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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Japarov Moves to Consolidate Power Vertical
WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by Sam Jones, Eurasia and Terrorism associate, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Japarov Moves to Consolidate Power Vertical
Executive Summary:
* On February 10, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov removed the country's second most influential figure, Kamchybek Tashiev, from his position as chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), rupturing the "tandem" model that has governed the Kyrgyz Republic since Japarov and Tashiev came to power in 2020.
* Japarov simultaneously began ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by Sam Jones, Eurasia and Terrorism associate, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Japarov Moves to Consolidate Power Vertical Executive Summary: * On February 10, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov removed the country's second most influential figure, Kamchybek Tashiev, from his position as chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), rupturing the "tandem" model that has governed the Kyrgyz Republic since Japarov and Tashiev came to power in 2020. * Japarov simultaneously beganpurging Tashiev's associates from security and government posts to dismantle his informal network, and instituted reforms to rein in the GKNB's mandate and prevent any future security chief from amassing sufficient power to challenge the presidency directly.
* These moves signal Japarov's intentions to build a personalist model of control ahead of next year's presidential elections, allowing him to consolidate power on a larger scale than any of his predecessors.
On February 10, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov announced that, effective immediately, he was removing Kamchybek Tashiev from the position as chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) (President of the Kyrgyz Republic, February 10). Since coming to power in October 2020, following the uprising against then-President Sooronbay Jeenbekov, Japarov and Tashiev have ruled as a tandem and consolidated power by silencing all opposition, weakening civil society, and coercing or co-opting the Kyrgyz Republic's elite networks (see EDM, October 27, 2020, November 17, 2025; The Diplomat, May 1, 2024). Under Tashiev's centralized control, the GKNB dramatically expanded its mandate, reaching all levels of Kyrgyz society and possibly becoming the country's most influential institution (Kaktus.media, February 12). Tashiev took the lead on many issues nominally outside of the purview of a security chief, including those in the diplomatic, economic, educational, and political spheres, among others (K-News, May 17, 2024; Economist.kg, March 13, 2025; Kaktus.media, May 26, 2025; 24.kz, November 17, 2025). Many even began to question whether Japarov was still the head of the country, or if Tashiev had eclipsed him (Kloop, July 8, 2025). In this context, Japarov's decision to remove Tashiev and begin dismantling the GKNB has sent shockwaves through the Kyrgyz political system.
Several factors likely led Japarov to act now. On February 9, the day before Tashiev's removal, a document signed by 75 people--including public figures, scientists, and former deputies and prime ministers--was sent to Japarov, demanding early elections due to the constitutional changes in April 2021 (24.kg;Kaktus.media, February 9)./[1] The signatories listed the administration's key achievements and shortcomings over the past five years, arguing that "the newly elected president and his new team will have the opportunity to continue the successful work and solve existing serious problems." Notably, the authors' list of achievements almost exclusively highlighted measures taken by Tashiev (Kloop, February 11). Many have interpreted this letter as an attempt by Tashiev--or, at the very least, by his supporters--to secure the presidency for himself in the event of early elections. Japarov's press secretary, Askat Alagosov, explained that people within Tashiev's entourage "called for defecting to the general's [Tashiev's] side and signing certain documents, thereby posing a threat to stability in government structures," in a direct reference to the letter sent to Japarov (Facebook/askat.alagozov, February 10;Open.kg, February 11).
Japarov is also likely acting now due to Tashiev's health. After his ouster, rumors began circulating that Tashiev had left the country to seek medical treatment. It has since been confirmed that Tashiev traveled to Germany and, according to Mayor of Osh Zhenishbek Toktorbayev, went to Munich for an examination after one of the five stents in his heart shifted (Kaktus.media, February 10; 24.kg, February 11). Japarov presumably concluded that Tashiev's absence presented the best opportunity to move against him, betting that Tashiev would not be able to rally associates and supporters to his side from abroad. This conclusion appears to be correct. No political figure in the Kyrgyz Republic has publicly defended Tashiev, allowing Japarov to swiftly take control without the obstruction of elite defections (Kloop; Telegram/@kaktus_mediakg; Telegram/@polit_lombard; Telegram/@kgbul, February 11).
