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No Novel Liability for App Stores, TechFreedom Tells Ninth Circuit
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release on April 17, 2026:
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No Novel Liability for App Stores, TechFreedom Tells Ninth Circuit
Today, TechFreedom filed an amicus brief urging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to reverse a district court order that refused to dismiss a lawsuit against app stores. The lawsuit accuses the app stores of running illegal gambling services. But the app stores merely provide payment processing on a neutral basis, including to apps that allegedly violate gambling laws. The plaintiffs seek
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release on April 17, 2026:
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No Novel Liability for App Stores, TechFreedom Tells Ninth Circuit
Today, TechFreedom filed an amicus brief urging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to reverse a district court order that refused to dismiss a lawsuit against app stores. The lawsuit accuses the app stores of running illegal gambling services. But the app stores merely provide payment processing on a neutral basis, including to apps that allegedly violate gambling laws. The plaintiffs seekto subject online services to a form of liability that their offline counterparts have never faced.
"The plaintiffs want to create a cause of action out of thin air," said Corbin K. Barthold, Director of Appellate Litigation at TechFreedom. "They allege at most that app stores aid and abet apps that are themselves allegedly illegal. But none of the laws they invoke permits aiding-and-abetting liability. Such liability exists only where a legislature creates it. Otherwise we are governed not by legislators, but by plaintiffs' lawyers."
"In any event, the app stores have done nothing wrong," Barthold continued. "Three recent Supreme Court decisions confirm--each by a vote of 9-0, no less--that a defendant who provides a neutral, generally available service to the public is not an aider and abettor merely because that service is misused by some customers. Social-media platforms are not liable for hosting terrorists. Gun manufacturers are not liable for selling guns through ordinary channels. Internet service providers are not liable for supplying access to copyright infringers. And so: app stores are not liable for processing payments."
"The app stores do not design the casino apps, operate the games, set the odds, or touch the digital chips," Barthold concluded. "They simply offer the same standardized payment service to every developer on the platform. To call that aiding and abetting would be to impose secondary liability on the everyday provision of general commercial services--exactly the result the Supreme Court has thrice forbidden."
The cases are Wilkinson, et al. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 25-7916 (9th Cir) and Custodero, et al. v. Apple Inc., No. 25-7917 (9th Cir).
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Find this brief and release on our website, and share it on Twitter and Bluesky. We can be reached for comment at media@techfreedom.org. Read our related work, including:
* Tech Policy Podcast: Social Media on Trial (Feb. 26, 2026)
* Amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to strike down a law letting the FCC impose civil penalties without a jury trial (Feb. 25, 2026)
* Amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to preserve the independence of the FTC and other traditional multimember agencies (Nov. 24, 2025)
* Amicus brief urging the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to block a lawsuit attacking Meta's social media design features (Oct. 28, 2025)
* Amicus brief urging the Ninth Circuit to protect email spam filtering from frivolous lawsuits (May 2, 2025)
* Amicus brief urging the Third Circuit to grant full-court review of a deeply incorrect panel decision gutting Section 230 (Oct. 8, 2024)
* Our Supreme Court amicus brief in Moody v. NetChoice (Dec. 7, 2023)
* Amicus brief urging Ninth Circuit to uphold Section 230 protections for hosting casino-style gaming apps (July 28, 2023)
* Our Supreme Court amicus brief in Gonzalez v. Google (Jan. 18, 2023)
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About TechFreedom:
TechFreedom is a nonprofit, nonpartisan technology policy think tank. We work to chart a path forward for policymakers towards a bright future where technology enhances freedom, and freedom enhances technology.
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Original Text here: https://techfreedom.org/no-novel-liability-for-app-stores-techfreedom-tells-ninth-circuit/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: 'Unconditional Escalation' Marks Iran's Shifting Deterrence Strategy
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Javad Heiran-Nia, director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, Iran, in its Terrorism Monitor:
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'Unconditional Escalation' Marks Iran's Shifting Deterrence Strategy
Executive Summary:
* The weakening of Iran's traditional deterrence--combined with the advanced military capabilities of the United States and Israel--has led Iran to regionalize the conflict to increase the costs for its adversaries, with implications
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Javad Heiran-Nia, director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, Iran, in its Terrorism Monitor:
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'Unconditional Escalation' Marks Iran's Shifting Deterrence Strategy
Executive Summary:
* The weakening of Iran's traditional deterrence--combined with the advanced military capabilities of the United States and Israel--has led Iran to regionalize the conflict to increase the costs for its adversaries, with implicationsfor its future deterrence posture.
* The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its impact on the world economy have turned it from a hypothetical point of leverage into a strategic and deterrent asset vital to Iran in future conflicts.
