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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Deadlocked War Subtly Changes to Russia's Detriment
WASHINGTON, April 14 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 13, 2026, by Pavel K. Baev, senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Deadlocked War Subtly Changes to Russia's Detriment
Executive Summary:
* This year's 32-hour-long Easter truce for Russia's war against Ukraine did not lead to a lasting ceasefire nor a resumption in peace talks, despite some cautious advocacy in the mainstream media.
* The Russian spring offensive in Donbas has yielded no territorial gains amid heavy casualties, recruitment ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 14 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 13, 2026, by Pavel K. Baev, senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Deadlocked War Subtly Changes to Russia's Detriment Executive Summary: * This year's 32-hour-long Easter truce for Russia's war against Ukraine did not lead to a lasting ceasefire nor a resumption in peace talks, despite some cautious advocacy in the mainstream media. * The Russian spring offensive in Donbas has yielded no territorial gains amid heavy casualties, recruitmentshortfalls, and rising financial strain. Regional budget crises and economic contraction deepen domestic pressures in Russia, revealing systemic limits in sustaining the war.
* The doctoring of statistics on Russia's economy camouflages the true depth of the recession. The sustained decline in investment activity, however, guarantees that the crisis will only deepen.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced this year's 32-hour-long Easter truce in his war against Ukraine in the same manner as in spring 2025. It was, however, not a precursor to a lasting ceasefire, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested. Neither was it a signal of Moscow's interest in resuming talks on a peace deal, despite some cautious advocacy in the mainstream media (Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 6). Putin merely sought to pacify public opinion, where support for continuing the war is very weak, particularly among younger generations (Levada.ru, April 2). He also found it opportune to move in step with the pause in the Gulf conflict, which Russian experts did not expect to last even two weeks (Kommersant, April 9). The talks in Islamabad and the consequences of their breakdown are attracting prime international attention, so little attention has lately been given to the changes in Russia's seemingly static war against Ukraine, which could be decisive.
The Russian spring offensive in Donbas has yielded no territorial gains and has even suffered several retreats driven by Ukrainian counterattacks (Meduza, March 31; Slovo i Dilo, April 9). Official Russian commentary ignores this setback, but jingoist bloggers have been making a lot of noise about the lack of reserves needed to regain momentum (TopWar.ru, April 8; Izvestiya, April 10). The main cause of this transformation of the battlefield is the new edge Ukraine has gained in drone warfare by combining saturation of the tactical zone with first-person view (FPV) drones and mid-range strikes, so that the effective "kill-zone" is expanded to some 120 kilometers (74.5 miles) (Re: Russia, March 20). The balance of territorial advances may have shifted imperceptibly, but it effectively undercuts Putin's claim that the whole Donbas will be occupied either through a deal or by force (Kommersant, April 10).
The botched attacks and crippled logistics result in record numbers of casualties in the Russian army. The documented number of 208,755 fatalities hardly makes half of the real losses of life (Mediazona, April 10). Since the start of the year, Russia's commercial recruitment system has been unable to attract a sufficient number of mercenaries to compensate for mounting losses, and this gap keeps widening (Important Stories, February 26; NV.ua, April 10). Neither the spreading campaign to recruit students, nor the pressure on the fresh draftees conscripted since April 1 to sign contracts for combat units can yield the required volume of manpower (Current time, April 3; Meduza, April 7). Regional authorities are compelled to raise bonuses for signing contracts, but the supply of "volunteers" still cannot meet demand (Agents Media, April 10). These payments add considerably to regional budget crises, and taxation increases bring widespread discontent, aggravated by the underfunding of responses to various local emergencies, such as the foot-and-mouth epidemic in Southern Siberia (Forbes.ru, March 25;Novaya gazeta Europe, April 8).
Ukraine in March managed to gain an advantage over Russia in the number of long-distance drone attacks, setting the mark above 7,300 strikes (The Moscow Times, April 6). The data on these activities is quite unreliable, but the devastating impact of Ukrainian drone hits on Russian energy infrastructure, including platforms in the Caspian Sea, is beyond doubt (Rubrika, April 10). Repeated attacks on oil terminals in Novorossiysk, Primorsk, and Ust-Luga have effectively denied Russia the opportunity to profit from the spike in oil prices driven by the conflict in the Gulf (Re: Russia, April 7). A new feature of Ukrainian drone warfare is the increased targeting of Russian air defense systems, including radars, which weakens the protection of many crucial assets exactly when the intensity of the threat goes up (Radio Svoboda, April 11).
Russian attempts to resort to nuclear blackmail or demonstrate its strategic muscle have also notably declined. Putin has avoided any nuclear bragging in his infrequent public appearances, and "patriotic" social media has turned to debates over the prospects of arms control (TopWar.ru, April 11; Kommersant, April 12). Dmitry Trenin, an advocate for nuclear escalation, has been promoted to president of the Russian International Affairs Council and has transitioned to a more sober discourse (RIAC, April 3). Moscow has also cut down on its hybrid attacks on its European neighbors and has been refraining from any counter-measures against the arrests of its "shadow fleet" ships (Fontanka.ru, April 10). A demarch by the Russian Foreign Ministry was the only step taken after the claim that the Baltic states opened air corridors for Ukrainian drone strikes on Primorsk and Ust-Luga, and Russian media noted that it was flatly turned down (RBC, April 10).
