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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Honor Killings and Blood Feuds Remain Widespread in North Caucasus
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Honor Killings and Blood Feuds Remain Widespread in North Caucasus
11.19.2026
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
* Honor killings and blood feuds in the North Caucasus, crimes the Soviet authorities tried to wipe out as "survivals of the past," remain major problems and even appear to have increased significantly since 1991 despite claims to the contrary by local officials.
* Exactly how much they have gone up, however, is difficult to say because ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Honor Killings and Blood Feuds Remain Widespread in North Caucasus 11.19.2026 Paul Goble Executive Summary: * Honor killings and blood feuds in the North Caucasus, crimes the Soviet authorities tried to wipe out as "survivals of the past," remain major problems and even appear to have increased significantly since 1991 despite claims to the contrary by local officials. * Exactly how much they have gone up, however, is difficult to say becauseof the lack of data. A Dagestani scholar's suggestion that laws should be softened concerning them, however, has provoked a widespread discussion that has brought far more evidence to light.
* This information now available underscores that such killings are deeply rooted in the region as a whole, particularly in its eastern third, and that eliminating or even seriously reducing them back to late Soviet-era levels will require enormous and long-term efforts.
-
Crimes the Soviet authorities tried to wipe out as "survivals of the past" remain major problems in the North Caucasus. Honor killings, in which women are killed for violating social norms, and blood feuds, in which families exchange attacks over a generation or more, have likely been increasing since 1991 despite local officials' claims to the contrary. Exactly how much, however, is difficult to say because of the lack of data. A Dagestani scholar's suggestion that laws should be softened concerning these crimes has provoked a widespread discussion that has brought far more evidence to light. (On her proposal, the discussion it has provoked, and what it shows, see Kavkaz Uzel, 7, 13; Radio Svoboda, November 12.) The information now available underscores that such killings are deeply rooted in the region as a whole, especially in its eastern third (Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan), and that eliminating or even seriously reducing them back to late Soviet-era levels will require enormous efforts for a long time to come. The first step toward solving this problem has now been taken because of the courageous reporting by those who have been threatened, family members who recount what happened to their relatives, and regional experts.
When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, they faced an enormous upsurge in the number of honor killings and blood feuds in the North Caucasus. Experts say this was because of the social dislocations that societies in that region had undergone during World War I and the Russian Civil War. The Soviet authorities blamed these phenomena on Islam and local traditions and saw such violence as a threat to their own power. As a result, they responded forcefully, executing those whom they captured. Later, the Soviets further reduced such crimes by deporting the nationalities most often involved and urbanizing the population, steps that reduced the power of traditionalist rural communities. By the 1970s and 1980s, Moscow proclaimed victory over these "survivals of the past," a claim that was not justified, given what happened as soon as Soviet power fell in 1991.
Moscow's inattention and the lack of capacity and even interest in regional governments opened the door to a rapid rise in the number of such cases, if not back to pre-1917 levels, then at least to levels not seen since the 1920s (Kavkaz Uzel, November 7). The two post-Soviet Chechen wars further increased the numbers of such crimes as the regional government's police powers decayed still further. An influx of people fled from that conflict into neighboring republics and the influence of traditional local Islamic and ethnic leaders increased. Some of these leaders accepted and even promoted honor killings and blood feuds as means of imposing at least some control on societies that were on the brink of nearly complete disintegration. Unsurprisingly, this led to a flow of horror stories coming from the region. They were often dismissed, however, as anecdotal and were, in any case, overshadowed by the military conflicts in the region and by claims, especially from the leadership in Chechnya and Ingushetia, that they were already having success in countering this trend. Many observers suggested these claims were highly exaggerated. Those problems continued right up until a few weeks ago (Radio Svoboda, November 12).
Durey Ziyadova, a professor of law at Dagestan State University, told a conference of legal experts on November 3 that murders carried out as honor killings or as part of blood feuds should be treated the same way as all other murders and not, as has been the case since Soviet times, as crimes for which additional years in prison can be added. Those found guilty of ordinary murders can be sentenced from six to 15 years in prison, while those convicted of murder as part of an honor killing or blood feud can be sentenced to up to 20 years. That difference is, in her view, "unjust" and should be eliminated because, after all, murder is murder (Kavkaz Uzel, November 3). That struck other legal specialists in the region and human rights activists as outrageous, given how widespread such crimes are. They rushed to explain that taking that step would make an already horrific problem even worse (Kavkaz Uzel, November 3, 7, 13; Radio Svoboda, November 12).
These experts notably challenged Chechnya's Ramzan Kadyrov's claim that he has overcome the problem. They pointed out that his own words show he still thinks in terms of taking revenge against those who act in ways that he does not approve of--precisely what drives honor killings and blood feuds. Perhaps even more important, these experts, including in particular the journalists of Daptar, a portal that tracks the mistreatment of women in the North Caucasus, argued that all official claims of success against these crimes should not be taken seriously as they reflect efforts to deceive or at least curry favor with Moscow rather than reality (Daptar.org, November 2). Dozens, if not hundreds, of women in the North Caucasus--and probably an even larger number of men who are part of families and clans locked in blood feuds--are now affected every year, they say. Public announcements that they have forsworn honor killings or agreed to end their blood feuds should be treated with skepticism, if not just rejected out of hand. If the dozens of cases they bring forward are representative, what the Soviets called "survivals of the past" and what many are inclined to blame on Islam alone are still part of the daily fabric of life in the North Caucasus and highlight the inequality that women and sexual minorities routinely face there. (For some especially compelling examples and evidence of the failure of the authorities to react effectively, see Radio Svoboda, November 9, 10; Kavkaz Uzel, November 10.)
If this situation is to change, the international community, Moscow, and the regional authorities must acknowledge what is happening and be willing to increase, rather than decrease, punishments for such crimes, rather than try to ignore or hide them as Moscow and the regional governments currently do.[1]
Acknowledgment must include a recognition that these crimes have arisen and continue not because of Islam by itself but rather because of an amalgam of factors, including complex regional histories and even the use of such violence as a substitute for the lack of law enforcement. A readiness to see that repression alone will not be enough. After all, despite Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's deportations and the transformation of the societies the Soviets carried out, honor killings and blood feuds re-emerged as soon as those forms of pressure were let up.
Once those realities are recognized and the false claims of officials dismissed, those who want to see women, sexual minorities, and even men have a chance for a better life must focus on the need for long-term and transformative educational programs. There will be no quick fix, but that should not be an excuse to do nothing now. Otherwise, many more people, and especially women in the North Caucasus, will continue to suffer.
* * *
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy.
* * *
The foregoing analysis and commentary published by The Jamestown Foundation are provided for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal, financial, intelligence, security, medical, diplomatic, or other professional advice. Readers should not act or rely on any content herein without seeking independent professional guidance appropriate to their circumstances. All analytical conclusions reflect information available at the time of writing and may be superseded by subsequent events; Jamestown undertakes no obligation to update published content. Jamestown does not warrant the accuracy, completeness, or continued availability of third-party sources cited in its publications. The views expressed by individual authors are their own and do not necessarily represent the positions of The Jamestown Foundation, its board, staff, funders, or advisors. Nothing in Jamestown's publications constitutes an endorsement of any government, organization, policy, product, or service. Jamestown's publications are protected by copyright; reproduction or redistribution without written permission is prohibited except as permitted by applicable law.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/honor-killings-and-blood-feuds-remain-widespread-in-north-caucasus/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Honor Killings and Blood Feuds Remain Widespread in North Caucasus
11.19.2026
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
* Honor killings and blood feuds in the North Caucasus, crimes the Soviet authorities tried to wipe out as "survivals of the past," remain major problems and even appear to have increased significantly since 1991 despite claims to the contrary by local officials.
* Exactly how much they have gone up, however, is difficult to say because ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Nov. 19, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Honor Killings and Blood Feuds Remain Widespread in North Caucasus 11.19.2026 Paul Goble Executive Summary: * Honor killings and blood feuds in the North Caucasus, crimes the Soviet authorities tried to wipe out as "survivals of the past," remain major problems and even appear to have increased significantly since 1991 despite claims to the contrary by local officials. * Exactly how much they have gone up, however, is difficult to say becauseof the lack of data. A Dagestani scholar's suggestion that laws should be softened concerning them, however, has provoked a widespread discussion that has brought far more evidence to light.
* This information now available underscores that such killings are deeply rooted in the region as a whole, particularly in its eastern third, and that eliminating or even seriously reducing them back to late Soviet-era levels will require enormous and long-term efforts.
