Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
Think Tanks
Featured Stories
Rand Issues Commentary: Better Way to Use Criminal Records in Hiring
SANTA MONICA, California, Oct. 17 -- Rand issued the following commentary:
* * *
A Better Way to Use Criminal Records in Hiring
Oct 15, 2026
By Elizabeth Chase and Shawn D. Bushway
Someone in your company just decided to rescind a job offer to a welder, a warehouse supervisor, a medical assistant, or a coder you desperately wanted to hire--not because the person can't do the work, but because a background check turned up a conviction record and your company's rules said, "no hire."
Roughly 90 percent of employers run those checks, and in some surveys as many as 60 percent say they won't hire ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Oct. 17 -- Rand issued the following commentary: * * * A Better Way to Use Criminal Records in Hiring Oct 15, 2026 By Elizabeth Chase and Shawn D. Bushway Someone in your company just decided to rescind a job offer to a welder, a warehouse supervisor, a medical assistant, or a coder you desperately wanted to hire--not because the person can't do the work, but because a background check turned up a conviction record and your company's rules said, "no hire." Roughly 90 percent of employers run those checks, and in some surveys as many as 60 percent say they won't hireanyone with a prior conviction. That's misguided.
What an employer actually wants to know is whether this applicant is likely to commit another crime, possibly on the job. But the screening rules many employers use are often about as accurate as a coin toss, in part because they're based on data that don't represent the population of job seekers with criminal records. A better approach comes from using representative data and careful analysis to answer the question: Which applicants are done committing crimes?
Most of them, it turns out. For a study published last month in the journal Statistics and Public Policy, we traced what happened to nearly 9.5 million people with convictions across seven states. We used court and prison records from 1992 to 2021 to see who among them was convicted again in the next decade and, just as importantly, who wasn't. In five of those states, close to four in five people hadn't been convicted again. In Texas and North Carolina, where reconviction was most common, the figure was still two-thirds.
The risk is low in the aggregate and low for most individuals. More than half of the people in our data set had a five percent or smaller chance of being convicted of anything in the coming year.
Our study found that three simple facts in a criminal record did nearly all the predictive work: How many total prior convictions do they have? How long has it been since their last conviction? And how old is the applicant now? We believe completing a rehabilitative program matters, too, but it wasn't something we could quantify across states for this study.
Now compare that to what employers scrutinize. Asked to rank their concerns about hiring someone with a felony record, employers in a RAND survey put any violent felony conviction first by a wide margin, with more than half calling it their single greatest concern. But the type of crime tells you almost nothing over and above what you can learn from the three simple facts listed above. Criminologists have held for decades that people who break the law tend to be generalists rather than specialists; the correlation between one offense and the next is weak.
On a standard accuracy scale where 0.50 is a coin flip, our model scored 0.70 at predicting a conviction in the year ahead when one year had passed since the last offense, and 0.64 at five years. A decade past the last conviction, no model we tested predicts well. At that point the record has told you what it can, and work history and references are the better evidence. Screening for felony convictions or violent offenses performed substantially worse than our model at every point we measured.
So why do the bright-line felony and violent-offense screens persist? Employers face a lopsided ledger. Hiring someone who causes harm can mean a negligent-hiring suit--rare, but expensive and unpredictable. Declining to hire someone who would have been fine costs the company essentially nothing in a labor market with plenty of workers. It starts to become costly in a tight labor market. It's also unfair. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has an informal test for such job screenings: Does it clear one protected group at less than 80 percent the rate of another protected group? Under a 10-year felony threshold, Black men in our data were 74 percent to 78 percent as likely to be cleared as White women--a failing grade. Under a model built on time, age, and priors, Black men were 98 percent as likely to be cleared as White women.
Because it's more statistically accurate and less discriminatory, this approach is also defensible across a range of regulatory schemes. California employers are feeling this directly right now: The state is in an active enforcement push on fair hiring regulations, and a pending law will further reshape those rules. An approach like the one we outline gives companies a path to compliance and also reduces the time required to evaluate candidates. As states become more prescriptive about the hiring screens that employers need to use, they should also evaluate the quality of their proposed rules. New laws that are not based on good science may actually increase racial disparity and prevent perfectly safe people from being hired.
Our approach fits within the sequence large employers already run: conditional offer, background check, targeted screen, then individualized assessment for anyone flagged. The job of the targeted screening is to clear the low-risk majority quickly so that human judgment is focused on the smaller group that warrants a real conversation.
Finally, a caution: Predicting reconviction risk is not the same as predicting job performance. It does not guarantee your job candidate will show up on time or do good work. That is still the hiring manager's job to find out.
Almost a third of American men have a conviction as an adult. In a labor market with less than 4.5 percent unemployment, where the United States has been for five years, the employer that uses hiring decision tools that are based on high-quality statistical models will find more capable workers that competitors may miss.
* * *
More About This Commentary
Elizabeth Chase is an associate statistician at RAND. Shawn D. Bushway is an adjunct economist and criminologist at RAND and a professor at the University at Albany, SUNY.
Their seven-state study was funded by Arnold Ventures. Bushway is developing a commercial tool, through a company in which he holds a financial interest, that builds on the methods described here; Chase has served as a paid consultant to that company.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/10/a-better-way-to-use-criminal-records-in-hiring.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
A Better Way to Use Criminal Records in Hiring
Oct 15, 2026
By Elizabeth Chase and Shawn D. Bushway
Someone in your company just decided to rescind a job offer to a welder, a warehouse supervisor, a medical assistant, or a coder you desperately wanted to hire--not because the person can't do the work, but because a background check turned up a conviction record and your company's rules said, "no hire."
Roughly 90 percent of employers run those checks, and in some surveys as many as 60 percent say they won't hire ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Oct. 17 -- Rand issued the following commentary: * * * A Better Way to Use Criminal Records in Hiring Oct 15, 2026 By Elizabeth Chase and Shawn D. Bushway Someone in your company just decided to rescind a job offer to a welder, a warehouse supervisor, a medical assistant, or a coder you desperately wanted to hire--not because the person can't do the work, but because a background check turned up a conviction record and your company's rules said, "no hire." Roughly 90 percent of employers run those checks, and in some surveys as many as 60 percent say they won't hireanyone with a prior conviction. That's misguided.
What an employer actually wants to know is whether this applicant is likely to commit another crime, possibly on the job. But the screening rules many employers use are often about as accurate as a coin toss, in part because they're based on data that don't represent the population of job seekers with criminal records. A better approach comes from using representative data and careful analysis to answer the question: Which applicants are done committing crimes?
Most of them, it turns out. For a study published last month in the journal Statistics and Public Policy, we traced what happened to nearly 9.5 million people with convictions across seven states. We used court and prison records from 1992 to 2021 to see who among them was convicted again in the next decade and, just as importantly, who wasn't. In five of those states, close to four in five people hadn't been convicted again. In Texas and North Carolina, where reconviction was most common, the figure was still two-thirds.
The risk is low in the aggregate and low for most individuals. More than half of the people in our data set had a five percent or smaller chance of being convicted of anything in the coming year.
Our study found that three simple facts in a criminal record did nearly all the predictive work: How many total prior convictions do they have? How long has it been since their last conviction? And how old is the applicant now? We believe completing a rehabilitative program matters, too, but it wasn't something we could quantify across states for this study.
Now compare that to what employers scrutinize. Asked to rank their concerns about hiring someone with a felony record, employers in a RAND survey put any violent felony conviction first by a wide margin, with more than half calling it their single greatest concern. But the type of crime tells you almost nothing over and above what you can learn from the three simple facts listed above. Criminologists have held for decades that people who break the law tend to be generalists rather than specialists; the correlation between one offense and the next is weak.
On a standard accuracy scale where 0.50 is a coin flip, our model scored 0.70 at predicting a conviction in the year ahead when one year had passed since the last offense, and 0.64 at five years. A decade past the last conviction, no model we tested predicts well. At that point the record has told you what it can, and work history and references are the better evidence. Screening for felony convictions or violent offenses performed substantially worse than our model at every point we measured.
So why do the bright-line felony and violent-offense screens persist? Employers face a lopsided ledger. Hiring someone who causes harm can mean a negligent-hiring suit--rare, but expensive and unpredictable. Declining to hire someone who would have been fine costs the company essentially nothing in a labor market with plenty of workers. It starts to become costly in a tight labor market. It's also unfair. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has an informal test for such job screenings: Does it clear one protected group at less than 80 percent the rate of another protected group? Under a 10-year felony threshold, Black men in our data were 74 percent to 78 percent as likely to be cleared as White women--a failing grade. Under a model built on time, age, and priors, Black men were 98 percent as likely to be cleared as White women.
Because it's more statistically accurate and less discriminatory, this approach is also defensible across a range of regulatory schemes. California employers are feeling this directly right now: The state is in an active enforcement push on fair hiring regulations, and a pending law will further reshape those rules. An approach like the one we outline gives companies a path to compliance and also reduces the time required to evaluate candidates. As states become more prescriptive about the hiring screens that employers need to use, they should also evaluate the quality of their proposed rules. New laws that are not based on good science may actually increase racial disparity and prevent perfectly safe people from being hired.
Our approach fits within the sequence large employers already run: conditional offer, background check, targeted screen, then individualized assessment for anyone flagged. The job of the targeted screening is to clear the low-risk majority quickly so that human judgment is focused on the smaller group that warrants a real conversation.
Finally, a caution: Predicting reconviction risk is not the same as predicting job performance. It does not guarantee your job candidate will show up on time or do good work. That is still the hiring manager's job to find out.
Almost a third of American men have a conviction as an adult. In a labor market with less than 4.5 percent unemployment, where the United States has been for five years, the employer that uses hiring decision tools that are based on high-quality statistical models will find more capable workers that competitors may miss.
* * *
More About This Commentary
Elizabeth Chase is an associate statistician at RAND. Shawn D. Bushway is an adjunct economist and criminologist at RAND and a professor at the University at Albany, SUNY.
Their seven-state study was funded by Arnold Ventures. Bushway is developing a commercial tool, through a company in which he holds a financial interest, that builds on the methods described here; Chase has served as a paid consultant to that company.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/10/a-better-way-to-use-criminal-records-in-hiring.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Huawei Becomes Proxy for Public Criticism of Party-State
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 16, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief:
* * *
Huawei Becomes Proxy for Public Criticism of Party-State
Christopher Nye
Executive Summary:
* Beijing has made Huawei the standard-bearer of the high-tech sector in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and content that questions the company is routinely met with complaints and takedowns. Mocking Huawei has therefore become a proxy for public criticism of the Party-state.
* A third-party test published on October 8 showed the brake pedal bracket of the Maextro ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 16, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief: * * * Huawei Becomes Proxy for Public Criticism of Party-State Christopher Nye Executive Summary: * Beijing has made Huawei the standard-bearer of the high-tech sector in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and content that questions the company is routinely met with complaints and takedowns. Mocking Huawei has therefore become a proxy for public criticism of the Party-state. * A third-party test published on October 8 showed the brake pedal bracket of the MaextroV800, a car launched by Huawei, breaking under repeated emergency braking. The test video then disappeared from multiple platforms, and online mockery moved from the brakes to censorship and to Huawei's political backers.