Given these circumstances, Japarov has moved to not only target Tashiev himself but also to dismantle his networks within Kyrgyz governance structures. Simultaneously with Tashiev's removal, Japarov ousted First Deputy Chairman of the GKNB Kurvanbek Avazov, Deputy Chairman of the GKNB and Director of the Cybersecurity Coordination Center Daniel Rysaliev, and Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for National Security and Director of the Anti-Terrorism Center Elizar Smanov (Dknews.kz, February 10). All are known to be close to Tashiev (RBC, February 10). In their place, Japarov has appointed Zhumgalbek Shabdanbekov as acting head of the GKNB, Rustam Mamasadykov as first deputy of the GKNB, Alisher Erbayev as director of the Anti-Terrorism Center, and Uranbek Shadybekov as head of the Cybersecurity Center. All are considered to be exclusively loyal to Japarov (Economist.kg, February 10; Feregana.agency; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 11). Purges within the GKNB and in other government structures continued in the following days. On February 14, Eldar Zhakypbekov was removed as head of the GKNB in Bishkek and arrested the following day (Kaktus.media, February 14; Vesti.kg, February 15). On February 16, Salmoor Dzhumabekov was removed as head of the GKNB of Osh and Osh oblast (24.kg, February 16). Later that day, Japarov dismissed Minister of Emergency Situations Boobek Azhikeyev, Minister of Natural Resources, Ecology, and Technical Supervision Meder Mashiev, and Minister of Transport and Communications Absattar Syrgabayev (President of the Kyrgyz Republic [1], [2], [3]; Vedomosti, February 16). The removal of Tashiev's associates and anyone suspected of disloyalty from government positions signals Japarov's intention to personalize Kyrgyz state institutions ahead of next year's presidential elections.
Alongside personnel rotations, Japarov has taken measures to significantly reduce the GKNB's power. On February 10, he established two new security services, the State Security Service and a Border Guard Service, which previously operated within the GKNB and will now function as an independent institution (President of the Kyrgyz Republic, February 10). Additionally, both institutions are directly subordinate to Japarov rather than to the GKNB (Telegram/@kaktus_mediakg; Telegram/@Vesti_Kyrgyzstan, February 10). The creation of separate, competing security institutions could be an act of counterbalancing./[2] The new security services intend to rein in the GKNB's mandate and prevent any future security chief from amassing sufficient power to challenge Japarov directly. According to sources in Bishkek, the GKNB will undergo further, serious reforms and purges in the coming months as Japarov seeks to consolidate control over the country's security structure (Kaktus.media, February 12).
Japarov and Tashiev had long competed for influence over members of the Jogorku Kenesh, the Kyrgyz Republic's parliament (Carnegie Politika, November 25, 2025). The removal of Tashiev has given Japarov an opportunity to fully subjugate parliament and rid the institution of any leftover influence from Tashiev's network. Speaker of the Jogorku Kenesh Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu--a southerner and known ally of Tashiev--officially resigned on February 12 amid rumors that Japarov sought his ouster (Vechernii Bishkek, February 12; 24.kg, February 13). Marlen Mamataliev--a northerner and strong supporter of Japarov--was swiftly elected unopposed in Turgunbek uulu's place (24.kg, February 12; Check-point.kz, February 16). In a February 13 interview with the state media company Kabar, Japarov stated that "everything began in the parliament," asserting that members of the parliament, deputies, and activists aimed to divide the country into two sides, the "president's" and the "general's." Japarov claims he was therefore forced to act quickly to prevent a coup and maintain unity (Kabar, February 13).
The Kyrgyz Republic's neighbors appear to have taken an interest in recent developments. A flurry of public diplomatic activity suggests a desire to quell potential political turmoil. On February 10, the day of Tashiev's ouster, Japarov held a call with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev (24.kg, February 10). On February 13, Japarov welcomed Tajik Prime Minister Kohir Rasulzoda and Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs Ermek Kosherbaev to Bishkek (Kabar, February 13 [1], [2]). The newly elected speaker of the Jogorku Kenesh, Mamataliev, also spoke by phone with the chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federal Assembly, Vyacheslav Volodin, on February 13. During the call, Volodin invited Mamatliev to visit Russia, which Mamatliev accepted (24.kg, February 13). On February 17, Japarov held a call with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Toakayev, in which Toakayev expressed his support for Japarov's decisions aimed at "preserving the unity of society and strengthening Kyrgyz statehood." Japarov, in turn, expressed support for Toakayev's constitutional reform in Kazakhstan (Vlast.kz, February 17).
While both Japarov and Tashiev have made their nationalist views known, Tashiev's particularly hard-line position has often impeded Japarov's efforts to develop closer ties with the Kyrgyz Republic's neighbors (Carnegie Politika, February 12). For example, in 2021, Tashiev almost ruptured the long-awaited border deal with Uzbekistan (Kloop, April 19, 2021). In 2023, he directly threatened the Tajik government over its territorial claims (24.kg, September 15, 2023). Tashiev's negative views of the Russian language, efforts to develop a foreign policy less reliant on Russia, and rebukes of Russia's treatment of migrants also angered many in Moscow (Gazeta.ru, December 31, 2025; Telegram/@Nezygar, February 11). Russian media and social media outlets close to the Kremlin and other siloviki-linked networks have notably celebrated Tashiev's ouster as the removal of the "main Russophobe," reflecting Moscow's past frustrations with him (Lenta.ru, February 10; Nezavisimaya gazeta; Telegram/@Nezygar, February 11; Vedomosti; Telegram/@Rybar, February 12).
