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Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: Unions' Hidden LIRR-Strike Scheme Aims to Pick Everyone's Pockets
NEW YORK, May 20 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 18, 2026, by fellow Ken Girardin and legal policy fellow John Ketcham to the New York Post:* * *
Unions' Hidden LIRR-Strike Scheme Aims to Pick Everyone's Pockets
The Long Island Rail Road strike that began early Saturday continues upending commutes from Manhattan to Suffolk County.
Unbeknownst to most riders, they're collateral damage in a much bigger but less visible fight that could slam the entire MTA region with both higher fares and heavier taxes.
Negotiations over the LIRR's union contracts, ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, May 20 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 18, 2026, by fellow Ken Girardin and legal policy fellow John Ketcham to the New York Post: * * * Unions' Hidden LIRR-Strike Scheme Aims to Pick Everyone's Pockets The Long Island Rail Road strike that began early Saturday continues upending commutes from Manhattan to Suffolk County. Unbeknownst to most riders, they're collateral damage in a much bigger but less visible fight that could slam the entire MTA region with both higher fares and heavier taxes. Negotiations over the LIRR's union contracts,which came up for renewal in 2023, have been dragging on for three years.
The slow pace of the talks means they now must cover a fourth year, potentially affecting the MTA's other union contracts as those talks open up.
On top of offering raises, LIRR management has pressed unsuccessfully to reform the railroad's rigid and inefficient work rules.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/05/18/opinion/unions-hidden-lirr-strike-scheme-will-pick-your-pocket-too)
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Ken Girardin is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute. John Ketcham is a legal policy fellow and director of Cities at the Manhattan Institute.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/unions-hidden-lirr-strike-scheme-aims-to-pick-everyones-pockets
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: South Caucasus Navigating Economic and Security Effects of Iran Conflict
WASHINGTON, May 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on May 19, 2026, by former career diplomat Irakli Laitadze in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
South Caucasus Navigating Economic and Security Effects of Iran Conflict
Executive Summary:
* The Iran conflict is transforming the South Caucasus by disrupting trade routes, shifting regional power balances, and increasing the strategic importance of transport corridors linking Europe, Central Asia, and the People's Republic of China that bypass Iran.
* Armenia faces growing economic and political pressure because a significant ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on May 19, 2026, by former career diplomat Irakli Laitadze in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * South Caucasus Navigating Economic and Security Effects of Iran Conflict Executive Summary: * The Iran conflict is transforming the South Caucasus by disrupting trade routes, shifting regional power balances, and increasing the strategic importance of transport corridors linking Europe, Central Asia, and the People's Republic of China that bypass Iran. * Armenia faces growing economic and political pressure because a significantportion of its trade and energy infrastructure depends on Iran. Disruptions threaten domestic stability ahead of upcoming parliamentary elections, increasing Armenia's vulnerability to renewed Russian influence and leverage.
* Azerbaijan faces major security and transit risks due to its long border with Iran and reliance on Iranian routes to reach its Nakhchivan exclave. Rising oil prices temporarily boost state revenues, but prolonged instability could damage Azerbaijan's trade and security.
* Georgia and Azerbaijan are benefiting from increased transit and aviation traffic as routes bypass Iran and Russia, strengthening pipelines and cargo corridors. Georgia, however, also faces higher energy costs, declining regional tourism, and geopolitical uncertainty.
The outcome of the Iran conflict will directly influence the balance of power in the South Caucasus for years to come. The conflict has already threatened transit routes, rearranged mechanisms of regional security, and weakened Russia's regional presence, which has been declining since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The February 28 U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iran accelerated power-shifting processes in the South Caucasus that began in 2020 with the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The Second Nagorno-Karabakh war, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan's 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the 12-day U.S.-Israeli bombing of Iranian military facilities in June 2025 have also gradually changed the security and economic architecture of the region.
The Iran conflict has become a major factor in Armenia's approaching June 7 parliamentary elections. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said on March 5 that his government has been preparing for potential fallout from a conflict in Iran for over a year in response to criticism of his campaign appearances amid ongoing security threats (Armenpress, March 5). The opposition in Armenia criticizes Pashinyan for not taking adequate measures to mitigate the security and economic risks brought on by the conflict. Moscow wants the pro-Russian opposition to win the elections in Armenia, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has pressed Pashinyan over Armenian restrictions affecting Russian passport holders (Vedomosti, April 1; OC Media, April 2). Electoral defeat of Pashinyan's Civil Contract party by Robert Kocharyan's pro-Russian Armenia Alliance party could partially resuscitate Russia's diminished influence in the South Caucasus.
Russian gas exports to Armenia and the rerouting of land cargo previously bound for Iran give Moscow powerful leverage. Around 25 percent of Armenia's international freight goes through Iran (CCBS, March 21). This route is critical since direct Armenia-Turkiye and Armenia-Azerbaijan trade remains limited, though increasing. Conflict in Iran endangers cargo movement, damaging Armenia's economy. The delivery time between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Armenia has increased from 45-60 days to 90 days since February (Sputnik Georgia, May 4; RitmEurasia, May 6).
