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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Russia Targets NATO Frontline States
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 17, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russia Targets NATO Frontline States
By Anna J. Davis
Executive Summary:
* A cargo ship sailing from St. Petersburg allegedly damaged an undersea telecoms cable in the Baltic Sea on December 31 after dragging its anchor along the seabed in an attempted act of sabotage. Russian forces sabotaging subsea cables and pipelines have become a regular threat across the Baltic Sea and the Arctic regions.
* Damaging undersea infrastructure is only one element of Russia's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 17, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Targets NATO Frontline States By Anna J. Davis Executive Summary: * A cargo ship sailing from St. Petersburg allegedly damaged an undersea telecoms cable in the Baltic Sea on December 31 after dragging its anchor along the seabed in an attempted act of sabotage. Russian forces sabotaging subsea cables and pipelines have become a regular threat across the Baltic Sea and the Arctic regions. * Damaging undersea infrastructure is only one element of Russia'sbroader campaign to reshape the security environment along the frontline of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
* Russia needs its war against Ukraine to continue, as it provides the Kremlin with a convenient scapegoat for aggressive actions against NATO states. With a meaningful peace agreement, Moscow would lose the plausible deniability it relies on to mask its offensive behavior by claiming it was unintended or by blaming Ukrainian forces.
On December 31, 2025, Finnish and Estonian authorities seized the Fitburg cargo ship in the Baltic Sea for attempting to damage an undersea telecoms cable running from Helsinki to Estonia. The Fitburg, which had departed from St. Petersburg, allegedly dragged its anchor along the Baltic seabed and damaged a cable located in Estonia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (Finnish Customs, January 1; Police of Finland, January 12). It was sailing under the flag of St Vincent and Grenadines and captained by Russian citizen Andrei Maksimenko (Police of Finland, January 3; ERR, January 12). The authorities have since released the vessel and taken a crew member, an Azerbaijani citizen who boarded the vessel in St. Petersburg, into custody. They have also issued a travel ban for several other crew members (ERR, January 12). One former Estonian Navy commander said that "if data cables were fully severed, and ATMs and card payments stopped working, that impact would be huge" (ERR, January 12).
Russia's sabotage of subsea cables and pipelines has become a regular threat across the Baltic Sea and the Arctic regions (see EDM, February 5, 2025). It is only one part of the larger, changing security environment along the frontline of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moscow is attempting to project power, vulnerability, and both real and perceived threats toward the populations and infrastructure of NATO member states as it continues its war against Ukraine. Russia needs its war against Ukraine to continue, however, if it is to sustain this behavior toward NATO frontline states. Russia's war against Ukraine enables Moscow to hide behind the narrative of accidental breaches against NATO or to blame the Ukrainian armed forces. Moscow holds an intrinsic interest in stalling meaningful peace talks because it places value on the ability to hide behind the blurred lines of war.
Russian hybrid tactics and political manipulation tend to occur in tandem across NATO's frontline. In December 2024, Romania's intelligence services revealed that Russia had orchestrated a social media operation to boost Calin Georgescu's presidential campaign (see Jamestown Perspectives, May 2, 2025). Georgescu, the far-right, pro-Russian candidate, won the first round of elections only to have the results annulled by the country's Constitutional Court due to Russian interference. Later that year, a Romanian F-16 fighter jet intercepted and escorted a Russian drone into Ukrainian airspace, where it was likely shot down (Antena 3 CNN, September 13, 2025; Kyiv Independent, September 14, 2025). The rate of Russian drone incursions inside Romanian airspace has increased exponentially since September 2023 (see EDM, December 2, 2025).
In Poland, Russian offensive tactics include sabotage, propaganda, and recruitment of refugees for espionage (see EDM, June 9, July 22, 2025). In response to these mounting threats, the Polish government has begun preparing for the possibility of direct military confrontation (see EDM, April 4, 2025). Between 2010 and 2025, 35 percent of Europe's arrests for Russian-linked espionage and sabotage occurred in Poland (see EDM, May 8, 2025). Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian activity inside Poland has targeted military bases, airfields, and adjacent transportation networks (see EDM, May 8, 2025). In September 2025, at least 19 decoy Gerbera drones entered Polish airspace during a large-scale Russian strike on Ukraine (see EDM, September 15, 2025). This was the first time NATO engaged Russian military assets over alliance territory.
Drones are not the only aircraft detected and intercepted by NATO frontline states. During the Christmas period, Polish air defense services intercepted and escorted a Russian reconnaissance plane away from international waters of the Baltic Sea (Polskie Radio, December 25, 2025). Polish Armed Forces Operational Command said that the aircraft was flying near Poland's airspace borders. Around the same time, reports indicated that 59 weather balloons, likely carrying smuggled goods, had entered Polish airspace via Belarus (RMF24, December 29, 2025; RBC-Ukraine, December 30, 2025).
In the Baltic states, Russia uses numerous tactics. These include information warfare, propaganda, subversion, covert violent action, conventional aggression, targeting social groups, influencing elections via cyber and information operations, cyber-attacks, targeting energy infrastructure, and initiating mass illegal migration (see EDM, May 27, 2025). Russia's Foreign Ministry is advancing the narrative that the West is using the Baltic states to threaten Russia and that the Baltic Sea is now "a potential theater of military operations" (see EDM, September 4, 2025). Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania officially disconnected their power grids from Russia in February 2025 to reduce Moscow's ability to manipulate their electricity supply (see EDM, February 20, 2025). The three states are in regular discussions with the United States to strengthen critical energy infrastructure security and reduce reliance on, or the threat from, Russia. The latest of these Baltic 3+1 Energy Dialogues emphasized the potential increase in U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports into the Baltics, as well as the development of nuclear technology (Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; U.S. Department of Energy, November 7, 2025). The Baltics have been exploring alternative nuclear technologies in response to Russia's threats to their energy security, including discussions to develop small modular reactors (SMRs) in collaboration with Sweden, Finland, and Poland (Government of Poland, September 10, 2025).
