Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
Featured Stories
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: U.S. Expands Counterterrorism Partnership With Kenya
WASHINGTON, April 4 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by Jacob Zenn, editor of Terrorism Monitor and Militant Leadership Monitor:
* * *
United States Expands Counterterrorism Partnership with Kenya
Executive Summary:
* In January, the United States and Kenya initiated a $71 million upgrade to the Manda Bay airfield to target al-Shabaab and regional terrorist groups.
* Kenya serves as a vital regional security anchor for the United States, providing stability and the potential to hedge against the expansion of Chinese military influence in Djibouti.
*
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 4 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by Jacob Zenn, editor of Terrorism Monitor and Militant Leadership Monitor:
* * *
United States Expands Counterterrorism Partnership with Kenya
Executive Summary:
* In January, the United States and Kenya initiated a $71 million upgrade to the Manda Bay airfield to target al-Shabaab and regional terrorist groups.
* Kenya serves as a vital regional security anchor for the United States, providing stability and the potential to hedge against the expansion of Chinese military influence in Djibouti.
*Enhanced by joint legal training, this partnership has the potential to significantly shape East African counterterrorism efforts over the coming decade to prevent further regional destabilization.
At the end of January, the United States and Kenya launched a new $71 million initiative to upgrade the Manda Bay airfield in Lamu County, Kenya. The base is directly adjacent to the Somali border. This initiative suggests a desire by the United States to target al-Shabaab--as well as other terrorist groups in East Africa--from bases in Kenya, rather than from Djibouti (ftlsomalia.com, February 1). The United States, however, may also be hedging against growing Chinese military influence in Djibouti. The People's Republic of China (PRC) opened the "Support Base" in Djibouti in 2017. The location of the base intends to provide the PRC a foothold to project influence and protect investments in the volatile Red Sea region (Congressional Research Service, June 6, 2025; Horn Review, February 13). While Kenya maintains cooperative relations with the PRC, Beijing has no formal bases in the country.
The Manda Bay airfield upgrade is a symbolic show of force and resilience against al-Shabaab. In January 2020, al-Shabaab raided the airfield in a surprise attack, which killed a U.S. soldier and two contractors, and caused more than $70 million of damage (hornobserver.com, January 5, 2020). As of last year, the United States was still offering rewards and seeking the capture of al-Shabaab's commanders who masterminded the operation (U.S. Embassy in Somalia, January 7, 2025). Although U.S. airstrikes killed one al-Shabaab mastermind and his wife--who was also involved in the planning and logistics of the attacks--other commanders involved in the attack still remain at large (VOA Africa, February 25, 2020).
Deputy Commander for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), Lt. Gen. John Brennan, also met with senior leaders of the Kenyan Defense Forces in both Nairobi and Manda Bay on February 5 and 6 to discuss countering terrorism in East Africa (AFRICOM, February 10). Brennan noted that Kenya was the "security anchor" in the region, referring not only to its role in combatting al-Shabaab but also to its proximity to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and, by extension, southward towards Mozambique. In both of those countries, Islamic State (IS) "provinces" have become increasingly lethal in recent years (adf-magazine, February 3).
Kenya is also seen as a reliable counterterrorism partner because of domestic changes underway in the country (apanews.net, February 24). Along with the United Kingdom, U.S. officials have provided training to the Kenyan Director of Public Prosecutions to more effectively prosecute terrorism suspects and financiers in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa. Kenya, therefore, is expected to offer the United States stability and ethicality in countering terrorism domestically, while also avoiding the geopolitical competition related to the PRC that other partners, such as Djibouti, exhibit.
The counterterrorism partnership between the United States and Kenya will inevitably shape the landscape of counterterrorism in Somalia and beyond over the coming decade. Al-Shabaab and other IS "provinces" in East Africa will experience the ramifications of the countries' bilateral cooperation. This will be key to preventing the region--which is already facing turmoil from the Sudanese and Ethiopian civil conflicts--from falling victim even further to the spread of terrorism.
* * *
Jacob Zenn
Editor, Terrorism Monitor and Militant Leadership Monitor; Senior Fellow, Terrorism Program
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/united-states-expands-counterterrorism-partnership-with-kenya/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Crocus City Hall Terrorism Trial Exposes Russian Counterterrorism Gaps
WASHINGTON, April 4 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by SpecialEurasia analyst Uran Botobekov in its Terrorism Monitor:
* * *
Crocus City Hall Terrorism Trial Exposes Russian Counterterrorism Gaps
Executive Summary:
* The March 12 verdict delivered by Moscow's Second Western District Military Court in the case of the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack reinforces that the attack was carried out by ISKP-linked Tajik militants, underscoring the expanding operational reach of the group's Central Asian networks.
* The ruling also weakens earlier politically
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 4 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by SpecialEurasia analyst Uran Botobekov in its Terrorism Monitor:
* * *
Crocus City Hall Terrorism Trial Exposes Russian Counterterrorism Gaps
Executive Summary:
* The March 12 verdict delivered by Moscow's Second Western District Military Court in the case of the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack reinforces that the attack was carried out by ISKP-linked Tajik militants, underscoring the expanding operational reach of the group's Central Asian networks.