Since 2009, Yerevan and Tehran have exchanged gas for electricity (see EDM, November 20, 2024). Armenia processes imported Iranian gas, makes electricity, and transfers it back to Iran, keeping any surplus. In August 2023, Yerevan and Tehran extended the agreement until 2030 (RITM Eurasia, August 16, 2023). Any major disruption of the energy system will cause serious consequences for Armenia, which may increase its consumption of Russian gas if Iranian supplies are further disrupted. Armenia has only fully operational land borders with Georgia and Iran, and trade with Turkiye and Azerbaijan has only recently begun to open. Armenia's border with Iran runs through the Syunik province. It is about 44 kilometers (27 miles) long and is the only active land link between Armenia and Iran. The disruption of this channel is economically detrimental to Armenia. The Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which Azerbaijan referred to as the Zangezur corridor, will link Azerbaijan to its Nakhichivan exclave via Armenia's Syunik province, and is not operational yet. TRIPP will eventually link to the broader Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, or the Middle Corridor) (Prime Minister of Armenia, December 9, 2025). Moscow and Tehran oppose the TRIPP and aspects of the TITR because the projects would mean decreased cargo turnover overland through Russia and Iran, and thus less political leverage over their neighbors.
Azerbaijan's 996-kilometer (619-mile) land border with Iran is a security risk. The deterioration of Azerbaijan's security could be caused by deliberate or unintended spillover of armed conflict, accidental military strikes, intentional provocations, violation of airspace, illegal trafficking, or a massive influx of refugees (see EDM, April 14). Azerbaijan is the only state in the South Caucasus that has come under direct military attack during the Iran conflict (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, March 5; see EDM, March 11). On March 5, drones launched from Iranian territory struck Nakhchivan. Since then, tensions between Baku and Tehran have de-escalated. The conflict is also a potential issue for Baku because of the estimated 14-15 million ethnic Azeris who live in Iran, around 16 percent of Iran's total population (Minority Rights Group, accessed May 19). Most of these ethnic Azeris live in parts of Iran directly bordering Azerbaijan. Ethnic Azeris are not a separatist force in Iran, but a protracted conflict has some potential, though currently small, to increase their political activity.
Nakhchivan depends on cargo transit via Iran. Baku and Yerevan are still developing direct transit between Armenia and Nakhchivan via TRIPP, and the alternative route through the Turkish province of Igdir has limited transit capacity. It does not provide direct access to the rest of Azerbaijan. Nakhchivan's border with Turkiye is only 17 kilometers (10.6 miles) long, compared to its border with Iran, which spans 179 kilometers (111 miles). If instability persists in Iran, the need for TRIPP will increase. Until TRIPP is built, the primary route from Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan is via Iran, which is currently closed. Other infrastructure connecting Azerbaijan to the Persian Gulf and South Asia runs through Iran. Disorder within Iran may fully or partially collapse these routes.
The conflict in Iran is boosting Azerbaijan's oil profits. The state budget for 2026 is based on the $65 per barrel of Brent oil, but conflict in the region and the Strait of Hormuz has increased the going rate to $101.29 as of May 11 (Report Informasiya Agentliyi, September 16, 2025; Bloomberg, May 11). According to the Dutch ING Group, each $ 10-per-barrel increase provides Azerbaijan with about $3 billion in annual export revenues, which is approximately $1.5 billion in profit (Report Informasiya Agentliyi, March 25). The unexpected rise in oil prices is beneficial for Baku, but Azerbaijan would face economic decline in the event of a prolonged conflict or widespread disorder in Iran. Negative developments would include the collapse of existing transport routes and a surge in the prices of imported goods.
The Iran conflict has suddenly made Georgia and Azerbaijan a narrow and important air corridor for TransEurasian flights between the People's Republic of China (PRC), Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe. Russian airspace has been closed to Western carriers since the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (European Commission, January 9, 2025). Iranian airspace was partially reopened in April, but the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) still prohibits carriers under its purview from operating there (EASA, accessed May 19). From January to March, Georgian airports served 1,605,508 passengers, a 4.28 percent increase in comparison to the first quarter (Q1) of 2025. In Q1 2026, cargo turnover in Georgia was 10,177.5 metric tons, a 32.3 percent increase compared to Q1 2025 (Georgian Civil Aviation Agency, April 27). Azerbaijan saw similar increases in flights and transit in Q1 of this year compared to the same period in 2025. In most of January and February, barring the first day of Israeli-U.S. airstrikes on Iran on February 28, passenger and cargo mobility were not defined by armed conflict. This means either that the year-over-year increase is due to factors other than conflict re-routing flights through Georgia and Azerbaijan, or that the re-rerouting was so significant in March that it produced a marked increase for the entire quarter. Transit of cargo through the Batumi and Poti sea ports in Q1 2026 increased by 4 percent compared to Q1 2025 (Georgia Today, April 7). The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) are also increasing their strategic importance as routes that bypass both Iran and Russia.
Regional tourism to Georgia, on the other hand, has suffered because of the conflict. The inflow of tourists from Israel and Iran has declined sharply year over year in Q1. Iranian tourism decreased by 48.8 percent, Israeli tourism by 17.5 percent, Armenian tourism by 11.2 percent, and Azerbaijani tourism by 8.1 percent (Gruziia Online, April 21). Airplane ticket prices have risen since the outbreak of conflict in Iran, which may be the driving factor behind this decline.
Georgia is completely dependent on oil and petroleum product imports for energy. These imported products account for around 99 percent of domestic consumption (Worldometer, accessed May 19). The surge in oil prices due to the conflict in Iran has directly increased the costs of nearly all goods and services in Georgia. The Iran conflict is generally having a mixed effect on the Georgian economy, and the future is quite uncertain (IMF, April 7). Since the very start of the conflict, Tbilisi has maintained a cautious stance, avoiding loud declarations about the war (Netgazeti, March 2; see EDM, March 9).
Iran is logistically important to Russia within the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). This complex multi-modal network carries diverse materials, including oil, oil-based products, grain, fertilizers, and dry cargo through India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe. It is a three-pronged transport network, and all three branches pass through Iran. According to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Savelyev, in 2025, 21.5 million metric tons took the route, of which 63 percent went through Azerbaijan (RSPP, March 20). Cargo turnover on the INSTC increased by 39 percent in the last five years (PortNews, April 1).
