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Rand Issues Commentary to STAT: Teens Are Turning to Chatbots for Mental Health Help. We Need Rules to Keep Them Safe
SANTA MONICA, California, July 3 -- Rand issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 2, 2026, by senior policy researcher Ryan K. McBain to STAT. McBain is also an assistant professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School.
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Teens Are Turning to Chatbots for Mental Health Help. We Need Rules to Keep Them Safe
While parents, schools, and lawmakers are still debating the impact of social media on children's mental health, a new technology has taken the therapist's seat: AI chatbots.
In research that my colleagues and I published recently in JAMA Pediatrics, we found that the share ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, July 3 -- Rand issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 2, 2026, by senior policy researcher Ryan K. McBain to STAT. McBain is also an assistant professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School. * * * Teens Are Turning to Chatbots for Mental Health Help. We Need Rules to Keep Them Safe While parents, schools, and lawmakers are still debating the impact of social media on children's mental health, a new technology has taken the therapist's seat: AI chatbots. In research that my colleagues and I published recently in JAMA Pediatrics, we found that the shareof young people using AI chatbots for mental health advice rose from about 1 in 8 to about 1 in 5 in a single year--more than a 40% increase.
That finding should end any illusion that this is a speculative problem. For millions of adolescents, AI is already part of the mental health landscape....
The remainder of this commentary is available at statnews.com (https://www.statnews.com/2026/07/02/teens-chatbots-mental-health-rules-bans/).
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McBain is an assistant professor at Harvard Medical School and a senior policy researcher at RAND.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/07/teens-are-turning-to-chatbots-for-mental-health-help.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Teens Are Turning to Chatbots for Mental Health Help. We Need Rules to Keep Them Safe
While parents, schools, and lawmakers are still debating the impact of social media on children's mental health, a new technology has taken the therapist's seat: AI chatbots.
In research that my colleagues and I published recently in JAMA Pediatrics, we found that the share ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, July 3 -- Rand issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 2, 2026, by senior policy researcher Ryan K. McBain to STAT. McBain is also an assistant professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School. * * * Teens Are Turning to Chatbots for Mental Health Help. We Need Rules to Keep Them Safe While parents, schools, and lawmakers are still debating the impact of social media on children's mental health, a new technology has taken the therapist's seat: AI chatbots. In research that my colleagues and I published recently in JAMA Pediatrics, we found that the shareof young people using AI chatbots for mental health advice rose from about 1 in 8 to about 1 in 5 in a single year--more than a 40% increase.
That finding should end any illusion that this is a speculative problem. For millions of adolescents, AI is already part of the mental health landscape....
The remainder of this commentary is available at statnews.com (https://www.statnews.com/2026/07/02/teens-chatbots-mental-health-rules-bans/).
* * *
McBain is an assistant professor at Harvard Medical School and a senior policy researcher at RAND.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/07/teens-are-turning-to-chatbots-for-mental-health-help.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Washington Examiner: States Need an Agenda on Serious Mental Illness
NEW YORK, July 3 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 2, 2026, by fellow Carolyn D. Gorman to the Washington Examiner:
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States Need an Agenda on Serious Mental Illness
Last month, a new state-run psychiatric hospital opened in Dallas, one of the first built in several decades. The Texas Behavioral Health Center is part of a multi-year, multibillion-dollar investment by the state to rebuild and modernize its state hospital system. No other state has made a dedicated investment of this kind, despite a nationwide shortage of psych beds.
Texas's ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, July 3 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 2, 2026, by fellow Carolyn D. Gorman to the Washington Examiner: * * * States Need an Agenda on Serious Mental Illness Last month, a new state-run psychiatric hospital opened in Dallas, one of the first built in several decades. The Texas Behavioral Health Center is part of a multi-year, multibillion-dollar investment by the state to rebuild and modernize its state hospital system. No other state has made a dedicated investment of this kind, despite a nationwide shortage of psych beds. Texas'sinvestment represents a needed shift. While states have poured tens of billions of dollars into unaccountable generic mental health efforts, serious mental illness has remained chronically undertreated. States need a strategy for serious mental illness. Texas is providing a framework for that.
Serious mental illness, best represented by schizophrenia, is distinct from common anxiety, depression, and ordinary distress. It warrants special attention. Serious mental illness causes functional impairment and often involves psychotic symptoms.
Although it affects only about 5% of Americans, it accounts for a disproportionate share of the street homeless and incarcerated. Neglected by the mental health system, these hardest cases put other public systems under strain: social services, courts, and emergency departments.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the Washington Examiner (https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/community-family/4632537/states-need-agenda-on-serious-mental-illness)
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Carolyn D. Gorman is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/states-need-an-agenda-on-serious-mental-illness
[Category: ThinkTank]
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States Need an Agenda on Serious Mental Illness
Last month, a new state-run psychiatric hospital opened in Dallas, one of the first built in several decades. The Texas Behavioral Health Center is part of a multi-year, multibillion-dollar investment by the state to rebuild and modernize its state hospital system. No other state has made a dedicated investment of this kind, despite a nationwide shortage of psych beds.
