Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
Featured Stories
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Asia Times: Why Dropping 'Indo-Pacific' Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by senior fellow Ken Moriyasu to Asia Times:
* * *
Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy
On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM).
The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largest ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by senior fellow Ken Moriyasu to Asia Times: * * * Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM). The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largestcombatant command.
This publication reported in June 2018 that the original change "highlights the increasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking and also marks India's re-entry into the American government's 'Asia Nexus.'"
As much as New Delhi may protest, this change signals the opposite: the decreasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking - and its exit from the American government's "Asia Nexus."
There were already hints of this in US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May. "India was mentioned last," an Asian diplomat in attendance recalled.
Hegseth praised the efforts of South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam before finally turning to India.
A strong India, "acting in its own self-interest," advances a shared goal of maintaining a regional balance of power, he said - hardly a description of a core ally in a coordinated strategy.
This name change, however, does not represent a toning down of competition with Beijing. On the contrary, it clarifies where competition with China will actually be fought -- and where it will not.
The decision moves the strategy in the right direction. There are three key takeaways.
First, the fact that the Pentagon made this significant move absent any immediate trigger suggests it is sending a deliberate message: the Indian Ocean is not central to dealing with China.
That message is aimed at both allies and Beijing itself. To its allies, it signals that in a potential conflict with China, the United States will concentrate on the Taiwan Strait, operating primarily from Japan and the Philippines.
In all other regions, allies and partners will be expected to take primary responsibility for conventional defense. South Korea will deter North Korea, Europe will confront Russia and the Indian Ocean will largely fall to India to monitor and control.
Symbolically, Hegseth made no mention of "Indo-Pacific" in his Shangri-La speech, nor did he reference Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's efforts to "update" the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept championed by her mentor, the late Shinzo Abe. Japan's region-wide strategic framing may soon require a rethink.
To China, the message is equally clear: the US is laser-focused on the Taiwan Strait.
Second, the shift signals that India is being written out of the core contingency that matters most: Taiwan.
Washington believes Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed the People's Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, by 2027. The Trump administration has little patience for fence-sitters.
It is prioritizing allies such as South Korea and the Philippines - who act like they "live on the front lines," as Hegseth said. India is not aligned, and Washington is no longer hoping that one day it will be.
Third - and most intriguingly - by treating India as a normal partner rather than a strategic centerpiece, Washington gains greater flexibility in dealing with Pakistan, India's archrival.
Trump has turned to Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir as a key backchannel to Tehran, relied on him in defusing the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis and invited him to discussions on expanding the Abraham Accords.
Pakistan matters not because of India, but because of China's westward pivot.
Over the past 15 years, China has steadily reduced its reliance on maritime energy routes through Indian Ocean chokepoints, such as the Malacca and Hormuz straits, shifting instead toward overland pipelines across Central Asia.
In responding to this Chinese pivot to Eurasia, Pakistan - not India - emerges as the more relevant partner.
The return to PACOM reflects these strategic realities. It is a recognition that clarity, not geographic sprawl or vague values-based alignments, will define how the US competes with China. And it is the right move.
Read in Asia Times (https://asiatimes.com/2026/06/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-the-pentagons-china-strategy/).
* * *
At A Glance:
Ken Moriyasu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-pentagons-china-strategy-ken-moriyasu
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy
On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM).
The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largest ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by senior fellow Ken Moriyasu to Asia Times: * * * Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM). The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largestcombatant command.
This publication reported in June 2018 that the original change "highlights the increasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking and also marks India's re-entry into the American government's 'Asia Nexus.'"
As much as New Delhi may protest, this change signals the opposite: the decreasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking - and its exit from the American government's "Asia Nexus."
There were already hints of this in US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May. "India was mentioned last," an Asian diplomat in attendance recalled.
Hegseth praised the efforts of South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam before finally turning to India.
A strong India, "acting in its own self-interest," advances a shared goal of maintaining a regional balance of power, he said - hardly a description of a core ally in a coordinated strategy.
This name change, however, does not represent a toning down of competition with Beijing. On the contrary, it clarifies where competition with China will actually be fought -- and where it will not.
The decision moves the strategy in the right direction. There are three key takeaways.
First, the fact that the Pentagon made this significant move absent any immediate trigger suggests it is sending a deliberate message: the Indian Ocean is not central to dealing with China.
That message is aimed at both allies and Beijing itself. To its allies, it signals that in a potential conflict with China, the United States will concentrate on the Taiwan Strait, operating primarily from Japan and the Philippines.
In all other regions, allies and partners will be expected to take primary responsibility for conventional defense. South Korea will deter North Korea, Europe will confront Russia and the Indian Ocean will largely fall to India to monitor and control.
Symbolically, Hegseth made no mention of "Indo-Pacific" in his Shangri-La speech, nor did he reference Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's efforts to "update" the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept championed by her mentor, the late Shinzo Abe. Japan's region-wide strategic framing may soon require a rethink.
To China, the message is equally clear: the US is laser-focused on the Taiwan Strait.
Second, the shift signals that India is being written out of the core contingency that matters most: Taiwan.
Washington believes Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed the People's Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, by 2027. The Trump administration has little patience for fence-sitters.
It is prioritizing allies such as South Korea and the Philippines - who act like they "live on the front lines," as Hegseth said. India is not aligned, and Washington is no longer hoping that one day it will be.
Third - and most intriguingly - by treating India as a normal partner rather than a strategic centerpiece, Washington gains greater flexibility in dealing with Pakistan, India's archrival.
Trump has turned to Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir as a key backchannel to Tehran, relied on him in defusing the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis and invited him to discussions on expanding the Abraham Accords.
Pakistan matters not because of India, but because of China's westward pivot.
Over the past 15 years, China has steadily reduced its reliance on maritime energy routes through Indian Ocean chokepoints, such as the Malacca and Hormuz straits, shifting instead toward overland pipelines across Central Asia.
In responding to this Chinese pivot to Eurasia, Pakistan - not India - emerges as the more relevant partner.
The return to PACOM reflects these strategic realities. It is a recognition that clarity, not geographic sprawl or vague values-based alignments, will define how the US competes with China. And it is the right move.
Read in Asia Times (https://asiatimes.com/2026/06/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-the-pentagons-china-strategy/).
* * *
At A Glance:
Ken Moriyasu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-pentagons-china-strategy-ken-moriyasu
[Category: ThinkTank]
Empire Center: 34 MTA Workers Made $200K+ In Overtime In 2025
ALBANY, New York, June 19 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release on June 18, 2026:
* * *
34 MTA Workers Made $200K+ In Overtime In 2025
Average Total Pay Surpasses $100K; OT Reaches $1.46 Billion
-
Thirty-four employees of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) received more than $200,000 in overtime payments in 2025, as total annual pay surpassed half a million dollars for some, according to data posted on SeeThroughNY, the Empire Center's government transparency website.
Overtime, as measured using payroll records, totaled $1.46 billion, representing ... Show Full Article ALBANY, New York, June 19 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release on June 18, 2026: * * * 34 MTA Workers Made $200K+ In Overtime In 2025 Average Total Pay Surpasses $100K; OT Reaches $1.46 Billion - Thirty-four employees of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) received more than $200,000 in overtime payments in 2025, as total annual pay surpassed half a million dollars for some, according to data posted on SeeThroughNY, the Empire Center's government transparency website. Overtime, as measured using payroll records, totaled $1.46 billion, representing17 percent of all MTA compensation and an eight percent rise since 2024. For the second consecutive year, the MTA's overtime champion was Bridges & Tunnels Lt. Edwin Lee, who collected $359,794 in OT, bringing his total pay to $528,809. Three other Bridges & Tunnels employees joined him at the top of the overtime list, each receiving more than $300,000 in overtime payments:
* Orlando Caholo, sergeant, Bridges & Tunnels: $334,002 in OT
* Edward Aristizabal, lieutenant, Bridges & Tunnels: $315,673 in OT
* John Anastasatos, sergeant, Bridges & Tunnels: $304,167 in OT
* * *
Table: Top MTA Overtime Recipients (2025)
* * *
Overtime accounts for 28 percent of all Bridges & Tunnels compensation -- the highest share of any MTA agency. At B&T, 97 of 632 overtime-earning employees collected more in OT than in regular pay.
Among the different agencies, overtime for the New York City Transit Authority jumped 10 percent to $790 million. Overtime also rose at the Long Island Rail Road by 6 percent to $219 million and Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MaBSTOA) by 6 percent to $150 million.
Among the 66,873 employees who received overtime, average overtime was highest at Bridges & Tunnels, where employees averaged $53,626 in OT, followed by Long Island Rail Road ($32,988) and Metro-North ($23,561). Gang foremen, a maintenance title concentrated at LIRR, averaged $70,584 in overtime, with the top earner, Leonardo Espinosa of LIRR, collecting $244,954 in OT and $396,749 in total pay.
A total of 801 MTA employees received six figures in overtime pay. 923 MTA employees more than doubled their 2025 regular pay with overtime, i.e., collected more in overtime than their regular pay.
* * *
Chart: Six-Figure Overtime Club
* * *
The overtime surge extends to relatively new employees. Thirty-one workers hired since 2020 collected more than $100,000 in overtime in 2025. Among them, Stationary Engineer James Kriegsmann, hired in 2021, earned $267,710 in OT and $535,660 in total pay. A 2024 hire at NYC Transit, Stationary Engineer Joseph Richter, collected $129,644 in OT in his second year on the job, bringing his total pay to $338,493.
Six MTA employees collected more than CEO Janno Lieber's total pay of $469,726. Stilwell Manriquez, senior stationary engineer at the Transit Authority, topped the list with a total pay of $549,122, including $276,898 in OT and $71,837 in retroactive pay. The rest are:
* James Kriegsmann, Stationary Engineer, Transit Authority -- total pay: $535,660, OT: $267,710
* Leonardo Abatangelo Sr., Stationary Engineer, Transit Authority -- total pay: $530,823, OT: $250,886
Edwin Lee, Lieutenant, Bridges & Tunnels -- total pay: $528,809, OT: $359,794
* Edward Aristizabal, Lieutenant, Bridges & Tunnels -- total pay: $479,443, OT: $315,673
* Orlando Caholo, Sergeant, Bridges & Tunnels -- total pay: $476,810, OT: $334,002
Four hundred forty-eight MTA employees collected more than NYC Mayor Mamdani's salary of $258,750.
Over half (45,490) of all MTA employees collected more than six figures in total pay, with 2,878 employees collecting more than $200,000. Overall, MTA employees collected an average total pay of $103,969 in 2025. For comparison, New York City government employees averaged $62,877 in total pay during fiscal year 2025. Among the different agencies, employees at Bridges & Tunnels averaged the highest pay at $136,977, followed by LIRR at $127,808 and Metro-North at $120,510.
The single largest overtime category by dollar amount was Train Operators, with 3,836 workers collecting a combined $74.7 million in OT.
* * *
Table: MTA Payroll by Agency (2025)
* * *
Beyond overtime, MTA employees also received $124 million in retroactive pay in 2025, spread across 11,285 workers. Some individual retro payments were substantial: Several employees at New York City Transit and Metro-North each received more than $70,000 in back pay alone, compounding already-elevated total compensation.
The Empire Center's 2019 payroll analysis sparked a sweeping probe of MTA overtime practices.