Japarov's successive and decisive measures indicate that he had long planned for the eventual necessity of Tashiev's removal. In his first statement after his removal, Tashiev expressed that Japarov's actions were "completely unexpected" for him, but that "we must comply with the president's decision" (Kloop, February 11). Japarov appears to support a quiet return home for Tashiev, one that will allow him to remain free but, in return, away from politics. On February 13, Tashiev returned to Bishkek before meeting with Japarov on February 15 (Kaktus.media, February 16). Commenting on the meeting, Japarov stated that Tashiev "will not return to a government position" and should instead "rest and take care of his health" (Kabar, February 16). By removing the country's second-most-powerful figure, Japarov has consolidated power more than any of his predecessors and now seeks to build a personalist system reminiscent of those in many of the Kyrgyz Republic's neighbors. The stability of this system may depend on Tashiev. The next presidential elections are scheduled for January 2027, and with Tashiev sidelined, Japarov will undoubtedly cruise to a decisive victory. If Tashiev decides to run and rally others to his side, however, Kyrgyz politics are likely to return to instability and unpredictability.
[1] This refers to the Kyrgyz Republic's new constitution, ratified in April 2021. Japarov was elected in January 2021 under the previous constitution, which allowed presidents to serve a single 6-year term. He quickly introduced a constitutional referendum, and the April 2021 constitution now allows for presidents to serve two 5-year terms. The letter argues that Japarov should call elections this year rather than next, because five years have passed since the new constitution was ratified. Japarov maintains that his presidency complies with the previous constitution, rather than the current one. Japarov's interpretation allows him to complete his six-year term and then serve two additional five-year terms under the current constitution. On February 17, the Kyrgyz Republic's constitutional court unsurprisingly ruled in favor of Japarov, officially declaring January 24, 2027, as the date of the next presidential elections and resetting Japarov's term limits under the new constitution (24.kg, February 17).
[2] For more on how leaders "counterbalance" against potential rivals by creating competing institutions, see De Bruin, Erica. How to Prevent Coups d'Etat: Counterbalancing and Regime Survival. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvv413v6.
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Sam Jones is an Eurasia and Terrorism Associate at The Jamestown Foundation.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/japarov-moves-to-consolidate-power-vertical/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Washington Times: Taiwan Is Not China's Sudetenland
WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by Miles Yu, senior fellow and director of the China Center, to the Washington Times:* * *
Taiwan Is Not China's Sudetenland
The CCP uses the island as a distraction.
*
Beijing has tried for years to convince the world that Taiwan is its ultimate, sacred "core interest," the one issue that eclipses everything else.
We are told that peace, trade, climate cooperation and even global stability all hinge ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by Miles Yu, senior fellow and director of the China Center, to the Washington Times: * * * Taiwan Is Not China's Sudetenland The CCP uses the island as a distraction. * Beijing has tried for years to convince the world that Taiwan is its ultimate, sacred "core interest," the one issue that eclipses everything else. We are told that peace, trade, climate cooperation and even global stability all hingeon whether the world yields to the Chinese Communist Party's demands over a small island of 23 million people. This fixation is not only imperious but also profoundly phony. History has seen this movie before.
In the 1930s, Adolf Hitler fixated the world's attention on the Sudetenland, a small, German-speaking enclave within the sovereign state of Czechoslovakia. He framed it as Germany's core grievance, wrapped in the language of history, ethnicity and national humiliation.
Britain and France bought the story. In Munich in 1938, they sold out Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland in exchange for a promise of peace.
Of course, Sudetenland was never the endgame. It was the opening move. The result was not stability but a chain of aggression that plunged the world into catastrophe.
Today, the CCP wants us to believe Taiwan is China's Sudetenland -- the one issue that must be "resolved" at all costs. The parallels are unsettling. Like Hitler, Beijing insists that if only this one grievance were settled, then everything else would calm down. Also like Hitler, Beijing's appetite extends far beyond a single territory.
China is simultaneously pressing claims against India, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Bhutan and others, both on land and at sea. Taiwan is not the only prey; it is the most useful distraction.
That distraction serves several purposes.
First, when cornered, the CCP changes the subject. By obsessively framing Taiwan as a "sovereignty issue," Beijing tries to force the free world into a false debate: Is Taiwan part of China or not? This framing deliberately obscures the real issue: not cartography, but free capitalism versus communist control.
Taiwan is a functioning democracy facing down an authoritarian dictatorship. Reducing that struggle to an internal Chinese matter launders tyranny into normal diplomacy.
At the core of this Taiwan fixation is the CCP's own act of cognitive deception: the false claim of "reunification." China's obsession with reunification rests on myths rather than historical or legal reality. Taiwan has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, making the language of "reuniting" inherently misleading.
Its political status as an independent and sovereign country is not a leftover from China's civil war, nor the product of shared ethnicity or ancient history, but the result of Taiwan's own democratic transformation since the late 1980s. Modern international law rejects historical nostalgia as a justification for annexation, and major U.S. policy frameworks, including the Three Communiques, do not recognize Taiwan as part of the PRC.
