powerfully states: "Nothing about us without us." Meaningful, equitable partnerships not top-down aid models are what will sustain HIV responses long-term. Communities must be at the table as partners, not recipients.
#About the Between the Lines podcast
This podcast series explores ground-breaking ideas in development for positive social and environmental change. Each month we feature an interview with an expert in international development who will talk about their latest research and ideas.
Episodes content could feature authors of new books, IDS research or interviews with special guest stars.
The discussions give an insight on the themes covered, exploring the challenges and discoveries, and why the issues matter for progressive and sustainable development globally.
Send your comments and episode suggestions to betweenthelines@ids.ac.uk
***
Original text here: https://www.ids.ac.uk/news/how-usaid-cuts-are-devastating-hiv-services-in-uganda/
* * *
How USAID cuts are devastating HIV services in Uganda
*
The sudden collapse of USAID in 2025 sent shockwaves through Uganda's HIV response and the people hardest hit are those the system was already failing.
Listen to this episode on your favourite podcast provider:
Acast | Spotify | Apple ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 9 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Institute of Development Studies, an organization that conducts research, learning and teaching that aims to transform the knowledge, action and leadership needed for equitable and sustainable development globally, posted the following news: * * * How USAID cuts are devastating HIV services in Uganda * The sudden collapse of USAID in 2025 sent shockwaves through Uganda's HIV response and the people hardest hit are those the system was already failing. Listen to this episode on your favourite podcast provider: Acast | Spotify | Apple| YouTube | Soundcloud
When Elon Musk bragged on social media that "USAID had been put through the woodchipper", the consequences for millions of people living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa were immediate - and potentially irreversible.
That is the warning from researchers and community advocates speaking on the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Between the Lines podcast. With an estimated loss in funding of over US$300 million, and while a new US$2.3 billion five-year health cooperation agreement was signed in December 2025, the abrupt reductions have severely impacted health services.
In the new podcast episode, Chris Stevenson, International Editor at the Independent, Megan Schmidt-Sane, Research Fellow at IDS, and Kyomya Macklean, Executive Director of the Alliance of Women Advocating for Change (AWAC) in Uganda examine what the impacts have been on community-based HIV services and vulnerable communities.
#Listen now
A system built on trust now in freefall, Uganda was long considered a gold standard in global HIV care. Decades of internationally funded work had established free clinics, peer outreach networks, community-based support, and medication access for some of the country's most marginalised populations -sex workers, LGBTQ+ people, and men who inject drugs.
Megan Schmidt-Sane says, "You could walk in, get your counselling for free, medication refills for free. That showed up in the gains Uganda had in reducing new HIV infections and keeping people on treatment. That progress is now in serious jeopardy."
The moment aid cuts were announced, chaos followed. HIV service providers were forced into impossible choices: fund antiretroviral medication keeping people alive, or fund the community outreach work home deliveries, peer support, trust-building that ensures people actually stay on treatment. Most cut the community side. The results have been devastating.
Megan Schmidt-Sane continues, "We've heard reports of young men sharing pills with their colleagues because they're not sure about getting refills. In the worst cases, they're skipping doses, making decisions based on uncertainty. That will have implications we'll see for years to come."
AWAC, which previously served over 11,000 female sex worker clients through its drop-in clinic, now struggles to reach even 15 a month with health services. Kyomya Macklean says, "It's sometimes very painful when I share this. funding really lifted grassroots communities. It gave us hope, courage, inspiration -even when you're living with HIV, you could still set your goals, give birth to children who are safe. Then all of a sudden, that ladder just drops."
#Bilateral deals leave the most vulnerable behind
The Trump administration's shift to government-to-government bilateral agreements has compounded the crisis for marginalised groups. Unlike the previous funding model which could flow directly to community organisations, the new approach explicitly excludes civil society groups working with sex workers, LGBTQ+ communities, and people who use drugs.
For organisations that have spent years building trust with communities that fear and avoid government health facilities due to criminalisation, stigma, and discrimination this is not a bureaucratic inconvenience. It is an existential threat.
In Uganda, sex work is criminalised. LGBTQ+ people face the Anti-Homosexuality Act. Walking into a government clinic carries real legal risk. The community organisations now being defunded were the bridge between these populations and life-saving care. Without them, people are disappearing underground.
#Innovation in the face of abandonment
Rather than wait to be rescued, community organisations are creating their own solutions establishing "community circles," pooling resources, and even planning community-run health facilities in partnership with other affected organisations.
This self-reliance is born of necessity, not choice. But it carries a powerful message to donors, governments, and researchers: community-led innovation works and it deserves investment, not charity.
As Kyomya Macklean powerfully states: "Nothing about us without us." Meaningful, equitable partnerships not top-down aid models are what will sustain HIV responses long-term. Communities must be at the table as partners, not recipients.
#About the Between the Lines podcast
This podcast series explores ground-breaking ideas in development for positive social and environmental change. Each month we feature an interview with an expert in international development who will talk about their latest research and ideas.
Episodes content could feature authors of new books, IDS research or interviews with special guest stars.
The discussions give an insight on the themes covered, exploring the challenges and discoveries, and why the issues matter for progressive and sustainable development globally.
Send your comments and episode suggestions to betweenthelines@ids.ac.uk
***
Original text here: https://www.ids.ac.uk/news/how-usaid-cuts-are-devastating-hiv-services-in-uganda/
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: Mamdani Charges Ahead With Another Careless Promise - Unfunded NYC 2-K
NEW YORK, Oct. 7 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary:
* * *
Mamdani Charges Ahead With Another Careless Promise: Unfunded NYC 2-K
By Liena Zagare, John Ketcham
New York Post
October 5th, 2026
As Mayor Mamdani touts progress in expanding "free" childcare, the bills for his socialist ambitions keep growing.
He hasn't come up with a plan to pay for it all -- other than, of course, betting that Albany will let him hike taxes.
Look at childcare: The city's pre-K and 3-K programs run partly through private providers who say the city pays them less than the ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Oct. 7 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary: * * * Mamdani Charges Ahead With Another Careless Promise: Unfunded NYC 2-K By Liena Zagare, John Ketcham New York Post October 5th, 2026 As Mayor Mamdani touts progress in expanding "free" childcare, the bills for his socialist ambitions keep growing. He hasn't come up with a plan to pay for it all -- other than, of course, betting that Albany will let him hike taxes. Look at childcare: The city's pre-K and 3-K programs run partly through private providers who say the city pays them less than thework costs.
One Brooklyn preschool owner told Intelligencer this week that her last contract funded assistant teachers at $30,000, with no health insurance.
According to the city comptroller's 2024 review, 90% of certified lead childcare teachers with master's degrees and at least a year of experience earned less than Department of Education peers.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/10/05/opinion/mamdani-charges-ahead-with-another-careless-promise-unfunded-nyc-2-k)
* * *
John Ketcham is a legal policy fellow and director of Cities at the Manhattan Institute. Liena Zagare is a legal policy fellow and director of Cities at the Manhattan Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/mamdani-charges-ahead-with-another-careless-promise-unfunded-nyc-2-k
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Mamdani Charges Ahead With Another Careless Promise: Unfunded NYC 2-K
By Liena Zagare, John Ketcham
New York Post
October 5th, 2026
As Mayor Mamdani touts progress in expanding "free" childcare, the bills for his socialist ambitions keep growing.
He hasn't come up with a plan to pay for it all -- other than, of course, betting that Albany will let him hike taxes.
Look at childcare: The city's pre-K and 3-K programs run partly through private providers who say the city pays them less than the ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Oct. 7 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary: * * * Mamdani Charges Ahead With Another Careless Promise: Unfunded NYC 2-K By Liena Zagare, John Ketcham New York Post October 5th, 2026 As Mayor Mamdani touts progress in expanding "free" childcare, the bills for his socialist ambitions keep growing. He hasn't come up with a plan to pay for it all -- other than, of course, betting that Albany will let him hike taxes. Look at childcare: The city's pre-K and 3-K programs run partly through private providers who say the city pays them less than thework costs.
One Brooklyn preschool owner told Intelligencer this week that her last contract funded assistant teachers at $30,000, with no health insurance.
According to the city comptroller's 2024 review, 90% of certified lead childcare teachers with master's degrees and at least a year of experience earned less than Department of Education peers.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/10/05/opinion/mamdani-charges-ahead-with-another-careless-promise-unfunded-nyc-2-k)
* * *
John Ketcham is a legal policy fellow and director of Cities at the Manhattan Institute. Liena Zagare is a legal policy fellow and director of Cities at the Manhattan Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/mamdani-charges-ahead-with-another-careless-promise-unfunded-nyc-2-k
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: PRC and Russia Deepen Biosecurity Integration
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 6, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief:
* * *
The PRC and Russia Deepen Biosecurity Integration
Matthew Johnson
Executive Summary:
* The unexplained death of an employee at Russia's Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute has exposed an unusual gap between extensive bilateral preparedness and public communication. Russian authorities quarantined a hospital, identified nearly 200 contacts, and dispatched Rospotrebnadzor chief Anna Popova after the employee reportedly became ill following a September 25 laboratory ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 6, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief: * * * The PRC and Russia Deepen Biosecurity Integration Matthew Johnson Executive Summary: * The unexplained death of an employee at Russia's Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute has exposed an unusual gap between extensive bilateral preparedness and public communication. Russian authorities quarantined a hospital, identified nearly 200 contacts, and dispatched Rospotrebnadzor chief Anna Popova after the employee reportedly became ill following a September 25 laboratoryincident.
