Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
Featured Stories
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Russia and Belarus Preparing for Escalation With Ukraine and NATO
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on June 4, 2026, by Alexander Taranov, an expert on Russian military and nuclear affairs, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Russia and Belarus Preparing for Escalation with Ukraine and NATO
Executive Summary:
* On May 15, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Russia is seeking to draw Belarus more deeply into the Kremlin's war against Ukraine. A Russian offensive from Belarusian territory would likely target northern Ukraine or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) eastern
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on June 4, 2026, by Alexander Taranov, an expert on Russian military and nuclear affairs, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Russia and Belarus Preparing for Escalation with Ukraine and NATO
Executive Summary:
* On May 15, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Russia is seeking to draw Belarus more deeply into the Kremlin's war against Ukraine. A Russian offensive from Belarusian territory would likely target northern Ukraine or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) easternflank.
* Several indicators suggest potential Russian-Belarusian preparations for an offensive, including the expansion of military infrastructure in southern Belarus, the use of Belarusian territory for drone operations, modernization of Russian-Belarusian facilities, and announcement of a joint strategic exercise.
* Other Belarusian actions--continuous combat readiness inspections, transitioning military units to higher readiness levels, and adapting its military for high-intensity maneuver warfare--indicate preparation for possible regional escalation.
*
Belarus officially denies plans to attack Ukraine or NATO countries, but Ukrainian officials remain skeptical due to Minsk's military preparations and Russia's use of Belarus as a launchpad for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 while denying any such intention.
* Kyiv has signaled it would strike military targets in Belarus if Belarusian territory is used for new attacks against Ukraine, which could destabilize the Belarusian regime and deny Russia's ability to use Belarus as a staging ground for operations.
-
On May 15, following consultations with the leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) General Staff, the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR), the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Russia is seeking to draw Belarus more deeply into the war against Ukraine. Zelenskyy also said that Russia is examining operational plans for actions from Belarusian territory against either Ukraine or a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member state. Ukraine says it has obtained intelligence regarding ongoing negotiations between Russian and Belarusian leadership on this matter. According to this intelligence, Russia is assessing operational plans to be launched from the south or north border of Belarus--either against the Chernihiv-Kyiv axis in Ukraine, or against a NATO member state. Zelenskyy cautioned that Ukraine would defend itself should Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka allow these operations. Zelenskyy has directed Ukraine's Defense Forces (UDF) to reinforce Ukraine's border with Belarus and to submit a contingency plan (Telegram/@ V_Zelenskiy_official, May 15). Zelenskyy's statements came in the wake of a telephone conversation between Lukashenka and Putin, during which the two leaders discussed defense cooperation (Telegram/@pul_1, May 15).
AFU Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi regards the threat of a Russian offensive from Belarusian territory as credible. According to Syrskyi, the Russian General Staff is actively war-gaming and planning offensive operations from the Belarus-Ukraine border with the objective of stretching the front line to exploit Russia's numerical superiority in manpower and equipment (Telegram/@milinua, May 22).
According to Ukrainian intelligence, the Russian General Staff is developing five scenarios for expanding the war through northern Ukraine. These plans may encompass both the use of Belarusian territory in proximity to the Russian border and operations conducted directly from Russian soil without Belarusian involvement. According to Ukrainian intelligence assessments, the most credible of these five scenarios--should Russia decide to launch a new offensive operation--is an attempt to establish a buffer zone in Chernihiv oblast extending 10 to 20 kilometers (6 to 12 miles) into Ukrainian territory. The least credible scenario is an advance on Kyiv. Under all potential courses of action, the Russian Armed Forces would not be able to initiate offensive operations before autumn at the earliest. To this end, the Kremlin is planning a new mobilization wave of an additional 100,000 soldiers (RBC-Ukraine, May 22).
On May 21, Zelenskyy visited Slavutych in northern Ukraine, where he met with the heads of the Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts. He stated that Ukraine is reinforcing its defenses along its northern border with Belarus, including its protective infrastructure and the defense and security forces deployed in that direction. Zelenskyy noted that Ukraine possesses the capability to act pre-emptively against Russian territory from which threats may emanate, and against Belarusian leadership (Telegram/@V_Zelenskiy_official, May 21). The next day, in Rivne, he said that there is a threat of an attack from Belarus against Volyn, Zhytomyr, and Rivne oblasts in addition to the Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts (Telegram/@V_Zelenskiy_official, May 22). Ukraine receives some supplies from Western partners through these regions, making a potential attack particularly problematic. Moreover, the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant, which supplies electricity to Kyiv and surrounding areas, is located just 60 kilometers (37 miles) from the border with Belarus. Russian control over this area would open the way for the encirclement of Kyiv and create a potential axis of advance toward Lviv oblast--a key logistic hub via which Ukraine gets almost all military and economic support from the West.
