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Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary Issues Commentary to National Review: Insidious New Morality Is Giving License To Kill
NEW YORK, Nov. 22 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Nov. 20, 2025, to the National Review:* * *
An Insidious New Morality Is Giving License To Kill
By Tal Fortgang
On neo-pagan notions of justice, power, and violence
A deranged man walked into a Manhattan skyscraper on July 28 and murdered four people before turning the gun on himself. His motivations are unknown and will probably remain so forever. For the first few hours after the shooting, social media reflected the somber mood that properly follows hearing news of a tragedy. When it became clear ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Nov. 22 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Nov. 20, 2025, to the National Review: * * * An Insidious New Morality Is Giving License To Kill By Tal Fortgang On neo-pagan notions of justice, power, and violence A deranged man walked into a Manhattan skyscraper on July 28 and murdered four people before turning the gun on himself. His motivations are unknown and will probably remain so forever. For the first few hours after the shooting, social media reflected the somber mood that properly follows hearing news of a tragedy. When it became clearthat one of the murdered was a police officer -- a husband and father of two young children, with a third on the way -- some of us worried we would see celebrations from the anti-police crowd. But that didn't materialize.
It turns out we were right to worry about grotesque celebrations of random violence, though. The first indication came in an X post from leftist podcaster Sean McCarthy: "New York City is so evil that if you walk into a random big building to do a mass shooting there's decent odds you'll hit the person in charge of buying up single family homes for blackstone [sic]." He was referring to Wesley LePatner, an executive at the asset management firm, a lay leader at her synagogue, and the mother of two children. To McCarthy, she was nothing more than an avatar for the evils of capitalism.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the National Review (https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2026/01/an-insidious-new-morality-is-giving-license-to-kill)
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Tal Fortgang is an adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute. He was a 2023 Sapir Fellow
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/an-insidious-new-morality-is-giving-license-to-kill
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Russia Exploits Temporary Ceasefires at Ukraine Nuclear Plant
WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Nov. 21, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russia Exploits Temporary Ceasefires at Ukraine Nuclear Plant
By Anna J. Davis
Executive Summary:
* Two temporary ceasefires between Ukraine and Russia occurred on October 23 and November 7 for repairs on opposite sides of the frontline to off-site power lines for the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP).
* After successfully reconnecting the power lines to the plant, Russian forces again damaged the 750-kilovolt Dniprovska power line on ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Nov. 21, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Exploits Temporary Ceasefires at Ukraine Nuclear Plant By Anna J. Davis Executive Summary: * Two temporary ceasefires between Ukraine and Russia occurred on October 23 and November 7 for repairs on opposite sides of the frontline to off-site power lines for the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP). * After successfully reconnecting the power lines to the plant, Russian forces again damaged the 750-kilovolt Dniprovska power line onNovember 14.
* From Moscow's point of view, ceasefires serve its own goals rather than being a gesture toward genuine peace. Any meaningful ceasefire results or peace agreement can only be achieved when there are real measures of accountability and consequences for Russia.
Ukraine and Russia have declared two temporary ceasefires in the past month to repair essential power lines supplying off-site power to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), which has been under Russian military occupation since March 2022. The ceasefires to repair the 750 kilovolt (kV) Dniprovska power line and the 330 kV Ferosplavna-1 power line were mediated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The locations of the damages required the Ukrainian and Russian expert teams to conduct repairs on opposite sides of the frontline (IAEA, October 18). Once the lines were repaired, however, Ukraine reported on November 14 that Russian forces yet again damaged the Dniprovska line, risking another safety crisis at the Zaporizhzhia NPP (RBC-Ukraine; Telegram/@Energoatom, November 14). Russia's behavior in these temporary ceasefire situations illustrates potential commonalities in a broader ceasefire scenario. Meaningful results can only be achieved when there are real measures of accountability and consequences for Russia.
Zaporizhzhia NPP has been operating with two (Dniprovska and Fersplavna-1) of its original 10 off-site power lines since Russia's full-scale invasion. Since then, a total of 10 loss-of-off-site-power (LOOP) outages have occurred at Zaporizhzhia NPP (IAEA, 2012; Facebook/@Svitlana Grynchuk, October 23). The most recent was a three-hour-and-34-minute blackout on July 4 (see EDM, July 11). NPPs rely on off-site power for safety systems and operations, including powering the cooling system for nuclear reactors, making any LOOP particularly dangerous (IAEA, 2012). The requirement for at least two off-site power lines is intended to reduce the likelihood of blackouts caused by frequent or prolonged LOOP outages (IAEA, 2012). Zaporizhzhia NPP has been operating with just one off-site power line, Dniprovska, since May, when the Ferosplavna-1 line was damaged by Russian shelling launched from the occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast, according to Ukraine's Ministry of Energy (IAEA, May 12, June 2).
The necessity of a temporary ceasefire became clear when the Dniprovska line was cut on September 23 (RBC-Ukraine, September 23). This marked the tenth time Zaporizhzhia NPP has lost external power supply since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (, November 14). Unlike the previous blackout, which lasted a few hours, this one lasted a month, and Zaporizhzhia NPP had to rely on its emergency diesel generators. According to Russian officials, there are 20 backup diesel generators at Zaporizhzhia NPP, which can provide emergency power for at least 20 days (IAEA, July 10).
