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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Putin's 'Special Electoral Operation' Could Backfire
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 21, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Putin's 'Special Electoral Operation' Could Backfire
Pavel K. Baev
Executive Summary:
* Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have been described by some Russian commentators as a "special electoral operation," echoing the Kremlin's term for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The phrase references the elections' tightly managed nature and their role in fabricating public support for Putin's war.
* The Kremlin framing the elections as ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 21, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Putin's 'Special Electoral Operation' Could Backfire Pavel K. Baev Executive Summary: * Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have been described by some Russian commentators as a "special electoral operation," echoing the Kremlin's term for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The phrase references the elections' tightly managed nature and their role in fabricating public support for Putin's war. * The Kremlin framing the elections asa referendum on its war while denying economic issues during the campaign may bring the regime's legitimacy into question as the problems that many Russians face daily, such as high prices and gas shortages, come into conflict with government messaging.
* The increase in Russian hybrid warfare across Europe, from drone incursions to reckless maneuvers of combat ships, over recent months may make it necessary for Europe to take countermeasures.
-
Elections in Russia over the two and a half decades of Russian President Vladimir Putin's rule have never been free and fair. The scope of electoral manipulation has been steadily rising to the point that the recent system that selected members of the Russian State Duma from September 18 to 20 cannot meaningfully be described as an election. Some Russian political commentators have dubbed the rigidly managed voting a "special electoral operation," borrowing the Kremlin's terminology for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine to point out that Putin is using the process to falsify broad public support for his war (Radio Svoboda, September 14, 2022; The Moscow Times, September 18; Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 21). At the start of campaigning in early summer, the Kremlin emphasized economic and social issues, but Putin has firmly set the focus on support for his war and "patriotic" unity since mid-August (Re: Russia, September 18). The government has not tried to boost optimism among the electorate by increasing pensions or social benefits, as was typically the case before many previous elections. Polls show that Russians expect more economic trouble in the future, even in semi-official polls (FOM.ru, September 15). In parallel, more Russians now disapprove of the State Duma than approve it (VTsIOM, September 18).
Counterfeiting public support has potential to backfire on Russia (The Insider, September 18). Dismissing economic concerns is especially dangerous. Putin's assertions that the economy is doing just fine depart increasingly far from the contraction of incomes and purchasing power for millions of Russians (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 16; Kommersant, September 17). The Russian Central Bank has cautiously increased the estimate of inflation from 4-5 percent to 5-6 percent, but consumer prices, in particular for gas, to the extent that it is available, are climbing at a much faster rate (RBC, September 16). The Russian oil and gas industry, which used to be the main source of revenue for the Kremlin, is in a structural crisis. The shortage of investment in the industry is aggravated by the need to rebuild refineries repeatedly attacked by Ukrainian drones, which cannot be stopped by the cheap metal nets currently used for defense (The Bell, September 11; Meduza, September 18).
Putin was not able to amplify his jingoist message with declarations of a victorious advance as he shifted electoral rhetoric to sustaining the war effort. His recent claim on the capture of Ukraine's Sviatohirsk monastery was followed by a chaotic retreat of Russian troops in the Lyman direction (Meduza, September 18). In a symbolic loss for Putin, Major-General Anton Grunis, who reported to Putin on the full control over Kostyantynivka--which is still contested by Ukrainian forces--and was rewarded with the Hero of Russia medal, was recently killed by a high-precision drone strike on his brigade's command center (The Insider, September 16). Russian casualties often exceed 1,500 a day, half of which are fatalities. The system of commercial recruitment cannot deliver enough new bodies to compensate for these losses, and the rationale for a new limited mobilization, aiming perhaps at some 300,000-500,000 new soldiers, is growing (Re: Russia, September 10). Every denial by the Kremlin of any plans for such mobilization produces a new wave of rumors and fears, accelerating the outflow of people and money from Russia (Forbes.ru, September 18).
Equally unconvincing are the official denials of reports that the Kremlin is preparing to escalate its confrontation with Europe. These denials are often said alongside threats to annihilate hostile states in the matter of days (Lenta.ru, September 16; Vedomosti, September 18). In recent weeks, Putin has refrained from nuclear brinksmanship, but the expansion of Russian hybrid warfare and provocations, from drone incursions to reckless maneuvers of combat ships, likely make it necessary for Europe to take countermeasures (see EDM, September 15; Radio Svoboda, September 19). Investments in military-technical cooperation with Ukraine are one way that Europe is building up its own defense capabilities. Moscow views these ties as Ukraine's incorporation into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) without formal procedures (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 17). Russia needs to break this trend, but its hybrid attacks are only giving NATO-Ukraine military-technical cooperation new impetus. Warnings about growing risks from Russia's mainstream pundits provide evidence that the Kremlin is evermore worried about this collaboration (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 15).
The Kremlin is promoting the message that its European neighbors cannot count on U.S. protection. Every development that contradicts this assumption--from the plan to build a U.S. base in Poland to the agreement on Greenland's security posture between the United States and Denmark--is downplayed (Izvestiya, September 17; Forbes.ru, September 19). Kremlin media dismissed the U.S. approval of a new package of military supplies to Kyiv, including air defense systems, as unable to mitigate the impact of winter on Ukraine's economy (Izvestiya, September 19). The September 18 signing of the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act coincided precisely with Russia's pseudo-elections and produced consternation in the Kremlin (Kommersant, September 17). The terse official response called it an "unfriendly act," and other regime-aligned voices advocated for "military deterrence" and emphasized the People's Republic of China's irritation (RBC, September 17; Lenta.ru, September 19). Russia needs to demonstrate that it has a position of strength, but Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will have a weaker hand than ever before in upcoming talks on Ukraine with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (Vedomosti, September 19).
Installing the new State Duma will not give Putin's regime any new energy. Whether to enact a new partial mobilization remains a choice between two high-risk options. The Russian public's tiredness of the Kremlin's war against Ukraine is increasing because of Ukrainian long-distance strikes, and this discontent has found no release in the war-drumming election campaign. International scorn of the quasi-democratic procedure, which was further delegitimized by voting staged on occupied Ukrainian territories, cuts Russia's democratic credibility down to the level of North Korea, the only other state that is willing to send its soldiers to Russia's "kill-zone" and defense plants.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/putins-special-electoral-operation-could-backfire/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Putin's 'Special Electoral Operation' Could Backfire
Pavel K. Baev
Executive Summary:
* Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have been described by some Russian commentators as a "special electoral operation," echoing the Kremlin's term for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The phrase references the elections' tightly managed nature and their role in fabricating public support for Putin's war.
* The Kremlin framing the elections as ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 21, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Putin's 'Special Electoral Operation' Could Backfire Pavel K. Baev Executive Summary: * Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have been described by some Russian commentators as a "special electoral operation," echoing the Kremlin's term for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The phrase references the elections' tightly managed nature and their role in fabricating public support for Putin's war. * The Kremlin framing the elections asa referendum on its war while denying economic issues during the campaign may bring the regime's legitimacy into question as the problems that many Russians face daily, such as high prices and gas shortages, come into conflict with government messaging.
* The increase in Russian hybrid warfare across Europe, from drone incursions to reckless maneuvers of combat ships, over recent months may make it necessary for Europe to take countermeasures.
-
Elections in Russia over the two and a half decades of Russian President Vladimir Putin's rule have never been free and fair. The scope of electoral manipulation has been steadily rising to the point that the recent system that selected members of the Russian State Duma from September 18 to 20 cannot meaningfully be described as an election. Some Russian political commentators have dubbed the rigidly managed voting a "special electoral operation," borrowing the Kremlin's terminology for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine to point out that Putin is using the process to falsify broad public support for his war (Radio Svoboda, September 14, 2022; The Moscow Times, September 18; Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 21). At the start of campaigning in early summer, the Kremlin emphasized economic and social issues, but Putin has firmly set the focus on support for his war and "patriotic" unity since mid-August (Re: Russia, September 18). The government has not tried to boost optimism among the electorate by increasing pensions or social benefits, as was typically the case before many previous elections. Polls show that Russians expect more economic trouble in the future, even in semi-official polls (FOM.ru, September 15). In parallel, more Russians now disapprove of the State Duma than approve it (VTsIOM, September 18).
Counterfeiting public support has potential to backfire on Russia (The Insider, September 18). Dismissing economic concerns is especially dangerous. Putin's assertions that the economy is doing just fine depart increasingly far from the contraction of incomes and purchasing power for millions of Russians (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 16; Kommersant, September 17). The Russian Central Bank has cautiously increased the estimate of inflation from 4-5 percent to 5-6 percent, but consumer prices, in particular for gas, to the extent that it is available, are climbing at a much faster rate (RBC, September 16). The Russian oil and gas industry, which used to be the main source of revenue for the Kremlin, is in a structural crisis. The shortage of investment in the industry is aggravated by the need to rebuild refineries repeatedly attacked by Ukrainian drones, which cannot be stopped by the cheap metal nets currently used for defense (The Bell, September 11; Meduza, September 18).
Putin was not able to amplify his jingoist message with declarations of a victorious advance as he shifted electoral rhetoric to sustaining the war effort. His recent claim on the capture of Ukraine's Sviatohirsk monastery was followed by a chaotic retreat of Russian troops in the Lyman direction (Meduza, September 18). In a symbolic loss for Putin, Major-General Anton Grunis, who reported to Putin on the full control over Kostyantynivka--which is still contested by Ukrainian forces--and was rewarded with the Hero of Russia medal, was recently killed by a high-precision drone strike on his brigade's command center (The Insider, September 16). Russian casualties often exceed 1,500 a day, half of which are fatalities. The system of commercial recruitment cannot deliver enough new bodies to compensate for these losses, and the rationale for a new limited mobilization, aiming perhaps at some 300,000-500,000 new soldiers, is growing (Re: Russia, September 10). Every denial by the Kremlin of any plans for such mobilization produces a new wave of rumors and fears, accelerating the outflow of people and money from Russia (Forbes.ru, September 18).
