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Rand Issues Commentary: Embracing 'Cuspness' - Australian Strategy in an Emerging World Order
SANTA MONICA, California, March 6 -- Rand issued the following commentary on March 5, 2026, by researcher Iain MacGillivray:
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Embracing 'Cuspness': Australian Strategy in an Emerging World Order
If ongoing geopolitical and regional trends persist, Australia may no longer be able to rely on the rules-based order. In such a scenario, maintaining the country's status as a stable middle power would arguably be the best short-term strategy. However, Australia's capacity to project global influence and shape the region will increasingly depend on its strategic importance rather than on rules,
... Show Full Article
SANTA MONICA, California, March 6 -- Rand issued the following commentary on March 5, 2026, by researcher Iain MacGillivray:
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Embracing 'Cuspness': Australian Strategy in an Emerging World Order
If ongoing geopolitical and regional trends persist, Australia may no longer be able to rely on the rules-based order. In such a scenario, maintaining the country's status as a stable middle power would arguably be the best short-term strategy. However, Australia's capacity to project global influence and shape the region will increasingly depend on its strategic importance rather than on rules,ideals, or values. Relying on emotional concerns about Australia's strategic dependence on the United States is unproductive, whilst clinging to outdated, static strategies or falling into the sunk-cost fallacy during regional and global upheavals will not adequately prepare Australia for the future.
How can Australia reinvent itself? One strategy is to adopt a distinct strategic position in the Indo-Pacific. Viewing Australia through the lens of cuspness offers an innovative perspective on its strategic challenges and a potential framework for adapting to the long-term disorder that may emerge.
What Is a Cusp State?
A cusp state refers to a nation that exists delicately on the border of established regions. These states are characterised not only by their geographic position but also by differences in culture, history, ethnicity, and beliefs that distinguish them from neighbouring areas. While they are not superpowers, cusp states often serve as important middle powers, featuring unique languages and economies. Importantly, cusp states are not all the same, even if they share similar geographic traits. Philip Robins, an expert on cusp states, suggests calling them "strategic countries"--nations whose actions significantly affect the complex, multilayered nature of international relations. Examples include Japan, Mexico, Israel, and Turkey.
These strategically important, often volatile states balance multiple influences and typically pursue pragmatic cooperation or adopt unique approaches to pursuing their national interests. Typically located between two or more regions, cusp states constantly decide whether to engage closely with specific areas or remain neutral. They often see themselves as "bridges" that connect diverse regions, which enables them to influence regional policies and outcomes while safeguarding their economic, diplomatic, defence, and security interests. They use strategies such as mediation, soft power, and multilateral diplomacy through existing institutions to reach their goals.
Cusp states are also volatile because they take riskier actions, such as the use of military force, to defend their national interests. This volatility arises from their position between rival power centres, where there is ongoing pressure to align with one side or another. They tend to balance among these rivals and manipulate relationships with great powers to gain concessions from multiple sides. This results in strategic hedging and frequent adjustments in foreign policy. Yet what appears as volatility--often involving the avoidance of alliance decisions that don't serve their interests--is primarily an exercise in strategic autonomy. They do not always seek consensus; rather, they often oscillate between agreement and resistance to new rules or changes when their interests are at risk. This flexibility is crucial and sets them apart from states without such a central and strategic position. This approach also affects how they engage with international institutions.
Turkey exemplifies the qualities of a cusp state. It showcases how a middle power can maintain strategic independence while functioning within alliance frameworks. As a NATO member for 74 years, Turkey occupies a strategic position between Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. Its status as a cusp state means it isn't fully aligned with any of the three regions. This enables Turkey to adopt flexible, multidirectional foreign and economic policies by oscillating between these areas and identities. It strives for strategic independence, balancing relations with Russia and the United States while operating autonomously. Concurrently, Turkey has expanded its influence across Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. It has mediated in the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict and played a role in reshaping Syria, for better or worse. Although Turkey aspires to join the EU, it still significantly influences debates and policies by opposing EU measures that affect its national interests.