This potential military theater is already a site of regular Russian interference and offensive behavior, both above, on, and beneath the surface. Earlier in January, a Russian border guard vessel remained in Estonian territorial waters for roughly 35 minutes without permission (ERR, July 28, 2025). In December, Estonian Defense Forces detected three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets that remained in the country's airspace without permission for nearly 12 minutes before being escorted by Italian Air Force F-35 fighter jets stationed as part of NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission (ERR, September 19, 2025). Earlier in 2025, Lithuanian officials announced they found two kilograms of explosive material in a drone that had crashed in Lithuanian territory. The drone had entered Lithuania from Belarus after Ukrainian defense systems altered its flight path (LRT, August 5, September 17, 2025; Delfi, August 6, 2025).
Czech intelligence services recently reported that Russia is fostering an extensive espionage network operating under diplomatic cover inside the country, according to the Czech security services' annual report for 2024, released in July 2025 (Security Information Service, July 10, 2025; see EDM, July 22, 2025). The report detailed that Russian operatives recruit individuals, including journalists, members of organized crime groups, and economically vulnerable migrants from non-EU countries, to carry out intelligence tasks. Recruits are often unaware they are working on behalf of Russia because intelligence officers rely on intermediaries.
Hungary and Slovakia have also faced Russian-instigated cyberattacks and hybrid threats despite their energy dependence on Russia and closer relations with Moscow than other European states. In March 2022, Russian security services instigated a cyberattack that infiltrated the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the ministry's network and a secure network for transmitting classified information (Hungary Today, April 14, 2022). Hungarian officials publicly denied the attack had taken place, calling it "election lies" (444, May 16, 2024). Hungarian media later found that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had known about the attack based on a letter by a Hungarian intelligence services head (UNN, May 16, 2024).
In May 2025, a report jointly released by the United States and several European states revealed that a Russian state-sponsored cyber campaign had been targeting surveillance cameras across Europe and the United States since 2022 (Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, May 2025). This campaign targeted approximately 170 cameras in Slovakia, 280 in Hungary, 200 in Poland, and 990 in Romania, with the remainder largely located in Ukraine. Slovakia had already been targeted in May 2024 by Russian hacker groups in a Central Europe-wide cyberattack, during which the groups issued bomb threats via email to Slovak schools, banks, and electronic retailers (TVP World, May 8, 2024).
Russia's offensive behavior along NATO's frontline is a sustained effort to exploit and manufacture vulnerabilities and to test NATO's commitment to its own defense, as well as to Ukraine. Without its war against Ukraine, Moscow loses a substantial degree of its ability to deny, blame, or excuse breaches and threats toward NATO. A meaningful peace agreement would deprive Russia of the plausible deniability on which it has come to rely. For that reason, the Kremlin will continue delaying and derailing negotiations until compelled to do otherwise.
* * *
Anna J. Davis is Fellow of Eurasia Studies at the Jamestown Foundation and a contrinuting editor of Eurasia Daily Monitor.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-targets-nato-frontline-states/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Posts Commentary to China-US Focus: China-ROK Relations on the Rebound?
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, posted the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, to China-US Focus:* * *
China-ROK Relations on the Rebound?
By Richard Weitz
On January 4, Lee Jae Myung became the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to travel to the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 2019. During his four-day state visit, Lee met with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, Chairman of the National People's Congress Zhao Leji, and other senior PRC leaders. Lee stated ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, posted the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, to China-US Focus: * * * China-ROK Relations on the Rebound? By Richard Weitz On January 4, Lee Jae Myung became the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to travel to the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 2019. During his four-day state visit, Lee met with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, Chairman of the National People's Congress Zhao Leji, and other senior PRC leaders. Lee statedthat, "Korea-China relations will advance to an entirely new stage through this visit to China." This will almost certainly not be the case.
The visit did address a wide range of important topics. However, the trip did not resolve any of the main differences between the two countries. The two governments deferred several sensitive questions to future discussions between the PRC and ROK officials. Implementing the economic and commercial agreements will depend on the capacity and willingness of many public and private sector actors to transform memoranda of understanding (MOUs) into concrete business projects. The pledge to "restore strategic dialogue channels in various fields, including between the diplomatic and security authorities of both countries," was also vague.
Lee has termed his approach "pragmatic diplomacy." Upon his return from China, he explained that, "In a ruthless international order where there are no eternal enemies, friends or rules, the fate of the Republic of Korea hinges on pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests." After winning a snap presidential election and assuming office in early June, Lee initially focused on shoring up relations with the United States. More recently, he has concentrated on improving ties with the PRC and the DPRK.
Lee's visit made some progress on enhancing economic ties. The two governments signed MOUs to expand cooperation in more than a dozen areas, including supply chains, digital technology, business startups, intellectual property, child welfare, and environmental preservation. Lee's delegation included many senior executives, who joined the president at the China-Korea business forum, where Lee called for expanding consumer goods sales and artificial intelligence cooperation. However, concerns about industrial espionage and U.S. export controls will continue to limit Sino-ROK high-tech trade.
