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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor:
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Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary
Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal
Executive Summary
* The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system.
* Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice.
* Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership sought ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal Executive Summary * The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system. * Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice. * Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership soughtspokesman candidates there from 2019, while personnel in Yemen were linked to provincial media, central media structures, communications, and the Somalia network.
* The April 2025 killing of Abu Zaid and the September raid that killed al-Ansari exposed a Yemen-based network of media personnel and communications infrastructure. Irregularities in IS media output after al-Ansari's death raise questions about how much of the group's wider media system had come to rely on Yemen.
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On September 1, Yemen's Central State Security Agency announced that a raid in Say'un, Hadramawt, had killed Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, the official spokesman of the Islamic State (IS) (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). Yemeni counterterrorism forces and coalition special forces had located him in a residential house and attempted to arrest him before he opened fire and was fatally wounded (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). The operation also detained a man with him and recovered an explosive belt, two laptops, two tablets, and five phones (South24; Long War Journal, September 1).
The raid killed more than IS's public spokesman. Yemeni jihadist sources and news outlets identify al-Ansari as Mithaq Thabit Haytham al-Hujayli, a Yemeni from Lahj who had simultaneously governed IS's Yemen province since 2020 under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (Sheba Intelligence; Jerusalem Post, September 1; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025). He had survived the destruction of the group's stronghold in Qayfa, al-Bayda, escaped to Marib with a small number of survivors, and rebuilt the province after much of its senior leadership was killed or captured (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, June 26, 2019; Yemen Agency Press, August 14, 2020; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023).
Al-Hujayli's dual role helps explain a larger dynamic. IS-Yemen had almost disappeared as a battlefield province, but Yemen had not disappeared from the IS's organization. Daniel Milton found that the branch's last recorded attack in al-Naba occurred in summer 2022, after 174 reported operations since summer 2018 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Instead, Yemen had become increasingly important to the group's media functions beyond the country. In February 2025, the UN Monitoring Team assessed that the weakened branch--then estimated at only 100-150 fighters--nevertheless retained an "experienced media and propaganda wing" and had played a role in advocating that IS's overall leader be located outside the Iraq-Syria theater (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025). A year later, the Monitoring Team reported that "key [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] ISIL media figures were in Yemen coordinating with ISIL-Somalia" and that the killing of one former core-media official had disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The province supplied IS's global spokesman, housed media-linked personnel, and remained tied to Somali-based financial and communication networks (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17-18, 2025; CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4). Al-Ansari's death therefore exposed a media role that attack statistics had largely concealed.
Yemen Becomes a Media Sanctuary
IS began looking to Yemen for media personnel before the province lost Qayfa. Sources familiar with IS-Yemen's internal communications say that as early as 2019, central leadership asked the province to nominate potential spokesmen and provide biographies and recordings of their sermons (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17-18, 2025). The request came as IS was losing its territorial center and senior leadership in Iraq and Syria. Founder and the first leader of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in October 2019, followed roughly a day later by then-spokesman Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir (Reuters, October 28, 2019). Yemen was therefore already being considered as a source of personnel for central media functions as pressure on the organization's core intensified.
That role survived the branch's military collapse. In August 2020, Houthi forces overran IS positions in Wald Rabi' and Qayfa, killing much of the remaining leadership and fighters (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 5, 2020; Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). Under al-Hujayli, IS-Yemen became smaller and less visible, with Yemeni sources describing a deliberate effort to rebuild away from the attrition of its earlier territorial presence.
The province nevertheless remained tied to the wider organization. IS central leaders appeared to direct the Somalia-based al-Karrar office to fund IS nodes in Yemen through the Umm al-Qura regional office, while UN reporting later highlighted Yemen's facilitation and financial links to al-Karrar across the Red Sea (United Nations Security Council, July 15, 2022; CTC Sentinel, September 2024). Yemen had lost territorial weight, but it retained access to funding, central structures, and inter-provincial networks--assets that gave it importance beyond its local attack tempo.
Al-Ansari Was More Than the Spokesman
Al-Hujayli combined religious credentials, security experience, and provincial leadership before becoming IS's global spokesman. He joined IS in 2015, served in IS-Yemen's Sharia apparatus, and later became deputy security official in Qayfa (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025; Okaz; South24, September 1). He had also studied Quranic recitation and held certifications in several readings (authors' interviews with one of al-Hujayli's relatives and other IS-Yemen members, March 2, 2024). An official 2018 release shows him delivering an Eid sermon in al-Bayda (Bayda, Islamic State, Wilayat al-Bayda, "Days of Thanks and Remembrance," 2018). After Qayfa collapsed, al-Hujayli emerged from the surviving leadership of a province weakened by internal divisions (Long War Journal, December 23, 2025). Sources say that despite the presence of older, more experienced candidates, he combined religious and security credentials with broader acceptance among competing elements, leading the central leadership to appoint him governor under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen members, April 15, 2023, and December 20, 2025).
In August 2023, the provincial governor became IS's global spokesman. After Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham captured Abu Umar al-Muhajir in Syria, al-Hujayli appeared as Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in an al-Furqan recording announcing the death of Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi and the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (Counter Extremism Project, August 3, 2023; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi; Middle East Forum, August 4, 2023; Enab Baladi, September 28, 2023; United Nations Security Council, January 31, 2024). In his February 21 address, al-Hujayli directed messaging toward multiple theaters (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He called for attacks against Syria's transitional government, praised attacks including New Orleans and Bondi Beach, and discussed IS campaigns in Somalia, Nigeria, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He also emphasized the importance of both official IS propaganda and unofficial supporter media while warning unofficial outlets not to depart from official ideology and guidance (Counter Extremism Project, February 23).
"Spokesman" therefore understates his position. Al-Hujayli simultaneously governed IS-Yemen and served as the organization's authorized global voice, directly linking a marginal battlefield province to a central IS media function (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17, 2025; authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025 and April 4; Counter Extremism Project, February 23; Sheba Intelligence, September 1).
Keeping Yemen Quiet
The province's post-Qayfa strategy helped create the environment in which that function could operate. One element was reducing confrontation with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). A member who carried communications between al-Hujayli and other leaders said he indicated that he did not want renewed fighting with AQAP (authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member, September 4, 2025). Internally, al-Hujayli continued to regard AQAP as an ideological enemy but argued that circumstances required suspending the confrontation (authors' interview with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025, and April 15, 2023). Indeed, there have been no reported clashes between IS-Yemen and AQAP since February 2020 despite continued hostile rhetoric (ACLED, December 14, 2020; April 6, 2023).
Finance also became less visible. Sources inside the province say IS-Yemen turned to kidnapping for ransom and conducted operations without claiming them publicly (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with Yemeni jihadist sources along with leaked IS-Yemen documents, April 17, 2023). NewsYemen linked the June 2022 kidnapping in Tarim of the son of a Hadrami businessman Abdullah al-Junayd, known as al-Maher, to IS and described the kidnapping as part of the branch's effort to find new revenue after severe financial losses (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022). Sources say proceeds from the ransom and other operations were used to repay debts and finance vehicles, explosives-related materials, and training (Yemen Agency Press, June 20, 2022; NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025).
Public reporting consequently captured only part of the province's activity. Milton noted that IS-Yemen's last recorded attack was in summer 2022 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Yet Yemeni sources describe continued financing, training, procurement, and organizational activity during that period (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025; United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). The province was fading from IS's public battlefield while becoming more useful behind its media front.
The Network Behind the Voice
Al-Hujayli was not the only media-linked figure operating from Yemen. Sources identify Khalid Ahmad Ali al-Ariqi, known as Abu Zaid al-Muhajir, as IS-Yemen's media official and link part of the organization's broader media activity to the province (information provided in 2022 by a jihadist security source; subsequently corroborated by authors' interviews with multiple IS-Yemen jihadist sources, September 4, 2025; Yemen News Now, October 5, 2025). Yemen also had an established media role: an IS image from al-Bayda shows al-Naba being produced locally, while an April 2020 IS-Yemen production addressed al-Qaeda's positions in Yemen, Afghanistan, Mali, and elsewhere, demonstrating propaganda activity beyond the local battlefield (Long War Journal, May 4, 2020).
Al-Ariqi was killed in an April 2025 airstrike in Ataq, Shabwa, which Yemeni security sources attribute to the United States (Yemen Window, April 3, 2025; authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025; Barran Press, April 12, 2025). The UN Monitoring Team later described an "Abu Zaid" killed that month as a former head of IS's core media office and a communications node between senior leader Abu Khadija and IS-Somalia, assessing that his death disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The alias and date correspond, although the UN report does not provide a full name.
The strike also exposed the infrastructure around the network. Hours later, security forces raided an apartment al-Ariqi had reportedly visited (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemeni security sources say U.S. counterterrorism personnel focused heavily on laptops, phones, and other electronics (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Another media- and communications-linked IS member, Humam Harhara, described by sources as involved in external communications and official media activity, reportedly tried to destroy equipment before he was killed, while another member was detained and surviving devices were seized (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemen's significance therefore extended beyond al-Ansari: the province contained media personnel, communications infrastructure, and inter-provincial links serving the wider IS network (CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4).
Al-Ansari's death may already be testing how much of that media system depended on Yemen. On September 13, Caleb Weiss, a researcher focused on jihadism in Africa and who tracks IS propaganda, observed that IS media output had become limited and sporadic and that al-Naba releases were appearing on a delayed schedule since al-Ansari's death (X/@caleb_weiss7, September 13). Al-Naba has not stopped publishing--Jihadology records issues 563 and 564 on September 3 and 10--but the broader output has become less regular (Jihadology, September 3; September 10).
Conclusion
Al-Ansari's death exposed IS-Yemen's trajectory after losing Qayfa. Its battlefield decline concealed another kind of importance: the province remained connected to central leadership and inter-provincial networks while hosting personnel who served IS's global media apparatus. UN reporting in 2025 and 2026 identified IS-Yemen as a media and propaganda hub linked to IS-Somalia and to the group's wider media apparatus (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). Al-Hujayli's simultaneous roles as provincial governor and global spokesman placed Yemen directly inside that system.
That concentration also helps explain renewed counterterrorism attention to IS personnel in Yemen. Yemeni security sources attribute the April 2025 Ataq strike that killed Abu Zaid to the United States, while follow-on operations reached communications personnel, electronic devices, and supporting infrastructure (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources April 12, 2025; authors' interviews with a defected IS-Yemen leader who also confirmed the information, October 4, 2025; subsequent corroboration by pro-IS channels). The September Say'un raid then reached al-Hujayli himself. The pattern suggests that IS-Yemen's value as a target increasingly lay not in its ability to hold territory or generate attacks, but in the central functions and personnel operating from the province.
The implications extend beyond Yemen. A province can become militarily marginal while remaining important to IS's global organization as central functions are dispersed across geographically distant branches. The limited and irregular media output observed after al-Ansari's death is too early to establish direct dependence, particularly because al-Naba has continued to appear, but it still indicates possible disruption within a system already shown to have significant personnel in Yemen. More broadly, the case shows the limits of judging an IS province primarily by attacks, manpower, or territorial control. Organizational importance may instead lie in functions such as media, communications, finance, or leadership support that serve the movement across theaters. IS-Yemen's attack tempo made it appear peripheral; its media role showed that it had become part of the infrastructure through which IS sustained a global organization and spoke to a global audience.
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Dr. Sara Harmouch is the CEO of H9 Defense, a research and advisory consultancy specializing in national security, counterterrorism, geopolitical risk, threat assessments, and open-source intelligence (OSINT). A counterterrorism expert and national security researcher, she focuses on political violence, terrorism, militancy, armed groups, Islamist militant organizations, irregular warfare, non-state actor behavior, alliance dynamics, and the conditions under which militant groups shift from domestic to international violence.
Mohammad Bin Faisal is a journalist and researcher specializing in Islamist extremist groups, with a focus on the ideological and organizational dimensions of extremism and terrorism in Yemen, the Middle East, and East Africa.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/yemen-becomes-the-islamic-states-media-sanctuary/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary
Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal
Executive Summary
* The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system.
* Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice.
* Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership sought ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Yemen Becomes the Islamic State's Media Sanctuary Sara Harmouch | Mohammad Bin Faisal Executive Summary * The September 1 killing of Islamic State (IS) spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in Say'un exposed Yemen's larger role in the organization's media system. * Yemeni sources identify al-Ansari as IS-Yemen's governor, making him more than the organization's public voice. * Yemen had become a sanctuary for IS media functions. Central leadership soughtspokesman candidates there from 2019, while personnel in Yemen were linked to provincial media, central media structures, communications, and the Somalia network.
* The April 2025 killing of Abu Zaid and the September raid that killed al-Ansari exposed a Yemen-based network of media personnel and communications infrastructure. Irregularities in IS media output after al-Ansari's death raise questions about how much of the group's wider media system had come to rely on Yemen.
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On September 1, Yemen's Central State Security Agency announced that a raid in Say'un, Hadramawt, had killed Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, the official spokesman of the Islamic State (IS) (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). Yemeni counterterrorism forces and coalition special forces had located him in a residential house and attempted to arrest him before he opened fire and was fatally wounded (Al-Jazeera; Long War Journal, September 1). The operation also detained a man with him and recovered an explosive belt, two laptops, two tablets, and five phones (South24; Long War Journal, September 1).
The raid killed more than IS's public spokesman. Yemeni jihadist sources and news outlets identify al-Ansari as Mithaq Thabit Haytham al-Hujayli, a Yemeni from Lahj who had simultaneously governed IS's Yemen province since 2020 under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (Sheba Intelligence; Jerusalem Post, September 1; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025). He had survived the destruction of the group's stronghold in Qayfa, al-Bayda, escaped to Marib with a small number of survivors, and rebuilt the province after much of its senior leadership was killed or captured (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, June 26, 2019; Yemen Agency Press, August 14, 2020; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023).
Al-Hujayli's dual role helps explain a larger dynamic. IS-Yemen had almost disappeared as a battlefield province, but Yemen had not disappeared from the IS's organization. Daniel Milton found that the branch's last recorded attack in al-Naba occurred in summer 2022, after 174 reported operations since summer 2018 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Instead, Yemen had become increasingly important to the group's media functions beyond the country. In February 2025, the UN Monitoring Team assessed that the weakened branch--then estimated at only 100-150 fighters--nevertheless retained an "experienced media and propaganda wing" and had played a role in advocating that IS's overall leader be located outside the Iraq-Syria theater (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025). A year later, the Monitoring Team reported that "key [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] ISIL media figures were in Yemen coordinating with ISIL-Somalia" and that the killing of one former core-media official had disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The province supplied IS's global spokesman, housed media-linked personnel, and remained tied to Somali-based financial and communication networks (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17-18, 2025; CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4). Al-Ansari's death therefore exposed a media role that attack statistics had largely concealed.
Yemen Becomes a Media Sanctuary
IS began looking to Yemen for media personnel before the province lost Qayfa. Sources familiar with IS-Yemen's internal communications say that as early as 2019, central leadership asked the province to nominate potential spokesmen and provide biographies and recordings of their sermons (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17-18, 2025). The request came as IS was losing its territorial center and senior leadership in Iraq and Syria. Founder and the first leader of IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in October 2019, followed roughly a day later by then-spokesman Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir (Reuters, October 28, 2019). Yemen was therefore already being considered as a source of personnel for central media functions as pressure on the organization's core intensified.
That role survived the branch's military collapse. In August 2020, Houthi forces overran IS positions in Wald Rabi' and Qayfa, killing much of the remaining leadership and fighters (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 5, 2020; Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). Under al-Hujayli, IS-Yemen became smaller and less visible, with Yemeni sources describing a deliberate effort to rebuild away from the attrition of its earlier territorial presence.
The province nevertheless remained tied to the wider organization. IS central leaders appeared to direct the Somalia-based al-Karrar office to fund IS nodes in Yemen through the Umm al-Qura regional office, while UN reporting later highlighted Yemen's facilitation and financial links to al-Karrar across the Red Sea (United Nations Security Council, July 15, 2022; CTC Sentinel, September 2024). Yemen had lost territorial weight, but it retained access to funding, central structures, and inter-provincial networks--assets that gave it importance beyond its local attack tempo.
Al-Ansari Was More Than the Spokesman
Al-Hujayli combined religious credentials, security experience, and provincial leadership before becoming IS's global spokesman. He joined IS in 2015, served in IS-Yemen's Sharia apparatus, and later became deputy security official in Qayfa (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, April 15, 2023 and December 17, 2025; Okaz; South24, September 1). He had also studied Quranic recitation and held certifications in several readings (authors' interviews with one of al-Hujayli's relatives and other IS-Yemen members, March 2, 2024). An official 2018 release shows him delivering an Eid sermon in al-Bayda (Bayda, Islamic State, Wilayat al-Bayda, "Days of Thanks and Remembrance," 2018). After Qayfa collapsed, al-Hujayli emerged from the surviving leadership of a province weakened by internal divisions (Long War Journal, December 23, 2025). Sources say that despite the presence of older, more experienced candidates, he combined religious and security credentials with broader acceptance among competing elements, leading the central leadership to appoint him governor under the name Abu Mus'ab al-Muhajir (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen members, April 15, 2023, and December 20, 2025).
In August 2023, the provincial governor became IS's global spokesman. After Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham captured Abu Umar al-Muhajir in Syria, al-Hujayli appeared as Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari in an al-Furqan recording announcing the death of Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi and the appointment of Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (Counter Extremism Project, August 3, 2023; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi; Middle East Forum, August 4, 2023; Enab Baladi, September 28, 2023; United Nations Security Council, January 31, 2024). In his February 21 address, al-Hujayli directed messaging toward multiple theaters (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He called for attacks against Syria's transitional government, praised attacks including New Orleans and Bondi Beach, and discussed IS campaigns in Somalia, Nigeria, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mozambique (Counter Extremism Project, February 23). He also emphasized the importance of both official IS propaganda and unofficial supporter media while warning unofficial outlets not to depart from official ideology and guidance (Counter Extremism Project, February 23).
"Spokesman" therefore understates his position. Al-Hujayli simultaneously governed IS-Yemen and served as the organization's authorized global voice, directly linking a marginal battlefield province to a central IS media function (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources, December 17, 2025; authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025 and April 4; Counter Extremism Project, February 23; Sheba Intelligence, September 1).
Keeping Yemen Quiet
The province's post-Qayfa strategy helped create the environment in which that function could operate. One element was reducing confrontation with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 29, 2021). A member who carried communications between al-Hujayli and other leaders said he indicated that he did not want renewed fighting with AQAP (authors' interviews with an IS-Yemen member, September 4, 2025). Internally, al-Hujayli continued to regard AQAP as an ideological enemy but argued that circumstances required suspending the confrontation (authors' interview with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, September 4, 2025, and April 15, 2023). Indeed, there have been no reported clashes between IS-Yemen and AQAP since February 2020 despite continued hostile rhetoric (ACLED, December 14, 2020; April 6, 2023).
Finance also became less visible. Sources inside the province say IS-Yemen turned to kidnapping for ransom and conducted operations without claiming them publicly (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with Yemeni jihadist sources along with leaked IS-Yemen documents, April 17, 2023). NewsYemen linked the June 2022 kidnapping in Tarim of the son of a Hadrami businessman Abdullah al-Junayd, known as al-Maher, to IS and described the kidnapping as part of the branch's effort to find new revenue after severe financial losses (NewsYemen, October 31, 2022). Sources say proceeds from the ransom and other operations were used to repay debts and finance vehicles, explosives-related materials, and training (Yemen Agency Press, June 20, 2022; NewsYemen, October 31, 2022; authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025).
Public reporting consequently captured only part of the province's activity. Milton noted that IS-Yemen's last recorded attack was in summer 2022 (CTC Sentinel, November-December 2025). Yet Yemeni sources describe continued financing, training, procurement, and organizational activity during that period (authors' interviews with IS-Yemen jihadist sources and an IS-Yemen member close to Hujayli, April 15, 2023; September 4, 2025; United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). The province was fading from IS's public battlefield while becoming more useful behind its media front.
The Network Behind the Voice
Al-Hujayli was not the only media-linked figure operating from Yemen. Sources identify Khalid Ahmad Ali al-Ariqi, known as Abu Zaid al-Muhajir, as IS-Yemen's media official and link part of the organization's broader media activity to the province (information provided in 2022 by a jihadist security source; subsequently corroborated by authors' interviews with multiple IS-Yemen jihadist sources, September 4, 2025; Yemen News Now, October 5, 2025). Yemen also had an established media role: an IS image from al-Bayda shows al-Naba being produced locally, while an April 2020 IS-Yemen production addressed al-Qaeda's positions in Yemen, Afghanistan, Mali, and elsewhere, demonstrating propaganda activity beyond the local battlefield (Long War Journal, May 4, 2020).
Al-Ariqi was killed in an April 2025 airstrike in Ataq, Shabwa, which Yemeni security sources attribute to the United States (Yemen Window, April 3, 2025; authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025; Barran Press, April 12, 2025). The UN Monitoring Team later described an "Abu Zaid" killed that month as a former head of IS's core media office and a communications node between senior leader Abu Khadija and IS-Somalia, assessing that his death disrupted IS media operations (United Nations Security Council, February 4). The alias and date correspond, although the UN report does not provide a full name.
The strike also exposed the infrastructure around the network. Hours later, security forces raided an apartment al-Ariqi had reportedly visited (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemeni security sources say U.S. counterterrorism personnel focused heavily on laptops, phones, and other electronics (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Another media- and communications-linked IS member, Humam Harhara, described by sources as involved in external communications and official media activity, reportedly tried to destroy equipment before he was killed, while another member was detained and surviving devices were seized (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources familiar with the Ataq operation, April 10, 2025). Yemen's significance therefore extended beyond al-Ansari: the province contained media personnel, communications infrastructure, and inter-provincial links serving the wider IS network (CTC Sentinel, September 2024; United Nations Security Council, February 4).
Al-Ansari's death may already be testing how much of that media system depended on Yemen. On September 13, Caleb Weiss, a researcher focused on jihadism in Africa and who tracks IS propaganda, observed that IS media output had become limited and sporadic and that al-Naba releases were appearing on a delayed schedule since al-Ansari's death (X/@caleb_weiss7, September 13). Al-Naba has not stopped publishing--Jihadology records issues 563 and 564 on September 3 and 10--but the broader output has become less regular (Jihadology, September 3; September 10).
Conclusion
Al-Ansari's death exposed IS-Yemen's trajectory after losing Qayfa. Its battlefield decline concealed another kind of importance: the province remained connected to central leadership and inter-provincial networks while hosting personnel who served IS's global media apparatus. UN reporting in 2025 and 2026 identified IS-Yemen as a media and propaganda hub linked to IS-Somalia and to the group's wider media apparatus (United Nations Security Council, February 6, 2025; February 4). Al-Hujayli's simultaneous roles as provincial governor and global spokesman placed Yemen directly inside that system.
That concentration also helps explain renewed counterterrorism attention to IS personnel in Yemen. Yemeni security sources attribute the April 2025 Ataq strike that killed Abu Zaid to the United States, while follow-on operations reached communications personnel, electronic devices, and supporting infrastructure (authors' interviews with Yemeni security sources April 12, 2025; authors' interviews with a defected IS-Yemen leader who also confirmed the information, October 4, 2025; subsequent corroboration by pro-IS channels). The September Say'un raid then reached al-Hujayli himself. The pattern suggests that IS-Yemen's value as a target increasingly lay not in its ability to hold territory or generate attacks, but in the central functions and personnel operating from the province.
The implications extend beyond Yemen. A province can become militarily marginal while remaining important to IS's global organization as central functions are dispersed across geographically distant branches. The limited and irregular media output observed after al-Ansari's death is too early to establish direct dependence, particularly because al-Naba has continued to appear, but it still indicates possible disruption within a system already shown to have significant personnel in Yemen. More broadly, the case shows the limits of judging an IS province primarily by attacks, manpower, or territorial control. Organizational importance may instead lie in functions such as media, communications, finance, or leadership support that serve the movement across theaters. IS-Yemen's attack tempo made it appear peripheral; its media role showed that it had become part of the infrastructure through which IS sustained a global organization and spoke to a global audience.
* * *
Dr. Sara Harmouch is the CEO of H9 Defense, a research and advisory consultancy specializing in national security, counterterrorism, geopolitical risk, threat assessments, and open-source intelligence (OSINT). A counterterrorism expert and national security researcher, she focuses on political violence, terrorism, militancy, armed groups, Islamist militant organizations, irregular warfare, non-state actor behavior, alliance dynamics, and the conditions under which militant groups shift from domestic to international violence.
