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Rand: One in Eight Adolescents and Young Adults Use AI Chatbots for Mental Health Advice
SANTA MONICA, California, Nov. 8 (TNSrep) -- Rand issued the following news release:* * *
One in Eight Adolescents and Young Adults Use AI Chatbots for Mental Health Advice
About 1 in 8 U.S. adolescents and young adults use AI chatbots for mental health advice, with the behavior most common among those aged 18 to 21, according to a new study (https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2841067).
Among those who used chatbots for mental health advice, 66 percent engage at least monthly, and over 93 percent reported that they found the advice helpful.
The study draws on the ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Nov. 8 (TNSrep) -- Rand issued the following news release: * * * One in Eight Adolescents and Young Adults Use AI Chatbots for Mental Health Advice About 1 in 8 U.S. adolescents and young adults use AI chatbots for mental health advice, with the behavior most common among those aged 18 to 21, according to a new study (https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2841067). Among those who used chatbots for mental health advice, 66 percent engage at least monthly, and over 93 percent reported that they found the advice helpful. The study draws on thefirst nationally representative survey of U.S. adolescents and young adults aged 12 to21, examining the prevalence, frequency, and perceived helpfulness of advice from generative AI tools when feeling sad, angry, or nervous.
The study is published in the journal JAMA Network Open.
Researchers say that the high use rates likely reflect the low cost, immediacy, and perceived privacy of AI-based advice, particularly among youth who are unlikely to receive traditional counseling. However, they say engagement with generative AI raises concerns, especially for users with intensive mental health needs.
"There are few standardized benchmarks for evaluating mental health advice offered by AI chatbots, and there is limited transparency about the datasets that are used to train these large language models," said Jonathan Cantor, the study's corresponding author and a senior policy researcher at RAND, a nonprofit research organization.
Since the launch of large language model (LLM) chatbots such as ChatGPT, the use of this form of generative AI has grown rapidly--especially among adolescents and young adults. Concurrently, the United States is experiencing a youth mental health crisis, with 18 percent of adolescents aged 12 to17 having had a major depressive episode over the past year and 40 percent of these youth receiving no mental health care.
Between February and March 2025, RAND researchers surveyed 1,058 youth aged 12 to 21 from the RAND American Life Panel and Ipsos' KnowledgePanel. Both survey panels use random sampling from population frames of U.S. households.
Participants were asked about their use of generative AI and whether they had used such tools for mental health advice.
Researchers say that the high utilization rates likely reflect the low cost, immediacy, and perceived privacy of AI-based advice, particularly for youth who might not receive traditional counseling.
The study found that Black respondents reported lower perceived helpfulness of AI chatbots, signaling potential cultural competency gaps.
The survey did not include measures of diagnosed mental illness. Researchers say that future research should examine the utilization rates among children with mental health conditions and the impact on mental health-related outcomes.
Support for the study was provided by the National Institute of Mental Health.
Other authors of the study include Ryan K. McBain, Robert Bozick, Melissa Diliberti, Li Ang Zhang, Aaron Kofner, Joshua Breslau, Bradley D. Stein, and Lori Uscher Pines from RAND; Fang Zhang, Alyssa Burnett, Benjamin Rader, and Hao Yu, from the Harvard Medical School; and Ateev Mehrotra from the Brown University School of Public Health.
RAND Health promotes healthier societies by improving health care systems in the United States and other countries.
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About RAND
RAND is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/news/press/2025/11/one-in-eight-adolescents-and-young-adults-use-ai-chatbots.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to UnHerd: How Mamdani Flipped the Black and Hispanic Vote
NEW YORK, Nov. 8 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Nov. 6, 2025, to UnHerd:* * *
How Mamdani Flipped the Black and Hispanic Vote
By Santiago Vidal Calvo
In Tuesday's mayoral election, Zohran Mamdani captured more than one million votes across New York's diverse electorate. Most notably, the democratic socialist made huge inroads with black and Hispanic voters in the Bronx and Queens.
These two groups backed Andrew Cuomo heavily in the Democratic primary but swung to Mamdani in the general election. Once wary of him -- particularly older voters and ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Nov. 8 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Nov. 6, 2025, to UnHerd: * * * How Mamdani Flipped the Black and Hispanic Vote By Santiago Vidal Calvo In Tuesday's mayoral election, Zohran Mamdani captured more than one million votes across New York's diverse electorate. Most notably, the democratic socialist made huge inroads with black and Hispanic voters in the Bronx and Queens. These two groups backed Andrew Cuomo heavily in the Democratic primary but swung to Mamdani in the general election. Once wary of him -- particularly older voters andunion households who doubted his promises on housing and transit -- they ultimately decided to give him a chance.
Mamdani achieved this by winning them over to his affordability agenda, mobilising an army of union-aligned canvassers across outer-borough neighbourhoods, and delivering his message in multiple languages. Early in the campaign, he took the unusual step for a non-Latino candidate of releasing a full Spanish-language ad -- speaking less than fluently, but with the conviction of someone who cared enough to try. This culturally fluent approach paid dividends. He won clear majorities of both Latino and black voters, especially in the working-class enclaves of the Bronx and Queens.
