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Hudson Institute Posts Commentary to Washington Post: Nightmare Scenario for Iran
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, posted the following commentary on Jan. 23, 2026, to the Washington Post:
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A Nightmare Scenario for Iran
By Michael Doran
With a U.S. carrier strike group slated to arrive in the Middle East this weekend, President Donald Trump will soon decide what to do next with Iran. But first, he must grapple with an unanswerable question: Is Iran a multiethnic nation or a Persian-dominated empire? Even Iranians cannot answer authoritatively.
History offers a
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WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, posted the following commentary on Jan. 23, 2026, to the Washington Post:
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A Nightmare Scenario for Iran
By Michael Doran
With a U.S. carrier strike group slated to arrive in the Middle East this weekend, President Donald Trump will soon decide what to do next with Iran. But first, he must grapple with an unanswerable question: Is Iran a multiethnic nation or a Persian-dominated empire? Even Iranians cannot answer authoritatively.
History offers awarning. Yugoslavia long presented itself as -- and was widely understood to be -- a pluralistic, multiethnic state. Many Yugoslavs embraced that identity sincerely. Yet when the regime collapsed in the early 1990s, the identity dissolved almost overnight. People called themselves Yugoslavs one day only to wake up the next as Serbs, Croats or Bosnians. Such arrangements can persist for decades -- until, suddenly, they do not. Long-suppressed ethnic identities surfaced, and politics turned violent.
In Yugoslavia, the hegemonic Serbs made up roughly 36 percent of the population. In Iran, Persians account for a larger share but are almost certainly still a minority. A 2010 Iranian government study put them at 47 percent.
Iran's ethnic geography sharpens the stakes. Persians dominate the central plateau around Tehran and Isfahan. Minority populations concentrate along the borders -- more accurately, astride them -- bound by language, culture and history to communities just across the frontier. Azerbaijanis cluster in the northwest along Azerbaijan and Turkey; Kurds in the west face Kurdish regions of Iraq and Turkey; Arabs in the oil-rich southwest look toward Iraq; Baluch in the southeast connect to kin in Pakistan and Afghanistan; Turkmen in the north border Turkmenistan.
Neighboring states therefore have a direct interest in how Iran manages -- or fails to manage -- its diversity. And one neighbor matters more than any other: Azerbaijan.
There are more ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran than there are in Azerbaijan proper. According to that same Iranian government study, Azerbaijanis account for roughly 23 percent of Iran's population (the true figure may be higher) and are concentrated in a geographically contiguous enclave. While Azerbaijanis have been better integrated into the Iranian state than any other minority group, signs of restlessness are growing. They increasingly consume Turkish and Azerbaijani media, show greater interest in their Turkic-Azerbaijani roots and demand schooling in their own language. It's not hard to see why. Turkey and Azerbaijan enjoy European-level development. The Islamic Republic presides over economic failure and isolation.
The last time Iran reordered itself, during the 1979 revolution, Azerbaijan was sealed inside the Soviet Union. After independence, it remained weak, consumed by war with Armenia and largely irrelevant to Iran's internal balance. That is no longer the case. Today, Azerbaijan is a rising regional power with a NATO-standard military, deep ties to Turkey and a close security partnership with Israel. In a scenario of violent internal conflict in Iran, Azerbaijan might feel compelled to intervene to protect its kin -- possibly with Turkish backing.
Ethnic fragmentation in Iran is not a foregone conclusion. But the possibility is real and something Washington cannot afford to ignore. The best way forward is to not embed too many assumptions, one way or another, about what Iran would look like should the current regime implode.
For U.S. policymakers, betting on a stable, centralized Iran may prove as risky as betting on fragmentation. That caution matters now because a strong movement is emerging in Washington, and among parts of the Iranian diaspora, to recognize Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran's shah who was deposed in 1979, as the representative of the Iranian nation. His appeal is real, but his legitimacy is contested. Many within Iran's ethnic minorities view him as a symbol of Persian chauvinism rather than of national unity, and Azerbaijani Iranians are no exception. Elevating a single figure as the embodiment of Iran risks predetermining an internal settlement that Iranians themselves have not yet reached.
In recent weeks, Azerbaijanis have repeatedly described to me a scenario that troubles them. In this vision, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei falls but the system does not. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps survives the transition, sheds its clerical skin, and reemerges as enforcers for a Persian nationalist dictatorship -- potentially welcoming Pahlavi as a symbolic figure while retaining real power behind the scenes.