Mohammad Bin Faisal is a journalist and researcher specializing in Islamist extremist groups, with a focus on the ideological and organizational dimensions of extremism and terrorism in Yemen, the Middle East, and East Africa.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/yemen-becomes-the-islamic-states-media-sanctuary/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Turkiye Expands Its Security Strategy in Libya
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor:
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Turkiye Expands its Security Strategy in Libya
Brian G. Karamuka
Executive Summary:
* Turkiye is broadening its Libya strategy by cultivating partnerships with rival government factions and shifting from intervention to long-term security brokerage.
* Ankara is anchoring its position in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean through military cooperation, maritime agreements, and economic engagement.
* Turkiye's expanding role challenges regional rivals ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Turkiye Expands its Security Strategy in Libya Brian G. Karamuka Executive Summary: * Turkiye is broadening its Libya strategy by cultivating partnerships with rival government factions and shifting from intervention to long-term security brokerage. * Ankara is anchoring its position in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean through military cooperation, maritime agreements, and economic engagement. * Turkiye's expanding role challenges regional rivalsand carries significant implications for U.S. interests, European energy security, and North African stability.
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In late May, Turkiye hosted military training exercises that brought together personnel from Libya's rival armed factions for the first time since the country's post-2011 civil war began. The exercises saw the unprecedented participation of soldiers aligned with both the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) and the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) under a single Libyan flag (RFI, May 23). The initiative signals Ankara's evolving approach to Libya; one that goes beyond supporting a single faction and positions Turkiye as a security broker capable of engaging both of the country's power centers. By cultivating both power centers, Ankara could gain greater leverage over any future political settlement and security architecture.
Since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, Libya has remained divided between two competing governments and military establishments. The GNU, headquartered in Tripoli and recognized by the United Nations, controls much of western Libya with political and military support from the European Union. In contrast, General Khalifa Haftar's LNA dominates eastern Libya and much of the country's oil-rich interior, relying on support from Egypt, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (Council on Foreign Relations, June 3). External support has enabled both factions to consolidate control over their respective territories, but neither side yet possesses sufficient capability to defeat the other (Geopolitical Intelligence Services, November 13, 2025).
Turkiye's military intervention in Libya marked a turning point in both the country's civil war and Ankara's regional security strategy. After General Haftar's 2019 offensive against Tripoli, Ankara intervened on behalf of the Government of National Accord (GNA)--Libya's interim governing structure between 2015 and 2021--preventing the collapse of the UN-recognized government and altering the conflict's trajectory (Al-Jazeera, June 5, 2020). Beyond preserving a friendly government in Tripoli, the intervention established Turkiye as one of Libya's most influential external security actors. It demonstrated Ankara's willingness to use military power to advance its geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkiye initially relied on military advisers, intelligence support, drones, and other defense assistance to halt the LNA's advance; however, as the balance of power shifted in favor of Tripoli, Ankara institutionalized its presence through a series of defense and maritime agreements with the GNA, including the landmark 2019 Turkey-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, focused on security cooperation and Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries (The New Arab, September 30, 2025).
The intervention later evolved into a permanent military footprint, shifting Ankara's role from an external supporter to a long-term security partner (Nordic Monitor, December 25, 2025). Turkiye established a naval presence at the Port of Misrata, expanded operations from Al-Watiya Air Base after its recapture from Haftar's forces, deployed advanced military systems--including Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and air defense assets--and provided extensive training, logistical, and technical support to Libyan forces.
Turkiye's interest in Libya extends well beyond stabilizing its internal conflict. Situated at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Sahel, Libya serves as a critical gateway linking Europe and Africa. It holds some of the continent's largest proven oil and natural gas reserves (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 18, 2020). For Ankara, securing a long-term foothold in Libya has therefore become central not only to its North Africa policy but also to its broader ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Building on the defense agreements signed in 2019, Turkiye and the Tripoli-based government concluded a maritime Memorandum of Understanding establishing an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that cuts across waters also claimed by Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt (United Nations, 2019).
The maritime agreement also gave Turkiye a legal and political framework to contest competing maritime claims, while granting Turkish firms preferential access to future offshore energy projects (Middle East Forum, April 12). The region's considerable hydrocarbon potential underpins these ambitions. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Eastern Mediterranean contains approximately 107 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, making control over maritime access increasingly consequential for regional competition (USGS, March 2010). By anchoring its military presence in Libya to expansive maritime claims, Ankara has enhanced its ability to pursue offshore energy exploration, project power across the Eastern Mediterranean, and shape Europe's evolving energy landscape.
Turkiye's expanding role in Libya is driven by objectives that extend well beyond preserving the Tripoli-based government. By establishing itself as a long-term security partner, Ankara has sought to counter the influence of regional rivals--including Greece, Cyprus, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt--who maintain interests in Libya (Libya Tribune, June 10, 2025). A sustained military presence also reinforces Turkiye's position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by enhancing its role on the Alliance's increasingly contested southern flank, where terrorism, migration, and great power competition are becoming central security concerns. At the same time, Ankara has begun recalibrating its Libya strategy. Rather than remaining exclusively aligned with the UN-recognized GNU, Turkiye has gradually expanded engagement with the LNA. Relations began improving in late 2023, culminating in the reopening of Turkiye's consulate in Benghazi in 2024 and high-level meetings between Turkish military officials and Haftar in 2025 (Turkish Minute, August 26, 2025).
Turkiye's military diplomacy has mirrored Libya's political reality. In 2025, Turkish naval vessels made port calls in both Tripoli and Benghazi during the same deployment--the first such engagement involving both rival administrations. The visits included naval training activities and consultations with defense officials from eastern and western Libya, including Major General Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the LNA, on future military cooperation under the banner of "One Libya, One Army" (DefenseNews, August 26, 2025). Together, these developments suggest Turkiye is transitioning from backing a single faction to positioning itself as a security broker capable of shaping Libya's military and political future.
This rapprochement gained momentum following Haftar's April 2025 visit to Ankara, where the LNA's Chief of Staff of Land Forces met with senior Turkish military officials to discuss expanding defense cooperation (Libya Tribune, September 26, 2025). Reports indicate the two sides have since negotiated agreements covering joint naval exercises, military training, advisory support, and the potential provision of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (Libya Tribune, September 27, 2025). By replicating the security partnerships it has built in eastern Libya, Ankara seeks to broaden support for the 2019 Turkiye-Libya maritime agreement, reinforce its long-term military presence, and strengthen the political legitimacy of its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The rapprochement has produced tangible political and military outcomes. Most notably, the LNA has reportedly considered ratifying the 2019 maritime Memorandum of Understanding originally signed by the Tripoli-based GNU. This move would significantly strengthen the agreement's political legitimacy. Military cooperation has likewise accelerated. Earlier this year, personnel from Libya's rival military factions participated together in Turkiye's Efes-2026 multinational exercise, marking the first time both sides trained under a single Libyan flag (DefenseNews, May 6, 2025).
Turkiye's engagement in Libya forms part of a broader strategy to establish a network of military and commercial footholds along Africa's most strategically important maritime corridors. Ankara has prioritized partnerships with Libya, Somalia, and Sudan, viewing their ports as gateways to the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, respectively. By expanding its presence at facilities such as Somalia's Mogadishu Port, Sudan's Suakin Port, and key Libyan ports, Turkiye has sought to strengthen its influence over critical maritime trade routes while advancing its energy and security interests (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025). A growing military footprint has reinforced this maritime strategy. Turkiye's two principal African bases are in Somalia and Libya, giving Ankara forward operating positions on both the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Opened in 2017, the TURKSOM military base in Mogadishu is Turkiye's largest overseas military installation and serves as the centerpiece of its security partnership with Somalia (Evrensel, July 29, 2025). The facility reportedly hosts more than 1,000 Turkish personnel and can train over 10,000 Somali troops, while providing logistics, operational support, and military assistance (Turkish Minute, August 6, 2025).
Turkiye has increasingly sought to differentiate itself from Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) by presenting itself as a flexible, responsive, and operationally capable security partner for African states confronting insurgencies, Islamist militant groups, and separatist movements (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 8, 2025). This approach has been particularly evident in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, where Ankara has paired defense cooperation with economic engagement to deepen its regional influence. Turkiye has also aligned with Morocco's Atlantic Initiative, which aims to give landlocked Sahelian states access to the Atlantic Ocean, signaling Ankara's support for emerging regional connectivity projects. Beyond security cooperation, Turkiye continues to expand its economic footprint through maritime and infrastructure investments, including supplying a modern tugboat to Kenya and supporting port and infrastructure development in Tanzania and Senegal (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025).
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Brian G. Karamuka is a graduate student at the Institute of World Politics (IWP). He has worked with several organizations in the DC area, focusing on U.S.-Africa relations, great power competition in Africa, as well as security and governance issues on the continent.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/turkiye-expands-its-security-strategy-in-libya/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Turkiye Expands its Security Strategy in Libya
Brian G. Karamuka
Executive Summary:
* Turkiye is broadening its Libya strategy by cultivating partnerships with rival government factions and shifting from intervention to long-term security brokerage.
* Ankara is anchoring its position in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean through military cooperation, maritime agreements, and economic engagement.
* Turkiye's expanding role challenges regional rivals ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Terrorism Monitor: * * * Turkiye Expands its Security Strategy in Libya Brian G. Karamuka Executive Summary: * Turkiye is broadening its Libya strategy by cultivating partnerships with rival government factions and shifting from intervention to long-term security brokerage. * Ankara is anchoring its position in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean through military cooperation, maritime agreements, and economic engagement. * Turkiye's expanding role challenges regional rivalsand carries significant implications for U.S. interests, European energy security, and North African stability.
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In late May, Turkiye hosted military training exercises that brought together personnel from Libya's rival armed factions for the first time since the country's post-2011 civil war began. The exercises saw the unprecedented participation of soldiers aligned with both the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) and the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) under a single Libyan flag (RFI, May 23). The initiative signals Ankara's evolving approach to Libya; one that goes beyond supporting a single faction and positions Turkiye as a security broker capable of engaging both of the country's power centers. By cultivating both power centers, Ankara could gain greater leverage over any future political settlement and security architecture.
Since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, Libya has remained divided between two competing governments and military establishments. The GNU, headquartered in Tripoli and recognized by the United Nations, controls much of western Libya with political and military support from the European Union. In contrast, General Khalifa Haftar's LNA dominates eastern Libya and much of the country's oil-rich interior, relying on support from Egypt, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (Council on Foreign Relations, June 3). External support has enabled both factions to consolidate control over their respective territories, but neither side yet possesses sufficient capability to defeat the other (Geopolitical Intelligence Services, November 13, 2025).
Turkiye's military intervention in Libya marked a turning point in both the country's civil war and Ankara's regional security strategy. After General Haftar's 2019 offensive against Tripoli, Ankara intervened on behalf of the Government of National Accord (GNA)--Libya's interim governing structure between 2015 and 2021--preventing the collapse of the UN-recognized government and altering the conflict's trajectory (Al-Jazeera, June 5, 2020). Beyond preserving a friendly government in Tripoli, the intervention established Turkiye as one of Libya's most influential external security actors. It demonstrated Ankara's willingness to use military power to advance its geopolitical interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkiye initially relied on military advisers, intelligence support, drones, and other defense assistance to halt the LNA's advance; however, as the balance of power shifted in favor of Tripoli, Ankara institutionalized its presence through a series of defense and maritime agreements with the GNA, including the landmark 2019 Turkey-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, focused on security cooperation and Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries (The New Arab, September 30, 2025).
The intervention later evolved into a permanent military footprint, shifting Ankara's role from an external supporter to a long-term security partner (Nordic Monitor, December 25, 2025). Turkiye established a naval presence at the Port of Misrata, expanded operations from Al-Watiya Air Base after its recapture from Haftar's forces, deployed advanced military systems--including Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and air defense assets--and provided extensive training, logistical, and technical support to Libyan forces.