Texas's ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, July 3 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 2, 2026, by fellow Carolyn D. Gorman to the Washington Examiner: * * * States Need an Agenda on Serious Mental Illness Last month, a new state-run psychiatric hospital opened in Dallas, one of the first built in several decades. The Texas Behavioral Health Center is part of a multi-year, multibillion-dollar investment by the state to rebuild and modernize its state hospital system. No other state has made a dedicated investment of this kind, despite a nationwide shortage of psych beds. Texas'sinvestment represents a needed shift. While states have poured tens of billions of dollars into unaccountable generic mental health efforts, serious mental illness has remained chronically undertreated. States need a strategy for serious mental illness. Texas is providing a framework for that.
Serious mental illness, best represented by schizophrenia, is distinct from common anxiety, depression, and ordinary distress. It warrants special attention. Serious mental illness causes functional impairment and often involves psychotic symptoms.
Although it affects only about 5% of Americans, it accounts for a disproportionate share of the street homeless and incarcerated. Neglected by the mental health system, these hardest cases put other public systems under strain: social services, courts, and emergency departments.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the Washington Examiner (https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/community-family/4632537/states-need-agenda-on-serious-mental-illness)
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Carolyn D. Gorman is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/states-need-an-agenda-on-serious-mental-illness
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Moldova's Moves to Limit Gagauz Autonomy Could Destabilize Southeastern Europe
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Moldova's Moves to Limit Gagauz Autonomy Could Destabilize Southeastern Europe
Executive Summary:
* Moldova is seeking to restrict further the autonomy of Gagauzia, its Christian Turkic region, ahead of a July 7 Constitutional Court ruling that would strip the region of its remaining self-governance rights under the 1994 accord, including control over its own elections.
* Chisinau ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Moldova's Moves to Limit Gagauz Autonomy Could Destabilize Southeastern Europe Executive Summary: * Moldova is seeking to restrict further the autonomy of Gagauzia, its Christian Turkic region, ahead of a July 7 Constitutional Court ruling that would strip the region of its remaining self-governance rights under the 1994 accord, including control over its own elections. * Chisinauframes this crackdown as necessary because Gagauz leaders have grown closer to Moscow. This move risks backfiring on Chisinau by slowing Moldova's European Union accession process, strengthening arguments for union with Romania, and hardening Gagauz demands for independence under the 1994 framework.
* Moldova's internal affairs appear likely to escalate into a wider crisis, potentially sparking tensions in eastern Europe and even leading to a military clash between Russia and Romania, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member state.
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A seemingly internal dispute over election procedures in Moldova has the potential to destabilize southeastern Europe. This development could complicate Western support for Ukraine amid Russia's war and contribute to a broader escalation of tensions between Moscow and the West. The dispute over the status of Gagauzia, officially the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, is unfolding as the Moldovan government seeks to further restrict the autonomy of the country's Christian Turkic region by requiring all electoral candidates to be vetted by the central government. While such vetting is already in place in other regions, this move would eliminate one of the last remaining powers granted to the Gagauz people under the 1994 agreement that ended a civil war and preserved Moldova's territorial integrity (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29). Chisinau argues that this step is necessary because Gagauz leaders have increasingly aligned themselves with Moscow rather than local interests, with Russia historically using Gagauzia and Transnistria as instruments to keep Moldova within its sphere of influence (see EDM, March 20, 21, September 7, 2024). The European Union has also reported that these recent developments are coming to a head, with Moldova's Constitutional Court expected to issue a ruling on July 7, which is likely to support the central government's position (Council of the European Union, June 15).
Chisinau's moves are already having consequences. Moldova's application to open European Union accession talks, already slowed by Hungary, may face further delays due to developments involving Gagauzia (Politico Europe, June 23). The European Union was among the most enthusiastic supporters of the 1994 accord between Chisinau and Gagauzia, later enshrined in Moldovan law and widely celebrated as a model for the peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet space. To the extent that Chisinau's actions effectively void that accord and raise the possibility that violence contained may now reappear, other European countries may be less enthusiastic about admitting Moldova, particularly given the European Union's emphasis on regional policies. That reaction, in turn, has already prompted some Moldovan officials to declare that they will pursue what they call "Plan B" by seeking EU membership through union with Romania (Euractiv, June 2). In that event, the Gagauz would likely seek independence.
Moldova's government has sufficient police powers to suppress Gagauz protests in the short term, absent outside intervention. Using these powers could further alienate EU member states and increase the likelihood of union with Romania, effectively integrating present-day Moldova into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework. That prospect would almost certainly prompt Moscow to act quickly to avoid facing another fait accompli to its west, potentially triggering a military conflict between Russian President Vladimir Putin's Russia and NATO and EU member country Romania. Some Russian commentators have already suggested the possibility of such a reaction (Rhythm of Eurasia, June 30). The course of events cannot be predicted with certainty, but there is little doubt that such a scenario would deepen divisions within the West and further intensify the crisis in relations between Moscow and the West that has unfolded since Putin invaded Ukraine. If Putin seeks to attack a NATO member state, the deteriorating relationship between Chisinau and the Gagauz could make Moldova a flashpoint, even though Russia does not share a common border with the country.
