Think Tanks
Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
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TechFreedom: For Innovative Space Activities, Mission Authorization Is the Right Model, But Congress Must Act
WASHINGTON, March 13 -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release:* * *
For Innovative Space Activities, Mission Authorization Is the Right Model, but Congress Must Act
Today, TechFreedom submitted comments to the Department of Commerce's Office of Commercial Space (OSC) on its framework to establish a "Mission Authorization" regulatory regime for innovative space activities. While the framework is sound, OSC lacks statutory authority to implement it.
"A mission authorization structure will help the U.S. lead in space," said James E. Dunstan, TechFreedom's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release: * * * For Innovative Space Activities, Mission Authorization Is the Right Model, but Congress Must Act Today, TechFreedom submitted comments to the Department of Commerce's Office of Commercial Space (OSC) on its framework to establish a "Mission Authorization" regulatory regime for innovative space activities. While the framework is sound, OSC lacks statutory authority to implement it. "A mission authorization structure will help the U.S. lead in space," said James E. Dunstan, TechFreedom'sSenior Counsel. "The success of America is a direct result of a society and government that values, promotes, and most importantly, protects, the concepts of innovation, invention, and entrepreneurship. The notion of 'permissionless innovation' runs deep in the American psyche and must serve as a critical starting point for how to regulate the activities of Americans in space. We've long supported a light-touch regulatory regime for space activities and applaud the fundamental structure of the Department of Commerce's framework, which closely resembles the concepts of 'Mission Registration' or 'Mission Certification' we've long advocated"
"Unfortunately, there is no clear statutory framework under which Commerce can proceed," warned Dunstan. "Congress has certainly provided a role for the Department of Commerce when it comes to space activities. What Congress did not bestow on the OSC, however, is actual rulemaking authority to create rules such as those contemplated in the OSC's Draft Concept. The OSC may be operating under the assumption that Executive Order (EO) 14335 itself provides the necessary authority. Unfortunately, it does not. A failure to anchor a regulatory structure to clear statutory authority introduces grave risks in the inherently international realm of outer space."
"The proposed framework is workable, but other significant issues exist," Dunstan concluded. "Even with 'firm deadlines,' the approach to interagency review looks suspiciously like the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regime--one of the true 'four letter words' of commercial space. American commercial space companies were subject to an interagency black-box process which defied transparency, timelines, or logic. Applicants waited and waited. Those that were denied lacked any sort of appeals process. A regulatory regime modeled after ITAR will not gain support in the commercial space community and will fail to keep America in the lead on the High Frontier."
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Find these comments on our website, and share them on Twitter and Bluesky. We can be reached for comment at media@techfreedom.org. Read our related work, including:
* Comments on the NPRM to modernize the FCC's space and earth station licensing process (Jan. 20, 2026)
* Comments to the European Commission regarding the EU's Draft Space Act (Nov. 7, 2025)
* Comments to the Dept of Commerce on the Draft EU Space Act (Aug. 15, 2025)
* We need a National Space Council to chart our future in outer space, SpaceNews (Jan. 23, 2025)
* Comments on the mitigation of orbital debris in the new space age, (June 27, 2024)
* Comments on NASA's Lunar Non-Interference Questionnaire, (June 7, 2024)
* Comments to the FCC on In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM) (Apr. 29, 2024)
* Do We Still Have the Right Stuff?, City Journal (Dec. 2023)
* SpaceX Makes Progress on Second Test of Starship, Reason (Nov. 18, 2023)
* Tech Policy Podcast #349: The State of Space Exploration (July 25, 2023)
* Regulating the space economy is vital for America's continued global leadership, Washington Examiner (July 15, 2023)
* Written testimony before the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology on U.S. leadership in commercial space (July 13, 2023)
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About TechFreedom: TechFreedom is a nonprofit, nonpartisan technology policy think tank. We work to chart a path forward for policymakers towards a bright future where technology enhances freedom, and freedom enhances technology.
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Original text here: https://techfreedom.org/for-innovative-space-activities-mission-authorization-is-the-right-model-but-congress-must-act/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Debate on New Kazakhstan Constitution Exacerbates Linguistic and Ethnic Divides
WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Debate on New Kazakhstan Constitution Exacerbates Linguistic and Ethnic Divides
Executive Summary:
* The debate on a new Kazakhstan constitution, set to be approved by referendum on March 15, has deepened the linguistic and ethnic divides and infuriated Moscow, which sees the revisions as threatening the roles of Russian and Russia itself in Central Asia.
* The new basic law reduces the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Debate on New Kazakhstan Constitution Exacerbates Linguistic and Ethnic Divides Executive Summary: * The debate on a new Kazakhstan constitution, set to be approved by referendum on March 15, has deepened the linguistic and ethnic divides and infuriated Moscow, which sees the revisions as threatening the roles of Russian and Russia itself in Central Asia. * The new basic law reduces thestatus of the Russian language to one that exists "alongside" rather than "in equality with" Russian and stops referring to the country as Kazakhstan, a Russian imposition, in favor of Kazakh eli, "the land of the Kazakhs."
* Such changes will speed the exodus of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan, as well as the shifts among Kazakhs away from Russian and from Astana toward Moscow, and may be the harbinger of changes across Central Asia, alarming Moscow and prompting it to react.
