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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Russian Sabotage Campaign Against NATO Surges
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Russian Sabotage Campaign Against NATO Surges
Maksym Panchokha
Executive Summary:
* Russian-linked hybrid attacks across Europe, particularly on military-industrial facilities, including an August 31 fire at Poland's WB Electronics, have surged to roughly 15 incidents a month since April.
* These attacks are calibrated to stay below the threshold for invoking Article 5, exploiting the fact that current NATO mechanisms are not fully coordinating ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russian Sabotage Campaign Against NATO Surges Maksym Panchokha Executive Summary: * Russian-linked hybrid attacks across Europe, particularly on military-industrial facilities, including an August 31 fire at Poland's WB Electronics, have surged to roughly 15 incidents a month since April. * These attacks are calibrated to stay below the threshold for invoking Article 5, exploiting the fact that current NATO mechanisms are not fully coordinatingthe registration, attribution, or collective characterization of sabotage against its defense-industrial base.
* Poland's outsized exposure and defense investment could give Warsaw standing to push NATO toward a coordinated joint reporting mechanism for gray-zone sabotage, modeled on existing cyber-coordination frameworks, before Moscow tests collective defense more directly.
-
On the night of August 31, a fire tore through a production building at WB Electronics in Skarzysko-Kamienna, Poland's largest privately owned defense manufacturer and a supplier of the FlyEye and Warmate drones that Ukrainian forces use daily on the front line. Security footage reportedly showed a masked figure scaling the perimeter fence shortly before the blaze started (The Insider, August 31). Polish prosecutors opened a terrorism investigation, and on September 2, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that there is no doubt that it was an act of deliberate arson (Nastoyashee Vremya, September 1). The fire is one of the latest entries in an accelerating, continent-wide pattern for which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) lacks shared categorization or a fully coordinated response.
The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism and GLOBSEC have documented 151 suspected Russian-linked industrial sabotage incidents across Europe between February 2022 and February 2026 (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, March 3). The Munich Security Report 2026, drawing on Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project figures, tallied roughly 150 suspected Russian hybrid incidents, including arson, sabotage, drone overflights, and incendiary parcels, in EU and NATO states from 2022 through 2025 (Defence Blog, August 24).
The pace of Russian-linked hybrid attacks on NATO countries is accelerating. Ukraine's Sahaidachnyi Security Center puts the rate at around 15 incidents a month between April and August, up from a previous ceiling of roughly ten attacks in a month (24 Kanal, August 30). This year's defense-industrial fires span Czechia, France, Bulgaria, Italy, and Estonia and now Poland twice over, after Slovak police say they disrupted a plot to burn down a Ukrainian-owned drone facility on August 25 (Euromaidan Press, June 19; UNN, August 30; Dagens News, August 31). Tusk warned days before the WB Electronics fire that the coming months could prove critical for the security of Ukraine and the wider region.
Other recent examples of Russian-linked hybrid attacks on NATO and EU military-industrial facilities are plentiful. U.K. authorities arrested a man on charges of working with a Russia-linked intelligence group to plan to sabotage drone factories in Swindon on September 4 (Nastoyashee Vremya, September 10). An EMCO weapons-storage facility in Bulgaria, which supplies ammunition to Ukraine, caught fire on September 12, the second EMCO warehouse fire in recent weeks that raised suspicions of Russian sabotage (Radio Svoboda, September 12).
NATO's Article 5 collective-defense guarantee was initially built to answer a tank column or a missile strike, an event unambiguous enough that 32 capitals can agree, quickly, that an armed attack occurred. In 2024, MI5 Director General Ken McCallum said publicly that Russia's military intelligence service was on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on U.K. and European streets, citing arson, sabotage, and other hybrid attacks (Meduza, October 8, 2024). Two years on, his warning reads as an accurate forecast of what is now happening to Europe's defense-industrial base. A drone-factory fire lit by an unidentified man in a balaclava does not trigger Article 5, and Moscow knows this--the ambiguity is the point, not a loophole. A campaign calibrated to stay under that line can still degrade production, spook insurers, and drain investigator hours without ever handing NATO a clean casus foederis.
NATO's response has so far been largely characterized by the fragmentation that the Russian strategy is built to exploit. Poland treats Skarzysko-Kamienna as a domestic terrorism case (Nabat, September 3). Slovakia handled its August case through its domestic police and criminal-justice system (Dagens News, August 31). Estonia, Czechia, France, Bulgaria, and Italy have each run their own investigations, on their own timelines, with their own agencies, and even attribution is inconsistent. Czech and Estonian authorities are actively probing a Russian link, while French, Bulgarian, and Italian officials have not formally connected their cases to Moscow at all (New Voice of Ukraine, September 4). There is no shared registry of these incidents, no joint threat briefing to all 32 capitals, and no agreed threshold at which a scatter of "isolated" fires becomes a recognized campaign. A strategy built to stay under the radar of collective defense is difficult to counter when attribution and response remain primarily national decisions, even when NATO institutions are monitoring the broader campaign.
Poland has both the exposure and the standing to press the issue. It has absorbed more of these incidents than any other ally, is spending close to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, has committed roughly 2 billion euros ($2.2 billion) to its Eastern Shield defenses, including for drones and surveillance, along its eastern border, and deployed about 10,000 troops under "Operation Horizon" to guard critical sites (Geopolitical Monitor, August 12; Insurance Journal, August 31). A standing mechanism, even an informal one to start, for members to report and jointly characterize sabotage against the defense-industrial base, in the same way it already coordinates to combat cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, could help NATO prevent these attacks. This does not require rewriting Article 5. It would require NATO to recognize that collective defense first needs collective recognition of the threat.
WB Electronics says it does not expect the fire to delay deliveries to the Polish military, which is a credit to the company rather than a reason for complacency. U.S. intelligence assessments reportedly warn that Russia may test NATO's collective-defense commitments directly within a few years, and a defense-industrial base that has spent this year quietly absorbing arson attacks, factory by factory and country by country, could be better prepared when that test arrives (RBC, August 7). The fire in Skarzysko-Kamienna will fade from headlines within weeks. The campaign it belongs to will not.
* * *
Maksym Panchokha is an independent researcher focusing on Russian politics and political economy, particularly the relationship between state policy, economic governance, and Russia's defense-industrial sector. He previously worked at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Russia Program and the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russian-sabotage-campaign-against-nato-surges/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Russian Sabotage Campaign Against NATO Surges
Maksym Panchokha
Executive Summary:
* Russian-linked hybrid attacks across Europe, particularly on military-industrial facilities, including an August 31 fire at Poland's WB Electronics, have surged to roughly 15 incidents a month since April.
* These attacks are calibrated to stay below the threshold for invoking Article 5, exploiting the fact that current NATO mechanisms are not fully coordinating ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russian Sabotage Campaign Against NATO Surges Maksym Panchokha Executive Summary: * Russian-linked hybrid attacks across Europe, particularly on military-industrial facilities, including an August 31 fire at Poland's WB Electronics, have surged to roughly 15 incidents a month since April. * These attacks are calibrated to stay below the threshold for invoking Article 5, exploiting the fact that current NATO mechanisms are not fully coordinatingthe registration, attribution, or collective characterization of sabotage against its defense-industrial base.
* Poland's outsized exposure and defense investment could give Warsaw standing to push NATO toward a coordinated joint reporting mechanism for gray-zone sabotage, modeled on existing cyber-coordination frameworks, before Moscow tests collective defense more directly.
-
On the night of August 31, a fire tore through a production building at WB Electronics in Skarzysko-Kamienna, Poland's largest privately owned defense manufacturer and a supplier of the FlyEye and Warmate drones that Ukrainian forces use daily on the front line. Security footage reportedly showed a masked figure scaling the perimeter fence shortly before the blaze started (The Insider, August 31). Polish prosecutors opened a terrorism investigation, and on September 2, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that there is no doubt that it was an act of deliberate arson (Nastoyashee Vremya, September 1). The fire is one of the latest entries in an accelerating, continent-wide pattern for which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) lacks shared categorization or a fully coordinated response.