Kyiv has already transmitted the relevant intelligence through diplomatic channels to its NATO partners and has tasked the relevant agencies with developing diplomatic pressure and conveying direct signals to the Belarusian leadership (Telegram/@V_Zelenskiy_official, May 20; X/@andrii_sybiha, May 21). According to Ukrainian intelligence assessments, activity along the Chernihiv-Kyiv axis and the overall threat level from Belarus remain low. Ukrainian leadership is, however, tracking several indicators that may point to Russian preparations for potential offensive action there (RBC-Ukraine, May 22).
The first indicator is that four battalions--approximately 1,900 troops--of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) remain deployed on a continuous rotation basis at the Belarus-Ukraine border. At present, however, there are insufficient Russian forces on Ukraine's border with Belarus or Russia's Bryansk oblast to conduct offensive operations (RBC-Ukraine, May 22). The second indicator, which has not yet been openly observed, is an intensification of reconnaissance and sabotage-reconnaissance activity on the part of Belarus and Russia along the axis of a potential strike.
The third indicator is Belarus' expansion of logistics routes and the construction of training ranges and bases near its border with Ukraine that could be utilized by Russian forces within the framework of their Union State treaty. Ukrainian intelligence indicates that road construction toward Ukrainian territory and the preparation of artillery positions are underway in the Belarusian border zone (Telegram/@V_Zelenskiy_official, April 17). Ukraine has also reported that Russia has deployed ground control stations for long-range drones in Belarus for strikes against Ukraine's Kyiv oblast (Unian, April 5). Furthermore, Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, adviser to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense on defense technologies, stated that Russian Shahed-type unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are utilizing Belarusian cellular roaming in the border area during strikes against Ukraine (Facebook.com/@Serhii.Flash, April 17). During recent large-scale strikes against Ukraine, Russia once again used Belarusian airspace for drone transit (Telegram/@kpszsu, May 13). Russia could therefore once again employ air attack assets on a large scale from Belarusian territory--especially given their significant qualitative and quantitative expansion compared to 2022--even without deploying ground forces into Ukraine. Russia and Belarus are close to completing the implementation of two new military infrastructure programs, indicating preparations for more large-scale conflict. These were developed because of operational shortcomings encountered during the first phase of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine launched from Belarusian territory in 2022:
Improvement of military infrastructure facilities designated for joint use in support of the Regional Troops Grouping (RTG) of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation in 2023-2026;
Modernization of rear support facilities designated for joint use in support of RTG of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation in 2023-2027 (Belarus Segodnya, November 14, 2024).
The fourth indicator comprises joint Belarusian-Russian nuclear exercises. Some of these exercises have taken place on Belarusian territory, designed as a demonstration of force as well as preparation for nuclear strikes directed at Ukraine and neighboring NATO member states (see EDM, April 30, June 17, 2024, April 17, 2025; President of Russia, May 21). Under the cover of such exercises, Belarusian and Russian forces may increase their troop presence along Ukraine's borders. To this end, and for the purpose of rehearsing joint operations, Belarus and Russia may attempt to conduct additional unscheduled exercises similar to Zapad-2025 or Souznaya Reshimost-2022 (Union Resolve-2022), which served as cover for the large-scale concentration of Russian forces ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Putin has already announced a joint exercise with Belarus designated Schit Soyuza-2027, and the possibility of a snap exercise along the lines of Soyuznaya Reshimost-2022, which the Kremlin used as cover to mass troops, equipment, and logistics in Belarus for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine from February 10-20, 2022, cannot be ruled out (Interfax, May 21). In such a scenario, the primary indicator of preparations would be the planning of a mass railway transfer of Russian forces into Belarus. The redeployment of a 100,000-strong grouping would require approximately three to four weeks and some 15,000 railcars and flatcars--at least twice the volume recorded ahead of the Souznaya Reshimost-2022 exercise (see EDM, September 15, 2025).
In April, former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that Belarus is systematically preparing for military escalation, and is examining the possibility of opening a second front against Ukraine or the Baltic states under Russian direction (YouTube/@Dmytro_Kuleba, April 18). He identified five key signs of Belarusian military preparation: continuous combat training conducted under Russian instructors, an emphasis on combat mobilization readiness and large-scale command-and-staff exercises, the reinforcement of air defenses with Russian systems, and the deepening of command coordination between Russian and Belarusian military structures. According to Kuleba, Moscow views potential activation of the Belarusian front as a way to stretch AFU resources, compelling Kyiv to redeploy experienced units from other sectors of the frontline to defend the northern border. Kuleba does not exclude the possibility that Belarusian military activity may be directed at intimidating the Baltic states and Poland, generating additional pressure on the region in the event of further Russian escalation (YouTube/@Dmytro_Kuleba, April 18).
