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Rand Issues Commentary: Electromagnetic Warfare - NATO's Blind Spot Could Decide the Next Conflict
SANTA MONICA, California, Nov. 25 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025:* * *
Electromagnetic Warfare: NATO's Blind Spot Could Decide the Next Conflict
By Clara Le Gargasson and James Black
The war in Ukraine has exposed a critical front long neglected by Western militaries: electromagnetic warfare (EW). Control over this invisible battlespace, where communications are jammed, drones blinded, and precision weapons thrown off course, can decide the outcome of a conflict. Russia has understood this sooner than NATO, using EW to isolate Ukrainian units, disrupt command networks, ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Nov. 25 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025: * * * Electromagnetic Warfare: NATO's Blind Spot Could Decide the Next Conflict By Clara Le Gargasson and James Black The war in Ukraine has exposed a critical front long neglected by Western militaries: electromagnetic warfare (EW). Control over this invisible battlespace, where communications are jammed, drones blinded, and precision weapons thrown off course, can decide the outcome of a conflict. Russia has understood this sooner than NATO, using EW to isolate Ukrainian units, disrupt command networks,and neutralize Western systems. Ukraine has adapted with ingenuity, but it is learning in combat what NATO should have learned in training. After decades focused on counterinsurgency, the Alliance now risks confronting its most capable adversary without mastery of a defining domain of modern warfare.
This is not to say that EW is a new phenomenon. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) has been an element of warfare since the early 1900s and the birth of signals intelligence (SIGINT), when the interception of naval radio transmissions helped Imperial Japan to defeat Tsarist Russia in 1905. The EMS was gradually instrumentalised in different ways: via radar and the interception and cracking of Enigma in World War 2, radio broadcast jamming in the Cold War, guidance systems jamming in the Yom Kippur War, and GPS jamming in the Gulf War. But despite periodic discoveries of new and varied ways to use EW, Western militaries deprioritised such technologies in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as part of a broader shift away from large-scale, state-on-state warfighting towards counterinsurgency.
Over the last five years, EW has gained renewed prominence as a warfighting domain through its crucial role in recent conflicts, such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the war in Ukraine, the fighting in Gaza, the Red Sea, and Iran. Modern EW involves more than simple jamming: it can degrade command and control, disrupt GPS and targeting systems, intercept and spoof communications, and safeguard against similar attacks in turn. Mastery of the EMS is now essential for digitalised militaries dependent on sensors, satellites, and networked systems to function effectively under fire.
Unlike the West, post-Soviet Russia did not pivot away from EW in the 1990s and 2000s. It has developed and is continuing to develop some of the most advanced EW capabilities in the world. Today, Russia has over four hundred radar sites spread across its and its allies' territories (Janes, 2025), and at least fourteen military EW units. It possesses mobile tactical EW equipment, such as the Krasukha-4 and Moscow-1 systems; ground-based, 300-kilometer-range jammers like the Murmansk-BN (theoretically able to limit high-frequency radio communications for most of the theatre); airborne radar jammers like the Divnomorye; surface-to-air missile radar jammers like the helicopter-mounted Mi-8MTPR-1. EW is deeply embedded in Russian military formations and doctrine.
Russia's favoured strategy in Ukraine is that of using EW to find and isolate Ukrainian positions, before overwhelming them with artillery fire. Russia also uses EW to degrade Ukrainian communications, jam GPS, radars, or subsystems on Ukrainian drones--or indeed, to fully disable them. Since 2022 especially, Ukraine has developed ways to defend itself from Russian EW and to use EW systems offensively--with rapid innovation on both sides in pursuit of windows of advantage.
Russia's large, mature EW arsenal stands in stark contrast to NATO's EW capabilities. Under the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence Policy, the Alliance has the right to conduct EW operations in peacetime. However, this use would be subject to international law and require political approval. In practice, this limits activity to exercises, simulation, and testing, offering little EW warfighting experience to NATO forces. Russia meanwhile is testing out different tactics and technologies on an active battlefield, learning how to improve their capabilities, and gaining insight into where further investment would lead to the most useful innovations.
NATO's dependence on the United States (PDF) compounds the problem. The United States provides critical EW capabilities, such as intelligence (ELINT) collection via airborne and space-based assets, threat library data centralisation and management, electronic suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), and jamming. With the second Trump administration prioritising the war on drugs and the Indo-Pacific theatre, this dependency has become a strategic vulnerability. NATO's reliance on the United States signals to Russia the comparative weakness of European NATO in this increasingly decisive dimension of warfare, undermining deterrence and increasing the risk that the Kremlin attacks Europe's defences and tests its resolve in future.
There are signs that this capability gap has started to be understood by some NATO members. In April, NATO and Ukraine established a new EW Coalition to formalise the exchange of equipment, training, and doctrine among thirteen current signatories. The Coalition will go some way towards bridging the knowledge deficit that NATO suffers in EW matters and help Allies gain a better understanding of what sort of technical systems they should be looking to acquire for themselves. But deep EW capability will take time to develop, especially when the specialist skills and experience to make use of that materiel properly are in short supply.
NATO must show that it will be ready and able to fight Russia in the EMS with or without the United States' equipment, expertise, and participation. To achieve this, European NATO members must invest in EW expertise, materiel, and infrastructure to ensure resilience to U.S. retrenchment or distraction in other theatres.
That means prioritising more ambition on EW in NATO planning and capability targets, building on the new 5 percent GDP target for defence spending. It also involves encouraging more countries to join the EW Coalition with Ukraine and making the systematic integration of the EMS dimension of warfare into NATO and national exercises and wargames mandatory--testing to failure, forcing troops to get used to operating with degraded comms, sensors, or GPS. Additionally, it requires strengthening European supply chains for EW components to reduce external dependencies.
