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Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Russia Continues to Reshape Arctic Security
WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Feb. 26, 2026, by Megi Benia, contributing editor of New Eastern Europe, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russia Continues to Reshape Arctic Security
Executive Summary:
* On January 22, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly publicly stated that increasing "competition" from Russia in the Arctic and the region's strategic importance make strengthening Allied deterrence and defensive posture in the High North essential.
* Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has increased ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Feb. 26, 2026, by Megi Benia, contributing editor of New Eastern Europe, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Continues to Reshape Arctic Security Executive Summary: * On January 22, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly publicly stated that increasing "competition" from Russia in the Arctic and the region's strategic importance make strengthening Allied deterrence and defensive posture in the High North essential. * Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has increasedthe securitization of the High North by reframing its approach to the Arctic from development-focused to a region essential for military deterrence.
* Russia's military posture in the Arctic relies on a blended toolkit of government tools, dual-use infrastructure, and diplomatic posturing to strengthen Russian control over access routes and to impose uncertainty on NATO planning.
On January 22, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly publicly stated that increasing "competition" from Russia in the Arctic and the region's strategic importance make strengthening Allied deterrence and defensive posture in the High North essential (NATO PA, January 22). There is a growing consensus within NATO that developments in the Arctic should be regarded as an indispensable aspect of the Allied efforts to adapt to its evolving Northern Flank (NATO, January 12). Since the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has increased its engagement in the Arctic. The Arctic has gained a central importance for Russia's deterrence credibility, reinforcement routes, and escalation management amid growing pressure from Western Allies, including sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and post-2022 NATO enlargement (see EDM, March 31, April 7, 2025).
Before 2022, Russia's Arctic engagement was mainly framed in terms of economic development, modernization, and regional cooperation (Security Council of Russia, March 5, 2020). Russia's 2021-2023 chairmanship of the Arctic Council, which was mostly focused on economic and cultural activities aimed at enhancing regional cooperation, illustrates this point (Government of Russia, May 15, 2021).
Since Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, securing Arctic military interests for deterrence and pressure on NATO has become Russia's core objective in the region. The Kremlin claims that the main drivers of this shift are Finland's and Sweden's NATO accession, which allows the alliance enhanced coordination across the Baltic-Nordic-Arctic regions, strengthens NATO's air and maritime capabilities, and expands its situational awareness and reinforcement options in the High North (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2022; The Arctic Institute, October 31, 2024). In Russia's 2023 foreign policy concept, the Kremlin explicitly stated that its core objective in the Arctic is to "neutralize" the ongoing "militarization of unfriendly states" in the region. Russia views this militarization as "limiting [its] ability to exercise its sovereign rights in the Arctic zone" (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2023). Russia's 2022 maritime doctrine stated that the principal threat to Russia's national security is the expansion of foreign naval presence in the Arctic, which Moscow views as a threat to its control over the Northern Sea Route (NSR) (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 31, 2022)
Russia's military buildup in the Arctic is not about responding to the "hostile actions" of NATO. Russia's Arctic buildup is driven by its fear of having limited space for its maneuvers in other theaters traditionally used by Russia as tools of deterrence and pressure against Europe and NATO. Russia seeks to shape NATO's decision-making process by creating uncertainty. The Arctic is a space where Russia can demonstrate resolve, test NATO response thresholds, and preserve escalation leverage without engaging in overt military conflict.
The core objective of Russia's post-February 2022 Arctic strategy is to preserve its deterrence credibility while shaping the operating environment to limit NATO's freedom of maneuver. Russia's "bastion" concept--a strategy with origins in the 1970s to protect its nuclear submarines in heavily defended near-shore zones--remains central (Upravlenie, August 27, 2024). This strategy is primarily implemented around the Kola Peninsula, where Russia's strategic nuclear assets are based. For decades, Russia has used this system in combination with anti-access and area-denial tactics to prevent foreign vessels from entering the waters within Russia's professed sphere. This build-up intensified after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which Russia reinforces with nuclear-powered icebreakers, strengthening its ability to control and develop Arctic territories and complicating the deployment of foreign forces in the region (Upravlenie, August 27, 2024).
Russia has bolstered its Arctic military posture in the High North since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian long-range military patrol aircraft, Ty-142MK, have conducted unique aerial refueling in regional skies, demonstrated improved surveillance capabilities, and shown anti-submarine and wide-area control capabilities (TASS, February 9). Russia is also deploying new satellite constellations to ensure uninterrupted monitoring of the air, surface, and maritime domains in the Arctic (Paluba, January 31, 2023). Russia's introduction of the nuclear icebreaker, Yakutiya, capable of escorting vessels through heavy Arctic ice year-round, strengthens the Kremlin's ability to control navigation and logistics along the NSR (Glavnii Regional'nii, January 14, 2025).
The implementation of dual-use infrastructure is also an important aspect of Russia's recent Arctic strategy. Russia builds port, airfield, and logistics hubs, and enhances communication capabilities under the guise of economic development, while also positioning these capabilities to support military mobility and operational sustainment (see EDM, June 18, 2025). In December 2025, for instance, Russia President Vladimir Putin issued a decree "On some issues of the Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation," which envisions the development of Transatlantic Transport Corridor, a system of maritime, railway, and transport routes connecting the European part of Russia (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk) with the Far East via the NSR (President of Russia, December 8, 2025). Dual-use assets, which can rapidly switch between civilian and military functions, create ambiguity and reduce response times during armed conflict. Military use of civilian infrastructure makes Russia's intent harder to interpret and NATO response options harder to calibrate, supporting the Kremlin's broader strategy of escalation management and uncertainty maintenance.
Russia has strengthened its Arctic military posture since February 2022 through new legislation and diplomatic signaling. On November 30, 2022, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted the "Law on navigation along the Northern Sea Route," which established a permit regime for the passage of foreign warships and other government vessels, requiring diplomatic notification or authorization at least 90 days before the planned transit (Federation Council, November 30, 2022). The law also limits the presence of these vessels to one at a time. On September 24, 2025, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs published its position on "Definition and Legal Status of the Northern Sea Route," asserting that the navigation through these waters is subject to a Russian permit regime and regulatory controls (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2025). Together with military exercises and patrols, these administrative restrictions, enforcement patterns, and "sovereignty" narratives allow Russia to introduce uncertainty into NATO planning by projecting control below the threshold of open confrontation (Bezopasnaia Arktika 2025).
Unlike NATO--which has not increased its collective presence in the region even after Finland's and Sweden's membership--Russia considers the Arctic a vital element of its national security and power projection (see EDM, June 18, 20, October 3, 2025). This prioritization allows Russia to increase the uncertainty and risks of NATO activity in the Arctic through investments in military infrastructure, deployments, and operational activity, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict to test NATO decision-making and transatlantic unity under ambiguous conditions. If Russia concludes that imposing gradual costs is feasible without triggering a meaningful response, it may be encouraged to continue to push Allied resolve.
Since at least 2024, NATO leadership has publicly stated the importance of strengthening deterrence, resilience, and risk management capabilities in response to Russia's activities in the Arctic. NATO has highlighted the necessity of integrating the region into the collective defense and transatlantic reinforcement (NATO, October 21, 2024). Given weather restrictions, conducting NATO operations in the Arctic depends on fragile infrastructure, undersea connectivity, port access, and other logistical considerations, all of which are increasingly vulnerable to Russian sabotage.
