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AFPI: National Framework Will Help Ensure American AI Dominance
WASHINGTON, March 21 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on March 20, 2026:* * *
AFPI: National Framework Will Help Ensure American AI Dominance
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Yusuf Mahmood, Director of AI and Emerging Technology, in response to President Trump's newly announced national AI legislative framework:
"We commend President Trump on publishing the National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence. It includes America First recommendations that will ensure American AI dominance and preserve key ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 21 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on March 20, 2026: * * * AFPI: National Framework Will Help Ensure American AI Dominance The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Yusuf Mahmood, Director of AI and Emerging Technology, in response to President Trump's newly announced national AI legislative framework: "We commend President Trump on publishing the National Policy Framework for Artificial Intelligence. It includes America First recommendations that will ensure American AI dominance and preserve keyareas of state sovereignty.
Protecting children and families, deregulating AI infrastructure while safeguarding household energy bills, defending the American worker, preventing future government censorship, and empowering our national security agencies to collaborate on frontier technologies are all essential to any federal AI framework. Now it is time for Congress to further develop and codify these common-sense policies."
AFPI has long aligned with President Trump's call for a national AI framework and looks forward to helping advance this agenda. AFPI continues to develop specific legislative recommendations in many of these areas, including infrastructure deregulation, AI censorship and transparency, child safety, tracking AI's workforce impacts, and AI capacity in national security.
Click here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/policy-areas/ai-and-emerging-technology) to learn more about AFPI's AI and Emerging Technology work.
Yusuf Mahmood, Director of AI and Emerging Technology, is available for interview. Click here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/contact/comms-team) to schedule.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-national-framework-will-help-ensure-american-ai-dominance
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Debunks Claims That AI Data Centers Will Drain Water
WASHINGTON, March 21 (TNSrep) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on March 20, 2026:* * *
AFPI Debunks Claims that AI Data Centers will Drain Water
This week, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released a new expert insight (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/the-data-center-water-use-hoax), debunking claims that artificial intelligence (AI) data centers are draining America's water supply. The report shows that even under the highest estimates, all U.S. data centers together account for a small fraction of America's freshwater use while powering ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 21 (TNSrep) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on March 20, 2026: * * * AFPI Debunks Claims that AI Data Centers will Drain Water This week, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released a new expert insight (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/the-data-center-water-use-hoax), debunking claims that artificial intelligence (AI) data centers are draining America's water supply. The report shows that even under the highest estimates, all U.S. data centers together account for a small fraction of America's freshwater use while poweringeconomic growth and strengthening our national security.
"The AI 'water crisis' is a hoax," said Yusuf Mahmood, AFPI's Director of AI and Emerging Technology. "Data centers account for a rounding error of our total water use but deliver outsized gains for workers, communities, and American power."
AFPI will continue to champion policies that unleash American innovation dominance in the AI and emerging technology space. The United States must lead the world's AI revolution.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-debunks-claims-that-ai-data-centers-will-drain-water
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Applauds Kansas Legislature for Passing Education Freedom Bill Expanding Scholarship Opportunities
WASHINGTON, March 21 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on March 20, 2026:* * *
AFPI Applauds Kansas Legislature for Passing Education Freedom Bill Expanding Scholarship Opportunities
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) issued the following statement after the Kansas State Legislature passed House Bill 2468, which elects Kansas to participate in the federal education freedom tax credit and expands the state's existing tax credit scholarship program. The bill now heads to Governor Laura Kelly's desk.
"Kansas parents deserve to be in the driver's seat ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 21 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on March 20, 2026: * * * AFPI Applauds Kansas Legislature for Passing Education Freedom Bill Expanding Scholarship Opportunities The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) issued the following statement after the Kansas State Legislature passed House Bill 2468, which elects Kansas to participate in the federal education freedom tax credit and expands the state's existing tax credit scholarship program. The bill now heads to Governor Laura Kelly's desk. "Kansas parents deserve to be in the driver's seatwhen it comes to their children's education. AFPI applauds the Kansas State Legislature for passing House Bill 2468," said Erika Donalds, Chair of Education Opportunity at the America First Policy Institute. "By opting in to the federal education tax credit, Kansas will empower families with greater education opportunities while ensuring charitable contributions stay in-state to support students and strengthen communities."
"House Bill 2468 also increases the maximum dollar amount of charitable donations to the state's tax credit program. We are grateful to Kansas lawmakers for advancing multiple policies that expand education freedom and put students first. This legislation represents a meaningful step forward to educational freedom for all Kansas families."
Kentucky Governor Andy Beshear recently vetoed similar legislation that would have codified the state's participation in the federal tax credit. On March 17, the Kentucky General Assembly voted to override that veto. Kentucky will now join nearly 30 other states that have opted in to the program, whether by governor election or legislation.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-applauds-kansas-legislature-for-passing-education-freedom-bill-and-expanding-scholarship-opportunities
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Telegram Outages Spike in Kremlin's Push for Digital Control
WASHINGTON, March 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on March 19, 2026, by analyst Kassie Corelli in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Telegram Outages Spike in Kremlin's Push for Digital Control
Executive Summary:
* The Russian government widened restrictions on Telegram in February and March, beginning with slowed speeds. By mid-March, widespread Telegram outages have left the platform intermittently inaccessible across much of the country, suggesting a phased move toward a potential full block.
* Over the past year and a half, the Russian government has steadily ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on March 19, 2026, by analyst Kassie Corelli in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Telegram Outages Spike in Kremlin's Push for Digital Control Executive Summary: * The Russian government widened restrictions on Telegram in February and March, beginning with slowed speeds. By mid-March, widespread Telegram outages have left the platform intermittently inaccessible across much of the country, suggesting a phased move toward a potential full block. * Over the past year and a half, the Russian government has steadilysought to gain control over the internet, restricting foreign messaging apps and turning off the mobile internet to shut down or restrict internet use in the event of public unrest, as occurred during recent protests in Iran.