Equally unconvincing are the official denials of reports that the Kremlin is preparing to escalate its confrontation with Europe. These denials are often said alongside threats to annihilate hostile states in the matter of days (Lenta.ru, September 16; Vedomosti, September 18). In recent weeks, Putin has refrained from nuclear brinksmanship, but the expansion of Russian hybrid warfare and provocations, from drone incursions to reckless maneuvers of combat ships, likely make it necessary for Europe to take countermeasures (see EDM, September 15; Radio Svoboda, September 19). Investments in military-technical cooperation with Ukraine are one way that Europe is building up its own defense capabilities. Moscow views these ties as Ukraine's incorporation into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) without formal procedures (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 17). Russia needs to break this trend, but its hybrid attacks are only giving NATO-Ukraine military-technical cooperation new impetus. Warnings about growing risks from Russia's mainstream pundits provide evidence that the Kremlin is evermore worried about this collaboration (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 15).
The Kremlin is promoting the message that its European neighbors cannot count on U.S. protection. Every development that contradicts this assumption--from the plan to build a U.S. base in Poland to the agreement on Greenland's security posture between the United States and Denmark--is downplayed (Izvestiya, September 17; Forbes.ru, September 19). Kremlin media dismissed the U.S. approval of a new package of military supplies to Kyiv, including air defense systems, as unable to mitigate the impact of winter on Ukraine's economy (Izvestiya, September 19). The September 18 signing of the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act coincided precisely with Russia's pseudo-elections and produced consternation in the Kremlin (Kommersant, September 17). The terse official response called it an "unfriendly act," and other regime-aligned voices advocated for "military deterrence" and emphasized the People's Republic of China's irritation (RBC, September 17; Lenta.ru, September 19). Russia needs to demonstrate that it has a position of strength, but Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will have a weaker hand than ever before in upcoming talks on Ukraine with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (Vedomosti, September 19).
Installing the new State Duma will not give Putin's regime any new energy. Whether to enact a new partial mobilization remains a choice between two high-risk options. The Russian public's tiredness of the Kremlin's war against Ukraine is increasing because of Ukrainian long-distance strikes, and this discontent has found no release in the war-drumming election campaign. International scorn of the quasi-democratic procedure, which was further delegitimized by voting staged on occupied Ukrainian territories, cuts Russia's democratic credibility down to the level of North Korea, the only other state that is willing to send its soldiers to Russia's "kill-zone" and defense plants.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/putins-special-electoral-operation-could-backfire/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Putin Expands Federal Protective Service
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 21, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Putin Expands Federal Protective Service
Alex Horobets
Executive Summary:
* The expansion of Russia's Federal Protective Service's (FSO) central apparatus by 12 percent since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine points to growing concern in the Kremlin over Putin's personal security.
* The repeated expansion of the president's security apparatus reflects the regime's growing distrust of other security structures and its perception ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 21, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Putin Expands Federal Protective Service Alex Horobets Executive Summary: * The expansion of Russia's Federal Protective Service's (FSO) central apparatus by 12 percent since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine points to growing concern in the Kremlin over Putin's personal security. * The repeated expansion of the president's security apparatus reflects the regime's growing distrust of other security structures and its perceptionof internal risks as real. This is turning the FSO into Putin's personal "guard" and one of the centers of influence within the system.
* In the long term, strengthening Putin's inner security perimeter makes the Russian regime more fragile. The more resources it takes to protect one individual, the more clearly it signals the regime's uncertainty about its own stability and the loyalty of the elites.
-
On August 31, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree increasing the authorized headcount of the central apparatus of the Federal Protective Service (FSO) from 785 to 812 personnel. This was the fourth increase in the service's staffing since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022 (The Moscow Times, March 31). The process began in late 2022, when the headcount was increased to 760. It rose again to 775 on January 1, 2024, and to 785 on January 1, 2025. Overall, the central apparatus has grown by 12 percent over the four years of the war. Before 2022, the size of the FSO's central apparatus had remained unchanged for almost 13 years. Since 2010, it had stood at 725 personnel.
Formally, an increase of 27 positions may seem insignificant. For the first time in many years, however, the decision was made not at the end or beginning of the calendar year, but in the middle. This is one indicator of how Russia's power architecture is changing. As the regime wages a prolonged war, it continues year after year to expand precisely the service responsible for the personal security of senior officials and the protection of key facilities.
The FSO is one of Russia's most secretive security agencies and is overseen personally by the president. Its primary task is protecting senior government officials and their families. The service also provides secure communications, protects official residences, and handles transportation for senior officials. During the full-scale war, the FSO's role has expanded beyond conventional protection. Its personnel stay close to Putin, have access to sensitive information about senior officials, and have effectively become one of the system's centers of influence.
The continued strengthening of Putin's immediate security perimeter also reflects the state of the regime--both its level of trust in other security agencies and its assessment of internal risks. The FSO is not directly responsible for protecting against external threats such as long-range drone attacks or acts of sabotage. The expansion of the service therefore has no direct connection to those risks. Rather, it appears aimed at controlling the space immediately around Putin--screening those who can approach him, strengthening security perimeters around residences and government facilities, and expanding the pool of loyal personnel.
The phased expansion of the FSO's central apparatus cannot be explained solely by an increased workload or bureaucratic inertia. There had been no apparent need for such expansion for more than a decade before 2022. In recent years, however, staffing increases have coincided with periods when the regime faced internal challenges, such as the Prigozhin mutiny in 2023, purges at the Defense Ministry, and conflicts among various groups within the security establishment (see EDM, July 24, 2023, May 13).
Putin has publicly stated that he has "never been afraid of anything" (TASS, August 11). His daily routine, however, is organized in such a way that an ordinary person simply cannot get near him. Every event involving the president in Russia is planned down to the smallest detail, including participants' pre-approved remarks. The circle of people granted access to him is also extremely limited. Since spring, reports emerged that the ban on phones around Putin has been supplemented by a requirement to also hand over watches before private meetings with the president, both electronic and mechanical (Telegram/@mozhemobyasnit, May 8). This new security measure does not apply to members of Putin's inner circle, particularly long-standing associates such as Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov. Putin himself, judging by video footage, also tries to remove his watch during meetings, although he does not always do so.
At the same time, the FSO is pushing for the creation of a security zone around the Kremlin gas station on Volkhonka Street, 300 meters (984 feet) from the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and the only operating gas station inside the Garden Ring serving government vehicles (Telegram/@ejdailyru, July 21). The proposed zone covers more than 6,000 square meters (64,583 square feet) and would prohibit tourist activities, mass events, and drone use. No formal reasons have been given, but the logic appears straightforward--tighten security around the president and minimize any uncontrolled points near the Kremlin.
The expansion of the FSO's staffing is taking place amid reports that the balance of power within Russia's security establishment is shifting. In particular, Putin may have granted significantly greater powers to the Federal Security Service's (FSB) Second Service, including a free hand to control the internet, block messaging services, and put pressure on Telegram (SFG Media, August 7). This strengthens the security services' position and could intensify conflict with the Kremlin's "civilian" factions, such as Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration.
In May, reports emerged of Kremlin concerns about possible attempts at internal destabilization, including some involving Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, his circle, and other members of the elite (Important Stories, May 4). The FSO serves as Putin's counterweight and personal "guard," tasked with protecting him not only from the outside world but also from the security services themselves.
The increase in the FSO's central apparatus may also have a long-term political dimension. In modern Russia the FSO has become not only a security agency but also a key personnel service for the president (see EDM, June 5, 2023). After serving as a personal aide or bodyguard, FSO officers can receive what amounts to a "ticket to rule." The most prominent examples from previous years are Viktor Zolotov, head of the National Guard; Alexei Dyumin, now State Council secretary and presidential aide; and Alexander Kurenkov, head of the Emergency Situations Ministry. The service will apparently continue expanding its political presence, acting as a personnel filter and placing trusted individuals in positions of responsibility. Putin is not only building a new tier of personally loyal officials who can replace the old elites if necessary.
Expanding the FSO's staffing can serve several purposes at once. First, it allows Putin to strengthen his physical protection and increase the number of people entrusted with access to the president. Second, amid competition among the FSB, National Guard, and Defense Ministry, strengthening his personal security reduces Putin's dependence on other players within the security establishment. The FSO's political weight is also important. Its constant presence alongside the president gives its leadership unique access and influence.
In the long term, this dynamic does not strengthen the regime's stability. Rather, it makes it more fragile. A regime that devotes ever more resources to strengthening its inner security perimeter is demonstrating a lack of confidence in its own elites. Such uncertainty usually brings increased repression, purges, and even greater secrecy in decision-making. This reduces the predictability of Russia's actions and increases the risk of irrational moves. The growing size of Putin's security apparatus is a visible sign of his growing vulnerability. The more FSO personnel are required to protect one individual, the less stability remains at the foundation of the entire Russian power structure.
* * *
Alex Horobets is a PhD candidate at the Institute of History of Ukraine National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, within the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Ukraine.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/putin-expands-federal-protective-service/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Putin Expands Federal Protective Service
Alex Horobets
Executive Summary:
* The expansion of Russia's Federal Protective Service's (FSO) central apparatus by 12 percent since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine points to growing concern in the Kremlin over Putin's personal security.
* The repeated expansion of the president's security apparatus reflects the regime's growing distrust of other security structures and its perception ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 21, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Putin Expands Federal Protective Service Alex Horobets Executive Summary: * The expansion of Russia's Federal Protective Service's (FSO) central apparatus by 12 percent since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine points to growing concern in the Kremlin over Putin's personal security. * The repeated expansion of the president's security apparatus reflects the regime's growing distrust of other security structures and its perceptionof internal risks as real. This is turning the FSO into Putin's personal "guard" and one of the centers of influence within the system.
* In the long term, strengthening Putin's inner security perimeter makes the Russian regime more fragile. The more resources it takes to protect one individual, the more clearly it signals the regime's uncertainty about its own stability and the loyalty of the elites.
-
On August 31, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree increasing the authorized headcount of the central apparatus of the Federal Protective Service (FSO) from 785 to 812 personnel. This was the fourth increase in the service's staffing since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022 (The Moscow Times, March 31). The process began in late 2022, when the headcount was increased to 760. It rose again to 775 on January 1, 2024, and to 785 on January 1, 2025. Overall, the central apparatus has grown by 12 percent over the four years of the war. Before 2022, the size of the FSO's central apparatus had remained unchanged for almost 13 years. Since 2010, it had stood at 725 personnel.
Formally, an increase of 27 positions may seem insignificant. For the first time in many years, however, the decision was made not at the end or beginning of the calendar year, but in the middle. This is one indicator of how Russia's power architecture is changing. As the regime wages a prolonged war, it continues year after year to expand precisely the service responsible for the personal security of senior officials and the protection of key facilities.
