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Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Russia Uses Controlled Pressure on Armenia Following Elections
WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 21, 2026, by Vali Kaleji, an expert on Central Asia and Caucasian studies in Tehran, Iran, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Russia Uses Controlled Pressure on Armenia Following Elections
Executive Summary:
* Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited Russia for the first time since winning Armenia's June 7 parliamentary elections on July 6. High-level Russian officials, however, have not recognized Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's parliamentary election victory while criticizing Armenia's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 21, 2026, by Vali Kaleji, an expert on Central Asia and Caucasian studies in Tehran, Iran, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Uses Controlled Pressure on Armenia Following Elections Executive Summary: * Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited Russia for the first time since winning Armenia's June 7 parliamentary elections on July 6. High-level Russian officials, however, have not recognized Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's parliamentary election victory while criticizing Armenia'selections.
* Yerevan's continued pursuit of peace with Baku, normalization with Turkiye, and closer ties with the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States could erode Russia's remaining military, political, and economic leverage in the region.
* Moscow is likely to rely on controlled political, media, and economic pressure--including energy leverage and support for opposition forces--rather than broad sanctions on Armenia, seeking to preserve influence while discouraging Armenia's further integration with the West.
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Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan made his first visit to Russia following the country's June 7 parliamentary elections on July 6 (Prime Minister of Armenia, July 6). In addition to attending the plenary session of the INNOPROM 2026 International Industrial Exhibition in Yekaterinburg, he met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin (Prime Minister of Armenia; The Moscow Times, July 6). The visit comes after senior Russian officials--including President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova--have yet to congratulate Pashinyan's ruling Civil Contract Party on its victory in the parliamentary elections (Al Jazeera, June 8).
Russian dissatisfaction extends well beyond its silence and refusal to congratulate Pashinyan. Echoing the strong criticism and protests voiced by Armenia's opposition parties regarding alleged organized electoral fraud and political and security-related pressure exerted by the Armenian government, Zakharova also sharply criticized the conduct of Armenia's parliamentary elections. She stated, "The parliamentary elections in Armenia were held under conditions of unprecedented pressure on the opposition and Western interference, primarily on the part of the European Union." She added, "During the electoral process, Yerevan openly violated the principles and procedures governing the conduct of free elections" (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 8).
The parliamentary elections in Armenia may signify the continuation and consolidation of the country's foreign policy trajectory that Yerevan has pursued since May 2018 following the Velvet Revolution (see EDM, May 3, 2018). The principal features of this trajectory include reducing tensions and moving toward peace with Azerbaijan; normalizing relations with Turkiye; gradually distancing itself from Russia--including the possibility of withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); expanding engagement with the Western world, particularly the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States; and implementing the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia's Syunik Province (see EDM, April 2, August 5, 2024, March 25, April 22, May 11, 22, June 3, 16, 22, July 20).
These trends do not align with Russia's geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus. Armenia has traditionally been a strategic ally of Russia. Since Pashinyan came to power in May 2018, however, the country has taken a significant distance from Russia (see EDM, June 3, 2022, January 10, 2024, January 28, February 6, 2025, May 12). If, following Pashinyan's victory in the recent parliamentary elections, Armenia were to withdraw from the CSTO and the EAEU, Russia would lose main points of leverage in the South Caucasus. Given that neither Azerbaijan nor Georgia is a member of these two Russia-led regional organizations, Moscow would effectively lose its two principal military-security and economic-commercial pillars in the South Caucasus. With the evacuation of Russian military bases from Armenia, the presence of Russian military forces in the South Caucasus would become limited only to the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see EDM, May 2, 2024, May 27)). Armenia's potential withdrawal from the CSTO could pave the way for the expansion of the country's cooperation with NATO. At the same time, its exit from the EAEU would lead to closer cooperation between Armenia and the European Union (see EDM, June 16).
Armenia's parliamentary elections became--much like the elections held in recent years in Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Eastern European countries--a choice between Russia and the West for Armenian voters (see EDM, April 15, June 5, June 15). A repeat of the results of the April Hungarian elections in Armenia within such a short period of time was another blow to Russia's influence. The fall of former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's government--Russia's closest partner within the European Union--after 16 years represented one of the most significant setbacks to Russia's strategy in Central Europe in recent years (see EDM, May 7).
Russia's preferred outcome in Armenia's parliamentary elections was likely the victory of Armenian nationalist and conservative political forces, particularly the Strong Armenia Alliance led by Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian-Russian businessman, or the Armenia Alliance led by former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan (see EDM, June 5). Such an outcome would have enabled Armenia to return its foreign policy to its pre-2018 orientation, under which the country, alongside states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, was regarded as one of Russia's close and traditional allies.
Under these circumstances, it appears that Russia is waiting to see the outcome of the continuing protest strategy pursued by Armenia's opposition parties. The joint statement issued by five opposition political parties condemning the ruling of Armenia's Constitutional Court upholding the election results, as well as the protests against the detention of prominent opposition figures, including Gagik Tsarukyan, leader of the Prosperous Armenia Party, may have led Russia to conclude that Armenia's political situation remains unstable (Armenian Weekly, July 7, 9).
The opposition parties may choose to boycott the new Armenian parliament while, at the same time, protests by their supporters continue on the streets of Yerevan (Caucasian Knot, July 14). Under such circumstances, Moscow could argue that a segment of Armenia's political community has not accepted the election results. In this context, the absence of congratulatory messages from Russian officials may be part of a broader strategy aimed at calling Pashinyan's political legitimacy into question. The most desirable scenario for Russia appears to be the creation of a prolonged war of attrition, in which street protests, legal challenges, parliamentary boycotts, and media pressure continue simultaneously. In such a situation, Pashinyan would remain prime minister from a legal standpoint, but he would continuously face challenges to his political legitimacy, making it more difficult to sustain his pro-Western orientation and to further distance Armenia from Russia.
Russia's subsequent steps will depend on its response to Pashinyan's practical course of action, particularly about Armenia's potential withdrawal from the CSTO, the closure of Russian military bases, and its potential exit from the EAEU. Under such circumstances, Russia would likely employ a combination of more punitive measures and economic pressure against Armenia, including the gradual increase of natural gas prices; the imposition of technical or customs restrictions on certain Armenian goods; the reduction of Russian investments; the application of informal restrictions on Armenian migrant workers in Russia; and political and media support for domestic opposition groups (see EDM, June 5; Armenpress, July 21).
This model can be described as controlled pressure. Moscow likely does not want to push Armenia completely toward the West by imposing excessive pressure. Amid its competition with the West, Moscow appears to prefer to preserve its remaining levers of influence in Armenia. Broad sanctions could have the opposite effect by further increasing anti-Russian sentiment among the Armenian public. In the energy sector, they could push Armenia toward alternative gas sources from Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan (see EDM, November 20, 2024, March 25, May 5, 19). In the transit sector, they could lead to Armenia's deeper integration into the Middle Corridor. They could allow European countries, the United States, India, Iran, and the People's Republic of China to become involved in infrastructure projects such as railways, telecommunications, and electricity networks, as well as in financial and banking markets (see EDM, August 12, September 24, October 15, 2025, January 22, March 31, May 22, June 3, July 20). All these considerations will likely compel Russia to apply controlled pressure on Pashinyan's government to change or adjust its policies.
Russia's continuing war against Ukraine also plays a factor in Russia's position abroad. Russia's involvement in the war against Ukraine and the extensive sanctions imposed on Russia by the West have played a role in Russia's flexibility toward Azerbaijan and Turkiye, as well as in the reduction of Russia's focus on the South Caucasus (see EDM, May 20, July 7, 22, October 27, 2025, February 2, April 22). If the war against Ukraine ends in any form, Russia's return to the geopolitical dynamics of this region would become highly likely, placing greater pressure on Armenia under Pashinyan's leadership.
If relations between Moscow and Yerevan enter a phase of severe tensions following the elections, an increase in gas prices and indirect economic pressures could be considered a relatively likely scenario. Comprehensive and official economic sanctions against Armenia, however, appear less likely in the short term, and such a scenario would become more plausible only if Armenia formally withdraws from the CSTO and the EAEU. Until then, Russia is likely to prefer using political and media pressure, as well as energy leverage, to exert influence without destroying its channels of communication with Armenia.