Turkiye's interest in Libya extends well beyond stabilizing its internal conflict. Situated at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Sahel, Libya serves as a critical gateway linking Europe and Africa. It holds some of the continent's largest proven oil and natural gas reserves (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 18, 2020). For Ankara, securing a long-term foothold in Libya has therefore become central not only to its North Africa policy but also to its broader ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Building on the defense agreements signed in 2019, Turkiye and the Tripoli-based government concluded a maritime Memorandum of Understanding establishing an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that cuts across waters also claimed by Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt (United Nations, 2019).
The maritime agreement also gave Turkiye a legal and political framework to contest competing maritime claims, while granting Turkish firms preferential access to future offshore energy projects (Middle East Forum, April 12). The region's considerable hydrocarbon potential underpins these ambitions. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Eastern Mediterranean contains approximately 107 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, making control over maritime access increasingly consequential for regional competition (USGS, March 2010). By anchoring its military presence in Libya to expansive maritime claims, Ankara has enhanced its ability to pursue offshore energy exploration, project power across the Eastern Mediterranean, and shape Europe's evolving energy landscape.
Turkiye's expanding role in Libya is driven by objectives that extend well beyond preserving the Tripoli-based government. By establishing itself as a long-term security partner, Ankara has sought to counter the influence of regional rivals--including Greece, Cyprus, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt--who maintain interests in Libya (Libya Tribune, June 10, 2025). A sustained military presence also reinforces Turkiye's position within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by enhancing its role on the Alliance's increasingly contested southern flank, where terrorism, migration, and great power competition are becoming central security concerns. At the same time, Ankara has begun recalibrating its Libya strategy. Rather than remaining exclusively aligned with the UN-recognized GNU, Turkiye has gradually expanded engagement with the LNA. Relations began improving in late 2023, culminating in the reopening of Turkiye's consulate in Benghazi in 2024 and high-level meetings between Turkish military officials and Haftar in 2025 (Turkish Minute, August 26, 2025).
Turkiye's military diplomacy has mirrored Libya's political reality. In 2025, Turkish naval vessels made port calls in both Tripoli and Benghazi during the same deployment--the first such engagement involving both rival administrations. The visits included naval training activities and consultations with defense officials from eastern and western Libya, including Major General Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the LNA, on future military cooperation under the banner of "One Libya, One Army" (DefenseNews, August 26, 2025). Together, these developments suggest Turkiye is transitioning from backing a single faction to positioning itself as a security broker capable of shaping Libya's military and political future.
This rapprochement gained momentum following Haftar's April 2025 visit to Ankara, where the LNA's Chief of Staff of Land Forces met with senior Turkish military officials to discuss expanding defense cooperation (Libya Tribune, September 26, 2025). Reports indicate the two sides have since negotiated agreements covering joint naval exercises, military training, advisory support, and the potential provision of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (Libya Tribune, September 27, 2025). By replicating the security partnerships it has built in eastern Libya, Ankara seeks to broaden support for the 2019 Turkiye-Libya maritime agreement, reinforce its long-term military presence, and strengthen the political legitimacy of its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The rapprochement has produced tangible political and military outcomes. Most notably, the LNA has reportedly considered ratifying the 2019 maritime Memorandum of Understanding originally signed by the Tripoli-based GNU. This move would significantly strengthen the agreement's political legitimacy. Military cooperation has likewise accelerated. Earlier this year, personnel from Libya's rival military factions participated together in Turkiye's Efes-2026 multinational exercise, marking the first time both sides trained under a single Libyan flag (DefenseNews, May 6, 2025).
Turkiye's engagement in Libya forms part of a broader strategy to establish a network of military and commercial footholds along Africa's most strategically important maritime corridors. Ankara has prioritized partnerships with Libya, Somalia, and Sudan, viewing their ports as gateways to the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, respectively. By expanding its presence at facilities such as Somalia's Mogadishu Port, Sudan's Suakin Port, and key Libyan ports, Turkiye has sought to strengthen its influence over critical maritime trade routes while advancing its energy and security interests (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025). A growing military footprint has reinforced this maritime strategy. Turkiye's two principal African bases are in Somalia and Libya, giving Ankara forward operating positions on both the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. Opened in 2017, the TURKSOM military base in Mogadishu is Turkiye's largest overseas military installation and serves as the centerpiece of its security partnership with Somalia (Evrensel, July 29, 2025). The facility reportedly hosts more than 1,000 Turkish personnel and can train over 10,000 Somali troops, while providing logistics, operational support, and military assistance (Turkish Minute, August 6, 2025).
Turkiye has increasingly sought to differentiate itself from Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) by presenting itself as a flexible, responsive, and operationally capable security partner for African states confronting insurgencies, Islamist militant groups, and separatist movements (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 8, 2025). This approach has been particularly evident in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, where Ankara has paired defense cooperation with economic engagement to deepen its regional influence. Turkiye has also aligned with Morocco's Atlantic Initiative, which aims to give landlocked Sahelian states access to the Atlantic Ocean, signaling Ankara's support for emerging regional connectivity projects. Beyond security cooperation, Turkiye continues to expand its economic footprint through maritime and infrastructure investments, including supplying a modern tugboat to Kenya and supporting port and infrastructure development in Tanzania and Senegal (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025).
* * *
Brian G. Karamuka is a graduate student at the Institute of World Politics (IWP). He has worked with several organizations in the DC area, focusing on U.S.-Africa relations, great power competition in Africa, as well as security and governance issues on the continent.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/turkiye-expands-its-security-strategy-in-libya/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Russians' Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Russians' Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize
Alyssa Dowling
Executive Summary:
* Fears of a new mobilization wave following Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have not materialized, but the Kremlin has introduced new taxes and raised utility prices.
* Declining contract recruitment, heavy battlefield losses, and expanding military registration infrastructure have fueled concerns about another mobilization wave. A formal call-up ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russians' Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize Alyssa Dowling Executive Summary: * Fears of a new mobilization wave following Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have not materialized, but the Kremlin has introduced new taxes and raised utility prices. * Declining contract recruitment, heavy battlefield losses, and expanding military registration infrastructure have fueled concerns about another mobilization wave. A formal call-upremains unlikely, but tighter conscription enforcement and regional mobilization drills suggest preparations for expanded recruitment.
* The Kremlin is likely to rely on contract recruitment rather than risk another politically damaging mobilization. Regional quotas incentivize authorities to pressure vulnerable Russians into military service, allowing Moscow to replenish its forces while obscuring responsibility for and the widespread existence of forced enlistment.
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Rumors that a new formal wave of mobilization would follow the September 18-20 State Duma elections saturated the Russian media space for months. These fears now seem unlikely to materialize soon (Vazhnye Istorii, June 24). Russian society has come to expect unpopular measures after elections. Russian President Vladimir Putin established a pattern over 20 years of making unwelcome decisions when society is least able to express discontent, including at the ballot box (Verstka, July 27). Putin provoked his first mass protests just a few months after the presidential elections in 2004 by choosing to reduce economic benefits for tens of millions of Russians, mostly pensioners. In 2018, he raised the retirement age after his reelection. Many Russians have accordingly expected unpopular measures to follow September's election. In the first Duma election after the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the primary Kremlin party, United Russia, gained a record of more than 77 percent of seats in parliament in the most tightly managed and falsified election of the Putin era (see EDM, September 21).
Putin framed these latest elections as a referendum on Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Critics of the war have expressed worry that Putin would use the elections to justify a new wave of mobilization because of heavy Russian losses on the battlefield and the Kremlin's desire to hasten territorial gains. Putin first announced a partial mobilization of reservists in September 2022, setting a goal to call up 300,000 for service. In October 2022, then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that the target had been met (RBC, October 28, 2022). This was Russia's first mobilization since World War II, and the Kremlin has not formally ended its legal basis (Radio Svoboda, October 31, 2022).
According to Vazhnye Istorii, high-level Russian officials denied new mobilization wave rumors 17 times between June 1 and September 15, including Putin dismissing reports from Ukrainian intelligence that the Kremlin was considering mobilization from Ukraine as "nonsense" designed to sow panic (Telegram/@istories_media, September 15). These adamant repudiations demonstrate how politically damaging the idea of another mobilization remains. On September 28, Putin signed a decree increasing the size of the armed forces by 15,500 soldiers, which will likely be achieved through increased contract and volunteer recruitment. This is the fourth increase in the size of the Russian army in 2026, compared to just three such increases in the first four years of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Meduza, September 28).
Separate unpopular measures have materialized in the three weeks since the elections. The Russian Ministry of Finance proposed a package of new taxes just four days after the vote, despite Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov saying on September 9 that increases should not be expected in the near future (Interfax, September 9; Meduza, September 24; The Bell, September 27). Asked about this discrepancy, Peskov skirted the question, saying that it is better to get explanations about the budget from the Kremlin's "economic bloc" (Kommersant, September 27). Utility prices also increased after the election because the Kremlin moved a planned increase from July 1 to October 1, just 11 days after the vote (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 23). Some other fears and reported conversations from the Kremlin, such as seizure of individuals' deposits, stricter exit visa laws, and fees for international internet traffic, have not come to fruition but remain possibilities (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 23).
Fears of another wave of mobilization are driven by the high casualty rates for Russian soldiers, the dwindling supply of Russians willing to sign a contract, and several anonymous reports from Russian authorities about Kremlin considerations of the step (Meduza; Telegram/@svobodnieslova, June 24). The principal way that the Kremlin has filled its armed forces--contract recruitment--has been falling since 2025. The reported quality of many new soldiers is low, from health to age to criminal record, and many units at the front lines are understaffed.
Mobilization rumors are also grounded in the build-up of logistical and legal infrastructure that could support the process, along with reports of regional mobilization drills. After the first wave of mobilization, the Kremlin created a unified military register, which could provide a more complete picture of which reservists are eligible for mobilization, send summons more quickly and gradually, and increase general administrative efficiency compared to the reported confusion and errors of the first wave (Vazhnye Istorii, December 22).
On February 15, the Russian Federal Chamber of Notaries sent a letter to regional chambers, though only Kaliningrad's receipt has been confirmed, instructing them to require potential conscripts to provide their draft registration papers before they can take out a mortgage, buy property, or start a business. Conscription is Russia's routine draft of eligible men aged 18-30 for one year of service, including during peacetime, who nominally do not serve in combat situations. It is legally separate from mobilization, but conscripts are often pressured into signing contracts for combat service, and there are reports of their deployment to Ukraine. Tightening enforcement for young men registering for conscription is therefore a sign that Moscow is trying to ramp up recruitment (The Insider, October 4). Additionally, regional administrations in Volzhsky and military groupings in Kaliningrad held mobilization logistics exercises over the summer, further fueling rumors (Radio Svoboda, June 19; The Moscow Times, August 23).
A new wave of mobilization is unlikely to resemble Putin's September 2022 televised announcement. The legal justification for mobilization remains, and the unified registration system means that the Kremlin has the information necessary to gradually mobilize reservists without generating the widespread panic of 2022, which led to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians. Forced contract signing, what some analysts call "hidden" or "covert" mobilization, remains prevalent in the regions of Russia and in the occupied territories of Ukraine, targeting vulnerable members of society who are more susceptible to pressure because of economic circumstances, criminal status, or social standing (Radio Svoboda, October 7). The Kremlin sets contract recruitment goals for the regions to avoid another unpopular mobilization, creating incentives for regional authorities and municipalities to meet those goals by any means necessary, and pushing pressure to find contract soldiers down the administrative hierarchy.
Regional administrations have quotas for contract soldiers. Russian human rights organizations received reports of forced detentions and coercion, including police beatings, to sign a military contract from at least 17 regions of Russia in just July and August (Verstka, August 24). Because regions provide the money for signing bonuses, which are becoming more expensive as supply decreases, poorer regions are more likely to use force to meet their quotas. In the Penza oblast, there have been many recent reports of police detaining men on the streets, in cars, and on public transport, then taking them to sign military contracts (Verstka, June 19). In the Ryazan oblast, Governor Pavel Malkov reportedly even established military contract quotas for employers in proportion to the size of their workplace (Gazeta.ru, April 2; see EDM, June 4).
According to The Bell, the number of people seeking information from human rights organizations about how to leave Russia has increased by 50 percent between fall and spring (The Bell, September 29). This spike demonstrates Russians' fear of another formal mobilization wave. The massive unpopularity of the 2022 partial mobilization, made clear through a protest movement of the mobilizeds' mothers and wives and the mass exodus of eligible men to avoid summonses, however, means that the Kremlin is less likely to obtain new soldiers for its ranks in that manner. Putin is more likely to continue to decentralize the dirty work of forcible military recruitment to keep new soldiers nominally "voluntary," diffuse responsibility for this process, and quietly feed his war machine.