* The Kremlin's restrictions on Telegram met with unexpected opposition from Russian war correspondents, deputies, and other government officials. This pushback demonstrates that the security services' attempts to cut the population off from communications can also damage regime interests.
Since the beginning of the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has systematically limited the functioning of foreign messaging apps inside of Russia and more generally expanded its control of the internet (see EDM, November 25, 2024, July 24, November 6, 2025, February 25). In August 2024, Roskomnadzor cut Russians off from Signal, the most well-known app for secure communication. Its audience in Russia was much smaller than that of other apps, but it was used to transmit sensitive information and communicate with users located abroad (Meduza, August 13, 2024). In mid-March, Russians reported Telegram outages across the country following much reduced download speeds on the app in February and other government-imposed limits on the app's functioning in 2025 (The Moscow Times, March 16).
In August 2025, the Kremlin restricted calls via WhatsApp and Telegram. Despite communication via both services still being possible without the use of a virtual private network (VPN), the government began to block voice calls from Russia. The Russian government explained these blocks as a fight against phone scammers (DW Russian Service, August 14, 2025).
Mobile internet access was also curtailed in many parts of Russia in 2025. Beginning in May 2025, outages became more frequent, larger, and longer with each month. Outages that began in southern and central Russia began to also affect Primorsky Krai, the Amur and Sakhalin oblasts, and Siberia. Internet outages can last weeks, with only occasional reactivations (T-Zh, December 3, 2025).
At the end of February, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law obligating Russian operators to block any communication when ordered by the Federal Security Service (FSB). Putin can personally decide to initiate blockages without explanation under the same law (DW Russian Service, February 21).
The Russian government claims that internet blockages defend against Ukrainian drone attacks. The Russian opposition, however, points out that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can carry out their missions without using the mobile internet. Moreover, the fight against drones cannot explain internet shutdowns in Kamchatka or Siberia, where there has not yet been a single Ukrainian attack. One of the leaders of the Russian opposition in exile, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, believes that the internet shutdowns are a "regime rehearsal for instability," so the government can turn off the internet in the event of protests, as occurred recently in Iran (YouTube/@Mikhail Khodorkovsky, February 17).
In December 2025, Roskomnadzor announced a partial blocking of WhatsApp "for breaking the law" (RG.RU, December 1, 2025). Since February 21, Russians have complained that they cannot send files on WhatsApp in addition to existing problems with calls (@ hi-tech, February 22). At the same time, the authorities began to slow access to Telegram, the most popular messaging app in Russia.
The Russian authorities began the "ideological preparation" for the idea of the need for Telegram outages in February. One of the main pro-regime news sources, "Russian Gazette," published an article on February 24, "exposing" the founder of Telegram, Pavel Durov. The author asserts that the platform has become "the main tool of the intelligence services of [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO countries and the 'Kyiv regime'" (RG.RU, February 24). The article says that Telegram "in no way censored" content and facilitated the exchange of coordinates and personal data (RG.RU, February 24). The author goes on, saying, "Since 2022, the number of crimes using Telegram exceeded 153,000," of which 33,000 were "crimes of sabotage, terrorist, and extremist nature," including explosions and arson attacks on military recruitment offices. The author did not conceal the fact that the article was based on "FSB materials" (RG.RU, February 24). At the same time, information appeared in the medi--also based on FSB data--that the government had opened a case against Durov for "aiding terrorism" (Vazhnie Istorii, February 24).
Telegram poses a more complicated problem for the authorities compared to other messaging services. It is actively used by Russian propagandists, ultra-nationalist "war correspondents," and official government agencies. Russian officials and military personnel communicate via Telegram. Several opposition journalists claim the messenger is unsafe for the opposition and is linked to the FSB.
Journalists from "Important Stories" note that all Telegram chats, except for secret ones, lack end-to-end encryption, and therefore user messages are stored on Telegram's servers. According to these journalists, these servers are maintained by the same people who operate the secret Russian intelligence complexes used to surveil Russian citizens (Vazhnie Istorii, June 10, 2025).
The relationship between the founder of Telegram and Russian intelligence is unclear. In 2018, the Kremlin blocked the service in Russia. Two years later, the block was lifted with the explanation that Durov was ready "to act against terrorism and extremism" (RBC, June 18, 2020). Telegram channels close to the presidential administration deny reports of a criminal case against Durov (Telegram/@russicaRU, February 24). Both the FSB leadership and Durov also deny any negotiations regarding the messaging app's fate (RBC, February 19).
Telegram outages affect the Russian military most of all. According to pro-Russian war correspondents, the military widely uses Telegram for orders, medical coordination, group evacuations, first aid, and the collection of donations for the needs of the front. With a complete block, the volume of donations could decrease by 70-80 percent (DW Russian Service, February 13).
The Russian army has reportedly banned the use of the domestically controlled "Max" messenger app at the front because it is not secure enough (see EDM, October 7, 2025; Mediazona, February 23). It is revealing that a group of State Duma deputies even considered sending a request to the Ministry of Digital Development regarding the reasons for blocking Telegram (Meduza, February 11).
Analysts close to the presidential administration opine that the Kremlin is not yet prepared to fully block Telegram (Telegram/@russicaRU, February 25). Independent analysts suggest, however, that the Kremlin will continue to slowly throttle Telegram to "squeeze out" the platform's loyal user base and reduce the political costs of a complete block (Re: Russia, February 20). If Durov does not go along with the Kremlin, the possibility of such a block in the future cannot be discarded. Considering the Russian military and government's dependence on Telegram, such a decision will primarily affect their performance.