Lee secured only a vague promissory note to end China's undeclared "Korean wave ban" on ROK cultural products, which began after the ROK angered the PRC by deploying a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in 2016. The sides reportedly agreed to begin by engaging in sports and games, such as football (soccer) and baduk (Go). They deferred expanding academic, entertainment, media, and youth exchanges to interagency deliberations. Following the trip, though, ROK Presidential Chief of Staff Kang Hoon Sik acknowledged that China was unlikely to halt its informal ban anytime soon.
The governments also deferred their dispute over the Yellow (West) Sea to future vice-ministerial-level talks on maritime and ocean issues. The South Koreans have complained about illegal Chinese fishing in their territorial waters and China's placing various metallic structures in the jointly managed Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ). This is located between each country's coastal territory but inside their overlapping exclusive economic zones. PRC representatives termed these structures fish farms, though some observers view them as the same kind of creeping territorial expansion through artificial islands that Beijing has employed in the South China Sea. Lee unsuccessfully proposed drawing a border line in the middle of the PMZ.
Regarding North Korea, Lee repeated the same appeal to Xi that he made the previous November on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Gyeongju: that Beijing use its influence with Pyongyang to rein in its nuclear program and resume diplomatic engagement with Seoul. Xi responded that patience was needed. His government committed only "to continue exploring creative ways to reduce tensions and build peace on the Korean Peninsula." Official Chinese statements, including during Lee's visit, no longer call for the Peninsula's denuclearization. On the positive side, the Chinese side did not display major public concern about the South's pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines, which ROK officials said they explained in detail to the PRC counterparts.
Xi made an overt effort to pull South Korea away from Japan and possibly the United States. In his meeting with Lee, Xi explicitly referred to both nations' war of liberation against Japan: "Over 80 years ago, China and the ROK made great sacrifices in resisting Japanese militarism and achieved the victory. Today, it is all the more important for the two sides to join hands to defend the victorious outcomes of World War II, and safeguard peace and stability of Northeast Asia." Xi also urged Lee to "firmly stand on the right side of history and make correct strategic choices."
In his own comments, Lee also referenced the two countries' historical partnership and visited a building in Shanghai where the Korean government-in-exile had met during Imperial Japan's occupation of Korea. Lee also distanced himself from the Japanese-U.S. line regarding Taiwan. He helped defuse the issue by telling the PRC media in advance of his trip that he respected the "One China" policy."
Lee understandably wanted to keep South Korea from suffering Japan's fate of heightened PRC denunciations and sanctions, which the ROK also experienced a decade earlier. When he visited Japan the following week, Lee avoided making public comments regarding China or Taiwan even while affirming intent to maintain robust relations with Japan. However, the two governments did discuss strengthening supply chains, an acknowledgement that PRC sanctions on Japan also impose costs on the ROK due to the three countries' economic interdependencies.
Other Asian governments face the same challenge as the Lee administration: how to balance the imperative of dealing with an increasingly assertive and economically preeminent China with their interest in sustaining economic and security ties with the United States and its allies. Lee has thus far adroitly juggled South Korea's diverse interests through pragmatism and multi-vector diplomacy. But the viability of this strategy will be sorely tested if Sino-U.S. relations undergo a renewed downturn over trade, Taiwan, North Korea, or the many other policy differences between Beijing and Washington.
Read in China-US Focus (https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-rok-relations-on-the-rebound).
* * *
Richard Weitz is senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as well as US foreign and defense policies.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/china-rok-relations-rebound-richard-weitz
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Arab News: Geopolitical Consequences of Iran Protests for South Caucasus
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, to Arab News:* * *
The Geopolitical Consequences of Iran Protests for South Caucasus
By Luke Coffey
The ongoing mass demonstrations in Iran are the largest protests the country has seen in about half a decade. Although this current round of nationwide demonstrations began as a response to the economic crisis affecting market traders in the bazaars, it rapidly spread across the country as long-standing grievances ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, to Arab News: * * * The Geopolitical Consequences of Iran Protests for South Caucasus By Luke Coffey The ongoing mass demonstrations in Iran are the largest protests the country has seen in about half a decade. Although this current round of nationwide demonstrations began as a response to the economic crisis affecting market traders in the bazaars, it rapidly spread across the country as long-standing grievancesover the lack of political reform and economic growth boiled over.
It is too early to tell what the outcome of these protests will be. The regime has proved resilient in the past and, although the situation does appear messy, it does not appear close to a total collapse. However, if the protests continue and outside intervention takes place, a wide range of outcomes is possible, from a rapid regime collapse as seen in Libya in 2011 to a gradual erosion of centralized control and de facto partition as seen in Syria.
While many policymakers view Iran primarily through the lens of the Middle East, the country's northern flank cannot be ignored. The three South Caucasus countries -- Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan -- will be watching events closely with nervousness and anxiety. Iran has historically viewed the South Caucasus as an area of influence in competition with Turkiye and Russia. The region is geopolitically important, as some of the world's most critical oil and gas transit pipelines run through it. Any spillover from Iran's internal turmoil could therefore have broader geopolitical consequences for the South Caucasus.
Although none of the three countries has made public statements regarding the demonstrations, off-the-record conversations with regional officials suggest clear concern. While the three states maintain varying degrees of relations with Tehran, two shared issues stand out.
The first is the economic impact of sustained unrest inside Iran. As neighbors, all three countries engage in trade and economic activity with Iran, albeit to different degrees. Azerbaijan, as the only country that borders both Russia and Iran, plays a role as a transit country between the two allies and generates revenue from this arrangement.