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Alyssa Dowling is the deputy editor for the Eurasia Daily Monitor at The Jamestown Foundation. She brings experience in both policy and programmatic work, having previously served as a Program Associate on the Eurasia team at the National Democratic Institute and as a Project Specialist in the federal government.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russians-post-election-fears-partially-materialize/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Russians' Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize
Alyssa Dowling
Executive Summary:
* Fears of a new mobilization wave following Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have not materialized, but the Kremlin has introduced new taxes and raised utility prices.
* Declining contract recruitment, heavy battlefield losses, and expanding military registration infrastructure have fueled concerns about another mobilization wave. A formal call-up ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 9, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russians' Post-Election Fears Partially Materialize Alyssa Dowling Executive Summary: * Fears of a new mobilization wave following Russia's September 18-20 State Duma elections have not materialized, but the Kremlin has introduced new taxes and raised utility prices. * Declining contract recruitment, heavy battlefield losses, and expanding military registration infrastructure have fueled concerns about another mobilization wave. A formal call-upremains unlikely, but tighter conscription enforcement and regional mobilization drills suggest preparations for expanded recruitment.
* The Kremlin is likely to rely on contract recruitment rather than risk another politically damaging mobilization. Regional quotas incentivize authorities to pressure vulnerable Russians into military service, allowing Moscow to replenish its forces while obscuring responsibility for and the widespread existence of forced enlistment.
-
Rumors that a new formal wave of mobilization would follow the September 18-20 State Duma elections saturated the Russian media space for months. These fears now seem unlikely to materialize soon (Vazhnye Istorii, June 24). Russian society has come to expect unpopular measures after elections. Russian President Vladimir Putin established a pattern over 20 years of making unwelcome decisions when society is least able to express discontent, including at the ballot box (Verstka, July 27). Putin provoked his first mass protests just a few months after the presidential elections in 2004 by choosing to reduce economic benefits for tens of millions of Russians, mostly pensioners. In 2018, he raised the retirement age after his reelection. Many Russians have accordingly expected unpopular measures to follow September's election. In the first Duma election after the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the primary Kremlin party, United Russia, gained a record of more than 77 percent of seats in parliament in the most tightly managed and falsified election of the Putin era (see EDM, September 21).
Putin framed these latest elections as a referendum on Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Critics of the war have expressed worry that Putin would use the elections to justify a new wave of mobilization because of heavy Russian losses on the battlefield and the Kremlin's desire to hasten territorial gains. Putin first announced a partial mobilization of reservists in September 2022, setting a goal to call up 300,000 for service. In October 2022, then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that the target had been met (RBC, October 28, 2022). This was Russia's first mobilization since World War II, and the Kremlin has not formally ended its legal basis (Radio Svoboda, October 31, 2022).
According to Vazhnye Istorii, high-level Russian officials denied new mobilization wave rumors 17 times between June 1 and September 15, including Putin dismissing reports from Ukrainian intelligence that the Kremlin was considering mobilization from Ukraine as "nonsense" designed to sow panic (Telegram/@istories_media, September 15). These adamant repudiations demonstrate how politically damaging the idea of another mobilization remains. On September 28, Putin signed a decree increasing the size of the armed forces by 15,500 soldiers, which will likely be achieved through increased contract and volunteer recruitment. This is the fourth increase in the size of the Russian army in 2026, compared to just three such increases in the first four years of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Meduza, September 28).
Separate unpopular measures have materialized in the three weeks since the elections. The Russian Ministry of Finance proposed a package of new taxes just four days after the vote, despite Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov saying on September 9 that increases should not be expected in the near future (Interfax, September 9; Meduza, September 24; The Bell, September 27). Asked about this discrepancy, Peskov skirted the question, saying that it is better to get explanations about the budget from the Kremlin's "economic bloc" (Kommersant, September 27). Utility prices also increased after the election because the Kremlin moved a planned increase from July 1 to October 1, just 11 days after the vote (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 23). Some other fears and reported conversations from the Kremlin, such as seizure of individuals' deposits, stricter exit visa laws, and fees for international internet traffic, have not come to fruition but remain possibilities (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 23).
Fears of another wave of mobilization are driven by the high casualty rates for Russian soldiers, the dwindling supply of Russians willing to sign a contract, and several anonymous reports from Russian authorities about Kremlin considerations of the step (Meduza; Telegram/@svobodnieslova, June 24). The principal way that the Kremlin has filled its armed forces--contract recruitment--has been falling since 2025. The reported quality of many new soldiers is low, from health to age to criminal record, and many units at the front lines are understaffed.
Mobilization rumors are also grounded in the build-up of logistical and legal infrastructure that could support the process, along with reports of regional mobilization drills. After the first wave of mobilization, the Kremlin created a unified military register, which could provide a more complete picture of which reservists are eligible for mobilization, send summons more quickly and gradually, and increase general administrative efficiency compared to the reported confusion and errors of the first wave (Vazhnye Istorii, December 22).
On February 15, the Russian Federal Chamber of Notaries sent a letter to regional chambers, though only Kaliningrad's receipt has been confirmed, instructing them to require potential conscripts to provide their draft registration papers before they can take out a mortgage, buy property, or start a business. Conscription is Russia's routine draft of eligible men aged 18-30 for one year of service, including during peacetime, who nominally do not serve in combat situations. It is legally separate from mobilization, but conscripts are often pressured into signing contracts for combat service, and there are reports of their deployment to Ukraine. Tightening enforcement for young men registering for conscription is therefore a sign that Moscow is trying to ramp up recruitment (The Insider, October 4). Additionally, regional administrations in Volzhsky and military groupings in Kaliningrad held mobilization logistics exercises over the summer, further fueling rumors (Radio Svoboda, June 19; The Moscow Times, August 23).
A new wave of mobilization is unlikely to resemble Putin's September 2022 televised announcement. The legal justification for mobilization remains, and the unified registration system means that the Kremlin has the information necessary to gradually mobilize reservists without generating the widespread panic of 2022, which led to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Russians. Forced contract signing, what some analysts call "hidden" or "covert" mobilization, remains prevalent in the regions of Russia and in the occupied territories of Ukraine, targeting vulnerable members of society who are more susceptible to pressure because of economic circumstances, criminal status, or social standing (Radio Svoboda, October 7). The Kremlin sets contract recruitment goals for the regions to avoid another unpopular mobilization, creating incentives for regional authorities and municipalities to meet those goals by any means necessary, and pushing pressure to find contract soldiers down the administrative hierarchy.
Regional administrations have quotas for contract soldiers. Russian human rights organizations received reports of forced detentions and coercion, including police beatings, to sign a military contract from at least 17 regions of Russia in just July and August (Verstka, August 24). Because regions provide the money for signing bonuses, which are becoming more expensive as supply decreases, poorer regions are more likely to use force to meet their quotas. In the Penza oblast, there have been many recent reports of police detaining men on the streets, in cars, and on public transport, then taking them to sign military contracts (Verstka, June 19). In the Ryazan oblast, Governor Pavel Malkov reportedly even established military contract quotas for employers in proportion to the size of their workplace (Gazeta.ru, April 2; see EDM, June 4).
According to The Bell, the number of people seeking information from human rights organizations about how to leave Russia has increased by 50 percent between fall and spring (The Bell, September 29). This spike demonstrates Russians' fear of another formal mobilization wave. The massive unpopularity of the 2022 partial mobilization, made clear through a protest movement of the mobilizeds' mothers and wives and the mass exodus of eligible men to avoid summonses, however, means that the Kremlin is less likely to obtain new soldiers for its ranks in that manner. Putin is more likely to continue to decentralize the dirty work of forcible military recruitment to keep new soldiers nominally "voluntary," diffuse responsibility for this process, and quietly feed his war machine.
* * *
Alyssa Dowling is the deputy editor for the Eurasia Daily Monitor at The Jamestown Foundation. She brings experience in both policy and programmatic work, having previously served as a Program Associate on the Eurasia team at the National Democratic Institute and as a Project Specialist in the federal government.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russians-post-election-fears-partially-materialize/
[Category: ThinkTank]
ICTD Researchers at Africa's Largest Tax Research Gathering, Rwanda
BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 10 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news:
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ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda
Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month.
Hosted by the ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 10 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news: * * * ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month. Hosted by theAfrican Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) under the theme Contemporary Taxation Issues in Africa, this year's Congress, co-hosted with the Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA), focused on critical issues facing revenue services today including digitalisation and artificial intelligence (AI), tax incentives and expenditure governance, international tax cooperation, and environmental taxation.
Strengthening African tax research capacity
Participation in the ATRN Congress reflects ICTD's long-standing commitment to strengthening tax research capacity in Africa, and its partnership with ATAF has been a key part of that.
In an interview with ATAF during the three-day event, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni highlighted the important role ATRN has played in expanding both the quantity and quality of tax research produced in Africa.
"Up to a decade ago, about the time when the ATRN was established, there were very few studies on taxation in African countries. So, when African governments had to take decisions, oftentimes they would resort to evidence from elsewhere, from high-income countries ... and obviously that doesn't always translate," she said.
Mascagni added: "Having that context-specific research has been incredibly important. Having a platform ... for researchers to talk about it, improve the quality, receive feedback, and to sensitise policymakers to the importance of research - all of that has been invaluable, and it's exactly the platform that the ATRN provides."
Exploring AI and the future of tax administration
ICTD Senior Research Fellow Fabrizio Santoro participated in a plenary session examining opportunities and challenges presented by AI and automation in African tax administrations. The discussion explored how AI is increasingly being used for a range of administrative functions, such as taxpayer risk profiling and compliance management, while also raising important questions around governance, transparency, taxpayer rights, and institutional capacity.
Drawing on ICTD's ongoing research programme on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and Tax, Santoro joined representatives from ATAF, the Rwanda Revenue Authority, the South African Revenue Service, and academia to discuss how African revenue authorities can harness new technologies while ensuring their adoption remains effective, accountable, and responsive to local contexts.
Three panellists seated on stage with green background at ATRN 2026. Middle person is Fabrizio Santoro, ICTD.
Courtesy of ATAF
Later that day, Santoro also presented his research paper, 'Tax Implications of Cashless Payments: Micro Evidence from African Counties', co-authored with ICTD Research Affiliate Lucia Rossel, which examines how the growing use of digital payment systems may affect tax administration and revenue mobilisation across the continent.
Advancing debate on tax incentives and expenditure reform
The next day, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni delivered a presentation during the plenary session on 'Tax Incentives and Expenditure: From Fiscal Drain to Strategic Governance'. The session examined how African governments can strengthen oversight and management of tax expenditures, improve transparency, and ensure that tax incentives better support development objectives.
Seven panellists seated on stage with green background showing ATAF logo and title of the session. The audience is also visible. Photo taken at ATRN 2026.
Courtesy of RRA
Mascagni's contribution drew on the work emerging from the Coalition on Tax Expenditure Reform (COATE), which ICTD helped establish following the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in 2025.
The discussion addressed growing concerns about the scale of revenue foregone through poorly monitored tax incentives, as well as the new opportunities created by global efforts to strengthen tax expenditure reporting and reform.
Building capacity on environmental taxation
Finally, ICTD Senior Research Fellow Giovanni Occhiali facilitated a masterclass on environmental taxation in lower-income countries (see ICTD's work on climate and environmental taxation). The session explored the role of environmental taxes and incentives, alongside the institutional considerations that shape their design and implementation.
The masterclass reflected growing interest among policymakers and researchers in how fiscal instruments can support climate and environmental objectives while remaining feasible within lower-income country contexts.
Strengthening African tax research and policy dialogue
The 11th ATRN Congress took place at a time when African governments face mounting pressure to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation amidst declining development assistance, evolving international tax rules, and rapid technological change. It presents a unique opportunity for researchers to present their work to an audience of decision-makers in ministries of finance, tax administrations and civil society organisations, as well as to academic researchers and tax practitioners. Throughout the three-day event, participants examined how research can help bridge the gap between knowledge and policymaking while supporting more effective and equitable tax systems across the continent.
9 October 2026
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Original text here: https://ictd.ac/general/ictd-researchers-at-africas-largest-tax-research-gathering-rwanda/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda
Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month.
