Think Tanks
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President Trump Wants Investments in Venezuelan Oil: What Are the Challenges?
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The American Action Forum issued the following news release:
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President Trump Wants Investments in Venezuelan Oil: What Are the Challenges?
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The United States' apprehension of former Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro has spurred much discussion of that country's oil production. In a new insight, Director of Energy and Environmental Policy Shuting Pomerleau provides an overview of Venezuela's crude oil reserve and analyzes the potential challenges to foreign investment, including uncertainty in political stability, muted appetite of global oil
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The American Action Forum issued the following news release:
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President Trump Wants Investments in Venezuelan Oil: What Are the Challenges?
*
The United States' apprehension of former Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro has spurred much discussion of that country's oil production. In a new insight, Director of Energy and Environmental Policy Shuting Pomerleau provides an overview of Venezuela's crude oil reserve and analyzes the potential challenges to foreign investment, including uncertainty in political stability, muted appetite of global oilmarkets, the country's deteriorating infrastructure, and the world's transition to clean energy.
Key points:
* President Trump has urged U.S. oil companies to invest in the Venezuelan oil industryto "go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, the oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country."
* Despite having one of the world's largest oil reserves, Venezuela's crude oil production has dropped substantially from about 3.5 million barrels per day in 1997 to 0.9 million in 2024, which is about 1 percent of the world's total crude oil production; the Venezuelan heavy crude is suitable for U.S. refining capabilities.
* In view of the major challenges, it is unlikely that Venezuelan oil production and exports will recover significantly over the short term, which means that it will have a minimal impact on the world's oil market; it remains to be seen how geopolitical developments will unfold over the next several months and how they will affect the oil industry in the country.
Read the analysis (https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/president-trump-wants-investments-in-venezuelan-oil-what-are-the-challenges/).
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/press-release/president-trump-wants-investments-in-venezuelan-oil-what-are-the-challenges/
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Daily Wire: Why Venezuelans Are Dancing in the Streets
NEW YORK, Jan. 7 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Jan. 5, 2026, to the Daily Wire:
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Why Venezuelans Are Dancing in the Streets
By Daniel Di Martino
What Venezuelans feel today is not bloodlust or vengeance. It is relief, gratitude, and hope.
Venezuelans throughout the world are celebrating after this weekend's perfectly executed U.S. military operation which captured narco-terrorist tyrant Nicolas Maduro. The morning I woke up to the news of Maduro's capture was one that I had been dreaming of for my entire life as a Venezuelan who suffered under
... Show Full Article
NEW YORK, Jan. 7 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Jan. 5, 2026, to the Daily Wire:
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Why Venezuelans Are Dancing in the Streets
By Daniel Di Martino
What Venezuelans feel today is not bloodlust or vengeance. It is relief, gratitude, and hope.
Venezuelans throughout the world are celebrating after this weekend's perfectly executed U.S. military operation which captured narco-terrorist tyrant Nicolas Maduro. The morning I woke up to the news of Maduro's capture was one that I had been dreaming of for my entire life as a Venezuelan who suffered underhis regime.
This move by President Trump and his team provides justice, advances America's and Venezuela's interests, and could unleash prosperity like we have never seen before in the Western Hemisphere.
Venezuela has been ruled by Maduro's socialist regime since I was born in 1999. The regime pillaged what was once the richest nation in Latin America. Millions of Europeans in the 1940s and 1950s sought opportunity in places like Caracas in the aftermath of World War II. Millions of Colombians crossed the border to Venezuela for safety from narco-terrorist Marxist guerrillas from the 1970s until the 1990s. Lebanese and Syrian Christians escaped to Venezuela in the 1960s after the Assad family's takeover. And Americans routinely traveled to Venezuela for tourism and investment opportunities.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the Daily Wire (https://www.dailywire.com/news/why-venezuelans-are-dancing-in-the-streets)
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Daniel Di Martino is a graduate fellow at the Manhattan Institute, a Ph.D. student in economics at Columbia University, and the founder of the Dissident Project, a speakers' bureau for young immigrants from socialist countries.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/why-venezuelans-are-dancing-in-the-streets
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to RealClearWorld: U.S. Captures Maduro - Deterrence, Legitimacy, and What Comes Next?