* Efforts to shield Huawei have spread the mockery further. Some official accounts have publicly urged the company to accept discussion, indicating that parts of the system regard criticism of Huawei as permissible. Since the brake pedal incident, central state media have declined to come to Huawei's defense, and the central leadership may keep its distance from the company in future propaganda.
-
On October 8, Dongchedi, a car review platform in the People's Republic of China (PRC), published a video of a brake test, where three new Maextro V800s made repeated emergency stops from 100 kilometers per hour. The brake pedal bracket broke on all three (China National Radio, October 8). [1] The car, built by Anhui Jianghuai Automobile (JAC), was launched by Huawei in August at prices from renminbi (RMB) 766,000 ($114,000) to RMB 1.02 million ($150,000). Its official website advertises the safety design as "multiple redundancies, as stable as Mount Tai" and states that the vehicle's architecture includes redundancy in braking, steering, computing, perception, positioning, interaction, communications, and power supply (HIMA, accessed October 9). JAC's shares fell to the circuit-breaker limit during trading that day and again once markets opened the following day (21st Century Business Herald, October 9).
The story quickly turned into one of censorship. From late that night, the test video displayed the message "submission invalid" on Bilibili, a leading PRC video-sharing platform, while WeChat Channels showed a notice stating that, following user complaints and platform review, the video had been found to contain content that violated the platform rules. The notice left both the complainant and the reason unstated (Xinhuanghe, October 9). By the next day, Internet users found that the original video and many reposts had been removed from Douyin, Bilibili, Weibo, and other platforms. Among comments from users inside the PRC relayed by the X account "Teacher Li Is Not Your Teacher", one read, "it must be said that Huawei has achieved, on the Party's behalf, strong leadership over the theoretical mouthpieces and the public opinion front" (X/@whyyoutouzhele, October 9). [2]
The comment borrows the vocabulary of Party control over the media and applies it to a company, Huawei, that holds special status in the PRC. Officials treat Huawei as the representative of Chinese high-tech firms suppressed by the United States, its critics are often accused of smearing domestic brands, and online content that questions it is frequently taken down by censors. This particular protectiveness on behalf of the authorities, coupled with the difficulties entailed in raising issues of censorship, privilege, and unequal justice directly with the regime, has led to Huawei becoming a proxy for public criticism of the Party-state.
Beijing Makes Huawei a National Symbol
U.S. sanctions turned Huawei into an object of patriotic consumption. In May 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce added Huawei to the Entity List, restricting sales by U.S. firms to the company (Federal Register, May 21, 2019). Promotions and patriotic sentiment then drove a surge in its smartphone sales at home (Reuters, August 5, 2019). Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei remarked wryly at the time that "one cannot say that using Huawei products is patriotic and that not using them is unpatriotic" (BBC, May 21, 2019).
During the Meng Wanzhou affair, officials presented Huawei's plight as the nation's plight. On September 25, 2021, Meng, who is Huawei's chief financial officer and Ren's daughter, returned to Shenzhen after nearly three years of detention in Canada. Xinhua headlined its report with her words at the airport, "If faith has a color, it must be China red!" (Xinhua, September 25, 2021). Two days later, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson stated that the case's "purpose was to suppress Chinese high-tech enterprises represented by Huawei" (MFA, September 27, 2021). Canadian and U.S. authorities had initially arrested her for charges of wire fraud that violated U.S. sanctions on Iran, though these were dismissed once a plea deal had been reached.
The state also backs Huawei with money and political favor. Materials from the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association reported by Bloomberg indicate that Huawei obtained about $30 billion from the central government and the Shenzhen municipal government (Bloomberg, August 23, 2023). In February 2025, at a symposium on private enterprise chaired by General Secretary Xi Jinping, Ren was listed first among the six business leaders who spoke (Xinhua, February 19, 2025). In recent years, private technology firms in the PRC have generally aligned themselves with national strategy before receiving explicit instructions (China Brief, March 20). Huawei has gone further, however, and has become part of the national narrative itself.
This status also shields Huawei from criticism. One PRC technology commentator has said outright that Huawei long enjoyed a degree of protection in public opinion under the national narrative (HK01, August 6). In late 2025, the well-known internet personality Luo Yonghao was likewise accused of "smearing national industry" after he joked about "far ahead", a catchphrase from Huawei's product launches (Sina Finance, January 3). After the brake incident, an industry insider still publicly questioned "certain media outlets that gain traffic at the expense of Chinese brands' reputations" (JRJ, October 9). In an atmosphere that binds Huawei tightly to patriotism, questioning its products is easily cast as opposing the country.
Pushback Ranges From Parody to Political Satire
Criticizing a company is far safer in the PRC than criticizing the Party or the government. Consumer complaints about product quality are an officially recognized right, and China Central Television (CCTV) devotes a broadcast every March 15 to exposing errant firms. Huawei is at once a company open to consumer complaint and one that officials treat as a representative of the nation. Those who mock it can therefore claim that they are simply discussing product quality.
Public pushback against Huawei falls into roughly three categories. The first is parody, which targets the company's marketing language. For instance, in July, Internet users decided that the "wah-wah" sound a traditional toy, the bamboo cicada, makes when shaken resembled both the voice of Huawei executive Yu Chengdong at product launches and the gasps of his audiences. Borrowing his description of the Aito M9 as "the best SUV under RMB 10 million", they dubbed the toy "the best toy under RMB 10 million" (21st Century Business Herald, August 7).
Huawei's reaction gave the parody political meaning. Its legal department filed mass complaints with platforms, alleging that the videos used metaphor, homophones, altered audio, and other veiled means to vilify and mock the company and its executives (21st Century Business Herald, August 3). [3] The complaints reminded one commentator of an earlier case, in which a Shanghai media professional wrote a poem about cicadas that his employer judged to be an allusion to Xi. His Weibo post was deleted and his account silenced (China Digital Times, August 10).
The second way in which public pushback occurs is questioning, which targets how Huawei treats ordinary people. In December 2018, Shenzhen police detained former Huawei employee Li Hongyuan after the company reported him. The following August, prosecutors declined to indict him, citing unclear facts and insufficient evidence. He had spent 251 days in custody and later received state compensation. Huawei responded that it "has the right, and also the obligation" to report suspected illegal conduct to the judicial authorities, adding that it supported him in using legal means to defend his rights and interests, including by suing Huawei (Yicai, December 2, 2019). One outlet summarized a metaphor then circulating online as "the elephant stamps once, and the ant may stamp back. The rights are the same, the damage vastly different" (The Cover, December 3, 2019).
Censorship turned this labor dispute into a protest against speech controls. Internet users flooded the comments beneath an open letter that Meng had published at the time with the string "985, 996, 251, 404." The four numbers refer, respectively, to elite university credentials, the work schedule of 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. six days a week, the days Li spent in custody, and the error code displayed when a web page has been deleted. These comments were subsequently removed as well. The New York Times reported that many people in the PRC were especially outraged by the censorship of news coverage and online responses. They said that they had felt helpless at being unable to criticize the government and now felt that they were "also not able to criticize a giant corporation" (The New York Times, December 4, 2019).
The third category of pushback ties Huawei directly to the Party-state. This includes comments such as those posted after the Maextro video was taken down that Huawei had achieved "strong leadership" on the Party's behalf. On X, one user wrote that blocking and removal across the entire Internet was a concrete expression of "stressing politics", a discipline that the Party requires of cadres and the media (X/@justicefallen20, October 9). Another was blunter, asking "whose company is Huawei? If we cannot deal with the red sun, can we at least deal with you, Huawei?" (X/@Neo_Marici, October 9). The user's meaning is that those who are powerless against Xi can vent their anger on Huawei.
Efforts to Shield Huawei Backfire
In the past, and especially after the Meng Wanzhou affair, propagandists could readily turn measures to protect Huawei to their advantage. In June 2019, Shenzhen police acted on a report from Huawei and placed two people in administrative detention for spreading rumors in WeChat groups, among them a claim that Huawei employees had spied for the United States (Xinhua, June 13, 2019). As the Li Hongyuan case gathered attention, the Global Times asserted that many Internet users had redirected their criticism toward foreign media, believing that the United States was exploiting the case to smear Huawei (Global Times, December 6, 2019).
Today, Huawei more often handles public opinion through legal complaints. [4] During the bamboo cicada affair, the Harmony Intelligent Mobility Alliance (HIMA), Huawei's automotive business, stated on August 4 that it respected normal online expression and well-intentioned criticism. It said that it had filed complaints against only 171 of the more than 56,000 related posts it had monitored, that platforms had removed 144 of them, and that its targets were malicious edits, imitations of executives' voices, and similar content (IT Home, August 4). Some bloggers countered that videos that merely showed the toy had also been taken down (21st Century Business Herald, August 3). At one point, a Weibo search for "bamboo cicada" came back nearly empty (Storm Media, August 7).
Huawei's heavy-handed approach backfired. The content it complained about spread more widely. Internet users bought bamboo cicadas to film their own versions, captioned with phrases such as "the lingering sound circles the rafters", which plays on the character for Yu's surname, and "shaking ahead", a pun on Yu's slogan, which was named one of the top ten internet buzzwords of 2023 (The Paper, December 8, 2023; HK01, August 3). One outlet called this Huawei's "Streisand effect," in which an attempt to suppress information spreads it further (Storm Media, August 7). As a Caixin commentary argued, the affair had weakened Huawei's sacred aura in the public mind and brought latent public opinion into the open (Caixin, August 6).
The extent of the backlash became clear when official media ceased to speak with one voice in Huawei's defense. On August 5, the WeChat account of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee's propaganda department wrote that the stronger a company is, the more open it should be to discussion (WeChat/Zhejiang Xuanchuan, August 5). A commentary the same day in the official newspaper of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee likewise observed that Huawei could hardly avoid giving the impression of overzealous rights protection and of making a fuss over a trifle (Xinhua Daily, August 5). Provincial propaganda organs had stepped in to urge a company to be magnanimous. The space for criticizing Huawei is evidently far wider than that for criticizing Party and government bodies.
The brake incident in October played out as a replay of the bamboo cicada affair. First came efforts to absolve Huawei. Weibo chief executive Wang Gaofei replied to a user that JAC had built the car and that the making of a brake pedal lay outside Huawei's "empowerment" role (ITHome, October 8). Next came attacks on the tester. Dongchedi's head of testing said that his phone had been bombarded with text messages (MyDrivers, October 9). Then the video was taken down, and the target of mockery moved from the brake pedal to censorship. One Weibo user wrote that the takedown merely "hammered nails into Maextro's coffin lid" (Weibo, October 9). The official WeChat account of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government then published an article criticizing Maextro for evading the question. It drew more than 100,000 views within half a day and was hidden by the account that evening (Lianhe Zaobao, October 10). Two days later, Zhejiang Xuanchuan weighed in again. It noted that the test video could no longer be viewed on multiple platforms and that many posts discussing it had vanished, and it called the habit of dismissing safety questions as smears against domestic cars an "irrational mentality of shielding one's own" (Zhejiang Xuanchuan, October 12). On October 13, Maextro published a third-party test report stating that the brake pedal met the industry standard, but the testing institution said that the report applied only to the samples the company had submitted and offered no guarantee for vehicles in mass production (Yicai, October 13). As of this article's publication, the episode is still unfolding.