Turkey's cusp identity and mercurical nature can be counterproductive, at times damaging its reputation and fostering mistrust among allies and partners. Unlike other cusp states, Turkey's institutional frameworks are weak, and its society lacks strong social cohesion; thus, it may struggle to reconcile internal tensions that are necessary to leverage its cusp status to its advantage without incurring domestic and geopolitical costs. Importantly, it has prioritised its national interests when necessary, at times disregarding its allies. Although this approach has been unpopular, it has sometimes been strategically correct. In hindsight, Turkey's strategically autonomous approach to the Syrian crisis demonstrates this kind of strategic thinking and an embrace of its cusp identity, which ultimately paid off for Turkey's political and security interests. Nonetheless, despite its volatility as a strategic actor, it remains within security alliance frameworks and is considered an important strategic partner, though it occasionally resists broader consensus. Despite these challenges, Turkey's cusp dynamics and its ability to navigate strategic autonomy within alliances offer valuable lessons for Australia.
Australia: Adopting Cusp State Dynamics
In a highly competitive environment among great powers, adopting cusp dynamics could give Australia a strategic edge by enabling it to remain flexible and adaptive. This approach could help Australia manage its international relations carefully and hedge its bets when needed. It would recognise its liminal position among regions and primarily pursue its national interests in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and adjacent areas through transactional methods. Although it would join multilateral frameworks when necessary, it would avoid them if they conflict with its interests. Alliances would be evaluated through cost-benefit analysis, adopting a pragmatic, transactional view of the U.S.-Australia security partnership while also prioritising increased engagement with regional nations. Military activities would primarily focus within Australia's sphere of influence, and it would develop capabilities that support this strategy. This practical approach involves shaping and influencing regional and global developments to benefit Australia, potentially acting as a disruptive force that challenges emerging power structures and norms to safeguard its vital interests, rather than aligning with larger powers or prevailing trends.
Australia could enhance its role in Southeast Asia and the Pacific by acting as both a mediator and a regional participant, choosing when and with whom to engage, but not necessarily aligning with regional consensus. Already serving as a link between Western and Asian nations through its involvement in the Quad and ASEAN, Australia's embrace of cusp dynamics builds on these efforts. By accepting certain volatility in its relationships and recognising that its cuspness entails trade-offs, including sacrifices and compromises of values, Australia would be better able to manage its position in great-power competition. It could pursue pragmatic cooperation or, when necessary, forge its own strategic path in a rapidly changing region. Using cusp-state traits leverages Australia's geographic and strategic position and its identity tensions to benefit from the U.S.-China rivalry without full alignment. As in the earlier Turkish example, Australia's strategic significance would enable it to remain relevant within existing alliance frameworks, secure benefits, and preserve strategic independence as a middle power by adapting these cusp dynamics into its future strategy.
Adopting cusp state dynamics carries risks. Australia would need to dedicate substantial resources to defence and reduce its dependence on the U.S. and China to enhance strategic flexibility. Overusing this strategy could lead Asian neighbours to view Australia's balancing efforts as opportunistic or inconsistent, thereby risking mistrust among allies and partners. Managing numerous relationships could also dilute Australia's focus, and excessive economic diversification and hedging could invite economic coercion by larger powers. Additionally, this strategy may face opposition from politicians and public servants who support an alliance system that might become outdated as the global landscape changes over the next decade, and they may resist shifting Australia's identity away from its Western roots. All significant and important risks to consider. However, Australia possesses strong institutions, diplomatic sophistication, and, most importantly, domestic cohesion--qualities that, when effectively utilised, make it a formidable power in the Indo-Pacific and a more ideal candidate for strategically leveraging its cuspness.
Australian Strategic Distinctiveness and the Emerging Order
The Indo-Pacific region faces increasing instability, necessitating that Australia adapt to changing circumstances. Practical diplomacy and strategic power play are essential. Despite some suggestions to revive a form of middle-power alliance outside of great-power competition and to promote "values-based realism"--a term that seems contradictory--if trends continue and the rules-based order is indeed in its death throes, then Australia might face a pivotal moment.