* * *
Dr. Vali Kaleji is an expert on Central Asia and Caucasian Studies in Tehran, Iran.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-uses-controlled-pressure-on-armenia-following-elections/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Russia Uses Controlled Pressure on Armenia Following Elections
Executive Summary:
* Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited Russia for the first time since winning Armenia's June 7 parliamentary elections on July 6. High-level Russian officials, however, have not recognized Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's parliamentary election victory while criticizing Armenia's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 21, 2026, by Vali Kaleji, an expert on Central Asia and Caucasian studies in Tehran, Iran, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Uses Controlled Pressure on Armenia Following Elections Executive Summary: * Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visited Russia for the first time since winning Armenia's June 7 parliamentary elections on July 6. High-level Russian officials, however, have not recognized Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's parliamentary election victory while criticizing Armenia'selections.
* Yerevan's continued pursuit of peace with Baku, normalization with Turkiye, and closer ties with the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States could erode Russia's remaining military, political, and economic leverage in the region.
* Moscow is likely to rely on controlled political, media, and economic pressure--including energy leverage and support for opposition forces--rather than broad sanctions on Armenia, seeking to preserve influence while discouraging Armenia's further integration with the West.
-
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan made his first visit to Russia following the country's June 7 parliamentary elections on July 6 (Prime Minister of Armenia, July 6). In addition to attending the plenary session of the INNOPROM 2026 International Industrial Exhibition in Yekaterinburg, he met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin (Prime Minister of Armenia; The Moscow Times, July 6). The visit comes after senior Russian officials--including President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova--have yet to congratulate Pashinyan's ruling Civil Contract Party on its victory in the parliamentary elections (Al Jazeera, June 8).
Russian dissatisfaction extends well beyond its silence and refusal to congratulate Pashinyan. Echoing the strong criticism and protests voiced by Armenia's opposition parties regarding alleged organized electoral fraud and political and security-related pressure exerted by the Armenian government, Zakharova also sharply criticized the conduct of Armenia's parliamentary elections. She stated, "The parliamentary elections in Armenia were held under conditions of unprecedented pressure on the opposition and Western interference, primarily on the part of the European Union." She added, "During the electoral process, Yerevan openly violated the principles and procedures governing the conduct of free elections" (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 8).
The parliamentary elections in Armenia may signify the continuation and consolidation of the country's foreign policy trajectory that Yerevan has pursued since May 2018 following the Velvet Revolution (see EDM, May 3, 2018). The principal features of this trajectory include reducing tensions and moving toward peace with Azerbaijan; normalizing relations with Turkiye; gradually distancing itself from Russia--including the possibility of withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); expanding engagement with the Western world, particularly the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States; and implementing the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia's Syunik Province (see EDM, April 2, August 5, 2024, March 25, April 22, May 11, 22, June 3, 16, 22, July 20).
These trends do not align with Russia's geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus. Armenia has traditionally been a strategic ally of Russia. Since Pashinyan came to power in May 2018, however, the country has taken a significant distance from Russia (see EDM, June 3, 2022, January 10, 2024, January 28, February 6, 2025, May 12). If, following Pashinyan's victory in the recent parliamentary elections, Armenia were to withdraw from the CSTO and the EAEU, Russia would lose main points of leverage in the South Caucasus. Given that neither Azerbaijan nor Georgia is a member of these two Russia-led regional organizations, Moscow would effectively lose its two principal military-security and economic-commercial pillars in the South Caucasus. With the evacuation of Russian military bases from Armenia, the presence of Russian military forces in the South Caucasus would become limited only to the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see EDM, May 2, 2024, May 27)). Armenia's potential withdrawal from the CSTO could pave the way for the expansion of the country's cooperation with NATO. At the same time, its exit from the EAEU would lead to closer cooperation between Armenia and the European Union (see EDM, June 16).
Armenia's parliamentary elections became--much like the elections held in recent years in Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Eastern European countries--a choice between Russia and the West for Armenian voters (see EDM, April 15, June 5, June 15). A repeat of the results of the April Hungarian elections in Armenia within such a short period of time was another blow to Russia's influence. The fall of former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's government--Russia's closest partner within the European Union--after 16 years represented one of the most significant setbacks to Russia's strategy in Central Europe in recent years (see EDM, May 7).
Russia's preferred outcome in Armenia's parliamentary elections was likely the victory of Armenian nationalist and conservative political forces, particularly the Strong Armenia Alliance led by Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian-Russian businessman, or the Armenia Alliance led by former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan (see EDM, June 5). Such an outcome would have enabled Armenia to return its foreign policy to its pre-2018 orientation, under which the country, alongside states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, was regarded as one of Russia's close and traditional allies.
Under these circumstances, it appears that Russia is waiting to see the outcome of the continuing protest strategy pursued by Armenia's opposition parties. The joint statement issued by five opposition political parties condemning the ruling of Armenia's Constitutional Court upholding the election results, as well as the protests against the detention of prominent opposition figures, including Gagik Tsarukyan, leader of the Prosperous Armenia Party, may have led Russia to conclude that Armenia's political situation remains unstable (Armenian Weekly, July 7, 9).
The opposition parties may choose to boycott the new Armenian parliament while, at the same time, protests by their supporters continue on the streets of Yerevan (Caucasian Knot, July 14). Under such circumstances, Moscow could argue that a segment of Armenia's political community has not accepted the election results. In this context, the absence of congratulatory messages from Russian officials may be part of a broader strategy aimed at calling Pashinyan's political legitimacy into question. The most desirable scenario for Russia appears to be the creation of a prolonged war of attrition, in which street protests, legal challenges, parliamentary boycotts, and media pressure continue simultaneously. In such a situation, Pashinyan would remain prime minister from a legal standpoint, but he would continuously face challenges to his political legitimacy, making it more difficult to sustain his pro-Western orientation and to further distance Armenia from Russia.
Russia's subsequent steps will depend on its response to Pashinyan's practical course of action, particularly about Armenia's potential withdrawal from the CSTO, the closure of Russian military bases, and its potential exit from the EAEU. Under such circumstances, Russia would likely employ a combination of more punitive measures and economic pressure against Armenia, including the gradual increase of natural gas prices; the imposition of technical or customs restrictions on certain Armenian goods; the reduction of Russian investments; the application of informal restrictions on Armenian migrant workers in Russia; and political and media support for domestic opposition groups (see EDM, June 5; Armenpress, July 21).
This model can be described as controlled pressure. Moscow likely does not want to push Armenia completely toward the West by imposing excessive pressure. Amid its competition with the West, Moscow appears to prefer to preserve its remaining levers of influence in Armenia. Broad sanctions could have the opposite effect by further increasing anti-Russian sentiment among the Armenian public. In the energy sector, they could push Armenia toward alternative gas sources from Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan (see EDM, November 20, 2024, March 25, May 5, 19). In the transit sector, they could lead to Armenia's deeper integration into the Middle Corridor. They could allow European countries, the United States, India, Iran, and the People's Republic of China to become involved in infrastructure projects such as railways, telecommunications, and electricity networks, as well as in financial and banking markets (see EDM, August 12, September 24, October 15, 2025, January 22, March 31, May 22, June 3, July 20). All these considerations will likely compel Russia to apply controlled pressure on Pashinyan's government to change or adjust its policies.
Russia's continuing war against Ukraine also plays a factor in Russia's position abroad. Russia's involvement in the war against Ukraine and the extensive sanctions imposed on Russia by the West have played a role in Russia's flexibility toward Azerbaijan and Turkiye, as well as in the reduction of Russia's focus on the South Caucasus (see EDM, May 20, July 7, 22, October 27, 2025, February 2, April 22). If the war against Ukraine ends in any form, Russia's return to the geopolitical dynamics of this region would become highly likely, placing greater pressure on Armenia under Pashinyan's leadership.
