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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Nearly a Million Tajiks Have Taken Russian Citizenship Affecting Both Countries
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 23, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Nearly a Million Tajiks Have Taken Russian Citizenship Affecting Both Countries
Executive Summary:
* More than 800,000 Tajiks have acquired Russian citizenship over the last decade. Most have taken advantage of the right to dual citizenship that a 1995 accord uniquely allows among the countries of the former Soviet space.
* This arrangement has limited Moscow's ability to restrict
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 23, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Nearly a Million Tajiks Have Taken Russian Citizenship Affecting Both Countries
Executive Summary:
* More than 800,000 Tajiks have acquired Russian citizenship over the last decade. Most have taken advantage of the right to dual citizenship that a 1995 accord uniquely allows among the countries of the former Soviet space.
* This arrangement has limited Moscow's ability to restrictunpopular immigration and is even changing the country's ethnic mix. Dual citizenship simultaneously poses a challenge to Tajikistan's independence from Moscow's control.
* Some in both countries now want that arrangement canceled. The Kremlin remains largely opposed, since abrogation would represent a retreat from Russian President Vladimir Putin's desire to maintain Russian influence in Central Asia and his drive to reintegrate the former Soviet space.
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More than 800,000 Tajiks have acquired Russian citizenship over the past decade, with many taking advantage of the 1995 Dual Citizenship Agreement between Dushanbe and Moscow. This is a unique agreement in the post-Soviet space that allows citizens of both countries to retain dual citizenship (Garant Company, September 7, 1995; APN Northwest, July 17). This arrangement has limited Moscow's ability to restrict ever more unpopular immigration from Central Asia while contributing to demographic changes in some cities and regions. Tajiks' ability to obtain Russian citizenship with relative ease represents a continuing challenge to Tajikistan's independence from Russian control (A Just Russia, August 4, 2023; Sputnik Russia, July 14).
Many Tajiks benefit from remittances and many Russian businesses rely on their labor. [1] Demands to end the dual-citizenship arrangement, however, have emerged in both countries (see EDM, May 9, 2024; Rhythm of Eurasia, December 8, 2025; Sputnik Russia, July 14). The Kremlin opposes such a move for now, as Russian businesses continue to rely on migrant labor and the abrogation of the arrangement would signal a retreat from Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to maintain Russian influence in Central Asia and reintegrate the former Soviet space (Charter 97, August 1, 2025; Novye Izvestia, October 17, 2025; Govorit NeMoskva, March 23).
Moscow and Dushanbe agreed in 1995 that citizens of their countries could obtain the other's citizenship through a simple application. This created the first, and to date only, arrangement in the former Soviet space, despite Moscow's hopes that it would serve as a model for Russia's relations with other post-Soviet states (Window on Eurasia, December 12, 2025). Since then, Tajiks have flooded into the Russian Federation in large numbers, becoming the largest Central Asian immigrant community in the country. Many have obtained Russian citizenship, as permitted under the 1995 accord, limiting Moscow's ability to regulate Tajik migrants in the same manner as other foreign nationals and giving Dushanbe a stronger position to protest (Window on Eurasia, August 11, 2024).
In response, the Russian authorities have often reduced repressive measures against Tajiks. They have even allowed Tajik police officers to operate in Russian cities and work with immigrants from that Central Asian country, a growing share of whom have acquired Russian citizenship (National Accent, October 20, 2025). The total number of ethnic Tajiks in Russia appears to have stabilized or declined amid rising anti-immigrant attitudes and attacks (Rhythm of Eurasia, August 12, 2024). The number of Tajiks who have acquired Russian citizenship and remained in the country has not fallen significantly, making this a political issue, particularly given the sharp decline in the number of foreigners obtaining Russian citizenship since Putin began his war against Ukraine in 2022. In that year, almost 700,000 foreigners obtained Russian citizenship, and last year, only 152,400 did so (Govorit NeMoskva, March 23).