* The ruling also weakens earlier politicallycharged claims advanced by the Kremlin and the Federal Security Service (FSB), which sought to attribute the attack to Ukraine as well as to U.S. and UK intelligence services.
* Russia's Ukraine-centered security posture--combined with coercive migration enforcement and restrictive religious policies widely perceived as hostile toward Islamic practices--risks deepening alienation within Central Asian migrant communities, inadvertently creating conditions conducive to further radicalization.
Moscow Court Verdict and Implications for ISKP Operations
On March 12, Moscow's Second Western District Military Court issued its verdict in the 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack. This was one of the deadliest jihadist operations on Russian soil in nearly two decades, which claimed 150 lives and injured more than 600 others (see EDM, March 26; 27, 2024; see Terrorism Monitor, May 6, 2024; Kommersant, March 12). The four attackers were Tajik nationals and were claimed by Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) after the attack.
Acting on prosecutorial requests, the court convicted 19 individuals linked to the operation. The four principal perpetrators--Shamsidin Fariduni, Dalerdzhon Mirzoyev, Muhammadsobir Fayzov, and Saidakrami Rachabalizoda--were among 11 others who were sentenced to life imprisonment in maximum-security penal colonies. An additional four defendants received approximately 20-year prison terms for facilitating the attack, including selling a vehicle to the gunmen and assisting with apartment rentals.
Three of the four main perpetrators pleaded guilty and expressed remorse. The fourth, Saidakrami Rachabalizoda, maintained his innocence, asserting that he had "carried out holy jihad," which reflected his continued adherence to ISKP's ideology (The Moscow Times, March 12). Each of the four main perpetrators was also fined 990,000 rubles (about $12,180). Among the remaining defendants, eight entered partial guilty pleas, while seven who were accused of providing logistical support denied any knowledge of the plot.
The proceedings highlighted how intra-diaspora rental and social networks facilitated ISKP operatives' ability to move, conceal, and execute a high-casualty attack while evading Russian counterterrorism surveillance.
Elements of the Operation
Investigative Committee Chairman Alexander Bastrykin confirmed that the Crocus City Hall case encompasses over 500 volumes of documents, including 300 site inspections, approximately 2,500 forensic analyses, and testimony from more than 1,000 witnesses and 2,300 officially recognized victims (TASS, May 20, 2025). The trial was conducted behind closed doors, and the appeals process remains unclear. The verdict represented a key milestone for Russia's legal response to terrorism and reinforced intelligence linking the attack to ISKP networks embedded within Central Asian jihadist circles.
Separately, on November 1, 2024, Russian authorities arrested four Ingush residents for supplying modified Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition to the Tajik perpetrators for a reported one million rubles (about $12,300). One suspect, however, was killed while attempting to evade capture (Kommersant, November 1, 2024). On March 28, 2024, Turkish authorities also detained five Tajik nationals who had resided with Shamsidin Fariduni in Istanbul until January 2024 and charged them with membership in ISKP (Anadolu, January 2, 2025).
Then-U.S. Attorney General Pamela Bondi further reported that Mohammad Sharifullah (aka Jafar)--an ISKP operative extradited from Pakistan for the 2021 Kabul airport attack--admitted to training two Tajik militants in weapons handling for the Crocus operation (U.S. Department of Justice, March 5, 2025). Collectively, these cases underscore ISKP's sophisticated cross-border networks for operational planning, training, logistics, and safe haven coordination.
Politicized Attribution and IS's Counter-Narrative
The Crocus City Hall attack was the most significant terrorist incident in a decade in Russia and occurred amid Moscow's full-scale war in Ukraine and escalating confrontations with the West. Despite prior warnings from the U.S. Embassy and CIA about a potential plot by ISKP, Director of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), Alexander Bortnikov, quickly attributed the attack to Ukrainian, U.S., and U.K. security services. He, therefore, transformed a jihadist operation into a geopolitical "witch hunt" (U.S. Embassy, March 7, 2024; TASS, March 26, 2024; New York Times, April 2, 2024).
Russian state media and pro-Kremlin "military bloggers" amplified Russian President Vladimir Putin's claim that the four main perpetrators attempted to flee to Ukraine through a prearranged "window." This advanced the conspiracy narrative that Ukrainian intelligence had allegedly exploited ISKP while coordinating with Western services against Russia (President of Russia; Meduza, March 23, 2024). Despite Kyiv's denials and strong U.S. rebuttals, Russia's political establishment largely embraced the "blame-Ukraine" narrative (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, March 22, 2024; The Hill, March 28, 2024). This reflected a Cold War-style geopolitical framing of terrorism, even as segments of the Russian public criticized the FSB for failing to prevent the attack (Meduza, March 26, 2024).