* Beijing issued no public warning or travel advisory. The silence follows an unusually intensive period of bilateral preparation for precisely this type of event. In August, more than 300 personnel from the People's Republic of China (PRC) joined Russian specialists--including Irkutsk institute director Sergey Balakhonov and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Northern Theater Command Disease Control Center--in an exercise rehearsing imported plague, pathogen identification, epidemic notification, joint risk assessment, and cross-border response; on September 29, bilateral health officials again met to discuss infectious disease prevention and disaster medicine.
* The PRC and Russia have built increasingly institutionalized mechanisms for biological security, pathogen research, and epidemic early warning under direct political guidance from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Since 2021, leader-level agreements and the PRC-Russia premiers' mechanism have expanded cooperation from laboratory testing and epidemiological research into border quarantine, biological security early warning, joint emergency exercises, cross-border epidemic control, and regular coordination among the PRC's disease control and customs agencies and Russia's Rospotrebnadzor.
* The resulting system is ambiguously civilian and military and is spreading beyond the bilateral relationship. Irkutsk combines a Soviet-era history of biological warfare (BW)-adjacent research with post-Soviet plague genetics cooperation involving the PLA-directed State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity; broader cooperation now encompasses PLA and Russian military medicine, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) exercises, Belarusian Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) biological-defense activity and PRC-Belarus infectious disease research, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) mechanisms extending surveillance, joint research, and epidemic warning into Central Asia.
-
Russian authorities have mounted an unusually large containment operation around the death of an employee of the Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute while issuing shifting accounts of the underlying event. According to Russian local reporting, 28-year-old Daria Shipilova was allegedly exposed while working with Yersinia pestis on September 25, developed severe pneumonia, and died in Shelekhov on October. The alleged laboratory exposure has not been officially confirmed (Euronews, October 4). The Shelekhov district hospital had already entered quarantine on October 1, and on October 2 an extraordinary regional sanitary and anti-epidemic commission met with Anna Popova, chief of federal public health agency Rospotrebnadzor; 197 possible contacts were subsequently identified and 189 reportedly placed in medical facilities for observation and treatment (Shelekhov District Administration; IRK.ru, October 2).
Russian public messaging then diverged sharply: the head of the neighboring Republic of Buryatia initially linked the death to plague; authorities in nearby Baikalsk briefly urged residents not to travel to Shelekhov before deleting the warning; and on October 4 Rospotrebnadzor said the employee had died from "pneumonia of unknown etiology," that expanded testing found no microorganism connected to her professional work, and that no pathogenic microorganism incident had occurred at the institute (The Moscow Times, October 2; Euronews; Interfax, October 4). The incident would ordinarily be expected to register quickly with Beijing because Irkutsk is directly connected to multiple cities in the People's Republic of China (PRC) by air. Yet as of October 4, Beijing had issued no public health warning or Russia-related travel advisory, the Chinese consulate in Irkutsk listed no new epidemic notice, and ordinary connectivity continued, with Irkutsk reporting on October 2 that as many as six flights a day continued to link the city with Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Manzhouli, and Harbin (PRC Consulate General in Irkutsk, accessed October 4; IRK.ru, October 2).
Beijing's silence is particularly incongruous because the incident occurred during the late summer and early autumn plague surveillance season along the PRC's northern border, when disease control authorities routinely intensify monitoring of rodent populations and vectors, alongside health screening of incoming passengers. In 2026, those seasonal measures coincided with an unusually large expansion of PRC-Russia cross-border infectious disease exercises, even as travel and tourism between the two sides accelerated. Moscow and Beijing held the first stage of their first joint exercises responding to infectious threats in Khabarovsk on June 9-11, followed on August 24-27 by a second, much larger exercise in Fuyuan, Heilongjiang, where more than 300 PRC personnel rehearsed an unknown tick-borne "Disease X", an imported plague outbreak, epidemic notification, joint risk assessment, and coordinated control measures. Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute director Sergey Balakhonov participated personally in the August exercise, while the PRC contingent included the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Northern Theater Command Disease Control Center (Rospotrebnadzor, August 26; Fuyuan Municipal Media Center; Heilongjiang Daily, August 27). From August 24 through September 10, PRC disease control authorities separately conducted rodent and ectoparasite surveillance along the Russia-facing Manzhouli border, a citywide plague response exercise, and a National Disease Control and Prevention Administration inspection of health declarations, temperature screening, vector monitoring, plague surveillance, epidemic early warning, emergency stocks, and information exchange with Russia (Manzhouli Municipal Health Commission, September 1; September 10; September 14).
On September 29--four days after Shipilova's alleged exposure and around the time she was reportedly hospitalized--the 26th PRC-Russia Health Cooperation Subcommittee met with the PRC's National Disease Control and Prevention Administration and CDC present and discussed infectious disease prevention and disaster medicine, but the meeting's public readout made no reference to events in Irkutsk (PRC National Health Commission, September 30). Meanwhile, PRC officials and businesses were actively promoting greater movement through the same region: the PRC consulate hosted Irkutsk governor Igor Kobzev at its September 28 National Day reception, representatives of 11 leading PRC tourism companies toured Irkutsk, Buryatia, and Primorye and signed new cooperation agreements, and on October 2 Irkutsk customs reported that PRC-bound passenger traffic had risen more than 35 percent year-on-year (PRC Consulate General in Irkutsk, September 30; IRK.ru, October 1; October 2). Against that backdrop, the absence of any public PRC reference to the suspected incident at a Russian institution that had participated in bilateral biosecurity exercises only a month earlier is conspicuous.
The Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute itself illustrates the persistent ambiguity--and accompanying secrecy--between civilian disease control and military biosecurity that characterizes PRC-Russia cooperation in this field. During the Soviet period, Irkutsk formed part of the Ministry of Health anti-plague system that was incorporated into the biological warfare defense program known as "Problem 5"; more contemporary histories assess Irkutsk as involved in that program to some degree, while noting that it lacked the direct institutional relationships with core Biopreparat facilities documented for other anti-plague institutes (Alibek and Handelman, 1999; Zilinskas, 2006; Zilinskas and Mauger 2018). [1] Its director from 1957-1964, Igor Domaradskij, simultaneously established working contacts with public health authorities in the PRC, Mongolia, and Vietnam and led research on high-risk pathogens and the biochemistry and pathogenesis of plague, before later becoming a senior figure in the secret structure directing Biopreparat's offensive biological weapons work (Carleton J. Phillips et al., 2009; Zilinskas, 2006). [2] Former Biopreparat deputy director Ken Alibek (also known as Kanatjan Alibekov) subsequently alleged that Irkutsk was among the Soviet Ministry of Health anti-plague complexes given special funding for "weapons-oriented genetic research" (Alibek and Handelman, 1999).[3] PRC participation became more directly military-linked in the post-Soviet period: in 2008, Irkutsk researchers including Balakhonov coauthored a molecular genetic study of 125 Yersinia pestis strains from the PRC, the former Soviet Union, and Mongolia with Ruifu Yang and other researchers from Beijing's State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, whose publications identify it as part of the PLA Academy of Military Medical Sciences (Cui Yujun et al., July 9, 2008; Hanping Yan et al., August 2008). [4]
The resulting mixture of civilian epidemiology, dangerous pathogen research, military medicine, biological defense, and cross-border pathogen and vector surveillance is not peculiar to Irkutsk, but increasingly characteristic of the wider architecture of PRC-Russia biosecurity cooperation.
From Leader-Level Directives to Operational Coordination
General Secretary Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin have progressively expanded biological security cooperation from infectious disease preparedness into a broader bilateral security and cross-border response agenda. In their June 28, 2021 joint statement marking the 20th anniversary of the PRC-Russia Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, the two leaders called for expanded cooperation on infectious disease early warning and response, pharmaceuticals, diagnostic reagents, and vaccines (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], June 28, 2021). On February 4, 2022, Xi and Putin called for a border region joint prevention and control mechanism covering epidemic control, information sharing, and border infrastructure, while separately declaring that alleged U.S. and allied "military-biological activities" posed a serious threat to the national security of both the PRC and Russia (MFA, February 4, 2022). Their May 16, 2024 joint statement went further, calling for cooperation on infectious disease prevention, domestic and cross-border transmission, and "biological disaster early warning and response" , while stressing cooperation in the PRC-Russia border region and protection of each country's sovereignty in the biological sphere (MFA, May 16, 2024). By May 21, 2026, the two leaders were explicitly directing their disease control authorities to expand cooperation on "biological security, infectious disease prevention and control, and cross-border transmission", while also endorsing continuing cooperation in disaster medicine and related medical research (MFA, May 21).