The first quarter of 2026 officially registered a contraction of the Russian economy, which is the strategic center of gravity in the war of attrition (The Moscow Times, April 8; Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 9). The doctoring of statistics camouflages the true depth of the recession, but the sustained decline in investment activity guarantees that the crisis will only deepen (The Bell, April 9). Alarm bells about the unprecedented expansion of the budget deficit may be temporarily silenced by the expected growth in petro-revenues, but the volume of additional income is clearly insufficient to address the unfolding financial disaster (Forbes.ru, April 6). Putin has no plan to address the economic decline, and his proposal to tax extra-high profits clashes with the reality of losses reported even by corporations enjoying the most-favored status (Kommersant, April 11). The total of these changes amounts to a strong new incentive for Russia to end the unwinnable war. Kyrylo Budanov, the top Ukrainian negotiator, has accordingly suggested that a compromise peace deal can be reached soon and implemented quickly. His point was instantly picked up by the Russian media (Izvestiya, April 11). Putin, however, operates on a different rationale centered on ensuring his grasp on power. He is less concerned about the regime's survival than, for instance, the Iranian leadership, which refuses to moderate its ambitions in the talks with the United States, but is much more obsessed with personal safety. He finds the risks of taking responsibility for ending the war--and, by extension, for starting it--and for standing in the way of the peace process equally disturbing. Fear exacerbates his usual reluctance to make hard decisions, but procrastination only adds to the gravity of his political dilemma.
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Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/deadlocked-war-subtly-changes-to-russias-detriment/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Manufacturers of Building Materials in Germany Expect Business to Deteriorate
MUNICH, Germany, April 14 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on April 13, 2026:* * *
Manufacturers of Building Materials in Germany Expect Business to Deteriorate
Sentiment among manufacturers of building materials (glass, ceramics, stone, and other nonmetallic minerals) grew distinctly gloomier in March. The business climate fell to minus 23.5 points, down from minus 17.9 points in February. "The high energy prices are dragging down sentiment among manufacturers of building materials. In terms of production value, this segment has one of the highest shares of energy costs in ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, April 14 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on April 13, 2026: * * * Manufacturers of Building Materials in Germany Expect Business to Deteriorate Sentiment among manufacturers of building materials (glass, ceramics, stone, and other nonmetallic minerals) grew distinctly gloomier in March. The business climate fell to minus 23.5 points, down from minus 17.9 points in February. "The high energy prices are dragging down sentiment among manufacturers of building materials. In terms of production value, this segment has one of the highest shares of energy costs inmanufacturing," says ifo industry expert Nicolas Bunde.
According to the ifo Business Survey, significantly more companies in the industry plan to raise prices. The corresponding indicator rose significantly in March to 22.2 points, up from 8.4 points in February. "Higher prices for building materials are likely to have an impact on the construction industry in the medium term," explains Bunde. At the same time, the share of companies scaling back their production increased (from minus 5.3 to minus 9.9). Nevertheless, companies assessed their order backlog in March 2026 (minus 43.5 points) as considerably more favorable than a year ago (minus 63.7 points). "The industry is slowly emerging from the crisis, but is being set back by the consequences of the conflict in the Middle East," says Bunde.
The gloomy sentiment among manufacturers of building materials (glass, ceramics, stone, and other nonmetallic minerals) is being driven primarily by significantly more pessimistic business expectations. However, the current situation is also viewed by companies as somewhat worse than in the previous month.
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ifo Podcast: Investment or Misuse - How is the Government Dealing with the New Debt?
A year ago, the Bundestag approved a massive debt package: up to 500 billion euros can be spent over 12 years on infrastructure and climate protection. After a year, 24.3 billion euros have been spent, and the ifo Institute has crunched the figures. Has the government been able to deliver on its promise to revitalise Germany with the new funds? How much extra has been invested in infrastructure? Were the concerns about the money simply being shuffled around justified?
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/media-center/2026-03-25/ifo-podcast-investment-or-misuse-how-government-dealing-new-debt)
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More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-04-13/manufacturers-building-materials-germany-expect-business-deteriorate)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-04-13/manufacturers-building-materials-germany-expect-business-deteriorate
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Free Press: Iran Needs the Strait of Hormuz More Than Anyone
WASHINGTON, April 14 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on April 13, 2026, by Zineb Riboua, research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, to the Free Press:* * *
Iran Needs the Strait of Hormuz More Than Anyone
Trump's announcement that the US would blockade the strait could take the last card out of Tehran's hand.
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On Sunday, President Donald Trump announced a full U.S. naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and threatened to destroy "the little ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 14 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on April 13, 2026, by Zineb Riboua, research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, to the Free Press: * * * Iran Needs the Strait of Hormuz More Than Anyone Trump's announcement that the US would blockade the strait could take the last card out of Tehran's hand. * On Sunday, President Donald Trump announced a full U.S. naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and threatened to destroy "the littlethat is left of Iran." In a pair of Truth Social posts, Trump declared that the U.S. military would begin blocking ships from entering or leaving the strait, intercept any vessel that had paid tolls to Iran to transit it safely, and warned that any Iranian who fires on U.S. or peaceful vessels would be "BLOWN TO HELL" while the Navy works to demine the strait. The announcement came as ceasefire negotiations in Islamabad, Pakistan, broke down and the U.S. delegation led by Vice President J.D. Vance returned home. In effect, Washington has moved to strip Tehran of the one coercive instrument it believed it held in reserve.