The challenge ahead for Australia is its absence of a tragic sensibility, which is necessary for accepting unavoidable trade-offs, value compromises, and potential losses in an uncertain future. Countries with strong strategic cultures understand this intrinsic realism. Incorporating cusp dynamics into its long-term strategy acknowledges internal tensions and regional shifts. Some may claim that this cusp-focused approach offers a narrow perspective on Australia's global role and is overly pragmatic and realist, suggesting that it is nothing more than hedging. But hedging assumes a highly reactive stance toward great-power politics and fails to account for proactive agency in shaping, acting on, and pursuing Australian interests in the near region and beyond. In the coming decades, Australia must recognise that it will need to leverage its resources and employ statecraft more effectively to sustain its strategic edge in a region poised to become the world's political and economic hub. Ignoring this is unrealistic and driven by optimism bias.
While policymakers often hesitate to embrace change, geopolitical shifts inevitably affect everyone. As author and physician Han Suyin observed, "We are all products of our time, vulnerable to history." Strategic imagination can be limited only by an inability to think broadly and create the right conditions. If Australia wants to address its middle-power anxiety, it needs to shift from reactive management to strategic planning amid changing global and regional conditions, necessitating adjustments to its strategy.
By integrating cusp dynamics into its middle-power role, Australia can position itself as a knowledgeable and influential regional actor--ready to influence when necessary and to assertively oppose unwanted changes. Having some form of strategic autonomy is primarily about relative gains rather than absolute gains. Key to this approach is managing cusp flexibility without damaging credibility, which requires careful diplomacy and, if necessary, strategic revisions. Australia isn't lacking strategic imagination, but it lacks the permission to think beyond its last 80 years of success. It must adapt to the instability shaping the next decade or face failure, and it should prepare for potential setbacks. Embracing cuspness offers a way to look beyond the current strategic horizon and consider what comes next for a key country that should aim to be a force in regional geopolitics and economics in the coming century.
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More About This Commentary
Iain MacGillivray is a researcher at RAND Australia.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/03/embracing-cuspness-australian-strategy-in-an-emerging.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: Big Lie Behind Mamdani's 'Tax the Rich' Demands
NEW YORK, March 6 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 4, 2026, by E.J. McMahon, senior fellow at the Empire Center for Public Policy, to the New York Post:
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The Big Lie Behind Mamdani's 'Tax the Rich' Demands
If there's one political slogan that's risen to the level of obsession with Mayor Zohran Mamdani, Democratic state lawmakers and other New York progressives, it's "tax the rich."
But unlike, say, "freeze the rent" -- which at least describes a demand that hasn't yet been achieved -- "tax the rich" is also slyly deceptive.
It implies,
... Show Full Article
NEW YORK, March 6 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 4, 2026, by E.J. McMahon, senior fellow at the Empire Center for Public Policy, to the New York Post:
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The Big Lie Behind Mamdani's 'Tax the Rich' Demands
If there's one political slogan that's risen to the level of obsession with Mayor Zohran Mamdani, Democratic state lawmakers and other New York progressives, it's "tax the rich."
But unlike, say, "freeze the rent" -- which at least describes a demand that hasn't yet been achieved -- "tax the rich" is also slyly deceptive.
It implies,falsely, that New York isn't already squeezing top earners harder than everyone else.
In fact, raising taxes on income millionaires has been Albany's primary revenue-raising strategy since the end of the 2007-'09 Great Recession.
As a result, New Yorkers with incomes over $1 million are now subject to the highest statutory tax rates since the early 1980s.
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Continue reading the entire piece here at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/03/04/opinion/the-big-lie-behind-mamdanis-tax-the-rich-demands). Based off a recent Issue Brief (https://manhattan.institute/article/the-limits-of-new-yorks-tax-the-rich-policy).
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E.J. McMahon is a senior fellow at the Empire Center for Public Policy and a Manhattan Institute adjunct fellow. Follow him on Twitter here.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/the-big-lie-behind-mamdanis-tax-the-rich-demands
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Poland Considers Developing Nuclear Program
WASHINGTON, March 6 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on March 4, 2026, by Jakub Bornio, senior analyst for the Institute of Central Europe in Lublin, Poland, and an assistant professor at the University of Wroclaw, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Poland Considers Developing Nuclear Program
Executive Summary:
* Polish President Karol Nawrocki has become the first senior Polish official to openly support initiating work on the development of Polish nuclear capabilities. His statement on this issue reflects an ongoing debate within Polish analytical and expert circles.