Armenia has often viewed Iran as an economic lifeline since trade with its neighbors Turkiye and Azerbaijan was frozen following the Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s. This remains the case today, with Armenia's land borders with both Turkiye and Azerbaijan still closed. As a result, Iran continues to serve as one of Yerevan's most important economic outlets.
Georgia's trade with Iran is smaller than that of Armenia and Azerbaijan but it has been growing in recent years. As the Georgian government has grown more politically aligned with Moscow and more distant from its traditional European partners, it has increasingly sought economic opportunities elsewhere, including with Tehran. Trade between Georgia and Iran has risen year on year.
Notably, Georgia has faced criticism for allowing Russian cargo aircraft to transit its airspace en route to Iran, despite the fact that Russia continues to occupy portions of Georgian territory. This underscores how economic considerations are increasingly overriding long-standing political sensitivities.
Another economic factor shaping regional thinking is US President Donald Trump's threat to impose a 25 percent tariff on any country doing business with Iran. While such a measure may not have a dramatic immediate impact on the economies of the South Caucasus, it would still create economic fallout that governments in the region would prefer to avoid, particularly at a time of broader regional uncertainty.
The second shared concern among the South Caucasus states is the humanitarian impact of a potential refugee crisis. If conditions in Iran deteriorate to levels seen in Libya or Syria in 2011, the countries of the South Caucasus could experience an influx of refugees fleeing instability and violence. Such a development would place serious strain on already-fragile economies and public services, and it is a scenario regional governments are keen to prevent.
For Armenia and Azerbaijan, the two South Caucasus countries that share a land border with Iran, additional concerns are at play. One major issue is the well-being of ethnic minority communities inside Iran. For Armenia, which has historically maintained close relations with Tehran, there is concern that a shift in the internal balance of power could undermine the status of Iran's ethnic Armenian community.
For Azerbaijan, the issue is both more sensitive and more consequential. Since the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 divided ethnic Azerbaijani lands between the Russian Empire and Persia, a latent grievance has existed in Azerbaijan regarding the treatment of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran. Some estimates place the number of ethnic Azerbaijanis living in northern Iran in the range of 15 million to 25 million. They continue to speak their own language and maintain cultural traditions more closely aligned with modern-day Azerbaijan than with Persian identity. Any major unrest in northern Iran could increase domestic pressure on authorities in Baku to respond, particularly if ethnic Azerbaijani communities are affected.
Another shared concern for Armenia and Azerbaijan is the potential impact of instability in Iran on the fragile peace process between the two countries. Although leaders in Yerevan and Baku pledged last August to ratify a peace agreement in the coming months, progress has been limited. A major crisis in Iran could easily divert political attention and diplomatic momentum away from completing this process.
Overall, the countries of the South Caucasus would strongly prefer stability and security over chaos and uncertainty. Yet recent history has shown that mass protests and sudden political shifts can rapidly reshape the region. Only a few weeks into 2026, the year is already shaping up to be one of significant geopolitical consequence. How events in Iran ultimately affect the South Caucasus and the wider region remains to be seen but, at present, the outlook is far from reassuring.
Read in Arab News (https://www.arabnews.com/node/2629548).
* * *
Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson analyzes national security and foreign policy, with a focus on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/geopolitical-consequences-iran-protests-south-caucasus-luke-coffey
[Category: ThinkTank]
Heritage Kicks Off 'America. The Beautiful.' Campaign
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release:* * *
Heritage Kicks Off "America. The Beautiful." Campaign
Starting this weekend, The Heritage Foundation will unveil an ambitious ad campaign that pays homage to "America. The Beautiful."
The centerpiece of this campaign is a 60-second cinematic TV ad that will air this weekend during NFL playoff games, with additional broadcasting during the College Football National Championship on Monday.
Watch the ad here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_XQuVlYxRxg).
Featuring the evolution of the American way of life, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release: * * * Heritage Kicks Off "America. The Beautiful." Campaign Starting this weekend, The Heritage Foundation will unveil an ambitious ad campaign that pays homage to "America. The Beautiful." The centerpiece of this campaign is a 60-second cinematic TV ad that will air this weekend during NFL playoff games, with additional broadcasting during the College Football National Championship on Monday. Watch the ad here (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_XQuVlYxRxg). Featuring the evolution of the American way of life,the TV ad highlights the enduring things that make America exceptional--particularly the commitment of husband and wife in marriage, the importance of parents and families passing along their values to the next generation, the rewards of service to community and country, and the faithfulness of God.
Heritage Foundation president Dr. Kevin Roberts made the following comment on the new campaign:
* * *
"I'm proud of Heritage's campaign to refocus America on what is true, good, and beautiful in our country, especially as we celebrate our nation's 250th birthday. The message in our ad serves as a powerful reminder that our nation has flourished because of its traditional values grounded in faith, marriage, and family.
"As long as we keep these commitments first in our lives, America's future will long endure."
* * *
The TV ad will run through April on networks including TBS, TNT, USA, TV Land, ESPN, ESPN2, ESPN U, Golf, FS!, Fox News, Fox Business, Newsmax, Cooking, GAC Family, Hallmark, Magnolia, GSN, GRIT, INSP, AHC, and potentially other channels.
The campaign will have an expansive presence on national networks, social media channels, and targeted digital ads. Learn more about the campaign here (https://www.heritage.org/beautiful).
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Original text here: https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-kicks-america-the-beautiful-campaign
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Posts Commentary: Maduro's Friends in America - The Alliance for Global Justice
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Capital Research Center posted the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026:* * *
Maduro's friends in America: the Alliance for Global Justice
The Alliance supports collectivist dictatorships across Latin America, and Nicolas Maduro was no exception.