* * *
The Empire Center, based in Albany, is an independent, not-for-profit, non-partisan think tank dedicated to promoting policies that can make New York a better place to live, work and raise a family.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/34-mta-workers-made-200k-in-overtime-in-2025/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
34 MTA Workers Made $200K+ In Overtime In 2025
Average Total Pay Surpasses $100K; OT Reaches $1.46 Billion
-
Thirty-four employees of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) received more than $200,000 in overtime payments in 2025, as total annual pay surpassed half a million dollars for some, according to data posted on SeeThroughNY, the Empire Center's government transparency website.
Overtime, as measured using payroll records, totaled $1.46 billion, representing ... Show Full Article ALBANY, New York, June 19 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release on June 18, 2026: * * * 34 MTA Workers Made $200K+ In Overtime In 2025 Average Total Pay Surpasses $100K; OT Reaches $1.46 Billion - Thirty-four employees of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) received more than $200,000 in overtime payments in 2025, as total annual pay surpassed half a million dollars for some, according to data posted on SeeThroughNY, the Empire Center's government transparency website. Overtime, as measured using payroll records, totaled $1.46 billion, representing17 percent of all MTA compensation and an eight percent rise since 2024. For the second consecutive year, the MTA's overtime champion was Bridges & Tunnels Lt. Edwin Lee, who collected $359,794 in OT, bringing his total pay to $528,809. Three other Bridges & Tunnels employees joined him at the top of the overtime list, each receiving more than $300,000 in overtime payments:
* Orlando Caholo, sergeant, Bridges & Tunnels: $334,002 in OT
* Edward Aristizabal, lieutenant, Bridges & Tunnels: $315,673 in OT
* John Anastasatos, sergeant, Bridges & Tunnels: $304,167 in OT
* * *
Table: Top MTA Overtime Recipients (2025)
* * *
Overtime accounts for 28 percent of all Bridges & Tunnels compensation -- the highest share of any MTA agency. At B&T, 97 of 632 overtime-earning employees collected more in OT than in regular pay.
Among the different agencies, overtime for the New York City Transit Authority jumped 10 percent to $790 million. Overtime also rose at the Long Island Rail Road by 6 percent to $219 million and Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MaBSTOA) by 6 percent to $150 million.
Among the 66,873 employees who received overtime, average overtime was highest at Bridges & Tunnels, where employees averaged $53,626 in OT, followed by Long Island Rail Road ($32,988) and Metro-North ($23,561). Gang foremen, a maintenance title concentrated at LIRR, averaged $70,584 in overtime, with the top earner, Leonardo Espinosa of LIRR, collecting $244,954 in OT and $396,749 in total pay.
A total of 801 MTA employees received six figures in overtime pay. 923 MTA employees more than doubled their 2025 regular pay with overtime, i.e., collected more in overtime than their regular pay.
* * *
Chart: Six-Figure Overtime Club
* * *
The overtime surge extends to relatively new employees. Thirty-one workers hired since 2020 collected more than $100,000 in overtime in 2025. Among them, Stationary Engineer James Kriegsmann, hired in 2021, earned $267,710 in OT and $535,660 in total pay. A 2024 hire at NYC Transit, Stationary Engineer Joseph Richter, collected $129,644 in OT in his second year on the job, bringing his total pay to $338,493.
Six MTA employees collected more than CEO Janno Lieber's total pay of $469,726. Stilwell Manriquez, senior stationary engineer at the Transit Authority, topped the list with a total pay of $549,122, including $276,898 in OT and $71,837 in retroactive pay. The rest are:
* James Kriegsmann, Stationary Engineer, Transit Authority -- total pay: $535,660, OT: $267,710
* Leonardo Abatangelo Sr., Stationary Engineer, Transit Authority -- total pay: $530,823, OT: $250,886
Edwin Lee, Lieutenant, Bridges & Tunnels -- total pay: $528,809, OT: $359,794
* Edward Aristizabal, Lieutenant, Bridges & Tunnels -- total pay: $479,443, OT: $315,673
* Orlando Caholo, Sergeant, Bridges & Tunnels -- total pay: $476,810, OT: $334,002
Four hundred forty-eight MTA employees collected more than NYC Mayor Mamdani's salary of $258,750.
Over half (45,490) of all MTA employees collected more than six figures in total pay, with 2,878 employees collecting more than $200,000. Overall, MTA employees collected an average total pay of $103,969 in 2025. For comparison, New York City government employees averaged $62,877 in total pay during fiscal year 2025. Among the different agencies, employees at Bridges & Tunnels averaged the highest pay at $136,977, followed by LIRR at $127,808 and Metro-North at $120,510.
The single largest overtime category by dollar amount was Train Operators, with 3,836 workers collecting a combined $74.7 million in OT.
* * *
Table: MTA Payroll by Agency (2025)
* * *
Beyond overtime, MTA employees also received $124 million in retroactive pay in 2025, spread across 11,285 workers. Some individual retro payments were substantial: Several employees at New York City Transit and Metro-North each received more than $70,000 in back pay alone, compounding already-elevated total compensation.
The Empire Center's 2019 payroll analysis sparked a sweeping probe of MTA overtime practices.
* * *
The Empire Center, based in Albany, is an independent, not-for-profit, non-partisan think tank dedicated to promoting policies that can make New York a better place to live, work and raise a family.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/34-mta-workers-made-200k-in-overtime-in-2025/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary: Enemies of Energy - Union of Concerned Scientists
WASHINGTON, June 19 (TNSrpt) -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Managing Editor and Director of Content Ken Braun:
* * *
Enemies of Energy: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)
"Modern technologies like wind and solar power are safe, abundant, cheap, reliable, and they don't heat up the Earth," claim the Union of Concerned Scientists who are clearly not concerned when their turbines eat up the Earth.
Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center.
-
One way to identify ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 (TNSrpt) -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Managing Editor and Director of Content Ken Braun: * * * Enemies of Energy: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) "Modern technologies like wind and solar power are safe, abundant, cheap, reliable, and they don't heat up the Earth," claim the Union of Concerned Scientists who are clearly not concerned when their turbines eat up the Earth. Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center. - One way to identifyanti-energy NGOs pretending to be nature-saving nonprofits is to look at their website for pictures of wind turbines and solar panels polluting what could--and should--be pristine landscapes. Doing this with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) required less than one second of research during February of 2026. Plastered atop the UCS home page was a huge photo of a snow-capped cliff, soaring gloriously above the ocean and covered with... giant turbine towers. (The image has since been replaced but is still available from the Wayback Machine). The UCS motto embedded this slogan on the image: "We use science to make change happen." Hopefully their idea of "change" will be kept from the similarly soaring peaks in places such as the Rocky Mountains and Yosemite Valley. [i]
"Modern technologies like wind and solar power are safe, abundant, cheap, reliable, and they don't heat up the Earth," claim scientists clearly not concerned when their turbines eat up the Earth. [ii]
The scientists also aren't concerned about the limits of astronomy, meteorology, and math. To accept their "reliable" claim, it's necessary to believe the Earth has stopped spinning and hiding the sun every day; that cloud cover doesn't exist; and that the wind shows up exactly where it's needed, when it's needed, and goes away when it isn't needed. The "abundant" claim is impossible and the price irrelevant if the energy isn't reliable.
So, weather restricted power is definitely "cheap," but only in quality. That should be a concern for the scientists.
The UCS is a 501(c)(3) tax exempt nonprofit that reported total revenue of $41.9 million for the year ending September 2024, with $50.3 in expenses, and net assets of $60.8 million. Their IRS filing for the year reported that a combined $28.2 million was spent on the "climate and clean energy program" and the "clean transportation program." That's more than half of total expenses, so most of what UCS reported it was doing during the year was in one of those two, closely-related areas. The NGO spends less on other objectives, such as food safety and nuclear weapons proliferation. They are primarily an anti-energy NGO.[iii]
This is one of the objectives of the "climate and clean energy program," according to what the UCS told the IRS: "UCS works to make sure the major fossil fuel companies face legal, financial, reputational, and political consequences for misleading the public about climate science and solutions." [emphasis added] [iv]
Again, the UCS is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charity and isn't legally permitted to engage in a lot of political behavior. Threatening to inflict "political consequences" against a critical American industry doesn't come off as very charitable.
In addition to their war against hydrocarbons, the UCS has a cleverly nuanced animosity towards nuclear power, which emits no emissions other than water vapor (steam).
For most of its history there was no question that the UCS was opposed to nuclear power. For example, in February 1987 the New York Times reported the UCS was petitioning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to close down eight nuclear reactors in five states.[v]
And in 1997 researchers from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst released a study examining the economic consequences of shutting down nuclear power stations by profiling the 1992 shutdown of the Yankee Rowe nuclear facility in Massachusetts. "Sophisticated protests by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a powerful advocacy group, against the continued use of the plant were frequent," wrote the authors. The report did not mention involvement from the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, nor the League of Conservation Voters. The only one of today's biggest anti-energy NGOs credited with the successful euthanasia of Yankee Rowe was the UCS. [vi]
France spent the 1970s and 1980s building a nuclear power industry that now provides 70 percent of their electricity and turned the French into Europe's largest electricity exporter. Americans could have done this as well, but growth of American nuclear power was stunted during this period, in no small measure because of the work of anti-nuclear NGOs. The Union of Concerned Scientists deserves a lot of the blame for today's lack of emissions-free nuclear power in America.[vii]
That destructive advocacy against America's largest source of emissions-free energy is hard to find on the UCS website today. Their page explaining nuclear power now concedes that "the low-carbon electricity provided by existing nuclear power plants is increasingly valuable in the fight against climate change," but goes on to raise the predictable and dubious/hypocritical claims about safety, cost, and waste disposal. The headline of the page says it all: "Nuclear Power: Low-carbon electricity, with serious economic and safety issues."[viii]
Now the UCS wants us to remember that they have always been just a "nuclear safety watchdog" rather than a major impediment to the technology. But their policy is to be pro-nuclear in principle (saying they support it if it can be made perfect) yet opposed in practice (because nothing is perfect). It's a distinction without a difference. [ix]
A more reliable description of the UCS nuclear energy agenda was revealed in a 2020 comment the group sent to a state public utility commission, purportedly seeking to help Xcel Energy plan its investments in electricity generation: [x]
We can't avoid the dangerous and unjust impacts of the climate crisis if we swap coal for another polluting fossil fuel, and every dollar Xcel spends on nuclear is one less spent on clean energy. [emphasis added]/[xi]
Translation: reliable and carbon-free nuclear energy is bad because it takes money that should be spent on unreliable wind turbines and solar panels.
The evidence all points in the same direction, whether it's images of mountaintop wind turbines on the UCS home page, the decades of advocacy against reliable and clean nuclear power, or obscure comments made to public utility commissions. The Union of Concerned Scientists is very concerned with promoting the weather dependent power industry, but much less concerned with protecting the planet and empowering the people who live on it.