Moscow considers the INSTC one of its key instruments for avoiding Western sanctions. In the event of drastic political changes in Iran or prolonged instability, this transport system may cease to function. This shift would reduce Russia's political leverage in the South Caucasus and diminish a cash flow that the Kremlin desperately needs to sustain its war against Ukraine.
Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan have expressed relatively cautious and reserved positions toward the conflict in Iran. All three governments have expressed their concerns about military conflict and urged for diplomatic engagement and a peaceful resolution of the war (Sputnik Armenia, March 1; Government of Georgia, March 2; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, April 8). The countries of the South Caucasus are navigating a complex political and security environment shaped by conflict in Iran, Russia's strong interests and waning capacity amid its war against Ukraine, and shifting east-west connectivity drives through the region.
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Irakli Laitadze is a former career diplomat and academic.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/south-caucasus-navigating-economic-and-security-effects-of-iran-conflict/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: Secret in Mamdani's Video That Shows What a Lie 'Nakba' Is
WASHINGTON, May 20 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on May 18, 2026, by senior fellow Liel Leibovitz to the New York Post:* * *
Secret in Mamdani's Video That Shows What a Lie "Nakba" Is
Like all theater kids, the artist formerly known as Young Cardamom -- more famous now as Zohran Mamdani -- loves a good prop.
So when his administration released a tear-jerker of a video to commemorate the Nakba, the word Palestinians use to describe their displacement during the war of 1948, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 20 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on May 18, 2026, by senior fellow Liel Leibovitz to the New York Post: * * * Secret in Mamdani's Video That Shows What a Lie "Nakba" Is Like all theater kids, the artist formerly known as Young Cardamom -- more famous now as Zohran Mamdani -- loves a good prop. So when his administration released a tear-jerker of a video to commemorate the Nakba, the word Palestinians use to describe their displacement during the war of 1948,it began with a tracking shot of a gorgeous poster hanging in the home of 88-year-old Inea Bushnaq.
The poster shows the Old City of Jerusalem in the shadow of a lonesome olive tree, with a caption that read "Visit Palestine."
The camera caresses it longingly, as Bushnaq shares her sob story of having to flee the dastardly Zionists who kicked her out of her home all those decades ago.
Never mind that Bushnaq's story ignores the complexities of a war started by five Arab armies, which invaded the nascent state of Israel amid vows to eradicate it.
Never mind that the term "Nakba" itself, literally meaning "disaster," was coined by a Syrian professor who used it to describe not the Jews' attempt at self-defense, but the sheer and gross stupidity of virtually all Arab states in waging war against Israel -- and then losing badly, despite overwhelming numeric advantages.
And never mind, too, that Bushnaq herself is far from the indigenous daughter she claims to be: Her grandparents left their native Bosnia and settled in Syria before finding their way to Jerusalem, making them -- to borrow a phrase Mamdani voters use often to describe the Jewish citizens of Israel -- European colonizers.
What's truly mind-blowing about Mamdani's video is the fact that it lingers long enough on that poster to reveal the name of its creator, one Franz Kraus.
If that name doesn't sound particularly Palestinian to you, it's because Kraus was an Austrian Jewish artist forced to flee the Nazis.
Like many Jews lucky enough to escape Europe in time, he moved to the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people, then still known by its ancient Roman name, Palestine.
The artwork he created perfectly expressed his longing for the city of Jerusalem -- the capital of the Jewish people since at least 1003 BCE, two millennia before the Bushnaqs moseyed over and declared the place their own.
As you can clearly see in Mamdani's video, Kraus signed his name on his artwork. In Hebrew.
Now, look: the mayor has every right to put aside trivial matters of no concern to New Yorkers, like the surge of murders and robberies on the subway, and focus instead on what he sees as really important -- a complicated century-old conflict on the other side of the world.
He may also be forgiven for blatantly taking sides, tossing aside all his empty promises to Jewish New Yorkers and releasing his hateful video just before sundown on Friday, all but guaranteeing that observant Jews would not be able to see it or respond for at least 25 hours.
But when the mayor produces work so clownishly amateurish that it argues for fake Palestinian refugees by showcasing the work of real Jewish ones -- well, that, frankly, is an insult.
All of us living in this city have known, and loved, our share of con men.
We're far from averse to slick talkers telling tall tales.
But when the hoax the mayor chooses to promote is a bit of third-world propaganda, and when he packages it so poorly that it not only shamelessly lies about history but doesn't even bother to cover up the fabrication, we've no choice but to respond with that time-worn New York credo: Get outta here.
Incompetent mayors we may forgive.
Fiery ideologues who care more about their partisan, hateful narratives are, sadly, nothing new.
But Mamdani's combination of malice and ineptitude is a new and not-at-all-welcome phenomenon, to Jews and all New Yorkers alike.
Read in the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/05/18/opinion/secret-in-mamdanis-video-that-shows-what-a-lie-nakba-is/).
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At A Glance:
Liel Leibovitz is a senior Fellow at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/secret-mamdanis-video-shows-what-lie-nakba-liel-leilbovitz
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A: Foreign Investment Attraction and CFIUS - Can the 'Known Investor Program' Make U.S. Investment Screening More Efficient?
WASHINGTON, May 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on May 19, 2026, involving Andrea Leonard Palazzi, associate fellow with the Department of Economic Security and Technology:* * *
Foreign Investment Attraction and CFIUS: Can the "Known Investor Program" Make U.S. Investment Screening More Efficient?
Attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) in support of reindustrialization and technology development has emerged as an economic security priority for the United States. In February 2025, the presidential memorandum on the America ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on May 19, 2026, involving Andrea Leonard Palazzi, associate fellow with the Department of Economic Security and Technology: * * * Foreign Investment Attraction and CFIUS: Can the "Known Investor Program" Make U.S. Investment Screening More Efficient? Attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) in support of reindustrialization and technology development has emerged as an economic security priority for the United States. In February 2025, the presidential memorandum on the AmericaFirst Investment Policy set an ambitious dual goal of accelerating FDI to support U.S. economic growth and innovation, while tightening controls on adversarial capital, specifically from China.
Q1: How can the United States balance foreign investment attraction with investment security?
A1: The Trump administration's approach has potentially far-reaching implications for the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) and its process for screening foreign investment for national security risks. On one hand, the over $5 trillion in foreign investment pledges announced by the White House (some of which remain aspirational) to support U.S. industrialization may be unlikely to materialize if bottlenecked by an inefficient and inconsistent CFIUS review process--a growing perception in the industry highlighted in a January 2026 congressional hearing with Investment Security Assistant Secretary Chris Pilkerton.
On the other hand, FDI flows into the United States and allied countries come with heightened risks of exposure to adversarial interests. Even investment among allies could indirectly grant bad actors access to strategic assets, given the complex network and structure of global investors. For example, CFIUS once flagged a Germany-registered pharmaceutical firm's proposal to acquire another Germany-based firm because the latter had operations in the United States and the former was a subsidiary of a Chinese investment firm.
To thread the needle, the Department of the Treasury announced the "Known Investor Program" (KIP) in May 2025 to facilitate investment from allied and partner countries by streamlining the review process for repeat filers. The Treasury Department began piloting the KIP in mid-2025 with a small, limited number of foreign investors chosen based on geographic diversity and frequency of filing, and whose identities are confidential. In February 2026, the Treasury Department issued a request for information to gather public comments to "inform the program's development," giving stakeholders until March 18, 2026, to share feedback on the KIP and the broader CFIUS process. Assistant Secretary Pilkerton suggested that the pilot will continue through 2026, and a final notice on the KIP's details is expected from the Treasury Department later this year.
While it is too early to assess the efficacy of the program, this piece reviews the KIP's goals and design through the perspectives of key stakeholders over the past year and identifies success factors for the KIP and implications for broader CFIUS reform.
Q2: What is CFIUS?
A2: CFIUS is an interagency committee chaired by the Treasury Department that screens investments that "threaten to impair the national security of the United States." It was established in 1975 by former President Gerald Ford to monitor the effects of foreign investment on U.S. national interests, but its jurisdiction has evolved laws and executive orders amid emerging threats and geopolitical tensions.
The most recent overhaul of CFIUS occurred in 2018 through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, which broadened the committee's jurisdiction to certain noncontrolling and real estate investments. Subsequent actions include former President Joe Biden's Executive Order 14083 in 2022, which called for greater focus on supply chain resiliency and advanced technologies, and the Treasury Department's final rules in 2024 to "sharpen and enhance CFIUS procedures and enforcement authorities" and expand the list of military installations around which CFIUS has real estate jurisdiction.
At a high level, CFIUS reviews three types of transactions: (1) investments that could lead to foreign control of a U.S. business; (2) certain noncontrolling investments in a U.S. business involved in critical technologies, critical infrastructure, or sensitive personal data (TID); and (3) transactions involving real estate that is located near sensitive installations, such as military facilities. CFIUS could also review foreign-to-foreign deals if the target business has operations in the United States.
Notifying CFIUS is largely voluntary but recommended to obtain a "safe harbor" for the deal. This is key because the committee's jurisdiction applies indefinitely, including to closed deals that bypassed its review and may require ex-post mitigation or divestiture. Filing becomes mandatory, however, for transactions involving foreign governments acquiring a "substantial interest" in TID businesses, or a TID business that produces, designs, or manufactures critical technology that would be subject to export controls.
The CFIUS review process runs through several steps. In the national security review, the committee assesses if the deal presents national security risks that may require CFIUS's intervention. If risks are present, CFIUS conducts a national security investigation to assess and potentially resolve the risks through mitigation measures; if the risks remain unmitigated, CFIUS refers the transaction with a recommendation to the president, who decides to approve, block, condition, or unwind the transaction. If a deal is cleared through mitigation, the committee also monitors the enforcement of the measures over time.
Although CFIUS's assessment of a given transaction is confidential, public regulations provide a high-level overview of the committee's risk-based analysis. That is, a function of (1) the threat posed by the foreign person, (2) the vulnerability that the business creates (e.g., exposure to sensitive data or technology), and (3) the consequences to national security arising from the combination of the first two factors.
Q3: How is the KIP intended to work?
A3: The KIP aims to streamline the CFIUS process for repeat investors by collecting information from eligible foreign investors--or "Known Investor Entities"--in advance of filing. As currently drafted, investors qualify for the KIP if they meet, at a high level, three conditions:
1. frequent filing (e.g., at least three CFIUS-cleared transactions within the past three years and expectation to submit a transaction within the next 12 months);
2. clean record with the committee (e.g., no adverse notice within the previous five years for, say, a misstatement or omission); and
3. limited ties to an adversary country or country on entity lists (e.g., no more than 10 percent interest and no board appointment rights).
Eligible investors can disclose documentation upfront--such as ownership structure, management, compliance history, and investment strategies--and submit only limited information in a subsequent filing. Participation in the KIP, however, does not necessarily guarantee a favorable review outcome.
Q4: Do the goals of the KIP match investors' needs as well as the public interest?