Xi and Putin's instructions have been translated into increasingly specific work programs through premier-level meetings and subordinate health cooperation structures. In December 2020, the 25th such regular meeting called for joint vaccine research, infectious disease information exchange at the border, and a bilateral emergency exercise responding to an infectious disease outbreak in 2021 (MFA, December 3, 2020). The communique from the mechanism's 26th meeting a year later expanded this agenda to laboratory testing, epidemiological research, border health quarantine, epidemic information exchange, laboratory networks, research bases, and "biological security early warning and emergency response control systems", while assigning cooperation to the PRC's National Disease Control and Prevention Administration and Russia's Rospotrebnadzor (MFA, December 1, 2021). In December 2022, Li Keqiang and Mikhail Mishustin's governments called for specialized disaster medicine exercises in the PRC and Russia, new interagency agreements between the two disease control systems, and a joint action plan between PRC Customs and Rospotrebnadzor covering border epidemic control and information exchange (MFA, December 2022). By August 2024 and November 2025, the premiers' communiques were calling respectively for joint operations to identify and eliminate sources of epidemic disease and for regular practical disaster medicine exercises, stronger cooperation among the PRC's National Disease Control and Prevention Administration, General Administration of Customs, and Rospotrebnadzor, and deeper coordination on pandemic preparedness and biological security (MFA, August 22, 2024, November 4, 2025).
These arrangements rest on a longer-running network of joint pathogen research, field surveillance, and cross-border warning procedures. Beyond the July 2008 collaboration between researchers from the PLA-affiliated State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity and those in Irkutsk, in June 2014, Rospotrebnadzor's Amur regional directorate and the PRC's Heihe health inspection and quarantine authorities signed a 2014-2018 program for joint study of rodents and ticks carrying infectious agents along the two countries' shared border. By 2015 they had also agreed on a unified procedure for responding when an infectious patient was detected at a border crossing, and by 2018 were discussing continued joint pathogen surveillance and comparative monitoring of influenza viruses in migratory birds (Rospotrebnadzor Amur Directorate, June 30, 2014, July 20, 2015, January 12, 2018). In December 2022, the PRC's Center for Disease Control (CDC) and its State Key Laboratory for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control convened PRC, Russian, Mongolian, and Kazakh specialists to plan joint investigation of the Altai Mountain natural plague; Balakhonov presented Russia's surveillance work; and participants discussed joint plague research, risk assessment, and a cross-border prevention and control mechanism (China CDC, December 15, 2022).
Military and Regional Biosecurity Networks Expand
The PRC and Russia have also developed a bilateral military channel for epidemic control, military medicine, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) preparedness alongside their civilian public health cooperation. On April 9, 2020, Russia's S.M. Kirov Military Medical Academy and the PLA Military Medical University held a dedicated teleconference on infectious diseases involving Russian military scientists, hospital chiefs, infectious disease specialists, epidemiologists, and PRC military doctors who had worked in Wuhan; the agenda included epidemiology, virology, clinical laboratory diagnosis, treatment of severe disease, and measures to prevent the introduction and spread of COVID-19 infection within military units (S.M. Kirov Military Medical Academy, April 10, 2020). In May 2020, with Central Military Commission approval, the PLA provided epidemic control supplies directly to the Russian armed forces, while the PRC Ministry of National Defense (MND) later described high-level exchanges, epidemic control, and joint exercises as three major components of PRC-Russia military cooperation during the year (MND, May 25, 2020, December 31, 2020). The PRC and Russia have also trained together in Russia's International Army Games "Safe Environment" nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance competition, and in 2019, Russian NBC troops used PRC reconnaissance vehicles and detection equipment in the PRC after PRC chemical defense troops had taken the same class of equipment to Russia the previous year (MND, August 13, 2019). Most recently, during the August 2026 Fuyuan cross-border exercise, the PLA Northern Theater Command Disease Control Center, PRC civilian disease control agencies, and Russian public health experts rehearsed responding to an unknown "tick-borne 'Disease X'", imported bubonic plague, metagenomic identification of an unknown pathogen, specimen transport, decontamination, and bilateral risk assessment (Heilongjiang Daily, August 27).
Beijing has also gained exposure to Russia's military biological response practices through multilateral exercises and third-party security relationships, particularly in Belarus. At the August 2022 meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) defense ministers, Russia proposed that the planned Peace Mission-2023 exercise include prevention of terrorist attacks using chemical and biological weapons, though the proposed exercise does not appear to have been held (SCO, August 26, 2022). In September 2023, Belarus hosted the first "Barrier-2023" exercise of the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) new joint radiation, chemical, and biological defense and medical support formation, which rehearsed biological reconnaissance, collection and laboratory transfer of samples, examination and evacuation of exposed personnel, deployment of a special treatment center, and elimination and decontamination of a biological threat site. The same CSTO notice stated that the PRC, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Mongolia had been invited as observers to the Belarus exercise, which also tested the ability of the new radiation, chemical, and biological (RCB) defense and medical teams to respond to the rapid spread of dangerous infectious diseases (CSTO, August 28, 2023). Belarus appears to be developing a similar pattern, with military and biosecurity cooperation with the PRC deepening against the backdrop of Minsk's continued integration into Russia-led CSTO biological defense structures. In August 2026, PRC and Belarusian airborne forces conducted the fourth "Swift Eagle" joint training exercise, using mixed formations and joint command procedures (MND, August 25). In parallel, the PRC Academy of Agricultural Sciences' Shanghai Veterinary Research Institute and Belarus's S.N. Vyshelessky Institute of Experimental Veterinary Medicine established the PRC-Belarus Joint Laboratory for Animal Disease Prevention and Control in May 2025, with research covering rapid diagnostics for major and emerging infectious diseases, vaccine development, and mechanisms for blocking cross-border disease transmission (Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, May 21, 2025).
The PRC-Russia biosecurity relationship is increasingly embedded in wider regional mechanisms that extend epidemic surveillance, research, and response outward through the SCO and overlapping bilateral partnerships. In June 2018, SCO heads of state called for reliable infectious disease information exchange, mobile anti-epidemic groups, stronger national laboratories, new research centers, joint research projects, and coordinated responses to major outbreaks; the November 2020 Moscow Declaration subsequently called for a multilateral mechanism for exchanging signs of infectious disease outbreaks, closer cooperation among research centers, joint development of diagnostics and preventive measures, and an Uzbekistan-proposed permanent SCO platform for responding to cross-border dangerous infections (SCO, June 10, 2018, November 10, 2020). By 2022-2023, the organization had added a Comprehensive Plan of Joint Measures to Counter Epidemic Threats, a Roadmap for Cooperation Between Medical Institutions on Preventing and Treating Infectious Diseases, a formal epidemiological information program, and regular meetings of national health and epidemiological services, while the PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly backed stronger Biological Weapons Convention mechanisms (MFA, July 29, 2022; SCO, October 26, 2023). The PRC has simultaneously built bilateral biosecurity cooperation with Kazakhstan: Xi Jinping and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev agreed in May 2023 to joint biological research and sharing of research results, and their July 2024 statement recorded continuing interagency biosecurity consultations, joint scientific projects, and support for Kazakhstan's proposal for an international biological security agency (MFA, May 17, 2023, July 3, 2024). Military cooperation has begun to expand through the same concentric structure: the MND states that SCO militaries have institutionalized exchanges in military medicine, and in May 2025 the PRC hosted the first SCO Military Medicine Seminar in Xi'an with military health chiefs and experts from Russia and other participating states (MND, July 15, 2024, May 13, 2025).
Conclusion
The Irkutsk episode highlights the gap between the depth of PRC-Russia biosecurity coordination and the opacity surrounding how that coordination functions in practice. As these mechanisms extend through Belarus, the SCO, and Central Asia, they are beginning to form a wider regional architecture for surveillance, research, preparedness, and response. If this trajectory continues, that architecture is likely to develop alongside rather than fully integrate with existing international biosecurity regimes, carrying forward the information-sharing and coordination gaps exposed by the Irkutsk episode and complicating global pandemic monitoring and other countries' biosecurity preparedness.
