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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor:
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Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary
Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal
Executive Summary
* The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system.
* Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice.
* Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership sought ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal Executive Summary * The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system. * Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice. * Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership soughtspokesman candidates there from 2019, while personnel in Yemen were linked to provincial media, central media structures, communications, and the Somalia network.
* The April 2025 killing of Abu Zaid and the September raid that killed al-Ansari exposed a Yemen-based network of media personnel and communications infrastructure. Irregularities in IS media output after al-Ansari's death raise questions about how much of the group's wider media system had come to rely on Yemen.
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On September 1, Yemen's Central State Security Agency announced that a raid in Say'un, Hadramawt, had killed Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, the official spokesman of the Islamic State (IS) (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). Yemeni counterterrorism forces and coalition special forces had located him in a residential house and attempted to arrest him before he opened fire and was fatally wounded (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). The operation also detained a man with him and recovered an explosive belt, two laptops, two tablets, and five phones (South24; Long War Journal, September 1).
The raid killed more than IS's public spokesman. Yemeni jihadist sources and news outlets identify al-Ansari as Mithaq Thabit Haytham al-Hujayli, a Yemeni from Lahj who had simultaneously governed IS's Yemen province since 2020 under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (Sheba Intelligence; Jerusalem Post, September 1; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025). He had survived the destruction of the group's stronghold in Qayfa, al-Bayda, escaped to Marib with a small number of survivors, and rebuilt the province after much of its senior leadership was killed or captured (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, June 26, 2019; Yemen Agency Press, August 14, 2020; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023).
Al-Hujayli's dual role helps explain a larger dynamic. IS-Yemen had almost disappeared as a battlefield province, but Yemen had not disappeared from the IS's organization. Daniel Milton found that the branch's last recorded attack in al-Naba occurred in summer 2022, after 174 reported operations since summer 2018 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Instead, Yemen had become increasingly important to the group's media functions beyond the country. In February 2025, the UN Monitoring Team assessed that the weakened branch--then estimated at only 100-150 fighters--nevertheless retained an "experienced media and propaganda wing" and had played a role in advocating that IS's overall leader be located outside the Iraq-Syria theater (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025). A year later, the Monitoring Team reported that "key [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] ISIL media figures were in Yemen coordinating with ISIL-Somalia" and that the killing of one former core-media official had disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The province supplied IS's global spokesman, housed media-linked personnel, and remained tied to Somali-based financial and communication networks (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17-18, 2025; CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4). Al-Ansari's death therefore exposed a media role that attack statistics had largely concealed.
Yemen Becomes a Media Sanctuary
IS began looking to Yemen for media personnel before the province lost Qayfa. Sources familiar with IS-Yemen's internal communications say that as early as 2019, central leadership asked the province to nominate potential spokesmen and provide biographies and recordings of their sermons (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17-18, 2025). The request came as IS was losing its territorial center and senior leadership in Iraq and Syria. Founder and the first leader of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in October 2019, followed roughly a day later by then-spokesman Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir (Reuters, October 28, 2019). Yemen was therefore already being considered as a source of personnel for central media functions as pressure on the organization's core intensified.
That role survived the branch's military collapse. In August 2020, Houthi forces overran IS positions in Wald Rabi' and Qayfa, killing much of the remaining leadership and fighters (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 5, 2020; Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). Under al-Hujayli, IS-Yemen became smaller and less visible, with Yemeni sources describing a deliberate effort to rebuild away from the attrition of its earlier territorial presence.
The province nevertheless remained tied to the wider organization. IS central leaders appeared to direct the Somalia-based al-Karrar office to fund IS nodes in Yemen through the Umm al-Qura regional office, while UN reporting later highlighted Yemen's facilitation and financial links to al-Karrar across the Red Sea (United Nations Security Council, July 15, 2022; CTC Sentinel, September 2024). Yemen had lost territorial weight, but it retained access to funding, central structures, and inter-provincial networks--assets that gave it importance beyond its local attack tempo.
Al-Ansari Was More Than the Spokesman
Al-Hujayli combined religious credentials, security experience, and provincial leadership before becoming IS's global spokesman. He joined IS in 2015, served in IS-Yemen's Sharia apparatus, and later became deputy security official in Qayfa (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025; Okaz; South24, September 1). He had also studied Quranic recitation and held certifications in several readings (authors' interviews with one of al-Hujayli's relatives and other IS-Yemen members, March 2, 2024). An official 2018 release shows him delivering an Eid sermon in al-Bayda (Bayda, Islamic State, Wilayat al-Bayda, "Days of Thanks and Remembrance," 2018). After Qayfa collapsed, al-Hujayli emerged from the surviving leadership of a province weakened by internal divisions (Long War Journal, December 23, 2025). Sources say that despite the presence of older, more experienced candidates, he combined religious and security credentials with broader acceptance among competing elements, leading the central leadership to appoint him governor under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen members, April 15, 2023, and December 20, 2025).
In August 2023, the provincial governor became IS's global spokesman. After Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham captured Abu Umar al-Muhajir in Syria, al-Hujayli appeared as Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in an al-Furqan recording announcing the death of Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi and the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (Counter Extremism Project, August 3, 2023; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi; Middle East Forum, August 4, 2023; Enab Baladi, September 28, 2023; United Nations Security Council, January 31, 2024). In his February 21 address, al-Hujayli directed messaging toward multiple theaters (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He called for attacks against Syria's transitional government, praised attacks including New Orleans and Bondi Beach, and discussed IS campaigns in Somalia, Nigeria, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He also emphasized the importance of both official IS propaganda and unofficial supporter media while warning unofficial outlets not to depart from official ideology and guidance (Counter Extremism Project, February 23).
"Spokesman" therefore understates his position. Al-Hujayli simultaneously governed IS-Yemen and served as the organization's authorized global voice, directly linking a marginal battlefield province to a central IS media function (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17, 2025; authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025 and April 4; Counter Extremism Project, February 23; Sheba Intelligence, September 1).
Keeping Yemen Quiet
The province's post-Qayfa strategy helped create the environment in which that function could operate. One element was reducing confrontation with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). A member who carried communications between al-Hujayli and other leaders said he indicated that he did not want renewed fighting with AQAP (authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member, September 4, 2025). Internally, al-Hujayli continued to regard AQAP as an ideological enemy but argued that circumstances required suspending the confrontation (authors' interview with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025, and April 15, 2023). Indeed, there have been no reported clashes between IS-Yemen and AQAP since February 2020 despite continued hostile rhetoric (ACLED, December 14, 2020; April 6, 2023).
Finance also became less visible. Sources inside the province say IS-Yemen turned to kidnapping for ransom and conducted operations without claiming them publicly (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with Yemeni jihadist sources along with leaked IS-Yemen documents, April 17, 2023). NewsYemen linked the June 2022 kidnapping in Tarim of the son of a Hadrami businessman Abdullah al-Junayd, known as al-Maher, to IS and described the kidnapping as part of the branch's effort to find new revenue after severe financial losses (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022). Sources say proceeds from the ransom and other operations were used to repay debts and finance vehicles, explosives-related materials, and training (Yemen Agency Press, June 20, 2022; NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025).
Public reporting consequently captured only part of the province's activity. Milton noted that IS-Yemen's last recorded attack was in summer 2022 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Yet Yemeni sources describe continued financing, training, procurement, and organizational activity during that period (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025; United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). The province was fading from IS's public battlefield while becoming more useful behind its media front.
The Network Behind the Voice
Al-Hujayli was not the only media-linked figure operating from Yemen. Sources identify Khalid Ahmad Ali al-Ariqi, known as Abu Zaid al-Muhajir, as IS-Yemen's media official and link part of the organization's broader media activity to the province (information provided in 2022 by a jihadist security source; subsequently corroborated by authors' interviews with multiple IS-Yemen jihadist sources, September 4, 2025; Yemen News Now, October 5, 2025). Yemen also had an established media role: an IS image from al-Bayda shows al-Naba being produced locally, while an April 2020 IS-Yemen production addressed al-Qaeda's positions in Yemen, Afghanistan, Mali, and elsewhere, demonstrating propaganda activity beyond the local battlefield (Long War Journal, May 4, 2020).
Al-Ariqi was killed in an April 2025 airstrike in Ataq, Shabwa, which Yemeni security sources attribute to the United States (Yemen Window, April 3, 2025; authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025; Barran Press, April 12, 2025). The UN Monitoring Team later described an "Abu Zaid" killed that month as a former head of IS's core media office and a communications node between senior leader Abu Khadija and IS-Somalia, assessing that his death disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The alias and date correspond, although the UN report does not provide a full name.
The strike also exposed the infrastructure around the network. Hours later, security forces raided an apartment al-Ariqi had reportedly visited (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemeni security sources say U.S. counterterrorism personnel focused heavily on laptops, phones, and other electronics (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Another media- and communications-linked IS member, Humam Harhara, described by sources as involved in external communications and official media activity, reportedly tried to destroy equipment before he was killed, while another member was detained and surviving devices were seized (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemen's significance therefore extended beyond al-Ansari: the province contained media personnel, communications infrastructure, and inter-provincial links serving the wider IS network (CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4).