Conclusion
By making Huawei a national symbol, Beijing has allowed the company to become a target of public discontent, deflecting people's ire from the authorities themselves. Mockery of Huawei uses the same homophones and veiled allusions as mockery of the Party-state. While it also draws complaints and takedowns, it does so at a far lower cost. Huawei is the most prominent firm in Beijing's narrative of technological self-reliance. As public deference toward it declines, the persuasiveness of that narrative declines with it.
The Party may already have realized that the public is magnifying Huawei's problems as a way of alluding to the Party-state, which is perhaps why central media declined to defend Huawei as they had in 2019. On October 10, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and three other departments solicited public comment on a draft notice that tightens the management of automotive research, development, testing, and validation (MIIT, October 10). The next day, the People's Daily named the Maextro V800 and declared that "a car's brake pedal should never 'break' while driving" (People's Daily, October 11). Beijing will continue to hold up Huawei as the standard-bearer of high-tech enterprise, but it may keep the company at a greater distance in its propaganda and defend its privileges less conspicuously.
* * *
Christopher Nye is a Non-Resident Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He previously served as a Professor and directed a university think tank in China. He holds a Ph.D. in Law and specializes in Chinese legal institutions, elite politics, U.S.-China technology competition, and local governance.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/huawei-becomes-proxy-for-public-criticism-of-party-state/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Huawei Becomes Proxy for Public Criticism of Party-State
Christopher Nye
Executive Summary:
* Beijing has made Huawei the standard-bearer of the high-tech sector in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and content that questions the company is routinely met with complaints and takedowns. Mocking Huawei has therefore become a proxy for public criticism of the Party-state.
* A third-party test published on October 8 showed the brake pedal bracket of the Maextro ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 16, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief: * * * Huawei Becomes Proxy for Public Criticism of Party-State Christopher Nye Executive Summary: * Beijing has made Huawei the standard-bearer of the high-tech sector in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and content that questions the company is routinely met with complaints and takedowns. Mocking Huawei has therefore become a proxy for public criticism of the Party-state. * A third-party test published on October 8 showed the brake pedal bracket of the MaextroV800, a car launched by Huawei, breaking under repeated emergency braking. The test video then disappeared from multiple platforms, and online mockery moved from the brakes to censorship and to Huawei's political backers.
* Efforts to shield Huawei have spread the mockery further. Some official accounts have publicly urged the company to accept discussion, indicating that parts of the system regard criticism of Huawei as permissible. Since the brake pedal incident, central state media have declined to come to Huawei's defense, and the central leadership may keep its distance from the company in future propaganda.
-
On October 8, Dongchedi, a car review platform in the People's Republic of China (PRC), published a video of a brake test, where three new Maextro V800s made repeated emergency stops from 100 kilometers per hour. The brake pedal bracket broke on all three (China National Radio, October 8). [1] The car, built by Anhui Jianghuai Automobile (JAC), was launched by Huawei in August at prices from renminbi (RMB) 766,000 ($114,000) to RMB 1.02 million ($150,000). Its official website advertises the safety design as "multiple redundancies, as stable as Mount Tai" and states that the vehicle's architecture includes redundancy in braking, steering, computing, perception, positioning, interaction, communications, and power supply (HIMA, accessed October 9). JAC's shares fell to the circuit-breaker limit during trading that day and again once markets opened the following day (21st Century Business Herald, October 9).
The story quickly turned into one of censorship. From late that night, the test video displayed the message "submission invalid" on Bilibili, a leading PRC video-sharing platform, while WeChat Channels showed a notice stating that, following user complaints and platform review, the video had been found to contain content that violated the platform rules. The notice left both the complainant and the reason unstated (Xinhuanghe, October 9). By the next day, Internet users found that the original video and many reposts had been removed from Douyin, Bilibili, Weibo, and other platforms. Among comments from users inside the PRC relayed by the X account "Teacher Li Is Not Your Teacher", one read, "it must be said that Huawei has achieved, on the Party's behalf, strong leadership over the theoretical mouthpieces and the public opinion front" (X/@whyyoutouzhele, October 9). [2]
The comment borrows the vocabulary of Party control over the media and applies it to a company, Huawei, that holds special status in the PRC. Officials treat Huawei as the representative of Chinese high-tech firms suppressed by the United States, its critics are often accused of smearing domestic brands, and online content that questions it is frequently taken down by censors. This particular protectiveness on behalf of the authorities, coupled with the difficulties entailed in raising issues of censorship, privilege, and unequal justice directly with the regime, has led to Huawei becoming a proxy for public criticism of the Party-state.
Beijing Makes Huawei a National Symbol
U.S. sanctions turned Huawei into an object of patriotic consumption. In May 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce added Huawei to the Entity List, restricting sales by U.S. firms to the company (Federal Register, May 21, 2019). Promotions and patriotic sentiment then drove a surge in its smartphone sales at home (Reuters, August 5, 2019). Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei remarked wryly at the time that "one cannot say that using Huawei products is patriotic and that not using them is unpatriotic" (BBC, May 21, 2019).
During the Meng Wanzhou affair, officials presented Huawei's plight as the nation's plight. On September 25, 2021, Meng, who is Huawei's chief financial officer and Ren's daughter, returned to Shenzhen after nearly three years of detention in Canada. Xinhua headlined its report with her words at the airport, "If faith has a color, it must be China red!" (Xinhua, September 25, 2021). Two days later, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson stated that the case's "purpose was to suppress Chinese high-tech enterprises represented by Huawei" (MFA, September 27, 2021). Canadian and U.S. authorities had initially arrested her for charges of wire fraud that violated U.S. sanctions on Iran, though these were dismissed once a plea deal had been reached.
The state also backs Huawei with money and political favor. Materials from the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association reported by Bloomberg indicate that Huawei obtained about $30 billion from the central government and the Shenzhen municipal government (Bloomberg, August 23, 2023). In February 2025, at a symposium on private enterprise chaired by General Secretary Xi Jinping, Ren was listed first among the six business leaders who spoke (Xinhua, February 19, 2025). In recent years, private technology firms in the PRC have generally aligned themselves with national strategy before receiving explicit instructions (China Brief, March 20). Huawei has gone further, however, and has become part of the national narrative itself.
This status also shields Huawei from criticism. One PRC technology commentator has said outright that Huawei long enjoyed a degree of protection in public opinion under the national narrative (HK01, August 6). In late 2025, the well-known internet personality Luo Yonghao was likewise accused of "smearing national industry" after he joked about "far ahead", a catchphrase from Huawei's product launches (Sina Finance, January 3). After the brake incident, an industry insider still publicly questioned "certain media outlets that gain traffic at the expense of Chinese brands' reputations" (JRJ, October 9). In an atmosphere that binds Huawei tightly to patriotism, questioning its products is easily cast as opposing the country.
Pushback Ranges From Parody to Political Satire
Criticizing a company is far safer in the PRC than criticizing the Party or the government. Consumer complaints about product quality are an officially recognized right, and China Central Television (CCTV) devotes a broadcast every March 15 to exposing errant firms. Huawei is at once a company open to consumer complaint and one that officials treat as a representative of the nation. Those who mock it can therefore claim that they are simply discussing product quality.
Public pushback against Huawei falls into roughly three categories. The first is parody, which targets the company's marketing language. For instance, in July, Internet users decided that the "wah-wah" sound a traditional toy, the bamboo cicada, makes when shaken resembled both the voice of Huawei executive Yu Chengdong at product launches and the gasps of his audiences. Borrowing his description of the Aito M9 as "the best SUV under RMB 10 million", they dubbed the toy "the best toy under RMB 10 million" (21st Century Business Herald, August 7).
Huawei's reaction gave the parody political meaning. Its legal department filed mass complaints with platforms, alleging that the videos used metaphor, homophones, altered audio, and other veiled means to vilify and mock the company and its executives (21st Century Business Herald, August 3). [3] The complaints reminded one commentator of an earlier case, in which a Shanghai media professional wrote a poem about cicadas that his employer judged to be an allusion to Xi. His Weibo post was deleted and his account silenced (China Digital Times, August 10).
The second way in which public pushback occurs is questioning, which targets how Huawei treats ordinary people. In December 2018, Shenzhen police detained former Huawei employee Li Hongyuan after the company reported him. The following August, prosecutors declined to indict him, citing unclear facts and insufficient evidence. He had spent 251 days in custody and later received state compensation. Huawei responded that it "has the right, and also the obligation" to report suspected illegal conduct to the judicial authorities, adding that it supported him in using legal means to defend his rights and interests, including by suing Huawei (Yicai, December 2, 2019). One outlet summarized a metaphor then circulating online as "the elephant stamps once, and the ant may stamp back. The rights are the same, the damage vastly different" (The Cover, December 3, 2019).
Censorship turned this labor dispute into a protest against speech controls. Internet users flooded the comments beneath an open letter that Meng had published at the time with the string "985, 996, 251, 404." The four numbers refer, respectively, to elite university credentials, the work schedule of 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. six days a week, the days Li spent in custody, and the error code displayed when a web page has been deleted. These comments were subsequently removed as well. The New York Times reported that many people in the PRC were especially outraged by the censorship of news coverage and online responses. They said that they had felt helpless at being unable to criticize the government and now felt that they were "also not able to criticize a giant corporation" (The New York Times, December 4, 2019).
The third category of pushback ties Huawei directly to the Party-state. This includes comments such as those posted after the Maextro video was taken down that Huawei had achieved "strong leadership" on the Party's behalf. On X, one user wrote that blocking and removal across the entire Internet was a concrete expression of "stressing politics", a discipline that the Party requires of cadres and the media (X/@justicefallen20, October 9). Another was blunter, asking "whose company is Huawei? If we cannot deal with the red sun, can we at least deal with you, Huawei?" (X/@Neo_Marici, October 9). The user's meaning is that those who are powerless against Xi can vent their anger on Huawei.
Efforts to Shield Huawei Backfire
In the past, and especially after the Meng Wanzhou affair, propagandists could readily turn measures to protect Huawei to their advantage. In June 2019, Shenzhen police acted on a report from Huawei and placed two people in administrative detention for spreading rumors in WeChat groups, among them a claim that Huawei employees had spied for the United States (Xinhua, June 13, 2019). As the Li Hongyuan case gathered attention, the Global Times asserted that many Internet users had redirected their criticism toward foreign media, believing that the United States was exploiting the case to smear Huawei (Global Times, December 6, 2019).