The FSO is one of Russia's most secretive security agencies and is overseen personally by the president. Its primary task is protecting senior government officials and their families. The service also provides secure communications, protects official residences, and handles transportation for senior officials. During the full-scale war, the FSO's role has expanded beyond conventional protection. Its personnel stay close to Putin, have access to sensitive information about senior officials, and have effectively become one of the system's centers of influence.
The continued strengthening of Putin's immediate security perimeter also reflects the state of the regime--both its level of trust in other security agencies and its assessment of internal risks. The FSO is not directly responsible for protecting against external threats such as long-range drone attacks or acts of sabotage. The expansion of the service therefore has no direct connection to those risks. Rather, it appears aimed at controlling the space immediately around Putin--screening those who can approach him, strengthening security perimeters around residences and government facilities, and expanding the pool of loyal personnel.
The phased expansion of the FSO's central apparatus cannot be explained solely by an increased workload or bureaucratic inertia. There had been no apparent need for such expansion for more than a decade before 2022. In recent years, however, staffing increases have coincided with periods when the regime faced internal challenges, such as the Prigozhin mutiny in 2023, purges at the Defense Ministry, and conflicts among various groups within the security establishment (see EDM, July 24, 2023, May 13).
Putin has publicly stated that he has "never been afraid of anything" (TASS, August 11). His daily routine, however, is organized in such a way that an ordinary person simply cannot get near him. Every event involving the president in Russia is planned down to the smallest detail, including participants' pre-approved remarks. The circle of people granted access to him is also extremely limited. Since spring, reports emerged that the ban on phones around Putin has been supplemented by a requirement to also hand over watches before private meetings with the president, both electronic and mechanical (Telegram/@mozhemobyasnit, May 8). This new security measure does not apply to members of Putin's inner circle, particularly long-standing associates such as Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov. Putin himself, judging by video footage, also tries to remove his watch during meetings, although he does not always do so.
At the same time, the FSO is pushing for the creation of a security zone around the Kremlin gas station on Volkhonka Street, 300 meters (984 feet) from the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and the only operating gas station inside the Garden Ring serving government vehicles (Telegram/@ejdailyru, July 21). The proposed zone covers more than 6,000 square meters (64,583 square feet) and would prohibit tourist activities, mass events, and drone use. No formal reasons have been given, but the logic appears straightforward--tighten security around the president and minimize any uncontrolled points near the Kremlin.
The expansion of the FSO's staffing is taking place amid reports that the balance of power within Russia's security establishment is shifting. In particular, Putin may have granted significantly greater powers to the Federal Security Service's (FSB) Second Service, including a free hand to control the internet, block messaging services, and put pressure on Telegram (SFG Media, August 7). This strengthens the security services' position and could intensify conflict with the Kremlin's "civilian" factions, such as Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration.
In May, reports emerged of Kremlin concerns about possible attempts at internal destabilization, including some involving Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, his circle, and other members of the elite (Important Stories, May 4). The FSO serves as Putin's counterweight and personal "guard," tasked with protecting him not only from the outside world but also from the security services themselves.
The increase in the FSO's central apparatus may also have a long-term political dimension. In modern Russia the FSO has become not only a security agency but also a key personnel service for the president (see EDM, June 5, 2023). After serving as a personal aide or bodyguard, FSO officers can receive what amounts to a "ticket to rule." The most prominent examples from previous years are Viktor Zolotov, head of the National Guard; Alexei Dyumin, now State Council secretary and presidential aide; and Alexander Kurenkov, head of the Emergency Situations Ministry. The service will apparently continue expanding its political presence, acting as a personnel filter and placing trusted individuals in positions of responsibility. Putin is not only building a new tier of personally loyal officials who can replace the old elites if necessary.
Expanding the FSO's staffing can serve several purposes at once. First, it allows Putin to strengthen his physical protection and increase the number of people entrusted with access to the president. Second, amid competition among the FSB, National Guard, and Defense Ministry, strengthening his personal security reduces Putin's dependence on other players within the security establishment. The FSO's political weight is also important. Its constant presence alongside the president gives its leadership unique access and influence.
In the long term, this dynamic does not strengthen the regime's stability. Rather, it makes it more fragile. A regime that devotes ever more resources to strengthening its inner security perimeter is demonstrating a lack of confidence in its own elites. Such uncertainty usually brings increased repression, purges, and even greater secrecy in decision-making. This reduces the predictability of Russia's actions and increases the risk of irrational moves. The growing size of Putin's security apparatus is a visible sign of his growing vulnerability. The more FSO personnel are required to protect one individual, the less stability remains at the foundation of the entire Russian power structure.
* * *
Alex Horobets is a PhD candidate at the Institute of History of Ukraine National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, within the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Ukraine.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/putin-expands-federal-protective-service/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Quiet Summit Should Alarm Taiwan
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary to the Wall Street Journal:
* * *
Sep 20, 2026
Wall Street Journal
A Quiet Summit Should Alarm Taiwan
Trump is mistaken if he thinks the status quo in the Taiwan Strait can hold with Beijing on the march.
Jason Hsu
-
When President Trump returned from his Beijing summit in May, he said the situation with Taiwan should "stay the way it is." As Xi Jinping arrives at the White House on Sept. 24 for another summit, expect ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary to the Wall Street Journal: * * * Sep 20, 2026 Wall Street Journal A Quiet Summit Should Alarm Taiwan Trump is mistaken if he thinks the status quo in the Taiwan Strait can hold with Beijing on the march. Jason Hsu - When President Trump returned from his Beijing summit in May, he said the situation with Taiwan should "stay the way it is." As Xi Jinping arrives at the White House on Sept. 24 for another summit, expectmore reassurance, talk of stability and an emphasis on mutual respect. Commentators will grade the meeting on whether both sides recommit to the status quo.
But "stay the way it is" assumes China's posture in the Taiwan Strait hasn't much changed. This is wrong. Recent history shows Beijing is on the march.
Read in the Wall Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/opinion/a-quiet-summit-should-alarm-taiwan-cf13113c).
* * *
Jason Hsu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute, where he focuses on the United States' technological cooperation with allies and partners.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/quiet-summit-should-alarm-taiwan-jason-hsu
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Sep 20, 2026
Wall Street Journal
A Quiet Summit Should Alarm Taiwan
Trump is mistaken if he thinks the status quo in the Taiwan Strait can hold with Beijing on the march.
Jason Hsu
-
When President Trump returned from his Beijing summit in May, he said the situation with Taiwan should "stay the way it is." As Xi Jinping arrives at the White House on Sept. 24 for another summit, expect ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary to the Wall Street Journal: * * * Sep 20, 2026 Wall Street Journal A Quiet Summit Should Alarm Taiwan Trump is mistaken if he thinks the status quo in the Taiwan Strait can hold with Beijing on the march. Jason Hsu - When President Trump returned from his Beijing summit in May, he said the situation with Taiwan should "stay the way it is." As Xi Jinping arrives at the White House on Sept. 24 for another summit, expectmore reassurance, talk of stability and an emphasis on mutual respect. Commentators will grade the meeting on whether both sides recommit to the status quo.
But "stay the way it is" assumes China's posture in the Taiwan Strait hasn't much changed. This is wrong. Recent history shows Beijing is on the march.
Read in the Wall Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/opinion/a-quiet-summit-should-alarm-taiwan-cf13113c).
* * *
Jason Hsu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute, where he focuses on the United States' technological cooperation with allies and partners.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/quiet-summit-should-alarm-taiwan-jason-hsu
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for American Progress: Paramount Merger Concerns Remain Despite Settlement of AG Lawsuit
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release:
* * *
Sep 21, 2026
Paramount Merger Concerns Remain Despite Settlement of AG Lawsuit
Washington, D.C. -- Today, state attorneys general from 12 states announced plans to settle their lawsuit challenging Paramount's takeover of Warner Bros. Discovery, which is the parent company of CNN. In response, Michael Sozan, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement:
Even with attempted safeguards built in, this deal poses a major threat to independent journalism and democracy, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release: * * * Sep 21, 2026 Paramount Merger Concerns Remain Despite Settlement of AG Lawsuit Washington, D.C. -- Today, state attorneys general from 12 states announced plans to settle their lawsuit challenging Paramount's takeover of Warner Bros. Discovery, which is the parent company of CNN. In response, Michael Sozan, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement: Even with attempted safeguards built in, this deal poses a major threat to independent journalism and democracy,and still risks higher consumer costs and worker layoffs. It also allows CNN to be placed under the corporate control of Paramount, whose directors get to select the members of the new "independence" monitoring board.
But the fight is not over. These settlement terms, if approved by a court, will be closely scrutinized to help ensure they are carried out. We must fight to ensure there is a free media independent of government control and intimidation.
For more information, or to speak with an expert, please contact Julia Cusick at jcusick@americanprogress.org.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/statement-paramount-merger-concerns-remain-despite-settlement-of-ag-lawsuit/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Sep 21, 2026
Paramount Merger Concerns Remain Despite Settlement of AG Lawsuit
Washington, D.C. -- Today, state attorneys general from 12 states announced plans to settle their lawsuit challenging Paramount's takeover of Warner Bros. Discovery, which is the parent company of CNN. In response, Michael Sozan, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement:
Even with attempted safeguards built in, this deal poses a major threat to independent journalism and democracy, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release: * * * Sep 21, 2026 Paramount Merger Concerns Remain Despite Settlement of AG Lawsuit Washington, D.C. -- Today, state attorneys general from 12 states announced plans to settle their lawsuit challenging Paramount's takeover of Warner Bros. Discovery, which is the parent company of CNN. In response, Michael Sozan, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement: Even with attempted safeguards built in, this deal poses a major threat to independent journalism and democracy,and still risks higher consumer costs and worker layoffs. It also allows CNN to be placed under the corporate control of Paramount, whose directors get to select the members of the new "independence" monitoring board.
But the fight is not over. These settlement terms, if approved by a court, will be closely scrutinized to help ensure they are carried out. We must fight to ensure there is a free media independent of government control and intimidation.
For more information, or to speak with an expert, please contact Julia Cusick at jcusick@americanprogress.org.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/statement-paramount-merger-concerns-remain-despite-settlement-of-ag-lawsuit/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: What Would an Interim U.S.-Mexico Trade Deal Actually Involve?
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
What Would an Interim U.S.-Mexico Trade Deal Actually Involve?