Continue reading the entire piece here at UnHerd (https://unherd.com/newsroom/how-mamdani-flipped-the-black-and-hispanic-vote)
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Santiago Vidal Calvo is a Cities policy analyst at the Manhattan Institute.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/how-mamdani-flipped-the-black-and-hispanic-vote
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Bloomberg Opinion: Cash Is Not King. It's Cringe.
NEW YORK, Nov. 8 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Nov. 7, 2025, to Bloomberg Opinion:* * *
Cash Is Not King. It's Cringe.
By Allison Schrager
A friend once complained to me that people would sigh and roll their eyes when she used a credit card to pay for her $3 coffee. This was about a decade ago, and I admit, at the time I silently judged her. What kind of psychopath, I thought to myself, forces everyone in line to wait for their coffee while her credit card transaction is approved?
How times have changed, and I'm not talking about that $3 coffee. ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Nov. 8 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Nov. 7, 2025, to Bloomberg Opinion: * * * Cash Is Not King. It's Cringe. By Allison Schrager A friend once complained to me that people would sigh and roll their eyes when she used a credit card to pay for her $3 coffee. This was about a decade ago, and I admit, at the time I silently judged her. What kind of psychopath, I thought to myself, forces everyone in line to wait for their coffee while her credit card transaction is approved? How times have changed, and I'm not talking about that $3 coffee.Today I feel that same impatience when someone ahead of me rummages through their wallet to find exact change to make a cash purchase. Electronic payments are much faster and have become the norm, even for small purchases.
Now it is cash that carries a social stigma -- as this survey of Generation Z consumers makes clear. Conducted in September, it finds that 53% use physical cash only as a last resort, and 29% believe that people who pay with cash are "cringe." I will ignore the generational insult and focus on the implications of this shift for both consumer behavior and public policy.
Continue reading the entire piece here at Bloomberg Opinion (https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-11-07/cash-is-not-king-it-s-cringe)
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Allison Schrager is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor of City Journal.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/cash-is-not-king-its-cringe
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Russia Strengthens ASEAN Nuclear Ties
WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Nov. 7, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russia Strengthens ASEAN Nuclear Ties
By Anna J. Davis, Panorama
Executive Summary:
* Russia's state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have taken the most tangible step thus far in nuclear energy cooperation from the bilateral to the institutional level, with the signing of a new Memorandum of Understanding.
* The Kremlin uses Rosatom as an extension of its foreign policy goals. ASEAN member states, however, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Nov. 7, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Strengthens ASEAN Nuclear Ties By Anna J. Davis, Panorama Executive Summary: * Russia's state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have taken the most tangible step thus far in nuclear energy cooperation from the bilateral to the institutional level, with the signing of a new Memorandum of Understanding. * The Kremlin uses Rosatom as an extension of its foreign policy goals. ASEAN member states, however,appear to be acting out of practicality rather than a desire to partner with Russia, as few other countries offer similar solutions for their immediate-term energy needs.
* As long as Russia can position itself as a necessary partner for energy security solutions in Southeast Asia and globally, it will continue to undermine any meaningful Western sanctions pressure.
On October 15-17, on the sidelines of the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Energy Business Forum (AEBF) in Malaysia, Russian state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on nuclear energy cooperation with ASEAN Centre for Energy (Rosatom; TASS, October 21).[1] Until now, most Russian nuclear engagements in Southeast Asia have been bilateral in nature. This MoU marks the most tangible step thus far toward broader institutional cooperation, as envisioned in the Russia-ASEAN Comprehensive Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategic Partnership for the period 2021-2025 (President of Russia; ASEAN, October 28, 2021).
Since January, Russia has publicly announced a number of nuclear energy roadmaps and intergovernmental cooperation agreements with ASEAN member states, including Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia (RIA Novosti, July 31, September 26; Lao News Agency, August 1; Rosatom, September 19). Vietnam and Russia have signed an MoU to resume construction of the Ninh Thuáºn nuclear power plant (NPP), which was suspended in 2016 due to financing and insufficient electricity demand (Vietnam News, September 27). Rosatom is also discussing options to provide its small modular reactor (SMR) or floating NPP technology to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (TASS, June 30, September 4, 19; Rosatom, July 28, October 21; Atomic Energy, October 30; Nikkei Asia, November 4; Interfax, November 5).
Rosatom is widely recognized as an extension of Russian foreign policy, including in Southeast Asia (see EDM, January 29, June 25, July 15, 21, September 19, October 8). Rosatom International Network General Director Vadim Titov, who signed the MoU on behalf of Russia, has been appointed as the new head of Russia's Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation (RIA Novosti, October 24). Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the creation of the new department in August as part of an overall shakeup of the executive office (President of Russia, August 29). Titov now reports directly to Sergei Kiriyenko, Putin's first deputy chief of staff (see EDM, October 20, 28).
Rosatom's intentions may be strategic, but ASEAN members appear to be aligning with Russia for practical reasons. ASEAN Secretary-General H.E. Dr. Kao Kim Hourn has stated that collaboration with Russia, particularly in civilian nuclear energy, supports ASEAN's energy security, economic resilience, and sustainability as the region's energy demand continues to rise (ASEAN, February 19). Hourn said this during the opening of an exhibition on the prospects for Russia-ASEAN nuclear cooperation at the organization's headquarters in Jakarta earlier this year (Mission of the Russian Federation to ASEAN, February 18).