On September 25, two days after the Dniprovska line was disconnected, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Moscow on the sidelines of World Atomic Week (see EDM, September 19; President of Russia, September 25). They are sure to have discussed the urgency of the situation, as the IAEA said that it began working immediately with Russia and Ukraine to enable repairs of both the Dniprovska and Ferosplavna-1 lines (IAEA, November 8). Grossi said on October 9 that Ukraine and Russia "have engaged with us in a constructive way to achieve this important objective for the sake of nuclear safety and security" (IAEA, October 9).
Ukraine and Russia agreed on October 18 to an IAEA proposal to establish temporary ceasefire zones on opposite sides of the frontline to repair the Dniprovska and Ferosplavna-1 power lines under IAEA supervision (IAEA, October 18). The ceasefire began on October 23 and led to the successful reconnection of the Zaporizhzhia NPP to the grid after the Dniprovska line was repaired (X/@iaeaorg, October 23). Additional damage was discovered at the Ferosplavna-1 line, which was repaired in a second temporary ceasefire on November 7 and 8 (Ukrainska Pravda, November 9). This marked the first time that the Fersoplavna-1 line has been in service since it was disconnected on May 7 (IAEA, November 8).
Both lines functioned for about a week, until November 14, when the Dniprovska power line's automatic protection system activated and the line was disconnected again (RBC-Ukraine; Telegram/@Energoatom, November 14). The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy cites Russian shelling as the cause, noting that Russia launched 731 strikes across Zaporizhzhia on that day (Telegram/@IvanFedorov; Ukrainian Ministry of Energy, November 14).
On November 14, the same day that the Dniprovska line was disconnected again, Grossi and Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev met in Kaliningrad to mark the success of the recent ceasefires in repairing the two power lines (Izvestiya; X/@rafaelmgrossi, November 14; IAEA, November 17).
After a four-day outage, IAEA and Ukrenergo, Ukraine's state-owned electricity transmission system operator, announced that Ukrainian specialists had successfully repaired and reconnected the power line to Zaporizhzhia NPP (X/@iaeaorg; Telegram/@Ukrenergo, November 19). IAEA has not provided an update on its investigation of the cause (IAEA, November 17, 19; X/@iaeaorg, November 19).
The Russian side has, without evidence, blamed the Ukrainian military for damage to both lines and claims that the IAEA had to ensure Ukraine's adherence to the ceasefire (Izvestiya, October 18; Rosatom, November 14). Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Russia is likely forcibly testing Zaporizhzhia NPP's integration into the Russian network by deliberately severing its connection to the Ukrainian energy grid (Interfax, October 2). Russia has been building electricity lines and pylons since at least February to connect Zaporizhzhia NPP to its own electrical grid (Greenpeace; Kyiv Post, May 27).
The temporary ceasefires follow the Kremlin's apparent reversal in September on its position toward cooperation with the United States and Ukraine at the Zaporizhzhia NPP (see EDM, September 5). Until then, the Kremlin had claimed that cooperation was not possible and that the plant's status was non-negotiable. Rosatom appeared to have played a role in this reversal, as months earlier, Likhachev said the corporation was ready to engage with the United States over U.S. nuclear fuel and intellectual property rights for U.S. technology at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. There had been no prior public discussions of potential ceasefires at or near the plant. Now that a precedent has been set regarding temporary ceasefires, the Russian side is certain to pursue continued engagement over U.S. nuclear fuel and intellectual property rights at the Zaporizhzhia NPP.
Russia's actions have exposed its real intentions even as reports circulate that Russia is engaging with the United States on a potential peace plan (TASS, November 19). From Moscow's point of view, ceasefires serve its own goals rather than constitute a gesture toward genuine peace. The temporary ceasefires at the Zaporizhzhia NPP were never intended to precede meaningful negotiations or peace agreements, but they did offer Moscow a chance to demonstrate its commitment to doing so. Such action proves that any meaningful ceasefire results or peace agreement can only be achieved when there are real measures of accountability and consequences for Moscow.
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May 7 ... Ferosplavna-1 line damaged.
July 4 ... Dniprovska line damaged, resulting in a three-hour and thirty-four-minute blackout.
September 23 ... Dniprovska line damaged, resulting in a month-long blackout.
October 18 ... Russia and Ukraine agreed to establish temporary ceasefire zones on opposite sides of the frontlines to enable their respective sides to conduct repairs on the 330 kV Ferosplavna-1 line and the 750 kV Dniprovska line.
October 23 ... First temporary ceasefire enabled reconnection of Zaporizhzhia NPP to Ukraine's electrical grid after a one-month outage following repairs to the Dniprovska line (successful reconnection to the NPP) and Ferosplavna-1 line (partially restored). This brought Zaporizhzhia NPP out of its tenth blackout since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. IAEA announced that additional damaged to the Ferosplavna-1 line was discovered outside the ceasefire zone near the Zaporizhzhia NPP.
November 7 ... Second temporary ceasefire to conduct further repairs to the Ferosplavna-1 power line. Technicians repaired a damaged cable between two pylons, with an IAEA team monitoring their work.
November 8 ... Ferosplavna-1 line restored. This restored redundancy in external power supply (a backup power line) for the first time in six months.
November 14 ... Grossi and Likhachev met to mark the recent repairs of Dniprovska and Ferosplava-1 power lines.
The Dniprovska line was disconnected again after the actuation of a protection system, which includes protective relays, circuit breakers, and fuses).
November 19 ... Ukrainian technicians successfully repaired and reconnected the Dniprovska power line to Zaporizhzhia NPP.
