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Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Rectifying Minnesota's Low Test Scores and High Graduation Rates
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 11 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 10, 2026, by policy fellow Josiah Padley:* * *
Rectifying Minnesota's low test scores and high graduation rates
How can we make sure that a diploma isn't just a piece of paper?
Last week, my colleague Catrin Wigfall wrote about Minnesota's 2025 graduation rate (highest on record at 84.9 percent) and the Class of 2025's correspondingly record-breaking poor academic readiness. She wrote:
"Even ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 11 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 10, 2026, by policy fellow Josiah Padley: * * * Rectifying Minnesota's low test scores and high graduation rates How can we make sure that a diploma isn't just a piece of paper? Last week, my colleague Catrin Wigfall wrote about Minnesota's 2025 graduation rate (highest on record at 84.9 percent) and the Class of 2025's correspondingly record-breaking poor academic readiness. She wrote: "Evenas graduation rates climb, academic performance is moving in the opposite direction. In math and reading, Minnesota high school students are performing at the lowest levels ever recorded for a graduating class. It's a tale of two stats: a record-high graduation rate paired with declining academic readiness."
[View chart in the link at bottom.]
The combination of Minnesota's high graduation rate and low test scores raises many questions. Why is the mismatch occurring? Is this something to be concerned about? How can we rectify the situation?
In an ideal world, both proficiency and graduation rates would be the same rate: 100 percent.
However, when there is such a strong disparity between students' actual knowledge (as measured by the state test) and their graduation rates, it's clear that the relationship between the two is so weak as to be functionally disconnected at many levels. Unfortunately, Minnesota isn't the only state in the nation struggling with this dynamic; many states are facing significant grade inflation issues.
Since most employment opportunities require a high school diploma, educators understandably endeavor to help as many students cross the stage as possible. However, a student's career and academic success is also dependent on the formation received while in the classroom. No matter what a student's life path might be, it's important that they master high-school level mathematics and reading before their graduation. A diploma must be a prize earned, not a gift bestowed.
The weakening of a high school diploma has negative social ripple effects. Former Assistant Secretary of Education Chester Finn has remarked that there are significant
"[C]osts of low-standard diplomas. Besides the divergence between grad rates and achievement levels, setting a low bar carries huge negatives both for "graduates" and for the country. It'll push more kids into college who don't belong there and worsen credential inflation as employers seek alternate proof of true competence. It'll degrade colleges, too, making them more remedial, forcing them--because they need students, graduates, alumni--to ease their own standards. It's bad for the economy. It's bad for international competitiveness. The U.S. will do even worse on PISA. And so much more."
Policymakers should consider ways to achieve these two essential and complementary goals: high levels of actual educational attainment and high graduation rates.
To this end, I suggest three possible structural changes to Minnesota's school system that could close this gap between actual learning and diploma attainment:
First, policymakers should consider returning an updated version of the Minnesota Graduation Required Assessment for Diploma (GRAD) exit exam, which was jettisoned in 2013. While exit exams have fallen out of fashion nationally, the concept might be due for a refresh, not a continued rejection. Exit exams should be one key component (not a cornerstone) of a highly functional state education program. The mere presence of a graduation requirement can kickstart the entire system, pushing educators, parents, and students towards achievement. A refreshed Minnesota exit exam could include realistic academic standards, several retake opportunities, and exceptions for students with IEPs. Most importantly, it would stand as a barrier between a student and a useless diploma gained by "failing upwards".
Interestingly, high school exit exams have positive effects on students in expected ways. When high school graduation requirements are made more demanding through the implementation of exit exams, local arrests decrease.
Second, systemic guards against grade inflation should be implemented. When a student attains a passing GPA despite a despairingly low level of actual knowledge, the problem lies with a system that accepts brokenness. Strong structural incentives have created a grade-ballooning environment in both K-12 and collegiate classrooms. Nationally, about eight in ten students currently receive a B average or higher. This dynamic sidelines parents that incorrectly assume their children are doing well, disempowers students that need to understand the relationship between effort and results, and smothers honest conversation about how to help struggling students. Minnesota's students deserve more than staying in lockstep beside disheartening national norms.
There are many potential avenues for grade inflation reform. For example, external checks on grades, like end-of-course exams, can be incredibly helpful. Transparent final report cards are essential; even if classroom grades remain inflated, printing a child's standardized test results alongside their grade level proficiency can clue parents in. Most parents (74 percent) who know that their child is performing below grade level in math are likely to schedule meetings with their child's teacher for personalized advice. Additionally, Minnesota's districts should avoid faddish, potentially inflationary grading reform schemes such as equity-based grading, which can be disastrous if not implemented thoughtfully.
Finally, creative overhauls of the entire diploma system might be in order. The current academic system is largely geared towards college readiness, with mandatory courses often selected with future college attendance in mind. Minnesota, like many states, ostensibly aims to prepare graduates for both postsecondary education and highly skilled work. But it's difficult, if not impossible, to do both. One 2018 study found that a high majority of states (including Minnesota) had not achieved full or partial alignment between their high school diploma requirements and the minimum admissions criteria for higher education admittance in their state.
If students have different interests and life pathways, one inflexible diploma pathway will not adequately encompass how a rigorous education might differ between students. Almost half of America's states offer multiple pathways to graduation. Some states, like Louisiana, have addressed this issue by providing students in tenth grade with a choice to either attain a university pathway diploma or a technical pathway diploma. Others, like New York, Ohio, and Texas) have "honors" diplomas, designed for students that plan to attend a university. For Minnesota, bifurcating diplomas into a career and a collegiate pathway (like Louisiana) seems both effective and elegant. Especially as a first reform step, two diploma pathways would be more than enough; some states have found that adding too many pathways leads to confusion.
However, Minnesota cannot and will not implement any of these reforms until honest conversations are had. Too many well-meaning school leaders dismiss the low state assessment results as one data point out of many and laud the high graduation rates as definitive achievements. Yes, Minnesotans should celebrate the attainment of a high school diploma -- but they can't allow their excitement to overshadow the task of ensuring that the diploma is meaningful. Students depend too much on their schools for system leaders to eschew seriousness about real learning.
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Josiah Padley is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
josiah.padley@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/rectifying-minnesotas-low-test-scores-and-high-graduation-rates/
[Category: ThinkTank]
TechFreedom: 'Breaking Down' the FCC's Assembly Line Model for Satellite Licensing
WASHINGTON, April 10 (TNSrpt) -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release on April 9, 2026:* * *
"Breaking Down" the FCC's Assembly Line Model for Satellite Licensing
Yesterday, TechFreedom published a new paper (https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/TechFreedom-Paper-Assembly-Line-Breaks-Down.pdf) exploring the developing conflict between the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) desire to create an "assembly line" for processing satellite applications and the reality of deploying megaconstellations.
