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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Moscow Conducts Fascistization of Russian Higher Education (Part Two)
WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 14, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Moscow Conducts Fascistization of Russian Higher Education (Part Two)
By Richard Arnold
Executive Summary:
* Russia's higher education system is increasingly isolated from global scholarship and infused with fascist, militaristic ideology, exemplified by the rapid expansion of state-backed Cossack universities emphasizing indoctrination, imperial nostalgia, and detachment from Western academic standards.
* Kremlin-supported Cossack educational initiatives explicitly ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 14, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Moscow Conducts Fascistization of Russian Higher Education (Part Two) By Richard Arnold Executive Summary: * Russia's higher education system is increasingly isolated from global scholarship and infused with fascist, militaristic ideology, exemplified by the rapid expansion of state-backed Cossack universities emphasizing indoctrination, imperial nostalgia, and detachment from Western academic standards. * Kremlin-supported Cossack educational initiatives explicitlylink universities, youth organizations, and military structures, mobilizing students for ideological conditioning and combat recruitment while embedding fascist identity formation within higher education under the guise of tradition, patriotism, and civic duty.
* The expanding Cossack education network integrates occupied Ukrainian territories and Russian regions into a unified fascist academic framework, using festivals, grants, and youth training to normalize militarization, suppress pluralism, and institutionalize state-driven ideological control over young elites.
Russia's system of higher education is increasingly embracing isolationist and fascist principles. This isolation is marked by the unique Russian model of education and the detachment from global science (see EDM, October 14, 2025). The Hague Center for Strategic Studies found that whereas in 2017 around 70 percent of citations in Russian university syllabi were to Western sources, in 2025 that number had collapsed to less than 15 percent. The Cossack system of education epitomizes this distinction. The Kremlin regime has already pioneered the development of an "association of Cossack universities" (see EDM, August 10, 2022, November 8, 2023, October 30, 2025). It is promoting itself through a series of events, including the fourth festival meeting of Cossack universities, which began at the end of September 2025 in the Cossack holy city of Novocherkassk in Russia's Rostov oblast (VsKO, September 30, 2025). The association is growing rapidly, and by the end of 2025, it included 29 universities educating over 1,600 Cossack students (VsKO, December 23, 2025). The Vvedensky ball held in Moscow in early December 2025 demonstrates the extent to which the Cossack educational system promotes ideas of a romantic imperial era (VsKO, December 5, 2025). The system of higher education is more openly embracing indoctrination with profoundly militaristic and fascist principles, further ingraining these themes into Russia's increasingly militarized society.
Opening the fourth festival meeting of Cossack universities at Platov Polytechnic University, the all-Russian Ataman Vitaly Kuznetsov announced, "The Russian Cossacks have a great future, and our greatest asset, the priority of every Cossack troop in Russia is you, the youth, our future in everything." He continued to emphasize why the youth are so important to the Cossacks, discussing their military contributions in the ongoing campaign against Ukraine and claiming that 19,000 "Cossacks" are currently fighting on the front lines (VsKO, September 30, 2025). In doing so, Kuznetsov reinforced that one of the Russian Cossacks' roles is to impose a militant, fascist identity on even the brightest young Russian minds, all in the name of contributing to an abstract sense of glory. Kuznetsov is a central figure in connecting people on university campuses and the Russian presidential administration, including with organizations that help recruit youth for fighting on the front lines in Ukraine (See Bellingcat, December 5, 2025, for more information on how Russian Cossacks drive young people to war).
The festivities in September 2025 were organized under the auspices of the Russian Ministry of Sciences and Higher Education with the assistance of the All-Russian Cossack Society. Kuznetsov's opening speech declared that the Association of Cossack Universities had recently expanded to 26 "leading institutions" throughout the country, and "more than another ten have also expressed their interest" in joining. This number has already increased. There were 350 young Cossacks from delegations from some 15 universities at the festival, and a total of 800 young Cossacks, including Cossack cadet corps and other organizations, for an event that lasted from September 30 to October 2 (VsKO, September 30, 2025). The second day featured military preparation for the attendees and a "Cossack trails" orienteering event with exhibits dedicated to Cossack history, life, and culture (VsKO, October 1, 2025). The final day began with a parade competition for Cossack squads, a quiz, a roundtable on how best to practice the Cossack hundreds (a traditional formation style for Cossacks), and the closing ceremony (VsKO, October 3, 2025). The event itself and parallel developments highlighted important characteristics of the Cossack movement that contributed to the development of a fascist system of higher education.