A4: Several stakeholders welcomed the program in their comments, with some viewing it as an opportunity to renovate CFIUS. The opportunity for streamlining is also apt because Japan and the United Arab Emirates, both among the largest foreign investment pledgers, ranked in CFIUS's top five filing nations for technology-related as well as overall transactions in 2024.
Another reason why the KIP is well timed is that CFIUS's efficiency has emerged as a defining priority amid geopolitical tensions, rapid technological change, and surging FDI volumes. According to the World Bank, net FDI inflows into the United States have grown from 0.14 percent of GDP since CFIUS's inception in 1975 to 1.03 percent in 2024. Similarly, the number of investigations conducted by the committee has grown from 67 in 2015 to 116 in 2024.
Today, although 90 percent of reviewed transactions cleared CFIUS in the past five years, the committee continues to struggle to negotiate mitigation measures within its statutory timeline, as suggested by the number of refiled transactions--roughly one quarter of the unique transactions in 2024. Indeed, as the review deadline approaches, parties often buy additional time by withdrawing and refiling the formal notice, which "resets the review clock" and essentially extends CFIUS's timelines. Given the potential for delays, some practitioners advise companies to plan for the CFIUS process to take five to six months from initial filing to completion--though negotiations for some high-profile deals that had already closed reportedly took years.
The friction point is hard to pin down to any single cause. Whether it is interagency coordination, staffing constraints, or political influences, several factors contribute to delays and uncertainty, which can affect valuations, funding timelines, and business plans. For example, a 2024 report by the Government Accountability Office highlighted the challenges that the continuous monitoring of mitigation measures poses on CFIUS's finite resources and multiagency coordination.
Q5: Does the KIP's design align with its goals?
A5: Following the Treasury Department's request for information in February 2026, several stakeholders shared their feedback on the program's design. Though generally well-received, the current design of the KIP raised a few issues.
Some investors requested clarity regarding the benefits under the KIP amid concerns that the additional disclosure required under the program may deter participation. For example, if investors have already cleared CFIUS's threat review in the past or they benefit from good standing, the gains from the KIP may be only at the margins, and participants may weigh those benefits against the burden of collecting extensive documentation for the KIP. Thus, some comments recommend a reduction in filing costs for participants or a presumption of reduced risk for their future transactions.
Even if other participants clear the threat review more rapidly through the KIP, timeliness is not assured. CFIUS would still need to assess the vulnerability factor on a case-specific basis, namely by looking at the criticality of the asset involved in that transaction. Ultimately, participation in the KIP does not guarantee a specific review outcome, and the committee's case-specific approach remains unchanged.
Some investors recommended tightening the KIP through additional disclosure requirements, network analysis as part of the qualification for the program, and detailed verification of the information submitted by participants. Commenters also emphasized solutions to automate and streamline some of these processes, such as standardized disclosure templates, recognizing existing defense mitigation frameworks, and piloting AI-driven screenings for the KIP and the broader CFIUS.
Definitions under the KIP were another concern. Some investors raised privacy concerns due to the broad scope and sensitivity of KIP-related disclosures, while others asked for greater specificity and clarity regarding eligibility criteria. For example, eligibility paperwork will likely require periodic updates to ascertain that eligibility criteria, such as distance from U.S. adversaries, are maintained. Yet, considering that much of the screening process already entails looking into an investor's network, it is unclear whether the program meaningfully alleviates the review burden in this regard.
Q6: What are the implications of the KIP for CFIUS more broadly?
A6: To the extent the KIP succeeds in streamlining review of lower-risk transactions, the CFIUS process would be able to focus resources and capacity on higher-risk cases. For such a risk-adjusted approach to fully achieve its potential, two additional factors should be considered:
1. How AI can help enhance the CFIUS process is the subject of active discussion among government and private sector stakeholders. AI has the potential to improve screening of investor networks by scanning large amounts of public and commercial sources to detect links between companies and investors and identify the type of relationship and risks. Mapping these networks typically involves procedures that can require time, money, and resources.
2. Even as efforts to improve operational efficiencies accrue, the CFIUS caseload will likely depend on how it interprets its national security remit in an era of geoeconomic competition. While there is a strong argument for including economic security considerations, there is a risk that the process becomes politicized and runs counter to the goals of FDI attraction to promote reindustrialization. Both the February 2026 request for information and legislative efforts in the previous Congress have reflected an appetite for an economic tilt, though any statutory shift would require a broader debate on how to bound such economic perimeter and ensure CFIUS has the capacity to assess economic--rather than purely security--implications.
In conclusion, early indications suggest that the announcement of the KIP sent a positive signal to the investment community, but its long-term viability will depend on the ability to address the design issues raised by stakeholders and assess the program's efficacy once launched. The KIP's effort to streamline CFIUS also shines a light on the implications for a broader CFIUS reform centered on clarifying definitions and automating processes.
An inefficient CFIUS is only one of the challenges to the administration's investment attraction agenda--trade and geopolitical volatility remain looming threats. But streamlining U.S. investment screening into a more scalable process may remove one fewer obstacle toward turning substantial foreign investment pledges into secure capital flows toward U.S. reindustrialization and technology development.