-
Crimes the Soviet authorities tried to wipe out as "survivals of the past" remain major problems in the North Caucasus. Honor killings, in which women are killed for violating social norms, and blood feuds, in which families exchange attacks over a generation or more, have likely been increasing since 1991 despite local officials' claims to the contrary. Exactly how much, however, is difficult to say because of the lack of data. A Dagestani scholar's suggestion that laws should be softened concerning these crimes has provoked a widespread discussion that has brought far more evidence to light. (On her proposal, the discussion it has provoked, and what it shows, see Kavkaz Uzel, 7, 13; Radio Svoboda, November 12.) The information now available underscores that such killings are deeply rooted in the region as a whole, especially in its eastern third (Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan), and that eliminating or even seriously reducing them back to late Soviet-era levels will require enormous efforts for a long time to come. The first step toward solving this problem has now been taken because of the courageous reporting by those who have been threatened, family members who recount what happened to their relatives, and regional experts.
When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, they faced an enormous upsurge in the number of honor killings and blood feuds in the North Caucasus. Experts say this was because of the social dislocations that societies in that region had undergone during World War I and the Russian Civil War. The Soviet authorities blamed these phenomena on Islam and local traditions and saw such violence as a threat to their own power. As a result, they responded forcefully, executing those whom they captured. Later, the Soviets further reduced such crimes by deporting the nationalities most often involved and urbanizing the population, steps that reduced the power of traditionalist rural communities. By the 1970s and 1980s, Moscow proclaimed victory over these "survivals of the past," a claim that was not justified, given what happened as soon as Soviet power fell in 1991.
Moscow's inattention and the lack of capacity and even interest in regional governments opened the door to a rapid rise in the number of such cases, if not back to pre-1917 levels, then at least to levels not seen since the 1920s (Kavkaz Uzel, November 7). The two post-Soviet Chechen wars further increased the numbers of such crimes as the regional government's police powers decayed still further. An influx of people fled from that conflict into neighboring republics and the influence of traditional local Islamic and ethnic leaders increased. Some of these leaders accepted and even promoted honor killings and blood feuds as means of imposing at least some control on societies that were on the brink of nearly complete disintegration. Unsurprisingly, this led to a flow of horror stories coming from the region. They were often dismissed, however, as anecdotal and were, in any case, overshadowed by the military conflicts in the region and by claims, especially from the leadership in Chechnya and Ingushetia, that they were already having success in countering this trend. Many observers suggested these claims were highly exaggerated. Those problems continued right up until a few weeks ago (Radio Svoboda, November 12).
Durey Ziyadova, a professor of law at Dagestan State University, told a conference of legal experts on November 3 that murders carried out as honor killings or as part of blood feuds should be treated the same way as all other murders and not, as has been the case since Soviet times, as crimes for which additional years in prison can be added. Those found guilty of ordinary murders can be sentenced from six to 15 years in prison, while those convicted of murder as part of an honor killing or blood feud can be sentenced to up to 20 years. That difference is, in her view, "unjust" and should be eliminated because, after all, murder is murder (Kavkaz Uzel, November 3). That struck other legal specialists in the region and human rights activists as outrageous, given how widespread such crimes are. They rushed to explain that taking that step would make an already horrific problem even worse (Kavkaz Uzel, November 3, 7, 13; Radio Svoboda, November 12).
These experts notably challenged Chechnya's Ramzan Kadyrov's claim that he has overcome the problem. They pointed out that his own words show he still thinks in terms of taking revenge against those who act in ways that he does not approve of--precisely what drives honor killings and blood feuds. Perhaps even more important, these experts, including in particular the journalists of Daptar, a portal that tracks the mistreatment of women in the North Caucasus, argued that all official claims of success against these crimes should not be taken seriously as they reflect efforts to deceive or at least curry favor with Moscow rather than reality (Daptar.org, November 2). Dozens, if not hundreds, of women in the North Caucasus--and probably an even larger number of men who are part of families and clans locked in blood feuds--are now affected every year, they say. Public announcements that they have forsworn honor killings or agreed to end their blood feuds should be treated with skepticism, if not just rejected out of hand. If the dozens of cases they bring forward are representative, what the Soviets called "survivals of the past" and what many are inclined to blame on Islam alone are still part of the daily fabric of life in the North Caucasus and highlight the inequality that women and sexual minorities routinely face there. (For some especially compelling examples and evidence of the failure of the authorities to react effectively, see Radio Svoboda, November 9, 10; Kavkaz Uzel, November 10.)
If this situation is to change, the international community, Moscow, and the regional authorities must acknowledge what is happening and be willing to increase, rather than decrease, punishments for such crimes, rather than try to ignore or hide them as Moscow and the regional governments currently do.[1]
Acknowledgment must include a recognition that these crimes have arisen and continue not because of Islam by itself but rather because of an amalgam of factors, including complex regional histories and even the use of such violence as a substitute for the lack of law enforcement. A readiness to see that repression alone will not be enough. After all, despite Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's deportations and the transformation of the societies the Soviets carried out, honor killings and blood feuds re-emerged as soon as those forms of pressure were let up.
Once those realities are recognized and the false claims of officials dismissed, those who want to see women, sexual minorities, and even men have a chance for a better life must focus on the need for long-term and transformative educational programs. There will be no quick fix, but that should not be an excuse to do nothing now. Otherwise, many more people, and especially women in the North Caucasus, will continue to suffer.
* * *
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy.
* * *
The foregoing analysis and commentary published by The Jamestown Foundation are provided for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal, financial, intelligence, security, medical, diplomatic, or other professional advice. Readers should not act or rely on any content herein without seeking independent professional guidance appropriate to their circumstances. All analytical conclusions reflect information available at the time of writing and may be superseded by subsequent events; Jamestown undertakes no obligation to update published content. Jamestown does not warrant the accuracy, completeness, or continued availability of third-party sources cited in its publications. The views expressed by individual authors are their own and do not necessarily represent the positions of The Jamestown Foundation, its board, staff, funders, or advisors. Nothing in Jamestown's publications constitutes an endorsement of any government, organization, policy, product, or service. Jamestown's publications are protected by copyright; reproduction or redistribution without written permission is prohibited except as permitted by applicable law.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/honor-killings-and-blood-feuds-remain-widespread-in-north-caucasus/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Heritage Foundation President Honors the Life of Brian Tracy
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release:
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Heritage Foundation President Honors the Life of Brian Tracy
Nov 20, 2026
WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation honors the life and legacy of Brian Tracy, Heritage trustee emeritus.
Dr. Kevin Roberts, president of The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action, honored Tracy's legacy:
"Our country has lost a great American, and Heritage has lost a dear friend, with the passing of Brian Tracy. Brian spent his life helping people reach their full potential, pursue excellence, and achieve the American ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release: * * * Heritage Foundation President Honors the Life of Brian Tracy Nov 20, 2026 WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation honors the life and legacy of Brian Tracy, Heritage trustee emeritus. Dr. Kevin Roberts, president of The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action, honored Tracy's legacy: "Our country has lost a great American, and Heritage has lost a dear friend, with the passing of Brian Tracy. Brian spent his life helping people reach their full potential, pursue excellence, and achieve the Americandream. But for all his professional accomplishments, nothing mattered more to him than his family. The fact that his children proudly joined him in the work he built speaks volumes about the man he was and the example he set. Brian's love of family, faith in America, and commitment to helping others live better lives leave a powerful legacy that will endure for generations."
Barb Van Andel-Gaby, Chairman of the Heritage Board of Trustees, reflected on Tracy's leadership:
"Brian understood from a lifetime in business that great institutions do not happen by accident. They require principled leadership, sound governance, clear goals, accountability, and a relentless commitment to excellence. He brought those standards to Heritage's Board and generously shared his experience and judgment with all of us.
"I deeply valued Brian's candor, high expectations, and determination to make Heritage stronger. He challenged us not simply to have the right ideas, but to build an institution capable of advancing them effectively. We are stronger because of his leadership, and I am profoundly grateful to have served alongside him."
* * *
Original text here: https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-foundation-president-honors-the-life-brian-tracy
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Heritage Foundation President Honors the Life of Brian Tracy
Nov 20, 2026
WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation honors the life and legacy of Brian Tracy, Heritage trustee emeritus.
Dr. Kevin Roberts, president of The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action, honored Tracy's legacy:
"Our country has lost a great American, and Heritage has lost a dear friend, with the passing of Brian Tracy. Brian spent his life helping people reach their full potential, pursue excellence, and achieve the American ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release: * * * Heritage Foundation President Honors the Life of Brian Tracy Nov 20, 2026 WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation honors the life and legacy of Brian Tracy, Heritage trustee emeritus. Dr. Kevin Roberts, president of The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action, honored Tracy's legacy: "Our country has lost a great American, and Heritage has lost a dear friend, with the passing of Brian Tracy. Brian spent his life helping people reach their full potential, pursue excellence, and achieve the Americandream. But for all his professional accomplishments, nothing mattered more to him than his family. The fact that his children proudly joined him in the work he built speaks volumes about the man he was and the example he set. Brian's love of family, faith in America, and commitment to helping others live better lives leave a powerful legacy that will endure for generations."