"Creating an efficient assembly line ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 10 (TNSrpt) -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release on April 9, 2026: * * * "Breaking Down" the FCC's Assembly Line Model for Satellite Licensing Yesterday, TechFreedom published a new paper (https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/TechFreedom-Paper-Assembly-Line-Breaks-Down.pdf) exploring the developing conflict between the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) desire to create an "assembly line" for processing satellite applications and the reality of deploying megaconstellations. "Creating an efficient assembly linefor satellite applications will be challenging," said James E. Dunstan, TechFreedom's Senior Counsel. "Like Henry Ford's assembly line, satellite deployment would require every step--design, manufacturing, licensing, launch--to be meticulously coordinated. But even on a perfect assembly line, the process fails if products start to pile up because of an inability to deliver. Without firm rules requiring deployment, the FCC's assembly line process will be choked by paper applications for hundreds of thousands--or even millions--of satellites that can't possibly be deployed."
"Megaconstellations present a situation that could crush the assembly line," warned Dunstan. "As constellation sizes grow, potentially up to a million satellites, the ability to deploy half of the constellation within the six-year milestone window of the Commission's rules will be impossible. In all likelihood, megaconstellation license holders will have to go back to the FCC to seek a waiver of the interim deployment rule, requiring 50% of the satellites to be launched within six years after license grant."
"There are several solutions the Commission should consider," Dunstan concluded. "The least desirable path would be to maintain the status quo--either freezing constellation sizes to those satellites launched at the end of six years or continuing to grant extensions. The Commission could also consider just scrapping the deployment milestones, but that would completely defeat the purpose of deterring unrealistic applications. Finally, the Commission should study a 'cap and defer' option, whereby licenses are modified to cap the number of satellites at those deployed during the first six years, and deferring all undeployed satellites to a later processing round. But something must be done before the processing line breaks down."
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Find this paper, "When the Assembly Line Breaks Down: Reassessing FCC Licensing of Next-Generation Satellite Systems" on our website, and share it on Twitter and Bluesky. We can be reached for comment at media@techfreedom.org. Read our related work, including:
* Comments to the Office of Commercial Space (OSC) on its framework to establish a "Mission Authorization" regulatory regime for innovative space activities (Mar. 13, 2026)
* Comments on the NPRM to modernize the FCC's space and earth station licensing process (Jan. 20, 2026)
* Comments to the European Commission regarding the EU's Draft Space Act (Nov. 7, 2025)
* Comments to the Dept of Commerce on the Draft EU Space Act (Aug. 15, 2025)
* We need a National Space Council to chart our future in outer space, SpaceNews (Jan. 23, 2025)
* Comments on the mitigation of orbital debris in the new space age, (June 27, 2024)
* Comments on NASA's Lunar Non-Interference Questionnaire, (June 7, 2024)
* Comments to the FCC on In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM) (Apr. 29, 2024)
* Do We Still Have the Right Stuff?, City Journal (Dec. 2023)
* SpaceX Makes Progress on Second Test of Starship, Reason (Nov. 18, 2023)
* Tech Policy Podcast #349: The State of Space Exploration (July 25, 2023)
* Regulating the space economy is vital for America's continued global leadership, Washington Examiner (July 15, 2023)
* Written testimony before the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology on U.S. leadership in commercial space (July 13, 2023)
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About TechFreedom: TechFreedom is a nonprofit, nonpartisan technology policy think tank. We work to chart a path forward for policymakers towards a bright future where technology enhances freedom, and freedom enhances technology.
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REPORT: https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/TechFreedom-Paper-Assembly-Line-Breaks-Down.pdf
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Original text here: https://techfreedom.org/breaking-down-the-fccs-assembly-line-model-for-satellite-licensing/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Ukrainian Military Offers Lessons Learned to NATO (Part One)
WASHINGTON, April 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 9, 2026, by Taras Kuzio, professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Ukrainian Military Offers Lessons Learned to NATO (Part One)
Executive Summary:
* In March, a senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military delegation led by Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation Admiral Pierre Vandier visited Kyiv, highlighting a new phase of military cooperation ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 9, 2026, by Taras Kuzio, professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Ukrainian Military Offers Lessons Learned to NATO (Part One) Executive Summary: * In March, a senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military delegation led by Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation Admiral Pierre Vandier visited Kyiv, highlighting a new phase of military cooperationbetween Ukraine and the alliance.
* Ukraine is gaining the status of a military innovator as Kyiv heads its own military training, increases success on the frontlines, expands medium and long-range missile attacks against Russia, targets Russian energy infrastructure, and receives urgent demand from Europe and the Gulf states for its military technology.
* Battlefield-tested drone tactics, advanced command-and-control systems, and a rapidly expanding private defense sector have made Ukraine one of the world's leading laboratories for modern warfare, positioning it as a future hub for Western military innovation.
The first visit of a senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military team to Kyiv, led by Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation Admiral Pierre Vandier, took place on March 22 (Facebook/Pavlo.Palisa; Ukrainska Pravda, March 22). During the visit, Vandier said that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine proved that Europe cannot sustain industrial-scale war. Ammunition is being consumed faster than it can be produced, and European stockpiles, industry, and planning were built for limited operations, not prolonged, high-intensity conflict. Ukraine is expected to produce nearly 10 million drones this year. NATO must similarly shift to mass drone production at scale, where affordability and the ability to ramp up production matter as much as the technological advancement of systems. Vandier believes there is an urgent need for NATO members to increase their air defenses because large-scale modern warfare, as seen in Russia's war against Ukraine and the conflict in and around Iran, involves strikes on energy infrastructure, data centers, and logistics nodes in addition to conventional military targets.
The visit reflects Ukraine's unique military experience and expertise, and occurred as Ukraine begins to lead its own military training; increases success on the frontlines; expands medium- and long-range missile attacks against Russia; targets Russian energy infrastructure; and receives urgent demand for its military technology from the Gulf states and U.S. investors. The NATO team that visited Kyiv in March discussed Ukraine's increased participation in NATO exercises as a hypothetical enemy, or "Red Team." Operations conducted by the NATO-Ukraine Joint Training Center (JATEC), which opened in 2025, will be expanded.