* * *
Dr. Matthew Johnson is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation. He specializes in China's contemporary elite politics, strategic thinking, technology policy, and political control over the financial sector and private economy.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/the-prc-and-russia-deepen-biosecurity-integration/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
The PRC and Russia Deepen Biosecurity Integration
Matthew Johnson
Executive Summary:
* The unexplained death of an employee at Russia's Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute has exposed an unusual gap between extensive bilateral preparedness and public communication. Russian authorities quarantined a hospital, identified nearly 200 contacts, and dispatched Rospotrebnadzor chief Anna Popova after the employee reportedly became ill following a September 25 laboratory ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 6, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief: * * * The PRC and Russia Deepen Biosecurity Integration Matthew Johnson Executive Summary: * The unexplained death of an employee at Russia's Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute has exposed an unusual gap between extensive bilateral preparedness and public communication. Russian authorities quarantined a hospital, identified nearly 200 contacts, and dispatched Rospotrebnadzor chief Anna Popova after the employee reportedly became ill following a September 25 laboratoryincident.
* Beijing issued no public warning or travel advisory. The silence follows an unusually intensive period of bilateral preparation for precisely this type of event. In August, more than 300 personnel from the People's Republic of China (PRC) joined Russian specialists--including Irkutsk institute director Sergey Balakhonov and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Northern Theater Command Disease Control Center--in an exercise rehearsing imported plague, pathogen identification, epidemic notification, joint risk assessment, and cross-border response; on September 29, bilateral health officials again met to discuss infectious disease prevention and disaster medicine.
* The PRC and Russia have built increasingly institutionalized mechanisms for biological security, pathogen research, and epidemic early warning under direct political guidance from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. Since 2021, leader-level agreements and the PRC-Russia premiers' mechanism have expanded cooperation from laboratory testing and epidemiological research into border quarantine, biological security early warning, joint emergency exercises, cross-border epidemic control, and regular coordination among the PRC's disease control and customs agencies and Russia's Rospotrebnadzor.
* The resulting system is ambiguously civilian and military and is spreading beyond the bilateral relationship. Irkutsk combines a Soviet-era history of biological warfare (BW)-adjacent research with post-Soviet plague genetics cooperation involving the PLA-directed State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity; broader cooperation now encompasses PLA and Russian military medicine, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) exercises, Belarusian Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) biological-defense activity and PRC-Belarus infectious disease research, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) mechanisms extending surveillance, joint research, and epidemic warning into Central Asia.
-
Russian authorities have mounted an unusually large containment operation around the death of an employee of the Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute while issuing shifting accounts of the underlying event. According to Russian local reporting, 28-year-old Daria Shipilova was allegedly exposed while working with Yersinia pestis on September 25, developed severe pneumonia, and died in Shelekhov on October. The alleged laboratory exposure has not been officially confirmed (Euronews, October 4). The Shelekhov district hospital had already entered quarantine on October 1, and on October 2 an extraordinary regional sanitary and anti-epidemic commission met with Anna Popova, chief of federal public health agency Rospotrebnadzor; 197 possible contacts were subsequently identified and 189 reportedly placed in medical facilities for observation and treatment (Shelekhov District Administration; IRK.ru, October 2).
Russian public messaging then diverged sharply: the head of the neighboring Republic of Buryatia initially linked the death to plague; authorities in nearby Baikalsk briefly urged residents not to travel to Shelekhov before deleting the warning; and on October 4 Rospotrebnadzor said the employee had died from "pneumonia of unknown etiology," that expanded testing found no microorganism connected to her professional work, and that no pathogenic microorganism incident had occurred at the institute (The Moscow Times, October 2; Euronews; Interfax, October 4). The incident would ordinarily be expected to register quickly with Beijing because Irkutsk is directly connected to multiple cities in the People's Republic of China (PRC) by air. Yet as of October 4, Beijing had issued no public health warning or Russia-related travel advisory, the Chinese consulate in Irkutsk listed no new epidemic notice, and ordinary connectivity continued, with Irkutsk reporting on October 2 that as many as six flights a day continued to link the city with Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Manzhouli, and Harbin (PRC Consulate General in Irkutsk, accessed October 4; IRK.ru, October 2).
Beijing's silence is particularly incongruous because the incident occurred during the late summer and early autumn plague surveillance season along the PRC's northern border, when disease control authorities routinely intensify monitoring of rodent populations and vectors, alongside health screening of incoming passengers. In 2026, those seasonal measures coincided with an unusually large expansion of PRC-Russia cross-border infectious disease exercises, even as travel and tourism between the two sides accelerated. Moscow and Beijing held the first stage of their first joint exercises responding to infectious threats in Khabarovsk on June 9-11, followed on August 24-27 by a second, much larger exercise in Fuyuan, Heilongjiang, where more than 300 PRC personnel rehearsed an unknown tick-borne "Disease X", an imported plague outbreak, epidemic notification, joint risk assessment, and coordinated control measures. Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute director Sergey Balakhonov participated personally in the August exercise, while the PRC contingent included the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Northern Theater Command Disease Control Center (Rospotrebnadzor, August 26; Fuyuan Municipal Media Center; Heilongjiang Daily, August 27). From August 24 through September 10, PRC disease control authorities separately conducted rodent and ectoparasite surveillance along the Russia-facing Manzhouli border, a citywide plague response exercise, and a National Disease Control and Prevention Administration inspection of health declarations, temperature screening, vector monitoring, plague surveillance, epidemic early warning, emergency stocks, and information exchange with Russia (Manzhouli Municipal Health Commission, September 1; September 10; September 14).
On September 29--four days after Shipilova's alleged exposure and around the time she was reportedly hospitalized--the 26th PRC-Russia Health Cooperation Subcommittee met with the PRC's National Disease Control and Prevention Administration and CDC present and discussed infectious disease prevention and disaster medicine, but the meeting's public readout made no reference to events in Irkutsk (PRC National Health Commission, September 30). Meanwhile, PRC officials and businesses were actively promoting greater movement through the same region: the PRC consulate hosted Irkutsk governor Igor Kobzev at its September 28 National Day reception, representatives of 11 leading PRC tourism companies toured Irkutsk, Buryatia, and Primorye and signed new cooperation agreements, and on October 2 Irkutsk customs reported that PRC-bound passenger traffic had risen more than 35 percent year-on-year (PRC Consulate General in Irkutsk, September 30; IRK.ru, October 1; October 2). Against that backdrop, the absence of any public PRC reference to the suspected incident at a Russian institution that had participated in bilateral biosecurity exercises only a month earlier is conspicuous.
The Irkutsk Anti-Plague Research Institute itself illustrates the persistent ambiguity--and accompanying secrecy--between civilian disease control and military biosecurity that characterizes PRC-Russia cooperation in this field. During the Soviet period, Irkutsk formed part of the Ministry of Health anti-plague system that was incorporated into the biological warfare defense program known as "Problem 5"; more contemporary histories assess Irkutsk as involved in that program to some degree, while noting that it lacked the direct institutional relationships with core Biopreparat facilities documented for other anti-plague institutes (Alibek and Handelman, 1999; Zilinskas, 2006; Zilinskas and Mauger 2018). [1] Its director from 1957-1964, Igor Domaradskij, simultaneously established working contacts with public health authorities in the PRC, Mongolia, and Vietnam and led research on high-risk pathogens and the biochemistry and pathogenesis of plague, before later becoming a senior figure in the secret structure directing Biopreparat's offensive biological weapons work (Carleton J. Phillips et al., 2009; Zilinskas, 2006). [2] Former Biopreparat deputy director Ken Alibek (also known as Kanatjan Alibekov) subsequently alleged that Irkutsk was among the Soviet Ministry of Health anti-plague complexes given special funding for "weapons-oriented genetic research" (Alibek and Handelman, 1999).[3] PRC participation became more directly military-linked in the post-Soviet period: in 2008, Irkutsk researchers including Balakhonov coauthored a molecular genetic study of 125 Yersinia pestis strains from the PRC, the former Soviet Union, and Mongolia with Ruifu Yang and other researchers from Beijing's State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity, whose publications identify it as part of the PLA Academy of Military Medical Sciences (Cui Yujun et al., July 9, 2008; Hanping Yan et al., August 2008). [4]
The resulting mixture of civilian epidemiology, dangerous pathogen research, military medicine, biological defense, and cross-border pathogen and vector surveillance is not peculiar to Irkutsk, but increasingly characteristic of the wider architecture of PRC-Russia biosecurity cooperation.
From Leader-Level Directives to Operational Coordination
General Secretary Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin have progressively expanded biological security cooperation from infectious disease preparedness into a broader bilateral security and cross-border response agenda. In their June 28, 2021 joint statement marking the 20th anniversary of the PRC-Russia Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, the two leaders called for expanded cooperation on infectious disease early warning and response, pharmaceuticals, diagnostic reagents, and vaccines (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], June 28, 2021). On February 4, 2022, Xi and Putin called for a border region joint prevention and control mechanism covering epidemic control, information sharing, and border infrastructure, while separately declaring that alleged U.S. and allied "military-biological activities" posed a serious threat to the national security of both the PRC and Russia (MFA, February 4, 2022). Their May 16, 2024 joint statement went further, calling for cooperation on infectious disease prevention, domestic and cross-border transmission, and "biological disaster early warning and response" , while stressing cooperation in the PRC-Russia border region and protection of each country's sovereignty in the biological sphere (MFA, May 16, 2024). By May 21, 2026, the two leaders were explicitly directing their disease control authorities to expand cooperation on "biological security, infectious disease prevention and control, and cross-border transmission", while also endorsing continuing cooperation in disaster medicine and related medical research (MFA, May 21).
