Think Tanks
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Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: Mayor Mamdani's New Scam - Charge NYC Taxpayers to Hire His Rent-a-Mobs
NEW YORK, May 5 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 3, 2026, by legal policy fellow John Ketcham and attorney and adjunct fellow Christian Browne to the New York Post:
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Mayor Mamdani's New Scam: Charge NYC Taxpayers to Hire His Rent-a-Mobs
New Yorkers, you've been slacking -- so the mayor wants to organize you.
Mayor Zohran Mamdani isn't happy that only 400 people showed up to last year's Rent Guidelines Board hearings.
In response, last Wednesday, he launched Organize NYC, a supposed volunteer effort to have New Yorkers participate in local
... Show Full Article
NEW YORK, May 5 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 3, 2026, by legal policy fellow John Ketcham and attorney and adjunct fellow Christian Browne to the New York Post:
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Mayor Mamdani's New Scam: Charge NYC Taxpayers to Hire His Rent-a-Mobs
New Yorkers, you've been slacking -- so the mayor wants to organize you.
Mayor Zohran Mamdani isn't happy that only 400 people showed up to last year's Rent Guidelines Board hearings.
In response, last Wednesday, he launched Organize NYC, a supposed volunteer effort to have New Yorkers participate in localgovernment.
Taken straight from the Democratic Socialists of America's community-organizing playbook, Mamdani is calling it "a long-term initiative to bring mass public participation into the work of governing."
First stop: the RGB. The body with power to set rent adjustments for the city's 1 million rent-stabilized units will hold four public hearings in June before voting on increases at its June 25 meeting.
Mamdani was elected on the dishonest promise to "immediately" freeze the rent on stabilized tenants for four years.
Since taking office, however, he has been forced to recognize what the law has made clear from the start: He cannot set rents himself, and overt interference with the independent RGB could expose a rent freeze to a legal challenge.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/05/03/opinion/mayor-mamdanis-new-scam-charge-nyc-taxpayers-to-hire-his-rent-a-mobs)
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John Ketcham is a legal policy fellow and director of Cities at the Manhattan Institute. Christian Browne is an attorney and adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/mayor-mamdanis-new-scam-charge-nyc-taxpayers-to-hire-his-rent-a-mobs
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Minding The Campus: Will the California Legislature Ever Stop Trying to Overturn Proposition 209?
NEW YORK, May 5 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 4, 2026, by Gail Heriot, professor of law at the University of San Diego, to Minding the Campus:
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Will the California Legislature Ever Stop Trying to Overturn Proposition 209?
There are a few indications--albeit very tentative ones--that suggest the California Legislature may be getting over its obsession with overturning Proposition 209, the voter initiative that banned state-sponsored preferential policies based on race, sex, or ethnicity.
Of course, only time will tell. But even if the Legislature's
... Show Full Article
NEW YORK, May 5 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 4, 2026, by Gail Heriot, professor of law at the University of San Diego, to Minding the Campus:
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Will the California Legislature Ever Stop Trying to Overturn Proposition 209?
There are a few indications--albeit very tentative ones--that suggest the California Legislature may be getting over its obsession with overturning Proposition 209, the voter initiative that banned state-sponsored preferential policies based on race, sex, or ethnicity.
Of course, only time will tell. But even if the Legislature'sDemocratic supermajority is getting over that obsession, that doesn't mean they are abandoning identity politics more generally.
Continue reading the entire piece at Minding The Campus (https://mindingthecampus.org/2026/05/04/will-the-california-legislature-ever-stop-trying-to-overturn-proposition-209)
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Gail Heriot is a professor of law at the University of San Diego, a member of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and a book fellow at the Manhattan Institute.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/will-the-california-legislature-ever-stop-trying-to-overturn-proposition-209
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Zelenskyy's Gabala Visit Upgrades Ukraine-Azerbaijan Bilateral Relations
WASHINGTON, May 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on May 4, 2026, by Vasif Huseynov, senior fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations and an adjunct lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Zelenskyy's Gabala Visit Upgrades Ukraine-Azerbaijan Bilateral Relations
Executive Summary:
* Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy paid his first wartime visit to Azerbaijan on April 25, signing six bilateral documents with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev covering security, the military-industrial
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, May 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on May 4, 2026, by Vasif Huseynov, senior fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations and an adjunct lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Zelenskyy's Gabala Visit Upgrades Ukraine-Azerbaijan Bilateral Relations
Executive Summary:
* Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy paid his first wartime visit to Azerbaijan on April 25, signing six bilateral documents with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev covering security, the military-industrialcomplex, energy, trade, and humanitarian cooperation.