However European NATO chooses to deal with this issue, its response must be fast and visible. The threat of direct conflict with Russia is not abating and Europe cannot afford to lag in the electromagnetic domain. The Alliance needs to demonstrate that, across every domain including the EMS, it is ready and able to fight and win.
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More About This Commentary
Clara Le Gargasson is a junior analyst and James Black is deputy director of the Defence and Security research group at RAND Europe.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/11/electromagnetic-warfare-natos-blind-spot-could-decide.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: City Council Power Play Will Make or Break Zohran Mamdani's Mayoralty
NEW YORK, Nov. 25 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Nov. 24, 2025, to the New York Post:* * *
City Council Power Play Will Make or Break Zohran Mamdani's Mayoralty
By John Ketcham and Christian Browne
In January, both ends of City Hall will be under new leadership.
The voters chose Zohran Mamdani as the city's next chief executive. He will run the mayor's side of the oldest functioning City Hall in the country.
The members of the City Council, however, will elect a new speaker, who will lead the city's legislature from the building's opposite wing.
Ahead ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Nov. 25 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Nov. 24, 2025, to the New York Post: * * * City Council Power Play Will Make or Break Zohran Mamdani's Mayoralty By John Ketcham and Christian Browne In January, both ends of City Hall will be under new leadership. The voters chose Zohran Mamdani as the city's next chief executive. He will run the mayor's side of the oldest functioning City Hall in the country. The members of the City Council, however, will elect a new speaker, who will lead the city's legislature from the building's opposite wing. Aheadof that January vote, the neck-and-neck front-runners are Julie Menin, an Upper East Side establishment Democrat considered a relative moderate, and the progressive Crystal Hudson of Brooklyn, the mayor-elect's ideological fellow traveler.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2025/11/24/opinion/city-council-power-play-will-make-or-break-mamdanis-mayoralty)
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John Ketcham is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute. Christian Browne is an attorney and adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/city-council-power-play-will-make-or-break-zohran-mamdanis-mayoralty
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Ukraine's Military Transitioning to Corps-Based Command Structure
WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Ukraine's Military Transitioning to Corps-Based Command Structure
By Hlib Parfonov
Executive Summary:
* Since early 2025, Ukraine's Armed Forces (AFU) have launched a transition to a corps-based command structure, making corps the largest operational units in the AFU, rather than brigades, and replacing temporary wartime groupings.
* The reform aims to establish permanent corps-level commands, improving accountability, coordination, and operational efficiency ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Ukraine's Military Transitioning to Corps-Based Command Structure By Hlib Parfonov Executive Summary: * Since early 2025, Ukraine's Armed Forces (AFU) have launched a transition to a corps-based command structure, making corps the largest operational units in the AFU, rather than brigades, and replacing temporary wartime groupings. * The reform aims to establish permanent corps-level commands, improving accountability, coordination, and operational efficiencyacross various fronts after years of organizational improvisation.
* Each corps, composed of five to seven brigades and 60,000-80,000 troops, reports to one of four regional commands. Overlapping brigade subordination remains a major challenge, hindering unified control and slowing progress toward fully independent corps operations.
* The reform would align Ukraine's military structure with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standards, introducing corps-division-brigade organization to enable joint planning and interoperability. Shortages of trained senior officers, logistics bottlenecks, and limited staff experience threaten effective reform implementation.
* Corps are evolving into recruitment and training hubs, conducting two-month preparation courses for new personnel and coordinating mobilization, boosting efficiency but straining resources, requiring sustained investment in infrastructure, equipment, and instructors to maintain long-term combat readiness.
Introduction
Since the beginning of 2025, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have launched a transition to a corps-based system of troop command and control. In 2022, brigades were the AFU's largest operational units. The new structure would make corps, comprising several brigades, the AFU's largest operational unit (Kyiv Independent, October 13). This reform had long been overdue, as the AFU has grown several times over since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Militarnyi, June 22; see EDM, June 27).
The corps reform is also designed to eliminate so-called "temporary structures," such as operational-strategic and operational-tactical groupings, introduced during Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Operational-strategic groupings were meant to manage sections of the front line by coordinating the activities of multiple operational-tactical groupings, acting as intermediate command structures. Since they were temporary in nature, these groupings did not assume complete responsibility for decision-making and lacked the full capabilities required for a given sector of the front. They also lacked a clear hierarchy and chain of command; if there were problems on a particular sector of the front, such as an enemy breakthrough, the responsibility lay not with the head of the operational-tactical grouping, but with the brigade commander (Army Inform, May 12).
This has now changed in some cases, as some individuals have been removed not from their ranks but from their command posts within the corps. The corps reforms aim to clarify the chain of command by making the corps the permanent, primary organizational unit within the armed forces. This occurred in the 20th Corps, which was directly engaged on the Novopavlivka axis. Responsibility for a given sector of the front is placed directly with the corps commander (Babel.ua, September 23).
The corps reform would pass full command of the corps to the Joint Forces Command, but this has not yet occurred. As a result, the AFU currently has several interim structures that command the corps and serve as a link between the Ukrainian General Staff and the corps.
Corps Structure
Since the corps reform began, the AFU has consolidated temporary structures into four regional commands: the South, East, and West groupings of forces, which are conducting the main battles, as well as the North grouping of forces. The corps are directly subordinated to these regional commands--approximately three corps per regional command.
One corps consists of five to seven brigades. This includes a separate artillery brigade, a heavy mechanized brigade, and several mechanized or motorized infantry brigades. The total number of troops per corps ranges from 60,000 to 80,000, depending on the formations assigned to it.
The main challenge facing the corps reform is ensuring that each corps has a distinct set of brigades under its command. At present, most brigades remain under the operational subordination of multiple corps, which means that very few corps have singular command of their own units.