First, the festival and parallel events demonstrated connections between the Cossacks and other ostensibly civil society youth organizations. At the same time as the festival, Cossacks in Ekaterinburg were recruiting 22 new young members for the BARS-6 battalion. In doing so, they worked with the DOSAAF; Dobrovol'noe obshchestvo sodeistviia armii, aviatsii i flotu, Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy), which works with youth (VsKO, October 3, 2025). DOSAAF was also present at a nearby festival in Rostov-on-Don, discussing the strengthening of Cossack education in that oblast (VsKO, October 1, 2025). Likewise, Olga Stepanova, the minister of education for Omsk oblast, announced in January 2025 the creation of a new Cossack Cadets Corps in the region. There were also over "514 Yunarmiya battalions containing more than 20 thousand schoolchildren" (Kazachestvo, January 14, 2025). Furthermore, Cossacks from the Black Sea Cossack Society served as military instructors for the 58 detachments of the Yunarmiya organization of schoolchildren and college students in Sochi, and reports suggest that those who complete Yunarmiya training enroll in Cossack Cadets Corps organizations (23rus.org, September 17, 2024). The Cossacks are but one piece of an intricate web of youth organizations pushing the fascist agenda, seemingly with a special claim on higher education.
Second, the event served to integrate the new territories into a fascist system of higher education. For example, representatives of the Karachun youth Cossack detachment from the so-called Donetsk People's Republic attended for the first time and were interviewed by correspondents from the Russian Cossackdom portal. One ataman told the interviewer that he enjoyed the festivities and "personally, I enjoyed the lecture on how to be a Cossack in the modern world. That is, how to identify yourself as a Cossack given modern realities." Other subjects expressed a wish to remain connected with the other Cossacks they had met, possibly through phone calls (Kazachestvo, October 3, 2025). Similarly, the fourth All-Russian Cossack Youth Rally at the Avangard Defense Sports Camp on October 6, 2025, gave the results of its grant competition with a total pot of three million rubles (about $38,000). For the first time, a representative of the Kherson regional Cossack society entered the competition, which funded eleven projects, each with its own militant theme (VsKO, October 6, 2025). Most entries came from university students, although seven were from people under 18.
The Cossack education system is continuing to grow and spread further through Russia and the occupied regions of Ukraine. The Cossacks are defining their place in the Russian education system as furthering the martial and fascist elements of contemporary Russian higher education.
Part One - (https://jamestown.org/moscow-conducts-fascistization-of-russian-higher-education-part-one/)
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Professor Richard Arnold teaches at Muskingum University and is a member of the PONARS network.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/moscow-conducts-fascistization-of-russian-higher-education-part-two/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Lithuania Grapples With Increased Immigration
WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 14, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Lithuania Grapples with Increased Immigration
By Dainius Genys
Executive Summary:
* Lithuania transitioned from net emigration to significant net immigration in 2019 and created a Reception and Integration Agency in 2025 to manage migrants, signaling that immigration is now central to the country's demographic and economic stability.
* Social attitudes and cultural norms lag behind demographic realities--immigrants often face social coldness and difficulties ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 14, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Lithuania Grapples with Increased Immigration By Dainius Genys Executive Summary: * Lithuania transitioned from net emigration to significant net immigration in 2019 and created a Reception and Integration Agency in 2025 to manage migrants, signaling that immigration is now central to the country's demographic and economic stability. * Social attitudes and cultural norms lag behind demographic realities--immigrants often face social coldness and difficultiesnavigating institutions, highlighting some persistent latent biases.
* Immigrants' visible contributions in labor-short sectors are facilitating their gradual acceptance, demonstrating that economic necessity and policy innovations can bridge cultural gaps and support long-term social cohesion.
On January 1, Lithuania implemented amendments to the Law on State Language that significantly strengthened Lithuanian language proficiency requirements for foreign nationals in the workforce (LRT, January 6). This policy shift reflects a broader transformation in Lithuania's migration profile. For the past six years, Lithuania has experienced positive net migration for the first period of its post-Soviet independence (International Organization for Migration Lithuania, October 2, 2025). The number of non-EU foreign workers in the country has increased twentyfold since 2020, prompting the creation of a dedicated Reception and Integration Agency, operationalized in January 2025, designed to comprehensively address migration challenges (European Commission, December 23, 2024; LRT, November 25, 2025). This institutional development signals a recognition that migration is no longer a marginal issue but a defining feature of Lithuania's demographic and economic landscape. The agency aims to streamline administrative processes, coordinate support services, and ensure that both refugees and labor migrants can integrate effectively into Lithuanian society.
This transition marks a historic shift from a predominantly emigration-oriented society to one increasingly shaped by incoming populations (Europos Migracijos Tinklas, December 29, 2025). Lithuania's demographic narrative was historically defined by labor and educational emigration, leaving gaps in the workforce and shaping social perceptions around mobility. Today, however, the influx of immigrants--ranging from Ukrainians fleeing war to legal labor migrants from other non-EU countries--poses both opportunities and challenges, particularly for the labor market and social cohesion (LRT, November 25, 2025).