*
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, March 6 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on March 4, 2026, by Jakub Bornio, senior analyst for the Institute of Central Europe in Lublin, Poland, and an assistant professor at the University of Wroclaw, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Poland Considers Developing Nuclear Program
Executive Summary:
* Polish President Karol Nawrocki has become the first senior Polish official to openly support initiating work on the development of Polish nuclear capabilities. His statement on this issue reflects an ongoing debate within Polish analytical and expert circles.
*Some representatives of Polish political circles have shifted their ambitions from merely joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) nuclear sharing program to initiating work on Poland's own nuclear capabilities.
* This shift is related to the perceived erosion of the international order and to the ambiguities, from Warsaw's perspective, surrounding U.S. policy on allied security guarantees vis-a-vis Russia.
On February 15, Polish President Karol Nawrocki, when asked in an interview about his position on initiating a Polish nuclear program, stated that "the path toward a Polish nuclear project, in full respect of all international regulations, is a path Poland should pursue." Pressed further on whether "the Americans would allow it," he replied that he "did not know, but that Poland should nevertheless move in this direction and begin preparatory work," citing Poland's frontline status and "imperial Russia's obvious attitude toward Poland" (Polsat News, February 15). Nawrocki became the first senior Polish political leader to openly advocate for developing an autonomous nuclear capability. The debate on nuclear deterrence in Poland, however, had already begun in 2020.
Poland's 2020 National Security Strategy was the first strategic document that signaled the Polish government's intention to engage more actively in shaping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) nuclear deterrence policy (see EDM, May 29, 2020). It implicitly referred to Poland's participation in NATO's Nuclear Sharing program. In 2020, the issue also gained international attention when voices emerged in Germany calling for withdrawal from NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement, and then-U.S. Ambassador to Poland Georgette Mosbacher suggested-- apparently assessing reactions--that U.S. nuclear assets could be relocated to Polish territory (Euractiv, May 20, 2020).
The deficit in nuclear deterrence had been evident in Poland long before the watershed events for regional security--the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2014 and Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. As early as 2009, the Russian-Belarusian Zapad military exercises included a simulated nuclear strike on Warsaw (see EDM, September 30, 2009). Since the current Deputy Chairman of Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev's presidency, Russia has regularly threatened to deploy Iskander-M missiles--capable of carrying nuclear warheads--in its Kaliningrad oblast, which borders Poland. Western support for Ukraine after 2014 has contributed to an intensification of Russian nuclear coercion.
NATO's post-2014 adaptation strategy relied primarily on strengthening conventional capabilities and refining operational procedures. The debate over extending the nuclear umbrella to the Eastern Flank states remained sporadic and was largely confined to expert circles (see, for example, CSIS, January 27, 2016). After 2022, however, the nuclear deterrence deficit on the Eastern Flank became increasingly apparent. In June 2023, following Russia's deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, then-Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki publicly called on allies to include Poland in the nuclear sharing program (Gazeta Prawna, June 30, 2023).
In the absence of a substantive debate among NATO partners--particularly the United States, whose nuclear potential vis-a-vis Russia remains the most important--Polish decision-makers began exploring alternative solutions, including cooperation with France. In March 2025, then-President Andrzej Duda expressed support for French President Emmanuel Macron's proposal to extend the French nuclear umbrella over Europe (President of Poland, March 13, 2025). During the same period, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk signaled the opening of negotiations with France on this matter (Biznes PAP, March 7, 2025). Polish analytical centers indicated that the issue was discussed during negotiations of the Polish-French treaty signed in May 2025 (PISM, May 13, 2025). Even though the treaty did not contain explicit provisions on nuclear deterrence, Macron emphasized that the mutual security assistance clause "involves all the components." On March the 2, Tusk stated, "Poland is in talks with France and a group of closest European allies on the programme of advanced nuclear deterrence" (X/@donaldtusk, March 2). Despite high-level political consultations, it remains evident in Poland that French nuclear guarantees cannot substitute for those of the United States. More broadly, France faces significant credibility challenges as an ally, stemming from technological limitations, objective capability constraints, and doubts regarding political will.