If relations between Moscow and Yerevan enter a phase of severe tensions following the elections, an increase in gas prices and indirect economic pressures could be considered a relatively likely scenario. Comprehensive and official economic sanctions against Armenia, however, appear less likely in the short term, and such a scenario would become more plausible only if Armenia formally withdraws from the CSTO and the EAEU. Until then, Russia is likely to prefer using political and media pressure, as well as energy leverage, to exert influence without destroying its channels of communication with Armenia.
* * *
Dr. Vali Kaleji is an expert on Central Asia and Caucasian Studies in Tehran, Iran.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-uses-controlled-pressure-on-armenia-following-elections/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Xinjiang Dealmaking Overcomes Sanctions Deterrent
WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 21, 2026, by editorial assistant Jonah Reisboard in its foundation's China Brief Notes:
* * *
Xinjiang Dealmaking Overcomes Sanctions Deterrent
Executive Summary:
* The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), sanctioned by the United States since 2020, is making overt appeals for international investment. This is likely a result of positive incentives and economic opportunities rather than a response to external sanctions.
* The ease with which the XPCC can identify foreign patrons and the candor ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 21, 2026, by editorial assistant Jonah Reisboard in its foundation's China Brief Notes: * * * Xinjiang Dealmaking Overcomes Sanctions Deterrent Executive Summary: * The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), sanctioned by the United States since 2020, is making overt appeals for international investment. This is likely a result of positive incentives and economic opportunities rather than a response to external sanctions. * The ease with which the XPCC can identify foreign patrons and the candorof its calls for international investment suggest that the efficacy of U.S. sanctions is limited.
* Outreach, platformed by trade expos and elevated by the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, appears to have achieved both political and financial successes, with foreign politicians giving speeches at these events and investment deals inked since 2025 reportedly totaling over $1.5 billion.
-
The 9th China-Eurasia Expo convened in Urumqi from June 25-29, bringing more than 3,000 companies from around the world to the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) (Belt and Road Journalists Network, June 28). The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, South Korea, and Thailand were represented for the first time, and Kazakhstan and Pakistan were named nations of honor as longstanding participants (Xinhua, June 27; Belt and Road Journalists Network, June 28). This expo, and others like it, advance the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) goal of normalizing the XUAR among foreign elites, despite the CCP's ongoing human rights abuses in the region.[1]
The XUAR's geographic position makes it central to Beijing's efforts at global connectivity and overland economic engagement. Expos and other trade shows serve to integrate the XUAR's governance structures with global businesses. This integration continues to take place alongside successive CCP campaigns that erode Uyghur autonomy, and while U.S.-led efforts seek to restrict economic engagement with the region in response. [2] The clearest evidence of the limitations of those efforts is the successful global engagement of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), which has capitalized on these expos to attract billions of dollars of foreign investment in recent years.
Expos Call to 'Invest in the XPCC'
Recent expos in Urumqi have voiced unique appeals to "invest in the XPCC". These calls first emerged as an official characterization of bilateral signing ceremonies and now stand out as candid requests to support the CCP's settler-colonial body in the region. The XPCC, which maintains the paramilitary institutions of its origin as a settlement of decommissioned World War II soldiers, advances the Party-state's goals of diluting the Uyghur population, building an extensive surveillance network, and constructing prisons and internment camps (Uyghur Human Rights Project, April 26, 2018, August 27, 2020; Miller et al., May 2025). [3] While the United States sanctioned the XPCC in 2020, this lever never fully isolated the entity due to its "integration with the corporate, trade, and financial landscape within Xinjiang, China, and the greater region," according to analysis by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) (Department of the Treasury, July 31, 2020; C4ADS, August 10, 2021).
The call for investment is likely driven more by opportunity than a result of any Western pressure. The People's Republic of China (PRC) established the China (Xinjiang) Pilot Free Trade Zone, covering Urumqi, Kashgar, and Khorgos, in 2023. Along with the development of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative's overland Silk Road Economic Belt, the XUAR has become a hub for overland trade as PRC-Eurasia trade flows increase (China Brief, October 17, 2025).
Foreign politicians have responded positively to the XPCC's appeals at recent investment conferences and expo sessions. At the 2025 Eurasia Commercial Trade Expo, for example, an "invest in the XPCC" session saw speeches from Avazbek Kerimbaev, vice chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Kyrgyzstan, and Yang Hai, president of the International Chamber of Commerce of Cambodia (Tianshan Net, June 28, 2025). Yang has supported economic engagement with the XPCC since at least 2024, when he established an XPCC branch for his chamber of commerce (Jianhua Daily, November 6, 2024).
In the 2026 China-Eurasia Expo, Malaysian senator and Malaysia-China Business Council chairman Low Kian Chuan gave the keynote address, where he suggested that Malaysia could serve as the conduit for the XPCC's entrance into Southeast Asia (The Star, June 30; Facebook/Malaysia-China Business Council, July 2). The participation of these foreign participants, albeit in an unofficial capacity, reflects the lack of stigma attached to conducting business in the XUAR--and with the XPCC--in much of the world.
The XPCC's appeals for cooperation over the past few years have produced repeated financial successes. As a result of its participation in the 10th China International Consumer Goods Expo in 2025, the XPCC signed agreements for 12 projects priced at $750 million (XPCC Daily, April 15, 2025). At the 8th China International Imports Expo, also in 2025, the XPCC announced deals covering a further 23 projects, including ten foreign investments that totaled $440 million (XPCC, November 11, 2025). The most recent event, the 2026 China-Eurasia Expo, produced agreements for 18 projects, including 12 with foreign partners, totaling $516 million (China Daily, June 26).
Conclusion
The XPCC and the XUAR regional government have found a feasible and relatively simple workaround to U.S. sanctions. Rallying behind OBOR investments and the PRC's friendly relations with its neighbors, foreign investment now drives the XPCC's development, despite U.S. attempts to cut it off from the global economy. Its expo-based dealmaking shows that the financial burden of U.S. sanctions has been outmatched by the allure of OBOR-related profits.
If the XPCC can be so explicit in its calls for foreign investment and still come away with deals while under U.S. sanctions, the United States needs a new approach to achieve its foreign policy goals in the XUAR. As of now, the XPCC is still benefiting from the PRC's regional diplomacy and economic integration across Eurasia.
* * *
Jonah Reisboard is an editorial assistant at the Jamestown Foundation.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/xinjiang-dealmaking-overcomes-sanctions-deterrent/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Xinjiang Dealmaking Overcomes Sanctions Deterrent
Executive Summary:
* The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), sanctioned by the United States since 2020, is making overt appeals for international investment. This is likely a result of positive incentives and economic opportunities rather than a response to external sanctions.
* The ease with which the XPCC can identify foreign patrons and the candor ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 21, 2026, by editorial assistant Jonah Reisboard in its foundation's China Brief Notes: * * * Xinjiang Dealmaking Overcomes Sanctions Deterrent Executive Summary: * The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), sanctioned by the United States since 2020, is making overt appeals for international investment. This is likely a result of positive incentives and economic opportunities rather than a response to external sanctions. * The ease with which the XPCC can identify foreign patrons and the candorof its calls for international investment suggest that the efficacy of U.S. sanctions is limited.
* Outreach, platformed by trade expos and elevated by the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, appears to have achieved both political and financial successes, with foreign politicians giving speeches at these events and investment deals inked since 2025 reportedly totaling over $1.5 billion.
-
The 9th China-Eurasia Expo convened in Urumqi from June 25-29, bringing more than 3,000 companies from around the world to the capital of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) (Belt and Road Journalists Network, June 28). The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, South Korea, and Thailand were represented for the first time, and Kazakhstan and Pakistan were named nations of honor as longstanding participants (Xinhua, June 27; Belt and Road Journalists Network, June 28). This expo, and others like it, advance the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) goal of normalizing the XUAR among foreign elites, despite the CCP's ongoing human rights abuses in the region.[1]
The XUAR's geographic position makes it central to Beijing's efforts at global connectivity and overland economic engagement. Expos and other trade shows serve to integrate the XUAR's governance structures with global businesses. This integration continues to take place alongside successive CCP campaigns that erode Uyghur autonomy, and while U.S.-led efforts seek to restrict economic engagement with the region in response. [2] The clearest evidence of the limitations of those efforts is the successful global engagement of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), which has capitalized on these expos to attract billions of dollars of foreign investment in recent years.