The debate over a new Kazakhstan constitution, set to be approved by referendum on March 15, has deepened linguistic and ethnic divides within the country (see EDM, February 17; RITM Eurasia, March 2; Altyn-Orda, March 9). Moscow sees the revisions as threatening the roles of Russia and the Russian language in Kazakhstan and in Central Asia as a whole (Stan Radar, March 6). Kazakhstan President Kasym-Jomart Tokayev, the author of the new version, did not intend this and has long opposed any linguistic radicalism. He has instead insisted that his goal was to simplify the political system by shifting from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature and by putting provisions in place that will force frequent changes in the country's leadership (Spik.kz, April 28, 2025, February 17). While all of Tokayev's changes have been widely discussed, none has attracted more attention inside the country or abroad than those affecting the status of the Russian language and the country's name (Vlast.kz, February 9; Altyn-Orda, February 17; Spik.kz, March 10).
The new basic law reduces the constitutional status of the Russian language to "alongside" rather than "in equality with" the Kazakh language and stops referring to the country as Kazakhstan, a Russian imposition, in favor of Kazakh eli, "the land of the Kazakhs." Some Kazakh nationalists do not feel the changes go far enough. They want all references to Russian eliminated from the country's basic law (Fond Strategicheskoi Kul'tury, March 3). Ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, Kazakhs who use Russian as their primary language, and Moscow, however, are worried that they go too far and will speed the exodus of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan as well as shifts both among Kazakhs away from using Russian and of Astana away from Moscow (Spik.kz, July 5, 2024; Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, February 12). Both supporters and opponents of such changes have suggested that what Kazakhstan is doing now could well be the harbinger of similar changes in other Central Asian countries, adding to the Kremlin's concern about a loss of influence and possibly even disturbing Turkiye, which has taken to calling the region Turkestan (Window on Eurasia, October 11, 2024; Altyn-Orda, February 17; Fond Strategicheskoi Kul'tury, March 3).
Mainstream Russian media have generally reported the change in status of Russian outlined in the draft Kazakhstan constitution accurately. Some Moscow commentators, however, likely reflect the thinking of many in the Kremlin, which is committed to maintaining a Russian world defined largely in terms of language. These commentators have attacked the new constitution as an insult to Russia and a threat to Moscow's influence in Kazakhstan. At the same time, relatively few have expressed concern in Kazakhstan except for Kazakh nationalists who are upset that the new basic law does not go far enough in reducing the role of Russian in their country. These sentiments are a possible bellwether of where Kazakhstan is going and where other Central Asian countries may follow. (On these patterns of reportage and discussion in Russia and Kazakhstan, see Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, February 12.)
The change in wording regarding language reflects the growing importance of Kazakh in the life of Kazakhstan. It will not, however negatively affect Russian speakers, Kazakh officials say (Vlast.kz, February 9). Under the current constitution, officials are obligated to provide any information they release in equal amounts in Kazakh and Russian. Under the new constitution, they will have to supply it in Russian only upon the request of the citizen involved in the proceeding or application process (see EDM, February 17). Over time, of course, that shift will likely intensify the general move away from Russian to Kazakh. Still, it is not, by itself, the kind of change that threatens relations with Moscow that some Russian commentators fear, or the failure to take action in defense of Kazakhs and against the use of Russian in Kazakhstan that Kazakh nationalists have hoped for.
Instead, this change is most obviously the product of the declining share of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan's population over the last two generations. In the mid-1980s, ethnic Russians accounted for 38 percent of the population, outnumbering the Kazakhs. In contrast, now the ethnic Russian share of the residents of Kazakhstan has declined to 14.8 percent (Altyn-Orda, February 20). Another product is the inevitable nationalizing experiences of independence, including the often and increasingly hyperbolic attacks from Russian commentators on even the existence of Kazakhstan and threats from the Russian capital that Kazakhstan will suffer Ukraine's fate if Astana does not do what Moscow wants (e.g., Nasha Niva, February 11; Altyn-Orda, March 8).
The situation regarding the proposed change in the country's name is similar. The current constitution specifies the name as Kazakhstan, while the new one declares that it is Kazakh eli, "the land of the Kazakhs." For some time, activists and commentators in Central Asian countries have wanted to change the names of their countries now ending in "stan" because they see it as the imposition of a Soviet Russian definition of their states. They also see it as a name that leads many there and elsewhere to dismiss them as "the stans," something exotic and the objects of great power conflict rather than countries and peoples in their own right. Kazakh commentators from the Altyn-Orda portal point out that "the name 'Kazakhstan' appeared in the Soviet system of coordinates," designating a territory but not the historical traditions of the population. The portal continues, "Kazakh eli sounds different: it is not an administration formula but a name arising from the people and its history." This change thus represents "a symbolic break with the era of things Soviet: it is not a denial of history but a sign of the completion of the post-Soviet era". It does not mean that minorities such as Russians do not have a place there (Altyn-Orda, February 17).