* Although proxy forces no longer serve Iran's traditional deterrent role in a war, their capacity to share the burden of an existential conflict and to destabilize strategic transit points will remain important for Iran in the future.
The U.S.-Israeli February 28 joint military action against Iran quickly expanded across the region. Iran's response to the attacks--both in regionalizing the war (horizontal escalation) and in diversifying targets and shifting red lines (vertical escalation)--can be evaluated from a deterrence perspective. Prior to Hamas's October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel, Iran's deterrence was based on a set of strategic principles and operational tools shaped within the framework of the Islamic Republic's security doctrine and the experience of the Iran-Iraq War. This deterrence was largely asymmetric, consisting of three layers: the proxy layer, the missile-and-drone layer, and the threshold or potential nuclear capability layer.
At the regional level, Iran had sought to contain threats beyond its borders--known as "forward defense." [1] Given the military superiority of the United States and Israel, Iran has relied on lower-cost tools instead of symmetric competition, including missiles, drones, and proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (Middle East Monitor, January 15, 2025; Iran Analytica, March 25). Its continued attacks on the Gulf countries, however, mark a distinct shift in Iran's approach to regional conflicts.
Regional War Approach
Iranian leaders view the current conflict as existential to the continued existence of the Islamic Republic. For this reason, Iran had already raised the possibility of expanding the conflict into the region before the first U.S.-Israeli strikes. On February 1, for example, then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei emphasized: "The Americans should know that if they start a war this time, it will be a regional war" (Khamenei.ir, February 1). From Iran's perspective, regionalizing the war is a strategy to confront an enemy that enjoys technological superiority, including advanced air weaponry, high firepower, satellite infrastructure, and artificial intelligence (AI) integration. Iran's conventional weakness led to the decision to turn it into a war of attrition (Tabnak, March 15).
Instead of attempting to directly defeat Israel--whose geography and air defense layers limited such an objective--Iran sought to weaken the supporting infrastructure that underpinned Israel's operational freedom (Iran Analytica, March 25). Iran's regionalization of the war is also framed within Tehran's "Samson Doctrine," a strategy aimed at creating maximum chaos across the Persian Gulf region and the global economy (Arab Gulf States Institute, March 13).
Iran has notably adopted an "eye for an eye" approach (Asr Iran, March 10). This approach is based on proportionality, thereby discouraging the United States and Israel from targeting Iran's critical interests, particularly energy infrastructure. According to Thomas Schelling's theory, deterrence is not only dependent on the ability to attack but also on the risk of uncontrolled escalation. In this regard, Iran aims to create a situation in which events could spiral out of control if the opposing side does not retreat from its threats (Schelling, 1960). [2] After three weeks of war, Iran's strategy shifted from purely retaliatory responses to an offensive phase. For example, Tehran quickly warned that its response would include attacks on regional energy and technology infrastructure and targeting U.S. financial institutions if the United States carried out attacks against Iran's electrical infrastructure (Asr Iran, March 22).
This new pattern showed that Iran is attempting to turn military asymmetry into a strategic lever through expanding the battlefield and linking escalation across multiple domains. By expanding its targets to energy infrastructure and economic assets in the Persian Gulf, Iran increases pressure on its enemies while simultaneously raising tensions with neighboring countries (Iran Analytica, March 25). Although Tehran hopes these countries will seek de-escalation rather than intervention, the immediate consequence is regional instability and an increased risk of miscalculation and rapid escalation (Al Monitor, March 24).
Closing the Strait of Hormuz
After the second round of Iranian-U.S. negotiations in Geneva on February 17, the IRGC Navy temporarily closed the Strait of Hormuz during a large-scale exercise called "Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz" (Fars News Agency, February 18). Iran then officially closed the waterway following the start of the conflict. This action was based on Tehran's belief that symbolic responses to the United States are ineffective and merely perpetuate cycles of pressure and subsequent strikes. Accordingly, Iran not only closed the Strait but moved toward "targeted disruption of the global energy market," including attacks on production facilities, pipelines, export terminals, or oil tankers. Tehran's logic was based on deterrence through the creation of systemic risk in the energy market (KEDM Public Radio, February 16).
From Iran's perspective, keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed would shift the regional balance of power in its favor and force countries highly dependent on Persian Gulf energy to recalibrate their geopolitical considerations toward Iran. Thus, the continuation of war and rising uncertainty in the region could strengthen Iran's geopolitical role. In times of crisis, control over strategic chokepoints and regional deterrence becomes more significant. Consequently, Iran aims to leverage its geographic position and strategic capabilities to increase its bargaining power, influencing the behavior of both regional and extra-regional actors toward more cautious engagement with Tehran (Mehr News Agency, March 14).