Moscow may be pursuing several additional objectives simultaneously. Preparations in Belarus are an element of Putin's plan to establish a "buffer zone" around Russia's border with Ukraine. The Russian president assigned this objective to his military commanders two years ago. Military buildup in Belarus also creates psychological pressure on the Ukrainian population, with the aim of rendering Kyiv more amenable to Moscow's terms. Finally, should Putin ultimately decide to advance on Kyiv from Belarus, he would attempt to decapitate and seize Ukraine's military-political leadership. Currently, however, this scenario appears to be the least probable (RBC-Ukraine, May 22).
In a May 21 statement, Lukashenka was quick to assert that he has no intention of attacking neighboring states and even proposed holding talks with Zelenskyy to dispel Ukrainian concerns. He stated that Belarus would be drawn into Russia's war against Ukraine only if aggression were committed against its territory. In such a scenario, Belarus and Russia would conduct military operations jointly (BelTA, May 21). Given that Belarusian political and military leadership were involved in a strategic disinformation campaign denying even the possibility of an attack being launched from Belarusian territory in the run-up to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, such assurances are met with little trust in Kyiv (RBC-Ukraine, May 21).
If Russian forces use Belarusian territory as a staging ground for an attack on Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine would then conduct retaliatory strikes against Belarusian territory, thereby "legitimizing" the involvement of the Belarusian Armed Forces in the conflict. Two parallel combat readiness inspections conducted from January to April--one ordered by Lukashenka and the other initiated by the Belarusian Ministry of Defense--indicate that the Belarusian leadership is preparing for the possibility of a major regional escalation. In an article released on April 17, Belarusian Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin stated that the comprehensive inspection of Western Operational Command, responsible for Belarus' border with Poland and Lithuania, provided a cross-sectional assessment of the overall level of readiness of the BAF to repel aggression, which he claimed persists on the European continent (BelTA, April 17). On April 1, Lukashenka said that Belarus is preparing for a war and underlined the need for the BAF to adapt to highly maneuverable, high-intensity combat operations concepts (President of Belarus, April 1). Such statements indicate anticipation of escalation involving the expansion of Russia's war against Ukraine. In this context, preparations are underway for the involvement of the BAF in military operations against Ukraine and for potential military actions against NATO's eastern flank.
During a May 12 briefing from Khrenin regarding the comprehensive combat readiness inspections of the BAF, Lukashenka stated that he intends to continue selectively mobilizing military units to prepare them for war (President of Belarus, May 12). The fact that the Immediate Reaction Forces, a grouping of the most combat-ready formations and permanently ready units of the Belarusian military, are being transitioned to a wartime footing serves as another indicator of Belarus' preparation for military engagement (Telegram/@Tsaplienko, May 22).
Ukraine accordingly views the possible reopening of a northern front as a credible threat. Should this happen, Kyiv would likely seek to transfer military operations onto Belarusian territory as rapidly as possible. These developments, if they occur, could destabilize the Lukashenka regime and deprive Russia of the ability to continue using Belarusian territory as a staging area for operations against Ukraine and NATO's eastern flank states.
* * *
Alexander Taranov is an expert on Russian military and nuclear affairs.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-and-belarus-preparing-for-escalation-with-ukraine-and-nato/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: More Than Half of Companies in Germany Use Artificial Intelligence
MUNICH, Germany, June 5 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
* * *
More Than Half of Companies in Germany Use Artificial Intelligence
54.5% of companies in Germany use artificial intelligence in their business processes, according to the latest survey by the ifo Institute in May 2026. Last year, the figure still stood at 40.9%. Other companies are already planning to use it (16%) or discussing the matter (21.6%). "Artificial intelligence has finally become mainstream in the German economy," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The rollout is moving at a rapid pace."
AI
... Show Full Article
MUNICH, Germany, June 5 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
* * *
More Than Half of Companies in Germany Use Artificial Intelligence
54.5% of companies in Germany use artificial intelligence in their business processes, according to the latest survey by the ifo Institute in May 2026. Last year, the figure still stood at 40.9%. Other companies are already planning to use it (16%) or discussing the matter (21.6%). "Artificial intelligence has finally become mainstream in the German economy," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The rollout is moving at a rapid pace."
AIis particularly widespread in manufacturing, where 58.7% of companies use relevant applications. Its use is now also widespread in the service sector, at 56.2%. In trade, usage has also increased significantly in recent years and is now at around 45%. In construction it has experienced particularly dynamic growth: Within three years, the share of companies using AI rose from 7.1% to 39.8%.
The bigger the company, the wider the spread of AI. Large companies (67.2%) continue to use the technology far more often than small (51.2%) and medium-sized companies (47.2%).
Among companies that use artificial intelligence, external applications clearly dominate. Just under three-quarters of companies use paid external AI solutions. In addition, 48.4% rely on free AI applications. 22.5% use only free systems. By contrast, far fewer companies develop their own AI systems, with a share of 18.7%.