Today, Huawei more often handles public opinion through legal complaints. [4] During the bamboo cicada affair, the Harmony Intelligent Mobility Alliance (HIMA), Huawei's automotive business, stated on August 4 that it respected normal online expression and well-intentioned criticism. It said that it had filed complaints against only 171 of the more than 56,000 related posts it had monitored, that platforms had removed 144 of them, and that its targets were malicious edits, imitations of executives' voices, and similar content (IT Home, August 4). Some bloggers countered that videos that merely showed the toy had also been taken down (21st Century Business Herald, August 3). At one point, a Weibo search for "bamboo cicada" came back nearly empty (Storm Media, August 7).
Huawei's heavy-handed approach backfired. The content it complained about spread more widely. Internet users bought bamboo cicadas to film their own versions, captioned with phrases such as "the lingering sound circles the rafters", which plays on the character for Yu's surname, and "shaking ahead", a pun on Yu's slogan, which was named one of the top ten internet buzzwords of 2023 (The Paper, December 8, 2023; HK01, August 3). One outlet called this Huawei's "Streisand effect," in which an attempt to suppress information spreads it further (Storm Media, August 7). As a Caixin commentary argued, the affair had weakened Huawei's sacred aura in the public mind and brought latent public opinion into the open (Caixin, August 6).
The extent of the backlash became clear when official media ceased to speak with one voice in Huawei's defense. On August 5, the WeChat account of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee's propaganda department wrote that the stronger a company is, the more open it should be to discussion (WeChat/Zhejiang Xuanchuan, August 5). A commentary the same day in the official newspaper of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee likewise observed that Huawei could hardly avoid giving the impression of overzealous rights protection and of making a fuss over a trifle (Xinhua Daily, August 5). Provincial propaganda organs had stepped in to urge a company to be magnanimous. The space for criticizing Huawei is evidently far wider than that for criticizing Party and government bodies.
The brake incident in October played out as a replay of the bamboo cicada affair. First came efforts to absolve Huawei. Weibo chief executive Wang Gaofei replied to a user that JAC had built the car and that the making of a brake pedal lay outside Huawei's "empowerment" role (ITHome, October 8). Next came attacks on the tester. Dongchedi's head of testing said that his phone had been bombarded with text messages (MyDrivers, October 9). Then the video was taken down, and the target of mockery moved from the brake pedal to censorship. One Weibo user wrote that the takedown merely "hammered nails into Maextro's coffin lid" (Weibo, October 9). The official WeChat account of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government then published an article criticizing Maextro for evading the question. It drew more than 100,000 views within half a day and was hidden by the account that evening (Lianhe Zaobao, October 10). Two days later, Zhejiang Xuanchuan weighed in again. It noted that the test video could no longer be viewed on multiple platforms and that many posts discussing it had vanished, and it called the habit of dismissing safety questions as smears against domestic cars an "irrational mentality of shielding one's own" (Zhejiang Xuanchuan, October 12). On October 13, Maextro published a third-party test report stating that the brake pedal met the industry standard, but the testing institution said that the report applied only to the samples the company had submitted and offered no guarantee for vehicles in mass production (Yicai, October 13). As of this article's publication, the episode is still unfolding.
Conclusion
By making Huawei a national symbol, Beijing has allowed the company to become a target of public discontent, deflecting people's ire from the authorities themselves. Mockery of Huawei uses the same homophones and veiled allusions as mockery of the Party-state. While it also draws complaints and takedowns, it does so at a far lower cost. Huawei is the most prominent firm in Beijing's narrative of technological self-reliance. As public deference toward it declines, the persuasiveness of that narrative declines with it.
The Party may already have realized that the public is magnifying Huawei's problems as a way of alluding to the Party-state, which is perhaps why central media declined to defend Huawei as they had in 2019. On October 10, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and three other departments solicited public comment on a draft notice that tightens the management of automotive research, development, testing, and validation (MIIT, October 10). The next day, the People's Daily named the Maextro V800 and declared that "a car's brake pedal should never 'break' while driving" (People's Daily, October 11). Beijing will continue to hold up Huawei as the standard-bearer of high-tech enterprise, but it may keep the company at a greater distance in its propaganda and defend its privileges less conspicuously.
* * *
Christopher Nye is a Non-Resident Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He previously served as a Professor and directed a university think tank in China. He holds a Ph.D. in Law and specializes in Chinese legal institutions, elite politics, U.S.-China technology competition, and local governance.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/huawei-becomes-proxy-for-public-criticism-of-party-state/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: CCP 'Saturates' Religion With Socialist Values
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 16, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief:
* * *
The CCP 'Saturates' Religion with Socialist Values
Jonah Reisboard
Executive Summary:
* The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is pushing to "saturate" religion with Chinese culture and socialist values. Party organs have used this tactic for more than a decade to wear down the organizational and spiritual independence of religious groups, and it is one of four mechanisms in a framework Party-state scholars use to describe the sinicization of religion.
* "Saturation" ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 16, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief: * * * The CCP 'Saturates' Religion with Socialist Values Jonah Reisboard Executive Summary: * The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is pushing to "saturate" religion with Chinese culture and socialist values. Party organs have used this tactic for more than a decade to wear down the organizational and spiritual independence of religious groups, and it is one of four mechanisms in a framework Party-state scholars use to describe the sinicization of religion. * "Saturation"creates new Party-aligned norms that must be followed to avoid persecution. It demands surveillance, both through grassroots inspections and through technical means to ensure compliance.
* Local governments have run sinicization campaigns for years following Party guidance alone in the absence of a national statute on religion. However, the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress Law contains some provisions relevant to religion and will lead to renewed efforts.
-
At the opening ceremony of the 2026 Shanghai Religious Community Chinese Culture Week, Shen Bin, the bishop of the Catholic Church of Shanghai, introduced the "Initiative on Chinese Culture Saturating Religion" (The Paper, July 17). The term "saturate" refers to the integration of Chinese culture--and socialism with Chinese characteristics--into religion, acting as one mechanism for the sinicization of religion. In 2023, Zheng Xiaoyun , director of the department of world religion research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, characterized the management of religion as consisting of (guidance), (harmonization), (saturation), and (transformation) (Zheng, 2023).[1]
Each tactic provides a framework for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to sinicize religion through its United Front Work Department (UFWD) and local ethnic and religious affairs (ERA) offices. In many Party-state directives and reports, multiple tactics are cited as the ends or means of the Party's religious work, and Zheng's heuristic is useful in showing that sinicization is multi-faceted. "Saturation" is particularly illustrative of the CCP's mandatory integration between socialism and religion, such that the independence of religious groups is both organizationally and spiritually eroded.
The Party-state's religious affairs work has explicitly followed the path of sinicization since the United Front Work Conference in 2015, when General Secretary Xi Jinping said that religion "must adhere" to this direction (People's Daily, May 21, 2025). The recently enacted Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress Law then standardized the sporadic approaches to sinicization across the People's Republic of China (PRC), which will likely lead to renewed efforts (China Brief, March 27, April 2).
The ethnic unity law expands on existing procedure in ways that touch religion, especially regarding mandates on Party alignment in the home and in schools; but provincial, county, and municipal governments do not need a national law to target religion. Party guidance previously sufficed to carry out sinicization efforts in the absence of a wide-ranging national statute, and Party organs have been promoting sinicization through "saturation" for over a decade, with local governments executing their guidance.
Local Documents Show 'Saturation' Efforts
"Saturation" is an attempt to reshape religion and integrate socialism with Chinese characteristics into personal identity. Book donations fill religious libraries with socialist and Party-aligned literature, such as Xi Jinping's Talks on Governance and Regulations on Religious Affairs. ERA committees also install flagpoles and put up propaganda posters. Shenyang City boasted donations of more than 2,000 books and more than 500 national flags in the years leading up to 2020 (Liaoning ERA Committee, December 18, 2020).
Party-guided education in history also plays a role in reshaping identity. In the northeast region, studying the Korean War is cited as helping to "cultivate the patriotism of the religious community, sharpen the ambition of strengthening the country, and practice service to the country" (Liaoning ERA Committee, December 18, 2020). In Hubei province, the ERA committee celebrated the "Hubei Religious Community 'Red Education' Base," a historical showcase that celebrates the CCP and its sinicization efforts (Hubei ERA Committee, April 24, 2022). The PRC's Patriotic Education Law calls for developing and visiting these sites (China Brief, December 15, 2023).
What the CCP calls "excellent traditional Chinese culture" provides yet another vector for influencing religious identity. In Hubei and elsewhere, religious sites will hold traditional festival celebrations and recitations of the Chinese classics (Hubei ERA Committee, April 24, 2022). Along with legal measures, using traditional culture for religious sinicization establishes that "the nation is greater than religion" (UFWD, May 19). Xu Xiaohong, chairman of the National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, a state-sanctioned body that oversees Protestant churches in the PRC, put this in a zero-sum context, saying that sinicization is a modern effort to prevent a reality where "one more Christian is one fewer Chinese" (Xinhua, March 11, 2019). This indicates that the fusion of religion and secular culture is an attempt to maintain a solely "Chinese" identity.
"Saturation" of religion also calls for the Party to influence theology itself. This can occur indirectly from book donations and ideological education, but is achieved more directly by encouraging religious leaders to align their messaging with the CCP. In Zhengzhou, the Protestant liang hui held a competition soliciting sinicized sermon manuscripts, and reportedly received 461 submissions (Zhengzhou ERA Bureau, July 9, 2024).[2] Sinicized sermons have covered themes such as "taking dedication to work as a sacrifice" and "being a patriotic Muslim" (China Islamic Steering Committee, 2021; The Protestant Church in China, July 1). [3] For these religious leaders, contests provided an incentive for alignment, but they also serve the CCP's goal of bringing ideology into churches. The Party-state's tactics of identifying, cultivating, and co-opting willing religious leaders to advance its "saturation" of religion mirrors its work in overseas united front operations (China Brief, February 11).
'Saturation' Demands Grassroots and Technical Surveillance
Governing religion through "saturation" creates ideological norms that must then be upheld by religious followers. In Pengxi county, located in Sichuan province, cadre inspections include "heart-to-heart talks" and soliciting opinions before meetings. This is an attempt to increase "ideological contact", and forces Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists to embrace ideology or be marked as anti-CCP elements (Pengxi County UFWD, July 28, 2023). Sending cadres into religious sites serves as a tool for monitoring religion and identifying the people, ideas, and value systems that threaten the Party's interests. The experience of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where indicators of religious extremism came to be defined so expansively as to include growing a beard or maintaining foreign contacts, shows how Party narratives shape what is tolerated and what is seen as religious fanaticism (United Nations, August 31, 2022).
The Party-state uses grassroots means to identify areas of interest and concentrate its monitoring efforts. In Jincheng, Shanxi province, the municipal united front work report discussed "targeted surveys and assessments covering villages with concentrated religious populations" and "foreign religious influences," seeking to "fortify defenses against religious infiltration and expansion in key sectors and regarding specific religious groups" by "firmly grasping the city's religious data" (Taixing Daily, February 28, 2022). In a sub-district of Wuxi City, "grid staff" must conduct inspections of religious sites daily and maintain a registration ledger of religious leaders (Wuxi ERA Bureau, January 21). A local government in Anhui province also made reference to inspections by "grid staff" and "work ledgers," where this refers to a report on investigative findings (Suncun Township Government, June 3, 2020).