Wars usually shut doors for American foreign policy. But this episode has revealed that Operation Epic Fury has opened them with uncommon force. To understand why requires an honest reckoning with Iran's biggest mistake in this war. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) decision to weaponize the Strait of Hormuz ranks among the most consequential miscalculations in the regime's history.
Following the American and Israeli strikes, the Revolutionary Guard pursued two anticipated outcomes from its Hormuz strategy.
The first was a global economic shock severe enough to force Washington to back down. Iran hoped it could cause a disruption so costly to oil markets and allied supply chains that the United States would be compelled to return to the negotiating table on Iranian terms. The strait carries roughly 20 percent of global oil trade and a similar amount of the world's liquefied natural gas. A genuine closure would send energy prices soaring across Europe, Asia, and the gulf alike.
The second objective was political. Iran sought to use disruption in the Strait to fracture the alignment between Washington and its Gulf partners, demonstrating that American military operations imposed an unbearable cost on regional stability, pressuring Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha to demand a stand-down.
What the IRGC failed to account for was the weight of the political debt it had accumulated across the Arab world. For decades, Tehran positioned the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the sacred center of Arab political life, consecrating every Iranian intervention and branding every Arab government that resisted as a traitor to Islam. The goal was to hijack Arab grievances and convert them into cover for the Islamic Republic's conquest.
The Revolutionary Guard was the instrument of that conquest, deployed across the region to construct parallel states, capture financial systems, and install political figures whose survival depended entirely on Iranian patronage.
In Iraq, 67 armed factions tied to the Popular Mobilization Forces, collectively claiming some 230,000 personnel, consumed roughly $3.5 billion annually from the national treasury while Iraqi prime ministers governed with Tehran's permission rather than a popular mandate.
In Syria, Iran poured billions into the Bashar al-Assad regime and transformed a once-sovereign Arab state into a forward operating base for revolutionary power projection. In 2013, Mehdi Taeb, the head of the Iranian regime's Ammar Base think tank, called Syria "Iran's 35th province."
Farther south, Houthi commanders answering directly to the IRGC held the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which 10 percent of global seaborne trade passes, perpetually hostage.
Every theater followed the same logic: subordinate Arab sovereignty to the Islamic Republic's revolutionary ambition, then present the occupation as resistance.
Arab populations ground down under this revolutionary machinery had long recognized the enterprise for what it was. As far back as 2017, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman described Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, as "the new Hitler of the Middle East." During Operation Epic Fury, Faiq al-Sheikh Ali, a former member of the Iraqi parliament, stated that "I am Arab. I see humiliation from the Iranians. I do not see any humiliation from any Israeli." The Arab world had been keeping score for years, and the IRGC had given it no shortage of reasons to reach that judgment.
This is why the second objective, fracturing Gulf alignment, failed. To make matters worse for Tehran, the regime had spent the weeks before the talks in Islamabad striking the very states on whose neutrality the strategy required, hitting desalination plants and oil facilities across the Gulf and curdling any residual sympathy in those countries into open hostility. Sultan Al Jaber, the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) minister of industry and advanced technology, stated that the strait has never been under Iranian control in any manner that would permit Tehran to legally close or restrict international shipping. The Gulf States reinforced the American posture directly, and the political dividend Tehran had assumed would follow from economic disruption never materialized.
In other words, the IRGC shot itself in the foot. Iran's available alternatives outside the strait can replace less than 10 percent of Gulf throughput. Before the war, inflation was running above 40 percent, the currency had lost more than 80 percent of its value over the preceding decade, and the shadow fleet Tehran had assembled to smuggle oil and fund IRGC operations was already straining under accumulated sanctions enforcement. Recruitment had collapsed so severely under the weight of unpaid salaries and economic asphyxiation that the IRGC was reportedly pulling 12-year-olds into its ranks. A sustained U.S. naval blockade renders continued resistance economically impossible.
By blockading the strait that Iran is trying to toll, America has called Tehran's bluff, revealing that the Islamic Republic needs Hormuz commerce at least as much as the rest of the world.
The lesson for all has been that Iran cannot be worked with or relied upon. And Gulf States have since moved to make the lesson permanent. After Trump's declarations, Saudi Arabia announced the full restoration of oil pumping capacity through its East-West pipeline to approximately seven million barrels per day, days after providing an assessment of damage to its energy sector from attacks during the conflict. By doing so, Riyadh has demonstrated that the region can route energy flows entirely around the strait. In trying to turn Hormuz into leverage, Iran accelerated the very investment the strategy was designed to prevent. The choke point Tehran sought to weaponize is being engineered out of strategic relevance by the states whose alignment Tehran had hoped to shatter.
But in the IRGC's misery there is Washington's opportunity, and opportunities of this magnitude do not repeat themselves. Properly leveraged, Trump's blockade could unlock a broader regional consolidation.
The first opportunity lies in expanding the Abraham Accords into a robust regional architecture. The Accords signed in 2020 between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco have already delivered measurable cooperation in trade, technology, and security. During Operation Epic Fury, Gulf States coordinated with U.S. Central Command at a level of intimacy unimaginable a decade ago, sharing intelligence, opening airspace, and integrating into a defense posture that functioned as a coherent whole. Bringing additional Gulf partners into a structured framework would convert that wartime alignment into a durable order, with the India-Middle East-Europe corridor providing the economic spine around which the broader architecture could take shape.