* * *
Endnotes
[i] Home page. Union of Concerned Scientists. Accessed February 20, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260223201912/https://www.ucs.org/
[ii] "Power Ahead." Union of Concerned Scientists. Accessed February 20, 2026. https://www.ucs.org/take-action/power-ahead
[iii] Union Of Concerned Scientists Inc. 2023 IRS Form 990. (EIN: 04-2535767) Accessed February 23, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/42535767/202512119349301666/full
[iv] Union Of Concerned Scientists Inc. 2023 IRS Form 990. (EIN: 04-2535767) Accessed February 23, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/42535767/202512119349301666/full
[v] "Group Urges Closing of 8 'Unstable' Reactors." New York Times. February 10, 1987. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20150524210930/https://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/11/us/group-urges-closing-of-8-unstable-reactors.html
[vi] Mullin, John R.;Kotval, Zenia. "The Closing of the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Plant: The Impact on a New England Community." Journal of the American Planning Association; Autumn 1997, Vol. 63 Issue 4. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/ecc8c9b0-50ad-44b9-b8e8-8b1b8ced2dcb/content
[vii] Nuclear Power in France. World Nuclear Association. Updated and accessed February 23, 2026. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france
[viii] "Nuclear Power: Low-carbon electricity, with serious economic and safety issues." Union of Concerned Scientists. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://www.ucs.org/energy/nuclear-power
[ix] "Nuclear Power: Low-carbon electricity, with serious economic and safety issues." Union of Concerned Scientists. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://www.ucs.org/energy/nuclear-power
[x] Orr, Isaac. "Clown Show: Union of Concerned Scientists Claims Nuclear Power Plants Are Not Clean Energy." Center of the American Experiment. December 22, 2020. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://www.americanexperiment.org/clown-show-union-of-concerned-scientists-claims-nuclear-power-plants-are-not-clean-energy/
[xi] Orr, Isaac. "Clown Show: Union of Concerned Scientists Claims Nuclear Power Plants Are Not Clean Energy." Center of the American Experiment. December 22, 2020. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://www.americanexperiment.org/clown-show-union-of-concerned-scientists-claims-nuclear-power-plants-are-not-clean-energy/
* * *
Ken Braun
As managing editor and director of content of CRC, Ken Braun edits Capital Research magazine. He also conducts investigative research and drafts profiles for InfluenceWatch.org.
* * *
REPORT: https://capitalresearch.org/app/uploads/FINAL-PDF_CRC_EnemiesofEnergy.pdf
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/enemies-of-energy-union-of-concerned-scientists-ucs/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Enemies of Energy: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)
"Modern technologies like wind and solar power are safe, abundant, cheap, reliable, and they don't heat up the Earth," claim the Union of Concerned Scientists who are clearly not concerned when their turbines eat up the Earth.
Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center.
-
One way to identify ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 (TNSrpt) -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Managing Editor and Director of Content Ken Braun: * * * Enemies of Energy: Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) "Modern technologies like wind and solar power are safe, abundant, cheap, reliable, and they don't heat up the Earth," claim the Union of Concerned Scientists who are clearly not concerned when their turbines eat up the Earth. Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center. - One way to identifyanti-energy NGOs pretending to be nature-saving nonprofits is to look at their website for pictures of wind turbines and solar panels polluting what could--and should--be pristine landscapes. Doing this with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) required less than one second of research during February of 2026. Plastered atop the UCS home page was a huge photo of a snow-capped cliff, soaring gloriously above the ocean and covered with... giant turbine towers. (The image has since been replaced but is still available from the Wayback Machine). The UCS motto embedded this slogan on the image: "We use science to make change happen." Hopefully their idea of "change" will be kept from the similarly soaring peaks in places such as the Rocky Mountains and Yosemite Valley. [i]
"Modern technologies like wind and solar power are safe, abundant, cheap, reliable, and they don't heat up the Earth," claim scientists clearly not concerned when their turbines eat up the Earth. [ii]
The scientists also aren't concerned about the limits of astronomy, meteorology, and math. To accept their "reliable" claim, it's necessary to believe the Earth has stopped spinning and hiding the sun every day; that cloud cover doesn't exist; and that the wind shows up exactly where it's needed, when it's needed, and goes away when it isn't needed. The "abundant" claim is impossible and the price irrelevant if the energy isn't reliable.
So, weather restricted power is definitely "cheap," but only in quality. That should be a concern for the scientists.
The UCS is a 501(c)(3) tax exempt nonprofit that reported total revenue of $41.9 million for the year ending September 2024, with $50.3 in expenses, and net assets of $60.8 million. Their IRS filing for the year reported that a combined $28.2 million was spent on the "climate and clean energy program" and the "clean transportation program." That's more than half of total expenses, so most of what UCS reported it was doing during the year was in one of those two, closely-related areas. The NGO spends less on other objectives, such as food safety and nuclear weapons proliferation. They are primarily an anti-energy NGO.[iii]
This is one of the objectives of the "climate and clean energy program," according to what the UCS told the IRS: "UCS works to make sure the major fossil fuel companies face legal, financial, reputational, and political consequences for misleading the public about climate science and solutions." [emphasis added] [iv]
Again, the UCS is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charity and isn't legally permitted to engage in a lot of political behavior. Threatening to inflict "political consequences" against a critical American industry doesn't come off as very charitable.
In addition to their war against hydrocarbons, the UCS has a cleverly nuanced animosity towards nuclear power, which emits no emissions other than water vapor (steam).
For most of its history there was no question that the UCS was opposed to nuclear power. For example, in February 1987 the New York Times reported the UCS was petitioning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to close down eight nuclear reactors in five states.[v]
And in 1997 researchers from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst released a study examining the economic consequences of shutting down nuclear power stations by profiling the 1992 shutdown of the Yankee Rowe nuclear facility in Massachusetts. "Sophisticated protests by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a powerful advocacy group, against the continued use of the plant were frequent," wrote the authors. The report did not mention involvement from the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, nor the League of Conservation Voters. The only one of today's biggest anti-energy NGOs credited with the successful euthanasia of Yankee Rowe was the UCS. [vi]
France spent the 1970s and 1980s building a nuclear power industry that now provides 70 percent of their electricity and turned the French into Europe's largest electricity exporter. Americans could have done this as well, but growth of American nuclear power was stunted during this period, in no small measure because of the work of anti-nuclear NGOs. The Union of Concerned Scientists deserves a lot of the blame for today's lack of emissions-free nuclear power in America.[vii]
That destructive advocacy against America's largest source of emissions-free energy is hard to find on the UCS website today. Their page explaining nuclear power now concedes that "the low-carbon electricity provided by existing nuclear power plants is increasingly valuable in the fight against climate change," but goes on to raise the predictable and dubious/hypocritical claims about safety, cost, and waste disposal. The headline of the page says it all: "Nuclear Power: Low-carbon electricity, with serious economic and safety issues."[viii]
Now the UCS wants us to remember that they have always been just a "nuclear safety watchdog" rather than a major impediment to the technology. But their policy is to be pro-nuclear in principle (saying they support it if it can be made perfect) yet opposed in practice (because nothing is perfect). It's a distinction without a difference. [ix]
A more reliable description of the UCS nuclear energy agenda was revealed in a 2020 comment the group sent to a state public utility commission, purportedly seeking to help Xcel Energy plan its investments in electricity generation: [x]
We can't avoid the dangerous and unjust impacts of the climate crisis if we swap coal for another polluting fossil fuel, and every dollar Xcel spends on nuclear is one less spent on clean energy. [emphasis added]/[xi]
Translation: reliable and carbon-free nuclear energy is bad because it takes money that should be spent on unreliable wind turbines and solar panels.
The evidence all points in the same direction, whether it's images of mountaintop wind turbines on the UCS home page, the decades of advocacy against reliable and clean nuclear power, or obscure comments made to public utility commissions. The Union of Concerned Scientists is very concerned with promoting the weather dependent power industry, but much less concerned with protecting the planet and empowering the people who live on it.
* * *
Endnotes
[i] Home page. Union of Concerned Scientists. Accessed February 20, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20260223201912/https://www.ucs.org/
[ii] "Power Ahead." Union of Concerned Scientists. Accessed February 20, 2026. https://www.ucs.org/take-action/power-ahead
[iii] Union Of Concerned Scientists Inc. 2023 IRS Form 990. (EIN: 04-2535767) Accessed February 23, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/42535767/202512119349301666/full
[iv] Union Of Concerned Scientists Inc. 2023 IRS Form 990. (EIN: 04-2535767) Accessed February 23, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/42535767/202512119349301666/full
[v] "Group Urges Closing of 8 'Unstable' Reactors." New York Times. February 10, 1987. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20150524210930/https://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/11/us/group-urges-closing-of-8-unstable-reactors.html
[vi] Mullin, John R.;Kotval, Zenia. "The Closing of the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Plant: The Impact on a New England Community." Journal of the American Planning Association; Autumn 1997, Vol. 63 Issue 4. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/ecc8c9b0-50ad-44b9-b8e8-8b1b8ced2dcb/content
[vii] Nuclear Power in France. World Nuclear Association. Updated and accessed February 23, 2026. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france
[viii] "Nuclear Power: Low-carbon electricity, with serious economic and safety issues." Union of Concerned Scientists. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://www.ucs.org/energy/nuclear-power
[ix] "Nuclear Power: Low-carbon electricity, with serious economic and safety issues." Union of Concerned Scientists. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://www.ucs.org/energy/nuclear-power
[x] Orr, Isaac. "Clown Show: Union of Concerned Scientists Claims Nuclear Power Plants Are Not Clean Energy." Center of the American Experiment. December 22, 2020. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://www.americanexperiment.org/clown-show-union-of-concerned-scientists-claims-nuclear-power-plants-are-not-clean-energy/
[xi] Orr, Isaac. "Clown Show: Union of Concerned Scientists Claims Nuclear Power Plants Are Not Clean Energy." Center of the American Experiment. December 22, 2020. Accessed February 23, 2026. https://www.americanexperiment.org/clown-show-union-of-concerned-scientists-claims-nuclear-power-plants-are-not-clean-energy/
* * *
Ken Braun
As managing editor and director of content of CRC, Ken Braun edits Capital Research magazine. He also conducts investigative research and drafts profiles for InfluenceWatch.org.
* * *
REPORT: https://capitalresearch.org/app/uploads/FINAL-PDF_CRC_EnemiesofEnergy.pdf
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/enemies-of-energy-union-of-concerned-scientists-ucs/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A: G7 Critical Minerals Ambitions and Iran's Natural Resources
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on June 18, 2026, involving Director Gracelin Baskaran and associate fellow Meredith Schwartz, both of the Critical Minerals Security Program:
* * *
G7 Critical Minerals Ambitions and Iran's Natural Resources
On June 15, Group of Seven (G7) heads of state, including President Donald Trump, convened in France for the annual summit. Featured prominently on the agenda were avenues for critical minerals cooperation, including price coordination and commitments to limit rare earth ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on June 18, 2026, involving Director Gracelin Baskaran and associate fellow Meredith Schwartz, both of the Critical Minerals Security Program: * * * G7 Critical Minerals Ambitions and Iran's Natural Resources On June 15, Group of Seven (G7) heads of state, including President Donald Trump, convened in France for the annual summit. Featured prominently on the agenda were avenues for critical minerals cooperation, including price coordination and commitments to limit rare earthsourcing from China. A day later, President Trump and Vice President JD Vance virtually signed an agreement with Iran to end hostilities, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, freeze Iranian nuclear activities, and usher in a new era of economic investment in Iran. While sanctions have long crippled the Iranian economy and blocked foreign investments into energy, infrastructure, and natural resources, the agreement may offer an opportunity to advance Iran's economic relationship with the West, particularly within the mining sector.