Civilian nuclear energy is a crucial component of the energy transition and energy security objectives outlined in ASEAN's Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016-2025 (ASEAN, 2016). Electricity demand across ASEAN is on track to triple by 2050--from 1,200 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2022 to 4,300 TWh in 2025 (Energy for Growth, June 30). Many ASEAN member states consider nuclear energy to be a viable low-carbon solution to meet that demand (ASEAN Hub, September 10).
For ASEAN member states interested in nuclear energy, the options Russia offers are more feasible and accessible than those provided by the West, and even the People's Republic of China (PRC), in the immediate term. Most ASEAN members are interested in SMRs or floating NPPs rather than conventional NPPs. This places Rosatom in a position to gain an advantage over other potential vendors, as it was the first to operate a commercial floating SMR, and it is on track to become the first country to export an SMR after signing an agreement with Uzbekistan in 2024 (Rosatom, June 2024; Kun.uz, September 11, 2024). Other SMR options are not yet commercialized for export. The PRC's Linglong is the first commercial land-based SMR (Global Times, October 16). It was expected to enter commercial operation in late 2025, but testing is still underway, and it is unclear if this goal will be met (Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), October 24). CNCC has partnered with ASEAN member states in the past to introduce nuclear and radiation technologies for medical, agricultural, and environmental applications (Nation Thailand, August 18, 2024). The PRC has, however, yet to move beyond the discussion phase and complete any agreements for nuclear energy capabilities with ASEAN member states (CNNC, September 19, 2023; Cambodia National Council for Sustainable Development, accessed November 4). Beyond Russia and the PRC, European, Canadian, and U.S. SMR construction projects are mostly in the design, site assessment, or licensing phases (Nuclear Engineering International, June 4, October 28; World Nuclear News, August 6, August 21, October 28; Canada Energy Regulator, August 20; Ansaldo Energia, September 16; European Industrial Alliance on SMRs, 2025).
Political and legal obstacles remain in ASEAN-Russia nuclear cooperation. Western sanctions do not currently prohibit civilian nuclear cooperation with Rosatom. A number of its senior personnel and subsidiaries, however, have been directly sanctioned (U.S. Department of State, January 10). This includes Rosatom's Deputy Director General for Mechanical Engineering and Industrial Solutions, Andrey Nikipelov, who jointly hosted the session at the ASEAN AEBF, where the MoU was signed (Rosatom, October 21; Nuclear Asia, October 31; Companies House; Office of Foreign Assets Control; U.K. Sanctions List, accessed November 1).
Further complicating ASEAN-Russia nuclear cooperation is the divergence in ASEAN member states' positions toward Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. ASEAN itself has not condemned Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, instead expressing deep concern and attempting to remain somewhat neutral (ASEAN, February 26, 2022). Cambodia, Singapore, and the Philippines have directly condemned Russia and, along with Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Timor-Leste, and Thailand, voted in favor of Russia withdrawing all military forces from Ukraine at the UN General Assembly in 2022 (European Union External Action, March 2, 2022; CamNess, March 28, 2022; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, June 16, 2024; Manila Bulletin, March 2). Laos and Vietnam abstained. Singapore has gone so far as to impose its own sanctions on Russia (Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 5, 2022; Vedomosti, April 4).
Rosatom's stance toward Southeast Asia suggests a Kremlin-directed strategy to position itself as a necessary partner in the region's long-term energy needs. The states in this region are left with few nuclear-related options to resolve their immediate-term energy needs without Russia, while also attempting to balance their commitments to a clean energy transition and energy security. This makes ASEAN a prime environment for Russia, via Rosatom, to ensure its indispensability to the global nuclear industry. The more Russia is able to do this, the more difficult it becomes to place meaningful pressure on the Kremlin through sanctions.
Note:
[1] ASEAN is an intergovernmental organization established in 1967, which now includes a total of eleven member states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos), Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Timor-Leste (East Timor) (ASEAN, October 26).
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Table: 2025 Russia-ASEAN Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Brunei ... Brunei is "carefully exploring" nuclear energy for energy security and economic growth, but has yet to begin any substantive initiatives (International Atomic Energy Agency, September 17).
Cambodia ... Cambodia has held discussions with both Russia and the PRC (Cambodia National Council for Sustainable Development, accessed November 4). On September 19, Rosatom and Cambodia signed an intergovernmental agreement on nuclear energy cooperation (Rosatom, September 19).
Indonesia ... In September, Rosatom and Indonesia's PLN Nusantara Power signed an MoU to conduct a feasibility study on NPP construction (Rosatom, September 26).
In November, during a visit to Indonesia ordered by Putin, Russian Maritime Board Chairman Nikolai Patrushev suggested that Indonesia consider Rosatom's SMR technology (Interfax, November 5). Patrushev's delegation included representatives from Rosatom and Russia's Ministry of Industry and Trade.
Laos ... In July, Rosatom and the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos) signed a nuclear energy roadmap for the period 2025-2026 (RIA Novosti, July 31). Putin described the roadmap as the "basis for providing the Lao economy with cheap and environmentally friendly energy" (Interfax, July 31).
Malaysia ... In June, a Malaysian delegation expressed an interest in Rosatom's nuclear technology and floating NPPs after visiting the Leningrad NPP and ATOM Museum in Moscow (TASS, June 27). A month prior, Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev claimed that Rosatom had offered to construct an NPP in Malaysia (Interfax, May 14).