A Pahlavi-for-Khamenei swap would look attractive in Washington: a clean decapitation, an end to the nuclear program and seeming moderation without the chaos of regime change. But for Iran's minorities, it would register as regime continuity at best, and perhaps something much darker. A government that relies on Persian nationalism to legitimize itself could quickly turn even more oppressive.
Whether Iran is a multiethnic nation or a Persian empire remains unknown -- and indeed will remain unknowable until events force a reckoning. Trump's next steps -- whether to pursue strikes, sanctions or negotiations -- could kick-start that process. Washington should consult broadly with Iranians of all ethnic backgrounds. It should also consult with leaders in the neighborhood who will live with the consequences of the coming crisis -- especially President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan.
But above all else, Trump should resist anointing successors in Iran and design policy for uncertainty, not stability. It is going to be a turbulent time.
Read in The Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/01/23/iran-ethnic-conflict-regime-collapse/).
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Michael Doran is a senior fellow and director of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/politics-government/nightmare-scenario-iran-michael-doran
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues InfluenceWatch Wrapup on Jan. 23, 2026
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on Jan. 23, 2026:
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By Jonathan Harsh
InfluenceWatch, a project of Capital Research Center, is a comprehensive and ever-evolving compilation of our research into the numerous advocacy groups, foundations, and donors working to influence the public policy process. The website offers transparency into these influencers' funding, motives, and connections while providing insight often neglected by other watchdog groups.
The information compiled in InfluenceWatch gives news outlets and other interested
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WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on Jan. 23, 2026:
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By Jonathan Harsh
InfluenceWatch, a project of Capital Research Center, is a comprehensive and ever-evolving compilation of our research into the numerous advocacy groups, foundations, and donors working to influence the public policy process. The website offers transparency into these influencers' funding, motives, and connections while providing insight often neglected by other watchdog groups.
The information compiled in InfluenceWatch gives news outlets and other interestedparties research to use in reporting on significant topics that are often overlooked by the American public.
CRC is pleased to present some of the most significant additions to InfluenceWatch in the past week:
* The Sustainable Food Alliance is a left-of-center advocacy group that promotes what it calls "sustainable agriculture" and a transition towards using "sustainable food and farming systems." It works alongside the Sustainable Food Trust, a United Kingdom-based charity founded in 2011 by environmental advocate Patrick Holden. The Sustainable Food Alliance has received funding from foundations including the Tides Foundation, the Gordon E. and Betty I. Moore Foundation, the California Endowment, the Seattle Foundation, the National Philanthropic Trust, the Greater Kansas City Community Foundation, and the Atlantic Foundation.
* All of Us is a research program of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). It was created during the Obama Administration in 2015, through the NIH's Precision Medicine Initiative Working Group of the Advisory Committee to the Director. All of Us aims to collect genetic samples of up to 1 million participants to study the impact of ancestry and genetic traits. Its CEO Josh Denny is an elected member of the National Academy of Medicine.
* GoFundMe.Org is a nonprofit associated with the digital crowdfunding platform GoFundMe. As of 2026, its current and former partners include Leonardo DiCaprio, Laurene Powell Jobs, Ellen DeGeneres, and former first lady Michelle Obama. Its partner foundations and corporations have included the Obama Foundation, the Asian American Foundation, the TIME'S UP Legal Defense Fund, Welcome.US, Netflix, Google, and Microsoft.
* Hunt Alternatives is an advocacy group that claims to promote "global peace, equity, justice, and civil rights." It was founded by Swanee Hunt, a philanthropist and the former US Ambassador to Austria during the Clinton Administration. In recent years Hunt Alternatives has been largely funded by Swanee Hunt and the Swanee Hunt Family Foundation.
* Bank Information Center (BIC) is a Washington D.C.-based nonprofit that advocates for "transparency, accountability, sustainability, and inclusion in development finance." According to its website, BIC works to "monitor and influence the policies and operations of the World Bank Group" by partnering with other organizations to perform "research and advocacy aimed at improving and reforming [Multilateral Development Bank] policy and practices." BIC has received funding from left-of-center groups such as the Ford Foundation, the Climateworks Foundation, George Soros's Open Society Action Fund, and the National Endowment for Democracy.