Al-Ansari's death may already be testing how much of that media system depended on Yemen. On September 13, Caleb Weiss, a researcher focused on jihadism in Africa and who tracks IS propaganda, observed that IS media output had become limited and sporadic and that al-Naba releases were appearing on a delayed schedule since al-Ansari's death (X/@caleb_weiss7, September 13). Al-Naba has not stopped publishing--Jihadology records issues 563 and 564 on September 3 and 10--but the broader output has become less regular (Jihadology, September 3; September 10).
Conclusion
Al-Ansari's death exposed IS-Yemen's trajectory after losing Qayfa. Its battlefield decline concealed another kind of importance: the province remained connected to central leadership and inter-provincial networks while hosting personnel who served IS's global media apparatus. UN reporting in 2025 and 2026 identified IS-Yemen as a media and propaganda hub linked to IS-Somalia and to the group's wider media apparatus (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). Al-Hujayli's simultaneous roles as provincial governor and global spokesman placed Yemen directly inside that system.
That concentration also helps explain renewed counterterrorism attention to IS personnel in Yemen. Yemeni security sources attribute the April 2025 Ataq strike that killed Abu Zaid to the United States, while follow-on operations reached communications personnel, electronic devices, and supporting infrastructure (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources April 12, 2025; authors' interviews with a defected IS-Yemen leader who also confirmed the information, October 4, 2025; subsequent corroboration by pro-IS channels). The September Say'un raid then reached al-Hujayli himself. The pattern suggests that IS-Yemen's value as a target increasingly lay not in its ability to hold territory or generate attacks, but in the central functions and personnel operating from the province.
The implications extend beyond Yemen. A province can become militarily marginal while remaining important to IS's global organization as central functions are dispersed across geographically distant branches. The limited and irregular media output observed after al-Ansari's death is too early to establish direct dependence, particularly because al-Naba has continued to appear, but it still indicates possible disruption within a system already shown to have significant personnel in Yemen. More broadly, the case shows the limits of judging an IS province primarily by attacks, manpower, or territorial control. Organizational importance may instead lie in functions such as media, communications, finance, or leadership support that serve the movement across theaters. IS-Yemen's attack tempo made it appear peripheral; its media role showed that it had become part of the infrastructure through which IS sustained a global organization and spoke to a global audience.
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Dr. Sara Harmouch is the CEO of H9 Defense, a research and advisory consultancy specializing in national security, counterterrorism, geopolitical risk, threat assessments, and open-source intelligence (OSINT). A counterterrorism expert and national security researcher, she focuses on political violence, terrorism, militancy, armed groups, Islamist militant organizations, irregular warfare, non-state actor behavior, alliance dynamics, and the conditions under which militant groups shift from domestic to international violence.
Mohammad Bin Faisal is a journalist and researcher specializing in Islamist extremist groups, with a focus on the ideological and organizational dimensions of extremism and terrorism in Yemen, the Middle East, and East Africa.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/yemen-becomes-the-islamic-states-media-sanctuary/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary
Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal
Executive Summary
* The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system.
* Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice.
* Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership sought ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal Executive Summary * The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system. * Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice. * Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership soughtspokesman candidates there from 2019, while personnel in Yemen were linked to provincial media, central media structures, communications, and the Somalia network.
* The April 2025 killing of Abu Zaid and the September raid that killed al-Ansari exposed a Yemen-based network of media personnel and communications infrastructure. Irregularities in IS media output after al-Ansari's death raise questions about how much of the group's wider media system had come to rely on Yemen.
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On September 1, Yemen's Central State Security Agency announced that a raid in Say'un, Hadramawt, had killed Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, the official spokesman of the Islamic State (IS) (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). Yemeni counterterrorism forces and coalition special forces had located him in a residential house and attempted to arrest him before he opened fire and was fatally wounded (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). The operation also detained a man with him and recovered an explosive belt, two laptops, two tablets, and five phones (South24; Long War Journal, September 1).
The raid killed more than IS's public spokesman. Yemeni jihadist sources and news outlets identify al-Ansari as Mithaq Thabit Haytham al-Hujayli, a Yemeni from Lahj who had simultaneously governed IS's Yemen province since 2020 under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (Sheba Intelligence; Jerusalem Post, September 1; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025). He had survived the destruction of the group's stronghold in Qayfa, al-Bayda, escaped to Marib with a small number of survivors, and rebuilt the province after much of its senior leadership was killed or captured (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, June 26, 2019; Yemen Agency Press, August 14, 2020; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023).
Al-Hujayli's dual role helps explain a larger dynamic. IS-Yemen had almost disappeared as a battlefield province, but Yemen had not disappeared from the IS's organization. Daniel Milton found that the branch's last recorded attack in al-Naba occurred in summer 2022, after 174 reported operations since summer 2018 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Instead, Yemen had become increasingly important to the group's media functions beyond the country. In February 2025, the UN Monitoring Team assessed that the weakened branch--then estimated at only 100-150 fighters--nevertheless retained an "experienced media and propaganda wing" and had played a role in advocating that IS's overall leader be located outside the Iraq-Syria theater (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025). A year later, the Monitoring Team reported that "key [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] ISIL media figures were in Yemen coordinating with ISIL-Somalia" and that the killing of one former core-media official had disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The province supplied IS's global spokesman, housed media-linked personnel, and remained tied to Somali-based financial and communication networks (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17-18, 2025; CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4). Al-Ansari's death therefore exposed a media role that attack statistics had largely concealed.
Yemen Becomes a Media Sanctuary
IS began looking to Yemen for media personnel before the province lost Qayfa. Sources familiar with IS-Yemen's internal communications say that as early as 2019, central leadership asked the province to nominate potential spokesmen and provide biographies and recordings of their sermons (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17-18, 2025). The request came as IS was losing its territorial center and senior leadership in Iraq and Syria. Founder and the first leader of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in October 2019, followed roughly a day later by then-spokesman Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir (Reuters, October 28, 2019). Yemen was therefore already being considered as a source of personnel for central media functions as pressure on the organization's core intensified.
That role survived the branch's military collapse. In August 2020, Houthi forces overran IS positions in Wald Rabi' and Qayfa, killing much of the remaining leadership and fighters (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 5, 2020; Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). Under al-Hujayli, IS-Yemen became smaller and less visible, with Yemeni sources describing a deliberate effort to rebuild away from the attrition of its earlier territorial presence.
The province nevertheless remained tied to the wider organization. IS central leaders appeared to direct the Somalia-based al-Karrar office to fund IS nodes in Yemen through the Umm al-Qura regional office, while UN reporting later highlighted Yemen's facilitation and financial links to al-Karrar across the Red Sea (United Nations Security Council, July 15, 2022; CTC Sentinel, September 2024). Yemen had lost territorial weight, but it retained access to funding, central structures, and inter-provincial networks--assets that gave it importance beyond its local attack tempo.
Al-Ansari Was More Than the Spokesman
Al-Hujayli combined religious credentials, security experience, and provincial leadership before becoming IS's global spokesman. He joined IS in 2015, served in IS-Yemen's Sharia apparatus, and later became deputy security official in Qayfa (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025; Okaz; South24, September 1). He had also studied Quranic recitation and held certifications in several readings (authors' interviews with one of al-Hujayli's relatives and other IS-Yemen members, March 2, 2024). An official 2018 release shows him delivering an Eid sermon in al-Bayda (Bayda, Islamic State, Wilayat al-Bayda, "Days of Thanks and Remembrance," 2018). After Qayfa collapsed, al-Hujayli emerged from the surviving leadership of a province weakened by internal divisions (Long War Journal, December 23, 2025). Sources say that despite the presence of older, more experienced candidates, he combined religious and security credentials with broader acceptance among competing elements, leading the central leadership to appoint him governor under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen members, April 15, 2023, and December 20, 2025).
In August 2023, the provincial governor became IS's global spokesman. After Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham captured Abu Umar al-Muhajir in Syria, al-Hujayli appeared as Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in an al-Furqan recording announcing the death of Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi and the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (Counter Extremism Project, August 3, 2023; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi; Middle East Forum, August 4, 2023; Enab Baladi, September 28, 2023; United Nations Security Council, January 31, 2024). In his February 21 address, al-Hujayli directed messaging toward multiple theaters (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He called for attacks against Syria's transitional government, praised attacks including New Orleans and Bondi Beach, and discussed IS campaigns in Somalia, Nigeria, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He also emphasized the importance of both official IS propaganda and unofficial supporter media while warning unofficial outlets not to depart from official ideology and guidance (Counter Extremism Project, February 23).
"Spokesman" therefore understates his position. Al-Hujayli simultaneously governed IS-Yemen and served as the organization's authorized global voice, directly linking a marginal battlefield province to a central IS media function (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17, 2025; authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025 and April 4; Counter Extremism Project, February 23; Sheba Intelligence, September 1).