Commentary by Diego Marroquin Bitar and Juan Carlos Baker Pineda
Published September 21, 2026
On July 1, 2026, the White House let the clock start on the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) by declining to renew the deal for another 16 years. The agreement did not expire; instead, it entered a phase of annual reviews that could run until 2036, when the agreement would lapse for good if the three governments ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * What Would an Interim U.S.-Mexico Trade Deal Actually Involve? Commentary by Diego Marroquin Bitar and Juan Carlos Baker Pineda Published September 21, 2026 On July 1, 2026, the White House let the clock start on the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) by declining to renew the deal for another 16 years. The agreement did not expire; instead, it entered a phase of annual reviews that could run until 2036, when the agreement would lapse for good if the three governmentsnever agree to extend it. With U.S.-Canada trade talks now in collapse, Mexico is the only USMCA track still moving. What Mexico concedes for tariff relief in a stopgap deal could become the baseline for Canada, and for the harder USMCA fight still to come.
Three weeks after the July 1 deadline, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer laid out the administration's two-stage plan for the USMCA before the Senate Finance Committee. The first step is reaching separate interim "deals" with Mexico and Canada to clear several trade and nontrade barriers before year's end, as well as reducing each country's exposure to U.S. tariffs. Then, the three countries would turn to the harder files: China, rules of origin, labor, and environmental provisions. Those issues that will ultimately decide whether the USMCA survives.
The United States and Canada were close to reaching an agreement in August, but negotiations collapsed, with both sides blaming the other. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney argued that some of the U.S. demands would have compromised Canada's control over its own policies, while President Trump accused Canada of having taken advantage of the United States and insisted that such a relationship would no longer continue. On August 22, the United States imposed a 50 percent tariff on $20 billion worth of Canadian products; Canada launched retaliatory tariffs on September 8. While regrettable, the collapse in U.S.-Canada negotiations does not decide Mexico's outcome. Mexico and the United States have continued their bilateral discussions since March 2026, and Mexican officials have publicly expressed optimism that an agreement can still be reached before the U.S. midterm elections of November. The United States' bilateral relations with its two USMCA partners are different enough economically, politically, and strategically that it could land in a different place with each, although neither of these agreements would amount to the renewal of the USMCA.
What An Interim Agreement Would Actually Involve
Recent U.S. deals with other partners, together with Ambassador Greer's own testimony, give a reasonably clear picture of what the United States will likely ask of Mexico, and what Mexico would look to secure in return. The administration offered few details, but it has signed enough agreements elsewhere to set precedent. These include agreements on reciprocal trade (ARTs) with countries such as Argentina, South Korea, and Japan. ARTs are not submitted to Congress as traditional free trade agreements; they largely rely on authority to the president claims t and are implemented through executive action. While the legality and scope of some of those authorities remain contested among members of Congress and other actors, these arrangements still indicate the type of concessions that Washington seeks from trading partners.
Their substance varies widely. Argentina's ART opened agricultural markets and tightened intellectual property enforcement. South Korea's committed $150 billion to U.S. shipbuilding and another $200 billion in broader investment. Japan's accepted a capped tariff rate in exchange for its own investment pledges. An important issue to keep in mind with respect ARTs is that implementation has been uneven, with commitments from U.S. partners being slow-rolled or quietly set aside.
Mexico is a different case. Unlike most countries signing ARTs, Mexico already has a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States and sits inside deeply integrated North American production networks. Whatever emerges from these talks should be understood strictly as temporary tariff relief, not a substitute for the USMCA.
Even so, it is difficult to picture the White House cutting existing Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs without asking Mexico for something in return. The results of negotiations with other countries suggest that tariff relief under this administration comes with a price. When the first International Emergency Economic Powers Act tariffs were announced, the United States had already presented Mexico a lengthy list of tariff and nontariff concerns that it wanted to address, reportedly more than 50 items. By the third U.S.-Mexico negotiation round this July, that list had shrunk to 14 issues. What closes the remaining gap, and what Mexico gets in exchange, is the decisive question now, especially with Canada having already rejected the United States' terms.
What Washington Could Ask For
Potential U.S. demands fall along two dimensions. The first is speed: how quickly Mexico can implement them. The second, and more consequential, is depth: how far they reach into Mexico's control over its domestic policies and its access to the U.S. market.
The first dimension includes short-term demands, which Mexico could address relatively quickly, and medium- or longer-term demands, which would require commitments that extend beyond an interim agreement. The second includes structural and nonstructural demands. This is perhaps more important. Some U.S. requests could be relatively easy for Mexico to implement without fundamentally changing its policies; others could have much deeper consequences by limiting Mexico's access to the U.S. market or its ability to conduct trade relations with other countries.
Crossing the two dimensions produces four types of demands:
[View table in the link at bottom.]
1. Housekeeping demands are quick to implement and limited in reach. These are the irritants that the United States has already identified and that Mexico could address through administrative or relatively limited regulatory action. These include U.S. industry complaints, such as U.S. cheese producers' objection to geographical-indication commitments Mexico made to the European Union, along with questions of agricultural market access, customs procedures, intellectual property rights, or specific regulatory barriers. Mexico can settle these without fundamentally changing the bilateral economic relationship, and it should make progress where doing so builds goodwill with the United States.
2. The Trojan horse is quick to implement but has deep reach. These demands are quickly addressed but introduce limits to Mexico's own policies well beyond the life of an interim deal. Washington may ask Mexico to align some of its trade policies with those of the United States. These could include tariffs, investment screening, export controls, transshipment, supply chain security, or measures directed at nonmarket economies, particularly China. A request of this type can be presented as a narrow technical adjustment and enacted weeks or by decree, but could have long-term and structural consequences for Mexican trade policy.
3. Rebalancing demands are slower to implement but shallow in reach. The United States may ask Mexico to reduce the bilateral trade deficit through additional purchases of U.S. agricultural, energy, or manufactured goods; to facilitate U.S. investment; or to support U.S. positions in organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. These demands could be costly economically, but they would leave the architecture of the USMCA intact. Similar proposals have been part of other agreements negotiated by the administration.
4. Structural demands are slow to implement but have deep reach. They would redraw Mexico's long-term domestic and foreign policy. Measures could include quantitative or other limits on Mexican exports, new U.S. content thresholds, explicit restrictions on Mexico's trade relations with third countries, or even changes that shift the trilateral nature of the USMCA toward a set of parallel bilateral deals. These proposals would outlast any interim framework negotiated between the two countries. Prime Minister Carney treated reported U.S. proposals to limit Canada's ability to negotiate trade deals with other partners as one of his country's red lines, blaming these demands for the collapse of the U.S.-Canada interim deal.
Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum's ability to move quickly is not in doubt. Article 131 of Mexico's Constitution provides the executive with the power to increase, reduce, or eliminate import and export tariffs and to establish restrictions on imports, exports, and transit when necessary to regulate foreign trade. This authority is further reinforced in Mexico's Foreign Trade Law, which provides the president and the economy ministry with important instruments to establish or modify tariff and nontariff measures. Consequently, some potentially significant commitments could be implemented without lengthy legislative processes. But if the result is to limit Mexico's ability to determine its own trade policy toward China or another country, the implications are clearly much more significant. Prime Minister Carney considered structural demands as red lines and claims they caused the collapse of the U.S.-Canada interim deal.
What Mexico May Look to Secure in Return
How easily Mexico can grant concessions should not be confused with their significance or cost. Mexico's potential for compromise will depend on what the United States offers in exchange.
Mexico's main objective in an interim agreement is tariff relief, particularly applied to Section 232 duties on steel, aluminum, automobiles, and related products. A second priority is resolving existing Section 301 tariff actions that apply to Mexico, one on forced labor and one on excess manufacturing capacity. A third is protection against future U.S. tariff actions. An interim deal that delivers duty relief on today's tariffs while leaving the door open for tomorrow's would give Mexico the illusion of protection while exposing the country to additional duties on the very products it is negotiating relief for right now.
The governing principle should be proportionality. If the United States requests relatively simple, reversible concessions, Mexico may be able to accept them in exchange for specific tariff relief. However, if the United States expects Mexico to make deeper and permanent structural changes to its policies, Mexico should receive a stronger guarantee in return. Mexico should not accept permanent limitations on its trade policy in exchange for the temporary suspension of tariffs that can be imposed again a few months later under Section 232, Section 301, or another legal authority. The recurring flaw of ARTs with other countries is that the United States has been unwilling to commit against reimposing tariffs it has agreed to lift.
This does not mean that Mexico should refuse to make important concessions. There may be areas where greater alignment with the United States serves Mexico's own interest--particularly if the objective is to strengthen North American production and secure supply chains--but the exchange needs to be balanced. The deeper and more lasting the demand, the stronger the guarantee that would be needed to justify it.
The failure of the U.S.-Canada negotiations makes this balance even more important for Mexico. Mexico may decide that some of the concessions rejected by Canada are acceptable if the benefits obtained from the United States justify them, but Canada's decision creates an unavoidable point of comparison. If Mexico accepts significant or structural concessions that Canada rejected but obtains only limited or temporary tariff relief in return, it could end up with the worst of both worlds: bound by restrictions that Canada was unwilling to accept while still remaining exposed to the next wave of U.S. tariffs. Similarly, if trade with Mexico and Canada ends up governed by two different sets of rules, each product of a separate bilateral bargain, the trilateral nature of USMCA would survive only on paper. An agreement built on common rules does not hold when the parties operate under divergent terms.
Buy Certainty, Keep Leverage
Mexico should approach an interim deal pragmatically, with a clear hierarchy of what matters. Resolving individual irritants, facilitating additional U.S. investment, and accepting deeper North American economic security cooperation are reasonable pieces of a broader bargain. What Mexico cannot afford to do is treat any such deal as final. President Trump is a permanent negotiator and will reopen trade files as economic or political circumstances shift. If an interim deal is reached, Mexico should assume that the United States can return with new demands next year regardless of what was signed and negotiate accordingly.
The value of an interim agreement lies precisely in the fact that it does not have to resolve everything. Mexico should use that to buy certainty where certainty is available, settle what can reasonably be settled now, and preserve enough leverage for the harder USMCA conversations that will resume in 2027. But the risk runs the other way, too: Mexico could burn through its negotiating capital in the early rounds and arrive at the decisive ones with nothing left to trade. The benchmark for a good interim deal is not just tariff reduction today; it also needs to be proportional, provide stable market access to the United States, and leave cards for Mexico to negotiate in the future.