According to Iranian officials, after the war, a "new protocol" is to be developed to ensure the safe passage of ships and define specific conditions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, March 17). The plan, titled the "Strategic Action Law for Peace and Endogenous and Sustainable Development of the Persian Gulf Region," includes four sections: Maritime security, environmental pollution charges, navigation service fees, and the establishment of a regional development fund (Fararu, March 30). The outlook for this new protocol faces challenges, however, including conflict with the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. Furthermore, unlike the Bosporus and Dardanelles--controlled by a single country (Turkiye)--the Strait of Hormuz is shared between Iran and Oman, which may not accept Iran's unilateral actions.
Use of Proxy Forces
Iran's security strategy has been based on regional strategic depth, seeking to transfer conflicts beyond its borders. This strategy made use of proxy forces known as the "Axis of Resistance," including Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces, and Yemeni Houthis. Despite the weakening of this network--especially its ability to generate simultaneous firepower after Hamas's October 7 attack--the remnants of these forces have been activated as tools to expand the battlefield. The goal is to maximize the costs of conflict, with proxies contributing to regional destabilization. Their political-strategic function has remained an important tool for Iran, despite a decline in their operational capabilities (Atlantic Council, April 9, 2024; Tabnak, March 15).
Hezbollah, Iraqi PMF, and Yemeni Houthis have all entered the conflict. Hezbollah and the Houthis focused on targeting Israel, while Iraqi forces targeted U.S. and Israeli positions not only in Iraq but also in Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain. Offensively, the Houthis--beyond their ability to close the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint--possess the capacity to target U.S. military assets within the range of their strategic arsenal, which includes long-range drones and missiles (New Arab, March 30).
After the war, Iran is expected to focus on preserving and rebuilding proxy groups through tactical flexibility, resistance to disarmament, and shifts in support priorities. In Iraq, Iran's approach is heavily influenced by U.S. pressure and the central government's will to disarm militias. Unlike in the past, Tehran has signaled to these groups that they should cooperate with disarmament plans to avoid a destructive confrontation with the United States (Deutsche Welle, April 7, 2025). Iran's goal is to ensure these groups' survival by gradually integrating them into Iraq's official state structure rather than maintaining them as independent militias (Deutsche Welle, August 10, 2025).
Lebanon remains the most sensitive point for Iran. A different approach has been adopted due to the Lebanese government's alignment with U.S. disarmament plans for Hezbollah. Tehran openly opposes any disarmament of Hezbollah and considers it a red line (Khabar Online, August 7, 2025). Therefore, despite some rhetorical moderation under diplomatic pressure, Iran coordinates with Hezbollah to resist disarmament through political means (Al Alam, April 24, 2025). Tehran's immediate goal is to prevent the loss of Hezbollah's existing capabilities--especially its large missile arsenal--as a key deterrent against Israel (European Council on Foreign, June 5, 2024).
With Hamas and Hezbollah significantly weakened, the Yemeni Houthis have become Iran's most powerful regional ally (Euro News, December 8, 2025; New Arab, March 30). The Houthis view themselves as partners, however, rather than as fully controlled proxies. Despite this, their ability to destabilize the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden increases their importance for Iran. If Tehran survives the current conflict, it will retain the ability to support its allies, even if some, such as Hezbollah, are weaker than before (New Arab, March 3).
Conclusion
Iran has moved away from its traditional deterrence doctrine and adopted a strategy of "unconditional escalation." This strategy involves regionalizing conflicts, targeting energy and financial infrastructure, closing the Strait of Hormuz, and activating proxy forces. This strategic shift--designed to turn military asymmetry into an economic-geoeconomic lever--increases the risk of regional instability and unpredictable escalation. Consequently, it could redefine Iran's role as a chokepoint power and lead to a new balance in the Middle East. In the future, therefore, maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis' capacity to control the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and missile and drone stockpiles will likely be of greater importance for Iran's deterrence capabilities than its latent nuclear program.
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Javad Heiran-Nia, Ph.D., International Relations, Director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies, Tehran, Iran.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/unconditional-escalation-marks-irans-shifting-deterrence-strategy/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Outlook for Minority Rebel and Separatist Militants in Iran
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Andrew McGregor, former editor of Terrorism Monitor and Militant Leadership Monitor:
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Outlook for Minority Rebel and Separatist Militants in Iran
Executive Summary:
* Iran's marginalized ethnic minorities, who often endure state suppression, may view current U.S. and Israeli military operations as an opportunity to seize greater autonomy.
* Four minority groups--the Kurds, Balochs, Lurs, and Ahwazi Arabs--maintain armed factions. Additionally, the exiled Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) aggressively
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Andrew McGregor, former editor of Terrorism Monitor and Militant Leadership Monitor:
* * *
Outlook for Minority Rebel and Separatist Militants in Iran
Executive Summary:
* Iran's marginalized ethnic minorities, who often endure state suppression, may view current U.S. and Israeli military operations as an opportunity to seize greater autonomy.