The Kremlin-driven narrative was interpreted by Islamic State (IS) as a challenge to its operational credibility, prompting the group to launch a coordinated propaganda response. The group rapidly claimed responsibility through its Amaq News Agency and praised "four Caliphate inghimasis" (suicide attackers in combat) who struck "the heart of the Christian world" in the Crocus City Hall operation (Amaq, March 22, 2024). The following day, Amaq also released photographs and video footage of the attackers displaying the IS flag, reinforcing its claim of operational ownership (Amaq, March 23, 2024). A week later, al-Naba yet again framed the attack as coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the Caliphate and mocked Moscow's Western-blame narrative as an attempt "to conceal...its major defeat at the hands of the Mujahideen" (Al-Naba, March 28, 2024).
In an audio statement released by al Furqan Media Foundation on March 28, IS spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al Ansari praised the attack, declaring that ISKP had "struck the Russian kafirun (infidels) and shed their blood" (Al-Furqan, March 28, 2024). ISKP's media arm, the Al Azaim Foundation, dedicated Voice of Khorasan Issue 34 to the attack, portraying it as a blow to "the pride of the kuffar" and a revival of global jihadist morale (Voice of Khurasan, April 8, 2024).
Subsequent regional propaganda reinforced this narrative. ISKP's Tajik-language Sadoi Khuroson magazine denounced Tajik President Emomali Rahmon as a "murtad" (apostate) and "Putin's slave" and condemned Tajikistan's alignment with Moscow (Sadoi Khuroson, March 29, 2024).
ISKP's Uzbek-language Xuroson Ovozi Telegram channel, meanwhile, rejected Russia's war against Ukraine as un-Islamic and urged Central Asians to join "true jihad." This echoed IS's longstanding depiction of the conflict as a "Crusader-on-Crusader" war beyond Islamic obligation (Al-Naba, March 6, 2022). Collectively, these publications illustrate a coordinated propaganda surge aimed at asserting operational ownership while expanding ISKP's messaging among Central Asian audiences.
Court Verdict Confirms Russia's War Priorities
Witness testimony presented during the trial revealed the operational infrastructure behind the attack. One confidential source embedded within migrant communities mapped the internal networks connecting all nineteen defendants (Vesti.ru, February 10). Another witness confirmed recruitment through ISKP's Tajik-language Telegram channel "Sadoi Khuroson" (Vedomosti, March 28, 2024). A third source testified that Shamsidin Fariduni--who had received militant training in Turkiye and Afghanistan--led the operation (TASS, December 19, 2025).
Bortnikov finally acknowledged that Afghan-based ISKP operatives had organized the attack and recruited Tajik migrants via Telegram, after evidence mounted and IS repeatedly claimed responsibility (Kommersant, October 4, 2024). The verdict issued by the Moscow Military Court later formally confirmed investigators' conclusion that the four main perpetrators were ISKP operatives (Asia-Plus, March 12). Despite this evidence, the verdict nonetheless incorporated a politically motivated "Ukrainian trail," asserting that the perpetrators acted "in the interests of Ukraine's top leadership" and that Ukrainian intelligence had coordinated the ISKP cell (Lenta.ru, March 12, 2025).
The FSB intensified repression against Central Asian migrants following the Crocus City Hall attack. Amid rising xenophobia and increasingly securitized migration policies, Russian security services expanded lethal operations against alleged Salafi networks, with suspects frequently killed during arrest raids. Approximately 75 individuals accused of Salafism or links to Ukrainian intelligence were killed after the attack (Important Stories, August 12, 2025). These heavy-handed measures appear to be producing unintended security consequences. Closed online discussions surrounding the court verdict have alarmed Russian authorities, with pro-Salafi-jihadi sympathizers among Muslim migrants praising the attackers as "brothers in faith" and disputing their guilt (Regions.ru, March 13).
Conclusion
Court testimony, investigative findings, and repeated IS claims confirm that the Crocus City Hall attack was executed by pro-ISKP Tajik Islamists, despite persistent attempts by Russian authorities to attribute responsibility to Ukraine. Moscow's externalization of blame risks obscuring a more immediate vulnerability: the radicalization potential within marginalized Central Asian migrant communities inside Russia. A Ukraine-centered security posture--combined with coercive migration enforcement and religious policies widely perceived by migrant communities as hostile to Islamic practice--may inadvertently expand ISKP's recruitment space in Russia. Without strategic recalibration, Russia's counterterrorism architecture risks being undermined less by external adversaries than by the domestic consequences of its own securitized overreach.
