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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Russian Regions Lack Money to Hire and Retain Officials to Fulfill Moscow's Orders
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 27, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Russian Regions Lack Money to Hire and Retain Officials to Fulfill Moscow's Orders
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
* Russia's federal subjects lack the funds to hire and retain personnel to do the jobs they are mandated to do, or to fulfill Moscow's orders for special tasks such as paying bonuses to those who sign military contracts.
* This problem appears to be especially acute precisely in regions and republics which are doing well economically ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 27, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russian Regions Lack Money to Hire and Retain Officials to Fulfill Moscow's Orders Paul Goble Executive Summary: * Russia's federal subjects lack the funds to hire and retain personnel to do the jobs they are mandated to do, or to fulfill Moscow's orders for special tasks such as paying bonuses to those who sign military contracts. * This problem appears to be especially acute precisely in regions and republics which are doing well economicallybecause people have the option to work for higher pay in the military-industrial sector rather than for government bureaucracies.
* Consequently, what might seem a regional problem is rapidly becoming an all-Russian one, with Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime having few good options as long as it continues its war against Ukraine to provide essential services via the federal subjects and stem popular anger.
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A growing number of Russia's federal subjects lack the funds to hire and retain the personnel they need to do the jobs they are mandated to do. These jobs play a key role in the government's overall functioning. The lack of funds prevents these federal subjects from fulfilling Moscow's orders to perform special tasks such as paying bonuses to those who sign military contracts or making one-time payments to those who lose loved ones in Russia's war against Ukraine (Vazhniye Istorii, September 2, 2024; Federal Press, June 4, 2025; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 8; Regional'nye Kommentarii, October 12; Odessa Journal, October 20; Radio Svoboda, October 22). While this pattern holds across the board, somewhat counterintuitively, it appears especially acute in the regions and republics doing well economically. People can work for higher pay in the military-industrial sector rather than in government bureaucracies. In poorer regions and republics, working for the state is often the only game in town (Reuters, November 28, 2024; Regional'nye Kommentarii, October 21). Consequently, what might seem to a casual observer as a problem restricted to the regions is becoming an all-Russian one. Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime is exacerbating the situation by demanding more efficiency and consolidation. It has few good options otherwise--as long as it continues its war against Ukraine--to provide essential services via the federal subjects and stem popular and even elite anger about the loss of such services (7x7, June 9 [1], [2]; Posle.Media, August 26; Window on Eurasia, August 29).
Even as the Russian media becomes ever less free, there has been a growth in the number of articles about the problems Russia's far-flung federal subjects are having in meeting both their traditional tasks of providing education, healthcare, and other basic services and doing Moscow's bidding as far as special tasks are concerned. One of the first discussions about how these difficulties are connected with the inability of regional governments to attract and hold staff has now been offered by Konstantin Kalachyov, the head of the Moscow-based Political Expert Group. In the Regional Comment portal, he says that increasing demands on the governments of the federal subjects and reduced support from Moscow have created a situation in which these essential components of the Russian government lack the funds needed to hire people in the first place or even hold those they have hired in the past (Regional'nye Kommentarii, October 21).
In that article, Kalachyov focuses on Tatarstan. This republic is doing well in its military-industrial segment, but he suggests that other federal subjects, including those almost equally well-placed, are now losing out in the competition for cadres. As a result, they lack the personnel to carry out either their own mandated responsibilities or the tasks Moscow assigns them, often with unfunded mandates. Specifically, he argues:
The deficit of qualified cadres in state service in Tatarstan really is creating risks for the quality and effectiveness of administration, preventing the timely fulfillment of state programs and may even be accompanied by a growth of threats of corruption. As such, this problem is not just a republican one but a problem for the country as a whole (Regional'nye Kommentarii, October 21).
Addressing these problems, the regional analyst says, will require boosting salaries and improving working conditions for those employed by the federal subject governments. The Putin regime shows no sign of being ready or able to make these moves given its ever-increasing spending on the war against Ukraine. Until it does so, however, Kalachyov argues regional governments will lose staff to favored businesses, and both regional and all-Russian state tasks will not be addressed effectively. (For others who have made similar, if perhaps less sweeping, points, see Centre for Eastern Studies, June 27, 2024; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 13.)
In the short term, the growing shortage of key officials in the regions also means that Moscow has to intervene even more often than it would otherwise. It cannot count on the regional bureaucracies to carry out its will--or the center must be willing to see a decay in governance across much of the country (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 13). That places added burdens on the center and ensures Moscow will engage in a whack-a-mole approach rather than addressing the problems this shortage of government cadres creates and the Russian population's negative reaction to what these shortages entail. It does help the Kremlin prevent regional challenges to itself from growing, however, at least for the time being (The Moscow Times, June 30, 2025).
The Kremlin currently seems to see one deus ex machina that it believes might help Moscow address these problems without having to change course more generally. It has been reintegrating veterans of Putin's war against Ukraine into government service. The Kremlin has institutionalized this idea through its "Time of Heroes" program and its requirement that regional governments give veterans hiring preference. That idea has serious problems. Few veterans have the skills that make them prime candidates for the government services regions provide. Most regional governments appear reluctant to take them in. Most veterans served because they could make unprecedented amounts of money and are thus less likely than other Russians to be persuaded to work for less in regional government agencies rather than in the private sector (Window on Eurasia, March 29, 2025). Consequently, this Kremlin hope is likely to prove a pipe dream, failing to provide more staff for regional governments at a time when precisely those governments will have to bear increasing burdens that, with their current staffing levels, they almost certainly will not be able to meet and ones that will force Moscow to intervene in other ways.
These problems suggest that the challenges Kalachyov and others point to will accelerate the overall decline in the quality and effectiveness of Russian governance. This decline does not necessarily point to any immediate disintegration. It could, however, trigger that, especially during the succession struggle after Putin leaves the scene. It is certainly one that means much of the Russian Federation will not be effectively governed, that anger among the Russian people, regional elites, and even people in Moscow will intensify, and that the Putin regime, in its effort to keep itself in power above all else, will counter with ever more repression in the hope that that will be enough. That hope is almost certainly misplaced, no matter how much confidence the Kremlin dictator and many of his admirers elsewhere have in it.
* * *
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russian-regions-lack-money-to-hire-and-retain-officials-to-fulfill-moscows-orders/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Russian Regions Lack Money to Hire and Retain Officials to Fulfill Moscow's Orders
Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
* Russia's federal subjects lack the funds to hire and retain personnel to do the jobs they are mandated to do, or to fulfill Moscow's orders for special tasks such as paying bonuses to those who sign military contracts.
* This problem appears to be especially acute precisely in regions and republics which are doing well economically ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 27, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russian Regions Lack Money to Hire and Retain Officials to Fulfill Moscow's Orders Paul Goble Executive Summary: * Russia's federal subjects lack the funds to hire and retain personnel to do the jobs they are mandated to do, or to fulfill Moscow's orders for special tasks such as paying bonuses to those who sign military contracts. * This problem appears to be especially acute precisely in regions and republics which are doing well economicallybecause people have the option to work for higher pay in the military-industrial sector rather than for government bureaucracies.
* Consequently, what might seem a regional problem is rapidly becoming an all-Russian one, with Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime having few good options as long as it continues its war against Ukraine to provide essential services via the federal subjects and stem popular anger.
-
A growing number of Russia's federal subjects lack the funds to hire and retain the personnel they need to do the jobs they are mandated to do. These jobs play a key role in the government's overall functioning. The lack of funds prevents these federal subjects from fulfilling Moscow's orders to perform special tasks such as paying bonuses to those who sign military contracts or making one-time payments to those who lose loved ones in Russia's war against Ukraine (Vazhniye Istorii, September 2, 2024; Federal Press, June 4, 2025; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 8; Regional'nye Kommentarii, October 12; Odessa Journal, October 20; Radio Svoboda, October 22). While this pattern holds across the board, somewhat counterintuitively, it appears especially acute in the regions and republics doing well economically. People can work for higher pay in the military-industrial sector rather than in government bureaucracies. In poorer regions and republics, working for the state is often the only game in town (Reuters, November 28, 2024; Regional'nye Kommentarii, October 21). Consequently, what might seem to a casual observer as a problem restricted to the regions is becoming an all-Russian one. Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime is exacerbating the situation by demanding more efficiency and consolidation. It has few good options otherwise--as long as it continues its war against Ukraine--to provide essential services via the federal subjects and stem popular and even elite anger about the loss of such services (7x7, June 9 [1], [2]; Posle.Media, August 26; Window on Eurasia, August 29).
Even as the Russian media becomes ever less free, there has been a growth in the number of articles about the problems Russia's far-flung federal subjects are having in meeting both their traditional tasks of providing education, healthcare, and other basic services and doing Moscow's bidding as far as special tasks are concerned. One of the first discussions about how these difficulties are connected with the inability of regional governments to attract and hold staff has now been offered by Konstantin Kalachyov, the head of the Moscow-based Political Expert Group. In the Regional Comment portal, he says that increasing demands on the governments of the federal subjects and reduced support from Moscow have created a situation in which these essential components of the Russian government lack the funds needed to hire people in the first place or even hold those they have hired in the past (Regional'nye Kommentarii, October 21).
In that article, Kalachyov focuses on Tatarstan. This republic is doing well in its military-industrial segment, but he suggests that other federal subjects, including those almost equally well-placed, are now losing out in the competition for cadres. As a result, they lack the personnel to carry out either their own mandated responsibilities or the tasks Moscow assigns them, often with unfunded mandates. Specifically, he argues:
The deficit of qualified cadres in state service in Tatarstan really is creating risks for the quality and effectiveness of administration, preventing the timely fulfillment of state programs and may even be accompanied by a growth of threats of corruption. As such, this problem is not just a republican one but a problem for the country as a whole (Regional'nye Kommentarii, October 21).