The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism and GLOBSEC have documented 151 suspected Russian-linked industrial sabotage incidents across Europe between February 2022 and February 2026 (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, March 3). The Munich Security Report 2026, drawing on Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project figures, tallied roughly 150 suspected Russian hybrid incidents, including arson, sabotage, drone overflights, and incendiary parcels, in EU and NATO states from 2022 through 2025 (Defence Blog, August 24).
The pace of Russian-linked hybrid attacks on NATO countries is accelerating. Ukraine's Sahaidachnyi Security Center puts the rate at around 15 incidents a month between April and August, up from a previous ceiling of roughly ten attacks in a month (24 Kanal, August 30). This year's defense-industrial fires span Czechia, France, Bulgaria, Italy, and Estonia and now Poland twice over, after Slovak police say they disrupted a plot to burn down a Ukrainian-owned drone facility on August 25 (Euromaidan Press, June 19; UNN, August 30; Dagens News, August 31). Tusk warned days before the WB Electronics fire that the coming months could prove critical for the security of Ukraine and the wider region.
Other recent examples of Russian-linked hybrid attacks on NATO and EU military-industrial facilities are plentiful. U.K. authorities arrested a man on charges of working with a Russia-linked intelligence group to plan to sabotage drone factories in Swindon on September 4 (Nastoyashee Vremya, September 10). An EMCO weapons-storage facility in Bulgaria, which supplies ammunition to Ukraine, caught fire on September 12, the second EMCO warehouse fire in recent weeks that raised suspicions of Russian sabotage (Radio Svoboda, September 12).
NATO's Article 5 collective-defense guarantee was initially built to answer a tank column or a missile strike, an event unambiguous enough that 32 capitals can agree, quickly, that an armed attack occurred. In 2024, MI5 Director General Ken McCallum said publicly that Russia's military intelligence service was on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on U.K. and European streets, citing arson, sabotage, and other hybrid attacks (Meduza, October 8, 2024). Two years on, his warning reads as an accurate forecast of what is now happening to Europe's defense-industrial base. A drone-factory fire lit by an unidentified man in a balaclava does not trigger Article 5, and Moscow knows this--the ambiguity is the point, not a loophole. A campaign calibrated to stay under that line can still degrade production, spook insurers, and drain investigator hours without ever handing NATO a clean casus foederis.
NATO's response has so far been largely characterized by the fragmentation that the Russian strategy is built to exploit. Poland treats Skarzysko-Kamienna as a domestic terrorism case (Nabat, September 3). Slovakia handled its August case through its domestic police and criminal-justice system (Dagens News, August 31). Estonia, Czechia, France, Bulgaria, and Italy have each run their own investigations, on their own timelines, with their own agencies, and even attribution is inconsistent. Czech and Estonian authorities are actively probing a Russian link, while French, Bulgarian, and Italian officials have not formally connected their cases to Moscow at all (New Voice of Ukraine, September 4). There is no shared registry of these incidents, no joint threat briefing to all 32 capitals, and no agreed threshold at which a scatter of "isolated" fires becomes a recognized campaign. A strategy built to stay under the radar of collective defense is difficult to counter when attribution and response remain primarily national decisions, even when NATO institutions are monitoring the broader campaign.
Poland has both the exposure and the standing to press the issue. It has absorbed more of these incidents than any other ally, is spending close to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, has committed roughly 2 billion euros ($2.2 billion) to its Eastern Shield defenses, including for drones and surveillance, along its eastern border, and deployed about 10,000 troops under "Operation Horizon" to guard critical sites (Geopolitical Monitor, August 12; Insurance Journal, August 31). A standing mechanism, even an informal one to start, for members to report and jointly characterize sabotage against the defense-industrial base, in the same way it already coordinates to combat cyberattacks against critical infrastructure, could help NATO prevent these attacks. This does not require rewriting Article 5. It would require NATO to recognize that collective defense first needs collective recognition of the threat.
WB Electronics says it does not expect the fire to delay deliveries to the Polish military, which is a credit to the company rather than a reason for complacency. U.S. intelligence assessments reportedly warn that Russia may test NATO's collective-defense commitments directly within a few years, and a defense-industrial base that has spent this year quietly absorbing arson attacks, factory by factory and country by country, could be better prepared when that test arrives (RBC, August 7). The fire in Skarzysko-Kamienna will fade from headlines within weeks. The campaign it belongs to will not.
* * *
Maksym Panchokha is an independent researcher focusing on Russian politics and political economy, particularly the relationship between state policy, economic governance, and Russia's defense-industrial sector. He previously worked at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Russia Program and the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russian-sabotage-campaign-against-nato-surges/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Russia's Invasion Provides Lessons for Military Medical Care
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief Notes:
* * *
Russia's Invasion Provides Lessons for Military Medical Care
Joaquin Camarena
Executive Summary:
* The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) is integrating lessons learned from observing Russia's war in Ukraine in the field of military medical care (MMC) capabilities.
* The Army Medical University will likely act as the lead in efforts to enhance MMC capabilities due to its crucial role in training new personnel and also because it aligns with the "three-in-one" ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief Notes: * * * Russia's Invasion Provides Lessons for Military Medical Care Joaquin Camarena Executive Summary: * The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) is integrating lessons learned from observing Russia's war in Ukraine in the field of military medical care (MMC) capabilities. * The Army Medical University will likely act as the lead in efforts to enhance MMC capabilities due to its crucial role in training new personnel and also because it aligns with the "three-in-one"training system initiated in 2013 that focuses on training "new era" personnel.
* Integrating unmanned systems into MMC work is the most significant development as it seeks to increase the survivability of casualties. Other developments are the increased use of unscripted scenarios and competitions as part of its training program for casualty care.
* The PLA likely still faces deficiencies despite making advancements with its MMC capabilities, such as the quality of the training and equipment used to treat injuries.
-
In late July, personnel from the 966th Hospital of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) conducted a combat-oriented medical support drill. The field hospital team was focused on improving their core capabilities in joint combat medical care, such as casualty handling, emergency rescue, and the treatment of complex injuries. The exercise also addressed the shortcomings in treating complex injuries that would occur on the modern battlefield by conducting simulated medical support missions to develop experience. Personnel began to receive and triage simulated casualties to ensure their efficient treatment after they set up the field hospital and associated areas (PLA Daily, July 31).
The exercise reflects how the PLA is taking lessons learned from observing Russia's war in Ukraine and incorporating new training models and equipment to increase its military medical care (MMC) capabilities.
Xi's University Visit Spurred Efforts to Learn From Russian Invasion
An April 2024 visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the Army Medical University (AMU) was the beginning of efforts to enhance the PLA's MMC capabilities. Xi listened as university leadership presented their key disciplines in battlefield medical treatment, and he gave a speech emphasizing the need to focus on the battlefield, soldiers, and their future by enhancing the quality of education and training the university provides (PLA Daily, April 25, 2024). He also examined MMC equipment and received demonstrations on their use by cadets attending AMU (Xinhua, April 27, 2024).
The PLA assesses that future conflicts will place increasingly high demands on frontline medical treatment capabilities. Its current MMC capabilities would be unable to effectively treat injuries similar to those encountered by medical units during Russia's war in Ukraine (CCTV, April 27, 2024). Xi's visit was therefore intended to spur efforts to improve the techniques and equipment that would be used by PLA units to treat battlefield injuries. It also signaled the important role the institute likely plays in improving and developing MMC techniques and equipment to treat injured personnel.
AMU, as a vital component of the PLA's support and training system for military medicine, plays a key role in efforts to incorporate lessons from the Russian invasion (PLA Daily, April 28, 2024). Xi emphasized this in his speech, urging the university to strengthen its medical support capabilities to increase combat effectiveness. The university's role may also include developing or modifying techniques and equipment involved in both tactical and operational levels of MMC, and then serving as a hub to disseminate these to other military medical universities and JLSF hospitals, which would pass them down to lower echelon units.
The PLA views military academies, including AMU, as being directly linked to the battlefield. These institutions are also core components of the "three-in-one new military talent training system for developing new-type military personnel", which since the Third Plenum in 2013 has integrated military academy education, troop training practice, and vocational education, and seeks to strengthen the PLA with talents in the new era (PLA Daily, October, 6, 2022, April 26, 2024).