* Four minority groups--the Kurds, Balochs, Lurs, and Ahwazi Arabs--maintain armed factions. Additionally, the exiled Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) aggressivelypursues violent regime change, losing 100 fighters in a clash with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on February 25.
* Armed factions are most likely to hesitate before any action due to unclear American objectives, fears of brutal regime retaliation if abandoned, and the fact that ethnic Persian opposition figures often share the regime's hostile view of these minority groups as separatist threats.
Iranian officials frequently refer to Iran and its 93 million people as "ethnically homogenous." They often proclaim the unity of the Islamic Republic and obscure the existence of the country's numerous minority groups. Many of these groups have had a contentious relationship with the Iranian state since Reza Pahlavi's 1921 coup introduced the ideological supremacy of Persian and Twelver Shi'a identity.
Iranian leaders typically regard minority demands for greater autonomy as threats to state security. Many minority members are denied government identification, leaving them open to various abuses by administrators and security forces. Accusations of working for Israel's Mossad or the CIA are usually enough to justify internal repression by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regime's Basij militia. The sheer number of detainees imprisoned for alleged "collaboration" with Israel suggests the political convenience of the charges.
The current U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran may be viewed by some minority leaders as an opportunity to seize greater autonomy. The perils of challenging a regime facing an external existential threat, however, are both clear and significant.
Iran's Ethnic and Religious Composition
The closest Iran gets to homogeneity is in its religious makeup. Shi'ite Muslims constitute some 90 percent of Iran's population. Sunni Muslims represent 9 percent, while the remainder consists of Christians, Baha'i, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Sabean Mandaeans (Gnostic monotheists).
Persians make up 61 percent of the Iranian population. There is wide variation regarding the numbers and percentages of minority groups represented in the population, which are perhaps best outlined in general terms:
* Larger minority groups (10-17 percent of the population): Kurds and Azeri Turks,
* Mid-sized minority groups (5-9 percent): Lurs,
* Small minority groups (2-4 percent): Ahwazi Arabs, Balochs, Turkmen,
* Very small minority groups (1 percent or less): Georgians, Qashqai, Armenians, Circassians, Assyrians (Al Jazeera, June 20, 2025).
Of the minority groups, four are known to have armed factions--the Kurds, the Balochs, the Ahwazi Arabs, and the Lurs. While most of those arrested during the 2025 protests were Persian, large numbers of Balochs, Kurds, and Ahwazi Arabs were also detained (Iran International, July 23, 2025).
Many of Iran's ethnic minorities hoped to benefit from the overthrow of the Shah following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The new Islamic regime quickly suppressed their aspirations, except in Iranian Kurdistan, however, which continued to resist Persian rule. Marginalization--if not outright persecution--continued to be the shared experience of Iran's minorities after the Islamic Revolution. Surveillance and detention of minorities intensified after last June's Israeli and American bombing campaign.
The Azeris
The Shi'ite Azeris are well-integrated into the Persian power structure; the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's father was an Azeri Turk. The Azeri Turks dominated the Iranian state from 1501 to 1925, including both the Safavid dynasty--which established Twelver Shi'ism as the state religion--and the later Qajar dynasty. When the latter was brought down by the Pahlavis, Azeri influence was diminished, and the Azeri language repressed. Recently, Israeli media have encouraged "the South Azerbaijani nation [i.e., Iranian Azerbaijan] and other ethnic groups" in Iran to "wage a war of revolution" (Jerusalem Post, March 4).
The Ahwazi Arabs
Most of Iran's Ahwazi Arab population lives in the southwestern province of Khuzestan. This province is home to Iran's largest oil field, which accounts for 90 percent of Iranian oil production, as well as large shares of Iran's natural gas and water resources. A mix of Arabized locals and migrant tribes from Iraq, the Ahwazi Arabs are mostly Shi'a, with a small number of Sunnis. The community's main language is Farsi, and Arabic-language education is forbidden except for religious instruction.
Before an emerging oil industry brought in an influx of ethnic Persian workers, Khuzestan was known as Arabistan. The Persians are still favored for employment in the oil sector over the Arab population. Khuzestan's natural resources and its strategic location on the Persian Gulf have led to a low tolerance for Arab cultural and political aspirations (New Lines Institute, February 18).
Existing as an autonomous emirate (Muhammara) since 1812, the region was fully incorporated into Iran in 1925, with its Arab ruler and his son placed in detention in Tehran. Place names were Persianized, and efforts at assimilation were first launched by Reza Shah (1925-1941) and continued under the Islamic Republic. Protests against the repression of Arab culture or expressions of Arab identity are typically met with violence (Arab News, January 7, 2022). Some residents seek independence or autonomy in a federal state.