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Jonathan Harsh holds a master's degree in political science from James Madison University and a bachelor's degree in political science from Beloit College. He edits entries and content of the InfluenceWatch website and contributes new content.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/influencewatch-friday-01-23-2026/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Japanese Energy Companies Step Up U.S. Investments
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 23, 2026:
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Japanese Energy Companies Step Up U.S. Investments
By Ben Cahill and Jane Nakano
Since mid-2025, some of Japan's largest exploration and production companies, gas and power utilities, and trading houses invested in U.S. natural gas assets. With the United States expected to supply up to one-third of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) volumes by the early 2030s, importers want to control more of their own supply base to mitigate the risk of rising U.S. gas prices.
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WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 23, 2026:
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Japanese Energy Companies Step Up U.S. Investments
By Ben Cahill and Jane Nakano
Since mid-2025, some of Japan's largest exploration and production companies, gas and power utilities, and trading houses invested in U.S. natural gas assets. With the United States expected to supply up to one-third of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) volumes by the early 2030s, importers want to control more of their own supply base to mitigate the risk of rising U.S. gas prices.Japanese companies also anticipate strong gas demand from the U.S. power sector and industry. Their recent investments show the appeal of U.S. shale gas and LNG assets, but also suggest some risks associated with the dominance of LNG supply from the United States.
Several deals illustrate this investment trend. On January 16, 2026, Mitsubishi announced that it would acquire the equity interests of Aethon Energy, a large Haynesville Basin producer, for $5.2 billion (as well as $2.33 billion in assumed debt). Mitsubishi cited a desire to build an integrated natural gas supply chain in North America, and to increase production of gas that could supply domestic power plants, manufacturing and other industry, and, potentially, LNG export facilities. In December 2025, Tokyo Gas--one of Japan's largest gas utilities--stated that it plans to spend at least half of its $2.3 billion overseas investment budget in the coming three years in the United States. JAPEX, an exploration and production company with assets in Indonesia, Iraq, Norway, Russia, and the United States, spent $1.3 billion on oil and gas assets in Colorado and Wyoming. And several months earlier, Jera--Japan's largest power producer and one of the world's largest LNG buyers--made a $1.5 billion investment in the Haynesville Basin, which supplies numerous Gulf Coast LNG export facilities. These deals followed earlier investments by several other utilities and trading houses, and more acquisitions could follow.
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Table 1: Japanese Investments in U.S. Oil and Gas Assets
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Japanese acquisitions in the shale patch are not a new phenomenon. In an earlier period of the shale revolution, from 2010 to 2012, companies including Itochu, Mitsui, Mitsui Oil Exploration Company, Marubeni, and Sumitomo made substantial investments in unconventional oil and gas assets. Like other investors, these companies wanted a foothold in a large-scale, rapidly growing resource base. They also sought to learn the fundamentals of short-cycle oil and gas development, which requires continuous drilling and completions, and prizes efficiency gains that lower costs and increase the productivity of each drilling rig. Many of these ventures were unsuccessful, especially as the steep oil price downturn of 2014-15 took a heavy toll. For example, Sumitomo took a $1.5 billion impairment in 2014 on its liquids-focused Permian Basin assets, and the following year Mitsui wrote down approximately $490 million on its Eagle Ford shale assets.
Today, the motivations for U.S. unconventional gas investments have evolved. When Jera announced its purchase of a Haynesville producer in October 2025, it cited "enhanced diversification for Jera's LNG value chain, expanded global reach across the gas value chain, and overall risk mitigation in a volatile energy market." These are important factors for a company that signed four long-term supply deals last year for 5.5 million tons per year in U.S. LNG. Jera, like other U.S. LNG buyers, values the volume growth and diverse supply options in the U.S. LNG industry, as well as the flexibility and hub indexation associated with U.S. LNG. Yet Japanese buyers are now exposed to North American gas price dynamics.
A potential concern is that higher Henry Hub gas prices will create a margin squeeze, as more elevated feedgas costs in the United States and lower LNG spot prices in Asia and Europe reduce arbitrage potential. Over the 20-year lifespan of a typical long-term sales and purchase agreement for U.S. LNG, this exposure to higher U.S. gas prices is a key risk. Aggregators or portfolio players, who hold offtake agreements for U.S. LNG but need to find end-users for their cargoes, are most vulnerable.