The transition from a society historically oriented toward emigration to one increasingly shaped by immigration has highlighted a fundamental tension. Social attitudes and cultural habits often change more slowly than the realities they are meant to respond to. Lithuanian public opinion, as surveys from the Institute of Sociology at the Lithuanian Centre for Social Sciences (LCSS) indicate, remains shaped by deep-seated norms, historical experiences, and collective memories of emigration and cultural trauma (LCSS, May 21, 2025). These enduring mentalities manifest in a general willingness to assist those perceived as orderly and rule-abiding, reflecting a broader moral commitment to fairness and responsibility. Newcomers from more distant countries or with less structured migration pathways, however, often encounter a colder reception, both socially and institutionally (LCSS, May 21, 2025). In these cases, the formal mechanisms designed to provide support--refugee centers, non-governmental organizations, integration programs--may appear rigid, almost like a "frozen" bureaucracy, operating strictly according to legal frameworks rather than flexible human judgment (Arunas Acus and Esua Alphonsius Fotindong, "On the Problem of the Integration of Migrants into Lithuanian Society in the Context of NGO Experience," December 30, 2024).
The general public and government institutions increasingly recognize spheres affected by depopulation or labor shortages as areas where immigrant labor is not only tolerated but needed. The rise in migrant numbers has begun to alleviate longstanding shortages in key sectors such as construction, information technology (IT), and transport services (LRT, November 25, 2025). Legal labor migrants are largely welcomed, and organizations exist to help foreign workers integrate as they fill roles critical to economic growth, contributing to productivity and innovation (Migration Information Center; Invest Lithuania, accessed January 14). These emerging patterns help bridge the gap between cultural predispositions and demographic reality, creating spaces where newcomers are gradually accepted and trusted, provided they navigate the social and procedural expectations of Lithuanian society. Social habits may be slow to evolve, but the lived experience of migration--combined with institutional structures, community engagement, and visible economic contributions--facilitates a recalibration of cultural norms.
Lithuanian hospitality remains selective despite these changes. Migrants with similar historical, cultural, or geopolitical backgrounds--particularly from the post-Soviet space--are more readily integrated into communities (LRT, November 25, 2024). Others remain positioned on the margins, tolerated for their economic utility but not necessarily embraced socially. These differentiated patterns of inclusion highlight the persistence of implicit hierarchies and latent xenophobic tendencies, even within a broadly pragmatic and functional migration system (LRT November 3, 2025). Ignoring these dynamics risks reinforcing social fragmentation and undermining the long-term success of integration policies.
Lithuania's current experiences with migration offer several lessons. First, the creation of dedicated migration institutions has demonstrated the necessity for coordinating support and ensuring fairness across diverse migrant groups. Second, the current situation and opinions toward migrants show how economic integration must be aligned with social integration. Labor market participation alone does not guarantee acceptance or well-being. Third, attention to the psychosocial dimensions of migration--particularly the recognition of the past and the cultivation of structured, reliable care--is critical for fostering long-term stability. Many newcomers arrive not only with material needs but with histories of war, displacement, political repression, or prolonged insecurity. In the case of Ukrainian refugees in Lithuania, for example, access to employment and housing has not eliminated the need for sustained psychological support, as trauma and loss continue to shape everyday functioning and social participation. Without institutional mechanisms that acknowledge and address these experiences, integration risks becoming formally successful but socially fragile. Finally, public communication and education initiatives can help mitigate selective bias. For example, Lithuania developed an Introduction to Sociocultural Knowledge program to support newcomers with practical information and an understanding of how Lithuania's social, institutional, and cultural systems function. The program provides an overview of the country, its institutions, and its people, and explores Lithuania's history as well as the social and cultural factors that shape Lithuanian identity, encouraging a broader cultural understanding of hospitality and belonging beyond familiar groups (Sociokulturinis ivadas, accessed January 14).
Lithuania's migration landscape is evolving rapidly, with profound implications for the labor market, social policy, and cultural norms. The establishment of a Reception and Integration Agency reflects a recognition that migration requires comprehensive, institutionalized responses. Lithuania's characteristic form of hospitality--disciplined, structured, and culturally grounded--offers a viable framework for managing this change. The long-term challenge, however, lies in ensuring that this hospitality becomes less conditional and more inclusive, capable of accommodating not only those who feel familiar but also those who seem distant. If Lithuania succeeds in aligning its institutional innovations with deeper cultural transformation, it may offer a compelling model of post-migration adaptation for other societies facing similar demographic shifts.