* The visit institutionalized a partnership previously confined largely to humanitarian aid and energy assistance, opening the way to militry-industrial co-production, joint work on unmanned systems, and an operational deployment of Ukrainian air-defense specialists already on the ground in Azerbaijan.
* By proposing Baku as a venue for prospective trilateral talks with Russia and the United States, Kyiv is publicly calling for Azerbaijan to play a mediator role in peace talks for Russia's war against Ukraine.
On April 25, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Azerbaijan and held substantive talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in the northern city of Gabala (President of Ukraine, April 25). The meeting was the seventh between the two leaders in more than four years, but it was the first to produce a package of six bilateral agreements. Documents were signed during the visit, spanning defense and security cooperation, energy, trade, and humanitarian engagement (President of Ukraine, April 25). Zelenskyy was accompanied by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, who held parallel talks with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov (Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 25).
The visit elevated bilateral ties in the security and military-industrial spheres. At the joint press conference, Zelenskyy highlighted the signing of documents on the joint development of the two countries' defense industries and emphasized that security was the top priority among the six agreements (President of Azerbaijan, April 25). For the first time, the Ukrainian president publicly confirmed that Ukrainian military experts had already been deployed to Azerbaijan to share their experience in defending against drone and missile attacks and protecting critical infrastructure (Euronews, April 25).
The cooperation announced in Gabala was not just an aspirational document. It reflected operational engagement already underway. The military-industrial dimension acquires special significance in the context of the Iranian drone attacks against Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan exclave on March 5 (see EDM, March 11, April 14). Few countries have comparable battle-tested expertise in countering Shahed-class loitering munitions and similar systems compared to Ukraine. It has refined doctrine, hardware, and electronic warfare techniques under sustained drone warfare, providing a model for how Azerbaijan can respond to similar threats.
Aliyev's response framed the same agenda from Azerbaijan's perspective. He stated that military-technical cooperation and the development of the military-industrial complex in both countries offer "significant prospects" for collaboration and that both sides discussed joint production opportunities at length (President of Azerbaijan, April 25). The Ukrainian side brings a defense ecosystem that has expanded dramatically under wartime conditions to joint production opportunities (see EDM, September 17, 2025, April 9, 20, 28). According to Ukraine's Defense Ministry, the country had fewer than ten specialized defense companies in 2022, but now has more than 500 dedicated to drone production (see EDM, October 8, 2024; RBC-Ukraine, February 2, 2025). Output has risen from a few thousand units in 2022 to four million in 2025, with the 2026 target exceeding seven million (Kyiv Post, November 12, 2025; Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, January 25). Kyiv has also reported intercepting around 90 percent of Russian Shahed-type drones at a fraction of the cost of Western air-defense missiles, an achievement that has turned Ukraine into a sought-after partner for Gulf and Middle Eastern states facing similar threats (Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, March 25; see EDM, April 1; RBC-Ukraine, April 27). The Gabala agreement with Azerbaijan is part of a broader Ukrainian strategy to transform Ukraine into a major security provider and military supplier. In mid-April, Zelenskyy had announced ten-year defense agreements with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, and signaled that Kyiv was turning its attention to the Caucasus (President of Ukraine, April 21).
The energy and humanitarian dimensions of the Azerbaijan-Ukraine talks in Gabala, while less novel, complemented the newly expanded security cooperation. Zelenskyy thanked Aliyev for eleven packages of energy assistance provided to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale war, while Sybiha noted that since 2022, Azerbaijan's humanitarian aid to Ukraine has exceeded $45 million, including high-capacity generators, transformers, and critical equipment that have helped sustain Ukraine's energy grid under sustained Russian strikes (Caliber, April 25). During the visit, Baku delivered five passenger buses to Ukrainian frontline communities (Newz.az, April 25). More than 500 Ukrainian children from war-affected regions have undergone rehabilitation in Azerbaijan, and the leaders agreed to expand cooperation in education, including hosting Azerbaijani students in Ukraine.