The scale of Tajikistan's deepening citizenship ties with Russia was underscored this month when Tajik officials announced that more than 800,000 Tajiks had acquired Russian citizenship over the past decade, including 120,000 in the last two years alone. This figure was previously cited by Russian Ambassador to Tajikistan Semyon Grigoryev (Sputnik Tajikistan, July 14). Perhaps sensing Tajik concerns about what this pattern means, those officials went out of their way to emphasize that Tajikistan was not losing these citizens either as a source of remittances to relatives at home or as members in good standing of the Tajik nation (Sputnik Tajikistan, July 14; APN Northwest, July 17). These assurances have exacerbated concerns among ordinary Russians, as well as many commentators, officials, and politicians, about Tajik immigration and Tajiks becoming Russian citizens (Window on Eurasia, December 12, 2025). Tensions have resulted in clashes between Russians and Tajiks in Moscow and other Russian cities, as well as growing anger over perceptions that Tajiks living in Russia are taking economic opportunities from Russians and marrying ethnic Russians, thus further diluting, in the minds of some, the Russianness of the Russian Federation (Window on Eurasia, August 10, 2019, February 6).
One of the clearest expressions of such attitudes came in recent years from Sergey Mironov, the head of the Just Russia-Patriots-For Truth Party, who said that the influx of Tajiks and their acquisition of Russian citizenship threaten the unity of the Russian Federation and are contributing to what he called "the Tajikification of Russia" (A Just Russia, August 4, 2023). "Yes, the population of Russia is declining," Mironov said in 2023, "but it is reckless to solve one problem while creating another. Or do we not care what is behind the growth of migration and the kind of citizens we get? It seems that everyone agrees the country needs highly qualified personnel who are close to us in culture, language, and mentality and who share our values. But in fact," he continued, "we are getting people from Tajikistan who, with all due respect, do not." To stop what he sees as a threat to Russian identity, Mironov calls for far stricter controls on granting citizenship to individuals from Tajikistan and Central Asia and even for imposing criminal sanctions on immigration officials who fail to enforce standards. Mironov's remarks reflect broader anti-migrant sentiment in Russia, where recent polling shows significant support for tighter immigration controls (A Just Russia, August 4, 2023; Levada Center, April 2025). Other Russian commentators and politicians have said much the same thing, including some who are outraged that Tajiks with two passports can move back and forth between countries to avoid paying Russian taxes or serving in the Russian army and who warn that the increasing number of Tajiks with Russian citizenship may lead them to demand the creation of a Tajik republic within the Russian Federation (Rhythm of Eurasia, December 8, 2025).
Dushanbe's discussion of the impact of Tajiks taking Russian citizenship shows that some in Tajikistan oppose emigration to Russia and, especially, the idea that Tajiks should change their citizenship (Sputnik Tajikistan, July 14). Most Tajiks recognize how important remittance payments are to their country's welfare and even survival, and are thus unlikely to challenge the status quo (Window on Eurasia, April 3, 2024). The situation in the Russian Federation is more complicated, making the fate of the dual citizenship arrangement more difficult to predict. Many Russians are alarmed by the influx of Tajiks and other Central Asians and especially by the possibility that these arrivals will follow the example of Tajiks by obtaining Russian citizenship and remaining permanently in the country (Rhythm of Eurasia, June 21, 2026). Russia's political and business elites, while concerned about such attitudes and about declines in both the population and the share of ethnic Russians within it, clearly fear roiling the waters by abandoning the 1995 agreement, and their voices will almost certainly prove decisive (Govorit NeMoskva, March 23). The political elite does not want to alienate Central Asians further or kill what it views as a precedent for a newly reintegrated Russian empire (Altyn-Orda, January 24, 2026). The business elite recognizes that it faces a difficult future without the ability to attract and retain Central Asian workers, something that the 1995 accord clearly helps it to do (Parliamentary Newspaper, April 19, 2024; Information Agency REX, August 29, 2025). The 1995 accord will therefore likely remain on the books, while the Russian authorities will do what they can bureaucratically to limit not so much the number of new Tajik immigrants as the number who choose to take Russian citizenship.