Barb Van Andel-Gaby, Chairman of the Heritage Board of Trustees, reflected on Tracy's leadership:
"Brian understood from a lifetime in business that great institutions do not happen by accident. They require principled leadership, sound governance, clear goals, accountability, and a relentless commitment to excellence. He brought those standards to Heritage's Board and generously shared his experience and judgment with all of us.
"I deeply valued Brian's candor, high expectations, and determination to make Heritage stronger. He challenged us not simply to have the right ideas, but to build an institution capable of advancing them effectively. We are stronger because of his leadership, and I am profoundly grateful to have served alongside him."
* * *
Original text here: https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-foundation-president-honors-the-life-brian-tracy
[Category: ThinkTank]
Heritage Foundation Issues Statement on Senate Passage of Historic Permitting Reform Bill
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release:
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Heritage Foundation Issues Statement on Senate Passage of Historic Permitting Reform Bill
Nov 20, 2026
WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action released the following statements after the Senate passed the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA).
Jason Hayes, Senior Research Fellow, Energy and Environment:
"The Senate's passage of the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act is an important step toward restoring America's ability to build. BAAJA makes much needed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release: * * * Heritage Foundation Issues Statement on Senate Passage of Historic Permitting Reform Bill Nov 20, 2026 WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action released the following statements after the Senate passed the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA). Jason Hayes, Senior Research Fellow, Energy and Environment: "The Senate's passage of the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act is an important step toward restoring America's ability to build. BAAJA makes much neededreforms to environmental reviews and litigation, protects ratepayers from unreasonable or unforeseen data center infrastructure costs, improves the approval process for nuclear licensing, and makes federal construction permits more durable across administrations. It's time for America to start building again."
Sarah Wagoner, Policy Analyst for Environmental and Energy Policy:
"The passage of BAAJA is an important victory for Americans tired of watching needed energy and infrastructure projects get tied up for years by government red tape and endless litigation. While more work remains to strengthen permit certainty and protect state authority over transmission, this legislation is a significant step toward allowing America to build again."
Steve Chartan, Executive Vice President of Heritage Action:
"Washington's bloated bureaucracy has prevented America from building the energy infrastructure our economy needs. And when a permit is approved by some miracle, projects are mired in endless, costly litigation. Today, the Senate took an important step toward ending that dysfunction and putting rebuilding America back on the agenda. The BAAJA will unleash American energy, create jobs, and lower costs for hardworking Americans. More work remains, but this is a victory worth celebrating."
* * *
Original text here: https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-foundation-issues-statement-senate-passage-historic-permitting-reform-bill
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Heritage Foundation Issues Statement on Senate Passage of Historic Permitting Reform Bill
Nov 20, 2026
WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action released the following statements after the Senate passed the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA).
Jason Hayes, Senior Research Fellow, Energy and Environment:
"The Senate's passage of the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act is an important step toward restoring America's ability to build. BAAJA makes much needed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release: * * * Heritage Foundation Issues Statement on Senate Passage of Historic Permitting Reform Bill Nov 20, 2026 WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action released the following statements after the Senate passed the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA). Jason Hayes, Senior Research Fellow, Energy and Environment: "The Senate's passage of the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act is an important step toward restoring America's ability to build. BAAJA makes much neededreforms to environmental reviews and litigation, protects ratepayers from unreasonable or unforeseen data center infrastructure costs, improves the approval process for nuclear licensing, and makes federal construction permits more durable across administrations. It's time for America to start building again."
Sarah Wagoner, Policy Analyst for Environmental and Energy Policy:
"The passage of BAAJA is an important victory for Americans tired of watching needed energy and infrastructure projects get tied up for years by government red tape and endless litigation. While more work remains to strengthen permit certainty and protect state authority over transmission, this legislation is a significant step toward allowing America to build again."
Steve Chartan, Executive Vice President of Heritage Action:
"Washington's bloated bureaucracy has prevented America from building the energy infrastructure our economy needs. And when a permit is approved by some miracle, projects are mired in endless, costly litigation. Today, the Senate took an important step toward ending that dysfunction and putting rebuilding America back on the agenda. The BAAJA will unleash American energy, create jobs, and lower costs for hardworking Americans. More work remains, but this is a victory worth celebrating."
* * *
Original text here: https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-foundation-issues-statement-senate-passage-historic-permitting-reform-bill
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Launches Commission on Future Transatlantic Relations
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following news release:
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CSIS Launches Commission on Future Transatlantic Relations
WASHINGTON, DC - November 20, 2026 - The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) today announced the launch of the Commission on Future Transatlantic Relations (CFTR), a new initiative led by the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program to recalibrate and strengthen the United States' strategic approach to Europe.
Set to launch in January 2027, the commission will include leading Europe experts, policy practitioners, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following news release: * * * CSIS Launches Commission on Future Transatlantic Relations WASHINGTON, DC - November 20, 2026 - The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) today announced the launch of the Commission on Future Transatlantic Relations (CFTR), a new initiative led by the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program to recalibrate and strengthen the United States' strategic approach to Europe. Set to launch in January 2027, the commission will include leading Europe experts, policy practitioners,and business leaders, with the goal of building a framework for a transatlantic relationship that is stronger, more resilient, and more prosperous for allies on both sides of the Atlantic.
"For too long, U.S. policy toward Europe has relied on the status quo rather than a strategy," said Max Bergmann, director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. "As Europe's role in the world evolves, this commission will define the partnership the United States wants with Europe and what it will take to achieve it."
Through the CFTR, members will spend one year conducting targeted research focused on four key issue areas: the fundamentals of U.S. engagement with Europe, defense and burden sharing, technology and digital infrastructure, and the transatlantic economic agenda.
The initiative will be chaired by Ambassador Julianne Smith, president of Clarion Strategies and former U.S. permanent representative to NATO; Ambassador John J. Sullivan, distinguished fellow at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, and former deputy secretary of state; and Ambassador Mark Brzezinski, president and CEO of Brzezinski Global Strategies and former U.S. ambassador to Sweden and Poland.
"This is a transformative moment for the transatlantic relationship. Many of the assumptions that held it together for decades are being tested, both from within and from without," said Amb. Smith. "Restating our commitment won't be enough to meet this moment. We need to look at the transatlantic bargain with fresh eyes and reimagine it for the decades ahead. That is the work of the CFTR, and I'm proud to serve as a co-chair."
"The transatlantic relationship is the anchor for America's engagement with the world," said Amb. Brzezinski. "I am delighted to join my colleagues to advance the unity of purpose and shared values around which the transatlantic relationship was founded, and build a shared approach to the challenges of our time."
"The transatlantic relationship is as vital as ever," said Amb. Sullivan. "Yet as the geopolitical and technological challenges we face become more acute, it is equally vital that the relationship adapts to meet the needs of a new future. I look forward to working with my colleagues to address these needs."
Learn more about the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program here (https://www.csis.org/programs/europe-russia-and-eurasia-program)
For media inquiries, please contact press@csis.org.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/news/csis-launches-commission-future-transatlantic-relations
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
CSIS Launches Commission on Future Transatlantic Relations
WASHINGTON, DC - November 20, 2026 - The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) today announced the launch of the Commission on Future Transatlantic Relations (CFTR), a new initiative led by the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program to recalibrate and strengthen the United States' strategic approach to Europe.
Set to launch in January 2027, the commission will include leading Europe experts, policy practitioners, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following news release: * * * CSIS Launches Commission on Future Transatlantic Relations WASHINGTON, DC - November 20, 2026 - The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) today announced the launch of the Commission on Future Transatlantic Relations (CFTR), a new initiative led by the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program to recalibrate and strengthen the United States' strategic approach to Europe. Set to launch in January 2027, the commission will include leading Europe experts, policy practitioners,and business leaders, with the goal of building a framework for a transatlantic relationship that is stronger, more resilient, and more prosperous for allies on both sides of the Atlantic.
"For too long, U.S. policy toward Europe has relied on the status quo rather than a strategy," said Max Bergmann, director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. "As Europe's role in the world evolves, this commission will define the partnership the United States wants with Europe and what it will take to achieve it."
Through the CFTR, members will spend one year conducting targeted research focused on four key issue areas: the fundamentals of U.S. engagement with Europe, defense and burden sharing, technology and digital infrastructure, and the transatlantic economic agenda.
The initiative will be chaired by Ambassador Julianne Smith, president of Clarion Strategies and former U.S. permanent representative to NATO; Ambassador John J. Sullivan, distinguished fellow at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, and former deputy secretary of state; and Ambassador Mark Brzezinski, president and CEO of Brzezinski Global Strategies and former U.S. ambassador to Sweden and Poland.