Following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has regarded the Arctic as an essential deterrence space and escalation management platform. To reinforce this objective, Russia has been actively utilizing a blended toolkit of securitized access, dual-use infrastructure, new legislation, and selective signaling to preserve strategic flexibility and restrict NATO's freedom of action in the region. Headline deployments do not define Russia's threat in the Arctic, but by the uncertainty and escalatory leverage that the Kremlin seeks to sow.
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Ms. Megi Benia is a former Georgian diplomat and security and foreign policy professional specializing in Russia's influence operations, NATO's collective defense posture, international cybersecurity, resilience, and transatlantic affairs. She currently serves as a Contributing Editor of New Eastern Europe.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-continues-to-increase-competition-in-the-arctic/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Rent Control Exacerbates Housing Shortage in Germany
MUNICH, Germany, Feb. 27 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:* * *
Rent Control Exacerbates Housing Shortage in Germany
Expanding rent control would increase the housing shortage in Germany. ifo President Clemens Fuest warns against it: "This kind of intervention doesn't ease the housing market, but rather worsens the shortage and reduces labor mobility," he says. According to Fuest, if less housing were built and rental markets were frozen at set price levels, young people and job seekers who have to move for new jobs would suffer the most.
According to ifo analyses, rental ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Feb. 27 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Rent Control Exacerbates Housing Shortage in Germany Expanding rent control would increase the housing shortage in Germany. ifo President Clemens Fuest warns against it: "This kind of intervention doesn't ease the housing market, but rather worsens the shortage and reduces labor mobility," he says. According to Fuest, if less housing were built and rental markets were frozen at set price levels, young people and job seekers who have to move for new jobs would suffer the most. According to ifo analyses, rentalregulation is leading to a decline in investment in new builds, and the use of existing living space is becoming less flexible. This can be seen, among other things, in rents for new builds being significantly higher than existing rents - by around 30 percent across Germany and almost 50 percent in attractive major cities - which makes relocation unattractive financially for many people. This declining mobility exacerbates the situation on the rental housing market because older people tend to stay in homes that are too large, while young people have more difficulty finding a place to live.
That's why ifo President Fuest is against further tightening rent control. "Measures that promote residential construction and improve the use of existing buildings would be important. Only then would it be possible to reconcile housing supply and demand in the long term."
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Opinion
26 February 2026 Opinion
Tightening Rent Control Exacerbates the Housing Shortage in Germany
For years, there have been complaints in Germany about living space in major cities and conurbations becoming increasingly scarce. Young people in particular, who have found a job in another city and want to move, are increasingly reporting that they have failed to find accommodation. This is not only frustrating for those affected but also damages overall economic development. Economic growth only works if people can take up new jobs and move to do so.
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/opinion/2026-02-26/tightening-rent-control-exacerbates-housing-shortage-germany)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-02-26/rent-control-exacerbates-housing-shortage-germany
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Global Taiwan Institute: What's In the New US-Taiwan 'Agreement on Reciprocal Trade'?
WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Feb. 26, 2026, by senior fellow Riley Walters to the Global Taiwan Institute:* * *
What's In the New US-Taiwan "Agreement on Reciprocal Trade"?
On February 12, officials from the United States and Taiwan signed an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) in Washington, DC. The ART is the most significant trade agreement between the United States and Taiwan in decades, and perhaps the closest thing the two countries will ever ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Feb. 26, 2026, by senior fellow Riley Walters to the Global Taiwan Institute: * * * What's In the New US-Taiwan "Agreement on Reciprocal Trade"? On February 12, officials from the United States and Taiwan signed an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) in Washington, DC. The ART is the most significant trade agreement between the United States and Taiwan in decades, and perhaps the closest thing the two countries will everhave to a bilateral trade agreement. The ART will eliminate or reduce trade barriers, and up to 99 percent of tariff barriers. It reflects a desire by both sides to promote the US-Taiwan economic partnership through increased investment and commercial opportunities. But getting the ART approved by Taiwan's legislature will be the greatest challenge before seeing this deal go into force.
What Are the Major Provisions of the ART?
The ART is a comprehensive agreement that covers tariff and non-tariff barriers, and regulatory and enforcement issues. It further outlines economic and national security measures, investments goals, and future purchase commitments of American goods. The deal only goes into force once it has been through the internal procedures of each country--which in Taiwan's case means approval by its legislature, the Legislative Yuan (LY).
Here are some highlights of the agreement:
Tariff Reductions
Taiwan is expected to reduce 99 percent of its tariff barriers on products from the United States.
The process will be a phased implementation over a three-year period, with the majority of tariffs expected to be eliminated once the deal goes into effect. Imports of products such as passenger vehicles, which currently have a 17.5 percent tariff, will be expected to drop to zero immediately. The tariff rate on more politically sensitive agricultural products1 --such as ducks, guinea fowl, and fresh oranges--will drop by at least 50 percent immediately. A 12.5 percent tariff on swine products is expected to drop by 50 percent over three years. Meanwhile, Taiwan's existing tariffs on rice, clams, oysters, and chickens will remain unchanged.
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ART: Taiwan's Tariff Changes
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Non-Tariff Reductions
Safety standards have often been seen as a non-tariff barrier for American exports to Taiwan. However, many such standards issues have been eased or eliminated in the ART. For example, Taiwan has agreed to accept vehicles that are compliant with U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. It will accept medical devices that are approved by the US Food and Drug Administration.
Further, Taiwan will ensure that its safety standards for food and agricultural imports conform with internationally recognized standards: to include historically sensitive products in US-Taiwan trade negotiations including beef, pork, and animal byproducts. There are also provisions relating to removing barriers to trade for bison, poultry, dairy, aquatic products (excluding catfish), potatoes, and agricultural biotechnology, including more reasonable limitations on future import restrictions on poultry products potentially affected by avian influenza.
Economic and National Security Cooperation
While Taiwan already has export controls and investment screening, the ART goes further to ensure that the United States and Taiwan coordinate more closely on these issues. Taiwan will align its export controls with respect to the US Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR) on semiconductors and equipment. It will ensure Taiwan maintains "robust research security measures," including entering into no agreements with the PRC regarding technologies such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing. Taiwan will also maintain and apply a comprehensive mechanism to review inbound and outbound investment.
Regulatory Alignment
On more technical trade matters, Taiwan will ensure transparency and fairness with respect to the protection or recognition of geographical indications--which link products to specific geographical places of origin. Taiwan will ensure there are no digital service taxes on American companies, while also ensuring the free transfer of data across trusted borders. The two countries will expand rare earth recycling opportunities. And Taiwan will crack down on illegal logging, unregulated fishing, and illegal wildlife trade.
Enforcement Enhancement
Taiwan will provide a robust standard of protection for intellectual property, including providing effective systems for civil, criminal, and border enforcement of intellectual property rights. It will ensure that these systems combat and deter the infringement or misappropriation of intellectual property, including online. Taiwan will also work towards enforcing internationally recognized labor rights, including the protection of unions. It will also eliminate any form of forced or compulsory labor, particularly in distant water fishing.