The Harakat al-Nidal al-'Arabi li-Tahrir al-'Ahwaz (Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz, ASMLA) is an armed group advocating the creation of an Arab state comprising Khuzestan and parts of several neighboring Iranian provinces. With rival leaderships based in Denmark and the Netherlands, the movement has carried out bombings and assassinations, leading to its designation as a terrorist group by the Iranian government.
As protests grew in Iran earlier this year, five Ahwazi political fronts agreed on February 9 to come under the authority of a single Coordinating Council of Ahwazi Organizations. The stated goals of the new umbrella group include preventing political violence, respecting human rights, and cooperating with other Iranian minorities (Middle East Online, February 24).
The Baloch
The Sunni Muslim Baloch people are spread across a region split between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In Iran, the Baloch are concentrated in the Sistan-Baluchestan province, bordering Pakistan's restless Balochistan province, which hosts a number of Baloch insurgent movements (there are differences between Pakistan and Iran in the official spelling of Balochistan/Baluchestan).
Sistan-Baluchestan has abundant resources, including oil, gas, coal, copper, uranium, and rare earth elements. Despite this, the Sunni Baloch of Iran have much lower living standards than their Shi'a Persian countrymen and suffer from state repression of their language, culture, and political aspirations (New Lines Institute, February 18). They are also ineligible to hold most elected positions in Iran.
Jaysh al-Adl (Army of Justice), a Balochi anti-Shi'a Islamist militant group, emerged around 2012 as a successor to the earlier Jundullah movement, after Tehran's capture and execution of Jundullah leader Abdelmalek Rigi in 2010 (see Terrorism Monitor, February 4, 2010). Jaysh al-Adl is designated as a terrorist organization by both Iran and the United States.
Fighters of Jaysh al-Adl often take refuge across the border in Pakistani Balochistan during the Iranian military operations that follow the group's attacks. Pakistan, on the other hand, accuses Iran of providing refuge to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) (see Terrorism Monitor, January 31, 2024). Cross-border strikes on Balochi insurgents have become common in recent years as Jaysh al-Adl and other armed Balochi groups carry out kidnappings, assassinations, suicide bombings, and attacks on police stations (Al Jazeera, January 17, 2024; Dawn, January 19, 2024).
In December 2025, Jaysh al-Adl announced it had merged with several other Baloch separatist movements to form the "Popular Fighters' Front." The new group intends to focus on civil disobedience "with full observance of personal and public security principles" while continuing attacks on Iranian security forces (Iran International, December 12, 2025).
Kurds
The Kurds are the second largest but most politically and militarily organized of Iran's minority groups. Mostly Sunni rather than Shi'ite, Iran's Kurds have experienced repression of their language, culture, and education.
The existence of significant and often restless Kurdish communities in Syria, Iraq, and Turkiye, as well as Iran, has opened the group up to allegations of separatist tendencies and foreign influence. Iran's four impoverished Kurdish-majority provinces notably lie along the Iraqi border, further contributing to the perception of separatist leanings. The Turkish government--now in the process of reconciling with its own Kurdish separatist movements--has no desire to see any kind of Kurdish political or military success in the region that might disrupt ongoing reconciliation processes in south-eastern Turkiye.
Iranian-Kurdish movements are insisting on an American-enforced no-fly zone over their operational area in northern Iran as well as the presence of U.S. land-based forces, before launching an offensive against the Iranian regime. This hesitancy stems from having witnessed fellow Kurds being burned several times in the past through alliances with the United States (France24, March 5). Reports indicate that the CIA began discussions on arming Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in early March and may have already begun supplying small arms (Al-Jazeera, March 4; El Pais, March 19). Since then, Iran has targeted the bases of these groups inside Iraq (France24, March 5).
The Alliance of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (a coalition of six Kurdish political movements) stated that "the struggle for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic and the realization of the national rights of the Kurdish nation" would continue unabated following Iranian attacks on Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and other places in Iraqi Kurdistan where Iranian Kurdish dissidents are based (PDKI.org; Anadolu Ajansi, March 8). Though there have been some intimations of a possible Kurdish offensive in western Iran, Iraq's prime minister, Muhammad Shi'a al-Sudani, and Kurdistan regional president Nechirvan Barzani, have united in declaring that "Iraqi territory must not be used as a launching point for attacks against neighboring countries" (Al-Jazeera, March 7).