On the energy track, Aliyev highlighted that the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) has been operating in the Ukrainian market for years and that "very good prospects" now exist for joint projects and investments (President of Azerbaijan, April 25). Bilateral trade has exceeded $500 million, and both presidents committed to expanding it further. The Gabala meeting also took place against the backdrop of a notable diplomatic win for Baku in Brussels. On April 22, five Azerbaijani tankers belonging to SOCAR and the State Shipping Company were removed from the European Union's 20th sanctions package, after having been initially targeted for alleged links to Russia's "shadow fleet" (Azertac, April 24).
A central political element of the joint statement of the two leaders concerned mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Zelenskyy stated, "I thank Azerbaijan for its support of our sovereignty and territorial integrity. Without a doubt, Ukraine has always supported the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan" (President of Ukraine, April 25). Aliyev, for his part, recalled his January 2022 visit to Kyiv and announced that the next meeting of the Ukraine-Azerbaijan Intergovernmental Commission will be held in Ukraine (President of Azerbaijan, April 25).
On the diplomatic front, Zelenskyy used the meeting in Gabala to propose Azerbaijan as a venue for U.S.-Ukraine-Russia trilateral talks. He stated, "We are ready for negotiations in Azerbaijan ... if Russia is ready for diplomacy," adding that previous rounds had taken place in Turkiye and in Switzerland (President of Ukraine, April 25). This proposal positions Baku as a potential venue alongside Istanbul and Geneva for future negotiations--an achievement made possible by Baku's multi-vector foreign policy and balanced relations with all major global powers, including Russia.
The Gabala summit thus marks a clear shift rather than a continuation of previous cooperation. By moving cooperation into joint defense production, formalizing the exchange of operational military expertise, and elevating Baku to the role of potential peace-process host, the visit institutionalizes a partnership previously more rhetorical than substantive. For Azerbaijan, it consolidates a foreign policy posture of strategic autonomy and middle-power positioning. For Ukraine, it secures a new partner in the South Caucasus.
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Dr. Vasif Huseynov is a senior fellow at the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center) and Adjunct Lecturer at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/zelenskyys-gabala-visit-upgrades-ukraine-azerbaijan-bilateral-relations/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Putin Missed Another Potential Chance to Work Toward Peace
WASHINGTON, May 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on May 4, 2026, by Pavel K. Baev, senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Putin Missed Another Potential Chance to Work Toward Peace
Executive Summary:
* Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to U.S. President Donald Trump in a 90-minute conversation on April 29 that could have provided an opportunity to revive stalled peace negotiations with Ukraine.
* Putin instead reiterated his false claims to Donbas and bragged about unconfirmed
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, May 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on May 4, 2026, by Pavel K. Baev, senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Putin Missed Another Potential Chance to Work Toward Peace
Executive Summary:
* Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to U.S. President Donald Trump in a 90-minute conversation on April 29 that could have provided an opportunity to revive stalled peace negotiations with Ukraine.
* Putin instead reiterated his false claims to Donbas and bragged about unconfirmedadvances into Ukraine. Growing Russian war fatigue, economic strain, and skepticism toward U.S. commitments contrast with Putin's continued commitment to his war against Ukraine.
* The windfall of oil profits for Russia because of the Iran conflict has been significantly below hopeful assessments. Putin has, nevertheless, put his faith in oil fortunes and assumes that they will buy more time to stay the course of high-intensity military operations.
On April 29, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke to U.S. President Donald Trump in a 90-minute conversation that could have provided an opportunity to revive stalled peace negotiations with Ukraine (RIA Novosti, April 29). Instead, Putin opted to reiterate Russia's territorial claims to Donbas, which, in Russian interpretation, are in line with the "spirit of Anchorage" conjured at the August 2025 U.S.-Russia summit at the Elmendorf-Richardson base in Alaska (RIA Novosti, April 20). Bragging about fabricated Russian gains, Putin sought to create the idea that Ukraine has no leverage (Vedomosti, April 29). Putin insists on the steady success of Russian attacks, ignoring the general population and many elite groups' growing tiredness of the war (Radio Svoboda, May 2). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, meanwhile, keeps strengthening his hand via long-distance strikes on Russian energy infrastructure and deep rear airbases, such as Shagol, in Russia's Chelyabinsk oblast (The Insider, May 1).