So far, companies have primarily been using artificial intelligence to support existing work processes. AI is used particularly often in administration, data analysis, programming, correspondence, and information research. Many companies also use AI for tasks in planning, controlling, or customer communication.
In manufacturing, AI is becoming increasingly important in production-related areas such as quality control, production planning, or maintenance. "Companies use AI mainly in areas where they expect tangible efficiency gains," says Wohlrabe. "AI opens up new possibilities, especially when it comes to routine tasks and processing large amounts of information."
* * *
More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-06-05/more-half-companies-germany-use-artificial-intelligence)
* * *
Dr. Klaus Wohlrabe, Deputy Director of the ifo Center for Macroeconomics and Surveys and Head of Surveys, +49(0)89/9224-1229, +49(0)89/9224-1463
wohlrabe@ifo.de
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-06-05/more-half-companies-germany-use-artificial-intelligence
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Ukraine Military Situation Report on June 3, 2026
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 3, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Can Kasapoglu:
* * *
Ukraine Military Situation Report | June 3
Executive Summary
* Battlefield assessment. Russia's operational tempo remained heightened across Ukraine, with Pokrovsk absorbing the heaviest pressure and Moscow conducting large-scale missile and drone strikes against Kyiv, Dnipro, and other urban targets.
* Kyiv Strikes St. Petersburg. Ukraine continued its long-range
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 3, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Can Kasapoglu:
* * *
Ukraine Military Situation Report | June 3
Executive Summary
* Battlefield assessment. Russia's operational tempo remained heightened across Ukraine, with Pokrovsk absorbing the heaviest pressure and Moscow conducting large-scale missile and drone strikes against Kyiv, Dnipro, and other urban targets.
* Kyiv Strikes St. Petersburg. Ukraine continued its long-rangedrone warfare campaign with a strike on a St. Petersburg oil refinery ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin's high-profile economic forum.
* Intensifying drone activity. Russia expanded its drone campaign, while Ukraine responded with deeper strikes, decoy drones, interceptor-drone concepts, and growing unmanned ground operations.
* Swedish aircraft for Ukraine. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced plans to transfer Swedish Gripen aircraft to Ukraine.
-
1. Battlefield Assessment
The Ukrainian battlespace saw intense combat last week. On some days, Russia and Ukraine fought over 300 tactical engagements, the highest operational tempo reported in several months. Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Kostiantynivka, Orikhiv, and Huliaipole again saw fierce fighting, while Pokrovsk absorbed the brunt of a growing Russian push.
Russia also conducted an intensive aerial bombardment of Ukraine. Russian strikes involved a dangerous mix of Shahed-Geran drones as well as Russian Iskander and North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles. Moscow hit Ukraine with Zircon nuclear-capable, scramjet-powered anti-ship cruise missiles, and S-400 interceptors modified for land-attack roles on quasi-ballistic trajectories.
Both sides traded long-range salvo exchanges at a heightened tempo. Ukraine's Air Force reported that on the nights of June 1 and 2, Russian forces launched Kalibr cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea, prompting air-raid warnings across Kyiv and several Ukrainian oblasts. Russian forces struck Kyiv with a combined drone and missile attack, causing fires and structural damage across extensive areas of the capital. Russian strikes hit residential buildings, a medical clinic, and high-rise apartment blocks, underscoring Moscow's continued reliance on large-scale strikes against urban infrastructure.
A separate Russian missile strike hit the city of Dnipro on June 2, in an attack that caused many civilian casualties, including children. The mayor of Dnipro declared June 3 a day of mourning, and Russian forces continued to attack the city during the day on Tuesday. Ukrainian officials have only just completed the search-and-rescue operation.
Ukraine conducted its own strikes, too. On May 29-30, Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces destroyed a launcher for an Iskander missile system and two Tu-142 aircraft at a military airfield in the Russian city of Taganrog. The Tu-142 is a long-range maritime-reconnaissance and anti-submarine-warfare aircraft operated by the Russian Navy. It is based on Russia's Tu-95 turboprop strategic-bomber platform, which Moscow has often used in mass cruise-missile attacks against Ukraine.
2. Kyiv Turns Drone Warfare into Political Warfare at the High-Profile St. Petersburg Forum
Ukraine has taken its long-range strike campaign to St. Petersburg.
On the night of June 2-3, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces, alongside other elements of the country's defense forces, targeted the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal, located hundreds of miles from Ukraine's border in Russia's Leningrad Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed that "important facilities on Russian territory" had been hit in the strikes.
Zelenskyy further framed the operation as another successful episode in Ukraine's campaign of "long-range sanctions" against Russia. Visuals from the area surrounding the oil terminal at the time of the attack revealed low-flying drone activity over the nearby Gulf of Finland, likely a Ukrainian FP-1 drone approaching its target. Satellite imagery dated June 3 showed a major fire at the terminal site.