The United States has sent mixed signals regarding the desirability of a Kurdish entry into the campaign in Iran. On March 5, U.S. President Donald Trump considered the possibility of a Kurdish attack, stating, "I think it's wonderful that they want to do that, I'd be all for it" (Al-Jazeera, March 6). Two days later, however, the president remarked: "We're very friendly with the Kurds, as you know, but we don't want to make the war any more complex than it already is ... I don't want the Kurds going in. I don't want to see the Kurds get hurt, get killed" (Anadolu Ajansi, March 8). The IRGC warned at the same time that "If separatist groups in the region [of Kurdistan] make any move against Iran's territorial integrity, we will crush them" (Al-Arabiya, March 7).
During the nationwide protests in Iran earlier this year, Kurdish opposition parties agreed to carry out strikes rather than protests in order to avoid the massacres that followed similar protests in the past. Nonetheless, raids by security forces followed the strikes, even in Kurdish Shi'ite communities.
The Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)
One exiled Iranian insurgent group--though not an ethnic minority--must be included in the list of movements seeking the violent downfall of the Iranian regime. The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI, better known as Mujahedin-e-Khalq - MEK) is a Marxist-Islamist group initially formed in 1965 to oppose the rule of the Pahlavi monarchy. The MEK is a designated terrorist group within Iran and appeared on the American Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list from 1997 to 2012.
The movement backed the Iranian Revolution in 1978-1979, believing they could leverage their support into a power-sharing agreement. Instead, they found themselves targeted by the new regime, forcing their leadership to flee to Paris while surviving members relocated to Iraq. The movement responded with suicide attacks, bombings, assassinations, and attacks on Iranian embassies abroad (Al-Jazeera, August 4, 2011).
MEK operated from bases in Iraq after being banned by Iran's post-revolution Islamic regime, carrying out credibility-damaging attacks on Iran during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-88) (Israel Hayom, January 13). In exchange for MEK support in suppressing Kurdish and Shi'ite rebellions in Iraq, Saddam Hussein provided the movement with military training, armor, and artillery (Times of Israel, March 5). The UN and the United States asked Albania to relocate the movement from Iraq in 2013 after it came under pressure from Shi'ite and Kurdish groups seeking revenge for their collaboration with Saddam Hussein. Some 3,000 members of MEK have since been based in an Albanian village (Deutsche Welle, January 20).
By June 2023, however, the MEK had worn out its welcome in Albania. 1,000 Albanian security officers raided the MEK compound during an organized crime investigation related to terrorist financing on June 20, 2023. Fifteen police officers and 21 MEK members were injured when MEK members attempted to prevent the seizure of computers and laptops (EuroNews, June 21, 2023; Times of Israel, March 5).
The MEK now presents itself as a human-rights-focused "democratic alternative" to the clerical regime in Iran. Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has visited the group's camp in Albania and described MEK leader Maryam Rajavi as "laying the groundwork for a free, sovereign, and democratic republic in Iran" (Iran International, May 17, 2022). The movement's official leader, Massoud Rajavi, has not been seen since March 2003, and the MEK has gained a reputation as a cult-like group exercising strict control over its members. Dissident members are typically described as agents of Iranian intelligence and subject to retaliation.
The IRGC reported killing at least 100 MEK fighters during a MEK operation near the Tehran headquarters of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, just days before the launch of the Israeli-American bombing campaign began (the incident and losses were confirmed by the MEK) (Jerusalem Post, February 25).
Despite broad American political support, the MEK's legitimacy as an Iranian opposition group suffers from its historical collaboration with Iraq, its long period of exile, and its socialist ideology.
Conclusion
Iranian minorities are likely to be alarmed by any upsurge in Persian support for the return of a Pahlavi monarchy known for Persian supremacism. Would-be king of Iran, Reza Pahlavi--son of the late Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi--recently described the Kurds and other minorities as "contemptible" separatists, stating, "Iran's territorial integrity is the ultimate red line of our great and united nation. Any individual or group that crosses this red line, or collaborates with those who do, will face the resolute response of the Iranian nation" (X/@PahlaviReza).
Ethnic Persian opposition groups have little in common with the ethnic minority factions, often sharing the regime's view of these groups as separatist threats to Iranian sovereignty. The MEK leadership has, in the past, even encouraged its members to kill Kurdish fighters before taking on the IRGC (Al-Jazeera, August 4, 2011).
The lack of clear goals or timelines for the U.S.-Israeli military campaign has discouraged the entry of armed Iranian ethnic minority factions into the conflict. If Washington declares it has achieved its objectives and withdraws its forces, these groups are likely to find themselves facing the fury of a wounded regime ready to see treasonous cooperation with Israelis and Americans behind any signs of opposition.