Ukraine "defeated" NATO forces in the May 2025 "Hedgehog-25" exercise in Estonia (Militarnyy, February 13). Four Ukrainian combat veterans from the Nemesis brigade taught 13 NATO armies how drone warfare works. NATO forces in the exercise parked their armored vehicles "as if on a parking lot," concealed equipment in forests, assuming they would remain concealed--they were not--and did not check roads for mines, which Ukrainian drones had earlier mined. NATO officers sent runners with paper maps to deliver coordinates to the Ukrainians. After the fourth delivery, the Ukrainians refused to accept further paper maps and showed NATO armies how to use the Ukrainian Delta communications system. Over three days, the Ukrainians launched 29 drone flights, which "destroyed" seven armored personnel carriers, one tank, three cars, two command posts, and one bridge (Oboronka, February 28). One NATO commander observing "Hedgehog-25" reportedly reacted with "We are f--ed" (Euromaidan Press, February 13).
Over the course of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO has shifted from training the Ukrainian military to receiving training from Ukrainian forces. NATO members who led sessions for Ukrainian troops primarily have experience with counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO member countries have not fought a full-scale war against a major industrial military since World War II and the Korean and, debatably, Vietnam wars.
Two years ago, then Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said, "Europe does not know how to fight wars" (Kyiv Independent, December 27, 2023). In August 2025, Colonel Markus Reisner, head of the Officer Training Institute at Austria's Theresian Military Academy, said that the European defense industry has produced nothing comparable to Ukraine's FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile since 2022 (Euromaidan Press, August 22, 2025). Former Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhnyy, currently Ukrainian ambassador to the United Kingdom, claims that only three countries are prepared for large-scale modern warfare--pro-Western Ukraine and anti-Western Russia and Iran (Telegraph, March 21).
Western military instructors lack experience in full-scale 21st-century combat against a major military power. Latvia adopted Ukrainian military experience into its training at its annual joint multinational exercises in January, where "For the first time in the history of these exercises, the program was entirely based on presentations" by Ukraine's Azov 12th Special Forces Brigade (Facebook/Azov 12th Special Forces Brigade, February 9; Euromaidan Press, February 10). Ukrainian military specialists also advised Nordic forces in the September 2025 joint "Wings of Defense" counter-drone exercises in Denmark (Kyiv Independent, September 30, 2025).
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy noted that Poland, NATO's highest military spender as a share of its gross domestic product, could only shoot down four out of 19 drones during Russia's September 2025 incursion (Ukrainska Pravda, September 16, 2025). In the first few days of the current Iran conflict, the United States and its Gulf allies used nearly 1,000 Patriot interceptor missiles, which cost approximately $3-4 million each, against Iranian Shahed drones, which cost $20,000-$50,000 each. In four years of war, Ukraine has received only 600 Patriot interceptor missiles. Ukraine has signed defense contracts with three Gulf states and Jordan to supply Ukrainian anti-drone interceptors, which cost $1,000-3,000 each. Two further contracts are currently being negotiated.
With a shortage of Patriot missiles, Firepoint, Ukraine's producer of Flamingo missiles and drones, is cooperating with European countries to produce a low cost air defense system against missiles to rival the U.S. Patriot system by 2027 (Kyiv Post, April 6). Now-retired U.S. general Christopher G. Cavoli said, "Ukrainians are even better at using the Patriot than the Americans. In my opinion, this is a true success story. Frankly, at first, I was a little skeptical that Ukrainians would be able to master the Patriot quickly. Now we're learning from the Ukrainians" (X/@UkrReview, March 26).
Some analysts have argued that Ukraine has gained the upper hand in the attritional war with Russia since late 2025. Ukraine's success on the battlefield is becoming recognized by NATO and the Gulf states. As of late March, Ukraine had been killing Russian soldiers at a faster rate than the Kremlin's recruitment. Russian President Vladimir Putin is fearful that moving from voluntary recruitment to mobilization would be politically destabilizing (see EDM, November 5, 2025, March 19). Ukraine has increased the volume of its drone attacks and changed to targeting soldiers rather than military equipment. Ukraine's top drone commander, "Madyar" Brovdi, claims that one Ukrainian can kill 400 Russians using unmanned systems for just $878 per kill in materials (Economist, March 22). Throughout the war, Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded at more than twice the rate of Ukrainian soldiers (Ukrainska Pravda, January 28). In March, Ukraine killed or wounded over 6,000 Russian troops in only four days (Ukrainska Pravda, March 23). In March, Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps reported halting Russia's biggest mechanized push, killing 405 Russian troops and destroying a large amount of military equipment (Telegram/@shturmmotherf--er, March 20).
Ukraine's recent battlefield gains have been facilitated by the denial of Starlink access to Russia and Putin's decision to ban the Telegram social media app in Russia (see EDM, February 10, March 19). Both steps have empowered Ukraine's military and security forces and undermined Russian military communications. In August 2024, during Ukraine's military intervention into Russia's Kursk oblast, Kyiv pioneered the combination of electronic warfare to disable Russian drones and the deployment of swarms of drones to target Russian forces, followed by ground forces moving in and securing territory. In the past three months, Ukrainian forces have recaptured most of Dnipropetrovsk oblast from Russia and retaken lost territory in Zaporizhzhia oblast. In Kharkiv oblast, fighting continues without major Russian gains, with the liberation of Kupiansk. Ukrainian forces are preventing significant Russian advances in Donetsk oblast. Russia's 2026 offensive has been slowed along the long front line--this year's Ukrainian counteroffensive has yielded Kyiv its largest territorial gains since 2023.
Since late 2025, Ukraine has expanded medium and long-range drone and missile attacks against Russian forces. Ukraine is targeting Russian staging areas and military bases, repair facilities, military factories and warehouses, air defense (accounting for half the attacks), Black Sea Fleet vessels, aircraft, helicopters, and energy facilities. Ukraine is destroying more Russian air defense than it can build, and their destruction opens the path to subsequent attacks against other military targets. Ukraine is using domestically produced drones BULAVA (built by Doviro) and RAM-2X (built by a consortium including Doviro, CDET, Ukrainian Armor, UDI, and SpetsTechnoEksport) that have smaller payloads and are decimating Russian air defense systems, including Buk, Tor, Strela, and ZU-23. Ukraine's longer-range RUBALKA (its producer is classified) and FP-2 (built by Firepoint) have larger payloads (Doviro, accessed April 9). These strikes have long been conducted by Ukrainian military intelligence (HRU). Now, they are also being directed by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operation Forces, and Unmanned Systems Forces (Ukrainska Pravda, March 22).
Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure are having a greater impact than Western sanctions, particularly after the United States eased sanctions on Russia following its conflict with Iran. Ukraine is attacking energy facilities thousands of miles inside Russia, along with Russian shadow fleet tankers in the Mediterranean Sea and from bases in Libya (Euromaidan Press, April 3). Russian oil exports through Baltic Sea ports have been completely halted after daily waves of Ukrainian drone strikes on the Leningrad oblast closed the Russian Baltic ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga (The Moscow Times, March 31; Ukrainska Pravda, April 2).
Ukrainian military technology is in high demand on Wall Street and urgently in demand by the Gulf states in the U.S. conflict with Iran (see EDM, April 1). Swarmer, the first Ukrainian defense company to be listed on Wall Street, had an IPO value of $67 million and had a market cap of $670 million after trading was opened, with initially priced shares of $5 closing at $31 (Kyiv Independent, March 21). Deborah Fairlamb, a founding partner of Green Flag VC, a venture fund focused on Ukrainian defense companies and one of Swarmer's earliest investors, said the listing "broke a barrier for the American investor, recognizing and understanding and having access to the talent of Ukrainian defense tech." She added that Ukrainian defense startups "have the capability to take their tech globally, that there is interest, and that this now sort of sets a path for others in the market to emulate" (Kyiv Independent, March 21). Nicolas Owens, a defense sector analyst, said that Swarmer's growth in value is "evidence of investors' strong appetite for stocks or opportunities in this area" (Kyiv Independent, March 21).
Ukraine has sent 201 military experts to the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to assist in countering Iranian attacks, with another 34 experts available for deployment (The Tribune, March 18). Zelenskyy said Ukraine produces 2,000 interceptors per day and only requires half of them to counter Russia's daily drone attacks. Ukraine's production could be increased if funding is made available (Radio Svoboda, April 6).
Ukrainian drone interceptors cost between $1,000 and $3,000 and are more economical than Patriot interceptors, which cost $3-4 million each. Ten Ukrainian companies produce drone interceptors which include the STRILA (produced by WIY), STING (Wild Hornets), OCTOPUS (Ukrspetsystems), P1-SUN (SkyFall) and BAYONET (Tenebris) with a range of up to 30 miles, carrying 0.5-1 kilogram (1.1-2.2 pounds) payloads, using artificial intelligence (AI)--which means they cannot be jammed as they do not use GPS--and flying at speeds of up to 250 miles per hour (Euromaidan Press, November 14, 2025). The new JEDI interceptor (Wild Hornets) is also AI-guided to targets but carries a heavier 4-kilogram (8.8-pound) payload and flies at a similar speed of 200 miles per hour.
Ukraine has reached this stage because of the legacy of its Soviet military-industrial complex, a large number of technology specialists, and its development in a fundamentally different way from Russia since its independence in 1991. For example, the first computer in Europe was invented in Kyiv in 1951. The Institute of Cybernetics within the Soviet Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was launched in 1957. The first Encyclopedia of Cybernetics (Encyklopediyi kibernetyky) in the world was published in Kyiv in 1973 (Istorychna Pravda, February 7, 2011). The Ukrainian information technology sector is valued at over $7.8 billion (Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, April 7).
The war is being fought between Ukraine--whose democratic society is constructed horizontally, allowing for the flourishing of a competitive private defense sector, volunteer groups, and amicable society-business-government relations--and Russia, whose regime is built vertically and where the defense sector remains, as in the Soviet Union, state-controlled. Putin is fearful of losing control, as seen in his banning of social media. The Telegram ban has negatively affected the already low level of volunteer recruitment for the Russian army (see EDM, March 19, April 2).
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has mobilized within the country and abroad an army of hundreds of thousands of software developers and engineers who assist the development of military technology and undertake cyber warfare. Competing ideas developed by programmers are sent to tech labs, incorporated into prototypes for the Ministry of Defense, and then tested on the battlefield in a rapid turnaround, which NATO planners are closely studying.
Ukraine's Delta communication system has been praised by NATO (Ukrainska Pravda, July 14, 2024). NATO armies have no equivalent and are plagued by secrecy between branches of the armed forces and between member states' commands. As seen in the "Hedgehog-25" exercise in Estonia, Delta provides Ukrainian armed forces with a real-time display of air, land, and sea conditions on digital maps. Ukrainian forces can communicate with one another securely through Delta's messenger, which allows for the sharing of intelligence within and outside brigades.
Zelenskyy's goal is for Ukraine to become a hub for the development of military technology in the West. Minister of Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin said he was "focusing on making Ukraine the arsenal of the free world" (Ministry of Strategic Industries, July 28, 2023). The investments of many European countries in Ukraine's defense sector and the proliferation of joint military ventures are assisting Kamyshyn's goal.
Ukraine's new defense sector no longer resembles the Soviet military-industrial complex. It is dominated by the private sector with small defense start-ups brought together in the Brave 1 platform, which Kyiv founded in April 2023 to promote competition and innovation. In March, NATO and Brave 1 launched the first joint innovation program between Ukraine and NATO to bring together defense companies to build solutions tested in war, such as countering drones, strengthening SIGINT and electronic warfare, and autonomous targeting systems (Brave 1 Unite-Brave NATO, March 26). Joint ventures that bring together Western and Ukrainian defense companies are proliferating. In contrast, Russia retains its Soviet era state-controlled military industrial complex, with joint ventures only established with authoritarian Iran, the People's Republic of China, and North Korea.
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Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and an associate research fellow at the London-based think tank, the Henry Jackson Society.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/ukrainian-military-offers-lessons-learned-to-nato-part-one/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Weapons Systems Failures May Have Led to Personnel Removals
WASHINGTON, April 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 9, 2026, by China Brief Deputy Editor Shijie Wang:* * *
Weapons Systems Failures May Have Led to Personnel Removals
Executive Summary:
* The Iran war has exposed a widening gap between Beijing's claims of military-technological superiority and the apparent battlefield performance of air defense and counter-drone warfare systems linked to the People's Republic of China (PRC).
* PRC state media has amplified Iranian disinformation and shifted attention to supposed U.S. strategic weaknesses, rather than ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 9, 2026, by China Brief Deputy Editor Shijie Wang: * * * Weapons Systems Failures May Have Led to Personnel Removals Executive Summary: * The Iran war has exposed a widening gap between Beijing's claims of military-technological superiority and the apparent battlefield performance of air defense and counter-drone warfare systems linked to the People's Republic of China (PRC). * PRC state media has amplified Iranian disinformation and shifted attention to supposed U.S. strategic weaknesses, rather thanconfront failures in Iran's air-defense response to U.S. and Israeli strikes.