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Anna J. Davis is Fellow of Eurasia Studies at the Jamestown Foundation and Editor of Eurasia Daily Monitor.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-exploits-temporary-ceasefires-at-ukraine-nuclear-plant/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to China-US Focus: Busan's Unfinished Agenda
WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Nov. 21, 2025, to China-US Focus:* * *
Busan's Unfinished Agenda
By Richard Weitz
On October 30, Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump held their first in-person meeting since 2019. During their 100-minute encounter at the Republic of Korea's Gimhae Air Base outside Busan, they made some progress de-escalating commercial issues, as detailed in a White House Fact Sheet. However, neither side fundamentally changed its ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Nov. 21, 2025, to China-US Focus: * * * Busan's Unfinished Agenda By Richard Weitz On October 30, Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump held their first in-person meeting since 2019. During their 100-minute encounter at the Republic of Korea's Gimhae Air Base outside Busan, they made some progress de-escalating commercial issues, as detailed in a White House Fact Sheet. However, neither side fundamentally changed itsposition on these or other issues. The agreements reached in Busan are politically but not legally binding. They provide few safeguards against a renewed cycle of escalatory retaliations.
Resolving many of these economic disputes requires addressing their security connections. Yet, Xi and Trump eschewed discussing most of the non-economic topics dividing their countries. These deferred issues included nuclear arms control and proliferation, the Korean situation, cyber issues beyond semiconductors, and Taiwan. We need to await next year's reciprocal presidential visits for authoritative decisions on these questions.
Trump reportedly raised Beijing's support for Moscow's war against Ukraine. U.S. officials believe that the PRC could strain Russia's military-industrial complex by curtailing hydrocarbon imports, technology exports, and other transactions that have helped Russia overcome Western sanctions. But persuading Beijing to change policies regarding Ukraine is challenging. China receives substantial benefits from the Russia-Ukraine war, which distracts the West from confronting the PRC in Asia and generates a large market for PRC investments and exports, without incurring substantial costs.
In any case, Putin's commitment to conquering Ukraine seems inexorable. The Russian government still insists on the same war aims as it did before Moscow launched its invasion, despite the enormous human, economic, and other costs of the conflict. Without Chinese aid, Russia's military effort would weaken. But even if Xi called Putin tomorrow and demanded that the Kremlin end the war or lose China's assistance, Putin would likely fight on until "victory" or he leaves office.
The presidents skirted important security issues entirely. Immediately before meeting Xi, Trump posted on his Truth Social account that the United States would resume nuclear weapons testing. The post probably reflected Trump's vexation at Putin's nuclear threats, but also reminded Xi of the need for Sino-American arms talks. U.S. officials want Beijing to understand that China's nuclear buildup and rejection of arms control with Washington are driving the United States to test its existing nuclear weapons and develop new ones.
Trump's inability to secure a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was not a major setback. Washington's leverage over Pyongyang remains minimal and a rushed meeting would likely have yielded little. Even so, Trump's highlighting interest in engaging with Kim could help dissuade Pyongyang from taking actions that might antagonize the U.S. president, such as detonating another nuclear weapon.
However, angst is growing in Washington that the PRC is relaxing its opposition to the North Korean nuclear program. In the past, China-U.S. cooperation to end the program and keep the Korean Peninsula free of weapons of mass destruction was a foundational pillar of Sino-American collaboration. If China joins Russia in legitimizing the DPRK nuclear arsenal, the prospects of further nuclear proliferation throughout the world will increase, to the detriment of China, the United States, and many other nations.
Trump and Xi also did not discuss Afghanistan, despite Sino-U.S. tensions over Trump's desire to restore the Bagram Air Base, the fighting between Afghan and Pakistani forces, and the potential for Afghan-related instability to disrupt Chinese and U.S. efforts to connect Central Asian governments better with global markets. Trump's hosting all five Central Asian leaders at a White House dinner the week after he returned from his largely successful week-long trip to Asia suggests a combined discussion of Afghan-Central Asian issues should be addressed during next year's Sino-American leadership engagements.
The narrow Busan dialogue on chip export controls could profitably expand to address additional Sino-U.S. cyber issues. For example, both governments now routinely accuse the other of cyber-enabled espionage. Furthermore, the inherent dual-use nature of AI means the PRC and U.S. governments will invariably consider its security as well as economic implications. Discussing safeguards against AI-related crime and standards to limit the risks of AI-controlled weapons.
The most explosive unresolved Sino-U.S. security issue, though, remains the Taiwan question. Trump said that Beijing would not invade Taiwan during his presidency due to Xi's respect for him and fear of U.S. power. Asians' fear that Moscow's invasion of Ukraine would embolden Beijing to use force in Asia has also declined over time. Yet, the Taiwan issue looms as the most likely cause of a Sino-American great power war. Trump has returned to the pre-Biden U.S. policy of ambiguity regarding whether the United States would intervene militarily to help defend Taiwan from a PRC invasion.
On the one hand, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio made a speech before the trip to dispel concerns that Trump would trade away Taiwan's security for PRC trade concessions. Indeed, Trump has not uttered the words Beijing wants to hear: that the United States "opposes" (vice "does not support") Taiwan's independence. But the administration has reduced the volume of arms sales, lowered the seniority of the bilateral defense talks, and not permitted the Taiwanese president to transit through U.S. territory. Perhaps Trump wanted to avoid discussing Taiwan at Busan to preserve ambiguity, but the issue will continue to challenge their interactions.