Myanmar ... In September, on the sidelines of World Atomic Week in Moscow, Myanmar and Russia signed a roadmap for nuclear energy cooperation in the period 2025-2026 (see EDM, September 19). The roadmap includes the implementation of a construction project for an SMR NPP. It builds on an SMR cooperation agreement signed earlier in the year (RIA Novosti, TASS, September 26).
Philippines ... During a joint Russian-Philippine commission on trade and economic cooperation in September, Rosatom expressed its interest in offering the Philippines an agreement on constructing SMRs and floating NPPs (TASS, September 19).
Singapore ... Singapore has expressed interest in adopting nuclear energy, primarily focusing on SMRs, but it has not agreed with any potential vendors. It was included among the countries that signed a 123 Agreement with the United States. The agreements reference Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which requires a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement before any significant nuclear material or equipment can be transferred from the United States (U.S. Department of Energy, July 11). Other ASEAN states that signed a 123 Agreement with the United States are Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam (U.S. Department of Energy, July 11).
Timor-Leste (East Timor) ... Timor-Leste (East Timor) is ASEAN's newest member state with no concrete plans for nuclear energy development (ASEAN, October 26).
Thailand ... Thailand's energy strategy aims to commission its first experimental SMR by 2037, and the country is interested in Russian technologies (Bangkok Post, June 20, 2024; Thai Times, October 20). In September, Rosatom's Director General of its International Network said that the corporation has been discussing such possibilities with Thailand (Interfax, September 4).
Vietnam ... On the sidelines of the ASEAN summit, Vietnam and Russia agreed to accelerate their plans to construct the first NPP in Vietnam, Ninh Thuan-1 (TASS, October 27). The Ninh Thuan-1 NPP project was suspended in 2016 due to financing issues and insufficient electricity demand, as well as delays resulting from the 2011 Fukushima NPP disaster (Nuclear Engineering International, November 15, 2016). The Vietnamese government announced the project's restart in 2024, emphasizing the need to ensure the country's energy security (The Saigon Times, November 25, 2024; Government News; VNExpress, November 30, 2024).
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Dr Anna J. Davis is an expert on nuclear policy and international relations, with a focus on the Eurasia region and the Arctic. She is a Fellow and Contributing Editor of Eurasia Daily Monitor at the Jamestown Foundation, Tutor at the University of Oxford, and Director of Sefton Analytics.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/program/russia-strengthens-asean-nuclear-ties/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Trade Deals and a New Chapter for American Nuclear?
WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 7, 2025:* * *
Trade Deals and a New Chapter for American Nuclear?
By Ray Cai, Jane Nakano and Joseph Majkut
Last week, the White House unveiled new details of the $550 billion U.S.-Japan investment agreement reached earlier this year, which commits significant capital to U.S. energy technologies, including nuclear reactors, power plant and grid components, and critical minerals. At the same time, the administration announced an $80 billion partnership with nuclear manufacturer Westinghouse ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 7, 2025: * * * Trade Deals and a New Chapter for American Nuclear? By Ray Cai, Jane Nakano and Joseph Majkut Last week, the White House unveiled new details of the $550 billion U.S.-Japan investment agreement reached earlier this year, which commits significant capital to U.S. energy technologies, including nuclear reactors, power plant and grid components, and critical minerals. At the same time, the administration announced an $80 billion partnership with nuclear manufacturer WestinghouseElectric Company to help build a fleet of new reactors in the United States. The White House indicated that some of the U.S.-Japan investment commitment would be directed to the Westinghouse deal. Together, these new initiatives could amount to the most ambitious U.S. government action to support nuclear energy in decades--though key questions remain.
Q1: What's in these deals, and who's involved?
A1: The joint fact sheet released last week included up to $100 billion each for Westinghouse and GE Vernova Hitachi to construct nuclear reactors, $25 billion each for Bechtel and GE Vernona for power equipment and services, and another $25 billion for Carrier for cooling systems. NuScale and ENTRA1 were also mentioned in the joint fact sheet, though no specific dollar amount was designated. In total, Japan is expected to invest $550 billion before President Trump's term ends in 2029.
According to a memorandum of understanding released in September, investments under the U.S.-Japan trade agreement will be selected by the U.S. president, who will establish an investment committee--chaired by the secretary of commerce--to recommend and oversee funding decisions. A new U.S. Investment Accelerator, housed in the Commerce Department, will manage and administer these investments, with each project operating through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) governed by the United States or its designees.
Once a project has been proposed, Japan has 45 days to review and transfer the related funds to the investment accelerator in U.S. dollars. If it declines to fund all or part of the project, the United States can impose tariffs on Japanese imports. To facilitate the deal, Japan will create a Strategic Investment Facility (SIF) under the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). The SIF will be active through March 2029 and draw from three funding sources: dollar-denominated bonds issued by JBIC, yen-denominated government loans to JBIC, and allocations from Japan's foreign exchange reserves.
Investment returns will initially be split 50/50 until Japan recoups its investment, after which 90 percent will go to the United States and 10 percent to Japan. The U.S. government will facilitate projects by providing federal land, access to water and power, offtake agreements, and expedited regulatory approvals, while giving Japanese firms priority as suppliers where feasible. The deal expects private financial institutions to be involved in providing funding, likely with the assistance of loan guarantees facilitated by Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI), Japan's export credit agency.