Hosted by the ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 10 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news: * * * ICTD researchers at Africa's largest tax research gathering, Rwanda Researchers from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) joined more than 280 tax administrators, policymakers, academics, and development practitioners for this year's 11th African Tax Research Network (ATRN) Congress which took place in Kigali, Rwanda, last month. Hosted by theAfrican Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) under the theme Contemporary Taxation Issues in Africa, this year's Congress, co-hosted with the Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA), focused on critical issues facing revenue services today including digitalisation and artificial intelligence (AI), tax incentives and expenditure governance, international tax cooperation, and environmental taxation.
Strengthening African tax research capacity
Participation in the ATRN Congress reflects ICTD's long-standing commitment to strengthening tax research capacity in Africa, and its partnership with ATAF has been a key part of that.
In an interview with ATAF during the three-day event, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni highlighted the important role ATRN has played in expanding both the quantity and quality of tax research produced in Africa.
"Up to a decade ago, about the time when the ATRN was established, there were very few studies on taxation in African countries. So, when African governments had to take decisions, oftentimes they would resort to evidence from elsewhere, from high-income countries ... and obviously that doesn't always translate," she said.
Mascagni added: "Having that context-specific research has been incredibly important. Having a platform ... for researchers to talk about it, improve the quality, receive feedback, and to sensitise policymakers to the importance of research - all of that has been invaluable, and it's exactly the platform that the ATRN provides."
Exploring AI and the future of tax administration
ICTD Senior Research Fellow Fabrizio Santoro participated in a plenary session examining opportunities and challenges presented by AI and automation in African tax administrations. The discussion explored how AI is increasingly being used for a range of administrative functions, such as taxpayer risk profiling and compliance management, while also raising important questions around governance, transparency, taxpayer rights, and institutional capacity.
Drawing on ICTD's ongoing research programme on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and Tax, Santoro joined representatives from ATAF, the Rwanda Revenue Authority, the South African Revenue Service, and academia to discuss how African revenue authorities can harness new technologies while ensuring their adoption remains effective, accountable, and responsive to local contexts.
Three panellists seated on stage with green background at ATRN 2026. Middle person is Fabrizio Santoro, ICTD.
Courtesy of ATAF
Later that day, Santoro also presented his research paper, 'Tax Implications of Cashless Payments: Micro Evidence from African Counties', co-authored with ICTD Research Affiliate Lucia Rossel, which examines how the growing use of digital payment systems may affect tax administration and revenue mobilisation across the continent.
Advancing debate on tax incentives and expenditure reform
The next day, ICTD Executive Director Giulia Mascagni delivered a presentation during the plenary session on 'Tax Incentives and Expenditure: From Fiscal Drain to Strategic Governance'. The session examined how African governments can strengthen oversight and management of tax expenditures, improve transparency, and ensure that tax incentives better support development objectives.
Seven panellists seated on stage with green background showing ATAF logo and title of the session. The audience is also visible. Photo taken at ATRN 2026.
Courtesy of RRA
Mascagni's contribution drew on the work emerging from the Coalition on Tax Expenditure Reform (COATE), which ICTD helped establish following the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in 2025.
The discussion addressed growing concerns about the scale of revenue foregone through poorly monitored tax incentives, as well as the new opportunities created by global efforts to strengthen tax expenditure reporting and reform.
Building capacity on environmental taxation
Finally, ICTD Senior Research Fellow Giovanni Occhiali facilitated a masterclass on environmental taxation in lower-income countries (see ICTD's work on climate and environmental taxation). The session explored the role of environmental taxes and incentives, alongside the institutional considerations that shape their design and implementation.
The masterclass reflected growing interest among policymakers and researchers in how fiscal instruments can support climate and environmental objectives while remaining feasible within lower-income country contexts.
Strengthening African tax research and policy dialogue
The 11th ATRN Congress took place at a time when African governments face mounting pressure to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation amidst declining development assistance, evolving international tax rules, and rapid technological change. It presents a unique opportunity for researchers to present their work to an audience of decision-makers in ministries of finance, tax administrations and civil society organisations, as well as to academic researchers and tax practitioners. Throughout the three-day event, participants examined how research can help bridge the gap between knowledge and policymaking while supporting more effective and equitable tax systems across the continent.
9 October 2026
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Original text here: https://ictd.ac/general/ictd-researchers-at-africas-largest-tax-research-gathering-rwanda/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities: States Are Rushing to Respond As Congress' SNAP Cost Shift Approaches. Are They Ready?
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following report:
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States Are Rushing to Respond As Congress' SNAP Cost Shift Approaches. Are They Ready?
October 9, 2026 | Peyton McConnell, Emmie DiCicco and Ed Bolen
The harmful 2025 Republican reconciliation law will require most states starting in October 2027 to pay a portion of SNAP benefit costs for the first time in the program's history. States' payment obligations will be based on their "payment error rate," a measure of states' overpayments and underpayments of SNAP benefits from earlier years. Faced ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following report: * * * States Are Rushing to Respond As Congress' SNAP Cost Shift Approaches. Are They Ready? October 9, 2026 | Peyton McConnell, Emmie DiCicco and Ed Bolen The harmful 2025 Republican reconciliation law will require most states starting in October 2027 to pay a portion of SNAP benefit costs for the first time in the program's history. States' payment obligations will be based on their "payment error rate," a measure of states' overpayments and underpayments of SNAP benefits from earlier years. Facedwith the threat of hundreds of millions -- or even billions[1] -- of dollars in new annual costs, states are scrambling to reduce their error rates. In 2026, lawmakers introduced roughly 100 bills across 35 states to respond to the reconciliation law's SNAP changes and cuts, including this massive "cost shift" (see Figure 1). If Congress fails to delay this cost shift to state budgets, states unable or unwilling to pay the costs will be forced to end SNAP entirely.
More than 5 million people nationwide have already had their SNAP benefits taken away, including likely about 2 million children, in the wake of the unprecedented SNAP cuts in last year's Republican law.[2] Behind these numbers are families skipping meals and choosing between buying groceries and paying for other essentials like rent.
Over five million people have already had their SNAP benefits taken away, including likely about two million children.
While the impact differs by state, these losses reflect, at least in part, states' responses to the significant new fiscal pressures the reconciliation law has created. Many of the bills state policymakers pursued in legislative sessions earlier this year proposed policies that could make it harder for eligible low-income families to receive food assistance, often without evidence that these changes would reduce payment errors. In many cases, these legislative proposals require state agencies to implement a specific policy that the agency may have already implemented or had very good reasons not to implement. These approaches could both increase access barriers for families eligible for SNAP and in some cases increase the very errors states are trying to eliminate to avoid a crushing state budget crisis.
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Figure 1: States Pursued Harmful SNAP Legislation Responding to the 2025 Republican Reconciliation Law
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Burdensome Citizenship Verification Jeopardizes SNAP for U.S. Citizens
Lawmakers introduced and advanced bills in nine states that would subject all U.S. citizen SNAP applicants to new and burdensome red tape to document their citizenship status. These bills would require applicants to provide paper documentation of citizenship and/or have their citizenship status verified by the Department of Homeland Security's Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system. While SNAP has longstanding harsh immigration-related eligibility restrictions, and those with a qualifying immigration status already must have their status verified through the SAVE system, these state bills often falsely claimed to be creating a new verification requirement for immigrants. Several of these bills passed, including in Tennessee, Wyoming, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Utah, and Iowa.[3]
These laws risk eligible citizens losing benefits because electronic data matching has longstanding limitations that result in some people unable to have their citizenship substantiated, and many citizens do not have documents such as passports and certificates of citizenship. People who experience challenges in having their status documented electronically include people who have changed their names (including due to marriage), people born abroad but have U.S. citizen parents (like the people whose parents were in the military or the foreign service), and newborn babies that do not yet have Social Security numbers or birth certificates.
Forcing Families to Re-Prove SNAP Eligibility More Frequently Adds Administrative Burdens
In eight states, lawmakers proposed requiring SNAP households to recertify their eligibility more frequently. This increases the administrative workload for both families and agencies and risks eligible households losing benefits if they can't complete the recertification process before their certification period expires or if an understaffed state agency falls behind on processing. Wyoming and Idaho were the only states to require truncated certification periods through state legislation.[4] Other states, including Illinois and Georgia, shortened certification periods for most households administratively.
Idaho's law will force people who struggle to afford basic expenses, including adults subject to SNAP's harsh time limit and families with circumstances the state considers "unstable" (without specifying further), to reapply at least every six months. It also gives the state agency broad discretion to require families to reapply every one or two months if it determines -- based on no standard -- that they will become ineligible "in the near future." These additional reviews would create unnecessary administrative burdens and increase the risk that eligible families lose food assistance.
Wyoming's law goes even further, requiring most households without an older adult or person with a disability to reapply every six months, as well as requiring adults subject to SNAP's harsh time limit and families with circumstances the state considers "unstable" (again, leaving to the agency to define) to reapply every four months. On top of that, similar to Idaho's law, families the state determines -- again, based on no clear standard -- will become ineligible "in the near future" could face reviews every one to two months. This means families may have to repeatedly complete forms, report income and household changes, gather pay stubs or other documents, complete an interview, and respond to follow-up requests -- sometimes almost as soon as the previous review ends.
For someone juggling an unpredictable work schedule, unreliable or limited transportation, caregiving responsibilities, or limited internet access, each additional review creates another opportunity to miss a notice or deadline and another opportunity for overburdened caseworkers to mishandle the renewal or fail to complete it on time. This will only create more work for state agencies and increase the risk that eligible families lose food assistance because of paperwork barriers or processing backlogs, not because their circumstances have changed.
Restricting Self-Attestation Makes It Harder for Eligible Households to Apply for SNAP
A half dozen states proposed restricting or eliminating the use of self-attestation for certain eligibility factors, such as reporting earning no income, household composition, or being unhoused. While SNAP rules require verification of certain information such as an applicant's identity, Social Security number, and income, these states have adopted policies that require additional documentation even in cases where federal SNAP rules allow self-attestation for information that is not questionable and where alternative documentation may be difficult or impractical to obtain. For example, a one-person household may have to get a neighbor to sign a document attesting that they live alone or find a document that proves that they don't have a job.
This provision was enacted in Kansas and Indiana.[5] In Kansas, these additional paperwork requirements are already contributing to backlogs and delays in families receiving SNAP benefits. According to state officials, they did not receive the additional administrative funding needed to manage the increased workload.[6]
Some States Chose to Take SNAP Away From People With Modest Assets
For fiscal year 2027, SNAP restricts eligibility for households without an elderly or disabled individual to those with savings or assets below $3,000, and to $4,750 for households that include seniors or people with disabilities.
More than 40 states have opted to raise this limit so that families, seniors, and people with disabilities can have modest savings without losing needed SNAP benefits. In states that remove this "asset test," fewer households are improperly denied or approved due to asset miscalculation. But Indiana and Idaho lowered their asset limit to the federal minimum in this year's legislative session.
Duplicative Data Checks Further Complicate Eligibility Process
States already conduct extensive data matches to verify SNAP eligibility. Yet, in more than a dozen states, lawmakers proposed legislation that would require state agencies to make additional, and sometimes overlapping, data checks on the same information (such as monthly income).
More data matches do not necessarily provide more accurate information: databases may be outdated, cover different time periods, or provide incomplete information. If the data conflict, state workers must resolve these conflicts and spend additional time contacting families, requesting additional documents, and manually reconciling records -- diverting limited staff resources from processing applications and increasing the risk of delays or payment errors. Adding more data checks can also increase procedural denials that occur when clients' benefits are terminated for not responding to a notice, even though they continue to be eligible. Laws that passed in Wyoming, Idaho, Kansas, and Indiana mandate a laundry list of these repetitive or overlapping matches.[7]
These approaches will likely increase paperwork, administrative mistakes, and in some cases, payment error rates -- raising the cost states will be responsible to pay under the reconciliation law's cost shift.
Families will suffer as a result, especially working parents already navigating jobs and children, if they can't overcome these additional barriers. That could cause them to lose critical help they need to buy groceries, despite being eligible for SNAP.