Addressing these problems, the regional analyst says, will require boosting salaries and improving working conditions for those employed by the federal subject governments. The Putin regime shows no sign of being ready or able to make these moves given its ever-increasing spending on the war against Ukraine. Until it does so, however, Kalachyov argues regional governments will lose staff to favored businesses, and both regional and all-Russian state tasks will not be addressed effectively. (For others who have made similar, if perhaps less sweeping, points, see Centre for Eastern Studies, June 27, 2024; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 13.)
In the short term, the growing shortage of key officials in the regions also means that Moscow has to intervene even more often than it would otherwise. It cannot count on the regional bureaucracies to carry out its will--or the center must be willing to see a decay in governance across much of the country (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 13). That places added burdens on the center and ensures Moscow will engage in a whack-a-mole approach rather than addressing the problems this shortage of government cadres creates and the Russian population's negative reaction to what these shortages entail. It does help the Kremlin prevent regional challenges to itself from growing, however, at least for the time being (The Moscow Times, June 30, 2025).
The Kremlin currently seems to see one deus ex machina that it believes might help Moscow address these problems without having to change course more generally. It has been reintegrating veterans of Putin's war against Ukraine into government service. The Kremlin has institutionalized this idea through its "Time of Heroes" program and its requirement that regional governments give veterans hiring preference. That idea has serious problems. Few veterans have the skills that make them prime candidates for the government services regions provide. Most regional governments appear reluctant to take them in. Most veterans served because they could make unprecedented amounts of money and are thus less likely than other Russians to be persuaded to work for less in regional government agencies rather than in the private sector (Window on Eurasia, March 29, 2025). Consequently, this Kremlin hope is likely to prove a pipe dream, failing to provide more staff for regional governments at a time when precisely those governments will have to bear increasing burdens that, with their current staffing levels, they almost certainly will not be able to meet and ones that will force Moscow to intervene in other ways.
These problems suggest that the challenges Kalachyov and others point to will accelerate the overall decline in the quality and effectiveness of Russian governance. This decline does not necessarily point to any immediate disintegration. It could, however, trigger that, especially during the succession struggle after Putin leaves the scene. It is certainly one that means much of the Russian Federation will not be effectively governed, that anger among the Russian people, regional elites, and even people in Moscow will intensify, and that the Putin regime, in its effort to keep itself in power above all else, will counter with ever more repression in the hope that that will be enough. That hope is almost certainly misplaced, no matter how much confidence the Kremlin dictator and many of his admirers elsewhere have in it.
* * *
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russian-regions-lack-money-to-hire-and-retain-officials-to-fulfill-moscows-orders/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: As Russia's War on Ukraine Drags On, Sanctions Remain Essential
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary:
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Oct 26, 2026
As Russia's War on Ukraine Drags On, Sanctions Remain Essential
Damien Cristofari
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has developed its most comprehensive sanctions regime ever. Today, sanctions remain the main--albeit not the only--foreign policy instrument available to EU member states and their allies to counter Russia's war effort and support ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary: * * * Oct 26, 2026 As Russia's War on Ukraine Drags On, Sanctions Remain Essential Damien Cristofari Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has developed its most comprehensive sanctions regime ever. Today, sanctions remain the main--albeit not the only--foreign policy instrument available to EU member states and their allies to counter Russia's war effort and supportUkraine.
While President Donald Trump's diesel deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin grabbed most of the international headlines, the EU last Monday moved in the opposite direction, further expanding its sanctions regime by adopting the largest round of sanctions designations since 2022. These new designations specifically target Russia's military-industrial complex, covering nearly 1,600 individuals and entities--including 826 Russian companies and 743 individuals serving as their chief executive officers. This latest round brings the total number of individuals and entities listed under the EU sanctions regime aimed at protecting Ukraine's territorial integrity to nearly 4,600.
The measures focus on mid-tier suppliers that form the backbone of Russia's defense industry, generating combined annual revenues of at least Euros20 billion and employing more than 250,000 people. The designated companies supply critical components for some of Russia's most advanced weapons systems, including missiles, drones, and aircraft. The EU imposed additional sanctions on 77 individuals involved in the illegal elections to the so-called Russian State Duma held in September 2026 in occupied Ukrainian territories. It also sanctioned three individuals and four entities linked to North Korea, notably those who facilitated cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang as part of North Korea's weapons programs.
Beyond these new designations--which entail travel bans and financial restrictions, including asset freezes and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to listed individuals and entities--EU foreign ministers also discussed further measures to maintain pressure on Russia's war economy. These include tightening measures against sanctions circumvention, particularly through the shadow fleet of vessels used to evade oil sanctions; expanding sectoral sanctions targeting Russia's financial and banking system, which would form part of the EU's twenty-second sanctions package since 2022; imposing additional restrictions on Russian diplomats; and reducing the number of visas issued to Russian nationals. Discussions will continue in the coming weeks and are expected to lead to further decisions.
This latest expansion of EU sanctions is a direct response to Russia's continued escalation of its aggression against Ukraine, particularly its recent military campaign deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure and inflicting severe suffering on the civilian population. As EU High Representative Kaja Kallas stated on Monday, "This is not the time to ease pressure on Moscow but to increase it."
The question of whether sanctions are effective is as old as sanctions themselves. And after nearly five years of war, it is legitimate to ask, Do sanctions work? According to the EU Council's sanctions guidelines, "restrictive measures are imposed by the EU to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, part of country, government, entities or individuals." By this standard, sanctions against Russia have not yet achieved their stated objective.
Nevertheless, economic research broadly suggests that sanctions have helped prevent Russia from gaining a decisive advantage in its war of aggression against Ukraine. They have constrained Russia's ability to finance and equip its military, reduced Moscow's energy export revenues, restricted Russian access to advanced Western technologies and industrial inputs, and isolated Russian financial institutions. Sanctions have significantly increased the economic cost of the war for the Russian regime. According to official EU estimates, Western sanctions have cost the Russian economy Euros1.3 trillion since the full-scale invasion began in 2022.
No one knows whether a threshold exists beyond which President Putin would consider the war too costly and agree to enter negotiations. But even without any certainty that such a tipping point exists, sanctions are imposing high costs on the Russian regime--and the pressure should therefore be sustained and intensified.
The effectiveness of economic sanctions, however, depends also on the degree of coordination among the countries imposing them. While Washington and Brussels operate under distinct legal frameworks and rely on different policy instruments, closer alignment undoubtedly increases their collective economic leverage, reduces opportunities for sanctions circumvention, and strengthens enforcement.
Against this backdrop, the United States' decision to suspend restrictions on Russian oil imports, along with President Trump's announcement that Russian diesel deliveries would be permitted, disappointed European leaders, particularly after the signing of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. Although Europe is not without its own contradictions regarding energy imports from Russia--EU countries continue to import substantial volumes of Russian liquefied natural gas, generating billions of euros in revenue for Moscow--a fundamental difference exists between managing the phase-out of an inherited energy dependency and deliberately reopening restricted trade. The US decision eases existing restrictions and risks signaling a broader normalization of economic relations with Moscow, at a time when transatlantic pressure should be maintained.
Regardless of what happens during the midterms, Brussels should be ready to engage Washington the day after the vote if for no other reason than to maximize the impact of its own sanctions. Amid the political changes sweeping Europe, which are perennial in one election cycle or another, the EU Council's latest decisions make clear that Europe remains committed to supporting Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.
* * *
Damien Cristofari is a visiting senior fellow at Hudson Institute's Center on Europe and Eurasia, where his research focuses on European foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, European defense, the European Union's external relations, and the Middle East.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/russias-war-ukraine-drags-sanctions-remain-essential-damien-cristofari
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Oct 26, 2026
As Russia's War on Ukraine Drags On, Sanctions Remain Essential
Damien Cristofari
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has developed its most comprehensive sanctions regime ever. Today, sanctions remain the main--albeit not the only--foreign policy instrument available to EU member states and their allies to counter Russia's war effort and support ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary: * * * Oct 26, 2026 As Russia's War on Ukraine Drags On, Sanctions Remain Essential Damien Cristofari Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has developed its most comprehensive sanctions regime ever. Today, sanctions remain the main--albeit not the only--foreign policy instrument available to EU member states and their allies to counter Russia's war effort and supportUkraine.
While President Donald Trump's diesel deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin grabbed most of the international headlines, the EU last Monday moved in the opposite direction, further expanding its sanctions regime by adopting the largest round of sanctions designations since 2022. These new designations specifically target Russia's military-industrial complex, covering nearly 1,600 individuals and entities--including 826 Russian companies and 743 individuals serving as their chief executive officers. This latest round brings the total number of individuals and entities listed under the EU sanctions regime aimed at protecting Ukraine's territorial integrity to nearly 4,600.
The measures focus on mid-tier suppliers that form the backbone of Russia's defense industry, generating combined annual revenues of at least Euros20 billion and employing more than 250,000 people. The designated companies supply critical components for some of Russia's most advanced weapons systems, including missiles, drones, and aircraft. The EU imposed additional sanctions on 77 individuals involved in the illegal elections to the so-called Russian State Duma held in September 2026 in occupied Ukrainian territories. It also sanctioned three individuals and four entities linked to North Korea, notably those who facilitated cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang as part of North Korea's weapons programs.
Beyond these new designations--which entail travel bans and financial restrictions, including asset freezes and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to listed individuals and entities--EU foreign ministers also discussed further measures to maintain pressure on Russia's war economy. These include tightening measures against sanctions circumvention, particularly through the shadow fleet of vessels used to evade oil sanctions; expanding sectoral sanctions targeting Russia's financial and banking system, which would form part of the EU's twenty-second sanctions package since 2022; imposing additional restrictions on Russian diplomats; and reducing the number of visas issued to Russian nationals. Discussions will continue in the coming weeks and are expected to lead to further decisions.