The same inspection and monitoring tactics are used to identify "underground" religious sites. In advance of the 100th anniversary of the CCP's founding in 2021, a local government in Huoqiu county, Anhui province, distributed an internal directive to villages and local bureaus. Party branches were ordered to inspect village units, shops, supermarkets, and hotels to identify unauthorized gathering points, including home-based gatherings (Wulong Town Party Committee and Government Office, 2021). The document names "core members" of "underground" churches that had previously been broken up, both as subjects for long-term monitoring and nodes within continuous investigations to ensure that their organizations do not return. At least during this "Large-Scale Inspection and Rectification Campaign", village Party officials were to "provide renewed education and guidance" for these "core members."
Religion-specific indicators are used to determine threats, reinforcing the Party's desire to "saturate" and co-opt religious groups. According to a work plan released by Shiti town, located in Dazhou, Sichuan province, the threats emerging from different religions vary, but all must be "checked and changed" (Dazhou District People's Government, September 22, 2018). Buddhists and Taoists are identified as constructing unauthorized temples and statues; the supposed threats in Christianity come from private gatherings, self-appointed preachers, and foreign influence; and for Islam, the Party is concerned by the appointment of imams from the northwest, foreign missions, and illegal classes (Dazhou District People's Government, September 22, 2018). These issues are seen as threats because they reflect religion taking on a form that the Party feels is beyond its control. "Saturation" is a way to re-center ideology and Chinese identity.
The Party-state turns to technical surveillance to reinforce cadre inspections. In 2022, Zhejiang province's "religious intelligent patrol" used real-time monitoring and early warning to identify three instances of illegal missionary activities, 11 illegal Buddhist events, three illegal renovations, and 49 cases of minors entering religious places (Daishan County Government Office, August 23, 2022). A document from Nantong, a city in Jiangsu province, shows that video surveillance is ubiquitous, with 534 surveillance cameras outfitted to the city's 178 religious sites. All video is fed to the county's "governance command center" that has supposedly "achieved full coverage of site monitoring and no blind spots" (ERA Commission of Jiangsu Province, April 25, 2025). Local Public Security Bureaus in Zhejiang also used the social media app Douyin to identify illegal Christian private gatherings (Daishan County Government Office, August 23, 2022).
Local governments rely on technical platforms built by the private sector. Baotou Pasis Network Technology, for instance, offers a "smart religion management system" that integrates and analyzes data such as personnel, activities, and finances, in part with assistance from artificial intelligence (Pasis, accessed October 4). [4] There are also mobile applications intended to facilitate ERA work, as have emerged across departments in the PRC in recent years (China Brief, April 28). One, which is offered on Apple's App Store, is meant to support inspections and assessments (Apple App Store, accessed October 4). Other companies offer similar products. In 2024, Jiangsu Cable Data Network won a bid to provide a digitalized platform for the Jiangsu government, writing in the press release that the project would "actively publicize relevant policies, regulations, and socialist core values through audio and video systems and terminals, and promote the implementation of religious sinicization" (Jiangsu Cable Data Network, April 24, 2024).
* * *
Figure 1: AI-enabled video monitoring service advertised by Pasis
* * *
Conclusion
The CCP describes the threat it faces from unmitigated religious practice, in part, as foreign "infiltration", with sinicization as the response. It is difficult to understand sending cadres into religious sites, shaping sermon rhetoric, cultivating ideology, and other aspects of religious "saturation" as anything other than the "infiltration" of religion by the Party itself. By acting against religious groups in much the same way that it describes the threat, the Party expresses its view that religion offers rival value systems and organizations that cannot remain independent. Zero-sum framing, such as Xu Xiaohong's statement that without sinicization "one more Christian is one fewer Chinese," only underscores this perspective.
* * *
Jonah Reisboard is an editorial assistant at the Jamestown Foundation. His research focuses on foreign influence and corporate engagement in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. He received his BA from the University of Richmond and is pursuing an MA in Asian Studies at George Washington University.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/the-ccp-saturates-religion-with-socialist-values/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
The CCP 'Saturates' Religion with Socialist Values
Jonah Reisboard
Executive Summary:
* The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is pushing to "saturate" religion with Chinese culture and socialist values. Party organs have used this tactic for more than a decade to wear down the organizational and spiritual independence of religious groups, and it is one of four mechanisms in a framework Party-state scholars use to describe the sinicization of religion.
* "Saturation" ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 16, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief: * * * The CCP 'Saturates' Religion with Socialist Values Jonah Reisboard Executive Summary: * The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is pushing to "saturate" religion with Chinese culture and socialist values. Party organs have used this tactic for more than a decade to wear down the organizational and spiritual independence of religious groups, and it is one of four mechanisms in a framework Party-state scholars use to describe the sinicization of religion. * "Saturation"creates new Party-aligned norms that must be followed to avoid persecution. It demands surveillance, both through grassroots inspections and through technical means to ensure compliance.
* Local governments have run sinicization campaigns for years following Party guidance alone in the absence of a national statute on religion. However, the Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress Law contains some provisions relevant to religion and will lead to renewed efforts.
-
At the opening ceremony of the 2026 Shanghai Religious Community Chinese Culture Week, Shen Bin, the bishop of the Catholic Church of Shanghai, introduced the "Initiative on Chinese Culture Saturating Religion" (The Paper, July 17). The term "saturate" refers to the integration of Chinese culture--and socialism with Chinese characteristics--into religion, acting as one mechanism for the sinicization of religion. In 2023, Zheng Xiaoyun , director of the department of world religion research at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, characterized the management of religion as consisting of (guidance), (harmonization), (saturation), and (transformation) (Zheng, 2023).[1]
Each tactic provides a framework for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to sinicize religion through its United Front Work Department (UFWD) and local ethnic and religious affairs (ERA) offices. In many Party-state directives and reports, multiple tactics are cited as the ends or means of the Party's religious work, and Zheng's heuristic is useful in showing that sinicization is multi-faceted. "Saturation" is particularly illustrative of the CCP's mandatory integration between socialism and religion, such that the independence of religious groups is both organizationally and spiritually eroded.
The Party-state's religious affairs work has explicitly followed the path of sinicization since the United Front Work Conference in 2015, when General Secretary Xi Jinping said that religion "must adhere" to this direction (People's Daily, May 21, 2025). The recently enacted Promotion of Ethnic Unity and Progress Law then standardized the sporadic approaches to sinicization across the People's Republic of China (PRC), which will likely lead to renewed efforts (China Brief, March 27, April 2).
The ethnic unity law expands on existing procedure in ways that touch religion, especially regarding mandates on Party alignment in the home and in schools; but provincial, county, and municipal governments do not need a national law to target religion. Party guidance previously sufficed to carry out sinicization efforts in the absence of a wide-ranging national statute, and Party organs have been promoting sinicization through "saturation" for over a decade, with local governments executing their guidance.
Local Documents Show 'Saturation' Efforts
"Saturation" is an attempt to reshape religion and integrate socialism with Chinese characteristics into personal identity. Book donations fill religious libraries with socialist and Party-aligned literature, such as Xi Jinping's Talks on Governance and Regulations on Religious Affairs. ERA committees also install flagpoles and put up propaganda posters. Shenyang City boasted donations of more than 2,000 books and more than 500 national flags in the years leading up to 2020 (Liaoning ERA Committee, December 18, 2020).
Party-guided education in history also plays a role in reshaping identity. In the northeast region, studying the Korean War is cited as helping to "cultivate the patriotism of the religious community, sharpen the ambition of strengthening the country, and practice service to the country" (Liaoning ERA Committee, December 18, 2020). In Hubei province, the ERA committee celebrated the "Hubei Religious Community 'Red Education' Base," a historical showcase that celebrates the CCP and its sinicization efforts (Hubei ERA Committee, April 24, 2022). The PRC's Patriotic Education Law calls for developing and visiting these sites (China Brief, December 15, 2023).
What the CCP calls "excellent traditional Chinese culture" provides yet another vector for influencing religious identity. In Hubei and elsewhere, religious sites will hold traditional festival celebrations and recitations of the Chinese classics (Hubei ERA Committee, April 24, 2022). Along with legal measures, using traditional culture for religious sinicization establishes that "the nation is greater than religion" (UFWD, May 19). Xu Xiaohong, chairman of the National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, a state-sanctioned body that oversees Protestant churches in the PRC, put this in a zero-sum context, saying that sinicization is a modern effort to prevent a reality where "one more Christian is one fewer Chinese" (Xinhua, March 11, 2019). This indicates that the fusion of religion and secular culture is an attempt to maintain a solely "Chinese" identity.
"Saturation" of religion also calls for the Party to influence theology itself. This can occur indirectly from book donations and ideological education, but is achieved more directly by encouraging religious leaders to align their messaging with the CCP. In Zhengzhou, the Protestant liang hui held a competition soliciting sinicized sermon manuscripts, and reportedly received 461 submissions (Zhengzhou ERA Bureau, July 9, 2024).[2] Sinicized sermons have covered themes such as "taking dedication to work as a sacrifice" and "being a patriotic Muslim" (China Islamic Steering Committee, 2021; The Protestant Church in China, July 1). [3] For these religious leaders, contests provided an incentive for alignment, but they also serve the CCP's goal of bringing ideology into churches. The Party-state's tactics of identifying, cultivating, and co-opting willing religious leaders to advance its "saturation" of religion mirrors its work in overseas united front operations (China Brief, February 11).
'Saturation' Demands Grassroots and Technical Surveillance
Governing religion through "saturation" creates ideological norms that must then be upheld by religious followers. In Pengxi county, located in Sichuan province, cadre inspections include "heart-to-heart talks" and soliciting opinions before meetings. This is an attempt to increase "ideological contact", and forces Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists to embrace ideology or be marked as anti-CCP elements (Pengxi County UFWD, July 28, 2023). Sending cadres into religious sites serves as a tool for monitoring religion and identifying the people, ideas, and value systems that threaten the Party's interests. The experience of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where indicators of religious extremism came to be defined so expansively as to include growing a beard or maintaining foreign contacts, shows how Party narratives shape what is tolerated and what is seen as religious fanaticism (United Nations, August 31, 2022).
The Party-state uses grassroots means to identify areas of interest and concentrate its monitoring efforts. In Jincheng, Shanxi province, the municipal united front work report discussed "targeted surveys and assessments covering villages with concentrated religious populations" and "foreign religious influences," seeking to "fortify defenses against religious infiltration and expansion in key sectors and regarding specific religious groups" by "firmly grasping the city's religious data" (Taixing Daily, February 28, 2022). In a sub-district of Wuxi City, "grid staff" must conduct inspections of religious sites daily and maintain a registration ledger of religious leaders (Wuxi ERA Bureau, January 21). A local government in Anhui province also made reference to inspections by "grid staff" and "work ledgers," where this refers to a report on investigative findings (Suncun Township Government, June 3, 2020).