Beijing's selective respect for borders, willingly ceding vast territories elsewhere while insisting Taiwan is nonnegotiable, reveals that ideology, not geography, drives its claims.
Second, the CCP's fixation on Taiwan allows Beijing to dodge global responsibility. Whenever the world presses China to act constructively -- on Iran, Russia, North Korea, global health, arms control, fentanyl, climate or maritime law -- Chinese leaders filibuster with ritualistic lectures about Taiwan and the hollow incantation of the hackneyed "One China" principle.
The result is paralysis. Serious global problems go unaddressed while China escapes accountability for human rights abuses, COVID-19 obfuscation, massive carbon emissions, espionage, weaponized supply chains and predatory economic practices. By pretending it can talk only about Taiwan, Beijing ensures it talks about nothing else.
Third, the CCP's obsession with Taiwan provides ideological cover for China's military buildup. Beijing insists its rapidly expanding and modernizing military is focused on "reunification," yet hardly any of its capabilities are designed solely for a Taiwan contingency. The People's Liberation Army is being built to contest and, if necessary, defeat the free world across space, cyber, maritime and long-range strike domains.
Taiwan is not the strategic destination; it is the narrative justification for a far broader bid for regional, and ultimately global, military dominance.
Finally, this brings us to the deeper ideological driver that ties everything together. The CCP is a Marxist-Leninist regime that depends on permanent struggle to sustain itself. Such a system requires an external enemy and perpetual emergency, real or imagined, to maintain internal cohesion, justify repression and keep revolutionary fervor alive.
Casting Taiwan as the "unfinished mission" of the communist revolution conveniently serves this purpose. It allows the party to blame an alleged imperialist conspiracy, led by the United States, for a failure that has lingered since 1949. From Mao Zedong, to Deng Xiaoping, to Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, every CCP leader has devoted to a constant and carefully calculated escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
This has included decades of artillery barrages on the Taiwan-held Quemoy and Matsu Islands since the mid-1950s, countless military provocations from missile firings to waters near Taiwan's shores, to ritualistic round-the-island military intimidations of today. All aim to promote domestic unity and sustain the narrative of the CCP's fighting vitality.
Seen in this light, Taiwan is not just a target; it is a tool. A tool to escape international responsibility, mobilize nationalism, suppress dissent, excuse militarization and sustain a revolutionary narrative that would otherwise collapse under the weight of its own contradictions.
The CCP's fixation on Taiwan is not the product of historical inevitability or national destiny, but rather a carefully cultivated obsession, one that tells us far more about the insecurities and phony moral solemnity of the regime than about the island it seeks to absorb.
If the world allows the CCP to take Taiwan, then the result will be a fatal trigger for a long chain of aggression that will engulf the world once again in a global conflagration, as happened after the betrayal in Munich in 1938.
Read in The Washington Times (https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/feb/16/taiwan-chinas-sudetenland/).
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/taiwan-not-chinas-sudetenland-miles-yu
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Russia's Hope for Trans-Atlantic Rift at MSC Disappointed
WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by Pavel K. Baev, senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russia's Hope for Trans-Atlantic Rift at MSC Disappointed
Executive Summary:
* Russia hoped the February 13-15 Munich Security Conference (MSC) would expose rifts between the United States and Europe through disputes over approaches to nuclear arms, Arctic security, and Ukraine. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio instead reaffirmed Washington's commitment to European security, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by Pavel K. Baev, senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia's Hope for Trans-Atlantic Rift at MSC Disappointed Executive Summary: * Russia hoped the February 13-15 Munich Security Conference (MSC) would expose rifts between the United States and Europe through disputes over approaches to nuclear arms, Arctic security, and Ukraine. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio instead reaffirmed Washington's commitment to European security,reinforcing trans-Atlantic unity.
* Russian media speculated that New START's expiration and contention over Greenland would cast a shadow over the MSC. Discussions in Munich largely downplayed these issues, and the United Kingdom highlighted NATO solidarity through joint Arctic naval deployments.
* Russia did not try to demonstrate its military might to the dignitaries conferencing in Munich, bucking the Kremlin's pattern of upping military pressure on Ukraine on the eve of peace talks. The lack of a new Russian offensive push is likely because of the depletion of troops from heavy casualties during the winter campaign.
Russia hopes to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe through hybrid attacks and nuclear brinkmanship to increase its chances of prevailing against Ukraine. The Kremlin expected the February 13-15 Munich Security Conference (MSC) to trigger a new surge in tensions between the United States and the European Union. Mainstream Russian commentary ahead of the conference assumed that EU leaders would critique U.S. policy (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 11). The main message from the MSC, however, was about reconfiguring and reinforcing the trans-Atlantic unity, and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio elaborately asserted the United States' commitment to European security (RIA Novosti, February 14). The conference often brings surprises, including Russian President Vladimir Putin's address in 2007, which strongly criticized the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and marked a turning point in Russia-West relations. Rubio's speech delivered another surprise, albeit of a very different nature than the Kremlin hoped (RBC, February 14).