This latest expansion of EU sanctions is a direct response to Russia's continued escalation of its aggression against Ukraine, particularly its recent military campaign deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure and inflicting severe suffering on the civilian population. As EU High Representative Kaja Kallas stated on Monday, "This is not the time to ease pressure on Moscow but to increase it."
The question of whether sanctions are effective is as old as sanctions themselves. And after nearly five years of war, it is legitimate to ask, Do sanctions work? According to the EU Council's sanctions guidelines, "restrictive measures are imposed by the EU to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, part of country, government, entities or individuals." By this standard, sanctions against Russia have not yet achieved their stated objective.
Nevertheless, economic research broadly suggests that sanctions have helped prevent Russia from gaining a decisive advantage in its war of aggression against Ukraine. They have constrained Russia's ability to finance and equip its military, reduced Moscow's energy export revenues, restricted Russian access to advanced Western technologies and industrial inputs, and isolated Russian financial institutions. Sanctions have significantly increased the economic cost of the war for the Russian regime. According to official EU estimates, Western sanctions have cost the Russian economy Euros1.3 trillion since the full-scale invasion began in 2022.
No one knows whether a threshold exists beyond which President Putin would consider the war too costly and agree to enter negotiations. But even without any certainty that such a tipping point exists, sanctions are imposing high costs on the Russian regime--and the pressure should therefore be sustained and intensified.
The effectiveness of economic sanctions, however, depends also on the degree of coordination among the countries imposing them. While Washington and Brussels operate under distinct legal frameworks and rely on different policy instruments, closer alignment undoubtedly increases their collective economic leverage, reduces opportunities for sanctions circumvention, and strengthens enforcement.
Against this backdrop, the United States' decision to suspend restrictions on Russian oil imports, along with President Trump's announcement that Russian diesel deliveries would be permitted, disappointed European leaders, particularly after the signing of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. Although Europe is not without its own contradictions regarding energy imports from Russia--EU countries continue to import substantial volumes of Russian liquefied natural gas, generating billions of euros in revenue for Moscow--a fundamental difference exists between managing the phase-out of an inherited energy dependency and deliberately reopening restricted trade. The US decision eases existing restrictions and risks signaling a broader normalization of economic relations with Moscow, at a time when transatlantic pressure should be maintained.
Regardless of what happens during the midterms, Brussels should be ready to engage Washington the day after the vote if for no other reason than to maximize the impact of its own sanctions. Amid the political changes sweeping Europe, which are perennial in one election cycle or another, the EU Council's latest decisions make clear that Europe remains committed to supporting Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.
* * *
Damien Cristofari is a visiting senior fellow at Hudson Institute's Center on Europe and Eurasia, where his research focuses on European foreign and security policy, transatlantic relations, European defense, the European Union's external relations, and the Middle East.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/russias-war-ukraine-drags-sanctions-remain-essential-damien-cristofari
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities: This Open Enrollment Period, ACA Marketplace Enrollees Face Higher Premiums, More Eligibility Restrictions
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on Oct. 27, 2026, by Claire Heyison, senior policy analyst of the health insurance and marketplace policy on the Health Team:
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This Open Enrollment Period, ACA Marketplace Enrollees Face Higher Premiums, More Eligibility Restrictions
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplace is a vital source of health coverage for people who don't have affordable coverage through their job and don't qualify for other federal programs, like Medicare or Medicaid. More than 19 million people rely on the ACA marketplaces ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on Oct. 27, 2026, by Claire Heyison, senior policy analyst of the health insurance and marketplace policy on the Health Team: * * * This Open Enrollment Period, ACA Marketplace Enrollees Face Higher Premiums, More Eligibility Restrictions The Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplace is a vital source of health coverage for people who don't have affordable coverage through their job and don't qualify for other federal programs, like Medicare or Medicaid. More than 19 million people rely on the ACA marketplacesfor their health insurance, including small business employees, entrepreneurs, part-time or seasonal workers, and more.
People who shop for marketplace coverage during the Open Enrollment Period this year (November 1-January 15 in most states) will likely find that coverage has become more expensive, due to the expiration of premium tax credit (PTC) enhancements and policy changes in the 2025 reconciliation law. However, everyone's situation is unique, and people should visit HealthCare.gov or their state-based marketplace to compare plans and see if they qualify for financial help, as there may be coverage options that suit their budget and needs.
Insurers have proposed increasing median gross premiums (premiums before or without PTC) by 15 percent for 2027; they attribute about 10 percentage points of this increase to rising medical costs, and 4 percentage points to ripple effects from the expiration of the PTC enhancements. These ripple effects occur because healthier people are more likely to drop their coverage when premium costs increase; the remaining enrollees therefore tend to have greater health care needs and expenses.
Despite increases in gross premiums, many marketplace enrollees may find that their net premiums (premiums after PTC is applied) have not increased as dramatically as they did last year. This is because unlike last year, when the PTC enhancements expired, the underlying PTC formula is not changing. As a result, PTC amounts will increase proportionally to cover some of the increase in gross premiums (see chart).
* * *
Chart: Enrollee Premiums Are Increasing in 2027, But Not as Dramatically as Last Year for Those With Premium Tax Credits
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Even so, continued premium increases will likely put coverage out of reach for even more people, compounding recent declines in marketplace enrollment. Between February 2025 and February 2026, marketplace enrollment fell by nearly 3 million people (13 percent), with some states losing nearly one-third of their enrollment. Some people who lost marketplace coverage may have gotten covered through Medicaid or an employer, but many are likely uninsured.
Adding to the coverage loss, the 2025 reconciliation law will take financial help away from many people with lawful immigration statuses. Beginning January 1, 2027, numerous immigrants living lawfully in the U.S. will become ineligible for PTCs, including people granted asylum, refugees, and people granted humanitarian parole. PTCs will only be available to U.S. citizens and nationals; lawful permanent residents (also known as green card holders); Cuban-Haitian entrants; and COFA migrants.[1] This change is expected to cause 900,000 people to become uninsured by 2034.
Rising premiums in the ACA marketplace are also likely to ramp up the sale of limited benefit products, such as short-term limited duration insurance (STLDI) and excepted benefits plans. These products are not subject to the ACA's consumer protections. For example, STLDI plans can refuse to cover people with pre-existing conditions, charge higher premiums to people with pre-existing conditions, and limit coverage of services related to pre-existing conditions. These plans are often marketed aggressively; a recent secret-shopper study found that agents and brokers who sell these plans frequently misrepresent coverage and refuse to provide any written information prior to enrollment.
The Trump Administration has responded to the rising cost of marketplace coverage by weakening financial and other consumer protections for enrollees, aiming to push premiums down by allowing less generous coverage options to proliferate. Several of these changes have been blocked by federal courts. The Administration also recently sent out one-time $500 payments to a small subset of marketplace enrollees, which will do little to address the coverage loss and higher premiums caused by the expiration of the PTC enhancements and other policies.
* * *
Claire Heyison is the Senior Policy Analyst -- Health Insurance and Marketplace Policy on the Health team. Her work focuses on promoting federal and state policies that improve the affordability and accessibility of Affordable Care Act marketplace coverage.
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Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/blog/this-open-enrollment-period-aca-marketplace-enrollees-face-higher-premiums-more-eligibility
[Category: ThinkTank]
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This Open Enrollment Period, ACA Marketplace Enrollees Face Higher Premiums, More Eligibility Restrictions
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplace is a vital source of health coverage for people who don't have affordable coverage through their job and don't qualify for other federal programs, like Medicare or Medicaid. More than 19 million people rely on the ACA marketplaces ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on Oct. 27, 2026, by Claire Heyison, senior policy analyst of the health insurance and marketplace policy on the Health Team: * * * This Open Enrollment Period, ACA Marketplace Enrollees Face Higher Premiums, More Eligibility Restrictions The Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplace is a vital source of health coverage for people who don't have affordable coverage through their job and don't qualify for other federal programs, like Medicare or Medicaid. More than 19 million people rely on the ACA marketplacesfor their health insurance, including small business employees, entrepreneurs, part-time or seasonal workers, and more.
People who shop for marketplace coverage during the Open Enrollment Period this year (November 1-January 15 in most states) will likely find that coverage has become more expensive, due to the expiration of premium tax credit (PTC) enhancements and policy changes in the 2025 reconciliation law. However, everyone's situation is unique, and people should visit HealthCare.gov or their state-based marketplace to compare plans and see if they qualify for financial help, as there may be coverage options that suit their budget and needs.
Insurers have proposed increasing median gross premiums (premiums before or without PTC) by 15 percent for 2027; they attribute about 10 percentage points of this increase to rising medical costs, and 4 percentage points to ripple effects from the expiration of the PTC enhancements. These ripple effects occur because healthier people are more likely to drop their coverage when premium costs increase; the remaining enrollees therefore tend to have greater health care needs and expenses.
Despite increases in gross premiums, many marketplace enrollees may find that their net premiums (premiums after PTC is applied) have not increased as dramatically as they did last year. This is because unlike last year, when the PTC enhancements expired, the underlying PTC formula is not changing. As a result, PTC amounts will increase proportionally to cover some of the increase in gross premiums (see chart).
* * *
Chart: Enrollee Premiums Are Increasing in 2027, But Not as Dramatically as Last Year for Those With Premium Tax Credits
* * *
Even so, continued premium increases will likely put coverage out of reach for even more people, compounding recent declines in marketplace enrollment. Between February 2025 and February 2026, marketplace enrollment fell by nearly 3 million people (13 percent), with some states losing nearly one-third of their enrollment. Some people who lost marketplace coverage may have gotten covered through Medicaid or an employer, but many are likely uninsured.
Adding to the coverage loss, the 2025 reconciliation law will take financial help away from many people with lawful immigration statuses. Beginning January 1, 2027, numerous immigrants living lawfully in the U.S. will become ineligible for PTCs, including people granted asylum, refugees, and people granted humanitarian parole. PTCs will only be available to U.S. citizens and nationals; lawful permanent residents (also known as green card holders); Cuban-Haitian entrants; and COFA migrants.[1] This change is expected to cause 900,000 people to become uninsured by 2034.