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 6, 2026, to RealClearWorld:
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The US Captures Maduro: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and What Comes Next?
By Brigham A. McCown
The United States has used force abroad when it has judged its security or strategic influence to be at risk, particularly in regions it considers vital to its interests. The military operation that apprehended Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela fits this pattern, reasserting deterrence in response to
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 6, 2026, to RealClearWorld:
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The US Captures Maduro: Deterrence, Legitimacy, and What Comes Next?
By Brigham A. McCown
The United States has used force abroad when it has judged its security or strategic influence to be at risk, particularly in regions it considers vital to its interests. The military operation that apprehended Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela fits this pattern, reasserting deterrence in response toWashington's diminished influence in its own hemisphere. But the administration's ultimate success depends on returning Venezuela to the path of democracy without getting bogged down in another doomed nation-building project.
Much of the initial commentary has focused on oil markets or alleged violations of the War Powers Resolution. But since the resolution's enactment in 1973, presidents of both parties have authorized limited military actions without congressional authorization when they judged core U.S. interests to be at stake. Action against the Maduro regime reflects a broad, if sometimes understated, bipartisan concern. Congress should now be fully briefed and engaged in its proper oversight role.
Others have described this as an oil-driven intervention, but that framing is incomplete; it should be viewed as a response to concerns about sovereignty, hemispheric security, and the balance of influence in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. policy grappled with how to confront risks posed by external powers in the region. Over the past decade, China, Russia, and Iran have expanded their presence across Latin America by leveraging weak institutions and fragile states. Venezuela has exemplified that dynamic, tightening its relationship with fellow authoritarian governments. A renewed hemispheric focus, if handled carefully, can still work to advance US interests elsewhere. The United States is better positioned to reassure allies and deter adversaries globally when it is secure, sovereign, and stable in its own neighborhood.
Foreign adversaries have exploited an illegitimate and collapsing state as a platform to undermine U.S. interests in its own hemisphere. While Americans may debate tactics, there has long been agreement that allowing hostile powers to entrench themselves so close to home is incompatible with U.S. security. Operation Absolute Resolve is the manifestation of the 2025 National Security Strategy's promise to restore deterrence in the Western Hemisphere. That both Russia and China have condemned U.S. actions in Venezuela underscores how the country has become a test case of great-power competition. A more stable, Western-aligned Venezuela could complicate the ambitions of principal adversaries.
Critics, particularly in Europe and on the American left, warn that such action risks establishing a precedent in which powerful states assert special prerogatives over their regions, potentially emboldening Russia or China elsewhere. That concern is serious and should be acknowledged. However, it overlooks key distinctions. Maduro's regime is widely believed to have falsified presidential elections, leading the United States (notably, under the Biden administration) and many European officials to refuse to recognize the outcome. This raises questions about Venezuela's claims to sovereign inviolability under the United Nations Charter--even if some governments, including Mexico's, recognize the Maduro regime.
The flow of illicit drugs into the United States lends further legitimacy to the Trump administration's decision. Over 100,000 Americans have died annually from overdoses, overwhelmingly driven by synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. While Venezuela is not a main channel in the fentanyl supply chain, it has long served as a central transit corridor for cocaine and a permissive environment for transnational criminal networks. These networks rely on chemical precursors sourced from China, processing and distribution hubs in Mexico and Central America, and cross-border cooperation between criminal organizations and elements of state security forces, including along the Colombia-Venezuela border. Maduro's regime was deeply entangled with these trafficking ecosystems, functioning less as a counterweight to organized crime and more as its facilitator. The United States, despite a decades-long drug war, has been steadily losing ground because of this permissive environment.