$85 Billion in Purchase Commitments
Between now and 2030, Taiwan agrees to purchase from the United States $44.4 billion worth of liquid natural gas (LNG) and crude oil; $25.2 billion worth of power equipment, power grids, materials, generators, storage facilities, marine equipment, steel-making equipment, and other relevant equipment; and, $15.2 billion worth of civil aircraft and engines.
$500 Billion Investment Companion
On January 15, 2026, officials from the US and Taiwan signed an investment agreement that will see $250 billion in new direct investment in the United States by Taiwanese semiconductor and technology enterprises, and $250 billion in credit guarantees by the government in Taiwan for additional investments. These investments will focus on building and expanding advanced semiconductor, energy, and artificial intelligence production, as well as the supply chain and ecosystems that support these industries. Taiwan is also expected to facilitate investment in America's LNG export capacity, and to invest in Taiwan's own LNG storage capacity--which is then expected to be filled with American LNG.
Unfortunately, neither the ART nor investment agreement mentioned any progress towards establishing a US-Taiwan bilateral tax agreement - despite all the planned investments to be made.
As a part of these trade and investment deals, the US has agreed to reduce tariffs applied on imports from Taiwan. The tariff rate applied under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) will be reduced from 20 percent to 15 percent. A 25 percent tariff rate on Taiwanese auto parts, timber, lumber, and wood derivative products applied under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 will be reduced to 15 percent. Tariff rates on generic pharmaceuticals, generic ingredients, aircraft components, and unavailable natural resources will become zero. And future tariffs on semiconductors will be based on a quota system that depends on Taiwanese investment in the United States.
Implications for Taiwan-PRC Relations
While much of the ART is focused on expanding the US-Taiwan economic partnership, several important efforts are made in the agreement to ensure that neither country expands their partnerships with China, at least without approval of the other party.
Article 5.4.6 of the ART states that if Taiwan enters into a new bilateral free trade agreement or preferential economic agreement with China, the United States may terminate this agreement and reimpose tariffs. Since the emphasis is on new agreements, it's safe to assume the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) doesn't affect this deal. However, both Taiwan's and China's desire to get into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) would.
Additionally, Article 4.3 of the deal states that if Taiwan enters into a digital trade agreement with China, the United States may terminate the agreement and reimpose tariffs. Article 5.2.7 states Taiwan will phase out the use of existing technology from countries of concern, and not allow technologies from those countries into Taiwan's digital infrastructure: including the country's 5G and 6G wireless networks, subsea cables, cloud systems, internet data centers, imaging technology used at airports and seaports, and cranes used at seaports.
Reactions from the PRC to the trade deal have been predictably negative.
Challenges Ahead
The ART will require the approval of Taiwan's unicameral legislature before it can move forward--and if recent challenges involving passage of the defense budget are any indicator, President Lai will have to spend a lot of political capital to get the ART through.
The tariff reductions specifically will require legislative approval, but the LY will want to review the entire agreement--including the companion investment deal, which has yet to be made publicly available. This will represent a significant challenge for the Lai Administration: Lai's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is in the minority in the legislature, with a coalition of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) holding a majority of the seats.
In light of how politically sensitive the ART may be domestically, there will be real difficulties in securing passage. The KMT has criticized the agreement, claiming that it could jeopardize food safety and harm Taiwanese industries (automotive, agricultural, etc.) that are now open to competition with American companies. Local elections in November may also add to the challenge to getting the ART through the LY, especially if the approval process stalls for very long. As of now, the LY may start its review of the ART in March.
Recent events between the US and South Korea show that Mr. Trump is not interested in other country's domestic politics where his trade deals are concerned. While trade deals don't typically include a date of implementation, if President Lai can't get the ART through the LY in a timely manner, tariffs on imports from Taiwan will go back up before too long.
Conclusion
The future of US-Taiwan trade relations rests on not just Taiwan's ability to get the deal approved through its legislature, but to also implement the deal in a timely manner. Whether the growing US-Taiwan trade deficit matters anymore is anyone's guess. But the ART contains language indicating that future exemptions from tariffs will depend not just on the trade deal--but also on Taiwan's ability to fund its defense at 3 percent of GDP, streamline defense trade, and develop shipbuilding, among other things.
While the US and Taiwan were on an established path towards a bilateral trade agreement under the 21st Century Trade Initiative, those efforts slowed and the US presidential administration changed. The Trump Administration has chosen a different path for US trade policy--one which has led to higher tariffs, but greater U.S-Taiwan investment and commercial opportunities.
The main point: The United States and Taiwan have signed a new trade deal called the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART). The ART will reduce or eliminate most tariff and non-tariff barriers on American imports in Taiwan - even for politically sensitive agricultural products. The ART is a companion deal to an investment agreement that was signed in January, which will see $500 billion in new investment in the United States--much of which will be focused on the semiconductor industry, and artificial intelligence-adjacent industries.
Read in The Global Taiwan Institute (https://globaltaiwan.org/2026/02/whats-in-the-new-us-taiwan-agreement-on-reciprocal-trade/).
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At A Glance:
Riley Walters is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute specializing in international economics and national security.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/global-economy/whats-new-us-taiwan-agreement-reciprocal-trade-riley-walters
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Australian: China Is Preparing for War, and Australia Must Act to Defend Its Sovereignty
WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Feb. 26, 2026, by senior fellow John Lee to The Australian:* * *
China Is Preparing for War, and Australia Must Act to Defend Its Sovereignty
If a country is preparing for war against us, we should take it seriously: whether this is to deter or to fight. The process is the same.
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"We are facing stormy seas. Be ready for war. Be ready to fight a war at any time." Since 2018 Chinese President Xi Jinping has spoken these ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Feb. 26, 2026, by senior fellow John Lee to The Australian: * * * China Is Preparing for War, and Australia Must Act to Defend Its Sovereignty If a country is preparing for war against us, we should take it seriously: whether this is to deter or to fight. The process is the same. * "We are facing stormy seas. Be ready for war. Be ready to fight a war at any time." Since 2018 Chinese President Xi Jinping has spoken thesewords dozens of times.
He has seized power from the committees for himself. He has purged military and political officers who disagree with his impatience to achieve what he calls the great rejuvenation of China.
There is a rule of thumb that is reaffirmed throughout history: If a dictator is rearming and openly telling his military and countrymen that a great battle is approaching, then it is prudent to believe him.
Let me present some facts about what has been happening in our region:
* For three decades, the annual increase in China's military budget has been twice as rapid as its economic growth.
* This is the fastest and largest rearmament program by any nation during peacetime in 200 years of recorded economic history.
* China now spends more on its military each year than the combined military budgets of the rest of Asia and the Pacific.
* It has entrenched a policy known as civil-military fusion, which basically means that any commercial asset or technology can be commandeered by the state for military purposes.
Australian officials and military experts speak about the loss of strategic warning time when we should prepare for war. This is a collective failure on our part.
You have probably heard this apparently sage advice: if we treat another country as an enemy, then we make it into one. I prefer a more practical approach. If a country is preparing for war against us, we should take it seriously: whether this is to deter or to fight. The process is the same. We have refused to heed the public warnings Xi has delivered for years.
Some may be thinking: what is the point? Australia is a population of under 28 million people against China's 1.4 billion. Our GDP is one-tenth that of China's, as is our military budget compared with the People's Liberation Army.