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Dr. Dainius Genys, sociologist, is a senior researcher at Andrei Sakharov Research Center for Democratic Development and Lithuanian Emigration Institute at Vytautas Magnus University.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/lithuania-grapples-with-increased-immigration/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: More Business Registrations in Germany Due to Intake of Refugees
MUNICH, Germany, Jan. 15 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:* * *
More Business Registrations in Germany Due to Intake of Refugees
The intake of refugees in Germany is increasing the number of business registrations and creating additional jobs, according to a new study by the ifo Institute. However, the new companies are not being founded by refugees or other foreigners but predominantly by Germans. "The intake of refugees is creating a need for new business models in many places, for example, in the health sector or financial services," says ifo researcher Sebastian ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Jan. 15 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * More Business Registrations in Germany Due to Intake of Refugees The intake of refugees in Germany is increasing the number of business registrations and creating additional jobs, according to a new study by the ifo Institute. However, the new companies are not being founded by refugees or other foreigners but predominantly by Germans. "The intake of refugees is creating a need for new business models in many places, for example, in the health sector or financial services," says ifo researcher SebastianSchirner. However, it should be noted that the increased demand may be a result of tax-financed transfers. The study does not examine this possibility. "At the same time, the supply of labor is increasing in the medium term, which is attractive for potential businesspeople."
According to the study, an increase of 100 refugees per 10,000 inhabitants leads to an average of seven additional business registrations with 27 new jobs. That corresponds to a rise in business registrations of 7.9 percent compared to the average registrations in an average district. The emerging companies are concentrated in the transport, health, manufacturing, and financial services sectors. Through new business registrations and existing companies, the intake of 100 refugees per 10,000 inhabitants creates a total of 109 additional jobs. Existing companies account for three quarters of them. The jobs are primarily full-time positions.
The study is based on data from a special evaluation of business registration statistics at district level between 2007 and 2021. The number of refugees at district level is measured using data from the Central Register of Foreigners. The researchers also used the official allocation quotas (according to the Konigstein Key and federal state rules). These quotas determine how many refugees a district should theoretically take in. Based on this, the study determines the causal effects of the intake of refugees on the number of business registrations and jobs.
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Publications
2025 Article in Journal
ifo Migrationsmonitor: Migrantische Unternehmensgrundungen
Clara Albrecht, Ahmet Erdem Bayram, Zohal Hessami, Sebastian Schirner, Clara Wobbe
ifo Schnelldienst, 2025, 78, Nr. 12 51-57
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2025/article-journal/ifo-migrationsmonitor-migrantische-unternehmensgrundungen)
2025 Working Paper CESifo
Asylum Seekers, New Businesses, and Job Creation
Zohal Hessami, Sebastian Schirner, Clara Wobbe
CESifo Working Paper No. 12151
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/cesifo/publications/2025/working-paper/asylum-seekers-new-businesses-and-job-creation)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-01-14/more-business-registrations-in-germany-due-to-intake-of-refugees
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Gloomy Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany
MUNICH, Germany, Jan. 15 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:* * *
Gloomy Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany
Sentiment in residential construction in Germany clouded over slightly at the end of the year. The ifo Business Climate Index fell in December from -19.3 to -20.6 points. Companies assessed their current situation and expectations for the coming months as worse. "Residential construction can't quite make any headway," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The industry's structural problems still remain."
The share of residential construction ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Jan. 15 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Gloomy Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany Sentiment in residential construction in Germany clouded over slightly at the end of the year. The ifo Business Climate Index fell in December from -19.3 to -20.6 points. Companies assessed their current situation and expectations for the coming months as worse. "Residential construction can't quite make any headway," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The industry's structural problems still remain." The share of residential constructioncompanies reporting too few orders rose further from 47.0 to 47.7%. Cancellations also increased again: The share of companies reporting canceled construction projects climbed from 11.0 to 11.5%. "The recent increase in residential building permits has not yet been reflected in sentiment among the companies," says Wohlrabe. "Many companies are still waiting for a noticeable upturn in demand." On average, it takes 3 to 6 months for the permits issued to translate into actual orders for companies.
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More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-01-15/gloomy-business-climate-residential-construction-germany)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-01-15/gloomy-business-climate-residential-construction-germany
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Why Greenland Could Spur Europe's Digital Awakening
WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 14, 2026:* * *
Why Greenland Could Spur Europe's Digital Awakening
By Emily Benson
Following U.S. action in Venezuela that toppled Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, international attention has moved to another region long coveted by Trump: Greenland. U.S. threats to acquire Greenland are more than rhetorical posturing.