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Kassie Corelli is an analyst with The Jamestown Foundation.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/telegram-outages-spike-in-kremlins-push-for-digital-control/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: What to Watch at the Trump-Takaichi Summit
WASHINGTON, March 20 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on March 18, 2026, by deputy director William Chou and senior fellow Masashi Murano, both of the Institute's Japan Chair:* * *
What to Watch at the Trump-Takaichi Summit
Introduction
On March 19, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will be making her first trip to Washington as Japan's leader, where she will have the opportunity to demonstrate two things: 1) Japan is an ally that follows through on its promises; 2) that American ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 20 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on March 18, 2026, by deputy director William Chou and senior fellow Masashi Murano, both of the Institute's Japan Chair: * * * What to Watch at the Trump-Takaichi Summit Introduction On March 19, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will be making her first trip to Washington as Japan's leader, where she will have the opportunity to demonstrate two things: 1) Japan is an ally that follows through on its promises; 2) that Americanand Japanese priorities are closely aligned, and that collaboration are vital towards achieving the president's agenda.
Takaichi previously met President Donald Trump back in October 2025, when Trump stopped in Tokyo on his way to the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) meeting in Seoul. This visit, which occurred merely days after Takaichi became prime minister, was a success. The two governments signed agreements on critical minerals, shipbuilding, and energy. Perhaps more importantly, both leaders demonstrated personal chemistry, thanks to their shared political priorities and affection for former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe.
Since October, though, four key developments have occurred.
* Takaichi won a landslide electoral victory in February, and her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) now holds a supermajority in the lower chamber.
* The two governments announced the first batch of projects under the $550 billion strategic industrial fund.
* China began using aggressive economic coercion against Japan after an opposition party politician forced Prime Minister Takaichi to affirm that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute "survival-threatening situation," in which case Japanese law would allow Tokyo to undertake collective self-defense.
* The Trump administration began undertaking military operations against Iran, which is impacting global energy markets and undermining China's partnership of convenience with Tehran.
Upcoming developments later this year will further shape the tenor of the United States-Japan relationship. For example, President Trump will likely visit China later this year, and the two nations will negotiate issues concerning host nation support this summer. Japan also plans to release its new national security documents at the end of this year.
Against this backdrop, Takaichi's likely aim this trip is to affirm how the Japan is America's most dependable ally, an ally that follows through on its promises. At a time when other countries make empty, unrealistic gestures or have a history of not fulfilling their agreements with the US, Japan stands apart. In the face of challenging global economic and security challenges, Takaichi will show how the two countries' economic, technological, and security are aligned and benefit from stronger cooperation.
Much of the expected announcements out of the summit will focus on economic rather than security issues. However, the broader bilateral diplomatic relationship, as well as the uncertain regional and global environments, provide the implicit setting for the two leaders' meetings. Here are several key issues that the visit will--or should--address.
Key Issues
The $550 Billion Strategic Industrial Fund
The foremost issue that the two leaders will address is the $550 billion strategic industrial fund, a key element of the two countries' trade deal from July 2025. The fund--which will support projects in key strategic sectors including artificial intelligence, energy, and critical minerals--announced its first batch of projects on February 17. The three projects in this group consist of:
* A 9.2 gigawatt-hour gas power plant in Portsmouth, Ohio, that will power AI data centers. Total cost is estimated at $33 billion, and SB Energy, a subsidiary of Softbank, will be the operator. Japanese firms such as Toshiba, Hitachi, and Mitsubishi Electric are interested in providing relevant equipment.
* A deepwater oil export terminal in Brazoria County, Texas, that will generate $20-30 billion in US crude exports. Total cost is estimated at $2.1 billion, and Sentinel Midstream will be an operator. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Nippon Steel, JFE Steel, and MODEC have expressed interest in providing relevant equipment and materials.
* A high-pressure, high-temperature synthetic diamond grit facility in Georgia that will service the semiconductor, automotive, and energy industries. Total cost is estimated at $600 million, and Element Six, which is part of the De Beers group, will be the project operator. Japanese diamond toolmakers Asahi Diamond Industrial and Noritake are interested in offtake.
Neither government, however, has released the administrative or financial terms of these projects, suggesting they are still under negotiation. Discussions with the private sector indicate that more information about such terms, as well as solutions to address workforce availability and regulatory processes, will be vital for encouraging industry from both nations to propose further projects for the $550 billion fund.
The upcoming Trump-Takaichi summit will likely show continued momentum behind the $550 billion fund. In addition to clarifying the first projects' terms, the summit should announce a second round of projects. One venture could be a $13 billion Japan Display plant that would service American automotive, medical, and defense needs. The two countries can also cooperate on nuclear energy or on a copper refining facility. Such projects can strengthen US-Japan cooperation in strategically important sectors.
Critical Minerals and Supply Chains
The two leaders will likely introduce new initiatives to cooperate on critical minerals, building on their October 2025 agreement to diversify their mining and processing of these materials. This builds off of a flurry of international bilateral agreements that the White House has advanced on critical minerals and rare earths, such as similar agreements with Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand last year. Subsequently, the Trump administration pushed ahead on a number of multilateral critical mineral initiatives, such as the State Department's Pax Silica and the critical minerals ministerial from February 2026. At the same time, Japan has been proactive as well, signing rare earth development agreements with entities in France and Brazil, and collaboration with other G7 countries to secure critical minerals.
The common thread in these initiatives emanating out of Washington and Tokyo is opposition to Beijing's dominance of rare earths and key supply chains. In the past year, Beijing instituted global restrictions against rare earth and legacy semiconductor exports, and more recently, "dual-use material" export restrictions targeting Japan. These coercive actions were in response to geopolitical or economic measures that angered Beijing, but they are also part of China's larger desire to acquire downstream supply chains through technology theft. Such aggression may currently target Japanese firms, who occupy midstream positions in supply chains. But these policies also hurt American manufacturers who depend on Japanese suppliers, and who will eventually come under threat themselves from Chinese competitors.