Russians are tired of the Kremlin's deadlocked war against Ukraine. Neither the keenest Russia observers nor analysts inside the Kremlin, however, have an accurate measure of this tiredness. Opinion polls cannot give a reliable estimate of the depth of discontent, but do identify a growing public perception that Russia is moving in the wrong direction (Levada Center, April 30). Spring has not brought the usual blossoming of optimistic feelings. On the contrary, attentive experts note a distinct darkening of social perspectives, as hopes for a cessation of hostilities fade and irritation with rising prices and curtailed internet freedoms turns into angst about Russia's financial and social problems (see EDM, April23,29; Meduza, April 30). Russians may have only vague ideas about the course of combat operations, but the Kremlin's focus on arbitrary or fabricated advances--including incessant reports about supposed advances on a Ukrainian village with less than 100 occupants, Malaya Tokmachka, repeated month after month--informs them about the failure of the spring offensive (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, May 2).
Mainstream Russian commentators have begun arguing that agreements with U.S. leadership are inherently tentative. They argue that U.S. promises can be broken and are certain to be revised by the next administration (RIAC, April 29). Putin, nevertheless, seeks to make a deal with Trump through personal rapport (Kommersant, April 27). Putin presumes that the United States is primarily focused on the conflict with Iran and has offered Russia's mediation to resolve the difficult nuclear aspect of the negotiations, hoping for a surge of U.S. pressure on Ukraine to accept Russian demands in return (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 30). The Putin-Trump conversation which both sides described as good, however, did not help advance Putin's plan because the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran minimized the strategic partnership between Moscow and Tehran (RBC, April 29; The Moscow Times, May 1). The April 29 Pentagon announcement on "unfreezing" the $400 million military aid package to Ukraine was a significant signal of Trump's dissatisfaction with Putin's inflexibility in negotiations with Ukraine (Gazeta.ru, April 30).
Ukraine has acknowledged the diversion of U.S. attention to Iran and appears to have expressed only minor disappointment with the cancellation of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner's visit to Kyiv (RBC, May 2). Zelenskyy is actively exploring other channels for peace talks, including with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, after building common ground with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (TopWar.ru, April 26; Voennoe Delo, May 2). Zelenskyy's main focus, however, appears to be on strengthening ties with key European supporters, particularly by building the Coalition for Coordinating Defense Procurement (CORPUS) and coordinating joint drone-production projects (Forbes.ua, April 30). Moscow remains resolutely opposed to any European participation in peace talks and assumes that rising tensions in trans-Atlantic relations, particularly with Germany, would derail plans to deploy troops from the European "coalition of the willing" in Ukraine, for which strong U.S. backing is necessary (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 30). Hawkish pundits in Moscow have again started to argue for greater reliance on nuclear instruments for destroying European resolve to expand their support for Ukraine (RIAC, April 30).
Putin has refrained from attempts at nuclear blackmail for many weeks. Still, his narrative about relentless advances in Donbas departs increasingly from the reality of fruitless Russian attacks and mounting casualties (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 30). His main attention has been on the Russian economy, the decisive driver in the war of attrition. Putin has demanded that his ministers return the economy to a trajectory of strong growth (The Bell, April 21). In late winter, Kremlin economists had very nearly persuaded him that a reduction in state expenditures--including the allocation of resources for the war--was necessary, but the sudden increase in oil export revenues caused by the Iran conflict allowed him to abandon prudence (The Moscow Times, April 29). The windfall of oil profits has been significantly below hopeful assessments, not least because of high-impact Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure and "shadow fleet" tankers. The scale of accumulated problems in most Russian industrial sectors is so great that a trickle of petro-revenues cannot alter the trend of structural recession (Riddle, April 29; Nastoyashee Vremya, May 3). Putin, nevertheless, has put his faith in oil fortunes and assumes that it will buy him more time to stay the course of high-intensity military operations.