* * *
Dr. Uran Botobekov is an analyst for SpecialEurasia (Italy) and an expert on Sunni jihadi movements and regional security in Central Asia.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/crocus-city-hall-terrorism-trial-exposes-russian-counterterrorism-gaps/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Arab News: Deeper Ties With Gulf States Will Strengthen NATO Alliance
WASHINGTON, April 4 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by senior fellow Luke Coffey to Arab News:
* * *
Deeper Ties with Gulf States Will Strengthen NATO Alliance
The war in Iran has resulted in no shortage of geopolitical consequences for policymakers around the globe. From high energy prices to key shipping lanes being closed, leaders from Europe to the Middle East to Australia are scrambling to mitigate the negative impact. However, another consequence beginning
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 4 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by senior fellow Luke Coffey to Arab News:
* * *
Deeper Ties with Gulf States Will Strengthen NATO Alliance
The war in Iran has resulted in no shortage of geopolitical consequences for policymakers around the globe. From high energy prices to key shipping lanes being closed, leaders from Europe to the Middle East to Australia are scrambling to mitigate the negative impact. However, another consequence beginningto gain attention as a result of the war in Iran is the breakdown in transatlantic relations.
US President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized the lack of willingness of Washington's NATO allies to dispatch a naval flotilla to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio has complained that some of America's European partners are restricting the use of air bases for operations against Iran.
This breakdown in transatlantic relations comes at a difficult time for the alliance. We are now inside the 100-day countdown to the next NATO summit in July, to be held in Ankara. Coincidentally, NATO has already been responsible for shooting down four Iranian missiles aimed at Turkiye, making the upcoming summit the first time the alliance has had to protect the airspace of a host nation.
Clearly, it will not be business as usual. Any agenda that diplomats have been working on behind the scenes in the lead-up must now be set aside. Instead of the alliance focusing on an ambitious and robust agenda, it is time to lower expectations and focus on mending the transatlantic relationship.
This is where it is fortuitous that the summit will be held in Turkiye. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been able to use his leadership to bridge different parts of the alliance in recent years and has cultivated a good relationship with Trump, which could work to the advantage of other European leaders. The summit will test Erdogan's statecraft in this regard.
It is clear that the war in Iran is the main focus of the US and Trump. Even if the fighting were to stop tomorrow, the geopolitical consequences would be felt for months. Keeping this in mind, NATO should tailor the upcoming summit to address this reality.
In addition to getting the US-European relationship back on track, there are two other policy areas that should be immediately obvious.
The first is finding common ground on air defense. The lessons of the war in Ukraine, combined with Iran's attacks on the Gulf states, highlight the difficulties of defending airspace in modern warfare. Challenges range from shortcomings in the defense industrial base, which struggles to produce weapons quickly enough, to the need for systems that have the technological edge required to destroy ballistic missiles and drones in a cost-effective manner. NATO should develop a comprehensive strategy on air defense that addresses these issues across the alliance.
The second area is deepening relations with the Gulf states. The last time NATO held a summit in Turkiye was in 2004 in Istanbul, which resulted in the historic Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This framework now serves as the main platform for NATO engagement with the Gulf. However, in the years since, little has been done in practical terms to advance the strategy.
NATO should seize the opportunity presented by again holding a summit in Turkiye, combined with the current geopolitical situation in the Gulf, to reinvigorate this initiative. Doing so would help bring NATO and the Gulf states closer together and make the alliance more relevant to Trump at a time when he is questioning NATO's value.
This also connects to the issue of air defense. As Ukrainian experts have deployed to the Gulf to offer assistance, it is clear that there is a shared interest, stretching from the Gulf of Finland to the Gulf of Oman, in ensuring that the skies are protected.
Regardless, one thing is certain: the NATO summit matters. Despite the rhetoric coming from Washington, it is unlikely that the US will leave the alliance that has supported transatlantic relations for more than seven decades. A unilateral withdrawal by Trump would not only be politically unpopular, but also legally difficult. In 2023, Rubio, then a US senator, led an effort to pass legislation making it illegal for any president to unilaterally withdraw from the alliance without two-thirds approval from the Senate. At present, there is no indication that the Senate would support such a move.
There is also a broader geopolitical reality to consider. Europe remains too important for the US economically for disengagement to be a viable option. A recent report by the US Chamber of Commerce found that 48 out of 50 states export more to Europe than to China, and that almost 60 percent of all foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, supporting millions of American jobs. Put simply, NATO serves as the primary security guarantor of America's largest export market, and placing this at risk is not in the country's interest.
While transatlantic relations may seem strained today, the alliance has endured similar upheavals in the past and ultimately emerged stronger. During the Suez crisis in 1956, deep divisions between the US and key European allies exposed serious fractures within the Western alliance. In 1966, Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO's integrated military command, forcing the alliance to relocate its headquarters from Paris to Brussels. Disagreements over the Iraq war in 2003 again strained transatlantic ties. More recently, concerns at the start of Trump's first term resulted in increased European defense spending and renewed attention on burden sharing in NATO.
As policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic scramble to assemble a workable agenda for the summit in light of developments in the Middle East, ambitions must be tempered. Realistic and achievable goals should be established, particularly in areas that matter to Trump. With sufficient creativity and political will, this can be done.
Read in Arab News (https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2638665).