The same inspection and monitoring tactics are used to identify "underground" religious sites. In advance of the 100th anniversary of the CCP's founding in 2021, a local government in Huoqiu county, Anhui province, distributed an internal directive to villages and local bureaus. Party branches were ordered to inspect village units, shops, supermarkets, and hotels to identify unauthorized gathering points, including home-based gatherings (Wulong Town Party Committee and Government Office, 2021). The document names "core members" of "underground" churches that had previously been broken up, both as subjects for long-term monitoring and nodes within continuous investigations to ensure that their organizations do not return. At least during this "Large-Scale Inspection and Rectification Campaign", village Party officials were to "provide renewed education and guidance" for these "core members."
Religion-specific indicators are used to determine threats, reinforcing the Party's desire to "saturate" and co-opt religious groups. According to a work plan released by Shiti town, located in Dazhou, Sichuan province, the threats emerging from different religions vary, but all must be "checked and changed" (Dazhou District People's Government, September 22, 2018). Buddhists and Taoists are identified as constructing unauthorized temples and statues; the supposed threats in Christianity come from private gatherings, self-appointed preachers, and foreign influence; and for Islam, the Party is concerned by the appointment of imams from the northwest, foreign missions, and illegal classes (Dazhou District People's Government, September 22, 2018). These issues are seen as threats because they reflect religion taking on a form that the Party feels is beyond its control. "Saturation" is a way to re-center ideology and Chinese identity.
The Party-state turns to technical surveillance to reinforce cadre inspections. In 2022, Zhejiang province's "religious intelligent patrol" used real-time monitoring and early warning to identify three instances of illegal missionary activities, 11 illegal Buddhist events, three illegal renovations, and 49 cases of minors entering religious places (Daishan County Government Office, August 23, 2022). A document from Nantong, a city in Jiangsu province, shows that video surveillance is ubiquitous, with 534 surveillance cameras outfitted to the city's 178 religious sites. All video is fed to the county's "governance command center" that has supposedly "achieved full coverage of site monitoring and no blind spots" (ERA Commission of Jiangsu Province, April 25, 2025). Local Public Security Bureaus in Zhejiang also used the social media app Douyin to identify illegal Christian private gatherings (Daishan County Government Office, August 23, 2022).
Local governments rely on technical platforms built by the private sector. Baotou Pasis Network Technology, for instance, offers a "smart religion management system" that integrates and analyzes data such as personnel, activities, and finances, in part with assistance from artificial intelligence (Pasis, accessed October 4). [4] There are also mobile applications intended to facilitate ERA work, as have emerged across departments in the PRC in recent years (China Brief, April 28). One, which is offered on Apple's App Store, is meant to support inspections and assessments (Apple App Store, accessed October 4). Other companies offer similar products. In 2024, Jiangsu Cable Data Network won a bid to provide a digitalized platform for the Jiangsu government, writing in the press release that the project would "actively publicize relevant policies, regulations, and socialist core values through audio and video systems and terminals, and promote the implementation of religious sinicization" (Jiangsu Cable Data Network, April 24, 2024).
* * *
Figure 1: AI-enabled video monitoring service advertised by Pasis
* * *
Conclusion
The CCP describes the threat it faces from unmitigated religious practice, in part, as foreign "infiltration", with sinicization as the response. It is difficult to understand sending cadres into religious sites, shaping sermon rhetoric, cultivating ideology, and other aspects of religious "saturation" as anything other than the "infiltration" of religion by the Party itself. By acting against religious groups in much the same way that it describes the threat, the Party expresses its view that religion offers rival value systems and organizations that cannot remain independent. Zero-sum framing, such as Xu Xiaohong's statement that without sinicization "one more Christian is one fewer Chinese," only underscores this perspective.
* * *
Jonah Reisboard is an editorial assistant at the Jamestown Foundation. His research focuses on foreign influence and corporate engagement in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. He received his BA from the University of Richmond and is pursuing an MA in Asian Studies at George Washington University.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/the-ccp-saturates-religion-with-socialist-values/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Targeted Programs Can Help Older Adults Get Out of Unemployment
MUNICH, Germany, Oct. 17 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
* * *
15 October 2026
Targeted Programs Can Help Older Adults Get Out of Unemployment
Tailored programs can help older unemployed people return to work. That's shown by an article in ifo Schnelldienst, which assesses new evidence from Austria and the Netherlands, among other sources, and compares the costs of such programs. "Long-term unemployment costs the state twice: It pays out social benefits and loses tax revenues. That's why even more expensive programs can be worthwhile if they help the unemployed reenter the ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Oct. 17 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * 15 October 2026 Targeted Programs Can Help Older Adults Get Out of Unemployment Tailored programs can help older unemployed people return to work. That's shown by an article in ifo Schnelldienst, which assesses new evidence from Austria and the Netherlands, among other sources, and compares the costs of such programs. "Long-term unemployment costs the state twice: It pays out social benefits and loses tax revenues. That's why even more expensive programs can be worthwhile if they help the unemployed reenter theworkforce," says ifo researcher Pia Heckl.
At 47 percent, just under half of unemployed people aged 55 and above were long-term unemployed in Germany in 2025. By comparison, the figure was just 34 percent in the 25 to 54 age group. The longer unemployment lasts, the more challenging it is to return to work. For older people it can often result in early retirement.
As an example, the authors cite an Austrian program that offered the long-term unemployed temporary jobs fully funded by the state. Two years after the program ended, the likelihood of being back in employment was 43 percentage points higher than in the comparison group. This effect is based entirely on regular, unsubsidized employment. "Although the program was expensive, around 68 percent of the costs were nevertheless offset by additional revenue and savings on unemployment benefits within four years," says Martin Halla of the Vienna University of Economics and Business. On average, the participants were only 54.6 years old. By the time they retired, it would therefore still be possible for the program to pay for itself in full.
The analysis also examines an example from the Netherlands. Older unemployed people there receive comprehensive advice that includes, in particular, networks such as former colleagues, friends, and family. One year after becoming unemployed, 40 percent of the respondents were no longer receiving unemployment benefits. In the comparison group, the figure was 38 percent. The state saved around EUR 715 per person, while the program itself cost just EUR 470. "Experience from other countries shows that older unemployed people are not a homogeneous group. Someone who loses their job for the first time after decades in the workforce needs a different kind of help than someone who has been unemployed for years," says Heckl. "Programs of this kind in Germany should be tailored specifically to the respective hurdles."
* * *
2026 Article in Journal
Was gezielte Arbeitsmarktpolitik fur altere Arbeitslose leisten kann
Martin Halla, Pia Heckl
ifo Schnelldienst, 2026, 79, Nr. 10 20-23
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/article-journal/gezielte-arbeitsmarktpolitik-aeltere-arbeitslose)
-
2026 Journal (Complete Issue)
ifo Schnelldienst 10/2026: Wachstum durch Flexibilitat?
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/article-journal/gezielte-arbeitsmarktpolitik-aeltere-arbeitslose)
-
2025 Working Paper
CESifo EN
Reintegrating Older Long-Term Unemployed Workers: The Impact of Temporary Job Guarantees
Alexander Ahammer, Martin Halla, Pia Heckl, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer
CESifo Working Paper No. 12340
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/cesifo/publications/2025/working-paper/reintegrating-older-long-term-unemployed-workers-impact-temporary)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-10-15/targeted-programs-can-help-older-adults-get-out-unemployment
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
15 October 2026
Targeted Programs Can Help Older Adults Get Out of Unemployment
Tailored programs can help older unemployed people return to work. That's shown by an article in ifo Schnelldienst, which assesses new evidence from Austria and the Netherlands, among other sources, and compares the costs of such programs. "Long-term unemployment costs the state twice: It pays out social benefits and loses tax revenues. That's why even more expensive programs can be worthwhile if they help the unemployed reenter the ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Oct. 17 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * 15 October 2026 Targeted Programs Can Help Older Adults Get Out of Unemployment Tailored programs can help older unemployed people return to work. That's shown by an article in ifo Schnelldienst, which assesses new evidence from Austria and the Netherlands, among other sources, and compares the costs of such programs. "Long-term unemployment costs the state twice: It pays out social benefits and loses tax revenues. That's why even more expensive programs can be worthwhile if they help the unemployed reenter theworkforce," says ifo researcher Pia Heckl.
At 47 percent, just under half of unemployed people aged 55 and above were long-term unemployed in Germany in 2025. By comparison, the figure was just 34 percent in the 25 to 54 age group. The longer unemployment lasts, the more challenging it is to return to work. For older people it can often result in early retirement.
As an example, the authors cite an Austrian program that offered the long-term unemployed temporary jobs fully funded by the state. Two years after the program ended, the likelihood of being back in employment was 43 percentage points higher than in the comparison group. This effect is based entirely on regular, unsubsidized employment. "Although the program was expensive, around 68 percent of the costs were nevertheless offset by additional revenue and savings on unemployment benefits within four years," says Martin Halla of the Vienna University of Economics and Business. On average, the participants were only 54.6 years old. By the time they retired, it would therefore still be possible for the program to pay for itself in full.
The analysis also examines an example from the Netherlands. Older unemployed people there receive comprehensive advice that includes, in particular, networks such as former colleagues, friends, and family. One year after becoming unemployed, 40 percent of the respondents were no longer receiving unemployment benefits. In the comparison group, the figure was 38 percent. The state saved around EUR 715 per person, while the program itself cost just EUR 470. "Experience from other countries shows that older unemployed people are not a homogeneous group. Someone who loses their job for the first time after decades in the workforce needs a different kind of help than someone who has been unemployed for years," says Heckl. "Programs of this kind in Germany should be tailored specifically to the respective hurdles."
* * *
2026 Article in Journal
Was gezielte Arbeitsmarktpolitik fur altere Arbeitslose leisten kann
Martin Halla, Pia Heckl
ifo Schnelldienst, 2026, 79, Nr. 10 20-23
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/article-journal/gezielte-arbeitsmarktpolitik-aeltere-arbeitslose)
-
2026 Journal (Complete Issue)
ifo Schnelldienst 10/2026: Wachstum durch Flexibilitat?
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/article-journal/gezielte-arbeitsmarktpolitik-aeltere-arbeitslose)
-
2025 Working Paper
CESifo EN
Reintegrating Older Long-Term Unemployed Workers: The Impact of Temporary Job Guarantees
Alexander Ahammer, Martin Halla, Pia Heckl, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer
CESifo Working Paper No. 12340
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/cesifo/publications/2025/working-paper/reintegrating-older-long-term-unemployed-workers-impact-temporary)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-10-15/targeted-programs-can-help-older-adults-get-out-unemployment
[Category: ThinkTank]
Empire Center: Switching to Electric Home Heating Could Add Thousands to Energy Bills
ALBANY, New York, Oct. 17 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release:
* * *
Switching to Electric Home Heating Could Add Thousands to Energy Bills
October 15, 2026
ALBANY, N.Y. A new Empire Center estimate shows that heating an average home from October to March would cost approximately $790 with natural gas, compared with $1,100 with a heat pump and $3,300 with electric resistance heating. The estimates show that natural gas is significantly less expensive than electricity for residential heating.