Disrupting criminal-state entanglements is a necessary step toward limiting the reach of transnational trafficking networks that thrive under permissive regimes. Reasserting U.S. resolve is intended not to provoke, but to restore credibility that has eroded through years of inaction. That said, this effort will be seen by some as emboldening autocratic leaders to reassert their own spheres of influence. To counter this narrative, and avoid America's fatigue of interventions, U.S. actions should remain limited in scope and duration. Any open-ended military commitment or broader occupation would be a strategic mistake, one that also risks broad bipartisan condemnation.
Ultimately, the success or failure of this operation will depend less on what the United States has done and more on what follows inside Venezuela. The priority should be a timely transfer of power that reflects the outcome Venezuelans already voted for, rather than a prolonged transitional process that allows regime holdovers or military figures to entrench themselves. If Venezuela emerges with another unelected authority or a military government, this effort will have failed.
This moment offers an opportunity for Venezuela to finally break itself from a cycle of repression. It also represents a challenge for the U.S. to act responsibly. Deposing a dictator is not easy, yet success will depend on restraint, diplomacy, and the ability to return Venezuela to the path of democracy.
Read in RealClearWorld (https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2026/01/06/the_us_captures_maduro_deterrence_legitimacy_and_what_comes_next_1156965.html).
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Brigham McCown is senior fellow and director of the Initiative on American Energy Security at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on energy security, critical minerals, global supply chains, regulatory reforms, and the strategic competition shaping global energy markets.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/us-captures-maduro-deterrence-legitimacy-what-comes-next-brigham-mccown
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Australian: Donald Trump Puts Dictators on Notice With Venezuela Power Play
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 6, 2026, to the Australian:
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Donald Trump Puts Dictators on Notice with Venezuela Power Play
By John lee
Does Donald Trump's Venezuelan move violate international law and the rules-based order?
In using military force to capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, has the US President made it easier for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to intervene forcefully in the domestic affairs of Taiwan
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 6, 2026, to the Australian:
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Donald Trump Puts Dictators on Notice with Venezuela Power Play
By John lee
Does Donald Trump's Venezuelan move violate international law and the rules-based order?
In using military force to capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, has the US President made it easier for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to intervene forcefully in the domestic affairs of Taiwanand even decapitate its leadership?
The answer to the first question is likely yes. But on the second issue, dictators such as Xi and Vladimir Putin will be feeling far more uncomfortable after last weekend.
In 2019, the National Assembly of Venezuela invoked the Venezuelan constitution and declared that Maduro had usurped power and was not the president of Venezuela. In 2024, he held on to power despite compelling evidence he had decisively lost the July elections.
More than 50 countries, including the US and those in the EU, subsequently refused to recognise Maduro as the country's head of state.
Even so, the existence of an illegitimate and corrupt leader does not itself provide legal ground for another country to use military action to capture the head of a regime or effect a change in who leads that country.
That was the case when John F. Kennedy approved the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 and is probably the case now. There was no treaty that permitted the action and no appropriate international court authorised it.
For this reason, international lawyers are scathing.
This legal perspective leads to the further assessment that by ignoring or violating international laws, rules and conventions, Trump is relinquishing the high moral ground for the democracies. China building and militarising artificial islands in the South China Sea was found to be illegal in a binding decision by the Court of Arbitration. Beijing didn't care but at least the law was on our side.
Has Trump just made aggression easier for revisionist dictators around the world? I don't think so. Leaders in countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, sometimes referred to as the CRINKs, systematically use or violate international law whenever it suits them.
For regimes in these countries, the first and most important question they ask when deciding on a course of action is whether they will feel pain, and how much.
In the contemporary global environment, the question for them is even simpler: how will America respond? This is because the involvement, or at least approval, of the US as the sole superpower is required to impose prohibitive material costs on the revisionist actions of these countries.
It should be clear by now that Trump's America First does not mean retreat or isolation. It means doing what it takes to maintain US primacy in the Western hemisphere and project power and influence in other parts of the world.