For the Westinghouse partnership, the Trump administration will similarly help facilitate financing, land acquisition and permitting, and international business development to support the construction of either about eight AP1000 reactors or a mix of large and small modular units. In return, Brookfield and Cameco--owners of Westinghouse--have entitled the U.S. government to 20 percent of future Westinghouse profits in excess of $17.5 billion; alternatively, if the company's valuation surpasses $30 billion by 2029, the government could require it to go public and receive an up to 20 percent equity stake.
Q2: Why are the deals significant?
A2: These deals mark another step in the Trump administration's efforts to advance its stated priorities of strengthening U.S. nuclear and rebalancing trade. The administration had already pushed for building 10 new AP1000s as part of a "nuclear renaissance" to foster AI competitiveness and economic growth. They also echo a pattern seen earlier this year--with MP Materials and Lithium Americas--of Washington taking direct equity positions in private businesses it deems to be of strategic importance or needing government support.
With the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) largely retaining Inflation Reduction Act tax credits and Department of Energy (DOE) loan authority for nuclear, policy mechanisms were already in place to support new builds. These new deals have the potential to facilitate the missing private capital and supply chain investments needed to form concrete order books.
This could provide a crucial boost to the U.S. nuclear industry, where construction has been largely stagnant for decades. Plant Vogtle, the country's only recent domestic new build, came online seven years late and nearly $17 billion over budget. Although a dozen new projects and four restarts are now in various stages of development (see CSIS dashboard), the pipeline remains shaky as financing and cost challenges continue to loom large.
Q3: How might the promised funding actually be used, and what remains unclear?
A3: Few details have been released about how the new investments will be deployed. Industry analysts and stakeholders have welcomed the announcements, but stress that key questions remain unanswered, particularly regarding the mechanisms and legal authorities that will channel the committed investments. Early reporting suggests that some portion of the funding could support the VC Summer restart in South Carolina, which was recently awarded to Brookfield.
The scope and structure of the planned investments remain to be seen. For the Westinghouse deal, it is not yet clear which stakeholders will receive funding or how the $80 billion commitment will be allocated across different stages of project development. Uncertainty extends to the channels of disbursement and the legal authorities under which the funding will be spent.
Previous federal nuclear financing--such as the $12 billion in loan guarantees for Plant Vogtle--was provided through the DOE Loan Programs Office (LPO) to local utilities and municipal power agencies under Title XVII (Section 1703 and 1706) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Analysts, however, have noted that investment structures under the new deals could be "radically different" than these earlier LPO transactions.
Q4: Who's missing from the deal, and what gaps remain?
A4: Thus far, the announced partnerships have revolved around service and equipment providers. But for the envisioned nuclear projects to materialize and succeed commercially, other key stakeholders still need to be involved. Most importantly, offtakers--whether utilities, hyperscalers, or the federal government--will be crucial to anchor demand by committing to purchase the power generated.
Historically, many nuclear plants were built and owned jointly by regulated utilities or public power cooperatives, which could recover costs through their general rate base or by selling to specific offtakers. The Vogtle 3 and 4 reactors, for instance, were planned, designed, and owned by three Georgia providers, with a fourth (Southern Company) as the project's developer and operator.
Here, several pathways appear possible. The administration could channel support through direct loans or credit enhancements; it could also establish cost overrun insurance or construction contingencies. Other options include prepaid power purchase agreements and federal offtake backstops to provide early revenue certainty, or equity stakes at the project level. Similarly, the funding could also be funneled toward local workforce development, procurement, waste disposal, or other activities aimed at firming up the supply chain and enabling environments.
In practice, these mechanisms differ sharply across dimensions, including cost incidence and risk allocation, which will all weigh on how these investments translate into project outcomes. The administration will likely need to address how these dynamics affect upfront planning and regulatory approval from relevant agencies ranging from the State Public Utility Commissions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which have been key pain points for nuclear projects.
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Ray Cai is an associate fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Jane Nakano is a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at CSIS. Joseph Majkut is director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/trade-deals-and-new-chapter-american-nuclear
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Rhetoric vs. Reality - The Philippines, ASEAN, and the South China Sea
WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 7, 2025:* * *
Rhetoric vs. Reality: The Philippines, ASEAN, and the South China Sea
By Monica Sato
With the conclusion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Philippines is preparing to assume the chairmanship of the grouping in 2026. Its new role as ASEAN chair comes at a historic time, coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the 2016 arbitral award ruling amid a period of heightened tensions with China in the South China Sea. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 7, 2025: * * * Rhetoric vs. Reality: The Philippines, ASEAN, and the South China Sea By Monica Sato With the conclusion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Philippines is preparing to assume the chairmanship of the grouping in 2026. Its new role as ASEAN chair comes at a historic time, coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the 2016 arbitral award ruling amid a period of heightened tensions with China in the South China Sea.Philippine President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. has repeatedly identified finalizing the long-stalled Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea as his priority for the chairmanship. However, this emphasis appears to be largely rhetorical. Manila's actions suggest that meaningful progress in addressing ongoing security challenges will depend less on ASEAN consensus and more on its expanding network of defense partnerships, particularly with the United States.