Keeping Yemen Quiet
The province's post-Qayfa strategy helped create the environment in which that function could operate. One element was reducing confrontation with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). A member who carried communications between al-Hujayli and other leaders said he indicated that he did not want renewed fighting with AQAP (authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member, September 4, 2025). Internally, al-Hujayli continued to regard AQAP as an ideological enemy but argued that circumstances required suspending the confrontation (authors' interview with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025, and April 15, 2023). Indeed, there have been no reported clashes between IS-Yemen and AQAP since February 2020 despite continued hostile rhetoric (ACLED, December 14, 2020; April 6, 2023).
Finance also became less visible. Sources inside the province say IS-Yemen turned to kidnapping for ransom and conducted operations without claiming them publicly (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with Yemeni jihadist sources along with leaked IS-Yemen documents, April 17, 2023). NewsYemen linked the June 2022 kidnapping in Tarim of the son of a Hadrami businessman Abdullah al-Junayd, known as al-Maher, to IS and described the kidnapping as part of the branch's effort to find new revenue after severe financial losses (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022). Sources say proceeds from the ransom and other operations were used to repay debts and finance vehicles, explosives-related materials, and training (Yemen Agency Press, June 20, 2022; NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025).
Public reporting consequently captured only part of the province's activity. Milton noted that IS-Yemen's last recorded attack was in summer 2022 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Yet Yemeni sources describe continued financing, training, procurement, and organizational activity during that period (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025; United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). The province was fading from IS's public battlefield while becoming more useful behind its media front.
The Network Behind the Voice
Al-Hujayli was not the only media-linked figure operating from Yemen. Sources identify Khalid Ahmad Ali al-Ariqi, known as Abu Zaid al-Muhajir, as IS-Yemen's media official and link part of the organization's broader media activity to the province (information provided in 2022 by a jihadist security source; subsequently corroborated by authors' interviews with multiple IS-Yemen jihadist sources, September 4, 2025; Yemen News Now, October 5, 2025). Yemen also had an established media role: an IS image from al-Bayda shows al-Naba being produced locally, while an April 2020 IS-Yemen production addressed al-Qaeda's positions in Yemen, Afghanistan, Mali, and elsewhere, demonstrating propaganda activity beyond the local battlefield (Long War Journal, May 4, 2020).
Al-Ariqi was killed in an April 2025 airstrike in Ataq, Shabwa, which Yemeni security sources attribute to the United States (Yemen Window, April 3, 2025; authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025; Barran Press, April 12, 2025). The UN Monitoring Team later described an "Abu Zaid" killed that month as a former head of IS's core media office and a communications node between senior leader Abu Khadija and IS-Somalia, assessing that his death disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The alias and date correspond, although the UN report does not provide a full name.
The strike also exposed the infrastructure around the network. Hours later, security forces raided an apartment al-Ariqi had reportedly visited (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemeni security sources say U.S. counterterrorism personnel focused heavily on laptops, phones, and other electronics (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Another media- and communications-linked IS member, Humam Harhara, described by sources as involved in external communications and official media activity, reportedly tried to destroy equipment before he was killed, while another member was detained and surviving devices were seized (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemen's significance therefore extended beyond al-Ansari: the province contained media personnel, communications infrastructure, and inter-provincial links serving the wider IS network (CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4).
Al-Ansari's death may already be testing how much of that media system depended on Yemen. On September 13, Caleb Weiss, a researcher focused on jihadism in Africa and who tracks IS propaganda, observed that IS media output had become limited and sporadic and that al-Naba releases were appearing on a delayed schedule since al-Ansari's death (X/@caleb_weiss7, September 13). Al-Naba has not stopped publishing--Jihadology records issues 563 and 564 on September 3 and 10--but the broader output has become less regular (Jihadology, September 3; September 10).
Conclusion
Al-Ansari's death exposed IS-Yemen's trajectory after losing Qayfa. Its battlefield decline concealed another kind of importance: the province remained connected to central leadership and inter-provincial networks while hosting personnel who served IS's global media apparatus. UN reporting in 2025 and 2026 identified IS-Yemen as a media and propaganda hub linked to IS-Somalia and to the group's wider media apparatus (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). Al-Hujayli's simultaneous roles as provincial governor and global spokesman placed Yemen directly inside that system.
That concentration also helps explain renewed counterterrorism attention to IS personnel in Yemen. Yemeni security sources attribute the April 2025 Ataq strike that killed Abu Zaid to the United States, while follow-on operations reached communications personnel, electronic devices, and supporting infrastructure (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources April 12, 2025; authors' interviews with a defected IS-Yemen leader who also confirmed the information, October 4, 2025; subsequent corroboration by pro-IS channels). The September Say'un raid then reached al-Hujayli himself. The pattern suggests that IS-Yemen's value as a target increasingly lay not in its ability to hold territory or generate attacks, but in the central functions and personnel operating from the province.
The implications extend beyond Yemen. A province can become militarily marginal while remaining important to IS's global organization as central functions are dispersed across geographically distant branches. The limited and irregular media output observed after al-Ansari's death is too early to establish direct dependence, particularly because al-Naba has continued to appear, but it still indicates possible disruption within a system already shown to have significant personnel in Yemen. More broadly, the case shows the limits of judging an IS province primarily by attacks, manpower, or territorial control. Organizational importance may instead lie in functions such as media, communications, finance, or leadership support that serve the movement across theaters. IS-Yemen's attack tempo made it appear peripheral; its media role showed that it had become part of the infrastructure through which IS sustained a global organization and spoke to a global audience.
* * *
Dr. Sara Harmouch is the CEO of H9 Defense, a research and advisory consultancy specializing in national security, counterterrorism, geopolitical risk, threat assessments, and open-source intelligence (OSINT). A counterterrorism expert and national security researcher, she focuses on political violence, terrorism, militancy, armed groups, Islamist militant organizations, irregular warfare, non-state actor behavior, alliance dynamics, and the conditions under which militant groups shift from domestic to international violence.
Mohammad Bin Faisal is a journalist and researcher specializing in Islamist extremist groups, with a focus on the ideological and organizational dimensions of extremism and terrorism in Yemen, the Middle East, and East Africa.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/yemen-becomes-the-islamic-states-media-sanctuary/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor:
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Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support
Javad Heiran-Nia
Executive Summary:
* Security-minded figures within Iran's power structure will ensure Iran pursues the Look East policy and engages more forcefully with the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the conflict with the United States and Israel.
* The PRC's cautious wartime response has sparked serious debates over future relations with Beijing, as many in Tehran view it as prioritizing ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support Javad Heiran-Nia Executive Summary: * Security-minded figures within Iran's power structure will ensure Iran pursues the Look East policy and engages more forcefully with the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the conflict with the United States and Israel. * The PRC's cautious wartime response has sparked serious debates over future relations with Beijing, as many in Tehran view it as prioritizingties with Arab states and dialogue with the United States to protect energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.
* This debate has intensified reformist-conservative divisions and strengthened the influence of security institutions, which prefer operational independence over restrictive alliances.
-
Iran's Look East policy is rooted in the ideological ideals of the 1979 Revolution, which, with the slogan "Neither East Nor West," sought to establish an order independent of the two power blocs. Over time--and under sanctions and international isolation--this slogan gave way to practical convergence with Eastern powers, especially Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1]
Across different presidential periods, this policy has pursued varying objectives. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tenure, the Look East policy took on an ideological, confrontational tone toward the West. Under Hassan Rouhani's administration, this policy complemented engagement with the West and operated within the framework of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. Under Ebrahim Raisi's government and thereafter, however, Look East has transformed into an exclusive strategy and a substitute for engagement with the West, materialized through documents such as the 25-year agreement with the PRC and accession to organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Middle East Council, September 2023). [2] This approach, rather than being based purely on economic interests, reflects the security-oriented, conservative outlook emphasized by Iran's security and military institutions (Khayrion, June 6, 2024).
The security establishment has consistently emphasized that countries such as Russia and the PRC are Iran's strategic partners. With this argument, they condemn relations with the West and advocate placing exclusive emphasis on relations with Eastern partners, which, from their perspective, represent the new poles of the international system (Khamenei.ir, July 22, 2022).
The current conflict with the United States and Israel has led to the emergence of serious and important debates on future relations with the PRC. The core debate centers on the fact that the PRC has not provided direct military support to Iran during the conflict. Beijing's response has largely been limited to diplomatic calls for de-escalation and respect for national sovereignty, which many assessed as a "balanced" and "conservative" approach (Foreign Affairs, April 17). This has disappointed many in Iran and raised questions about the PRC's commitment and reliability as a strategic partner.
Iran's Perception of the Relationship with PRC
A serious theoretical debate has emerged in Iran over two divergent pathways for the future of cooperation with the PRC. Reformists believe Iran should follow the PRC's economic development model--one based on a productive economy, openness to the world, and attracting foreign investment. In this view, the PRC is an ideal partner for revitalizing Iran's economy and breaking out of isolation, but it should not be seen as Iran's strategic partner in future confrontation.