The trajectory of Sino-U.S. economic relations is fraught with problems. Among all major U.S. commercial partners, China is better positioned to contest a trade war due to the size of its economy, control over critical rare earth elements, and other advantages. The PRC continues to pursue "asymmetric decoupling," aiming to decrease reliance on other countries while increasing their dependence on China. Meanwhile, the United States is demanding foreign investment primarily to enhance its long-term self-reliance.
Read in China-US Focus.
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Richard Weitz is senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/busans-unfinished-agenda-richard-weitz
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Arab News: Azerbaijan - A Strategic Addition to the C5
WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Nov. 21, 2025, to Arab News:* * *
Azerbaijan: A Strategic Addition to the C5
By Luke Coffey
At a meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, last Sunday, the leaders of the five Central Asian states -- Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan -- made an important decision that could have geopolitical ramifications for Eurasia. At the Seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, also ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Nov. 21, 2025, to Arab News: * * * Azerbaijan: A Strategic Addition to the C5 By Luke Coffey At a meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, last Sunday, the leaders of the five Central Asian states -- Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan -- made an important decision that could have geopolitical ramifications for Eurasia. At the Seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, alsoreferred to as the C5, the leaders agreed to formally add Azerbaijan to the format. Going forward, this body will be known as the C6.
The C5 format has helped the five countries of Central Asia facilitate deeper cooperation, especially in the fields of trade, economics, culture and energy. It was created after these states regained their independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union and has served as the major platform for regional cooperation in Central Asia.
It has also been used for the region's external relations. For example, just last week, US President Donald Trump hosted a summit marking the 10th anniversary of the C5+1 format, which is the platform that brings Washington into regular engagement with the region. Bringing Azerbaijan formally into the format was the logical next step in the evolution of this grouping.
One only has to look at a map to understand why. Azerbaijan is in a strategic location. Situated on the western shore of the Caspian Sea, it serves as one of the primary gateways for Central Asia to reach European and global markets. In recent years, Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia have significantly increased their bilateral relations.
Over the past three years, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has made 14 visits to Central Asian countries, while his Central Asian counterparts have paid 23 visits to Azerbaijan. This is a reminder that old-school diplomacy can have a big impact. With this growing level of engagement, it makes sense that the countries would formalize a more regional grouping into the C6.
There are three main reasons why closer cooperation on both sides of the Caspian Sea makes sense for the region.
The first is geopolitical reality. The Central Asian states are trying to diversify away from an overreliance on the Russian and Chinese markets. While they do not seek to replace their engagement with these countries, they are always looking for alternative and additional markets as part of their broader balancing approach to foreign policy and their need to grow economically. Looking south, the uncertainty in Afghanistan and the continued tension between India and Pakistan make that route an unrealistic option. For Central Asian states, looking westward offers far greater opportunities, especially as they seek reliable access to global markets.
The second reason is the existence of well-established transport and trade links that run from Azerbaijan through the South Caucasus to Europe and beyond. This route is referred to as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly known as the Middle Corridor. It includes many of the region's major oil and gas pipelines, rail connections, motorways, fiber-optic cables and air corridors that bypass both Russia and Iran through the heart of the South Caucasus.
Azerbaijan is a key hub for this route, so bringing Baku into the fold makes sense for the Central Asian states. This is especially true as Trump's efforts to bring peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the possibility of normalization between Turkiye and Armenia, create new transportation, trade and energy opportunities that Central Asian states could benefit from.
Finally, Azerbaijan shares a common Turkic heritage with most of the Central Asian republics. Other than Tajikistan, the other four are linguistically, culturally and ethnically Turkic-majority countries. And with the rise of the Organization of Turkic States, a body founded to increase cooperation among the ethnically Turkic countries of Eurasia, connecting Azerbaijan and Central Asia in another important format such as the C6 makes perfect sense.
The implications of the newly established C6 and the trade, transit and energy opportunities it will provide are not limited to the region. There could also be a positive impact in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf.
Turkiye is leading an ambitious project called the Dry Canal corridor, intended to link Iraq's southern coast and the Gulf to Turkish ports on the Mediterranean by the late 2030s. This plan includes construction of a new rail line and road network spanning Iraq and linking to Turkiye. There are also plans to reconstruct a rail link that once connected Mosul in northern Iraq with the Turkish city of Gaziantep. It is not unrealistic to assume that the road and rail networks of the Dry Canal could eventually link up with those currently used by the Middle Corridor and the South Caucasus as they converge into Turkiye.
The opportunities for trade and transit between the Gulf and Central Asia could grow even more if the proposed Gulf Railway, designed to connect the six Gulf Cooperation Council states by rail, becomes a reality. In theory, goods from as far away as Duqm Port in Oman could reach markets in Central Asia using the Middle Corridor.
And the importance of Azerbaijan and Central Asia has not gone unnoticed by many Gulf states. In recent months, we have seen the UAE and Saudi Arabia sign multibillion-dollar agreements with Kazakhstan and there are indications of growing Gulf interest in Azerbaijan as well. These engagements -- ranging from energy and trade to broader investment discussions -- may be planting the seeds for future interregional connectivity.
While the world is focused on the Gaza peace plan, the continued fighting between Russia and Ukraine and the US military buildup around Venezuela, the decision by the Central Asian states to add Azerbaijan and create the C6 might not get the attention it deserves. But if the right policies are pursued, this could prove to be a turning point in Eurasian economic growth, trade and connectivity, bringing benefits to the region and beyond.
Read in Arab News (https://www.arabnews.com/node/2623445).