Critical minerals cooperation will therefore be a key issue during the Trump-Takaichi summit, with preparatory work leading up to the meeting. The two countries just announced that they will create a "US-Japan Critical Minerals Project" in Indiana, North Carolina, and Arizona, to address rare earths, copper, and lithium development. Last weekend, Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Ryosei Akazawa announced at an Indo-Pacific energy ministerial that Japan will work with the US on a rapid-response group for supply chain disruptions that will entail information sharing. At the same ministerial, Japan and other Asian nations signed more than $57 billion in 22 agreements for energy and critical minerals. In addition, the US Trade and Development Agency renewed its partnership with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation to collaborate in the infrastructure investment needed for such energy and critical mineral projects. The Office of the US Trade Representative is working with the Japanese government to design a trade deal that will include a price floor and tariffs for materials to compete against Chinese market distortions. Finally, there is expectation that both countries will sign an agreement to cooperate on deep-sea mining for rare earths, especially off Japan's Minami-Torishima island.
As China has made it clear that it will continue to double down on its dominance over critical mineral supply chains in its latest draft of its upcoming Five-Year plan, US-Japanese cooperation in this area bolsters both countries' economic security. It will also give President Trump leverage in his upcoming trip to Beijing.
Shipbuilding
A third issue of likely announcements later this week will be shipbuilding. Shipbuilding is a high priority for both the United States and Japan, two maritime powers dependent on global commerce and the naval power needed to secure it. American shipbuilding--as exemplified by Liberty ships and Essex-class carriers--played a major role in our victory in World War II, while Japan became the world's leading shipbuilder by 1956 and dominated global shipping well into the early 1990s. Since then, however, Japan's share of global shipbuilding has declined to about 8 percent, and America's share has declined to less than 1 percent.
Each country has introduced plans to revitalize its shipbuilding sector. In April 2025, the White House announced its intention to restore American maritime dominance. The Maritime Action Plan (MAP), finally published in February 2026, introduced several measures to strengthen American shipbuilding. This includes a universal fee on foreign-built vessels to fund future shipbuilding measures. It also includes the creation of a Strategic Commercial Fleet (SCF) of US-built and US-flagged ships. Finally, it encourages a "bridge" strategy that permits foreign construction while eventually shifting to US construction. Finnish icebreakers are the obvious case, but the "bridge" strategy will likely also extend to Japan and South Korea given the two nations' shipbuilding agreements with the US.
Japan has had shipbuilding plans of its own for several years now. This includes measures within the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) to support more resilient supply chains for ship components. In June 2025, the LDP proposed a 1 trillion-yen fund to support the shipping industry; the Japan Shipbuilding Industry Association matched it with a 350-billion pledge to double Japan's shipbuilding volume. In December 2025, the Japanese government introduced a 720 billion yen, over 10 years, to support the shipping industry through doubling gross tonnage produced, automation and robotic ship construction, facility expansion, and equipment procurement.
The two countries' shipbuilding priorities should prompt further announcements of cooperation during Takaichi's visit this week. The US and Japan created a working group to address these goals after Trump's visit to Tokyo in October 2025. The group has held extensive discussions on cooperation in shipbuilding, industrial base investments, increasing vessel demand, workforce development, and technological innovation. Yet conversations with working group members indicate there are differing priorities and investment timelines.
Such differences over policy and planning between close allies is natural. But at a time when Chinese shipbuilding is dominant--accounting for three-quarters of future LNG carrier orders--both Washington and Tokyo must work to address these differences to ensure maritime prosperity and security for our two nations.
Artificial Intelligence and Cutting-Edge Technology
Takaichi's visit to Washington should also prompt new cooperative agreements in AI-driven research and development in cutting-edge technological fields. In November 2025, the White House announced the creation of the Genesis Mission, which seeks to "build an integrated AI platform to harness Federal scientific assets...to train scientific foundation models and create AI agents to test new hypotheses, automate research workflows, and to accelerate scientific breakthroughs." Genesis is thus at the foundation of the Trump administration's numerous efforts to support AI development and its application in order to support the priorities of industrial revitalization and technological leadership.
The Takaichi government, which has similar ambitions to spark Japanese economic growth and technological innovation through investment in 17 strategic sectors, is keen to collaborate with America. At the SupercomputingAsia conference in Osaka in January 2026, Japan became the first international partner to work with the US on the Genesis Mission. Takaichi has placed a great deal of emphasis on investment in critical technologies to fuel her plans to place the Japanese economy on a growth trajectory in the long term. As such, her visit this week is likely to yield further progress on areas of AI-powered research and development between the US and Japan, building on existing research efforts between Riken, Fujitsu, and Nvidia to develop a successor to Japan's Fugaku supercomputer.
As technological innovation becomes the currency of geopolitical competition, both the US and Japan understand that continued R&D and implementation will be how we can deter unfair competitors. The two leaders in Washington and Tokyo understand this, and both will work during this summit and in the future for this effort to "run faster."
Golden Dome
In addition to these economic and technological agreements, Trump and Takaichi are expected to discuss Japan's participation in the "Golden Dome" missile initiative. The aim will be to cooperate in the joint development of interceptor missiles, the construction of a satellite network, and to improve Japan's ability to counter hypersonic glide vehicles that China, Russia, and North Korea are currently deploying.
The president has made Golden Dome a priority for a long time, issuing a directive for planning development in January 2025, and then holding a conference in May 2025 announcing that it will be operational by the end of his term. Bringing such a project online will be a considerable feat, requiring operational scaling, technological integration, and security sufficient resources. Yet in the face of new missile challenges, existing ballistic missile defense may no longer be sufficient.