Drone Integration Key to New Techniques and Equipment
To overcome tactical medicine limitations, the PLA has incorporated several new technologies and training models. These include the use of various drones to evacuate wounded personnel from frontline positions, reducing the threats posed by first-person view (FPV) drones and loitering munitions.
In early September, the 980th Hospital of the JLSF conducted a medical support exercise that focused on mass mobile evacuation, casualty triage, and treatment in a battlefield environment. The exercise also focused on ensuring the efficient operation of the chain for treating wounded personnel. The hospital employed an air-ground coordination model that used unmanned vehicles to bridge the last mile of the treatment chain and transported the simulated casualties to the field aid stations for initial treatment. Cao Jianhua, a soldier with the hospital, highlighted how personnel benchmark their training against realistic injuries in extreme environments to enable them to operate under complex conditions (CCTV, September 3).
In May, a brigade from the 77th Group Army conducted a medical support training exercise that used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and robotic dogs armed with infrared cameras and other sensors to conduct searches so the medical teams could retrieve casualties. The drones that the brigade used to conduct battlefield search and rescue missions also enable personnel to understand how to employ them under realistic circumstances. The exercise incorporated several emergency scenarios that included electromagnetic interference and power outages (PLA Daily, May 19). These enhanced the medical teams' confidence in using the procedures to respond to emergencies that would allow them to continue to treat casualties.
The PLA also uses competitions to train medics and personnel in auxiliary medical positions. The People's Armed Police (PAP), which reports to the Central Military Commission though is institutionally distinct from the PLA, could be deployed in a conflict and so would benefit from improving its MMC capabilities. An annual PAP competition therefore likely provides useful information about the techniques and equipment that the PLA would use to treat casualties. The 2026 competition, titled the "Support Vanguard Record Breaking Competition", focused on logistical fields such as medical support, ordnance, and supply, and featured combat-oriented drills designed to enhance training. It also tested PAP personnel on casualty assessment and treatment, with drills focused on assessing the condition of a simulated casualty and providing the necessary medical treatment so they can be moved to collection points (PLA Daily, September 1).
The PAP also holds training sessions to provide auxiliary medics with the necessary knowledge and skills to treat battlefield casualties and increase their MMC capabilities. In 2025, the Mobile Detachment of the PAP's Hebei Corps held a specialized training exercise for this purpose. Personnel from various sections, including mobile operations, communications, and transport, participated in the drill. The training involved realistic drills based on modules for managing combat-related hemorrhages and other types of battlefield medical support (WeChat/Central Theater Command, September 2, 2025). The personnel had to demonstrate their proficiency in using the techniques and equipment, such as trauma bandages and tourniquets, to treat casualties.
Conclusion
The PLA is improving its MMC capabilities to increase combat units' survivability based on observations of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Its most significant lesson learned is the integration of various drones and new training models to increase the survivability of casualties. Xi's 2024 visit to AMU kickstarted the PLA's focus on developing new teaching models and equipment to overcome this limitation. AMU was chosen to lead the effort because of its crucial role in training new personnel, and also because it aligns with the "three-in-one" training system.
Despite these advances, the PLA's tactical medical capabilities likely contain weaknesses. Both the equipment used to treat the type of wounds that medics and medical personnel might encounter on the battlefield and the quality of training are likely deficient. At the same time, some units continue to use scripted scenarios instead of more realistic exercises, which suggests a lack of readiness. The PLA is also still in the process of integrating militia and reserve units into medical training exercises, to prevent any proficiency gaps from appearing. This integration would allow militia and reserve units to play a role in operational plans that the PLA would implement during conflicts.
* * *
Joaquin Camarena is a former United States Marine Corps intelligence analyst who runs Sino Talk, an entity devoted to monitoring the PLA's developing capabilities. His main focuses are PLAN and PLANMC expeditionary capabilities and PLA modernization efforts.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russias-invasion-provides-lessons-for-military-medical-care/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Russia's Invasion Provides Lessons for Military Medical Care
Joaquin Camarena
Executive Summary:
* The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) is integrating lessons learned from observing Russia's war in Ukraine in the field of military medical care (MMC) capabilities.
* The Army Medical University will likely act as the lead in efforts to enhance MMC capabilities due to its crucial role in training new personnel and also because it aligns with the "three-in-one" ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief Notes: * * * Russia's Invasion Provides Lessons for Military Medical Care Joaquin Camarena Executive Summary: * The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) is integrating lessons learned from observing Russia's war in Ukraine in the field of military medical care (MMC) capabilities. * The Army Medical University will likely act as the lead in efforts to enhance MMC capabilities due to its crucial role in training new personnel and also because it aligns with the "three-in-one"training system initiated in 2013 that focuses on training "new era" personnel.
* Integrating unmanned systems into MMC work is the most significant development as it seeks to increase the survivability of casualties. Other developments are the increased use of unscripted scenarios and competitions as part of its training program for casualty care.
* The PLA likely still faces deficiencies despite making advancements with its MMC capabilities, such as the quality of the training and equipment used to treat injuries.
-
In late July, personnel from the 966th Hospital of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) conducted a combat-oriented medical support drill. The field hospital team was focused on improving their core capabilities in joint combat medical care, such as casualty handling, emergency rescue, and the treatment of complex injuries. The exercise also addressed the shortcomings in treating complex injuries that would occur on the modern battlefield by conducting simulated medical support missions to develop experience. Personnel began to receive and triage simulated casualties to ensure their efficient treatment after they set up the field hospital and associated areas (PLA Daily, July 31).
The exercise reflects how the PLA is taking lessons learned from observing Russia's war in Ukraine and incorporating new training models and equipment to increase its military medical care (MMC) capabilities.
Xi's University Visit Spurred Efforts to Learn From Russian Invasion
An April 2024 visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to the Army Medical University (AMU) was the beginning of efforts to enhance the PLA's MMC capabilities. Xi listened as university leadership presented their key disciplines in battlefield medical treatment, and he gave a speech emphasizing the need to focus on the battlefield, soldiers, and their future by enhancing the quality of education and training the university provides (PLA Daily, April 25, 2024). He also examined MMC equipment and received demonstrations on their use by cadets attending AMU (Xinhua, April 27, 2024).
The PLA assesses that future conflicts will place increasingly high demands on frontline medical treatment capabilities. Its current MMC capabilities would be unable to effectively treat injuries similar to those encountered by medical units during Russia's war in Ukraine (CCTV, April 27, 2024). Xi's visit was therefore intended to spur efforts to improve the techniques and equipment that would be used by PLA units to treat battlefield injuries. It also signaled the important role the institute likely plays in improving and developing MMC techniques and equipment to treat injured personnel.
AMU, as a vital component of the PLA's support and training system for military medicine, plays a key role in efforts to incorporate lessons from the Russian invasion (PLA Daily, April 28, 2024). Xi emphasized this in his speech, urging the university to strengthen its medical support capabilities to increase combat effectiveness. The university's role may also include developing or modifying techniques and equipment involved in both tactical and operational levels of MMC, and then serving as a hub to disseminate these to other military medical universities and JLSF hospitals, which would pass them down to lower echelon units.
The PLA views military academies, including AMU, as being directly linked to the battlefield. These institutions are also core components of the "three-in-one new military talent training system for developing new-type military personnel", which since the Third Plenum in 2013 has integrated military academy education, troop training practice, and vocational education, and seeks to strengthen the PLA with talents in the new era (PLA Daily, October, 6, 2022, April 26, 2024).
Drone Integration Key to New Techniques and Equipment
To overcome tactical medicine limitations, the PLA has incorporated several new technologies and training models. These include the use of various drones to evacuate wounded personnel from frontline positions, reducing the threats posed by first-person view (FPV) drones and loitering munitions.
In early September, the 980th Hospital of the JLSF conducted a medical support exercise that focused on mass mobile evacuation, casualty triage, and treatment in a battlefield environment. The exercise also focused on ensuring the efficient operation of the chain for treating wounded personnel. The hospital employed an air-ground coordination model that used unmanned vehicles to bridge the last mile of the treatment chain and transported the simulated casualties to the field aid stations for initial treatment. Cao Jianhua, a soldier with the hospital, highlighted how personnel benchmark their training against realistic injuries in extreme environments to enable them to operate under complex conditions (CCTV, September 3).