The second opportunity is more consequential over time. For two decades, the United States attempted to suppress Iranian-backed networks through direct military engagement in states too weak or too captured to act as genuine partners, a model that proved strategically exhausting and produced no durable result.
The degradation of Iran's proxy architecture changes the underlying condition entirely. An Iraq reclaiming sovereignty over its own security sector, a Syria freed from Iranian entrenchment, and Gulf States that absorbed sustained attack without political fracture are better positioned to police their own territory. Strong sovereign states are the only counterterrorism infrastructure capable of producing lasting outcomes, and Washington now has a genuine opportunity to help build them through security cooperation and diplomatic engagement, freeing up American strategic bandwidth for the Indo-Pacific.
The Middle East is already reordering itself around Iran's diminishment. Washington's opportunity is to consolidate what the region has begun.
Read in The Free Press (https://www.thefp.com/p/iran-needs-the-strait-of-hormuz-more).
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At A Glance:
Zineb Riboua is a research fellow with Hudson Institute's Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/iran-needs-strait-hormuz-more-anyone-zineb-riboua
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Arab News: Iran Ceasefire Offers an Opportunity to Reset U.S.-UK Relations
WASHINGTON, April 14 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on April 13, 2026, by senior fellow Luke Coffey to Arab News:* * *
Iran Ceasefire Offers an Opportunity to Reset US-UK Relations
One of the geopolitical consequences of the Iran-US war has been the severe strain it has placed on America's relations with Europe, and specifically within NATO.
On one hand, President Donald Trump was frustrated that Europe seemed unwilling to play an active role in the fighting, particularly ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 14 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on April 13, 2026, by senior fellow Luke Coffey to Arab News: * * * Iran Ceasefire Offers an Opportunity to Reset US-UK Relations One of the geopolitical consequences of the Iran-US war has been the severe strain it has placed on America's relations with Europe, and specifically within NATO. On one hand, President Donald Trump was frustrated that Europe seemed unwilling to play an active role in the fighting, particularlyregarding the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Europeans felt slighted that they were not consulted or coordinated with before Trump and Israel launched the war.
Yet one specific aspect of the transatlantic ties deserves more attention: the "Special Relationship" between the US and the UK, and the breakdown in personal relations between Trump and the British prime minister, Keir Starmer.
What leaders in Washington and London might not fully appreciate is how much of a stabilizing force the close relationship between the US and the UK represents to observers around the world.
For example, last week I was traveling through the South Caucasus and on a number of occasions senior officials asked me directly about the state of the US-UK relationship. As an American who has worked at senior levels in the British government, perhaps they believed I was well placed to answer. Nevertheless, the fact that they were asking the question at all underscores just how closely the Special Relationship is watched, internationally, and how much confidence others place in its strength.
Many people become disappointed with the Special Relationship because they misunderstand what it truly is. It is not defined by how personally close or politically aligned the leaders in Washington and London happen to be at any given moment. It runs much deeper that that and is far more resilient than any temporary alignment between two individuals.
In 1946, Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech in Fulton, Missouri, which is widely referred to as the "Iron Curtain" speech and often viewed as the geopolitical starting point of the Cold War. Less frequently noted is the fact that Churchill also introduced the term "Special Relationship" in that same address. Had he not warned of the descent of the Iron Curtain, the speech might well be remembered primarily for defining the enduring partnership between London and Washington.
Churchill described this relationship in practical, institutional terms: close cooperation between military advisers, common assessments of threats, alignment in weapons systems and doctrine, and the exchange of officers and cadets. He also emphasized the joint use of naval and air bases and a shared responsibility for global security.
This is what makes the US-UK relationship truly special. Measured against this definition, it remains fundamentally strong despite political tensions at the highest levels.
Recent events illustrate this clearly. Despite Trump's criticism of what he perceived as a lack of British willingness to participate directly in airstrikes against Iran, the UK nevertheless provided critical support. British bases, both in the UK itself and overseas territories in the Indian Ocean, were used to launch operations at a time when some NATO allies would not even permit the use of their airspace.
Britain also deployed fighter aircraft from bases in Cyprus and Qatar to the skies over Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar and the UAE to help provide air defense against Iranian drone attacks. These contributions helped alleviate pressure on the US and regional air-defense systems.
In addition, for more than two decades the UK has played a leading role in Gulf maritime security alongside the US and other partners. The deputy commander of the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain, for example, is a British admiral.
Starmer also responded to Trump's calls for help to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by supporting a platform through which interested countries could coordinate their efforts. The British foreign secretary convened a meeting of more than 40 countries, along with international institutions such as the International Maritime Organization, to address the issue.
Meanwhile, the UK's Permanent Joint Headquarters, the British military center from which overseas operations are planned and controlled, hosted a multinational conference to explore potential military options for restoring freedom of navigation.
Given these efforts, it is unfair to suggest that the UK has been absent. Could London have done more? Certainly. Have successive rounds of defense cuts by governments of both major political parties constrained Britain's military capabilities? Yes. But even if Trump was dissatisfied with the speed or enthusiasm of the British response, it is wrong to suggest that the UK was doing nothing.