The corps reform is meant to streamline the management of units in a specific sector of the front. Internal reassignments can then be made at the corps level. For example, a brigade that performs successfully can serve as a model, with its experience scaled and applied to other brigades that lag in training or command quality. As with any military organism, the combat power of a corps is judged by its weakest unit (see EDM, June 27).
Certain mobilization experiments connected with recruiting and mobilizing directly into corps units are also being conducted. At least several corps, whether in the National Guard or the AFU, are currently engaging in such practices. Newly mobilized personnel are offered training at the corps' training grounds, a two-month preparation course, and subsequent assignment solely into the corps' units (24tv.ua, October 10).
"West" Grouping of Forces
The West grouping of forces is responsible for the Volyn, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts, as well as the city of Kyiv. It is commanded by Brigadier General Shvediuk and includes four army corps (the 12th, 14th, 15th, and 18th Army Corps).
The full composition of the West Grouping includes: OPBr (Presidential Brigade "Hetman Bohdan Khemelnystkyi')*, 1st Separate Heavy Mechanized Brigade (OVMBr), 1st Separate Territorial Defense Brigade (OBrTrO), 5th Separate Assault Brigade (OShBr)*, 10th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade (OGShBr), 21st Mechanized Brigade (OMBr), 22nd OMBr, 27th Artillery Brigade (OABr), 42nd OMBr, 44th OABr, 47th OMBr, 47th OABr, 58th Motorized Infantry Brigade (OMPBr), 66th OMBr, 67th OMBr*, 72nd OMBr*, 92nd OShBr, 101st OBrTrO, 104th OBrTrO, 105th OBrTrO, 106th OBrTrO, 112th OBrTrO, 118th OBrTrO, 120th OBrTrO, 129th OVMBr, 143rd OMBr, 144th OMBr, 151st OMBr*, 156th OMBr, 157th OMBr*, and 158th OMBr.
*These brigades are likely to be reassigned from the 12th Army Corps to other corps.
The West brigades (excluding mechanized brigades within the 12th Army Corps) include:
* Eight mechanized brigades
* Eight territorial defense (TrO) brigades
* Three heavy mechanized brigades
* Four artillery brigades
* One assault brigade
* One mountain assault brigade
* One motorized infantry brigade
* One separate presidential brigade
There are a total of twenty-three infantry brigades and four fire-support brigades.
With its current set of forces, the West grouping's primary task is the complete expulsion of the enemy beyond the state border in Sumy oblast.
"North" Grouping of Forces
The North grouping of forces is responsible for the Kharkiv oblast and parts of the Luhansk oblast. It is commanded by Major General Krasylnykov and consists of five corps (3rd, 10th, 16th, and 21st Army Corps and the 2nd Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU)).
The whole composition of the North grouping includes: 3rd OShBr, 3rd OVMBr, 3rd NGU Operational Brigade, 4th OVMBr, 4th NGU Operational Brigade, 12th OVMBr, 13th NGU Operational Brigade, 14th OMBr, 17th NGU Brigade, 18th NGU Brigade, 26th OABr, 41st OMBr, 43rd OMBr, 48th OABr, 52nd OABr, 53rd OMBr, 57th OMPBr, 60th OMBr, 63rd OMBr, 93rd OMBr, 113th OBrTrO, 115th OMBr, 116th OMBr, 125th OVMBr, 152nd OMBr, 154th OMBr, 155th OMBr, and 159th OMBr.
The North brigades include:
* Thirteen mechanized brigades
* Five national guard brigades
* Four artillery brigades (1 uncertain)
* Four heavy mechanized brigades
* One motorized infantry brigade
* One territorial defense brigade
* One assault brigade
There are a total of 25 infantry brigades and four fire-support brigades.
The main task of the North grouping of forces in autumn-winter 2025 is to prevent the occupation of Lyman. The defense of Kupiansk has also been prioritized and assigned to the 2nd NGU Corps and the 10th Army Corps.
"East" Grouping of Forces
The East grouping of forces is responsible for Donetsk oblast, as well as parts of the Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. It is not yet known who commands the grouping, and it consists of six corps (11th, 19th, 9th, 20th Army Corps, 1st NGU Corps, and the 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces)
The full composition of the East Grouping includes: 1st NGU Operational Brigade, 5th OVMBr, 12th NGU Special Purpose Brigade, 14th NGU Operational Brigade, 15th NGU Operational Brigade, 17th OVMBr, 20th NGU Operational Brigade, 23rd OMBr, 24th OMBr, 25th Airborne Brigade (OPDBr), 28th OMBr, 30th OMBr, 31st OMBr, 32nd OMBr, 33rd OMBr, 40th OABr, 44th OMBr, 45th OABr, 54th OMBr, 55th OABr, 56th OMPBr, 60th OABr, 68th Separate Jaeger Brigade, 77th Separate Airmobile Brigade, 79th Air Assault Brigade, 81st Separate Airmobile Brigade, 110th OBrTrO, 117th OVMBr, 127th OVMBr, 141st OMBr, 142nd OMBr, 147th OABr, and 153rd OMBr.
The East brigades include:
* Twelve mechanized brigades
* Five national guard brigades
* Five artillery brigades
* Four heavy mechanized brigades
* Two airmobile brigades
* One air assault brigade
* One airborne brigade
* One Jaeger brigade
* One motorized infantry brigade
* One territorial defense brigade
There is a total of 28 infantry brigades and five fire-support brigades.
Among the first "failures" of the grouping was Russia's advance toward Dnipropetrovsk oblast, which led to the removal of Colonel Maksym Kituha from command of the 20th Army Corps (Kyiv Post, September 16).
The main task of the East grouping of forces is to prevent the occupation of Siversk, eliminate the threat of a "blockade" of Pokrovsk, conduct targeted counterattacks to halt enemy advances, prevent a breakthrough toward Kostiantynivka, and hold the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk border zone in the sector of the 20th Army Corps.