Ukraine timed its strikes to carry a clear political message. Thick black smoke was visible from miles away and hung over St. Petersburg on the morning of June 3, just as the first delegations were arriving for the 2026 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. The event is one of Russia's flagship international business gatherings and is closely associated with Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to signal the country's economic resilience. Ukraine's attack, therefore, did not only target Russia's hydrocarbon industry and the revenues it produces. Kyiv also damaged the political and economic narratives the Kremlin is attempting to craft.
The St. Petersburg Oil Terminal occupies part of the Great Port of St. Petersburg, a major seaport that serves the famous city and northwest Russia. The oil terminal is among the Baltic Sea region's most prominent bulk-cargo and petroleum-transshipment facilities, and receives and ships fuel and other liquid cargo by sea, river, rail, and road links. Open-source reporting indicates that the facility boasts an annual throughput capacity of about 12.5 million tons, while Ukrainian military reporting reveals that the site holds dozens of storage tanks. The terminal has a large total storage capacity for petroleum products and other liquid cargo.
By hitting a major fuel-storage and export node in St. Petersburg during a high-profile economic forum, Kyiv has demonstrated its prowess in drone combat, deep-strike operations, and political warfare all in one salvo. The attack on Russia's fabled gateway to the West also underscores a central trend of the war: Ukraine is increasingly using long-range unmanned systems to impose real costs on the Kremlin's energy economy, logistics architecture, and carefully cultivated image of firm control over a nation at war.
3. Russia's Momentum on the Ground Has Stalled, but the Drone War Is Intensifying
Open-source monitoring of the conflict's battlefield geometry suggests that a promising trend is emerging for Kyiv.
In May 2026, Russia gained roughly five square miles of sovereign Ukrainian territory, its smallest gain since 2023. Despite worrying signs in Kostiantynivka, the Ukrainian military likely gained more territory than it lost in May, producing a net territorial loss for Russia during the month.
As it lost territory, however, the Russian military increased its use of attack drones. In May 2026, Russia used more than 7,400 loitering munitions, most of them Iran-designed, Shahed-derivative Geran drones. To counter these munitions, the Ukrainian defense-industrial complex is now test-running the Clear Sky project, which aims to arm light-attack aircraft with interceptor drones.
In a related move, the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine is now reportedly using more decoy drones to saturate Russian air defenses. The Armed Forces of Ukraine also continued to use unmanned ground vehicles in combat operations, including in urban warfare.
4. Sweden's Gripen Aircraft to Augment Ukraine's Air-Warfare Deterrent
Sweden is moving to make its Gripen aircraft Ukraine's next major Western fighter platform. Stockholm plans to transfer up to 16 used JAS 39 Gripen C/D aircraft from the Swedish Air Force to Kyiv, and support Ukraine's procurement of up to 20 newer Gripen E/F fighters. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson announced the countries' new plan on May 28, alongside Zelenskyy, in the Swedish city of Uppsala.
Kyiv has identified the Gripen as its long-term fighter of choice. As a result, Ukraine's first C/D aircraft could arrive in early 2027, with Gripen E/F deliveries expected before 2030. Ukraine plans to finance the acquisition of newer Gripen E/F aircraft with Euros2.5 billion from the European Union's Ukraine Support Loan mechanism.
The transfer remains subject to final purchase arrangements and Swedish export approvals. The broader package also includes advanced weapons, training, maintenance, electronic-warfare assets, ammunition support, long-range capabilities, and defense-industrial cooperation.
The Gripen largely fits Ukraine's battlefield needs, as it is designed for dispersed wartime operations, including road-based use, rapid turnaround, and maintenance from small ground crews under harsh conditions. These qualities are important to an air force operating under constant Russian missile and drone pressure against fixed air bases.
The Gripen can also carry weapons aligned to North Atlantic Treaty Organization standards, including IRIS-T, AMRAAM, and METEOR air-to-air missiles. The latter munition is particularly important due to its range and high-end power pack. Accordingly, Zelenskyy hinted that Meteor missiles could be added to Ukraine's Gripen deterrent.