It is already the case, these commentators say, that "the young generation does not think of itself in terms of 'the post-Soviet space.'" The youth thinks about itself in "global terms, mobile, and confident." To them, a new name is not a "radical step but a logical continuation of ongoing processes." Moreover, they stress that the term is not about exclusion but about the basis of the state. "The Kazakh people have formed the historic nucleus of statehood, but the present-day state remains a hope for all its citizens. The name fixes the cultural foundation, but it is not about any limiting of rights" (Altyn-Orda, February 17). Some ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan will see this change as threatening and decide to leave, further reducing the share of ethnic Russians in the population. Additionally, fewer ethnic Russians fleeing Putin's repression will see Kazakhstan as a welcoming place, especially if, as is rumored, Astana moves to expel some of those who have gone there since 2022 (Meduza, March 10). The Kremlin will view this as at a minimum a form of lese-majeste against it and even more likely as a Western plot to diminish Russian influence in Central Asia or even to exclude it altogether, something Moscow has no choice but to respond to.
Some may view this as a minor shift in the rules governing the use of Russian in a country far away and a quaint change in its name. In reality, it may set the stage for new tectonic shifts in the region. These shifts are likely to prove more significant than other developments that have attracted more attention in the outside world.
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Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/debate-on-new-kazakhstan-constitution-exacerbates-linguistic-and-ethnic-divides/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Rochester Police Involved in Fatal Officer Involved Shooting With Mentally Ill Man
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, March 13 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by public safety policy fellow David Zimmer:* * *
Rochester police involved in fatal officer involved shooting with mentally ill man
On Wednesday evening March 11th, 2026, at about 9:30 pm, Rochester Police fatally shot a man who reportedly grabbed an officer's gun while being detained for a mental health hold. The fatal shooting was the first involving the Rochester Police Department ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, March 13 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by public safety policy fellow David Zimmer: * * * Rochester police involved in fatal officer involved shooting with mentally ill man On Wednesday evening March 11th, 2026, at about 9:30 pm, Rochester Police fatally shot a man who reportedly grabbed an officer's gun while being detained for a mental health hold. The fatal shooting was the first involving the Rochester Police Departmentsince 2007, and it occurred despite a co-response by a mental health professional from the Olmsted County Crisis Response Team (CRT). The incident illustrates the difficulties and dangers facing our public safety personnel when dealing with the mentally ill.
The incident
The event began with a 911 call for a domestic related issue involving a man believed to be experiencing a mental health crisis. This triggered a co-response by the CRT member - a model becoming more common around the state and nation as a way to help de-escalate potentially volatile situations involving the mentally ill. Olmsted County's CRT co-response protocol went into effect in January 2025.
Once on scene the CRT and the police determined the man was a threat to himself and others and attempted to detain the man for transport to the hospital on a mental health hold. The man physically resisted and during the struggle he reportedly grabbed the firearm of one of the officers. Another officer assessed that action as an imminent threat to the life of those present and shot the man. Life saving measures were conducted at the scene and the man was transported to St. Mary's Hospital where he was pronounced dead.
As is customary in officer involved shootings, the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension's (BCA) Force Investigations Unit was called to investigate the use of deadly force by the police officer. Results of that investigation will be turned over to the Olmsted County Attorney's Office who will determine, either independently or through a grand jury, whether the use of deadly force was justified under the law.
The law
Minnesota state statute 609.066 authorizes peace officers to use deadly force in limited situations including:
""...if an objectively reasonable officer would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time and without the benefit of hindsight, that such force is necessary:"
"(1) to protect the peace officer or another from death or great bodily harm, provided that the threat:
"(i) can be articulated with specificity;
"(ii) is reasonably likely to occur absent action by the law enforcement officer; and
"(iii) must be addressed through the use of deadly force without unreasonable delay...""
The investigative and legal determination process can take months to over a year to complete. The officers involved have likely been placed on administrative leave for several days, and the Rochester Police Department will evaluate when each officer is fit for a return to duty on an individual basis.
Based on the limited information available, it appears the response was handled properly, especially as it included the CRT co-response in an effort to de-escalate the volatile situation. The fatal shooting illustrates that despite best practices being employed, dealing with the mentally ill in a crisis can turn dangerous for first responders without warning - a heartbreaking reality for everyone involved.
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David Zimmer is a Public Safety Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
David.Zimmer@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/rochester-police-involved-in-fatal-officer-involved-shooting-with-mentally-ill-man/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: DFL Political Word Games Will Have Real Costs for All Students
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, March 13 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on March 11, 2026, by policy fellow Catrin Wigfall:* * *
DFL political word games will have real costs for all students
The Minnesota House Education Finance Committee held a hearing Tuesday (March 10) on H.F. 3490, which would opt Minnesota into a new federal education tax-credit program that allows scholarship-granting organizations (SGOs) to provide scholarships to eligible public school, non-public ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, March 13 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on March 11, 2026, by policy fellow Catrin Wigfall: * * * DFL political word games will have real costs for all students The Minnesota House Education Finance Committee held a hearing Tuesday (March 10) on H.F. 3490, which would opt Minnesota into a new federal education tax-credit program that allows scholarship-granting organizations (SGOs) to provide scholarships to eligible public school, non-publicschool, and homeschool students.
The federal tax-credit program was enacted by Congress last summer and is now part of federal law. However, scholarships will only be awarded if governors opt their states into the program. More than half of states have announced their intent to participate, but Minnesota is not among them. H.F. 3490 would change that, adding Minnesota to the list.