The possibility that these developments could unfold in the near future is suggested by comments made during a June 29 session of the People's Assembly of Gagauzia. Although the Assembly's term in office ended last year amid disputes over the election, its members have continued to meet independently. Participants suggested that Chisinau's recent actions regarding Gagauzia's autonomous status constitute the complete cancellation of the terms of the 1994 agreement that the Moldovan government passed into law. The agreement gave the Gagauz many rights, including control over their own elections and the right to declare independence should Moldova ever decide to unite with Romania (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29). With few exceptions, that arrangement remained in place until 2020, when current Moldovan President Maia Sandu, committed to breaking with Moscow and siding with the West, came to power and began rolling back the provisions of the 1994 accord. In the view of many Gagauz, Sandu has already eliminated most of the rights guaranteed under that agreement, except control over their own elections, and there are now concerns that even this remaining power may be taken away.
The day before the assembly meeting, Moldova's president infuriated people of the region by declaring that the Gagauz "do not have genuine autonomy" because decisions are not being made independently but rather "by someone in Moscow." Sandu further stated that the current arrangement was invented in the Kremlin and that it must stop. Until the Gagauz "listen less to Moscow," she said, "elections [in Gagauzia] will continue to be postponed" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29).
Participants at the Gagauz meeting responded by asserting that they are a distinct people and that all provisions of the 1994 accord must be upheld, including the right to autonomy in governing its own elections. They also warned that continued pressure from Chisinau would have serious consequences for Moldova's future. According to Valery Yanioglo, former deputy chairman of the Gagauz Executive Committee and a participant at the meeting, "the central authorities must understand that the greater the pressure they put on the autonomous region, the stronger will be the desire of our people to resolve issues independently" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29). Such language suggests that an increasing number of Gagauz are considering independence not only as a right, recognized by the Moldovan government, but also as a possible option sooner if the central authorities continue their current drive to assert full control over the autonomy.
There is still time for compromise. The Moldovan Supreme Court could issue a decision granting the Gagauz some of their demands, Chisinau could offer concessions, and European actors could display greater understanding of the security pressures Chisinau faces from Russia. This would help avert a situation in which Russian actions involving Gagauzia derail the opening of EU accession talks. The clock is ticking, and the window for compromise is narrowing compared to the past (see EDM, February 29, 2024). This is particularly the case as the stakes remain high and Putin stands ready to exploit the situation (Rhythm of Eurasia, June 30).
* * *
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/moldovas-moves-to-limit-gagauz-autonomy-could-destabilize-southeastern-europe/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Moldova's Moves to Limit Gagauz Autonomy Could Destabilize Southeastern Europe
Executive Summary:
* Moldova is seeking to restrict further the autonomy of Gagauzia, its Christian Turkic region, ahead of a July 7 Constitutional Court ruling that would strip the region of its remaining self-governance rights under the 1994 accord, including control over its own elections.
* Chisinau ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Moldova's Moves to Limit Gagauz Autonomy Could Destabilize Southeastern Europe Executive Summary: * Moldova is seeking to restrict further the autonomy of Gagauzia, its Christian Turkic region, ahead of a July 7 Constitutional Court ruling that would strip the region of its remaining self-governance rights under the 1994 accord, including control over its own elections. * Chisinauframes this crackdown as necessary because Gagauz leaders have grown closer to Moscow. This move risks backfiring on Chisinau by slowing Moldova's European Union accession process, strengthening arguments for union with Romania, and hardening Gagauz demands for independence under the 1994 framework.
* Moldova's internal affairs appear likely to escalate into a wider crisis, potentially sparking tensions in eastern Europe and even leading to a military clash between Russia and Romania, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member state.
-
A seemingly internal dispute over election procedures in Moldova has the potential to destabilize southeastern Europe. This development could complicate Western support for Ukraine amid Russia's war and contribute to a broader escalation of tensions between Moscow and the West. The dispute over the status of Gagauzia, officially the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, is unfolding as the Moldovan government seeks to further restrict the autonomy of the country's Christian Turkic region by requiring all electoral candidates to be vetted by the central government. While such vetting is already in place in other regions, this move would eliminate one of the last remaining powers granted to the Gagauz people under the 1994 agreement that ended a civil war and preserved Moldova's territorial integrity (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29). Chisinau argues that this step is necessary because Gagauz leaders have increasingly aligned themselves with Moscow rather than local interests, with Russia historically using Gagauzia and Transnistria as instruments to keep Moldova within its sphere of influence (see EDM, March 20, 21, September 7, 2024). The European Union has also reported that these recent developments are coming to a head, with Moldova's Constitutional Court expected to issue a ruling on July 7, which is likely to support the central government's position (Council of the European Union, June 15).
Chisinau's moves are already having consequences. Moldova's application to open European Union accession talks, already slowed by Hungary, may face further delays due to developments involving Gagauzia (Politico Europe, June 23). The European Union was among the most enthusiastic supporters of the 1994 accord between Chisinau and Gagauzia, later enshrined in Moldovan law and widely celebrated as a model for the peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet space. To the extent that Chisinau's actions effectively void that accord and raise the possibility that violence contained may now reappear, other European countries may be less enthusiastic about admitting Moldova, particularly given the European Union's emphasis on regional policies. That reaction, in turn, has already prompted some Moldovan officials to declare that they will pursue what they call "Plan B" by seeking EU membership through union with Romania (Euractiv, June 2). In that event, the Gagauz would likely seek independence.