Japan, which lies at the front lines of hypersonic missile threats from China, Russia, and North Korea, and hosts 55,000 US service members, has both incentive and capabilities to contribute to Golden Dome. Tokyo plans to build a satellite constellation by March 2028 for missile intelligence and tracking. This capability and intelligence sharing will be vital to bilateral cooperation on Golden Dome, as will the development of the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI).
At the same time, Golden Dome should not be conceived solely as a system for the defense of the continental United States. To be strategically effective, it must also contribute to the defense of forward US territories and allied operational spaces across the Pacific. This includes Hawaii and Guam, as well as the broader maritime and airspace extending toward Japan and Taiwan along the First and Second Island Chains. Integrating these regions into a more resilient missile defense architecture would strengthen deterrence and help safeguard the economic interests and long-term prosperity of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, where secure sea lines of communication and regional stability remain vital to American and allied economies.
Defense Coproduction
Bilateral cooperation on Golden Dome highlights the need for stepped-up defense industrial base cooperation between the two countries, even if specific announcements are not expected during Takaichi's visit. There are three avenues for doing so going forward:
First, both countries should strengthen allied defense industrial supply chains by encouraging companies to release critical technical information to trusted allies. In the case of missile defense, technical data for key components, such as missile seekers, should be available for licensed production within the alliance. As they directly affect the alliance's defensive capabilities, these decisions cannot be left entirely to corporate caution. Should firms be reluctant to release sensitive technologies, governments should support efforts to develop alternative component suppliers to provide comparable capabilities. Such efforts are already underway, such as in the case shipbuilding with South Korea; they should be expanded across the broader defense industrial base.
Second, defense industrial cooperation must expand to scalable and adaptable systems. US-Japan defense industrial cooperation has traditionally emphasized high-end systems, such as SM-3 Block 2A, which are highly capable but produced in limited quantities. Recent conflicts in Iran and Ukraine, however, suggest these systems alone cannot sustain prolonged operations. Affordable, sufficiently capable, and mass-produceable weapon systems must also be part of bilateral industrial cooperation. Candidates include low-cost precision munitions for counter-drone and point-defense missions, such as Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS), as well as scalable stand-off strike systems like JDAM-LR and Barracuda. Systems such as anti-ship variant LUCAS-type loitering munitions and balloon-based high-altitude platforms (HAPS) also point toward new operational concepts built around scalable and adaptable capabilities.
Third, Japan must continue to revise its own policy framework to support and expand its defense industrial capacity. Japan is now moving to revise its defense exports policy, which previously limited exports to five nonlethal categories--rescue, transport, reconnaissance, surveillance, and minesweeping. Under the new proposal from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Japanese government will classify defense equipment into "lethal" and "nonlethal," with the former exportable after review from Japan's National Security Council, to countries with defense equipment and technology transfer agreements with Japan.
Such a shift aligns with how public sentiment in Japan increasingly supports helping allies and like-minded partners facing security challenges. Yet historically Japan's defense industry has been largely focused on meeting domestic demand, leaving little capacity for exports. Revising the principles could change this dynamic by allowing Japan to build production capacity that includes surplus output capable of supporting allied demand. This would represent not merely a change in export policy but an opportunity to expand the industrial foundation that underpins alliance deterrence.
Conclusion
Prime Minister Takaichi's visit to Washington will likely build upon the positive start that she and President Trump shared during their meeting in Tokyo last October. Though there have been several significant economic, security, and economic developments since their last meeting, both countries share numerous priorities and are in positions to support each other through deepened cooperation. At a time when economic and security challenges abound, Japan is earnest and serious in its efforts to implement collaboration in the areas of strategic industries, critical minerals, shipbuilding, advanced R&D, missile defense, and defense industrial base. As she heads to Washington, Takaichi understands that in these challenging circumstances, real and tangible results--even if the result of tough negotiations--are the currency of a true ally.
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William Chou is a senior fellow and deputy director of Hudson Institute's Japan Chair.
Masashi Murano is a senior fellow with Hudson Institute's Japan Chair.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/what-to-watch-at-trump-takaichi-summit-william-chou
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary: Author Interview - Why Democracy Needs the Rich (Part 2 of 2)
WASHINGTON, March 20 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following recorded conversation on March 19, 2026, involving senior fellow Michael E. Hartmann and John O. McGinnis, George C. Dix professor in Constitutional Law at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law:* * *
Author interview: Why Democracy Needs the Rich (part 2 of 2)
The Northwestern Pritzker School of Law professor talks about America as both a commercial republic and a philanthropic republic; the relationship between the civil society about which Alexis de Tocqueville wrote and the tax-incentivized nonprofit sector in its ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 20 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following recorded conversation on March 19, 2026, involving senior fellow Michael E. Hartmann and John O. McGinnis, George C. Dix professor in Constitutional Law at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law: * * * Author interview: Why Democracy Needs the Rich (part 2 of 2) The Northwestern Pritzker School of Law professor talks about America as both a commercial republic and a philanthropic republic; the relationship between the civil society about which Alexis de Tocqueville wrote and the tax-incentivized nonprofit sector in itscurrent form; the wealthy and artificial intelligence; and sensible regulation and who's best positioned to formulate it.
Editorial note: this essay originally appeared at The Giving Review.
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John O. McGinnis is the George C. Dix Professor in Constitutional Law at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law and a prolific and influential writer and commentator in both the scholarly and popular press. He served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice from 1987 to 1991 and was an editor of the Harvard Law Review.
He co-authored Originalism and the Good Constitution with Michael B. Rappaport and authored Accelerating Democracy: Transforming Governance through Technology. He writes regularly for The Wall Street Journal, National Review, Law & Liberty, and City Journal, and his work has also appeared in National Affairs and Policy Review.