President Trump has been interested in Greenland at least since 2019, when he discussed acquiring the territory with advisers and publicly expressed his desire ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 14, 2026: * * * Why Greenland Could Spur Europe's Digital Awakening By Emily Benson Following U.S. action in Venezuela that toppled Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, international attention has moved to another region long coveted by Trump: Greenland. U.S. threats to acquire Greenland are more than rhetorical posturing. President Trump has been interested in Greenland at least since 2019, when he discussed acquiring the territory with advisers and publicly expressed his desirefor it. Despite consistent messaging from the U.S. president on Greenland, Europe has failed to take the ongoing White House push for territorial expansion seriously. In December 2025, President Trump appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as special envoy to Greenland, saying, "We have to have it." This decision led to a strong rebuke by Danish leadership, which noted that "territorial integrity must be respected." White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller has doubled down on how easy acquiring Greenland would be, claiming there would be no need for U.S. military intervention because "nobody's going to fight the U.S. over the future of Greenland."
Despite clear and transparent messaging from the administration, Europe has been slow to mount a collective response. As it contemplates how to respond to the United States' threat to take NATO territory, Europe will inevitably turn to technology. U.S. threats to Greenland will accelerate the European Union's drive to de-risk from U.S. technology. While military action remains unlikely, the Trump administration's aggressive posture toward Greenland is an additional catalyst for Europe's digital sovereignty movement and could significantly impact the long-term market share of U.S. companies across Europe.
Strategic Underpinnings of U.S. Action
Greenland holds strategic value in its potential. It contains major untapped reserves of critical minerals, which are of great interest to the United States and Europe, as they try to wean themselves off of reliance on China for critical inputs. RESourceEU, unveiled alongside the recently updated European Economic Security Strategy, specifically earmarks funds for critical mineral projects in Greenland. Yet most of these deposits are not currently viable economically because extraction remains challenging, if not impossible. As ice melt accelerates, these deposits could become more accessible, but critical minerals for now are little more than a distraction from hard power dynamics.
More immediately, Greenland's vast Arctic coastline gives it growing strategic importance. The United States has grown anxious that additional ice melt will encourage China to expand shipping lines in the Arctic, presenting new commercial and military risks, potentially resulting in an "Arctic Silk Road." In 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and others warned that China had expanded its Arctic container shipping with a record of 14 container ship voyages--an uptick but far from the tens of thousands of vessels that transit the Suez and Panama Canals each year. The true extent of Chinese activity in the region is hotly contested. Winter conditions have not made full passage from East Asia easier, and Russia does not maintain functional search and rescue missions in the far North, discouraging vessels from traversing the Russian coastline.
Aside from the desire to police international shipping routes, U.S. interests in Greenland relate primarily to military affairs and U.S. national security. China and Russia have held joint military drills in the region, and decades of regional military buildup are palpable. Russia's northern fleet, a core part of Russia's nuclear deterrent, is stationed on the Kola Peninsula in the Russian Arctic. The U.S. desire for expanded presence in the region comes alongside new fears about warfare conducted via autonomous subsea vehicles, including those with nuclear weapons launch capabilities, such as Russia's Poseidon tests. Ice melt will enable better intelligence collection via satellite imagery, potentially exposing a fuller extent of regional military ambitions.
In short, climate change is opening the Arctic to more commercial activity, from shipping to mining, which is in turn attracting the attention of the world's major powers, making it a region of greater geopolitical focus and competition. Indeed, President Trump said in December 2025, "We need Greenland for national security, not minerals."
And yet, there is little need for the United States to possess Greenland for its security. The United States had roughly 15,000 troops and numerous bases in Greenland during the Cold War, and now it has just 150 troops and one base. Should the United States want to increase its presence, it is at liberty to do so under the agreement it has with Denmark. Thus, despite the growing importance of Arctic security, the Trump administration's focus on possessing the Arctic strikes Europeans as detached from any security rationale and being driven by an imperialist approach.
Europe's Digital Reckoning and the Sovereignty Imperative
The Trump administration's hard-power and extractive approach to geopolitics has already convinced European governments they must urgently de-risk from U.S. technology providers, a prospect few in Washington seem to take seriously. Recognizing the changing nature of digital interconnectedness and associated threats, European governments are pursuing digital sovereignty to insulate critical services from disruptions and espionage alike and to develop technology stacks governable by domestic rules with fewer diplomatic complications.
Short on European alternatives, some governments have instead begun to diversify their set of cloud services so that they rely not on one single cloud service provider but a mix of mostly American cloud service giants plus EU firms. Denmark's decision to pursue open-source alternatives following service disruptions is likely just the beginning. In 2025, the European Union unveiled ambitious plans to build AI gigafactories and is set to accelerate indigenous semiconductor production through a potential CHIPS Act 2.0.