Many Iranian experts advocate for focusing on economic relations with the PRC. From this perspective, adopting a Cold War mindset and expecting military support from the PRC misreads Beijing's foreign policy. In their view, the PRC does not fundamentally subscribe to an international order based on military alliances (Tabnak, May 12). Accordingly, they argue that the PRC should not be criticized for its lack of military support for Iran, as its foreign policy focuses on mutual non-alignment and non-alliance. This principle means the PRC is not committed to entering a war if Iran is attacked (Tabnak, May 12).
Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi, Secretary of Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, argued that the PRC and Russia interact with the United States within the "great power management" model (Iran International, May 29). Therefore, the PRC and Russia have adopted a policy of positive neutrality toward the conflict--one that requires them to maintain a baseline of strategic relations with all countries involved. Russia and the PRC's decision to abstain from, rather than veto, UN Security Council Resolution 2817 condemning Iranian attacks against regional neighbors fits within this policy framework (UN Security Council, March 11).
In contrast, conservatives--and, at their forefront, military-security groups--are more inclined to expand relations with the PRC along the Russian model: strengthening military capability, relying on oil revenues, and confronting the West. One of the reasons for Iranian conservatives' opposition to relations with the West, particularly the United States, is the cultural impact such relations would have on Iranian society and, consequently, on their revolutionary slogans, leading to delegitimization and diminished acceptance of their revolutionary and ideological principles among the Iranian public (Middle East Institute, September 25, 2023).
Impact on the Domestic Balance of Power
Despite internally recognizing Beijing's lack of direct support, Iran is likely to continue its turn toward the PRC. Iran's military-security apparatus is the most significant variable in policymaking. Over 45 years, the security organizations have determined the "big game" of Iran's foreign policy to the detriment of successive presidential administrations. Presidents can engage in a "small game" of foreign policy maneuvers, provided they do not disrupt the overall power structure (Manara, February 21, 2022). Beijing's support for security-affiliated groups in Iran limits the pathway for reformists and moderates to gain power within Iran's power structure and further strengthens the IRGC's position within it. Accordingly, rather than relying on Iran's formal state institutions, the PRC is coordinating with IRGC-affiliated operational networks that control a substantial share of Iran's economy and security (Strategic Analysis Network, May 28).
Discussions have also emerged about fully implementing the two countries' 25-year strategic cooperation agreement. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described his visit to the PRC--the first visit by an Iranian official to the PRC since the start of the conflict--as one of the most significant trips in Iran's history (International Institute for Iranian Studies, May 17). During this visit, Araghchi emphasized Iran's trust in the PRC. This trust creates a favorable environment to pursue the objectives outlined in the 25-year agreement (Al Jazeera, May 6). This visit, rather than announcing a new position on the document, sought to redefine Iran's standing with the PRC after the war and secure trust for subsequent steps in implementing the agreement. This visit, therefore, should be seen as a prelude to more serious discussions on operationalizing 25-year cooperation in a post-conflict era.
Iran's approach frames ties with the PRC as part of a broader strategy to position itself in the emerging global order. The most significant indicator of this approach is the appointment of Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf--a prominent conservative figure and Speaker of Parliament--as Iran's special representative for PRC affairs. This appointment, proposed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and approved by Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, demonstrates unprecedented coordination among power institutions and the executive, legislative, and leadership branches in prioritizing relations with the PRC (Tasnimnews.ir, May 17).
Ali Larijani, the late Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, previously held this position and played a key role in signing the 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between Iran and the PRC (Fars News, May 17). Ghalibaf's appointment signals a determination to revive and implement this document. Beyond his parliamentary role, Ghalibaf is a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander and currently leads Iran's negotiating team with the United States. This tripartite role enables him to coordinate effectively across military, political, and economic systems and remove obstacles hindering cooperation with the PRC. By entrusting the PRC portfolio to Ghalibaf, Iran has effectively linked negotiations with Washington to cooperation with Beijing, using this as a lever to increase bargaining power against U.S. pressure.
These developments suggest that the 25-year Iran-PRC agreement--which envisions Chinese investment in infrastructure, oil, and military sectors in exchange for discounted oil--may be implemented more rapidly. Following de-escalation, therefore, the PRC could become the primary reconstructor of Iran's damaged infrastructure.
Conclusion
Iran's Look East approach has evolved from a purely economic strategy. Rooted in the country's strategic literature, Iran's approach rests on the belief that the U.S. unipolar order is declining and the world is moving toward multipolarity. Iran defines itself as an emerging power in this landscape and argues it needs "strategic alignment" with Eastern powers to consolidate its position. Sanctions and international isolation have made the PRC and Russia Tehran's only serious partners. From Iran's perspective, these collaborations can raise the costs of confrontation for Washington.
Iran's relations with the East are defined on a new model of cooperation without commitment. Many in Iran have recognized that the conflict has revealed the limitations of the PRC's support. The PRC and Russia have offered rhetorical and limited political support to Iran as a partner, but have not provided security guarantees or practical support. This approach, however, aligns fully with Iran's military-security institutions, which prefer operational independence over restrictive alliances. Iranian leaders have therefore concluded that these partnerships, despite any limitations, are the best and only available options for survival.
* * *
Javad Heiran-Nia, Ph.D., International Relations, Director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies, Tehran, Iran. He was the Current Affairs Analyst at Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/iran-to-deepen-prc-ties-despite-lack-of-military-support/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support
Javad Heiran-Nia
Executive Summary:
* Security-minded figures within Iran's power structure will ensure Iran pursues the Look East policy and engages more forcefully with the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the conflict with the United States and Israel.
* The PRC's cautious wartime response has sparked serious debates over future relations with Beijing, as many in Tehran view it as prioritizing ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Iran to Deepen PRC Ties Despite Lack of Military Support Javad Heiran-Nia Executive Summary: * Security-minded figures within Iran's power structure will ensure Iran pursues the Look East policy and engages more forcefully with the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the conflict with the United States and Israel. * The PRC's cautious wartime response has sparked serious debates over future relations with Beijing, as many in Tehran view it as prioritizingties with Arab states and dialogue with the United States to protect energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.
* This debate has intensified reformist-conservative divisions and strengthened the influence of security institutions, which prefer operational independence over restrictive alliances.
-
Iran's Look East policy is rooted in the ideological ideals of the 1979 Revolution, which, with the slogan "Neither East Nor West," sought to establish an order independent of the two power blocs. Over time--and under sanctions and international isolation--this slogan gave way to practical convergence with Eastern powers, especially Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1]
Across different presidential periods, this policy has pursued varying objectives. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tenure, the Look East policy took on an ideological, confrontational tone toward the West. Under Hassan Rouhani's administration, this policy complemented engagement with the West and operated within the framework of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement. Under Ebrahim Raisi's government and thereafter, however, Look East has transformed into an exclusive strategy and a substitute for engagement with the West, materialized through documents such as the 25-year agreement with the PRC and accession to organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (Middle East Council, September 2023). [2] This approach, rather than being based purely on economic interests, reflects the security-oriented, conservative outlook emphasized by Iran's security and military institutions (Khayrion, June 6, 2024).
The security establishment has consistently emphasized that countries such as Russia and the PRC are Iran's strategic partners. With this argument, they condemn relations with the West and advocate placing exclusive emphasis on relations with Eastern partners, which, from their perspective, represent the new poles of the international system (Khamenei.ir, July 22, 2022).
The current conflict with the United States and Israel has led to the emergence of serious and important debates on future relations with the PRC. The core debate centers on the fact that the PRC has not provided direct military support to Iran during the conflict. Beijing's response has largely been limited to diplomatic calls for de-escalation and respect for national sovereignty, which many assessed as a "balanced" and "conservative" approach (Foreign Affairs, April 17). This has disappointed many in Iran and raised questions about the PRC's commitment and reliability as a strategic partner.
Iran's Perception of the Relationship with PRC
A serious theoretical debate has emerged in Iran over two divergent pathways for the future of cooperation with the PRC. Reformists believe Iran should follow the PRC's economic development model--one based on a productive economy, openness to the world, and attracting foreign investment. In this view, the PRC is an ideal partner for revitalizing Iran's economy and breaking out of isolation, but it should not be seen as Iran's strategic partner in future confrontation.
Many Iranian experts advocate for focusing on economic relations with the PRC. From this perspective, adopting a Cold War mindset and expecting military support from the PRC misreads Beijing's foreign policy. In their view, the PRC does not fundamentally subscribe to an international order based on military alliances (Tabnak, May 12). Accordingly, they argue that the PRC should not be criticized for its lack of military support for Iran, as its foreign policy focuses on mutual non-alignment and non-alliance. This principle means the PRC is not committed to entering a war if Iran is attacked (Tabnak, May 12).
Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi, Secretary of Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, argued that the PRC and Russia interact with the United States within the "great power management" model (Iran International, May 29). Therefore, the PRC and Russia have adopted a policy of positive neutrality toward the conflict--one that requires them to maintain a baseline of strategic relations with all countries involved. Russia and the PRC's decision to abstain from, rather than veto, UN Security Council Resolution 2817 condemning Iranian attacks against regional neighbors fits within this policy framework (UN Security Council, March 11).