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Andrew McGregor is a former Terrorism Monitor Editor and Militant Leadership Monitor Editor for the Jamestown Foundation (which he assumed in 2007), and Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues related to the Islamic world.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/outlook-for-minority-rebel-and-separatist-militants-in-iran/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Interest Rate Concerns Weigh on Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany
MUNICH, Germany, April 18 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on April 17, 2026:
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Interest Rate Concerns Weigh on Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany
Sentiment in residential construction in Germany deteriorated again in March. The business climate fell from -17.7 to -19.5 points, due to noticeably more pessimistic expectations. By contrast, the current situation was assessed as somewhat better. "Concerns about renewed rises in interest rates are weighing on expectations in residential construction," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "Higher
... Show Full Article
MUNICH, Germany, April 18 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on April 17, 2026:
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Interest Rate Concerns Weigh on Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany
Sentiment in residential construction in Germany deteriorated again in March. The business climate fell from -17.7 to -19.5 points, due to noticeably more pessimistic expectations. By contrast, the current situation was assessed as somewhat better. "Concerns about renewed rises in interest rates are weighing on expectations in residential construction," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "Higherfinancing costs would once again dampen the housebuilding ambitions of many households."
In operating business, however, initial signs of improvement can be seen, as the order situation slowly eases. The share of companies reporting too few orders fell considerably to 43.4%, the lowest level since July 2023. The reason for that is a recent increase in building permits. Cancellations also declined and stood most recently at 10.8%. "The order situation is slowly improving, but uncertainty remains high," says Wohlrabe.
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More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-04-17/interest-rate-concerns-weigh-business-climate-residential-construction)
ifo Podcast: A Closer Look at Distorted Rental Markets in Inner Cities (https://www.ifo.de/en/media-center/2026-02-13/ifo-podcast-mieten-wohnungsnot)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-04-17/interest-rate-concerns-weigh-business-climate-residential-construction
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: International Collaboration Took the United States Back to the Moon
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Lauryn Williams, deputy director of the Strategic Technologies Program and senior fellow in the Economic Security and Technology Department:
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International Collaboration Took the United States Back to the Moon
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
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When Artemis II astronauts Victor Glover, Reid Wiseman, Christina Koch,
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Lauryn Williams, deputy director of the Strategic Technologies Program and senior fellow in the Economic Security and Technology Department:
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International Collaboration Took the United States Back to the Moon
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
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When Artemis II astronauts Victor Glover, Reid Wiseman, Christina Koch,and Jeremy Hansen splashed down in the Pacific following their nearly 700,000-mile Moon circumnavigation journey, their achievement was not America's alone. NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman heralded the crew for "[demonstrating] to the world what America is capable of and our international cooperation is capable of" and traveling "farther from Earth than any humans have ever gone before." More than a triumph of American ingenuity, the first crewed Moon mission in 50 years was the result of deep and sustained international partnership, propelling the first diverse multinational crew beyond Earth orbit.
How did Artemis II come to exemplify twenty-first-century international space collaboration? The mission's global DNA can be found both in its shared physical hardware and its governing principles, the U.S.-led Artemis Accords, now signed by over 60 diverse nations.
While some international partners' contributions to Artemis's success to date were immediately evident--for example, the Canadian Space Agency--other contributions were perhaps less visible but no less essential. Europe, in particular, is an essential NASA partner in developing key hardware across the five planned Artemis missions. The program's key physical components include the massive U.S.-built Space Launch System rocket and the Orion crewed spacecraft--known as Integrity--that housed the Artemis II astronauts over their 10-day lunar journey. The European Space Agency developed the European Space Module, which powered Orion out of Earth orbit and provided astronauts with oxygen, water, and temperature control during the mission. Europe will play this same role for each of the subsequent crewed Artemis missions, making international collaboration neither optional nor ancillary, but mission-critical.
Beyond hardware, the Artemis program was, from its inception, deeply rooted in international partnership. Casting aside the Cold War's zero-sum U.S.-Russia space race, the Artemis Accords were designed in 2020 as a big-tent coalition to achieve big goals collaboratively. Announced during President Donald Trump's first term by former Vice President Mike Pence (who led an extremely active National Space Council), the Artemis Accords were intended to be the most robust international space collaboration in history. With the U.S.-led coalition now spanning over 60 nations, the Artemis Accords aim to not only launch astronauts to the Moon but to work toward a permanent, multinational human presence on its surface. They also spurred joint scientific research, deep-space communications, and became a key element of U.S. space diplomacy over three presidential administrations. With the Artemis II launch drawing more than 18 million views in the United States alone, that approach has undeniably resonated with U.S. and global audiences.