Xi and Putin's instructions have been translated into increasingly specific work programs through premier-level meetings and subordinate health cooperation structures. In December 2020, the 25th such regular meeting called for joint vaccine research, infectious disease information exchange at the border, and a bilateral emergency exercise responding to an infectious disease outbreak in 2021 (MFA, December 3, 2020). The communique from the mechanism's 26th meeting a year later expanded this agenda to laboratory testing, epidemiological research, border health quarantine, epidemic information exchange, laboratory networks, research bases, and "biological security early warning and emergency response control systems", while assigning cooperation to the PRC's National Disease Control and Prevention Administration and Russia's Rospotrebnadzor (MFA, December 1, 2021). In December 2022, Li Keqiang and Mikhail Mishustin's governments called for specialized disaster medicine exercises in the PRC and Russia, new interagency agreements between the two disease control systems, and a joint action plan between PRC Customs and Rospotrebnadzor covering border epidemic control and information exchange (MFA, December 2022). By August 2024 and November 2025, the premiers' communiques were calling respectively for joint operations to identify and eliminate sources of epidemic disease and for regular practical disaster medicine exercises, stronger cooperation among the PRC's National Disease Control and Prevention Administration, General Administration of Customs, and Rospotrebnadzor, and deeper coordination on pandemic preparedness and biological security (MFA, August 22, 2024, November 4, 2025).
These arrangements rest on a longer-running network of joint pathogen research, field surveillance, and cross-border warning procedures. Beyond the July 2008 collaboration between researchers from the PLA-affiliated State Key Laboratory of Pathogen and Biosecurity and those in Irkutsk, in June 2014, Rospotrebnadzor's Amur regional directorate and the PRC's Heihe health inspection and quarantine authorities signed a 2014-2018 program for joint study of rodents and ticks carrying infectious agents along the two countries' shared border. By 2015 they had also agreed on a unified procedure for responding when an infectious patient was detected at a border crossing, and by 2018 were discussing continued joint pathogen surveillance and comparative monitoring of influenza viruses in migratory birds (Rospotrebnadzor Amur Directorate, June 30, 2014, July 20, 2015, January 12, 2018). In December 2022, the PRC's Center for Disease Control (CDC) and its State Key Laboratory for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control convened PRC, Russian, Mongolian, and Kazakh specialists to plan joint investigation of the Altai Mountain natural plague; Balakhonov presented Russia's surveillance work; and participants discussed joint plague research, risk assessment, and a cross-border prevention and control mechanism (China CDC, December 15, 2022).
Military and Regional Biosecurity Networks Expand
The PRC and Russia have also developed a bilateral military channel for epidemic control, military medicine, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) preparedness alongside their civilian public health cooperation. On April 9, 2020, Russia's S.M. Kirov Military Medical Academy and the PLA Military Medical University held a dedicated teleconference on infectious diseases involving Russian military scientists, hospital chiefs, infectious disease specialists, epidemiologists, and PRC military doctors who had worked in Wuhan; the agenda included epidemiology, virology, clinical laboratory diagnosis, treatment of severe disease, and measures to prevent the introduction and spread of COVID-19 infection within military units (S.M. Kirov Military Medical Academy, April 10, 2020). In May 2020, with Central Military Commission approval, the PLA provided epidemic control supplies directly to the Russian armed forces, while the PRC Ministry of National Defense (MND) later described high-level exchanges, epidemic control, and joint exercises as three major components of PRC-Russia military cooperation during the year (MND, May 25, 2020, December 31, 2020). The PRC and Russia have also trained together in Russia's International Army Games "Safe Environment" nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance competition, and in 2019, Russian NBC troops used PRC reconnaissance vehicles and detection equipment in the PRC after PRC chemical defense troops had taken the same class of equipment to Russia the previous year (MND, August 13, 2019). Most recently, during the August 2026 Fuyuan cross-border exercise, the PLA Northern Theater Command Disease Control Center, PRC civilian disease control agencies, and Russian public health experts rehearsed responding to an unknown "tick-borne 'Disease X'", imported bubonic plague, metagenomic identification of an unknown pathogen, specimen transport, decontamination, and bilateral risk assessment (Heilongjiang Daily, August 27).
Beijing has also gained exposure to Russia's military biological response practices through multilateral exercises and third-party security relationships, particularly in Belarus. At the August 2022 meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) defense ministers, Russia proposed that the planned Peace Mission-2023 exercise include prevention of terrorist attacks using chemical and biological weapons, though the proposed exercise does not appear to have been held (SCO, August 26, 2022). In September 2023, Belarus hosted the first "Barrier-2023" exercise of the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) new joint radiation, chemical, and biological defense and medical support formation, which rehearsed biological reconnaissance, collection and laboratory transfer of samples, examination and evacuation of exposed personnel, deployment of a special treatment center, and elimination and decontamination of a biological threat site. The same CSTO notice stated that the PRC, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Mongolia had been invited as observers to the Belarus exercise, which also tested the ability of the new radiation, chemical, and biological (RCB) defense and medical teams to respond to the rapid spread of dangerous infectious diseases (CSTO, August 28, 2023). Belarus appears to be developing a similar pattern, with military and biosecurity cooperation with the PRC deepening against the backdrop of Minsk's continued integration into Russia-led CSTO biological defense structures. In August 2026, PRC and Belarusian airborne forces conducted the fourth "Swift Eagle" joint training exercise, using mixed formations and joint command procedures (MND, August 25). In parallel, the PRC Academy of Agricultural Sciences' Shanghai Veterinary Research Institute and Belarus's S.N. Vyshelessky Institute of Experimental Veterinary Medicine established the PRC-Belarus Joint Laboratory for Animal Disease Prevention and Control in May 2025, with research covering rapid diagnostics for major and emerging infectious diseases, vaccine development, and mechanisms for blocking cross-border disease transmission (Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, May 21, 2025).
The PRC-Russia biosecurity relationship is increasingly embedded in wider regional mechanisms that extend epidemic surveillance, research, and response outward through the SCO and overlapping bilateral partnerships. In June 2018, SCO heads of state called for reliable infectious disease information exchange, mobile anti-epidemic groups, stronger national laboratories, new research centers, joint research projects, and coordinated responses to major outbreaks; the November 2020 Moscow Declaration subsequently called for a multilateral mechanism for exchanging signs of infectious disease outbreaks, closer cooperation among research centers, joint development of diagnostics and preventive measures, and an Uzbekistan-proposed permanent SCO platform for responding to cross-border dangerous infections (SCO, June 10, 2018, November 10, 2020). By 2022-2023, the organization had added a Comprehensive Plan of Joint Measures to Counter Epidemic Threats, a Roadmap for Cooperation Between Medical Institutions on Preventing and Treating Infectious Diseases, a formal epidemiological information program, and regular meetings of national health and epidemiological services, while the PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan jointly backed stronger Biological Weapons Convention mechanisms (MFA, July 29, 2022; SCO, October 26, 2023). The PRC has simultaneously built bilateral biosecurity cooperation with Kazakhstan: Xi Jinping and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev agreed in May 2023 to joint biological research and sharing of research results, and their July 2024 statement recorded continuing interagency biosecurity consultations, joint scientific projects, and support for Kazakhstan's proposal for an international biological security agency (MFA, May 17, 2023, July 3, 2024). Military cooperation has begun to expand through the same concentric structure: the MND states that SCO militaries have institutionalized exchanges in military medicine, and in May 2025 the PRC hosted the first SCO Military Medicine Seminar in Xi'an with military health chiefs and experts from Russia and other participating states (MND, July 15, 2024, May 13, 2025).
Conclusion
The Irkutsk episode highlights the gap between the depth of PRC-Russia biosecurity coordination and the opacity surrounding how that coordination functions in practice. As these mechanisms extend through Belarus, the SCO, and Central Asia, they are beginning to form a wider regional architecture for surveillance, research, preparedness, and response. If this trajectory continues, that architecture is likely to develop alongside rather than fully integrate with existing international biosecurity regimes, carrying forward the information-sharing and coordination gaps exposed by the Irkutsk episode and complicating global pandemic monitoring and other countries' biosecurity preparedness.
* * *
Dr. Matthew Johnson is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation. He specializes in China's contemporary elite politics, strategic thinking, technology policy, and political control over the financial sector and private economy.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/the-prc-and-russia-deepen-biosecurity-integration/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Having Lost 'Presidents,' Ever More Russian Federal Subjects Now Have Prime Ministers
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 6, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Having Lost 'Presidents,' Ever More Russian Federal Subjects Now Have Prime Ministers
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
* At Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence, Russia has only one president. Since his war against Ukraine began in 2022, the number of federal subjects with prime ministers in addition to Moscow-appointed "heads" has risen from 10 to 39 and is likely to continue to rise.