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Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/nearly-a-million-tajiks-have-taken-russian-citizenship-affecting-both-countries/
[Category: ThinkTank]
ICTD and Zambia Revenue Authority Host Future of Tax Reform Forum in Lusaka
BRIGHTON, England, July 24 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news on July 23, 2026:
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ICTD and Zambia Revenue Authority host Future of Tax Reform forum in Lusaka
Over 100 researchers, government officials, and civil society representatives from across Africa and beyond gathered in Lusaka on July 14 -15 for the Forum on the Future of Tax Reform. Co-hosted by the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) and the Zambia Revenue
... Show Full Article
BRIGHTON, England, July 24 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news on July 23, 2026:
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ICTD and Zambia Revenue Authority host Future of Tax Reform forum in Lusaka
Over 100 researchers, government officials, and civil society representatives from across Africa and beyond gathered in Lusaka on July 14 -15 for the Forum on the Future of Tax Reform. Co-hosted by the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) and the Zambia RevenueAuthority (ZRA), the two-day event focused on identifying effective and equitable strategies for tax reform.
The timing itself is significant as African countries grapple with a financing gap exacerbated by drastic cuts to international aid and debt servicing costs.
Indeed, in his opening remarks, Richard Kapasa, speaking on behalf of Commissioner General, Dingani Banda, emphasised the pressing need for an evidence-based approach, stating:
"As revenue authorities, we are tasked with mobilising more domestic revenue and strengthening tax compliance. But we also have a responsibility to improve taxpayer services, harness new technologies and maintain public confidence. We know that data and research have a vital role in informing our decisions on the evidence of what works best for both the government and taxpayers."
Creating a space for exchange and collaboration around tax reform
For her part, ICTD Executive Director, Giulia Mascagni, highlighted the collaborative aspect of the Forum, saying:
"By bringing together policymakers, researchers, practitioners, civil society actors, and development partners, we hope the Forum will create space for open and candid exchange, strengthen connections and learning across the tax community, and help shape future research, collaboration, and the next generation of tax reforms."
To address the various dimensions of future tax reform, the Forum was organised around four critical working groups. Together, these groups examined what "taxing smarter" requires in practice: the institutions driving reform, the political pressures shaping possibilities, the data systems enabling better administration, and the policy choices determining the distribution of the tax burden.
Across the two days, these participatory sessions were complemented by three plenary conversations designed to connect insights across themes, clarify shared priorities, and develop practical pathways for future collaboration. One outcome of the Forum was a clearer and more practical direction for the next phase of the Coalition on Tax Expenditure Reform's work, launched last year at the International Financing for Development Conference by ICTD and four other organisations. The discussion helped refine the Coalition's minimum reporting standards as well as the structure and target audience of its upcoming online course. It also reinforcing the need to connect technical work on tax expenditures with governance, oversight and political engagement.
New MOU seals ICTD and ZRA partnership
Mascagni also announced further collaboration between ICTD and ZRA: "It is no accident that we are here in Zambia, talking about the value of research and evidence for tax policy and practice. ICTD is collaborating with ZRA on research projects that are practical and aim to address pressing policy and administrative questions and has just finalised a new MOU which we will sign here in Lusaka. I am delighted to support the ZRA with this new partnership as it grows its capacity to produce robust research and use it to inform decisions," she said.
After the Forum concluded, ICTD and ZRA officially signed the memorandum of understanding (MOU) at the ZRA offices, formalising a long-term research partnership.
In addition to strengthening research capacity through training and producing empirical data evidence to inform decision-making, the MOU builds on a recent engagement between the two organisations on the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) in tax administration. From the ICTD side, this work falls under a broader thematic area on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and Taxation and will be led by Research Fellow Awa Diouf.