Rising premiums in the ACA marketplace are also likely to ramp up the sale of limited benefit products, such as short-term limited duration insurance (STLDI) and excepted benefits plans. These products are not subject to the ACA's consumer protections. For example, STLDI plans can refuse to cover people with pre-existing conditions, charge higher premiums to people with pre-existing conditions, and limit coverage of services related to pre-existing conditions. These plans are often marketed aggressively; a recent secret-shopper study found that agents and brokers who sell these plans frequently misrepresent coverage and refuse to provide any written information prior to enrollment.
The Trump Administration has responded to the rising cost of marketplace coverage by weakening financial and other consumer protections for enrollees, aiming to push premiums down by allowing less generous coverage options to proliferate. Several of these changes have been blocked by federal courts. The Administration also recently sent out one-time $500 payments to a small subset of marketplace enrollees, which will do little to address the coverage loss and higher premiums caused by the expiration of the PTC enhancements and other policies.
* * *
Claire Heyison is the Senior Policy Analyst -- Health Insurance and Marketplace Policy on the Health team. Her work focuses on promoting federal and state policies that improve the affordability and accessibility of Affordable Care Act marketplace coverage.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/blog/this-open-enrollment-period-aca-marketplace-enrollees-face-higher-premiums-more-eligibility
[Category: ThinkTank]
California Wants a Microphone in Your Home. Goldwater Is Fighting Back.
PHOENIX, Arizona, Oct. 27 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Goldwater Institute posted the following news:
* * *
California Wants a Microphone in Your Home. Goldwater Is Fighting Back.
*
Imagine the government ordering you to install cameras and microphones in your home office. They must run day and night, recording conversations with clients, coworkers, and family. And you must save the recordings for at least a year in case the government wants to review them. Astonishingly, this is exactly what California is requiring some home-based, firearms businesses to do. Now, the Goldwater Institute is ... Show Full Article PHOENIX, Arizona, Oct. 27 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Goldwater Institute posted the following news: * * * California Wants a Microphone in Your Home. Goldwater Is Fighting Back. * Imagine the government ordering you to install cameras and microphones in your home office. They must run day and night, recording conversations with clients, coworkers, and family. And you must save the recordings for at least a year in case the government wants to review them. Astonishingly, this is exactly what California is requiring some home-based, firearms businesses to do. Now, the Goldwater Institute isurging the full Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to end this unprecedented invasion of privacy.
Goldwater filed an amicus brief urging the full Ninth Circuit to rehear Richards v. Newsom and to reverse an August ruling by a three-judge panel. The panel upheld a decision dismissing a challenge to a California law that requires firearms dealers to install continuously-running cameras and microphones in designated business areas--a violation of both the First and Fourth amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The law doesn't just target suspected wrongdoers--it's aimed broadly at firearms businesses that have a license to operate in the state.
The challenge comes from California attorney and small-business owner Adam Richards, who operates a federally licensed firearms business from a detached office on his residential property. He also uses that office for roughly half his legal practice, including confidential phone calls with clients. His family visits him there, too. Yet California law requires firearms dealers--even home-based dealers like Richards--to record video and sound continuously in designated business areas, even after business hours, and preserve the recordings for at least a year.
Of course, a microphone can't tell a firearms sale from a confidential legal consultation--or a conversation with a loved one. It records them all the same.
The reasoning of the three-judge panel that dismissed Richard's challenge was troubling: No Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government only requires the recordings, the panel concluded, because officials haven't physically entered the premises or accessed the footage yet.
This modern surveillance regime doesn't require an officer standing in your doorway. California forces business owners to turn fleeting conversations into durable records of people's voices, faces, and visits--records created for potential government inspection. That an inspection might not happen in every case does not erase the intrusion of forcing people to create it.
The constitutional injury begins when the state orders the cameras and microphones turned on--not merely when a bureaucrat presses play.
California's law violates the First Amendment, too, because it chills speech in affected private homes and businesses. People may think twice before discussing politics, their constitutional rights, or sensitive personal matters if they know every word is being saved. One plaintiff alleges that the recording requirement has already curtailed his participation in discussions about legislation, litigation, and constitutional rights. Telling people they can avoid recording by remaining silent misses the point: silence is the harm.
Judge Kenneth Lee, dissenting from the panel's decision, underscored how extraordinary California's law is: "Neither the federal government nor the other 49 states have ever enacted such an intrusive audio-recording requirement for any business activity."
This is not just about having a security camera directed at a sales counter but an always-on microphone capturing unrelated conversations, even after hours. The Ninth Circuit has previously recognized this distinction, limiting inspections of home-based day-care operations to the places and times associated with the regulated business.
California's approach will not stop with firearms dealers. Their argument is that the individuals involved consent to the recording simply by choosing to enter into a licensed business. But California requires licenses for at least 177 different occupations.
If operating a business under a license allows the government to demand round-the-clock recordings, what's to prevent a similar requirement for a home baker whose kitchen is also where her family eats and talks? The logic could reach countless Americans who work where they live.
Goldwater has long defended the right to earn a living at home without forfeiting constitutional protections. The Bill of Rights has no business-license exception. The full Ninth Circuit should hear this case and reaffirm a basic promise of American liberty: Your home doesn't stop being private just because you do business there.
Tony Napolitano is a Senior Attorney at the Goldwater Institute.
***
Original text here: https://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/california-wants-a-microphone-in-your-home-goldwater-is-fighting-back/
* * *
California Wants a Microphone in Your Home. Goldwater Is Fighting Back.
*
Imagine the government ordering you to install cameras and microphones in your home office. They must run day and night, recording conversations with clients, coworkers, and family. And you must save the recordings for at least a year in case the government wants to review them. Astonishingly, this is exactly what California is requiring some home-based, firearms businesses to do. Now, the Goldwater Institute is ... Show Full Article PHOENIX, Arizona, Oct. 27 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Goldwater Institute posted the following news: * * * California Wants a Microphone in Your Home. Goldwater Is Fighting Back. * Imagine the government ordering you to install cameras and microphones in your home office. They must run day and night, recording conversations with clients, coworkers, and family. And you must save the recordings for at least a year in case the government wants to review them. Astonishingly, this is exactly what California is requiring some home-based, firearms businesses to do. Now, the Goldwater Institute isurging the full Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to end this unprecedented invasion of privacy.
Goldwater filed an amicus brief urging the full Ninth Circuit to rehear Richards v. Newsom and to reverse an August ruling by a three-judge panel. The panel upheld a decision dismissing a challenge to a California law that requires firearms dealers to install continuously-running cameras and microphones in designated business areas--a violation of both the First and Fourth amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The law doesn't just target suspected wrongdoers--it's aimed broadly at firearms businesses that have a license to operate in the state.
The challenge comes from California attorney and small-business owner Adam Richards, who operates a federally licensed firearms business from a detached office on his residential property. He also uses that office for roughly half his legal practice, including confidential phone calls with clients. His family visits him there, too. Yet California law requires firearms dealers--even home-based dealers like Richards--to record video and sound continuously in designated business areas, even after business hours, and preserve the recordings for at least a year.
Of course, a microphone can't tell a firearms sale from a confidential legal consultation--or a conversation with a loved one. It records them all the same.
The reasoning of the three-judge panel that dismissed Richard's challenge was troubling: No Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government only requires the recordings, the panel concluded, because officials haven't physically entered the premises or accessed the footage yet.
This modern surveillance regime doesn't require an officer standing in your doorway. California forces business owners to turn fleeting conversations into durable records of people's voices, faces, and visits--records created for potential government inspection. That an inspection might not happen in every case does not erase the intrusion of forcing people to create it.
The constitutional injury begins when the state orders the cameras and microphones turned on--not merely when a bureaucrat presses play.
California's law violates the First Amendment, too, because it chills speech in affected private homes and businesses. People may think twice before discussing politics, their constitutional rights, or sensitive personal matters if they know every word is being saved. One plaintiff alleges that the recording requirement has already curtailed his participation in discussions about legislation, litigation, and constitutional rights. Telling people they can avoid recording by remaining silent misses the point: silence is the harm.
Judge Kenneth Lee, dissenting from the panel's decision, underscored how extraordinary California's law is: "Neither the federal government nor the other 49 states have ever enacted such an intrusive audio-recording requirement for any business activity."
This is not just about having a security camera directed at a sales counter but an always-on microphone capturing unrelated conversations, even after hours. The Ninth Circuit has previously recognized this distinction, limiting inspections of home-based day-care operations to the places and times associated with the regulated business.
California's approach will not stop with firearms dealers. Their argument is that the individuals involved consent to the recording simply by choosing to enter into a licensed business. But California requires licenses for at least 177 different occupations.
If operating a business under a license allows the government to demand round-the-clock recordings, what's to prevent a similar requirement for a home baker whose kitchen is also where her family eats and talks? The logic could reach countless Americans who work where they live.
Goldwater has long defended the right to earn a living at home without forfeiting constitutional protections. The Bill of Rights has no business-license exception. The full Ninth Circuit should hear this case and reaffirm a basic promise of American liberty: Your home doesn't stop being private just because you do business there.
Tony Napolitano is a Senior Attorney at the Goldwater Institute.
***
Original text here: https://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/california-wants-a-microphone-in-your-home-goldwater-is-fighting-back/
CSIS Issues Commentary: New Zealand's Two-Track China Policy
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
New Zealand's Two-Track China Policy
Commentary by Anna Fifield
October 26, 2026
New Zealand's foreign policy has for decades been based on a political consensus around making independent decisions and supporting the rules-based international order and multilateral system. Ahead of the hotly contested November 7 general election, however, and amid a rapidly deteriorating geopolitical environment, that consensus is being tested like seldom before.