Instead of these burdensome approaches, some states, such as Hawaii, have reduced administrative burdens without sacrificing accuracy by extending certification periods, particularly for seniors whose information changes less frequently.[8]
The flurry of state legislative action around SNAP payment errors shows that states are taking the new financial risks created by last year's reconciliation law seriously. But their rushed response under intense time pressure means higher barriers to access that are contributing to millions of people already losing access to SNAP, even before the cost shift takes effect.[9] In next year's state legislative sessions, we anticipate continued misguided proposals to lower error rates that could result in additional barriers to access for families.
To help states address error rates without rushing to implement harmful policies, Congress should extend the delay to all states, not just the small handful of states with the highest error rates. That would give state agencies and legislatures more time to understand the factors impacting payment accuracy and assess how best to lower errors without unduly restricting access for families eligible for SNAP. States also need time to regroup and respond to the steep declines in SNAP participation and take affirmative steps to help eligible families re-enroll in SNAP.
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End Notes
[1] Katie Bergh and Joseph Llobrera, "States' First-Ever Bill for SNAP Benefits Could Cost Billions," CBPP, June 24, 2026, https://www.cbpp.org/blog/states-first-ever-bill-for-snap-benefits-could-cost-billions.
[2] Dottie Rosenbaum et al., "SNAP Tracker: People Are Losing Food Assistance as the Harmful 2025 Republican Reconciliation Law Is Implemented," CBPP, September 24, 2026, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-tracker-people-are-losing-food-assistance-as-the-republican-megabill.
[3] Tennessee SB 1915, May 2026, https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default?BillNumber=SB1915&ga=114; Wyoming SF 0106, Welfare Fraud Prevention Act Amendments, March 2026, https://www.wyoleg.gov/Legislation/2026/SF0106; Idaho HB 0730, 2026, https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2026/legislation/H0730.pdf; Indiana SB 1, March 2026, https://iga.in.gov/legislative/2026/bills/senate/1/details; Louisiana HB 0335, 2026, https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1481232; Utah HB 0471, Social Services Amendments, March 2026, https://legiscan.com/UT/text/HB0471/id/3388142; Iowa SB 2422, June 2026, https://legiscan.com/IA/text/SF2422/2025.
[4] Wyoming SF 0106, Welfare Fraud Prevention Act Amendments, March 2026, https://www.wyoleg.gov/Legislation/2026/SF0106; Idaho HB 0730, 2026, https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2026/legislation/H0730.pdf.
[5] Kansas HB 2731, https://www.kslegislature.gov/b2025_26/bills/download/?apn=b2025_26/year2/ready_for_publication/hb_2731/hb2731_enrolled.pdf; Indiana SB 1, https://iga.in.gov/legislative/2026/bills/senate/1/details.
[6] Sophia Gernander, "Wichitans face long waits, delays for SNAP benefits," KWCH, September 2, 2026, https://www.kwch.com/2026/09/03/wichitans-face-long-waits-delays-snap-benefits/.
[7] Wyoming SF 0106, Welfare Fraud Prevention Act Amendments, March 2026, https://www.wyoleg.gov/Legislation/2026/SF0106; Idaho HB 0730, 2026, https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2026/legislation/H0730.pdf; Kansas HB 2731, https://www.kslegislature.gov/b2025_26/bills/download/?apn=b2025_26/year2/ready_for_publication/hb_2731/hb2731_enrolled.pdf; Indiana SB 1, March 2026, https://iga.in.gov/legislative/2026/bills/senate/1/details.
[8] Hawai'i SB 3245, Relating to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, July 2026, https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session/measure_indiv.aspx?billtype=SB&billnumber=3245&year=2026.
[9] Rosenbaum et al., op. cit.
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Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/states-are-rushing-to-respond-as-congress-snap-cost-shift-approaches-are
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
States Are Rushing to Respond As Congress' SNAP Cost Shift Approaches. Are They Ready?
October 9, 2026 | Peyton McConnell, Emmie DiCicco and Ed Bolen
The harmful 2025 Republican reconciliation law will require most states starting in October 2027 to pay a portion of SNAP benefit costs for the first time in the program's history. States' payment obligations will be based on their "payment error rate," a measure of states' overpayments and underpayments of SNAP benefits from earlier years. Faced ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following report: * * * States Are Rushing to Respond As Congress' SNAP Cost Shift Approaches. Are They Ready? October 9, 2026 | Peyton McConnell, Emmie DiCicco and Ed Bolen The harmful 2025 Republican reconciliation law will require most states starting in October 2027 to pay a portion of SNAP benefit costs for the first time in the program's history. States' payment obligations will be based on their "payment error rate," a measure of states' overpayments and underpayments of SNAP benefits from earlier years. Facedwith the threat of hundreds of millions -- or even billions[1] -- of dollars in new annual costs, states are scrambling to reduce their error rates. In 2026, lawmakers introduced roughly 100 bills across 35 states to respond to the reconciliation law's SNAP changes and cuts, including this massive "cost shift" (see Figure 1). If Congress fails to delay this cost shift to state budgets, states unable or unwilling to pay the costs will be forced to end SNAP entirely.
More than 5 million people nationwide have already had their SNAP benefits taken away, including likely about 2 million children, in the wake of the unprecedented SNAP cuts in last year's Republican law.[2] Behind these numbers are families skipping meals and choosing between buying groceries and paying for other essentials like rent.
Over five million people have already had their SNAP benefits taken away, including likely about two million children.
While the impact differs by state, these losses reflect, at least in part, states' responses to the significant new fiscal pressures the reconciliation law has created. Many of the bills state policymakers pursued in legislative sessions earlier this year proposed policies that could make it harder for eligible low-income families to receive food assistance, often without evidence that these changes would reduce payment errors. In many cases, these legislative proposals require state agencies to implement a specific policy that the agency may have already implemented or had very good reasons not to implement. These approaches could both increase access barriers for families eligible for SNAP and in some cases increase the very errors states are trying to eliminate to avoid a crushing state budget crisis.
* * *
Figure 1: States Pursued Harmful SNAP Legislation Responding to the 2025 Republican Reconciliation Law
* * *
Burdensome Citizenship Verification Jeopardizes SNAP for U.S. Citizens
Lawmakers introduced and advanced bills in nine states that would subject all U.S. citizen SNAP applicants to new and burdensome red tape to document their citizenship status. These bills would require applicants to provide paper documentation of citizenship and/or have their citizenship status verified by the Department of Homeland Security's Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system. While SNAP has longstanding harsh immigration-related eligibility restrictions, and those with a qualifying immigration status already must have their status verified through the SAVE system, these state bills often falsely claimed to be creating a new verification requirement for immigrants. Several of these bills passed, including in Tennessee, Wyoming, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Utah, and Iowa.[3]
These laws risk eligible citizens losing benefits because electronic data matching has longstanding limitations that result in some people unable to have their citizenship substantiated, and many citizens do not have documents such as passports and certificates of citizenship. People who experience challenges in having their status documented electronically include people who have changed their names (including due to marriage), people born abroad but have U.S. citizen parents (like the people whose parents were in the military or the foreign service), and newborn babies that do not yet have Social Security numbers or birth certificates.
Forcing Families to Re-Prove SNAP Eligibility More Frequently Adds Administrative Burdens
In eight states, lawmakers proposed requiring SNAP households to recertify their eligibility more frequently. This increases the administrative workload for both families and agencies and risks eligible households losing benefits if they can't complete the recertification process before their certification period expires or if an understaffed state agency falls behind on processing. Wyoming and Idaho were the only states to require truncated certification periods through state legislation.[4] Other states, including Illinois and Georgia, shortened certification periods for most households administratively.
Idaho's law will force people who struggle to afford basic expenses, including adults subject to SNAP's harsh time limit and families with circumstances the state considers "unstable" (without specifying further), to reapply at least every six months. It also gives the state agency broad discretion to require families to reapply every one or two months if it determines -- based on no standard -- that they will become ineligible "in the near future." These additional reviews would create unnecessary administrative burdens and increase the risk that eligible families lose food assistance.
Wyoming's law goes even further, requiring most households without an older adult or person with a disability to reapply every six months, as well as requiring adults subject to SNAP's harsh time limit and families with circumstances the state considers "unstable" (again, leaving to the agency to define) to reapply every four months. On top of that, similar to Idaho's law, families the state determines -- again, based on no clear standard -- will become ineligible "in the near future" could face reviews every one to two months. This means families may have to repeatedly complete forms, report income and household changes, gather pay stubs or other documents, complete an interview, and respond to follow-up requests -- sometimes almost as soon as the previous review ends.
For someone juggling an unpredictable work schedule, unreliable or limited transportation, caregiving responsibilities, or limited internet access, each additional review creates another opportunity to miss a notice or deadline and another opportunity for overburdened caseworkers to mishandle the renewal or fail to complete it on time. This will only create more work for state agencies and increase the risk that eligible families lose food assistance because of paperwork barriers or processing backlogs, not because their circumstances have changed.
Restricting Self-Attestation Makes It Harder for Eligible Households to Apply for SNAP
A half dozen states proposed restricting or eliminating the use of self-attestation for certain eligibility factors, such as reporting earning no income, household composition, or being unhoused. While SNAP rules require verification of certain information such as an applicant's identity, Social Security number, and income, these states have adopted policies that require additional documentation even in cases where federal SNAP rules allow self-attestation for information that is not questionable and where alternative documentation may be difficult or impractical to obtain. For example, a one-person household may have to get a neighbor to sign a document attesting that they live alone or find a document that proves that they don't have a job.
This provision was enacted in Kansas and Indiana.[5] In Kansas, these additional paperwork requirements are already contributing to backlogs and delays in families receiving SNAP benefits. According to state officials, they did not receive the additional administrative funding needed to manage the increased workload.[6]
Some States Chose to Take SNAP Away From People With Modest Assets
For fiscal year 2027, SNAP restricts eligibility for households without an elderly or disabled individual to those with savings or assets below $3,000, and to $4,750 for households that include seniors or people with disabilities.
More than 40 states have opted to raise this limit so that families, seniors, and people with disabilities can have modest savings without losing needed SNAP benefits. In states that remove this "asset test," fewer households are improperly denied or approved due to asset miscalculation. But Indiana and Idaho lowered their asset limit to the federal minimum in this year's legislative session.
Duplicative Data Checks Further Complicate Eligibility Process
States already conduct extensive data matches to verify SNAP eligibility. Yet, in more than a dozen states, lawmakers proposed legislation that would require state agencies to make additional, and sometimes overlapping, data checks on the same information (such as monthly income).
More data matches do not necessarily provide more accurate information: databases may be outdated, cover different time periods, or provide incomplete information. If the data conflict, state workers must resolve these conflicts and spend additional time contacting families, requesting additional documents, and manually reconciling records -- diverting limited staff resources from processing applications and increasing the risk of delays or payment errors. Adding more data checks can also increase procedural denials that occur when clients' benefits are terminated for not responding to a notice, even though they continue to be eligible. Laws that passed in Wyoming, Idaho, Kansas, and Indiana mandate a laundry list of these repetitive or overlapping matches.[7]
These approaches will likely increase paperwork, administrative mistakes, and in some cases, payment error rates -- raising the cost states will be responsible to pay under the reconciliation law's cost shift.
Families will suffer as a result, especially working parents already navigating jobs and children, if they can't overcome these additional barriers. That could cause them to lose critical help they need to buy groceries, despite being eligible for SNAP.
Instead of these burdensome approaches, some states, such as Hawaii, have reduced administrative burdens without sacrificing accuracy by extending certification periods, particularly for seniors whose information changes less frequently.[8]
The flurry of state legislative action around SNAP payment errors shows that states are taking the new financial risks created by last year's reconciliation law seriously. But their rushed response under intense time pressure means higher barriers to access that are contributing to millions of people already losing access to SNAP, even before the cost shift takes effect.[9] In next year's state legislative sessions, we anticipate continued misguided proposals to lower error rates that could result in additional barriers to access for families.
To help states address error rates without rushing to implement harmful policies, Congress should extend the delay to all states, not just the small handful of states with the highest error rates. That would give state agencies and legislatures more time to understand the factors impacting payment accuracy and assess how best to lower errors without unduly restricting access for families eligible for SNAP. States also need time to regroup and respond to the steep declines in SNAP participation and take affirmative steps to help eligible families re-enroll in SNAP.
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End Notes
[1] Katie Bergh and Joseph Llobrera, "States' First-Ever Bill for SNAP Benefits Could Cost Billions," CBPP, June 24, 2026, https://www.cbpp.org/blog/states-first-ever-bill-for-snap-benefits-could-cost-billions.