"Collaborating with ZRA's new AI unit has been a fantastic opportunity to see how DPI can practically improve tax administration. One clear takeaway is that AI isn't a standalone technology. It depends on the systems, institutions and governance around it. Our goal is to ensure that any new reforms are transparent, efficient, and tailored to the specific needs of the Zambian context," she said.
How can Zambia make better use of the data already collected: building an evidence ecosystem for tax reform
Earlier, ICTD supported ZRA ton the organisation of a half-day session on the role of evidence, administrative data and research partnerships in strengthening tax policy and administration in Zambia.
The event built on the recent launch of the ZRA Secure Data Lab and gathered a diverse group of stakeholders, including representatives from local research think tanks, civil society organisations, universities, postgraduate student representatives, government representatives and private sector actors. This wide participation reflected the purpose of the session: to integrate the Data Lab in the broader national evidence ecosystem and reflect on lessons from other African revenue authorities.
ICTD Senior Research Fellow, Giovanni Occhiali, who supported the organisation of the event, remarked:
"This day was a vital step in ensuring that the wealth of data held by the Authority isn't just an academic resource, but a practical tool for development. By integrating the Secure Data Lab into the national research ecosystem, we are assisting Zambian researchers and students in helping address local policy challenges through rigorous, data-driven analysis."
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Original text here: https://www.ictd.ac/news/ictd-and-zambia-revenue-authority-partner-to-drive-evidence-based-tax-reform-in-lusaka/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Ukraine Military Situation Report on July 22, 2026
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 22, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Can Kasapoglu:
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Ukraine Military Situation Report | July 22
Executive Summary
* Battlefield assessment. Russia sustained its offensive pressure with a heightened operational tempo. Moscow likely controls over half of the contested city of Kostiantynivka.
* Ukrainian air operations. In the first such kill of the war, Ukrainian F-16s downed a Russian Su-35 air-superiority
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 22, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Can Kasapoglu:
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Ukraine Military Situation Report | July 22
Executive Summary
* Battlefield assessment. Russia sustained its offensive pressure with a heightened operational tempo. Moscow likely controls over half of the contested city of Kostiantynivka.
* Ukrainian air operations. In the first such kill of the war, Ukrainian F-16s downed a Russian Su-35 air-superioritycombat aircraft.
* A reshuffle in Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine after Ukrainians protested the firing of the country's defense minister.
* Drone innovations. Ukraine began using aerial drones to airlift unmanned ground vehicles across difficult terrain, testing a hybrid concept that could further change the face of warfare.
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1. Battlefield Assessment
The operational tempo remained heightened across the battlespace last week, as Russia and Ukraine waged between 200 and 250 tactical clashes each day. The Ukrainian cities of Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Huliaipole, Pokrovsk, Lyman, and Kostiantynivka continued to absorb the bulk of Russia's offensive push.
Declassified intelligence from the United Kingdom revealed that Russia's chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, reportedly briefed Russian President Vladimir Putin three weeks ago that Moscow's forces had fully captured Kostiantynivka. The city is a strategically important component of Ukraine's so-called fortress belt, a heavily fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast. Its capture would carry significant military implications, providing Russia with a potential launching point for further operations against the remaining fortress belt cities of Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk.
While available evidence suggests it is highly unlikely that Russian forces have established complete control over the city, Kostiantynivka remains heavily contested. Open-source visuals suggest that Ukraine is using mostly unmanned systems to run supplies to its frontline troops. Combat footage also highlighted the intense urban fighting raging in the city. Russian troops most likely occupy slightly more than half of the metropolitan area.
Marking a turning point in the air war, General Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, announced that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter had shot down a Russian Su-35 air-superiority aircraft. General Caine's announcement likely confirms a July 8 announcement by the Ukrainian Air Force.
In related operational news, Ukraine's General Staff reported that the country's 15th Separate Artillery Reconnaissance Brigade struck a Russian MiG-29 fighter jet and a Pantsir-S1 air-defense system at Khalino airfield in Kursk Oblast. The unit, nicknamed the "Black Forest," has a history of preying on Russian air defenses. Its latest strike targeted both a combat aircraft and one of the systems protecting the airfield.