* This change, which has largely been under the radar, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 6, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Having Lost 'Presidents,' Ever More Russian Federal Subjects Now Have Prime Ministers Paul Goble Executive Summary: * At Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence, Russia has only one president. Since his war against Ukraine began in 2022, the number of federal subjects with prime ministers in addition to Moscow-appointed "heads" has risen from 10 to 39 and is likely to continue to rise. * This change, which has largely been under the radar,reflects the increasing burdens Putin's policies have shifted to the federal subjects and the desire of their heads to share these and the challenges anger about them now pose.
* As a result, the governments of the federal subjects are looking like self-standing institutions even though Moscow appoints their heads and thus may have a greater capacity to act as independent actors in the course of the looming succession struggle.
-
At Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence, Russia has only one president. After some resistance, the federal subjects were forced to stop calling their leaders presidents and instead refer to them as "heads" (Window on Eurasia, February 12, 2021). Since Russia's war against Ukraine began in 2022, the number of federal subjects with their own prime ministers, in addition to Moscow-appointed "heads," has risen from 10 to 39 and is projected to rise further in the coming months (Klub Regionov, September 30). This latter change is taking place largely under the radar. It reflects both the burdens Putin's policies have shifted to the federal subjects--such as raising troops and handling crises such as the current gas shortage--and the desire of their heads to share these burdens and deflect the rising tide of popular anger about some policies from themselves (Telegram/@thegraschenkov, September 30). As a result, regional governments are looking like self-standing institutions, even though Moscow still appoints their heads, and thus may have greater capacity to act as independent actors in the looming succession struggle. That is especially likely because prime minister offices in the federal subjects now affect more predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krais than non-Russian republics, reversing the earlier pattern in which the latter subjects with prime ministers outnumbered the former in holding such positions.
Putin's elimination of the office of president in Russia's federal subjects symbolizes his drive to centralize power in his own person. Despite resistance in some places, the Kremlin leader succeeded. Now, no federal subject has a president, only a governor or a head. That has not been the end of the story, however. As that was happening, and especially after Putin shifted more burdens onto the federal subjects, the latter responded by adding the position of prime minister to their leadership teams, with the number of such oblasts, krais, and republics having a prime minister increasing from fewer than a dozen in 2022 to 39 now. Under Russian law, this office has always been optional for federal subjects (Klub Regionov, September 30). At the same time, the people appointed to such positions largely shifted from technocrats put in place to handle specific projects to politicians capable of interacting with the public and thus taking pressure off the republic heads (Klub Regionov; Telegram/@thegraschenkov, September 30). For now, these innovations and their spread from non-Russian republics to predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krais do not challenge Moscow. In some future succession struggle, however, it means that leadership teams of these federal subjects will look more like independent states than they have since Putin began to geld them two decades ago. This places them in a better position to act on their own than either he or most others suspect--even if many of these people were appointed by Moscow or named with the center's approval.
For all these reasons, these regional prime ministers are now attracting ever more attention from the expert community in the Russian Federation. One example is a new report by the Moscow Center for the Development of Regional Policy entitled The Chairmen of Regional Governments in the Subjects of Russia: Their Administrative Profile and Media Activity (Telegram/@thegraschenkov, September 30). That study draws seven major conclusions:
* First, the most successful of these new premiers have been able to win support in Moscow and among regional elites simultaneously at a time when challenges to regional administrations are increasing.
* Second, over the last six months, there has been "a qualitative change" in who is being recruited to these positions. Earlier, they were almost exclusively technicians, "now the heads of the regions ever more often seek figures capable not only of administering but also sharing public responsibility."
* Third, that change in turn has meant that "the media activity of the prime ministers has undergone a significant transformation." As regional heads have lost their audiences, many prime ministers have stepped into the breach and become active media players.
* Fourth, because of this success, the number of regions likely to choose to introduce prime ministers will grow over the next 12 to 18 months and affect "in the first instance" not just smaller ones but "major subjects with populations of more than one million each where governors physically are not able to handle the full extent of administrative tasks."
* Fifth, "the role of prime ministers in issues connected with the Special Military Operation" in Ukraine will "intensify." This is a major reason why Putin has not and will not move to block this change even if, as he can see, it may present problems for him or his successors later.
* Sixth, according to the report, "the key criterion of the effectiveness of prime ministers in 2026 and next year will be the ability to work in a regime of constant reactions to crises." Those who succeed are likely to be promoted either within their own regions or elsewhere, reducing Moscow's influence in at least some cases.
* Seventh, the rise of regional prime ministers almost certainly will "intensify" differences in how the federal subjects are run, with some of these premiers opening up the political system to win support and others choosing to try to close things down further. Both approaches are logical, the report concludes, "but the first gives greater chances for political growth while the second helps preserve stability in the shadows of the governors."
Commenting on this report, the Club of the Regions portal adds some important details. It notes that in some places, the position of prime minister has been introduced where it had never existed before (the Jewish Autonomy and Chelyabinsk oblast among them), and in others, it has been restored after a post that had existed earlier (Tomsk and Kherson oblasts). At the same time, the portal observes that "there are no prime ministers in any of the cities of federal importance," one reason this trend has attracted little attention so far. It says that while most premiers remain "in the information shadow of governors and do not form their own media agendas, the importance of such people, and by implication, their independence, "is growing not only helping their governor bosses and Moscow but their own careers as well." If, as some predict, regional heads who failed to attract enough votes for United Russia in the recent Duma elections are replaced, these prime ministers could become a more important source of their replacements than those usually considered (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 1).
For all these reasons, the prime ministers in the regions are politicians to be watched not only because they are changing the political scene in the federal subjects now but also because they, perhaps even more than governors parachuted in by Moscow from the outside, are likely to become major players during the upcoming succession struggle.
* * *
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/having-lost-presidents-ever-more-russian-federal-subjects-now-have-prime-ministers/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Having Lost 'Presidents,' Ever More Russian Federal Subjects Now Have Prime Ministers
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
* At Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence, Russia has only one president. Since his war against Ukraine began in 2022, the number of federal subjects with prime ministers in addition to Moscow-appointed "heads" has risen from 10 to 39 and is likely to continue to rise.
* This change, which has largely been under the radar, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 6, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Having Lost 'Presidents,' Ever More Russian Federal Subjects Now Have Prime Ministers Paul Goble Executive Summary: * At Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence, Russia has only one president. Since his war against Ukraine began in 2022, the number of federal subjects with prime ministers in addition to Moscow-appointed "heads" has risen from 10 to 39 and is likely to continue to rise. * This change, which has largely been under the radar,reflects the increasing burdens Putin's policies have shifted to the federal subjects and the desire of their heads to share these and the challenges anger about them now pose.
* As a result, the governments of the federal subjects are looking like self-standing institutions even though Moscow appoints their heads and thus may have a greater capacity to act as independent actors in the course of the looming succession struggle.
-
At Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence, Russia has only one president. After some resistance, the federal subjects were forced to stop calling their leaders presidents and instead refer to them as "heads" (Window on Eurasia, February 12, 2021). Since Russia's war against Ukraine began in 2022, the number of federal subjects with their own prime ministers, in addition to Moscow-appointed "heads," has risen from 10 to 39 and is projected to rise further in the coming months (Klub Regionov, September 30). This latter change is taking place largely under the radar. It reflects both the burdens Putin's policies have shifted to the federal subjects--such as raising troops and handling crises such as the current gas shortage--and the desire of their heads to share these burdens and deflect the rising tide of popular anger about some policies from themselves (Telegram/@thegraschenkov, September 30). As a result, regional governments are looking like self-standing institutions, even though Moscow still appoints their heads, and thus may have greater capacity to act as independent actors in the looming succession struggle. That is especially likely because prime minister offices in the federal subjects now affect more predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krais than non-Russian republics, reversing the earlier pattern in which the latter subjects with prime ministers outnumbered the former in holding such positions.
Putin's elimination of the office of president in Russia's federal subjects symbolizes his drive to centralize power in his own person. Despite resistance in some places, the Kremlin leader succeeded. Now, no federal subject has a president, only a governor or a head. That has not been the end of the story, however. As that was happening, and especially after Putin shifted more burdens onto the federal subjects, the latter responded by adding the position of prime minister to their leadership teams, with the number of such oblasts, krais, and republics having a prime minister increasing from fewer than a dozen in 2022 to 39 now. Under Russian law, this office has always been optional for federal subjects (Klub Regionov, September 30). At the same time, the people appointed to such positions largely shifted from technocrats put in place to handle specific projects to politicians capable of interacting with the public and thus taking pressure off the republic heads (Klub Regionov; Telegram/@thegraschenkov, September 30). For now, these innovations and their spread from non-Russian republics to predominantly ethnic Russian oblasts and krais do not challenge Moscow. In some future succession struggle, however, it means that leadership teams of these federal subjects will look more like independent states than they have since Putin began to geld them two decades ago. This places them in a better position to act on their own than either he or most others suspect--even if many of these people were appointed by Moscow or named with the center's approval.