In contrast, conservatives--and, at their forefront, military-security groups--are more inclined to expand relations with the PRC along the Russian model: strengthening military capability, relying on oil revenues, and confronting the West. One of the reasons for Iranian conservatives' opposition to relations with the West, particularly the United States, is the cultural impact such relations would have on Iranian society and, consequently, on their revolutionary slogans, leading to delegitimization and diminished acceptance of their revolutionary and ideological principles among the Iranian public (Middle East Institute, September 25, 2023).
Impact on the Domestic Balance of Power
Despite internally recognizing Beijing's lack of direct support, Iran is likely to continue its turn toward the PRC. Iran's military-security apparatus is the most significant variable in policymaking. Over 45 years, the security organizations have determined the "big game" of Iran's foreign policy to the detriment of successive presidential administrations. Presidents can engage in a "small game" of foreign policy maneuvers, provided they do not disrupt the overall power structure (Manara, February 21, 2022). Beijing's support for security-affiliated groups in Iran limits the pathway for reformists and moderates to gain power within Iran's power structure and further strengthens the IRGC's position within it. Accordingly, rather than relying on Iran's formal state institutions, the PRC is coordinating with IRGC-affiliated operational networks that control a substantial share of Iran's economy and security (Strategic Analysis Network, May 28).
Discussions have also emerged about fully implementing the two countries' 25-year strategic cooperation agreement. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described his visit to the PRC--the first visit by an Iranian official to the PRC since the start of the conflict--as one of the most significant trips in Iran's history (International Institute for Iranian Studies, May 17). During this visit, Araghchi emphasized Iran's trust in the PRC. This trust creates a favorable environment to pursue the objectives outlined in the 25-year agreement (Al Jazeera, May 6). This visit, rather than announcing a new position on the document, sought to redefine Iran's standing with the PRC after the war and secure trust for subsequent steps in implementing the agreement. This visit, therefore, should be seen as a prelude to more serious discussions on operationalizing 25-year cooperation in a post-conflict era.
Iran's approach frames ties with the PRC as part of a broader strategy to position itself in the emerging global order. The most significant indicator of this approach is the appointment of Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf--a prominent conservative figure and Speaker of Parliament--as Iran's special representative for PRC affairs. This appointment, proposed by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and approved by Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, demonstrates unprecedented coordination among power institutions and the executive, legislative, and leadership branches in prioritizing relations with the PRC (Tasnimnews.ir, May 17).
Ali Larijani, the late Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, previously held this position and played a key role in signing the 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between Iran and the PRC (Fars News, May 17). Ghalibaf's appointment signals a determination to revive and implement this document. Beyond his parliamentary role, Ghalibaf is a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander and currently leads Iran's negotiating team with the United States. This tripartite role enables him to coordinate effectively across military, political, and economic systems and remove obstacles hindering cooperation with the PRC. By entrusting the PRC portfolio to Ghalibaf, Iran has effectively linked negotiations with Washington to cooperation with Beijing, using this as a lever to increase bargaining power against U.S. pressure.
These developments suggest that the 25-year Iran-PRC agreement--which envisions Chinese investment in infrastructure, oil, and military sectors in exchange for discounted oil--may be implemented more rapidly. Following de-escalation, therefore, the PRC could become the primary reconstructor of Iran's damaged infrastructure.
Conclusion
Iran's Look East approach has evolved from a purely economic strategy. Rooted in the country's strategic literature, Iran's approach rests on the belief that the U.S. unipolar order is declining and the world is moving toward multipolarity. Iran defines itself as an emerging power in this landscape and argues it needs "strategic alignment" with Eastern powers to consolidate its position. Sanctions and international isolation have made the PRC and Russia Tehran's only serious partners. From Iran's perspective, these collaborations can raise the costs of confrontation for Washington.
Iran's relations with the East are defined on a new model of cooperation without commitment. Many in Iran have recognized that the conflict has revealed the limitations of the PRC's support. The PRC and Russia have offered rhetorical and limited political support to Iran as a partner, but have not provided security guarantees or practical support. This approach, however, aligns fully with Iran's military-security institutions, which prefer operational independence over restrictive alliances. Iranian leaders have therefore concluded that these partnerships, despite any limitations, are the best and only available options for survival.
* * *
Javad Heiran-Nia, Ph.D., International Relations, Director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies, Tehran, Iran. He was the Current Affairs Analyst at Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/iran-to-deepen-prc-ties-despite-lack-of-military-support/
[Category: ThinkTank]
ICTD Researchers at Africa's Largest Tax Research Gathering, Rwanda
BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 10 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news:
* * *
ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda
Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month.
Hosted by the ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 10 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news: * * * ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month. Hosted by theAfrican Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) under the theme Contemporary Taxation Issues in Africa, this year's Congress, co-hosted with the Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA), focused on critical issues facing revenue services today including digitalisation and artificial intelligence (AI), tax incentives and expenditure governance, international tax cooperation, and environmental taxation.
Strengthening African tax research capacity
Participation in the ATRN Congress reflects ICTD's long-standing commitment to strengthening tax research capacity in Africa, and its partnership with ATAF has been a key part of that.
In an interview with ATAF during the three-day event, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni highlighted the important role ATRN has played in expanding both the quantity and quality of tax research produced in Africa.
"Up to a decade ago, about the time when the ATRN was established, there were very few studies on taxation in African countries. So, when African governments had to take decisions, oftentimes they would resort to evidence from elsewhere, from high-income countries ... and obviously that doesn't always translate," she said.
Mascagni added: "Having that context-specific research has been incredibly important. Having a platform ... for researchers to talk about it, improve the quality, receive feedback, and to sensitise policymakers to the importance of research - all of that has been invaluable, and it's exactly the platform that the ATRN provides."
Exploring AI and the future of tax administration
ICTD Senior Research Fellow Fabrizio Santoro participated in a plenary session examining opportunities and challenges presented by AI and automation in African tax administrations. The discussion explored how AI is increasingly being used for a range of administrative functions, such as taxpayer risk profiling and compliance management, while also raising important questions around governance, transparency, taxpayer rights, and institutional capacity.
Drawing on ICTD's ongoing research programme on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and Tax, Santoro joined representatives from ATAF, the Rwanda Revenue Authority, the South African Revenue Service, and academia to discuss how African revenue authorities can harness new technologies while ensuring their adoption remains effective, accountable, and responsive to local contexts.
Three panellists seated on stage with green background at ATRN 2026. Middle person is Fabrizio Santoro, ICTD.
Courtesy of ATAF
Later that day, Santoro also presented his research paper, 'Tax Implications of Cashless Payments: Micro Evidence from African Counties', co-authored with ICTD Research Affiliate Lucia Rossel, which examines how the growing use of digital payment systems may affect tax administration and revenue mobilisation across the continent.
Advancing debate on tax incentives and expenditure reform
The next day, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni delivered a presentation during the plenary session on 'Tax Incentives and Expenditure: From Fiscal Drain to Strategic Governance'. The session examined how African governments can strengthen oversight and management of tax expenditures, improve transparency, and ensure that tax incentives better support development objectives.
Seven panellists seated on stage with green background showing ATAF logo and title of the session. The audience is also visible. Photo taken at ATRN 2026.
Courtesy of RRA
Mascagni's contribution drew on the work emerging from the Coalition on Tax Expenditure Reform (COATE), which ICTD helped establish following the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in 2025.
The discussion addressed growing concerns about the scale of revenue foregone through poorly monitored tax incentives, as well as the new opportunities created by global efforts to strengthen tax expenditure reporting and reform.
Building capacity on environmental taxation
Finally, ICTD Senior Research Fellow Giovanni Occhiali facilitated a masterclass on environmental taxation in lower-income countries (see ICTD's work on climate and environmental taxation). The session explored the role of environmental taxes and incentives, alongside the institutional considerations that shape their design and implementation.
The masterclass reflected growing interest among policymakers and researchers in how fiscal instruments can support climate and environmental objectives while remaining feasible within lower-income country contexts.
Strengthening African tax research and policy dialogue
The 11th ATRN Congress took place at a time when African governments face mounting pressure to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation amidst declining development assistance, evolving international tax rules, and rapid technological change. It presents a unique opportunity for researchers to present their work to an audience of decision-makers in ministries of finance, tax administrations and civil society organisations, as well as to academic researchers and tax practitioners. Throughout the three-day event, participants examined how research can help bridge the gap between knowledge and policymaking while supporting more effective and equitable tax systems across the continent.
9 October 2026
* * *
Original text here: https://ictd.ac/general/ictd-researchers-at-africas-largest-tax-research-gathering-rwanda/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda
Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month.
Hosted by the ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 10 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news: * * * ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month. Hosted by theAfrican Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) under the theme Contemporary Taxation Issues in Africa, this year's Congress, co-hosted with the Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA), focused on critical issues facing revenue services today including digitalisation and artificial intelligence (AI), tax incentives and expenditure governance, international tax cooperation, and environmental taxation.