In his new Why Democracy Needs the Rich, from Encounter Books, McGinnis contests the seemingly increasingly common view that the ultra-wealthy are eroding the practice of democracy in America--contrarily arguing that they are actually vital to preserving, and in fact strengthening, democratic systems.
Wealth "is not democracy's rival," McGinnis concludes, "but one of its catalysts: the reserve of independence that checks conformity, the counterweight that steadies the scale against rival elites, the reservoir that funds excellence, and the restless engine that helps renew liberal democracy, generation after generation." Offering examples, he frequently cites the wealthy's philanthropy as part of its democracy-catalyzing.
McGinnis kind enough to join me for a recorded conversation last month. In the first part of our discussion, which is here, we talk about the "clerisy" and how to think about the relationship of the wealthy and their philanthropy to it.
The just more than 14-minute video below is the second part, during which we discuss America as both a commercial republic and a philanthropic republic; the relationship between the civil society about which Alexis de Tocqueville wrote and the tax-incentivized nonprofit sector in its current form; the wealthy and artificial intelligence; and sensible regulation and who's best positioned to formulate it.
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzM5UOSqir8
Wealth that sustains and associations that improve
Describing the commercial republic, McGinnis tells me, our Enlightenment founding thought "commerce was really excellent," because "it created wealth and therefore was sustaining of the republic by increasing the pie and not having people fight over a static or shrinking point. So that was good about it," and it put people in relation with one another in sort of joint enterprises and for mutual gain, and that made people think of one another as ... at least commercial friends rather than antagonists and helped unite a country that might be divided across other axes, of religion or ethnicity. ... That was an essential aspect of the founding of our society, and you look at the Constitution, the Commerce Clause tries to give the federal government, the power to open the avenues of commerce for that reason.
The philanthropic republic has always been part of America, as Alexis de Tocqueville noted, "right from the beginning," according to McGinnis. It was "a sense of people's self-image .... [T]hey wanted to improve the world and associate to improve the world." Again citing Tocqueville, McGinnis continues, [W]hen you had a limited state that was directing how social improvement went, people gathered together and had enterprises for social improvement and moral betterment. And of course, you need resources to do that and I argue in the book that you may even need more resources in the modern world.
The wealthy "have always been important to creating associations because, just like with companies, you need seed capital to create associations, and this is also an important aspect of America," he says. "In fact, I don't think you really can have a kind of limited government without a philanthropic republic because that allows public goods the government may not provide to be provided either by associations or directly sometimes by the wealthy funding them."
Asked whether Tocquevillian civil society is the same as today's tax-incentivized nonprofit sector, McGinnis answers, "Oh, absolutely not. But another point: there was not a large income tax back then." He says the deduction for philanthropy is saying that's still something that we're interested in, we value as a society. So I agree, it's different, but you're always struggling with translating one world to the next and you have a much bigger state than Tocqueville saw and much higher levels of taxation. So I think in that sense, it's still a translation, an avenue, a channeling of some of the same impulses that Tocqueville saw almost 200 years ago.
Might civil society even benefit from being unconnected to the tax code? "You wouldn't have the cues to do it and you'd have less of it. ... The government would take up more of the slack. And is that good? I don't think so," answers McGinnis, saying he's not making "an argument for a night-watchman state." It's an argument that "public goods and civil society encouraged by the government are a supplement and, in some sense, sometimes a correction to the government because the government says, 'Well, this is working better and maybe that should change the way we deliver public goods."
A worthwhile distinction and sensible regulation
Turning to technology in general, the topic of his earlier book Accelerating Democracy, and artificial intelligence in particular, McGinnis says "I'm sort of ambivalent and worried and excited and worried" and that "we're at a hinge in human history" and "things may be fundamentally changing." He is "of the view that our world might not be very recognizable in 20 years."
Placing the topic in the context of his new Why Democracy Needs the Rich, he observes, that "we have actually a lot of wealthy people" who "are putting a lot of money into think tanks that are just focusing on this problem and it's not a problem, I think, easily the government could solve on its own." He says, "The rich are at the forefront both of its creation and of its, I think, ultimately its sensible regulation."
According to McGinnis, "This is not obvious stuff. It's not like regulating a carburetor or something like that--particularly given that if we regulated in bad ways, that may actually give power to China and to people in the world who then will be use it for a malevolent way."
He thinks there's worthwhile distinction to be drawn between the formulation of legal and regulatory blueprints by, on the one hand, politicians who are "elections specialists" and, on the other, "specialists in the best kind of policy," whose work may be funded by the wealthy and their philanthropy.
"The left has a whole group of people at universities who are working full-time to create a policy menu for them, right? And what the right has done is create alternative institutions," McGinnis says, "that actually make the right, once they when they get into power, act more sensibly in policy than they would be if they just were relying on the instincts of their raw politicians."
Of what some may consider "sensible regulation" of the wealthy's involvement in partisan politics through the charitable-nonprofit avenue specifically, he says, "I certainly think it's a good idea to have a separation, insofar as we can." If philanthropy has "a viewpoint perspective, that's fine. But if it actually gets involved in actually trying to elect candidates with grassroots organizing, things of that sort, that strikes me as much more like politics. Now, I'm in favor of the rich being able to do that as well, but" we "might not want to have tax benefits for" it. "[T]hat strikes me as a sensible line that government could and should draw, and it may well be a difficult line, and one that is not always honored."
Of Why Democracy Needs the Rich more generally, McGinnis says, "Not a lot of people are thinking about defending the rich. A lot of people are attacking the rich. So I thought this was a useful contrarian perspective."
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Michael E. Hartmann is CRC's senior fellow and director of the Center for Strategic Giving, providing analysis of and commentary about philanthropy and giving. He also co-edits The Giving Review, a joint project of Philanthropy Daily and the Center for Strategic Giving.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/author-interview-why-democracy-needs-the-rich-part-2-of-2/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Could Iran Disrupt the Gulf Countries' Desalinated Water Supplies?