* * *
At A Glance:
Can Kasapoglu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/ukraine-military-situation-report-june-3-can-kasapoglu
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities: Data Show Social Security Staff Cuts Harm Service Delivery in Every State
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on June 3, 2026, by senior fellow Kathleen Romig:
* * *
New Data Show Social Security Staff Cuts Harm Service Delivery in Every State
In just 15 months, the Trump Administration has pushed out more than 8,000 Social Security Administration (SSA) workers -- causing SSA's largest one-year staffing reduction on record. This 14 percent cut has compromised SSA's ability to reliably serve seniors, bereaved families, and people with disabilities. By January 2026, SSA had fewer employees than at any time
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on June 3, 2026, by senior fellow Kathleen Romig:
* * *
New Data Show Social Security Staff Cuts Harm Service Delivery in Every State
In just 15 months, the Trump Administration has pushed out more than 8,000 Social Security Administration (SSA) workers -- causing SSA's largest one-year staffing reduction on record. This 14 percent cut has compromised SSA's ability to reliably serve seniors, bereaved families, and people with disabilities. By January 2026, SSA had fewer employees than at any timesince 1967, when the agency was not yet responsible for administering Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and served 52 million fewer beneficiaries.
This largest-ever cut in SSA staffing has affected field offices and operations in every state -- with 42 states and the District of Columbia seeing SSA staff losses greater than 10 percent between January 2025 and April 2026, according to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) data. (See table below.) This short-staffing of critical functions has affected SSA's ability to deliver across the country.
The loss of thousands of employees hit key customer service positions hard, including a drop of more than 3,800 customer service staff who assist visitors to SSA field offices and callers to SSA's national 800 number. SSA leadership responded by shifting thousands of remaining workers to new roles to help fill the gap the Administration had created. But redistributing the too-few remaining workers to roles where they have little or no experience risks ameliorating one service delivery problem by exacerbating others.
But it's hard for Congress and the public to understand how these radical changes affect the people SSA serves, from new babies being assigned a Social Security number, to workers at the beginnings and ends of their careers, to the surviving spouses and children of workers who die. That's because in the summer of 2025, amid bad press on its worsening performance, SSA stopped publicly releasing regular monthly updates of many customer-focused service metrics.
SSA restored the public release of some of those measures over time, but certain key metrics have remained unreported. For example, SSA no longer shares how long callers to the 800 number wait on hold or for a call to be returned, how long it takes applicants to get an appointment, or how many unfulfilled requests languish in the processing backlog. And in May 2026, SSA failed to publish any updates to its monthly performance measures.
The lack of transparency is not serving the agency well, particularly as agency leadership claims that SSA is "working better and faster than ever" seem readily undercut by press reports on customer service and processing strains at the agency. For example, phone wait times are much longer than publicly advertised; lengthy waits for appointments particularly harm widows and children who have lost parents; local offices often struggle to operate with shrinking staffs; and record-high processing backlogs create longer waits for needed help.
SSA already faced customer service challenges when the Trump Administration took office, as years of underfunding had forced the agency to serve the growing number of beneficiaries with fewer staff. The Administration's personnel policies have made things worse. While SSA Commissioner Frank Bisignano has promised that SSA will partly compensate for cuts in staffing through improved efficiency, he has yet to explain how it will do so. The reality is the agency will need to begin hiring significant numbers of new employees now to avoid even greater deterioration in service.
The Administration needs to publish detailed plans for addressing its customer service challenges, identifying the specific steps it will take to improve customer service. It also needs to increase transparency by publishing the type of regular, detailed customer service metrics it used to release to the public. Taking these basic steps can help restore confidence in the agency and hold it accountable for delivering on its promises.
* * *
Table: Trump Administration Cuts to Social Security Staffing, January 2025 to April 2026
* * *
Kathleen Romig is a Senior Fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/blog/new-data-show-social-security-staff-cuts-harm-service-delivery-in-every-state
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: No Time to Ease In - Immediate Priorities for Frank Garcia, the State Department's New Africa Lead
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on June 4, 2026, by Oge Onubogu, director and senior fellow of the Africa Program:
* * *
No Time to Ease In: Immediate Priorities for Frank Garcia, the State Department's New Africa Lead
After more than a year without a Senate-confirmed leader at the helm of the State Department's Africa Bureau, Frank Garcia's confirmation as assistant secretary of state for African affairs fills a significant vacancy in the most senior U.S. diplomatic post for Africa. But it does not resolve the larger problem
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on June 4, 2026, by Oge Onubogu, director and senior fellow of the Africa Program:
* * *
No Time to Ease In: Immediate Priorities for Frank Garcia, the State Department's New Africa Lead
After more than a year without a Senate-confirmed leader at the helm of the State Department's Africa Bureau, Frank Garcia's confirmation as assistant secretary of state for African affairs fills a significant vacancy in the most senior U.S. diplomatic post for Africa. But it does not resolve the larger problemweakening U.S. policy on the continent across successive U.S. administrations: ambitious strategic framing that is not consistently matched by resources, coordination, or sustained follow-through and at the same time is too often undermined by ill-considered military and political moves. As the Trump administration leans more heavily toward a commercially driven, interest-based approach to Africa, Garcia's first 6-12 months will be an early test of whether the United States is prepared to match ambition with policy clarity, diplomatic capacity, and sustained strategic purpose.