Expos Call to 'Invest in the XPCC'
Recent expos in Urumqi have voiced unique appeals to "invest in the XPCC". These calls first emerged as an official characterization of bilateral signing ceremonies and now stand out as candid requests to support the CCP's settler-colonial body in the region. The XPCC, which maintains the paramilitary institutions of its origin as a settlement of decommissioned World War II soldiers, advances the Party-state's goals of diluting the Uyghur population, building an extensive surveillance network, and constructing prisons and internment camps (Uyghur Human Rights Project, April 26, 2018, August 27, 2020; Miller et al., May 2025). [3] While the United States sanctioned the XPCC in 2020, this lever never fully isolated the entity due to its "integration with the corporate, trade, and financial landscape within Xinjiang, China, and the greater region," according to analysis by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) (Department of the Treasury, July 31, 2020; C4ADS, August 10, 2021).
The call for investment is likely driven more by opportunity than a result of any Western pressure. The People's Republic of China (PRC) established the China (Xinjiang) Pilot Free Trade Zone, covering Urumqi, Kashgar, and Khorgos, in 2023. Along with the development of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative's overland Silk Road Economic Belt, the XUAR has become a hub for overland trade as PRC-Eurasia trade flows increase (China Brief, October 17, 2025).
Foreign politicians have responded positively to the XPCC's appeals at recent investment conferences and expo sessions. At the 2025 Eurasia Commercial Trade Expo, for example, an "invest in the XPCC" session saw speeches from Avazbek Kerimbaev, vice chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Kyrgyzstan, and Yang Hai, president of the International Chamber of Commerce of Cambodia (Tianshan Net, June 28, 2025). Yang has supported economic engagement with the XPCC since at least 2024, when he established an XPCC branch for his chamber of commerce (Jianhua Daily, November 6, 2024).
In the 2026 China-Eurasia Expo, Malaysian senator and Malaysia-China Business Council chairman Low Kian Chuan gave the keynote address, where he suggested that Malaysia could serve as the conduit for the XPCC's entrance into Southeast Asia (The Star, June 30; Facebook/Malaysia-China Business Council, July 2). The participation of these foreign participants, albeit in an unofficial capacity, reflects the lack of stigma attached to conducting business in the XUAR--and with the XPCC--in much of the world.
The XPCC's appeals for cooperation over the past few years have produced repeated financial successes. As a result of its participation in the 10th China International Consumer Goods Expo in 2025, the XPCC signed agreements for 12 projects priced at $750 million (XPCC Daily, April 15, 2025). At the 8th China International Imports Expo, also in 2025, the XPCC announced deals covering a further 23 projects, including ten foreign investments that totaled $440 million (XPCC, November 11, 2025). The most recent event, the 2026 China-Eurasia Expo, produced agreements for 18 projects, including 12 with foreign partners, totaling $516 million (China Daily, June 26).
Conclusion
The XPCC and the XUAR regional government have found a feasible and relatively simple workaround to U.S. sanctions. Rallying behind OBOR investments and the PRC's friendly relations with its neighbors, foreign investment now drives the XPCC's development, despite U.S. attempts to cut it off from the global economy. Its expo-based dealmaking shows that the financial burden of U.S. sanctions has been outmatched by the allure of OBOR-related profits.
If the XPCC can be so explicit in its calls for foreign investment and still come away with deals while under U.S. sanctions, the United States needs a new approach to achieve its foreign policy goals in the XUAR. As of now, the XPCC is still benefiting from the PRC's regional diplomacy and economic integration across Eurasia.
* * *
Jonah Reisboard is an editorial assistant at the Jamestown Foundation.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/xinjiang-dealmaking-overcomes-sanctions-deterrent/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Less Than Half of Low-Skilled Workers Participate in Firm Training
MUNICH, Germany, July 22 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 21, 2026:
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Less Than Half of Low-Skilled Workers Participate in Firm Training
Only 45 percent of lower-skilled workers participate in firm training. That's according to a recent study by the ifo Institute and the Technical University of Munich (TUM) in May 2024, which surveyed 3,700 respondents. Participation is greater among higher-skilled workers.
67 percent of respondents in this group participated in a firm training program in the past twelve months. "Higher-skilled workers expect considerably ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, July 22 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 21, 2026: * * * Less Than Half of Low-Skilled Workers Participate in Firm Training Only 45 percent of lower-skilled workers participate in firm training. That's according to a recent study by the ifo Institute and the Technical University of Munich (TUM) in May 2024, which surveyed 3,700 respondents. Participation is greater among higher-skilled workers. 67 percent of respondents in this group participated in a firm training program in the past twelve months. "Higher-skilled workers expect considerablygreater benefits for job and career from participating in further training, while lower-skilled workers underestimate the benefits of further training," says Philipp Lergetporer, ifo Research Professor and Professor of Economics at the TUM Campus Heilbronn.
The study examines what benefits employees expect to gain from further training. "Employees expect both higher earnings after completing further training measures, and also non-pecuniary benefits in the form of better promotion prospects, more interesting work, and less risk of losing their job," says co-author Hanna Brosch, Economist at the TUM Campus Heilbronn. "While the expectations of higher- and lower-skilled employees are closer together with regard to salary, they differ significantly when it comes to non-pecuniary benefits."
On average, employees can expect to earn almost 9 percent more six years after beginning regular further training than they would without it.
The study uses data from a representative online survey of more than 3,700 dependent employees between the ages of 25 and 55, conducted in May 2024. Through a survey experiment, the researchers can also identify measures to increase willingness to participate in further training. "Our study shows that information about earnings increases the likelihood of pursuing further training, particularly among lower-skilled workers," says Franziska Pfaehler of the ifo Center for the Economics of Education. Brief, cost-effective information and communication measures by employers, for example, could therefore increase participation in further training.
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2026 Article in Journal
Erwartungen entscheiden uber betriebliche Weiterbildung
Hanna Brosch, Philipp Lergetporer, Franziska Pfaehler, Florian Schoner
ifo Schnelldienst, 2026, 79, Nr. 6 47-51
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/article-journal/erwartungen-entscheiden-uber-betriebliche-weiterbildung)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-21/less-half-low-skilled-workers-participate-firm-training
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Less Than Half of Low-Skilled Workers Participate in Firm Training
Only 45 percent of lower-skilled workers participate in firm training. That's according to a recent study by the ifo Institute and the Technical University of Munich (TUM) in May 2024, which surveyed 3,700 respondents. Participation is greater among higher-skilled workers.
67 percent of respondents in this group participated in a firm training program in the past twelve months. "Higher-skilled workers expect considerably ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, July 22 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 21, 2026: * * * Less Than Half of Low-Skilled Workers Participate in Firm Training Only 45 percent of lower-skilled workers participate in firm training. That's according to a recent study by the ifo Institute and the Technical University of Munich (TUM) in May 2024, which surveyed 3,700 respondents. Participation is greater among higher-skilled workers. 67 percent of respondents in this group participated in a firm training program in the past twelve months. "Higher-skilled workers expect considerablygreater benefits for job and career from participating in further training, while lower-skilled workers underestimate the benefits of further training," says Philipp Lergetporer, ifo Research Professor and Professor of Economics at the TUM Campus Heilbronn.
The study examines what benefits employees expect to gain from further training. "Employees expect both higher earnings after completing further training measures, and also non-pecuniary benefits in the form of better promotion prospects, more interesting work, and less risk of losing their job," says co-author Hanna Brosch, Economist at the TUM Campus Heilbronn. "While the expectations of higher- and lower-skilled employees are closer together with regard to salary, they differ significantly when it comes to non-pecuniary benefits."
On average, employees can expect to earn almost 9 percent more six years after beginning regular further training than they would without it.
The study uses data from a representative online survey of more than 3,700 dependent employees between the ages of 25 and 55, conducted in May 2024. Through a survey experiment, the researchers can also identify measures to increase willingness to participate in further training. "Our study shows that information about earnings increases the likelihood of pursuing further training, particularly among lower-skilled workers," says Franziska Pfaehler of the ifo Center for the Economics of Education. Brief, cost-effective information and communication measures by employers, for example, could therefore increase participation in further training.