* * *
At A Glance:
Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work analyzes national security and foreign policy, with a focus on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/deeper-ties-gulf-states-will-strengthen-nato-alliance-luke-coffey
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Minnesota Unemployment Rate Above U.S. Average
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 4 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by policy fellow Bill Glahn:
* * *
MN unemployment rate above US average
Yesterday, Minnesota announced its state unemployment rate. From KWLM Radio,
"State unemployment rate for January higher than the U.S. rate"
The state rate stands at 4.4 percent. Somehow, while announcing a state unemployment rate increase, to higher the national average, when national unemployment for January (see
... Show Full Article
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 4 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by policy fellow Bill Glahn:
* * *
MN unemployment rate above US average
Yesterday, Minnesota announced its state unemployment rate. From KWLM Radio,
"State unemployment rate for January higher than the U.S. rate"
The state rate stands at 4.4 percent. Somehow, while announcing a state unemployment rate increase, to higher the national average, when national unemployment for January (seebelow) fell, Trump is blamed,
"The national economy has been slowing over the last year, with erratic tariffs and a radical shift in immigration policy taking a toll. No state has borne the brunt of these factors more directly than Minnesota, especially earlier in 2026."
That last sentence appears to be a reference to Operation Metro Surge, a connection which the Minneapolis Star Tribune makes directly,
"[Employment Commissioner Matt] Varilek noted the gloomy January jobs picture aligned with the height of Operation Metro Surge. While ramped-up Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) activity affected communities statewide, most happened in the Twin Cities metro, where DEED reported nearly 2,000 jobs lost in the month -- a year-over-year drop Varilek said "is very unusual.""
Here's the problem: the unemployment rate is estimated based on household surveys. We are to believe that illegal aliens skipping work while cowering in fear at home to avoid ICE are answering surveys from that same federal government?
Even so, if you have a job and are not showing up, you are not counted as unemployed. To be counted as unemployed, you have to not have a job and be actively looking for one.
More importantly, Minnesota has a significantly higher unemployment rate than its neighboring states,
For those familiar with the region, Minnesota differs in only one significant aspect: politics.
You get what you vote for.
Meanwhile, the national employment numbers for March were announced today, From Fox 2 (Detroit),
"US labor market rebounding as 178,000 jobs added in March, well above expectations."
The March report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) can be read here. The unemployment rate came in at 4.3 percent. January numbers were revised up, February numbers were revised down.
My favorite sentence,
"Federal government employment continued to decline in March (-18,000). Since reaching a peak in October 2024, federal government employment is down by 355,000, or 11.8 percent."
Digging into the numbers, state government employment was also down (local was up). Zerohedge noted,
"More good news: government workers [at all levels] dropped again (-8K) in March, down for the 6th straight month, and 8 of the past 9."
BLS data continue to show year-on-year declines in the size of the foreign-born adult population and the number of foreign-born workers employed.
[Note: an earlier version (https://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2026/04/strong-march-job-numbers.php) of this post appeared at Power Line.]
* * *
Bill Glahn is a Policy Fellow with Center of the American Experiment.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/mn-unemployment-rate-above-us-average/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Minnesota Highest Graduation Rate Paired With Lowest Proficiency
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 4 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by policy fellow Catrin Wigfall:
* * *
Minnesota highest graduation rate paired with lowest proficiency
The Minnesota Department of Education recently announced that the class of 2025 set a new record for high school graduation rates.
At 84.9 percent, the four-year graduation rate is up from last year's rate of 84.2 percent.
"This is a moment worth celebrating," said Gov. Tim Walz. "Decades
... Show Full Article
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 4 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by policy fellow Catrin Wigfall:
* * *
Minnesota highest graduation rate paired with lowest proficiency
The Minnesota Department of Education recently announced that the class of 2025 set a new record for high school graduation rates.
At 84.9 percent, the four-year graduation rate is up from last year's rate of 84.2 percent.
"This is a moment worth celebrating," said Gov. Tim Walz. "Decadesin the classroom have helped inform many of the goals I've set and the policies we've passed over the last seven years to support our students, teachers, and parents. Every student who receives that diploma is better equipped to navigate the challenges of landing a job, pursuing higher education, and building a future they feel excited about."
But there is another side to the story that continues to be left out, as was the case last year when graduation percentages were also a record high.
Even as graduation rates climb, academic performance is moving in the opposite direction. In math and reading, Minnesota high school students are performing at the lowest levels ever recorded for a graduating class.
It's a tale of two stats: a record-high graduation rate paired with declining academic readiness.
Minnesota High School Proficiency & Four-Year Graduation Rate
[View chart in the link at bottom.]
Because high school students take the reading Minnesota Comprehensive Assessment (MCA) in 10th grade and the math MCA in 11th grade, we don't have a perfect measure of what they know at graduation. But the available data paints a clear picture. As 11th graders, just 34.7 percent of the class of 2025 met grade-level standards in math. As 10th graders, only 51.5 percent were proficient in reading. Both figures represent record lows for a graduating cohort.
The declining proficiency isn't limited to the overall student population. Student subgroup data shows similar trends, even as rising graduation rates across demographics receive more attention.