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Andrea Leonard Palazzi is an associate fellow with the Economic Security and Technology Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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The author would like to thank EST interns Jacob Zimmerman and Sofia Leathers for their valuable research support.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/foreign-investment-attraction-and-cfius-can-known-investor-program-make-us-investment
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: How Trade Reduces the Risk of War
WASHINGTON, May 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on May 19, 2026, by Philip Luck, director of Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business, and Christopher M. Meissner, professor of economics at the University of California-Davis:* * *
How Trade Reduces the Risk of War
That trade and security are linked is among the oldest claims in political economy. A new paper by Ling Feng, Qiuyue Huang, Zhiyuan Li, and Christopher Meissner marks a major step forward in measuring the peace dividend credibly, and the magnitudes are striking. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on May 19, 2026, by Philip Luck, director of Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business, and Christopher M. Meissner, professor of economics at the University of California-Davis: * * * How Trade Reduces the Risk of War That trade and security are linked is among the oldest claims in political economy. A new paper by Ling Feng, Qiuyue Huang, Zhiyuan Li, and Christopher Meissner marks a major step forward in measuring the peace dividend credibly, and the magnitudes are striking.A doubling of bilateral trade between two countries reduces their probability of militarized conflict by roughly 30 percent. It also softens the perception of enmity that primes conflict in the first place.
Building on an earlier CSIS analysis, which demonstrated that NATO membership raises long-run bilateral trade between countries by 12-27 percent, this piece examines the converse: the security returns that trade itself generates. Together, these two arguments reveal what current policy debates--burden-sharing on one side, decoupling and de-risking on the other--are leaving off the books.
Washington keeps two ledgers that, held apart, never fully reconcile. In one room, policy analysts debate the value of alliances and burden-sharing. In another, they debate the welfare effects of trade. The cross-effects between them--how security relationships deepen economic ties, and how economic ties shape the security environment--get lost in the hallway between. And when they go uncounted, the returns the architecture has generated look like costs it imposes, and the reasons it has lasted look like reasons to abandon it.
Why the Question Stayed Open
The hypothesis that trade support peace is centuries old. Montesquieu theorized in 1748 that commerce increases mutual dependence across populations, thereby softening their manners. Immanuel Kant predicted in 1795 that the spirit of commerce, incompatible with war, would eventually imbue itself within every nation. Norman Angell, on the eve of World War I, asserted that economic interdependence had made great-power conflict too costly to pursue.
But the causal link between trade and war has been elusive precisely because commerce and conflict share so many of the same root causes. Wars suppress trade, but trade may also suppress wars; political alignment partly determines both war and trade, and geographic proximity drives all of the above. The difficulty of disentangling this causal knot has plagued empirical researchers for decades. Feng and coauthors offer a way around it, exploiting a geographical quirk that politics cannot control.
A Natural Experiment in the Sky
The authors find their answer in a quirk of political history, geography, and the development of aviation technology--what social scientists call a "natural experiment." Beginning in the 1960s and accelerating in the 1980s, advances in aviation technology, such as long-range jets, dedicated freighters, and hub-and-spoke logistics, reduced the costs of moving goods between countries. But trade gains were not distributed evenly. Increases were greatest for country pairs whose sea routes are long and circuitous relative to their direct air routes. The shock came from the sky, not from politics.
Two examples illustrate the different test groups within this natural experiment (Figure 1). Shipping goods from Lithuania to Iraq by sea requires a 14,000-kilometer journey from the Baltic Sea, through the Suez Canal, and onward to the Persian Gulf. The direct air route is under 3,000 kilometers. Aviation reduced the effective shipping distance for that pair by nearly 80 percent. In the second test group, which includes Germany and Norway, country pairs were already connected by short coastal sea routes, so aviation had little effect on trade dynamics. The same global technology produced wildly different effects depending on geographical features that no one chose, and no one can change.
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Figure 1: Examples of Sea and Air Transport Routes
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This generates variation in bilateral trade that cannot be explained by political alignment, regime type, or reverse causation. Countries with little or no part in the birth of aviation suddenly saw this new technology dramatically change the distance between them and their partners. The result is reproduced under an entirely different natural experiment: The 1985 liberalization of Soviet airspace, which, by abruptly shortening flight paths between Western Europe and East Asia, produced a sharp, time-dependent rise in trade between affected pairs. Two independent identification strategies, one answer.
The Findings
According to the authors' estimates, the doubling of bilateral trade due to reduced shipping costs of aviation reduces the probability of militarized conflict between two countries by roughly 30 percent. It also reduces the intensity of conflict when it occurs. Given the economic and human cost of conflict, this dividend of economic integration is enormous.
The largest effects accrued in the East and Southeast Asian theater, where rapid integration into global manufacturing networks coincided with the stabilization of a historically volatile region. China, South Korea, Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines led the leaderboard in how much trade reduced their risk of conflict. The postwar stabilization of East Asia is one of the most consequential geopolitical phenomena of the last 70 years, and these trade effects offer a plausible causal mechanism for a key contributor to how this stabilization was achieved. This is the ledger's off-diagonal at work: Economic integration generating a security return that analysts of the decoupling trend fail to recognize.
Critically, these statistical models establish that trade not only reduces realized conflict but also dampens the perceptions of enmity that pave the way to conflict. Using a strategic rivalry dataset that measures whether governments view one another as competitive and threatening enemies, the authors find that higher bilateral trade significantly reduces the probability of strategic rivalry--the perception of hostility that shapes state behavior long before boots begin to move. Trade soothes tensions before they harden into violence.
Reckoning with the Realists
Despite the strength of the evidence, it is also undeniable that trade creates mutual gains which, even where they temper our worst instincts, can be weaponized as coercive leverage. Albert Hirschman, in National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945), argued that asymmetric trade dependence creates leverage that one state can use to coerce another. Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin extended the case: Interdependence breeds vulnerability, and vulnerability breeds conflict. The contemporary geoeconomics literature, studies by Cathrin Mohr and Christoph Trebesch as well as Christopher Clayton and coauthors, have documented how trade ties can become instruments of geopolitical influence through sanctions, export controls, and supply chain weaponization.