According to Ukrainian press sources, a typical MiG-29 is worth approximately $25 million. The Pantsir-S1 is another expensive component of Russia's short-range air-defense network. The system is particularly effective at low-to-mid altitudes.
The Khalino strike followed a broader Ukrainian campaign against Russian air defenses. On the night of July 19-20, Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reportedly destroyed multiple Russian air-defense assets, including Tor-M2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and Nebo radars. The majority of these assets were in Krasnodar Krai, while two were in occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
Russia retains a large inventory of combat aircraft and air-defense systems. But it faces the challenge of protecting an immense geographic area that extends from occupied Ukraine to the Caucasus and the Russian interior. Ukraine does not need to destroy Russia's entire air-defense network to succeed. By forcing Moscow to disperse its combat platforms, Kyiv can progressively weaken the rear-area sanctuary that supports Russian air operations.
2. Protests Heat Up as Ukraine Reshuffles Its Military Leadership
On July 22, President Zelenskyy dismissed Oleksandr Syrskyi as commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. To contain a leadership crisis that exposed a deeper struggle over the future of Ukraine's military, Zelenskyy appointed General Mykhailo Drapatyi to succeed Syrskyi.
Zelenskyy made the change amid mounting political pressure at home. His removal of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, a popular and tech-savvy official, sparked protests that are now in their sixth day. By the second day of demonstrations, protests were already calling for General Syrskyi's dismissal.
These events followed a public confrontation between Fedorov and Syrskyi. Syrskyi, 60, represents a traditional military culture centered on infantry, artillery, centralized authority, and established command hierarchies. His critics have accused him of excessive micromanagement and preserving a command culture rooted in Soviet-vintage military doctrine.
Fedorov, 35, represents a competing paradigm centered on innovation, decentralization, and technological modernization. The young minister has become the public face of Ukraine's military innovations, from the expanded use of drones to the development of digital battle networks, autonomous systems, and data-driven warfare.
President Zelenskyy's removal of Syrskyi was likely intended to ease public anger over his firing of Fedorov, but the uproar shows few signs of subsiding. Thus far neither Fedorov's nor Syrskyi's camp has shown a willingness to ease tensions. Zelenskyy, moreover, has reportedly ruled out restoring Fedorov as defense minister, although he has offered him another prominent government position focused on strengthening Ukraine's technology sector. Fedorov reportedly rejected the proposed compromise, insisting that he would return only as defense minister.
Against this backdrop, on July 20 Zelenskyy convened a special meeting of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. For the first time, this gathering brought together army corps commanders, including the commanders of the Air Assault Forces and Army Corps, alongside representatives of Ukraine's leading new defense companies. The participants agreed to establish a regular mechanism for meetings between corps commanders, defense manufacturers, and government institutions, which the Ministry of Defense and the National Security and Defense Council would coordinate. This initiative appeared to institutionalize the battlefield-to-factory feedback system associated with Fedorov's reform agenda.
3. Ukraine Takes Its Ground Robots Airborne
Ukraine appears to be combining its aerial and ground drones into a single strike system.
Footage published by the Russian Telegram channel Archangel of Special Forces reportedly shows a Ukrainian heavy-lift hexacopter using a cable to carry a small kamikaze unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). Although authorities have not confirmed the operation's location or date, Ukrainian reporting has identified the UGV as an Ark Robotics ARK-1 carrying TM-series anti-tank mines.
Combining aerial and ground drones is useful because trenches, mud, vegetation, mines, broken terrain, and other obstacles constrain small ground robots. They must also travel through areas exposed to Russian reconnaissance drones, artillery, and electronic warfare.