Moldova's government has sufficient police powers to suppress Gagauz protests in the short term, absent outside intervention. Using these powers could further alienate EU member states and increase the likelihood of union with Romania, effectively integrating present-day Moldova into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework. That prospect would almost certainly prompt Moscow to act quickly to avoid facing another fait accompli to its west, potentially triggering a military conflict between Russian President Vladimir Putin's Russia and NATO and EU member country Romania. Some Russian commentators have already suggested the possibility of such a reaction (Rhythm of Eurasia, June 30). The course of events cannot be predicted with certainty, but there is little doubt that such a scenario would deepen divisions within the West and further intensify the crisis in relations between Moscow and the West that has unfolded since Putin invaded Ukraine. If Putin seeks to attack a NATO member state, the deteriorating relationship between Chisinau and the Gagauz could make Moldova a flashpoint, even though Russia does not share a common border with the country.
The possibility that these developments could unfold in the near future is suggested by comments made during a June 29 session of the People's Assembly of Gagauzia. Although the Assembly's term in office ended last year amid disputes over the election, its members have continued to meet independently. Participants suggested that Chisinau's recent actions regarding Gagauzia's autonomous status constitute the complete cancellation of the terms of the 1994 agreement that the Moldovan government passed into law. The agreement gave the Gagauz many rights, including control over their own elections and the right to declare independence should Moldova ever decide to unite with Romania (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29). With few exceptions, that arrangement remained in place until 2020, when current Moldovan President Maia Sandu, committed to breaking with Moscow and siding with the West, came to power and began rolling back the provisions of the 1994 accord. In the view of many Gagauz, Sandu has already eliminated most of the rights guaranteed under that agreement, except control over their own elections, and there are now concerns that even this remaining power may be taken away.
The day before the assembly meeting, Moldova's president infuriated people of the region by declaring that the Gagauz "do not have genuine autonomy" because decisions are not being made independently but rather "by someone in Moscow." Sandu further stated that the current arrangement was invented in the Kremlin and that it must stop. Until the Gagauz "listen less to Moscow," she said, "elections [in Gagauzia] will continue to be postponed" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29).
Participants at the Gagauz meeting responded by asserting that they are a distinct people and that all provisions of the 1994 accord must be upheld, including the right to autonomy in governing its own elections. They also warned that continued pressure from Chisinau would have serious consequences for Moldova's future. According to Valery Yanioglo, former deputy chairman of the Gagauz Executive Committee and a participant at the meeting, "the central authorities must understand that the greater the pressure they put on the autonomous region, the stronger will be the desire of our people to resolve issues independently" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 29). Such language suggests that an increasing number of Gagauz are considering independence not only as a right, recognized by the Moldovan government, but also as a possible option sooner if the central authorities continue their current drive to assert full control over the autonomy.
There is still time for compromise. The Moldovan Supreme Court could issue a decision granting the Gagauz some of their demands, Chisinau could offer concessions, and European actors could display greater understanding of the security pressures Chisinau faces from Russia. This would help avert a situation in which Russian actions involving Gagauzia derail the opening of EU accession talks. The clock is ticking, and the window for compromise is narrowing compared to the past (see EDM, February 29, 2024). This is particularly the case as the stakes remain high and Putin stands ready to exploit the situation (Rhythm of Eurasia, June 30).
* * *
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/moldovas-moves-to-limit-gagauz-autonomy-could-destabilize-southeastern-europe/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to National Review: An Opening for Trump to Secure Peace in Ukraine
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Keystone Defense Initiative Director Rebeccah L. Heinrichs to the National Review:
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An Opening for Trump to Secure Peace in Ukraine
Yes, Putin should make a deal.
-
President Trump often touts the number of wars he's ended, and notes that ending Russia's war against Ukraine has been harder than he thought. The root of the problem is that Vladimir Putin is ideologically committed to his hostility against ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 3 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Keystone Defense Initiative Director Rebeccah L. Heinrichs to the National Review: * * * An Opening for Trump to Secure Peace in Ukraine Yes, Putin should make a deal. - President Trump often touts the number of wars he's ended, and notes that ending Russia's war against Ukraine has been harder than he thought. The root of the problem is that Vladimir Putin is ideologically committed to his hostility againstthe United States and the West. This is why Trump's strategy hasn't worked. He has sought to appear impartial and demand that both sides compromise, focusing on territory in the Donbas, as if the war is a violent real estate dispute between feuding personalities.
But Ukraine (and Volodymyr Zelensky) is neither at fault for the cause nor for the continuation of the war, and if he surrendered the territory Russia demands, the war would continue and end in Ukraine's total defeat. Only Putin can end the war by, at the very least, accepting a cease-fire. Ukraine and NATO could then focus on rebuilding their stocks and defense industrial capacity to deter further Russian aggression, especially as the U.S. urges Europe to help carry more of the burden of defense.
Trump has shown a willingness to adapt when his plans don't work, and now is the time to shift the strategy. The only way for Trump to help end the war is by applying pain and pressure to Russia and encouraging Ukraine and the rest of NATO to do the same. For a while, Trump seemed convinced that Ukraine couldn't hold back Russia. But flouting the Russian argument that Moscow will inevitably succeed, Trump noted in September of last year that he thought Ukraine may be able to retake territory Russia occupies, that the Russian economy was faltering, and that Putin should make a deal. Since the president observed this, developments have presented an opportunity for a new diplomatic push.