To achieve that end, the Trump administration believes almost any means are justifiable.
This is not the restrained and cautious America of the Barack Obama or Joe Biden eras. Some lament this. But it was also during these two eras that China intensified its coercion and harassment of Taiwan and accelerated its activities in the South China Sea; that Iran greatly increased its support for and funding of proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas; and Russia invaded Crimea in 2014 and Ukraine in 2022, with Putin making the calculation that Obama and Biden respectively were unlikely to oppose him.
The first countries to condemn the capture of Maduro were Russia, China, and Iran. This is because under Maduro, Venezuela was becoming a military and economic beachhead for these authoritarian countries in the Americas. The reason allies are anxious about Trump is obvious.
But in observing what he has done rather than said, Trump has deployed military force against the Islamic State in Somalia, Iraq, Syria and Nigeria, the Houthis in Yemen and nuclear sites in Iran. These are not formal allies of any of the major authoritarian states but they share the common purpose of challenging the interests of the democratic countries.
It may be that Trump's plans for Venezuela are ill-conceived and he finds himself unable to extricate the US from a military and political morass.
This is something he promised the US would not suffer under his administration. But assessments that Xi will be emboldened to use force to decapitate the leadership in Taiwan or speed up plans for an invasion after last weekend seem wide of the mark.
It is true that Trump's military actions have been against smaller or weakened countries with minimal American casualties and risks. But Trump's preparedness to use force and take political risks is something that has the leaders of the CRINKs worried. It is US geopolitical timidity and caution that embolden them.
There is an uncomfortable truth about any international order no matter how benign or hostile. It is primarily shaped and ultimately maintained by the accumulation and exercise of power. The degree to which one is comfortable with the US pushing and crossing the boundaries of international laws and conventions for geopolitical gain depends on how seriously we take the threat of the revisionist authoritarian powers.
The more profound we believe the threat to be, the more the exercise of raw power will take precedence over legal obligation and restraint.
Read in The Australian (https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/donald-trump-puts-dictators-on-notice-with-venezuela-power-play/news-story/9d4a36f42c48ebea0822f4cc7940fc1e?amp&nk=ac395b600b812614f0ee7a859d07cd61-1767709521).
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John Lee is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. He is also a senior fellow (nonresident) at the United States Studies Centre and an adjunct professor at the University of Sydney.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/donald-trump-puts-dictators-notice-venezuela-power-play-john-lee
[Category: ThinkTank]
Health and Human Services Administratively Updates Childhood Vaccine Schedule
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The American Action Forum issued the following news release:
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Health and Human Services Administratively Updates Childhood Vaccine Schedule
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The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), recently updated the childhood vaccination schedule. In a new insight, Director of Health Care Policy Michael Baker highlights the key changes.
Key points:
* The change was taken pursuant to a presidential memorandum directing HHS and CDC to review "best practices" among peer countries for
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The American Action Forum issued the following news release:
* * *
Health and Human Services Administratively Updates Childhood Vaccine Schedule
*
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), recently updated the childhood vaccination schedule. In a new insight, Director of Health Care Policy Michael Baker highlights the key changes.
Key points:
* The change was taken pursuant to a presidential memorandum directing HHS and CDC to review "best practices" among peer countries for"core" childhood vaccine recommendations and to update the U.S. schedule if those practices were determined to be "superior," while "preserving access" to vaccines currently available.
* The revised schedule distinguishes: (1) immunizations recommended for all children, (2) immunizations recommended for certain high-risk groups or populations, and (3) immunizations based on shared clinical decision-making.
* The administration's published rationale for updating the children's vaccination schedule is framed as (1) international benchmarking and (2) trust and adherence considerations.
Read the analysis (https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/health-and-human-services-administratively-updates-childhood-vaccine-schedule/).