WASHINGTON, March 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 19, 2026, by David Michel, senior associate (non-resident) for water security with the Global Food and Water Security Program:* * *
Could Iran Disrupt the Gulf Countries' Desalinated Water Supplies?
The economies of the Persian Gulf countries depend on oil and natural gas. Their populations depend on desalinated water. Nature endows the Arabian Peninsula with scant freshwater resources. Consequently, all of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations lining the Gulf's southern ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 19, 2026, by David Michel, senior associate (non-resident) for water security with the Global Food and Water Security Program: * * * Could Iran Disrupt the Gulf Countries' Desalinated Water Supplies? The economies of the Persian Gulf countries depend on oil and natural gas. Their populations depend on desalinated water. Nature endows the Arabian Peninsula with scant freshwater resources. Consequently, all of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations lining the Gulf's southernshores critically rely on desalination plants drawing seawater from the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The war on Iran that began on February 28 puts these essential water systems at risk. Desalination facilities in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) suffered indirect damage from missile and drone strikes early in the conflict. Subsequently, plants in Bahrain and Iran have reportedly been intentionally attacked. Deliberate targeting of desalination infrastructure would represent a significant conflict escalation, potentially threatening vital water supplies for millions of people across the region.
Petrostates and Saltwater Kingdoms
The Middle East is one of the most arid regions on Earth. Across the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, not a single permanent river flows. Only Oman and Yemen enjoy a handful of small, often brackish, natural lakes. For the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia), most of their freshwater supply comes from a constellation of groundwater aquifers. Many of these, however, are severely over-exploited, depleted at rates far exceeding what nature can replenish. The total renewable surface and groundwater resources of the six GCC countries together amount to 7.21 billion cubic meters (m3) a year--less than the annual flow of the Potomac River for a population of 62 million.
Water managers generally consider that societies require 1700 m3 of renewable freshwater per person each year to meet their populations' water needs, from drinking, cooking, and washing to the demands of agriculture and industry. Below that threshold, "water stress" emerges, and competition for water resources may begin to impact countries' social welfare. By this metric, the members of the GCC exhibit "absolute water scarcity." According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Oman enjoys no more than 286 m3 per capita of annually available renewable freshwater resources; Bahrain and Saudi Arabia each possess only 75 m3 per capita per year; Qatar has 20 m3 per capita per year; while the UAE and Kuwait receive just 15 m3 and 4 m3, respectively.
But technology and geology have given the GCC countries an alternative means to meet their freshwater needs. Hydrocarbon riches have provided these nations with the financial and energy resources needed to develop desalination systems capable of supplying their growing economies and populations. While the first saltwater "distillation" efforts in Saudi Arabia date to the early twentieth century, Gulf desalination capacity accelerated exponentially in the wake of the 1970s oil crises. From 1990 to 2022, annual desalinated water production soared by 314 percent across the GCC, rising from 1.4 to 5.9 billion m3. The six Gulf states now count some 3,401 operational desalination plants, comprising 19 percent of all desalination facilities worldwide. Collectively, these plants can churn out 22.67 million m3 of desalinated water each day--enough to fill over 9,000 Olympic-size swimming pools--representing 33 percent of global daily production capacity. The "petrostates" have become "saltwater kingdoms."
A Strategic Vulnerability
For the GCC countries, extensive desalination systems constitute indispensable critical infrastructure. Desalination fulfills 77.3 percent of total water demand in Qatar, 67.5 percent in Bahrain, 52.1 percent in the UAE, 42.2 percent in Kuwait, 31 percent in Oman, and 18.1 percent in Saudi Arabia. Desalination plants are especially important for meeting drinking water needs. Qatar derives 99 percent of its drinking water supplies from its network of desalination facilities, and Bahrain over 90 percent. For Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, the figures are 90 percent, 86 percent, 70 percent, and 42 percent, respectively. Cities such as Doha, Dubai, Manama, and Kuwait City would not be possible without desalination. Qatar and Bahrain, in particular, also rely heavily on desalination for industry, too, devoting over half their desalinated water production to sectors such as petrochemicals and data centers. Damage or disruptions to the region's desalination infrastructure could compromise crucial water resources for business, industry, and thousands or even millions of people across the Persian Gulf.
Concerns for the security of Gulf desalination systems rose from the outset of the Iran war. Within the first days of the conflict, reports circulated that the Fujairah F1 power and water complex in the UAE and the Doha West power and water station in Kuwait had been damaged by missiles or falling debris from intercepted drones, though operations continued uninterrupted at both facilities. Then on March 7, Iran accused the United States of attacking a desalination plant on Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz. Claiming the strike impacted water supplies to 30 villages, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned, "the U.S. set this precedent, not Iran." The following day, the Bahraini Ministry of Interior alleged that an Iranian drone had hit one of the country's desalination centers, but without affecting water supplies.
Though the war in the Persian Gulf has not so far materially disrupted the region's water supplies, the prospective risks are real. The GCC's desalination plants are large, fixed, open-air industrial complexes. Mostly concentrated along the coast within 350 kilometers of the Islamic Republic, they are as exposed to Iranian weaponry as any of the civilian infrastructure that has yet been targeted, from oil and gas terminals to airports and hotels. Desalination plants are also essentially linear facilities, meaning that the seawater-to-freshwater transformation takes place through an ordered sequence of stages. Damage to sensitive parts of the system, such as high-pressure pumps or membrane buildings, could disable production entirely, potentially requiring weeks to repair.