Q1: What has the G7 agreed on for critical minerals cooperation?
A1: For the first time, G7 leaders endorsed a measurable supply chain resilience target: reducing dependence on any single non-G7 supplier of rare earths and permanent magnets to below 60 percent by 2030, with the longer-term objective of lowering that figure to 50 percent. For all other critical minerals, relevant ministers have been tasked with establishing clear dependency-reduction targets and implementation plans before the end of the year.
G7 countries have not agreed to a coordinated price floor mechanism. A major obstacle to establishing a price floor has been the lack of agreement over how it should be funded. The central question is who should bear the cost. G7 governments have been reluctant to use public funds to support a price floor, particularly as countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia face growing fiscal pressures and competing demands on public services.
At the same time, policymakers have been hesitant to pass the cost on to end users. In price-sensitive sectors such as automotive manufacturing, higher input costs could translate into higher vehicle prices, dampening demand and ultimately reducing industry growth. As a result, policymakers face a difficult balancing act: supporting critical mineral production without placing an unsustainable burden on taxpayers or undermining the competitiveness of downstream industries.
Q2: Is the G7 agreement to limit imports of Chinese rare earths and magnets by 2030 feasible?
A2: The target is ambitious and will be challenging to achieve. China is responsible for 93 percent of permanent magnet production globally, used across the modern economy in automotives, renewable energy technologies, consumer electronics, and medical equipment. G7 nations are some of the largest consumers of rare earth magnets in the world, accounting for over half of global imports.
While the West has made significant progress in diversifying rare earth mining operations, China still dominates the refining segment of the supply chain. Today, China controls an estimated 85-91 percent of global rare earth refining. This dominance is even more pronounced for the heavy rare earths required for permanent magnets, including dysprosium and terbium.
Building refining capacity outside of China will be crucial to meeting this 60 percent threshold. While projects have been announced in coordination with government financing support across the United States, Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, not all projects are likely to reach commercial production within the next four years. Many projects are led by startup companies with unproven technology on a commercial scale. USA Rare Earths has publicly announced its intention to expand its footprint from Stillwater, Oklahoma, to Goias, Brazil, and Lacq, France. However, the company is already facing a lawsuit from a competitor for allegedly using stolen proprietary technology and was only just selected by the Department of Energy for pilot scale testing of its continuous ion exchange separation technology in May of 2026. Even more seasoned producers such as Lynas Rare Earths have encountered challenges with meeting project milestones. In 2021, the Department of Defense awarded Lynas with Defense Production Act funding to build a heavy rare earth processing facility in Seadrift, Texas. After years of permitting troubles and rising costs, Lynas announced that the project was effectively shelved in 2025.
The experience of G7 partner Japan is indicative of just how challenging it is to build rare earth capacity outside of China. As the largest rare earth magnet producer outside of China, and a frequent target of Chinese export controls, Japan has spent over 15 years working to de-risk its supply chains. Its strategy has emphasized long-term investments in both homegrown innovation in recycling, processing technologies, and deep-sea exploration, as well as in international production and resource development. Still, Japan has only just started to shift reliance from China to regional partners in Australia, South Korea, and Vietnam. In 2024, Japan was still the world's largest importer of Chinese rare earth metals. Japan serves as an important reminder that government targets and capital allocations alone do not build supply chains.
Q3: What does the U.S.-Iran peace deal mean for critical minerals supply chains?
A3: President Trump signed the U.S.-Iran agreement at the Palace of Versailles in France at the conclusion of the G7 summit. Following the signing, the United States transmitted a photograph of the executed document to Iranian officials, after which Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the agreement.
The agreement establishes a 60-day framework for negotiating a final comprehensive deal between the two countries. It also commits the United States to issuing sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to resume oil exports, outlines measures to reopen and secure navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and includes a commitment by the United States and its regional partners to develop a $300 billion reconstruction fund to support Iran's economic recovery and infrastructure development.
The reopening of the strait should help bring down sulfur and sulfuric acid prices, which have sharply increased the costs across critical mineral supply chains. Sulfur prices have risen by more than 50 percent since the outbreak of the Iran conflict, while sulfuric acid prices have more than doubled in some regions. The disruption has tightened physical supply, increased operating costs for refiners and processors, and forced some facilities to reduce output. Sulfuric acid is a key input in the processing of lithium, nickel, copper, and rare earths, meaning price spikes have immediate implications for production economics.
Additionally, as part of the agreement, Iran is expected to regain access to frozen assets. This could have implications for the country's mining and resource investments abroad. For example, Iran holds a 15 percent stake in the Rossing Uranium Mine, acquired through a 1976 investment. Because the mine's majority owner, the China National Uranium Corporation, has remained compliant with international sanctions, revenues attributable to Iran's stake have reportedly been placed in escrow accounts that Tehran has been unable to access. Should sanctions relief proceed under the agreement, Iran may be able to recover or gain access to some of these accumulated funds.
Q4: Can mining help drive Iran's economic reintegration into global markets?
A4: The agreement included a $300 billion investment fund in U.S.-Iran framework. Iran has significant mineral resources--particularly copper, aluminum, and zinc. The country possesses approximately 2.6 billion metric tons of identified copper reserves, equivalent to about 5 percent of global known reserves, making it one of the world's most significant copper resource holders. Following the easing of international sanctions in 2016, Iran sought to attract foreign investment into its copper sector, reportedly holding discussions with major mining companies including Glencore and Rio Tinto. At the time, the government outlined ambitious plans to expand copper concentrate production to as much as 2 million metric tons annually by 2025, a dramatic increase from historical production levels. Central to these ambitions is the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex, which is widely regarded as one of the world's largest open-pit copper mines and serves as the cornerstone of Iran's copper industry.
While Iran has significantly expanded its copper production capacity over the past decade, with annual copper concentrate output increasing from 783,000 metric tons in 2014 to approximately 1.2 million metric tons in 2021, sanctions have made it difficult to further expand the sector owing to challenges with importing equipment and investment limitations (an additional 17 Iranian mining companies were sanctioned in 2020). If sanctions are eased, this could drive an investment in Iran's mining sector, particularly copper, which is attracting significant investment globally due to its use in data centers and energy infrastructure.
* * *
Table 1: Iran's Copper Assets and Reserves
* * *
Q5: What risks and challenges remain for investors in Iran?
A5: While Iran's geologic resources are significant, several factors continue to complicate the investment landscape within Iran. Iran has been one of the highest-risk investment regions in the world since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Iranian business environment is characterized by not only strict international sanctions but also high rates of corruption, stagflation, political violence, and little to no diplomatic assistance from Western consulates.
The greatest risk facing investors in Iran is the possibility that sanctions relief could be reversed. While a peace agreement may provide some immediate access to international markets and unlock new investment opportunities, much of the existing sanctions architecture remains in place and could be rapidly reimposed if Iran is found to be in violation of the agreement. U.S., European, and UN sanctions have historically been subject to "snapback" mechanisms, creating uncertainty over the durability of any sanctions relief.
For investors, this creates a fundamental challenge. Mining, energy, and infrastructure projects often require investment horizons measured in decades, yet sanctions policy can change in a matter of months. This uncertainty is particularly acute because investors have seen similar reversals before. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was an agreement between Iran and major world powers that limited Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. After implementation in 2016, Iran regained access to parts of the global financial system, increased oil exports, recovered frozen assets, and attracted interest from international companies. The agreement was terminated in October 2025. As a result, the key question for investors is not whether Iran offers attractive opportunities, but whether the current opening will prove durable enough to justify long-term capital commitments.
Q6: Is the Trump administration introducing a new model of foreign policy with historically complex, resource-rich countries?
A6: The Trump administration has taken a more head-on approach to managing challenging adversaries. For years, the Venezuelan and Iranian economies have languished under hostile authoritarian regimes and crippling Western sanctions, causing an exodus of foreign investment. Now, in a reversal of longstanding U.S. foreign policy emphasizing economic isolation to pressure hostile regimes, the United States has followed military operations with actively encouraging investment into their natural resources sectors as a means of introducing geopolitical stability. In Venezuela, the U.S Treasury has eased sanctions and granted general licenses for Chevron, BP, Eni, and other global energy companies to operate. The U.S. has also now authorized trading activities for Venezuela-origin gold and minerals, leading a delegation of Western mining executives to Venezuela to discuss investment opportunities in gold, bauxite, iron ore, and other minerals.
Under the peace agreement, Iran will be permitted to resume the full export of its oil and petroleum products, restoring access to its primary source of foreign revenue. At current production levels and prevailing oil prices, Iranian energy exports could generate more than $60 billion annually, providing a substantial boost to government finances and foreign exchange reserves. The return of Iranian oil to global markets would not only strengthen Tehran's fiscal position but also increase its ability to attract foreign investment, modernize its energy infrastructure, and finance domestic economic development. After years of sanctions that constrained export volumes, restricted access to international banking systems, and limited investment in the energy sector, the agreement has the potential to significantly improve Iran's economic outlook and reintegrate the country into global energy markets. At the same time, U.S. and Western investment in Iranian infrastructure and resource development could offer a kind of insurance against future threats of large-scale destruction to civilian infrastructure.
While it remains to be seen if Venezuela and Iran will successfully reintegrate into the global energy economy, the Iran agreement marks a new foreign policy approach in which a combination of military leverage and economic incentives may be used to shape post-conflict political outcomes and encourage stability within adversarial nations.
* * *
Gracelin Baskaran is director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
Meredith Schwartz is an associate fellow for the Critical Minerals Security Program at CSIS.
If you are interested in learning more about this topic, explore CSIS's Executive Education course Driving Critical Minerals Security.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/g7-critical-minerals-ambitions-and-irans-natural-resources
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
G7 Critical Minerals Ambitions and Iran's Natural Resources
On June 15, Group of Seven (G7) heads of state, including President Donald Trump, convened in France for the annual summit. Featured prominently on the agenda were avenues for critical minerals cooperation, including price coordination and commitments to limit rare earth ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on June 18, 2026, involving Director Gracelin Baskaran and associate fellow Meredith Schwartz, both of the Critical Minerals Security Program: * * * G7 Critical Minerals Ambitions and Iran's Natural Resources On June 15, Group of Seven (G7) heads of state, including President Donald Trump, convened in France for the annual summit. Featured prominently on the agenda were avenues for critical minerals cooperation, including price coordination and commitments to limit rare earthsourcing from China. A day later, President Trump and Vice President JD Vance virtually signed an agreement with Iran to end hostilities, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, freeze Iranian nuclear activities, and usher in a new era of economic investment in Iran. While sanctions have long crippled the Iranian economy and blocked foreign investments into energy, infrastructure, and natural resources, the agreement may offer an opportunity to advance Iran's economic relationship with the West, particularly within the mining sector.
Q1: What has the G7 agreed on for critical minerals cooperation?
A1: For the first time, G7 leaders endorsed a measurable supply chain resilience target: reducing dependence on any single non-G7 supplier of rare earths and permanent magnets to below 60 percent by 2030, with the longer-term objective of lowering that figure to 50 percent. For all other critical minerals, relevant ministers have been tasked with establishing clear dependency-reduction targets and implementation plans before the end of the year.