Paul Keating is a constant critic of our alliance with the US and of agreements such as AUKUS. He has argued that pitting our military against China's is like "throwing toothpicks at a mountain".
Why take on a giant when Australia is under no threat of direct invasion? China openly wants to take Taiwan. This will allow it to break out into the Western Pacific and beyond, thereby surrounding and isolating Japan and the Southeast Asian states. It wants to control how our region operates by dismantling the US alliances with Japan, South Korea, The Philippines and Australia.
The numbers reveal and dictate the Chinese strategy. If the US is eased out of the region, there is no possible military or economic balance that can keep China in check.
China does not have to become more powerful than the US. It just needs to weaken or neutralise American alliances because the US cannot sustain its position in our region without the assistance of allies. This is why China is constantly urging and demanding that Australia remain neutral and on the sidelines. It is a clever strategy to ensure there is no possible deterrent.
You still may wonder: so what? There is about 7250km between northern Australia and the southern tip of China. Keating and others are correct: we are unlikely to see an invasion of Australia under any circumstances. But it comes down to the terms by which we exist as a sovereign and independent country. What might China want and demand from Australia if Xi achieves economic and military dominance in the region?
Well, it would buy our iron ore at prices well below the global commodity market price. It will insist on purchasing our mineral and agricultural assets without restriction and sell these commodities to the Chinese market at below market prices. The way would be clear for China to entrench an exclusive military and police presence in the South Pacific. In controlling shipping lanes and market access in the entire region, it would punish Australian governments or firms when they make decisions that Beijing does not like. It would openly monitor the activities of Chinese diasporas in Australia and insist that those critical of China be punished or even extradited to China for detention.
If you think I am exaggerating or speculating, just remember the 14 grievances the Chinese embassy issued to Australia back in November 2021 as justification for the economic punishments against us.
Of those 14 grievances, nine concerned our domestic policies. In other words, the Morrison government could have remained silent on the treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang, on the threats being made against Taiwan and on the illegal Chinese claim to all of the South China Sea. That would not have been enough to avoid punishment. According to the 14 grievances, we also needed to clamp down on our domestic media, remove hurdles for Chinese firms wanting to control Australian assets, defund think tanks critical of Chinese policies and allow firms such as Huawei to dominate our critical infrastructure and technologies.
There won't be a PLA invasion of Australia but how we live and exist as a country will be very different from what we now enjoy. If you still don't believe me, look at countries such as Cambodia, Laos or even Malaysia. You can see for yourself how much China has restricted their ability to make sovereign decisions for themselves.
Why do we need to spend more on defence if our military cannot make a difference when it comes to deterring China? Why do we need AUKUS?
The answer is that we can make a difference and China knows it - which is why Beijing is hoping we will not properly fund AUKUS.
The one thing we have that is irreplaceable in strategic terms is geography. Japan is called the northern anchor of the US-led alliance. We are known as the southern anchor.
It's not the only thing the Australian Defence Force brings to the table. It is also the use of our territory for hosting satellite and other technological assets that is needed by modern militaries, including planes, such as the F35.
Our bases in the Northern Territory can provide munitions and stores of fuel and other military needs. Shipyards in Western Australia can service allied ships and submarines to increase the number of these that are operational and in the fight at any given time.
In a prolonged war, and that is what it is likely to be if one begins, say over Taiwan, the great allied weakness is adequate supply chains. Australia becomes critical in this respect.
To prevent a war, we need to convince the Chinese that we will collectively fight and can prevail in a war. In this context, Japan is the most important ally. Australia is next. If allies are not fully committed, the US cannot provide that check in Asia. China wins - without a shot being fired.
If China gets its way, the Australian way of life based on being able to make our own decisions and live the way we have grown accustomed will change.
Our current defence budget does not allow Australia to play this necessary role. Don't blame Donald Trump for our predicament.
His accusation that allied free-riding weakens all of us is correct. He might be transactional. But the deal is this: the more we do for ourselves, the more America will do for us. And the reverse holds true.
Allow me to end on a personal note. And I hope I am not insulting any of you by saying this.
I migrated here from Malaysia in 1980. What it means to be free and sovereign in Australia is far more meaningful than from where I was born. It often takes someone who has lived overseas to know there is a difference.
I began with a quote from Xi Jinping and I will end with another. Every time Xi sees Vladimir Putin, he says: great changes, unseen for a century, are occurring. He refers to the decline and eclipse of the West because he believes we are indulgent, distracted, divided and not ready for what is to come. He must be proved wrong.
Read in The Australian (https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/china-is-preparing-for-war-and-australia-must-act-to-defend-its-sovereignty/news-story/963eeafac19698de2ae800734acbd424?amp).
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At A Glance:
John Lee is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/china-preparing-war-australia-must-act-defend-its-sovereignty-john-lee
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary: Amidst Historical Nescience, Recalling the Black, Minton, Anderson, and Buchanan Committees
WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Feb. 26, 2026, by Michael E. Hartmann, senior fellow and director of the Center for Strategic Giving:* * *
Amidst historical nescience, recalling the Black, Minton, Anderson, and Buchanan Committees
A feared "future" that actually began about nine decades ago.
Editorial note: this essay originally appeared at The Giving Review.
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A number of conservatives have issued warnings about any aggressive populist reaction against establishment progressive philanthropy and its activities, including those of ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Feb. 26, 2026, by Michael E. Hartmann, senior fellow and director of the Center for Strategic Giving: * * * Amidst historical nescience, recalling the Black, Minton, Anderson, and Buchanan Committees A feared "future" that actually began about nine decades ago. Editorial note: this essay originally appeared at The Giving Review. * * * A number of conservatives have issued warnings about any aggressive populist reaction against establishment progressive philanthropy and its activities, including those ofalmost all the largest private foundations and nonprofits in America, because of that which such a reaction might in turn mean for conservative foundations and nonprofit groups if and when liberals and progressives inevitably return to positions of political, policymaking, and prosecutorial power themselves.
This might strike some as a little historically uninformed--specifically, about that which those progressives have actually done when they previously possessed such power. In just recent history, think of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Arctic Frost investigation of conservative nonprofits starting in 2022--about which we're still learning much that should be of concern, as well as cause for pause among those "let's-tone-it-downers" fretful about a new future. It sure appears as if the feared future has happened already.
In fact, this supposed future is about 90 years old, at least. One needn't wait to learn much more about the Black, Minton, Anderson, and Buchanan Committee, for instance. We do know about them.
Or at least should.
Frontal assault on enemies
As President Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term was ending and there were great concerns among progressives and Democrats about his re-election prospects in 1936, the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Lobbying Activities--established the prior year and chaired by Alabama Democrat Hugo Black--"mounted a more frontal assault on the New Deal's enemies," according to University of Alabama historian David T. Beito's 2023 book The New Deal's War on the Bill of Rights.
During his tenure as this committee's chair, Black had deployed highly controversial methods such as dragnet subpoenas of telegrams (with the assistance of the Federal Communications Commission) and of tax records (with the assistance of the Internal Revenue Service [IRS]) when probing anti-New Deal business interests and political organizations," according to Beito and Marcus M. Witcher in a 2016 Independent Review article. (All parentheses in original.) This was far prior to better-known, later abuses of the IRS by Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon, of course.