***
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/press-release/health-and-human-services-administratively-updates-childhood-vaccine-schedule/
CSIS Issues Commentary: Credible Path to Political Stability Is Indispensable for Trump's Venezuela Oil Aspirations
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 6, 2026:
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A Credible Path to Political Stability Is Indispensable for Trump's Venezuela Oil Aspirations
By Clayton Seigle
Following a three-week U.S. naval quarantine that has halted most of Venezuela's oil exports, the Trump administration apprehended Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and declared that the United States is now running Venezuela. President Trump said that U.S. oil companies would invest billions of dollars to rejuvenate Venezuela's dilapidated oil industry,
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 6, 2026:
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A Credible Path to Political Stability Is Indispensable for Trump's Venezuela Oil Aspirations
By Clayton Seigle
Following a three-week U.S. naval quarantine that has halted most of Venezuela's oil exports, the Trump administration apprehended Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and declared that the United States is now running Venezuela. President Trump said that U.S. oil companies would invest billions of dollars to rejuvenate Venezuela's dilapidated oil industry,with proceeds used to pay back those investments, reimburse prior American claims, and support the people of Venezuela.
This commentary analyzes President Trump's stated vision for Venezuela's oil industry, describing the resources and conditions needed to secure U.S. company participation in rehabilitating the sector and associated costs and timelines. A forthcoming paper will address the wider geostrategic effects of Trump's policies as energy consumers and producers react and adjust to rapidly changing circumstances.
Venezuela's Oil Potential
Venezuela possesses the largest oil resources in the world, estimated at more than 300 billion barrels. At its highest point, Venezuela produced close to 3.5 million barrels per day (mb/d). Production steadily declined due to severe mismanagement under the leadership of former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, and it has continued its downward trajectory in recent years under pressure from U.S. sanctions, bottoming out at just 500 thousand barrels per day (kb/d) during the first Trump administration. Since summer 2025, output has hovered around 900 kb/d (see Figure 1).
Most Venezuelan oil is "extra heavy," meaning it is extremely viscous and carbon rich compared to lighter oil grades, such as U.S. West Texas Intermediate. It requires special preprocessing (called upgrading) prior to refining into transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel--and that added processing requires costly, capital-intensive infrastructure.
Ramp-Up Requirements
Hypothetically, under optimal legal, fiscal, and physical operating conditions, it should be possible for Venezuela to reattain its historical high-water mark of oil production above 3 mb/d. But its oil industry requires a range of repairs and investments to come back online, including the following:
* Reliable electrical power supply: The national grid is dilapidated, causing consumers in all sectors (including industrial) to suffer outages. To operate sophisticated processing and upgrading equipment, power must be readily accessible.
* Drilling rigs and their operators: The entire country of Venezuela has only a couple of rigs present and operating; dozens of rigs will be needed to rehabilitate oil fields and grow production. These will be operated by international oilfield services companies, which will require similar reassurances as the oil and gas producers themselves before deciding whether to enter the market.
* Upgraders: Extra-heavy oil requires specialized facilities that remove carbon and/or add hydrogen. These are essentially oil refining units that cost billions of dollars to design and build over multiyear construction timelines. Only one of Venezuela's four installed upgraders is currently operational. Renovating the shuttered upgraders could require investments comparable in size to those for new builds.
How Much More and How Soon?
Adding incremental tranches of Venezuelan oil production can be split into two categories: easy/short-term and challenging/protracted. For example, one "low-hanging fruit" initiative to increase output would involve an extensive program of "workovers" (major maintenance and repairs) on existing oil wells. This would require the deployment of at least a few dozen drilling rigs from outside Venezuela, access to specialized materials (many of which will be more expensive starting this year because of Trump's tariffs), and oilfield services specialists from countries like the United States. Such a workover program might increase output by approximately 500 kb/d (or 50 percent of current output) within 18 months of its initiation, at a cost of "only" a few billion dollars.
On the other hand, building and refurbishing upgrading units are on the other side of the cost and complexity spectrum--with a price tag of tens of billions of dollars and requiring at least several years for unit renovations, and perhaps six or more years for new builds. This longer timeline will be needed to grow Venezuela's sustainable production capacity materially above 2 mb/d.