* The unexplained removal of multiple defense-linked academicians from the rosters of top scientific institutions has fueled suspicion that failures in overseas battlefield performance may be intersecting with deeper problems of accountability and effectiveness in the PRC defense-industrial system.
On April 5-6, state media in the People's Republic of China (PRC) reported that the second crew member from a U.S. F-15E shot down over Iran had been rescued, but only after what Xinhua described as a U.S. mission that nearly suffered "catastrophic losses" (Xinhua, April 6). The story allowed Beijing to imply that Iran's air defenses were still capable of exacting a price, continuing a tendency in official discourse to amplify isolated Iranian successes rather than confront what the broader collapse of Iran's air-defense network may reveal about the battlefield credibility of PRC-linked military technology./[1]
State Media Amplifies Iranian Disinformation
At the start of the war in early March, PRC outlets did not report at all on Iranian losses of air-defense radars, choosing instead to cite content from Iranian official and pro-regime information channels. This included social-media-amplified claims stating that U.S. radar sites in Gulf states had been devastated by Iranian missiles and Shahed drones (CCTV, March 2, March 9; Xinhua, March 10, March 24)./[2] A typical example came on February 28. Citing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Xinhua claimed that a U.S. radar in Qatar, used to track ballistic missiles and with a detection range of 5,000 kilometers, had been "completely destroyed" (Xinhua, February 28). But the accompanying images were plainly AI-generated (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Example of AI-Generated Disinformation Spread by Pro-Islamic Republic Social Media Accounts
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As the war progressed, Beijing repeatedly cited claims from Tehran that U.S. aircraft had been shot down or damaged--most of them disinformation--as if Iran's air-defense network were still exerting a meaningful deterrent effect on U.S. airpower (Xinhua, March 28, April 3). Even when Iran did genuinely bring down an F-15E aircraft, some influential civilian military and political commentators with ties to Beijing even circulated exaggerated footage from video game Arma 3 as if it were real video of a U.S. aircraft being shot down (Weibo/@Simapingbang, April 4).
As U.S. and Israeli tactical successes belied Iran's claimed battlefield achievements, Beijing shifted attention to what it portrayed as America's looming strategic failure in the face of a possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In a series of reports, Beijing emphasized that the United States had failed to achieve its war aims and was instead facing a dilemma of being eager to extricate itself from the conflict but unwilling to escalate. Xinhua cited PRC scholars as saying that "not a single U.S. war objective has been achieved", arguing that Washington's simultaneous push for a ceasefire and continued troop deployments suggested it "has not made the strategic decision" (Xinhua, March 27). Reporting repeatedly magnified the strategic pressure posed by the Strait of Hormuz, warning that the United States could once again "sink into a war quagmire" if it attempted coastal assaults or limited ground operations to reopen the waterway (Xinhua, March 27; Qilu Evening News, March 28).
Weapons Experts Removed From Academy Websites
Apparent personnel changes at leading defense research institutions suggest that Beijing's public information strategy is in part an attempt to deflect from the tactical success of U.S. and Israeli strikes carried out by weapons platforms it regards as outdated. Such an admission would cast doubt on its self-image of a pioneer of cutting-edge technology and the broad narrative of "the East is rising, the West is declining" (Xinhua, June 30, 2023).
The website of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) recently removed three names from its "List of Academicians". Although the individual profile pages of Wu Manqing, Wei Yiyin, and Zhao Xiangeng remain accessible, their names no longer appear among the 988 members on the public roster (CAE, accessed March 23). Earlier reporting on Wu described him as an "expert with outstanding contributions to the national defense science and technology industry sector", noting that he had "independently developed digital array technology and driven continuous innovation in radar system design" (Global Times, June 13, 2022). The other two are likewise specialists from the defense-industrial sector.
According to the CAE's charter, academician status is a lifetime honor and may be revoked only under three circumstances: serious academic misconduct, conviction for a criminal offense, or voluntary relinquishment at the individual's request (CAE, accessed March 23). Authorities have not explained why the qualifications of these three academicians were withdrawn, but public speculation has increasingly linked the change to the overseas battlefield performance of PRC platforms (Mnews, March 19).
The Chinese Academy of Sciences similarly removed two academicians from its roster, again without any official explanation (Zaobao, March 20). Liu Guozhi, an expert in high-power microwave technology, and Liu Wei, chief designer of the J-20 fighter, were both defense experts. Of the two, Liu Guozhi's field is more directly relevant to the export of the advanced weapons Beijing claims to possess. At last year's September 3 military parade, Beijing prominently declared that weapons based on high-power microwave technology constituted one of the "powerful three iron pillars" of counter-drone warfare, alongside counter-drone gun-and-missile systems and high-energy laser weapons (Xinhua, September 3, 2025).
The only PRC-exported counter-drone system publicly confirmed to have reached Iran is the Shen Nong Shield 3000 high-energy laser weapon, though the country may also have acquired a high-power microwave counter-drone weapon. A leaked product brochure by defense giant Norinco at the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow stated that such a system had been approved for export (see Figure 2) (TWZ, October 7, 2024). The buyer was not disclosed, but some within PRC military enthusiast communities have speculated that if high-energy laser weapons were exported to Iran to counter Israeli drones, then this high-power microwave weapon was highly likely to have been exported to Iran too (Sohu Blog/@Dizhang Tanbing, October 15, 2024)./[3] The IRGC, with its penchant for exaggeration, is unlikely to have remained quiet if it had successfully deployed PRC-exported counter-drone systems. The fact that it did not claim to have downed U.S. and Israeli drones until April 5 could indicate deficiencies in the equipment at its disposal (Reuters, April 5). In that context, Liu Guozhi's apparent removal has likewise fueled suspicion about the effectiveness of PRC counter-drone platforms.
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Figure 2. Leaked Page of Product Brochure for a High-Power Microwave Counter-Drone Weapon
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Conclusion
The Iran war has revealed a widening gap between Beijing's rhetoric and the apparent battlefield performance of PRC-linked military technology. Official silence, reliance on Iranian claims, and unusual personnel changes in the PRC's defense-scientific establishment all undermine the credibility of Beijing's carefully cultivated claims to military-technological superiority.
[1] U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that the aircraft had been shot down by a shoulder-fired missile (Times of Israel, April 6).