Minnesota High School Proficiency & Four-Year Graduation Rate by Student Groups
[View chart in the link at bottom.]
Minnesota requires high school students to complete all state academic standards and a minimum number of course credits in order to graduate, but there is no state-mandated minimum GPA requirement. And unlike in the past, students no longer have to pass a high school exit exam. In 2013, the DFL-controlled legislature eliminated the Graduation Required Assessment for Diploma (GRAD), removing a statewide standard for demonstrating basic competency in reading and math in order to receive a high school diploma.
Since then, the gap between graduation rates and academic performance has become harder to ignore.
ACT results tell a similar story. Scores in English, math, science, and overall composite averages for Minnesota's class of 2025 remain at record lows. Only 39 percent of exam-takers met at least three of the four college-readiness benchmarks. Perhaps more concerning is that 36 percent -- an increase from 2024 -- met zero of the benchmarks.
According to ACT, students who meet the college readiness benchmarks "have a roughly 50 [percent] chance of earning a B or better in the corresponding first-year college courses and a roughly 75 [percent] chance of earning a C or better."
"ACT data from prior graduating classes shows that 84 [percent] of students who have met all four benchmarks graduate with postsecondary degrees within six years. Only 38 [percent] of students who meet zero benchmarks and 56 [percent] of students meeting one benchmark graduate in that time."
State data reinforces the connection. Minnesota's own assessment materials acknowledge a strong relationship between MCA performance and college entrance exam results.
At the same time, research from ACT shows that grade inflation continues to drive high school grades up, making student GPAs less predictive of student success in college. In contrast, ACT composite scores "continue to be a reliable predictor of students' early success in college," according to the report.
While rising high school graduation rates are a positive goal, it is equally important that a diploma reflects genuine academic readiness and that its value is not compromised in the pursuit of these higher numbers. A false sense of achievement not only undermines the credibility of the high school credential but also places unfair burdens on students who believe they are prepared only to find out too late that they aren't, putting at risk their future success in college, the workforce, or daily life.
* * *
Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/minnesota-highest-graduation-rate-paired-with-lowest-proficiency/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Winning the Minerals Race Requires Building Demand, Not Just Supply
WASHINGTON, April 4 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by Gracelin Baskaran, director of the Critical Minerals Security Program:
* * *
Winning the Minerals Race Requires Building Demand, Not Just Supply
The United States has made real progress on the supply side of critical minerals security. New mines have been permitted, processing investments backed, and stockpiling authorities expanded. But supply-side progress alone is not enough. Markets for critical minerals are currently in disequilibrium: Supply is outpacing demand,
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 4 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by Gracelin Baskaran, director of the Critical Minerals Security Program:
* * *
Winning the Minerals Race Requires Building Demand, Not Just Supply
The United States has made real progress on the supply side of critical minerals security. New mines have been permitted, processing investments backed, and stockpiling authorities expanded. But supply-side progress alone is not enough. Markets for critical minerals are currently in disequilibrium: Supply is outpacing demand,prices are depressed, and private capital is slow to materialize. The reason is straightforward--investors will not finance expensive new mines and processing facilities unless they can see credible, long-term buyers on the other end.
That demand signal is largely absent. The United States is a relatively small direct consumer of many of the minerals at the center of its own supply chain policy. CSIS analysis shows that in 2024, the United States accounted for just 4.5 percent of global nickel consumption, 3.6 percent of cobalt, 1.7 percent of rare earths, and 3 percent of gallium. These low shares reflect the fact that the United States often imports finished goods rather than raw materials processed domestically. The result is a country that is deeply dependent on foreign mineral supply chains but represents only a marginal share of the demand that would justify building alternatives.
Defense procurement, often assumed to be the anchor buyer for critical minerals, cannot fill this gap on its own. The defense sector is a relatively small offtaker in volume terms--it accounts for just 10 percent of batteries produced, and often far smaller percentages of most other critical minerals. Projects sized to serve defense needs alone typically lack the scale to achieve cost competitiveness or attract private capital. Critical mineral supply chains cannot be built around the defense industrial base alone.
What Demand-Side Policy Actually Requires
1. Prioritize support for the electric vehicle (EV) industry. Increasing demand for EVs will be critical to strengthening demand for upstream critical minerals. While a traditional internal combustion engine vehicle requires roughly 32 kilograms of critical minerals, an EV requires closer to 210 kilograms--more than a sixfold increase. Scaling EV adoption, therefore, has a direct and material impact on mineral demand, helping absorb excess supply, stabilize prices, and improve the commercial viability of new mining and processing projects.
China's dominance in critical minerals markets has been driven not only by upstream control, but by building demand through downstream manufacturing--most notably via BYD. China pursued an integrated, mine-to-manufactured-goods strategy: securing mineral supply through strategic overseas investments and offtake agreements, developing extensive domestic processing capacity, and scaling EV manufacturing to create sustained demand pull. This vertically integrated model has allowed China to shape both supply and demand dynamics across the value chain. China's EV industry did not develop through free market economics. Between 2009 and 2023, BYD received at least $230.8 billion in government support. This helped it create an empire from Beijing to Rome to Mexico City.