Now, with a fragile ceasefire in place, Washington has an opportunity to take a more deliberate view of the broader geopolitical situation in the Middle East. This moment also presents the UK with a chance to distinguish itself from other European allies by contributing meaningfully to a durable peace.
There is also an opportunity to reset the US-UK relationship at the political level. Later this month, King Charles is expected to travel to the US for a state visit. Trump is well known for his admiration of the British monarchy, and there might be no better figure than King Charles to help rebuild the personal bridge across the Atlantic.
Restoring momentum to the Special Relationship is not only in the interest of both of the countries themselves, it is vital for NATO and for global stability more broadly. Around the world, allies and partners take reassurance from the strength of this partnership. When it appears strained, uncertainty grows. When it is functioning well, it serves as an anchor of stability in an increasingly volatile international system.
The sooner Washington and London can realign at the political level, the better it will be -- not only for themselves but for the alliance they lead and for the broader international system that depends on their cooperation.
Read in Arab News (https://www.arabnews.com/node/2639464).
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At A Glance:
Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/iran-ceasefire-offers-opportunity-reset-us-uk-relations-luke-coffey
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: State Government is Squeezing School Budgets and Pushing Up Property Taxes With Unfunded Mandates
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 14 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 13, 2026, by economist John Phelan:* * *
State government is squeezing school budgets and pushing up property taxes with unfunded mandates
Back in 2023, the "historic" DFL trifecta enacted a K-12 education bill which included a $2.2 billion hike in spending on schools. The bill indexed the per pupil funding formula to the rate of inflation in future years -- capped at 3% -- with a boost of 4% the ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 14 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 13, 2026, by economist John Phelan: * * * State government is squeezing school budgets and pushing up property taxes with unfunded mandates Back in 2023, the "historic" DFL trifecta enacted a K-12 education bill which included a $2.2 billion hike in spending on schools. The bill indexed the per pupil funding formula to the rate of inflation in future years -- capped at 3% -- with a boost of 4% thefollowing fiscal year and 2% the year after that; it included additional money to cover some of the costs of special education programs; there was money to recruit more teachers of color and hire more school psychologists; it awarded additional funding for stocking schools -- including, notoriously, boy's bathrooms -- with menstrual products free of charge to students; and there was money for a supply of the opioid antagonist naloxone, in schools, for use in fentanyl overdoses.
"This entire bill is about investing in our future, in our Minnesota learners," said Rep. Cheryl Youakim (DFL). "It's our job as legislators to make sure that every one of our public schools are a healthy and safe learning environment for all of our kids." With full control of the state government, the DFL was able to deliver on its 2022 campaign promise of "fully funding education."
Last year, I noted that, two years on from Minnesota's schools being "fully funded" by the DFL trifecta, they needed more cash. Another year on, the story is the same.
The Star Tribune reports:
Staffing cuts are underway at Minnesota schools as districts again face sizable budget gaps and uncertain funding prospects at the State Capitol.
Minneapolis Public Schools is poised to eliminate 187 full-time school positions after a projected 2026-27 deficit of $30.3 million rose to $50.5 million.
St. Michael-Albertville and St. Paul are grappling with shortfalls even after voters agreed last November to back new taxes for schools.
Districts have been here before: The Association of Metropolitan School Districts, which represents half of the state's public school students, reports that its members are confronted with $223 million in red ink in the latest installment of a three-year run of deficits and layoffs. That's less, though, than the more than $280 million shortfall that the 47 districts faced last year.
The Strib gives a number of reasons for these dire fiscal straits: falling enrollment numbers, "rising costs during the recent surge in immigration enforcement," and, incredibly, "the state's adoption in 2023 of universal free school meals."
But there is another culprit which goes unidentified: the "trifecta," that gift that keeps on taking.
Last year, the Minnesota Reformer explained "Why $2B in new school funding Is leaving Minnesota districts scrambling for cash." Going back to that 2023 education bill, it noted that:
...even before the ink on Walz's signature was dry, school leaders were bemoaning the fine print...
...the Minnesota School Boards Association, the Association of Metropolitan School Districts and others estimate that up to half the $2.2 billion had already been earmarked for as many as 65 new mandates, ranging from free meals for all students to menstrual products in school restrooms.
Lawmakers also extended unemployment insurance to cover bus drivers, some substitute teachers, cafeteria workers, classroom aides and other seasonal workers. This made Minnesota the first state to mandate this benefit for hourly employees, but it was unclear who will pay the premiums in the long term.
After a grueling fight, the Legislature allotted $135 million to pay for the first year of unemployment insurance premiums, promising to revisit funding in the future. District leaders were only partly appeased, noting that even if the state subsidized the premiums going forward, the employees who typically staff summer programs could choose not to.
...
Welcome though the money and new benefits are, says [executive director of the Minnesota School Boards Association Kirk] Schneidawind, districts will still have to scramble to cover some costs. Part of the difficulty of calculating just how much that will be is that school systems keep discovering new ways that the costs are showing up. The private companies that supply substitute teachers, for instance, are passing along their new state benefit costs.
These are the "unfunded mandates" which drive up costs for local governments and school districts who are then forced to hike property taxes to cover them.
I have noted this problem before:
An obvious solution is to ditch these things. Failing that, those who make these mandates legal commitments ought to be responsible for appropriating the funding necessary to finance their provision.