In May, a brigade from the 77th Group Army conducted a medical support training exercise that used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and robotic dogs armed with infrared cameras and other sensors to conduct searches so the medical teams could retrieve casualties. The drones that the brigade used to conduct battlefield search and rescue missions also enable personnel to understand how to employ them under realistic circumstances. The exercise incorporated several emergency scenarios that included electromagnetic interference and power outages (PLA Daily, May 19). These enhanced the medical teams' confidence in using the procedures to respond to emergencies that would allow them to continue to treat casualties.
The PLA also uses competitions to train medics and personnel in auxiliary medical positions. The People's Armed Police (PAP), which reports to the Central Military Commission though is institutionally distinct from the PLA, could be deployed in a conflict and so would benefit from improving its MMC capabilities. An annual PAP competition therefore likely provides useful information about the techniques and equipment that the PLA would use to treat casualties. The 2026 competition, titled the "Support Vanguard Record Breaking Competition", focused on logistical fields such as medical support, ordnance, and supply, and featured combat-oriented drills designed to enhance training. It also tested PAP personnel on casualty assessment and treatment, with drills focused on assessing the condition of a simulated casualty and providing the necessary medical treatment so they can be moved to collection points (PLA Daily, September 1).
The PAP also holds training sessions to provide auxiliary medics with the necessary knowledge and skills to treat battlefield casualties and increase their MMC capabilities. In 2025, the Mobile Detachment of the PAP's Hebei Corps held a specialized training exercise for this purpose. Personnel from various sections, including mobile operations, communications, and transport, participated in the drill. The training involved realistic drills based on modules for managing combat-related hemorrhages and other types of battlefield medical support (WeChat/Central Theater Command, September 2, 2025). The personnel had to demonstrate their proficiency in using the techniques and equipment, such as trauma bandages and tourniquets, to treat casualties.
Conclusion
The PLA is improving its MMC capabilities to increase combat units' survivability based on observations of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Its most significant lesson learned is the integration of various drones and new training models to increase the survivability of casualties. Xi's 2024 visit to AMU kickstarted the PLA's focus on developing new teaching models and equipment to overcome this limitation. AMU was chosen to lead the effort because of its crucial role in training new personnel, and also because it aligns with the "three-in-one" training system.
Despite these advances, the PLA's tactical medical capabilities likely contain weaknesses. Both the equipment used to treat the type of wounds that medics and medical personnel might encounter on the battlefield and the quality of training are likely deficient. At the same time, some units continue to use scripted scenarios instead of more realistic exercises, which suggests a lack of readiness. The PLA is also still in the process of integrating militia and reserve units into medical training exercises, to prevent any proficiency gaps from appearing. This integration would allow militia and reserve units to play a role in operational plans that the PLA would implement during conflicts.
* * *
Joaquin Camarena is a former United States Marine Corps intelligence analyst who runs Sino Talk, an entity devoted to monitoring the PLA's developing capabilities. His main focuses are PLAN and PLANMC expeditionary capabilities and PLA modernization efforts.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russias-invasion-provides-lessons-for-military-medical-care/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Regional Rivalries Could Jeopardize TAPI Pipeline Ambitions
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Regional Rivalries Could Jeopardize TAPI Pipeline Ambitions
Syed Fazl-e-Haider
Executive Summary:
* On August 10, Turkmenistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan signed a memorandum of understanding on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline gas purchases, while on August 27, Afghan Herat Province Governor Sheikh Maulana Islam Jar said the province's section could be completed within two months.
* Despite the progress, renewed Pakistan-Afghanistan ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Regional Rivalries Could Jeopardize TAPI Pipeline Ambitions Syed Fazl-e-Haider Executive Summary: * On August 10, Turkmenistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan signed a memorandum of understanding on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline gas purchases, while on August 27, Afghan Herat Province Governor Sheikh Maulana Islam Jar said the province's section could be completed within two months. * Despite the progress, renewed Pakistan-Afghanistantensions and India's concerns over dependence on Pakistan for transit raise doubts about extending TAPI beyond Afghanistan to its intended South Asian markets.
* Originally envisioned as a vehicle for regional cooperation and stability, TAPI could instead become a source of strategic leverage among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India if regional tensions escalate.
-
On August 10, Turkmen Parliament Chairman Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov visited Afghanistan, where he discussed progress on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline with Afghan Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund in a meeting held in Herat. On August 27, Afghan Herat Province Governor Sheikh Maulana Islam Jar stated that work on the local section of the TAPI gas pipeline project in Herat would be completed within two months and that the project could be commissioned soon afterward (Pajhwok, August 27). The two sides discussed progress on the 153-kilometer (95-mile) Serhetabat-Herat section of the pipeline, which stretches from the Turkmen border at Serhetabat to the Afghan province of Herat (Turkmenistan: Golden Age, August 11). During the visit, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on gas purchases under the TAPI project. Under the MoU, the two sides will determine gas prices, demand levels, and distribution arrangements (Government of Afghanistan , August 10). The gas-purchase MoU was signed between Turkmenistan's state-owned Turkmengaz and Afghanistan's state-owned Afghan Gas, establishing the main terms for future gas supplies. Abdul Ghani Baradar asked Ashgabat to support the development of a gas distribution network in Herat and to create local employment through the project (AnewZ TV, August 11).
Uncertainty remains over the extension of TAPI into Pakistan and India, the project's two largest South Asian markets, despite the recent progress between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. A gas deal between Ashgabat and Kabul could make Afghanistan the first TAPI customer to receive Turkmen gas. The much-delayed TAPI pipeline project, if completed, would connect Turkmenistan's Galkynysh gas field, one of the world's largest, with energy-hungry markets in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan (News.az, September 12, 2024; The Times of Central Asia, August 28).
Envisaged in the early 1990s, the TAPI pipeline has been delayed for decades, primarily because of security concerns surrounding its route through Afghanistan and, more recently, broader regional tensions. The project involves construction of a 1,800-kilometer (1,118-mile) pipeline running from the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to Fazilka, India, near the Pakistan-India border, with a planned capacity to transport 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually (Business Turkmenistan, August 23, 2022; South Asian Voices, November 6, 2024).
In 2014, the estimated cost of the pipeline was $10 billion. The project was launched in 2018, but the construction stalled amid security risks in Afghanistan (Pakistan Today, January 18, 2022). After the Taliban returned to power in 2021, its administration expressed renewed interest in reviving the project. In 2022, the Taliban government dedicated 30,000 troops to security coverage in a move to assure security of the pipeline traversing Afghan territory. In September 2024, work on the Serhetabat-Herat section officially resumed (Pakistan Today, January 18, 2022; Turkmen Portal, September 11, 2024).
A fully operational TAPI pipeline will have an estimated capacity of 14 bcm of gas supply annually to Pakistan and India each, with a smaller allocation of 5 bcm to Afghanistan. Turkmenistan, which follows a strategy of diversifying gas exports, is willing to supply gas to Afghanistan even as uncertainty persists over Pakistan's and India's participation in the project. By supplying gas to Afghanistan through the TAPI pipeline, Turkmenistan wants not only to demonstrate the viability of this transnational project but also to attract additional demand from South Asian markets. Ashgabat sees Afghanistan as another export market, even even if initial TAPI sales remain limited (The Times of Central Asia, August 28).
A gas-supply deal through the TAPI pipeline between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan is yet to be concluded, despite periodic claims by Turkmen and Afghan officials that work is progressing rapidly. The pace of work on the Serhetabat-Herat section remains limited. Gas pricing, supply volumes, and other key commercial terms have yet to be finalized between the two sides for the first section of the TAPI pipeline (Eurasianet, August 12). Abdul Ghani Baradar called for an agreement on gas pricing under the TAPI project. "A long-term agreement should be concluded, contain simplified conditions and include a flexible mechanism for reviewing the agreement," said an Afghan government statement (Trend News Agency, August 11).