Putin's phone call with Trump was an opportunity for him to regain momentum in the stalled peace process by showing the flexibility necessary to arrange a durable ceasefire. Instead, Putin suggested only the shortest possible cessation of hostilities to celebrate Victory Day on May 9, even if the Red Square parade is reduced to marching of a few infantry battalions (Radio Svoboda, April 29). This short ceasefire could be seen as a response to the effectiveness of Ukrainian long-range strikes, which may mark a tentative step toward compromise and a test of the Russian public's readiness to accept it. Putin's calculus of risks generated by the continuation of the unwinnable war and by bringing it to an end keeps shifting, and his ambitions are apparently diminishing, while his worries about personal safety are growing. More opportunities to freeze the hostilities and then move toward a sequence of peace deals are certain to appear in the coming weeks, but each missed one digs deeper the hole into which Putin has delivered Russia.
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Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/putin-missed-another-potential-chance-to-work-toward-peace/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: USA vs. State of Minnesota
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, May 5 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
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USA v. State of Minnesota
The federal government is suing state Attorney General Keith Ellison over his attempted regulation of global greenhouse gas emissions via litigation.
The lawsuit (Case No. 26-cv-2456) was filed this morning in federal court in Minnesota. The Department of Justice put out a press release on the lawsuit, which includes a link to today's filing.
Fox News reports,
"BREAKING: Justice
... Show Full Article
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, May 5 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
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USA v. State of Minnesota
The federal government is suing state Attorney General Keith Ellison over his attempted regulation of global greenhouse gas emissions via litigation.
The lawsuit (Case No. 26-cv-2456) was filed this morning in federal court in Minnesota. The Department of Justice put out a press release on the lawsuit, which includes a link to today's filing.
Fox News reports,
"BREAKING: JusticeDepartment files complaint against Minnesota over state suing energy companies for greenhouse gas emissions"
From the New York Times,
"Trump Administration Sues Minnesota to Block Climate Lawsuit:
The federal government is suing Minnesota to try to stop that state's own lawsuit against Exxon Mobil, the American Petroleum Institute."
Minnesota: producing more news than can be consumed locally.
...
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Bill Glahn is a Policy Fellow with Center of the American Experiment.
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/usa-v-state-of-minnesota/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A: Can Sports Diplomacy Open a Door on the Korean Peninsula?
WASHINGTON, May 5 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on May 4, 2026, by Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department, and Andy Lim, deputy director and fellow with the CSIS Korea Chair:
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Can Sports Diplomacy Open a Door on the Korean Peninsula?
North Korea's Naegohyang Women's Football Club is scheduled to arrive in South Korea on May 17, ahead of its match against South Korea's Suwon FC Women in the semifinal of the Asian Football Confederation Women's Champions League on May 20. This will be the first
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, May 5 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on May 4, 2026, by Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department, and Andy Lim, deputy director and fellow with the CSIS Korea Chair:
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Can Sports Diplomacy Open a Door on the Korean Peninsula?
North Korea's Naegohyang Women's Football Club is scheduled to arrive in South Korea on May 17, ahead of its match against South Korea's Suwon FC Women in the semifinal of the Asian Football Confederation Women's Champions League on May 20. This will be the firstvisit by North Korean athletes to South Korea since December 2018, and the first time a North Korean club football team has visited South Korea. The visiting North Korean delegation includes 27 players and 12 support staff, and they will reportedly stay together with the South Korean team at a local hotel. The winner of the final--against Australia's Melbourne City or Japan's Tokyo Verdy Beleza--will receive $1 million in prize money, with the runner-up receiving $500,000.
Q1: What is the diplomatic significance of this sporting match?
A1: From when the two Koreas fielded a joint table tennis team in 1991 to beat China, to the first joint march under the unification flag during the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics, to North Korea's high-level participation in South Korea's 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, sports diplomacy has always been an important tool of inter-Korean diplomacy. In 2018, Kim Jong-un's sister Kim Yo-jong participated in the opening ceremony of the Pyeongchang Olympics, which contributed to diplomatic openings that tempered the "fire and fury" threats between Trump and Kim Jong-un in 2017 and led to the April 2018 inter-Korean summit and subsequent Trump summits in Singapore and Hanoi.
Q2: Has sports diplomacy been successful in the past?
A2: Yes, South Korea has been successful at using sports to advance diplomatic goals. Everyone thinks of ping pong diplomacy with Nixon and China, but South Korea successfully used the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics as a vehicle to open dialogue with the Soviet Union, eventually leading to normalization of relations in 1990. Two years after the Seoul Olympics, South Korea supported China at the 1990 Beijing Asian Games with advertising revenue, logistics support, and tourism despite global sanctions against China for the massacre of citizens at Tiananmen Square. This helped pave the way to normalization of China-South Korea relations in 1992.