"Dragnet subpoenas" are, more formalistically, blanket duces tecum subpoenas; duces tecum means "under penalty bring with you," and they include all potentially relevant documentation, covering correspondence, financial information, and whatever else. Arctic Frost-like, it might seem.
Or, I guess, the future.
While the Internal Revenue Code Sec. 501(c)'s categorization of different types of nonprofit groups wasn't created until 1954, well after the Black Committee's existence, the committee's investigations also blanketly covered what would now be considered (c)(3) charitable and (c)(4) social-welfare ones. In January 1936, for example, "as former Democratic standard-bearer Al Smith was speaking at a highly publicized American Liberty League dinner, the committee was mailing out questionnaires to hundreds of individuals," Beito writes in the book.
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These asked under oath for itemized answers for any contributions over the previous two years to the American Liberty League as well as to the following other anti-New Deal groups: the Crusaders, the New York State Economic Council, the American Taxpayers League, and the Sentinels of the Republic. The mailings warned the recipients to be prepared to testify. Not without reason, many critics suggested that a key goal of the probe was to help Roosevelt's campaign by scaring away potential donors fearful of being hauled before a congressional committee or subjected to tax audits. In a predictable response, the American Liberty League said it was being singled out for advocating "constitutional principles" and did not intend to comply because it was not a lobby.
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Heavy-handed retaliation
Then, FDR's second term began in 1937 "with three months of uninterrupted triumph followed by interludes of confusion, embattlement, false starts, several high-profile setbacks, an economic dip, and finally a determination to retaliate" against New Deal opponents, Beito recounts in The New Deal's War on the Bill of Rights. The Senate's Special Committee to Investigate Lobbying Activities "was a leading component of this strategy of retaliation."
Indiana Democrat Sherman Minton had just become chairman of the committee, after FDR appointed Black, Minton's mentor, to the Supreme Court. Minton himself was later nominated by FDR to a federal appeals-court judgeship in 1941 and by Harry S Truman to the Supreme Court in 1949. Black and Minton were men favored by the progressive establishment, intellectually and politically enamored of its New Deal, and aggressive in targeting its enemies with whatever investigative powers of the state over which they could coldly--perhaps frostily?--and calculatedly wield any influence.
"Minton, who had been Roosevelt's preferred choice for the first open Supreme Court slot but had turned him down, was even more zealous than his predecessor in fealty to the New Deal," Beito and Witcher write in their Independent Review piece. "The Minton Committee's heavy-handed methods, however, produced widespread anger, thanks, in part, to the machinations of an all-too-obviously partisan chair. Rather than protecting and advancing the New Deal as intended, its actions had the opposite effect."
Under Minton's leadership, the committee additionally targeted a new entity formed just after FDR's February 1937 announcement of his intent to pack the Supreme Court--the Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government, which would be more fairly characterized as an outright political committee that didn't engage in charitable or social-welfare activities. It also focused deeply on the American Liberty League, as well, and the Famers Independence Council of America. Black Committee- and Arctic Frost-like.
Or the future. Again.
More probing questionnaires
In 1944, the House Committee on Campaign Expenditures--chaired by Rep. Clinton Anderson, Democrat of New Mexico, so known as the Anderson Committee--launched yet another investigation, targeting the Committee for Constitutional Government, which had shortened its name three years earlier from the old Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government, as Beito overviews in The New Deal's War on the Bill of Rights. The Anderson Committee "represented continuity" with the Black and Minton Committees, Beito writes.
The Anderson Committee's work helped generate the evidentiary and political foundation for the failed "Great Sedition Trial" in '44, after many far right, pro Nazi, or Nazi sympathetic propagandists previously scrutinized by the Black and Minton Committees were indicted under the Smith Act. It ended in a mistrial. The committee's work also helped lay the predicate for the Lobbying Act of 1946, requiring disclosure of all those contributing $500 or more to an organization, and "indirectly spawned" the House Select Committee on Lobbying, by Beito's telling.
"After Truman's upset victory in 1948, bringing Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, the victors promised again to scrutinize lobbies widely blamed for the previous Republican triumph" in the November 1946 mid-term elections, according to Beito's book. The House Select Committee on Lobbying--chaired by Rep. Frank Buchanan, Democrat of Pennsylvania, so known as the Buchanan Committee--was authorized in 1949.
In 1950, the Buchanan Committee began its investigation with "a probing questionnaire sent to more than 170 businesses and organizations," Beito writes.
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The wording defined lobbying in the broadest possible terms to also include groups responsible for the indirect formation of political ideas. Buchanan vowed to play no favorites and pledged that his goals were only information and transparency, but few of the questionnaires went out to businesses or groups led by New Dealers or Fair Dealers. Especially revealing was the question asking to "include all expenditures in connection with" eight, and only eight, named organizations. All but one of these organizations were either right-wing or libertarian in orientation: the CCG, the American Enterprise Association (predecessor of the American Enterprise Institute), America's Future, Inc. (a conservative outlet for Robert McCormick of the Chicago Daily Tribune), the Constitution and Free Enterprise Foundation, the Economists National Committee for Monetary Policy (pro-gold standard), the libertarian Foundation for Economic Education, and the Constitutional Educational League. The lone exception to this pattern was the Public Affairs Institute, a left-of- center group that promoted an even larger welfare state.
* * *
(All footnotes omitted.)
Beito notes what he calls the "glaring omissions" from the list of "the CIO-PAC as well as businesses allied with the administration ... Buchanan himself revealed some explicit bias early on when he said that three out of the eight organizations under fire advocated 'a brand of American Fascism; they are against those who believe in a free, progressive America.'"
Those concerned about aggressive governmental treatment by liberals and progressives of conservative nonprofits in particular cannot nesciently look only to a new, retaliatory future. Evidence of such treatment is also elsewhere.
The past--which, in fact, may actually serve to many populist conservatives as at least some basis for aggressive governmental reaction to liberal and progressive nonprofitdom.
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Michael E. Hartmann is CRC's senior fellow and director of the Center for Strategic Giving, providing analysis of and commentary about philanthropy and giving. He also co-edits The Giving Review, a joint project of Philanthropy Daily and the Center for Strategic Giving.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/amidst-historical-nescience-recalling-the-black-minton-anderson-and-buchanan-committees/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A: Industrial Policy Is Back--And Minerals Are at the Center
WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Feb. 26, 2026, involving Director Gracelin Baskaran and associate fellow Meredith Schwartz of the Critical Minerals Security Program:* * *
Industrial Policy Is Back--And Minerals Are at the Center
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States deployed bold and creative industrial policies to secure critical minerals during crises. Today, it has fully revived that playbook--using equity stakes, price floors, foreign sourcing agreements, public procurement, and strategic ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Feb. 26, 2026, involving Director Gracelin Baskaran and associate fellow Meredith Schwartz of the Critical Minerals Security Program: * * * Industrial Policy Is Back--And Minerals Are at the Center Throughout the twentieth century, the United States deployed bold and creative industrial policies to secure critical minerals during crises. Today, it has fully revived that playbook--using equity stakes, price floors, foreign sourcing agreements, public procurement, and strategicstockpiling to develop mineral markets and bolster security actively. This renewed intervention is particularly significant because, for many key commodities, mining and processing capacity outside China remains underdeveloped and requires sustained, deliberate support to scale and become commercially viable.
Q1: Has the United States utilized industrial policy for minerals security before the current wave?