Beyond Afghanistan, security remains a major obstacle to transporting Turkmen gas to Pakistan and India. Although the Taliban government has provided security guarantees for the pipeline's passage through Afghanistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan are currently engaged in heightened tensions over cross-border militancy. A surge in terrorist attacks by Afghanistan-based militants against Pakistan has triggered repeated clashes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, prompting Islamabad to close its border with Afghanistan in October 2025. Relations between Pakistan and India are also deeply adversarial and deteriorated further following a military clash in May 2025. Given the regional security environment, extending TAPI from Afghanistan into Pakistan and then India faces significant security and geopolitical obstacles (The Times of Central Asia, October 23, 2025). New Delhi is also wary of depending on Pakistan for gas supplies delivered through TAPI, as such dependence could give Islamabad leverage during a future bilateral crisis. India fears that Pakistan could disrupt gas supplies during a conflict (The Economic Times, September 17, 2024).
The TAPI pipeline project was envisaged as a peace initiative for regional cooperation and stability. It could, however, be used as a weapon by Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India to settle scores against each other should hostilities break out in the region.
* * *
Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a contributing analyst at the South Asia desk of Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books, including the Economic Development of Balochistan (2004).
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/regional-rivalries-could-jeopardize-tapi-pipeline-ambitions/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Regional Rivalries Could Jeopardize TAPI Pipeline Ambitions
Syed Fazl-e-Haider
Executive Summary:
* On August 10, Turkmenistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan signed a memorandum of understanding on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline gas purchases, while on August 27, Afghan Herat Province Governor Sheikh Maulana Islam Jar said the province's section could be completed within two months.
* Despite the progress, renewed Pakistan-Afghanistan ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Regional Rivalries Could Jeopardize TAPI Pipeline Ambitions Syed Fazl-e-Haider Executive Summary: * On August 10, Turkmenistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan signed a memorandum of understanding on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline gas purchases, while on August 27, Afghan Herat Province Governor Sheikh Maulana Islam Jar said the province's section could be completed within two months. * Despite the progress, renewed Pakistan-Afghanistantensions and India's concerns over dependence on Pakistan for transit raise doubts about extending TAPI beyond Afghanistan to its intended South Asian markets.
* Originally envisioned as a vehicle for regional cooperation and stability, TAPI could instead become a source of strategic leverage among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India if regional tensions escalate.
-
On August 10, Turkmen Parliament Chairman Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov visited Afghanistan, where he discussed progress on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline with Afghan Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund in a meeting held in Herat. On August 27, Afghan Herat Province Governor Sheikh Maulana Islam Jar stated that work on the local section of the TAPI gas pipeline project in Herat would be completed within two months and that the project could be commissioned soon afterward (Pajhwok, August 27). The two sides discussed progress on the 153-kilometer (95-mile) Serhetabat-Herat section of the pipeline, which stretches from the Turkmen border at Serhetabat to the Afghan province of Herat (Turkmenistan: Golden Age, August 11). During the visit, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on gas purchases under the TAPI project. Under the MoU, the two sides will determine gas prices, demand levels, and distribution arrangements (Government of Afghanistan , August 10). The gas-purchase MoU was signed between Turkmenistan's state-owned Turkmengaz and Afghanistan's state-owned Afghan Gas, establishing the main terms for future gas supplies. Abdul Ghani Baradar asked Ashgabat to support the development of a gas distribution network in Herat and to create local employment through the project (AnewZ TV, August 11).
Uncertainty remains over the extension of TAPI into Pakistan and India, the project's two largest South Asian markets, despite the recent progress between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. A gas deal between Ashgabat and Kabul could make Afghanistan the first TAPI customer to receive Turkmen gas. The much-delayed TAPI pipeline project, if completed, would connect Turkmenistan's Galkynysh gas field, one of the world's largest, with energy-hungry markets in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan (News.az, September 12, 2024; The Times of Central Asia, August 28).
Envisaged in the early 1990s, the TAPI pipeline has been delayed for decades, primarily because of security concerns surrounding its route through Afghanistan and, more recently, broader regional tensions. The project involves construction of a 1,800-kilometer (1,118-mile) pipeline running from the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to Fazilka, India, near the Pakistan-India border, with a planned capacity to transport 33 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas annually (Business Turkmenistan, August 23, 2022; South Asian Voices, November 6, 2024).
In 2014, the estimated cost of the pipeline was $10 billion. The project was launched in 2018, but the construction stalled amid security risks in Afghanistan (Pakistan Today, January 18, 2022). After the Taliban returned to power in 2021, its administration expressed renewed interest in reviving the project. In 2022, the Taliban government dedicated 30,000 troops to security coverage in a move to assure security of the pipeline traversing Afghan territory. In September 2024, work on the Serhetabat-Herat section officially resumed (Pakistan Today, January 18, 2022; Turkmen Portal, September 11, 2024).
A fully operational TAPI pipeline will have an estimated capacity of 14 bcm of gas supply annually to Pakistan and India each, with a smaller allocation of 5 bcm to Afghanistan. Turkmenistan, which follows a strategy of diversifying gas exports, is willing to supply gas to Afghanistan even as uncertainty persists over Pakistan's and India's participation in the project. By supplying gas to Afghanistan through the TAPI pipeline, Turkmenistan wants not only to demonstrate the viability of this transnational project but also to attract additional demand from South Asian markets. Ashgabat sees Afghanistan as another export market, even even if initial TAPI sales remain limited (The Times of Central Asia, August 28).
A gas-supply deal through the TAPI pipeline between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan is yet to be concluded, despite periodic claims by Turkmen and Afghan officials that work is progressing rapidly. The pace of work on the Serhetabat-Herat section remains limited. Gas pricing, supply volumes, and other key commercial terms have yet to be finalized between the two sides for the first section of the TAPI pipeline (Eurasianet, August 12). Abdul Ghani Baradar called for an agreement on gas pricing under the TAPI project. "A long-term agreement should be concluded, contain simplified conditions and include a flexible mechanism for reviewing the agreement," said an Afghan government statement (Trend News Agency, August 11).
Beyond Afghanistan, security remains a major obstacle to transporting Turkmen gas to Pakistan and India. Although the Taliban government has provided security guarantees for the pipeline's passage through Afghanistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan are currently engaged in heightened tensions over cross-border militancy. A surge in terrorist attacks by Afghanistan-based militants against Pakistan has triggered repeated clashes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, prompting Islamabad to close its border with Afghanistan in October 2025. Relations between Pakistan and India are also deeply adversarial and deteriorated further following a military clash in May 2025. Given the regional security environment, extending TAPI from Afghanistan into Pakistan and then India faces significant security and geopolitical obstacles (The Times of Central Asia, October 23, 2025). New Delhi is also wary of depending on Pakistan for gas supplies delivered through TAPI, as such dependence could give Islamabad leverage during a future bilateral crisis. India fears that Pakistan could disrupt gas supplies during a conflict (The Economic Times, September 17, 2024).
The TAPI pipeline project was envisaged as a peace initiative for regional cooperation and stability. It could, however, be used as a weapon by Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India to settle scores against each other should hostilities break out in the region.
* * *
Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a contributing analyst at the South Asia desk of Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books, including the Economic Development of Balochistan (2004).
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/regional-rivalries-could-jeopardize-tapi-pipeline-ambitions/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Discover our MA Food Systems and Sustainable Development degree
BRIGHTON, England, Sept. 16 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Institute of Development Studies, an organization that conducts research, learning and teaching that aims to transform the knowledge, action and leadership needed for equitable and sustainable development globally, posted the following news:
* * *
Discover our MA Food Systems and Sustainable Development degree
*
We are delighted to announce that our MA Food & Development - delivered in partnership with the University of Sussex - is changing name to MA Food Systems & Sustainable Development to better reflect the content of the course.
The ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Sept. 16 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Institute of Development Studies, an organization that conducts research, learning and teaching that aims to transform the knowledge, action and leadership needed for equitable and sustainable development globally, posted the following news: * * * Discover our MA Food Systems and Sustainable Development degree * We are delighted to announce that our MA Food & Development - delivered in partnership with the University of Sussex - is changing name to MA Food Systems & Sustainable Development to better reflect the content of the course. TheMA Food Systems & Sustainable Development engages learners with pressing contemporary social and environmental development challenges through critical reflection on how food systems operate and the outcomes they generate at local, national and global scales. The degree fosters critical and systemic thinking, equipping students with interdisciplinary perspectives, analytical skills, and practical tools to tackle complex sustainability and equity challenges related to food systems.