By Robert Stilson
Erstwhile Venezuelan dictator-president Nicolas Maduro is in federal custody after having been captured in a cross-border raid by U.S. forces. This has predictably touched off a firestorm among his most ardent nonprofit supporters in America, and few groups have been more vocal or consistent in their ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Capital Research Center posted the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026: * * * Maduro's friends in America: the Alliance for Global Justice The Alliance supports collectivist dictatorships across Latin America, and Nicolas Maduro was no exception. By Robert Stilson Erstwhile Venezuelan dictator-president Nicolas Maduro is in federal custody after having been captured in a cross-border raid by U.S. forces. This has predictably touched off a firestorm among his most ardent nonprofit supporters in America, and few groups have been more vocal or consistent in theiradmiration for Maduro's repressive and boundlessly corrupt regime than the Alliance for Global Justice.
Background
A mainstay of the internationally oriented far-left in the United States, the Alliance for Global Justice is a 501(c)(3) public charity that principally serves as a fiscal sponsor for ideologically-aligned activist groups that do not have their own tax-exempt status from the IRS. The Alliance has described itself as "the accounting department for the movement for social change," and takes pride in "continuing to sponsor the groups that no other fiscal sponsor will take on." In its fiscal year ending March 2024 it reported $6.7 million in total revenue against $8.8 million in expenses.
Despite its relatively modest size, the Alliance for Global Justice has occasionally made headlines for its fiscal sponsorship activities. During its 2020-2021 fiscal year, the Alliance brought in $56.4 million (an eightfold increase from the year before) largely due to its sponsorship of the Movement for Black Lives and a number of other Black Lives Matter-related groups. It was also revealed to have served as fiscal sponsor for Samidoun, a group which was sanctioned by the governments of the United States and Canada as "a sham charity that serves as an international fundraiser for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorist organization." Today, the "donate" page on the Alliance's website blames what the group calls its "right-wing Zionist adversaries" for its resulting inability to accept credit card payments.
Support for Venezuela
Since the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the activists occupying America's leftmost fringes have regularly turned toward Latin America in search of a geopolitical lodestar. The Alliance for Global Justice is no exception. Its origins can be traced back to 1979 and a pro-Sandinista group called the Nicaragua Network. Until 2024, the Alliance served as fiscal sponsor for the Venceremos Brigade, which has dispatched thousands of sympathetic American radicals to Cuba to labor in solidarity with its communist government since 1969.
It is no different with Venezuela, which alongside Nicaragua tends to account for an outsized portion of the Alliance for Global Justice's public commentary. The group has been a staunch supporter of Venezuela's socialist "Bolivarian Revolution" since Hugo Chavez became president in 1999. It attributes the country's myriad socioeconomic problems not to profound domestic corruption and mismanagement, but to sanctions and other foreign interference from the United States.
It can be difficult to distinguish material published on the Alliance's website from Venezuelan government propaganda. In 2024, after Maduro claimed to have secured another six-year term as president in an election widely considered to have been outright stolen, the Alliance dutifully promoted the regime's official results. In a statement, it declared:
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Alliance for Global Justice congratulates Venezuela for a clear, transparent, consistent and peaceful electoral process implemented on July 28. We also congratulate President Nicolas Maduro on his re-election and the Venezuelan National Electoral Council (CNE) for administering a free and fair election.
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The Alliance has also been aggressively critical of the decision to award the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize to Venezuelan pro-democracy opposition figure Maria Corina Machado, publishing a doctored photograph of her with the flags of the United States and Israel superimposed across her face and clothing. Earlier in 2025, the Alliance's weekly newsletter spotlighted Iran's violent theocratic autocracy for standing with Venezuela "against US aggressions," alongside a quote from Maduro declaring that "the State of Israel was created to colonize the Middle East and Central Asia, to plunder the wealth of those regions and subjugate their peoples."
The Alliance's affinity for Maduro's dictatorship evidently extends to a willingness to encourage domestic lawbreaking. In conjunction with several other activist groups (including Code Pink), it had previously asked supporters to pledge to rapidly "perform direct action and risk arrest if the US invades or otherwise overthrows the democratically elected government of Venezuela."
It made good on this pledge after Maduro was captured in January 2026, joining with dozens of other activist groups in calling for "coordinated and organized resistance" across the United States in order to "defend Venezuela's sovereignty and right to resist" and to "shut down the supply chains of imperialism." To the Alliance for Global Justice, Maduro's capture was part of an effort "to thwart the autonomy and success of the Venezuelan people" and "an attack on socialism, in all its forms, in order to advance a new fascism across the Americas."