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Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson analyzes national security and foreign policy, with a focus on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/azerbaijan-strategic-addition-c5-luke-coffey
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Will Trump's Peace Plan for Ukraine Succeed?
WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 21, 2025:* * *
Will Trump's Peace Plan for Ukraine Succeed?
By Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan
U.S. President Donald Trump is right. The war in Ukraine must end. The challenge is determining how to set conditions for a lasting peace deal in a way that doesn't further destabilize Europe or create openings for additional Russian aggression.
This installment of Critical Questions reviews findings published in the CSIS Futures Lab Strategic Headwinds series over the last year on ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 21, 2025: * * * Will Trump's Peace Plan for Ukraine Succeed? By Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan U.S. President Donald Trump is right. The war in Ukraine must end. The challenge is determining how to set conditions for a lasting peace deal in a way that doesn't further destabilize Europe or create openings for additional Russian aggression. This installment of Critical Questions reviews findings published in the CSIS Futures Lab Strategic Headwinds series over the last year onthe opportunities and challenges to negotiating--and implementing--a peace deal in Ukraine. This series integrates expert surveys and analysis with an AI model trained on historic peace negotiations to provide perspectives on the prospects for peace and ending the war in Ukraine. Drawing on CSIS Futures Lab survey data across Ukraine war experts, this analysis maps where the plan's provisions intersect with issues previously identified as plausible negotiation articles.
The only way Trump's Ukraine peace plan can make any meaningful progress is if it serves as an opening gambit to start a larger peace negotiation with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The plan's limited security guarantees should change to include third-party guarantees that extend beyond economic sanctions. Ukraine can survive not being in NATO. But it cannot survive as a sovereign state with a hollowed-out military and limits on the ability of European states to deter future Russian aggression.
Q1: Why do most peace deals tend to fail?
A1: Peace deals tend to fail because of commitment problems: Neither side can know if the other party won't take advantage of the pause in fighting to regroup and attack them in the future. Kyiv cannot know if Moscow really wants peace or is just waiting for a more favorable future moment to seize additional land by force. Based on historical analysis, 31 percent of interstate wars end in a stalemate under ceasefire agreements, creating this exact type of commitment challenge. The fighting stops, but the underlying disputes remain, and trust is low.
Commitment problems are even more acute when one of the parties has a history of breaking deals. Russia has a track record of breaking past agreements, including the Minsk I Protocol in 2014, and has even used peace talks as a way to position forces on the battlefield rather than to seek long-term peace. From a Ukrainian perspective, the Minsk II agreement only slowed fighting to the contact line in the Donbas while setting the stage for the 2022 invasion.
Domestic politics and economic shocks common in post-conflict settings tend to compound fears. Bad deals tend to produce political crises and can even topple democratically elected governments, paving the way for instability and future conflict.
Q2: How might Trump's Ukraine peace plan succeed?
A2: It's all about economics. Human experts see the most promising parts of the Trump plan in the "pragmatic" space rather than the grand political trade. They think Trump's ideas around reconstruction and investment in Ukraine have real traction, especially letting Western companies help rebuild infrastructure and energy systems and using Ukraine's gas transit network as part of a postwar European energy regime, which all sides rate as fairly negotiable. By offering a clear pathway to economic reintegration and G8 membership, the proposal effectively removes the economic levers the West has used to constrain the Kremlin.
Strategically, this creates a high probability that Russia would agree to the initial terms, as the peace plan grants them a strategic victory without further military cost. Experts rate "using Ukraine's gas transit infrastructure for European energy supplies from Russia" as both highly negotiable and reasonably satisfying for all four sides. Those are the parts of Trump's package most likely to survive in any serious negotiation--because they sit in the narrow band where expert expectations for mutual gain actually converge.
Security guarantees are more complicated. Human experts see them as critical to any lasting deal. The Trump peace plan includes limited guarantees at best. Earlier expert surveys and studies in Strategic Headwinds call for robust commitments, including air as well as cyber and space support alongside foreign peacekeepers. Trump's plan limits these measures and even calls for rolling back NATO aircraft in Poland. Rather, the "security guarantee" is tied to economic sanctions and removing de facto recognition of Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine.
Rerunning the same expert survey, albeit with a large language model as the judge, paints a similar "success core," but is more bullish on some elements and more skeptical on others. AI models rate Trump's humanitarian plank extremely highly, treating the return of deported Ukrainians and children as both very negotiable and very satisfying for Ukraine, Europe, and the United States. Algorithmic judges also see demilitarized zones and peacekeeping arrangements as one of the safest and most workable security devices in a peace package, which again contrasts with Trump's peace plan. Like human experts, the AI survey is very positive about large-scale Western investment in Ukrainian resources and infrastructure.
Where AI differs from humans is that it is much colder on sanctions relief and returning frozen Russian assets, and much warmer on keeping sanctions tight and using them as enforcement, so it expects Trump's peace plan to succeed most where it leans into reconstruction, gas and infrastructure cooperation, robust guarantees and humanitarian deals, rather than big gifts to Moscow on territory or sanctions.
Figure 1 shows experts' assessment of positions of parties across negotiability and satisfaction for the subset of negotiation articles that resembles most of Trump's peace plan. With this subset of articles, Ukraine's negotiability space appears to be very low. More detailed discussions of methodology can be found at Strategic Headwinds.
Q3: How might Trump's Ukraine peace plan fail?