As a federal tax-credit program, opting in would not increase state spending or reduce public education funding. Instead, it would expand educational support for Minnesota students through private donations incentivized by federal tax credits while leaving existing state education dollars unchanged.
Because roughly 90 percent of Minnesota students attend public schools, most students eligible for scholarships would likely come from the public school system -- a point I emphasized in my testimony. Despite this, several Democratic legislators indicated they would oppose the bill because it would allow private school students to receive scholarships too.
Democratic legislators also repeatedly referred to the bill as a "voucher" program, as did testimony from the Minnesota Department of Education and the Minnesota School Boards Association. However, the proposal operates differently. Unlike vouchers, the tax-credit scholarship program is funded by private donations, not direct government payments. Vouchers can typically only be used toward tuition at non-public schools. The federal tax-credit scholarship can be used by eligible students in all learning environments for a variety of educational services.
Perhaps the distinctions between the two policies simply aren't understood, given that the "voucher" label continued to be used throughout the hearing. Or perhaps using the politically loaded language is more convenient for opponents.
Either way, by the end of the hearing, the policy divide became clear. Democratic legislators on the committee are willing to jeopardize millions in potential scholarships for public school students just to block non-public school students from receiving the scholarships as well.
This opposition reflects longstanding resistance to school choice policies, but it reaches a new level with this policy, considering it would significantly benefit public school students and teachers.
For example, public school students could use the scholarships for supplemental services such as tutoring, specialized therapies, test preparation courses, or exam fees. They could also use the dollars for supplies, an expense teachers often pay out of pocket. According to estimates from Education Reform Now, if just 30 percent of Minnesota taxpayers made donations to SGOs and took the full federal tax credit ($1,700), more than $487 million could be available for scholarships each year.
Refusing to opt in will come at a great cost to Minnesota students in all learning environments, while the "wealthy" families that Democratic legislators decry as the only beneficiaries will see no negative impact. They, along with other interested Minnesota taxpayers, can still claim the dollar-for-dollar federal tax credit by donating to eligible SGOs in the 27 other states that have already opted in, including our neighbors North Dakota, South Dakota, and Iowa.
Those philanthropic dollars should remain here in Minnesota, supporting our students, our schools, and our communities. Regrettably, misinformation and political word games could make students statewide pay the price.
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Rep. Sydney Jordan (DFL-Minneapolis) wasted no time speaking out against the "private school vouchers" that would be "at the expense of everyday kids earning a public education."
Listen below to American Experiment's Bill Walsh fact-check her claims.
Spoiler alert: Rep. Jordan fails the lie detector test.
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Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/dfl-political-word-games-will-have-real-costs-for-all-students/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Nepal's Election Marks a Generational Break-and a New Strategic Moment in the Himalayas
WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by Anjali Kaur, senior associate (non-resident) with the India and Emerging Asia Program:* * *
Nepal's Election Marks a Generational Break-and a New Strategic Moment in the Himalayas
Nepal's latest election has produced something the country has not seen in decades: a genuine generational rupture with its political past. But the significance extends well beyond Kathmandu. As a younger political figure rises to national leadership, Nepal is entering a new strategic moment--shaped ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by Anjali Kaur, senior associate (non-resident) with the India and Emerging Asia Program: * * * Nepal's Election Marks a Generational Break-and a New Strategic Moment in the Himalayas Nepal's latest election has produced something the country has not seen in decades: a genuine generational rupture with its political past. But the significance extends well beyond Kathmandu. As a younger political figure rises to national leadership, Nepal is entering a new strategic moment--shapedby intensifying geopolitical competition, shifting development partnerships, and a generation of voters who have run out of patience with institutions that promise reforms but rarely deliver.
The victory of former Kathmandu mayor Balendra "Balen" Shah places a leader at the helm who sits outside Nepal's traditional political establishment. At 35, Shah represents a stark contrast to the governing class that has defined Nepal's politics since the end of the monarchy--a small circle of senior party figures, many now in their 70s and 80s, whose influence has survived coalition after coalition with remarkably little accountability. His election signals that a growing share of Nepali voters, particularly younger ones, are no longer willing to accept political recycling as a governing philosophy.
But framing this solely as a story of generational change would miss what is actually driving it. Behind Shah's rise are years of accumulated frustration--with corruption, with institutional stagnation, with an economy that exports its young people as remittance workers rather than retaining them. The question now is whether Nepal's new leadership can convert that frustration into durable institutional reform.
A Youth Movement Finds Electoral Expression
Shah's victory did not come from nowhere.
For several electoral cycles, younger Nepalis have been signaling dissatisfaction with entrenched leadership--at first at the margins, then with increasing force. That trajectory reached a turning point in 2025, when youth-led protests erupted across the country in response to corruption scandals, economic stagnation, and government attempts to restrict social media platforms. The protests were organized through digital networks by a generation that has grown up connected to global conversations about governance, transparency, and opportunity--and that has drawn its own conclusions about the gap between those conversations and what Nepali institutions actually deliver.
Shah became the clearest political embodiment of that demand. A former rapper turned independent political figure, he first captured national attention by winning the Kathmandu mayoral race in 2022 on a reformist, anti-corruption platform built on digital outreach and grassroots mobilization rather than traditional party structures. His national campaign followed the same logic--and this time, at a much larger scale.