The New Zealand Security Intelligence ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * New Zealand's Two-Track China Policy Commentary by Anna Fifield October 26, 2026 New Zealand's foreign policy has for decades been based on a political consensus around making independent decisions and supporting the rules-based international order and multilateral system. Ahead of the hotly contested November 7 general election, however, and amid a rapidly deteriorating geopolitical environment, that consensus is being tested like seldom before. The New Zealand Security IntelligenceService (NZSIS) recently issued its punchiest Security Threat Assessment yet, publicly calling out the Chinese government for espionage conducted "at scale" against New Zealand. The assessment concluded that spy services--especially China's--with "a voracious appetite" for information have dramatically stepped up their effort to get information about critical assets and "cannot be described as benign." This showcases a broader trend in New Zealand's security posture: As China's military, economic, and diplomatic ambitions in the Pacific--and in the wider world--have become increasingly obvious, New Zealand has become more willing to confront China's security activities.
This is a significant shift after years in which New Zealand trailed its traditional partners--especially the United States during the first Trump administration, and Australia under Scott Morrison from 2018 to 2022--in acting on concerns about China's goals and its tactics for achieving them. But this shift does not amount to a full strategic realignment: Like so many small and middle powers around the world, New Zealand now finds itself trying to hedge between an increasingly assertive China and an increasingly unpredictable United States under President Donald Trump. Even as it strengthens its security posture and seeks to diversify its trading relationships, New Zealand is even more dependent on China as a result of geopolitical disruption. Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said at a recent business forum that, as the world enters "an era of ongoing disruption," New Zealand's "consequential" relationship with China was becoming even more important.
The Old Bargain: Economic Dependence and Strategic Caution
New Zealand has for decades been one of the most eager Western nations to work with China. Over the years, both countries have repeatedly championed their "five firsts": New Zealand was the first Western country to support China's accession to the World Trade Organization, to recognize China as a market economy, and to sign a free trade agreement with China. It was also the first to sign up to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and to sign a memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative. New Zealand's underlying assumption was that economic dependence could coexist with strategic distance: New Zealand could deepen its relationship with China without having to choose sides in the emerging U.S.-China rivalry.
This posture was bipartisan, with both left-leaning Labour Party and right-leaning National Party prime ministers embracing China as an enormous economic opportunity. China quickly became fundamental to the country's prosperity: New Zealand sent 3.3 percent of its goods exports to China in 2000, but by 2021, that share had topped 32 percent. Export growth by share has since cooled, in no small part due to China's slowing domestic economy, but the value has remained relatively stable, with New Zealand exporting almost NZ$20 billion worth of goods to China in 2025. This has created whole industries that rely on China, such as Fonterra, the dairy cooperative that is New Zealand's largest company by revenue and earns one-third of its revenue from China. Similarly, almost 90 percent of China's softwood log imports--especially radiata pine used in construction--came from New Zealand last year. These examples illustrate why diversification is so difficult: The industries that are central to New Zealand's economy and identity rely on demand from China.
New Zealand's Evolving Stance on China
New Zealand's position on China began to slowly evolve about a decade ago, when it started to become apparent that Xi Jinping was leading China into a more muscular, party-state era. This influenced New Zealand's thinking in several key ways:
* Erosion of Trust: As a small trading nation, New Zealand relies on the international rules-based order. Wellington became less confident that Beijing's behavior would remain predictable or constrained by international rules. For example, China ignored the Permanent Court of Arbitration and continued building in the contested South China Sea, even after the Philippines won its complaint against China in 2016.
* Human Rights Issues: Reports of human rights abuses against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and moves to bring Hong Kong under tight control despite the supposed "one country, two systems" framework also caused concern in Wellington. This coincided with the election of a Labour-led government in New Zealand in 2017, which devoted more attention to human rights issues than its conservative predecessor. Labour Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern became willing to voice concerns about what was happening in Xinjiang--albeit softly.
* Economic Retaliation: When former Australian prime minister Morrison angered China by calling for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, China responded by imposing severe trade restrictions on agricultural products. Australian wine exports, hit with tariffs of up to 218 percent, plummeted almost overnight. New Zealand was well aware that similar punishments would be devastating in its primary sectors. More than one-third of New Zealand dairy exports and 54 percent of forestry exports go to China, according to the Ministry for Primary Industries.
Together, these factors caused a strategic awakening and started changing how New Zealand policymakers looked at China, albeit at varying speeds. Before, it had been all upside, but now the risks, whether from retribution or recession, started to mount. The emerging conundrum for New Zealand was not simply that China was becoming more powerful; it was that China's lack of compunction about breaching international rules made the assumptions underpinning New Zealand's China strategy harder to sustain.
Security Becomes Harder to Ignore
Throughout all of this was also the growing recognition of China as a threat to New Zealand's own national security. Beijing has stepped up its foreign interference efforts, especially through its United Front Work Department. The academic who sounded the global alarm on the United Front in New Zealand was Anne-Marie Brady, a University of Canterbury professor who used New Zealand as a case study in her influential Magic Weapons report, showing how China was using smaller Western economies to control academic institutions, media, and Chinese diaspora communities.
The pivotal moment for New Zealand came in 2023, when the NZSIS released its first public security threat environment report, naming China eight times and saying it was trying to interfere in New Zealand. Shortly afterward, defense minister Andrew Little declared that New Zealand did "not live in a benign strategic environment." When Labour lost the election at the end of 2023, many observers thought National would return to its pro-business ways. However, the political approach to China had become more bipartisan, as agencies continued to ring alarm bells.
The NZSIS's annual threat assessments have become notably blunter. This year's report noted that the Purple Mountain Observatory, a research institution within the Chinese Communist Party that is particularly interested in Antarctica, was last year found trying to covertly install ground-based space infrastructure in New Zealand. This all followed the NZSIS earlier joining its Five Eyes partners in publicly warning that Chinese military intelligence services were using platforms such as LinkedIn to recruit New Zealanders with access to classified information. The NZSIS's unprecedented willingness to address the practice underscored how China was becoming a concern not just for diplomats, but also for intelligence and defense agencies.
The rhetorical shift has been accelerated by two incidents of Chinese assertiveness in New Zealand's backyard. The Chinese navy conducted live-fire exercises without notice in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand last year, causing passenger jets to be diverted, and this year, China fired a nuclear-capable missile into the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. The latter was widely viewed as a warning to Washington, but it nevertheless showed that Beijing calculated that such a move would not cost any of its diplomatic gains in the Pacific.
For New Zealand, these incidents show that its geographic isolation no longer provides insulation. In fact, its location in the South Pacific puts New Zealand in the middle of an emerging battleground. China's security agreements across the Pacific--notably including last year's comprehensive strategic partnership with the Cook Islands, a realm country that is obliged to confer with New Zealand's government on international affairs--further raised concern about China's intentions in the region, and specifically about whether it was trying to establish a permanent military foothold in the Pacific.
Policymakers and politicians received another wake-up call earlier this year when China put yearlong travel bans on four backbench parliamentarians who made a routine visit to Taiwan, which would be dropped if they apologized; they did not. China nevertheless issued an angry response to the visit, saying "anyone who crosses the line on the Taiwan question will pay a price." This appeared to be an effort by China to use New Zealand to set a new red line on Taiwan and scare parliamentarians from other countries away from making similar visits.
The Politics of a Tougher Security Setting
One way that New Zealand is trying to mitigate its reliance on China is through trade diversification. It is trying to strengthen other relationships, upgrading ties across Southeast Asia in particular, and forging free trade agreements with the few remaining partners it did not have deals with: India, the United Arab Emirates, and the European Union. Yet even while New Zealand is expanding its markets, China remains the foundation of its export industries. These contradictions will continue to constrain the next government's ability to act decisively on either security or trade, regardless of who wins the November 7 election.
Prime Minister Luxon and the governing center-right National-led coalition have embarked on an election campaign with economic growth at its core. Under Luxon's leadership, the government is pursuing a target to double the value of New Zealand's exports by 2034, with little regard to the makeup of those exports. Meanwhile, Luxon's foreign minister, Winston Peters, has reoriented relationships toward the United States while trying to maintain strong economic ties with China. In his final speech of this term, Peters said New Zealand needs to take a realpolitik approach to "the world as it is, not how we wish it would be."
For its part, the center-left Labour Party has said it would pursue "moral clarity" in foreign policy if it wins power next month. Foreign affairs spokeswoman Vanushi Walters said the sitting government had not taken a balanced approach to its relationships, accusing Peters of "outright racism directed at one partner"--China--but silence over the Trump administration's breaches of the UN Charter. "There is a time for quiet diplomacy, and there is a time when quiet diplomacy must bend to moral clarity--that is undeniably the case when the scale of human rights abuses is so stark that it amounts to genocide, to ethnic cleansing," she said.
Polls currently show a tight race, with National and Labour each sitting below 30 percent, putting the minor parties in a kingmaker position in New Zealand's proportional representation system. These divergent views represent a significant cleavage in a country where foreign policy has traditionally been an area of bipartisan agreement--and one that could complicate New Zealand's ability to navigate a rapidly changing global environment.
The Limits of New Zealand's Reset on China
In its latest Defence Capability Plan, New Zealand said that "China's assertive pursuit of its strategic objectives" was the "principal driver" of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. "Of particular concern is the rapid and non-transparent growth of China's military capability," the report said in notably blunt language. The report was accompanied by an additional NZ$9 billion in new spending over four years, with the goal of lifting defense spending from the current 1.1 percent of GDP to more than 2 percent within eight years, which aims to lift the defense force "out of the intensive care unit."
At an intellectual level, more political leaders in Wellington are realizing that New Zealand must lessen its dependence on China, but doing so at a practical level remains difficult. New Zealand is changing its assessment of China faster than it can change the makeup of its economy and the destination of its exports. Nor does it have the rich stockpiles of minerals that make Australia indispensable to China, or the economic heft and advanced computer chips of the United States. That means there will be a limit to how far the country can strengthen its security posture, especially with Beijing trying to keep Wellington in its previous neutral stance. That problem will remain front and center, whatever the shape of New Zealand's next government.