[2] This followed a pattern observed after last year's Operation Midnight Hammer, in which state media largely confined itself to relaying messages from Tehran, some of them obviously false (China Brief Notes, June 27, 2025).
[3] Based on a review of past PRC arms-export records, when the buyer has been a Middle Eastern political entity not hostile to the United States, such as the UAE or Egypt, the purchaser's identity has usually been disclosed openly. By contrast, when the buyer is more politically sensitive, as in the case of Iran, information about the end user has often been left deliberately vague.
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Shijie Wang is a Deputy Editor for China Brief. He is a graduate of the Master of Public Policy Program at Georgetown University.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/weapons-systems-failures-may-have-led-to-personnel-removals/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Germany's Travel Industry Under Severe Strain Due to Iran Conflict
MUNICH, Germany, April 10 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:* * *
Germany's Travel Industry Under Severe Strain Due to Iran Conflict
The business climate for travel agencies and tour operators cooled significantly in March. The ifo Institute index fell to minus 41.7 points, down from minus 14.8 points in February. Companies were considerably more reserved in the assessment of their current situation than in February, and their business expectations also deteriorated significantly. "The geopolitical situation is leading to a high level of uncertainty among travelers and travel ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, April 10 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Germany's Travel Industry Under Severe Strain Due to Iran Conflict The business climate for travel agencies and tour operators cooled significantly in March. The ifo Institute index fell to minus 41.7 points, down from minus 14.8 points in February. Companies were considerably more reserved in the assessment of their current situation than in February, and their business expectations also deteriorated significantly. "The geopolitical situation is leading to a high level of uncertainty among travelers and travelcompanies, especially for trips via the Gulf states in the Middle East," says industry expert Patrick Hoppner.
Since the escalation of the conflict at the end of February, travel warnings were issued for key transit countries with hub airports in the Gulf region: Many air travelers with destinations in Asia change planes there. According to the air traffic statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office, around 2.7 million air passengers flying from a major airport in Germany first flew to Qatar or the United Arab Emirates in 2025. That was about 5.9 percent of all departing passengers with an initial destination outside the European Union.
Turkey and Egypt are two further travel destinations that border on the conflict region: In 2025, around 20.3 percent of air travelers traveling from Germany to a destination outside the European Union flew to Turkey. The corresponding figure from Egypt was around 4.8 percent. January and February are traditionally the peak booking months for vacation trips. "Many travel agencies and tour operators had to rebook or cancel trips already booked to or via countries in the Middle East," explains Hoppner.
The percentage of travel agencies and tour operators expecting rising prices for travel services for the coming months in the ifo Business Surveys rose in March: One of the reasons is the increase in fuel costs in recent weeks, which may make arrival and departure flights more expensive in the future. "An increase in the inflation rate is likely to strain the travel budgets of many vacationers as the year goes on," says Hoppner.
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Further information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-04-10/germanys-travel-industry-under-severe-strain-due-to-iran-conflict)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-04-10/germanys-travel-industry-under-severe-strain-due-iran-conflict
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A: Preparing for the Consequences of Collapse in Cuba
WASHINGTON, April 10 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on April 9, 2026, involving deputy director and senior fellow Christopher Hernandez-Roy and associate fellow Henry Ziemer, both of the Americas Program, Katherine E. Bliss, director and senior fellow for Immunizations and Health Systems Resilience in the Global Health Policy Center, deputy director Zane Swanson and non-resident senior associate David Michel, both of the Global Food and Water Security Program, and Andrew Friedman, director and senior fellow in the Human Rights Initiative:* ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 10 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on April 9, 2026, involving deputy director and senior fellow Christopher Hernandez-Roy and associate fellow Henry Ziemer, both of the Americas Program, Katherine E. Bliss, director and senior fellow for Immunizations and Health Systems Resilience in the Global Health Policy Center, deputy director Zane Swanson and non-resident senior associate David Michel, both of the Global Food and Water Security Program, and Andrew Friedman, director and senior fellow in the Human Rights Initiative: ** *
Preparing for the Consequences of Collapse in Cuba
Only days after the January 3 military action to remove Nicolas Maduro from power in Venezuela, the Trump administration signaled that it wanted some type of regime change in Cuba, with the president telling the island's leaders to "make a deal, before it is too late." The United States swiftly imposed an oil blockade to apply economic and social pressure on the Cuban regime, stopping any Venezuelan shipments and threatening other suppliers with tariffs should they send oil to the island. The oil embargo has also collapsed the tourism industry, a crucial source of hard currency for the regime. While speaking on March 27 about U.S. military action in Venezuela and Iran, President Donald Trump said "Cuba is next." These measures have produced some initial discussions with members of the Cuban leadership, as well as signs of potential economic opening, including an announcement that members of the Cuban diaspora would be allowed to invest in and own businesses on the island. But on March 30, President Trump allowed a Russian tanker to make a delivery of crude to the island. The reversal can be understood as (1) the administration wishing to avoid a confrontation with Russia as the United States is consumed with the conflict with Iran, (2) a gesture of goodwill because negotiations with the Cuban regime might be proceeding well, (3) an acknowledgement that the humanitarian situation on the island is reaching a breaking point which could threaten stability, or (4) all three. Much has been written on what comes next for Cuba--in terms of U.S. pressure, regime change or regime management, and who might be Cuba's "Delcy"--with less focus on the impact that U.S. policy is having on the people of Cuba, who already faced a dire humanitarian situation created by their leaders. What consequences would stem from a sudden collapse of the regime, and what should the United States and the international community be doing to prepare for this eventuality?
Q1: How might Cuba reach the breaking point?
A1: A recent New York Times interactive article interviewing Cubans on the island in February describes how the country's deepening fuel crisis is disrupting nearly every aspect of daily life. To be sure, conditions on the island were terrible even before the Trump administration began stopping the deliveries of oil. The Cuban Human Rights Observatory's 2025 annual report (describing conditions in 2024) points to a deep and systemic crisis. According to the report, extreme poverty affects 89 percent of the population, while 91 percent negatively view the government's economic and social management. Food insecurity is widespread: 70 percent of Cubans have skipped meals due to lack of resources, and only 15 percent can consistently maintain three daily meals, with the elderly, unemployed, and those without remittances most affected. As conditions worsen with the U.S. imposed oil blockage, frustration is rising among citizens, increasing the risk of social unrest and further destabilizing an already fragile economy.