For many voters, Shah represents not simply a younger face but the possibility of a different governing style: one that prioritizes transparency, responsiveness, and measurable results. Whether that expectation can survive contact with Nepal's political system is, of course, an entirely different matter.
Part of a Wider Regional Pattern
Nepal's election also fits within a broader shift visible across South Asia.
In Sri Lanka, mass protests in 2022 forced a sitting president from office following a severe economic crisis. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, younger voters have increasingly organized around governance and accountability through digital networks and new political formations. Across the region, a generation that grew up connected to global information flows--and global expectations--is demonstrating a growing willingness to challenge political hierarchies that have dominated governance for decades.
Nepal's election adds an important data point to this pattern. In the right conditions, that energy can move from street protests to electoral outcomes. The deeper question--for Nepal and for the region--is whether these generational political shifts translate into more effective governance, or whether they simply install new personalities into systems that remain structurally resistant to reform.
Governing Will Be Harder Than Winning
Shah's victory carries enormous symbolic weight, but Nepal's political terrain does not reward symbolism for long.
The country's history is one of frequent coalition collapses, constitutional crises, and slow policy implementation. Anti-corruption demands were central to both the protest movement and the election results, which means that the new government's credibility will be tested early and measured against concrete action--not rhetoric. Nepal's 2015 constitution created a federal structure intended to bring governance closer to citizens, but provincial and local governments still face significant gaps in administrative capacity and fiscal authority. That incomplete decentralization represents both a reform opportunity and a governance liability. And while Nepal has made genuine progress in poverty reduction over the past two decades, its economy remains structurally dependent on remittances from citizens working abroad--a dependence that no amount of political goodwill can address without serious structural reform.
If the new government cannot demonstrate meaningful progress on at least one of these fronts in its early months, the political momentum that carried Shah to power will dissipate quickly.
India and China Are Recalibrating
For Nepal's two giant neighbors, the election introduces a new variable into calculations that both have managed carefully for years.
India maintains deep and multidimensional ties with Nepal--an open border, extensive trade links, and a growing energy relationship built on hydropower development and electricity trade that has made political stability in Kathmandu a direct Indian economic interest. New Delhi has invested significantly in deepening regional energy integration, and it monitors shifts in Nepal's domestic politics accordingly.
China has steadily expanded its own economic and political footprint over the past decade, investing in transportation corridors, cross-border connectivity, and infrastructure financing tied to the Belt and Road Initiative. More recently, Beijing has extended its presence into areas historically supported by Western development partners--digital connectivity, public-sector capacity programs, and governance training--positioning itself as a comprehensive long-term partner rather than simply an infrastructure financier. That positioning has become more visible and more deliberate, as the dismantling of major U.S. development assistance programs has created openings in Nepal's development landscape.
Shah's rise introduces a different dynamic into this regional equation. As a political outsider, he is less embedded in the networks through which both India and China have historically managed relationships with Nepali political elites. That does not necessarily mean a dramatic reorientation of Nepal's foreign policy--the structural constraints of geography and economic dependence are powerful stabilizing forces. But it may produce a more independent diplomatic posture as the new government seeks to demonstrate autonomy while managing relationships with neighbors whose interests do not always align.
The immediate question for Beijing and New Delhi is not whether Nepal will shift alignment, but whether a new generation of leadership in Kathmandu will govern in less legible--and less predictable--ways than the political networks they have long understood.
The Himalayan Strategic Stakes
Nepal's political trajectory also matters because of its position within a broader Himalayan strategic landscape that is rapidly acquiring new significance.
The Himalayas are increasingly recognized as a critical nexus for climate security, water resources, and regional energy systems--and Nepal sits at the center of that geography. Its river systems feed into major South Asian water basins; its hydropower potential could play a meaningful role in regional clean energy transitions. As climate change accelerates glacier melt and alters water flows across the Himalayan region, governance quality and political stability in countries like Nepal will carry consequences that extend well beyond their borders. Decisions made in Kathmandu on hydropower development, water management, and cross-border energy trade will shape downstream outcomes across South Asia for decades.
This is the context in which Nepal's political shift is unfolding--not simply a domestic democratic story, but a governance transition at a geographically strategic moment.
Why the United States Should Be Paying Attention
For decades, U.S. development programs helped support Nepal's democratic institutions, local governance systems, and economic reforms. Those programs worked with national and provincial institutions to strengthen democratic processes, expand economic participation, and improve public-sector transparency. They helped build institutional foundations--in local governance capacity, civil society oversight, and anti-corruption systems--that Nepal continues to rely on today.
The dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and broader reductions in U.S. foreign assistance have created real gaps in Nepal's development ecosystem--gaps visible enough that the Asian Development Bank's own 2025-2029 Country Partnership Strategy explicitly named them. Thirty-four active programs were terminated, affecting over 300 NGOs and cutting support to local governance systems that Nepal's still-young federal structure depends on. The Millennium Challenge Corporation compact survived a funding freeze and was reinstated, but its scope is infrastructure: transmission lines and highways. The governance, civil society, and institutional capacity work that distinguished U.S. development engagement in Nepal has no current substitute--and unlike infrastructure, where other actors are moving to fill the gap, this work is simply not being replaced. That gap has strategic consequences that outlast any development program.