At present, state politicians can have their cake and eat it. Those who passed this tidal wave of unfunded mandates have been able to tout their role in providing paid family and medical leave or unemployment insurance for part time workers, while it has been people at the county level who have been tasked with finding a way to pay for it. The opprobrium for hiking property taxes is falling, unjustly, to a large degree, on them.
If we want to bring property taxes in Minnesota under control, we need to ensure that those who propose expansion of local government spending incur the political costs -- or benefits -- of financing it. When state policymakers internalize that cost, Minnesota's hard pressed property tax payers might catch a break.
This is a necessary part of any affordability agenda in Minnesota.
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John Phelan is an Economist at the Center of the American Experiment.
john.phelan@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/state-government-is-squeezing-school-budgets-and-pushing-up-property-taxes-with-unfunded-mandates/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Australia and Indonesia - A Strategic Partnership for Climate and Energy Resilience
WASHINGTON, April 14 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 13, 2026, by Australia Chair program manager John Auge and Japhet Quitzon, associate fellow with the Southeast Asia Program:* * *
Australia and Indonesia: A Strategic Partnership for Climate and Energy Resilience
Introduction
Climate change presents an existential challenge for the international community. Sea level rise and intensified storms stemming from climate change disproportionately affect coastal and archipelagic nations. Countries in the Association of Southeast Asian ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 14 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 13, 2026, by Australia Chair program manager John Auge and Japhet Quitzon, associate fellow with the Southeast Asia Program: * * * Australia and Indonesia: A Strategic Partnership for Climate and Energy Resilience Introduction Climate change presents an existential challenge for the international community. Sea level rise and intensified storms stemming from climate change disproportionately affect coastal and archipelagic nations. Countries in the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN) are on the frontlines of these impacts, at risk of suffering billions of dollars in damage, mass displacement, and loss of life. These countries seek to balance economic growth with addressing the ongoing climate crisis, which presents grave challenges to territorial integrity, economic stability, and public welfare.
With many countries in the region pursuing rapid industrialization, population and infrastructure needs have skyrocketed. Energy demand has surged, necessitating new investments in green energy as many Southeast Asian countries pursue ambitious zero-carbon goals by mid-century.
ASEAN nations' climate risks and energy needs are growing rapidly. This is especially evident in Indonesia, the fourth-most-populous country in the world. For countries like Indonesia, finding reliable partners is essential to sustaining economic gains while managing climate risk. Given regional concerns about the reliability of the United States, especially after the demise of the U.S. Agency for International Development, new actors are needed to fill the gap. China, which maintains strong economic relationships with the region, is well-positioned to do so, but it nets low levels of public trust. Chinese economic coercion is top of mind for many in the region. China's loose adherence to international rules and norms leaves many regional partners concerned about the downside risks of its growing role in regional development and trade.
To balance China's growing role in regional development financing, more champions for the rules-based international order should emerge. Australia is a natural partner in a prime position to help fill the development gap left by the United States. Australia's relationship with Indonesia--arguably its strongest in the region--offers an important case study for Canberra's expanded role. There are key opportunities in climate change mitigation and labor mobility that could deepen bilateral cooperation and help meet Indonesia's evolving needs, with significant implications for the region at large.
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Background
Australia benefits from positive perceptions throughout the region and has significant capacity for infrastructure assistance. Australia was the first dialogue partner for ASEAN in 1974 and is one of the bloc's key partners. Future partnerships in infrastructure development and migration coordination will become vital as climate change becomes more pressing.
Australia's deepening engagement with Southeast Asia during the administration of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has improved regional perceptions of its strategic importance. Indonesians, in particular, report growing trust and goodwill toward Australia--a 2021 Lowy Institute poll found that 55 percent of surveyed Indonesians trust Australia. The Albanese government made ASEAN centrality a core part of its foreign policy approach to the region, linking Australia's national security objectives with its development finance initiatives. Recognizing the importance of a prosperous ASEAN to Australia's own security and national objectives, the Albanese government appointed a special envoy for Southeast Asia, Nicholas Moore, to focus on improving trade and investment ties throughout the region.
Announced in November 2025 and signed in February 2026, Australia and Indonesia agreed to a treaty that would commit them to consult each other if either country is threatened. The agreement was shaped by the 1995 bilateral security agreement that was scrapped four years later due to an Australia-led United Nations peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste. Additionally, new initiatives to deepen defense cooperation were announced, including developing joint training facilities in Indonesia, offering to create a position for a senior Indonesian officer to work within the Australian Defence Force, and expanding programs that foster connections among emerging military leaders.
Australia leverages foreign aid as a critical tool of its engagement with partners in the region, yet it is not spreading its weight evenly. From 2008 to 2023, Australia spent $8 billion out of the $8.1 billion it committed to Southeast Asia. In contrast, it spent $21.1 billion out of the committed $23.1 billion on the Pacific Islands. Despite Australia's tight budget due to inflation, Australia should consider incrementally increasing development aid for Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, to bring its official development assistance (ODA) in the region more in line with that budgeted for the Pacific Islands.
Indonesia is Australia's closest partner in the region, making it an easily transposable case study for the region at large. Currently, Australia allocates a mere $225 million to Indonesia out of a total ODA budget of $1.8 billion. Southeast Asia overall is set to receive $596 million compared to the Pacific Islands' $1.1 billion in Australia's 2026 ODA budget.