A1: Of course. Industrial policy has underpinned U.S. minerals security for more than a century. In moments of crisis from World War I through the Cold War, Washington did not rely on markets alone. It built strategic stockpiles, imposed price and production controls, financed mines and processing facilities at home and abroad, and negotiated foreign procurement and barter agreements to secure critical inputs.
These interventions were not ideological. Instead, they were pragmatic responses to supply shocks and wartime vulnerability. When private capital could not absorb the risk, when prices collapsed or spiked unpredictably, or when adversaries controlled key materials, the government stepped in to stabilize supply and ensure the defense industrial base could function. Industrial policy, in this context, was less about picking winners and more about guaranteeing access to the minerals that underpin national power. Some examples include:
* War Minerals Stimulation Law (1918): The first large-scale U.S. intervention in mineral markets authorized the president to take over and operate undeveloped mineral deposits, mines, and smelters deemed vital to the war effort. Backed by a $50 million fund, the law also empowered the creation of government corporations to boost production and manage distribution.
* Financing Foreign Supply (1942): The U.S. government funded a state-of-the-art nickel mine in Cuba to secure a critical wartime supply, stepping in where private markets were not delivering.
* Price Floors (1948): The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission announced guaranteed minimum prices for uranium ore. The federal government committed to purchasing all domestically produced uranium, effectively making itself the sole buyer and establishing a guaranteed market for producers.
* Production Controls (1951): To ensure there were minerals available for defense use, the National Production Authority banned copper use in more than 300 consumer products, reserving it for essential applications without substitutes.
* Barter for Strategic Minerals (1954): Under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, the United States exchanged surplus agricultural commodities for strategic minerals. Sections 202 and 203 explicitly authorized mineral barters. In 1982, the United States secured roughly 1.6 million tons of bauxite from Jamaica in exchange for dairy products, using creative procurement to strengthen mineral supply chains.
* Reviving the National Defense Stockpile (1981): President Ronald Reagan launched the first major stockpile purchase program in over two decades, warning of U.S. vulnerability to sudden raw material shortages affecting defense production.
Q2: How is the Trump administration using industrial policy?
A2: The Trump administration has deployed a comprehensive industrial policy toolkit for critical minerals, combining price floors, direct equity investments, public procurement, foreign sourcing agreements, and strategic stockpiling. It has also leveraged political risk insurance, concessional financing, loan guarantees, and offtake agreements. Rather than relying on a single instrument, the administration has used a broad set of tools to stabilize markets, strengthen domestic and allied capacity, and reduce exposure to concentrated supply chains. Some examples are:
* Stockpiling: Project Vault is a strategic critical minerals stockpile that operates to give manufacturers predictable access to 60 essential minerals during disruptions. It is backed by a $10 billion loan from the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM)--the largest in its 92-year history. This revives a classic industrial policy tool: government-supported reserves to reduce exposure to volatile or adversarial supply chains.
* Equity: The U.S. government has taken direct equity stakes in strategic mineral assets both domestically and internationally to strengthen supply chain security. Domestically, it has taken equity stakes in Trilogy Metals, MP Materials, Korea Zinc, Atalco, and Lithium Americas to support upstream mining and processing capacity. Internationally, it has partnered with Maaden to take an equity position in a rare earths refinery in Saudi Arabia.
* Public Procurement: The U.S. government signed a 10-year agreement to purchase 100 percent of the output from MP Materials' planned "10X" magnet facility. The U.S. Defense Logistics Agency also signed a five-year contract to purchase up to $245 million in antimony from the United States Antimony Corporation.
* Foreign Supply Arrangements: After President Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) proposed a minerals-for-security arrangement with the United States, Washington helped facilitate the signing of a peace deal. While peace in eastern Congo remains elusive, U.S.-DRC minerals cooperation has progressed, including a U.S. company working to acquire the Chemaf mine and a recent offtake agreement for 100,000 tons of Congolese copper to the United States (aligned to the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States and the DRC).
* Price Controls: The U.S. government established a 10-year $110 per kg price floor for neodymium praseodymium oxide (NdPr) to support MP Materials. Since then, the administration has moved beyond asset-specific arrangements toward a broader, market-based approach. At the 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial, Vice President JD Vance outlined a plurilateral strategy to enhance price stability through a preferential critical minerals trade zone with enforceable price floors.
Q3: Will all of these efforts work?
A3: Over the past six months, the U.S. government has mobilized more than $30 billion in letters of interest, loans, investments, and equity commitments across multiple agencies with financing authority. Although these large-scale interventions are significant, they are not without risk. Government financing can serve as a critical "bridge to bankability" for minerals projects that have historically struggled to attract private capital in an environment defined by high-risk, low commodity prices, and long development timelines. However, public capital cannot substitute for fundamentally sound project economics.
Rare earth elements have become the centerpiece of the U.S. industrial policy interventions. They are essential to defense and civilian applications and have repeatedly been subject to Chinese export restrictions. Yet, rare earths are among the most difficult mineral commodities to produce economically. Although they are relatively abundant in the Earth's crust, they rarely occur in high-concentration deposits. Their separation and processing are technically complex, and production entails significant reagent, energy, and environmental management costs. High ore grades are critical to the economic viability of rare earth mines. Higher-grade deposits require less material to be extracted and processed, making separation more efficient and significantly reducing overall costs.
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Table 1: USG Financing Announcements for Rare Earth Elements
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Even with substantial financial backing, the commercial viability of certain projects remains challenging. USA Rare Earth recently secured a letter of intent from the Department of Commerce's CHIPS Program for a $1.6 billion debt-and-equity package to develop a domestic rare earths mine in Round Top, Texas, and a permanent magnet manufacturing facility in Oklahoma. The mine was first identified in the 1970s during exploration for fluoride and beryllium, but the deposit was never mined, owing partially to commercial viability challenges.
The most significant economic risk facing Round Top is its exceptionally low ore grade. At approximately 0.03 percent total rare earth oxides (TREO), the deposit is orders of magnitude lower than higher-grade operations such as Mt. Weld, Mountain Pass, and Pela Ema. This creates a fundamental "volume problem." To produce the same quantity of TREO as Mt. Weld, Round Top would need to mine and process roughly 100-150 times more rock. The grade differential will drive cost inflation, processing complexity, materials handling challenges, and sustained capital intensity over the life of the project.
Higher-grade deposits require less material to be mined and processed, which makes separation more efficient and reduces overall operating costs. Low-grade deposits can be economic, but their viability typically depends on advances in processing and recovery technologies that must be demonstrated at a commercial scale. Proving and deploying those technologies takes time, capital, and carries meaningful execution risk.
Additionally, although USA Rare Earth has highlighted that Round Top is heavy rare earth-enriched on a relative basis, the absolute concentrations remain materially lower than those found in competing deposits. For dysprosium, Browns Range contains approximately 840 parts per million (ppm), Mt. Weld around 400 ppm, Pela Ema roughly 48 ppm, while Round Top averages just 30 ppm. The gap is similar for terbium: Browns Range reports about 120 ppm, Mt. Weld approximately 100 ppm, and Round Top only 3 ppm. Yttrium follows the same pattern, with Mt. Weld at roughly 1,360 ppm compared to 248 ppm at Round Top. These differences are not marginal--they reflect substantial disparities in the volume of material that must be mined and processed to produce the same quantity of heavy rare earth output.