"This is a transformative moment for the transatlantic relationship. Many of the assumptions that held it together for decades are being tested, both from within and from without," said Amb. Smith. "Restating our commitment won't be enough to meet this moment. We need to look at the transatlantic bargain with fresh eyes and reimagine it for the decades ahead. That is the work of the CFTR, and I'm proud to serve as a co-chair."
"The transatlantic relationship is the anchor for America's engagement with the world," said Amb. Brzezinski. "I am delighted to join my colleagues to advance the unity of purpose and shared values around which the transatlantic relationship was founded, and build a shared approach to the challenges of our time."
"The transatlantic relationship is as vital as ever," said Amb. Sullivan. "Yet as the geopolitical and technological challenges we face become more acute, it is equally vital that the relationship adapts to meet the needs of a new future. I look forward to working with my colleagues to address these needs."
Learn more about the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program here (https://www.csis.org/programs/europe-russia-and-eurasia-program)
For media inquiries, please contact press@csis.org.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/news/csis-launches-commission-future-transatlantic-relations
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Newsletter: Gulf's Fuel Foothold in Africa
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following newsletter:
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The Gulf's Fuel Foothold in Africa
by Will Todman and Kira Nygren
November 19, 2026
Gulf-Africa cumulative trade exceeded $121 billion in 2023, reflecting more than a decade of deepening economic engagement. Successive geopolitical shocks--most recently the war with Iran--have reinforced African and Gulf middle powers' imperative to diversify their international partnerships, and economic ties are a core pillar of their expanding relationships. This installment of Charting the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following newsletter: * * * The Gulf's Fuel Foothold in Africa by Will Todman and Kira Nygren November 19, 2026 Gulf-Africa cumulative trade exceeded $121 billion in 2023, reflecting more than a decade of deepening economic engagement. Successive geopolitical shocks--most recently the war with Iran--have reinforced African and Gulf middle powers' imperative to diversify their international partnerships, and economic ties are a core pillar of their expanding relationships. This installment of Charting theMiddle East highlights the prominence of two Gulf middle powers among select African middle powers' fuel trade. It is drawn from a soon to be published CSIS brief, "Middle Power Ties in the Gulf and Africa: The Iran War Inflection Point."
The United Arab Emirates has pursued the most ambitious economic engagement strategy with African middle powers, becoming the leading fuel trading partner for both Ethiopia and Kenya. Saudi Arabia is the second-largest trading partner for both states in this sector, while Qatar lags significantly behind. Yet, these relationships are imbalanced, and Gulf middle powers account for a larger share of African middle powers' trade than vice versa. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria do not feature at all among Gulf middle powers' top 10 trading partners.
The war with Iran is prompting Gulf states to reassess their economic priorities and diversification plans as their budgets become more strained. As Gulf states rebalance their portfolios, they will face critical decisions about whether to continue to prioritize markets and investments in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia or to direct their capital toward domestic investments.
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Will Todman
Chief of Staff, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department; and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program
Kira Nygren
Program Manager and Research Associate, Middle East Program
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/gulfs-fuel-foothold-africa
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
The Gulf's Fuel Foothold in Africa
by Will Todman and Kira Nygren
November 19, 2026
Gulf-Africa cumulative trade exceeded $121 billion in 2023, reflecting more than a decade of deepening economic engagement. Successive geopolitical shocks--most recently the war with Iran--have reinforced African and Gulf middle powers' imperative to diversify their international partnerships, and economic ties are a core pillar of their expanding relationships. This installment of Charting the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following newsletter: * * * The Gulf's Fuel Foothold in Africa by Will Todman and Kira Nygren November 19, 2026 Gulf-Africa cumulative trade exceeded $121 billion in 2023, reflecting more than a decade of deepening economic engagement. Successive geopolitical shocks--most recently the war with Iran--have reinforced African and Gulf middle powers' imperative to diversify their international partnerships, and economic ties are a core pillar of their expanding relationships. This installment of Charting theMiddle East highlights the prominence of two Gulf middle powers among select African middle powers' fuel trade. It is drawn from a soon to be published CSIS brief, "Middle Power Ties in the Gulf and Africa: The Iran War Inflection Point."
The United Arab Emirates has pursued the most ambitious economic engagement strategy with African middle powers, becoming the leading fuel trading partner for both Ethiopia and Kenya. Saudi Arabia is the second-largest trading partner for both states in this sector, while Qatar lags significantly behind. Yet, these relationships are imbalanced, and Gulf middle powers account for a larger share of African middle powers' trade than vice versa. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria do not feature at all among Gulf middle powers' top 10 trading partners.
The war with Iran is prompting Gulf states to reassess their economic priorities and diversification plans as their budgets become more strained. As Gulf states rebalance their portfolios, they will face critical decisions about whether to continue to prioritize markets and investments in Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia or to direct their capital toward domestic investments.
* * *
Will Todman
Chief of Staff, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department; and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program
Kira Nygren
Program Manager and Research Associate, Middle East Program
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/gulfs-fuel-foothold-africa
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Newsletter: Assessing Modi 3.0 Reforms at the Midway Point
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following newsletter:
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Assessing Modi 3.0 Reforms at the Midway Point
by Richard M. Rossow
November 19, 2026
The Modi government is at the midway point of its third term. Contrasted with U.S.-fueled global turmoil, the Indian market has been a beacon of stability. But stability is not the need of the day. Positive change through economic reform is more important than ever, and the track record during this term is mixed, as evidenced by our India Reforms Scorecard. Modi 3.0 is doing well on trade policy ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following newsletter: * * * Assessing Modi 3.0 Reforms at the Midway Point by Richard M. Rossow November 19, 2026 The Modi government is at the midway point of its third term. Contrasted with U.S.-fueled global turmoil, the Indian market has been a beacon of stability. But stability is not the need of the day. Positive change through economic reform is more important than ever, and the track record during this term is mixed, as evidenced by our India Reforms Scorecard. Modi 3.0 is doing well on trade policyand has triggered a few domestic reforms. In its remaining time, the government should also prioritize FDI reforms and push states to improve their business environments.
Power over Policymaking
The Modi government won re-election in 2024 but, with a reduced mandate, was forced into a coalition to retain power. But this position is not a significant detriment to reform; the BJP's two core coalition partners, the Andhra Pradesh-based Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and Bihar-based Janata Dal-United (JD-U) are not traditionally anti-reform. The BJP continues to strengthen its hand in the upper house of Parliament, the Rajya Sabha. The party holds 117 of 244 seats. And the BJP has its all-time record of 17 chief ministers.
The Crisis that Didn't Materialize Domestically
A year ago, there was a palpable sense in Delhi that an economic crisis was at hand. The Trump administration was unleashing a trade war with most of the world. India was targeted even more sharply. Crude oil prices had spiked--even before the United States first attacked Iran. This concern drove a few significant reforms in late 2025, notably a rationalization of the Goods and Services Tax; amendments to the Insurance Act; and amending India's nuclear power development laws.
However, the "crisis" did not really materialize. The government reported 7.8% growth in the first quarter of the fiscal year. FDI inflows have remained relatively strong by Indian standards, hitting $70b from September 2025-October 2026, a 24 percent jump from the prior year. India's goods exports are up 9 percent year-on-year, and services exports grew 10 percent year-on-year. Foreign portfolio investment (FPI) has been weak with $28b net outflows over 12 months, but India's SENSEX stock index remains close to record levels.
Domestic Reforms:
The Modi government's performance this term in pushing big domestic commercial reforms has been mixed. There have been some notable successes such as rationalizing the Goods and Services Tax, liberalizing atomic energy production through the SHANTI Bill, and decriminalizing some types of corporate offenses through the Jan Vishwas Bill. Below the headline reforms, former cabinet secretary Rajiv Gauba has been leading an effort to introduce a range of process reforms at NITI Aayog. These capture fewer headlines but certainly improve the "ease of doing business."
Other domestic reforms such as privatization, modernizing the Electricity Act, further relaxation of labor regulations, and efficient restitution of business legal cases remains on the "to do list."
Trade Policy Reforms:
The Modi government's third term has been most progressive in terms of trade policy. India continues its recent pursuit of tariff-focused trade agreements with key partners. The Union Budget has tended to have more tariff line decreases than increases. And there is a subtle shift away from the use of non-tariff barriers like Quality Control Orders (QCOs).
The government still maintains local manufacturing rules in some sectors. However, this tool has been employed less aggressively this term.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Reforms:
The Modi government has not aggressively pursued additional FDI reforms since early in its first term. Over the last two and a half years, the government has made only a single FDI reform--a legislative change to the Insurance Act that increases the maximum FDI holding in an insurance company from 74 percent to 100 percent.