A3: The real killer for the peace plan's success, however, is the cluster of provisions on territory, Ukrainian military power, and amnesty. CSIS expert data identifies the specific mechanisms where the peace plan is statistically most likely to collapse: the imposition of severe military restrictions and territorial concessions on Ukraine. The proposal to cap the Armed Forces of Ukraine personnel size is viewed by experts as a nonstarter, with Ukrainian satisfaction ratings plummeting to a near-absolute zero and negotiability hovering at a very low level. However, the peace plan refers to a number of 600,000 Ukrainian troops. If this is the number of active forces, it could still put Ukraine in the top 10 militaries by size in the world.
Furthermore, the requirement to recognize Crimea and the Donbas as Russian territory--while freezing the lines in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson--demands a significant political concession from the Ukrainian leadership that the current government is unlikely to survive. Trump's plan appears to systematically choose the Russian-maximizing version of each of these trade-offs. These are effectively impossible for a sovereign Ukraine to accept voluntarily. In probabilistic terms, this is where the package is least likely to be accepted absent a dramatic Ukrainian military collapse or a major fracture in the Western coalition. Trump's plan creates both an international and domestic commitment issue for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that makes it untenable.
Finally, the plan's justice and governance provisions cut against expert expectations for a sustainable settlement. The Futures Lab's survey indicates strong support--especially in Ukraine and Europe--for "demanding accountability for Russian war crimes," and very high satisfaction with the "return of forcibly deported Ukrainians, including kidnapped children." Trump's plan adopts the latter but explicitly rejects the former by granting full amnesty and waiving future claims for all parties, landing squarely on the side that experts view as most satisfying for Russia and least satisfying for Ukraine. Early elections within 100 days, another Trump demand, show low satisfaction and only middling negotiability across the board in the data, suggesting they are more likely to destabilize than legitimize the settlement.
The AI-enabled survey largely converges with expert assessments on where Trump's plan is likely to fail. It rates recognition of Russian control over occupied territories, including freezing the line of contact in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, as deeply unacceptable in Europe, the United States, and especially Ukraine, making these clauses prime candidates to break any deal. The models also see strict limits on the Ukrainian military and a blanket amnesty as planting the seeds of renewed violence: capping Ukraine's forces and constraining its weapons lock in a power imbalance that rewards maximalist aims in Moscow, while erasing accountability runs directly against the strong AI preference for war crimes trials and undermines the legitimacy of any settlement. Finally, although the survey finds more room for bargaining over NATO status than human experts do, it still treats a security architecture built mainly on economic sanctions and political denunciations, rather than robust defense commitments and a capable Ukrainian army, as an unstable foundation that is unlikely to deter future aggression.
Q4: Is this an end plan?
A4: Trump's plan is the start, not the end, of negotiations. The president sees himself as a dealmaker and likely views ending the war in Ukraine as part of a larger grand bargain. Therefore, the peace plan is the first step in bringing Russia to the table. What should happen now is that diplomats from across Europe engage with the White House to map out how best to compromise with Putin, as morally repugnant as that sounds. The fact is, 60 percent of all wars conclude through some form of compromise, especially when there is no clear path to battlefield victory. Unless there is a fundamental change on the battlefield, Ukraine is likely to lose territory.
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Benjamin Jensen is director of the Futures Lab and a senior fellow for the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Yasir Atalan is the deputy director and data fellow in the Futures Lab at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-trumps-peace-plan-ukraine-succeed
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Mogami - Advancing Australia-Japan Defense Cooperation
WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 21, 2025:* * *
The Mogami: Advancing Australia-Japan Defense Cooperation
By Moyuru Tanaka
In August 2025, the Australian government announced its selection of the upgraded Japanese Mogami-class frigate as its new general-purpose frigate. Just one month later, on September 5, 2025, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles met with Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani in Tokyo for the 12th Japan-Australia 2+2 Ministerial Consultations. Later that day, they observed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 21, 2025: * * * The Mogami: Advancing Australia-Japan Defense Cooperation By Moyuru Tanaka In August 2025, the Australian government announced its selection of the upgraded Japanese Mogami-class frigate as its new general-purpose frigate. Just one month later, on September 5, 2025, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles met with Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani in Tokyo for the 12th Japan-Australia 2+2 Ministerial Consultations. Later that day, they observedthe Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) frigate JS Mikuma, which is the fourth vessel of the Mogami-class frigate.
This development in shipbuilding cooperation between Australia and Japan will boost Australia's naval capabilities, enhance interoperability between the two countries, reinforce deterrence against China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, strengthen Australia's shipbuilding industrial base, and deepen supply chain cooperation between Australia and Japan.
During the consultations, the ministers also recognized that strengthening cooperation with the United States, a key ally for both nations, is critical to realizing their shared objectives. The Australia-Japan naval shipbuilding partnership also presents opportunities to strengthen trilateral cooperation and symbolizes the broader significance of cooperation among U.S. allies to secure peace and stability in the region.
Aligning Security Strategies
Japan's 2022 National Defense Strategy identified Australia as its closest security partner second only to the United States, under the framework of the "Special Strategic Partnership". Australia's 2024 National Defence Strategy stated that the alliance with the United States is fundamental to national security, and that Japan is an indispensable partner for achieving regional peace and prosperity. Both countries view their alliances with the United Sates as a key pillar of their security policies.