First, Ukraine is winning. In recent weeks, the nation struck more than 1,500 miles deep into Russian territory with attacks on oil refineries in Siberia and Moscow. Ukraine has also successfully targeted Crimean bridges and energy infrastructure, which fund the war. Last month, the Ukrainian military liberated more Ukrainian territory than Russia seized. U.S. officials affirm this new battlefield reality; Ambassador Dan Negrea, representing the United States to the U.N., stated recently, "Russia is taking 40,000 casualties per month" and "time is not on Moscow's side." Ukraine's bold and daring attacks against Moscow's legitimate military targets, while avoiding Russian civilians, bring the war much closer to the homes of Russians who may blame Putin for the fear and chaos. Ukraine's recent attack in Moscow came with a foreboding promise from President Zelensky. "If Ukraine is going to burn, your Moscow will burn too," he said, adding that the attack was meant to push Russia to stop. "It is time to end the aggression, time to end this war." The United States should encourage, not restrict, Ukraine's bolder operations and should exhort NATO nations to continue supplying Ukraine with weapons, including by purchasing key systems from American companies.
Second, Ukraine has proven itself a net contributor to the strength and security of the U.S.-led West. Ukraine has received air defenses, guided bombs, medium- and long-range strike missiles, and other weapons. Ukrainians have adapted the way they use them, have improved the missiles' technology, and have made Ukraine a coveted location for Western arms producers to test their weapons and tactics against a sophisticated adversary. Ukraine's success in the current phase of the war, which primarily uses drones, has made it a world leader in unmanned warfare. Ukrainians created the Sting drone, which can intercept Russian suicide drones at a fraction of the cost of traditional interceptors. The country's advanced indigenous drone capabilities led the U.S. State and War Departments to form a framework for a joint drone production deal. The United States should look for more ways to take advantage of this alliance, Ukraine's drone warfare ecosystem, and its battlefield experience.
Third, the Russian economy is veering toward crisis. Russia's budget deficit skyrocketed in the first four months of 2026, going well beyond the desired annual target of 3.79 trillion rubles to 5.87 trillion rubles (approximately $81 billion). Russia is facing a wave of corporate defaults and increased risk for consumer lending and bonds, along with a 5.52 percent inflation rate. The Russian public is feeling the biting pain of a war that until recently has been kept mostly out of sight. Russian households are suffering from 18 percent higher food prices, sky-high utility bills, and gasoline shortages. The United States has allowed its sanctions waiver on Russian oil to expire, and it should go further and embrace Congress's effort to pass secondary crushing sanctions against Russia, while cracking down harder against Russia's shadow fleet.
Ukraine has agreed to every cease-fire Trump has announced. Ukraine will compromise enough if it agrees to a cease-fire along the current lines of contact, as long as the temporarily occupied Russian territories are never recognized as de jure Russian. Russia has thus far refused to alter its original objectives and still seeks the total subjugation of Kyiv, though its aggression has inspired Sweden and Finland to join NATO and has made Ukraine an even stronger, more robust military power with increased national cohesion and proud identity.
As Secretary of State Marco Rubio asserted earlier this month, "All of our sanctions are on Russia and all the aid that we've provided has been on the Ukrainian side. . . . We are not an impartial mediator here. We clearly are supporting one side over another." The U.S. strategy should more overtly reflect that reality if it is to be effective. The United States should lead our allies to increase the pain against Russia now and sharply to make it clear: things will only get worse for Russia, and Putin should take the deal.
Read in the National Review (https://www.nationalreview.com/2026/07/an-opening-for-trump-to-secure-peace-in-ukraine/).
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At A Glance:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs is a senior fellow and director of the Keystone Defense Initiative. She specializes in US national defense policy with a focus on strategic deterrence.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/opening-trump-secure-peace-ukraine-rebeccah-heinrichs
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
An Opening for Trump to Secure Peace in Ukraine
Yes, Putin should make a deal.
-
President Trump often touts the number of wars he's ended, and notes that ending Russia's war against Ukraine has been harder than he thought. The root of the problem is that Vladimir Putin is ideologically committed to his hostility against ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 3 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Keystone Defense Initiative Director Rebeccah L. Heinrichs to the National Review: * * * An Opening for Trump to Secure Peace in Ukraine Yes, Putin should make a deal. - President Trump often touts the number of wars he's ended, and notes that ending Russia's war against Ukraine has been harder than he thought. The root of the problem is that Vladimir Putin is ideologically committed to his hostility againstthe United States and the West. This is why Trump's strategy hasn't worked. He has sought to appear impartial and demand that both sides compromise, focusing on territory in the Donbas, as if the war is a violent real estate dispute between feuding personalities.
But Ukraine (and Volodymyr Zelensky) is neither at fault for the cause nor for the continuation of the war, and if he surrendered the territory Russia demands, the war would continue and end in Ukraine's total defeat. Only Putin can end the war by, at the very least, accepting a cease-fire. Ukraine and NATO could then focus on rebuilding their stocks and defense industrial capacity to deter further Russian aggression, especially as the U.S. urges Europe to help carry more of the burden of defense.