Nawrocki's remarks coincide with a broader debate on the proliferation of nuclear capabilities in Europe and globally. Amid the erosion of the international security architecture, similar discussions have emerged in Australia, South Korea, and Sweden (Australian Foreign Affairs, October 2018; Foundation for Strategic Research, July 18, 2025; Breaking Defense, January 27). In Germany, too, there is an ongoing debate on European nuclear capabilities (MSC, February 2026). Nawrocki's statements, however, still received wide coverage in the international media (See, for example, Bloomberg, February 15; The Telegraph, February 16).
Subsequently, Polish Minister of National Defense Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz expressed measured support regarding the idea of developing national nuclear capabilities. He declared himself in favor of "developing our own research and development capacities" (Polskie Radio 24, February 17). After some time, Tusk reiterated the same position (X/@donaldtusk, March 3). Not all members of the Polish government, however, viewed the president's initiative positively. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Radoslaw Sikorski described Nawrocki's remarks as "irresponsible and harmful," suggesting that such a debate should not be conducted publicly (Polskie Radio 24, February 19). Meanwhile, recent surveys indicate that more than 50 percent of Poles support Poland's acquisition of nuclear capabilities (TVP.info, March 3).
The debate over Poland's potential acquisition of nuclear capabilities has also undergone a qualitative shift within the expert community. Previously, the discussion focused primarily on extending allied nuclear guarantees to Poland (Instytut Europy Srodkowej, April 30, 2024). Changes in the international order, however, have compelled Polish analysts to reassess the issue more fundamentally (Swidzinski, 2026; Defence24.pl, February 16; Koziej, February 19).
The progressive erosion of the international security architecture and the persistent Russian nuclear coercion constitute the principal determinants of the renewed debate on nuclear deterrence in Poland. By 2026, the discussion no longer concerns solely participation in nuclear sharing arrangements or the extension of another state's nuclear umbrella. The qualitative shift triggered by Nawrocki's remarks is closely linked to U.S. President Donald Trump's administration's ambiguous policy toward Europe. Efforts to "Europeanize" NATO have exposed Europe's deficiencies in deterring Russia, including in the nuclear domain.
In Poland, doubts regarding the credibility of Western European allies--particularly in the nuclear dimension--persist. The principal concern in Warsaw, however, is not merely about declaratory assurances. Rather, it is the shift in U.S. posture in the region, especially in light of diplomatic attempts to reach accommodations with Russia, that has revitalized the domestic debate on nuclear capabilities. This is particularly salient given that nuclear weapons remain a domain in which Russia retains a significant advantage vis-a-vis Poland. By contrast, in the conventional sphere, Russia currently generates fewer concerns due to the growing capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces and the substantial difficulties Moscow has encountered in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
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Dr. Jakub Bornio is an assistant professor at the University of Wroclaw and a senior analyst for the Institute of Central Europe in Lublin, Poland.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/poland-considers-developing-nuclear-program/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Kremlin Suspends Internal Russian Passport Issuance in Abkhazia
WASHINGTON, March 6 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on March 5, 2026, by Irakli Laitadze, former career diplomat and academic, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Kremlin Suspends Internal Russian Passport Issuance in Abkhazia
Executive Summary:
* In early February, the Kremlin suspended the issuance of internal Russian passports inside Abkhazia, a breakaway territory of Georgia, after concerns from local authorities about sovereignty, relocating the offices to nearby Sochi, Russia. The move highlights tensions surrounding Moscow's long-running "passportization"
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, March 6 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on March 5, 2026, by Irakli Laitadze, former career diplomat and academic, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Kremlin Suspends Internal Russian Passport Issuance in Abkhazia
Executive Summary:
* In early February, the Kremlin suspended the issuance of internal Russian passports inside Abkhazia, a breakaway territory of Georgia, after concerns from local authorities about sovereignty, relocating the offices to nearby Sochi, Russia. The move highlights tensions surrounding Moscow's long-running "passportization"campaign in Abkhazia, where 80 percent of residents are dual citizens of Abkhazia and Russia.
* Since Russia's 2008 war with Georgia, Moscow has steadily integrated Abkhazia through security cooperation, financial systems integration, infrastructure investments, and legal harmonization. These mechanisms embed the territory within Russian systems--direct financial transfers from Russia constituted 30 percent of Abkhazia's 2025 budget, for example--without pursuing formal annexation.
