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Rand Issues Commentary: Tipping the Cyber Balance - How AI Benchmarks Could Make Software Safer
SANTA MONICA, California, Feb. 4 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Feb. 3, 2026:* * *
Tipping the Cyber Balance: How AI Benchmarks Could Make Software Safer
By Gopal Sarma and Kathleen Fisher
In February 2024, a ransomware attack on Change Healthcare disrupted medical claims processing for nearly half of all U.S. healthcare transactions. The breach cost UnitedHealth Group over $2.8 billion, exposed the personal data of 190 million Americans, and forced hospitals nationwide to delay patient care. The cause? A remote access portal without multi-factor authentication. As one senator ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Feb. 4 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Feb. 3, 2026: * * * Tipping the Cyber Balance: How AI Benchmarks Could Make Software Safer By Gopal Sarma and Kathleen Fisher In February 2024, a ransomware attack on Change Healthcare disrupted medical claims processing for nearly half of all U.S. healthcare transactions. The breach cost UnitedHealth Group over $2.8 billion, exposed the personal data of 190 million Americans, and forced hospitals nationwide to delay patient care. The cause? A remote access portal without multi-factor authentication. As one senatorput it: "This hack could have been stopped with cybersecurity 101."
This attack illustrates a broader pattern. Critical infrastructure depends on complex systems with sprawling attack surfaces--misconfigurations, excessive privileges, inadequate monitoring, and software vulnerabilities--and attackers are exploiting these weaknesses faster than defenders can address them. Artificial intelligence is accelerating this dynamic: the same technology that helps developers build applications faster also enables attackers to find and exploit flaws more quickly. According to Google's Mandiant Threat Intelligence, the average time-to-exploit for vulnerabilities dropped from 63 days in 2018-2019 to just five days in 2023. Some claim that AI systems can now generate working exploits as quickly as 15 minutes following a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) disclosure, a standardized public announcement of a specific software vulnerability.
AI is intensifying the arms race--but it could also tip the balance toward defenders, if we create the right incentives today. The key is automated reasoning--also known as formal methods. These are mathematical techniques for creating precise, machine-checkable descriptions of how software should behave, and often for verifying that it does.
What Stronger Foundations Would Enable
A different future is within reach--one where defenders hold the advantage. Automated reasoning could help us harden critical software, build trustworthy infrastructure for AI systems, and lay technical foundations for governing advanced AI. Here's what that would look like:
Systematic hardening of critical infrastructure. Hospitals, power grids, and telecommunications depend on legacy software that attackers exploit routinely. AI systems capable of identifying flaws, generating verified fixes, and mapping the tangled dependencies in legacy codebases could make large-scale hardening practical. Translating code to memory-safe languages like Rust--which prevent common security flaws by design--is only part of the challenge; understanding how changes ripple through interconnected systems is where AI could bring additional leverage. CISA's guidance on memory-safe languages points the way and AI could accelerate this transition.
Secure execution environments. As AI systems become more autonomous, we need infrastructure we can trust to enforce boundaries. Memory-safe runtimes, minimal operating systems, and formally verified execution environments--that is, software infrastructure that is built to enforce boundaries--would ensure that AI agents cannot exceed authorized access, exfiltrate sensitive data, or take actions outside permitted bounds.
Technical foundations for international agreements. Managing risks from advanced AI may eventually require international cooperation--and cooperation requires verification. A recent RAND study identified six independent approaches for verifying compliance with AI agreements, including tamper-resistant hardware, on-chip monitoring, and whistleblower programs. International agreements take years to negotiate, and the underlying technologies must mature in parallel. Advancing formal methods now could enable cryptographic proof that AI models underwent approved evaluations without tampering--laying the technical groundwork so that credible verification is ready when the diplomatic moment arrives.
Higher-assurance AI control, alignment, and interpretability. Rather than relying solely on empirical testing, automated reasoning could provide mathematical guarantees about certain types of AI system behavior. Specifications like "only authorized actions are allowed" can be translated into machine-checkable properties and enforced at critical interfaces--API calls, data access, and system commands--where AI systems interact with external resources. Research on AI control has shown that safety protocols can be developed that are effective even in situations where models intentionally try to subvert them. While interpretability of neural networks remains nascent, and formal verification of the networks themselves is still in early stages, the interplay between these fields offers practical insights. Interpretability research is beginning to identify latent representations--internal patterns encoding concepts like credentials or plans to bypass oversight--that warrant explicit constraints. These findings can sharpen specifications and target verification effort where risk is highest.
The Benchmark Opportunity
The key to unlocking these capabilities is measurement. Today, most AI evaluations test general reasoning or code generation ability, not security. Rigorous benchmarks evaluating AI's ability to assist with automated reasoning tasks (writing specifications, proving theorems, generating verified code) would fill that gap and reshape the competitive landscape. If the market comes to value security benchmarks the way it now values math and coding tests, competitive pressure will drive AI labs to invest in verifiable safety, and the entire ecosystem will benefit.