G7 countries have not agreed to a coordinated price floor mechanism. A major obstacle to establishing a price floor has been the lack of agreement over how it should be funded. The central question is who should bear the cost. G7 governments have been reluctant to use public funds to support a price floor, particularly as countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia face growing fiscal pressures and competing demands on public services.
At the same time, policymakers have been hesitant to pass the cost on to end users. In price-sensitive sectors such as automotive manufacturing, higher input costs could translate into higher vehicle prices, dampening demand and ultimately reducing industry growth. As a result, policymakers face a difficult balancing act: supporting critical mineral production without placing an unsustainable burden on taxpayers or undermining the competitiveness of downstream industries.
Q2: Is the G7 agreement to limit imports of Chinese rare earths and magnets by 2030 feasible?
A2: The target is ambitious and will be challenging to achieve. China is responsible for 93 percent of permanent magnet production globally, used across the modern economy in automotives, renewable energy technologies, consumer electronics, and medical equipment. G7 nations are some of the largest consumers of rare earth magnets in the world, accounting for over half of global imports.
While the West has made significant progress in diversifying rare earth mining operations, China still dominates the refining segment of the supply chain. Today, China controls an estimated 85-91 percent of global rare earth refining. This dominance is even more pronounced for the heavy rare earths required for permanent magnets, including dysprosium and terbium.
Building refining capacity outside of China will be crucial to meeting this 60 percent threshold. While projects have been announced in coordination with government financing support across the United States, Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, not all projects are likely to reach commercial production within the next four years. Many projects are led by startup companies with unproven technology on a commercial scale. USA Rare Earths has publicly announced its intention to expand its footprint from Stillwater, Oklahoma, to Goias, Brazil, and Lacq, France. However, the company is already facing a lawsuit from a competitor for allegedly using stolen proprietary technology and was only just selected by the Department of Energy for pilot scale testing of its continuous ion exchange separation technology in May of 2026. Even more seasoned producers such as Lynas Rare Earths have encountered challenges with meeting project milestones. In 2021, the Department of Defense awarded Lynas with Defense Production Act funding to build a heavy rare earth processing facility in Seadrift, Texas. After years of permitting troubles and rising costs, Lynas announced that the project was effectively shelved in 2025.
The experience of G7 partner Japan is indicative of just how challenging it is to build rare earth capacity outside of China. As the largest rare earth magnet producer outside of China, and a frequent target of Chinese export controls, Japan has spent over 15 years working to de-risk its supply chains. Its strategy has emphasized long-term investments in both homegrown innovation in recycling, processing technologies, and deep-sea exploration, as well as in international production and resource development. Still, Japan has only just started to shift reliance from China to regional partners in Australia, South Korea, and Vietnam. In 2024, Japan was still the world's largest importer of Chinese rare earth metals. Japan serves as an important reminder that government targets and capital allocations alone do not build supply chains.
Q3: What does the U.S.-Iran peace deal mean for critical minerals supply chains?
A3: President Trump signed the U.S.-Iran agreement at the Palace of Versailles in France at the conclusion of the G7 summit. Following the signing, the United States transmitted a photograph of the executed document to Iranian officials, after which Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the agreement.
The agreement establishes a 60-day framework for negotiating a final comprehensive deal between the two countries. It also commits the United States to issuing sanctions waivers that would allow Iran to resume oil exports, outlines measures to reopen and secure navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and includes a commitment by the United States and its regional partners to develop a $300 billion reconstruction fund to support Iran's economic recovery and infrastructure development.
The reopening of the strait should help bring down sulfur and sulfuric acid prices, which have sharply increased the costs across critical mineral supply chains. Sulfur prices have risen by more than 50 percent since the outbreak of the Iran conflict, while sulfuric acid prices have more than doubled in some regions. The disruption has tightened physical supply, increased operating costs for refiners and processors, and forced some facilities to reduce output. Sulfuric acid is a key input in the processing of lithium, nickel, copper, and rare earths, meaning price spikes have immediate implications for production economics.
Additionally, as part of the agreement, Iran is expected to regain access to frozen assets. This could have implications for the country's mining and resource investments abroad. For example, Iran holds a 15 percent stake in the Rossing Uranium Mine, acquired through a 1976 investment. Because the mine's majority owner, the China National Uranium Corporation, has remained compliant with international sanctions, revenues attributable to Iran's stake have reportedly been placed in escrow accounts that Tehran has been unable to access. Should sanctions relief proceed under the agreement, Iran may be able to recover or gain access to some of these accumulated funds.
Q4: Can mining help drive Iran's economic reintegration into global markets?
A4: The agreement included a $300 billion investment fund in U.S.-Iran framework. Iran has significant mineral resources--particularly copper, aluminum, and zinc. The country possesses approximately 2.6 billion metric tons of identified copper reserves, equivalent to about 5 percent of global known reserves, making it one of the world's most significant copper resource holders. Following the easing of international sanctions in 2016, Iran sought to attract foreign investment into its copper sector, reportedly holding discussions with major mining companies including Glencore and Rio Tinto. At the time, the government outlined ambitious plans to expand copper concentrate production to as much as 2 million metric tons annually by 2025, a dramatic increase from historical production levels. Central to these ambitions is the Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex, which is widely regarded as one of the world's largest open-pit copper mines and serves as the cornerstone of Iran's copper industry.
While Iran has significantly expanded its copper production capacity over the past decade, with annual copper concentrate output increasing from 783,000 metric tons in 2014 to approximately 1.2 million metric tons in 2021, sanctions have made it difficult to further expand the sector owing to challenges with importing equipment and investment limitations (an additional 17 Iranian mining companies were sanctioned in 2020). If sanctions are eased, this could drive an investment in Iran's mining sector, particularly copper, which is attracting significant investment globally due to its use in data centers and energy infrastructure.
* * *
Table 1: Iran's Copper Assets and Reserves
* * *
Q5: What risks and challenges remain for investors in Iran?
A5: While Iran's geologic resources are significant, several factors continue to complicate the investment landscape within Iran. Iran has been one of the highest-risk investment regions in the world since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The Iranian business environment is characterized by not only strict international sanctions but also high rates of corruption, stagflation, political violence, and little to no diplomatic assistance from Western consulates.
The greatest risk facing investors in Iran is the possibility that sanctions relief could be reversed. While a peace agreement may provide some immediate access to international markets and unlock new investment opportunities, much of the existing sanctions architecture remains in place and could be rapidly reimposed if Iran is found to be in violation of the agreement. U.S., European, and UN sanctions have historically been subject to "snapback" mechanisms, creating uncertainty over the durability of any sanctions relief.
For investors, this creates a fundamental challenge. Mining, energy, and infrastructure projects often require investment horizons measured in decades, yet sanctions policy can change in a matter of months. This uncertainty is particularly acute because investors have seen similar reversals before. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was an agreement between Iran and major world powers that limited Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. After implementation in 2016, Iran regained access to parts of the global financial system, increased oil exports, recovered frozen assets, and attracted interest from international companies. The agreement was terminated in October 2025. As a result, the key question for investors is not whether Iran offers attractive opportunities, but whether the current opening will prove durable enough to justify long-term capital commitments.
Q6: Is the Trump administration introducing a new model of foreign policy with historically complex, resource-rich countries?
A6: The Trump administration has taken a more head-on approach to managing challenging adversaries. For years, the Venezuelan and Iranian economies have languished under hostile authoritarian regimes and crippling Western sanctions, causing an exodus of foreign investment. Now, in a reversal of longstanding U.S. foreign policy emphasizing economic isolation to pressure hostile regimes, the United States has followed military operations with actively encouraging investment into their natural resources sectors as a means of introducing geopolitical stability. In Venezuela, the U.S Treasury has eased sanctions and granted general licenses for Chevron, BP, Eni, and other global energy companies to operate. The U.S. has also now authorized trading activities for Venezuela-origin gold and minerals, leading a delegation of Western mining executives to Venezuela to discuss investment opportunities in gold, bauxite, iron ore, and other minerals.
Under the peace agreement, Iran will be permitted to resume the full export of its oil and petroleum products, restoring access to its primary source of foreign revenue. At current production levels and prevailing oil prices, Iranian energy exports could generate more than $60 billion annually, providing a substantial boost to government finances and foreign exchange reserves. The return of Iranian oil to global markets would not only strengthen Tehran's fiscal position but also increase its ability to attract foreign investment, modernize its energy infrastructure, and finance domestic economic development. After years of sanctions that constrained export volumes, restricted access to international banking systems, and limited investment in the energy sector, the agreement has the potential to significantly improve Iran's economic outlook and reintegrate the country into global energy markets. At the same time, U.S. and Western investment in Iranian infrastructure and resource development could offer a kind of insurance against future threats of large-scale destruction to civilian infrastructure.
While it remains to be seen if Venezuela and Iran will successfully reintegrate into the global energy economy, the Iran agreement marks a new foreign policy approach in which a combination of military leverage and economic incentives may be used to shape post-conflict political outcomes and encourage stability within adversarial nations.
* * *
Gracelin Baskaran is director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
Meredith Schwartz is an associate fellow for the Critical Minerals Security Program at CSIS.
If you are interested in learning more about this topic, explore CSIS's Executive Education course Driving Critical Minerals Security.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/g7-critical-minerals-ambitions-and-irans-natural-resources
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Iran Won the Negotiation, Even Though It Lost the War
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Emily Harding, director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the CSIS Defense and Security Department:
* * *
Iran Won the Negotiation, Even Though It Lost the War
The full text of the framework agreement with Iran is now public, and it is lopsided.
There is one piece of good news: Washington and Tehran are publicly describing the same deal. Previous purported agreements in this conflict featured wildly different accounts ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Emily Harding, director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the CSIS Defense and Security Department: * * * Iran Won the Negotiation, Even Though It Lost the War The full text of the framework agreement with Iran is now public, and it is lopsided. There is one piece of good news: Washington and Tehran are publicly describing the same deal. Previous purported agreements in this conflict featured wildly different accountsof what had supposedly been settled, a classic tactic for backing an opponent into a corner publicly in hopes of extracting concessions they never actually made. This time, the two sides agree on what they agreed to. That is a real signal that both sides are ready to be done with the fighting, at least for now.
That is where the good news ends. The deal itself is horrifically lopsided. Iran gets most of what it wants, and it gets it up front--before negotiations on a final deal even start. The United States gets very little. Israel gets even less. And there are still a great many trap doors through which Iran can escape, or through which the whole thing can fall apart.
What Iran Got
The list is long. The framework calls for an end to all military operations, including in Lebanon, which shows up three times in the agreement's first paragraph alone. Most astonishingly, the text commits the parties to "ensuring the territorial integrity of Lebanon"--language Israel will not honor until Hezbollah is fully dismantled and the Lebanese Armed Forces actually control the southern border. That goal is still a long way off, which makes this pledge read more like a wish than a plan.
Israel, notably, is implicitly included in this agreement. The text says the United States, Iran, "and their allies" agree to its terms. But did Israel actually agree to this? This dynamic is a wobbly three-legged stool: The United States wants this over, Iran wants to survive and call it a win, and Israel would prefer to see Iran neutralized and internally divided. These interests are not aligned.