Table 1 provides a history of past inter-Korean sports events since 1990.
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Table 1: Can Sports Diplomacy Open a Door on the Korean Peninsula?
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Q3: Can a football match facilitate a diplomatic breakthrough?
A3: Hard to say. If the visit goes through as scheduled, it produces three useful data points worth tracking. First, the fact that Pyongyang allowed athletes to travel to South Korea is significant given North Korea's shutdown of all dialogue with South Korea and its assertion of the enemy-state declaration vis-a-vis Seoul. In this regard, the football match could demonstrate the potential to separate cultural exchanges from politics.
Second, the football match follows the conciliatory North Korean response in April to South Korea's statement of regret over the unauthorized flying of drones into North Korea. That rare gesture, delivered through Kim Yo-jong, shows space for potential inter-Korean dialogue. There is no existing agreement on drones in the 2018 inter-Korean Comprehensive Military Agreement even though drone flights by either side could lead to inadvertent escalation.
Third is President Trump's political will to meet Kim Jong-un, which he made clear in the run-up to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting last fall. Another entreaty to Kim is possible as Trump prepares to go to Beijing in the coming days. If this meeting were to take place, it would likely occur after the Trump-Xi meeting, so as not to upstage China.
Q4: What is Naegohyang Women's Football Club?
A4: Naegohyang (meaning "My Homeland") Women's FC, based in Pyongyang, is sponsored by the Korean People's Army-owned conglomerate of the same name--a maker of cigarettes (including the 7.27 brand reportedly favored by Kim Jong-un), electronics, sports apparel, and soju. The team is a football powerhouse and a two-time North Korean Women's Premier League champion. It beat Suwon FC Women 3-0 in the November 2025 group stage and is heavily favored in the upcoming match.
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Victor Cha is president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Andy Lim is deputy director and fellow with the Korea Chair at CSIS.
The authors appreciate Phillip Meylan's and Kharle Wu's work in publishing this article.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-sports-diplomacy-open-door-korean-peninsula
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Policy of Truth - Reporting Requirements for Critical Minerals Investments
WASHINGTON, May 5 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on May 4, 2026, by Brad Brooks-Rubin, senior associate (non-resident) with the Human Rights Initiative and Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business:
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Policy of Truth: Reporting Requirements for Critical Minerals Investments
In paper after paper, webinar after webinar, forum after forum, experts from around the world, and especially in Washington, are opining on the meaning and implications of the current scramble for critical minerals. What would be the best framework
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, May 5 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on May 4, 2026, by Brad Brooks-Rubin, senior associate (non-resident) with the Human Rights Initiative and Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business:
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Policy of Truth: Reporting Requirements for Critical Minerals Investments
In paper after paper, webinar after webinar, forum after forum, experts from around the world, and especially in Washington, are opining on the meaning and implications of the current scramble for critical minerals. What would be the best frameworkfor countering Chinese dominance of the sector, the most reliable methods to ensure return on investment, the fairest approaches to host community and government engagement, or the most appropriate ways overall for the United States and other governments to work in this new reality where such minerals are vital for the changing economy?
Some of this thinking is certainly worthy of review and consideration by policymakers. The difficult reality is that every mineral, every deposit, every context, every governing framework, every community engagement approach, every development-focused intervention, and every supply chain is different. There are many past lessons to be learned, but the elusive search for sets of standards and regulations that can ensure responsible engagement across contexts is destined to remain just that: elusive. Especially when mines can take at least a decade, or longer, to move from initial greenfield investment to operational site, along with questions about where trading, processing, and refining happens that can call into question what U.S. investment, let alone control, can even really mean.
In that context, what we need instead of new policy frameworks, papers, and proposed rules is to channel dance-pop legends Depeche Mode and institute a "Policy of Truth."
This Policy of Truth that should be developed and deployed has a precedent in one of the countries and contexts that connects to a previous scramble, Myanmar, but remains relevant today given that it is home both to many of the global reserves of rare earths, along with other critical minerals, gems, and gold, as well as being governed by a repressive junta known for its violence, human rights violations, corruption, and engagement with U.S. competitors.