[2] Dottie Rosenbaum et al., "SNAP Tracker: People Are Losing Food Assistance as the Harmful 2025 Republican Reconciliation Law Is Implemented," CBPP, September 24, 2026, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-tracker-people-are-losing-food-assistance-as-the-republican-megabill.
[3] Tennessee SB 1915, May 2026, https://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default?BillNumber=SB1915&ga=114; Wyoming SF 0106, Welfare Fraud Prevention Act Amendments, March 2026, https://www.wyoleg.gov/Legislation/2026/SF0106; Idaho HB 0730, 2026, https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2026/legislation/H0730.pdf; Indiana SB 1, March 2026, https://iga.in.gov/legislative/2026/bills/senate/1/details; Louisiana HB 0335, 2026, https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=1481232; Utah HB 0471, Social Services Amendments, March 2026, https://legiscan.com/UT/text/HB0471/id/3388142; Iowa SB 2422, June 2026, https://legiscan.com/IA/text/SF2422/2025.
[4] Wyoming SF 0106, Welfare Fraud Prevention Act Amendments, March 2026, https://www.wyoleg.gov/Legislation/2026/SF0106; Idaho HB 0730, 2026, https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2026/legislation/H0730.pdf.
[5] Kansas HB 2731, https://www.kslegislature.gov/b2025_26/bills/download/?apn=b2025_26/year2/ready_for_publication/hb_2731/hb2731_enrolled.pdf; Indiana SB 1, https://iga.in.gov/legislative/2026/bills/senate/1/details.
[6] Sophia Gernander, "Wichitans face long waits, delays for SNAP benefits," KWCH, September 2, 2026, https://www.kwch.com/2026/09/03/wichitans-face-long-waits-delays-snap-benefits/.
[7] Wyoming SF 0106, Welfare Fraud Prevention Act Amendments, March 2026, https://www.wyoleg.gov/Legislation/2026/SF0106; Idaho HB 0730, 2026, https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2026/legislation/H0730.pdf; Kansas HB 2731, https://www.kslegislature.gov/b2025_26/bills/download/?apn=b2025_26/year2/ready_for_publication/hb_2731/hb2731_enrolled.pdf; Indiana SB 1, March 2026, https://iga.in.gov/legislative/2026/bills/senate/1/details.
[8] Hawai'i SB 3245, Relating to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, July 2026, https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session/measure_indiv.aspx?billtype=SB&billnumber=3245&year=2026.
[9] Rosenbaum et al., op. cit.
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Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/states-are-rushing-to-respond-as-congress-snap-cost-shift-approaches-are
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Minnesota's Struggling Economy - Poor Productivity and Sluggish Job Growth
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
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Minnesota's struggling economy: Poor productivity and sluggish job growth
Written by John Phelan | October 8, 2026
Yesterday, I wrote about revisions to official data which show that Minnesota's economic performance in recent years has been even worse than previously thought.
As Figure 1 shows, since that inflection point for per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 2014, Minnesota's economy ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * Minnesota's struggling economy: Poor productivity and sluggish job growth Written by John Phelan | October 8, 2026 Yesterday, I wrote about revisions to official data which show that Minnesota's economic performance in recent years has been even worse than previously thought. As Figure 1 shows, since that inflection point for per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 2014, Minnesota's economyhas grown at an average annual rate of 1.4%, below 39 out of 50 states.
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Figure 1: Average annual real GDP growth, 2014 to 2025
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Total GDP is just the sum of the output of each worker, so we can break total GDP growth down into the components that come from 1) more workers and 2) more output per worker.
Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Figure 2 breaks down the numbers shown in Figure 1 into those components. It shows that Idaho ranked top out of 50 states for employment growth between 2014 and 2025 and Wyoming last while, for output per worker, Washington came top and Oklahoma came bottom. Minnesota ranked 32nd out of 50 states for employment growth between 2014 and 2025, and 42nd for growth of output per worker. We are some way below the average for both.
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Figure 2: Average annual growth, 2014 to 2025
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So, Minnesota's disappointing GDP growth is the result of below average growth in per worker output and employment. These are the problems at the root of Minnesota's weak economic performance, and we'll dig into them a bit next week.
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John Phelan is an Economist at the Center of the American Experiment. john.phelan@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/minnesotas-struggling-economy-poor-productivity-and-sluggish-job-growth/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Minnesota's struggling economy: Poor productivity and sluggish job growth
Written by John Phelan | October 8, 2026
Yesterday, I wrote about revisions to official data which show that Minnesota's economic performance in recent years has been even worse than previously thought.
As Figure 1 shows, since that inflection point for per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 2014, Minnesota's economy ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * Minnesota's struggling economy: Poor productivity and sluggish job growth Written by John Phelan | October 8, 2026 Yesterday, I wrote about revisions to official data which show that Minnesota's economic performance in recent years has been even worse than previously thought. As Figure 1 shows, since that inflection point for per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 2014, Minnesota's economyhas grown at an average annual rate of 1.4%, below 39 out of 50 states.
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Figure 1: Average annual real GDP growth, 2014 to 2025
* * *
Total GDP is just the sum of the output of each worker, so we can break total GDP growth down into the components that come from 1) more workers and 2) more output per worker.
Using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Figure 2 breaks down the numbers shown in Figure 1 into those components. It shows that Idaho ranked top out of 50 states for employment growth between 2014 and 2025 and Wyoming last while, for output per worker, Washington came top and Oklahoma came bottom. Minnesota ranked 32nd out of 50 states for employment growth between 2014 and 2025, and 42nd for growth of output per worker. We are some way below the average for both.
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Figure 2: Average annual growth, 2014 to 2025
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So, Minnesota's disappointing GDP growth is the result of below average growth in per worker output and employment. These are the problems at the root of Minnesota's weak economic performance, and we'll dig into them a bit next week.
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John Phelan is an Economist at the Center of the American Experiment. john.phelan@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/minnesotas-struggling-economy-poor-productivity-and-sluggish-job-growth/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: "Emerging Adult" Charged in Eden Prairie High School Shooting
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
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"Emerging adult" charged in Eden Prairie High School shooting
Written by David Zimmer | October 9, 2026
Charges
The Hennepin County Attorney's Office (HCAO) filed charges today against Adam Abdihakeem Adam, 18, of St. Louis Park for the shooting at the Eden Prairie High School homecoming football game one week ago today.
Reports indicated that police arrested Adam yesterday while driving in Minneapolis, ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * "Emerging adult" charged in Eden Prairie High School shooting Written by David Zimmer | October 9, 2026 Charges The Hennepin County Attorney's Office (HCAO) filed charges today against Adam Abdihakeem Adam, 18, of St. Louis Park for the shooting at the Eden Prairie High School homecoming football game one week ago today. Reports indicated that police arrested Adam yesterday while driving in Minneapolis,and that Adam was booked into the Hennepin County Jail for probable cause 2nd degree assault.
The formal charges that were filed this afternoon included two 2nd degree assault counts and a third count of Riot in the 2nd degree. There were no charges related to gang involvement at this point.
Adam is now held on $100,000 bail and has been given a first appearance court date for Monday October 12th.
The affidavit that supported the charges was scant on details but describes Adam driving a car that belonged to his older brother when he pulled into the Eden Prairie High School parking lot next to a fight involving about ten people.
Surveillance video shows Adam get out of the driver's seat of the car and fire a handgun toward those fighting. Two victims, who were described earlier as 17 and 18-year-old Somali males from St Paul, were struck but are expected to survive their injuries.
Police recovered one fired casing from the scene. Adam's phone records tracked him and the car he was driving to and from the scene, after which Adam disposed of his phone.
Police searched Adam's home and recovered clothing that matches the clothing he wore during the shooting.
There is no indication in the complaint about whether any firearms have been recovered or if there are other people being sought in connection with the shooting.
Emerging Adult
Hennepin County Attorney Mary Moriarty has previously spoken of young adults under the age of 25 as being "emerging adults" who have less culpability for their actions due to their on-going brain development.
Moriarty's representative, Morgan Kunz, spoke at the Edina community meeting earlier this week and explained that the HCAO's approach to any potential charges in this incident would emphasize "proportionality." According to Kunz the HCAO would seek to be "firm and fair" and would not necessarily seek the largest possible sentence, as that approach can "destabilize families and communities."
"Proportionality"
Note - Adam intentionally fired a handgun at a group of people in a busy parking lot of a high school, striking two. He could have easily killed several, and his actions have led to significant actions being taken to try and quell a troubling number of retaliatory shootings taking place among young Somali males.
Adam was charged with two counts of 2nd degree assault (as well as a lesser count of "riot") and held on $100,000 bail.
Earlier this year an ICE agent brandished his firearm during an incident on a freeway during which he believed he was being boxed in by a protestor. The agent did not shoot the firearm or injure anyone during the incident. When a State Trooper interviewed him, the agent fully cooperated and gave a statement about what led to the incident.
Morgan Kunz charged that ICE agent with two counts of 2nd degree assault and held him on $100,000 bail.
Proportionality in action.
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David Zimmer is a Public Safety Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment. David.Zimmer@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/emerging-adult-charged-in-eden-prairie-high-school-shooting/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
"Emerging adult" charged in Eden Prairie High School shooting
Written by David Zimmer | October 9, 2026
Charges
The Hennepin County Attorney's Office (HCAO) filed charges today against Adam Abdihakeem Adam, 18, of St. Louis Park for the shooting at the Eden Prairie High School homecoming football game one week ago today.
Reports indicated that police arrested Adam yesterday while driving in Minneapolis, ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 10 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * "Emerging adult" charged in Eden Prairie High School shooting Written by David Zimmer | October 9, 2026 Charges The Hennepin County Attorney's Office (HCAO) filed charges today against Adam Abdihakeem Adam, 18, of St. Louis Park for the shooting at the Eden Prairie High School homecoming football game one week ago today. Reports indicated that police arrested Adam yesterday while driving in Minneapolis,and that Adam was booked into the Hennepin County Jail for probable cause 2nd degree assault.
The formal charges that were filed this afternoon included two 2nd degree assault counts and a third count of Riot in the 2nd degree. There were no charges related to gang involvement at this point.
Adam is now held on $100,000 bail and has been given a first appearance court date for Monday October 12th.
The affidavit that supported the charges was scant on details but describes Adam driving a car that belonged to his older brother when he pulled into the Eden Prairie High School parking lot next to a fight involving about ten people.
Surveillance video shows Adam get out of the driver's seat of the car and fire a handgun toward those fighting. Two victims, who were described earlier as 17 and 18-year-old Somali males from St Paul, were struck but are expected to survive their injuries.
Police recovered one fired casing from the scene. Adam's phone records tracked him and the car he was driving to and from the scene, after which Adam disposed of his phone.
Police searched Adam's home and recovered clothing that matches the clothing he wore during the shooting.
There is no indication in the complaint about whether any firearms have been recovered or if there are other people being sought in connection with the shooting.
Emerging Adult
Hennepin County Attorney Mary Moriarty has previously spoken of young adults under the age of 25 as being "emerging adults" who have less culpability for their actions due to their on-going brain development.
Moriarty's representative, Morgan Kunz, spoke at the Edina community meeting earlier this week and explained that the HCAO's approach to any potential charges in this incident would emphasize "proportionality." According to Kunz the HCAO would seek to be "firm and fair" and would not necessarily seek the largest possible sentence, as that approach can "destabilize families and communities."
"Proportionality"
Note - Adam intentionally fired a handgun at a group of people in a busy parking lot of a high school, striking two. He could have easily killed several, and his actions have led to significant actions being taken to try and quell a troubling number of retaliatory shootings taking place among young Somali males.
Adam was charged with two counts of 2nd degree assault (as well as a lesser count of "riot") and held on $100,000 bail.
Earlier this year an ICE agent brandished his firearm during an incident on a freeway during which he believed he was being boxed in by a protestor. The agent did not shoot the firearm or injure anyone during the incident. When a State Trooper interviewed him, the agent fully cooperated and gave a statement about what led to the incident.
Morgan Kunz charged that ICE agent with two counts of 2nd degree assault and held him on $100,000 bail.
Proportionality in action.
* * *
David Zimmer is a Public Safety Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment. David.Zimmer@americanexperiment.org
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/emerging-adult-charged-in-eden-prairie-high-school-shooting/
[Category: ThinkTank]