Strengthening African tax research capacity
Participation in the ATRN Congress reflects ICTD's long-standing commitment to strengthening tax research capacity in Africa, and its partnership with ATAF has been a key part of that.
In an interview with ATAF during the three-day event, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni highlighted the important role ATRN has played in expanding both the quantity and quality of tax research produced in Africa.
"Up to a decade ago, about the time when the ATRN was established, there were very few studies on taxation in African countries. So, when African governments had to take decisions, oftentimes they would resort to evidence from elsewhere, from high-income countries ... and obviously that doesn't always translate," she said.
Mascagni added: "Having that context-specific research has been incredibly important. Having a platform ... for researchers to talk about it, improve the quality, receive feedback, and to sensitise policymakers to the importance of research - all of that has been invaluable, and it's exactly the platform that the ATRN provides."
Exploring AI and the future of tax administration
ICTD Senior Research Fellow Fabrizio Santoro participated in a plenary session examining opportunities and challenges presented by AI and automation in African tax administrations. The discussion explored how AI is increasingly being used for a range of administrative functions, such as taxpayer risk profiling and compliance management, while also raising important questions around governance, transparency, taxpayer rights, and institutional capacity.
Drawing on ICTD's ongoing research programme on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and Tax, Santoro joined representatives from ATAF, the Rwanda Revenue Authority, the South African Revenue Service, and academia to discuss how African revenue authorities can harness new technologies while ensuring their adoption remains effective, accountable, and responsive to local contexts.
Three panellists seated on stage with green background at ATRN 2026. Middle person is Fabrizio Santoro, ICTD.
Courtesy of ATAF
Later that day, Santoro also presented his research paper, 'Tax Implications of Cashless Payments: Micro Evidence from African Counties', co-authored with ICTD Research Affiliate Lucia Rossel, which examines how the growing use of digital payment systems may affect tax administration and revenue mobilisation across the continent.
Advancing debate on tax incentives and expenditure reform
The next day, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni delivered a presentation during the plenary session on 'Tax Incentives and Expenditure: From Fiscal Drain to Strategic Governance'. The session examined how African governments can strengthen oversight and management of tax expenditures, improve transparency, and ensure that tax incentives better support development objectives.
Seven panellists seated on stage with green background showing ATAF logo and title of the session. The audience is also visible. Photo taken at ATRN 2026.
Courtesy of RRA
Mascagni's contribution drew on the work emerging from the Coalition on Tax Expenditure Reform (COATE), which ICTD helped establish following the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in 2025.
The discussion addressed growing concerns about the scale of revenue foregone through poorly monitored tax incentives, as well as the new opportunities created by global efforts to strengthen tax expenditure reporting and reform.
Building capacity on environmental taxation
Finally, ICTD Senior Research Fellow Giovanni Occhiali facilitated a masterclass on environmental taxation in lower-income countries (see ICTD's work on climate and environmental taxation). The session explored the role of environmental taxes and incentives, alongside the institutional considerations that shape their design and implementation.
The masterclass reflected growing interest among policymakers and researchers in how fiscal instruments can support climate and environmental objectives while remaining feasible within lower-income country contexts.
Strengthening African tax research and policy dialogue
The 11th ATRN Congress took place at a time when African governments face mounting pressure to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation amidst declining development assistance, evolving international tax rules, and rapid technological change. It presents a unique opportunity for researchers to present their work to an audience of decision-makers in ministries of finance, tax administrations and civil society organisations, as well as to academic researchers and tax practitioners. Throughout the three-day event, participants examined how research can help bridge the gap between knowledge and policymaking while supporting more effective and equitable tax systems across the continent.
9 October 2026
* * *
Original text here: https://ictd.ac/general/ictd-researchers-at-africas-largest-tax-research-gathering-rwanda/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: After $430k Bill, Taxpayers Still in the Dark on Walz's Second Hearing Prep Cost
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
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After $430k bill, taxpayers still in the dark on Walz's second hearing prep cost
Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026
Remember last year, when taxpayers got stuck with a $430,000 legal bill to prepare Gov. Tim Walz for a single congressional hearing? His administration hired outside lawyers to prepare him for a June 12, 2025 hearing. The public didn't learn what the preparation cost until after ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * After $430k bill, taxpayers still in the dark on Walz's second hearing prep cost Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026 Remember last year, when taxpayers got stuck with a $430,000 legal bill to prepare Gov. Tim Walz for a single congressional hearing? His administration hired outside lawyers to prepare him for a June 12, 2025 hearing. The public didn't learn what the preparation cost until afterthe press dug into the records. American Experiment awarded the governor's legal bill the 2025 Golden Turkey Award last fall after 53 percent of voters chose it.
Now taxpayers -- who could once again foot the bill -- are waiting to find out how much Walz's second hearing prep cost.
On March 4, 2026, Walz and Attorney General Keith Ellison returned to Washington to answer questions from the U.S. House Oversight Committee about fraud in Minnesota's state programs. That same day, the committee released an interim staff report saying senior Minnesota officials -- including Walz and Ellison -- had known for years about widespread fraud involving federally funded social services programs.
According to Axios, the administration again hired K&L Gates to prepare Walz for the hearing. The news outlet filed a public records request for the invoices the next day, March 5.
More than seven months later, taxpayers still don't know the price tag. Walz's office told Axios in early September that it expected to respond to the request "within the next few weeks." As of this writing (Oct. 8), the bill remains undisclosed.
The administration says it has been overwhelmed by public records requests since Operation Metro Surge. It also says it has produced three times as much data this year as it did last year.
But getting records out of this administration has been "extremely slow and cumbersome" since Walz took office in 2019 and pledged to prioritize transparency, according to Matt Ehling, president of The Forum for Constitutional Rights.
Without timely access to public records, Ehling told Axios, "government can continue to do whatever it is doing without the public really understanding what's happening until it's too late."
Minnesota's open records law only requires requests to be handled in an "appropriate and prompt manner" and doesn't set a firm deadline. That "flexibility" has turned into months or even years of journalists and others waiting for records, points out Axios.
American Experiment had to sue the Minnesota Department of Education to get a straightforward data request processed. And when the Minnesota State Board of Investment finally responded to an American Experiment request six months later, the response still didn't include all of the requested numbers.
A $430,000 bill to prepare a former 12-year congressman for a hearing was not a good look for the Walz administration. The silence so far about the next bill isn't helping its transparency record.
Maybe the invoice will turn up in time for this year's Golden Turkey voting.
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Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment. catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/after-430k-bill-taxpayers-still-in-the-dark-on-walzs-second-hearing-prep-cost/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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After $430k bill, taxpayers still in the dark on Walz's second hearing prep cost
Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026
Remember last year, when taxpayers got stuck with a $430,000 legal bill to prepare Gov. Tim Walz for a single congressional hearing? His administration hired outside lawyers to prepare him for a June 12, 2025 hearing. The public didn't learn what the preparation cost until after ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * After $430k bill, taxpayers still in the dark on Walz's second hearing prep cost Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026 Remember last year, when taxpayers got stuck with a $430,000 legal bill to prepare Gov. Tim Walz for a single congressional hearing? His administration hired outside lawyers to prepare him for a June 12, 2025 hearing. The public didn't learn what the preparation cost until afterthe press dug into the records. American Experiment awarded the governor's legal bill the 2025 Golden Turkey Award last fall after 53 percent of voters chose it.
Now taxpayers -- who could once again foot the bill -- are waiting to find out how much Walz's second hearing prep cost.
On March 4, 2026, Walz and Attorney General Keith Ellison returned to Washington to answer questions from the U.S. House Oversight Committee about fraud in Minnesota's state programs. That same day, the committee released an interim staff report saying senior Minnesota officials -- including Walz and Ellison -- had known for years about widespread fraud involving federally funded social services programs.
According to Axios, the administration again hired K&L Gates to prepare Walz for the hearing. The news outlet filed a public records request for the invoices the next day, March 5.
More than seven months later, taxpayers still don't know the price tag. Walz's office told Axios in early September that it expected to respond to the request "within the next few weeks." As of this writing (Oct. 8), the bill remains undisclosed.
The administration says it has been overwhelmed by public records requests since Operation Metro Surge. It also says it has produced three times as much data this year as it did last year.
But getting records out of this administration has been "extremely slow and cumbersome" since Walz took office in 2019 and pledged to prioritize transparency, according to Matt Ehling, president of The Forum for Constitutional Rights.
Without timely access to public records, Ehling told Axios, "government can continue to do whatever it is doing without the public really understanding what's happening until it's too late."
Minnesota's open records law only requires requests to be handled in an "appropriate and prompt manner" and doesn't set a firm deadline. That "flexibility" has turned into months or even years of journalists and others waiting for records, points out Axios.
American Experiment had to sue the Minnesota Department of Education to get a straightforward data request processed. And when the Minnesota State Board of Investment finally responded to an American Experiment request six months later, the response still didn't include all of the requested numbers.