Major Funders
All of this makes the question of who currently funds the Alliance for Global Justice an interesting one. At least thirty-one nonprofit grantmakers reported giving at least $20,000 to the Alliance in their respective fiscal years ending in 2024, which is the most recent available. These are listed below in descending order, along with links to their corresponding profiles on InfluenceWatch:
* Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program: $392,100
* Fidelity Investments Charitable Gift Fund: $303,908
* Colorado Health Foundation: $300,150
* William Penn Foundation: $250,000
* Groundswell Fund: $220,170
* Morgan Stanley Global Impact Funding Trust: $180,000
* Common Counsel Foundation: $130,000
* Marin Community Foundation: $125,000
* New York Foundation: $102,500
* Michael Reese Health Trust: $100,000
* Park Foundation: $90,000
* Eugene and Agnes E. Meyer Foundation: $89,000
* Borealis Philanthropy: $80,000
* Race Forward: $80,000
* 128 Collective Foundation: $75,000
* North Star Fund: $60,000
* Solutions Project: $60,000
* Claneil Foundation: $55,000
* SisterSong: $50,200
* Krupp Family Foundation: $43,478
* Amalgamated Charitable Foundation: $38,250
* Community Food Bank of Southern Arizona: $37,090
* Destination Tomorrow: $30,000
* Field Foundation of Illinois: $30,000
* Key Lime Foundation: $30,000
* Manzanita Foundation: $30,000
* San Diego Foundation: $25,000
* Tides Center: $25,000
* Institute for Local Self-Reliance: $23,000
* Brown University: $22,200
* American Online Giving Foundation: $20,382
Combined, these thirty-one funders gave $3,097,428 to the Alliance for Global Justice in 2024, which would represent somewhat less than half of the group's total revenue that year. Of course, such a calculation cannot precisely be made, because many of these grantmakers operate on different fiscal years than the Alliance (and from one another).
Thoughts and questions
A few additional comments may be worth noting.
First, functionally-anonymous grants from donor-advised fund providers such as Vanguard, Fidelity, and Morgan Stanley account for a significant portion of the Alliance for Global Justice's revenue. This is consistent with modern philanthropic giving trends, but also may reflect the particularly controversial nature of the Alliance's advocacy and a desire among donors to conceal their support for the group. That, of course, is speculation.
Second, while some grants were made simply to support the Alliance's general operations, many others were earmarked for specific fiscally sponsored projects. The Common Counsel Foundation noted that its funding was designated for the Reale Justice Network and Assata's Daughters (named in honor of the recently-deceased fugitive murderer Assata Shakur), while Borealis Philanthropy's grant was for the purpose of supporting Black Trans Media.
Finally, it would be interesting to hear what these grantmakers think of the Alliance's strident pro-Maduro advocacy--to say nothing of its other noxious activism. Do they agree with it? If not, why do they continue their financial support? This is especially true for those funders that made general support grants--such as the Park Foundation--since they cannot claim that they merely intended to support one of the Alliance's sponsored projects. Such an argument would nevertheless be specious, however, as the Alliance's board only accepts projects for sponsorship if they align with its own mission and vision. The bottom line is that these funders are willingly underwriting a group that openly favors a rotten authoritarian kleptocracy over the United States of America.
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Robert Stilson
Robert runs several of CRC's specialized projects. Originally from Indiana, he has a B.A. from Hanover College and a J.D. from University of Richmond School of Law, where he graduated magna cum laude.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/maduros-friends-in-america-the-alliance-for-global-justice/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Rift in the Gulf, and Only the Gulf Can Solve It
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026:* * *
A New Rift in the Gulf, and Only the Gulf Can Solve It
By Michael Ratney
For two countries now at each other's throats, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have an awful lot in common. They share the ambition and resources to remake the Middle East as an engine of economic opportunity and to serve as global hubs for artificial intelligence, shipping and aviation, tourism, finance, and much more. They both long to turn the page on the region's history ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026: * * * A New Rift in the Gulf, and Only the Gulf Can Solve It By Michael Ratney For two countries now at each other's throats, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have an awful lot in common. They share the ambition and resources to remake the Middle East as an engine of economic opportunity and to serve as global hubs for artificial intelligence, shipping and aviation, tourism, finance, and much more. They both long to turn the page on the region's historyof extremism and instability, and focus instead on commerce, social development, and economic diversification. They are both working to wean their economies away from dependence on oil, investing in renewable energy and their own human capital. They both want a strong security partnership with the United States to help defend against their ultimate threats, namely Iran and jihadi terrorists including al Qaida and ISIS. And they both think Israel should ultimately be an integral part of their region, even while their timelines and conditions for advancing that relationship differ sharply.
With all that the two countries share, there should be great opportunities for cooperation--with each other and with the United States. But those commonalities also set the stage for the bitter antagonism they are now living, which exploded into public view when an Emirati-supported political movement, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), took over two large provinces in Yemen, including one right along Saudi Arabia's southern border. Following sharp words and air strikes, the STC withdrew and most of its leadership, accepted a Saudi offer to come to Riyadh and talk, and has now reportedly disbanded completely. The UAE has meanwhile reportedly withdrawn its own forces from Yemen. The immediate crisis is perhaps behind us, but the antagonism will likely endure for some time.
Some of that antagonism is not about Yemen, but is more deeply rooted in longstanding economic competition. Both countries seek to attract investment and headquarters of multinational companies, build global airlines, draw tourists, and maximize revenues from the oil exports on which both countries still depend. For years the UAE was the unquestioned economic powerhouse of the Gulf, and many observers will say it is still 20 years ahead of Saudi Arabia in economic development. But Riyadh is trying to catch up fast.
Some of the antagonism is no doubt personal--the 64-year-old Emirati president, Mohammad bin Zayed (MBZ), was once a mentor of sorts for the younger Saudi Crown Prince, the 40-year-old Mohammad bin Salman (MBS). Because both countries are ruled by monarchs, national relations inevitably become personal, and that relationship has degenerated in recent years into something more like a rivalry. The Saudis believe the UAE does not accept the dominant role Saudi Arabia has historically played--indeed, always will play--in anchoring a stable system of Arabian monarchies. They see the UAE stoking the very instability they should all be seeking to contain. The UAE, on the other hand, believes Saudi Arabia misjudges, even dismisses, the Emiratis' economic influence, and their expanding regional role and identity, which has grown rapidly in recent years independently of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) construct that has long defined the region and its pecking order.