* * *
Anna Fifield is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a New Zealand journalist.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/index%2ephp/analysis/new-zealands-two-track-china-policy
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
New Zealand's Two-Track China Policy
Commentary by Anna Fifield
October 26, 2026
New Zealand's foreign policy has for decades been based on a political consensus around making independent decisions and supporting the rules-based international order and multilateral system. Ahead of the hotly contested November 7 general election, however, and amid a rapidly deteriorating geopolitical environment, that consensus is being tested like seldom before.
The New Zealand Security Intelligence ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * New Zealand's Two-Track China Policy Commentary by Anna Fifield October 26, 2026 New Zealand's foreign policy has for decades been based on a political consensus around making independent decisions and supporting the rules-based international order and multilateral system. Ahead of the hotly contested November 7 general election, however, and amid a rapidly deteriorating geopolitical environment, that consensus is being tested like seldom before. The New Zealand Security IntelligenceService (NZSIS) recently issued its punchiest Security Threat Assessment yet, publicly calling out the Chinese government for espionage conducted "at scale" against New Zealand. The assessment concluded that spy services--especially China's--with "a voracious appetite" for information have dramatically stepped up their effort to get information about critical assets and "cannot be described as benign." This showcases a broader trend in New Zealand's security posture: As China's military, economic, and diplomatic ambitions in the Pacific--and in the wider world--have become increasingly obvious, New Zealand has become more willing to confront China's security activities.
This is a significant shift after years in which New Zealand trailed its traditional partners--especially the United States during the first Trump administration, and Australia under Scott Morrison from 2018 to 2022--in acting on concerns about China's goals and its tactics for achieving them. But this shift does not amount to a full strategic realignment: Like so many small and middle powers around the world, New Zealand now finds itself trying to hedge between an increasingly assertive China and an increasingly unpredictable United States under President Donald Trump. Even as it strengthens its security posture and seeks to diversify its trading relationships, New Zealand is even more dependent on China as a result of geopolitical disruption. Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said at a recent business forum that, as the world enters "an era of ongoing disruption," New Zealand's "consequential" relationship with China was becoming even more important.
The Old Bargain: Economic Dependence and Strategic Caution
New Zealand has for decades been one of the most eager Western nations to work with China. Over the years, both countries have repeatedly championed their "five firsts": New Zealand was the first Western country to support China's accession to the World Trade Organization, to recognize China as a market economy, and to sign a free trade agreement with China. It was also the first to sign up to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and to sign a memorandum of understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative. New Zealand's underlying assumption was that economic dependence could coexist with strategic distance: New Zealand could deepen its relationship with China without having to choose sides in the emerging U.S.-China rivalry.
This posture was bipartisan, with both left-leaning Labour Party and right-leaning National Party prime ministers embracing China as an enormous economic opportunity. China quickly became fundamental to the country's prosperity: New Zealand sent 3.3 percent of its goods exports to China in 2000, but by 2021, that share had topped 32 percent. Export growth by share has since cooled, in no small part due to China's slowing domestic economy, but the value has remained relatively stable, with New Zealand exporting almost NZ$20 billion worth of goods to China in 2025. This has created whole industries that rely on China, such as Fonterra, the dairy cooperative that is New Zealand's largest company by revenue and earns one-third of its revenue from China. Similarly, almost 90 percent of China's softwood log imports--especially radiata pine used in construction--came from New Zealand last year. These examples illustrate why diversification is so difficult: The industries that are central to New Zealand's economy and identity rely on demand from China.
New Zealand's Evolving Stance on China
New Zealand's position on China began to slowly evolve about a decade ago, when it started to become apparent that Xi Jinping was leading China into a more muscular, party-state era. This influenced New Zealand's thinking in several key ways:
* Erosion of Trust: As a small trading nation, New Zealand relies on the international rules-based order. Wellington became less confident that Beijing's behavior would remain predictable or constrained by international rules. For example, China ignored the Permanent Court of Arbitration and continued building in the contested South China Sea, even after the Philippines won its complaint against China in 2016.
* Human Rights Issues: Reports of human rights abuses against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and moves to bring Hong Kong under tight control despite the supposed "one country, two systems" framework also caused concern in Wellington. This coincided with the election of a Labour-led government in New Zealand in 2017, which devoted more attention to human rights issues than its conservative predecessor. Labour Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern became willing to voice concerns about what was happening in Xinjiang--albeit softly.
* Economic Retaliation: When former Australian prime minister Morrison angered China by calling for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19, China responded by imposing severe trade restrictions on agricultural products. Australian wine exports, hit with tariffs of up to 218 percent, plummeted almost overnight. New Zealand was well aware that similar punishments would be devastating in its primary sectors. More than one-third of New Zealand dairy exports and 54 percent of forestry exports go to China, according to the Ministry for Primary Industries.
Together, these factors caused a strategic awakening and started changing how New Zealand policymakers looked at China, albeit at varying speeds. Before, it had been all upside, but now the risks, whether from retribution or recession, started to mount. The emerging conundrum for New Zealand was not simply that China was becoming more powerful; it was that China's lack of compunction about breaching international rules made the assumptions underpinning New Zealand's China strategy harder to sustain.
Security Becomes Harder to Ignore
Throughout all of this was also the growing recognition of China as a threat to New Zealand's own national security. Beijing has stepped up its foreign interference efforts, especially through its United Front Work Department. The academic who sounded the global alarm on the United Front in New Zealand was Anne-Marie Brady, a University of Canterbury professor who used New Zealand as a case study in her influential Magic Weapons report, showing how China was using smaller Western economies to control academic institutions, media, and Chinese diaspora communities.
The pivotal moment for New Zealand came in 2023, when the NZSIS released its first public security threat environment report, naming China eight times and saying it was trying to interfere in New Zealand. Shortly afterward, defense minister Andrew Little declared that New Zealand did "not live in a benign strategic environment." When Labour lost the election at the end of 2023, many observers thought National would return to its pro-business ways. However, the political approach to China had become more bipartisan, as agencies continued to ring alarm bells.
The NZSIS's annual threat assessments have become notably blunter. This year's report noted that the Purple Mountain Observatory, a research institution within the Chinese Communist Party that is particularly interested in Antarctica, was last year found trying to covertly install ground-based space infrastructure in New Zealand. This all followed the NZSIS earlier joining its Five Eyes partners in publicly warning that Chinese military intelligence services were using platforms such as LinkedIn to recruit New Zealanders with access to classified information. The NZSIS's unprecedented willingness to address the practice underscored how China was becoming a concern not just for diplomats, but also for intelligence and defense agencies.
The rhetorical shift has been accelerated by two incidents of Chinese assertiveness in New Zealand's backyard. The Chinese navy conducted live-fire exercises without notice in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand last year, causing passenger jets to be diverted, and this year, China fired a nuclear-capable missile into the nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. The latter was widely viewed as a warning to Washington, but it nevertheless showed that Beijing calculated that such a move would not cost any of its diplomatic gains in the Pacific.
For New Zealand, these incidents show that its geographic isolation no longer provides insulation. In fact, its location in the South Pacific puts New Zealand in the middle of an emerging battleground. China's security agreements across the Pacific--notably including last year's comprehensive strategic partnership with the Cook Islands, a realm country that is obliged to confer with New Zealand's government on international affairs--further raised concern about China's intentions in the region, and specifically about whether it was trying to establish a permanent military foothold in the Pacific.
Policymakers and politicians received another wake-up call earlier this year when China put yearlong travel bans on four backbench parliamentarians who made a routine visit to Taiwan, which would be dropped if they apologized; they did not. China nevertheless issued an angry response to the visit, saying "anyone who crosses the line on the Taiwan question will pay a price." This appeared to be an effort by China to use New Zealand to set a new red line on Taiwan and scare parliamentarians from other countries away from making similar visits.
The Politics of a Tougher Security Setting
One way that New Zealand is trying to mitigate its reliance on China is through trade diversification. It is trying to strengthen other relationships, upgrading ties across Southeast Asia in particular, and forging free trade agreements with the few remaining partners it did not have deals with: India, the United Arab Emirates, and the European Union. Yet even while New Zealand is expanding its markets, China remains the foundation of its export industries. These contradictions will continue to constrain the next government's ability to act decisively on either security or trade, regardless of who wins the November 7 election.
Prime Minister Luxon and the governing center-right National-led coalition have embarked on an election campaign with economic growth at its core. Under Luxon's leadership, the government is pursuing a target to double the value of New Zealand's exports by 2034, with little regard to the makeup of those exports. Meanwhile, Luxon's foreign minister, Winston Peters, has reoriented relationships toward the United States while trying to maintain strong economic ties with China. In his final speech of this term, Peters said New Zealand needs to take a realpolitik approach to "the world as it is, not how we wish it would be."
For its part, the center-left Labour Party has said it would pursue "moral clarity" in foreign policy if it wins power next month. Foreign affairs spokeswoman Vanushi Walters said the sitting government had not taken a balanced approach to its relationships, accusing Peters of "outright racism directed at one partner"--China--but silence over the Trump administration's breaches of the UN Charter. "There is a time for quiet diplomacy, and there is a time when quiet diplomacy must bend to moral clarity--that is undeniably the case when the scale of human rights abuses is so stark that it amounts to genocide, to ethnic cleansing," she said.
Polls currently show a tight race, with National and Labour each sitting below 30 percent, putting the minor parties in a kingmaker position in New Zealand's proportional representation system. These divergent views represent a significant cleavage in a country where foreign policy has traditionally been an area of bipartisan agreement--and one that could complicate New Zealand's ability to navigate a rapidly changing global environment.