* Russia is continually hollowing out Abkhazia's genuine sovereignty while maintaining its nominal independence. This incremental integration strengthens Moscow's leverage in the South Caucasus and entrenches long-term Russian control over Georgia's breakaway territory.
In early February, the Kremlin suspended the issuance of internal Russian passports in Abkhazia--a breakaway region of Georgia effectively under Russian control since the Kremlin's 2008 invasion--to dual citizens over concerns about Russian "passportization" (Caucasian Knot, February 6; February 7). Passportization refers to the mass, fast-track naturalization of a territory's population by distributing passports (see EDM, January 22). Of the approximately 224,000 residents of Abkhazia, 190,000, approximately 80 percent, hold dual "Abkhaz" and Russian citizenship (The Moscow Times, February 6). Abkhazians do not automatically hold Russian citizenship, but they have access to a simplified acquisition program that broadened after legislation changes in 2002 and grew further after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and Russia's recognition of Abkhazia's "independence" (see EDM, October 21, 2021). Abkhazia's "independence" is only recognized by Nicaragua, Russia, Syria, Tuvalu, and Venezuela, so obtaining Russian citizenship and an international Russian passport is one of the only ways for residents of Abkhazia to travel to other countries. In Russia, the internal and international passports are distinct, with the internal passport mainly designed for identification within Russia, access to Russian state services, and travel to a few other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the international passport designed for international travel. In July 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing the issuance of internal Russian passports to citizens inside of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Official Legal Acts of Russia, July 17, 2025). Passportization is a direct threat to Abkhazia's marginal independence, eroding it through legal and demographic means with each successive expansion.
On February 4, the Abkhazian parliament held a closed session questioning the legal basis of allowing Russian documents to be issued through Abkhazian institutions (Apsadgil.info, February 4). No official statement was issued from the Abkhazian parliament, but some ministers told journalists that the parliament would recommend that the interior ministry halt the process. Kan Kvarchia, a member of the Abkhazian parliament, questioned the legality of the issuance of internal Russian passports in Abkhazia, which he stated constitutes interference in the internal affairs of a "sovereign state" (Telegram/@apsnypress, February 6). Two days later, Russian Ambassador to Abkhazia Mikhail Shurgalin announced that the embassy would stop issuing internal Russian passports in Abkhazia, saying that "now, obtaining a passport is only possible in Russia and requires a state fee of 4,000 to 6,000 rubles ($50 to $76)" (Russian Embassy in Abkhazia; Telegram/@apsnypress, February 6; JAM News, February 9). Shurgalin said that both Putin and Abkhaz authorities had greenlit Russian internal passport and driver's license offices in Abkhazia, and that closing the office in Abkhazia would limit dual citizens' access to Russian government services and social benefits (The Moscow Times, Telegram/@apsnypress, February 6). The Russian embassy in Abkhazia halted the passportization process in Sokhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, only to relocate the issuance process to Sochi, Russia (BPN, February 18). The episode exposed unease within Abkhazia about the implications of Russian citizenship (Abkhaz Inform, December 25, 2025).
Since its 2008 invasion of Georgia, Russia has consolidated its military, security, institutional, and bureaucratic presence in Abkhazia (Gogov, February 7, 2024; Vedomosti, December 31, 2025). Russia is using hard and soft power to gradually solidify its control (Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 4, 2025). Unlike Crimea's open and rapid annexation in 2014, Abkhazia's integration into Russia has crawled, a slow diminution of Abkhazian "statehood" by military, financial, legal, and demographic mechanisms. Although Abkhazian leaders have sought to convince the Abkhaz public that Russia and Abkhazia are equal partners, crucial government functions are increasingly controlled by Moscow (Apsnypress, June 8, 2024).