Air transport addresses many of these issues. A hexacopter helps a UGV bypass difficult terrain, engage closer to its objective, and withdraw before entering a heavily defended area. This shortens its exposure and enables a UGV to conduct its final approach as a one-way attack system. Such cross-domain unmanned teaming uses an aerial platform to provide mobility and operational reach while a ground platform performs the terminal strike.
The ARK-1 has already moved from the Ukrainian battlespace to the proving grounds of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization just 120 miles from the Russian border. Latvia's 2nd Mechanized Infantry Battalion employed the Ukraine-developed robotic-warfare platform during Exercise Crystal Arrow 2026. During the exercise, Latvian forces used UGVs for reconnaissance and one-way attacks, including operations against defended positions, while Ukrainian veterans and company personnel provided tactical instruction. The ARK-1 weighs approximately 26 pounds, carries a standard payload of 33 pounds, and can reach speeds of up to 25 miles per hour.
While Ukraine's robotic airlift of UGVs remains tactical in scope, the overall military impact of this innovation could carry strategic significance. Airborne deployment of a kamikaze UGV could represent the next step in Ukrainian robotic warfare.
4. What to Look for in the Coming Weeks
The military leadership reshuffle currently roiling the political environment in Ukraine could shape the nation's postwar future. The state of civil-military relations in the country will merit monitoring for the foreseeable future.
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At A Glance:
Can Kasapoglu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/ukraine-military-situation-report-july-22-can-kasapoglu
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Will the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Proceed?
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 23, 2026, by senior adviser Michael Ratney:
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Will the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Proceed?
On July 22, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a bilateral agreement laying the foundation for civil nuclear cooperation, including the commercial development of a nuclear power industry in Saudi Arabia utilizing U.S. technology. Along with solar and wind, Saudi Arabia regards nuclear energy as a key element of its plans under Vision 2030 to diversify away from its dependence on fossil
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 23, 2026, by senior adviser Michael Ratney:
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Will the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Deal Proceed?
On July 22, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a bilateral agreement laying the foundation for civil nuclear cooperation, including the commercial development of a nuclear power industry in Saudi Arabia utilizing U.S. technology. Along with solar and wind, Saudi Arabia regards nuclear energy as a key element of its plans under Vision 2030 to diversify away from its dependence on fossilfuels. Indeed, for a country that currently generates more than a third of its domestic electricity by burning crude oil that it would rather export for profit, nuclear power is not an unreasonable ambition.
The announcement was quickly overshadowed by two controversies, however. The first was press reports suggesting that the agreement would permit Saudi Arabia to develop a uranium enrichment capacity, allowing it to join the short list of countries--currently just 14--with indigenous nuclear enrichment facilities. Saudi Arabia reportedly has considerable uranium deposits and has long had ambitions to own the entire nuclear "supply chain," from uranium mine to power plant. Although such a development would, according to these press reports, come only after a multiyear period of consultations over the commercial viability of an enrichment facility, the prospect raised nuclear proliferation concerns in the United States and in Israel--specifically that the just-signed agreement could put Saudi Arabia on a path to developing nuclear weapons.
The second controversy came seemingly in reaction to the first. Not a day after the agreement was signed, President Trump issued a statement on social media linking the deal to Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. He also seemed to rule out uranium enrichment and, oddly, to equate the Iranian and UAE nuclear programs.
Trump's insistence that the nuclear deal would be contingent on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing relations with Israel surprised many observers, seemingly adding a major condition to an agreement that his most senior officials had negotiated on his behalf and signed to great fanfare only a day earlier. This nuclear deal does not change the Saudi calculus on normalization, however. Saudi agreement to pursue normalization with Israel still depends--as it has since normalization negotiations began during the Biden administration--on Israel agreeing to support the creation of a Palestinian state. A Palestinian state has been explicitly and repeatedly ruled out by the current Israeli government.
Beyond that, ruling out enrichment may also vex the Saudi leadership. While a uranium enrichment facility may be extraordinarily expensive, take a decade or more to develop, and ultimately not be viable on a commercial basis, Saudi Arabia likely discerned great political value in claiming both the right and ability to pursue it.