In 2026, the bite of these arguments is hard to miss. Europe's reliance on Russian gas before February 2022 is one example; China's tightening of rare earth export licenses since 2023 is another; the Strait of Hormuz is currently wreaking havoc on global supply chains. The argument that interdependence creates exploitable vulnerability is unequivocally correct. It is the reason why narrow, targeted efforts to build redundancy or limit concentration in certain commercial domains have defensible logic. Whether the broader de-risking or decoupling agenda can claim the same justification is a different question, one that this new evidence brings us one step closer to answering.
The estimates by Feng et al. imply that blanket efforts to limit dependence by reducing integration will, on average, raise the likelihood of conflict--the security cost the decoupling ledger is not pricing in.
Completing the Ledger
Ultimately, security alliances generate trade returns that the burden-sharing argument has overlooked. Trade generates security returns that the decoupling agenda has taken for granted. These are the two diagonals of Washington's policy ledger. The post-1945 architecture has been producing returns on margins that current policy debates simply do not see, and each omission makes the architecture look costlier than it is.
This does not prejudge any specific policy question. It establishes what serious cost-benefit analysis should now account for: The security dividend that broad fragmentation forfeits is no longer theoretical. The economic costs of trade restrictions are visible in price indices and trade volumes. The security costs are not, but they are no less real, and they are now quantifiable. Accounting for them is the minimum prerequisite for evaluating the merits of any fragmentation policy. What these costs imply for de-risking and decoupling debates is the subject of a forthcoming piece.
What comes next will be designed in capitals and shaped by politicians, policymakers, and pundits working from a ledger whose diagonals they have never read. They no longer have that excuse. The postwar order lasted because its architects, knowingly or not, built something whose parts reinforced each other. The next order will last only if its architects design with their eyes open.
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Philip Luck, Director, Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business
Christopher Meissner, Professor of Economics, University of California, Davis
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-trade-reduces-risk-war
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Tariff Refunds - Will Consumers Benefit?
WASHINGTON, May 20 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on May 19, 2026, by trade policy analyst Jacob Jensen:* * *
Tariff Refunds: Will Consumers Benefit?
Executive Summary
* On April 20, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) launched the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) portal to automate the process of refunding U.S. importers for International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs.
* As U.S. importers - primarily consisting of businesses - begin to receive refunds, many taxpayers and lawmakers are expressing concerns that big businesses ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 20 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on May 19, 2026, by trade policy analyst Jacob Jensen: * * * Tariff Refunds: Will Consumers Benefit? Executive Summary * On April 20, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) launched the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) portal to automate the process of refunding U.S. importers for International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs. * As U.S. importers - primarily consisting of businesses - begin to receive refunds, many taxpayers and lawmakers are expressing concerns that big businesseswill be "bailed out" while U.S. consumers are left footing the tariff bill.
* This insight sheds light on why importers are receiving refunds directly, why consumers will be reimbursed indirectly through "secondary refunds," and why the current process is simply the inverse of how tariffs were paid in the first place.
Introduction
On April 20, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) launched the Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) portal to automate the process of refunding U.S. importers for International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs. As U.S. importers - primarily consisting of businesses - begin to receive refunds, many taxpayers and lawmakers are expressing concerns that big businesses will be "bailed out" while U.S. consumers are left footing the tariff bill.
This view, however, neglects complexities in the refund process and nuances with how tariffs were passed along the supply chain. This insight sheds light on why importers are receiving refunds directly, why consumers will be reimbursed indirectly through "secondary refunds," and why the current process is simply the inverse of how tariffs were paid in the first place.
Why Importers Get Refunds
The reason many businesses are receiving refunds is almost entirely a legal matter. Simply put, importers are the entities that directly paid the tariff costs to CBP and are therefore the ones entitled to receive the refunds of the illegally collected government tariffs. Let's consider an example using an individual tax return. If an individual were to overpay his taxes in a given year by $100, it goes without saying that he is entitled to a $100 tax refund when tax season rolls around. In the meantime, however, this taxpayer is short $100 that he may have used for extra purchases, indirectly impacting the bottom line of one or more business owners. In this scenario, the "cost" of the overpaid taxes is partially passed along to the business owners. This does not entitle the business owner to receive compensation from the government, however. It is up to the taxpayer to eventually make the purchase once the government sends the tax refund, thereby correcting the mistake for the legally impacted party.
"Secondary Refunds" for Consumers Are Coming
Some companies have already begun to receive refunds as of May 6, with the flow of refunds expected to steadily continue over the coming weeks. As the government continues to pay back U.S. companies, consumers should eventually begin to feel relief as businesses gradually pass along cost savings. Just as tariff costs were passed along gradually from importers and businesses to U.S. consumers, tariff savings will take time to work their way through the economy. The difficulty will be in pinpointing the specific effects these "secondary refunds" have on consumer prices which, it should be noted, are driven by myriad factors that may counteract the potency of tariff savings.
It is also important to consider the market dynamics at play that initially worked against consumers, but which are beginning to work for them. In a competitive market, businesses had to respond to tariffs at one point or another, otherwise they would become uncompetitive over the long term compared to rival companies. A business that "eats" the entirety of a tariff for too long erodes its margins compared to other companies that slowly shift the burden to consumers. Lower margins result in less appeal in equity markets and less ability to reinvest in the business. That weaker margin may necessitate cost cutting in other areas, such as the labor pool or research and development, which may hurt the organization down the line. Similar market pressures will work in reverse. With the dissolution of IEEPA tariff costs, businesses that lower prices or refuse to raise them will be more competitive than companies that maintain higher prices. Some companies could try to maintain higher margins. They will lose market share over the long term, however, to companies that gradually pass along tariff savings to consumers.