Yet, the deeply international Artemis project is increasingly at odds with second-term President Trump's "America First" approach. This includes an apparent pivot away from transatlantic security and traditional alliances like NATO and cuts to both international and domestic program budgets. Six years into Artemis, NASA recently released an accelerated plan for its third, fourth, and fifth missions to reach a lunar landing by 2028, before the end of the Trump administration. It also canceled the long-planned Lunar Gateway program relying on European, Japanese, Canadian, and Emirati space agencies. The new goal--putting more effort toward a Moon base to counter China's space ambitions--recalls a past era of geopolitical competition and may leave international partners with little to show for their Lunar Gateway investments. At the same time, NASA also faces the possibility of dramatic White House-proposed cuts to its operating budget. While these dynamics may not immediately affect Artemis milestones and timelines, they could profoundly affect NASA's ability to lead as the world's preferred partner in civil space exploration.
Following the astronauts' recent return, Administrator Isaacman appeared to affirm NASA's commitment to "working with international partners to successfully accomplish [its] missions." As just the second of five planned missions, and the product of Accords signed by dozens of nations, Artemis II is a shining testament to international collaboration on a physical and intangible level to accomplish the hardest human tasks imaginable. International collaboration with a wide range of partners remains not just a nice-to-have, but an essential enabling condition for success. Even as the United States appears to chart a path alone in most other policy areas, it cannot forget this important lesson.
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Lauryn Williams is the deputy director of the Strategic Technologies Program and senior fellow in the Economic Security and Technology Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/international-collaboration-took-united-states-back-moon
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Tracker - The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Financial Services Policy Director Thomas Kingsley:
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Tracker: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
Introduction
This tracker follows the Federal Reserve's (Fed) total consolidated assets, held on its balance sheet, as the best indicator of the Fed's direct intervention in the economy.
Context
The Fed's dual mandate requires it to ensure both stable prices and maximum employment. The traditional tool the Fed uses to accomplish these goals is the adjustment of the federal funds
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Financial Services Policy Director Thomas Kingsley:
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Tracker: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
Introduction
This tracker follows the Federal Reserve's (Fed) total consolidated assets, held on its balance sheet, as the best indicator of the Fed's direct intervention in the economy.
Context
The Fed's dual mandate requires it to ensure both stable prices and maximum employment. The traditional tool the Fed uses to accomplish these goals is the adjustment of the federal fundsrate, the short-term interest rate that determines how much it costs for banks to lend to each other overnight. The 2007-2008 financial crisis, however, demonstrated that even lowering the interest rate to zero was considered insufficient to shore up economies in freefall, and the Fed turned to more unusual tactics. One of these measures was what the Fed refers to as "large-scale asset purchases," which is more commonly known as "quantitative easing." Under this process, the Fed enters the market to buy securities, typically mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and Treasuries, injecting both capital and liquidity into the market. This approach is not without risks - for the first time in its history, the Fed is regulator, supervisor, and now participant in the economy.
The development of quantitative easing as a go-to tool for the Fed in times of crisis has led to an unprecedented focus on one of its traditionally unremarkable aspects - the Fed total assets. Just as with any other firm, securities that the Fed purchases are considered assets and therefore are represented on the Fed's balance sheet. This therefore is the most reflective guide of the state of quantitative easing and, by extension, the degree to which the Fed has deemed it necessary to intervene in the economy.
Each week, the Federal Reserve publishes its balance sheet, typically on Wednesday afternoon around 4:30 p.m.
As of April 15, the Fed's assets stand at $6.7 trillion, up nearly $12 billion from the prior week but down over $21 billion from a year ago.
Sources:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB
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Thomas Kingsley is the Director of Financial Services Policy at the American Action Forum.
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/tracker-the-federal-reserves-balance-sheet/
[Category: Think Tank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to Breitbart: Tax Code Built for American Abundance
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on April 17, 2026, by American Prosperity Co-Chair Michael Faulkender to Breitbart:
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A Tax Code Built for American Abundance
It's mid-April and Americans are once again calculating what taxes they owe. But we should also be asking a different question: does our tax system reward those who give back?
Too many in Washington treat taxpayers as a source of revenue rather than as the lifeblood of a thriving economy. The result has been slower investment, fewer opportunities for families,
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on April 17, 2026, by American Prosperity Co-Chair Michael Faulkender to Breitbart:
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A Tax Code Built for American Abundance
It's mid-April and Americans are once again calculating what taxes they owe. But we should also be asking a different question: does our tax system reward those who give back?
Too many in Washington treat taxpayers as a source of revenue rather than as the lifeblood of a thriving economy. The result has been slower investment, fewer opportunities for families,and a sense that getting ahead is harder than it should be.
The latest round of tax reforms changes that. Our enactment of a pro-growth, pro-family tax code is unleashing an era of American abundance where businesses expand, paychecks rise, and hard-working Americans build real financial security.
To keep reading, click here (https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2026/04/16/exclusive-michael-faulkender-a-tax-code-built-for-american-abundance/).
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The Honorable Michael Faulkender, Co-Chair, American Prosperity
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/a-tax-code-built-for-american-abundance
[Category: ThinkTank]