* * *
2026 Article in Journal
Erwartungen entscheiden uber betriebliche Weiterbildung
Hanna Brosch, Philipp Lergetporer, Franziska Pfaehler, Florian Schoner
ifo Schnelldienst, 2026, 79, Nr. 6 47-51
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/article-journal/erwartungen-entscheiden-uber-betriebliche-weiterbildung)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-21/less-half-low-skilled-workers-participate-firm-training
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities: Republicans' Fast-Track Budget Process Ignores Families Losing Help Affording Groceries
WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following statement on July 21, 2026:
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Republicans' Fast-Track Budget Process Ignores Families Losing Help Affording Groceries
Statement of Sharon Parrott, CBPP President, on House Republicans' Budget Resolution
-
At least 1.5 million fewer children -- and more than 4.5 million fewer people overall -- are receiving SNAP food assistance after congressional Republicans and President Trump enacted unprecedented cuts last year, despite no appreciable improvement in the economy and high food prices. This is a crisis ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following statement on July 21, 2026: * * * Republicans' Fast-Track Budget Process Ignores Families Losing Help Affording Groceries Statement of Sharon Parrott, CBPP President, on House Republicans' Budget Resolution - At least 1.5 million fewer children -- and more than 4.5 million fewer people overall -- are receiving SNAP food assistance after congressional Republicans and President Trump enacted unprecedented cuts last year, despite no appreciable improvement in the economy and high food prices. This is a crisisunfolding in plain sight. Despite this, House Republicans have started a budget process that ignores the urgent need to help low-income families and children who are losing SNAP and can't afford groceries.
Many people who have lost SNAP are in groups that weren't intended to be the target of the eligibility restrictions in last year's Republican reconciliation law, like children. That means many struggling families are losing SNAP because they can't navigate new bureaucratic obstacles, or they are going without the help they need as additional red tape pushes understaffed state agencies to their breaking point. The results are stark: an ill grandmother raising teens can't get her SNAP reinstated despite being eligible, and parents are skipping meals to save food for their children. Families who have had their food assistance taken away are turning to overburdened food banks, which cannot fill the gap.
House Republicans are looking past this emergency in their budget legislation -- while using it to help farmers struggling with high costs due to Trump's tariffs and oil prices driven up by the war in Iran.
Congress could help both farmers and families. At a minimum, they need to slow down the hasty implementation of the massive shift in SNAP costs to states. How much each state will have to pay is based on its error rate -- a flawed measure of benefit errors, most of which are unintentional mistakes by state agencies or households. With little time to bring down their error rate before the cost shift is locked in and unavoidable, now in a matter of weeks, states are erecting access barriers to SNAP, causing millions of children and families to lose SNAP and leaving them unable to afford food. (Because of how the error rate formula is determined, eligible families denied SNAP and those unable to navigate endless red tape don't count as errors, but eligible families who receive somewhat more or less than they are owed do.)
The damage from the SNAP cuts could worsen quickly as some states are considering ending their SNAP programs entirely as soon as October 2027, when the cost shift takes effect. States unable or unwilling to pay the costs they incur will have no choice but to end the program.
Last year's reconciliation law delayed the cost shift for a handful of states to give them more time to lower their error rates; policymakers should extend that delay to all states to keep eligible families from losing the help they need affording groceries.
It's a relief that House leadership and the Trump Administration have not sought further cuts to SNAP to pay for the $12 billion in farm aid despite calls for cuts from some Republican members. Policymakers should reject any calls for more cuts to SNAP if the process moves ahead.
But "no new cuts" isn't the right yardstick when more than 1.5 million children, and more than 4.5 million people overall, have already lost SNAP since the cuts were enacted last year.
People across the U.S. consistently say they want Washington to focus on affordability, especially the cost of food. Mitigating last year's cuts to SNAP and staunching the number of families and children losing SNAP would be a good place to start.
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Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/press/statements/republicans-fast-track-budget-process-ignores-families-losing-help-affording
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Republicans' Fast-Track Budget Process Ignores Families Losing Help Affording Groceries
Statement of Sharon Parrott, CBPP President, on House Republicans' Budget Resolution
-
At least 1.5 million fewer children -- and more than 4.5 million fewer people overall -- are receiving SNAP food assistance after congressional Republicans and President Trump enacted unprecedented cuts last year, despite no appreciable improvement in the economy and high food prices. This is a crisis ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following statement on July 21, 2026: * * * Republicans' Fast-Track Budget Process Ignores Families Losing Help Affording Groceries Statement of Sharon Parrott, CBPP President, on House Republicans' Budget Resolution - At least 1.5 million fewer children -- and more than 4.5 million fewer people overall -- are receiving SNAP food assistance after congressional Republicans and President Trump enacted unprecedented cuts last year, despite no appreciable improvement in the economy and high food prices. This is a crisisunfolding in plain sight. Despite this, House Republicans have started a budget process that ignores the urgent need to help low-income families and children who are losing SNAP and can't afford groceries.
Many people who have lost SNAP are in groups that weren't intended to be the target of the eligibility restrictions in last year's Republican reconciliation law, like children. That means many struggling families are losing SNAP because they can't navigate new bureaucratic obstacles, or they are going without the help they need as additional red tape pushes understaffed state agencies to their breaking point. The results are stark: an ill grandmother raising teens can't get her SNAP reinstated despite being eligible, and parents are skipping meals to save food for their children. Families who have had their food assistance taken away are turning to overburdened food banks, which cannot fill the gap.
House Republicans are looking past this emergency in their budget legislation -- while using it to help farmers struggling with high costs due to Trump's tariffs and oil prices driven up by the war in Iran.
Congress could help both farmers and families. At a minimum, they need to slow down the hasty implementation of the massive shift in SNAP costs to states. How much each state will have to pay is based on its error rate -- a flawed measure of benefit errors, most of which are unintentional mistakes by state agencies or households. With little time to bring down their error rate before the cost shift is locked in and unavoidable, now in a matter of weeks, states are erecting access barriers to SNAP, causing millions of children and families to lose SNAP and leaving them unable to afford food. (Because of how the error rate formula is determined, eligible families denied SNAP and those unable to navigate endless red tape don't count as errors, but eligible families who receive somewhat more or less than they are owed do.)
The damage from the SNAP cuts could worsen quickly as some states are considering ending their SNAP programs entirely as soon as October 2027, when the cost shift takes effect. States unable or unwilling to pay the costs they incur will have no choice but to end the program.
Last year's reconciliation law delayed the cost shift for a handful of states to give them more time to lower their error rates; policymakers should extend that delay to all states to keep eligible families from losing the help they need affording groceries.
It's a relief that House leadership and the Trump Administration have not sought further cuts to SNAP to pay for the $12 billion in farm aid despite calls for cuts from some Republican members. Policymakers should reject any calls for more cuts to SNAP if the process moves ahead.
But "no new cuts" isn't the right yardstick when more than 1.5 million children, and more than 4.5 million people overall, have already lost SNAP since the cuts were enacted last year.
People across the U.S. consistently say they want Washington to focus on affordability, especially the cost of food. Mitigating last year's cuts to SNAP and staunching the number of families and children losing SNAP would be a good place to start.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/press/statements/republicans-fast-track-budget-process-ignores-families-losing-help-affording
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities: Number of Children Receiving SNAP Continues to Drop Under Harmful 2025 Republican Reconciliation Law
WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on July 21, 2026, by Joseph Llobrera, senior director of research for the Food Assistance Team:
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Number of Children Receiving SNAP Continues to Drop Under Harmful 2025 Republican Reconciliation Law
In the 19 states with publicly available data or that have shared unpublished data, the harmful Republican reconciliation law has taken SNAP food assistance away from more than 1 million children since it was enacted in July 2025. That accounts for nearly half of the 2.4-million-person decline in ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on July 21, 2026, by Joseph Llobrera, senior director of research for the Food Assistance Team: * * * Number of Children Receiving SNAP Continues to Drop Under Harmful 2025 Republican Reconciliation Law In the 19 states with publicly available data or that have shared unpublished data, the harmful Republican reconciliation law has taken SNAP food assistance away from more than 1 million children since it was enacted in July 2025. That accounts for nearly half of the 2.4-million-person decline inSNAP participation among people of all ages in those states. (See table.) Nationwide, it's very likely that the number of children receiving SNAP has dropped by more than 1.5 million since July 2025, based on our conservative estimate (see methodological note below). The sharp participation declines likely reflect, in part, the 2025 Republican reconciliation law's shift of large SNAP benefit costs to states, with the amount states owe based on their payment error rate. Without immediate congressional action to delay this cost shift for all states, the unfolding emergency will only worsen as more children are cut off from the food assistance their families need to afford nutritious food.