Automated reasoning and formal methods-based approaches have long been too labor-intensive for widespread use. But AI can change that equation. Models that excel at reasoning about security properties of software designs and faithfully implementing those designs with memory-safe code and securely validated inputs, could make verification practical at scale. The missing piece is incentives: comprehensive benchmarks that make these capabilities visible and valued.
The foundation already exists. Projects like seL4, a formally verified microkernel (the core software layer that manages hardware access), demonstrated over a decade ago that mathematical proof of software correctness is achievable. DARPA's HACMS program leveraged seL4 to create software for a military helicopter that proved unassailable by a world-class red team with full knowledge of the system. CompCert, a verified C compiler, guarantees that compiled code behaves exactly as the source specifies. AWS's Automated Reasoning Group applies these techniques at scale across cloud infrastructure today. Microsoft's Z3 theorem prover has become foundational infrastructure for verification tools across the industry, and Google's Project Silver Oak applies formal verification to hardware security. These advances occurred largely independently of AI, meaning they deliver value regardless of how AI capabilities evolve. AI could dramatically accelerate this work, but the fundamentals are sound either way.
New security-focused benchmarks would cover the full spectrum of verification tasks: converting legacy code to memory-safe languages like Rust, automating input validation, writing formal specifications, proving theorems about system behavior, and verifying cryptographic implementations. Public leaderboards for progress on these benchmarks would create competitive pressure for AI labs to prioritize these capabilities, for example, by investing in the simulated practice environments (e.g. reinforcement learning, or RL environments). These investments could transform automated reasoning from a niche specialty into a core AI competency.
DARPA's AI Cyber Challenge has already demonstrated that AI systems can find and patch vulnerabilities in open-source software, with competitors discovering over a dozen real-world flaws. Industry is following suit: Google DeepMind's CodeMender automatically generates and validates security patches, signaling that AI-powered vulnerability repair is moving from research to deployment. Benchmarks for automated reasoning would extend this progress toward provable guarantees.
A Path Forward
Developing and maintaining rigorous automated reasoning benchmarks for software design would give model developers, enterprise buyers, and open-source communities a common yardstick for security claims. This approach harnesses market dynamics rather than restricting AI progress. It aligns existing incentives, specifically the competitive pressure that drives AI labs to top leaderboards, with measurable security outcomes.
Benchmarks are foundational, but alone they are insufficient. The defensive applications they enable must advance in parallel: hardening critical infrastructure, building secure execution environments, developing treaty verification protocols, and creating higher-assurance controls. Each line of effort informs the others. Real-world hardening projects surface specification challenges, evaluation infrastructure reveals what properties matter most, and control research identifies where formal guarantees are needed. Waiting for perfect AI or automated reasoning capabilities before starting this work would squander precious time.
The strategic stakes are significant. China has invested heavily in AI-integrated theorem proving, with labs like DeepSeek and ByteDance producing state-of-the-art systems. Most U.S. frontier labs have not prioritized this domain. Benchmarks would create the incentive structure to change that calculus, helping ensure continued American AI leadership in an area with broad implications for both cybersecurity and AI security.
AI's rapid evolution challenges decades of assumptions about how software is built and secured. By investing in benchmarks that reward verifiable security, and advancing the defensive applications in parallel, we can convert AI's disruptive capabilities into structured defensive advantages. The goal: ensuring that the balance tips toward those who build, not those who break.
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More About This Commentary
Gopal Sarma is a member of the AI Security Cluster in RAND's Center for AI, Security, and Technology (CAST).
Kathleen Fisher is an expert in formal methods, programming languages, and cybersecurity, and was previously a technical resident at RAND CAST.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/02/tipping-the-cyber-balance-how-ai-benchmarks-could-make.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to UnHerd: 'Fafo' Is No Answer to Gentle Parenting
NEW YORK, Feb. 4 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Feb. 3, 2026, to UnHerd:* * *
'Fafo' Is No Answer to Gentle Parenting
By Carolyn D. Gorman
Last year, gentle parenting was declared dead. "The helicopter parent has been grounded," The Today Show announced last summer, as so-called "Fafo" ("Fuck around and find out") parents surged into fashion.
Now, a Guardian report from last week has revealed how mothers on social media are championing the tough, no-nonsense approach designed to teach children hard lessons through consequences rather than negotiation. ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Feb. 4 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Feb. 3, 2026, to UnHerd: * * * 'Fafo' Is No Answer to Gentle Parenting By Carolyn D. Gorman Last year, gentle parenting was declared dead. "The helicopter parent has been grounded," The Today Show announced last summer, as so-called "Fafo" ("Fuck around and find out") parents surged into fashion. Now, a Guardian report from last week has revealed how mothers on social media are championing the tough, no-nonsense approach designed to teach children hard lessons through consequences rather than negotiation.But is Fafo parenting a genuine shift in child-rearing, or just the latest online fad?