This year's ASEAN Summit underscored the enduring limitations of ASEAN's collective approach to the South China Sea. Most member states issued cautious statements and avoided directly addressing recent developments, including China's declaration of a nature reserve at the Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal, its deployment of buoys, and its continued ramming and use of water cannons against Philippine vessels. As the 2025 chair, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim reiterated that disputes should be resolved within ASEAN and warned that the involvement of "outside forces" would only heighten tensions. While President Marcos publicly agreed with this sentiment, his administration continues to pursue partnerships beyond the bloc to deter further Chinese escalation at sea.
In contrast to Prime Minister Anwar's restrained tone, President Marcos delivered remarks described by Philippine media as "strong." Without naming China directly, he criticized the "dangerous maneuvers and coercive use of tools and equipment to interfere with or obstruct legitimate and routine Philippine activities in [our own] maritime zones and airspace." His comments at the 20th East Asia Summit were even more pointed. In the presence of Chinese Premier Li Qiang, he condemned Beijing's declaration of a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal, asserting that the feature "has long been part of Philippine territory." At a subsequent press conference, President Marcos maintained that his statements were not provocative but a reflection of the reality that the Philippines is facing in the South China Sea and added that if ASEAN "fails [to resolve issues], at least we should keep finding a way to manage the tensions . . . with some level of modus vivendi for all involved."
President Marcos's remarks illustrate Manila's evolving diplomatic policy of reaffirming ASEAN centrality in principle while simultaneously widening its strategic engagement with other partners. Although the Philippines remains supportive of the COC process, the slow pace of negotiations has reinforced a growing consensus in Manila that ASEAN alone cannot deliver meaningful security outcomes in the South China Sea, especially when tensions now can directly threaten the safety and livelihoods of Filipino citizens.
Developments at the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus demonstrated where Manila's tangible security progress is being made--nearly a week after the main ASEAN Summit. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro jointly announced the creation of Task Force Philippines and the completion of an Alliance Readiness Action Plan. Modeled after Task Force Ayungin, which was revealed last year as a U.S. military unit focused on allied response to potential crises in the South China Sea, it offers a step beyond current initiatives coordinated by the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group. Under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Task Force Philippines will reportedly have a wider mandate than its predecessor, covering other missions like disaster relief across the archipelago, but should still be expected to focus on the South China Sea. The task force will include around 60 permanent personnel and be led by a one-star general or flag officer, allowing for greater flexibility in responding to contingencies.
Secretary Teodoro emphasized that Manila and Washington must not only strengthen their alliance but "add more allies"--a goal the Philippines has already begun to actively pursue. The Philippines and Canada signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) over the weekend, Ottawa's first such arrangement in the Indo-Pacific. And on the sidelines of the 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung described the Philippines as a "special friend" and called for closer cooperation between the two countries, while South Korea's Hanwha Ocean promised to support the Philippine Navy's emerging submarine program.
These developments add to a growing list of Manila's recent defense partnerships, including a reciprocal access agreement with Japan, a SOVFA with New Zealand, a defense cooperation agreement with Germany, and several defense agreements with India. Additionally, the Philippines and France are in the process of negotiating their own visiting forces agreement. These arrangements highlight Manila's effort to build a network of security partners capable of supporting deterrence and capacity-building outside ASEAN.
Looking ahead, the Philippines faces a delicate balancing act. Its ASEAN chairmanship offers an opportunity to reaffirm the grouping's role in maintaining regional stability, yet it also compels Manila to navigate the bloc's internal divisions, particularly among members seeking to avoid direct confrontation with China. President Marcos's emerging approach appears to be pragmatic. The Philippines will likely use its chairmanship to highlight ASEAN's commitment to peaceful dispute resolution through its continued emphasis of the COC without expecting breakthroughs on the state of negotiations. At the same time, Manila will cultivate its network of "minilateral" defense partnerships capable of generating operational outcomes that ASEAN's consensus-based mechanisms cannot.
The Philippines' 2026 ASEAN chairmanship will likely be both symbolic and strategic. It marks a decade since Manila's legal victory at The Hague, underscoring its enduring commitment to a rules-based maritime order. At the same time, it represents an opportunity to reconcile ASEAN diplomacy with security realities for the Philippine government in the South China Sea. President Marcos's challenge now will be to uphold ASEAN principles while advancing Philippine national interests. If successful, the Philippines could position itself as both a defender of ASEAN centrality and a driver of multilateral security cooperation--the success of which will shape not only Manila's chairmanship but also Southeast Asia's trajectory in navigating great power competition at sea.
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Monica Sato is a research associate with the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/rhetoric-vs-reality-philippines-asean-and-south-china-sea
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Avoiding Catastrophe - The Importance of Privacy When Leveraging AI and Machine Learning for Disaster Management
WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 7, 2025:* * *
Avoiding Catastrophe: The Importance of Privacy when Leveraging AI and Machine Learning for Disaster Management
By Leah Kieff
In developing countries, the impact of significant events such as earthquakes, extreme weather, terrorist attacks, cyber incidents, or health emergencies can be more pronounced given the lack of planning, budget constraints, and weak infrastructure that these countries are confronted with. Leveraging data effectively is fundamental to managing ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 8 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 7, 2025: * * * Avoiding Catastrophe: The Importance of Privacy when Leveraging AI and Machine Learning for Disaster Management By Leah Kieff In developing countries, the impact of significant events such as earthquakes, extreme weather, terrorist attacks, cyber incidents, or health emergencies can be more pronounced given the lack of planning, budget constraints, and weak infrastructure that these countries are confronted with. Leveraging data effectively is fundamental to managingthe impact of these disasters. New and emerging technologies, including machine learning (ML) and AI, can be leveraged to process and organize the data into usable information, as well as to support effective collection. But any mass collection of data carries privacy concerns, which must be mitigated from the start. Given the recent devastation of Hurricane Melissa in the Caribbean and with the AI Impact Summit approaching in February 2026, these are timely topics to address.