Indonesia's Climate Challenges Today
Indonesia is experiencing significant impacts from climate change. The country has a population of about 287 million and has more than 17,500 islands. Much of the population lives in coastal cities susceptible to sea level rise and extreme weather events. Indonesia faced over 6,800 climate-related disasters from 2023 to 2024, affecting more than 13 million people. Jakarta, the nation's capital, was designated the most vulnerable city to environmental threats in the world. A series of disasters in late 2025, including floods, landslides, and a cyclone on the island of Sumatra, claimed more than 1,100 lives.
Microeconomic Outlook
Approximately 23.9 million Indonesians, or 8.5 percent of the population, live in poverty. In rural areas, the poverty rate hovers at 11.0 percent compared to 6.7 percent in urban areas. Remittances play an important role in the Indonesian economy, steadily increasing since the 1980s. Total remittances reached $16.0 billion in 2024, a significant increase from $9.4 billion in 2021. Currently, Indonesia and Australia facilitate six-month worker exchanges, and Australia allows up to 200 Indonesians to participate in six-month work training programs. The number of holiday and work visas available to Indonesians traveling to Australia will increase to 5,000 over the next six years, up from the current 1,000. With more Indonesians working abroad, the amount of remittances will only increase, stimulating local economies.
Macroeconomic Outlook
Indonesia receives major foreign aid contributions from its partners. Between 2015 and 2023, 85 development partners implemented 20,456 aid and development projects in Indonesia, equaling $100 billion in official development finance (ODA). During that same timespan, Australia committed and spent $4 billion on 1,300 projects in Indonesia. Australia's embassy in Indonesia outlines three objectives for its foreign aid: (1) "effective economic institutions and infrastructure," (2) "human development for a productive and healthy society," and (3) "an inclusive society through effective governance." Specific Australian initiatives have included a $300 million Eastern Indonesia National Road Improvement project, a $128 million Australia-Indonesia Partnership for HIV project, and a $60 million Empowering Indonesian Women for Poverty Reduction project.
Recommendations
Australia is already a key development partner for Indonesia, and there are ample opportunities to expand this partnership. About 75 cents of every dollar Australia spends on development assistance goes toward the government's Indo-Pacific initiatives. Australia could play a vital role in mitigating climate-related risk throughout Southeast Asia, boosting its regionwide reputation for reliability. It could contribute development assistance to a broad gamut of climate risk mitigation initiatives, such as extensive mangrove planting programs and energy grid upgrade assistance. The climate crisis has the potential to displace hundreds of thousands throughout Southeast Asia. Mass calamity and urban flight could overwhelm Australia's immigration system without adequate preparation. As such, assisting Southeast Asia with its climate initiatives should be of paramount importance to Australia. Three key opportunities could help expand the partnership between Australia and Indonesia, serving as a blueprint for assistance to the wider region:
Climate and Energy Resilience Aid
1. Australian development finance schemes should support and expand upon existing mangrove planting programs in Indonesia. Mangrove planting in Indonesia has already proven to be highly productive, improving fish and farm yields, while protecting coastal areas from intensifying storms wrought by climate change. The World Bank's Mangroves for Coastal Resilience project aims to rehabilitate 600,000 hectares of mangrove forests throughout Indonesia. Australian finance schemes could serve to build upon this model within Indonesia, where mangrove forest loss has exacerbated climate-related extreme weather events and flooding.
2. Australia should expand upon its existing commitment to ASEAN's energy transition by directly supporting grid upgrades and clean energy projects. The Australian government has already affirmed its commitment to the ASEAN Strategy for Carbon Neutrality and the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016-2025. It has also established new government-to-government programs aimed at improving regional capacity and expertise. The Australia-Indonesia Climate and Infrastructure Partnership (KINETIK) earmarks A$200 million from 2022 to 2027 to encourage investment in Indonesia's clean energy projects, unlocking finance for small and medium-sized climate enterprises within the country through the Private Infrastructure Development Group. These investments, though prudent and timely, are not sufficient to help Indonesia meet its 2060 net-zero goals. Increased investment in these sectors would help reduce the frequency of power outages across the country. Australia has an opportunity to lead the way in encouraging international development finance and investment to Indonesia and its neighbors. A gradual increase in Australian development assistance for Southeast Asia to approach parity with Australia's efforts in the Pacific Islands could go a long way in bolstering critical infrastructure and energy assistance projects.
Labor Mobility
3. Australia should add Indonesia to its Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) scheme. Under PALM, Australian companies can hire workers from nine Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste for short-term roles of up to nine months and longer-term roles of up to four years. In January 2026, 31,970 PALM scheme workers were employed by 533 employers, with 56 percent in agriculture, 36 percent in meat processing, and the remainder in other industries. With this addition, Australian companies would be allowed to hire Indonesians as well. The addition of Indonesia, a Southeast Asian country, would not be unprecedented, as Timor-Leste also sends workers to Australia under this scheme. Given Indonesia's large population, beginning with 6,000 PALM workers going to Australia is an appropriate starting point. This initiative would allow Indonesians to not only develop their skills but also send remittances back to their families, increasing the quality of life for recipients as well as decreasing the number of job vacancies in Australia. Given that Indonesia's President Prabowo Subianto stated his top priority while in office is the quality of life of Indonesians, the addition of Indonesia to the PALM scheme would likely be welcomed.