Nothing Happens Without Political Stability
One of the most important requirements on every energy company's checklist for doing business around the world is the outlook for political stability in the host country. That's especially true in a case like Venezuela, with its history of socialist, autocratic rule; stolen elections; alliances with U.S. adversaries; macroeconomic failures; and oil industry expropriations driven by resource nationalism.
It doesn't matter how much oil is underground and technically accessible if drillers and producers believe that the risks outweigh potential rewards in a host country. While President Trump aspires for U.S. energy companies to invest heavily in Venezuela's energy sector, a credible road map to political stability is the chief prerequisite.
And there's good reason to doubt the outlook for political stability in Caracas, as governance and transition plans are ambiguous at best.
Although Maduro himself is out of the picture, Trump has signaled his expectation that the Maduro regime will cooperate with the administration. Asked whether the United States would work with Venezuelan interim president and Maduro regime leader Delcy Rodriguez, Trump said Rodriguez is "essentially willing to do what we think is necessary to make Venezuela great again." And Trump senior adviser Stephen Miller told CNN that the Venezuelan "government has sent . . . message after message making clear that they will meet the terms, demands, conditions, and requirements of the United States."
Trump's approach to working with Venezuela's current leadership is difficult to reconcile with the administration's longstanding accusation of its illegitimacy, recognizing that Maduro and his associates fraudulently retained power despite the political opposition's landslide victory in the July 2024 election.
Trump is apparently hoping that the very same regime, now headed by Delcy Rodriguez, will change its behaviors by halting drug activity, ending cooperation with U.S. adversaries, and welcoming U.S. oil companies back into the country under favorable fiscal terms. Trump is therefore not seeking to oust the Venezuelan political leadership, but to transform it into a partner of the United States.
As of now, there's no indication that this approach is likely to succeed in attracting international energy corporations into Venezuela's oil sector. Unless and until those companies are confident of a stable political future in Venezuela--one that will last a lot longer than Trump's term--they're unlikely to make the tremendous investments that would be needed to restore and grow Venezuela's capacity to produce oil and gas.
Perhaps mindful that far more pressure will be needed to obtain the Maduro-Rodriguez regime's cooperation, Trump is for now maintaining the naval quarantine blocking most of Venezuela's oil exports and leaving the massive U.S. military force nearby and at the ready for additional missions.
Aligning Expectations with Industry Requirements
Considering Trump's expectation that U.S. oil companies will enthusiastically enter the Venezuelan oil sector, there's a lesson to be learned from the administration's first-year assumption that policy changes would incentivize large increases in domestic energy supply. Neither early rhetoric like "drill baby, drill" and "unleashing" American energy supplies, nor modest policy changes like new lease sales, have pushed U.S. oil output significantly higher; meanwhile, output is forecasted to decline during Trump's second year in office. Companies ran the numbers and determined that major new oil production with prices near or below $60 would not be profitable--an unacceptable outcome for their investors.
Likewise, energy companies will evaluate opportunities in Venezuela with a similar litmus test--do the benefits of committing to multi-decade and multi-billion-dollar investments outweigh the risks? Even if the answer is yes--and we're far from reaching that answer after last weekend's dramatic events--policymakers should set realistic expectations for the long timetables associated with those results.
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Clayton Seigle is a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and holds the James R. Schlesinger Chair in Energy and Geopolitics.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/credible-path-political-stability-indispensable-trumps-venezuela-oil-aspirations
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Health and Human Services Administratively Updates Childhood Vaccine Schedule
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on Jan. 6, 2026:
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Health and Human Services Administratively Updates Childhood Vaccine Schedule
By Michael Baker
Executive Summary
* The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), recently updated the childhood vaccination schedule.