And some of the antagonism simply comes down to policy goals and differing approaches to the region. Saudi Arabia, dubious that the region's worst conflicts can be satisfyingly resolved, has sought principally to de-escalate them and distance the most pernicious effects of those conflicts from Saudi borders. The UAE, meanwhile, has sought to deal with that instability by projecting influence, developing relationships and access throughout the region, often through local proxies in places such as Yemen, Sudan, and Libya, which harbor separatist ambitions or rival governments. The Saudis have no love for Islamist political movements--indeed they are a threat to the Saudi monarchy and outlawed in the kingdom--but the Saudis have historically been willing to work with them where there is no viable alternative, such as in Syria. The UAE, on the other hand, has sought to extirpate Islamist political movements in the region, even if it involves working with other unsavory local partners.
Whether rooted in commercial competition, personal rivalry, or ideology, this Saudi-UAE tension has been growing since MBS became Saudi crown prince in 2017. It may have reached a crisis point over Yemen, but the intense vitriol in social media right now suggests that this is far worse than a temporary disagreement over one country, and perhaps more profound than the GCC rupture with Qatar in 2017. That rupture was not fixed with outside mediation, though the United States tried. It was ultimately Kuwait, with help from Oman, that helped bring it to a close, and it was not a speedy process. Though never really freighted with the economic and personal rivalry of the Saudi-UAE relationship, it still took over three years. If the current split is ultimately resolvable, it could easily take longer, and like the 2017 break with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their Gulf neighbors will need to repair this in their own way and on their own timetable.
At the same time, the United States and its partners can reinforce with GCC leaders--quietly, patiently--that they are better off working together for the collective good. Divisions, bleeding into conflict, become own-goals--opportunities for Iran to exploit. Better would be a common regional strategy that keeps the United States and all its Gulf partners arrayed against the real adversaries, and helps maintain momentum toward what both countries want: a region where their vast ambitions in technology, energy, infrastructure, transportation, tourism, and many other sectors can truly make the Arabian Peninsula an island of stability and prosperity.
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Michael Ratney served for over three decades as a U.S. diplomat, most recently as ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He is currently a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-rift-gulf-and-only-gulf-can-solve-it
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Exploring the New Math Puzzle of a PJM Intervention
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026:* * *
Exploring the New Math Puzzle of a PJM Intervention
By Arushi Sharma Frank
Earlier today, the White House National Energy Dominance Council and partnering agencies released a "Statement of Principles Regarding PJM." These principles come out of "an agreement with governors across the Mid-Atlantic region to urge PJM to make electricity more affordable for residential customers and strengthen grid reliability by building more than $15 billion of reliable baseload power ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026: * * * Exploring the New Math Puzzle of a PJM Intervention By Arushi Sharma Frank Earlier today, the White House National Energy Dominance Council and partnering agencies released a "Statement of Principles Regarding PJM." These principles come out of "an agreement with governors across the Mid-Atlantic region to urge PJM to make electricity more affordable for residential customers and strengthen grid reliability by building more than $15 billion of reliable baseload powergeneration."
The Statement of Principles outlines a radical departure from market norms as follows:
* A new reliability backstop auction that will guarantee 15-year price certainty, a stark contrast to the market's traditional short-term signals.
* To protect ratepayers, the plan extends the existing price cap on existing generation for two more auctions, effectively freezing scarcity revenues for the legacy fleet.
* Costs for the new plants will be allocated 100 percent to new data centers--"whether they show up and use the power or not"--unless they can prove they have self-procured capacity or have agreed to be curtailable.
* The Trump administration explicitly directs PJM to bypass its own stakeholder process ("no further CIFP processes are necessary") and mandates that interconnection studies be completed in "150 days or less."
A proposal to auction 15-year generation contracts will do more than just fund new power plants. It will fundamentally alter who bears the risk of building out the American grid and keeping current power plants (thermal and non-thermal) open, creating a new, paradoxical reality for the technology sector: Participants are potentially "short" on power today, but "long" on liability tomorrow.
This shift moves regional transmission organizations (RTOs) into uncharted territory. RTO markets were designed to facilitate bilateral contracting and unitary pricing, not to host separate government-mandated procurements for a specific asset class. Whether that is the intent of the proposal, and what PJM files, is yet to be seen.
The policy implication is clear though: By carving out a dedicated market for certain loads while leaving the rest of the grid in the legacy auction, this proposal breaks the unitary market structure. On first read, the reality appears to be a hybrid: financially segregated but physically integrated. The data center might pay the mortgage (the 15-year contract), but the electrons flow into the shared grid. This distinction will be vital to understand the merits of the rules to come from PJM; it determines whether this intervention actually lowers prices for consumers--via a "denominator effect," discussed below.
Scenarios for PJM Money Problems Versus Physical Problems
As this issue unfurls in new or modified PJM rules, a few distinct futures could emerge.
In one scenario, the definition of "eligibility" could dictate: By explicitly listing self-procured capacity and curtailment as the only off-ramps, these principles create an immediate, existential financial incentive for large loads to engineer their way out of the auction. Building your own plants could be a path out of the cost allocation; an exemption for "curtailable" load puts pressure on PJM to enact pathways to validate and count on that behavior for economics and reliability.
Critically, a 15-year contract could solve the money problem, but it does not fix the physical problem. While the principles mandate that interconnection studies be completed in "150 days or less," industry insiders note that a memo cannot manufacture a transformer or staff a power study team overnight. This is a path for creating a financial instrument to pay for infrastructure that may still take years to physically connect.