Thus far, there have not been nation-wide protests similar to the ones that occurred on July 11, 2021, when the largest demonstrations in Cuba since the 1990s took place. Following the 2021 protests, the Cuban government brutally cracked down on dissent, and imprisoned almost 2,000 people. Despite the fear of a new crackdown, a growing number of Cubans are banging pots at night in protest. During the month of March, the Cuban Observatory of Conflicts recorded 1,245 protests, including a new record of 556 "Challenges to the Police State." On March 13, protesters ransacked the headquarters of the ruling Communist Party in the city of Moron, making a bonfire with the office furniture, after the city had been without electricity for 30 hours. Conditions today are much worse than in the years before the 2021 social explosion.
There is no doubt that the pressure brought by the U.S. oil blockade is increasing the chances of a new island-wide challenge to the regime. The risk is that the Trump administration will wrongly calibrate the balance between creating enough pressure to force concessions, and societal collapse. Should the regime fall or should the existing slow-motion humanitarian crisis simply continue for a prolonged period, there would be grave humanitarian consequences for the people of Cuba.
Q2: What impacts would lack of oil and the collapse of the electrical sector have?
A2: The U.S. embargo and sanctions on fuel shipments are crippling Cuba's power systems. Imported fuels make up two-thirds of Cuba's total energy supply, according to the International Energy Agency. The same source states that oil and natural gas, in particular, generate 95.9 percent of the island's electricity. Deprived of sufficient fuel, Cuba's electric grid has suffered multiple nationwide blackouts. Rationing, shortages, and prolonged power outages affect multiple territories around the country.
Ongoing energy shocks threaten cascading breakdowns across power-dependent water, food, and public health systems. Water and sanitation services, for example, require reliable energy to collect, treat, and deliver safe water. The United Nations estimates that 84 percent of Cuba's water pumping equipment rely on electricity, while one-in-ten Cubans receive their drinking water from tanker trucks--which need fuel to make their rounds. The energy crisis hobbles these vital distribution networks, disrupting supplies and pushing underserved communities to draw on potentially unsafe alternative sources.
Energy shortages similarly risk weakening food security at each stage of agricultural production. Three-quarters of Cuba's irrigated farmland relies on electric or diesel pumps to move water from source to field for growing food. Lack of fuel could curtail farmers' use of machinery to properly harvest and process certain crops. Post-harvest, power cuts and fuel constraints could compromise food storage, transport, and preparation, upending supply chains and undermining affordability, especially for vulnerable populations.
The U.S. fuel blockade compounds long-standing strains on Cuba's energy, water, and food systems. Decades of inadequate investment (limited by restricted access to foreign capital), deferred maintenance, and reliance on substandard crude oil--which exacerbates wear and tear from power generation--have saddled the nation with neglected energy infrastructure, precipitating recurrent grid failures. Outdated policies and inadequate regulations likewise afflict the water sector, curbing progress toward ensuring safe water availability. In Havana alone, 40 to 70 percent of water produced is lost to leaks in the increasingly dilapidated pipe system.
Natural disasters have worsened matters. Hurricanes Oscar and Rafael in 2024 and Melissa in 2025 repeatedly damaged critical water infrastructure with little interval for recovery. One-third of the population in the affected areas, on average, lack safely managed water services. Cuban farmers, too, have long faced multiple challenges, including energy shortages and limited access to fertilizer, seeds, and machinery. From 2016 to 2024, production of major crops such as corn and rice plunged 38-58 percent. By 2025, the UN World Food Programme furnished 1.5 million Cubans with direct assistance for food security and nutrition. Now, as the current crisis deepens, risks of a potential "humanitarian collapse" in Cuba are rising.
Q3: As systems degrade, what would a deepening humanitarian crisis look like?
A3: For several decades, affordable, accessible high-quality primary healthcare was a key element of Cuba's revolutionary program. A high ratio of doctors per person, elevated spending per capita on health, and investments in biomedical research and development all contributed to low infant mortality and rates of infectious disease transmission comparable to those in higher-income countries.
But in recent years, the Cuban health system has experienced significant stress, with limited resources for repairs and infrastructure improvements at labs, hospitals and care centers. Recent hurricanes also damaged clinics, and the ongoing fuel shortages are choking a once promising model of community-based health care.
U.S. export regulations limiting the sale to Cuba of items having 10 percent or more U.S.-origin components have made it challenging for the island's health system to procure critical pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and supplies. The U.S. government exempts medical supplies for humanitarian purposes from the economic embargo and allows exporters to request waivers to the Export Administration Regulations, but the government's process of determining that medical supplies will be used to deliver care and not sold or reexported can be time-consuming. Supply constraints are making it difficult for clinics to deliver routine services, such as dialysis for people living with chronic kidney disease, and they are affecting treatments for infectious diseases as well. With limited access to antibiotics, doctors are reporting higher rates of maternal and child death. Estimated deaths among children under the age of one have risen from 4.8 per 1,000 in 2012 to 6.8 per 1,000 in 2024. Deaths among children under the age of five have also risen sharply, from 6.0 per 1,000 in 2012 to 8.6 in 2024.
The ongoing fuel shortage is further stymying the health sector, as fuel is needed to run water pumps, power hospitals with electricity, and transport patients, as well as care providers, to clinical care sites. The Cuban government reports a current backlog of nearly 100,000 surgeries that have had to be postponed due to lack of electricity and available staff.
Many supplies, such as vaccine components, arrive by air, but deliveries have been canceled because of airlines' inability to refuel in Havana. If fuel to support backup generators runs out, the refrigerators in which vaccines are stored may break down, leading to spoilage of existing supplies and increasing the number of children--currently an estimated 30,000--who have missed critical immunizations. The prevention and treatment of vector-borne diseases is also at risk. With limited fuel for transportation, delivering insecticide to sites where mosquitoes proliferate has been a challenge, increasing the risk of dangerous dengue, oropouche, and chikungunya outbreaks, which a struggling health system may not be prepared to address.
Q4: How would a weakened or absent central authority impact governance?
A4: A recent UN report on the situation in Venezuela after Nicolas Maduro's ouster provides a key lesson for the future of governance in Cuba. The report states that while the president has been removed, the repressive engine of the state continues unabated. While President Delcy Rodriguez has stated that Venezuela is entering a new era and has released some political prisoners, the country has seen 87 arrests of human rights defenders since Maduro's ouster, and "ongoing harassment of opposition figures and journalists."
This reality demonstrates a fundamental dichotomy in dictatorships: Political leadership may change rapidly, sometimes even espousing policy that is both more open and more free, but it takes substantial effort and time to dismantle the day-to-day engine of oppression.