The 2025 Republican reconciliation law's cost shift has led states to take steps that are making it harder for eligible people to receive SNAP, including families with children. Losing SNAP also makes it harder for children in families with low incomes to qualify for other food assistance, such as WIC (the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children) and free school meals - jeopardizing the short- and long-term health, education, and economic benefits of nutrition programs for our children and society. While cutting SNAP eligibility for children was not a stated target of the Republican reconciliation law's proponents, the cost shift and resulting access barriers are causing serious losses of food assistance for children in households with low incomes.
Under the harmful 2025 Republican reconciliation law, states will be required to start paying a share of SNAP benefit costs starting October 2027, which could total hundreds of millions of dollars in many states. States that are unable or unwilling to pay the full cost will either have to take steps to further restrict access or drop out of the program entirely - some states have already indicated the potential risk of withdrawing from or pausing SNAP. Congress should delay the new law's cost shift for two years for all states, not just the few states already granted a delay under the new law, to give them time to improve payment accuracy without taking food assistance away from eligible people.
New access barriers and inadequate funding to implement the program changes appear to be having a large impact on children. The table below shows SNAP participation data for children for states that publicly report these data or do not currently publish participation data publicly but have shared unpublished data. While it's uncertain which factors are the primary drivers of the participation decline in these states, those declines cannot be explained by an improvement in people's economic well-being. Nationally, unemployment has remained steady, real wages declined year-over-year in April, food insecurity remained high in 2025, and grocery costs are rising.
* * *
Table: Change in Child SNAP Participation Since Enactment of Harmful Republican Reconciliation Law in July 2025
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Methodological Note:
Among states that have provided participation data for children, the share of the state's total SNAP participation decline that is from fewer children participating ranged from roughly 30 percent to about 60 percent. To calculate this national estimate, we conservatively took the low end of this range and assumed the decline in the number of children comprised roughly 30 percent of the total participation decline in states where we do not have participation data for children. For most of the 19 states, the number of children participating in SNAP is posted publicly. For six states - Alabama, Arkansas, California, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Vermont - CBPP is using unpublished data from the state agency.
* * *
Joseph Llobrera is the Senior Director of Research for the Food Assistance team, where his work highlights the positive impacts of federal nutrition assistance programs on people's health, food security, and economic well-being.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/blog/number-of-children-receiving-snap-continues-to-drop-under-harmful-2025-republican
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Number of Children Receiving SNAP Continues to Drop Under Harmful 2025 Republican Reconciliation Law
In the 19 states with publicly available data or that have shared unpublished data, the harmful Republican reconciliation law has taken SNAP food assistance away from more than 1 million children since it was enacted in July 2025. That accounts for nearly half of the 2.4-million-person decline in ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on July 21, 2026, by Joseph Llobrera, senior director of research for the Food Assistance Team: * * * Number of Children Receiving SNAP Continues to Drop Under Harmful 2025 Republican Reconciliation Law In the 19 states with publicly available data or that have shared unpublished data, the harmful Republican reconciliation law has taken SNAP food assistance away from more than 1 million children since it was enacted in July 2025. That accounts for nearly half of the 2.4-million-person decline inSNAP participation among people of all ages in those states. (See table.) Nationwide, it's very likely that the number of children receiving SNAP has dropped by more than 1.5 million since July 2025, based on our conservative estimate (see methodological note below). The sharp participation declines likely reflect, in part, the 2025 Republican reconciliation law's shift of large SNAP benefit costs to states, with the amount states owe based on their payment error rate. Without immediate congressional action to delay this cost shift for all states, the unfolding emergency will only worsen as more children are cut off from the food assistance their families need to afford nutritious food.
The 2025 Republican reconciliation law's cost shift has led states to take steps that are making it harder for eligible people to receive SNAP, including families with children. Losing SNAP also makes it harder for children in families with low incomes to qualify for other food assistance, such as WIC (the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children) and free school meals - jeopardizing the short- and long-term health, education, and economic benefits of nutrition programs for our children and society. While cutting SNAP eligibility for children was not a stated target of the Republican reconciliation law's proponents, the cost shift and resulting access barriers are causing serious losses of food assistance for children in households with low incomes.
Under the harmful 2025 Republican reconciliation law, states will be required to start paying a share of SNAP benefit costs starting October 2027, which could total hundreds of millions of dollars in many states. States that are unable or unwilling to pay the full cost will either have to take steps to further restrict access or drop out of the program entirely - some states have already indicated the potential risk of withdrawing from or pausing SNAP. Congress should delay the new law's cost shift for two years for all states, not just the few states already granted a delay under the new law, to give them time to improve payment accuracy without taking food assistance away from eligible people.
New access barriers and inadequate funding to implement the program changes appear to be having a large impact on children. The table below shows SNAP participation data for children for states that publicly report these data or do not currently publish participation data publicly but have shared unpublished data. While it's uncertain which factors are the primary drivers of the participation decline in these states, those declines cannot be explained by an improvement in people's economic well-being. Nationally, unemployment has remained steady, real wages declined year-over-year in April, food insecurity remained high in 2025, and grocery costs are rising.
* * *
Table: Change in Child SNAP Participation Since Enactment of Harmful Republican Reconciliation Law in July 2025
* * *
Methodological Note:
Among states that have provided participation data for children, the share of the state's total SNAP participation decline that is from fewer children participating ranged from roughly 30 percent to about 60 percent. To calculate this national estimate, we conservatively took the low end of this range and assumed the decline in the number of children comprised roughly 30 percent of the total participation decline in states where we do not have participation data for children. For most of the 19 states, the number of children participating in SNAP is posted publicly. For six states - Alabama, Arkansas, California, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Vermont - CBPP is using unpublished data from the state agency.
* * *
Joseph Llobrera is the Senior Director of Research for the Food Assistance team, where his work highlights the positive impacts of federal nutrition assistance programs on people's health, food security, and economic well-being.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/blog/number-of-children-receiving-snap-continues-to-drop-under-harmful-2025-republican
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A: Understanding President Trump's New Tariffs on Canadian Imports
WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on July 21, 2026, involving Christopher Gundermann and Hugh Grant-Chapman, fellows with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business:
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Understanding President Trump's New Tariffs on Canadian Imports
On July 20, President Trump formally invoked Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to impose an additional 50 percent tariff against a significant range of Canadian products. The tariffs are scheduled to come into force on August 19. This marks the first time ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on July 21, 2026, involving Christopher Gundermann and Hugh Grant-Chapman, fellows with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business: * * * Understanding President Trump's New Tariffs on Canadian Imports On July 20, President Trump formally invoked Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to impose an additional 50 percent tariff against a significant range of Canadian products. The tariffs are scheduled to come into force on August 19. This marks the first timea U.S. president has used Section 338 to impose tariffs.
In three different proclamations, the White House argued that the tariffs are a response to Canadian "discriminatory" trade practices, namely provincial policies pulling U.S. alcohol from liquor stores, imposing tariffs and quotas on U.S. autos, and restricting the sale of U.S. dairy in Canada compared to other trading partners.
Canada is also a party to the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which is currently under review.
* * *
Figure 1: Canadian Imports of U.S. Automotive and Alcohol Products Have Declined Since 2025
* * *
Q1: What is Section 338?
A1: Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 gives the president the power to impose tariffs up to 50 percent or ban imports from a country that discriminates against U.S. products (after 30 days have elapsed from an initial presidential announcement). Crucially, Section 338 also gives the president the authority to impose tariffs of up to 50 percent against imports from a third country benefiting from the original country's discrimination, though President Trump has not invoked this authority here.