Russia's military and security footprint in Abkhazia is the cornerstone of Moscow's control. The military base in Gudauta is incorporated in the Southern Grouping of Russia's Ministry of Defense, and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) guards the border between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. Russia is upgrading Abkhazian infrastructure--including the Sukhumi airport and other communication centers--and regularly carries out joint military exercises with local forces. Moscow also plans to build a military seaport in Ochamchire capable of giving safe haven to Russia's Black Sea Fleet vessels (TASS, October 5, 2023; Sova News, December 23, 2025). A cargo terminal under construction in the Gali region carries the risk of becoming a hub for military or dual-use goods smuggled to Russia through essentially non-existent customs controls (Abkhazeti Info, December 10, 2025). Incorporation into Russian defense systems makes Abkhazia profoundly dependent on Moscow (see EDM, November 20, 2023; Sova News, September 30, 2024). These developments will facilitate Russia's war against Ukraine while transforming Abkhazia's sea and land into potential war zones. In October 2023, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy did not rule out striking Russian naval assets at the new base (Ukrainska Pravda, October 24, 2023). In July 2025, Ukrainian drones allegedly entered Abkhazian airspace for the first time (OC Media, July 24, 2025). Kremlin-affiliated news recently reported that the Russian and Abkhazian militaries recorded 30 drones of unclear origin in a "massive, unprecedented air raid" on Abkhazia on March 4 (RIA Novosti, March 5).
According to Mikheil Ukleba--former first deputy minister of foreign affairs of Georgia and former Georgian ambassador to Ukraine and the People's Republic of China (PRC)--economic dependency is another instrument that Russia uses to integrate Abkhazia into Russia (Author's interview, February 17). Direct financial transfers from Moscow financed 30 percent of Abkhazia's state budget in 2025 and are expected to cover 28 percent of expenditures in 2026, making the government directly responsible to the Kremlin (Vedomosti, December 30, 2024; Sputnik Abkhazia, December 29, 2025). Russian investments in Abkhazian infrastructure develop the territory's transportation and energy sectors. Russian companies are securing long-term leases along the Black Sea and are actively engaged in the hospitality business. Pensions and social allowances paid by Russia directly build the population's loyalty to Moscow (Apsnypress, March 12, 2025).
The 2014 Agreement on Alliance and Strategic Partnership established the legal framework governing Russian-Abkhazian relations (Government of the Russian Federation, November 24, 2014). The agreement's key provisions formalized the gradual harmonization of Abkhazia's legal framework with Russia's--including military and security regulations, tax alignment, banking standards, and health policy--significantly curtailing the scope of autonomous local decision-making (Civil Georgia, August 15, 2024). The expansion of Russian security agencies' jurisdiction over Abkhazian territory has deepened Moscow's direct presence. Russian banks are replacing local financial institutions, while financial reporting and budgetary planning are aligned with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Passportization is one of the most consequential instruments in the steady erosion of Abkhazia's so-called statehood. Russian passportization of the population of Abkhazia is a basis for powerful political rhetoric about "defense of Russian citizens," and can easily serve as a justification for Russian military presence in the South Caucasus. Passportization can also worsen fissures in local populations and form distrust between different layers of society. Russia has a large degree of control over Abkhazia's economy, security, and politics. The Kremlin has methodically rearranged political, military, economic, and legal mechanisms to gradually dissolve the remnants of Abkhazia's independence. Over the long term, Russia's effective control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 20 percent of Georgia's territory, will restructure the balance of power in the South Caucasus. According to Ukleba, Abkhazia is an instrument of Russia's geopolitical strategy in the region (Author's interview, February 17). Abkhazian state institutions are empty shells, while Moscow makes all the meaningful decisions--a serious security threat for the South Caucasus.
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Irakli Laitadze is a former career diplomat and academic. He served as Senior Counsellor at the Mission of Georgia to the European Union and previously headed the EU Political Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/kremlin-suspends-internal-russian-passport-issuance-in-abkhazia/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Wall Street Journal: Can the Iranian Regime Survive?
WASHINGTON, March 6 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 5, 2026, by Walter Russell Mead, Ravenel B. Curry III distinguished fellow in strategy and statesmanship, to the Wall Street Journal:
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Can the Iranian Regime Survive?
A ground war is unlikely, but the US and Israel have other ideas about how to bring the mullahs down.
*
Can the Islamic Republic of Iran survive the waves of devastating attacks being launched around the clock by the Israelis and
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, March 6 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 5, 2026, by Walter Russell Mead, Ravenel B. Curry III distinguished fellow in strategy and statesmanship, to the Wall Street Journal:
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Can the Iranian Regime Survive?
A ground war is unlikely, but the US and Israel have other ideas about how to bring the mullahs down.
*
Can the Islamic Republic of Iran survive the waves of devastating attacks being launched around the clock by the Israelis andAmericans? Nobody knows.