This record compares unfavorably to the Modi government's first term (37 FDI reforms in 5 years) and second term (12 FDI reforms) and falls below the average of 20 FDI reforms per 5-year terms under the Vajpayee and Singh governments. Over thirty sectors still have some form of FDI limitation, and at least ten sectors have regulations that only apply to foreign firms.
Encouraging State-Level Reforms:
This is the area of reform that requires the most attention. States control the core factors that will "make or break" India's economic dreams- electricity, water-sanitation, labor, and land acquisition. Some of the Modi government's big ideas from its first term, such as creating model policies for states' consideration and ranking states' business competitiveness through the Business Reform Action Plan (BRAP) have been discarded and need to be reinvigorated.
Pushing politically challenging economic reforms is challenging when topline data suggests the economy is doing well. However, future coalitions may prove to be more difficult to work with. Future prime ministers may be less business friendly. There will be periods with less center-state political uniformity. And the world is looking for beacons of growth. This could be India's moment.
"U.S.-India Insight: Assessing Modi 3.0 Reforms at the Midway Point" (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2026-11/261119_Rossow_India_Insight.pdf?VersionId=k0cpKmDl9RLl7jGLx_1_XsBhap.UHvt2)
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Richard Rossow holds the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics, and is a senior adviser, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-modi-30-reforms-midway-point
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Assessing Modi 3.0 Reforms at the Midway Point
by Richard M. Rossow
November 19, 2026
The Modi government is at the midway point of its third term. Contrasted with U.S.-fueled global turmoil, the Indian market has been a beacon of stability. But stability is not the need of the day. Positive change through economic reform is more important than ever, and the track record during this term is mixed, as evidenced by our India Reforms Scorecard. Modi 3.0 is doing well on trade policy ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following newsletter: * * * Assessing Modi 3.0 Reforms at the Midway Point by Richard M. Rossow November 19, 2026 The Modi government is at the midway point of its third term. Contrasted with U.S.-fueled global turmoil, the Indian market has been a beacon of stability. But stability is not the need of the day. Positive change through economic reform is more important than ever, and the track record during this term is mixed, as evidenced by our India Reforms Scorecard. Modi 3.0 is doing well on trade policyand has triggered a few domestic reforms. In its remaining time, the government should also prioritize FDI reforms and push states to improve their business environments.
Power over Policymaking
The Modi government won re-election in 2024 but, with a reduced mandate, was forced into a coalition to retain power. But this position is not a significant detriment to reform; the BJP's two core coalition partners, the Andhra Pradesh-based Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and Bihar-based Janata Dal-United (JD-U) are not traditionally anti-reform. The BJP continues to strengthen its hand in the upper house of Parliament, the Rajya Sabha. The party holds 117 of 244 seats. And the BJP has its all-time record of 17 chief ministers.
The Crisis that Didn't Materialize Domestically
A year ago, there was a palpable sense in Delhi that an economic crisis was at hand. The Trump administration was unleashing a trade war with most of the world. India was targeted even more sharply. Crude oil prices had spiked--even before the United States first attacked Iran. This concern drove a few significant reforms in late 2025, notably a rationalization of the Goods and Services Tax; amendments to the Insurance Act; and amending India's nuclear power development laws.
However, the "crisis" did not really materialize. The government reported 7.8% growth in the first quarter of the fiscal year. FDI inflows have remained relatively strong by Indian standards, hitting $70b from September 2025-October 2026, a 24 percent jump from the prior year. India's goods exports are up 9 percent year-on-year, and services exports grew 10 percent year-on-year. Foreign portfolio investment (FPI) has been weak with $28b net outflows over 12 months, but India's SENSEX stock index remains close to record levels.
Domestic Reforms:
The Modi government's performance this term in pushing big domestic commercial reforms has been mixed. There have been some notable successes such as rationalizing the Goods and Services Tax, liberalizing atomic energy production through the SHANTI Bill, and decriminalizing some types of corporate offenses through the Jan Vishwas Bill. Below the headline reforms, former cabinet secretary Rajiv Gauba has been leading an effort to introduce a range of process reforms at NITI Aayog. These capture fewer headlines but certainly improve the "ease of doing business."
Other domestic reforms such as privatization, modernizing the Electricity Act, further relaxation of labor regulations, and efficient restitution of business legal cases remains on the "to do list."
Trade Policy Reforms:
The Modi government's third term has been most progressive in terms of trade policy. India continues its recent pursuit of tariff-focused trade agreements with key partners. The Union Budget has tended to have more tariff line decreases than increases. And there is a subtle shift away from the use of non-tariff barriers like Quality Control Orders (QCOs).
The government still maintains local manufacturing rules in some sectors. However, this tool has been employed less aggressively this term.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Reforms:
The Modi government has not aggressively pursued additional FDI reforms since early in its first term. Over the last two and a half years, the government has made only a single FDI reform--a legislative change to the Insurance Act that increases the maximum FDI holding in an insurance company from 74 percent to 100 percent.
This record compares unfavorably to the Modi government's first term (37 FDI reforms in 5 years) and second term (12 FDI reforms) and falls below the average of 20 FDI reforms per 5-year terms under the Vajpayee and Singh governments. Over thirty sectors still have some form of FDI limitation, and at least ten sectors have regulations that only apply to foreign firms.
Encouraging State-Level Reforms:
This is the area of reform that requires the most attention. States control the core factors that will "make or break" India's economic dreams- electricity, water-sanitation, labor, and land acquisition. Some of the Modi government's big ideas from its first term, such as creating model policies for states' consideration and ranking states' business competitiveness through the Business Reform Action Plan (BRAP) have been discarded and need to be reinvigorated.
Pushing politically challenging economic reforms is challenging when topline data suggests the economy is doing well. However, future coalitions may prove to be more difficult to work with. Future prime ministers may be less business friendly. There will be periods with less center-state political uniformity. And the world is looking for beacons of growth. This could be India's moment.
"U.S.-India Insight: Assessing Modi 3.0 Reforms at the Midway Point" (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2026-11/261119_Rossow_India_Insight.pdf?VersionId=k0cpKmDl9RLl7jGLx_1_XsBhap.UHvt2)
* * *
Richard Rossow holds the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics, and is a senior adviser, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-modi-30-reforms-midway-point
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Between a Rock and a Hard Place - Evaluating the Risks of Chinese Memory Chips
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Evaluating the Risks of Chinese Memory Chips
Commentary by Lauryn Williams
November 19, 2026
The United States is experiencing an increasingly sharp memory chip supply shortage as a limited number of suppliers prioritize high bandwidth memory (HBM) bound for hyperscaler customers building AI data centers, shifting capacity away from conventional dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips and contributing to rising prices for consumers.
DRAM chips, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Evaluating the Risks of Chinese Memory Chips Commentary by Lauryn Williams November 19, 2026 The United States is experiencing an increasingly sharp memory chip supply shortage as a limited number of suppliers prioritize high bandwidth memory (HBM) bound for hyperscaler customers building AI data centers, shifting capacity away from conventional dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips and contributing to rising prices for consumers. DRAM chips,which act as a computer's short-term memory, are found in consumer products including cell phones, laptops, gaming consoles, cars, and medical devices. They are also a key component across defense technologies: For example, drone manufacturers are leveraging DRAM to integrate increasingly autonomous capabilities. HBM, a higher-end product formed by stacking and connecting conventional DRAM chips, is shaping today's memory market in significant ways as AI infrastructure demand skyrockets.
The vast majority of DRAM and HBM supply is produced by just three firms--Micron, SK hynix, and Samsung--and much of their limited supply is spoken for. In September, Micron announced 26 total strategic customer agreements extending into the 2030s that ensure long-term supply for well-resourced hyperscaler customers. In late October, SK hynix stated it was sold out of DRAM and HBM through 2029. Micron warned customers to expect "supply-demand conditions to be much tighter" in coming years, with the shortage unlikely to abate before 2030 as demand outstrips supply and HBM demand consumes up to 70 percent of available capacity.
These firms are meanwhile building new facilities in the United States and elsewhere to expand production. Yet future construction plans cannot alleviate today's short-term realities, due to the expected lag time (up to four years) between investments and facilities coming online. And, in some cases, a newly announced project will not address the heart of the challenge: SK hynix's new $4 billion Indiana facility will be used for HBM packaging and research and development, not DRAM fabrication.
The memory crunch is not limited to the United States. Supply in Asia is also stretched, with the International Data Corporation projecting that regional PC shipments would decline nearly 14 percent in 2026 as suppliers prioritize HBM. In China, leading firm CXMT's capacity is reportedly booked through 2027, while Chinese firms are locking in their own supply.
In this constrained global market, U.S. companies seeking access to conventional DRAM chips find themselves between a rock and a hard place. They must weigh short-term needs against longer-term considerations. Sustainable solutions are urgently needed to leverage U.S. allies and partners to expand future memory chip supply, with current manufacturers' capacity committed through the 2030s. As a result, some firms are exploring alternative solutions in the next-largest memory market: China.