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Figure 1: Japan LNG Imports by Origin
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One way for Japanese buyers to mitigate this risk is to move into the U.S. upstream sector. This allows them to enjoy the benefits of higher natural gas prices, rather than merely to suffer the knock-on effects as LNG buyers, thereby hedging their price risks. Greater integration may also be possible, if these companies use their operated gas supply as feedstock for LNG export facilities. Japanese companies may also gain some new insights into supply dynamics including service sector and labor costs. In short, Japanese companies that will increasingly depend on U.S. LNG want to be active rather than passive players in helping to control price risks.
There are parallels to past investments by Japanese companies in overseas gas development and liquefaction facilities, in countries including Australia, Qatar, and Southeast Asian exporters. It is debatable that such investments ultimately reduced supply risks--economic or otherwise--for Japanese LNG importers, but they helped develop Japan's global presence throughout the LNG value chain.
These business activities are occurring at a time when energy engagements between the United States and Japan are fast evolving in the context of bilateral tariff negotiations. As part of last year's U.S.-Japan trade agreement, Japan agreed to invest $550 billion in the United States. Energy is one of the seven areas that Japan has committed to investing in by January 2029, the end of Trump's second term.
Since Japan is the world's second largest LNG importer, a large U.S. LNG buyer--and the fifth-largest importer of U.S. crude oil and petroleum products--upstream gas assets would be a natural fit. To date, however, energy investments under discussion, as stipulated in a Japanese government fact sheet from late October, are primarily related to technology components and infrastructure, such as nuclear reactors, gas turbines, and generators. There has been no mention of energy resources as investment targets. As such, it is unclear if upstream oil and gas investment opportunities are shortlisted as the United States and Japan continue consultations. But recent deals are well aligned with the Japanese government view that investment in the gas sector can bolster energy security, with LNG identified as a practical means of energy transition. In fact, the country's Seventh Strategic Energy Plan (released in 2025) stresses the importance of direct Japanese involvement in upstream development and production. It states "Japan aims to increase its independent development ratio of oil and natural gas to 50 percent or more by 2030 and 60 percent or more by 2040."
Japan's appetite for natural gas continues to set the tone for strategic energy engagements between the two countries. Tokyo's latest trade commitments to Washington--separate yet related to the investment commitments--include "stable and long-term incremental purchases of U.S. energy, including LNG, totaling $7 billion per year, while exploring a new Alaskan offtake agreement for such LNG." Japanese companies likely see strategic value in the ability to influence gas production as they anticipate growing offtake from U.S. LNG projects. Japanese companies may be demonstrating a cautious approach in differentiating between gas investments in the Lower 48 versus Alaska LNG, with its extremely challenging project economics.
Japanese investments in U.S. oil and gas assets show the continued appeal of the country's resource base and the abundance of opportunities on offer in unconventional gas and LNG. Japan's energy security planning, the importance of U.S. LNG supply in Japanese portfolios, and the trade agenda and geopolitical backdrop suggest this trend will continue.
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Ben Cahill is a senior associate (non-resident) for the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Jane Nakano is a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/japanese-energy-companies-step-us-investments
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: How Syria Can Succeed in Integrating the Kurds
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 22, 2026:
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How Syria Can Succeed in Integrating the Kurds
By Mona Yacoubian and Will Todman
Intensified conflict between the Syrian transition government (STG) and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) poses the most significant threat to Syria's fragile transition to date. The SDF overplayed its hand in negotiations with the STG, but now President Ahmed al-Sharaa risks similar overreach. A shaky four-day ceasefire is set to expire on January 24. Good faith gestures
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WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 22, 2026:
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How Syria Can Succeed in Integrating the Kurds
By Mona Yacoubian and Will Todman
Intensified conflict between the Syrian transition government (STG) and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) poses the most significant threat to Syria's fragile transition to date. The SDF overplayed its hand in negotiations with the STG, but now President Ahmed al-Sharaa risks similar overreach. A shaky four-day ceasefire is set to expire on January 24. Good faith gesturesfrom Sharaa that bridge the gap between the imperatives of a unified Syria and Kurdish demands for community-led protection and local autonomy in Kurdish-majority areas are critical at this moment and can serve as an important off-ramp for conflict. Otherwise, Syria's transition could be derailed, with significant ripple effects across Syria and the wider region.
Background to Tensions
Early in Syria's post-Assad transition, Kurdish integration stood out as among the most challenging issues facing the transition government. A March 2025 integration agreement aimed to establish a process for folding Kurdish-led governance and security entities into the Damascus-led transition government by the end of 2025. It called for border crossings and oil and gas facilities in SDF-controlled areas of Syria's northeast to come under transition government control but did not offer details on the thornier challenge of integrating the Kurdish-led SDF.