Trump has shown a willingness to adapt when his plans don't work, and now is the time to shift the strategy. The only way for Trump to help end the war is by applying pain and pressure to Russia and encouraging Ukraine and the rest of NATO to do the same. For a while, Trump seemed convinced that Ukraine couldn't hold back Russia. But flouting the Russian argument that Moscow will inevitably succeed, Trump noted in September of last year that he thought Ukraine may be able to retake territory Russia occupies, that the Russian economy was faltering, and that Putin should make a deal. Since the president observed this, developments have presented an opportunity for a new diplomatic push.
First, Ukraine is winning. In recent weeks, the nation struck more than 1,500 miles deep into Russian territory with attacks on oil refineries in Siberia and Moscow. Ukraine has also successfully targeted Crimean bridges and energy infrastructure, which fund the war. Last month, the Ukrainian military liberated more Ukrainian territory than Russia seized. U.S. officials affirm this new battlefield reality; Ambassador Dan Negrea, representing the United States to the U.N., stated recently, "Russia is taking 40,000 casualties per month" and "time is not on Moscow's side." Ukraine's bold and daring attacks against Moscow's legitimate military targets, while avoiding Russian civilians, bring the war much closer to the homes of Russians who may blame Putin for the fear and chaos. Ukraine's recent attack in Moscow came with a foreboding promise from President Zelensky. "If Ukraine is going to burn, your Moscow will burn too," he said, adding that the attack was meant to push Russia to stop. "It is time to end the aggression, time to end this war." The United States should encourage, not restrict, Ukraine's bolder operations and should exhort NATO nations to continue supplying Ukraine with weapons, including by purchasing key systems from American companies.
Second, Ukraine has proven itself a net contributor to the strength and security of the U.S.-led West. Ukraine has received air defenses, guided bombs, medium- and long-range strike missiles, and other weapons. Ukrainians have adapted the way they use them, have improved the missiles' technology, and have made Ukraine a coveted location for Western arms producers to test their weapons and tactics against a sophisticated adversary. Ukraine's success in the current phase of the war, which primarily uses drones, has made it a world leader in unmanned warfare. Ukrainians created the Sting drone, which can intercept Russian suicide drones at a fraction of the cost of traditional interceptors. The country's advanced indigenous drone capabilities led the U.S. State and War Departments to form a framework for a joint drone production deal. The United States should look for more ways to take advantage of this alliance, Ukraine's drone warfare ecosystem, and its battlefield experience.
Third, the Russian economy is veering toward crisis. Russia's budget deficit skyrocketed in the first four months of 2026, going well beyond the desired annual target of 3.79 trillion rubles to 5.87 trillion rubles (approximately $81 billion). Russia is facing a wave of corporate defaults and increased risk for consumer lending and bonds, along with a 5.52 percent inflation rate. The Russian public is feeling the biting pain of a war that until recently has been kept mostly out of sight. Russian households are suffering from 18 percent higher food prices, sky-high utility bills, and gasoline shortages. The United States has allowed its sanctions waiver on Russian oil to expire, and it should go further and embrace Congress's effort to pass secondary crushing sanctions against Russia, while cracking down harder against Russia's shadow fleet.
Ukraine has agreed to every cease-fire Trump has announced. Ukraine will compromise enough if it agrees to a cease-fire along the current lines of contact, as long as the temporarily occupied Russian territories are never recognized as de jure Russian. Russia has thus far refused to alter its original objectives and still seeks the total subjugation of Kyiv, though its aggression has inspired Sweden and Finland to join NATO and has made Ukraine an even stronger, more robust military power with increased national cohesion and proud identity.
As Secretary of State Marco Rubio asserted earlier this month, "All of our sanctions are on Russia and all the aid that we've provided has been on the Ukrainian side. . . . We are not an impartial mediator here. We clearly are supporting one side over another." The U.S. strategy should more overtly reflect that reality if it is to be effective. The United States should lead our allies to increase the pain against Russia now and sharply to make it clear: things will only get worse for Russia, and Putin should take the deal.
Read in the National Review (https://www.nationalreview.com/2026/07/an-opening-for-trump-to-secure-peace-in-ukraine/).
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At A Glance:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs is a senior fellow and director of the Keystone Defense Initiative. She specializes in US national defense policy with a focus on strategic deterrence.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/opening-trump-secure-peace-ukraine-rebeccah-heinrichs
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS: U.S. Has Opted Not to Extend the USMCA
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following statements on July 2, 2026:
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The United States Has Opted Not to Extend the USMCA
The United States has opted not to renew the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) for another 16 years, triggering instead the annual review process that runs to 2036. But the decision settles little. Bilateral negotiations are set to continue without a clear timeline, tariff threats remain on the table, and businesses across North America face an extended stretch of uncertainty over the future of the region's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following statements on July 2, 2026: * * * The United States Has Opted Not to Extend the USMCA The United States has opted not to renew the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) for another 16 years, triggering instead the annual review process that runs to 2036. But the decision settles little. Bilateral negotiations are set to continue without a clear timeline, tariff threats remain on the table, and businesses across North America face an extended stretch of uncertainty over the future of the region'smost important trade pact. What comes next depends less on the July 1 announcement than on the agenda, sequencing, and political will that follow it. In this Experts React, CSIS scholars analyze the road ahead.