Further, a structural risk looms in either scenario. Whether this commissioned generation is "siphoned" for large loads or allocated into the shared PJM loads pool, the influx of mandated supply--without a guaranteed match in net demand--creates a signal of artificial oversupply. Paradoxically, this could depress prices enough to motivate the retirement of the very baseload power the policy intends to preserve.
Denominator Effects for Consumer Electricity Rates
If the intent of the policy comes into being--the potential to protect residential retail ratepayers from steep increases due to data center demand--the proposed auction could operate like a capital injection: It forces data centers to cover the capital cost of these new plants upfront. When that generation eventually turns on, it bids into the PJM market with its construction costs already covered. It only needs to recover its fuel and operations. The result would be to inject massive amounts of supply that can bid at marginal cost. Assuming all other factors remain equal, this suppresses the wholesale price of energy for everyone.
Rates are assessed based on the costs of building, maintaining, and operating the grid. If some of those costs are already being absorbed by data center developers, then there is more power for everyone without increased costs, and rates can fall. This isn't magic--it's simply the math of the denominator effect (more energy hours to pay for a relatively fixed or new expense-insulated delivery infrastructure cost = lower rates for all impacted classes who can benefit).
This will not, however, fully insulate ratepayers. Increasing rates are not usually driven by the cost of adding generation. It's the wires. If a utility builds a $50 million substation for a data center and spreads that cost to the legacy rate base, residential bills can rise despite low-cost generation. This is where state regulators must hold the line, with tariffs that require large data centers to pay demand charges covering specific infrastructure costs (including substations). Regulators can look to models like the Rappahannock Electric Cooperative's Large Power-Dedicated Facilities tariff, which bills based on the installed capacity of the delivery infrastructure, and incentivize loads to build private firming solutions that bring flexibility to the utility. The incentive has an effect of derisking overbuild of the utility infrastructure The policy announcement today from the White House seems similar in intent: Pay for the power plant capital costs, whether the energy hours are used or not.
Considerations for Large Loads Asset Class Fracturing
Even if the new math of PJM protects the residential consumer, the pain within the technology sector is expected to be uneven, as will the pain to be distributed between legacy generation assets (thermal and renewable) and new construction under contract. This is largely true of existing proposals in PJM's stakeholder processes: at least one such proposal posits market-oriented reforms consisting of a reliability backstop mechanism with multiyear price certainty (from Amazon, Calpine, Constellation, Google, Microsoft, Talen).
Early reactions to the announcements portend that this approach--a contract-specific auction--effectively has the economic impact of fracturing the electricity ratepayer asset class into at least three tiers while at least solving some of the problems of bringing enough capacity into the market to support gigawatts of load. Impacts on these classes, at least from the principles released today, also depend on the work that states will do to effectuate load-serving entity cost allocation.
Residential customers could remain shielded, provided state regulators enforce the strict tariffs described above and other theoretical wins become reality, including distributed energy and grid utilization programs that support lowering the average cost of utility operations. They get the increased reliability of a robust grid without the increased costs. Tech giants like Microsoft, Google, and Amazon are the "long capital" class. They are the most likely candidates who could possess the balance sheets to absorb a 15-year infrastructure liability, and if the rules of such a program or other PJM programs going forward allow it, the engineering depth to execute complex private firm delivery strategies needed to opt out (they can hedge the risk or pass it downstream).
The likely casualties of this new regime may include specialized infrastructure providers, co-location firms, and conventional industrial loads that lack the balance sheet of a hyperscaler. The administration's Statement of Principles explicitly demands that new loads provide "credit/collateral support" to be counted, a hurdle that favors the giants. Often locked into fixed-price contracts with tenants, these "middle-class" providers lack the credit depth to absorb a 15-year liability and the physical footprint to execute the "self-procure or curtail" opt-outs envisioned by the new rules. For them, the choice between a massive balance sheet liability and a regulatory blockade represents an existential margin squeeze.
The other likely casualty to insure against, is price signals for existing PJM generators, and their contracted status with loads that cannot benefit from the new policy. The principles document extends the existing price collar for two more auctions, effectively capping scarcity revenues for the legacy fleet just as reliability value is rising. Perhaps most concerning to existing resources is a future where existing generators face a "dumping" risk. If the 7.5 GW of new mandated capacity is built but not fully utilized by data centers, that excess power flows onto the grid at zero marginal cost. This artificial oversupply creates a price-suppressive signal that could ironically force the retirement of the very baseload units the policy claims to value. As is usually the case in PJM, when a major market intervention suppresses price signals for existing thermal assets, it drags existing renewables down with it. By capping capacity revenues and potentially flooding the energy market with subsidized "must-run" baseload, the policy erodes the investment case for all legacy generation, not just the coal and gas plants it aims to protect.
Ultimately, this intervention privatizes the cost of reliability, a move that stands in sharp contrast to the unitary market design PJM has administered to date. While the principles document calls for a future "Return to Market Fundamentals" by 2027, the precedent from the proposed approach is one in which reliability procurement is no longer for and from a shared pool of buyers and sellers; PJM's work over the next several months will be to develop a segmented product that is effectively procured by multi-state mandate and billed to specific asset classes. Market stakeholders invested in future-proofing retail and wholesale power deliverability solutions should find themselves even more invested than before in innovating solutions for their large and small customers.
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Arushi Sharma Frank is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/exploring-new-math-puzzle-pjm-intervention
[Category: ThinkTank]