"Secondary refunds" to downstream consumers and businesses are not just an abstract economic theory but are becoming a tangible reality. Major shipping companies such as UPS and FedEx have already declared they will pay their customers - which includes U.S. consumers - by setting up their own systems for processing and distributing "secondary refunds."
Why Refunding Importers Is Practical
Issuing refunds to importers of record is also a practical matter. There are records that prove the amount importers paid for specific products as well as CBP systems in place for the distribution of payments. CAPE is not a perfect system as there will be errors made, difficulties in having small businesses enlisted in the process, and delays along the way. Nevertheless, it is immensely cleaner than the alternative.
It would be a logistical nightmare for the federal government to attempt to compensate U.S. consumers for IEEPA tariffs they may have paid. The government would have to decipher how much extra someone paid for an iced latte, a pair of shoes, or a new home as a result of tariff policy. This would require CBP or some other entity to track down hundreds of millions of receipts, from tens of millions of Americans, dating back to March 2025. After this monumental task was complete, CBP would either have to ask businesses how much of the tariff burden they shifted to the price of certain products, or it would have to (imprecisely) calculate the consumer tariff burden on its own. This would be an enormously complex undertaking, as tariff costs may have been passed down a supply chain that includes multiple businesses before reaching a retail store. It is also possible that businesses dealt with added costs in different ways, for instance by cutting labor costs or by raising the price of some products while maintaining the price of others based on the elasticity of demand. The administrative nightmare, imprecision, and economic distortions that stem from a direct-to-consumer refund system are heavily mitigated by allowing CBP to repay importers that can then issue "secondary refunds" to businesses and consumers.
Alternatively, the government could simply ignore all this precision and administrative effort by sending every American the same exact "rebate." In fact, one bill in the House of Representatives titled the "American Consumer Tariff Rebate Act of 2026" proposes sending more than $230 billion to taxpayers, ostensibly to pay back tariff-impacted consumers. Similarly, a bill titled the "Tariff Refunds for Working Families Act" would pay $600 to certain individuals. The issue with these bills is that they operate more like an economic stimulus package than an attempt at a targeted tariff refund. Rebates are limited based on income, there is extra cash set aside for those with children, and there are various other qualifications in place that neglect to consider that all U.S. consumers were impacted by tariff policy. These caveats shift the purpose of the legislation from consumer rebates to politically popular welfare checks in the lead-up to the 2026 midterm elections.
An Imperfect but Understandable Process
The uncertainty fomented in 2025 due to constantly shifting tariff policy was just as challenging for businesses as it was for consumers and analysts attempting to predict what future prices might look like. Importers, businesses, and individuals responded to a government-imposed tax hike. These tariffs changed cost structures for many companies to the point they had to raise prices, reduce costs elsewhere, or face the inability to stay afloat. Many big businesses did, in fact, absorb tariff costs and eased into price hikes over time because they had the ability to adapt or temporarily "eat" the tariffs. Smaller businesses, with lower margins, did not have the same luxury; they have less capacity to shift suppliers and limited cash reserves to rely upon. Recall that there are nearly 35 million small businesses in the United States making up close to half of all U.S. employment. Many of the importers that should be receiving refunds include these small businesses that represent a vast number of Americans.
Going forward, the IEEPA tariff refund process will be a difficult public relations challenge for companies to navigate. Consumers may question whether they are receiving their rightfully owed share of refunds, so companies would be wise to show greater transparency to garner trust. Meanwhile, some politicians have already attempted to capitalize on the uncertainty that stems from the refund process - both to push for their own favored legislation and to pass the blame from government missteps to private companies.
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Jacob Jensen is the Trade Policy Analyst at the American Action Forum.
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/tariff-refunds-will-consumers-benefit/
[Category: Think Tank]
AFPI Applauds Department of Education's Finalized Workforce Pell Rule
WASHINGTON, May 20 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on May 19, 2026:* * *
AFPI Applauds Department of Education's Finalized Workforce Pell Rule
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) commends the U.S. Department of Education for finalizing the Workforce Pell Grant rule yesterday, a landmark step toward restoring opportunity, dignity, and economic mobility for millions of American workers shut out of the traditional four-year college pipeline.
The finalized Workforce Pell rule extends Pell Grant eligibility to high-quality, short-term workforce training ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 20 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on May 19, 2026: * * * AFPI Applauds Department of Education's Finalized Workforce Pell Rule The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) commends the U.S. Department of Education for finalizing the Workforce Pell Grant rule yesterday, a landmark step toward restoring opportunity, dignity, and economic mobility for millions of American workers shut out of the traditional four-year college pipeline. The finalized Workforce Pell rule extends Pell Grant eligibility to high-quality, short-term workforce trainingprograms that prepare Americans for in-demand careers in fields such as the skilled trades, advanced manufacturing, healthcare, energy, and the technologies of tomorrow.
"For decades, federal financial aid has been rigged in favor of an outdated college-for-all model that saddles far too many students with debt and sometimes delivers poor returns," said Christopher Schorr, Ph.D., director of higher education reform at AFPI.
"Thanks to the Working Families Tax Cuts, millions of American students now have access to Workforce Pell grants that support pathways to high-demand, family-supporting careers outside of traditional higher education. These grants ensure we invest in all Americans seeking quality education and career training; not just the college-bound."
AFPI stands ready to support Congress, states, and accrediting bodies to build on this momentum by holding all federally funded programs to rigorous outcomes-based standards, expanding apprenticeships and industry-aligned career pathways, and continuing to dismantle the regulatory barriers that protect the higher education status quo at the expense of American workers.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-applauds-department-of-educations-finalized-workforce-pell-rule
[Category: ThinkTank]