"South" Grouping of Forces
The South grouping of forces is responsible for the Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson oblasts, and most of Zaporizhzhia oblast. It is commanded by Major General Sydorenko and consists of two corps (17th Army Corps and 30th Marine Corps).
The full composition of the South grouping includes: 32nd OABr, 34th Coastal Defense Brigade (OBrBO), 35th Marine Brigade, 36th Marine Brigade, 37th Marine Brigade, 38th Marine Brigade, 39th OBrBO, 40th OBrBO, 54th OABr, 65th OMBr, 108th OBrTrO, 110th OMBr, 118th OMBr, 128th OVMBr, 128th OGShBr, 241st OBrTrO, and 406th OABr.
The South brigades include:
* Four marine brigades
* Three coastal defense brigades
* Three artillery brigades
* Three mechanized brigades
* Two territorial defense brigades
* One heavy mechanized brigade
* One mountain assault brigade
There are a total of 13 infantry brigades and three fire-support brigades.
One of its corps has already drawn the attention of the Ukrainian General Staff and General Oleksandr Syrskyi personally due to the loss of the settlement of Kamianske in Zaporizhzhia oblast, which led to the removal of Colonel Volodymyr Sylenko from command of the 17th Army Corps (Kyiv Post, September 16).
The main task of the South grouping of forces is to limit the Russian forces' offensive potential in Zaporizhzhia oblast.
Reform Outlook
The corps reform is part of Ukraine's long-term alignment with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standards. Since 2016, the General Staff has discussed introducing a corps-division-brigade system, but the project has been repeatedly postponed. The expansion of the AFU after Russia's full-scale invasion made a corps reform unavoidable. The corps system is designed to mirror allied models of field corps and army groups, enabling the AFU to communicate in the same "operational language" as NATO partners and prepare for joint operations.
While the introduction of corps increases accountability and unifies responsibility for sectors of the front, it has also exposed a chronic shortage of trained officers at the divisional and corps staff level. Many newly created headquarters lack the institutional memory and operational experience to coordinate five to seven brigades simultaneously. Logistics, communications, and staff training remain critical weak points, and the success of the corps reform depends on whether these gaps can quickly be closed under wartime conditions.
The reform is not limited to the land forces. Several corps of the NGU and Air Assault Forces have been integrated into the new system. This demonstrates an effort to create a joint command structure in which all types of forces--army, airborne, and national guard--operate within a single corps framework. Such integration, however, requires harmonizing doctrines, communications, and mobilization pipelines across branches, which remains a work in progress.
A less visible, but no less important, aspect of the corps reform is its effect on mobilization. Corps headquarters are increasingly used as centers for recruitment, training, and deployment, with two-month preparation courses for mobilized personnel conducted at corps training grounds. This approach centralizes responsibility for reserves but also places a heavy burden on the state, which must provide equipment, instructors, and infrastructure at a scale far beyond pre-war planning.
The sustainability of this system will be a decisive factor for Ukraine's ability to maintain combat effectiveness over time.
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Hlib Parfonov is a graduate of the National Aviation University (Kyiv) and a flight engineer. Since 2020, he has headed security policy at the Doctrine Center for Political Studies, in Kyiv.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/ukraines-military-transitioning-to-corps-based-command-structure/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Red States Dominate the Highest Rankings in Reading and Math
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Nov. 25 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025:* * *
Red states dominate the highest rankings in reading and math
By Catrin Wigfall
In a national landscape where academic outcomes vary widely by region, an analysis of demographically-adjusted 2024 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores shows that conservative-leaning or "red" states occupy many of the top positions in reading and math achievement.
The top performers ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Nov. 25 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025: * * * Red states dominate the highest rankings in reading and math By Catrin Wigfall In a national landscape where academic outcomes vary widely by region, an analysis of demographically-adjusted 2024 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores shows that conservative-leaning or "red" states occupy many of the top positions in reading and math achievement. The top performersshare several characteristics. Many have implemented early literacy initiatives, structured reading instruction grounded in the science of reading, or statewide reforms aimed at reducing bureaucratic complexity in classrooms. Others emphasize consistent academic standards or data-driven intervention strategies that identify struggling students early.
With six out of the 10 top-ranked states on NAEP located in the south, the longstanding assumptions about which regions traditionally lead in educational outcomes are also being challenged.
States such as Mississippi, which has been widely studied for its dramatic improvement in early literacy scores over the past decade, demonstrate how targeted policymaking can yield measurable academic benefits. Similar reforms in other red states appear to be contributing to improved reading proficiency and stronger math foundations.
Table: Rankings Based on Adjusted National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) Scores for 2024
What about Minnesota?
At the same time, states once viewed as consistent academic leaders are losing ground. Minnesota -- long regarded as a high-performing education state -- drops significantly when NAEP test scores are adjusted for socioeconomic and demographic factors. The adjusted rankings highlight how Minnesota's results, though often stronger in raw statewide averages, fall behind when comparing performance on an equalized basis with other states.
Minnesota ranks 39th in fourth-grade reading, 26th in fourth-grade math, 31st in eighth-grade reading, and 15th in eighth-grade math, for an overall ranking of 28th.
For Minnesota, the drop to 28th serves as a cautionary benchmark, suggesting that past strengths are no longer enough to keep pace with states pushing faster and harder on academic reform.
On one front, the Minnesota Legislature finally took notice. During the 2023 legislative session, the state overhauled its approach to literacy instruction through the Reading to Ensure Academic Development Act, known as the READ Act, with the goal of having every Minnesota child reading at or above grade level every year, beginning in kindergarten. To help accomplish this goal, it requires teacher preparation programs and districts to use evidence-based reading strategies in their instruction that include teaching phonemic awareness, phonics, vocabulary, fluency, and comprehension. Statewide literacy screenings are also required to help identify students at risk of falling further behind.