Nepal occupies a position where U.S. and Indian strategic interests converge. Both share an interest in a stable, institutionally coherent, and strategically autonomous Nepal--and neither is well-served by the governance vacuum that is now deepening. Neither Washington nor New Delhi has a coherent answer to that question yet. The longer that remains true, the more Nepal's institutional landscape will be shaped by actors whose interests in Nepal's political trajectory may not align with those of Washington or New Delhi.
What Comes Next
Balendra Shah's victory opens a genuine inflection point in Nepal's political trajectory. What it does not do is guarantee the transformation that brought him to power.
Nepali voters have demonstrated that they are willing to break from long-standing political patterns in pursuit of something different. That is not a small thing--in a region where incumbency and patronage networks have proven deeply durable, the willingness to disrupt them electorally is itself significant.
But the real test is institutional. Generational change in leadership matters only if it translates into different governance outcomes--greater accountability, more effective public institutions, and an economy that can retain the talent it currently exports. Shah's government will be judged on that standard, quickly and without much patience for excuses.
And beyond Nepal's borders, the Himalayan region is entering a period of intensifying competition and strategic consequence--one in which how Kathmandu governs itself will matter far more than it has in decades.
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Anjali Kaur is a senior associate (non-resident) with the India and Emerging Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/nepals-election-marks-generational-break-and-new-strategic-moment-himalayas
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Iran War Cost Estimate Update - $11.3 Billion at Day 6, $16.5 Billion at Day 12
WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary by Mark F. Cancian, senior adviser with the CSIS Defense and Security Department, and Chris H. Park, research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy:* * *
Iran War Cost Estimate Update: $11.3 Billion at Day 6, $16.5 Billion at Day 12
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has reportedly informed Congress that the first six days (D+6) of the war cost $11.3 billion. This is broadly consistent with earlier reports that munitions expenditures in the first few days cost $5.6 billion, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary by Mark F. Cancian, senior adviser with the CSIS Defense and Security Department, and Chris H. Park, research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy: * * * Iran War Cost Estimate Update: $11.3 Billion at Day 6, $16.5 Billion at Day 12 The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has reportedly informed Congress that the first six days (D+6) of the war cost $11.3 billion. This is broadly consistent with earlier reports that munitions expenditures in the first few days cost $5.6 billion,but it exceeds the previous CSIS estimate of the war's first 100 hours. Even with the high usage implied by the cost estimate, the DOD does not appear to face immediate inventory concerns in conducting the current conflict. However, reduced inventories create risks, particularly in the western Pacific and Ukraine.
This update: (1) provides a plausible breakdown of the DOD's $11.3 billion topline; (2) assesses the impact on munition inventories if the reported costs are accurate; (3) revises upward the estimated damage to U.S. bases in the region with available reporting and overhead photographs; and (4) estimates total war costs through the first 12 days using the latest DOD information.
As noted in the 100-hour estimates, the total cost for this war is highly sensitive to the mix of munitions used. After munitions use, combat losses and infrastructure damage ($1.4 billion through the first six days) comprise the next largest category. Daily costs have declined substantially since the first days of the war. Coalition air dominance has allowed the use of less expensive short-range munitions, while Iranian missile and drone launches have declined sharply.
On the DOD's $11.3 Billion Estimate
In its reporting, the New York Times provided few details on the DOD estimate shared with Congress. The top line reportedly excludes the cost of "buildup of military hardware and personnel ahead of the first strikes" and appears to count only the operation's unbudgeted costs. Subsequent reporting also indicates the $11.3 billion figure did not include any estimate of repairing facilities or replacing losses.
Also unclear is whether this estimate had been reviewed and cleared by the White House. The White House has so far remained silent about war costs. The Office of Management and Budget often disagrees with agencies about what to include. Table 1 estimates the breakdown of the reported $11.3 billion in unbudgeted costs during the first six days of the war.
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[View Table 1 in the link at bottom.]
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CSIS applied its existing methodology to estimate the munitions usage implied by the reported war cost six days into the campaign. Table 2 presents the results. The technical note below and the previous CSIS commentary on the costs of the first 100 hours of the war detail the approach.
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[View Table 2 in the link at bottom.]
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U.S. Munitions Stockpile After the First Six Days
Overall, the DOD does not appear to have an inventory problem in sustaining the current conflict because munitions use to date and expected future expenditures will not drive any inventories to zero. These expenditures, however, create risks in other theaters such as Ukraine and the western Pacific, as high-demand munitions are diverted to the current war with Iran. Production in FY 2026 will not fully cover usage to date and will therefore limit the hoped expansion of inventories. Table 3 summarizes this analysis.
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[View Table 3 in the link at bottom.]
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Ship-Launched Missiles
Navy destroyers and submarines in the region are striking ground targets with Tomahawk missiles. The destroyers also launch the Standard Missile family of missiles for air defense. Ship-launched missiles introduce a unique constraint because ships need to return to port once missiles are depleted. They cannot be reloaded at sea.
* Tomahawk: Using 319 Tomahawks would nearly empty the missile magazines of the U.S. Navy ships in the region. The authors previously estimated that the Navy had about 3,100 Tomahawks available, including those aboard ships. Estimated expenditures in the first six days of Operation Epic Fury would take the inventory down to about 2,700. In FY 2026, 190 Tomahawks are slated for delivery. Of these, 64 are intended to go to the Army and 16 to the Marine Corps.