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Table 2: REE Concentration by Element
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Additionally, Round Top presents a significant metallurgical challenge because it is effectively a geochemical "soup." In addition to 15 rare earths, there are an additional 23 minerals, including meaningful concentrations of lithium, beryllium, uranium, and thorium. The presence of multiple metals in solution also heightens purity risk. Each additional element becomes a potential impurity stream that must be removed through additional separation steps. Achieving the 99 percent purity required for high-tech and defense applications is materially more difficult when starting from a complex, multi-metal solution like Round Top's, compared to cleaner mineral systems.
Another structural risk is Round Top's heavy economic reliance on byproducts. In the 2019 preliminary economic assessment, lithium was projected to account for 32 percent of total project revenue. This creates commercial complexity, where the viability of rare earth production is indirectly dependent on the strength of secondary commodity markets. That dependence introduces exposure to market volatility. If lithium prices decline sharply, the overall project economics could deteriorate to the point where rare earth production becomes uneconomic on a stand-alone basis. In contrast, higher-grade operations such as Mt. Weld function more as "pure play" rare earth assets, with economics primarily anchored in REE production rather than byproduct cross-subsidization.
And finally, a Definitive Feasibility Study (DFS) for Round Top has not yet been completed. A DFS is a critical milestone in mine development, as it provides the detailed engineering, cost estimates, recovery assumptions, capital requirements, and financial modeling necessary to assess whether a project is economically viable under realistic market conditions.
Q4: What happens if they don't work?
A4: Not every project will succeed, and that is inherent to any industrial strategy. While there are fiscal considerations, the broader approach is intentionally diversified, with the United States and its allies supporting a portfolio of projects across commodities and jurisdictions. If a sufficient number reach commercial scale, the overall objective of strengthening supply security and reducing concentration risk can still be achieved.
The mining sector is inherently high-risk owing to technological, geopolitical, and commodity price cycle risks. For example, the Department of Defense awarded $90 million in Defense Production Act funds to Albemarle alone in 2023 for the reopening of the King's Mountain lithium mine in North Carolina. The mine was originally scheduled to reopen in 2026, but production has been delayed due to the collapse of lithium prices.
Q5: What steps can the United States take to ensure that critical mineral interventions translate into durable production capacity and sustained private investment?
A5: The United States government's industrial policy measures will be most effective in building diverse and secure critical mineral supply chains if combined with rigorous due diligence, clear and measurable performance milestones, and strong international partnerships. Embedding these disciplines from the outset not only improves project outcomes and capital efficiency but also makes interventions more politically durable across administrations.
1. Complete Rigorous Due Diligence Before Public Announcement: As the United States advances strategic critical mineral initiatives, completing rigorous technical and commercial due diligence prior to public announcements can help ensure long-term success. Confirming economic and project viability before signaling federal support strengthens investor confidence, protects scarce public financing tools, and reinforces U.S. credibility. Sequencing technical validation ahead of policy endorsement helps ensure that strategic interventions are durable, defensible, and capable of attracting sustained private capital. A disciplined approach can also reduce future controversy and mitigate the risk of politically-induced delays that have historically affected mining projects.
2. Tie Federal Support to Performance Milestones: Federal loans, grants, or offtake agreements should be milestone-based and tied to permitting progress, construction timelines, private capital commitments, and recovery benchmarks. This ensures that public capital supports execution. Milestone-based structures protect taxpayer dollars by aligning incentives: projects that advance receive continued support; projects that stall do not continue drawing federal resources.
3. Build Allied Supply Chains: Where domestic deposits are subscale, low-grade, or economically marginal in the near term, the United States should pursue a parallel strategy of deepened allied integration rather than overextending scarce federal capital. Strength in critical minerals will not come from attempting autarky at any cost; it will come from building a resilient, trusted production network anchored in close security and trade partners. Australia is the clearest example. As home to globally competitive rare earth deposits, Australia already supplies a significant share of non-Chinese rare earth feedstock. An allied model allows the United States to concentrate domestic resources on segments where it can build a durable advantage--particularly midstream separation, magnet manufacturing, and advanced materials--while securing upstream inputs through long-term, security-aligned supply arrangements.
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Gracelin Baskaran is director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Meredith Schwartz is an associate fellow for the Critical Minerals Security Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/industrial-policy-back-and-minerals-are-center
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A: Criminal Kingpin 'El Mencho' Is Dead, What Comes Next?
WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Feb. 26, 2026, involving Director Ryan C. Berg and associate fellow Henry Ziemer of the Americas Program:* * *
Criminal Kingpin "El Mencho" Is Dead, What Comes Next?
On Sunday, February 22, Mexico's Ministry of Defense reported that it had killed drug kingpin Nemesio "El Mencho" Oseguera Cervantes in an operation originally aimed at capturing him. During the operation, six other cartel members were killed, and weapons, including "rocket launchers capable of downing aircraft ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 27 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Feb. 26, 2026, involving Director Ryan C. Berg and associate fellow Henry Ziemer of the Americas Program: * * * Criminal Kingpin "El Mencho" Is Dead, What Comes Next? On Sunday, February 22, Mexico's Ministry of Defense reported that it had killed drug kingpin Nemesio "El Mencho" Oseguera Cervantes in an operation originally aimed at capturing him. During the operation, six other cartel members were killed, and weapons, including "rocket launchers capable of downing aircraftand destroying armored vehicles" (authors' translation) were reportedly seized. Mexico will need to keep up pressure against organized crime, however, to further dismantle the powerful criminal enterprise El Mencho oversaw, which remains intact following his death.
Q1: The Mexican government carried out a significant operation against the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). What happened, and how did the CJNG respond?
A1: The head of the feared CJNG, El Mencho, was the Mexican cartel leader with the highest reward on his head--the Department of State had offered $15 million for assistance in his arrest. Although not much is known about the operation carried out against El Mencho beyond the tracking performed to locate the drug lord at a remote hideout, Mexico's Claudia Sheinbaum administration has insisted that Mexican forces carried out the operation, with intelligence assistance from the United States. U.S. announcements confirm the same.
This represents an early and significant victory for the Joint Interagency Task Force-Counter Cartel (JIATF-CC), which was established a little over one month ago by the U.S. Department of Defense. An interagency effort, JIATF-CC aims to map cartel networks that operate seamlessly across the southern border and collect actionable intelligence. Both the Mexican and the U.S. governments hinted at this intelligence-sharing and broader cooperation framework in their announcements after El Mencho's death.
Predictably, the CJNG responded to the death of their leader with violence and a show of force against the Mexican state. Normally, after the killing of a cartel leader, the Mexican state expects acts of revenge and shows of force in areas of cartel control, in this case centered around the group's power center in the states of Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Michoacan. By contrast, on Sunday, at least 20 states reported cartel activity and outbursts of violence coordinated by the CJNG. This included harrowing scenes of an attempted takeover of the Puerto Vallarta Airport, stranded tourists in beachside hotels, and more than 250 "narco blockades" along roads and important transport arteries in Mexico, where burning vehicles or physical barriers prevented passage. To date, the fallout has resulted in the deaths of dozens of the CJNG operatives, as well as at least 25 members of the Mexican Armed Forces. The scope of the CJNG's reprisals was notable and serves as a fresh reminder of the power cartels wield in Mexico vis-a-vis the Mexican state. By Tuesday, violence had become concentrated once again in some of its main areas of territorial operation, such as the aforementioned central states of Mexico.