The USMCA's World Cup Summer: No Breakup, Just Extra Time
- Diego Marroquin Bitar, Fellow, Americas Program
The United States has opted not to pursue a clean, 16-year renewal of the USMCA. That doesn't mean the pact ends. Without an extension, the USMCA simply continues on its current terms until it expires on July 1, 2036. Still, the three countries have room to extend the agreement and preserve the trade pact that has helped U.S. businesses thrive, Mexican autoworkers earn higher wages, and Canadian farmers grow export markets. That window won't stay open on its own. The parties are heading into a longer, more protracted negotiation. The more it drags on, the more uncertainty compounds across supply chains, growth prospects, and the jobs and investment this integration supports. None of that will be easy to win back once it's gone. Firms will simply keep delaying expansion, hedging their bets, and steering investment elsewhere, and the damage will show up less as sudden decline than as absence: plants that don't get built, jobs that don't get created, supply chains that quietly settle somewhere else while everyone waits to see how this ends.
That waiting game is set to run through the summer, on two fronts. On the pitch, all three North American countries remain in contention in the World Cup, chasing a shot at the final. In trade policy, expect the same kind of drama: more tariff threats and more brinkmanship before the issue is resolved. The USMCA has a final whistle, too: July 1, 2036. The whole point of this review is making sure the game never goes that long. Every team left in this tournament knows exactly how many games stand between them and the final. Nobody in this negotiation can say the same about how many rounds stand between here and a renewed USMCA. That number, not another tariff threat, is what would actually move capital off the sidelines.
The USMCA Review: Welcome to the Hotel California
- Kellie Meiman Hock, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
Investors yearning for stability understood long ago that the July 1 USMCA "joint review" would offer little comfort, with a 16-year extension unimaginable. Under the USMCA, this means "the Commission shall meet to conduct a joint review every year" until 2036.
Yet, orderly annual trilateral meetings feel equally unimaginable--although it is positive that the parties met trilaterally on July 1. Instead, a "Hotel California"-style, ongoing review is likely. To quote the Eagles, "you can checkout anytime you like, but you can never leave."
Checking out (withdrawal from the agreement) will continue to be threatened, despite the USMCA representing roughly $2 trillion in trilateral trade, up nearly $400 billion since the agreement went into force in 2020, and one-third of all imported U.S. manufacturing inputs originating in Canada and Mexico. The Chamber of Commerce estimates that North American trade supports 13 million American jobs, and Canada and Mexico are the United States' top two agricultural export markets, by far.
So, despite expected continued "checkout" threats, the devastating economic impact of withdrawal makes it unlikely, which explains why the USMCA enjoys unique carveouts from the administration's tariffs.
All of this means that North America "can never leave" the Hotel California that is this review. Deliberations--still bilaterally conducted--will not conclude quickly. Trade issues that never fully resolve (including lumber, dairy, cultural industries, digital trade, energy, labor, and seasonal produce) are challenging enough, and then there's U.S. efforts to further tighten auto rules of origin, already the most stringent in the world.
Core to the review, however, is addressing Chinese involvement in North America. U.S. imports from China have decreased significantly in recent years, but the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico has doubled since the USMCA came into force. Ensuring China does not deploy the USMCA as a backdoor for its overcapacity is a shared concern, lending heft to talks about unified tariff treatment, inbound investment and transshipment screenings, export controls, and sanctions. Evaluating origin of capital within rules of origin, with possible "de maximus" levels for Chinese content, is another concept reportedly under consideration. All are ideas worth discussing, but none will be easy given the global economy's overreliance on Chinese intermediate goods.
Meanwhile, Canada and Mexico are left questioning the value of the USMCA if Section 232 and 301 tariffs undercut market access. Recalling the late-stage deal on Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs in the NAFTA renegotiation, can another Hail Mary pass be expected late in the fourth quarter? Or will Canada and Mexico remain frustrated in their attempts to gain relief?
These dynamics do not point to a tidy resolution of the review, reinforcing transparent rules that have made the USMCA the vehicle of North American competitiveness. Meanwhile, companies delay major investment decisions and muddle onward. Hopefully the Hotel California has good room service, because unfortunately we are going to be here for a while.
The USMCA's Biggest Barrier Is Political, Not Economic
- Eric Miller, President, Rideau Potomac Strategy Group
To read the text, the review of the USMCA on July 1, 2026, should have been rather clinical. After assessing its operation and considering amendments, the United States, Canada, and Mexico had to say if they are ready to extend the deal for another 16 years. As the United States was not in agreement, the three countries now must revisit the "extension" question every year for the next decade.
This assumes that the USMCA survives. President Trump has made repeated statements expressing both indifference and hostility toward the agreement that he negotiated. In addition, the United States has initiated bilateral negotiations with Mexico and presumably at some future date will do the same with Canada. It is unclear how these agreements would relate to the existing USMCA framework.
Regardless of the ultimate architecture, politics will play a key role in any USMCA renewal. While U.S.-Mexico relations are always complicated, U.S.-Canada relations are at their lowest point in modern history. This constrains the political space available to leaders to make deals.