Prior to 2014, Japan had effectively prohibited defense exports for decades. However, in response to an increasingly severe security environment, it established the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology that year. Despite this policy shift, Japan lost to France in the bid for Australia's submarine program in 2016 and has made little progress since then, aside from a 2020 agreement to transfer air surveillance radars to the Philippines. The transfer of upgraded Mogami-class frigates to Australia, alongside the recently announced joint development of next-generation fighter aircraft with Italy and the United Kingdom, marks a significant step forward in Japan's defense export policy and its defense cooperation with allies and partners.
Australia-Japan defense ties date back to the 2003 Memorandum on Defence Exchange. Since then, both countries have steadily cultivated a foundation for joint activities through a series of key agreements, including the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the 2013 Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services, the 2013 Agreement on the Security of Information, the 2014 Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology, and the 2023 Agreement Concerning the Facilitation of Reciprocal Access and Cooperation.
Building on that foundation, both countries are steadily making practical progress through bilateral and multilateral exercises such as Nichi-Gou Trident, Talisman Sabre, and Orient Shield, as well as through the mutual exchange of liaison officers between the Australian Defence Force Headquarters Joint Operations Command and the Japan Self-Defense Forces Joint Operations Command.
Why the Mogami Was Selected
Australia is increasingly concerned about China's coercive activities in the Indo-Pacific and its expansion of influence and presence in the Pacific Island nations. For example, in November 2023, the Chinese navy used sonar pulses against Australian divers in international waters off Japan, injuring them. In June 2024, Chinese coast guard vessels fired water cannons and blocked an Armed Forces of the Philippines resupply mission in the South China Sea, severely injuring a Philippine sailor. In February 2025, the Chinese navy conducted live-fire exercises in the Tasman Sea without adequate notification, prompting passenger planes to change course mid-flight. In April 2025, China launched large-scale military drills around Taiwan, simulating attacks and maritime blockades.
In response to the intensifying security environment, Australia's 2023 Defence Strategic Review concluded that the Australian Defence Force's current force structure is not fit for purpose. It emphasized the need for an enhanced lethality surface combatant fleet and recommended an independent analysis to assess its size, structure, and composition. That analysis, released in February 2024, recommended that the government accelerate the acquisition of 11 general-purpose frigates to replace the aging Anzac-class frigates, with capabilities to secure maritime trade routes, defend the northern approaches, and escort military assets, using a hybrid offshore-then-onshore build strategy. In November 2024, the Australian government announced that the first three ships would be constructed offshore, with the remainder to be built domestically in Australia once production capacity at the Henderson precinct is ready.
The Australian defence minister emphasized that the decision was entirely based on capability. The upgraded Mogami-class frigate selected by Australia offers the following key features:
* Long-Range Navigation Capability: The Mogami provides a range of up to 10,000 nautical miles and a top speed exceeding 30 knots, enabled by its powerful and efficient propulsion system. This supports Royal Australian Navy (RAN) sea lane defense operations, contributing to securing maritime trade routes.
* Missile Strike Capability: The Mogami is equipped with a 32-cell Vertical Launch System, four times as many cells as the eight on the RAN's current Anzac-class frigate, for surface-to-air missiles such as the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, and also carries anti-ship missiles. This can enhance the RAN's deterrence posture and supports its strategy of denial in the northern approaches.
* Interoperability with U.S. Forces: The Mogami is highly interoperable with U.S. systems. Both Australia and Japan prioritize interoperability with U.S. forces and employ many U.S.-made weapons. This commonality would further strengthen their ability to operate seamlessly alongside U.S. forces.
* Manpower Efficiency: The Mogami offers manpower-saving operations through its Combat Information Center, which consolidates information control functions using advanced automation technologies. Consequently, it can be operated by only 90 crew members, half the approximately 180 required to operate the RAN's existing Anzac-class frigate. This would significantly ease the RAN's workforce challenges, which are the most severe among the three services.
* Rapid Construction and On-Time Delivery: Australia's Hunter-class frigate program has faced cost overruns and delivery delays due to repeated specification changes. In contrast, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), the shipbuilder of the Mogami, has a 35-year record of on-time delivery to the JMSDF, thanks to its swift and efficient construction methods and scheduling. To reduce program risk, the Australian version will have minimal changes. As a result, the first Australian Mogami is scheduled for delivery in 2029, with operational deployment targeted for 2030.
Strengthening the Shipbuilding Industrial Base
The analysis released by the Australian government also emphasized the need to support Australia's continuous naval shipbuilding and sustainment industry. The government has stated that it will invest tens of billions of dollars in defense capabilities in Western Australia over the next two decades, creating approximately 10,000 well-paid, high-skilled jobs. However, Australia's 2024 Defence Industry Development Strategy highlights a shortage of skilled engineers, making workforce development an urgent priority for rapid ship construction.
To address the workforce shortage, the offshore production phase in Japan is essential. MHI could host Australian engineers at its shipyard, providing technical training, such as welding skills, and sharing advanced shipbuilding technologies, including digital engineering. Australian engineers could further develop their skills by working alongside Japanese engineers during ship construction.
A naval ship comprises not only a hull but also numerous onboard systems, including radars, antennas, sonars, sensors, and information processing systems. This means that in addition to MHI, which is the prime shipbuilder for the hull, many Japanese onboard systems companies, such as Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu, and Oki Electric Industry, are involved in the construction of Australian Mogami. For Australian engineers, working with such Japanese industries on system installation would also help them gain and enhance technical skills, facilitating technology transfer to Australia.
During the offshore production phase, Australia could simultaneously advance its own engineer training and infrastructure development at Henderson Shipyard to prepare for the onshore production of the remaining ships. This hybrid offshore-onshore approach would help accelerate the construction of all 11 frigates and the development of Australia's shipbuilding industrial base.