A $430,000 bill to prepare a former 12-year congressman for a hearing was not a good look for the Walz administration. The silence so far about the next bill isn't helping its transparency record.
Maybe the invoice will turn up in time for this year's Golden Turkey voting.
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Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment. catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/after-430k-bill-taxpayers-still-in-the-dark-on-walzs-second-hearing-prep-cost/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: 16 Minnesota School Districts Face Legal Challenge Over Sexual Identity Policies
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
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16 Minnesota school districts face legal challenge over sexual identity policies
Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026
The Upper Midwest Law Center (UMLC), a local public interest law firm, recently sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights requesting an investigation -- and enforcement action, if necessary -- into 16 Minnesota school districts over alleged Title ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * 16 Minnesota school districts face legal challenge over sexual identity policies Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026 The Upper Midwest Law Center (UMLC), a local public interest law firm, recently sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights requesting an investigation -- and enforcement action, if necessary -- into 16 Minnesota school districts over alleged TitleIX violations.
The September letter argues that the districts' sexual identity policies violate Title IX, the U.S. Constitution, and federal executive orders.
According to UMLC, the firm also sent letters to the 16 districts and the Minnesota State High School League (MSHSL), alleging that they were likely violating the same provisions.
- The letters target policies that UMLC says allow boys to participate in girls' sports, use girls' restrooms and locker rooms, and share overnight accommodations with girls based on their stated sexual identity preference. UMLC also argues that several districts allow or require schools to socially transition students through name and pronoun changes without parental notice or consent.
The 16 school districts named by UMLC, and links to the policies challenged by the law firm, are provided below.
* Anoka-Hennepin School District
* Bloomington Public Schools
* Burnsville-Eagan-Savage School District
* Duluth Public Schools
* Hopkins Public Schools
* Minneapolis Public Schools
* Moorhead Area Public Schools
* North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale School District
* Osseo Area Schools
* Richfield Public Schools
* Robbinsdale Public Schools
* Rochester Public Schools
* Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public Schools
* St. Louis Park Public Schools
* St. Paul Public Schools
* White Bear Lake Area School District
State and federal conflict
In February 2025, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sent a letter to the MSHSL stating that adherence to federal executive orders on the issue would "violate" the Minnesota Human Rights Act. His position implied that the league should continue allowing biological males to participate in girls' sports. UMLC argues Ellison's position "is contrary to federal law, has created confusion for school districts, and makes federal enforcement action more urgent."
Ellison also sued the Trump administration in spring 2025 over its interpretation of Title IX. A federal judge rejected most of the claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Tenth Amendment.
In spring 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Education and MSHSL, alleging that the two organizations "have engaged in sex-based discrimination by requiring girls to compete against boys in athletic competitions that are designated exclusively for girls and allowing boys to invade intimate spaces designated exclusively for girls, such as multi-person locker rooms and bathrooms."
According to the DOJ, the policies undermine the very protections Title IX was enacted to guarantee. The lawsuit is still pending.
Efforts to change MSHSL sports policy
The timing of UMLC's letters coincides with a grassroots effort called Make It Fair MN, which is focused primarily on sports participation. The group is informing Minnesota schools that they can change sports policy "without waiting for another legislative session, another election, or years of additional litigation."
The MSHSL has allowed transgender students to participate on sports teams consistent with their gender identity since 2014, when its board adopted the policy. Make It Fair MN contends that the policy was adopted by the MSHSL board rather than through a vote of the League's member schools. Under MSHSL's constitution, each of the 509 member schools can propose and vote on bylaw amendments through their two appointed representatives.
Make It Fair MN has circulated a proposed amendment that would define eligibility for sex-separated sports based on biological sex at birth. The change, according to Make It Fair MN, could also address issues raised in the DOJ lawsuit.
The amendment's success depends on action by MSHSL member schools and their representatives. Make It Fair MN says changing the policy would restore "equal protection and fair competition" in Minnesota school sports.
UMLC is also looking for potential plaintiffs affected by the policies. Anyone with information about the policies or who believes they may be affected can contact UMLC at legal@umlc.org.
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Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment. catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/16-minnesota-school-districts-face-legal-challenge-over-sexual-identity-policies/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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16 Minnesota school districts face legal challenge over sexual identity policies
Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026
The Upper Midwest Law Center (UMLC), a local public interest law firm, recently sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights requesting an investigation -- and enforcement action, if necessary -- into 16 Minnesota school districts over alleged Title ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * 16 Minnesota school districts face legal challenge over sexual identity policies Written by Catrin Wigfall | October 8, 2026 The Upper Midwest Law Center (UMLC), a local public interest law firm, recently sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights requesting an investigation -- and enforcement action, if necessary -- into 16 Minnesota school districts over alleged TitleIX violations.
The September letter argues that the districts' sexual identity policies violate Title IX, the U.S. Constitution, and federal executive orders.
According to UMLC, the firm also sent letters to the 16 districts and the Minnesota State High School League (MSHSL), alleging that they were likely violating the same provisions.
- The letters target policies that UMLC says allow boys to participate in girls' sports, use girls' restrooms and locker rooms, and share overnight accommodations with girls based on their stated sexual identity preference. UMLC also argues that several districts allow or require schools to socially transition students through name and pronoun changes without parental notice or consent.
The 16 school districts named by UMLC, and links to the policies challenged by the law firm, are provided below.
* Anoka-Hennepin School District
* Bloomington Public Schools
* Burnsville-Eagan-Savage School District
* Duluth Public Schools
* Hopkins Public Schools
* Minneapolis Public Schools
* Moorhead Area Public Schools
* North St. Paul-Maplewood-Oakdale School District
* Osseo Area Schools
* Richfield Public Schools
* Robbinsdale Public Schools
* Rochester Public Schools
* Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public Schools
* St. Louis Park Public Schools
* St. Paul Public Schools
* White Bear Lake Area School District
State and federal conflict
In February 2025, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sent a letter to the MSHSL stating that adherence to federal executive orders on the issue would "violate" the Minnesota Human Rights Act. His position implied that the league should continue allowing biological males to participate in girls' sports. UMLC argues Ellison's position "is contrary to federal law, has created confusion for school districts, and makes federal enforcement action more urgent."
Ellison also sued the Trump administration in spring 2025 over its interpretation of Title IX. A federal judge rejected most of the claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Tenth Amendment.
In spring 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Education and MSHSL, alleging that the two organizations "have engaged in sex-based discrimination by requiring girls to compete against boys in athletic competitions that are designated exclusively for girls and allowing boys to invade intimate spaces designated exclusively for girls, such as multi-person locker rooms and bathrooms."
According to the DOJ, the policies undermine the very protections Title IX was enacted to guarantee. The lawsuit is still pending.
Efforts to change MSHSL sports policy
The timing of UMLC's letters coincides with a grassroots effort called Make It Fair MN, which is focused primarily on sports participation. The group is informing Minnesota schools that they can change sports policy "without waiting for another legislative session, another election, or years of additional litigation."
The MSHSL has allowed transgender students to participate on sports teams consistent with their gender identity since 2014, when its board adopted the policy. Make It Fair MN contends that the policy was adopted by the MSHSL board rather than through a vote of the League's member schools. Under MSHSL's constitution, each of the 509 member schools can propose and vote on bylaw amendments through their two appointed representatives.
Make It Fair MN has circulated a proposed amendment that would define eligibility for sex-separated sports based on biological sex at birth. The change, according to Make It Fair MN, could also address issues raised in the DOJ lawsuit.
The amendment's success depends on action by MSHSL member schools and their representatives. Make It Fair MN says changing the policy would restore "equal protection and fair competition" in Minnesota school sports.
UMLC is also looking for potential plaintiffs affected by the policies. Anyone with information about the policies or who believes they may be affected can contact UMLC at legal@umlc.org.
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Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment. catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/16-minnesota-school-districts-face-legal-challenge-over-sexual-identity-policies/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: "Emerging Adult" Charged in Eden Prairie High School Shooting
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
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"Emerging adult" charged in Eden Prairie High School shooting
Written by David Zimmer | October 9, 2026
Charges
The Hennepin County Attorney's Office (HCAO) filed charges today against Adam Abdihakeem Adam, 18, of St. Louis Park for the shooting at the Eden Prairie High School homecoming football game one week ago today.
Reports indicated that police arrested Adam yesterday while driving in Minneapolis, ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * "Emerging adult" charged in Eden Prairie High School shooting Written by David Zimmer | October 9, 2026 Charges The Hennepin County Attorney's Office (HCAO) filed charges today against Adam Abdihakeem Adam, 18, of St. Louis Park for the shooting at the Eden Prairie High School homecoming football game one week ago today. Reports indicated that police arrested Adam yesterday while driving in Minneapolis,and that Adam was booked into the Hennepin County Jail for probable cause 2nd degree assault.
The formal charges that were filed this afternoon included two 2nd degree assault counts and a third count of Riot in the 2nd degree. There were no charges related to gang involvement at this point.