A Rock and a Hard Place
Attempts to source new memory chip supply from China are sparking discussions across the tech industry and policy community. Two key suppliers form China's memory ecosystem: CXMT (ChangXin Memory Technologies) and YMTC (Yangtze Memory Technologies). CXMT is already the fourth-largest global DRAM manufacturer, and NAND flash memory supplier YMTC's market position is growing. Yet with Washington slow to introduce short- or long-term solutions to relieve the supply crunch and much of the Big Three's current supply already committed, some firms are pursuing alternatives. Former Apple CEO Tim Cook reportedly engaged the Trump administration regarding using Chinese chips for China-destined products, and new CEO John Ternus recently reasserted that "all options should be on the table." Other laptop manufacturers are already reportedly introducing CXMT DRAM chips into a limited subset of laptops for non-U.S. markets.
With the Beijing question unlikely to disappear while DRAM chip supply remains limited, a clear cost-benefit analysis of sourcing Chinese memory supply is essential. U.S. firms considering CXMT DRAM chips should base their evaluation on numerous risk factors, including procurement and export control considerations, cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities, product sensitivities, and destination market, as well as long-term economic competitiveness. Figure 1 evaluates use of CXMT DRAM chips across these dimensions and introduces a tiered risk framework for consideration by policymakers and companies alike.
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Figure 1: Tiered, Risk-Based Approach to Incorporating China-Produced DRAM
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Procurement and Export Control Hurdles
Today, companies looking to Chinese DRAM as an emergency measure should consider whether their use introduces procurement exposure, and whether possible export controls could make future sourcing unsustainable. Companies face two categories of U.S. policy hurdles. The first is procurement restrictions, limiting whether the U.S. government and its contractors can do business with CXMT and YMTC. These include the Pentagon's 1260H List, which includes both firms, and the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 5949 prohibition, coming December 2027. The second is export controls, including the Entity List, which currently includes YMTC but not CXMT. The Department of Commerce limits what U.S. technology can flow to firms on the list. While export controls do not prevent a U.S. company from buying Chinese DRAM, they do shape whether China is a sustainable source and how U.S. companies might think about anything beyond off-the-shelf purchases.
The Pentagon's 1260H List, established in the FY 2021 NDAA, lists by name firms it considers "Chinese military companies" with ties to the People's Liberation Army. As of June 8, 2026, both CXMT and YMTC are included on the list (after being briefly removed in February 2026). Listing carries legal consequences under Section 805 of the FY 2024 NDAA. The Department of Defense has been barred since June 30, 2026, from contracting directly with 1260H-listed companies, and from June 30, 2027, from purchasing goods or services from these entities indirectly through third parties. U.S. companies incorporating CXMT chips as components are not directly implicated, but should be aware of possible reputational consequences and heightened scrutiny from defense customers.
Additionally, the FY 2023 NDAA Section 5949 statute specifically prevents federal agencies and government contractors from buying semiconductors from CXMT, YMTC, and SMIC--another Chinese firm--beginning December 2027, a prohibition that will apply across the federal government. While this does not formally prevent U.S. firms from procuring DRAM from these companies, or individuals from purchasing laptops with these chips, it is likely to heighten scrutiny on business with these firms and should impact U.S. firms' calculus.
Perhaps most well-known, the Department of Commerce's Entity List requires a license for exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of items to listed foreign parties subject to U.S. export controls. Since December 2022, YMTC has been a listed entity, with a license requirement covering all such items and a presumption of denial. CXMT is not currently on the Entity List, but a possible listing is a prospective risk, though the Department of Commerce has not published new additions since October 2025 amid active trade discussions with Beijing. As experts have noted, if listed, CXMT could face reduced access to the U.S. tools, materials, and servicing its facilities require, impacting long-term reliability. And, while U.S. firms buying off-the-shelf chips is not considered an export, activities such as sharing product roadmaps or producing customized products with a listed supplier could require an export license that is likely to be denied.
Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Risks
Chinese DRAM also raises distinct cybersecurity and supply chain questions. Potential risks of embedding Chinese memory in U.S. companies' products, none of which are particularly new, could arise on two different fronts.
1. Established Regulatory Risks Derived from China's Software Vulnerability Regulations
Since 2021, Western researchers have drawn attention to a Chinese regulation that has raised significant concerns across the software vulnerability ecosystem: the Regulations on Management of Security Vulnerabilities in Network Products, introduced by the Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), and Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The most notable provision requires reporting "information on relevant vulnerabilities" to MIIT in 48 hours. Chinese companies discovering vulnerabilities cannot publish them before developing a patch, or share unpublished details overseas other than to the provider. In sum, the law guarantees ministries access to vulnerability information within two days of a company learning about it, often before a fix exists.
The national security implications of this policy represent an ongoing cost of doing business with Chinese chip suppliers such as CXMT. These concerns are noteworthy, as a growing number of companies are actively considering incorporating CXMT chips. Indeed, HP, Asus, and Acer have reportedly already begun introducing CXMT chips in limited laptop models sold outside the United States (the companies did not confirm the reports). As cybersecurity experts have recently expressed, the law effectively provides China access to critical vulnerability information, potentially before downstream customers are aware. Before a fix is available, foreign companies could find themselves exposed to flaws the Chinese government is already aware of. With the law in effect for several years, these dynamics are not hypothetical; they are a reality to be baked into U.S. companies' chip sourcing decisions.
The possible risks are greatest for sensitive government and critical infrastructure systems and connected or safety-critical devices, with lower but nonzero risk to mainstream consumer electronic products. Companies considering CXMT DRAM, and chips produced by U.S. and allied firms in China, should build in safeguards, patch vulnerabilities, and engage in component testing.
2. Lower-Probability Risk of an Embedded "Back Door"
Known evidence does not definitively establish that CXMT DRAM products contain an embedded hardware back door, so the risk is hypothetical rather than a corroborated feature of the threat landscape. Importantly, DRAM chips, which serve as temporary memory storage, are not designed to store user data once disconnected from power. They are volatile memory, with information lost once turned off, and do not independently maintain network connections or transmit communications outside a particular environment. The technical parameters of DRAM technology thus severely limit the possibility of a Chinese-supplier-introduced hidden back door operating independently of the processor or operating system. It is not impossible that chip hardware could be compromised, but DRAM is less likely to provide surveillance or espionage opportunities for threat actors.
These risks are likely less immediate than those posed by China's regulatory environment but require consideration. CXMT products have reportedly been evaluated by independent security researchers far less extensively than chips produced by their competitors. A lack of documented concerns therefore cannot be completely disentangled from the absence of substantial independent security research overall or taken as evidence of security. Existing uncertainties thus support two policies: (1) excluding CXMT DRAM from U.S. government and sensitive critical infrastructure uses, and (2) investing in testing and other mitigations to reduce potential consumer product risks. In addition, U.S. and allied companies--which have their own qualification and testing processes--can use such procedures or engage independent third parties to further the identification of any potential vulnerabilities.
U.S. Economic Competitiveness Considerations
Discussions around alternative chip supply take place against a backdrop in which U.S.-based Micron, and South Korea-based SK hynix and Samsung, are market-leading suppliers, accounting for roughly 90 percent of global DRAM revenue as of mid-2026, while CXMT holds a smaller, growing position. Samsung holds the largest revenue share at roughly 39 percent in Q2 2026, after reclaiming the top spot from SK hynix, which leads in HBM.
All three major firms are investing in manufacturing capacity on U.S. soil. Micron has committed more than $250 billion to U.S. fabrication and research and development through 2035, while SK hynix's U.S. footprint centers on a roughly $4 billion HBM packaging plant in Indiana, with mass production targeted for 2029. Samsung's largest U.S. project, its $37 billion Taylor, Texas, facility, is a logic foundry, so neither Korean firm's U.S. investment has as yet added DRAM fabrication capacity.
In 2026, the Trump administration regularly threatened tariffs to pressure South Korean suppliers many U.S. firms currently rely on, a measure likely to exacerbate current challenges. In this context, introducing CXMT or YMTC chips into the U.S. market even for Type 2 or 3 products with moderate or low risk profiles could be inconsistent with broader administration efforts to onshore and friendshore chip capacity (see Figure 1). Further, with CXMT today accounting only for about 10 percent of global DRAM revenues (up from 4 percent in 2025), some experts are skeptical that introducing Chinese memory supply will meaningfully address current shortages.
How short-term introduction of CXMT chips into the U.S. market could affect competitiveness of U.S. and allied firms is a critical question for policymakers in search of solutions. Policymakers should consider whether potential purchases could affect the competitiveness of U.S. and allied memory suppliers over time. If they adopt measures to facilitate sales, they should tailor policies to ensure that any approach, including a temporary one, does not undermine U.S. and allied long-term memory investments.