The agreement's implementation remained stalled over the intervening months, which were punctuated by periods of tension and even clashes between the transition government and the SDF. These tensions flared more significantly in early January, when simmering disputes between the two sides erupted into larger conflict in Aleppo. STG forces successfully pushed Kurdish fighters out of the Aleppo neighborhoods, a prelude to a broader lightning offensive by Damascus, effectively routing Kurdish forces from Arab-majority regions of the Raqqa and Deir Zor governorates.
The SDF Overplayed Its Hand
Several key miscalculations facilitated the SDF's rout. First, the SDF miscalculated the degree to which power dynamics had shifted in favor of the STG. President Sharaa had gradually secured his position internationally and concentrated his focus on Syria's territorial integrity. U.S.-mediated talks between Israelis and Syrians in Paris in early January decreased tensions in southern Syria and allowed Sharaa to focus his attention on the northeast. Yet, despite Sharaa's growing power, the SDF continued to adopt a maximalist stance in integration talks and refused to make concessions.
Second, the SDF overestimated U.S. backing. In fact, the STG essentially replaced the SDF as the United States' primary partner in Syria, particularly following Sharaa's decision to join the anti-ISIS coalition in November 2025, which dramatically eroded the SDF's unique value to the United States. In the following months, the STG demonstrated its ability to contribute to anti-ISIS efforts through several partnered operations with U.S. forces. The STG reportedly floated operations into SDF-held territory in the Paris meetings with U.S. and Israeli officials and received no objections. Damascus's operation against Kurdish fighters in Aleppo revealed U.S. reticence to push back on the government's anti-SDF operations.
Third, the SDF failed to secure the backing of local populations in many Arab-majority parts of the territory it controlled. As the STG advanced, Arab elements of the SDF defected and locals rose up in support of the STG. The SDF lost control of key strategic assets, such as oil and gas fields and dams, key sources of its leverage over Damascus.
Sharaa Risks Overplaying His Hand
The SDF overplayed its hand, and Sharaa must not do the same. If the ceasefire collapses and the STG advances into Kurdish-majority urban centers such as Hasakeh and Kobane, violence will escalate significantly. Even if the STG secures control of these areas, a prolonged Kurdish-led insurgency is likely. The STG's rapid advances have garnered warnings from senior U.S. officials such as Senator Lindsey Graham, who threatened that the United States could reimpose sanctions on Syria. Reports of besiegement and abuses against Kurdish fighters and civilians risk escalating intercommunal tensions significantly, particularly amid an apparent internet blackout in Kobane.
Other Syrian minorities, such as the Druze in southern Syria, will watch the events in northeast Syria closely. For Sharaa to avoid further rounds of conflict, he must prove that his quest to entrench his sovereignty over all of Syria's territory does not pose an existential threat to minority-led factions. Additional concessions and confidence-building measures are critical.
Unresolved tensions between the Syrian Kurds and the transition government would generate broader negative reverberations. Ongoing conflict with the Kurds could allow for an ISIS resurgence in both Syria and Iraq. Already, amid the current violence, the U.S. military estimates that 200 low-level ISIS fighters have escaped from Shaddadi prison, although many have been recaptured. Fearful of the potential for larger-scale prison breaks, CENTCOM launched an operation to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq, transporting 150 prisoners and noting that up to 7,000 could be moved to Iraq.
Certainly, the ensuing chaos of deepening conflict between the Kurds and the transition government would create conditions favorable to an ISIS resurgence. ISIS cells are well placed to exploit the security and governance vacuums that could emerge in some of these areas. Moreover, distracted by Kurdish threats and at times lacking discipline, Syrian transition security forces may not effectively secure ISIS-related detention sites, leading to prison breaks that can replenish ISIS forces on the ground. And Syria's often porous border with Iraq underscores that the threat would not be contained to Syria but could reverberate back into Iraq.
A Kurdish insurgency in northeast Syria would also contribute to broader regional instability centered on mounting separatism.
Separatist threats and actions have already provoked even greater instability in south Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. Failure to successfully integrate the Kurds in Syria would add yet another active separatist conflict to the region and could also encourage other Syrian separatists, notably in Druze-majority areas of southern Syria.