The Kremlin believed that the expiration of the U.S.-Russian New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) would cast a shadow over the conference (Radio Svoboda, February 12). Russian pundits were eager to speculate about greater risks of a new nuclear arms race, but Rubio ignored this matter altogether (Kommersant, February 4; TopWar.ru, February 12). The Kremlin still hopes to engage the U.S. government in protracted and self-serving talks on strategic stability, but Russian nuclear threats mostly target Europe (RIAC, February 9). Moscow intended its January 9 Oreshnik strike on an aircraft repair plant in Lviv to stoke European doubts about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear guarantees (see EDM, January 13; The Insider, February 10). Pro-Kremlin media have amplified every rumor about Europe considering developing an independent nuclear deterrent capability, but U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer's statement about the expansion of the U.K.-French cooperation in nuclear strategy was the only such signal from Munich (Izvestiya, February 13; Kommersant, February 14).
Moscow also viewed Arctic security, particularly arguments over Greenland, as a potential source of division within NATO during Munich (Forbes.ru, January 23; Kommersant, February 13). Russian commentators interpreted French President Emmanuel Macron's warning about the fragility of the partial solution on Greenland negotiated by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the Davos Forum in January as evidence of a deep chasm between the United States and the European Union (RBC, February 10; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 11). The United States and European Union carefully downplayed the Greenland question in Munich. Starmer made the most prominent point about Arctic security by announcing the United Kingdom's forthcoming deployment of its aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales for NATO patrols in the Northern Atlantic (Vedomosti, February 14). Moscow's ability to project power from its naval "bastion" in the Eastern part of the Barents Sea along the coast of Norway and into the Northern Sea is limited to a few nuclear submarines as Russia's Northern Fleet struggles to keep its major surface combatants operational (Izvestiya, February 13).
The degree of Western unity in supporting Ukraine is the most important matter for Russia in the Munich discussions. Moscow can hardly find comfort in Rubio's discourse on the broad, civilizational foundation of the U.S.-Europe alliance (Meduza, February 14). Rubio was succinct on the topic of peace talks that are set to continue in Geneva, confirming that U.S. negotiators will keep testing Putin's readiness to bring the war to an end (Nastoyashee Vremya, February 13). Nothing in Rubio's remarks confirmed the existence of the "spirit of Anchorage," which Russian authorities try to conjure to imply an understanding between Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump to pressure Ukraine to make concessions (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 10; Meduza, February 11). European preparations for deploying forces of the "coalition of the willing" as a part of security guarantees for Ukraine are decried in Moscow as attempts to poison this mythical "spirit of Anchorage" (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 10; RBC, February 11).
Russia did not try to demonstrate its military might to the dignitaries conferencing in Munich by executing a series of massive missile strikes on Kyiv or by attempting a stronger push in the Donbas "kill-zone" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 10). This passivity does not fit the Kremlin's pattern of upping military pressure on the eve of peace talks and may indicate an attempt to build reserves for a new spring-summer offensive (The Insider, February 13). More probably, however, the lack of a new Russian push in the Donbas is because of the depletion of "storm" units from heavy casualties during the winter campaign, when severe cold turned light wounds into fatalities (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, February 11).
Russia's capacity to replace these casualties by recruiting 35,000-40,000 new soldiers per month is increasingly uncertain. Only extra-high signing bonuses can stimulate middle-aged men to sign military contracts, as expanding cemeteries illustrate the probability of death at the front (Carnegie Politika, February 10). In Moscow's war of attrition against Ukraine, the cost of recruitment driven by signing bonuses is a heavy addition to the financial crisis, which affects Russia's poorest regions the hardest (Re: Russia, February 13). The Kremlin has revised its forecasts of economic stagnation downwards as oil export revenues are squeezed by U.S. pressure and EU sanctions (The Moscow Times; The Bell, February 13).
This degradation of the Russian economy generates strong disincentives for potential investors. Whatever proposals for joint projects Putin's special envoy Kirill Dmitriev may bring to the side rooms of the Geneva talks, their shrinking margins of profits translate into diminishing political leverage (Vedomosti, February 13). The volume of resources that the European Union earmarks for reconstruction of Ukraine, in addition to current military and financial support, guarantees a very different short- and mid-term environment for investors. Putin may cherish hopes for a personal rapport with Trump underpinned by lucrative opportunities, but his obsession with subjugating Ukraine erases the space for compromises necessary for a peace deal and for doing business. Trans-Atlantic unity, re-energized in Munich, reduces Putin's chance of diplomatic victory, perhaps even more disastrous for Russia than the plan to conquer Kyiv by the end of February 2022.