* * *
Diego Marroquin Bitar is a fellow in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Juan Carlos Baker Pineda is resident fellow with the Georgetown Americas Institute and one of the architects of the original USMCA.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-would-interim-us-mexico-trade-deal-actually-involve
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
What Would an Interim U.S.-Mexico Trade Deal Actually Involve?
Commentary by Diego Marroquin Bitar and Juan Carlos Baker Pineda
Published September 21, 2026
On July 1, 2026, the White House let the clock start on the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) by declining to renew the deal for another 16 years. The agreement did not expire; instead, it entered a phase of annual reviews that could run until 2036, when the agreement would lapse for good if the three governments ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * What Would an Interim U.S.-Mexico Trade Deal Actually Involve? Commentary by Diego Marroquin Bitar and Juan Carlos Baker Pineda Published September 21, 2026 On July 1, 2026, the White House let the clock start on the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) by declining to renew the deal for another 16 years. The agreement did not expire; instead, it entered a phase of annual reviews that could run until 2036, when the agreement would lapse for good if the three governmentsnever agree to extend it. With U.S.-Canada trade talks now in collapse, Mexico is the only USMCA track still moving. What Mexico concedes for tariff relief in a stopgap deal could become the baseline for Canada, and for the harder USMCA fight still to come.
Three weeks after the July 1 deadline, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer laid out the administration's two-stage plan for the USMCA before the Senate Finance Committee. The first step is reaching separate interim "deals" with Mexico and Canada to clear several trade and nontrade barriers before year's end, as well as reducing each country's exposure to U.S. tariffs. Then, the three countries would turn to the harder files: China, rules of origin, labor, and environmental provisions. Those issues that will ultimately decide whether the USMCA survives.
The United States and Canada were close to reaching an agreement in August, but negotiations collapsed, with both sides blaming the other. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney argued that some of the U.S. demands would have compromised Canada's control over its own policies, while President Trump accused Canada of having taken advantage of the United States and insisted that such a relationship would no longer continue. On August 22, the United States imposed a 50 percent tariff on $20 billion worth of Canadian products; Canada launched retaliatory tariffs on September 8. While regrettable, the collapse in U.S.-Canada negotiations does not decide Mexico's outcome. Mexico and the United States have continued their bilateral discussions since March 2026, and Mexican officials have publicly expressed optimism that an agreement can still be reached before the U.S. midterm elections of November. The United States' bilateral relations with its two USMCA partners are different enough economically, politically, and strategically that it could land in a different place with each, although neither of these agreements would amount to the renewal of the USMCA.
What An Interim Agreement Would Actually Involve
Recent U.S. deals with other partners, together with Ambassador Greer's own testimony, give a reasonably clear picture of what the United States will likely ask of Mexico, and what Mexico would look to secure in return. The administration offered few details, but it has signed enough agreements elsewhere to set precedent. These include agreements on reciprocal trade (ARTs) with countries such as Argentina, South Korea, and Japan. ARTs are not submitted to Congress as traditional free trade agreements; they largely rely on authority to the president claims t and are implemented through executive action. While the legality and scope of some of those authorities remain contested among members of Congress and other actors, these arrangements still indicate the type of concessions that Washington seeks from trading partners.
Their substance varies widely. Argentina's ART opened agricultural markets and tightened intellectual property enforcement. South Korea's committed $150 billion to U.S. shipbuilding and another $200 billion in broader investment. Japan's accepted a capped tariff rate in exchange for its own investment pledges. An important issue to keep in mind with respect ARTs is that implementation has been uneven, with commitments from U.S. partners being slow-rolled or quietly set aside.
Mexico is a different case. Unlike most countries signing ARTs, Mexico already has a comprehensive free trade agreement with the United States and sits inside deeply integrated North American production networks. Whatever emerges from these talks should be understood strictly as temporary tariff relief, not a substitute for the USMCA.
Even so, it is difficult to picture the White House cutting existing Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs without asking Mexico for something in return. The results of negotiations with other countries suggest that tariff relief under this administration comes with a price. When the first International Emergency Economic Powers Act tariffs were announced, the United States had already presented Mexico a lengthy list of tariff and nontariff concerns that it wanted to address, reportedly more than 50 items. By the third U.S.-Mexico negotiation round this July, that list had shrunk to 14 issues. What closes the remaining gap, and what Mexico gets in exchange, is the decisive question now, especially with Canada having already rejected the United States' terms.
What Washington Could Ask For
Potential U.S. demands fall along two dimensions. The first is speed: how quickly Mexico can implement them. The second, and more consequential, is depth: how far they reach into Mexico's control over its domestic policies and its access to the U.S. market.
The first dimension includes short-term demands, which Mexico could address relatively quickly, and medium- or longer-term demands, which would require commitments that extend beyond an interim agreement. The second includes structural and nonstructural demands. This is perhaps more important. Some U.S. requests could be relatively easy for Mexico to implement without fundamentally changing its policies; others could have much deeper consequences by limiting Mexico's access to the U.S. market or its ability to conduct trade relations with other countries.
Crossing the two dimensions produces four types of demands:
[View table in the link at bottom.]
1. Housekeeping demands are quick to implement and limited in reach. These are the irritants that the United States has already identified and that Mexico could address through administrative or relatively limited regulatory action. These include U.S. industry complaints, such as U.S. cheese producers' objection to geographical-indication commitments Mexico made to the European Union, along with questions of agricultural market access, customs procedures, intellectual property rights, or specific regulatory barriers. Mexico can settle these without fundamentally changing the bilateral economic relationship, and it should make progress where doing so builds goodwill with the United States.
2. The Trojan horse is quick to implement but has deep reach. These demands are quickly addressed but introduce limits to Mexico's own policies well beyond the life of an interim deal. Washington may ask Mexico to align some of its trade policies with those of the United States. These could include tariffs, investment screening, export controls, transshipment, supply chain security, or measures directed at nonmarket economies, particularly China. A request of this type can be presented as a narrow technical adjustment and enacted weeks or by decree, but could have long-term and structural consequences for Mexican trade policy.
3. Rebalancing demands are slower to implement but shallow in reach. The United States may ask Mexico to reduce the bilateral trade deficit through additional purchases of U.S. agricultural, energy, or manufactured goods; to facilitate U.S. investment; or to support U.S. positions in organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. These demands could be costly economically, but they would leave the architecture of the USMCA intact. Similar proposals have been part of other agreements negotiated by the administration.
4. Structural demands are slow to implement but have deep reach. They would redraw Mexico's long-term domestic and foreign policy. Measures could include quantitative or other limits on Mexican exports, new U.S. content thresholds, explicit restrictions on Mexico's trade relations with third countries, or even changes that shift the trilateral nature of the USMCA toward a set of parallel bilateral deals. These proposals would outlast any interim framework negotiated between the two countries. Prime Minister Carney treated reported U.S. proposals to limit Canada's ability to negotiate trade deals with other partners as one of his country's red lines, blaming these demands for the collapse of the U.S.-Canada interim deal.
Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum's ability to move quickly is not in doubt. Article 131 of Mexico's Constitution provides the executive with the power to increase, reduce, or eliminate import and export tariffs and to establish restrictions on imports, exports, and transit when necessary to regulate foreign trade. This authority is further reinforced in Mexico's Foreign Trade Law, which provides the president and the economy ministry with important instruments to establish or modify tariff and nontariff measures. Consequently, some potentially significant commitments could be implemented without lengthy legislative processes. But if the result is to limit Mexico's ability to determine its own trade policy toward China or another country, the implications are clearly much more significant. Prime Minister Carney considered structural demands as red lines and claims they caused the collapse of the U.S.-Canada interim deal.
What Mexico May Look to Secure in Return
How easily Mexico can grant concessions should not be confused with their significance or cost. Mexico's potential for compromise will depend on what the United States offers in exchange.
Mexico's main objective in an interim agreement is tariff relief, particularly applied to Section 232 duties on steel, aluminum, automobiles, and related products. A second priority is resolving existing Section 301 tariff actions that apply to Mexico, one on forced labor and one on excess manufacturing capacity. A third is protection against future U.S. tariff actions. An interim deal that delivers duty relief on today's tariffs while leaving the door open for tomorrow's would give Mexico the illusion of protection while exposing the country to additional duties on the very products it is negotiating relief for right now.
The governing principle should be proportionality. If the United States requests relatively simple, reversible concessions, Mexico may be able to accept them in exchange for specific tariff relief. However, if the United States expects Mexico to make deeper and permanent structural changes to its policies, Mexico should receive a stronger guarantee in return. Mexico should not accept permanent limitations on its trade policy in exchange for the temporary suspension of tariffs that can be imposed again a few months later under Section 232, Section 301, or another legal authority. The recurring flaw of ARTs with other countries is that the United States has been unwilling to commit against reimposing tariffs it has agreed to lift.
This does not mean that Mexico should refuse to make important concessions. There may be areas where greater alignment with the United States serves Mexico's own interest--particularly if the objective is to strengthen North American production and secure supply chains--but the exchange needs to be balanced. The deeper and more lasting the demand, the stronger the guarantee that would be needed to justify it.
The failure of the U.S.-Canada negotiations makes this balance even more important for Mexico. Mexico may decide that some of the concessions rejected by Canada are acceptable if the benefits obtained from the United States justify them, but Canada's decision creates an unavoidable point of comparison. If Mexico accepts significant or structural concessions that Canada rejected but obtains only limited or temporary tariff relief in return, it could end up with the worst of both worlds: bound by restrictions that Canada was unwilling to accept while still remaining exposed to the next wave of U.S. tariffs. Similarly, if trade with Mexico and Canada ends up governed by two different sets of rules, each product of a separate bilateral bargain, the trilateral nature of USMCA would survive only on paper. An agreement built on common rules does not hold when the parties operate under divergent terms.
Buy Certainty, Keep Leverage
Mexico should approach an interim deal pragmatically, with a clear hierarchy of what matters. Resolving individual irritants, facilitating additional U.S. investment, and accepting deeper North American economic security cooperation are reasonable pieces of a broader bargain. What Mexico cannot afford to do is treat any such deal as final. President Trump is a permanent negotiator and will reopen trade files as economic or political circumstances shift. If an interim deal is reached, Mexico should assume that the United States can return with new demands next year regardless of what was signed and negotiate accordingly.