There are, however, key provisions missing from Minnesota's READ Act that are included in the reading laws of Mississippi and other states with strong literacy gains. One of the more challenging distinctions to discuss is retention, a topic I have written about many times. Mississippi holds students back in third grade if they can't read at grade level, and pairs its retention requirements with strong interventions. The impact on the retained students has been positive.
It will take time to know if achievement improvements will result from Minnesota's READ Act changes, as the law is still being implemented. Buy-in during this implementation phase among all who need to execute the reforms is essential. Having policy on the books is one thing, making sure it is carried out as intended is another.
Parents with students who can't afford to fall behind another year in reading as they wait for curriculum choices to be made, re-training to finish, and full implementation should be empowered to access a school environment and educational services equipped to meet their learning needs today. With Education Savings Accounts (ESAs), Minnesota families could use the dollars already allocated for their child's education to cover pre-approved expenses such as tuition at another school, reading tutoring, and special education services, to name a few. It's an opportunity to fully customize a child's education and meet individual students where they are at right now because there are only so many years in their K-12 journey, and they can't wait.
Gov. Tim Walz should also opt Minnesota in to the federal tax-credit scholarship provision that will take effect Jan. 1, 2027. This will give public school students the opportunity to use the scholarships to pay for reading tutoring and supplemental learning expenses. Not only does this help the student but it is helpful for teachers, as it sends students back into the classroom better prepared.
While no single factor fully explains the emerging landscape, the pattern is clear: Red states are increasingly dominating the highest national rankings in reading and math, while states like Minnesota are slipping in adjusted comparisons. As policymakers debate the next generation of education reforms, these shifts should shape discussions about what works -- and what needs to change -- in America's classrooms.
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Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/red-states-dominate-the-highest-rankings-in-reading-and-math/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Another State Commits to the Federal Education Tax Credit Program. Is Minnesota Next?
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Nov. 25 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025:* * *
Another state commits to the federal education tax credit program. Is Minnesota next?
By Josiah Padley
This summer, Congress passed The Educational Choice for Children Act (ECCA) as part of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. The ECCA allows every taxpayer nationwide to gain up to $1700 in tax credit when they donate to a scholarship granting organization (SGO).
While every taxpayer ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Nov. 25 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025: * * * Another state commits to the federal education tax credit program. Is Minnesota next? By Josiah Padley This summer, Congress passed The Educational Choice for Children Act (ECCA) as part of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. The ECCA allows every taxpayer nationwide to gain up to $1700 in tax credit when they donate to a scholarship granting organization (SGO). While every taxpayeris eligible to donate to an SGO in any state, only SGOs in some states will receive money. That's because governors must authorize SGOs to operate in their respective states by submitting a list of approved SGOs to the U.S. Treasury Department by January 1 each year. This additional step of verification means that governors have the ability to exercise their discretion as to whether or not the scholarship money is a good choice for their state.
Scholarship granting organizations can serve students attending private schools, but they can also offer a cash boost to public schools. For example, in Minnesota, parent-teacher organizations already consistently raise funds for public schools. Purchases range by district from classroom supplies to entire salaries for new staff. Similarly, SGOs could provide additional extracurricular opportunities or academic support services to students in public schools.
On Friday, South Dakota Gov. Larry Rhoden announced that the state would be the fourth state in the country, after Nebraska, North Carolina, and Tennessee, to commit to President Donald Trump's federal education tax credit program.
For Rhoden, opting into the federal tax credit program was a decision largely made around expanding school choice initiatives. South Dakota already has an existing tax credit program, which allows insurance companies to donate up to a total of $5 million to a private school scholarship program for students whose families have low incomes. Rhoden noted that the two tax programs would "pair well" with one another.
Education news outlet The 74 quoted Rhoden. "I'd just as soon give those dollars to a private school than Uncle Sam. I think they know how to spend it a little wiser than the federal government."
Some states have already decided that the tax credit program isn't right for them. Officials in Oregon, New Mexico, and Wisconsin have publicly noted that their states will not be participating. Critics of the ECCA, including a Brookings scholar, have argued that more accountability against fraud is necessary. Additionally, a public rumble with the Trump administration is likely weighed carefully in some state officials' calculus to opt out of the program.
Currently, the tax credit isn't available for taxpayers until 2027. By then, the U.S. Department of Treasury is expected to issue proposed rules detailing the program's operation.
Minnesota has not yet opted into the tax credit program. For more information about Minnesota's tax credit opportunity, visit this page.
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Josiah Padley is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
josiah.padley@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/another-state-commits-to-the-federal-education-tax-credit-program-is-minnesota-next/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Geoeconomic Conundrum of India's Oil Purchases
WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025:* * *
The Geoeconomic Conundrum of India's Oil Purchases
By Shashwat Kumar
India is a net importer of crude oil, importing 88 percent of its requirement in FY 2025. For a high import-dependent and price-sensitive market like India, where demand is increasing every year, economics dictate import strategy, which is why the share of cheaply available Russian oil went from just 2 percent to more than 30 percent in a short span. However, India's oil import basket is likely ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025: * * * The Geoeconomic Conundrum of India's Oil Purchases By Shashwat Kumar India is a net importer of crude oil, importing 88 percent of its requirement in FY 2025. For a high import-dependent and price-sensitive market like India, where demand is increasing every year, economics dictate import strategy, which is why the share of cheaply available Russian oil went from just 2 percent to more than 30 percent in a short span. However, India's oil import basket is likelyto undergo a drastic change as India may find it increasingly difficult to ignore geopolitical compulsions. The latest sanctions by the United States, along with decisions by the United Kingdom and the European Union, on Rosneft and Lukoil, Russia's two largest oil companies, coupled with earlier sanctions on Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftgas, will require India to recalibrate its crude oil import strategy based on the steepening tradeoffs between cheap oil and geoeconomic ties with Washington and other members of the sanctioning coalition.