The type of data that may be useful in a disaster can range from personal health information to satellite imagery of an affected geographic area. Satellite imagery can be invaluable in determining the level of destruction, including baseline and post-disaster comparisons. Census data can help determine the demographic characteristics of a region for logistics for evacuations, and the movement of supplies. Successful intelligence collection and analysis can allow law enforcement to stop a terrorist attack from occurring.
The usefulness of data in disaster management is only increasing in the era of big data. The term "big data" describes massive data sets that are collected from the palms of our hands, via cell phones, wearable technologies, and digital transactions. This data may be actively volunteered by the individual (such as social media postings) or passively provided (such as automated means like credit card usage). While large data sets such as censuses have been collected for thousands of years, the types of data sets, as well as collection methods and speed, have been revolutionized by technological advances.
Despite the promise, the collection and use of data for disaster management is not without risks. Data quality may not be accurate, leading decisionmakers to believe that they have a truthful picture of the disaster, including those impacted, when they may not. And even if the data sourcing and validation are done correctly, the aggregation, synthesis, and analysis must be done well to allow for effective inference-driven decisionmaking. The existence of these huge data repositories without a process to transform them into informed decisions is equivalent to attempting to put crude oil into your car instead of gasoline. Data pipelines can refine raw data into insights. These pipelines can and should be supported by AI and ML to increase efficiency and accuracy.
Guiding Principles to Build Strong Privacy Frameworks for Data in Disasters
Currently, disaster management planners are at a disadvantage in protecting privacy as they are solving extremely complex, often unexpected problems in diverse, changing environments. Furthermore, those tasked with disaster management planning may wear many hats and rely on volunteer or staff support, which is more operationally focused on the immediate loss of life or property, not factoring in the long-term potential harms. On the ground staff with operational focus are often the ones collecting or interacting with the data the most.
Furthermore, the infrastructure needed to develop the bespoke analytical tools, to make sense of the data, and solve problems is the job of data scientists or engineers and cannot be accomplished unless these people are on staff somewhere with the data already at their fingertips. This infrastructure is expensive to maintain and manage. Ensuring privacy is incorporated requires additional expertise and planning.
Remembering that the entire goal of these disaster management efforts is to minimize harm to persons and property highlights the need for privacy fundamentals, such as notice and consent, to be fully integrated into the efforts. Frameworks to support privacy must include a number of core tenets.
First, the framework should include the tenets of the security of the data, internally and externally. Internally, this means only those with a legitimate need to know can access the data, and that there are recorded logs of employees who have done so. Externally, this means that cybersecurity best practices are leveraged to prevent incursions.
Finally, the framework should address the destruction of data following the conclusion of response efforts. This includes ensuring that there are not only timelines in place for the destruction of the data at hand, but also that the systems are built to support this destruction, and users providing this data are informed of the timeline of the data lifecycle. There must also be audits and reviews incorporated into this process to ensure these processes are carried out.
Why Data Helps in Disasters
Data, when processed effectively, allows a better understanding of emergency risks, early action, and quick response. This supports more cost-effective prevention and preparedness, rather than costly reactions during or after the fact. It is estimated that every dollar invested in disaster preparedness saves six dollars in response. Furthermore, it can help support responses to smaller-scale, local events that are often the most devastating disasters in the developing world.
Social media can be a valuable source of existing and newly generated data that can be used in disasters, both by individuals and the government, to help responders. For example, in Kenya, following the 2008 presidential elections, a platform leveraging social posts and eyewitness reporting helped locals avoid areas experiencing violent unrest. During the 2015 Chennai floods in India, social media was leveraged as an effective tool to solicit real-time information via the internet, as other communication channels experienced interruptions. This is a perfect example of why disaster data models must account for damage to critical infrastructure, whether temporarily or longer term, that may affect data available and transmission of data during a disaster.
Private companies can play a key role in helping the government organize and access data during disasters, as in the 2015 Chennai floods example. This can be done through aggregating social media inputs, as in the examples above, but this can also be done through data the company has already collected for another purpose. For example, after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Google created an enormous database of people's information to allow them to locate their family members. Questions on data validity and consent are particularly salient when data is used--even in the context of a disaster--for something outside its stated initial purpose. This can be mitigated by the privacy framework previously outlined.
Data collected must be organized in order to be used for inferences. To be effective, these models must be developed to be able to take these disparate data sources from social media postings to video, cellular, and geospatial signals in their individually unstructured formats and combine the data streams to provide useful insights into problems. The engineers who construct modeling infrastructure must do so together with on-the-ground decisionmakers who have experience in how these various emergencies might unfold, and what insights will be most useful in shaping disaster response. The need is further complicated as the sourcing, accessibility, and analytical capabilities needed differ and change with new situations. But effective models can automate the production and delivery of insights to decisionmakers in real-time for response.