According to various mum bloggers, Fafo parenting is about letting kids experience the consequences of their behaviour. Your child doesn't like what's for dinner? Let them go hungry. They won't get off the iPad? Chuck it out the window. It's a "tough luck" approach.
Continue reading the entire piece here at UnHerd (https://unherd.com/newsroom/fafo-is-no-answer-to-gentle-parenting/?edition=us)
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Carolyn D. Gorman is a Paulson Policy Analyst at the Manhattan Institute.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/fafo-is-no-answer-to-gentle-parenting
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: What Possible Justification Do Dems Have for Not Letting ICE Deport a Sex Offender?
NEW YORK, Feb. 4 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Feb. 2, 2026, to the New York Post:* * *
What Possible Justification Do Dems Have for Not Letting ICE Deport a Sex Offender?
By Rafael A. Mangual
You really can't make it up.
A previously deported illegal immigrant named Gerardo Miguel Mora, whose rap sheet includes attempted rape and strangulation, was back in a New York City courtroom last week on a shoplifting charge, which, according to The Post, was his second arrest in the month of January -- the first being for crack possession.
That's actually ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Feb. 4 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Feb. 2, 2026, to the New York Post: * * * What Possible Justification Do Dems Have for Not Letting ICE Deport a Sex Offender? By Rafael A. Mangual You really can't make it up. A previously deported illegal immigrant named Gerardo Miguel Mora, whose rap sheet includes attempted rape and strangulation, was back in a New York City courtroom last week on a shoplifting charge, which, according to The Post, was his second arrest in the month of January -- the first being for crack possession. That's actuallynot the unbelievable part of the story.
The reason Mora's most recent criminal case made news is that New York City Judge Sheridan Jack-Browne allowed him to waltz right out of the courthouse despite being made aware of a federal criminal warrant for Mora's arrest.
The result was that, upon realizing that Mora had been released, federal agents had to chase him down and take him into custody on the street.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/02/02/opinion/what-possible-justification-do-dems-have-for-not-letting-ice-deport-a-sex-offender)
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Rafael Mangual is the Nick Ohnell Fellow and head of research for the Policing and Public Safety Initiative at the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor of City Journal. He is also the author of Criminal (In)Justice: What the Push for Decarceration and Depolicing Gets Wrong and Who It Hurts Most.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/what-possible-justification-do-dems-have-for-not-letting-ice-deport-a-sex-offender
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Business Climate in Germany's Chemical Industry Improves Slightly
MUNICH, Germany, Feb. 4 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:* * *
Business Climate in Germany's Chemical Industry Improves Slightly
The business climate in Germany's chemical industry improved slightly in January. Although the index rose to -23.5 points, up from -24.6* points in December, the current situation deteriorated significantly and fell to -34.9 points, down from -29.7* points in December. By contrast, expectations brightened, up from -19.3* to -11.4 points in January. "The chemical industry is somewhat less pessimistic about the future, but current business remains ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Feb. 4 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Business Climate in Germany's Chemical Industry Improves Slightly The business climate in Germany's chemical industry improved slightly in January. Although the index rose to -23.5 points, up from -24.6* points in December, the current situation deteriorated significantly and fell to -34.9 points, down from -29.7* points in December. By contrast, expectations brightened, up from -19.3* to -11.4 points in January. "The chemical industry is somewhat less pessimistic about the future, but current business remainsweak," says ifo industry expert Anna Wolf.
While there was still a mood of crisis at the end of 2025, demand stabilized slightly in January. The order backlog rose for the first time in months. The indicator rose from -23.7 to +3.4 points. The order books are full for 1.8 months, compared to 1.4 months in October. Despite these positive signals, companies continue to assess the overall order backlog as very low at -47.1 points. At 72.7%, capacity utilization in the chemical industry is well below the long-term average of the past ten years of 80.9%. Companies are planning to scale back their production in the coming months and further reduce staff. "The ongoing price pressure and uncertainty in foreign trade due to the threat of tariffs are weighing on the chemical industry," says Wolf.
*Seasonally adjusted
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More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-02-02/business-climate-germanys-chemical-industry-improves-slightly)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-02-02/business-climate-germanys-chemical-industry-improves-slightly
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Posts Commentary to Arab News: Arctic Remains a Zone of Sustained Competition
WASHINGTON, Feb. 4 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, posted the following commentary on Feb. 2, 2026, to Arab News:* * *
The Arctic Remains a Zone of Sustained Competition
By Luke Coffey
US President Donald Trump's recent statements about the need to acquire Greenland caused considerable division within the transatlantic community. Fortunately, these tensions appear to have been resolved for now. One positive consequence of the Greenland debate, however, has been to elevate the strategic importance of the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 4 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, posted the following commentary on Feb. 2, 2026, to Arab News: * * * The Arctic Remains a Zone of Sustained Competition By Luke Coffey US President Donald Trump's recent statements about the need to acquire Greenland caused considerable division within the transatlantic community. Fortunately, these tensions appear to have been resolved for now. One positive consequence of the Greenland debate, however, has been to elevate the strategic importance of theArctic region on the international agenda.