The lack of clarity from the United States on sanction enforcement provides India with maneuverability in planning a diversification strategy. Russian oil is not providing the high returns that it did in the early years of the war in Ukraine. A 50 percent tariff imposed on Indian goods by the United States is hurting India's micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). Therefore, it is in India's own interest to diversify its oil imports and use them as a bargaining tool in the bilateral trade negotiation with the United States. India's strong macroeconomic indicators (e.g., low inflation and low current account deficit) and 2026 global oil outlook do favor a transition back to prewar diversified import levels.
Russian Oil's Cushioning of the Indian Economy
* India's Oil Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP Reduced
It is difficult to assess the exact savings that accrued to the Indian economy on account of purchasing discounted Russian oil because of monthly variations in oil prices, quantity purchased, and the discount offered per barrel. The estimates vary from $5 billion to $10 billion annually. In FY 2023, on average, India imported 1.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of Russian crude, which then increased to 1.6 mbd (in FY 2024) and 1.8 mbd (in FY 2025). In this period, the volatility in crude prices was substantial, the highest since 2013-2014. On average, crude prices increased by roughly 17 percent in FY 2023 to $93.2 per barrel before declining in subsequent years.
Table 1 shows how the purchase of discounted Russian oil helped India lower its oil bills. Assuming India saved $10 billion annually, the biggest impact can be seen in FY 2023 when India's expenditure on oil as a percentage of GDP increased by a point from a year earlier to 4.7 percent. If not for the $60 per barrel price cap (enforced in December 2022) and additional discounts from Russia, this number would have been 5 percent.
Subsequently, the reduction in average crude oil price (USD per barrel) of India's import basket, coupled with discounted Russian oil (discount margins reduced substantially in FY 2025), has brought down the expenditure to 3.5 percent, which is below prewar levels.
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Table 1: India's Expenditure on Oil Import
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* Indian Refineries and the Government Exchequer Gained
Reliance Industries Limited, Nayara Energy, the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL), and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) are India's five largest refining companies. The first two are privately owned, and the remaining three are public refineries. For domestic supplies within India, the IOC, HPCL, and BPCL hold a combined market share of 85-90 percent, and that is why they have only been considered for subsequent analysis.
Figure 1 shows how the gross refining margin (GRM) of IOC, HPCL, and BPCL, India's top three public refineries, fared in the last four financial years. GRM is the difference between the revenue from selling refined products and the cost of crude oil. Due to the price cap and discounts offered, Indian refineries were able to procure Russian crude at a cheaper cost. This enabled them to reduce their overall costs and earn a higher margin since pump prices largely remained unchanged.
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Figure 1: GRM for India's Public Refineries
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The GRM for these companies peaked in the first year (FY 2023) of war due to higher discounts on offer. None of these companies saw an increase in net profit (see Table 2) in that year compared to the previous one due to currency depreciation, as the value of the Indian rupee weakened by 8 percent against the U.S. dollar. In FY 2024, the profits surged for all three companies.
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Table 2: Net Profits of IOC, BPCL and HPCL (Crore)
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An increase in net profit enabled these refineries to increase their investment in capacity expansion and contribute more to the government exchequer in the form of duties, taxes, and dividends. IOC, which is the largest of the three public refineries with a market share of 42 percent, alone contributed roughly $27-30 billion each year, or, ₹240,185 crore (FY 2023), ₹241,629 crore (FY 2024), and ₹232,299 crore (FY 2025) respectively, which is one-third of overall contribution by the oil and gas industry in the last three fiscal years.
* The Pump Prices in India Largely Remained Stable
Figure 2 below shows the daily pump price across four Indian metro cities for the last four years (April 1, 2021-October 30, 2025), and it is evident that they were not affected by the fluctuations in international crude oil prices. In FY 2023, the average price of India's crude import basket (see Table 1 above) increased by roughly 17 percent. In this period, due to the onset of the war in Ukraine and the accompanying global oil price spike, for about two months in 2022 (March 22-May 21), petrol and diesel prices in India did go up by 10 percent. Thereafter, it fell by around 7 percent and remained stable for the next two years before further reducing by 2 percent in March 2024 (before India's 2024 general elections). Meanwhile, the average price of India's crude import basket reduced by 11 percent and 5 percent in FY 2024 and FY 2025, respectively.
As per the latest data provided by India's Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, in FY 2026 (between April and November), the average price of India's crude import basket has further receded to $67.68 per barrel. This is 14 percent lower than FY 2025 and 27 percent lower than FY 2023, when the average price of Indian crude reached $93.15 per barrel.
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Figure 2: Daily Metro Petrol and Diesel Prices
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Based on the global crude oil price trend, pump prices in India should have gone down. However, it did not happen and can be attributed to the pricing mechanism, where taxes levied by the central and state governments in India constitute nearly half of the final price. This mechanism provided the government with the ability to navigate and keep the prices stable, either by increasing or decreasing taxes. Between November 2021 and May 2022, the Union government reduced excise duty by ₹13 per liter (18 cents per liter) on petrol and ₹16 per liter (21 cents per liter) on diesel in two tranches, and this benefit was passed on to the consumers. In April 2025, excise duty on petrol and diesel was increased by ₹2 per liter (0.02 cents per liter) each, but this was not passed on to consumers.
The Fears of Pivoting Away
It is feared that the loss of savings on the oil import bill caused by the shift away from cheap Russian oil will make fuel expensive for Indian industries and households. A 10 percent increase in global crude oil prices can raise India's domestic inflation by 0.2-0.3 percent, which in turn can impact India's GDP growth. However, the data in Table 1 and Figure 2 don't support this argument. The retail prices of petrol and diesel have remained stable. India's spending on oil imports is decreasing because of falling oil prices. India's macroeconomic indicators are on a strong footing as the current account deficit has narrowed to 0.2 percent of GDP in Q1 of FY 2025-2026 from 0.9 percent a year ago. The inflation (consumer price index) forecast has also been lowered to 2.6 percent from 3.1 percent. As an icing on the cake, in 2026, global oil prices are expected to remain well below $70 per barrel and could reach as low as $60 per barrel.