The value of an interim agreement lies precisely in the fact that it does not have to resolve everything. Mexico should use that to buy certainty where certainty is available, settle what can reasonably be settled now, and preserve enough leverage for the harder USMCA conversations that will resume in 2027. But the risk runs the other way, too: Mexico could burn through its negotiating capital in the early rounds and arrive at the decisive ones with nothing left to trade. The benchmark for a good interim deal is not just tariff reduction today; it also needs to be proportional, provide stable market access to the United States, and leave cards for Mexico to negotiate in the future.
* * *
Diego Marroquin Bitar is a fellow in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Juan Carlos Baker Pineda is resident fellow with the Georgetown Americas Institute and one of the architects of the original USMCA.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-would-interim-us-mexico-trade-deal-actually-involve
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Levantine Opportunity in a Churning Middle East
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
The Levantine Opportunity in a Churning Middle East
Commentary by Paul Salem
September 21, 2026
Part of the Middle East Program's Middle East Futures Project, this Commentary series will analyze the Middle East's current period of disequilibrium, explore future scenarios for the region, and identify potential pathways forward.
-
The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. -Antonio Gramsci, Italian philosopher, 1930
One ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * The Levantine Opportunity in a Churning Middle East Commentary by Paul Salem September 21, 2026 Part of the Middle East Program's Middle East Futures Project, this Commentary series will analyze the Middle East's current period of disequilibrium, explore future scenarios for the region, and identify potential pathways forward. - The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. -Antonio Gramsci, Italian philosopher, 1930 OneWar, Two Subregions
The wars of the past three years--starting with the attacks of October 7, 2023, and culminating in the U.S.-Israel war with Iran--have indeed collapsed whatever fragile order prevailed in the Middle East but have not yet given rise to a discernible new order. Old deterrence patterns failed to hold, states and nonstate actors tested their defensive and offensive capacities, key players fundamentally changed their strategies, and some actors--such as the Assad regime of Syria--have ceased to exist. And the conflict is still ongoing, with no near end in sight.
This three-year period of war can also be roughly divided into two phases and two subregions, with different outcomes in each. The first phase, from October 2023 to May 2025, was largely in Gaza and the Levant. (This essay uses the term "Levant" in its narrow sense, indicating mainly Syria and Lebanon.) During this phase, Israel devastated Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its actions led indirectly to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. The second phase saw the U.S.-Israel direct war on Iran, first in June 2025, then from late February 2026. Given Iran's response of attacking the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and closing the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has turned this second phase into what can be described as a Gulf war. Lebanon reached a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement with Israel in November 2024 and had hoped to insulate itself from this second phase of the war, but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) pushed Hezbollah to reopen the Lebanon front on March 2, 2026, leading to a new wave of conflict and an expansion of Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon.
When looking at the last three years of war, a number of patterns emerge that underscore the separation between the two arenas.
1. Timing: The main strategic changes in Syria and Lebanon took place in 2024 and early 2025: the weakening of Hezbollah, the departure of Iran from Syria, and the emergence of new state leadership in Syria and Lebanon. They were not fundamentally strategically altered by the subsequent June 2025 or February 2026 wars on Iran. Alternatively, the Gulf was not much affected in the first, Levantine phase of the war, but has paid a tremendous and ongoing price in the latter phase.
2. Winners and Losers: Iran has been a net loser in the Levant, while it has emerged arguably strategically stronger in the Gulf. Of course, Iran is still present in Lebanon, albeit with a weaker and more isolated Hezbollah, and Iran can always hope for--and is indeed working for--a breakdown of order in Syria through which it can try to regain a foothold there. But so far, with its exit from Syria and its weaker position in Lebanon, it has been an overall net loser in the Levant. In the Gulf, Iran has emerged stronger, with a demonstrated ability to block the Strait of Hormuz, attack GCC states, and even indirectly threaten the Bab al-Mandab despite U.S. military presence. In an interesting connectivity between the two subregions, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the second phase of the war has been an unforeseen geoeconomic boon for the Levant, creating a GCC and Iraqi need for energy and transport alternatives to Hormuz, partly through the Levant.
3. Future Subregional Order: The Levant is feeling its way toward an order between the reemerging states of Syria and Lebanon and the regional powers of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. It is also looking for a way to disarm Hezbollah and further limit or change the nature of Iranian influence in the Levant from one of supporting proxies to one of state-to-state interaction. In the Gulf, the GCC countries are looking for an end to the U.S.-Iran confrontation, as well as a new GCC-U.S.-Iran security and economic order that can enable the rebuilding of some stability and the resumption of full economic activity.
Decline and Collapse of the Old Levantine Order
For roughly two and a half decades after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000--with a brief breakdown in 2006--the Levant maintained a precarious stability. Iran built Hezbollah as a deterrent against an Israeli or U.S. attack on Iran, while Israel coexisted uneasily with the group despite its growing military power.
That old order unraveled slowly and then all at once. The Assad regime was the keystone of Iran's projection of power into the Levant; weakened by the uprising and civil war that began in 2011, it finally collapsed in 2024. In Lebanon, the Hezbollah-dominated political and security order was shaken by the 2019 economic and banking collapse, mass protests, and the 2020 Beirut port blast. The U.S.-mediated 2022 maritime border agreement with Israel offered a possible economic and geopolitical lifeline, but it produced no immediate transformation before the events of October 2023 overtook it.
Broader regional shifts also strained the equilibrium. The 2020 Abraham Accords pursued Arab-Israeli normalization while bypassing the Palestinian issue, contributing to Palestinian anxiety that partly fueled the Hamas attacks of October 7 and raising Iranian fears that closer Arab-Israeli alignment would bring the Israeli threat closer to Iran.
Both sides miscalculated. Israel and the United States underestimated the potential strategic blowback from normalization without progress on Palestine; Iran falsely assumed that backing Hamas, opening a second front through Hezbollah, and rallying the Axis of Resistance would play out like earlier confrontations without major strategic consequences. Instead, Israel, with U.S. support, went on the offensive against Iran's proxies and allies and eventually Iran itself.
Outlines of an Emerging Levantine Order
The key change in the Levant is that after decades of Iranian dominance--facilitated by the Assad regime--in both Lebanon and Syria, Iran's power and access in the Levant has been severely curtailed. In Lebanon, the devastating blows to Hezbollah in 2024 enabled the election of a president and the formation of a government outside the group's control and hostile to its interests. In Syria, Iran suffered a wholesale defeat and exit with the collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of a new government deeply hostile to it.
Syria remains the keystone to the future order of the Levant, and much depends on the survival and consolidation of the new government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. But the outlines of a potential new order in the Levant are already emerging. In both Syria and Lebanon, there is an urgent state rebuilding project aimed at seizing back control from external powers and internal armed groups and rebuilding state sovereignty. And, for the first time in decades, the two states are reinforcing each other's steps, rather than working at cross purposes.
Also for the first time in decades, Damascus and Beirut are sharing the same regional and global alignments. In contrast, the previous Syrian regime had aligned first with the Soviet Union and then with Iran--in both cases, in hostility to the orientation of the Beirut government and of critical Arab states, especially in the Gulf. The new government in Syria is aligned with Saudi Arabia and the GCC, Europe, and the United States--the same alignment as Lebanon. Syria and Lebanon's strategic economic interests are also aligning, with both countries moving quickly to reconnect with the Gulf countries through geoeconomic energy and trade routes, invite regional and international investment, and move their economies from ruin toward recovery and growth. The two countries, however, might be drawn into the geoeconomic tensions over eastern Mediterranean gas corridors between Turkey on one side, and an Israeli-Cypriot-Greek axis on the other; the new Syrian government is already close to Turkey on this issue, whereas the Lebanese state has leaned toward the Cypriot-Greek pathway.
In geopolitical terms, the outlines of a new alignment, which might eventually mature into an order, are emerging in the Levant. Syria is anchored to Turkey and Saudi Arabia and is rebuilding good relations with other GCC and Arab states, including its immediate neighbors Lebanon and Jordan. It is also rebuilding close relations with the United States and Europe while maintaining good relations with China and Russia. Meanwhile, the new regime in Syria is deeply hostile to Iran, but it has been reaching out to Israel in direct negotiations to roll back recent Israeli incursions into southern Syria and work toward at least lasting security and nonaggression arrangements, and perhaps in the longer term work toward peace.
In Lebanon the challenge is more daunting with a still strong IRGC and Hezbollah and an expanding Israeli occupation of the south. But the reemerging state in Lebanon generally shares the new Syria's geopolitical alignment and desired end state: a Levant aligned with the GCC, Europe and the United States, devoid of Iranian direct or proxy influence, and in a state of nonaggression or perhaps eventual peace with Israel.
The pathway to that end point has gotten more difficult over the past months, as the IRGC insisted on reopening the Lebanon-Israel front, and Israel has expanded its occupation of southern Lebanon. Lebanon and Israel have formally agreed--in their trilateral framework with the United States--on this desired end state of a fully sovereign Lebanon, a fully withdrawn Israel, and secure and peaceful relations between the two. Hezbollah and the IRGC, for their part, have refused to discuss the possibility of Hezbollah accepting the authority of the Lebanese state, or of handing over its weapons and integrating into the state. Whether this promise of a stable Levantine order remains only a chimera or will work itself through to reality will depend on a plethora of factors, including decision-making in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Iran, Turkey, the GCC, and the United States.
The State-Building Challenge
The core of any stable Levantine order is successful state building in Syria and Lebanon. Both seek sovereignty and territorial integrity, the disarming or integration of militias, and economic recovery. But they start from opposite positions: Syria's government has power but must build inclusivity, pluralism, and durable institutions, while Lebanon has those institutions but struggles to regain actual state power. Both have made historic strides since early 2025, although major uncertainties remain.
In Syria, the transition has gone better than most could have expected. The long civil war has largely ended, Damascus has reestablished institutional authority over most of the country except the Israeli-occupied border strip and the Druze area of Sweida, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are reintegrating into the state, and Syria has rebuilt relations with much of the regional and international community. A baseline scenario would see this consolidation continuing through 2030. Major risks include something happening to Sharaa, unauthorized actions by his radical base, renewed ethnic or sectarian tensions, or public discontent as the optimism of Assad's fall meets the hard realities of an economy that will need many years, perhaps decades, to recover. Syria also risks trading the old Iran-Israel conflict axis for an Israeli-Turkish one.