There are structural similarities between Section 338 and Section 301, which also allows the president to impose tariffs based on discriminatory practices. However, Section 338 has a less-clear investigative requirement, and a shorter timeline.
Notably, the president's Section 338 tariffs apply on goods regardless of their USMCA compliance status, but not on goods already subject to Section 232 duties.
Q2: Why is President Trump invoking Section 338 now?
A2: While the White House has said that the tariffs are being imposed in response to Canada's discriminatory treatment of U.S. products, the administration likely has additional motivations. President Trump previously threatened to impose tariffs on Canada following recent Canadian wildfires which left much of the U.S. shrouded in smoke. Furthermore, Brazil recently announced its intent to retaliate against the United States following President Trump's recent decision to formally impose 25 percent tariffs on a number of Brazilian imports, scheduled to take effect on July 22. Using Section 338 to impose tariffs against Canada, the only country to formally retaliate against the United States (except for China, which enjoys a trade detente with the United States, stemming from its leverage over rare earths), sends a clear message that the United States will punish trading partners that retaliate against it. Additionally, the move demonstrates that the president still has trade tools he can use without being burdened by the time-consuming processes required by Section 301 and Section 232 and following the Supreme Court's rejection of his International Emergency Economic Powers Act tariffs. Section 338 may also become increasingly relevant as the Trump administration prepares alternative actions to replace the Section 122 tariffs set to expire on Friday, July 24.
But the president may have chosen to impose the Section 338 tariffs now for a separate reason. U.S. negotiations with Mexico regarding the USMCA have advanced speedily, while the United States and Canada have yet to formally initiate negotiations. With U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer in Mexico City this week to meet with Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum following a third negotiating session, it is possible the two nations could announce an agreement in principle on a revamped USMCA. With Canada reluctant to negotiate with the United States, the threat of the Section 338 duties may be an attempt to do three things: build leverage, push Canada to join USMCA review talks, and pressure Ottawa to concede to U.S. demands. Such a dynamic would not be new for a USMCA negotiation. In President Trump's first term, the United States and Mexico held a series of productive negotiations, which the Canadians largely eschewed. President Trump would subsequently impose 25 percent tariffs on imports of Canadian steel products and 10 percent tariffs on aluminum products in May 2018, and also threaten to impose auto tariffs later that year. Canada later agreed to join the deal at the last minute.
Q3: Will these tariffs hold up under legal scrutiny?
A3: No court has yet interpreted Section 338. Broadly, the courts have been deferential to the executive branch on tariff matters. However, there are several potential legal questions that will need to be answered about the president's usage of Section 338. Namely, the statute says that the U.S. International Trade Commission is responsible for monitoring for unfair trade treatment of U.S. goods and reporting its findings and recommendations to the president. The White House's proclamation does not indicate whether that process occurred. Other legal analysts have said that Section 338 was implicitly repealed via later legislation.
The arguments presented in each of the three proclamations are subtly different, and each may create subsequent legal questions. In the automotive proclamation, the list of items tariffed does not in fact include automobiles or auto parts at all--with the exception of motorcycles--but rather targets a large number of non-auto-related goods. The dairy action, meanwhile, alleges that Canadian tariff-rate quotas have resulted in U.S. imports facing high tariffs, but researchers have pointed out that U.S. dairy exports to Canada remain far below the quota threshold after which the higher tariff rate comes into effect. Finally, the Section 338 duties would also likely violate the United States' World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. Canada has filed WTO cases against the United States for its 2025 tariff actions on steel, automobiles, and certain agricultural products, though these have not materially impacted U.S. policy.
Q4: How large would the impacted trade flows be?
A4: Each Section 338 proclamation imposes a 50 percent tariff on a different set of Canadian imports, covering a wide range of products including wine, hockey sticks, and cement. USTR reported that the tariffs will impact nearly $20 billion in Canadian imports. Per CSIS analysis of Trade Data Monitor data, in 2024, the total value of the targeted goods was $20.2 billion, equivalent to 4.9 percent of total U.S. imports from Canada that year. However, the United States had previously broadly refrained from imposing tariffs on USMCA-compliant goods. Tariffing goods that meet the agreement's strict provisions risks raising uncertainty about the willingness of the United States to abide by the terms of the agreement, as well as the sustainability of the interconnected auto supply chains--among others--between Canada and the United States. That said, it is still possible that the president could try to extend the 30-day deadline, or back away from the tariffs entirely should negotiations advance.
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Figure 2: New Tariffs Affect Around 5 Percent of U.S. Imports from Canada
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Q5: What are the impacts on other ongoing negotiations?
A5: The administration has always considered Section 338 as a viable backup option for imposing tariffs. The fact that Section 338 is being invoked now, and only against Canada, likely suggests that the administration only intends to use Section 338--or thinks it only has legal standing to do so--when trading partners have already retaliated against the United States. Under that logic, using Section 338 could now function as a warning to other U.S. trading partners in advance of expected Section 301 tariffs imposed for alleged failure to combat the importation of goods made with forced labor and for excess production of manufactured goods.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney responded by calling on both countries to resolve the trade disputes. Coercive measures of this kind have yet to produce concessions from Canada, but they reliably shrink the political room Carney has to engage the United States constructively. Mexico's more conciliatory posture has kept its negotiating track moving. Sustained threats have had the opposite effect on Canada.
Finally, the president's Section 338 tariffs will likely promote more uncertainty in the economic environment than previous tariff threats. Throughout the administration's ongoing tariff negotiations, tariff-free treatment for USMCA-compliant goods has largely remained steadfast, except for imports of Canadian steel and aluminum. Given the deeply interconnected U.S., Mexican, and Canadian economies, the Section 338 tariffs will hit U.S. businesses and consumers in a way other tariffs and tariff threats have not. The tariffs will also dramatically add to near-home economic instability for U.S. companies and investors, already heightened due to the United States' decision to not extend the USMCA.
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Christopher Gundermann is a fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Hugh Grant-Chapman is a fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS. Diego Marroquin Bitar is a fellow with the Americas Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-president-trumps-new-tariffs-canadian-imports
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Understanding President Trump's New Tariffs on Canadian Imports
On July 20, President Trump formally invoked Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to impose an additional 50 percent tariff against a significant range of Canadian products. The tariffs are scheduled to come into force on August 19. This marks the first time ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on July 21, 2026, involving Christopher Gundermann and Hugh Grant-Chapman, fellows with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business: * * * Understanding President Trump's New Tariffs on Canadian Imports On July 20, President Trump formally invoked Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to impose an additional 50 percent tariff against a significant range of Canadian products. The tariffs are scheduled to come into force on August 19. This marks the first timea U.S. president has used Section 338 to impose tariffs.
In three different proclamations, the White House argued that the tariffs are a response to Canadian "discriminatory" trade practices, namely provincial policies pulling U.S. alcohol from liquor stores, imposing tariffs and quotas on U.S. autos, and restricting the sale of U.S. dairy in Canada compared to other trading partners.
Canada is also a party to the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which is currently under review.
* * *
Figure 1: Canadian Imports of U.S. Automotive and Alcohol Products Have Declined Since 2025
* * *
Q1: What is Section 338?
A1: Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 gives the president the power to impose tariffs up to 50 percent or ban imports from a country that discriminates against U.S. products (after 30 days have elapsed from an initial presidential announcement). Crucially, Section 338 also gives the president the authority to impose tariffs of up to 50 percent against imports from a third country benefiting from the original country's discrimination, though President Trump has not invoked this authority here.
There are structural similarities between Section 338 and Section 301, which also allows the president to impose tariffs based on discriminatory practices. However, Section 338 has a less-clear investigative requirement, and a shorter timeline.
Notably, the president's Section 338 tariffs apply on goods regardless of their USMCA compliance status, but not on goods already subject to Section 232 duties.
Q2: Why is President Trump invoking Section 338 now?