This Policy of Truth approach does not focus on meeting (or claiming to meet) specific standards or relying on third-party auditing; it simply focuses on the need for a Policy of Truth, basic due diligence related to the policy, and public reporting. That combination may result in a few-paragraph summary or a 60-page detailed report, with the decision left up to the filer. The scrutiny and potential enforcement are then in the hands of investors, downstream purchasers, communities, civil society, and potentially, government enforcement agencies.
As I have advocated previously, if the United States can only take one approach in a new battle for minerals dominance, this is the simplest and most direct way to facilitate an honest conversation about what is (and what should be) happening in the sector. Policies and investments rarely succeed without that as the starting point. This analysis will briefly review the background on the requirements as they relate to Myanmar, consider how these could be adapted for the current rush, and look ahead to future scenarios.
The Past: Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements.
In 2012, the Obama administration introduced the Burma Responsible Investment Reporting Requirements (RIRRs). Over several years in the early 2010s, the then-ruling junta began to make changes that appeared to signal a shift toward democracy, rule of law, and a more open approach to foreign economic investment. This brought much enthusiasm from supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, as well as broader civil society and other advocates for change in Myanmar, but also caution. Were these signs and words of intention to change going to lead to true and lasting reforms? Or were they a smokescreen?
As negotiations continued between the Obama administration and the junta regarding these issues, the removal of the extensive sanctions program in place on Myanmar became a key topic. There is no perfect time for sanctions removal, especially given the risks: If the U.S. government removes sanctions too soon, and then there is backsliding, reimposition is challenging, time-consuming, and often imperfect in execution; this was a part of what happened with respect to North Korea in the late 2000s, during a brief period of detente. On the other hand, if the U.S. government waits too long, hoped-for economic changes and foreign investment may not come soon enough, and hardliners can manipulate public opinion to undermine reforms and bring back authoritarianism and violence; this is a core piece of the history of Sudan between 2019 and 2021.
The RIRRs were a rare time when a middle ground was found that allowed for sanctions to be eased in a moderated form. The RIRRs were, in essence, a condition of the removal of the prohibition on "new investment" that had been a hallmark of the sanctions program since the early 2000s. In sum, according to the general license issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to ease the investment sanctions, any U.S person who invested more than $500,000 in Myanmar needed to file a report with the U.S. Embassy in Yangon detailing their business investments within six months of making them. The report obliged the filer to set out the specifics of the investments made and detail the due diligence measures taken with respect to a particular set of issues: engagement with Myanmar's government and military, as well as human rights, corruption, environmental concerns, security arrangements, property acquisitions, payment transparency, and more.
The decision on what to file substantively was left to the company. In some cases, extensive reports of dozens of pages were compiled, including by companies like General Electric that did not believe they needed to file, demonstrating both meaningful due diligence as well as awareness of areas where risks remained high and in need of further mitigation. In other cases, companies provided less than two pages with quite scant details, summary information, and an obvious sense that no real due diligence or risk mitigation had been undertaken. This was not a failure, but a feature: Rather than have companies pretend to meet a set of standards that they had not, they simply stated the truth, and then the market and external stakeholders could be the judge, which began to happen in 2013 and 2014.
The RIRRs disappeared too soon, as the Obama administration ended the sanctions program as a whole in 2016, meaning that the underlying general license establishing the RIRRs was no longer valid. This was not only too bad in hindsight, given what unfolded in Myanmar in the coming years, but it also meant the experiment ended prematurely. For example, the enforcement authority was never quite figured out between the Department of State and OFAC, and the reports were not varied enough in terms of sector to lead to meaningful conclusions about where regulatory or market interventions could be useful. But even with those shortcomings, the groundwork of the Policy of Truth was laid.
The Present: Venezuela and Other Sanctions Relief Cases
So when faced with the question of how to handle critical minerals investments in contexts of uncertain governance situations--including with partners whose long-term reliability is questionable at best--the clearest and most direct approach should be to reinvigorate the RIRRs. Perhaps there is a world in which the higher ground of a more robust or deeper framework would be possible, but the current climate is not that world, and this middle ground is both achievable and desirable.