Unlike Saddam Hussein's Iraq or Moammar Gadhafi's Libya, Iran has a long record of success. On Oct. 6, 2023, it appeared to be achieving its long-term goal of a durable hegemony in the Middle East. Its proxies and allies dominated Iraq.
Bashar al-Assad seemed firmly in power in Syria. Hezbollah held Lebanon's destiny in its hands. The Houthis had enough firepower to choke off navigation through the Red Sea, depriving Egypt of badly needed Suez Canal revenue and imposing costs on shipping and trade.
Read the full article in The Wall Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/opinion/can-the-iranian-regime-survive-c56d25f8?mod=articletype_article_pos1).
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At A Glance:
Walter Russell Mead is the Ravenel B. Curry III distinguished fellow in strategy and statesmanship at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/can-iranian-regime-survive-walter-russell-mead
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for American Progress: Trump's Voluntary 'Pledge' From Big Tech Offers No Real Protection From Soaring Utility Costs
WASHINGTON, March 6 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following statement on March 4, 2026:
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Trump's Voluntary 'Pledge' From Big Tech Offers No Real Protection From Soaring Utility Costs
Today, President Donald Trump is meeting at the White House with leaders of major technology companies to formalize a voluntary "Ratepayer Protection Pledge" for consumers. In response, Trevor Higgins, senior vice president of the Energy and Environment department at the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement:
A voluntary pledge from corporate actors to stay on their
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WASHINGTON, March 6 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following statement on March 4, 2026:
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Trump's Voluntary 'Pledge' From Big Tech Offers No Real Protection From Soaring Utility Costs
Today, President Donald Trump is meeting at the White House with leaders of major technology companies to formalize a voluntary "Ratepayer Protection Pledge" for consumers. In response, Trevor Higgins, senior vice president of the Energy and Environment department at the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement:
A voluntary pledge from corporate actors to stay on theirbest behavior is simply a vague and largely meaningless effort that fails to offer ratepayers any guaranteed protection from soaring utility rates.
Unless all data centers are required to pay their fair share for the costs for their power, companies can opt out or hide the true impacts of their data center development. And if the Trump administration continues to block the fastest, cleanest power from being added to the grid, it will force data centers to use dirty, expensive coal and gas plants in communities around the country.
The country needs a real plan that requires all tech companies to pay the full costs of powering their new data centers.
For more information or to speak with an expert, please contact Sam Hananel at shananel@americanprogress.org.
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Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/statement-trumps-voluntary-pledge-from-big-tech-offers-no-real-protection-from-soaring-utility-costs/
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Applauds Termination of National Student Clearinghouse-Tufts Student Voter Data Partnership
WASHINGTON, March 6 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on March 5, 2026:
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AFPI Applauds Termination of National Student Clearinghouse-Tufts Student Voter Data Partnership
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) issued the following statement from Anna Pingel, Campaign Director for Secure Elections, after the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) announced it will terminate its partnership with Tufts University's National Study of Learning, Voting, and Engagement (NSLVE) program amid an ongoing U.S. Department of Education investigation into potential violations
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WASHINGTON, March 6 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on March 5, 2026:
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AFPI Applauds Termination of National Student Clearinghouse-Tufts Student Voter Data Partnership
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) issued the following statement from Anna Pingel, Campaign Director for Secure Elections, after the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) announced it will terminate its partnership with Tufts University's National Study of Learning, Voting, and Engagement (NSLVE) program amid an ongoing U.S. Department of Education investigation into potential violationsof student data privacy protections.
"AFPI is encouraged that students are finally being protected," said Pingel. "The dissolution of the NSC and NSLVE partnership is in the best interest of universities, parents, and students. It represents an important step toward ensuring that sensitive student data is not exploited for political purposes. The purpose of higher education is to prepare students for the workforce, not to make them unwitting targets of political operations."
The NSC-NSLVE partnership was originally created following pressure from the Obama administration targeting universities to increase student voter turnout. Earlier this year, AFPI sent a letter to the Department of Education outlining concerns that the partnership may have allowed sensitive student data to be shared with third parties for political purposes, potentially violating the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-applauds-termination-of-national-student-clearinghousetufts-student-voter-data-partnership
[Category: ThinkTank]