EU sovereignty discussions also coincide with the Trump administration's ongoing attempts to seek EU regulatory concessions on its Digital Decade package. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick has linked relief on steel and other tariffs to EU acquiescence on digital regulation. More dramatically, the Department of State sanctioned former European Commissioner Thierry Breton and other EU officials over alleged online censorship, a move telegraphed months in advance as a clear warning. That EU officials did not take these threats seriously far in advance should serve as a stark reminder that the Trump administration is very transparent in its policy objectives: If the United States threatens certain actions, believe them the first time.
The budding diplomatic crisis over Greenland has further intensified Europe's digital sovereignty concerns, transforming them from abstract policy debates into urgent strategic imperatives. As U.S. and EU views on the future of digital governance continue to grow apart, what began as divergent opinions over civil liberties and data security has become a set of strategic imperatives that could impact multiple domains, from electrical grid continuity to the storage of government files. If Russian tanks cross the border into Europe, some infrastructure will be damaged. On the other hand, if a cloud service outage impacts an entire country, all hospitals could go offline. Other recent incidents have hardened European attitudes about the trustworthiness of U.S. technology. For example, nonconsensual AI-generated imagery on X, formerly Twitter, has fueled consumer and government skepticism of U.S. social media platforms.
For their part, U.S. tech companies have demonstrated an eagerness to maintain market share and are willing to build bespoke products to meet foreign government needs. This includes, for example, the deployment of Google Distributed Cloud air-gapped solution in Germany, where Google will service sensitive German military and government needs. Bespoke offerings have assuaged some member state governments' concerns, but other European parties are beginning to look anew at existing and future contracts with foreign providers.
The Path Ahead
There is an assumption in the United States that Europe is incapable of reversing its dependence on U.S. technology, therefore giving the United States significant leverage. However, U.S. technology companies have significantly benefited from the benign perception of dependence on the United States. It has been assumed that if Europe could be reliant on the United States for defense, why not also for tech? Tech companies should look at the sizable European investments in defense and Europe's race for greater strategic autonomy with some alarm. If Europe determines it cannot rely on the United States for its security, it may also decide it cannot rely on U.S. tech.
The fear over Greenland could spur the European Union and its member states to de-risk from U.S. technology. De-risking and pushing back could include stiffer fines on U.S. companies and subsidies or other affirmative inducements for domestic European alternatives. Worse yet for U.S. companies would be if the European Union were to adopt some of the pointier sides of the U.S. trade and investment toolkit, as China has repeatedly done. This includes export restrictions on critical inputs, the denial of export licenses for software, outbound investment rules to curtail European participation in U.S. funds, or the development of an instrument similar to the foreign direct product rule or Chinese equivalent, which affords governments tremendous authority over global supply chains.
Instead of aiming for a more abrupt decoupling, the European Union could focus its efforts on determining where geopolitical risks are most acute and where risks do not merit immediate action. Major changes are not necessary across the entire stack and for every single end-use. For example, vacation bookings do not need to be sovereign or air-gapped, whereas military services might need to be. The European Union could determine that it needs limited sovereign compute for core government services, ranging from cloud storage for government to technologies supporting public health care.
It is unlikely that the European Union would determine it needs to follow the United States in vying for reach artificial general intelligence, a resource-intensive endeavor largely associated with U.S.-China tech competition. Instead, the European Union might conclude that diversifying its basket of goods and services is most viable. In the short-term, diversification could entail spreading services across several U.S. providers, while slowly integrating European players as capacity grows. Although the loss of U.S. market share might be limited at first, this approach could seriously squeeze U.S. technology providers over the long run, particularly if coupled with lasting changes in European consumer sentiment about the reliability of the United States as a partner.
Another factor the European Union could add to bolster its tech sovereignty credibility is to retool tech sector financing. Europe has already undertaken serious efforts to rework the way it underwrites defense spending, and lessons learned in that domain could easily transfer to consumer and dual-use technologies. After evaluating parts of the stack that do deserve diversification and potential sovereign buildout, the European Union could also turn to emerging U.S. models for creative financing. Under the Trump administration, the United States offers a panoply of options, from standing up new equity markets for economic security purposes, taking equity stakes in critical companies, or inking offtake agreements to induce additional U.S. domestic capacity in a given sector.
Full-scale decoupling from the United States remains highly unlikely and would be painful and expensive, given the decades-long advantage U.S. providers maintain in key technologies like advanced semiconductors and cloud services. However, recent examples of European decoupling from Russian gas and Chinese decoupling from U.S. semiconductor technologies demonstrate that sufficiently motivated large markets can mitigate deep strategic dependencies. Sustained EU tech de-risking could cause U.S. market share in the European Union to atrophy, reducing opportunities in a bloc with 450 million people and a GDP of over $22 trillion.