Likely driving Trump's surprise announcement was a desire to blunt the domestic and Israeli criticism that emerged as soon as the deal was announced. But it will leave everyone--including the Saudis, the U.S. nuclear power industry, and the U.S. Congress, which has 90 days to review the deal--quite confused.
During the Biden administration, the United States and Saudi Arabia had been negotiating a grand deal that was to include a U.S.-Saudi mutual defense treaty, a bilateral defense cooperation agreement, the advancement of prospects for Palestinian statehood, and a set of economic measures, among them an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. The idea at the time was that only a deal with something for everyone--the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinians--could garner the 67 votes necessary in the U.S. Senate to win ratification of a U.S.-Saudi treaty.
The Gaza war in the aftermath of the October 7 terror attacks in Israel made that all much more difficult, and Israel's refusal to support a two-state solution effectively took the deal off the table for the foreseeable future. During his current administration, President Trump has given Saudi Arabia most of what it would have gained from a normalization deal: a major upgrade in the strategic partnership, including an agreement to sell F-35 fighter jets; economic agreements, including on artificial intelligence; and now a civil nuclear agreement. And he did it all without Saudi Arabia normalizing with Israel, which effectively left the prospect of normalization even more remote. By inserting normalization at the last minute, President Trump now throws a great deal of uncertainty into a deal that was always going to be controversial and creates more questions about the reliability of the United States as a strategic partner.
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Michael Ratney served for over three decades as a U.S. diplomat, most recently as U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He is currently a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/will-us-saudi-nuclear-deal-proceed
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Detour Dividends - How Syrian Airspace Benefits From the Iran War
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 23, 2026, by Dylan Joseph Herman, research intern for the Middle East Program:
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Detour Dividends: How Syrian Airspace Benefits from the Iran War
Airspace closures in response to the Iran war caused sweeping disruptions to flight routes in the Middle East and beyond. In a notable reversal following years of conflict, Syria has remained largely insulated from the destabilizing impacts of the Iran war. Recovery has been slow, but for Syria, redirected flights into its airspace
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 23, 2026, by Dylan Joseph Herman, research intern for the Middle East Program:
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Detour Dividends: How Syrian Airspace Benefits from the Iran War
Airspace closures in response to the Iran war caused sweeping disruptions to flight routes in the Middle East and beyond. In a notable reversal following years of conflict, Syria has remained largely insulated from the destabilizing impacts of the Iran war. Recovery has been slow, but for Syria, redirected flights into its airspacehave created a new revenue source as the country looks to recover from years of civil war. This installment of Charting the Middle East spotlights the unlikely positive implications of flight disruptions for Syria.
Syria's aviation sector has been slow to rebound. Carriers were hesitant to embrace the reopening of its airspace, deterred by damaged infrastructure and broader regional instability. Yet, when the U.S. and Israel launched attacks on Iran on February 28, airlines rerouted over Syria when much of the Gulf's airspace closed--earning the Syrian government a $499 flat fee with every overhead flight.
Syria's airspace temporarily shut down in March but once re-opened more than doubled its pre-war monthly average, generating a $5.89 million and $7.79 million windfall in May and June 2026 respectively.
While Gulf carriers are predominantly crossing over Syria on their way to Europe, U.S., Canadian, and European operators remain advised against using Syrian airspace, a legacy of Syria's civil war era.
The routing shift holds immense opportunity for Syria, especially as the government highlights Syria's strategic location bridging the Gulf to Europe and positioning itself as a critical logistics corridor. While increased air traffic alone does not confirm Syria's reintegration into regional logistics networks, it is a strong indicator that the process is gaining momentum.