Non-U.S. Market Segmentation
Policymakers evaluating Chinese-supplied DRAM chips should take a clear-eyed approach to weighing risks against potential benefits. In addition to the factors described above, a risk-based approach should also consider any potential benefits of permitting consumer firms to incorporate limited CXMT chips for non-U.S. customers. These include the fact that any additional chip supply allows U.S. companies to produce consumer products they might otherwise forgo (or raise prices on during a supply shortage), while also strengthening their ability to maintain market share. In limiting potential products containing CXMT DRAM to Chinese markets, U.S. firms could reallocate memory supplied by U.S. and South Korean firms to U.S. and allied customers while potentially establishing a stronger foothold with Chinese customers.
Today's export control and procurement landscape makes opportunities for introducing CXMT DRAM into U.S.-destined products high-risk for companies, particularly for Type 1 U.S. government, defense, and critical infrastructure uses. Type 2 connected or safety-critical products, such as cars, medical devices, or smart-home products, also face elevated risks due to China's regulatory and cybersecurity landscape. Finally, Type 3 mainstream consumer products sold exclusively in China would present less exposure to sensitive U.S. government systems and U.S.-based users--though the company could still face cybersecurity and compliance risks (see Figure 1).
If, as some firms argue, limited use of CXMT DRAM could enable the manufacture of consumer products that would otherwise not be produced, then non-U.S. market segmentation could be one limited, short-term approach introducing the least risk to Americans. However, it is not a complete safeguard.
Risk-Informed Recommendations for Policymakers and Industry
There are few easy solutions to today's memory chip supply crunch. As U.S. companies urgently seek sources of conventional DRAM and supply is increasingly constrained by demand for HBM to fuel data centers, previously unheard-of policy solutions are now openly discussed. U.S. companies considering incorporating CXMT chips into their supply chains should take into account the risks presented in this analysis.
As policymakers actively develop solutions to U.S. firms' and consumers' needs, they should avoid binaries and consider the following risk-informed recommendations:
* Maintain current restrictions on CXMT DRAM for Type 1 use cases. Procurement restrictions should remain in place to reduce exposure to existing and potential risks to the most sensitive U.S.
systems and users.
* Adopt a tiered risk framework to assess CXMT DRAM beyond Type 1. U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security, should develop a tiered risk framework for assessing procurement exposure, cybersecurity and supply chain risks, market segmentation, and potential long-term effects on U.S. and allied competitiveness.
* Conduct independent technical research on CXMT chips. Companies should subject these products to rigorous hardware and firmware testing and assessments and treat them neither as inherently secure nor vulnerable.
* Invest in allied and partner national semiconductor ecosystems for sustainable future supply. Instead of threatening counterproductive tariffs, the Trump administration should clearly communicate the importance of expanding supply from trusted allies and partners as they make significant investments on U.S. soil. Long-term, the United States should secure and diversify the trusted memory supply available to U.S. and allied firms through intentional engagement with South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.
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Lauryn Williams is deputy director and senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/index%2Ephp/analysis/between-rock-and-hard-place-evaluating-risks-chinese-memory-chips
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Evaluating the Risks of Chinese Memory Chips
Commentary by Lauryn Williams
November 19, 2026
The United States is experiencing an increasingly sharp memory chip supply shortage as a limited number of suppliers prioritize high bandwidth memory (HBM) bound for hyperscaler customers building AI data centers, shifting capacity away from conventional dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips and contributing to rising prices for consumers.
DRAM chips, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Evaluating the Risks of Chinese Memory Chips Commentary by Lauryn Williams November 19, 2026 The United States is experiencing an increasingly sharp memory chip supply shortage as a limited number of suppliers prioritize high bandwidth memory (HBM) bound for hyperscaler customers building AI data centers, shifting capacity away from conventional dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips and contributing to rising prices for consumers. DRAM chips,which act as a computer's short-term memory, are found in consumer products including cell phones, laptops, gaming consoles, cars, and medical devices. They are also a key component across defense technologies: For example, drone manufacturers are leveraging DRAM to integrate increasingly autonomous capabilities. HBM, a higher-end product formed by stacking and connecting conventional DRAM chips, is shaping today's memory market in significant ways as AI infrastructure demand skyrockets.
The vast majority of DRAM and HBM supply is produced by just three firms--Micron, SK hynix, and Samsung--and much of their limited supply is spoken for. In September, Micron announced 26 total strategic customer agreements extending into the 2030s that ensure long-term supply for well-resourced hyperscaler customers. In late October, SK hynix stated it was sold out of DRAM and HBM through 2029. Micron warned customers to expect "supply-demand conditions to be much tighter" in coming years, with the shortage unlikely to abate before 2030 as demand outstrips supply and HBM demand consumes up to 70 percent of available capacity.
These firms are meanwhile building new facilities in the United States and elsewhere to expand production. Yet future construction plans cannot alleviate today's short-term realities, due to the expected lag time (up to four years) between investments and facilities coming online. And, in some cases, a newly announced project will not address the heart of the challenge: SK hynix's new $4 billion Indiana facility will be used for HBM packaging and research and development, not DRAM fabrication.
The memory crunch is not limited to the United States. Supply in Asia is also stretched, with the International Data Corporation projecting that regional PC shipments would decline nearly 14 percent in 2026 as suppliers prioritize HBM. In China, leading firm CXMT's capacity is reportedly booked through 2027, while Chinese firms are locking in their own supply.
In this constrained global market, U.S. companies seeking access to conventional DRAM chips find themselves between a rock and a hard place. They must weigh short-term needs against longer-term considerations. Sustainable solutions are urgently needed to leverage U.S. allies and partners to expand future memory chip supply, with current manufacturers' capacity committed through the 2030s. As a result, some firms are exploring alternative solutions in the next-largest memory market: China.
A Rock and a Hard Place
Attempts to source new memory chip supply from China are sparking discussions across the tech industry and policy community. Two key suppliers form China's memory ecosystem: CXMT (ChangXin Memory Technologies) and YMTC (Yangtze Memory Technologies). CXMT is already the fourth-largest global DRAM manufacturer, and NAND flash memory supplier YMTC's market position is growing. Yet with Washington slow to introduce short- or long-term solutions to relieve the supply crunch and much of the Big Three's current supply already committed, some firms are pursuing alternatives. Former Apple CEO Tim Cook reportedly engaged the Trump administration regarding using Chinese chips for China-destined products, and new CEO John Ternus recently reasserted that "all options should be on the table." Other laptop manufacturers are already reportedly introducing CXMT DRAM chips into a limited subset of laptops for non-U.S. markets.
With the Beijing question unlikely to disappear while DRAM chip supply remains limited, a clear cost-benefit analysis of sourcing Chinese memory supply is essential. U.S. firms considering CXMT DRAM chips should base their evaluation on numerous risk factors, including procurement and export control considerations, cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities, product sensitivities, and destination market, as well as long-term economic competitiveness. Figure 1 evaluates use of CXMT DRAM chips across these dimensions and introduces a tiered risk framework for consideration by policymakers and companies alike.
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Figure 1: Tiered, Risk-Based Approach to Incorporating China-Produced DRAM
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Procurement and Export Control Hurdles
Today, companies looking to Chinese DRAM as an emergency measure should consider whether their use introduces procurement exposure, and whether possible export controls could make future sourcing unsustainable. Companies face two categories of U.S. policy hurdles. The first is procurement restrictions, limiting whether the U.S. government and its contractors can do business with CXMT and YMTC. These include the Pentagon's 1260H List, which includes both firms, and the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 5949 prohibition, coming December 2027. The second is export controls, including the Entity List, which currently includes YMTC but not CXMT. The Department of Commerce limits what U.S. technology can flow to firms on the list. While export controls do not prevent a U.S. company from buying Chinese DRAM, they do shape whether China is a sustainable source and how U.S. companies might think about anything beyond off-the-shelf purchases.
The Pentagon's 1260H List, established in the FY 2021 NDAA, lists by name firms it considers "Chinese military companies" with ties to the People's Liberation Army. As of June 8, 2026, both CXMT and YMTC are included on the list (after being briefly removed in February 2026). Listing carries legal consequences under Section 805 of the FY 2024 NDAA. The Department of Defense has been barred since June 30, 2026, from contracting directly with 1260H-listed companies, and from June 30, 2027, from purchasing goods or services from these entities indirectly through third parties. U.S. companies incorporating CXMT chips as components are not directly implicated, but should be aware of possible reputational consequences and heightened scrutiny from defense customers.
Additionally, the FY 2023 NDAA Section 5949 statute specifically prevents federal agencies and government contractors from buying semiconductors from CXMT, YMTC, and SMIC--another Chinese firm--beginning December 2027, a prohibition that will apply across the federal government. While this does not formally prevent U.S. firms from procuring DRAM from these companies, or individuals from purchasing laptops with these chips, it is likely to heighten scrutiny on business with these firms and should impact U.S. firms' calculus.