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Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russias-hope-for-trans-atlantic-rift-at-msc-disappointed/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Kazakhstan's Downgrading of Russian Language Infuriates Moscow
WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Kazakhstan's Downgrading of Russian Language Infuriates Moscow
Executive Summary:
* The new draft Kazakhstan constitution downgrades the status of the Russian language by specifying that Russian exists "alongside" Kazakh rather than sharing legal equality with it, a move upsetting Moscow and Kazakh nationalists for opposite reasons.
* This change reflects both demographic changes in Kazakhstan--Kazakhs ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Kazakhstan's Downgrading of Russian Language Infuriates Moscow Executive Summary: * The new draft Kazakhstan constitution downgrades the status of the Russian language by specifying that Russian exists "alongside" Kazakh rather than sharing legal equality with it, a move upsetting Moscow and Kazakh nationalists for opposite reasons. * This change reflects both demographic changes in Kazakhstan--Kazakhsnow form more than 70 percent of the total and ethnic Russians fewer than 15 percent--and Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's increasing readiness to challenge Moscow.
* Russian commentators see this as the latest hostile act by Astana, something they say shows that Kazakhstan is moving along the same path as Ukraine and may require a similar and equally harsh Russian response to maintain Russian President Vladimir Putin's "Russian world."
President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has been less inclined to defer to Moscow than his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, since succeeding him in 2019. Tokayev has adopted policies that reflect his commitment to promoting Kazakh national identity and taking public stands against Russian President Vladimir Putin's increasingly aggressive Russian foreign policy (QMonitor, February 10). He and his government have promoted ethnic Kazakh identity alongside civil Kazakhstanets identity, talked about the famine in Kazakhstan perpetrated by Joseph Stalin and other Soviet leaders, and hedged against Moscow on a variety of issues, including Ukraine (Central Asia Monitor, August 5, 2018; Novaya Gazeta, December 24, 2021; Business Online; Telegram/@stat_gov_kz_official, April 30, 2023; Fergana.News, May 1, 2023). [1] Moreover, Tokayev has engaged in what many Russians see as an act of lese-majeste by speaking in Kazakh to Russians, despite making the effort to speak in Chinese to officials from the People's Republic of China (Svobodnaya Pressa, November 10, 2023; Lenta.ru, November 13, 2023).
Kazakhstan's new draft constitution, slated to be approved by referendum in March, downgrades the status of the Russian language. It specifies that Russian exists "alongside" Kazakh rather than "on par" with it. Moscow views this move as a threat to good relations between the two countries. Kazakh nationalists, on the other hand, are upset because Astana has not dropped any commitment to a special status for Russian (Vlast, February 9; Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, February 12; Altyn-Orda, February 15). The proposed change reflects demographic developments in Kazakhstan. The country had an ethnic Russian plurality of around 40 percent of the population until near the end of Soviet times, but is now more than 70 percent ethnically Kazakh, with ethnic Russians accounting for fewer than 15 percent of the total. Tokayev is increasingly willing to promote Kazakh identity and challenge Moscow's policies, albeit in generally careful and balanced ways (Window on Eurasia, May 4, 2023). Many Russian commentators, however, ignore both this new demographic reality and the diplomatic care with which Tokayev has acted. They instead view all such moves, including the latest one, as an indication that Kazakhstan is now moving along the same path Ukraine did before Putin launched his full-scale invasion and may require Moscow to respond in a similar way (Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, January 12).
Tokayev has taken another step that is especially infuriating to these commentators. This comes at a time when Putin is pushing his "Russian world" and defining that word in largely linguistic terms (see EDM, October 31, 2024). In this new draft constitution, Tokayev has lowered the status of the Russian language by changing the terms used to designate its status in Kazakhstan, no longer defining it as equal to Kazakh but suggesting that it is another language existing alongside it. Such a shift lowers Russian from its status as the language of interethnic communication it has enjoyed since the first constitution of independent Kazakhstan in the 1990s and may very well presage further reductions in the future (Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, February 12).
This shift in wording reflects both the increasing importance of Kazakh in the life of Kazakhstan and the sense that the role of Russian will naturally decline as the number of its speakers does. Tokayev has promoted this process without entering unnecessary conflicts with the Kremlin, while not sacrificing any of his country's fundamental interests (Window on Eurasia, September 16, 2025). As government experts in Kazakhstan point out, this change will have few immediate consequences (Vlast, February 9).
Under the current constitution, these experts say, officials are obligated to give any information they release in Kazakh and Russian. Under the new constitutional language, they will have to supply it in Russian only upon the request of the citizen involved in the proceeding or application. Very few Russian speakers in Kazakhstan will be discommoded, but the change, after such a long period during which Astana did not use Moscow's preferred terminology, sends a signal to Kazakhstan's population that Tokayev is prepared to take further steps to boost the Kazakh language and Kazakh identity. That alone will annoy Moscow while encouraging nationalists to press their case. Tokayev's past behavior suggests he will try to manage this situation, possibly by taking some actions Moscow would like, while moving in other ways it would not. That certainly appears likely to be the case in his recent decision to agree to the expulsion of some Russians the Kremlin wanted returned (The Moscow Times, February 13).