Iran also wins a pledge of noninterference in its internal affairs. Iran always assumes the United States and Israel are working to undermine the regime, so they will have insisted on this line. It gets the immediate end of the U.S. naval blockade, with the American pullback required to be complete within 30 days--meaning Iranian oil starts flowing out and cash starts flowing in almost immediately, with an expectation of roughly status quo ante shipping. Withdrawal of U.S. troops is a bigger one still, even though it belongs to the eventual final deal rather than this interim one: The United States agrees to pull its forces from "the proximity of" Iran within 30 days of that final agreement.
Then there's the money. Iran is in line for an estimated $300 billion in "reconstruction and economic development" funds. This is a tough pill to swallow. But if Iran has any hope of a stable future, some real structural problems need fixing--Tehran is, quite literally, running out of water because of decades of neglected infrastructure. Sanctions relief is a similar story: The United States "undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions," with that one hedge word, "undertakes," doing a lot of work, given how tangled the sanctions regime has become over 20 years. Sanctions relief belongs to the final deal, not this one. Immediate waivers letting Iran sell oil, though, do not wait--more cash for Tehran, starting now. Same with the release of frozen assets, which the text says must be "made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of [Iran]."
What the United States Got
By comparison, this is a short list. Commercial vessels get to transit the Strait of Hormuz "with no charge for 60 days only," and the strait will be cleared of "technical and military obstacles." So, no more threat to commercial shipping--at least for now. The Gulf allies will be thrilled about this one.
Iran also "reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons." But the world has every right to be skeptical of such promises, which have proven hollow in the past.
Then there's the disposition of the enriched uranium, which has long been a U.S. redline. The framework's "minimum methodology" is "downblending on site," meaning Iran keeps control of both the material and the process--including who gets in to help and how. If past International Atomic Energy Agency inspection fights are any indication, this is going to be a mess.
So, What's Left to Negotiate? Plenty.
Once the framework is signed, all fighting stops, including in Lebanon. The naval blockade ends. Shipping moves freely through the strait. Oil waivers go into effect. Frozen assets may or may not start moving. Only then does the 60-day negotiation clock start, and there is still much to negotiate:
* How does the fighting in Lebanon actually end? Can the Lebanese Armed Forces push Hezbollah out of the south--an Israeli redline--and will Israel withdraw all the way up to the Litani River?
* What counts as U.S. troops in the "proximity" of Iran? Does that mean the entire region? Kuwait? Qatar? Does the Fifth Fleet pull out of Bahrain?
* How will the $300 billion in "reconstruction" be spent? There is plenty of room for that money to land in the pockets of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders, who run security in Iran and also happen to own most of its profitable businesses.
* What happens to the enriched uranium, and what does a sustainable end to Iran's nuclear program actually look like? What do inspections look like? Who gets to participate?
* What are the actual "procedures" for releasing frozen Iranian assets?
* How does the UN Security Council pass a binding resolution? Here, again, the United States seems to be speaking for all of the council's permanent members--which may be a rather large assumption. Russia could play spoiler with its veto. And the United States has spent decades insisting it will only be loosely bound by whatever the United Nations decides. In an odd way, this is a retreat for Washington.
The Bottom Line
The United States does get two important things that don't show up anywhere in the text. First, hope for a global economic recovery before the November midterm elections. The administration's political advisers can clearly see the that Americans are feeling gas prices and inflation. Second, Washington patched up its relationship with the Gulf royals. This conflict has been a major loss for them, in lost oil exports now and in the long term. This is the second oil shock in five years, which might be enough to push the world to take real, permanent steps toward renewables.
Iran lost the war but won the negotiation and won it convincingly. Tehran used every economic lever it had and walked away with a phenomenal deal. The next round is the real test: Does Iran try to extract more, or does it negotiate in good faith? Does it use the first exchange of fire in Lebanon as an excuse to walk away, or does it play it well enough to quietly widen the gap between the United States and Israel? The framework answers none of that. Only the opaque decisionmaking of a scattered Iranian regime will decide.
* * *
Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-won-negotiation-even-though-it-lost-war
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Iran Won the Negotiation, Even Though It Lost the War
The full text of the framework agreement with Iran is now public, and it is lopsided.
There is one piece of good news: Washington and Tehran are publicly describing the same deal. Previous purported agreements in this conflict featured wildly different accounts ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Emily Harding, director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the CSIS Defense and Security Department: * * * Iran Won the Negotiation, Even Though It Lost the War The full text of the framework agreement with Iran is now public, and it is lopsided. There is one piece of good news: Washington and Tehran are publicly describing the same deal. Previous purported agreements in this conflict featured wildly different accountsof what had supposedly been settled, a classic tactic for backing an opponent into a corner publicly in hopes of extracting concessions they never actually made. This time, the two sides agree on what they agreed to. That is a real signal that both sides are ready to be done with the fighting, at least for now.
That is where the good news ends. The deal itself is horrifically lopsided. Iran gets most of what it wants, and it gets it up front--before negotiations on a final deal even start. The United States gets very little. Israel gets even less. And there are still a great many trap doors through which Iran can escape, or through which the whole thing can fall apart.
What Iran Got
The list is long. The framework calls for an end to all military operations, including in Lebanon, which shows up three times in the agreement's first paragraph alone. Most astonishingly, the text commits the parties to "ensuring the territorial integrity of Lebanon"--language Israel will not honor until Hezbollah is fully dismantled and the Lebanese Armed Forces actually control the southern border. That goal is still a long way off, which makes this pledge read more like a wish than a plan.
Israel, notably, is implicitly included in this agreement. The text says the United States, Iran, "and their allies" agree to its terms. But did Israel actually agree to this? This dynamic is a wobbly three-legged stool: The United States wants this over, Iran wants to survive and call it a win, and Israel would prefer to see Iran neutralized and internally divided. These interests are not aligned.
Iran also wins a pledge of noninterference in its internal affairs. Iran always assumes the United States and Israel are working to undermine the regime, so they will have insisted on this line. It gets the immediate end of the U.S. naval blockade, with the American pullback required to be complete within 30 days--meaning Iranian oil starts flowing out and cash starts flowing in almost immediately, with an expectation of roughly status quo ante shipping. Withdrawal of U.S. troops is a bigger one still, even though it belongs to the eventual final deal rather than this interim one: The United States agrees to pull its forces from "the proximity of" Iran within 30 days of that final agreement.
Then there's the money. Iran is in line for an estimated $300 billion in "reconstruction and economic development" funds. This is a tough pill to swallow. But if Iran has any hope of a stable future, some real structural problems need fixing--Tehran is, quite literally, running out of water because of decades of neglected infrastructure. Sanctions relief is a similar story: The United States "undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions," with that one hedge word, "undertakes," doing a lot of work, given how tangled the sanctions regime has become over 20 years. Sanctions relief belongs to the final deal, not this one. Immediate waivers letting Iran sell oil, though, do not wait--more cash for Tehran, starting now. Same with the release of frozen assets, which the text says must be "made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of [Iran]."
What the United States Got
By comparison, this is a short list. Commercial vessels get to transit the Strait of Hormuz "with no charge for 60 days only," and the strait will be cleared of "technical and military obstacles." So, no more threat to commercial shipping--at least for now. The Gulf allies will be thrilled about this one.
Iran also "reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons." But the world has every right to be skeptical of such promises, which have proven hollow in the past.
Then there's the disposition of the enriched uranium, which has long been a U.S. redline. The framework's "minimum methodology" is "downblending on site," meaning Iran keeps control of both the material and the process--including who gets in to help and how. If past International Atomic Energy Agency inspection fights are any indication, this is going to be a mess.
So, What's Left to Negotiate? Plenty.
Once the framework is signed, all fighting stops, including in Lebanon. The naval blockade ends. Shipping moves freely through the strait. Oil waivers go into effect. Frozen assets may or may not start moving. Only then does the 60-day negotiation clock start, and there is still much to negotiate:
* How does the fighting in Lebanon actually end? Can the Lebanese Armed Forces push Hezbollah out of the south--an Israeli redline--and will Israel withdraw all the way up to the Litani River?
* What counts as U.S. troops in the "proximity" of Iran? Does that mean the entire region? Kuwait? Qatar? Does the Fifth Fleet pull out of Bahrain?
* How will the $300 billion in "reconstruction" be spent? There is plenty of room for that money to land in the pockets of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders, who run security in Iran and also happen to own most of its profitable businesses.
* What happens to the enriched uranium, and what does a sustainable end to Iran's nuclear program actually look like? What do inspections look like? Who gets to participate?
* What are the actual "procedures" for releasing frozen Iranian assets?
* How does the UN Security Council pass a binding resolution? Here, again, the United States seems to be speaking for all of the council's permanent members--which may be a rather large assumption. Russia could play spoiler with its veto. And the United States has spent decades insisting it will only be loosely bound by whatever the United Nations decides. In an odd way, this is a retreat for Washington.
The Bottom Line
The United States does get two important things that don't show up anywhere in the text. First, hope for a global economic recovery before the November midterm elections. The administration's political advisers can clearly see the that Americans are feeling gas prices and inflation. Second, Washington patched up its relationship with the Gulf royals. This conflict has been a major loss for them, in lost oil exports now and in the long term. This is the second oil shock in five years, which might be enough to push the world to take real, permanent steps toward renewables.
Iran lost the war but won the negotiation and won it convincingly. Tehran used every economic lever it had and walked away with a phenomenal deal. The next round is the real test: Does Iran try to extract more, or does it negotiate in good faith? Does it use the first exchange of fire in Lebanon as an excuse to walk away, or does it play it well enough to quietly widen the gap between the United States and Israel? The framework answers none of that. Only the opaque decisionmaking of a scattered Iranian regime will decide.
* * *
Emily Harding is director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program and vice president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-won-negotiation-even-though-it-lost-war
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: FERC Data Center Orders Accelerate Grid Connection
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Energy and Environmental Policy Director Shuting Pomerleau:
* * *
FERC Data Center Orders Accelerate Grid Connection
Executive Summary
* On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued six tailored orders aimed at drastically accelerating grid interconnection for artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and other large-load energy users; this action, taken under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, fulfills a 2025 request by Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright.
* ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Energy and Environmental Policy Director Shuting Pomerleau: * * * FERC Data Center Orders Accelerate Grid Connection Executive Summary * On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued six tailored orders aimed at drastically accelerating grid interconnection for artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and other large-load energy users; this action, taken under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, fulfills a 2025 request by Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright. *The orders compel regional grid operators to: 1) justify within 60 days why their existing utility pricing structures can accommodate massive data centers, or immediately reform them, and 2) submit a mandatory reliability report within 30 days detailing how they will secure sufficient generation capacity to support large loads; additionally, FERC recommends five categories of potential future reform areas, including prevention of cost shifting.
* FERC's aggressive timelines will likely reshape the AI data center landscape by significantly shortening the multi-year interconnection queue backlog and leading to new retail large-load rate categories in more states; furthermore, by deploying targeted, region-specific orders restricted to FERC's jurisdiction rather than a broad national rulemaking, FERC strategically maximizes its actions' legal durability against potential challenges from state-level stakeholders.
-
Introduction
On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an agency that "regulates the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, and electricity," issued tailored orders under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act to each U.S. regional grid operator. This historic action directly fulfills a 2025 request submitted by Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Chris Wright that aimed to drastically accelerate grid interconnection for large-load energy users--specifically AI data centers--amid unprecedented energy demand.