In many cases of current interest with respect to minerals investments--Venezuela, Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)--versions of the RIRRs could again be implemented through sanctions general licensing. Should Myanmar return to a more democratic path, it, too, could have a new round of RIRRs implemented through the new sanctions program brought back into place after the 2021 coup. Venezuela sanctions have, of course, been easing over the last several months since the arrest of former President Nicolas Maduro, but importantly, these RIRRs could be implemented through general licenses even in contexts in which the sanctions themselves are not being eased. Even in cases where our policy overall on sanctions remains unchanged, such as the DRC, a general license establishing the RIRRs would be permissible.
As before, the reporting requirements would be simple and follow a specific starting template:
* Details of the investment (e.g., which minerals or location)
* Details of the investors and operators (beneficial owners and key operating partners on the ground)
* Chain of custody or other approaches taken with respect to offtake
* Expected operating returns and summary of payments to the host government
* Labor and human rights due diligence frameworks implemented
* Security arrangements, including contracts with the host country's security forces
* Confirmation of sanctions and anti-money laundering compliance programs
* Social license to operate approaches taken, if any
* Free, prior, informed consent engagements, if any
* If necessary, some information could be provided to the U.S. government directly via classified submission, but the subjects covered in that submission would be required to be noted in the public report
Rather than remain staid and identical, in each case, the Department of State would issue a business risk advisory that would outline the specific risks relevant to a specific country (or region), which would then add supplemental elements to the report for filers active there. Enforcement would rest principally with OFAC (e.g., for failure to file, which is a violation of the license), but with guidance provided by the Department of State and other agencies with information regarding the investments on the ground.
The U.S. government has recently included a version of this idea and incorporated it into the private reporting provided to OFAC and State in the context of Venezuelan minerals. In March 2026, OFAC issued GL 51 and 51A related to Venezuelan minerals, including gold, allowing for U.S. entities to engage in all transactions related to these minerals under certain conditions, including that a report be provided to OFAC and the State Department within 10 days of the first transaction and every 30 days thereafter covering these elements:
* The parties involved
* Documentation demonstrating supply chain due diligence plans to determine the chain of custody of the minerals
* Quantities, descriptions, and purchase prices of the minerals
* The dates the transactions occurred
* Any taxes, fees, or other payments provided to the government of Venezuela
In addition to a narrower focus, these reports also lack the public component. There would be several key benefits to this broader approach:
* The RIRRs, including the underlying general license and informational advisories, would be adaptable and adjustable over time, responsive to ongoing circumstances.
* The reports will likely be clear, simple, and easily accessible and digestible to downstream purchasers and the public in the United States and in host countries, allowing for more meaningful engagement than reports pursuant to certification systems have done.
* The reports will provide important baselines for more country-specific and mineral-specific interventions, given that the differences across minerals can be hard for a single framework to cover effectively.
* The reports can become key baselines for investors, financial institutions, insurance companies, and other companies essential to the operation of critical minerals investments.
The Future: A Broader Reporting Framework Beyond Existing Sanctions
The deeper question is how to apply the RIRRs in other contexts where sanctions are not immediately available, such as Indonesia, Zambia, and Brazil. Without a legal authority in place through sanctions or otherwise, reports could be encouraged voluntarily, as discussed below, but the ideal approach would be a legal framework applicable to all minerals investments.
A few options could be pursued to develop the underlying authority, or an alternative:
* Introduce a "Critical Minerals Sanctions" program, which not only allows targeting of those foreign actors undermining critical minerals investments through corruption or other illicit means, but also authorizes and requires the submission of RIRRs.
* Pass legislation authorizing a federal agency--and agencies such as the Departments of the Interior, State, Energy, or even the Commodity Futures Trading Commission could all be candidates--to collect, maintain, and eventually enforce the reports.
* If no government-led approach can be developed outside sanctions frameworks, outside stakeholders can consider the development of a multi-stakeholder initiative that can oversee, collect, and disseminate the reports.Reviving the RIRRs will not solve the myriad issues underlying the current critical minerals scramble; in the end, no single framework can. The broad and complex set of policies that must eventually underlie critical minerals investments and community development can be developed, but first, there must be a baseline and comparable set of data and an overarching Policy of Truth.
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Brad Brooks-Rubin is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Human Rights Initiative and Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/policy-truth-reporting-requirements-critical-minerals-investments
[Category: ThinkTank]