Perhaps most well-known, the Department of Commerce's Entity List requires a license for exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of items to listed foreign parties subject to U.S. export controls. Since December 2022, YMTC has been a listed entity, with a license requirement covering all such items and a presumption of denial. CXMT is not currently on the Entity List, but a possible listing is a prospective risk, though the Department of Commerce has not published new additions since October 2025 amid active trade discussions with Beijing. As experts have noted, if listed, CXMT could face reduced access to the U.S. tools, materials, and servicing its facilities require, impacting long-term reliability. And, while U.S. firms buying off-the-shelf chips is not considered an export, activities such as sharing product roadmaps or producing customized products with a listed supplier could require an export license that is likely to be denied.
Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Risks
Chinese DRAM also raises distinct cybersecurity and supply chain questions. Potential risks of embedding Chinese memory in U.S. companies' products, none of which are particularly new, could arise on two different fronts.
1. Established Regulatory Risks Derived from China's Software Vulnerability Regulations
Since 2021, Western researchers have drawn attention to a Chinese regulation that has raised significant concerns across the software vulnerability ecosystem: the Regulations on Management of Security Vulnerabilities in Network Products, introduced by the Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), and Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The most notable provision requires reporting "information on relevant vulnerabilities" to MIIT in 48 hours. Chinese companies discovering vulnerabilities cannot publish them before developing a patch, or share unpublished details overseas other than to the provider. In sum, the law guarantees ministries access to vulnerability information within two days of a company learning about it, often before a fix exists.
The national security implications of this policy represent an ongoing cost of doing business with Chinese chip suppliers such as CXMT. These concerns are noteworthy, as a growing number of companies are actively considering incorporating CXMT chips. Indeed, HP, Asus, and Acer have reportedly already begun introducing CXMT chips in limited laptop models sold outside the United States (the companies did not confirm the reports). As cybersecurity experts have recently expressed, the law effectively provides China access to critical vulnerability information, potentially before downstream customers are aware. Before a fix is available, foreign companies could find themselves exposed to flaws the Chinese government is already aware of. With the law in effect for several years, these dynamics are not hypothetical; they are a reality to be baked into U.S. companies' chip sourcing decisions.
The possible risks are greatest for sensitive government and critical infrastructure systems and connected or safety-critical devices, with lower but nonzero risk to mainstream consumer electronic products. Companies considering CXMT DRAM, and chips produced by U.S. and allied firms in China, should build in safeguards, patch vulnerabilities, and engage in component testing.
2. Lower-Probability Risk of an Embedded "Back Door"
Known evidence does not definitively establish that CXMT DRAM products contain an embedded hardware back door, so the risk is hypothetical rather than a corroborated feature of the threat landscape. Importantly, DRAM chips, which serve as temporary memory storage, are not designed to store user data once disconnected from power. They are volatile memory, with information lost once turned off, and do not independently maintain network connections or transmit communications outside a particular environment. The technical parameters of DRAM technology thus severely limit the possibility of a Chinese-supplier-introduced hidden back door operating independently of the processor or operating system. It is not impossible that chip hardware could be compromised, but DRAM is less likely to provide surveillance or espionage opportunities for threat actors.
These risks are likely less immediate than those posed by China's regulatory environment but require consideration. CXMT products have reportedly been evaluated by independent security researchers far less extensively than chips produced by their competitors. A lack of documented concerns therefore cannot be completely disentangled from the absence of substantial independent security research overall or taken as evidence of security. Existing uncertainties thus support two policies: (1) excluding CXMT DRAM from U.S. government and sensitive critical infrastructure uses, and (2) investing in testing and other mitigations to reduce potential consumer product risks. In addition, U.S. and allied companies--which have their own qualification and testing processes--can use such procedures or engage independent third parties to further the identification of any potential vulnerabilities.
U.S. Economic Competitiveness Considerations
Discussions around alternative chip supply take place against a backdrop in which U.S.-based Micron, and South Korea-based SK hynix and Samsung, are market-leading suppliers, accounting for roughly 90 percent of global DRAM revenue as of mid-2026, while CXMT holds a smaller, growing position. Samsung holds the largest revenue share at roughly 39 percent in Q2 2026, after reclaiming the top spot from SK hynix, which leads in HBM.
All three major firms are investing in manufacturing capacity on U.S. soil. Micron has committed more than $250 billion to U.S. fabrication and research and development through 2035, while SK hynix's U.S. footprint centers on a roughly $4 billion HBM packaging plant in Indiana, with mass production targeted for 2029. Samsung's largest U.S. project, its $37 billion Taylor, Texas, facility, is a logic foundry, so neither Korean firm's U.S. investment has as yet added DRAM fabrication capacity.
In 2026, the Trump administration regularly threatened tariffs to pressure South Korean suppliers many U.S. firms currently rely on, a measure likely to exacerbate current challenges. In this context, introducing CXMT or YMTC chips into the U.S. market even for Type 2 or 3 products with moderate or low risk profiles could be inconsistent with broader administration efforts to onshore and friendshore chip capacity (see Figure 1). Further, with CXMT today accounting only for about 10 percent of global DRAM revenues (up from 4 percent in 2025), some experts are skeptical that introducing Chinese memory supply will meaningfully address current shortages.
How short-term introduction of CXMT chips into the U.S. market could affect competitiveness of U.S. and allied firms is a critical question for policymakers in search of solutions. Policymakers should consider whether potential purchases could affect the competitiveness of U.S. and allied memory suppliers over time. If they adopt measures to facilitate sales, they should tailor policies to ensure that any approach, including a temporary one, does not undermine U.S. and allied long-term memory investments.
Non-U.S. Market Segmentation
Policymakers evaluating Chinese-supplied DRAM chips should take a clear-eyed approach to weighing risks against potential benefits. In addition to the factors described above, a risk-based approach should also consider any potential benefits of permitting consumer firms to incorporate limited CXMT chips for non-U.S. customers. These include the fact that any additional chip supply allows U.S. companies to produce consumer products they might otherwise forgo (or raise prices on during a supply shortage), while also strengthening their ability to maintain market share. In limiting potential products containing CXMT DRAM to Chinese markets, U.S. firms could reallocate memory supplied by U.S. and South Korean firms to U.S. and allied customers while potentially establishing a stronger foothold with Chinese customers.
Today's export control and procurement landscape makes opportunities for introducing CXMT DRAM into U.S.-destined products high-risk for companies, particularly for Type 1 U.S. government, defense, and critical infrastructure uses. Type 2 connected or safety-critical products, such as cars, medical devices, or smart-home products, also face elevated risks due to China's regulatory and cybersecurity landscape. Finally, Type 3 mainstream consumer products sold exclusively in China would present less exposure to sensitive U.S. government systems and U.S.-based users--though the company could still face cybersecurity and compliance risks (see Figure 1).
If, as some firms argue, limited use of CXMT DRAM could enable the manufacture of consumer products that would otherwise not be produced, then non-U.S. market segmentation could be one limited, short-term approach introducing the least risk to Americans. However, it is not a complete safeguard.
Risk-Informed Recommendations for Policymakers and Industry
There are few easy solutions to today's memory chip supply crunch. As U.S. companies urgently seek sources of conventional DRAM and supply is increasingly constrained by demand for HBM to fuel data centers, previously unheard-of policy solutions are now openly discussed. U.S. companies considering incorporating CXMT chips into their supply chains should take into account the risks presented in this analysis.
As policymakers actively develop solutions to U.S. firms' and consumers' needs, they should avoid binaries and consider the following risk-informed recommendations:
* Maintain current restrictions on CXMT DRAM for Type 1 use cases. Procurement restrictions should remain in place to reduce exposure to existing and potential risks to the most sensitive U.S.
systems and users.
* Adopt a tiered risk framework to assess CXMT DRAM beyond Type 1. U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security, should develop a tiered risk framework for assessing procurement exposure, cybersecurity and supply chain risks, market segmentation, and potential long-term effects on U.S. and allied competitiveness.
* Conduct independent technical research on CXMT chips. Companies should subject these products to rigorous hardware and firmware testing and assessments and treat them neither as inherently secure nor vulnerable.
* Invest in allied and partner national semiconductor ecosystems for sustainable future supply. Instead of threatening counterproductive tariffs, the Trump administration should clearly communicate the importance of expanding supply from trusted allies and partners as they make significant investments on U.S. soil. Long-term, the United States should secure and diversify the trusted memory supply available to U.S. and allied firms through intentional engagement with South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.
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Lauryn Williams is deputy director and senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/index%2Ephp/analysis/between-rock-and-hard-place-evaluating-risks-chinese-memory-chips
[Category: ThinkTank]