The Kremlin is likely cognizant of this fact. It has at least concluded that as long as its war against Ukraine continues, Russia does not have the ability or interest in taking tough actions against Astana. One indication of that is that no prominent Russian government official or Kremlin-controlled media outlet has denounced Kazakhstan's new draft constitution's new phrasing on language (Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, February 12). That has not stopped Russian commentators from attacking the downgrading of the Russian language in Kazakhstan, an action that they see as presaging Astana's break with Moscow and thus a clear threat to Russian national interests, suggestions that likely reflect the opinions of some within the Putin elite (RITM Eurasia; Altyn-Orda; Redovka, February 12; Business Online, February 15).
The most dramatic Russian reaction to what Kazakhstan and other former Soviet republics are now doing on various issues came last month from Vladimir Solovyov, perhaps Moscow's most prominent pro-war television commentator. He said that Moscow should launch "special military operations" similar to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine against Central Asian countries and Armenia if they do not agree to Moscow's demands (Nasa Niva, January 11). He declared that what happens in "our Asia" and Armenia is far more important to Moscow than what happens in Venezuela, international law is dead, Russia should not care about the reaction of European countries, and it should even expand its efforts to subjugate Ukraine.
His words have unsurprisingly sparked outrage in Kazakhstan, throughout Central Asia, and in the South Caucasus, prompting governments to raise the issue with Moscow (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 15). Russia sought to calm the situation by suggesting Solovyev's words were only his "personal opinion" (Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, January 12; EurAsia Daily, January 13). While many analysts have suggested that Solovyev, known for his bombastic and extremist language, was simply responding to the U.S. moves in Venezuela and against Russian shipping, others noted that he is so close to the Kremlin that his Kremlin bosses likely intend such threats to intimidate the non-Russians and prepare Russians for new "special operations." They suggest that those in the Kremlin are not surprised that the TV personality's words are generating backlash (The Times of Central Asia, January 12; Minval Politika). The phrasing about language in Kazakhstan's new constitution will only exacerbate such feelings further.
[1] Kazakhstanets refers to a citizen or resident of Kazakhstan, regardless of ethnicity.
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Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/kazakhstans-downgrading-of-russian-language-infuriates-moscow/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Wall Street Journal: Iran's Crisis Is Trump's Sweet Spot
WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by Walter Russell Mead, Ravenel B. Curry III distinguished fellow in strategy and statesmanship, to the Wall Street Journal:* * *
Iran's Crisis Is Trump's Sweet Spot
For him, the worst thing about the standoff may be that it can't last forever.
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The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group cruised the Caribbean last month as American forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. This ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by Walter Russell Mead, Ravenel B. Curry III distinguished fellow in strategy and statesmanship, to the Wall Street Journal: * * * Iran's Crisis Is Trump's Sweet Spot For him, the worst thing about the standoff may be that it can't last forever. * The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group cruised the Caribbean last month as American forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. Thismonth, America's largest aircraft carrier is heading toward the Middle East as the long-running standoff between Iran and the U.S. enters a new and dangerous phase.
The Trump administration can be clownish, depraved and dysfunctional. It can also be stunningly effective. Caracas had been a headache for American presidents ever since Hugo Chavez put Venezuela on the road to ruin back in 1999 (to great applause from American leftists who hailed Chavismo as, finally, the Socialism That Works). Even as economic decline drove floods of refugees across its frontiers and the marriage of its government with drug cartels worsened the drug crisis, Venezuela subsidized late
Read the full article in The Wall Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/opinion/irans-crisis-is-trumps-sweet-spot-6874426a?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqeLSl2uTaIiu3YK1xMFJBt2lYGFEKaQwnu7i3CN9PbrvDxagVGMa3uvfT3Zpqw%3D&gaa_ts=699460b1&gaa_sig=8C8l9WfH6wjs7LCNT41uejMWDDW50opf7PnyYNQWPIhMX7mxjdE2ERFr2SZFy0y5Rhn8B0OFEA9A4Ij6OEjccQ%3D%3D).
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/irans-crisis-trumps-sweet-spot-walter-russell-mead
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Trump Discovers Multilateralism
WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by William Alan Reinsch, Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program:* * *
Trump Discovers Multilateralism
Council on Foreign Relations President Michael Froman made an important point in his February 6 column regarding multilateralism. In short, it may be coming back. While administration officials have frequently said that "America First" does not mean "America Alone," until now, there has been very little evidence that they mean it. Trump himself clearly prefers ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 17, 2026, by William Alan Reinsch, Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program: * * * Trump Discovers Multilateralism Council on Foreign Relations President Michael Froman made an important point in his February 6 column regarding multilateralism. In short, it may be coming back. While administration officials have frequently said that "America First" does not mean "America Alone," until now, there has been very little evidence that they mean it. Trump himself clearly prefersbilateral negotiations, apparently on the theory that in most of them--China being the obvious exception--the United States is the bigger party and in a good position to push the other country around. Multilateral talks, in contrast, provide an opportunity for the other guys to gang up on him.