The lasting nature of state engines of repression pairs uneasily with the potential for the collapse of the Cuban regime. Should such a collapse transpire, not only is it likely that repressive elements will continue on, but also that the ensuing chaos and lack of formal government will further empower malign actors. This includes the expansion of black markets and illicit economies, potentially putting greater resources into the hands of criminal actors, at the same time as reduced formal security structures but the continued existence of security forces who likely are no longer paid by the government. In Guatemala, individuals who had perpetrated violence on behalf of a military dictatorship seamlessly created and perpetrated violence on behalf of clandestine criminal networks when those dictatorships fell.
A dystopian scenario is not, however, pre-ordained. In situations of national government collapse, local-level and informal governance structures take on a new importance. Informal government structures can reinforce problematic power dynamics, creating a "might makes right" or wholly non-inclusive structure, but they can also serve to reinvigorate inclusive democratic mores and serve as a seed for democracy across the island. In Cuba, neighborhood groups known as Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) already exist, creating an easy structure for local-level coordination. CDRs already serve some community functions, including vaccination drives and other social services. However, CDRs will have to contend with a lack of national-level coordination that had previously existed and a deeply autocratic history, having once served as the "eyes and ears" of a repressive regime, to become an agent for democratic reform.
Q5: What should the United States and the rest of the international community be doing to prepare for collapse?
A5: Current reports suggest the United States is more interested in pursuing a strategy of regime management, not wholesale regime change, in Cuba. However, the precarity of conditions on the island means that developments on the ground could evolve faster than the governments in either Havana or Washington would like, and the possibility of political collapse should not be ruled out. The outbreak of mass anti-regime protests, departure of key Cuban Communist Party leadership like Diaz-Canel, or a breakdown in U.S.-Cuba talks could all seriously exacerbate the humanitarian crisis faced by Cuban citizens. Collapse would most likely trigger a major exodus from the island, while those without the means to migrate--including a significant portion of the 300,000 elderly Cubans who live alone--would be left to confront even more acute food, fuel, and medical shortages.
It is difficult to predict the exact timing of a political collapse, making it all the more imperative that the United States and international community take steps immediately to prepare for a range of humanitarian contingencies. The United States, Canada, and the European Union, among others, need to establish communication channels with international organizations including the World Food Programme, World Health Organization/Pan American Health Organization, and International Committee of the Red Cross. These entities should also stand up a diplomatic contact group to engage whatever authorities remain on the island and coordinate aid, access, and basic order during fragmentation. The United States can also work to pre-position assistance, including generators, fuel, water treatment units, and emergency food logistics to keep electricity, water, and supply chains functioning. Military and Coast Guard assets will likely be among the first responders, and U.S. Southern Command should consider reallocating airlift assets from Joint Task Force Bravo to Naval Station Guantanamo Bay alongside the pre-positioned aid in order to surge assistance on short notice.
Aid providers will also need to be able to cut through sanctions architecture in order to deploy assistance quickly and consistently. Cuba is far more unforgiving territory than Venezuela in this regard, as U.S. sanctions are codified in law thanks to a series of congressional acts, instead of executive branch prerogative. Statutes such as the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, for instance, subject the president to stringent requirements for what constitutes a political transition in Cuba, including "public commitments to organizing free and fair elections for a new government to be held in a timely manner within a period not to exceed 18 months." Meanwhile, the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act prohibits "United States Government assistance, including United States foreign assistance . . . for exports to Cuba." Congress should work with the White House to amend key provisions of these acts in order to decouple life-saving assistance from political transition. To be sure, statutory restrictions have a role to play ensuring U.S. commitments to a democratic transition in Cuba remain more than mere rhetoric, but in the wake of a humanitarian crisis, the U.S. government and its international partners alike will need more flexibility than current sanctions infrastructure offers.
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Christopher Hernandez-Roy is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Katherine E. Bliss is director and senior fellow for Immunizations and Health Systems Resilience in the Global Health Policy Center at CSIS. Andrew Friedman is director and senior fellow in the Human Rights Initiative at CSIS. David Michel is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS. Zane Swanson is deputy director of the Global Food and Water Security Program at CSIS. Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/preparing-consequences-collapse-cuba
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: Education Freedom Tax Credit: Kansas' Time Has Come
WASHINGTON, April 10 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on April 9, 2026:* * *
Education Freedom Tax Credit: Kansas' Time Has Come
Kansas has achieved a veto override allowing Senate Bill 361 to become law and opting the state in to the federal Education Freedom Tax Credit (EFTC). The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) celebrates yet another state bringing education freedom to their families.
The EFTC created by the Working Families Tax Cut Act gives states a tremendous opportunity to expand educational freedom. The law allows taxpayers to claim up to ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 10 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on April 9, 2026: * * * Education Freedom Tax Credit: Kansas' Time Has Come Kansas has achieved a veto override allowing Senate Bill 361 to become law and opting the state in to the federal Education Freedom Tax Credit (EFTC). The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) celebrates yet another state bringing education freedom to their families. The EFTC created by the Working Families Tax Cut Act gives states a tremendous opportunity to expand educational freedom. The law allows taxpayers to claim up to$1,700 in dollar-for-dollar federal tax credits for contributions to nonprofit Scholarship Granting Organizations (SGOs).
"Now Kansas families will benefit from critical scholarships to support the education their kids need," said Erika Donalds, chair for Education Opportunity at AFPI. "This action by the legislature ensured that Kansans did not watch hundreds of millions of dollars in scholarships walk right out the door. Thankfully those dollars will now stay in Kansas and work for Kansas families."
According to AFPI's recently released scholarship calculator, Kansas families could have lost up to $420 million in scholarship funds in just three years, a total of 75,000 student scholarships. Kansans' charitable contributions will now remain in-state, supporting local students. These funds will expand educational opportunities for K-12 students through scholarships for private school tuition, tutoring, homeschooling, special education services, books, supplies, and more.
Because scholarships will be funded by private donations, participation in the credit would not cost state governments a single penny. This is the first time the federal government has established a tax credit incentivizing K-12 scholarships and is a historic step toward school choice for every student in every state.
Kansas has more than a decade of experience operating a similar state level tax credit program--and has already certified a dozen SGOs--which makes opting in to the federal initiative a natural next step.
The 28 states that have already committed to participate are sending a clear signal to families, school leaders, and investors that a major expansion of education freedom policies are coming in 2027. Kansas lawmakers have passed a straightforward statutory modification that will have an enormous and lasting positive effect on Kansas students.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/education-freedom-tax-credit-kansas-time-has-come
[Category: ThinkTank]