Building Trust
While the transition government has emerged in a more powerful position with this latest episode of violence, failure to integrate the Kurds successfully could derail transition efforts. Elements of the January 18 integration agreement could be amended to bridge the most serious gaps:
* Perhaps the most pressing SDF demand is protection in Kurdish-majority areas, which SDF head General Mazloum Abdi termed a "red line." Establishing Kurdish community police forces that report to the Ministry of Interior in all Kurdish-majority regions could assuage these most visceral fears.
* The presidential decree appointing a governor of Hasakeh governorate should explicitly reference General Mazloum as governor and perhaps grant him authority over a list of SDF members to serve in leadership positions in the central government military and security structures.
* Presidential Decree No. 13 (2026), which recognizes Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights, should be elevated to a constitutional amendment, enshrining these rights into law. Renaming the Syrian Arab Republic to the Syrian Republic could serve as a broader signal of inclusion to Syria's many minorities.
These workarounds could go far in cementing the ceasefire and advancing Kurdish integration into a new Syria. If successful, the agreement could also serve as an important template for other minority groups such as the Druze. It could launch a virtuous cycle in which compromise to secure the buy-in of one key minority group engenders faith by others that they too can find a place in the new united Syria.
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Mona Yacoubian is director and senior adviser of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Will Todman is the chief of staff of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-syria-can-succeed-integrating-kurds
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Canada and the European Union - Two New Wins for Chinese Exports in the West
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 22, 2026:
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Canada and the European Union: Two New Wins for Chinese Exports in the West
By Ilaria Mazzocco
Last week was full of surprises for trade disputes between China and U.S. allies in what has become a highly controversial sector in recent years: electric vehicles (EVs). Both Canada and the European Union appear to have reached agreements with China that would allow for more Chinese-made EVs to enter their markets. The United States should take note. Both the European
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WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 22, 2026:
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Canada and the European Union: Two New Wins for Chinese Exports in the West
By Ilaria Mazzocco
Last week was full of surprises for trade disputes between China and U.S. allies in what has become a highly controversial sector in recent years: electric vehicles (EVs). Both Canada and the European Union appear to have reached agreements with China that would allow for more Chinese-made EVs to enter their markets. The United States should take note. Both the EuropeanUnion and Canada were converging with the United States on their approach toward Chinese industrial policy, overcapacity, and trade disputes, but these deals suggest more willingness to engage with China on commercial matters, despite the country's record exports (see Figure 1). Indeed, at a time when Washington is increasingly focused on technological competition with China, it appears as though some close allies may be considering a more diversified approach to technological stacks--one which may include some reliance and cooperation with China. Although derisking may still be a priority for Brussels and Ottawa in some specific sectors, neither government is espousing a broad strategy to isolate China at the moment.
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Figure 1: Chinese Vehicle Exports by Type
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There are big differences between Canada and the European Union and their respective relationships with China. Moreover, the breakthroughs of this week don't address the structural issues that have raised tensions between China and many of its trading partners in recent years. However, taken together, the developments are significant because of the signal they send. One reasonable conclusion is that Western countries are still interested in Chinese technology and are mainly focused on reducing the volume or price competition rather than blocking trade altogether. A key background element in both cases is Chinese investments, which governments in Europe and Canada hope may boost domestic employment and innovation through potential technology transfers. Indeed, in the case of Europe, the investments already exist, and the debate has already shifted to how to manage and ensure that Chinese manufacturing can benefit long-term competitiveness and innovation goals. In other words, European and Canadian leaders believe that there are economic benefits to maintaining some trade and allowing some investment from China.
What Is the European Union's Deal?
On January 12, 2026, the European Commission released a guidance document providing information to companies on how to submit offers for voluntary price undertakings for battery EV exports from China, signaling it would welcome such an approach in some cases as an alternative to the tariffs imposed after its anti-subsidy investigation on battery electric vehicles made in China. This came as reports broke that not only had Volkswagen already submitted an application for the CUPRA Tavascan, which is produced in China, but that the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) had endorsed such an approach, reversing its earlier position.
For the European Union, the debate over EV imports has been both drawn out and high profile due to the large-scale economic implications of the rapid shift in the automotive balance of trade with China (see Figure 2). When tariffs on Chinese-made battery electric vehicles ranging from 7.8 percent for Tesla to 35.3 percent for SAIC Motor were introduced in 2024, the European Commission explicitly indicated that some alternative mechanisms could be utilized to avoid tariffs. However, over the next year, little progress was achieved between Beijing and Brussels when it came to finding an agreement. To complicate matters, European automakers such as Volkswagen that have extensive production capacity in China were also affected by the tariffs, while Chinese companies, including BYD, have been investing in Europe to localize more of their production and avoid duties. Indeed, European policymakers have faced tough choices due to the complex trade and investment ties between the two economies and the large number of cars exported from China to Europe by Western automakers such as Tesla, Volkswagen, and others.