MA Food Systems & Sustainable Development Co-Convenor and IDS Research Fellow Lidia Cabral said:
"Since 2018, this course has welcomed students from around the world, each bringing diverse experiences of food systems and a broad range of interests in the sustainable development challenges they present, together with the pathways that can transform them. This diversity of perspectives has enriched the programme and encouraged us to place greater emphasis on positive examples of food systems transformation. Our graduates have gone on to pursue exciting careers across the food systems field. They work in local government, charities and international organisations, undertake PhDs and academic research, and contribute as practitioners and advocates for more sustainable and fairer food systems."
#Hear from our students
Want to get a better understanding of what the MA Food Systems & Sustainable Development can do for you? Hear more from some of our current students below about why they chose the degree, and what their current dissertation research is.
Verity Hobbs
I chose to study the MA Food & Development because I wanted to better understand how we can create more sustainable and equitable food systems. I have always been drawn to food through what I buy, grow, and eat, but I soon realised that while collective consumer choices can have an influence, they only go so far when shaped by the wider structures that determine how food is produced, distributed, and valued - with consequences for the health of the environment and of ourselves.
Studying part-time has enabled me to work with the wonderful Brighton & Hove Food Partnership, allowing me to put my learning into practice while continuing to develop professionally, seeing in real time how local solutions are applied to the wider food system.
A particular highlight of the course so far has been the Fairtrade, Ethical Business, and New Moral Economies module with Dinah Rajak, whose thought-provoking teaching encouraged us to critically examine historic and contemporary capitalism, consumption, and production. It was one of those rare "aha" moments that shifted the way I viewed the world around me and cemented that I was in the right place at a very crucial time in our society which perpetually feels at a tipping-point.
One of the most rewarding aspects of the course has been the way it encourages critical thinking across such a diverse range of issues. It has challenged me to see food not as an isolated subject, but as something deeply connected to climate change, sustainability, trade, and the social and political systems that influence our daily lives.
During my studies, I have enjoyed exploring areas such as agrotourism and seed sovereignty, which have further developed my interest in more resilient, community-led approaches, and the importance of supporting local economies within a globalised food system. This interdisciplinary approach is why I'm particularly excited to be part of the course as its name evolves to better reflect the depth and scope of what it offers: a critically analytical and solutions-focused learning environment that truly wants for a better, more sustainable future.
Madeleine Jule
During my BA in Media and Culture I developed a keen interest in environmental sustainability through various electives and volunteering opportunities. I was especially interested in the relationship between food and climate change and knew I wanted to study this further.
The Food and Development MA at IDS and University of Sussex really stood out as the logical next step after finishing my undergraduate degree due to its specialised focus on food. The course both broadened my knowledge of sustainable food systems as well as delving into the social inequalities and geopolitical barriers ingrained within them.
Throughout the year, I have developed a deep interest in food access and equality. This has informed my dissertation topic, which explores the interaction between GLP-1 RA treatment (medicines for weight-loss and diabetes) and individual food environments. Specifically, how enabling / inhibiting different food environments are for individuals on GLP-1 RA medication.
Will Giessler
I chose the MA Food & Development because it is uniquely focused on transforming structural issues within agriculture, global value chains, and government planning to create a more sustainable and equitable food system.
The opportunity to take modules from both IDS and the University of Sussex has been a great value-add to my experience as I've learned from faculty and classmates from both institutions whose diversity of prior experience and expertise have been critical to better understanding complex issues like food security.
Social and environmental injustices resulting from concentration of corporate power across the food system has been a theme throughout the course and this opened my eyes to the need to reorient the objective of the food system back towards facilitating equitable food security. The focus on bottom-up system transformation has inspired me to design my dissertation research around exploring the ability for ethical consumerism to drive sustainable agriculture initiatives within UK supermarkets' supply chains.
#Interested in studying the MA Food Systems & Sustainable Development with us?
Find out more
***
Original text here: https://www.ids.ac.uk/news/discover-our-ma-food-systems-and-sustainable-development-degree/
* * *
Discover our MA Food Systems and Sustainable Development degree
*
We are delighted to announce that our MA Food & Development - delivered in partnership with the University of Sussex - is changing name to MA Food Systems & Sustainable Development to better reflect the content of the course.
The ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Sept. 16 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Institute of Development Studies, an organization that conducts research, learning and teaching that aims to transform the knowledge, action and leadership needed for equitable and sustainable development globally, posted the following news: * * * Discover our MA Food Systems and Sustainable Development degree * We are delighted to announce that our MA Food & Development - delivered in partnership with the University of Sussex - is changing name to MA Food Systems & Sustainable Development to better reflect the content of the course. TheMA Food Systems & Sustainable Development engages learners with pressing contemporary social and environmental development challenges through critical reflection on how food systems operate and the outcomes they generate at local, national and global scales. The degree fosters critical and systemic thinking, equipping students with interdisciplinary perspectives, analytical skills, and practical tools to tackle complex sustainability and equity challenges related to food systems.
MA Food Systems & Sustainable Development Co-Convenor and IDS Research Fellow Lidia Cabral said:
"Since 2018, this course has welcomed students from around the world, each bringing diverse experiences of food systems and a broad range of interests in the sustainable development challenges they present, together with the pathways that can transform them. This diversity of perspectives has enriched the programme and encouraged us to place greater emphasis on positive examples of food systems transformation. Our graduates have gone on to pursue exciting careers across the food systems field. They work in local government, charities and international organisations, undertake PhDs and academic research, and contribute as practitioners and advocates for more sustainable and fairer food systems."
#Hear from our students
Want to get a better understanding of what the MA Food Systems & Sustainable Development can do for you? Hear more from some of our current students below about why they chose the degree, and what their current dissertation research is.
Verity Hobbs
I chose to study the MA Food & Development because I wanted to better understand how we can create more sustainable and equitable food systems. I have always been drawn to food through what I buy, grow, and eat, but I soon realised that while collective consumer choices can have an influence, they only go so far when shaped by the wider structures that determine how food is produced, distributed, and valued - with consequences for the health of the environment and of ourselves.
Studying part-time has enabled me to work with the wonderful Brighton & Hove Food Partnership, allowing me to put my learning into practice while continuing to develop professionally, seeing in real time how local solutions are applied to the wider food system.
A particular highlight of the course so far has been the Fairtrade, Ethical Business, and New Moral Economies module with Dinah Rajak, whose thought-provoking teaching encouraged us to critically examine historic and contemporary capitalism, consumption, and production. It was one of those rare "aha" moments that shifted the way I viewed the world around me and cemented that I was in the right place at a very crucial time in our society which perpetually feels at a tipping-point.
One of the most rewarding aspects of the course has been the way it encourages critical thinking across such a diverse range of issues. It has challenged me to see food not as an isolated subject, but as something deeply connected to climate change, sustainability, trade, and the social and political systems that influence our daily lives.
During my studies, I have enjoyed exploring areas such as agrotourism and seed sovereignty, which have further developed my interest in more resilient, community-led approaches, and the importance of supporting local economies within a globalised food system. This interdisciplinary approach is why I'm particularly excited to be part of the course as its name evolves to better reflect the depth and scope of what it offers: a critically analytical and solutions-focused learning environment that truly wants for a better, more sustainable future.
Madeleine Jule
During my BA in Media and Culture I developed a keen interest in environmental sustainability through various electives and volunteering opportunities. I was especially interested in the relationship between food and climate change and knew I wanted to study this further.
The Food and Development MA at IDS and University of Sussex really stood out as the logical next step after finishing my undergraduate degree due to its specialised focus on food. The course both broadened my knowledge of sustainable food systems as well as delving into the social inequalities and geopolitical barriers ingrained within them.
Throughout the year, I have developed a deep interest in food access and equality. This has informed my dissertation topic, which explores the interaction between GLP-1 RA treatment (medicines for weight-loss and diabetes) and individual food environments. Specifically, how enabling / inhibiting different food environments are for individuals on GLP-1 RA medication.
Will Giessler
I chose the MA Food & Development because it is uniquely focused on transforming structural issues within agriculture, global value chains, and government planning to create a more sustainable and equitable food system.
The opportunity to take modules from both IDS and the University of Sussex has been a great value-add to my experience as I've learned from faculty and classmates from both institutions whose diversity of prior experience and expertise have been critical to better understanding complex issues like food security.