"Replacing natural gas with electricity for home heating could ... Show Full Article ALBANY, New York, Oct. 17 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release: * * * Switching to Electric Home Heating Could Add Thousands to Energy Bills October 15, 2026 ALBANY, N.Y. A new Empire Center estimate shows that heating an average home from October to March would cost approximately $790 with natural gas, compared with $1,100 with a heat pump and $3,300 with electric resistance heating. The estimates show that natural gas is significantly less expensive than electricity for residential heating. "Replacing natural gas with electricity for home heating couldadd hundreds or even thousands of dollars to New Yorkers' energy bills," said Zilvinas Silenas, President of the Empire Center for Public Policy.
The Empire Center estimated October-to-March home-heating costs using the previous year's natural-gas and electricity prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration and heating degree days from NYSERDA. The calculation assumes that a residence requires 40 MMBtu of heat energy. It excludes the cost of purchasing and installing heat pumps or other equipment, which can range from thousands to tens of thousands of dollars.
"Ditching cheaper gas for expensive electricity makes no sense. No wonder two-thirds of New Yorkers oppose it," said Silenas. "Lawmakers and candidates need to come clean: Are they going to force home-heating electrification on New Yorkers, or are they going to drop it?"
New data in the Empire Center's Energy Data Bulletin show that New York residential natural-gas prices were 17 percent above the national average and 7 percent higher than the previous year. Earlier data showed that residential electricity prices were 63 percent above the national average and 14 percent higher than the previous year.
* * *
About the Empire Center for Public Policy
The Empire Center is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank located in Albany, New York. Our mission is to make New York a better place to live and work by promoting public policy reforms grounded in free-market principles, personal responsibility, and the ideals of effective and accountable government.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/switching-to-electric-home-heating-could-add-thousands-to-energy-bills/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Switching to Electric Home Heating Could Add Thousands to Energy Bills
October 15, 2026
ALBANY, N.Y. A new Empire Center estimate shows that heating an average home from October to March would cost approximately $790 with natural gas, compared with $1,100 with a heat pump and $3,300 with electric resistance heating. The estimates show that natural gas is significantly less expensive than electricity for residential heating.
"Replacing natural gas with electricity for home heating could ... Show Full Article ALBANY, New York, Oct. 17 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release: * * * Switching to Electric Home Heating Could Add Thousands to Energy Bills October 15, 2026 ALBANY, N.Y. A new Empire Center estimate shows that heating an average home from October to March would cost approximately $790 with natural gas, compared with $1,100 with a heat pump and $3,300 with electric resistance heating. The estimates show that natural gas is significantly less expensive than electricity for residential heating. "Replacing natural gas with electricity for home heating couldadd hundreds or even thousands of dollars to New Yorkers' energy bills," said Zilvinas Silenas, President of the Empire Center for Public Policy.
The Empire Center estimated October-to-March home-heating costs using the previous year's natural-gas and electricity prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration and heating degree days from NYSERDA. The calculation assumes that a residence requires 40 MMBtu of heat energy. It excludes the cost of purchasing and installing heat pumps or other equipment, which can range from thousands to tens of thousands of dollars.
"Ditching cheaper gas for expensive electricity makes no sense. No wonder two-thirds of New Yorkers oppose it," said Silenas. "Lawmakers and candidates need to come clean: Are they going to force home-heating electrification on New Yorkers, or are they going to drop it?"
New data in the Empire Center's Energy Data Bulletin show that New York residential natural-gas prices were 17 percent above the national average and 7 percent higher than the previous year. Earlier data showed that residential electricity prices were 63 percent above the national average and 14 percent higher than the previous year.
* * *
About the Empire Center for Public Policy
The Empire Center is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank located in Albany, New York. Our mission is to make New York a better place to live and work by promoting public policy reforms grounded in free-market principles, personal responsibility, and the ideals of effective and accountable government.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/switching-to-electric-home-heating-could-add-thousands-to-energy-bills/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for American Progress: Trump's Proposed Rule Changes Could Fundamentally Undermine the Head Start Promise
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release:
* * *
Oct 16, 2026
Trump's Proposed Rule Changes Could Fundamentally Undermine the Head Start Promise
Washington, D.C. -- Recently, the Trump administration proposed a rule change that would drastically reduce Head Start performance standards, threatening grantees' statutory compliance, access to comprehensive services, and early education quality. Today, the Center for American Progress published two complementary analyses quantifying the impact this rule change would have on approximately 17,000 Head ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release: * * * Oct 16, 2026 Trump's Proposed Rule Changes Could Fundamentally Undermine the Head Start Promise Washington, D.C. -- Recently, the Trump administration proposed a rule change that would drastically reduce Head Start performance standards, threatening grantees' statutory compliance, access to comprehensive services, and early education quality. Today, the Center for American Progress published two complementary analyses quantifying the impact this rule change would have on approximately 17,000 HeadStart centers across the United States.
The first analysis summarizes recent research on the projected impacts the rule change will have on Head Start jobs, health funding, and child care costs. The second showcases new CAP data analysis of the vital role Head Start plays for communities lacking access to other forms of licensed care.
Key findings from CAP's analysis include:
* 22.4 percent of income-eligible young children in rural communities lack access to licensed home-based, center-based, or preschool supply, compared with just 2.7 percent of nonrural children--more than an eightfold gap.
* Rural children make up about 20 percent of income-eligible children under age 5, but they account for nearly three-quarters--73 percent--of all children for whom Head Start is the only available licensed child care option.
* For income-eligible children with no other options, Head Start is able to reach roughly 5.9 percent of them in rural areas, compared with 4.5 percent in nonrural communities.
"Head Start is a vital resource for families across the country, with a proven record of improving academic achievement," said Hailey Gibbs, associate director for Early Childhood Policy at CAP and author of the analyses. "But it's more than early education; it helps improve children's health, ensures kids with disabilities get the early interventions they need, supports parents in improving their financial circumstances, and much more. The administration's repeated attacks on this essential community hub over a period of two years only underscore its derision of policies and programs designed to help families thrive."
CAP also submitted a public comment to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) opposing the rule change and encouraging HHS to preserve existing program standards. This comment warns that such a change could result in widespread harm to vulnerable groups, including children in rural communities; children with disabilities; families in need of wraparound services, such as those experiencing homelessness; dual language learners; and children from Black and brown communities.
Read the explainer: "Head Start Works, but the Trump Administration Is Undermining It" (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/head-start-works-but-the-trump-administration-is-undermining-it/) by Hailey Gibbs and Carter Nesmith
Read the data brief: "In Rural Communities, Head Start Is Often the Only Licensed Child Care Option" (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/in-rural-communities-head-start-is-often-the-only-licensed-child-care-option/) by Hailey Gibbs
Read CAP's public comment: "CAP Comments on HHS' Notice Rolling Back Program Performance Standards Key to Fulfilling the Head Start Promise" (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/cap-comments-on-hhs-notice-rolling-back-program-performance-standards-key-to-fulfilling-the-head-start-promise/)by Hailey Gibbs
For more information or to speak with an expert, contact Mishka Espey at eespey@americanprogress.org.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release-trumps-proposed-rule-changes-could-fundamentally-undermine-the-head-start-promise/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Oct 16, 2026
Trump's Proposed Rule Changes Could Fundamentally Undermine the Head Start Promise
Washington, D.C. -- Recently, the Trump administration proposed a rule change that would drastically reduce Head Start performance standards, threatening grantees' statutory compliance, access to comprehensive services, and early education quality. Today, the Center for American Progress published two complementary analyses quantifying the impact this rule change would have on approximately 17,000 Head ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release: * * * Oct 16, 2026 Trump's Proposed Rule Changes Could Fundamentally Undermine the Head Start Promise Washington, D.C. -- Recently, the Trump administration proposed a rule change that would drastically reduce Head Start performance standards, threatening grantees' statutory compliance, access to comprehensive services, and early education quality. Today, the Center for American Progress published two complementary analyses quantifying the impact this rule change would have on approximately 17,000 HeadStart centers across the United States.
The first analysis summarizes recent research on the projected impacts the rule change will have on Head Start jobs, health funding, and child care costs. The second showcases new CAP data analysis of the vital role Head Start plays for communities lacking access to other forms of licensed care.
Key findings from CAP's analysis include:
* 22.4 percent of income-eligible young children in rural communities lack access to licensed home-based, center-based, or preschool supply, compared with just 2.7 percent of nonrural children--more than an eightfold gap.
* Rural children make up about 20 percent of income-eligible children under age 5, but they account for nearly three-quarters--73 percent--of all children for whom Head Start is the only available licensed child care option.
* For income-eligible children with no other options, Head Start is able to reach roughly 5.9 percent of them in rural areas, compared with 4.5 percent in nonrural communities.
"Head Start is a vital resource for families across the country, with a proven record of improving academic achievement," said Hailey Gibbs, associate director for Early Childhood Policy at CAP and author of the analyses. "But it's more than early education; it helps improve children's health, ensures kids with disabilities get the early interventions they need, supports parents in improving their financial circumstances, and much more. The administration's repeated attacks on this essential community hub over a period of two years only underscore its derision of policies and programs designed to help families thrive."
CAP also submitted a public comment to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) opposing the rule change and encouraging HHS to preserve existing program standards. This comment warns that such a change could result in widespread harm to vulnerable groups, including children in rural communities; children with disabilities; families in need of wraparound services, such as those experiencing homelessness; dual language learners; and children from Black and brown communities.
Read the explainer: "Head Start Works, but the Trump Administration Is Undermining It" (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/head-start-works-but-the-trump-administration-is-undermining-it/) by Hailey Gibbs and Carter Nesmith
Read the data brief: "In Rural Communities, Head Start Is Often the Only Licensed Child Care Option" (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/in-rural-communities-head-start-is-often-the-only-licensed-child-care-option/) by Hailey Gibbs
Read CAP's public comment: "CAP Comments on HHS' Notice Rolling Back Program Performance Standards Key to Fulfilling the Head Start Promise" (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/cap-comments-on-hhs-notice-rolling-back-program-performance-standards-key-to-fulfilling-the-head-start-promise/)by Hailey Gibbs
For more information or to speak with an expert, contact Mishka Espey at eespey@americanprogress.org.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release-trumps-proposed-rule-changes-could-fundamentally-undermine-the-head-start-promise/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Could Russia Be Poised to Use an On-Orbit Weapon Against a Commercial Satellite?
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
Could Russia Be Poised to Use an On-Orbit Weapon Against a Commercial Satellite?