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Figure 2: China-EU Automotive Trade by Type of Vehicle (Electric Vehicle vs. Internal Combustion Engine), Q1 2019-Q3 2025
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The issue with a price undertaking is that it may not solve the European Union's competitiveness or EV deployment problems, but it may help alleviate Chinese firms' "involution" struggles. Indeed, MOFCOM may turn out to be very pleased with the outcome, even if it wasn't an early vocal supporter of this solution. While tariffs require companies to pay a duty, a price undertaking would allow them to retain higher margins and potentially reinvest the money in expanding further production or research and development. Either way, consumers should see a similar, if higher, price tag. However, although much concern has been raised about the possibility of this outcome benefiting Chinese firms, it is worth noting that so far, Volkswagen, a German company, is the only one that has submitted a request for a price undertaking. Whether others will follow remains to be seen.
What Is Canada's Deal?
Only a few days after the news from Europe, during Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's visit to Beijing on January 16, the first such state visit in eight years, the Canadian government indicated that a series of commercial deals had been reached between the two countries. Among other things, the Canadian side agreed to allow 49,000 Chinese EVs into Canada at a most-favored-nation rate of 6.1 percent. This is far lower than the 100 percent rate that was imposed in 2024 following the United States' lead under then-President Joe Biden, which effectively stopped imports (see Figure 3). Some reports indicated that the number of vehicles would then increase to 70,000 over five years. In exchange, China has reportedly committed to lowering tariffs on Canadian agricultural products such as canola oil and to increasing investment in Canada, among other things.
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Figure 3: China EV Exports to Canada
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Prime Minister Carney and much of the reporting have highlighted that 49,000 cars is a small number compared to Canada's overall light vehicle market, which was roughly 1.8 million in 2025. However, when looking at EV sales, the number becomes far more significant. After a record year in 2024, when almost 251,000 EVs were sold in Canada, in 2025 the number dropped significantly, reaching less than 165,000 by the end of November, according to EV Volumes, an industry data provider. Thus, it is possible that 50,000 vehicles could inject some momentum into the market, especially if their price point can entice consumers. This is clearly part of the calculation--the Canadian official statement points to the hope that a significant portion of the vehicles would cost less than C$35,000 (about $25,000).
The Canadian deal is particularly opaque right now, and much remains unexplained, including which brands will be included in the 49,000 vehicles. For example, Tesla, a U.S. company, is a major exporter of EVs from China, but its vehicles would be in the more expensive range, and it is not clear that Beijing or Ottawa would prioritize a foreign firm's exports.
Regardless, this signals a far more dramatic shift in policy compared to that of the European Union. While Europe is already an importer of EVs from China and many European manufacturers are deeply dependent on the Chinese market and Chinese value chains, Canada is in a different position, as it has adopted a similar approach to the United States, effectively closing its market to Chinese automotive exports in 2024. By opening its market, even in such a limited fashion, it is effectively signaling a willingness to create more linkages with the Chinese market--especially given Prime Minister Carney's emphasis on the potential investment that would flow to Canada as part of this deal.
The fact that Canada is willing to cut such a deal with China and involve a hot-button issue such as EVs is significant also in relation to Ottawa's relationship with Washington, which, as Carney's speech at Davos this week indicates, is evolving rapidly. Lower tariffs on Chinese EVs and, more broadly, a deal with China will certainly come under scrutiny during United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement negotiations. Mexico is also a major importer of Chinese-made EVs as well as ICE vehicles, ensuring that this will indeed be a complicated discussion. Indeed, if the deal were to increase Chinese investment in Canada, that would raise concerns in Washington, even if, as of now, it seems that the main target of Chinese negotiations is access to the Canadian market.
Looking Ahead: A Complicated Path Forward
It is difficult to look at the data and conclude that Chinese manufacturing and EV producers won't play a major role in the future of the automotive industry. However, the deals discussed in this piece do not solve some of the broader issues that the industry faces in China, including over-competition and low margins and profitability. Meanwhile, although the European Union and Canada have signaled some interest in retaining or reestablishing some trade in the sector, they are far from swinging open the floodgates. In both cases, the governments are expecting some level of productive investment from China to mitigate the negative effects of changing trade dynamics. As argued above, both U.S. allies are effectively signaling a strong interest in the technologies that Chinese firms can offer.