Lebanon's transition has been slower but no less historic. Unlike Syria, its old order weakened rather than disappearing overnight. Yet the new president, prime minister and government have reasserted a statist and sovereigntist agenda. In 2026, Lebanon outlawed Hezbollah's military and security operations and the IRGC presence, declared the Iranian ambassador persona non grata, launched direct negotiations with Israel, and advanced two of three key banking reform laws needed to revive the financial sector and economy. However, much remains to be done on governance, economic and security reform, and Hezbollah's disarmament, now complicated by renewed large-scale conflict and a potentially long-term Israeli occupation of the south.
A baseline scenario for Lebanon by 2030 is grimmer than Syria's. Hezbollah is likely to weaken further but still be supported by the IRGC. And while the state can and should do more to disarm the group, it might not be able to force a full disarmament if Hezbollah continues to refuse. Unlike Syria's SDF, which accepted reintegration through negotiation, Hezbollah and its Iranian backers continue to reject it. Without full disarmament of Hezbollah, a future Israeli government is unlikely to agree to full withdrawal of Lebanon.
Nevertheless, Lebanon by 2030 is likely to be markedly better placed than in 2023, when Hezbollah, the IRGC, and the Assad regime dominated the state; the economy was in freefall; and no path to sovereignty or reform was visible. The Lebanese Armed Forces are likely to grow stronger with U.S. and other international support and extend state control. Completion of the so-called financial gap law, expected in 2027, should help revive the banking sector by establishing how the enormous losses accumulated in the financial system will be allocated among the state, the central bank, commercial banks, and depositors, and how frozen deposits will be recovered. At the same time, renewed foreign aid and investment, along with greater regional connectivity through Syria to Iraq and the GCC, should generate new economic activity.
Full Hezbollah disarmament and Israeli withdrawal by 2030 are uncertain, but state institutions, services, banking, and the economy can still make significant progress. These would advance much faster if the arms issue was resolved, and if Lebanon and Israel stabilized their shared border through a security agreement or a peace treaty.
Seizing the Opportunity
For the first time in decades, the Levant has a chance to consolidate into an area of states rather than proxies, a locus of stability and security rather than open-ended conflict, and a bridge for regional trade and cooperation rather than a regional battleground.
But such a future will not create itself. Leaders in Beirut and Damascus must redouble their efforts to build up state authority, reform governance and economic institutions, and forge cooperative and peaceful relations with each other and their neighbors. Leaders in Israel, especially those that must chart Israel's future after the upcoming elections in late October, must decide if they want to invest for the long term in a stable state-based Levant regional order or continue to undertake preemptive military actions that perpetuate instability across their border.
Turkey can help stabilize and rebuild Syria and Lebanon, but its tensions with Israel could determine whether Syria consolidates or again becomes a regional battleground. Saudi Arabia and the GCC will remain central economically and geopolitically, with a renewed interest in a stable Levant as a partner in overland energy and trade routes to the Mediterranean and Europe. So far, GCC states have acted broadly in harmony toward Syria and Lebanon rather than reproducing rivalries seen elsewhere.
Iran has already lost its presence in Syria, but it should consider whether continuing to push Hezbollah to stand against the reemerging state in Lebanon and insisting that it maintain open-ended warfare with Israel suits Iran's long-term interests. This is particularly true because the Lebanese Shiite community base that Iran has relied upon for Hezbollah's support has been utterly devastated by the latest round of fighting and occupation, and many in the community see their interests diverging sharply from those of the IRGC.
The main extra-regional player in the Levant remains the United States. Although the United States was not directly involved in the events that devastated Hezbollah and collapsed the Assad regime in 2024, it has been active in encouraging and enabling both transitions in Syria and Lebanon. The United States has a long-term interest in a stable, state-based Levant that is integrated with the economies of the region and the world, free of Iranian and militia presence, and in peaceful relations with Israel.
The United States has backed the new leaders; efforts to disarm or integrate militias; closer ties among Syria, Lebanon, the GCC and Turkey; and direct talks with Israel. The Trump administration and Congress have an interest in maintaining and increasing this engagement through the remainder of Trump's term. As the road to a stable Levant will extend beyond 2028, it is important that any new administration that takes over the White House in early 2029 continue this set of policies and not reverse them.
* * *
Paul Salem is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/levantine-opportunity-churning-middle-east
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
The Levantine Opportunity in a Churning Middle East
Commentary by Paul Salem
September 21, 2026
Part of the Middle East Program's Middle East Futures Project, this Commentary series will analyze the Middle East's current period of disequilibrium, explore future scenarios for the region, and identify potential pathways forward.
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The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. -Antonio Gramsci, Italian philosopher, 1930
One ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * The Levantine Opportunity in a Churning Middle East Commentary by Paul Salem September 21, 2026 Part of the Middle East Program's Middle East Futures Project, this Commentary series will analyze the Middle East's current period of disequilibrium, explore future scenarios for the region, and identify potential pathways forward. - The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. -Antonio Gramsci, Italian philosopher, 1930 OneWar, Two Subregions
The wars of the past three years--starting with the attacks of October 7, 2023, and culminating in the U.S.-Israel war with Iran--have indeed collapsed whatever fragile order prevailed in the Middle East but have not yet given rise to a discernible new order. Old deterrence patterns failed to hold, states and nonstate actors tested their defensive and offensive capacities, key players fundamentally changed their strategies, and some actors--such as the Assad regime of Syria--have ceased to exist. And the conflict is still ongoing, with no near end in sight.
This three-year period of war can also be roughly divided into two phases and two subregions, with different outcomes in each. The first phase, from October 2023 to May 2025, was largely in Gaza and the Levant. (This essay uses the term "Levant" in its narrow sense, indicating mainly Syria and Lebanon.) During this phase, Israel devastated Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its actions led indirectly to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. The second phase saw the U.S.-Israel direct war on Iran, first in June 2025, then from late February 2026. Given Iran's response of attacking the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and closing the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has turned this second phase into what can be described as a Gulf war. Lebanon reached a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement with Israel in November 2024 and had hoped to insulate itself from this second phase of the war, but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) pushed Hezbollah to reopen the Lebanon front on March 2, 2026, leading to a new wave of conflict and an expansion of Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon.
When looking at the last three years of war, a number of patterns emerge that underscore the separation between the two arenas.
1. Timing: The main strategic changes in Syria and Lebanon took place in 2024 and early 2025: the weakening of Hezbollah, the departure of Iran from Syria, and the emergence of new state leadership in Syria and Lebanon. They were not fundamentally strategically altered by the subsequent June 2025 or February 2026 wars on Iran. Alternatively, the Gulf was not much affected in the first, Levantine phase of the war, but has paid a tremendous and ongoing price in the latter phase.
2. Winners and Losers: Iran has been a net loser in the Levant, while it has emerged arguably strategically stronger in the Gulf. Of course, Iran is still present in Lebanon, albeit with a weaker and more isolated Hezbollah, and Iran can always hope for--and is indeed working for--a breakdown of order in Syria through which it can try to regain a foothold there. But so far, with its exit from Syria and its weaker position in Lebanon, it has been an overall net loser in the Levant. In the Gulf, Iran has emerged stronger, with a demonstrated ability to block the Strait of Hormuz, attack GCC states, and even indirectly threaten the Bab al-Mandab despite U.S. military presence. In an interesting connectivity between the two subregions, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the second phase of the war has been an unforeseen geoeconomic boon for the Levant, creating a GCC and Iraqi need for energy and transport alternatives to Hormuz, partly through the Levant.
3. Future Subregional Order: The Levant is feeling its way toward an order between the reemerging states of Syria and Lebanon and the regional powers of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. It is also looking for a way to disarm Hezbollah and further limit or change the nature of Iranian influence in the Levant from one of supporting proxies to one of state-to-state interaction. In the Gulf, the GCC countries are looking for an end to the U.S.-Iran confrontation, as well as a new GCC-U.S.-Iran security and economic order that can enable the rebuilding of some stability and the resumption of full economic activity.
Decline and Collapse of the Old Levantine Order
For roughly two and a half decades after Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000--with a brief breakdown in 2006--the Levant maintained a precarious stability. Iran built Hezbollah as a deterrent against an Israeli or U.S. attack on Iran, while Israel coexisted uneasily with the group despite its growing military power.
That old order unraveled slowly and then all at once. The Assad regime was the keystone of Iran's projection of power into the Levant; weakened by the uprising and civil war that began in 2011, it finally collapsed in 2024. In Lebanon, the Hezbollah-dominated political and security order was shaken by the 2019 economic and banking collapse, mass protests, and the 2020 Beirut port blast. The U.S.-mediated 2022 maritime border agreement with Israel offered a possible economic and geopolitical lifeline, but it produced no immediate transformation before the events of October 2023 overtook it.
Broader regional shifts also strained the equilibrium. The 2020 Abraham Accords pursued Arab-Israeli normalization while bypassing the Palestinian issue, contributing to Palestinian anxiety that partly fueled the Hamas attacks of October 7 and raising Iranian fears that closer Arab-Israeli alignment would bring the Israeli threat closer to Iran.
Both sides miscalculated. Israel and the United States underestimated the potential strategic blowback from normalization without progress on Palestine; Iran falsely assumed that backing Hamas, opening a second front through Hezbollah, and rallying the Axis of Resistance would play out like earlier confrontations without major strategic consequences. Instead, Israel, with U.S. support, went on the offensive against Iran's proxies and allies and eventually Iran itself.
Outlines of an Emerging Levantine Order
The key change in the Levant is that after decades of Iranian dominance--facilitated by the Assad regime--in both Lebanon and Syria, Iran's power and access in the Levant has been severely curtailed. In Lebanon, the devastating blows to Hezbollah in 2024 enabled the election of a president and the formation of a government outside the group's control and hostile to its interests. In Syria, Iran suffered a wholesale defeat and exit with the collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of a new government deeply hostile to it.
Syria remains the keystone to the future order of the Levant, and much depends on the survival and consolidation of the new government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. But the outlines of a potential new order in the Levant are already emerging. In both Syria and Lebanon, there is an urgent state rebuilding project aimed at seizing back control from external powers and internal armed groups and rebuilding state sovereignty. And, for the first time in decades, the two states are reinforcing each other's steps, rather than working at cross purposes.