Commentary by Clayton Swope and Chantal Li
October 15, 2026
As of October 15, 2026, based on commercial space situational awareness data, a Russian satellite called Cosmos 2612 is on a trajectory that will bring it into very close proximity to a U.S.-registered commercial synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite. The satellite, which supports Ukraine, is operated by ICEYE, a company founded in Finland. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Could Russia Be Poised to Use an On-Orbit Weapon Against a Commercial Satellite? Commentary by Clayton Swope and Chantal Li October 15, 2026 As of October 15, 2026, based on commercial space situational awareness data, a Russian satellite called Cosmos 2612 is on a trajectory that will bring it into very close proximity to a U.S.-registered commercial synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite. The satellite, which supports Ukraine, is operated by ICEYE, a company founded in Finland.Given Russia's history of testing on-orbit weapons, policymakers should assume Cosmos 2612 could take an action that threatens the commercial satellite. But the risk extends beyond just one satellite. A Russian counterspace activity in the vicinity of Western satellites should be assessed within the context of aggressive Russian gray zone activities targeting U.S. and European interests. To date, neither the United States nor Europe has been able to deter Russia from expanding the scope and frequency of these gray zone actions. As Russia appears poised to increase hostile actions in outer space to test Western resolve, the United States and Europe should decide how they would respond to a hostile act in space and make that response clear.
In April 2026, Russia launched six satellites, Cosmos 2609 through Cosmos 2614, into low Earth orbit (LEO). A month later, five of the satellites executed high-energy maneuvers that raised their inclinations to match the orbital plane of the ICEYE satellite. These moves were unusual because satellites in LEO typically avoid plane-change maneuvers as they require a large amount of fuel. Several of these Cosmos satellites came near the commercial satellite in May 2026, with Cosmos 2609 getting closest on May 26, at just 2.5 kilometers away. However, none of the Cosmos satellites maneuvered during this period to stay plane-matched (or coplanar) with the ICEYE satellite, so their orbital planes slowly diverged. Then, over two weeks beginning on September 30, 2026, Cosmos 2612 executed a series of new maneuvers that brought it back into coplanar alignment and placed it at nearly the same altitude as the commercial satellite.
Russia has previously tested releasing objects from satellites in orbit, which one senior U.S. official described in 2017 as a nesting doll, and said it "exhibited characteristics of a weapon system." In July 2020, Cosmos 2543 released an object that traveled at up to 186 meters per second relative to the satellite. Both the United States and United Kingdom subsequently issued public condemnations of the test, noting that it had the hallmarks of a counterspace weapon. In 2026, the commander of U.S. Space Command said it was "evident" that Russia was deploying a "space weapon" with Cosmos 2558. Although none of these tests occurred near non-Russian satellites, over the last several years, Russia has maneuvered satellites into coplanar orbits with respect to U.S. government and commercial satellites, raising concerns from U.S. officials.
Maneuvering a satellite in LEO into a coplanar orbit is unusual because it requires a large expenditure of fuel--a limited resource on a satellite--and is not part of the standard mission profile for most satellite missions, including broadband and remote sensing. A satellite in an orbit coplanar to another satellite is positioned to quickly move, with little additional fuel expenditure, into place for conducting close-proximity operations. Close-proximity operations could have a benign purpose, such as satellite servicing or debris removal, but might also presage the deployment of a kinetic or non-kinetic counterspace weapon or a hostile grappling operation. The concern arises, then, that a potentially hostile satellite could project kinetic or non-kinetic energy on a target satellite. A Russian satellite conducting plane-matching maneuvers with a Western satellite is, thus, justifiably raising significant alarm. The West needs a unified approach toward deterring this specific type of behavior: Russia maneuvering its satellites into plane-matched orbits, possibly paired with a standoff distance, with non-Russian satellites in LEO. The United States and Europe certainly also want to deter Russian use or testing of on-orbit kinetic weapons near their satellites.
Over the last several years, Russia has deployed increasingly aggressive hybrid warfare against U.S. and European interests. Russia has conducted cyberattacks, interfered with satellite navigation signals, and planned sabotage operations, including against undersea cables, space infrastructure on Earth, and a German airport, using a drone. The frequency of these attacks is also increasing. Using a counterspace weapon against a Western satellite may fit this pattern. Additionally, Russia has said it might consider commercial satellites supporting Ukraine to be legitimate military targets.
The United States and its allies should expeditiously consider several questions. How can the United States and its partners deter Russia from testing or using any type of counterspace capability near a U.S. or friendly satellite? While Russian satellites have conducted such activities near other Russian satellites, no public information indicates they have done so near non-Russian satellites. If Russia does conduct counterspace operations near a U.S.-registered commercial satellite, what should be the U.S. and allied response? Possible responses include canceling the recent diesel deal between the United States and Russia and cracking down on Russian shadow fleet operations. The United States and its partners should also consider the implications of more widespread Russian coplanar activities in LEO near U.S. and allied satellites.
No one should assume to know what Russia will do next with Cosmos 2612, but the potential for a threat is there. Washington and its allies may think that hostile actions targeting a Western satellite would be highly escalatory--but Moscow may be willing to take that risk, believing the West will not respond forcefully. Russia may see little risk of escalation, a belief that is reflected across Russian actions in Europe. The United States and Europe must respond assertively if Russia makes a hostile act against another nation's satellite. A muted Western response would signal to Moscow that it can continue to expand the envelope of its gray zone actions with little risk of escalation, with reverberations well beyond outer space.
* * *
Clayton Swope is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Chantal Li is a research assistant with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-russia-be-poised-use-orbit-weapon-against-commercial-satellite
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Could Russia Be Poised to Use an On-Orbit Weapon Against a Commercial Satellite?
Commentary by Clayton Swope and Chantal Li
October 15, 2026
As of October 15, 2026, based on commercial space situational awareness data, a Russian satellite called Cosmos 2612 is on a trajectory that will bring it into very close proximity to a U.S.-registered commercial synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite. The satellite, which supports Ukraine, is operated by ICEYE, a company founded in Finland. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Could Russia Be Poised to Use an On-Orbit Weapon Against a Commercial Satellite? Commentary by Clayton Swope and Chantal Li October 15, 2026 As of October 15, 2026, based on commercial space situational awareness data, a Russian satellite called Cosmos 2612 is on a trajectory that will bring it into very close proximity to a U.S.-registered commercial synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite. The satellite, which supports Ukraine, is operated by ICEYE, a company founded in Finland.Given Russia's history of testing on-orbit weapons, policymakers should assume Cosmos 2612 could take an action that threatens the commercial satellite. But the risk extends beyond just one satellite. A Russian counterspace activity in the vicinity of Western satellites should be assessed within the context of aggressive Russian gray zone activities targeting U.S. and European interests. To date, neither the United States nor Europe has been able to deter Russia from expanding the scope and frequency of these gray zone actions. As Russia appears poised to increase hostile actions in outer space to test Western resolve, the United States and Europe should decide how they would respond to a hostile act in space and make that response clear.
In April 2026, Russia launched six satellites, Cosmos 2609 through Cosmos 2614, into low Earth orbit (LEO). A month later, five of the satellites executed high-energy maneuvers that raised their inclinations to match the orbital plane of the ICEYE satellite. These moves were unusual because satellites in LEO typically avoid plane-change maneuvers as they require a large amount of fuel. Several of these Cosmos satellites came near the commercial satellite in May 2026, with Cosmos 2609 getting closest on May 26, at just 2.5 kilometers away. However, none of the Cosmos satellites maneuvered during this period to stay plane-matched (or coplanar) with the ICEYE satellite, so their orbital planes slowly diverged. Then, over two weeks beginning on September 30, 2026, Cosmos 2612 executed a series of new maneuvers that brought it back into coplanar alignment and placed it at nearly the same altitude as the commercial satellite.
Russia has previously tested releasing objects from satellites in orbit, which one senior U.S. official described in 2017 as a nesting doll, and said it "exhibited characteristics of a weapon system." In July 2020, Cosmos 2543 released an object that traveled at up to 186 meters per second relative to the satellite. Both the United States and United Kingdom subsequently issued public condemnations of the test, noting that it had the hallmarks of a counterspace weapon. In 2026, the commander of U.S. Space Command said it was "evident" that Russia was deploying a "space weapon" with Cosmos 2558. Although none of these tests occurred near non-Russian satellites, over the last several years, Russia has maneuvered satellites into coplanar orbits with respect to U.S. government and commercial satellites, raising concerns from U.S. officials.
Maneuvering a satellite in LEO into a coplanar orbit is unusual because it requires a large expenditure of fuel--a limited resource on a satellite--and is not part of the standard mission profile for most satellite missions, including broadband and remote sensing. A satellite in an orbit coplanar to another satellite is positioned to quickly move, with little additional fuel expenditure, into place for conducting close-proximity operations. Close-proximity operations could have a benign purpose, such as satellite servicing or debris removal, but might also presage the deployment of a kinetic or non-kinetic counterspace weapon or a hostile grappling operation. The concern arises, then, that a potentially hostile satellite could project kinetic or non-kinetic energy on a target satellite. A Russian satellite conducting plane-matching maneuvers with a Western satellite is, thus, justifiably raising significant alarm. The West needs a unified approach toward deterring this specific type of behavior: Russia maneuvering its satellites into plane-matched orbits, possibly paired with a standoff distance, with non-Russian satellites in LEO. The United States and Europe certainly also want to deter Russian use or testing of on-orbit kinetic weapons near their satellites.
Over the last several years, Russia has deployed increasingly aggressive hybrid warfare against U.S. and European interests. Russia has conducted cyberattacks, interfered with satellite navigation signals, and planned sabotage operations, including against undersea cables, space infrastructure on Earth, and a German airport, using a drone. The frequency of these attacks is also increasing. Using a counterspace weapon against a Western satellite may fit this pattern. Additionally, Russia has said it might consider commercial satellites supporting Ukraine to be legitimate military targets.
The United States and its allies should expeditiously consider several questions. How can the United States and its partners deter Russia from testing or using any type of counterspace capability near a U.S. or friendly satellite? While Russian satellites have conducted such activities near other Russian satellites, no public information indicates they have done so near non-Russian satellites. If Russia does conduct counterspace operations near a U.S.-registered commercial satellite, what should be the U.S. and allied response? Possible responses include canceling the recent diesel deal between the United States and Russia and cracking down on Russian shadow fleet operations. The United States and its partners should also consider the implications of more widespread Russian coplanar activities in LEO near U.S. and allied satellites.
No one should assume to know what Russia will do next with Cosmos 2612, but the potential for a threat is there. Washington and its allies may think that hostile actions targeting a Western satellite would be highly escalatory--but Moscow may be willing to take that risk, believing the West will not respond forcefully. Russia may see little risk of escalation, a belief that is reflected across Russian actions in Europe. The United States and Europe must respond assertively if Russia makes a hostile act against another nation's satellite. A muted Western response would signal to Moscow that it can continue to expand the envelope of its gray zone actions with little risk of escalation, with reverberations well beyond outer space.
* * *
Clayton Swope is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Chantal Li is a research assistant with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/could-russia-be-poised-use-orbit-weapon-against-commercial-satellite
[Category: ThinkTank]