For all these reasons, these regional prime ministers are now attracting ever more attention from the expert community in the Russian Federation. One example is a new report by the Moscow Center for the Development of Regional Policy entitled The Chairmen of Regional Governments in the Subjects of Russia: Their Administrative Profile and Media Activity (Telegram/@thegraschenkov, September 30). That study draws seven major conclusions:
* First, the most successful of these new premiers have been able to win support in Moscow and among regional elites simultaneously at a time when challenges to regional administrations are increasing.
* Second, over the last six months, there has been "a qualitative change" in who is being recruited to these positions. Earlier, they were almost exclusively technicians, "now the heads of the regions ever more often seek figures capable not only of administering but also sharing public responsibility."
* Third, that change in turn has meant that "the media activity of the prime ministers has undergone a significant transformation." As regional heads have lost their audiences, many prime ministers have stepped into the breach and become active media players.
* Fourth, because of this success, the number of regions likely to choose to introduce prime ministers will grow over the next 12 to 18 months and affect "in the first instance" not just smaller ones but "major subjects with populations of more than one million each where governors physically are not able to handle the full extent of administrative tasks."
* Fifth, "the role of prime ministers in issues connected with the Special Military Operation" in Ukraine will "intensify." This is a major reason why Putin has not and will not move to block this change even if, as he can see, it may present problems for him or his successors later.
* Sixth, according to the report, "the key criterion of the effectiveness of prime ministers in 2026 and next year will be the ability to work in a regime of constant reactions to crises." Those who succeed are likely to be promoted either within their own regions or elsewhere, reducing Moscow's influence in at least some cases.
* Seventh, the rise of regional prime ministers almost certainly will "intensify" differences in how the federal subjects are run, with some of these premiers opening up the political system to win support and others choosing to try to close things down further. Both approaches are logical, the report concludes, "but the first gives greater chances for political growth while the second helps preserve stability in the shadows of the governors."
Commenting on this report, the Club of the Regions portal adds some important details. It notes that in some places, the position of prime minister has been introduced where it had never existed before (the Jewish Autonomy and Chelyabinsk oblast among them), and in others, it has been restored after a post that had existed earlier (Tomsk and Kherson oblasts). At the same time, the portal observes that "there are no prime ministers in any of the cities of federal importance," one reason this trend has attracted little attention so far. It says that while most premiers remain "in the information shadow of governors and do not form their own media agendas, the importance of such people, and by implication, their independence, "is growing not only helping their governor bosses and Moscow but their own careers as well." If, as some predict, regional heads who failed to attract enough votes for United Russia in the recent Duma elections are replaced, these prime ministers could become a more important source of their replacements than those usually considered (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 1).
For all these reasons, the prime ministers in the regions are politicians to be watched not only because they are changing the political scene in the federal subjects now but also because they, perhaps even more than governors parachuted in by Moscow from the outside, are likely to become major players during the upcoming succession struggle.
* * *
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/having-lost-presidents-ever-more-russian-federal-subjects-now-have-prime-ministers/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary Entitled 'AI Export Dilemma'
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
The AI Export Dilemma
Commentary by William Alan Reinsch
October 6, 2026
Until now, I have resisted writing much about AI. I confess to being a doomer about it and wish it would just go away. That, of course, is not going to happen, so I am finally going to take up one small part of the puzzle. There are a host of issues around AI: Is it going to kill all of us, or just some of us? Will it create mass unemployment? How do we ensure humans retain control? What, if any, safety guardrails ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * The AI Export Dilemma Commentary by William Alan Reinsch October 6, 2026 Until now, I have resisted writing much about AI. I confess to being a doomer about it and wish it would just go away. That, of course, is not going to happen, so I am finally going to take up one small part of the puzzle. There are a host of issues around AI: Is it going to kill all of us, or just some of us? Will it create mass unemployment? How do we ensure humans retain control? What, if any, safety guardrailsare appropriate and feasible? What should we do about data centers? How will their demand for electric power and semiconductor chips affect the rest of the economy? And on and on. Those are important questions, and I leave them to the experts. Since this is a column about trade, I will discuss exporting AI technology: Should we allow it, and, if so, under what conditions or limitations?
Wading into that question reopens an old debate: Is it better to stringently protect the technology, both hardware and software, so it does not fall into the hands of our adversaries, primarily China? Or is it better to "flood the zone" and establish U.S. models and the chips that support them as the global standard? This is essentially an argument over whether a "safe" strategy or one that is high-risk and high-reward is more effective. This is not a new debate. It recurs with every new breakthrough technology development. The safe strategy tends to be favored by security hawks, particularly in the Pentagon, while the other finds a home in the business community and government agencies such as the Department of Commerce that are more responsive to corporate concerns. It would be nice if one of these had a clear record of success and was demonstrably more effective than the other. Sadly, in this case, both strategies have been employed, and both have had their successes and failures, which provides little guidance to government officials trying to decide what to do about AI.
The safe strategy requires extensive, detailed rules about which exports are permitted and which are not, competent licensing officials who understand the new and rapidly changing technology, and a strong enforcement program that can detect and constrain leakage. When it works, it enables the United States to maintain its technology leadership. Jet engine hot section technology is a good example of long-term success.
The risks include regulations that can be so complicated it is difficult for companies to understand what products apply, and, because of their complexity, inevitably leave loopholes that companies can exploit. The recent history of controls over semiconductor chips is a good example. Detailed regulations also impose a significant due diligence burden on companies to know their customers and make sure their exports are going to legitimate parties that will use them for their declared purpose. Large companies have sufficient resources to maintain strong compliance teams that do their best to make sure the rules are followed. That is much more difficult for smaller companies, particularly startups, which are dedicating most of their resources to product development and put compliance further down their list of priorities. While leakage is inevitable even in the best of circumstances, tight controls and effective enforcement can make it difficult for the adversary to scale.
The "flood the zone" strategy takes a different approach. It is based on the idea that the better way to maintain U.S technology leadership in a cutting-edge sector is to export and try to ensure that U.S. products become the global standard. Simply put, if everybody is buying American, then other countries will find it difficult to produce viable alternatives and will have little incentive to do so. Not always mentioned but also part of the strategy is that U.S. companies will make a lot of money, which they can then invest in next-generation development that will continue U.S. leadership. A classic example is Microsoft Windows, which the company successfully made a global product that is so widely used, it is difficult for others to compete. The security theory behind the strategy is that, if successful, it enables the United States to control the technology and its use and effectively isolate Chinese competition. The strategy does not mean no controls, but it permits more flexibility.
The main risk of this strategy is that rather than deterring China, it could instead encourage China to move faster to develop and market competing models while providing the tools to do it, because less restrained U.S. exports to other countries will inevitably fall into Chinese hands and make it easier for them to catch up. In other words, this strategy makes leakage more likely. In the case of AI, we have already seen this risk in the administration's AI partnership deal with the United Arab Emirates, which has long had a reputation for being a place where exports find their way onwards to China or Russia.
My conclusion is that with respect to AI, where China is already actively in a contest for leadership, neither strategy is likely to be fully effective, and, while the United States should maintain controls, its best move is to run faster to stay ahead. Of course, that may end up killing all of us, in which case who won the leadership race won't matter much.
* * *
William A. Reinsch is a senior adviser (non-resident) and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at wreinsch7@gmail.com.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ai-export-dilemma
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
The AI Export Dilemma
Commentary by William Alan Reinsch
October 6, 2026
Until now, I have resisted writing much about AI. I confess to being a doomer about it and wish it would just go away. That, of course, is not going to happen, so I am finally going to take up one small part of the puzzle. There are a host of issues around AI: Is it going to kill all of us, or just some of us? Will it create mass unemployment? How do we ensure humans retain control? What, if any, safety guardrails ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * The AI Export Dilemma Commentary by William Alan Reinsch October 6, 2026 Until now, I have resisted writing much about AI. I confess to being a doomer about it and wish it would just go away. That, of course, is not going to happen, so I am finally going to take up one small part of the puzzle. There are a host of issues around AI: Is it going to kill all of us, or just some of us? Will it create mass unemployment? How do we ensure humans retain control? What, if any, safety guardrailsare appropriate and feasible? What should we do about data centers? How will their demand for electric power and semiconductor chips affect the rest of the economy? And on and on. Those are important questions, and I leave them to the experts. Since this is a column about trade, I will discuss exporting AI technology: Should we allow it, and, if so, under what conditions or limitations?