For example, Google has built a platform that leverages weather data, spatial mapping, and ML flood modeling to offer earlier warning of floods in flood-prone countries, including India. The Indian government is providing more accurate heat warnings to citizens by leveraging AI to combine satellite imagery and local information. Google also built a tool that uses both AI and ML to predict storms' progress. This model, which combines data on global weather patterns and thousands of historic cyclones, was able to provide early warning about the likelihood that Hurricane Melissa would be a category five.
The United States and countries around the world use ML and AI to predict not only where fires may occur, but also their likely spread, enabling timely evacuations and helpful routes. This pre-collection is helpful not only to predict disaster elements such as changes in temperatures but also to ensure the systems are able to be online and more accurate when deployed. The benefits of data usage in disaster preparedness and response may be especially impactful in the developing world, but there are likely to also be additional challenges in data security as well.
Data Privacy Challenges in Disaster Management: The Case of the Covid-19 Pandemic
Even in static situations, the balance between data use and privacy protection is difficult to strike. In rapidly changing emergencies, where loss of life is at stake, this balance becomes even more challenging. There is a risk of a collector or third party misusing the data, either accidentally or intentionally, before, during, and after the disaster. Misuse can cause significant harm to individuals and undermine public trust in the state. These risks are increased by storage and access gaps, and are generally higher in the developing world, where cybersecurity and privacy protections are generally less developed. Furthermore, disasters themselves have a greater impact in these settings because of existing infrastructure, limited response capacities, and weaker institutions. When not managed effectively, disasters can reverse decades of progress in these least developed countries.
The Covid-19 pandemic provides a recent example of the use of data in responding to a disaster and highlights the importance of frameworks such as the one described earlier in this piece being integrated, as well as the risks and harms when these considerations are not at the forefront. During the pandemic, governments around the world collected and used their citizens' personal data on a large scale. One of the ways this was done was through contract tracing applications installed on smartphones. While in the United States, these applications were available as tools for individuals wishing to leverage them, in other countries, such as China, they were mandatory. Additionally, the designed security of the applications and the access to the data these applications collected varied widely across the globe.
Furthermore, the data collected from these applications was not created equal, either in terms of usefulness for modelling for mitigation or for the potential privacy implications. Contact tracing applications leveraged during the Covid-19 pandemic generally used either GPS or Bluetooth technology to determine their users' location, mapping likely encounters to determine if they had been exposed to someone who was infected with Covid-19. But determining which technology should be used in these applications must consider not only the availability and technological functionality but also the privacy versus data collection abilities of both. In this instance, Bluetooth is more effective than GPS in areas with high concentrations of users. This also means that Bluetooth data exposes more specific individual information to the application.
This inverse relationship between data collection ability and privacy protection increases the need to have specific guidelines--limiting use and directing data destruction--including specific timelines and scope in place before the implementation of these types of applications. For instance, if individual data is collected and then shared, the aggregation of this data must be done in a way that it cannot easily be reversed. If this step is not taken, user data that was not effectively anonymized can be released, exposing the home addresses and daily movements of users. This is what happened in South Korea during the pandemic. While in this instance it was done inadvertently by design flaw, it can also be done intentionally.
In the case of China in 2022, these applications were used to track and police protest movements, which was not their original stated intent. Using the data for purposes other than those originally agreed to by the users means that there was no informed consent present. Informed consent refers to an ethical principle whereby the individual making the decision has the information and capacity to freely agree. Informed consent can be absent even if the use is something the user might have agreed to--such as informing authorities of the spread of fire. This is an important tenet to consider when planning to use data sets collected in advance of a disaster. This might involve de-identifying data, where possible, or, among other options, reengaging users to seek consent.
In another example related to a Covid-19 tracing application, the Polish government announced plans to keep data collected from its application for six years. It is hard to understand how data collected to support contact tracing during a pandemic would be useful for the original purpose six years after the fact. Additionally, the longer the data is retained, the more difficult to ensure there will not be a breach or spill of this sensitive user information.
The potential for misuse of this data, whether by the original collectors or by a third party who may access the data, is greater in places where cyber and data protections are less developed. This may be due to the lack of infrastructure, institutional capacity for data management, or the ability to access and leverage data. The challenges around institutional capacity, from financing to infrastructure to skilled professionals, also impact cybersecurity in these countries, which can compound problems with data security. Using foreign hardware or software can exacerbate the security challenges of systems. All these additional challenges create increased risks for data to be used with limited harm in developing countries.
Conclusion
Balancing data access with privacy protection is a difficult task, especially during disaster preparedness and response situations. When data is used effectively, it has the power to save lives and protect assets with maximum efficiency. AI and ML make it easier to organize this data into information that can support decisionmaking.
But to ensure that data is used correctly, the three high-level principles outlined above (security, methods and storage, and destruction) must be addressed at the onset, in a privacy framework. Creation and incorporation of these frameworks throughout the lifecycle of the data will pay dividends everywhere, including but not limited to the developing world. These privacy considerations maximize the benefits that data can bring in these dire situations while minimizing the potential harm to individuals' privacy.
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Leah Kieff is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/avoiding-catastrophe-importance-privacy-when-leveraging-ai-and-machine-learning-disaster
[Category: ThinkTank]