Social and environmental injustices resulting from concentration of corporate power across the food system has been a theme throughout the course and this opened my eyes to the need to reorient the objective of the food system back towards facilitating equitable food security. The focus on bottom-up system transformation has inspired me to design my dissertation research around exploring the ability for ethical consumerism to drive sustainable agriculture initiatives within UK supermarkets' supply chains.
#Interested in studying the MA Food Systems & Sustainable Development with us?
Find out more
***
Original text here: https://www.ids.ac.uk/news/discover-our-ma-food-systems-and-sustainable-development-degree/
CSIS Issues Commentary: Last Week Meatballs, This Week Spaghetti
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
Last Week Meatballs, This Week Spaghetti
Commentary by William Alan Reinsch
Published September 15, 2026
Current trade policy seems to be devolving into a series of food fights. Last week's column discussed meatballs (beef), and this week's is about spaghetti (pasta). This is not new. Previous columns dealt with (chlorinated) chickens, genetically modified organisms, and geographic indications. This week's pasta story begins with a thinly sourced report that Secretary of Commerce ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Last Week Meatballs, This Week Spaghetti Commentary by William Alan Reinsch Published September 15, 2026 Current trade policy seems to be devolving into a series of food fights. Last week's column discussed meatballs (beef), and this week's is about spaghetti (pasta). This is not new. Previous columns dealt with (chlorinated) chickens, genetically modified organisms, and geographic indications. This week's pasta story begins with a thinly sourced report that Secretary of CommerceHoward Lutnick encouraged Department of Commerce career staff to reduce antidumping and countervailing duties on pasta imports. As the report indicates, the department said that "Secretary Lutnick has not directed Commerce staff to apply or avoid any particular rates or set of rate options." That is not saying he didn't tell them to do something, only that he did not put a specific number on it. Regardless of what Lutnick did or did not say, however, there are some underlying issues that deserve some comment. First comes a short tutorial on what the fuss is all about.
Investigations into dumping--generally speaking, selling below the cost of production--or government subsidization require the petitioners, usually domestic competitors, to prove two things: that the dumping or subsidization has occurred and that they have been injured by it. The Commerce Department decides the former, and the International Trade Commission decides the latter, and all of it is subject to a lot of detailed regulations, strict timetables, and no political intervention. In practice, the Commerce Department finds most respondents--the foreign producers--guilty, and the debate among the department and the lawyers for both sides is usually over the amount of guilt. The law permits a compensatory rather than a punitive tariff; that is, the tariff must be no greater than the amount of dumping or subsidy assessed. Determining that amount requires an investigation into the foreign companies' production costs and the records of any benefits it has received from its government. The Commerce Department has a skilled career staff expert at examining these costs and coming up with an accurate assessment.
Some companies cooperate with the department's investigators and share their data. (Whether it is real or phony is something the investigators have to figure out.) When they do share, they usually end up receiving a lower tariff. Other companies decline to cooperate and refuse to share their data. In that circumstance, the law permits investigators to use "adverse facts available" (AFA), a term that usually means using information provided by the petitioners, who always allege higher levels of dumping and subsidization. The difference is often stark. In the pasta case, preliminary tariffs for cooperating companies were less than 10 percent, while those for non-cooperating companies were over 90 percent. The latter were later adjusted downward to a level comparable with the others. Making an adjustment is normal: The department issues a preliminary determination, which stimulates another round of debate with both sides' lawyers and leads to further investigation and a final determination that is usually different and often lower, presumably the result of additional information. However, the large reduction in this case has led to suggestions that the adjustment had more to do with the politics of high food prices than with the actual amount of dumping or subsidization.
I don't know the truth of this particular case, and it appears nobody does aside from a handful of people at the Commerce Department who are not talking, at least on the record. The case does, however, provide two takeaways. First, the law is designed to insulate the process from political intervention. The tariffs in question are not discretionary and are not subject to review by the president or other political appointees, unlike other statutes. They are what the career staff says they are. So, secretarial involvement would be a major no-no. That said, it is hard to believe that in the more than 100 years of administration of these statutes, politics has never intruded. I've been following these laws for nearly 50 years and have seen high-pressure lobbying by interested parties to skew officials' decisions one way or another. As one might expect, the most effective lobbying comes from the domestic side. After all, they are the people who vote. Foreign producers do not. So, the allegations in this case, if true, are hardly unprecedented.
Second, while it is unusual for an official of the current administration to be arguing for lower tariffs, given Trump's fondness for high ones, the idea that tariffs ought to be adjusted for broader policy reasons is not new. For years, there have been arguments in the trade community that the government should have authority to mitigate these tariffs because of their impact on consumers or for reasons related to the national interest. The statutes do not permit that, and efforts to amend them in the past did not get very far. If anything, administration of these laws over the past several administrations of both parties has tilted in favor of higher tariffs. The AFA rule, for example, was put into law in 1995, strengthened in 2015, and codified in regulations in 2024. The current episode, if it actually happened, is ironic--an implicit assertion that political appointees should be able to overrule administrative findings even if that means contradicting the administration's high-tariff policy.
* * *
William A. Reinsch is a senior adviser (non-resident) and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at wreinsch7@gmail.com.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/last-week-meatballs-week-spaghetti
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Last Week Meatballs, This Week Spaghetti
Commentary by William Alan Reinsch
Published September 15, 2026
Current trade policy seems to be devolving into a series of food fights. Last week's column discussed meatballs (beef), and this week's is about spaghetti (pasta). This is not new. Previous columns dealt with (chlorinated) chickens, genetically modified organisms, and geographic indications. This week's pasta story begins with a thinly sourced report that Secretary of Commerce ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Last Week Meatballs, This Week Spaghetti Commentary by William Alan Reinsch Published September 15, 2026 Current trade policy seems to be devolving into a series of food fights. Last week's column discussed meatballs (beef), and this week's is about spaghetti (pasta). This is not new. Previous columns dealt with (chlorinated) chickens, genetically modified organisms, and geographic indications. This week's pasta story begins with a thinly sourced report that Secretary of CommerceHoward Lutnick encouraged Department of Commerce career staff to reduce antidumping and countervailing duties on pasta imports. As the report indicates, the department said that "Secretary Lutnick has not directed Commerce staff to apply or avoid any particular rates or set of rate options." That is not saying he didn't tell them to do something, only that he did not put a specific number on it. Regardless of what Lutnick did or did not say, however, there are some underlying issues that deserve some comment. First comes a short tutorial on what the fuss is all about.
Investigations into dumping--generally speaking, selling below the cost of production--or government subsidization require the petitioners, usually domestic competitors, to prove two things: that the dumping or subsidization has occurred and that they have been injured by it. The Commerce Department decides the former, and the International Trade Commission decides the latter, and all of it is subject to a lot of detailed regulations, strict timetables, and no political intervention. In practice, the Commerce Department finds most respondents--the foreign producers--guilty, and the debate among the department and the lawyers for both sides is usually over the amount of guilt. The law permits a compensatory rather than a punitive tariff; that is, the tariff must be no greater than the amount of dumping or subsidy assessed. Determining that amount requires an investigation into the foreign companies' production costs and the records of any benefits it has received from its government. The Commerce Department has a skilled career staff expert at examining these costs and coming up with an accurate assessment.
Some companies cooperate with the department's investigators and share their data. (Whether it is real or phony is something the investigators have to figure out.) When they do share, they usually end up receiving a lower tariff. Other companies decline to cooperate and refuse to share their data. In that circumstance, the law permits investigators to use "adverse facts available" (AFA), a term that usually means using information provided by the petitioners, who always allege higher levels of dumping and subsidization. The difference is often stark. In the pasta case, preliminary tariffs for cooperating companies were less than 10 percent, while those for non-cooperating companies were over 90 percent. The latter were later adjusted downward to a level comparable with the others. Making an adjustment is normal: The department issues a preliminary determination, which stimulates another round of debate with both sides' lawyers and leads to further investigation and a final determination that is usually different and often lower, presumably the result of additional information. However, the large reduction in this case has led to suggestions that the adjustment had more to do with the politics of high food prices than with the actual amount of dumping or subsidization.