The Arctic region is home to some of the harshest terrain and environmental conditions on Earth. There are eight countries that can call themselves Arctic states: the US, Canada, Denmark via Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Many more countries are now seeking to expand their influence in the region.
The region is important for scientific, environmental, trade, transit, and energy reasons. Tourism has also been growing, boosting local economic activity. The region is widely believed to contain vast amounts of untapped oil and gas reserves, along with significant quantities of rare earth minerals. The challenge lies in finding ways to access and extract these resources that are both economically viable and environmentally responsible. This is made even more difficult by the lack of infrastructure and limited logistical connectivity.
The Arctic Council, an intergovernmental body led by the eight Arctic states, was established to promote cooperation on issues such as search and rescue coordination, environmental protection, and scientific research. However, the council has all but stopped functioning since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, severely limiting one of the few institutional mechanisms for Arctic-wide cooperation.
For the US, it is clear that the Trump administration views the Arctic primarily through the lens of great power competition. The US became an Arctic state in the 1860s with the purchase of Alaska from Russia. What was widely seen at the time as a mistake has since proven to be one of the most strategic decisions made in the post-Civil War era. Despite the rhetoric from multiple Washington administrations, however, relatively little emphasis has been placed on improving American capabilities or presence in the Arctic. For example, the US Coast Guard currently operates only one heavy icebreaker there.
So far in his first year in office, Trump has placed renewed focus on the region, including moving forward with a significant purchase of new icebreakers in cooperation with Finland. Even during the first Trump administration, the US role in the Arctic was framed largely in the context of great-power competition, particularly in relation to China. There is little reason to assume the second Trump administration will approach the region any differently.
Russia is the world's largest Arctic state, with roughly half the world's Arctic coastline located within the Russian Federation. For Moscow, the Arctic has long been a source of national pride and identity, dating back to the era of Peter the Great. After many Arctic bases and military facilities were shuttered at the end of the Cold War, President Vladimir Putin has invested heavily in reopening, modernizing, and expanding these installations. In recent years, Russia has also fielded specialized military units designed to operate in extreme Arctic conditions.
Moscow also views the Northern Sea Route, the shipping corridor between Europe and Asia that runs along its Arctic coastline, as both geopolitically and economically significant. Russia has invested substantially in infrastructure along this route in an effort to attract more commercial shipping between European and Asian markets. However, many of Russia's ambitious cargo-volume targets have not been met, and it remains unclear whether the route will become as commercially viable as Russian officials hope.
For China, the Arctic represents yet another region where Beijing seeks to expand its global influence. Although China is not an Arctic country, it has declared itself a "near-Arctic state," despite being roughly 1,200 km from the Arctic Circle at its closest point. Beijing has leveraged international institutions such as the Arctic Council to expand its presence in the region and has taken advantage of Russia's growing isolation from the West to deepen Arctic cooperation with Moscow, often in ways that disproportionately benefit China.
China has tried to pursue investments in key Arctic infrastructure projects, including some located in NATO members, and maintains a small, but strategically significant, scientific outpost in Norway's Svalbard archipelago. While China has not conducted overt military activity above the Arctic Circle, it has sent numerous scientific missions, research vessels, and icebreakers to the region -- assets that could serve dual civilian and military purposes. In the years ahead, China can be expected to seek an even greater role in the Arctic.
Meanwhile, it has not always been clear to Europeans, beyond those countries that are Arctic states, what role the rest of the Continent should play in the region. While the EU as an institution holds policy competencies over many issues that directly affect the Arctic, member states that are Arctic countries have largely kept decision-making at the national level. In fact, the EU has attempted multiple times to join the Arctic Council as an observer, only to be blocked.
In the wake of Trump's rhetoric over Greenland, however, Europe has begun to step up its engagement in the Arctic, a development that will be welcomed in Washington. From a security perspective, the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO means that seven of the eight Arctic states now fall under the same security umbrella. For the first time, NATO itself has adopted a more direct and active role in the region.
Still, the future of Arctic cooperation hinges on the growing competition and divisions among the great powers. With relations between the West and China increasingly uncertain, and with the Arctic Council sharply reducing its activities due to the breakdown in relations between Russia and the other Arctic states, it is clear that the region will remain a zone of sustained competition. What must be avoided at all costs is allowing the Arctic to become the next theater of global conflict.
Read in Arab News (https://www.arabnews.com/node/2631298/amp).