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Chart: Syrian Revenue from Overhead Flights, July 2025-June 2026
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Dylan Joseph Herman, Research Intern, Middle East Program
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/detour-dividends-how-syrian-airspace-benefits-iran-war
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to Townhall: Save Our Elections to Save America
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 23, 2026, by law and justice senior fellow Chad Mizell to Townhall:
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Save Our Elections to SAVE America
Last Thursday night, President Trump unveiled a massive trove of evidence showing that America's election systems are vulnerable to fraud. This vulnerability is a risk to the very foundations of our Republic, and elected officials at both the state and federal levels need to take action right now.
The White House has released evidence showing extensive attempts by China to
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 23, 2026, by law and justice senior fellow Chad Mizell to Townhall:
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Save Our Elections to SAVE America
Last Thursday night, President Trump unveiled a massive trove of evidence showing that America's election systems are vulnerable to fraud. This vulnerability is a risk to the very foundations of our Republic, and elected officials at both the state and federal levels need to take action right now.
The White House has released evidence showing extensive attempts by China tomeddle in our elections. They have also uncovered Deep State efforts to cover up Chinese election meddling so that it could continue. The Department of Homeland Security also released a report showing that nearly 300,000 foreign nationals registered to vote in just a handful of states. The national number is likely much higher.
These sound like the practices of Third World banana republics. But for too long they've been tolerated in the world's oldest and greatest Republic. Now that we have definitive proof, Republicans who fail to take action to stop them are complicit in the lawbreaking.
To read the full article, click here (https://townhall.com/columnists/chad-mizelle/2026/07/23/save-our-elections-to-save-america-n2679952).
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Chad Mizelle serves as a senior fellow for law and justice at AFPI.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/save-our-elections-to-save-america
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Applauds Department of Education's Rollback of Disparate Impact Doctrine
WASHINGTON, July 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 23, 2026:
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AFPI Applauds Department of Education's Rollback of Disparate Impact Doctrine
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Michael Shires, Ph.D., vice chair of Education Opportunity, in response to the Department of Education's recent announcements addressing compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA):
"Yesterday, the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights announced the termination of the Methods of Administration
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WASHINGTON, July 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 23, 2026:
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AFPI Applauds Department of Education's Rollback of Disparate Impact Doctrine
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Michael Shires, Ph.D., vice chair of Education Opportunity, in response to the Department of Education's recent announcements addressing compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA):
"Yesterday, the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights announced the termination of the Methods of Administrationprogram, which imposed unnecessary and burdensome compliance reviews on Career and Technical Education programs. These reviews were never required of other postsecondary education programs, despite those programs also being subject to Title VI requirements. As such, the policy was duplicative and needlessly burdensome.
Today, the department also announced it has rescinded several disparate impact regulations pursuant to President Trump's 2025 executive order. I applaud Secretary Linda McMahon's commitment to ensuring all students, whether they pursue a bachelor's or technical degree, are protected from discriminatory practices disguised as equal treatment."
The Department of Education continues to play a leading role in the fight to ensure equal treatment under law for all Americans. As described in a recent AFPI policy paper, "The concept of 'disparate impact discrimination' inverts the traditional understanding of discrimination in ways that undermine procedural equality. Whereas 'discrimination' ordinarily describes disparate treatment... disparate impact theory applies this label to group outcome differences or 'disparities,' including those resulting from equal treatment." The department's announcement follows a recent legal opinion by the Department of Justice challenging the constitutionality of disparate impact law under Title VII of the CRA.
For decades, politicians, federal regulators, and activist courts have too often ignored the plain meaning of civil rights statutes. Through affirmative action programs, disparate impact doctrine, and, more recently, diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) policies, these radical actors sought to impose a burdensome and un-American outcomes-leveling vision of "equity" on the American people. Much of that vision entailed discriminating against Americans based on protected characteristics, in plain violation of civil rights law. AFPI opposes illegal discrimination in any form and supports all efforts to ensure equal treatment for all Americans under the law.
Learn more about AFPI's Education Opportunity here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/policy-areas/education-opportunity).
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-applauds-department-of-educations-rollback-of-disparate-impact-doctrine
[Category: ThinkTank]