Conclusion and Regional Implications
Climate resilience needs vary significantly across Southeast Asian countries. The 11 countries of ASEAN all face different developmental challenges owing to geography, culture, and domestic politics. Southeast Asia is not a monolith, and Australian success in Indonesia does not guarantee that its approach can be easily grafted to other countries. But, incrementally increasing its economic and development aid outreach throughout Southeast Asia would paint an important picture for a region wary of abandonment--that Australia, and the rules-based international order it continues to represent, is here to stay.
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John Auge is the program manager for the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Japhet Quitzon is an associate fellow with the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/australia-and-indonesia-strategic-partnership-climate-and-energy-resilience
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary to Blue Blaze: Why Didn't Iran Use Terrorism
WASHINGTON, April 14 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 12, 2026, by Daniel Byman, director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, to Blue Blaze:* * *
Why Didn't Iran Use Terrorism
Five Possible Explanations
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The United States has long described Iran as "the leading state sponsor of terrorism," using both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, the rare state entity the United States has designated as a terrorist group) and an array of terrorist groups, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 14 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 12, 2026, by Daniel Byman, director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program, to Blue Blaze: * * * Why Didn't Iran Use Terrorism Five Possible Explanations * The United States has long described Iran as "the leading state sponsor of terrorism," using both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, the rare state entity the United States has designated as a terrorist group) and an array of terrorist groups, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthisin Yemen, as proxies. Iran and Iranian-backed proxies have conducted or attempted attacks in Argentina, Bahrain, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United States, and other countries. This history spans decades and includes both spectacular international attacks and more limited operations designed to signal resolve without triggering full-scale war.
Given this track record, it would be reasonable to think that Iran would use terrorism in its 2026 war with Israel and the United States, both of which declared "regime change" as one of their goals--a truly existential threat to Iran's leaders. Yet, so far at least, Iran has not used terrorism even though it has launched rocket, missile, and drone attacks on civilian as well as military targets in the region and closed the Strait of Hormuz.
What explains this surprising lack of terrorism? It's difficult to know why something didn'thappen, but here I offer four nonexclusive possibilities. Each points to a different constraint on Iranian decisionmaking, ranging from operational limits to strategic restraint.
Perhaps the simplest explanation is the best: Iran did not conduct terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies because it was not able to do so. The Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iran, especially the assassination campaign that killed over 250 senior Iranian political and military leaders, demonstrated a remarkable intelligence penetration of Iran. Although the intelligence required to target leaders differs from that necessary to disrupt operations, it is plausible that some of the techniques that led to the assassinations also revealed information on terrorist operations, allowing for disruption. Equally important, Iran itself was probably running scared, believing that its operations and networks might be penetrated even if they were not. It is also likely that the assassination campaign disrupted command and control, making it difficult to organize and direct operations while also hiding from U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. In this sense, the absence of terrorism may reflect not restraint but temporary incapacity--an intelligence-driven suppression of Iran's external networks at a critical moment.
A second possibility is that Iran feared escalation and retaliation from the United States and Israel. That may seem an odd fear given the firepower unleashed in Operations Epic Fury and Lion's Roar (the Israeli equivalent). The United States, however, could easily have inflicted more damage on Iran. Trump was already promising to unleash destruction on a "whole civilization" and target power plants and bridges, and the United States was also sending ground forces to the Gulf region. Terrorism, particularly against the U.S. homeland or high-profile civilian targets, risked transforming a limited war into a far broader and more existential conflict for the Iranian regime.
A related third possibility is the risk of blowback for Iran. The Iran war was unpopular in the United States, but a terrorist attack could bolster support, creating a casus belliwhere one was previously lacking. The conflict was even less popular in Europe and Asia, but terrorist attacks there might increase hostility toward Iran and thus support for U.S. and Israeli attacks. Rather than dividing Iran's adversaries, terrorism might unify them--strengthening political will, legitimizing escalation, and undermining Tehran's efforts to portray itself as a victim of aggression.
The fourth possibility is the most grim--that such attacks are in the pipeline but just haven't happened yet. Revenge, like ice cream, is best served cold. Iran waited over a year to begin a plot to kill former National Security Adviser John Bolton because of his role in the U.S. assassination of IRGC Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani. That U.S. violence pales by comparison to the scale of the 2026 killings, including the assassination of Iran's supreme leader, intelligence chief, head of the IRGC, and many others. Iran may simply be looking for the right opportunity to exact revenge, perhaps waiting until the conflict is completely over and the risk of escalation is lower.
A fifth possibility is that Iranian leaders believe that they do not need to use terrorism because their current response has succeeded. Drone strikes, missile attacks, shipping disruption, and proxy warfare have already allowed Tehran to impose costs and create an effective deterrent for the resumption of the war. In this context, terrorism may have been redundant--offering limited additional leverage while carrying disproportionate risks.
Taken together, these explanations suggest that Iran's restraint is contingent rather than permanent. Whether due to capability constraints, strategic caution, or timing, the underlying logic that has long driven Iran's use of terrorism may simply be dormant--for now.
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Daniel Byman is the director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-didnt-iran-use-terrorism
[Category: ThinkTank]