The implications for the United States are significant. If companies like BYD continue to achieve dominant global market share, it will erode the competitiveness of U.S. automakers such as General Motors, Ford Motor Company, and Stellantis. In this context, EV adoption is not a climate objective; it is increasingly a strategic lever for sustaining industrial competitiveness and securing upstream resource supply.
EV-related production tax credits bolstered U.S. manufacturing. The expiration of the $7,500 federal tax credit drove a surge in EV sales in the third quarter of 2025, as consumers accelerated purchases ahead of the incentive's phaseout. Tesla, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors each recorded their highest electric vehicle sales to date, with General Motors more than doubling its U.S. EV sales compared to the prior year.
The rollbacks of the tax credits have had significant impacts on U.S. jobs. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, vehicle and parts manufacturers eliminated approximately 21,000 jobs in the United States in 2025. Ford Motor Company, General Motors, and Stellantis, the transatlantic parent company of Chrysler, Fiat, Jeep, and Peugeot, reported multibillion-dollar losses at the end of 2025 as they scaled back, delayed, or canceled portions of their electric vehicle investment plans.
2. Establish an industry-agnostic minerals sourcing incentive. Current policy tools are fragmented across sectors and end uses. For example, the Section 30D tax credit in the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provided a $7,500 tax credit if the minerals used in EVs were sourced in the United States or countries with which it had a free trade agreement. This left defense primes, semiconductor producers, and other advanced industries without comparable mechanisms to diversify their mineral supply chains. It created an uneven landscape that rewards sourcing decisions in some sectors while offering limited support in others. China's export controls on critical minerals do not differentiate by end use; U.S. policy should take a similarly comprehensive approach to strengthening supply chain resilience. Any product manufactured in the United States or an allied country that incorporates minerals sourced from these jurisdictions should be eligible for a tax credit. Such a framework would broaden demand, strengthen supply chain resilience, and better align industrial policy with the realities of global mineral markets.
3. Extend and refine the Section 45X production tax credit (PTC). Beyond a new universal framework, existing tools also need repair. Section 45Xof the IRA provides a 10 percent credit to taxpayers for the costs incurred during the production of critical minerals to specified levels of purity. The credit was intended to expand domestic production of critical mineral components for clean energy technologies. According to the rules published in November 2024, while the credit phases out for all other components, including solar, wind, and battery components by 2032, critical mineral projects were not subject to the phaseout, meaning the credit maintains its value in perpetuity. However, in 2025, Congress voted to phase out the Section 45X tax credit in 2032--undermining the economic viability of beneficiary projects.
Expanding the Section 45X PTC--both by extending its duration and broadening eligibility across industries--is critical. Automotive manufacturers, defense primes, and battery producers alike can benefit from the Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit. It is one of the most effective tools currently available to support domestic mineral and materials production. Unlike project-based credits, 45X rewards production directly, lowering operating costs and helping Western firms compete against heavily subsidized foreign producers, particularly in China.
Additionally, increasing the Section 45X credit for critical minerals to 20 percent for the first five years it is claimed by a taxpayer, with the incentive stepping down to 10 percent thereafter, would strengthen early-stage project economics and help ensure companies can meet internal hurdle rates. The higher initial credit would improve cash flow during the most capital-intensive and highest-risk phase of development, when financing constraints are most acute. A predictable step-down structure would also preserve long-term fiscal discipline while providing sufficient near-term support to catalyze investment, accelerate project timelines, and crowd in private capital across mining, refining, and processing segments of the supply chain.
4. Use compliance standards, not environmental, social, and governance criteria, to create a differentiated market. There is broad interest in using environmental, social, and governance criteria to reward responsibly sourced minerals with premium pricing. In practice, ESG criteria are difficult to translate into enforceable price differentials. Compliance-based standards offer a more viable path. Requirements tied to existing law--particularly the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA)--are clearly defined, enforceable, and already familiar to industry. Companies that are unwilling to disclose detailed supply chain data for intellectual property reasons are generally willing to certify compliance with established statutory standards.
Building differentiated markets around these compliance requirements--where certified producers command better pricing and preferred access--would reward responsible sourcing without creating new regulatory architecture. It converts an existing enforcement mechanism into a market signal.
5. Harmonize defense sourcing requirements. The current regulatory environment for defense mineral sourcing is a patchwork of overlapping and sometimes inconsistent authorities: Section 889 of the FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) sourcing restrictions, Buy American and Trade Agreements Act requirements, the UFLPA, International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Each framework was designed independently, and their interaction creates significant compliance friction for the industry. Companies face duplicative certification requirements, unclear guidance on allied alternatives, and slow procurement timelines as a result.