Conclusion
Europe has the agency to change the current tech dynamic. What steps Europe takes next could catapult it into a geopolitical powerhouse built on European ingenuity, or it could flounder under the weight of burdensome processes and misallocated investments. But the evolving diplomatic row over Greenland has crystallized a fundamental shift: Europe's push for digital sovereignty has become a core component of European strategic independence, driven by the sobering recognition that alliance relationships built over decades are only as strong as the laws that underpin them.
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Emily Benson is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-greenland-could-spur-europes-digital-awakening
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Trump's Greenland Ambition Is About U.S. Power, Not Alliances
WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 14, 2026:* * *
Trump's Greenland Ambition Is About U.S. Power, Not Alliances
By Sir Robin Niblett
Danish and other European governments are struggling to decide how to manage President Donald Trump's latest demands that Greenland become part of the United States. This week, foreign ministers from Denmark and Greenland are making the case in Washington to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance that Greenland's security from Russian and Chinese encroachment would ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 14, 2026: * * * Trump's Greenland Ambition Is About U.S. Power, Not Alliances By Sir Robin Niblett Danish and other European governments are struggling to decide how to manage President Donald Trump's latest demands that Greenland become part of the United States. This week, foreign ministers from Denmark and Greenland are making the case in Washington to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance that Greenland's security from Russian and Chinese encroachment wouldbest be enhanced through joint investments by the United States and its European allies under the framework of NATO and the 1951 bilateral treaty between the Danish and U.S. governments. European leaders have recently suggested building a new NATO mission, "Arctic Sentry," modelled on the ongoing "Baltic Sentry" mission.
As Denmark, Greenland, and other European leaders have also reasonably argued, there is no need for the United States to "own" Greenland to make it safe. The United States can already track Russian missiles overflying the island to the United States from the Pituffik Space Base on Greenland's northwest coast, just as it does via radar based in Canada as part of the joint U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command. Nothing is stopping the United States from adding more missile tracking stations or "Golden Dome" interceptors in Greenland.
These arguments are all correct in theory, but they entirely misunderstand President Trump's thinking. The European countries' focus on these discussions assumes he is interested in strengthening NATO allies' collective security, when the president's "America First" doctrine is focused on achieving benefits for the United States, above all else.
One of Trump's longest-standing complaints is that European countries have been free riding on the United States' security guarantee to defend them--first, from the Soviet Union and, since 2014, from a revanchist Russia. While the United States continued spending roughly 3.5 percent of its GDP on sustaining world-class military capabilities, European countries spent under 2 percent on their defenses, investing the difference--in Trump's eyes--to build globally competitive manufacturing industries that have then outcompeted their U.S. counterparts in the United States and abroad. For Trump, the United States' decades-long investments in Europe's security have been rewarded by transatlantic trade deficits and regulatory warfare against U.S. businesses.
Why then would Donald Trump turn to a 1951 treaty to negotiate spending more U.S. dollars to help Denmark defend hugely valuable mineral reserves whose exploitation might mostly benefit--if not Russia and China--then equally rapacious European countries? As Trump said in February last year, "the European Union was formed to screw the United States."
President Trump's problem with Venezuela wasn't only drug trafficking and narcoterrorism; it was that Chinese and Russian companies might control its vast oil reserves more than U.S. companies.
Similarly, when Trump says the United States needs Greenland for U.S. security, what he really means is that he wants the United States to control Greenland's extensive, though mostly untapped and extremely hard to extract, rare earth deposits and large reserves of copper, graphite, nickel, titanium, zinc, and gold. Trump wants to go down in history as the president who did the best real estate deal for the United States since Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867, adding trillions to the United States' net wealth.
And for Trump, only by owning the territory can the U.S. government ensure that its economic benefits accrue to U.S. companies and the U.S. balance sheet. As he said in his recent interview with the New York Times, "ownership gives you a thing that you can't do, whether you're talking about a lease or a treaty."
European countries will need to hold their nerve and stick to their principles, making clear in Washington, especially to the U.S. Congress, that the essence of post-1945 European security is that borders should not be changed by force or any other sort of coercion. For the United States to go against this principle in the case of Greenland would mean the end of the Atlantic Alliance. It would then put in jeopardy many of the benefits the United States gains in Europe from NATO's continued existence, including bases and arms sales.
There is little hope that President Trump will be swayed over Greenland by appeals to Cold War treaties built on the idea that the United States and Europe are stronger together. Yet, pursuing Greenland will only leave the United States weaker and alone.