A2: While the White House has said that the tariffs are being imposed in response to Canada's discriminatory treatment of U.S. products, the administration likely has additional motivations. President Trump previously threatened to impose tariffs on Canada following recent Canadian wildfires which left much of the U.S. shrouded in smoke. Furthermore, Brazil recently announced its intent to retaliate against the United States following President Trump's recent decision to formally impose 25 percent tariffs on a number of Brazilian imports, scheduled to take effect on July 22. Using Section 338 to impose tariffs against Canada, the only country to formally retaliate against the United States (except for China, which enjoys a trade detente with the United States, stemming from its leverage over rare earths), sends a clear message that the United States will punish trading partners that retaliate against it. Additionally, the move demonstrates that the president still has trade tools he can use without being burdened by the time-consuming processes required by Section 301 and Section 232 and following the Supreme Court's rejection of his International Emergency Economic Powers Act tariffs. Section 338 may also become increasingly relevant as the Trump administration prepares alternative actions to replace the Section 122 tariffs set to expire on Friday, July 24.
But the president may have chosen to impose the Section 338 tariffs now for a separate reason. U.S. negotiations with Mexico regarding the USMCA have advanced speedily, while the United States and Canada have yet to formally initiate negotiations. With U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer in Mexico City this week to meet with Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum following a third negotiating session, it is possible the two nations could announce an agreement in principle on a revamped USMCA. With Canada reluctant to negotiate with the United States, the threat of the Section 338 duties may be an attempt to do three things: build leverage, push Canada to join USMCA review talks, and pressure Ottawa to concede to U.S. demands. Such a dynamic would not be new for a USMCA negotiation. In President Trump's first term, the United States and Mexico held a series of productive negotiations, which the Canadians largely eschewed. President Trump would subsequently impose 25 percent tariffs on imports of Canadian steel products and 10 percent tariffs on aluminum products in May 2018, and also threaten to impose auto tariffs later that year. Canada later agreed to join the deal at the last minute.
Q3: Will these tariffs hold up under legal scrutiny?
A3: No court has yet interpreted Section 338. Broadly, the courts have been deferential to the executive branch on tariff matters. However, there are several potential legal questions that will need to be answered about the president's usage of Section 338. Namely, the statute says that the U.S. International Trade Commission is responsible for monitoring for unfair trade treatment of U.S. goods and reporting its findings and recommendations to the president. The White House's proclamation does not indicate whether that process occurred. Other legal analysts have said that Section 338 was implicitly repealed via later legislation.
The arguments presented in each of the three proclamations are subtly different, and each may create subsequent legal questions. In the automotive proclamation, the list of items tariffed does not in fact include automobiles or auto parts at all--with the exception of motorcycles--but rather targets a large number of non-auto-related goods. The dairy action, meanwhile, alleges that Canadian tariff-rate quotas have resulted in U.S. imports facing high tariffs, but researchers have pointed out that U.S. dairy exports to Canada remain far below the quota threshold after which the higher tariff rate comes into effect. Finally, the Section 338 duties would also likely violate the United States' World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. Canada has filed WTO cases against the United States for its 2025 tariff actions on steel, automobiles, and certain agricultural products, though these have not materially impacted U.S. policy.
Q4: How large would the impacted trade flows be?
A4: Each Section 338 proclamation imposes a 50 percent tariff on a different set of Canadian imports, covering a wide range of products including wine, hockey sticks, and cement. USTR reported that the tariffs will impact nearly $20 billion in Canadian imports. Per CSIS analysis of Trade Data Monitor data, in 2024, the total value of the targeted goods was $20.2 billion, equivalent to 4.9 percent of total U.S. imports from Canada that year. However, the United States had previously broadly refrained from imposing tariffs on USMCA-compliant goods. Tariffing goods that meet the agreement's strict provisions risks raising uncertainty about the willingness of the United States to abide by the terms of the agreement, as well as the sustainability of the interconnected auto supply chains--among others--between Canada and the United States. That said, it is still possible that the president could try to extend the 30-day deadline, or back away from the tariffs entirely should negotiations advance.
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Figure 2: New Tariffs Affect Around 5 Percent of U.S. Imports from Canada
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Q5: What are the impacts on other ongoing negotiations?
A5: The administration has always considered Section 338 as a viable backup option for imposing tariffs. The fact that Section 338 is being invoked now, and only against Canada, likely suggests that the administration only intends to use Section 338--or thinks it only has legal standing to do so--when trading partners have already retaliated against the United States. Under that logic, using Section 338 could now function as a warning to other U.S. trading partners in advance of expected Section 301 tariffs imposed for alleged failure to combat the importation of goods made with forced labor and for excess production of manufactured goods.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney responded by calling on both countries to resolve the trade disputes. Coercive measures of this kind have yet to produce concessions from Canada, but they reliably shrink the political room Carney has to engage the United States constructively. Mexico's more conciliatory posture has kept its negotiating track moving. Sustained threats have had the opposite effect on Canada.
Finally, the president's Section 338 tariffs will likely promote more uncertainty in the economic environment than previous tariff threats. Throughout the administration's ongoing tariff negotiations, tariff-free treatment for USMCA-compliant goods has largely remained steadfast, except for imports of Canadian steel and aluminum. Given the deeply interconnected U.S., Mexican, and Canadian economies, the Section 338 tariffs will hit U.S. businesses and consumers in a way other tariffs and tariff threats have not. The tariffs will also dramatically add to near-home economic instability for U.S. companies and investors, already heightened due to the United States' decision to not extend the USMCA.
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Christopher Gundermann is a fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Hugh Grant-Chapman is a fellow with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS. Diego Marroquin Bitar is a fellow with the Americas Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-president-trumps-new-tariffs-canadian-imports
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Arizona Chair on Today's Primary Election
WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 21, 2026:
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AFPI Arizona Chair on Today's Primary Election
PHOENIX, AZ - America First Policy Institute (AFPI) Arizona Chair Kimmie Dillon today urged Arizonans to head to the polls and cast their ballots for America First values in the state's primary election.
This year, the primary has permanently moved to the second-to-last Tuesday in July.
"Arizona's primary has been moved, and I don't want a single voter to miss it. Today is the day, so make a plan, get to the polls, and make your ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 21, 2026: * * * AFPI Arizona Chair on Today's Primary Election PHOENIX, AZ - America First Policy Institute (AFPI) Arizona Chair Kimmie Dillon today urged Arizonans to head to the polls and cast their ballots for America First values in the state's primary election. This year, the primary has permanently moved to the second-to-last Tuesday in July. "Arizona's primary has been moved, and I don't want a single voter to miss it. Today is the day, so make a plan, get to the polls, and make yourvoice heard," Dillon stated.
"Arizonans know exactly what they're voting for. This election is about the values that built the America First movement: safe and secure communities, a lower cost of living, the freedom for parents to choose their kids' schools, energy we control, and elections we can trust.
Vote to defend those priorities and send a message the entire country will hear."
Learn more about AFPI Arizona here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/state-chapter/america-first-arizona).
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-arizona-chair-on-todays-primary-election
[Category: ThinkTank]
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AFPI Arizona Chair on Today's Primary Election
PHOENIX, AZ - America First Policy Institute (AFPI) Arizona Chair Kimmie Dillon today urged Arizonans to head to the polls and cast their ballots for America First values in the state's primary election.
This year, the primary has permanently moved to the second-to-last Tuesday in July.
"Arizona's primary has been moved, and I don't want a single voter to miss it. Today is the day, so make a plan, get to the polls, and make your ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 22 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 21, 2026: * * * AFPI Arizona Chair on Today's Primary Election PHOENIX, AZ - America First Policy Institute (AFPI) Arizona Chair Kimmie Dillon today urged Arizonans to head to the polls and cast their ballots for America First values in the state's primary election. This year, the primary has permanently moved to the second-to-last Tuesday in July. "Arizona's primary has been moved, and I don't want a single voter to miss it. Today is the day, so make a plan, get to the polls, and make yourvoice heard," Dillon stated.
"Arizonans know exactly what they're voting for. This election is about the values that built the America First movement: safe and secure communities, a lower cost of living, the freedom for parents to choose their kids' schools, energy we control, and elections we can trust.
Vote to defend those priorities and send a message the entire country will hear."
Learn more about AFPI Arizona here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/state-chapter/america-first-arizona).
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-arizona-chair-on-todays-primary-election
[Category: ThinkTank]