The FERC orders compel regional grid operators to: 1) justify within 60 days why their existing utility pricing structures can accommodate massive data centers, or they must immediately reform them, and 2) submit a mandatory reliability report within 30 days detailing how they will secure sufficient generation capacity to support large loads; additionally, FERC recommends five categories of potential future reform areas.
FERC's aggressive timelines will likely reshape the AI data center landscape by significantly shortening the multi-year interconnection queue backlog and leading to new retail large-load rate categories in more states; furthermore, by deploying targeted, region-specific orders restricted to FERC's jurisdiction rather than a broad national rulemaking, FERC strategically maximizes its actions' legal durability against potential challenges from state-level stakeholders.
FERC's New Orders to the Six Regional Grid Operators
Overview
FERC has launched "aggressive targeted action" to speed up large load interconnection to the grid following its June 18, 2026, open meeting. The action addresses how large-load energy users, including AI data centers and manufacturing facilities, are connected to the grid. This action is a direct response to DOE's request filed last year (discussion in the background section below).
To many experts' surprise, instead of issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) that typically takes a long time to finalize, FERC has issued customized show cause orders via Section 206 of the Federal Power Act to each of the six regional grid operators. FERC's press release states that these orders are aimed at "moving to ensure that Americans have reliable, affordable power--even as electricity demand and technology accelerates."
These regional transmission organizations (RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs) are PJM, Interconnection, LLC, Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP), California Independent System Operator Corporation, ISO New England Inc., and New York Independent System Operator, Inc..
Specifically, these tailored orders direct the regional grid operators to:
* Justify or reform--FERC has ordered the operators to either justify why their existing tariffs (utility fees/pricing structures) remain "just and reasonable without provisions tailored to large loads," within a 60-day period or to "to file tariff changes that address the issues the Commission identified."
* Address five categories of reform--FERC has requested they address several reform areas, including 1) developing efficient transmission services, 2) preventing cost shifting and requiring transparency into transmission costs, 3) accommodating co-location agreements (building a power plant next to an AI data center) and behind-the-meter generation (off-grid operation), 4) providing new transmission services for flexible large loads, and 5) developing a process to study generation plants that power large load users.
* Submit informational reports--Within 30 days, FERC ordered that each grid operator and its transmission owners must submit a report "describing how the grid operator intends to ensure that adequate generation will be available to serve existing and new large loads."
Background
On October 23, 2025, DOE Secretary Wright requested that FERC consider an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANOPR) regarding the connection of large electrical loads--specifically those exceeding 20 megawatts (MW), such as the energy demanded by AI data centers--to the interstate transmission system.
Although FERC is an independent agency, Secretary Wright invoked a rarely deployed legal authority via Section 403 of the Department of Energy Organization Act to make the request to the agency.
The request asked FERC to assert its jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of electricity at wholesale in interstate commerce." DOE also recommended FERC consider a set of principles to ensure "large loads, including AI data centers, served by public utilities must be able to connect to the transmission system in a timely, orderly, and non-discriminatory manner."
Potential Implications
FERC's actions have significant implications for stakeholders including utilities, state utility regulators, data center developers, transmission providers, and other large industrial or commercial energy users.
Much-shorter regulatory timelines for large load interconnection
If FERC had issued a NOPR rather than targeted orders, it would likely take the agency 2-5 years to draft, review public comments, and finalize the rule. Instead, FERC has issued six different tailored orders to the regional grid operators requiring them to move relatively quickly to connect large loads to their grid. The 30-day and 60-day deadlines in the orders demonstrate the agency's acknowledgement of the importance of the issue and recognition of the need for swift solutions.
Notably, FERC highlights in its factsheet that SPP, the RTO that manages states in the Central and Western United States, "stands out with its High Impact Large Load and High Impact Large Load Generation Assessment processes," highlighting it as a potential model for other regional grid operators.
Currently, it typically takes at least 5 years for large-scale energy users (200+ MW load) to be connected to the grid from initial submission of the interconnection request to the energy user connecting to the grid and beginning commercial operation. This means that under the existing framework and processes, it would take AI data centers at least 5 years to gain access to power from the grid to begin commercial operation.
FERC's orders today will likely lead to highly compressed regulatory timelines for AI data centers to be connected to the grid after regional grid operators and state regulators reform the existing processes and requirements.
New rate classes for AI data centers likely ahead
The "justify or reform" order from FERC will likely lead more states to create a new utility rate class for large-load customers, especially AI data centers, to prevent utility rate spikes in the residential sector.
For example, Virginia's state corporation commission (SCC)--a regulator of utilities--has approved a new electricity rate for large-scale customers including AI data centers that will start in January 2027. Under this new framework, affected customers must pay for at least 85 percent of contracted distribution and transmission demand and 60 percent of generation demand. American Action Forum (AAF)'s previous insight provides a detailed analysis of this new rate class. Under FERC's new orders, it's likely some states will follow Virginia's lead to create a sperate rate class for large-load customers.
Bulletproofing potential legal challenges from state and local entities
FERC has taken a strategic preemption approach to avoid legal challenges and pushbacks from state-level stakeholders.
Before this meeting, legal experts had regarded anticipating federal versus state jurisdiction as the key point of contention for FERC's pending action. The Federal Power Act gives FERC authority over the management of interstate transmission and the wholesale market, and leaves the matters of retail sales, local distribution, and siting to the states. Historically, FERC standardized how generators connect to the grid, while leaving the rules for end-use load interconnections to be managed by states through retail tariffs (pricing related to the transmission and distribution of electricity) and local distribution planning.
Legal experts believed that a uniform national standardization of processes issued by FERC would be subject to litigation from state and local stakeholders on the grounds of federal overreach on state authority. In fact, state-level stakeholders such as the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC)--an organization representing state utility regulators, and the Virginia SCC filed official comments with FERC highlighting the problems of a national standardization of large-load interconnection.
On April 13, 2026, NARUC filed a public comment with FERC to urge the agency not to encroach upon state jurisdiction to regulate the local electricity market. Specifically, the document stated
Federal regulation of large load interconnections will impede states' abilities to (i) adapt quickly to industry changes or region-specific challenges as they emerge, and (ii) adequately protect the affordability of service to other retail customers.
FERC's orders appear to reshape the landscape with regard to AI energy load while avoiding any questions or challenges on the basis of jurisdiction. Taking into account the comments and concerns from state-level stakeholders, FERC explicitly stated that it respects states' jurisdiction in today's orders:
Importantly, nothing in today's orders intrudes either on the authority of states to select, site, and permit generating resources or on the authority of state public utility commissions to set the rates, terms, and conditions of retail sales of electricity. The orders also make clear that the Commission acts today to guard against cost shifting among transmission customers but leaves to the states the responsibility to ensure that there is no cost shifting among retail customers.
In addition, today's orders are not intended to disrupt existing agreements that large loads have negotiated, or are in the process of negotiating, for the provision of transmission service. These orders provide that the RTOs/ISOs should allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize agreements that are nearing completion when any tariff revisions are filed with the Commission.
Other Major Federal Energy Policy Response to AI Data Center Boom
These FERC orders represent a significant reform of federal policy affecting the AI data center buildout, but they are far from the only such measures. The Trump Administration has adopted several measures aimed at promoting AI data center development in the country:
* In July 2025, the administration released a document titled "Winning the Race, America's AI Action Plan" outlining the U.S. strategy of boosting AI and AI data center development in the United States. The action plan includes steps to support innovation, infrastructure, security, and other items. AAF's insight provided an overview of the action plan.
* In January 2026, the administration reached an agreement with a bipartisan group of governors to direct PJM to hold an emergency electricity auction to make tech companies pay for the construction of new power plants, which aims to ensure the rapid expansion of AI data centers does not increase electricity costs for residential customers.
Looking Forward
As the 30-day and 60-day deadlines in FERC's orders approach, it will be critical to monitor how the six regional grid operators structurally reshape their transmission pricing structures to strike a balance between meeting AI data centers' demand and protecting residential customers' utility bills from spiking.
At the same time, state utility commissions are likely to use this compliance period to accelerate their own local distribution and retail rate reforms, potentially using Virginia's landmark 2027 rate structure as a blueprint.
It remains to be seen whether FERC's orders will allow the U.S. grid to successfully accommodate the AI boom without sacrificing long-term reliability and affordability for residential ratepayers.
* * *
Shuting Pomerleau is the Director of Energy and Environmental Policy at the American Action Forum
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/ferc-data-center-orders-accelerate-grid-connection/
[Category: Think Tank]
* * *
FERC Data Center Orders Accelerate Grid Connection
Executive Summary
* On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued six tailored orders aimed at drastically accelerating grid interconnection for artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and other large-load energy users; this action, taken under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, fulfills a 2025 request by Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright.
* ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Energy and Environmental Policy Director Shuting Pomerleau: * * * FERC Data Center Orders Accelerate Grid Connection Executive Summary * On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued six tailored orders aimed at drastically accelerating grid interconnection for artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and other large-load energy users; this action, taken under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, fulfills a 2025 request by Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright. *The orders compel regional grid operators to: 1) justify within 60 days why their existing utility pricing structures can accommodate massive data centers, or immediately reform them, and 2) submit a mandatory reliability report within 30 days detailing how they will secure sufficient generation capacity to support large loads; additionally, FERC recommends five categories of potential future reform areas, including prevention of cost shifting.
* FERC's aggressive timelines will likely reshape the AI data center landscape by significantly shortening the multi-year interconnection queue backlog and leading to new retail large-load rate categories in more states; furthermore, by deploying targeted, region-specific orders restricted to FERC's jurisdiction rather than a broad national rulemaking, FERC strategically maximizes its actions' legal durability against potential challenges from state-level stakeholders.
-
Introduction
On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an agency that "regulates the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, and electricity," issued tailored orders under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act to each U.S. regional grid operator. This historic action directly fulfills a 2025 request submitted by Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Chris Wright that aimed to drastically accelerate grid interconnection for large-load energy users--specifically AI data centers--amid unprecedented energy demand.
The FERC orders compel regional grid operators to: 1) justify within 60 days why their existing utility pricing structures can accommodate massive data centers, or they must immediately reform them, and 2) submit a mandatory reliability report within 30 days detailing how they will secure sufficient generation capacity to support large loads; additionally, FERC recommends five categories of potential future reform areas.
FERC's aggressive timelines will likely reshape the AI data center landscape by significantly shortening the multi-year interconnection queue backlog and leading to new retail large-load rate categories in more states; furthermore, by deploying targeted, region-specific orders restricted to FERC's jurisdiction rather than a broad national rulemaking, FERC strategically maximizes its actions' legal durability against potential challenges from state-level stakeholders.
FERC's New Orders to the Six Regional Grid Operators
Overview
FERC has launched "aggressive targeted action" to speed up large load interconnection to the grid following its June 18, 2026, open meeting. The action addresses how large-load energy users, including AI data centers and manufacturing facilities, are connected to the grid. This action is a direct response to DOE's request filed last year (discussion in the background section below).
To many experts' surprise, instead of issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) that typically takes a long time to finalize, FERC has issued customized show cause orders via Section 206 of the Federal Power Act to each of the six regional grid operators. FERC's press release states that these orders are aimed at "moving to ensure that Americans have reliable, affordable power--even as electricity demand and technology accelerates."