For the United States, this raises interesting questions. Firstly, at a time when U.S. automakers have reined in their plans for electrification and federal policy has rolled back incentives for EV deployment, the growth of EV trade in other countries should be taken as a serious signal of future global trends. Second, Washington's strategy toward many of its allies, including Ottawa and Brussels, has been to utilize its leverage, whether it be military or economic, to secure more concessions. In several instances, this has proven a remarkably effective strategy. However, it has also created a new set of incentives for countries to, among other things, seek to stabilize their commercial relationship with Beijing, which is now portraying itself as a more reliable partner. While not necessarily always detrimental to U.S. national security in the short term, it could nonetheless carry long-term consequences. A more holistic foreign policy approach would consider both the motivations and interests of allies that can be leveraged to mutual benefit, in addition to the pressure points that can be used to pursue U.S. interests in a more direct way.
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Ilaria Mazzocco is deputy director and senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/canada-and-european-union-two-new-wins-chinese-exports-west
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Celebrates the End of Human Fetal Tissue in Taxpayer-Funded Research
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on Jan. 23, 2026:
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AFPI Celebrates the End of Human Fetal Tissue in Taxpayer-Funded Research
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement:
"AFPI applauds the NIH for ending the use of human fetal tissue in taxpayer funded, NIH supported research. Instead, the Trump Administration is advancing innovative technologies to conduct more effective bio medical testing without the cost to unborn life. This decision marks a turning point for gold-standard science in the
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on Jan. 23, 2026:
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AFPI Celebrates the End of Human Fetal Tissue in Taxpayer-Funded Research
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement:
"AFPI applauds the NIH for ending the use of human fetal tissue in taxpayer funded, NIH supported research. Instead, the Trump Administration is advancing innovative technologies to conduct more effective bio medical testing without the cost to unborn life. This decision marks a turning point for gold-standard science in theUnited States.
For too long, the abortion industry has insisted that any breakthroughs in science rely on elective abortions; instead, Director Bhattacharya has shown that you can be pro-life and pro-science. On this 52nd annual March for Life, we celebrate the advances in medicine that are done without harm to the most innocent or promote a culture of death."
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-celebrates-the-end-of-human-fetal-tissue-in-taxpayer-funded-research
[Category: ThinkTank]
"Not Another Penny" for DHS Funding in Next Senate Vote
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 [Category: ThinkTank] -- Common Cause posted the following news release:
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"Not Another Penny" for DHS Funding in Next Senate Vote
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WASHINGTON, DC - Today, for the second time in two weeks, federal agents murdered an American citizen in Minnesota for exercising their constitutional right.
Statement of Common Cause President & CEO Virginia Kase Solomon
President Trump's federal agents shot and killed another citizen, further evidence of his failure to keep America's cities safe. The American public deserves nothing less than full accountability and transparency for
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 [Category: ThinkTank] -- Common Cause posted the following news release:
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"Not Another Penny" for DHS Funding in Next Senate Vote
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WASHINGTON, DC - Today, for the second time in two weeks, federal agents murdered an American citizen in Minnesota for exercising their constitutional right.
Statement of Common Cause President & CEO Virginia Kase Solomon
President Trump's federal agents shot and killed another citizen, further evidence of his failure to keep America's cities safe. The American public deserves nothing less than full accountability and transparency fortoday's murder.
Once again, one million Common Cause members are calling on President Trump to remove ICE from our communities to end the violence.
And our message to the U.S. Senate: not another penny for the Department of Homeland Security until ICE is removed and there is an immediate investigation.
Statement of Common Cause's Minnesota Executive Director Annastacia Belladona-Carrera
Today's killing of another Minnesota community member is a terrible and completely avoidable tragedy. Minnesotans have a constitutional right to free speech and criticism of its government without fear of violence or murder. We call on federal authorities to immediately de-escalate and halt enforcement actions that endanger the public, and we urge Congress and the Trump Administration to rein in operations that are escalating into violence. Minnesota and every state deserve safety, due process, and accountability, not intimidation and impunity. Democracy requires accountability, especially when the government uses force in public space.
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Original text here: https://www.commoncause.org/press/not-another-penny-for-dhs-funding-in-next-senate-vote/