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Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson analyzes national security and foreign policy, with a focus on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/arctic-remains-zone-sustained-competition-luke-coffey
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Posts Commentary: Frontline - Technology Is a Modern Warfighting Domain
WASHINGTON, Feb. 4 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies posted the following commentary on Feb. 2, 2026:* * *
The New Frontline: Technology Is a Modern Warfighting Domain
By Katrina Schweiker
The history of war is inextricably linked to science and technology, from the Stone Age to spears and crossbows through guns and tanks to space, nuclear, stealth, and cyber. Control of science and technology through national investments and the American creative drive for innovation has fueled U.S. hegemony for the past 80 years. China's increasing research and development investments ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 4 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies posted the following commentary on Feb. 2, 2026: * * * The New Frontline: Technology Is a Modern Warfighting Domain By Katrina Schweiker The history of war is inextricably linked to science and technology, from the Stone Age to spears and crossbows through guns and tanks to space, nuclear, stealth, and cyber. Control of science and technology through national investments and the American creative drive for innovation has fueled U.S. hegemony for the past 80 years. China's increasing research and development investmentssince 2000 demonstrate the recognition of science and technology as a "key battleground" of modern war, essential for national power and power projection. Modern war requires the United States to establish science and technology as a warfighting domain or risk ceding key terrain in the next conflict.
The technology domain (Figure 1) shares some characteristics with other warfighting domains. Like cyberspace, technology is a man-made, global domain requiring continual human engagement. Similarly, just as the land domain presents maneuver forces with terrain that varies in operational importance over time, the technology domain presents scientists, engineers, acquirers, and warfighters with different opportunities that vary in operational and strategic importance over time. Activities in the technology domain are essential for freedom of action in air, space, and cyberspace and for enabling Joint All-Domain Operations. Like air superiority, technological superiority is constrained in time and space, requiring a maneuver approach to position technical forces in key physical and technological terrain to generate advantage across all warfighting domains and time.
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Figure 1: Schematic Illustration of a Portion of the Technology Domain
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Technology Maneuver
Technology maneuver treats individual emerging technologies like contested terrain, requiring speed to seize initiative, deception to misdirect adversaries, and constant repositioning to maintain advantage. As a framework, it provides a mechanism to mobilize all national resources with a shared understanding of both warfighting and homeland defense requirements. To successfully adapt technology at combat-relevant speeds, military technical forces that are embedded with operational units must maintain continuous connection with the nation's academic and industrial bases.
Maneuvering through the technology domain is the art of modern conflict, demonstrated by the war in Ukraine. As with other forms of maneuver warfare, time is a critical factor in technology maneuver. Time pressure requires the Ukrainian military to execute nondoctrinal solutions to build new warfighting capabilities. Frontline units have integrated research and development shops that adapt commercial technology to unit-specific tactical tasks and challenges, compressing innovation and adaptation cycles to weeks, days, and even hours. Tactical innovation did not replace the work of institutions, laboratories, or centralized procurement. Rather, small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) and electronic warfare-enabled counter-UAS capabilities were of immediate importance at the tactical and operational levels, creating combat advantage to buy time for the strategically important, long-term investments in the production capacity for first-person view (FPV) drones, cruise missiles, and sUAS to occur.
Maneuver warfare is defined by actions and counteractions. In the war in Ukraine, Russia has executed several counteractions in the technology domain to which the Ukrainian military has then had to respond. In response to the rapid fielding of commercial drones by the Ukranian military, Russia deployed high-power, large-scale jammers, which then required Ukraine to innovate counter-counter-measures. The rapid industrial scaling to mass production of low-cost Shahed drones and development of fiber optic drones are other examples of technology maneuver that significantly affected all warfighting domains.
Technology maneuver lessons are not new. In World War I, Major General George Squier, commander of the Signal Corps and radio scientist, recognized that signal troops did not have the expertise required to run communications hubs. He recruited telephone operators from the United States who were technical experts in their craft, enabling faster dissemination of orders to Allies and freeing Signal Corps members to execute their mission closer to the front. Employing technical expertise for faster command and control was a huge success and marked a critical turning point for the Allies.
During World War II, Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Doolittle, an innovative aviator and one of the first recipients of an aeronautical engineering doctorate from MIT, was tasked to plan an air raid on Japan. He used his technical and operational expertise to design the plans to modify the fuel tanks of the B-25 and build innovative training and tactics so modified planes could take off from a carrier.
In each of the examples described above, leaders relearned old lessons in the crucible of combat, as the realities of war necessitated tight coupling with technical and operational forces. How might the United States set conditions now to prepare all forces and the nation so that it does not have to rediscover these principles when the next conflict starts? Technology maneuver prepares U.S. technical forces (e.g., scientists, coders, and engineers) as combatants in an essential aspect of warfighting--technological adaptation.
A successful maneuver approach needs a military prepared to outlearn the adversary by employing combined arms teams connected to existing acquisition reform levers. Recent guidance to unify defense technology innovation efforts under a single chief technology officer is a step in the right direction. The undersecretary of war for research and engineering, who will serve as the department's chief technology officer, recently released a new list of critical technology areas. The list provides some focus by consolidating the previous administration's fourteen critical technology areas to six. However, the services often duplicate investments without always having a clear purpose for doing so. One way to deconflict research investments and maximize gains is for the undersecretary of war for research and engineering to appoint a lead service for each critical technology area, optimizing investments and decisionmaking authority. The lead service for each critical technology area should then design technology development campaigns that include identification of key technology terrain, associated military objectives, and mechanisms to achieve unity of effort across the development ecosystem of academia, industry, and federal research and development organizations.