Adam is now held on $100,000 bail and has been given a first appearance court date for Monday October 12th.
The affidavit that supported the charges was scant on details but describes Adam driving a car that belonged to his older brother when he pulled into the Eden Prairie High School parking lot next to a fight involving about ten people.
Surveillance video shows Adam get out of the driver's seat of the car and fire a handgun toward those fighting. Two victims, who were described earlier as 17 and 18-year-old Somali males from St Paul, were struck but are expected to survive their injuries.
Police recovered one fired casing from the scene. Adam's phone records tracked him and the car he was driving to and from the scene, after which Adam disposed of his phone.
Police searched Adam's home and recovered clothing that matches the clothing he wore during the shooting.
There is no indication in the complaint about whether any firearms have been recovered or if there are other people being sought in connection with the shooting.
Emerging Adult
Hennepin County Attorney Mary Moriarty has previously spoken of young adults under the age of 25 as being "emerging adults" who have less culpability for their actions due to their on-going brain development.
Moriarty's representative, Morgan Kunz, spoke at the Edina community meeting earlier this week and explained that the HCAO's approach to any potential charges in this incident would emphasize "proportionality." According to Kunz the HCAO would seek to be "firm and fair" and would not necessarily seek the largest possible sentence, as that approach can "destabilize families and communities."
"Proportionality"
Note - Adam intentionally fired a handgun at a group of people in a busy parking lot of a high school, striking two. He could have easily killed several, and his actions have led to significant actions being taken to try and quell a troubling number of retaliatory shootings taking place among young Somali males.
Adam was charged with two counts of 2nd degree assault (as well as a lesser count of "riot") and held on $100,000 bail.
Earlier this year an ICE agent brandished his firearm during an incident on a freeway during which he believed he was being boxed in by a protestor. The agent did not shoot the firearm or injure anyone during the incident. When a State Trooper interviewed him, the agent fully cooperated and gave a statement about what led to the incident.
Morgan Kunz charged that ICE agent with two counts of 2nd degree assault and held him on $100,000 bail.
Proportionality in action.
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David Zimmer is a Public Safety Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment. David.Zimmer@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/emerging-adult-charged-in-eden-prairie-high-school-shooting/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
"Emerging adult" charged in Eden Prairie High School shooting
Written by David Zimmer | October 9, 2026
Charges
The Hennepin County Attorney's Office (HCAO) filed charges today against Adam Abdihakeem Adam, 18, of St. Louis Park for the shooting at the Eden Prairie High School homecoming football game one week ago today.
Reports indicated that police arrested Adam yesterday while driving in Minneapolis, ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * "Emerging adult" charged in Eden Prairie High School shooting Written by David Zimmer | October 9, 2026 Charges The Hennepin County Attorney's Office (HCAO) filed charges today against Adam Abdihakeem Adam, 18, of St. Louis Park for the shooting at the Eden Prairie High School homecoming football game one week ago today. Reports indicated that police arrested Adam yesterday while driving in Minneapolis,and that Adam was booked into the Hennepin County Jail for probable cause 2nd degree assault.
The formal charges that were filed this afternoon included two 2nd degree assault counts and a third count of Riot in the 2nd degree. There were no charges related to gang involvement at this point.
Adam is now held on $100,000 bail and has been given a first appearance court date for Monday October 12th.
The affidavit that supported the charges was scant on details but describes Adam driving a car that belonged to his older brother when he pulled into the Eden Prairie High School parking lot next to a fight involving about ten people.
Surveillance video shows Adam get out of the driver's seat of the car and fire a handgun toward those fighting. Two victims, who were described earlier as 17 and 18-year-old Somali males from St Paul, were struck but are expected to survive their injuries.
Police recovered one fired casing from the scene. Adam's phone records tracked him and the car he was driving to and from the scene, after which Adam disposed of his phone.
Police searched Adam's home and recovered clothing that matches the clothing he wore during the shooting.
There is no indication in the complaint about whether any firearms have been recovered or if there are other people being sought in connection with the shooting.
Emerging Adult
Hennepin County Attorney Mary Moriarty has previously spoken of young adults under the age of 25 as being "emerging adults" who have less culpability for their actions due to their on-going brain development.
Moriarty's representative, Morgan Kunz, spoke at the Edina community meeting earlier this week and explained that the HCAO's approach to any potential charges in this incident would emphasize "proportionality." According to Kunz the HCAO would seek to be "firm and fair" and would not necessarily seek the largest possible sentence, as that approach can "destabilize families and communities."
"Proportionality"
Note - Adam intentionally fired a handgun at a group of people in a busy parking lot of a high school, striking two. He could have easily killed several, and his actions have led to significant actions being taken to try and quell a troubling number of retaliatory shootings taking place among young Somali males.
Adam was charged with two counts of 2nd degree assault (as well as a lesser count of "riot") and held on $100,000 bail.
Earlier this year an ICE agent brandished his firearm during an incident on a freeway during which he believed he was being boxed in by a protestor. The agent did not shoot the firearm or injure anyone during the incident. When a State Trooper interviewed him, the agent fully cooperated and gave a statement about what led to the incident.
Morgan Kunz charged that ICE agent with two counts of 2nd degree assault and held him on $100,000 bail.
Proportionality in action.
* * *
David Zimmer is a Public Safety Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment. David.Zimmer@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/emerging-adult-charged-in-eden-prairie-high-school-shooting/
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Statement on Brazil's Presidential Election
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:
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AFPI Statement on Brazil's Presidential Election
October 9, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement following the first round of Brazil's presidential election:
"Brazil's election is the latest sign of a major political shift taking place across our hemisphere," said Chad Wolf, Chair of AFPI's Homeland Security & Immigration Policy and Chair of the Western Hemisphere Initiative. "Across eight presidential elections since President Trump ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * AFPI Statement on Brazil's Presidential Election October 9, 2026 WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement following the first round of Brazil's presidential election: "Brazil's election is the latest sign of a major political shift taking place across our hemisphere," said Chad Wolf, Chair of AFPI's Homeland Security & Immigration Policy and Chair of the Western Hemisphere Initiative. "Across eight presidential elections since President Trumpreturned to office, voters in Latin America are increasingly turning toward leaders who support stronger security, economic freedom, and closer ties with the United States."
The AFPI Western Hemisphere Initiative starts with the premise that the safety of the U.S. depends on the stability of our neighbors. As the largest country and economy in Latin America, Brazil will continue to play a big role in determining the direction of the Western Hemisphere. A stronger U.S.-Brazil partnership could strengthen cooperation against narcotrafficking and transnational criminal organizations, counter growing Chinese influence, expand trade and investment, and bring one of the region's most important powers more closely into the U.S.-led security architecture being built across the Americas.
First round voting results show a strong showing for Brazil's political right, which indicates a growing importance of public security and organized crime in political debates across Latin America. Proposals to take a tougher approach toward criminal organizations, expand regional counternarcotics cooperation, and deepen security partnerships with the United States are increasingly part of the conversation throughout the hemisphere.
AFPI commends the Brazilian people for their participation in the democratic process and looks forward to working with Brazil following the conclusion of the presidential election.
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Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-statement-on-brazils-presidential-election/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
AFPI Statement on Brazil's Presidential Election
October 9, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement following the first round of Brazil's presidential election:
"Brazil's election is the latest sign of a major political shift taking place across our hemisphere," said Chad Wolf, Chair of AFPI's Homeland Security & Immigration Policy and Chair of the Western Hemisphere Initiative. "Across eight presidential elections since President Trump ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * AFPI Statement on Brazil's Presidential Election October 9, 2026 WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement following the first round of Brazil's presidential election: "Brazil's election is the latest sign of a major political shift taking place across our hemisphere," said Chad Wolf, Chair of AFPI's Homeland Security & Immigration Policy and Chair of the Western Hemisphere Initiative. "Across eight presidential elections since President Trumpreturned to office, voters in Latin America are increasingly turning toward leaders who support stronger security, economic freedom, and closer ties with the United States."
The AFPI Western Hemisphere Initiative starts with the premise that the safety of the U.S. depends on the stability of our neighbors. As the largest country and economy in Latin America, Brazil will continue to play a big role in determining the direction of the Western Hemisphere. A stronger U.S.-Brazil partnership could strengthen cooperation against narcotrafficking and transnational criminal organizations, counter growing Chinese influence, expand trade and investment, and bring one of the region's most important powers more closely into the U.S.-led security architecture being built across the Americas.
First round voting results show a strong showing for Brazil's political right, which indicates a growing importance of public security and organized crime in political debates across Latin America. Proposals to take a tougher approach toward criminal organizations, expand regional counternarcotics cooperation, and deepen security partnerships with the United States are increasingly part of the conversation throughout the hemisphere.
AFPI commends the Brazilian people for their participation in the democratic process and looks forward to working with Brazil following the conclusion of the presidential election.
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Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-statement-on-brazils-presidential-election/
[Category: ThinkTank]