* The change was taken pursuant to a presidential memorandum directing HHS and CDC to review "best practices" among peer countries for "core" childhood vaccine recommendations and to update the U.S. schedule if
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on Jan. 6, 2026:
* * *
Health and Human Services Administratively Updates Childhood Vaccine Schedule
By Michael Baker
Executive Summary
* The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), recently updated the childhood vaccination schedule.
* The change was taken pursuant to a presidential memorandum directing HHS and CDC to review "best practices" among peer countries for "core" childhood vaccine recommendations and to update the U.S. schedule ifthose practices were determined to be "superior," while "preserving access" to vaccines currently available.
* The revised schedule distinguishes: (1) immunizations recommended for all children, (2) immunizations recommended for certain high-risk groups or populations, and (3) immunizations based on shared clinical decision-making.
Introduction
On January 5, 2026, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced that Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) leadership had updated the U.S. childhood immunization schedule after a review comparing U.S. recommendations with those of "peer, developed" countries. The change was taken pursuant to a December 5, 2025, presidential memorandum directing HHS and CDC to review "best practices" among peer countries for "core" childhood vaccine recommendations and to update the U.S. schedule if those practices were determined to be "superior," while "preserving access" to vaccines currently available.
Operationally, HHS describes the revised schedule as a three-part structure that distinguishes: (1) immunizations recommended for all children, (2) immunizations recommended for certain high-risk groups or populations, and (3) immunizations based on shared clinical decision-making (SCDM), which is a decision process between the health care provider and the patient or parent/guardian. HHS also states that vaccines listed across these categories will be covered by insurance without cost-sharing, positioning the change as a reclassification of "default" recommendations rather than a restriction on availability.
2026 Vaccine Schedule Update
HHS' press release identifies the "recommended for all children" category to include immunization against measles, mumps, rubella, polio, pertussis, tetanus, diphtheria, haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) , pneumococcal disease, human papillomavirus (HPV), and varicella.
The policy change is clearest in what is not in the universal category. The HHS fact sheet specifies that the high-risk category vaccines include respiratory syncytial virus monoclonal antibody (RSV-mAb), hepatitis A, hepatitis B, dengue, meningococcal vaccine for serotypes A, C, W, and Y, and meningococcal B (with further footnotes defining the triggering risk criteria). Finally, the shared clinical decision-making category includes rotavirus, COVID-19, influenza, meningococcal disease, hepatitis A, and hepatitis B. As noted in the listings above, meningococcal disease, hepatitis A, and hepatitis B are dually categorized on the new schedule.
HHS also highlights a change to HPV dosing, stating the CDC is now recommending one dose (rather than two) based on "recent scientific studies" and alignment with "several peer nation[s]."
Below is a table summarizing the recategorization of the childhood vaccination schedule.
Purported Rationale
The administration's published rationale for updating the children's vaccination schedule is framed as (1) international benchmarking and (2) trust and adherence considerations.
First, the presidential memorandum asserts that the United States has been an "outlier" in the number of diseases for which it recommended vaccination for all children (including COVID-19 as of January 2025), and it cites Denmark, Japan, and Germany as comparators with fewer universally recommended diseases. HHS's press release adopts a similar framing, stating that in 2024 the United States recommended more childhood vaccines than any peer nation and "more than twice as many doses" as some European nations, again referencing Denmark at the low end. The fact sheet states the revised U.S. schedule is intended to recommend "all vaccines for which there is consensus among peer nations," with non-consensus vaccines reallocated to high-risk or SCDM categories.
Second, HHS explicitly links the revision to public trust and uptake. The press release states that its assessment documented a "significant decline in public trust" from 2020-2024, coinciding with falling childhood vaccination rates and increased risk of vaccine-preventable disease. The fact sheet offers a quantified trust claim (trust declining from 72 percent to 40 percent between 2020 and 2024) and argues that a more "focused" core schedule could improve "clarity," adherence, and public confidence.
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Michael Baker is the Director of Health Care Policy at the American Action Forum
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/health-and-human-services-administratively-updates-childhood-vaccine-schedule/
[Category: Think Tank]