Recently, acquisition was codified as a warfighting function, following Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's unveiling of the Warfighting Acquisition System. The acquisition system has traditionally focused on the strategic level of war, generating deterrence through the development and procurement of large, complex, advanced weapons systems (Figure 2). The recent guidance memorandum on transforming the defense innovation ecosystem is the first step in realizing a future where technology development is fluid, with iteration cycles closer to combat than bureaucracy. It directed moving the current ecosystem away from alignment to technology maturity, instead aligning to the three pillars the innovation ecosystem delivers: technology innovation, product innovation, and operational capability innovation.
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Figure 2: Technology and Capability Development Across Three Levels of War
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Recommendations for Implementing Acquisition as a Warfighting Function
Practical implementation of acquisition as a warfighting function requires recognizing technology as a key warfighting domain, operationalizing the lessons from history, and enabling technology maneuver as the doctrinal framework across all levels of war.
Tactical Warfighting in the Technology Domain
The new integrated innovation ecosystem designates the Defense Innovation Unit and Strategic Capabilities Office as field activities, along with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, the Test Resource Management Center, and the Office of Strategic Capital. However, this construct does not sufficiently resource the tactical level of war in the technology domain. The services should establish technology reconnaissance detachments to pair technical forces with operational units. Technology maneuver elements at the tactical level must have clearly defined tactics, techniques, and procedures to enable frontline technology adaptation. The employment of technology combined arms teams should be institutionalized by continuing the integration of technical and operational forces in combatant commands and major exercises. The new integrated ecosystem and other defense experimentation units should link to operational units through these teams to demonstrate feasible entry points for new technologies.
The Air Force requires technology to access its primary warfighting domains and should therefore lead the way for the department by improving the integration of technical and operational forces across all levels of war. Technical officers and Futures Airmen should develop tactical adaptation experience early, empowered by the principle of decentralized initiatives to solve technological challenges at the point of need. A Technology Integrator Course should be established to produce Technology Integration Officers, who will serve as the Air Force's tactical experts in the technology domain and will be empowered as both frontline problem solvers and instructors in the art of technology maneuver.
Operational Warfighting in the Technology Domain
Critically, responsibility for executing the operational level of war in the technology domain must be defined. The technology centers in each service--the Air Force Research Laboratory, Office of Naval Research, or Army Research Laboratory--are best postured to serve as technology operations centers. Living at the nexus of past, present, and future, with relationships across academia, industry, and government, they are best postured to quarterback the information flow between tactical innovation and strategic procurement, consolidating gains at scale across the Joint Force.
Federal technology centers must continue to unapologetically imagine new futures and execute the discovery and technology development work required to bring them to fruition. Federal research and development de-risks future technology and product innovation through constant interactions across discovery, development, delivery, and adaptation. Improving feedback loops between the tactical and strategic levels of war is required to maneuver at speed.
Strategic Warfighting in the Technology Domain
Technologists across the nation--in academia, industry, and federal research centers--must incorporate modularity, adaptability, and learning fast by failing faster into their ethos.
Acquirers should fully integrate technical forces into systems integration and development programs to mitigate technical risk and deliver new capabilities at the speed required by tactical-level warfighters.
Conclusion
The United States excels at maneuver warfare because it is most closely aligned with the American military ethos, which has always prioritized initiative, adaptability, and innovation. It is time to bring this concept into the digital age by establishing technology as a warfighting domain and adopting a maneuver approach to win against the United States' adversaries. The United States' historic ability to mobilize national treasure and talent across academia, government, and industry toward a war-winning technological vision is its asymmetric advantage. The United States has ceded key technological terrain, but a maneuver approach can help take it back.
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Col. Katrina Schweiker is an active duty Air Force Officer. She is a 2025 military fellow with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
The author would like to thank the Department of the Air Force Pathfinder program and members of Project Doolittle for their active support and engagement in the development of this concept and their thoughtful review of this article.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-frontline-technology-modern-warfighting-domain
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Three Truths About the End of New START and What It Means for Strategic Competition
WASHINGTON, Feb. 4 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 2, 2026:* * *
Three Truths About the End of New START and What It Means for Strategic Competition
By Heather Williams
The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, expires February 5. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeated an offer to informally continue to observe the treaty limits for an additional year. Barring a last-minute reprieve from President Donald Trump, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 4 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 2, 2026: * * * Three Truths About the End of New START and What It Means for Strategic Competition By Heather Williams The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, expires February 5. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeated an offer to informally continue to observe the treaty limits for an additional year. Barring a last-minute reprieve from President Donald Trump,the end of New START will be the end of an era for nuclear arms control.