The Road Ahead for India
India has two options available--stay the course and continue to buy from Russia or diversify away from Russian crude.
The first option carries substantial risk given the hawkish stance of the current administration in the United States. Choosing this option jeopardizes the ongoing bilateral trade negotiations, which need to be addressed urgently to improve the competitiveness of Indian MSMEs due to the imposition of 50 percent tariffs. The recent purchase trend suggests India is opting for the second option as its refineries are scaling down their purchases of Russian crude--a few refineries have stopped buying, while others are buying from non-sanctioned entities.
Going forward, there are three important questions to be addressed:
1. Is there enough oil supply in the global market to replace Russian oil?
2. Can India revert to its prewar import basket to replace Russian crude?
3. What should be the strategy for diversification?
For the first question, the outlook is favorable. The International Energy Agency estimates that there will be a surplus of crude oil in 2026 over global demand. The increase in oil supply is led by non-Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries (the United States, Guyana, Canada, and Brazil), accounting for two-thirds of global supply growth. The remaining will come from OPEC+ countries, including Russia. The surplus oil supply will also keep downward pressure on oil prices.
To address the second question, a comparison of India's oil import basket before and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine offers insights (see Table 3). The prewar period (January 2021-March 2022) is used as a baseline, discounting pandemic-related distortions and previous embargo losses from Venezuelan and Iranian supplies.
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Table 3: India's Oil Import Basket Before and After Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
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The meteoric rise of Russian crude has come at the expense of established suppliers:
* Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia collectively lost around 15 percentage points of market share.
* The United States' share dropped by five percentage points.
* Nigeria's share shrank by four points.
* The "others" category, including Mexico, Malaysia, Colombia, and Brazil, saw a combined 10 percentage point decline.
India's ability to restore its prewar import basket hinges on the production capacity of key suppliers, notably Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, which collectively accounted for over 50 percent of India's crude imports prior to their displacement. These Middle Eastern partners have been steadily increasing output in 2025 and have announced further capacity increments, positioning them as the most viable replacements for Russian crude. Importantly, the crude grades from these suppliers are broadly compatible with Indian refinery configurations, which predominantly process high-sulfur crude (about 75 percent).
However, India should pursue a phased transition (across Q1 to Q4) as it shifts away from over 1.5 million barrels per day of Russian oil for the following reasons. First, while Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, and Saudi Arabia could technically substitute Russian volumes immediately, doing so would likely diminish their spare capacity going into 2026, heightening the risk of volatility in global oil markets. These suppliers have so far adopted a cautious stance on output increases, with further increments only confirmed through March 2026. Second, crude production in the United States is at its peak, with sustained growth in Guyana, Canada, and Brazil. India can leverage this evolving supply landscape by balancing long-term contracts with targeted spot market purchases, optimizing both costs and energy security in 2026. Third, Indian refineries are optimized for certain crude grades (75 percent high sulfur and 25 percent low sulfur), and a phased approach gives refineries time to adjust blending strategies, manage inventories, and optimize yields for new sources. Fourth, a phase transition will allow India to assess how the sanctions will be enforced by the United States and its allies on Russian crude.
India stands at a pivotal moment in its energy policy, faced with the dual challenge of maintaining affordability and security while navigating evolving geopolitical realities. The macroeconomic foundation is robust: Oil import spending has stabilized, inflation and current account deficits have moderated, and global supply outlooks remain favorable. Diminishing discounts on Russian crude and a downward trend in global oil prices further support a pivot back to prewar diversified imports.
A phased transition away from Russian crude is not only economically prudent but also strategically wise, as it reduces the risk of market volatility and reinforces India's leverage in global trade and diplomatic negotiations. Ultimately, the pace and success of this shift will depend on external sanctions enforcement and India's adept economic diplomacy. A steady, calibrated diversification strategy offers the best pathway to protect the Indian economy from transient disruptions, locking in resilience and bargaining power for the years ahead.
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Shashwat Kumar is a fellow with the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/geoeconomic-conundrum-indias-oil-purchases
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: CRINK in 10 Charts
WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025:* * *
CRINK in 10 Charts
By Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Maria Snegovaya and Mona Yacoubian
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) are increasingly working together in ways that challenge the United States and global governance. The CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department released a series of briefs that leverage data to analyze the nature and degree of CRINK alignment across the economic, diplomatic, and security domains. This page draws on the data collected in ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Nov. 24, 2025: * * * CRINK in 10 Charts By Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Maria Snegovaya and Mona Yacoubian China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) are increasingly working together in ways that challenge the United States and global governance. The CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department released a series of briefs that leverage data to analyze the nature and degree of CRINK alignment across the economic, diplomatic, and security domains. This page draws on the data collected inthose reports to highlight key insights, focusing on how China and Russia anchor CRINK cooperation and how Russia's war in Ukraine has accelerated alignment among the four countries.
1. CRINK at a Glance
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea share a mutual desire to challenge U.S. and Western influence. Collectively, they can bring to bear considerable power on the world stage. CRINK countries are home to over one-fifth of the global population, and they generate one-quarter of global GDP. Militarily, the four countries account for roughly one-fifth of the world's defense spending, and Russia, China, and North Korea collectively possess over half of all nuclear weapons.
2. CRINK Power Asymmetries
While CRINK countries share a common goal of undermining Western influence, they differ vastly in several respects, leading to notable asymmetries of power. China's economy is nearly 9 times larger than Russia's, 43 times bigger than Iran's and roughly 1,100 times the size of North Korea's economy. Their militaries differ greatly as well. China and Russia far outspend the others on defense, and Iran stands out as the only one of the four to lack nuclear weapons. Iran is also geographically separated from the others, which share borders in Northeast Asia.