Harmonizing these authorities--providing clearer definitions of prohibited sources, covered materials, and acceptable allied substitutes--would reduce compliance costs and accelerate procurement. Establishing a single certification office with authority to issue unified compliance approvals across all sourcing requirements would be particularly valuable, giving defense contractors a single "stamp of approval" rather than requiring them to navigate each framework separately. It is important to note that DFARS requirements cannot realistically be extended across the broader commercial supply chain. Defense demand is simply too small a share of most manufacturers' total customer base for defense-specific sourcing rules to drive commercial investment decisions. Harmonization should focus on reducing friction within the defense procurement system, not on expanding its reach.
6. Pool allied demand. The United States faces a structural disadvantage in supply chain calculus: It is a relatively small direct consumer of many of the minerals it seeks to secure. In 2024, the United States consumed less than 5 percent of the world's nickel, rare earths, cobalt, and gallium. A country that represents less than 2 percent of global rare earth consumption cannot, on its own, generate the offtake commitments required to bring new mines, refineries, and processing facilities into production outside of China. Improving the economics of mineral production and processing requires demand aggregation.
The United States' 343 million consumers represent only a modest share of global demand. But a coalition spanning Australia, the United Kingdom, India, the European Union, Canada, Japan, and South Korea would bring that total to roughly 2.6 billion people--a 7.5-fold expansion of the potential market for minerals-intensive goods. At that scale, processing and refining facilities that cannot be commercially justified on U.S. offtake alone become viable: a smelter or separation plant that would struggle to survive serving one country can thrive with guaranteed demand from many buyers.
In February 2026, the new multilateral Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) was announced. Establishing a joint offtake commitment framework among FORGE member nations, modeled on the NATO defense spending commitment, under which participating governments agree to source specified percentages of critical mineral procurement from allied producers, can help. Under this framework, participating governments would commit to sourcing a defined share of their critical mineral needs from allied producers. Such coordinated demand signals would provide the long-term revenue certainty needed to attract private capital into mining, refining, and processing projects.
Conclusion
The United States has treated critical minerals primarily as a supply problem, when it is equally a demand problem. Supply-side investments create the potential for resilient supply chains; demand-side policy determines whether that potential is realized. China built its dominance not only by controlling resources and processing capacity, but by controlling demand through state-directed purchasing, long-term offtake agreements, and industrial policy that integrates upstream and downstream in a single commercial logic. Competing with that model requires the United States and its allies to develop an equivalent demand architecture: creating incentives, broadening and extending 45X PTC, pooling allied purchasing power through FORGE, and building markets that reward compliant producers with genuine price advantages.
* * *
Gracelin Baskaran is director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
This Commentary was made possible through generous support from General Motors to the CSIS Critical Minerals Security Program.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/winning-minerals-race-requires-building-demand-not-just-supply
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Tracker - The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
WASHINGTON, April 4 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by Financial Services Policy Director Thomas Kingsley:
* * *
Tracker: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
Introduction
This tracker follows the Federal Reserve's (Fed) total consolidated assets, held on its balance sheet, as the best indicator of the Fed's direct intervention in the economy.
Context
The Fed's dual mandate requires it to ensure both stable prices and maximum employment. The traditional tool the Fed uses to accomplish these goals is the adjustment of the federal funds rate,
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 4 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on April 3, 2026, by Financial Services Policy Director Thomas Kingsley:
* * *
Tracker: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
Introduction
This tracker follows the Federal Reserve's (Fed) total consolidated assets, held on its balance sheet, as the best indicator of the Fed's direct intervention in the economy.
Context
The Fed's dual mandate requires it to ensure both stable prices and maximum employment. The traditional tool the Fed uses to accomplish these goals is the adjustment of the federal funds rate,the short-term interest rate that determines how much it costs for banks to lend to each other overnight. The 2007-2008 financial crisis, however, demonstrated that even lowering the interest rate to zero was considered insufficient to shore up economies in freefall, and the Fed turned to more unusual tactics. One of these measures was what the Fed refers to as "large-scale asset purchases," which is more commonly known as "quantitative easing." Under this process, the Fed enters the market to buy securities, typically mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and Treasuries, injecting both capital and liquidity into the market. This approach is not without risks - for the first time in its history, the Fed is regulator, supervisor, and now participant in the economy.
The development of quantitative easing as a go-to tool for the Fed in times of crisis has led to an unprecedented focus on one of its traditionally unremarkable aspects - the Fed total assets. Just as with any other firm, securities that the Fed purchases are considered assets and therefore are represented on the Fed's balance sheet. This therefore is the most reflective guide of the state of quantitative easing and, by extension, the degree to which the Fed has deemed it necessary to intervene in the economy.
Each week, the Federal Reserve publishes its balance sheet, typically on Wednesday afternoon around 4:30 p.m.
As of April 1, the Fed's assets stand at $6.7 trillion.
Sources:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB
* * *
Thomas Kingsley is the Director of Financial Services Policy at the American Action Forum.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/tracker-the-federal-reserves-balance-sheet/
[Category: Think Tank]