Wading into that question reopens an old debate: Is it better to stringently protect the technology, both hardware and software, so it does not fall into the hands of our adversaries, primarily China? Or is it better to "flood the zone" and establish U.S. models and the chips that support them as the global standard? This is essentially an argument over whether a "safe" strategy or one that is high-risk and high-reward is more effective. This is not a new debate. It recurs with every new breakthrough technology development. The safe strategy tends to be favored by security hawks, particularly in the Pentagon, while the other finds a home in the business community and government agencies such as the Department of Commerce that are more responsive to corporate concerns. It would be nice if one of these had a clear record of success and was demonstrably more effective than the other. Sadly, in this case, both strategies have been employed, and both have had their successes and failures, which provides little guidance to government officials trying to decide what to do about AI.
The safe strategy requires extensive, detailed rules about which exports are permitted and which are not, competent licensing officials who understand the new and rapidly changing technology, and a strong enforcement program that can detect and constrain leakage. When it works, it enables the United States to maintain its technology leadership. Jet engine hot section technology is a good example of long-term success.
The risks include regulations that can be so complicated it is difficult for companies to understand what products apply, and, because of their complexity, inevitably leave loopholes that companies can exploit. The recent history of controls over semiconductor chips is a good example. Detailed regulations also impose a significant due diligence burden on companies to know their customers and make sure their exports are going to legitimate parties that will use them for their declared purpose. Large companies have sufficient resources to maintain strong compliance teams that do their best to make sure the rules are followed. That is much more difficult for smaller companies, particularly startups, which are dedicating most of their resources to product development and put compliance further down their list of priorities. While leakage is inevitable even in the best of circumstances, tight controls and effective enforcement can make it difficult for the adversary to scale.
The "flood the zone" strategy takes a different approach. It is based on the idea that the better way to maintain U.S technology leadership in a cutting-edge sector is to export and try to ensure that U.S. products become the global standard. Simply put, if everybody is buying American, then other countries will find it difficult to produce viable alternatives and will have little incentive to do so. Not always mentioned but also part of the strategy is that U.S. companies will make a lot of money, which they can then invest in next-generation development that will continue U.S. leadership. A classic example is Microsoft Windows, which the company successfully made a global product that is so widely used, it is difficult for others to compete. The security theory behind the strategy is that, if successful, it enables the United States to control the technology and its use and effectively isolate Chinese competition. The strategy does not mean no controls, but it permits more flexibility.
The main risk of this strategy is that rather than deterring China, it could instead encourage China to move faster to develop and market competing models while providing the tools to do it, because less restrained U.S. exports to other countries will inevitably fall into Chinese hands and make it easier for them to catch up. In other words, this strategy makes leakage more likely. In the case of AI, we have already seen this risk in the administration's AI partnership deal with the United Arab Emirates, which has long had a reputation for being a place where exports find their way onwards to China or Russia.
My conclusion is that with respect to AI, where China is already actively in a contest for leadership, neither strategy is likely to be fully effective, and, while the United States should maintain controls, its best move is to run faster to stay ahead. Of course, that may end up killing all of us, in which case who won the leadership race won't matter much.
* * *
William A. Reinsch is a senior adviser (non-resident) and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at wreinsch7@gmail.com.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ai-export-dilemma
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Agenda Delivers Transparent Healthcare Marketplace for Americans
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:
* * *
America First Agenda Delivers Transparent Healthcare Marketplace for Americans
October 6, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) issued the following statement in response to this week's announcement from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS):
"Americans have a right to know what their health care will cost before they receive the bill," said Gov. Bobby Jindal, Chair, Center for a Healthy America, America First Policy Institute.
"By delivering real, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * America First Agenda Delivers Transparent Healthcare Marketplace for Americans October 6, 2026 WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) issued the following statement in response to this week's announcement from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): "Americans have a right to know what their health care will cost before they receive the bill," said Gov. Bobby Jindal, Chair, Center for a Healthy America, America First Policy Institute. "By delivering real,accurate, and actionable price transparency that empowers Americans to compare care based on quality and cost, the Trump Administration is putting patients first.
The updates to the Transparency in Coverage (TiC) rules are another step toward creating a more transparent healthcare marketplace."
AFPI will keep fighting to expand transparency and accountability in our healthcare system, so American families keep winning. Learn more here (https://americafirstpolicy.com/channel/healthcare/).
* * *
Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-first-agenda-delivers-transparent-healthcare-marketplace-for-americans/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
America First Agenda Delivers Transparent Healthcare Marketplace for Americans
October 6, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) issued the following statement in response to this week's announcement from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS):
"Americans have a right to know what their health care will cost before they receive the bill," said Gov. Bobby Jindal, Chair, Center for a Healthy America, America First Policy Institute.
"By delivering real, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * America First Agenda Delivers Transparent Healthcare Marketplace for Americans October 6, 2026 WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) issued the following statement in response to this week's announcement from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): "Americans have a right to know what their health care will cost before they receive the bill," said Gov. Bobby Jindal, Chair, Center for a Healthy America, America First Policy Institute. "By delivering real,accurate, and actionable price transparency that empowers Americans to compare care based on quality and cost, the Trump Administration is putting patients first.
The updates to the Transparency in Coverage (TiC) rules are another step toward creating a more transparent healthcare marketplace."
AFPI will keep fighting to expand transparency and accountability in our healthcare system, so American families keep winning. Learn more here (https://americafirstpolicy.com/channel/healthcare/).
* * *
Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-first-agenda-delivers-transparent-healthcare-marketplace-for-americans/
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Issue Brief Examines Stronger Election Record Retention Standards
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:
* * *
New AFPI Issue Brief Examines Stronger Election Record Retention Standards
October 6, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C.-- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI)'s Secure Elections initiative released a new issue brief, A Better Standard for Election Records Retention, examining whether federal and state record-retention requirements provide sufficient time for review of election records when questions about their administration arise.
AFPI's brief evaluates existing federal and state retention standards ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * New AFPI Issue Brief Examines Stronger Election Record Retention Standards October 6, 2026 WASHINGTON, D.C.-- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI)'s Secure Elections initiative released a new issue brief, A Better Standard for Election Records Retention, examining whether federal and state record-retention requirements provide sufficient time for review of election records when questions about their administration arise. AFPI's brief evaluates existing federal and state retention standardsand recommends a longer, more uniform framework designed to improve transparency, preserve evidence, and strengthen public confidence in election administration.
"You can't audit an election with records that no longer exist. When ballots, cast vote records, and voter rolls are erased or overwritten before anyone has a chance to look at them, there's no way to verify what happened, leaving us only with speculation about what people think happened," said Ken Blackwell, AFPI's chair of Secure Elections. "To restore trust in our elections process, a paper trail needs to still exist that can provide concrete answers.
Critically, the brief recommends that policymakers increase the current election record retention minimum to allow election administrators, legislative and oversight bodies, inspectors general, courts, and law enforcement agencies access to the evidence necessary to perform their duties. Further, the brief suggests a five-year retention policy as the standard of transparency for federal and state law, arguing it covers a full presidential election cycle while giving courts and election officials time to resolve disputes, without requiring indefinite record-keeping.
To read the full issue brief, click here (https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/a-better-standard-for-election-records-retention/).
* * *
Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/new-afpi-issue-brief-examines-stronger-election-record-retention-standards/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
New AFPI Issue Brief Examines Stronger Election Record Retention Standards
October 6, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C.-- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI)'s Secure Elections initiative released a new issue brief, A Better Standard for Election Records Retention, examining whether federal and state record-retention requirements provide sufficient time for review of election records when questions about their administration arise.
AFPI's brief evaluates existing federal and state retention standards ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * New AFPI Issue Brief Examines Stronger Election Record Retention Standards October 6, 2026 WASHINGTON, D.C.-- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI)'s Secure Elections initiative released a new issue brief, A Better Standard for Election Records Retention, examining whether federal and state record-retention requirements provide sufficient time for review of election records when questions about their administration arise. AFPI's brief evaluates existing federal and state retention standardsand recommends a longer, more uniform framework designed to improve transparency, preserve evidence, and strengthen public confidence in election administration.
"You can't audit an election with records that no longer exist. When ballots, cast vote records, and voter rolls are erased or overwritten before anyone has a chance to look at them, there's no way to verify what happened, leaving us only with speculation about what people think happened," said Ken Blackwell, AFPI's chair of Secure Elections. "To restore trust in our elections process, a paper trail needs to still exist that can provide concrete answers.
Critically, the brief recommends that policymakers increase the current election record retention minimum to allow election administrators, legislative and oversight bodies, inspectors general, courts, and law enforcement agencies access to the evidence necessary to perform their duties. Further, the brief suggests a five-year retention policy as the standard of transparency for federal and state law, arguing it covers a full presidential election cycle while giving courts and election officials time to resolve disputes, without requiring indefinite record-keeping.
To read the full issue brief, click here (https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/a-better-standard-for-election-records-retention/).
* * *
Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/new-afpi-issue-brief-examines-stronger-election-record-retention-standards/
[Category: ThinkTank]