Here's what the end of New START does and does not mean for strategic competition: The end of New START does not augur the start of an arms race. The end of New START does not mean the United States will automatically and massively build up its nuclear arsenal. And the end of New START does not equal the end of arms control; rather, this may be the beginning of a new era of arms control. Arms control must adapt to the moment. And this moment calls for diversifying and expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal, paired with a new approach to arms control.
This Is Not an Arms Race--And If It Is, America Is Losing
The end of New START has prompted fears of a new arms race. Senator Ed Markey warned, "If the U.S. exceeds New START limits by uploading warheads, Russia will do the same, and China will use it as another excuse to build up their nuclear arsenal." The United States has shown exceptional restraint over the past decade in not expanding its arsenal and remaining committed to a modernization program since 2012. In a 2024 interview, the head of the New START delegation, Rose Gottemoeller, explained ongoing U.S. nuclear modernization as, "it's not about a buildup or a nuclear arms race--the modernization that we are undertaking. But it is about a replacement of obsolescent systems that are no longer safe to operate." But without the constraints of New START, these fears of an arms race have become more acute if the United States decides to build up, and Russia or China responds.
Arms racing is an action-reaction cycle, typically defined by an automaticity whereby one party builds up in direct response to an adversary's actions. During the Cold War, Hedley Bull described arms races as sustaining or exacerbating conflicts, as well as expressing them; however, "the idea that arms races obey a logic of their own and can only result in war, is false; and perhaps also dangerous." Some of the historic concerns about arms racing are that it can increase risks of misperception and accident, along with the financial costs. In the mid-1980s, for example, the Soviet Union was spending 15-17 percent of its GDP on defense. Whether or not we are in an arms race and whether or not arms races are "good" or "bad" remain hotly debated topics. Some experts argue that the arms race is already underway and point to Russian and Chinese nuclear buildups.
New data from both the Council on Strategic Risks and Federation of American Scientists provide insights about the quantitative and qualitative expansion of Russian and Chinese arsenals and can provide some insights into whether or not this is an arms race moment. Since New START was concluded in 2010, Russia has expanded its number of nuclear-capable systems by 22 percent on average, to include a 20 percent increase in the number of nuclear-armed submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). China has engaged in an even more rapid buildup, such as by increasing the number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles by 635 percent and adding new types of strategic and nonstrategic delivery vehicles.
Conversely, as shown in Figure 1, the United States has not expanded anywhere near the scale of Russia and China since New START was concluded in 2010. Instead, U.S. nuclear capabilities have either stayed constant or gone down.
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Figure 1: Types of Systems Active
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This asymmetry can be seen across the board in nuclear platforms. There has been a 33 percent decrease in nonstrategic nuclear weapons platforms.
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Figure 2: NSNW Types Active
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Russia has increased its SLBMs by over 20 percent, while the United States decreased by 17 percent decrease in SLBMs since New START was finalized.
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Figure 3: SLBMs
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One of the most striking changes has been the 88 percent increase in China's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, while the United States ICBM force actually decreased by 11 percent under New START.
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Figure 4: ICBMs
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What these figures show is that Russia and China have been significantly expanding their strategic arsenals despite restraint on the part of the United States. If this is a nuclear arms race, the United States is losing; and if it is not yet an arms race but turns into one, the United States is starting from behind.
The United States Does Not Need to Massively Build Up--It Needs to Diversify and Expand
Arms control is a product of its time. The New START agreement was concluded in 2010, following the 2009 U.S.-Russia "reset," President Obama's 2009 Prague speech calling for the "peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons," and an ambitious action plan for the 190 states in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to include additional arms control and risk reduction measures. At the time, a bilateral, verifiable arms control agreement was in the interests of both the United States and Russia. New START limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed warheads on 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The treaty's verification measures include on-site inspections, data and telemetric information exchanges, and a semiannual Bilateral Consultative Commission.
Historically, arms control has been a tool for managing strategic competition, and it is essentially a bargain between the parties involved that, though they may continue to compete and seek strategic advantage, they will limit themselves in this specific, discrete domain. Bilateral strategic arms control is neither a political nor a legal requirement for the United States. As described by former Department of State official Tom Countryman, "Arms control agreements are not a concession made by the United States, nor a favor done for another nation; they are an essential component of, and contributor to, our national security." Arms control comes with strategic benefits of transparency and predictability into adversary arsenals, especially through on-site inspections, and also contributes to obligations under the 1968 NPT.
Since 2010, Russia has violated, suspended, or withdrawn from numerous important arms control agreements. A 2014 Department of State compliance report raised concerns about Russia's compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In 2022, Russia suspended inspection activities under New START, and in 2023, it suspended participation in New START and withdrew ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Putin's offer to continue to observe New START limits did not include an offer to return to inspections or other transparency measures associated with the treaty. Despite its abysmal record with arms control and recent buildup in nonstrategic nuclear weapons, Russia faces practical challenges that mean it is unlikely to massively expand its strategic delivery vehicles.