I don't know the truth of this particular case, and it appears nobody does aside from a handful of people at the Commerce Department who are not talking, at least on the record. The case does, however, provide two takeaways. First, the law is designed to insulate the process from political intervention. The tariffs in question are not discretionary and are not subject to review by the president or other political appointees, unlike other statutes. They are what the career staff says they are. So, secretarial involvement would be a major no-no. That said, it is hard to believe that in the more than 100 years of administration of these statutes, politics has never intruded. I've been following these laws for nearly 50 years and have seen high-pressure lobbying by interested parties to skew officials' decisions one way or another. As one might expect, the most effective lobbying comes from the domestic side. After all, they are the people who vote. Foreign producers do not. So, the allegations in this case, if true, are hardly unprecedented.
Second, while it is unusual for an official of the current administration to be arguing for lower tariffs, given Trump's fondness for high ones, the idea that tariffs ought to be adjusted for broader policy reasons is not new. For years, there have been arguments in the trade community that the government should have authority to mitigate these tariffs because of their impact on consumers or for reasons related to the national interest. The statutes do not permit that, and efforts to amend them in the past did not get very far. If anything, administration of these laws over the past several administrations of both parties has tilted in favor of higher tariffs. The AFA rule, for example, was put into law in 1995, strengthened in 2015, and codified in regulations in 2024. The current episode, if it actually happened, is ironic--an implicit assertion that political appointees should be able to overrule administrative findings even if that means contradicting the administration's high-tariff policy.
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William A. Reinsch is a senior adviser (non-resident) and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at wreinsch7@gmail.com.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/last-week-meatballs-week-spaghetti
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: America Must Win the AI Race and Protect National Security
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:
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America Must Win the AI Race and Protect National Security
September 15, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C.-- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Michael Faulkender, AFPI's co-chair of Economy and Trade Policy and chair of AI and Emerging Technology, on the need to protect America's leadership in artificial intelligence while addressing legitimate national-security risks through existing authorities.
America is the greatest technology power on earth and must remain ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * America Must Win the AI Race and Protect National Security September 15, 2026 WASHINGTON, D.C.-- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Michael Faulkender, AFPI's co-chair of Economy and Trade Policy and chair of AI and Emerging Technology, on the need to protect America's leadership in artificial intelligence while addressing legitimate national-security risks through existing authorities. America is the greatest technology power on earth and must remainso. The President already has clear authority to oversee the artificial intelligence industry. Existing tools, including the voluntary framework established in Executive Order 14409 , can create a CFIUS-style review process for new AI models.
This offers a practical way to address national-security risks, limit harms, and constrain bad actors while still winning geopolitically, economically, and militarily. These authorities can also require embedded auditing, which the industry has recently embraced. AFPI research confirms that legitimate national-security risks should be met with decisive action through these existing tools, led by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.
Much of the anti-AI campaign is a foreign influence operation, led primarily by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Claims about data center water use, for instance, have been disproved by AFPI's research. The President's Ratepayer Protection Pledge ensures that data centers benefit local communities by upgrading energy infrastructure and training workers. When communities voluntarily host them, the results are clear: high-paying jobs and lower property-tax burdens from strong local revenues.
The choice is simple: America can win the AI race - and realize major economic benefits along the way - or cede the future to Beijing.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-must-win-the-ai-race-and-protect-national-security
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
America Must Win the AI Race and Protect National Security
September 15, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C.-- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Michael Faulkender, AFPI's co-chair of Economy and Trade Policy and chair of AI and Emerging Technology, on the need to protect America's leadership in artificial intelligence while addressing legitimate national-security risks through existing authorities.
America is the greatest technology power on earth and must remain ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * America Must Win the AI Race and Protect National Security September 15, 2026 WASHINGTON, D.C.-- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Michael Faulkender, AFPI's co-chair of Economy and Trade Policy and chair of AI and Emerging Technology, on the need to protect America's leadership in artificial intelligence while addressing legitimate national-security risks through existing authorities. America is the greatest technology power on earth and must remainso. The President already has clear authority to oversee the artificial intelligence industry. Existing tools, including the voluntary framework established in Executive Order 14409 , can create a CFIUS-style review process for new AI models.
This offers a practical way to address national-security risks, limit harms, and constrain bad actors while still winning geopolitically, economically, and militarily. These authorities can also require embedded auditing, which the industry has recently embraced. AFPI research confirms that legitimate national-security risks should be met with decisive action through these existing tools, led by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.
Much of the anti-AI campaign is a foreign influence operation, led primarily by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Claims about data center water use, for instance, have been disproved by AFPI's research. The President's Ratepayer Protection Pledge ensures that data centers benefit local communities by upgrading energy infrastructure and training workers. When communities voluntarily host them, the results are clear: high-paying jobs and lower property-tax burdens from strong local revenues.
The choice is simple: America can win the AI race - and realize major economic benefits along the way - or cede the future to Beijing.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-must-win-the-ai-race-and-protect-national-security
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to Daily Wire: I Was Robbed Of My Innocence, Not Of My Voice. Congress Should Pass Kayleigh's Law.
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary:
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I Was Robbed Of My Innocence, Not Of My Voice. Congress Should Pass Kayleigh's Law.
Kayleigh Kozak
September 15, 2026
Originally published by the Daily Wire
I was 12 years old when I was robbed of my innocence. In 2003, my PE teacher at school began to sexually abuse me. And he continued to do so for two years.
Children are taught to trust adults, especially their teachers, and to believe they will keep us safe. But how could a little girl believe that when she was being violated ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary: * * * I Was Robbed Of My Innocence, Not Of My Voice. Congress Should Pass Kayleigh's Law. Kayleigh Kozak September 15, 2026 Originally published by the Daily Wire I was 12 years old when I was robbed of my innocence. In 2003, my PE teacher at school began to sexually abuse me. And he continued to do so for two years. Children are taught to trust adults, especially their teachers, and to believe they will keep us safe. But how could a little girl believe that when she was being violatedby someone entrusted with her care, in a place where she was supposed to be protected?
At 14, I finally found the courage to tell someone. I did what children are taught to do: tell the truth, trust the police and prosecutors, and believe justice will follow.
To read the full article, click here (https://www.dailywire.com/news/robbed-of-innocence-not-of-my-voice-congress-should-pass-kayleighs-law).
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Kayleigh Kozak serves as the Senior Manager for the America Combats Child Exploitation Initiative at the America First Policy Institute, where she is committed to developing and advances policy with the goal of ending the scourge of trafficking and child exploitation and ensuring harsh penalties and accountability for those who cause harm.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/i-was-robbed-of-my-innocence-not-of-my-voice-congress-should-pass-kayleighs-law
[Category: ThinkTank]
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I Was Robbed Of My Innocence, Not Of My Voice. Congress Should Pass Kayleigh's Law.
Kayleigh Kozak
September 15, 2026
Originally published by the Daily Wire
I was 12 years old when I was robbed of my innocence. In 2003, my PE teacher at school began to sexually abuse me. And he continued to do so for two years.
Children are taught to trust adults, especially their teachers, and to believe they will keep us safe. But how could a little girl believe that when she was being violated ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 16 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary: * * * I Was Robbed Of My Innocence, Not Of My Voice. Congress Should Pass Kayleigh's Law. Kayleigh Kozak September 15, 2026 Originally published by the Daily Wire I was 12 years old when I was robbed of my innocence. In 2003, my PE teacher at school began to sexually abuse me. And he continued to do so for two years. Children are taught to trust adults, especially their teachers, and to believe they will keep us safe. But how could a little girl believe that when she was being violatedby someone entrusted with her care, in a place where she was supposed to be protected?
At 14, I finally found the courage to tell someone. I did what children are taught to do: tell the truth, trust the police and prosecutors, and believe justice will follow.
To read the full article, click here (https://www.dailywire.com/news/robbed-of-innocence-not-of-my-voice-congress-should-pass-kayleighs-law).
* * *
Kayleigh Kozak serves as the Senior Manager for the America Combats Child Exploitation Initiative at the America First Policy Institute, where she is committed to developing and advances policy with the goal of ending the scourge of trafficking and child exploitation and ensuring harsh penalties and accountability for those who cause harm.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/i-was-robbed-of-my-innocence-not-of-my-voice-congress-should-pass-kayleighs-law
[Category: ThinkTank]