3. Bilateral Trade Between CRINK Countries
Power asymmetries among CRINK countries are evident in their trade relations. At over $245 billion in 2024, trade between China and Russia overwhelmingly surpasses bilateral trade between all other CRINK pairs. The next biggest trade relationship is between China and Iran. According to official customs data, their trade stood at about $13 billion in 2024, but this excludes approximately $29 billion of sanctioned oil, which Iran exports to China through intermediary countries. Russia-North Korea bilateral trade has risen significantly amid heightened cooperation during the war in Ukraine, but detailed figures are unavailable since the two countries stopped reporting bilateral trade statistic in 2022.
4. Russian and Iranian Seaborne Oil Exports to China
Energy has become a key area of economic cooperation among CRINK countries, especially since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Following Western energy sanctions against Russia, China ramped up purchases of discounted oil from Russia, providing Moscow much-needed injections of funding for the war. In the first half of 2025, China imported an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) from Russia--an increase of 80 percent from the same six-month period in 2021. Chinese imports of Iranian oil grew by an even larger 400 percent over that same timeframe, offering Iran an economic lifeline amid biting Western sanctions.
5. Chinese Exports of "High Priority" Dual-Use Goods to Russia
China has also been crucial to sustaining Russia's war in Ukraine by providing dual-use goods that have both military and commercial applications. Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, China quickly ramped up exports to Russia of "high-priority items," a set of 50 key dual-use goods that are divided into four tiers based on the level of risk they pose. According to Chinese customs data, the bulk of China's exports to Russia were "tier 3" goods comprising electronic and mechanical components for weapons systems. However, China's exports of "tier 4" goods saw a much bigger jump. In particular, tier 4B goods--which include machine tools and components for precision manufacturing--rose over 3,000 percent compared to January 2021, aiding Russia in the production of materials to support the war effort.
6. Russian Net Arms Transfers to China, Iran, and North Korea
Transfers of military weapons have emerged as another key accelerating area of CRINK cooperation since the start of the war in Ukraine. Historically, Russia was a major supplier of arms to Iran, North Korea, and especially China, but this trend has completely reversed. As North Korea and Iran began shipping weaponry to Russia to sustain the war in Ukraine, Russia transformed from an arms supplier to other CRINK countries to being a net importer of weapons from them./1 North Korea has supplied Russia millions of artillery shells, ballistic missiles, and other systems, and Iran has provided Russia with ballistic missiles, armed drones, and other equipment.
7. Joint Military Exercises Among CRINK Countries
The strengthening of CRINK security ties since the Ukraine war is also evident in more frequent joint military exercises. According to data collected by the CSIS China Power Project, there have been 37 joint exercises involving at least two CRINK countries since 2022, an average of nearly 10 exercises per year. That is a major uptick from the preceding years: Between 2003 (when the first China-Russia exercise occurred) and 2021 (the year prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine), CRINK averaged just over three exercises per year. China-Russia bilateral exercises drive much of that growth, but there is emergent trilateral cooperation, including a 2024 exercise in which North Korea participated as an observer in a rare instance of China-Russia-North Korea trilateral activity.
8. Security Cooperation with Russia during the Ukraine War
Iran and North Korea have gone even further to support Russia's war in Ukraine. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a mutual defense treaty, after which North Korea deployed an estimated 14,000-15,000 troops and thousands of additional workers to support the war effort. Iran likewise signed a new treaty with Russia in January 2025 (without a binding defense obligation). Iran also sent drone trainers and technicians, but unlike North Korea, it has stopped short of deploying large numbers of troops. China has been more restrained, withholding lethal weapons and troops, but its unmatched dual-use exports and economic support have been crucial to Russia's war.
9. Senior Diplomatic Meetings Between CRINK Countries
Growing security and economic cooperation among CRINK countries has been supported by engagements between top leaders and their diplomats./2 Since Russia and North Korea signed their mutual defense pact in June 2024, their top officials have significantly increased the frequency of their meetings. However, it is China and Russia that meet with each other the most. Since January 2022, their political leaders and diplomats have met nearly 50 times, significantly more than the other CRINK pairs.
10. China-Russia Vote Alignment on the UN Security Council
Not all areas of cooperation have shown clear signs of strengthening in recent years. In the United Nations Security Council, where China and Russia are permanent members, the two powers frequently align their votes on key issues--especially to counter U.S. initiatives. Yet their vote alignment has slightly decreased since 2022, compared to the four years before the war./3 Meanwhile, the share of partially aligned votes (where one abstains while the other votes yes or no) has increased, and in November 2024, the two voted opposite of each other, making the first such instance in over two decades.
These data points show that CRINK countries are not unified actors and that there are significant differences in their capabilities and willingness to engage in different types of cooperation. Yet the data also shows a clear pattern of accelerated cooperation--especially since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine--demonstrating how these four countries can work together to challenge the United States and its allies and partners.
Footnotes
[1] While Russia is a net arms importer based on transfers with China, Iran, and North Korea, it is still a net arms exporter when including all its global exports.
[2] This data includes only bilateral meetings between top leaders (e.g., presidents, premiers, and vice premiers) and/or foreign ministers. Multiple meetings occurring during one visit count as one data entry. Figures exclude multilateral meetings and meetings between ministers of defense, finance, etc., unless those ministers met with top leaders or diplomats.
[3] Excludes UNSC resolutions that passed unanimously. Includes UNSC vetoed resolutions and passed resolutions that were not unanimously passed. Based on data through July 17, 2025.
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Brian Hart is deputy director and fellow of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
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Bonny Lin is director of the China Power Project and senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
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Maria Snegovaya is a senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a postdoctoral fellow in Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service.
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Mona Yacoubian is director and senior adviser of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/crink-10-charts
[Category: ThinkTank]