For the most part, that has not happened. There has been remarkably little retaliation against his tariffs, except for China and Canada, which acted separately. So, no ganging up--until Trump's moves to acquire Greenland several weeks ago; European nations, both in the European Union and outside it (Norway and the United Kingdom), rediscovered their spines and stood up--with some success. It is tempting to say that was an inflection point, and the world is likely to see more of it; indeed, I said that after it happened. In truth, it's too early to reach that conclusion.
Instead, we have seen the United States, in a bit of a U-turn, rediscover multilateralism in the form of its proposed Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) initiative, in Froman's words, "a coalition of countries aimed at quickly scaling up public and private investment in critical minerals supply chains." He also quotes Vice President JD Vance, who described it as a "preferential trade zone for critical minerals protected from external disruptions through enforceable price floors." Details remain to be revealed, but it appears to be similar to a customs union with (relatively) free trade among its members for the covered minerals, and a common external tariff on imports of the same items from nonmembers, primarily China.
The purpose, however, is not identical to customs unions. Instead of focusing entirely on promoting trade within the membership, FORGE appears designed to set a price floor on imports from nonmembers that will prevent them from dumping their production into the group and thus undermining the ability of companies within the membership to compete. The rationale for that is national security. The minerals in question--there does not seem to be a public list yet--are all critical to the United States' ability to produce sophisticated technologies that are essential to U.S. security.
The obvious question is who will end up joining. Multilateralism only works when it is actually multilateral--when the group constitutes a critical mass. So far, it appears that nobody has said no, but few have said yes. It's a good idea and a necessary counter to China's tactics, but countries may be rightly concerned about Trump's increasingly erratic record of policy pronouncements, a growing number of which are never implemented. They may also be worried about a structure that appears to be more focused on U.S. security than their own. A successful multilateral regime will ensure that all members are treated equally and participate equally in the benefits.
Whether FORGE is a good idea or not, however, is not the point of this column. The point is that FORGE is significant because it is a multilateral approach coming from an administration that has largely eschewed such a policy. Of course, it is also recognition of the obvious--the United States cannot solve its dependency on China for critical minerals by itself. It does not have all the resources it needs, and reestablishing an indigenous processing capability will take more time than we have.
In addition to whether it will work, the other big question is whether it is a one-off endeavor or a sign of change in the administration's thinking about how to deal with other countries. I am inclined to say it is the former. Trump is a confirmed unilateralist and believer in the use of leverage to get his way, a worldview that is fundamentally different from the idea of building cooperative structures that put all participating nations on an equal footing. In the critical minerals case, he has been forced to adopt a different strategy because of the economics of that sector and the disadvantaged position the United States finds itself in. It is hard to see signs of other situations that might persuade him to change his usual tactics.
Related to that is the question of whether his bullying treatment of other countries, friends, and foes alike will constrain his ability to construct multilateral structures. In the minerals case, shared concern about China may prompt other nations to swallow their irritation with the United States and work together toward a goal important to all of them. So far, the other countries have approached the proposal cautiously. How the administration configures it, and the manner in which it is rolled out, will ultimately determine whether it is successful or simply one more Trump announcement made with considerable fanfare that does not end up amounting to much.
Whether it eventually succeeds is important, but the fact that it was even proposed by an administration committed to unilateralism is significant. Hopefully, it will be an example for future initiatives rather than a one-off curiosity.
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William A. Reinsch is senior adviser and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/trump-discovers-multilateralism
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI: NC Voter Roll Settlement Highlights Importance of SAVE America Act
WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on Feb. 17, 2026:* * *
AFPI: NC Voter Roll Settlement Highlights Importance of SAVE America Act
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) issued the following statement from Kevin Daniels, Executive Director of North Carolina's State Chapter, in response to news that 73,000 North Carolina voters registered without proper identification will remain on the voter rolls following a settlement agreement:
"Secure, credible elections start with accurate voter rolls and enforceable ID verification. While the left ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 18 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on Feb. 17, 2026: * * * AFPI: NC Voter Roll Settlement Highlights Importance of SAVE America Act The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) issued the following statement from Kevin Daniels, Executive Director of North Carolina's State Chapter, in response to news that 73,000 North Carolina voters registered without proper identification will remain on the voter rolls following a settlement agreement: "Secure, credible elections start with accurate voter rolls and enforceable ID verification. While the leftmay celebrate weakening these safeguards, Americans want and deserve safe and reliable elections whose results they can trust.
That is exactly what the SAVE America Act is designed to do. The bill requires documented proof of U.S. citizenship when registering to vote, directs states to remove noncitizens from existing voter rolls, and adds a photo voter ID requirement before casting a ballot in federal elections.
These are the basic building blocks of election integrity, and fundamental for creating an election system the public can believe in."
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-nc-voter-roll-settlement-highlights-importance-of-save-america-act
[Category: ThinkTank]