Q2: What are the likely scenarios for Mexico and the CJNG moving forward?
A2: Mexico has sent forces to Mexican states where the CJNG has its power base. Occasionally in the past, killing a cartel kingpin has been highly destabilizing in the short-to-medium term. Much depends on whether the CJNG can consolidate around a single leader, or whether the group fractures and enters a civil war.
In the first scenario, the situation may revert to its status quo ante before the death of El Mencho, with the CJNG maintaining control over key territories in Mexico and remaining a predictable source of violence. This scenario would require someone within the CJNG to quickly consolidate support and prevent any factions from opposing their rule. As of now, there are unconfirmed reports that Juan Carlos Valencia Gonzalez, El Mencho's stepson, who runs the Elite Group within the CJNG, has assumed control. If confirmed, Valencia Gonzalez's leadership would present a host of challenges for JIATF-CC, as he was born in the United States; there are limits on intelligence collection and kinetic operations against U.S. citizens.
In the second scenario, violence could spiral out of control and present another front in Sheinbaum's public security efforts. Since 2024, the state of Sinaloa, home to Mexico's other large and famous cartel, has been the site of an ongoing civil war between the "Chapitos" faction, run by the remaining sons of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, and the "Mayitos" faction, run by the son of Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada Garcia. Violence in that state has accelerated beyond the Mexican state's ability to control. Homicides in Sinaloa rose by 400 percent as the two groups descended into internecine warfare. The last thing the Sheinbaum government wants is a further hit to Mexico's public image, especially given that Jalisco state's Guadalajara is planning to host FIFA World Cup matches later this year.
A third scenario would be both preferred by the United States and best for Mexico as well. President Claudia Sheinbaum, emboldened by the success of the mission against El Mencho, may be encouraged to leverage the forces surged to multiple Mexican states and exploit the disruption to CJNG's leadership. She may opt to continue pressing for the Mexican state to improve territorial control. This would require her and her secretary of security and citizen protection, Omar Garcia Harfuch, to continue leaning into cooperation with the United States and the intelligence collection undertaken by JIATF-CC. While risky, electing to continue pressing ahead in a moment of vulnerability for the CJNG could see Mexico make important gains in the fight against cartels.
Q3: What does Mexico need to translate tactical success into lasting security?
A3: Despite its impressive tactical performance on February 22, Mexico cannot afford to relax the pressure on organized crime. The elimination of a single leader, no matter how notorious, is not sufficient to unwind a group as wealthy, well-armed, and brutal as the CJNG. A bloody contest for control over the cartel, or even a splintering of the organization into rival factions, could all exacerbate problems of insecurity in Mexico.
Furthermore, the CJNG has seemingly held a fair amount of its capabilities in reserve. For instance, the CJNG has been at the cutting edge of weaponized drone use in Mexico, but has seemingly avoided deploying these systems en masse against security forces. This could reflect the surprise and ad hoc nature of the group's initial retaliation, but it may also signal that the cartel is conserving its forces to wage a more protracted fight against the state. Countering this demands a sustained effort by Mexican security forces to not merely take out cartel leadership, but to take and hold territory formerly ruled by armed groups.
Another key challenge for Mexico will be rooting out corruption and impunity within the political system. Especially at the local level, cartels like the CJNG routinely seek to co-opt or intimidate government officials into doing their bidding. This includes high-ranking members of President Claudia Sheinbaum's own Morena Party, like Adan Augusto Lopez, who resigned from his role as President of the Senate this year, dogged by scandals alleging his links to organized crime, including the CJNG. Furthermore, impunity remains a perennial issue in Mexico, where up to 99 percent of violent crimes go unsolved. The country's recent judicial reforms, which brought a spate of, in some cases, underqualified and unvetted judges to the bench, could worsen this problem at a time when a stronger criminal justice system is sorely needed. Nevertheless, recent arrests of local government officials, including the mayor of Tequila, Jalisco (a Morena party member), for extortion and collaboration with the CJNG, could be a sign that the Sheinbaum administration is beginning to take graft and impunity seriously.
Q4: Has the killing of El Mencho meaningfully reduced the likelihood of kinetic action from the United States?
A4: The probability of unilateral U.S. military intervention in Mexico has likely decreased with the death of El Mencho. The CJNG leader was a priority for the United States, which last year designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. While President Donald Trump's eagerness to take credit for the killing of the cartel leader during his Tuesday State of the Union Address may rankle some within Mexico, it is far more important that the president did not take the opportunity to levy any threats of direct military action against the cartels.
Preliminary reports of the operation also signal strong U.S.-Mexico intelligence cooperation leading up to, and even during, the raid on El Mencho's safehouse. In addition to JIATF-CC, the CIA and FBI both provided critical intelligence on the precise location of this facility, while one recent article claimed that a U.S. Predator drone circled overhead as Mexican special forces dueled with cartel hitmen on the ground. This would be consistent with reports last year that the United States has flown unarmed MQ-9 Reaper drones into Mexican airspace at the request of the Sheinbaum administration, collecting intelligence on organized crime, which led to subsequent arrests of cartel leaders. In August of 2025, one such drone flight was detected on public flight tracking sites penetrating deep into southeastern Mexico, around the states of Michoacan and Jalisco, where the CJNG has a significant presence. It is possible that some of these flights helped build an operational picture of El Mencho's facility and its defenses ahead of the assault.
The February 22 raid could also provide a template for future U.S.-Mexico security cooperation wherein the United States provides enabling intelligence while Mexico provides the boots on the ground. The United States has significant intelligence collection capabilities but is often reticent to share this with non-vetted partners. Under former President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, U.S.-Mexico intelligence sharing fell to historic lows, compromising Washington's trust in the ability of its partners to act decisively on the information being shared. The fact that seemingly Mexican special forces were able to achieve total surprise against the CJNG is therefore encouraging in this regard. Beyond intelligence sharing, the United States can also play an important role in capacity building for the Mexican police and military. Indeed, the week before the raid on El Mencho's compound, U.S. Navy SEAL Team 2 arrived in Mexico to begin a two-month training exercise with their Mexican counterparts. U.S. expertise in special operations will be critical to allowing the Mexican armed forces to keep up an aggressive tempo against cartel leadership.
While it seems like U.S. kinetic action in Mexico is in abeyance, developments in the coming weeks and months might cause the current equilibrium to erode. A CJNG civil war centered around Jalisco and Michoacan states would exacerbate the problem of violence along Mexico's east coast. With the Sinaloa civil war still raging, Mexico would find renewed intra-cartel violence difficult to control. If the White House begins to feel again that Mexico is unwilling or unable to keep a lid on criminal violence, it could return to its former position that only direct military intervention can break the power of the cartels. Other developments, like the targeting of U.S. tourists or violence during the upcoming World Cup, could exacerbate this sentiment within the Trump administration. Although U.S.-Mexico security cooperation appears much stronger now than it did a year ago, the present stability is predicated on continued progress in the fight against organized crime.
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Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/criminal-kingpin-el-mencho-dead-what-comes-next
[Category: ThinkTank]