By the same token, the GCC's desalination infrastructure is susceptible to multiple vulnerabilities, from its energy and seawater supplies to its distribution networks and operating systems. Desalination is an energy-intensive process, for example. Due to that energy need, some three-quarters of desalination plants in the GCC countries are integrated power and water production facilities. Freshwater output from these installations could thus be interrupted not only by strikes on the water treatment units but also on the energy plants and grid connections supplying them. Cut the water by cutting the power. Similarly, water produced by central desalination plants must then be distributed to consumers. Iran might attempt to degrade GCC water systems by targeting the pumping stations and pipelines that deliver desalinated water to users.
On a different register, Gulf desalination plants require a continuous supply of incoming seawater. Iran might seek to incapacitate GCC water systems by blocking or fouling their saltwater intakes in the Persian Gulf. This scenario has unfolded before. In 1991, during the first Gulf War, Iraqi forces purposely destroyed most of Kuwait's desalination capacity and dumped millions of barrels of oil into the northern Persian Gulf, jeopardizing water intakes for plants in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. After coalition forces retook the country, water shortages forced Kuwaiti authorities to cut household water services to four days a week while relying on contracted tanker ships and hundreds of tanker trucks to deliver bulk water for the population. The Seawater Reverse Osmosis (SWRO) technologies predominating today's desalination plants could be markedly more vulnerable to clogged intakes and fouled filtration membranes than the thermal processes common in the 1990s. Tellingly, in 2008-2009, a massive "red tide" algal bloom shut down several installations in Oman and the UAE for up to two months due to this risk.
Finally, industry analysts judge that GCC desalination plants could face Iranian cyber threats. Attackers might penetrate water providers' IT networks, for instance, or compromise their operating technologies or industrial control systems. Iran has actively targeted water sector infrastructure, utilities, and energy systems around the GCC (as well as in the U.S. and Israel) for many years, and Tehran has already launched aggressive cyber retaliation operations in the current conflict.
Weaponizing Water
Deliberately striking at the Gulf's vital desalination systems would represent a significant escalation in hostilities. Article 54(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions expressly prohibits attacking or destroying "objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as . . . drinking water installations and supplies." Targeting such essential civilian infrastructure violates international law and could constitute a war crime.
Yet Iran might come to calculate that threatening GCC water supplies could provide an effective asymmetric strategy for waging an existential struggle for regime survival. Iran can neither defeat the United States and Israel militarily nor prevent them from striking Iranian territory at will. Instead, Tehran has embarked on a campaign of both "horizontal" and "vertical" escalation. Closing the Strait of Hormuz, throttling global energy and fertilizer markets, and unleashing missile and drone barrages at soft targets in the GCC and other countries all serve to widen the war's scope and raise its stakes, increasing the costs of continuing conflict for governments, economies, and publics far beyond the Persian Gulf. The goal is not military victory but strategic leverage in a war of political attrition in which Iran believes it can outlast the United States. So far, the GCC states have not been direct combatants in this fight and have not taken offensive actions against Iran. Targeting their water sources could change that. But Iran might gamble that attacking critical water infrastructure could alternatively (or simultaneously) work to drive wedges between the Gulf governments that Tehran views as helping enable the conflict and the U.S. and Israeli governments prosecuting it, while also heightening pressures on GCC capitals to seek an end to a war they did not choose.
Whether deliberate Iranian attacks would succeed in substantially compromising GCC water supplies remains an open question. Desalination systems are widely distributed, with each country maintaining dozens to hundreds of installations. Damages even to multiple facilities could likely be largely compensated by production from others. Yet within these dispersed supply networks, each country also operates a number of mega complexes, some serving a million people or more. Successful attacks on these hubs could be far more disruptive. Likewise, missile and drone strikes pose the greatest threat to individual plants. Major weaponized oil spills, however, could potentially cripple whole city systems for hundreds of miles around. Without greater (unlikely) knowledge of remaining Iranian capacities and actual GCC vulnerabilities, the effective impacts from cyber risks can only be speculative. Extreme scenarios of concerted attacks integrating all three tactics--drones, oil, and cyberwarfare--while improbable, should not be dismissed as unimaginable.
Importantly, though the GCC countries have developed considerable production capacity for desalinated water, they have not, for the most part, established corresponding capacity for stockpiling against supply disruptions. The UAE, for instance, in 2017 unveiled its 2036 Water Security Strategy to increase water efficiency and boost national water storage. But realizing the initiative's goal would provide water stores for only two days of national demand under normal conditions, potentially lasting up to 16-45 days under rationing for extreme emergency. Saudi Arabia, too, has created strategic reservoirs furnishing modest water reserves. But Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar possess insufficient storage capacity to buffer significant supply interruptions.
Wells of Anxiety
The ultimate ramifications of any Iranian attacks on GCC desalination systems would depend upon the specific circumstances. Which country or countries are targeted? Which plant(s) are struck? What is the nature and extent of the damages and the duration of the resulting disruption? The most important effects could well be psychological. The GCC countries have devoted decades to cultivating a business model premised on their reputation as islands of prosperity and stability even in seas of geopolitical turmoil. Iran's continuing coercive capacity to precipitate potential water crises across the GCC prospectively casts this premise into question. "The real weapon is not the drone," in the words of one analyst, "it is the insurance cancellation, the rerouted tanker, and the investor who pauses." For insurers, investors--and inhabitants--potentially forced to envisage relying on tankers and trucks to bring vital water for their homes, hospitals, schools, and businesses, confidence in the continuing security of that business model could dry up long before the last water from their taps.
More than 40 years ago, a classified CIA analysis, made public in 2010, called out the security vulnerabilities created by the Gulf countries' dependence on desalination. The current conflict reveals with force that the dependence has deepened and the vulnerabilities remain. When the guns fall silent, GCC conceptions of their water security and of their national security will likely stand transformed.
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David Michel is a senior associate (non-resident) for water security with the Global Food and Water Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-iran-disrupt-gulf-countries-desalinated-water-supplies
[Category: ThinkTank]