Garcia enters office at a moment when U.S. policy toward Africa is increasingly shaped by short-term transactions rather than long-term strategy. Diplomatic capacity has thinned across the continent, with more than 30 U.S ambassadorial posts reportedly vacant even as the Trump administration's commercial rhetoric about competition, investment, and infrastructure has grown louder. The result is a growing mismatch between what Washington says it wants in Africa and what it is institutionally prepared to deliver. Even in simple logistics, the United States would be moving backward rather than forward if it goes ahead with reported plans to shrink the number of embassies in Africa that process visas--an essential for any serious commercial exchange--from the current 50 to just 20, meaning that many African businesspeople seeking to travel to the United States to engage in the economic dynamism that the administration says it wants to support will have to spend extra time and money just to get a visa.
The recent U.S. emphasis on commercial diplomacy in Africa has been broadly welcomed by many African governments. For African leaders seeking capital, infrastructure, and job creation, that approach aligns with their own economic agendas and reduces ambiguity about what Washington wants from the relationship.
Yet this strategic clarity has also raised expectations. African governments now expect the United States to deliver tangible economic outcomes--financing, market access, and catalytic investments--at a scale that can compete with other major external actors. China remains Africa's largest trading partner and, as of May 2026, has expanded zero-tariff access to 53 African countries. Over the longer term, the shift in Africa's trade orientation toward China has been striking: In 2003, 18 African countries counted China as their top trading partner, but by 2023 that number had risen to 52. India, too, has deepened its commercial ties with the continent, with India-Africa trade surpassing $100 billion in 2024-25, up from $56 billion in 2019-20. Turkey has likewise expanded its economic and diplomatic presence over the past two decades, increasing trade with Africa from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $37 billion in 2024 while growing its embassy network to 44 missions. The critical question is whether the United States can institutionally meet these heightened expectations or whether the gap between ambition and delivery will continue to widen.
Immediate Priorities for the New State Department Africa Lead
Frank Garcia's success will depend less on articulating the U.S. pivot to commercial diplomacy in Africa than on operationalizing it. By focusing on coordination, delivery, and credibility in the near term, he can help ensure that U.S. commercial diplomacy becomes not just a stated priority but a trusted and effective reality. What he does next will matter less for symbolism than for what it reveals about Washington's strategic seriousness. He should take the following steps immediately:
1. Clarify the chain of command. Garcia's first task should be internal: define who owns Africa policy across the State Department, the National Security Council, and other agencies, and establish clear lines of communication with the senior officials already shaping the file. The Africa Bureau has already gone through several leadership changes since the start of the administration in January 2025. Without clearer authority and tighter coordination, mixed signals will continue to erode U.S. credibility.
2. Issue a short strategic guidance note. Within the first 100 days, Garcia should articulate a concise statement of priorities: what the United States wants to achieve with its Africa policy, which countries and regional issues require immediate focus, and how commercial goals fit alongside diplomacy and security commitments. At a moment when U.S. rhetoric increasingly casts Africa through the lens of transactions, competition, and access to critical minerals, a short guidance note would help distinguish strategy from improvisation.
3. Rebuild diplomatic ballast. Garcia should conduct a rapid review of embassy vacancies, bureau staffing gaps, and priority postings where the absence of experienced leadership may be constraining bilateral engagement. Even if ambassadorial appointments move slowly, there are still steps he can take to strengthen coordination. Incremental measures--improved delegation, clearer reporting lines, and stronger charge-level authority--can help prevent key relationships from drifting. Without more consistent diplomatic coverage, broader policy ambitions are likely to remain more difficult to carry forward.
4. Signal seriousness on trade. If the administration aims to demonstrate a credible shift toward trade-centered engagement, as reflected in the State Department's recently launched "Trade Over Aid" initiative, Garcia should identify a small number of commercially meaningful deliverables early on. These could include building on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), now reauthorized through December 2026; advancing follow-on discussions; facilitating investment; or developing sector-specific partnerships in logistics, energy, and critical minerals. In a landscape where the United States is one of several consequential external actors, African governments are likely to assess this approach by the extent to which it generates practical outcomes. It is also important to recognize that trade and aid are not mutually exclusive. Strategic aid can support countries in building the infrastructure and strengthening the institutions needed to become reliable and attractive trading partners.
5. Engage African partners early and directly. An early round of consultations with a representative set of African governments, regional organizations, and civic and business leaders would help Garcia test Washington's assumptions against the priorities of African counterparts and identify where U.S. objectives align--or diverge--from those of its partners. Just as importantly, it would signal that the United States is prepared to listen, not simply unveil a new framework from Washington.
6. Set measurable benchmarks. Garcia should define what success looks like over the first year: stronger diplomatic coverage, clearer interagency coordination, progress on specific trade initiatives, and more disciplined messaging about U.S. objectives. Without benchmarks, the administration's policy shift will be difficult to evaluate and easy to overstate.