* Standard Missiles: SM-3s are used against ballistic missiles. SM-6s are used against cruise missiles and drones, as well as against ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. Budget documents indicate deliveries of 76 SM-3s (45 Block IB, 31 Block IIA) and 125 SM-6s in FY 2026.
Air- and Ground-Launched Missiles
In-theater magazine depth does not pose a concern for air- and ground-launched missiles. Cargo aircraft can resupply bases in theater, while replenishment ships can deliver munitions to aircraft carriers.
* Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs): Although other exquisite munitions exist in the Air Force inventory, JASSMs are likely the main air-launched, long-range missiles used in this war. There are other expensive Air Force munitions, but these are unlikely to have been used in Epic Fury. JASSM inventories are large (approximately 3,500) because of sizable Air Force purchases in the last decade.
* MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missile (PrSM): These are medium-range munitions launched from Army vehicles. ATACMS production ended in 2007, although a life-extension program kept the inventory functional. The current inventory is about 1,000. ATACMS's successor, the PrSM, began production in 2022; 60 have been delivered, with 70 more to be delivered in FY 2026.
* Patriot: These have received the most attention because they are needed in both Ukraine and the western Pacific. CSIS previously calculated the Patriot inventory to be about 2,000--1,600 of which were the most modern PAC-3 MSE, and the others were older versions. The Army anticipates the delivery of 172 Patriot missiles this fiscal year. Demand will continue to be high in the Middle East as the Iranians continue their ballistic missile attacks. Allies and partners, particularly those in the Gulf region, will need their own resupply.
* Terminal High-Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD): There have been no new deliveries of THAAD interceptors since August 2023. Deliveries are set to resume by April 2027. A previous CSIS analysis estimated 534 interceptors to be in the U.S. inventory prior to the Twelve-Day War in June 2025, during which "more than 150" were reportedly
* Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), and Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER): These are short- to medium-range, air-launched ground-attack munitions with large inventories.
* Low-cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS): This is an American clone of the Iranian Shahed drones. LUCAS has a long range and is inexpensive, though numbers are limited because the system entered service in 2025.
Equipment and Infrastructure Damage
At the time of the publication of CSIS's 100-hour cost estimate, there were many unconfirmed reports of U.S. losses and damages. Three F-15s and one KC-135 remain the only U.S. equipment losses officially confirmed by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Overhead photographs have since become available, which enable some preliminary assessments of damage to U.S. bases. Details remain highly limited. The cost could be significantly higher depending on what equipment was inside the facilities that were struck. In our estimate, the satellite communication systems ("golf balls") are the primary cost driver. CSIS awaits further information from the DOD. The aggregate cost estimate below includes the reported loss of at least one THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar and 11 Reaper drones.
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[View Table 4 in the link at bottom.]
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The War Since the Sixth Day: Estimating Costs at Day 12
The DOD continues to release limited information about ongoing operations, making cost estimation difficult. The various, competing public reports on DOD-estimated war costs provide useful signals but lack the detail needed to develop a high-confidence estimate.
The costs of the war are not evenly distributed. The first several days were much more expensive than the subsequent days. U.S. forces appear to have heavily used high-end ground-attack munitions initially--as laid out in Table 2. CSIS's 100-hour estimate was low, as the intense early use of air defense and exquisite strike munitions and the extent of the infrastructure damage exceeded initial assumptions. The use of high-cost ground attack munitions decreased when the U.S. coalition gained air superiority, which allowed the use of much less expensive munitions.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine indicated that U.S. forces had approached a "point of munitions transition" by the fourth day of Operation Epic Fury. Thus, the United States continues to fight with precision-guided munitions but predominantly with less expensive, shorter-range weapons that are more abundant in stockpiles. Hegseth reported that only 1 percent of munitions used by Day 14 were stand-off. CSIS's 100-hour estimate placed the munitions transition point earlier in the campaign than subsequent DOD releases suggest.
To illustrate the magnitude of the change, a single Tomahawk missile costs around $3.5 million, whereas a BLU-110 bomb fitted with the JDAM guidance kit costs less than $100,000. Both accurately deliver 1,000-pound payloads.
The United States and its coalition partners also had to defend against attacks by large numbers of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. These attacks declined by around 90 percent by Day 5, requiring many fewer interceptions. Nearly all of the casualties and damage to bases appear to have occurred during the first few days when attacks were heaviest. Damage to bases appears to have nearly stopped, with a concomitant decline in casualties. Here, our previous calculation gave coalition partners more credit for shooting down Iranian missiles and drones. DOD estimates reported following publication of the original estimate imply a far greater U.S. burden for air defense.
Keeping the assumptions about the U.S.-allied split in air defense and assuming more than 90 percent of munitions used after Day 5--"point of munitions transition"--to be low-cost weapons, Operation Epic Fury is estimated to have cost $16.5 billion by its twelfth day. This number includes the cost of operations--both budgeted and unbudgeted--and damages. War costs will increase by about half a billion dollars a day, unless one side significantly changes its activities or an outside event alters the war substantially. Figure 1 illustrates the daily cost of this war, showing the huge cost impact of the munitions shift, while Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative sum.