Also for the first time in decades, Damascus and Beirut are sharing the same regional and global alignments. In contrast, the previous Syrian regime had aligned first with the Soviet Union and then with Iran--in both cases, in hostility to the orientation of the Beirut government and of critical Arab states, especially in the Gulf. The new government in Syria is aligned with Saudi Arabia and the GCC, Europe, and the United States--the same alignment as Lebanon. Syria and Lebanon's strategic economic interests are also aligning, with both countries moving quickly to reconnect with the Gulf countries through geoeconomic energy and trade routes, invite regional and international investment, and move their economies from ruin toward recovery and growth. The two countries, however, might be drawn into the geoeconomic tensions over eastern Mediterranean gas corridors between Turkey on one side, and an Israeli-Cypriot-Greek axis on the other; the new Syrian government is already close to Turkey on this issue, whereas the Lebanese state has leaned toward the Cypriot-Greek pathway.
In geopolitical terms, the outlines of a new alignment, which might eventually mature into an order, are emerging in the Levant. Syria is anchored to Turkey and Saudi Arabia and is rebuilding good relations with other GCC and Arab states, including its immediate neighbors Lebanon and Jordan. It is also rebuilding close relations with the United States and Europe while maintaining good relations with China and Russia. Meanwhile, the new regime in Syria is deeply hostile to Iran, but it has been reaching out to Israel in direct negotiations to roll back recent Israeli incursions into southern Syria and work toward at least lasting security and nonaggression arrangements, and perhaps in the longer term work toward peace.
In Lebanon the challenge is more daunting with a still strong IRGC and Hezbollah and an expanding Israeli occupation of the south. But the reemerging state in Lebanon generally shares the new Syria's geopolitical alignment and desired end state: a Levant aligned with the GCC, Europe and the United States, devoid of Iranian direct or proxy influence, and in a state of nonaggression or perhaps eventual peace with Israel.
The pathway to that end point has gotten more difficult over the past months, as the IRGC insisted on reopening the Lebanon-Israel front, and Israel has expanded its occupation of southern Lebanon. Lebanon and Israel have formally agreed--in their trilateral framework with the United States--on this desired end state of a fully sovereign Lebanon, a fully withdrawn Israel, and secure and peaceful relations between the two. Hezbollah and the IRGC, for their part, have refused to discuss the possibility of Hezbollah accepting the authority of the Lebanese state, or of handing over its weapons and integrating into the state. Whether this promise of a stable Levantine order remains only a chimera or will work itself through to reality will depend on a plethora of factors, including decision-making in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Iran, Turkey, the GCC, and the United States.
The State-Building Challenge
The core of any stable Levantine order is successful state building in Syria and Lebanon. Both seek sovereignty and territorial integrity, the disarming or integration of militias, and economic recovery. But they start from opposite positions: Syria's government has power but must build inclusivity, pluralism, and durable institutions, while Lebanon has those institutions but struggles to regain actual state power. Both have made historic strides since early 2025, although major uncertainties remain.
In Syria, the transition has gone better than most could have expected. The long civil war has largely ended, Damascus has reestablished institutional authority over most of the country except the Israeli-occupied border strip and the Druze area of Sweida, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are reintegrating into the state, and Syria has rebuilt relations with much of the regional and international community. A baseline scenario would see this consolidation continuing through 2030. Major risks include something happening to Sharaa, unauthorized actions by his radical base, renewed ethnic or sectarian tensions, or public discontent as the optimism of Assad's fall meets the hard realities of an economy that will need many years, perhaps decades, to recover. Syria also risks trading the old Iran-Israel conflict axis for an Israeli-Turkish one.
Lebanon's transition has been slower but no less historic. Unlike Syria, its old order weakened rather than disappearing overnight. Yet the new president, prime minister and government have reasserted a statist and sovereigntist agenda. In 2026, Lebanon outlawed Hezbollah's military and security operations and the IRGC presence, declared the Iranian ambassador persona non grata, launched direct negotiations with Israel, and advanced two of three key banking reform laws needed to revive the financial sector and economy. However, much remains to be done on governance, economic and security reform, and Hezbollah's disarmament, now complicated by renewed large-scale conflict and a potentially long-term Israeli occupation of the south.
A baseline scenario for Lebanon by 2030 is grimmer than Syria's. Hezbollah is likely to weaken further but still be supported by the IRGC. And while the state can and should do more to disarm the group, it might not be able to force a full disarmament if Hezbollah continues to refuse. Unlike Syria's SDF, which accepted reintegration through negotiation, Hezbollah and its Iranian backers continue to reject it. Without full disarmament of Hezbollah, a future Israeli government is unlikely to agree to full withdrawal of Lebanon.
Nevertheless, Lebanon by 2030 is likely to be markedly better placed than in 2023, when Hezbollah, the IRGC, and the Assad regime dominated the state; the economy was in freefall; and no path to sovereignty or reform was visible. The Lebanese Armed Forces are likely to grow stronger with U.S. and other international support and extend state control. Completion of the so-called financial gap law, expected in 2027, should help revive the banking sector by establishing how the enormous losses accumulated in the financial system will be allocated among the state, the central bank, commercial banks, and depositors, and how frozen deposits will be recovered. At the same time, renewed foreign aid and investment, along with greater regional connectivity through Syria to Iraq and the GCC, should generate new economic activity.
Full Hezbollah disarmament and Israeli withdrawal by 2030 are uncertain, but state institutions, services, banking, and the economy can still make significant progress. These would advance much faster if the arms issue was resolved, and if Lebanon and Israel stabilized their shared border through a security agreement or a peace treaty.
Seizing the Opportunity
For the first time in decades, the Levant has a chance to consolidate into an area of states rather than proxies, a locus of stability and security rather than open-ended conflict, and a bridge for regional trade and cooperation rather than a regional battleground.
But such a future will not create itself. Leaders in Beirut and Damascus must redouble their efforts to build up state authority, reform governance and economic institutions, and forge cooperative and peaceful relations with each other and their neighbors. Leaders in Israel, especially those that must chart Israel's future after the upcoming elections in late October, must decide if they want to invest for the long term in a stable state-based Levant regional order or continue to undertake preemptive military actions that perpetuate instability across their border.
Turkey can help stabilize and rebuild Syria and Lebanon, but its tensions with Israel could determine whether Syria consolidates or again becomes a regional battleground. Saudi Arabia and the GCC will remain central economically and geopolitically, with a renewed interest in a stable Levant as a partner in overland energy and trade routes to the Mediterranean and Europe. So far, GCC states have acted broadly in harmony toward Syria and Lebanon rather than reproducing rivalries seen elsewhere.
Iran has already lost its presence in Syria, but it should consider whether continuing to push Hezbollah to stand against the reemerging state in Lebanon and insisting that it maintain open-ended warfare with Israel suits Iran's long-term interests. This is particularly true because the Lebanese Shiite community base that Iran has relied upon for Hezbollah's support has been utterly devastated by the latest round of fighting and occupation, and many in the community see their interests diverging sharply from those of the IRGC.
The main extra-regional player in the Levant remains the United States. Although the United States was not directly involved in the events that devastated Hezbollah and collapsed the Assad regime in 2024, it has been active in encouraging and enabling both transitions in Syria and Lebanon. The United States has a long-term interest in a stable, state-based Levant that is integrated with the economies of the region and the world, free of Iranian and militia presence, and in peaceful relations with Israel.
The United States has backed the new leaders; efforts to disarm or integrate militias; closer ties among Syria, Lebanon, the GCC and Turkey; and direct talks with Israel. The Trump administration and Congress have an interest in maintaining and increasing this engagement through the remainder of Trump's term. As the road to a stable Levant will extend beyond 2028, it is important that any new administration that takes over the White House in early 2029 continue this set of policies and not reverse them.
* * *
Paul Salem is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/levantine-opportunity-churning-middle-east
[Category: ThinkTank]
CAP Stands With News Organizations Fighting Unconstitutional Ban From White House
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release:
* * *
Sep 21, 2026
CAP Stands With News Organizations Fighting Unconstitutional Ban From White House
Washington, D.C. -- In response to President Donald Trump's announcement that he would ban reporters from CNN, MS NOW, and Politico from the White House, Neera Tanden, president and CEO of the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement:
This move by President Trump is yet another brazen attack on the First Amendment and freedom of the press. He is banishing these news organizations ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release: * * * Sep 21, 2026 CAP Stands With News Organizations Fighting Unconstitutional Ban From White House Washington, D.C. -- In response to President Donald Trump's announcement that he would ban reporters from CNN, MS NOW, and Politico from the White House, Neera Tanden, president and CEO of the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement: This move by President Trump is yet another brazen attack on the First Amendment and freedom of the press. He is banishing these news organizationsfrom the White House simply because he does not like what they are reporting. Fundamental to the First Amendment and free speech is that speech critical of the government and its policies are protected.
These news outlets are exercising their constitutional rights with honesty and integrity, and they must be allowed to do so free from illegal government interference. We stand with these news organizations as they fight these arbitrary and unlawful restrictions. And we hope all those who claim to care about free speech will stand up as well.
For more information on this topic or to speak with an expert, please contact Sam Hananel at shananel@americanprogress.org.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/statement-cap-stands-with-news-organizations-fighting-unconstitutional-ban-from-white-house/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Sep 21, 2026
CAP Stands With News Organizations Fighting Unconstitutional Ban From White House
Washington, D.C. -- In response to President Donald Trump's announcement that he would ban reporters from CNN, MS NOW, and Politico from the White House, Neera Tanden, president and CEO of the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement:
This move by President Trump is yet another brazen attack on the First Amendment and freedom of the press. He is banishing these news organizations ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release: * * * Sep 21, 2026 CAP Stands With News Organizations Fighting Unconstitutional Ban From White House Washington, D.C. -- In response to President Donald Trump's announcement that he would ban reporters from CNN, MS NOW, and Politico from the White House, Neera Tanden, president and CEO of the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement: This move by President Trump is yet another brazen attack on the First Amendment and freedom of the press. He is banishing these news organizationsfrom the White House simply because he does not like what they are reporting. Fundamental to the First Amendment and free speech is that speech critical of the government and its policies are protected.
These news outlets are exercising their constitutional rights with honesty and integrity, and they must be allowed to do so free from illegal government interference. We stand with these news organizations as they fight these arbitrary and unlawful restrictions. And we hope all those who claim to care about free speech will stand up as well.
For more information on this topic or to speak with an expert, please contact Sam Hananel at shananel@americanprogress.org.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/statement-cap-stands-with-news-organizations-fighting-unconstitutional-ban-from-white-house/
[Category: ThinkTank]