What these trends all point toward is an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons by the United States' adversaries, particularly for regional ambitions to intimidate U.S. allies and partners and try to drive a wedge between them and Washington. In congressional testimony in March 2022, then-Commander of U.S. Strategic Command Charles Richard pointed to this specific concern: "It is not all strategic. There is a significant class of theater threats that we are going to have to rethink, potentially, how we deter that." Richard's successor, General Anthony Cotton emphasized that in Russia's case, nonstrategic weapons are not included under New START limits. Facing growing competition from nuclear-armed adversaries, the 2026 National Defense Strategy reasserts that the United States will "modernize and adapt our nuclear forces accordingly with focused attention on deterrence and escalation management amid the changing global nuclear landscape."
Until today, New START has restrained the United States' ability to adapt its strategic forces, but even with the treaty's end, the United States does not need a massive nuclear buildup. In his testimony, Richard said, "We do not necessarily have to match weapon for weapon.... But it is clear what we have today is the absolute minimum, and we are going to have to ask ourselves what additional capability, capacity, and posture we need to do, based on where the threat is going." What the United States needs now is a nuclear force posture that is more diverse and flexible to deter an increasing range of threats across multiple theaters, which may require expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal, albeit "not radically, not monumentally."
With the end of New START, the United States can consider at least four options for how it might change its nuclear force posture to align with Richard's recommendations and develop a nuclear force that is more flexible. The first option would be to upload warheads to existing ICBM and SLBM platforms, which could "roughly double" the number of deployed warheads from New START numbers, according to former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kingston Reif. In the Project Atom 2025 study, Matthew Costlow makes the case for the second option: the United States should expand its procurement of systems that are "resilient, survivable, and forward-deployed (or deployable) in theater," such as a new stand-off weapon or dual-capable intermediate-range systems. A third option would be expanding existing plans for nuclear modernization, such as additional B-21s or Columbia-class submarines. A final option, of course, is to make no changes to plans for U.S. nuclear force posture and instead invest in conventional capabilities, although this would come with a significant risk of undermining assurance and allied proliferation.
How the United States Can Lead a New Era of Arms Control
This is not the end of arms control. In an interview for the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues arms control oral history project, Gottemoeller pointed to this as a moment of opportunity for arms control: "It's very important the next treaty must be very much a Donald J. Trump treaty and Vladimir V. Putin treaty. It has to step into this new era that we are experiencing now with Trump in the lead." Bull described arms control as "spasmodic." It happens in waves, as evidenced throughout the history of the Cold War. Although this moment might signal a downturn in arms control as we know it, President Trump has repeatedly expressed an interest in a "denuclearization" agreement with Russia and China, which suggests a window of opportunity for new approaches to arms control.
What is to be done in this new era of arms control? As it considers how to respond to the pressures of the security environment and Russian and Chinese nuclear buildups, the Trump administration can pursue three simultaneous arms control priorities, some of them ambitious. First, Trump himself should play a role in leading future arms control initiatives. This could include a head-of-state-level trilateral meeting with Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, committing to a series of measures reducing the risks of nuclear use, such as hotlines, keeping a human in the loop in nuclear decisionmaking, and recommitting to the NPT. China has historically avoided any dialogue that hints at "arms control," but a head-of-state-level dialogue may tempt Xi. Trump's interest in new multilateral institutions, such as the Board of Peace, could be well-suited to nuclear diplomacy, such as establishing a Nuclear Risk Reduction Summit.
Second, while leaving the door open for dialogue with Moscow and Beijing, the Trump administration should also work with the international community to hold Russia and China accountable for their risky nuclear activities. Russia and China have expanded their nuclear arsenals with impunity. Both are suspected of conducting low-yield nuclear tests in violation of a testing moratorium. And Russia has consistently relied on nuclear threats throughout the war in Ukraine, with no accountability on the international stage. Key actors that claim to champion nuclear disarmament have refused to call out Russian behavior in the United Nations. South Africa, for example, abstained from four key resolutions on Ukraine, including one on the safety of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
Reducing the risks of nuclear weapons use is not only the responsibility of the United States, but of all nuclear possessors, and it is the responsibility of the wider international community to hold bad actors responsible. Until now, Russia and China have gotten a free pass. The United States can contribute to this accountability effort by sharing more data about Russian and Chinese nuclear buildups and behavior, combating disinformation about the U.S. nuclear posture, and actively participating in international forums such as the NPT.
And finally, the future of arms control requires the people and knowledge to seize opportunities when they arise. This new era of arms control requires new thinking, new ideas, and the creativity that the next generation of arms control leaders can bring. At the same time, the lessons learned from treaties like New START, particularly tacit knowledge, should not be lost. To be sure, the end of New START is a moment for reflection on all the treaty achieved and how the strategic landscape has changed since 2010; but it should also be a cue for new thinking on arms control and how it can work in tandem with deterrence in this era of strategic competition.
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Heather Williams is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/three-truths-about-end-new-start-and-what-it-means-strategic-competition
[Category: ThinkTank]