The Mogami has a projected service life of 40 years. To sustain the long-term operational readiness of the fleet over that period, maintenance and repair capabilities are just as critical as initial construction. Operating common platforms and systems between Australia and Japan could facilitate the shared use and production of spare parts in both countries, thereby supporting long-term sustainability. This would also strengthen supply chain cooperation and aligns with the Pentagon's Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience initiative, which encourages allies and partners to create a trusted ecosystem of technical cooperation, supply chain resilience, and co-production and co-sustainment collaboration.
U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Collaboration
The U.S. shipbuilding sector faces similar hurdles, including skilled workforce shortages. The construction of the Australian Mogami could offer valuable lessons in engineer training and the adoption of new technologies, supporting efforts to rebuild the U.S. maritime industrial base, as advocated in the executive order Restoring America's Maritime Dominance.
Importantly, the United States is a key partner in the construction of the Australian Mogami. As noted above, Australia and Japan prioritize interoperability with U.S. forces. Given Australia's plan to adopt the upgraded Mogami design with minimal specification changes, the Australian version is likewise expected to incorporate many U.S. systems. This presents significant economic opportunities for the U.S. defense industry. Australia and Japan should maintain close coordination with the United States to ensure the timely delivery of these systems.
Enhanced trilateral interoperability will lead to more effective and efficient naval operations among the three countries. For example, it will facilitate the implementation of the new trilateral terms of reference on maritime logistics, signed by the three navies in July 2025. This arrangement includes missile reloading and flexible refueling, enabling faster naval responses in the event of a crisis in the Indo-Pacific.
Conclusion
The security environment in the Indo-Pacific region is deteriorating rapidly as China seeks to shift the regional balance of power in its favor. The challenges posed by Chinese coercion cannot be addressed by any single nation.
The construction of the Australian Mogami through Australia-Japan cooperation stands as a strong example of defense and industrial collaboration among regional partners. It will enhance Australia's naval capabilities, improve interoperability between the two countries, deliver economic and strategic benefits to Australia, Japan, and the United States, and potentially strengthen trilateral shipbuilding and maintenance bases as well as supply chain resilience in the region.
Moreover, a recent media report stated that New Zealand has also expressed interest in the upgraded Mogami, and the Japanese and New Zealand defense ministers have agreed to maintain close communication regarding a possible frigate deal. Members of the U.S. alliance and partner network should continue to strengthen and expand defense cooperation to reinforce integrated deterrence and ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.
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Moyuru Tanaka is a visiting fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., from the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) in Japan's Ministry of Defense.
The views expressed herein are solely the author's and do not represent the views of Japan's Ministry of Defense, nor the government of Japan.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/mogami-advancing-australia-japan-defense-cooperation
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI, Benny Johnson Launch 'Make Housing Great Again' Initiative
WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on Nov. 21, 2025:* * *
AFPI, Benny Johnson Launch 'Make Housing Great Again' Initiative
New Partnership Aims to Restore the American Dream for Young Americans
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today announced "Restoring the American Dream: Make Housing Great Again," a national initiative led by Benny Johnson, an award-winning media personality and host of "The Benny Show", which has garnered more than 5 billion views worldwide.
Under Johnson's leadership, the initiative will focus on improving ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 22 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on Nov. 21, 2025: * * * AFPI, Benny Johnson Launch 'Make Housing Great Again' Initiative New Partnership Aims to Restore the American Dream for Young Americans The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today announced "Restoring the American Dream: Make Housing Great Again," a national initiative led by Benny Johnson, an award-winning media personality and host of "The Benny Show", which has garnered more than 5 billion views worldwide. Under Johnson's leadership, the initiative will focus on improvingthe lives of young Americans by working to make homeownership and family life accessible and affordable once more.
For generations, strong families, homeownership, and economic stability have defined the American Dream. However, recent polling shows that most Americans, especially Gen Z and Millennials, believe that they will never be able to own a home or afford to build a stable family.
This new initiative aims to reverse these trends with bold, pro-family, pro-growth policies. As national spokesperson, Johnson will bring a powerful voice to the partnership by engaging Americans who feel forgotten.
"Homes are too expensive and totally out of reach for young people. The slow death of the American Dream is happening before our eyes. It is a generational betrayal and we must reverse this trend by Making Housing Great Again," said Johnson. "Today, the average homebuyer in America is 40 years old. That is well past the optimal age for marriage and family creation. The battle for home ownership is a battle for our cultural and civilizational survival. We need more young people to get married and start families and that cannot happen without a culture of homeownership. We must deliver on this promise for our young people. The American Dream hangs in the balance."
"Rising costs, stagnant wages, regulatory burdens, and a culture that too often diminishes traditional aspirations have left millions feeling directionless and forgotten," added Greg Sindelar, AFPI's Interim President and CEO. "AFPI is committed to reversing this trend by advancing meaningful, actionable policy solutions rooted in the principles of the America First movement."
"A home is where families grow strong and the American Dream comes alive," said Ashley Hayek, AFPI's Executive Vice President and Co-Chair of the Initiative. "Young Americans have been told they can't build a future, but under President Trump's leadership and America First policies, anything is possible again. As a mom, I refuse the Left's defeatist narrative and with partners like Benny Johnson, we're fighting to restore hope, opportunity, and a future our kids can believe in."
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-benny-johnson-launch-make-housing-great-again-initiative
[Category: ThinkTank]