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Sir Robin Niblett is a CSIS senior adviser and distinguished fellow at Chatham House. He previously served as director and chief executive of Chatham House (2007-2022) and as executive vice president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is also affiliated with the Asia Society Policy Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/trumps-greenland-ambition-about-us-power-not-alliances
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Japan Poised for Early General Election
WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 14, 2026:* * *
Japan Poised for Early General Election
By Kristi Govella and Yuko Nakano
On January 14, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi informed ruling coalition officials of her intention to dissolve the lower house of the Japanese parliament, setting in motion preparation for an early general election. This decision comes at a time when Japan faces intensifying tensions with China and challenges in its relationship with the United States, as well as difficult economic ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 14, 2026: * * * Japan Poised for Early General Election By Kristi Govella and Yuko Nakano On January 14, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi informed ruling coalition officials of her intention to dissolve the lower house of the Japanese parliament, setting in motion preparation for an early general election. This decision comes at a time when Japan faces intensifying tensions with China and challenges in its relationship with the United States, as well as difficult economicand social issues at home. The election will be critical for Takaichi and her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as they attempt to strengthen their position in the lower house and gain a mandate for their policy moving forward.
Q1: What is the status of Takaichi's decision and what would an early election timeline look like?
A1: Since Takaichi assumed office last October, there has been consistent speculation that she would call a snap election to solidify her political footing, particularly in light of her very high approval ratings. However, until now, Takaichi has repeatedly stressed that her priority is implementing her policy agenda. At her New Year's press conference, for example, she highlighted her efforts to boost economic growth through "responsible and proactive public finances" to enable strategic investments aimed at enhancing Japan's resilience and security. Therefore, it was widely expected that the government would focus on passing the 2026 budget before the end of the current fiscal year in March. Although rumors that she was considering dissolving the lower house intensified this week, few within her own party appeared to have anticipated Takaichi's decision.
Takaichi has yet to formally announce or explain this decision, partly to avoid overshadowing this week's high-profile visits by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. She is expected to lay out her plans on January 19 and then to dissolve the lower house after it convenes on January 23, with election day likely set for February 8 or 15. LDP Secretary-General Shunichi Suzuki has suggested that the benchmark for victory is retaining the ruling coalition's majority, while others contend that the party should aim to reclaim a majority on its own.
Q2: Why did Takaichi decide to call an early election?
A2: Takaichi hopes to translate her personal popularity into electoral gains for the LDP. According to some polls, her approval ratings are as high as 78 percent at the moment--an extraordinary level for Japanese politics. Takaichi inherited a minority government after the previous LDP-Komeito coalition lost control of both houses in the national elections over the past two years, forcing the LDP to rely on cooperation with other parties. The general election is likely to be framed as a referendum on the LDP's new coalition with the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), formed after its long-standing partner Komeito exited the coalition last fall. With the cooperation of several independent lawmakers, this new LDP-JIP coalition holds a majority in the lower house by only a single seat.
However, a snap election is a calculated risk. Despite Takaichi's popularity, support for the LDP as a party remains in the 30 percent range, reflecting ongoing public concerns. Additionally, if the public perceives that Takaichi is prioritizing politics over policy, this could have negative effects at the ballot box. Opposition parties, including the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP)--which previously agreed to cooperate with the LDP on the timely passage of the budget--have already begun criticizing Takaichi's decision as putting economic priorities on the back burner. The opposition parties themselves are discussing potential strategies for campaign coordination, but their approval ratings are very low and they also face many challenges. Japan's political situation continues to be very fluid as parties redefine their relationships to one another.
Q3: What are the implications for Japanese politics and foreign policy?
A3: The stakes of this election are high. Takaichi's government has an ambitious agenda planned, including revising Japan's three key national security-related documents by the end of this year, accelerating defense spending, and dealing with economic issues such as inflation. Although the LDP-led coalition would remain in the minority in the upper house, securing an outright majority in the more powerful lower house would ease the legislative process and enable Takaichi to take a stronger leadership role on difficult domestic and foreign policy issues. With no national election scheduled for the upper house until 2028, this would be a significant advantage, giving the Takaichi administration more scope to take a long-term strategic approach.
Nonetheless, the risks are also significant. Losing additional seats in an election would leave the LDP searching for additional partners to maintain control of the lower house and make the negotiation and decisionmaking process even more complex than it is now. Even maintaining the current political status quo would likely sap momentum and support for Takaichi's policy agenda and could potentially weaken her credibility on the international stage. Regardless of the outcome, this election will have important consequences for the future of Japanese leadership at home and abroad.
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Kristi Govella is senior adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and associate professor of Japanese politics and international relations at the University of Oxford. Yuko Nakano is a fellow with the Japan Chair and associate director of the U.S.-Japan Strategic Leadership Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/japan-poised-early-general-election
[Category: ThinkTank]