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Figure 1: Estimated Daily Cost of Operation Epic Fury at D+12
Figure 2: Estimated Total Cost of Operation Epic Fury at D+12
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Total expenditures are large enough for the administration to ask Congress for additional funds. The internal trade-offs to cover war costs within the existing budget would be very difficult. In theory, Congress could redirect some of the $153 billion from the reconciliation bill toward Operation Epic Fury, but that would undermine the concept behind the increase: to build capability, not pay existing bills.
These estimates will not be the final word on war costs. The war, of course, continues, and surprises will occur. Further, these estimates do not include provisions for resupplying Israel, higher fuel costs across the DOD, or increased domestic security--all of which are likely to be included in a final government-wide tally. In addition, there will be future veterans' benefits for injured service members, though these are not customarily recognized in current budgets.
Technical Note on the Calculations
This technical note provides additional details on the CSIS calculations. The starting point was the DOD's officially released data. These provided the number of targets struck, the number of Iranian missile and drone attacks, and information to build the U.S. order of battle. News reports, known U.S. capacity, and past campaigns helped fill the gaps.
* For Strike Munitions: Interpolating from CENTCOM updates, U.S. forces struck over 2,500 targets by the sixth day of the war. The calculations assumed 1.3 munitions per target based on past U.S. bombing campaigns fought entirely with precision munitions. This means that even for precision munitions, the ratio is not quite one target to one munition. It further assumes that 70 to 80 percent of munitions expended in the first three days of the campaign are exquisite and "mid-tier" ones to strike targets at standoff range.
* For Air Defense Munitions: Estimates began with Admiral Cooper's March 3 update, which reported more than 2,000 drone and 500 ballistic missile launches in less than 100 hours of the war. Cooper's March 5 briefing and General Caine's March 10 briefing indicated that launches had declined sharply--by 83 percent for drone launches and 90 percent for ballistic missiles. These declines were driven by coalition attacks on launchers and inventories. More frequent updates from the Gulf states gave a sense of the trends of Iranian launch capacity in interpolating between the U.S. updates. The calculation assumed that the United States was responsible for shooting down half of incoming drones and ballistic missiles. A "shoot-look-shoot" shot doctrine was assumed for most U.S. air defenders. Coalition partners, by intercepting the remaining drones and ballistic missiles, greatly decreased U.S. costs.
* For Cost of Replacing Munitions: FY 2026 budget documents provided the weapons costs. Munition costs assume a like-for-like replacement with items in production (e.g., SM-3 Block IIA for Block IB expended).
* For the Cost of Operations and Support: Operating costs are based on Congressional Budget Office estimates, with an addition above the base amount to account for costs of a higher operational tempo.
CSIS continues to refine its methodology to account for additional information as it becomes available.
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Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
Chris H. Park is a research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.
The authors are grateful for the expeditious work by Madison Bruno and Julia Huh in editing and formatting this article.
If you are interested in learning more about this topic, explore CSIS's Executive Education courses Meeting China's Military Challenge and Inside DOD's FY 2027 Budget.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-war-cost-estimate-update-113-billion-day-6-165-billion-day-12
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to Daily Wire: Parent Trap - The Detransition Reality Schools Tried To Hide From Moms And Dads
WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 12, 2026, by Director of American Values Jennifer Bauwens to the Daily Wire:* * *
The Parent Trap: The Detransition Reality Schools Tried To Hide From Moms And Dads
Last week, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an important ruling in Mirabelli v. Bonta, a case addressing whether schools can implement policies that deliberately exclude parents from critical decisions about their children's well-being. The Court answered that question with a clear and resounding no.
In ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 12, 2026, by Director of American Values Jennifer Bauwens to the Daily Wire: * * * The Parent Trap: The Detransition Reality Schools Tried To Hide From Moms And Dads Last week, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an important ruling in Mirabelli v. Bonta, a case addressing whether schools can implement policies that deliberately exclude parents from critical decisions about their children's well-being. The Court answered that question with a clear and resounding no. Inits order, the Court reinstated a prior injunction, barring California schools from enforcing policies that conceal students' gender transitions from parents or require teachers to use names or pronouns inconsistent with biological sex. Under these rules, this information was withheld from parents unless the child consented. Naturally, many parents and teachers challenged these policies, arguing that they violated constitutional rights.
The Court agreed that the parents raising religious objections are likely to win their claims under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The justices also found that the policies are likely to interfere with parents' long-recognized constitutional right to direct the upbringing and care of their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.
To continue reading, click here (https://www.dailywire.com/news/the-parent-trap-the-detransition-reality-schools-tried-to-hide-from-moms-and-dads?topStoryPosition=undefined&author=Jennifer+Bauwens&category=DW+Opinion&elementPosition=1&row=1&rowHeadline=Top+Stories&rowType=Top+Stories&title=The+Parent+Trap%3A+The+Detransition+Reality+Schools+Tried+To+Hide+From+Moms+And+Dads).
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Dr. Jennifer Bauwens serves as the Director of American Values. She is responsible for leading the research agenda and the development of policy priorities pertaining to family, faith, and pro-life issues.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/the-parent-trap-the-detransition-reality-schools-tried-to-hide-from-moms-and-dads
[Category: ThinkTank]