Frank Garcia takes office at a moment when those asked to carry out U.S. policy toward Africa are being asked to do more with less: compete commercially, act strategically, and project seriousness despite thinner diplomatic capacity and uneven policy coordination. His first 6-12 months in office will not resolve all of those structural constraints. But they will offer an early indication of whether Washington is prepared to bring greater discipline, coherence, and follow-through to its engagement with the continent. U.S. officials, despite the hostility too often directed toward some African leaders and countries--as well as their people--also clearly recognize Africa's strategic importance. Success in cultivating strategic synergies depends on whether the administration is prepared to build a policy that treats the continent with the respect it demands and deserves. For African partners with expanding options, credibility will hinge less on what Washington says than on what it delivers.
* * *
Oge Onubogu is director and senior fellow of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-time-ease-immediate-priorities-frank-garcia-state-departments-new-africa-lead
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: Erika Donalds Commemorates Title IX Month and a Half Century of Opportunity for Girls
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on June 3, 2026:
* * *
Erika Donalds Commemorates Title IX Month and a Half Century of Opportunity for Girls
In recognition of Title IX Month, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released the following statement from Erika Donalds, Chair of Education Opportunity, on the critical importance of Title IX in protecting opportunities for women and girls.
Erika Donalds, Chair of Education Opportunity at AFPI, said:
"As a former elected school board member, a founder of classical schools, a former
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on June 3, 2026:
* * *
Erika Donalds Commemorates Title IX Month and a Half Century of Opportunity for Girls
In recognition of Title IX Month, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released the following statement from Erika Donalds, Chair of Education Opportunity, on the critical importance of Title IX in protecting opportunities for women and girls.
Erika Donalds, Chair of Education Opportunity at AFPI, said:
"As a former elected school board member, a founder of classical schools, a formerhigh school athlete, and most importantly, as a mom, I have always believed the same thing: Every child deserves education opportunities that meet their individual and unique needs, and parents, not bureaucrats, should be the ones in the driver's seat.
Education freedom isn't limited to the classroom. Athletic programs instill a student with discipline, resilience, and the drive to succeed. When Title IX passed in 1972, fewer than 300,000 girls played high school sports. Today more than three million do. Athletic opportunity teaches young women to set a goal, to work for it, to lose with dignity, and win with grace. Those are the lessons that build leaders.
This is why protecting Title IX is critical right now. The law was written to defend opportunity for women and girls, not erase the line of protection when ideologies redefine biology. When we erase Title IX, we take away fairness from the very girls the law was meant to serve. Girls deserve their own locker rooms, their own podiums, and scholarships that honor their work.
We will keep standing with moms, dads, and young women on this issue. The women who came before us turned a few lines of law into a half century of opportunity. We owe it to our daughters to keep that promise alive."
Learn more about AFPI's Education Opportunity and Athletes for America initiative here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/policy-areas/education-opportunity) and here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/initiative/athletes-for-america-coalition).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/erika-donalds-commemorates-title-ix-month-and-a-half-century-of-opportunity-for-girls
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI President and CEO Greg Sindelar Participates in Oxford Union Debate
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on June 4, 2026:
* * *
AFPI President and CEO Greg Sindelar Participates in Oxford Union Debate
OXFORD, England - Today, the Oxford Union, the world's most storied debating society, hosted a formal debate on the motion "This House Believes Trump Has Betrayed Conservatism." The debate asked whether President Trump has abandoned conservative principles or remade conservatism for a new age.
Greg Sindelar, Interim President and CEO of the America First Policy Institute and President of the Texas Public Policy
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 5 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on June 4, 2026:
* * *
AFPI President and CEO Greg Sindelar Participates in Oxford Union Debate
OXFORD, England - Today, the Oxford Union, the world's most storied debating society, hosted a formal debate on the motion "This House Believes Trump Has Betrayed Conservatism." The debate asked whether President Trump has abandoned conservative principles or remade conservatism for a new age.
Greg Sindelar, Interim President and CEO of the America First Policy Institute and President of the Texas Public PolicyFoundation, spoke in opposition to the motion. Other debaters included:
* Michael Knowles - Host of the Michael Knowles Show, Daily Wire
* Allan Lichtman - American Historian & Political Analyst
* Reflecting on the opportunity, Sindelar commented:
"I was honored to take the floor of the Oxford Union alongside Michael Knowles and Allan Lichtman. and make the case that far from betraying conservatism, President Trump has returned it to its rightful owners: the American people.
Conservatism exists to conserve a nation and its people, rather than to serve the comfort of political insiders. President Trump put those principles back to work for the American people, and the results speak for themselves."
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-president-and-ceo-greg-sindelar-participates-in-oxford-union-debate
[Category: ThinkTank]