These regional transmission organizations (RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs) are PJM, Interconnection, LLC, Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP), California Independent System Operator Corporation, ISO New England Inc., and New York Independent System Operator, Inc..
Specifically, these tailored orders direct the regional grid operators to:
* Justify or reform--FERC has ordered the operators to either justify why their existing tariffs (utility fees/pricing structures) remain "just and reasonable without provisions tailored to large loads," within a 60-day period or to "to file tariff changes that address the issues the Commission identified."
* Address five categories of reform--FERC has requested they address several reform areas, including 1) developing efficient transmission services, 2) preventing cost shifting and requiring transparency into transmission costs, 3) accommodating co-location agreements (building a power plant next to an AI data center) and behind-the-meter generation (off-grid operation), 4) providing new transmission services for flexible large loads, and 5) developing a process to study generation plants that power large load users.
* Submit informational reports--Within 30 days, FERC ordered that each grid operator and its transmission owners must submit a report "describing how the grid operator intends to ensure that adequate generation will be available to serve existing and new large loads."
Background
On October 23, 2025, DOE Secretary Wright requested that FERC consider an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANOPR) regarding the connection of large electrical loads--specifically those exceeding 20 megawatts (MW), such as the energy demanded by AI data centers--to the interstate transmission system.
Although FERC is an independent agency, Secretary Wright invoked a rarely deployed legal authority via Section 403 of the Department of Energy Organization Act to make the request to the agency.
The request asked FERC to assert its jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of electricity at wholesale in interstate commerce." DOE also recommended FERC consider a set of principles to ensure "large loads, including AI data centers, served by public utilities must be able to connect to the transmission system in a timely, orderly, and non-discriminatory manner."
Potential Implications
FERC's actions have significant implications for stakeholders including utilities, state utility regulators, data center developers, transmission providers, and other large industrial or commercial energy users.
Much-shorter regulatory timelines for large load interconnection
If FERC had issued a NOPR rather than targeted orders, it would likely take the agency 2-5 years to draft, review public comments, and finalize the rule. Instead, FERC has issued six different tailored orders to the regional grid operators requiring them to move relatively quickly to connect large loads to their grid. The 30-day and 60-day deadlines in the orders demonstrate the agency's acknowledgement of the importance of the issue and recognition of the need for swift solutions.
Notably, FERC highlights in its factsheet that SPP, the RTO that manages states in the Central and Western United States, "stands out with its High Impact Large Load and High Impact Large Load Generation Assessment processes," highlighting it as a potential model for other regional grid operators.
Currently, it typically takes at least 5 years for large-scale energy users (200+ MW load) to be connected to the grid from initial submission of the interconnection request to the energy user connecting to the grid and beginning commercial operation. This means that under the existing framework and processes, it would take AI data centers at least 5 years to gain access to power from the grid to begin commercial operation.
FERC's orders today will likely lead to highly compressed regulatory timelines for AI data centers to be connected to the grid after regional grid operators and state regulators reform the existing processes and requirements.
New rate classes for AI data centers likely ahead
The "justify or reform" order from FERC will likely lead more states to create a new utility rate class for large-load customers, especially AI data centers, to prevent utility rate spikes in the residential sector.
For example, Virginia's state corporation commission (SCC)--a regulator of utilities--has approved a new electricity rate for large-scale customers including AI data centers that will start in January 2027. Under this new framework, affected customers must pay for at least 85 percent of contracted distribution and transmission demand and 60 percent of generation demand. American Action Forum (AAF)'s previous insight provides a detailed analysis of this new rate class. Under FERC's new orders, it's likely some states will follow Virginia's lead to create a sperate rate class for large-load customers.
Bulletproofing potential legal challenges from state and local entities
FERC has taken a strategic preemption approach to avoid legal challenges and pushbacks from state-level stakeholders.
Before this meeting, legal experts had regarded anticipating federal versus state jurisdiction as the key point of contention for FERC's pending action. The Federal Power Act gives FERC authority over the management of interstate transmission and the wholesale market, and leaves the matters of retail sales, local distribution, and siting to the states. Historically, FERC standardized how generators connect to the grid, while leaving the rules for end-use load interconnections to be managed by states through retail tariffs (pricing related to the transmission and distribution of electricity) and local distribution planning.
Legal experts believed that a uniform national standardization of processes issued by FERC would be subject to litigation from state and local stakeholders on the grounds of federal overreach on state authority. In fact, state-level stakeholders such as the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC)--an organization representing state utility regulators, and the Virginia SCC filed official comments with FERC highlighting the problems of a national standardization of large-load interconnection.
On April 13, 2026, NARUC filed a public comment with FERC to urge the agency not to encroach upon state jurisdiction to regulate the local electricity market. Specifically, the document stated
Federal regulation of large load interconnections will impede states' abilities to (i) adapt quickly to industry changes or region-specific challenges as they emerge, and (ii) adequately protect the affordability of service to other retail customers.
FERC's orders appear to reshape the landscape with regard to AI energy load while avoiding any questions or challenges on the basis of jurisdiction. Taking into account the comments and concerns from state-level stakeholders, FERC explicitly stated that it respects states' jurisdiction in today's orders:
Importantly, nothing in today's orders intrudes either on the authority of states to select, site, and permit generating resources or on the authority of state public utility commissions to set the rates, terms, and conditions of retail sales of electricity. The orders also make clear that the Commission acts today to guard against cost shifting among transmission customers but leaves to the states the responsibility to ensure that there is no cost shifting among retail customers.
In addition, today's orders are not intended to disrupt existing agreements that large loads have negotiated, or are in the process of negotiating, for the provision of transmission service. These orders provide that the RTOs/ISOs should allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize agreements that are nearing completion when any tariff revisions are filed with the Commission.
Other Major Federal Energy Policy Response to AI Data Center Boom
These FERC orders represent a significant reform of federal policy affecting the AI data center buildout, but they are far from the only such measures. The Trump Administration has adopted several measures aimed at promoting AI data center development in the country:
* In July 2025, the administration released a document titled "Winning the Race, America's AI Action Plan" outlining the U.S. strategy of boosting AI and AI data center development in the United States. The action plan includes steps to support innovation, infrastructure, security, and other items. AAF's insight provided an overview of the action plan.
* In January 2026, the administration reached an agreement with a bipartisan group of governors to direct PJM to hold an emergency electricity auction to make tech companies pay for the construction of new power plants, which aims to ensure the rapid expansion of AI data centers does not increase electricity costs for residential customers.
Looking Forward
As the 30-day and 60-day deadlines in FERC's orders approach, it will be critical to monitor how the six regional grid operators structurally reshape their transmission pricing structures to strike a balance between meeting AI data centers' demand and protecting residential customers' utility bills from spiking.
At the same time, state utility commissions are likely to use this compliance period to accelerate their own local distribution and retail rate reforms, potentially using Virginia's landmark 2027 rate structure as a blueprint.
It remains to be seen whether FERC's orders will allow the U.S. grid to successfully accommodate the AI boom without sacrificing long-term reliability and affordability for residential ratepayers.
* * *
Shuting Pomerleau is the Director of Energy and Environmental Policy at the American Action Forum
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/ferc-data-center-orders-accelerate-grid-connection/
[Category: Think Tank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to The Critic: Towards an Allied Civil Society Network in Europe
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on June 18, 2026, by civilizational action fellow Kristen Ziccarelli to The Critic:
* * *
Towards an allied civil society network in Europe
It's now no secret that part of the Trump Administration's strategy towards Europe includes reorienting elements of its foreign funding architecture toward civil society. Reversing Europe's "civilizational erasure" from a top-down policy perspective has its limits; but what Secretary Rubio has realized is that it requires engagement at the level where ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on June 18, 2026, by civilizational action fellow Kristen Ziccarelli to The Critic: * * * Towards an allied civil society network in Europe It's now no secret that part of the Trump Administration's strategy towards Europe includes reorienting elements of its foreign funding architecture toward civil society. Reversing Europe's "civilizational erasure" from a top-down policy perspective has its limits; but what Secretary Rubio has realized is that it requires engagement at the level whereideas are formed, advocated for, and normalized in both government and among average citizens.
Civil society is the place where culture meets politics, where narratives take root and ideas are normalized or shunned. For decades, American funding -- both governmental and private -- has flowed into European civil society with a strong ideologically Leftist tilt. Progressive, Marxist, and anti-American organizations, backed by networks such as George Soros's Open Society Foundations as well as funding streams connected to USAID and other U.S. government entities, have played an outsized role in shaping advocacy landscapes across the continent. Much of this came to light early 2025 when the White House published a list of some of the most egregious projects like $1.5 million to "advance diversity equity and inclusion in Serbia's workplaces and business communities" and "$70,000 for production of a "DEI musical" in Ireland."
Though important to point out that not every single previous funding project was harmful, the bottom line is that for decades, American taxpayers were financially supporting initiatives aligned with expansive interpretations of social policy, identity politics, and ruinous cultural transformation.
In practice, this support has been so overwhelming that it has marginalized the comparatively underfunded alternative viewpoints in European societies -- particularly those that are Christian, conservative and patriotic.
To read the full article, click here (https://thecritic.co.uk/towards-an-allied-civil-society-network-in-europe/).
* * *
Kristen Ziccarelli serves as a Fellow for Civilizational Action at the America First Policy Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/towards-an-allied-civil-society-network-in-europe
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Towards an allied civil society network in Europe
It's now no secret that part of the Trump Administration's strategy towards Europe includes reorienting elements of its foreign funding architecture toward civil society. Reversing Europe's "civilizational erasure" from a top-down policy perspective has its limits; but what Secretary Rubio has realized is that it requires engagement at the level where ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on June 18, 2026, by civilizational action fellow Kristen Ziccarelli to The Critic: * * * Towards an allied civil society network in Europe It's now no secret that part of the Trump Administration's strategy towards Europe includes reorienting elements of its foreign funding architecture toward civil society. Reversing Europe's "civilizational erasure" from a top-down policy perspective has its limits; but what Secretary Rubio has realized is that it requires engagement at the level whereideas are formed, advocated for, and normalized in both government and among average citizens.
Civil society is the place where culture meets politics, where narratives take root and ideas are normalized or shunned. For decades, American funding -- both governmental and private -- has flowed into European civil society with a strong ideologically Leftist tilt. Progressive, Marxist, and anti-American organizations, backed by networks such as George Soros's Open Society Foundations as well as funding streams connected to USAID and other U.S. government entities, have played an outsized role in shaping advocacy landscapes across the continent. Much of this came to light early 2025 when the White House published a list of some of the most egregious projects like $1.5 million to "advance diversity equity and inclusion in Serbia's workplaces and business communities" and "$70,000 for production of a "DEI musical" in Ireland."
Though important to point out that not every single previous funding project was harmful, the bottom line is that for decades, American taxpayers were financially supporting initiatives aligned with expansive interpretations of social policy, identity politics, and ruinous cultural transformation.
In practice, this support has been so overwhelming that it has marginalized the comparatively underfunded alternative viewpoints in European societies -- particularly those that are Christian, conservative and patriotic.
To read the full article, click here (https://thecritic.co.uk/towards-an-allied-civil-society-network-in-europe/).
* * *
Kristen Ziccarelli serves as a Fellow for Civilizational Action at the America First Policy Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/towards-an-allied-civil-society-network-in-europe
[Category: ThinkTank]