The Limits of New Zealand's Reset on China
In its latest Defence Capability Plan, New Zealand said that "China's assertive pursuit of its strategic objectives" was the "principal driver" of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. "Of particular concern is the rapid and non-transparent growth of China's military capability," the report said in notably blunt language. The report was accompanied by an additional NZ$9 billion in new spending over four years, with the goal of lifting defense spending from the current 1.1 percent of GDP to more than 2 percent within eight years, which aims to lift the defense force "out of the intensive care unit."
At an intellectual level, more political leaders in Wellington are realizing that New Zealand must lessen its dependence on China, but doing so at a practical level remains difficult. New Zealand is changing its assessment of China faster than it can change the makeup of its economy and the destination of its exports. Nor does it have the rich stockpiles of minerals that make Australia indispensable to China, or the economic heft and advanced computer chips of the United States. That means there will be a limit to how far the country can strengthen its security posture, especially with Beijing trying to keep Wellington in its previous neutral stance. That problem will remain front and center, whatever the shape of New Zealand's next government.
* * *
Anna Fifield is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a New Zealand journalist.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/index%2ephp/analysis/new-zealands-two-track-china-policy
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Ant and the Grasshopper - Revised Version
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
The Ant and the Grasshopper - Revised Version
Commentary by William Alan Reinsch
October 27, 2026
If you've heard this story before, just bear with me. Once upon a time, there was an ant, and there was a grasshopper. The ant spent his summer gathering food for the winter, while the grasshopper spent the summer playing with his friends. The ant warned the grasshopper that he needed to prepare, but the grasshopper always answered that he would do that tomorrow. Winter arrived, and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * The Ant and the Grasshopper - Revised Version Commentary by William Alan Reinsch October 27, 2026 If you've heard this story before, just bear with me. Once upon a time, there was an ant, and there was a grasshopper. The ant spent his summer gathering food for the winter, while the grasshopper spent the summer playing with his friends. The ant warned the grasshopper that he needed to prepare, but the grasshopper always answered that he would do that tomorrow. Winter arrived, andwith it came cold weather. The ant was snug and warm in his nest when one day the grasshopper knocked on his door and asked to come in. He said, "Oh, ant, I'm cold and hungry. Can you help me?" The ant gave him a lecture about how he should have spent the summer preparing for this. The grasshopper said he was very sorry and would do better next year, but right now he was cold and starving and needed help. The ant thought for a moment and said, "Well, there is one thing I can think of." The grasshopper said, "Grand, what is it?" The ant said, "You could become an ant." The grasshopper said, "I never thought of that. How would I do it?" The ant responded, "I have no idea. That's implementation. I'm in policy planning." And that is the end of the story.
This story, sadly, is relevant to the government. The people, usually political appointees, tasked with coming up with new initiatives are rarely the people who subsequently have to figure out how to turn those ideas into administrative reality. They are also the ones who usually have to deal with the unexpected consequences that inevitably occur. The best trade example is the Liberation Day tariffs, which created implementation difficulties and a boatload--pun intended--of unanticipated consequences. There were problems at the beginning, such as the high tariffs imposed on an island populated only by penguins (which did lead to some very funny videos), and there were implementation errors in revising the tariff schedules, such as the inclusion of one category of gold and the exclusion of another.
Implementation turned out to be complicated due to the lack of clear guidelines and parameters. For example, why did Vietnam receive a 20 percent tariff while Malaysia received 18 percent, Indonesia 19 percent, the United Kingdom 10 percent, and the European Union, South Korea, and Japan 15 percent? Tariffs were imposed pursuant to a formula that was at best arbitrary rather than based on a clear guiding principle. The result was massive uncertainty in the market, evidenced initially in the bond market immediately after Liberation Day, which then led to implementation delays and downward revisions in the tariffs. Apparently, someone decided tariffs were a good idea and ordered staff to develop a set of them without much guidance as to what they were supposed to accomplish.
This became even more evident during the negotiation of multiple agreements on reciprocal trade, where the other countries found themselves asking the U.S. negotiators exactly what the United States was looking for and getting no definitive answers. Worse, when they asked whether the United States would commit to making no further demands once agreement had been reached--in other words, a commitment not to move the goalposts--the answer was "no." That probably explains why some of the agreements have remained as frameworks and why some countries, notably India, are slow-rolling concluding them. Uncertainty generated by U.S. court rulings and Trump's tendency to sharply shift course has left both U.S. negotiators and other governments in trade purgatory, the former not sure what they are supposed to do and the latter waiting to learn their fate.
Another recent example of implementation confusion is the imposition of 50 percent tariffs on some Canadian imports pursuant to Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The basic idea appears to have been "let's punish Canada." Hapless bureaucrats were then tasked with developing a list of items that would be subject to the tariffs. If any policy guidance was given, it appears to have been simply to avoid items that were politically sensitive in the United States. That has turned out to be a moving target. Last week, Trump directed the removal of tariffs on some items, including a lot of paper and cardboard items, plastic bags, selected machinery, and seaweed and algae, many of them important to Maine, and the imposition of new tariffs on others, including air conditioners, carpet, archery equipment, coffins, shampoo, and parts for yachts. We will shortly find out where those imports have been going when their recipients complain, and if it turns out to be in Michigan, Minnesota, or other states with key Senate races, we should expect further revisions. When you are robbing Peter to pay Paul, it is hard to keep up.
The lesson here is not about who is an ant and who is a grasshopper. Rather, it is about the importance of having well-defined goals from the start with clear instructions to those charged with implementation on what they are supposed to do. When the government fails to do that, it doesn't lead to starving grasshoppers, but it does lead to unexpected downstream consequences and uncertainty that suppress growth and investment.
* * *
William A. Reinsch is a senior adviser (non-resident) and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at wreinsch7@gmail.com.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/index%2ephp/analysis/ant-and-grasshopper-revised-version
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
The Ant and the Grasshopper - Revised Version
Commentary by William Alan Reinsch
October 27, 2026
If you've heard this story before, just bear with me. Once upon a time, there was an ant, and there was a grasshopper. The ant spent his summer gathering food for the winter, while the grasshopper spent the summer playing with his friends. The ant warned the grasshopper that he needed to prepare, but the grasshopper always answered that he would do that tomorrow. Winter arrived, and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * The Ant and the Grasshopper - Revised Version Commentary by William Alan Reinsch October 27, 2026 If you've heard this story before, just bear with me. Once upon a time, there was an ant, and there was a grasshopper. The ant spent his summer gathering food for the winter, while the grasshopper spent the summer playing with his friends. The ant warned the grasshopper that he needed to prepare, but the grasshopper always answered that he would do that tomorrow. Winter arrived, andwith it came cold weather. The ant was snug and warm in his nest when one day the grasshopper knocked on his door and asked to come in. He said, "Oh, ant, I'm cold and hungry. Can you help me?" The ant gave him a lecture about how he should have spent the summer preparing for this. The grasshopper said he was very sorry and would do better next year, but right now he was cold and starving and needed help. The ant thought for a moment and said, "Well, there is one thing I can think of." The grasshopper said, "Grand, what is it?" The ant said, "You could become an ant." The grasshopper said, "I never thought of that. How would I do it?" The ant responded, "I have no idea. That's implementation. I'm in policy planning." And that is the end of the story.
This story, sadly, is relevant to the government. The people, usually political appointees, tasked with coming up with new initiatives are rarely the people who subsequently have to figure out how to turn those ideas into administrative reality. They are also the ones who usually have to deal with the unexpected consequences that inevitably occur. The best trade example is the Liberation Day tariffs, which created implementation difficulties and a boatload--pun intended--of unanticipated consequences. There were problems at the beginning, such as the high tariffs imposed on an island populated only by penguins (which did lead to some very funny videos), and there were implementation errors in revising the tariff schedules, such as the inclusion of one category of gold and the exclusion of another.
Implementation turned out to be complicated due to the lack of clear guidelines and parameters. For example, why did Vietnam receive a 20 percent tariff while Malaysia received 18 percent, Indonesia 19 percent, the United Kingdom 10 percent, and the European Union, South Korea, and Japan 15 percent? Tariffs were imposed pursuant to a formula that was at best arbitrary rather than based on a clear guiding principle. The result was massive uncertainty in the market, evidenced initially in the bond market immediately after Liberation Day, which then led to implementation delays and downward revisions in the tariffs. Apparently, someone decided tariffs were a good idea and ordered staff to develop a set of them without much guidance as to what they were supposed to accomplish.
This became even more evident during the negotiation of multiple agreements on reciprocal trade, where the other countries found themselves asking the U.S. negotiators exactly what the United States was looking for and getting no definitive answers. Worse, when they asked whether the United States would commit to making no further demands once agreement had been reached--in other words, a commitment not to move the goalposts--the answer was "no." That probably explains why some of the agreements have remained as frameworks and why some countries, notably India, are slow-rolling concluding them. Uncertainty generated by U.S. court rulings and Trump's tendency to sharply shift course has left both U.S. negotiators and other governments in trade purgatory, the former not sure what they are supposed to do and the latter waiting to learn their fate.
Another recent example of implementation confusion is the imposition of 50 percent tariffs on some Canadian imports pursuant to Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The basic idea appears to have been "let's punish Canada." Hapless bureaucrats were then tasked with developing a list of items that would be subject to the tariffs. If any policy guidance was given, it appears to have been simply to avoid items that were politically sensitive in the United States. That has turned out to be a moving target. Last week, Trump directed the removal of tariffs on some items, including a lot of paper and cardboard items, plastic bags, selected machinery, and seaweed and algae, many of them important to Maine, and the imposition of new tariffs on others, including air conditioners, carpet, archery equipment, coffins, shampoo, and parts for yachts. We will shortly find out where those imports have been going when their recipients complain, and if it turns out to be in Michigan, Minnesota, or other states with key Senate races, we should expect further revisions. When you are robbing Peter to pay Paul, it is hard to keep up.
The lesson here is not about who is an ant and who is a grasshopper. Rather, it is about the importance of having well-defined goals from the start with clear instructions to those charged with implementation on what they are supposed to do. When the government fails to do that, it doesn't lead to starving grasshoppers, but it does lead to unexpected downstream consequences and uncertainty that suppress growth and investment.
* * *
William A. Reinsch is a senior adviser (non-resident) and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at wreinsch7@gmail.com.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/index%2ephp/analysis/ant-and-grasshopper-revised-version
[Category: ThinkTank]
BPC, NGA Announce Steering Committee for American Opportunity Project
WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Bipartisan Policy Center issued the following news release:
* * *
BPC, NGA Announce Steering Committee for American Opportunity Project
*
Washington, DC--The Bipartisan Policy Center and National Governors Association today announced a bipartisan group of important leaders who will guide the American Opportunity Project as members of a steering committee.
The leaders include sitting and former governors, former members of Congress, former Cabinet members, and leaders of some of the nation's foremost companies and nonprofits. This range of expertise ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Bipartisan Policy Center issued the following news release: * * * BPC, NGA Announce Steering Committee for American Opportunity Project * Washington, DC--The Bipartisan Policy Center and National Governors Association today announced a bipartisan group of important leaders who will guide the American Opportunity Project as members of a steering committee. The leaders include sitting and former governors, former members of Congress, former Cabinet members, and leaders of some of the nation's foremost companies and nonprofits. This range of expertiseand experience will ensure that the options generated by the American Opportunity Project are practical, bipartisan, and actionable for Congress and the next administration.
This summer, BPC and NGA launched the American Opportunity Project to address our unsustainable national debt, AI-driven economic disruption, and fragile social safety net. This unique federal-state partnership will develop evidence-based options and honest tradeoffs for current and incoming leaders who will have to confront urgent policy deadlines.
The breadth and depth of the steering committee's membership reflect the project's commitment to working across party lines with federal, state and local, and business leaders to meet this challenge head-on and with the optimism inherent to the American spirit.
"Americans are anxious about affordability, the promise and pitfalls of AI, and uncertain opportunity for future generations. The absence of a national AI plan, our rising debt, and a fragile safety net give them good reason for that anxiety," said Bipartisan Policy Center President and CEO Margaret Spellings. "They are looking to leaders for solutions, and that is what we intend to give them. We are bringing our nation's leading voices together to craft practical, workable policy options that give the next president and Congress a strong foundation for decisive action."
"The impacts of America's growing national debt are not in the distant future," said Brandon Tatum, CEO, National Governors Association. "The American Opportunity Project will work with urgency toward developing solutions that tackle not just the debt but related challenges like affordability and economic disruptions expected from AI. This unique mix of governors and other experts brings the right leaders together to find effective, workable solutions that address Americans' top concerns."
Leaders on the American Opportunity Project steering committee include:
* Gov. Laura Kelly (D-KS)
* Gov. Kevin Stitt (R-OK)
* Hon. Cheri Bustos, Former U.S. Representative (D-IL)
* Hon. Mel Martinez, Former U.S. Senator (R-FL); Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
* Clarence E. Anthony, CEO and Executive Director, National League of Cities; Former Mayor of South Bay, FL
* Hon. Alex Michael Azar II, Chairman, Healthcare Leadership Council; Former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services; Former President, Lilly USA, LLC
* Thomas J. Falk, Board Chair, Bipartisan Policy Center; Former Chairman and CEO, Kimberly-Clark
* Dr. Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Former President and CEO, TIAA; Former Vice Chairman, Federal Reserve System
* Dr. Doug Holtz-Eakin, President, American Action Forum; Former Director, Congressional Budget Office
* Robert Kaplan, Vice Chair, Goldman Sachs; Former President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
* Hon. Jacob J. Lew, Former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury; Former Director, Office of Management and Budget
* Hon. Steven C. Preston, President and CEO, Goodwill Industries Intl.; Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; Former Administrator of the U.S. Small Business Administration
* Hon. Kathleen Sebelius, Former Kansas Governor; Former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services
* Hon. Margaret Spellings, President and CEO, Bipartisan Policy Center; Former U.S. Secretary of Education
* Evan Spiegel, Co-founder and CEO, Snap Inc.
* Dr. Brandon Tatum, CEO, National Governors Association; Former CEO, Public Regional University System of Oklahoma
* Gretchen Watkins, Board Director and Former President, Shell USA
* Hon. Shalanda Young, Distinguished Scholar in Residence, NYU Law; Former Director, Office of Management and Budget
The American Opportunity Project starts from a different premise than past fiscal efforts. Tax policy, benefits and health care, workforce, and competitiveness are usually debated in silos, but the people affected experience them together. A family's ability to afford a home, find child care, keep pace with a changing job market, and plan for retirement all depend on one another, and so do the policy choices behind them.
The American Opportunity Project will examine these issues as one system. An investment in one place may require tough choices in another, and the project will put those tradeoffs on the table so federal policymakers can see what each option--including sustaining the status quo--costs and gains.
To set the stage for this project, BPC and NGA are convening economists, business leaders, and policy experts today to lay out the facts on the fiscal outlook, America's changing demography, and the division of responsibilities among federal, state, and local governments. Learn more and watch video of the event.
***
Original text here: https://bipartisanpolicy.org/press-release/bpc-nga-announce-steering-committee-for-american-opportunity-project/
* * *
BPC, NGA Announce Steering Committee for American Opportunity Project
*
Washington, DC--The Bipartisan Policy Center and National Governors Association today announced a bipartisan group of important leaders who will guide the American Opportunity Project as members of a steering committee.
The leaders include sitting and former governors, former members of Congress, former Cabinet members, and leaders of some of the nation's foremost companies and nonprofits. This range of expertise ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Bipartisan Policy Center issued the following news release: * * * BPC, NGA Announce Steering Committee for American Opportunity Project * Washington, DC--The Bipartisan Policy Center and National Governors Association today announced a bipartisan group of important leaders who will guide the American Opportunity Project as members of a steering committee. The leaders include sitting and former governors, former members of Congress, former Cabinet members, and leaders of some of the nation's foremost companies and nonprofits. This range of expertiseand experience will ensure that the options generated by the American Opportunity Project are practical, bipartisan, and actionable for Congress and the next administration.
This summer, BPC and NGA launched the American Opportunity Project to address our unsustainable national debt, AI-driven economic disruption, and fragile social safety net. This unique federal-state partnership will develop evidence-based options and honest tradeoffs for current and incoming leaders who will have to confront urgent policy deadlines.
The breadth and depth of the steering committee's membership reflect the project's commitment to working across party lines with federal, state and local, and business leaders to meet this challenge head-on and with the optimism inherent to the American spirit.
"Americans are anxious about affordability, the promise and pitfalls of AI, and uncertain opportunity for future generations. The absence of a national AI plan, our rising debt, and a fragile safety net give them good reason for that anxiety," said Bipartisan Policy Center President and CEO Margaret Spellings. "They are looking to leaders for solutions, and that is what we intend to give them. We are bringing our nation's leading voices together to craft practical, workable policy options that give the next president and Congress a strong foundation for decisive action."
"The impacts of America's growing national debt are not in the distant future," said Brandon Tatum, CEO, National Governors Association. "The American Opportunity Project will work with urgency toward developing solutions that tackle not just the debt but related challenges like affordability and economic disruptions expected from AI. This unique mix of governors and other experts brings the right leaders together to find effective, workable solutions that address Americans' top concerns."
Leaders on the American Opportunity Project steering committee include:
* Gov. Laura Kelly (D-KS)
* Gov. Kevin Stitt (R-OK)
* Hon. Cheri Bustos, Former U.S. Representative (D-IL)
* Hon. Mel Martinez, Former U.S. Senator (R-FL); Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
* Clarence E. Anthony, CEO and Executive Director, National League of Cities; Former Mayor of South Bay, FL
* Hon. Alex Michael Azar II, Chairman, Healthcare Leadership Council; Former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services; Former President, Lilly USA, LLC
* Thomas J. Falk, Board Chair, Bipartisan Policy Center; Former Chairman and CEO, Kimberly-Clark
* Dr. Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Former President and CEO, TIAA; Former Vice Chairman, Federal Reserve System
* Dr. Doug Holtz-Eakin, President, American Action Forum; Former Director, Congressional Budget Office
* Robert Kaplan, Vice Chair, Goldman Sachs; Former President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
* Hon. Jacob J. Lew, Former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury; Former Director, Office of Management and Budget
* Hon. Steven C. Preston, President and CEO, Goodwill Industries Intl.; Former U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; Former Administrator of the U.S. Small Business Administration
* Hon. Kathleen Sebelius, Former Kansas Governor; Former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services
* Hon. Margaret Spellings, President and CEO, Bipartisan Policy Center; Former U.S. Secretary of Education
* Evan Spiegel, Co-founder and CEO, Snap Inc.
* Dr. Brandon Tatum, CEO, National Governors Association; Former CEO, Public Regional University System of Oklahoma
* Gretchen Watkins, Board Director and Former President, Shell USA
* Hon. Shalanda Young, Distinguished Scholar in Residence, NYU Law; Former Director, Office of Management and Budget
The American Opportunity Project starts from a different premise than past fiscal efforts. Tax policy, benefits and health care, workforce, and competitiveness are usually debated in silos, but the people affected experience them together. A family's ability to afford a home, find child care, keep pace with a changing job market, and plan for retirement all depend on one another, and so do the policy choices behind them.
The American Opportunity Project will examine these issues as one system. An investment in one place may require tough choices in another, and the project will put those tradeoffs on the table so federal policymakers can see what each option--including sustaining the status quo--costs and gains.
To set the stage for this project, BPC and NGA are convening economists, business leaders, and policy experts today to lay out the facts on the fiscal outlook, America's changing demography, and the division of responsibilities among federal, state, and local governments. Learn more and watch video of the event.
***
Original text here: https://bipartisanpolicy.org/press-release/bpc-nga-announce-steering-committee-for-american-opportunity-project/