When the United States imposed tariffs on all its trading partners from February to April 2025, only Canada and China imposed counter-tariffs on U.S. goods. Washington took note. Canada has maintained a steadfast anti-tariff position, dairy notwithstanding. Moreover, threats in some quarters to use Canada's sizeable oil and electricity exports to the United States as leverage have been viewed as especially concerning. Senior U.S. officials have grown steadily more frustrated with Canada.
Canada sees things differently. U.S. tariffs are viewed as a threat to Canadian prosperity and a betrayal of the long-established partnership between the two nations. In addition, President Trump's repeated threats to annex Canada and make it the "51st state" have been seen by Canadians not only as deeply offensive, but as an existential challenge to their nation's survival. Former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper, historically a friend of the United States, stated in February 2026 that Canada must make "any sacrifice necessary" to urgently reduce its dependence on the United States.
Canada's national mood as it celebrated its 159th birthday on July 1 was proud and defiant. While this is a powerful combination, major USMCA compromises may be viewed with deep skepticism. On June 25, 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney had to remind the public that Canada must be ready to strike a USMCA deal if the right opportunity arises.
What may eventually save the USMCA is its eternal value proposition. Roughly one-quarter to one-third of the value of U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico is U.S. content. No other region of the world comes close. By contrast, U.S. content levels are in the single digits in its imports from Asia and Europe. The intensity of the intraregional trade linkages drove President Trump to exempt many USMCA originating goods in March 2025. It may eventually be the lynchpin to a full USMCA renewal--just not in July 2026.
USMCA Nonrenewal Is Not the End of North American Integration
- Juan Carlos Baker, Researcher, Foreign Trade and Investment Research Laboratory, Pan American University, and former Mexican Deputy Trade Minister
While some headlines portray this decision as a dramatic turning point for North American trade, the announcement itself should come as little surprise. President Trump spent months signaling his dissatisfaction with the agreement, and markets, businesses, and policymakers have had ample time to prepare for this outcome. Moreover, maintaining leverage rather than providing certainty has long been a defining feature of President Trump's negotiating style, and the USMCA review appears unlikely to be an exception.
Beyond the announcement itself, what is more important is what comes immediately afterward. Framing the nonrenewal as the beginning of a negotiation process, accompanied by a roadmap for further negotiations, with scheduled meetings, clearly identified issues, and a timeline for future deliverables, may actually reassure stakeholders, easing the uncertainty and tension that the nonrenewal may bring. Conversely, if the White House simply declares that the agreement will not be renewed and offers no path forward, uncertainty across North America will increase significantly.
Indeed, much of the current commentary assumes that the nonrenewal represents a major setback for Mexico and Canada; however, although prolonged uncertainty undoubtedly carries costs for both countries, those costs are by no means borne by them alone. The integrated nature of North American supply chains means that U.S. manufacturers, investors, and consumers also depend heavily on a predictable institutional framework. Automotive companies, agricultural exporters, machinery producers, and countless suppliers have structured investment decisions around the assumption of continued regional integration. Extending uncertainty indefinitely imposes costs on all three partners, including the United States itself--even if President Trump claims that the United States does not need anything from Mexico or Canada.
This is why domestic pressure on the White House as a result of President Trump's decision should not be disregarded. If uncertainty begins to delay investment decisions or disrupt supply chains, U.S. businesses are likely to become an increasingly influential constituency in favor of a negotiated outcome, especially in an election year.
Finally, the process ahead is likely to become more political, more contentious, and more closely linked to broader issues such as industrial policy, economic security, and relations with China, but after all, has that not been evident already for some time?
The nonrenewal, then, should not be mistaken for the collapse of North American economic integration. Instead, it marks the formal beginning of a new bargaining phase in which leverage, rather than certainty, will remain Washington's preferred negotiating instrument.
The real story begins after July 1. The announcement itself was largely expected. What will truly matter is the agenda the United States places on the table, and whether it leaves enough room for meaningful negotiations to continue.
The USMCA Question Nobody's Asking: Does Congress Even Get a Vote?
- William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business
The July 1 decision of the three countries party to the USMCA to not renew the agreement and instead trigger the 10-year annual review process opens the door to a potentially extended period of negotiation. It appears that talks will continue without interruption, which creates the possibilities of either an early conclusion--in time for Trump to declare victory before the midterm election--or extended talks, timing that could lead the United States to increase its demands once the election is over.
Either way, business will have to grapple with the continuing uncertainty of both the negotiations and the aftermath, where the issue is whether the resulting agreement must be submitted to Congress for approval. The initial USMCA agreement was submitted to Congress and approved pursuant to then-existing Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which expired in 2021. TPA, an updated version of procedures initially enacted in the Trade Act of 1974, created a trade-off for the president. If he followed the procedural consultation requirements and time limits, Congress would consider the agreement without delay, amendment, or filibuster, a significant advantage. However, recent administrations have taken the position that agreements only need congressional approval if they require changes in U.S. law. On that basis, a number of agreements, including Trump's with Japan and Biden's with Taiwan, were not sent to Congress. In the latter case, Congress rebelled and passed legislation--which Biden signed--retroactively approving the first half of the Taiwan agreement and requiring the second half to be submitted for approval. The congressional position has generally been that all agreements should be submitted for approval; just as the president's has been that as few as possible should be submitted.
It is too soon to say whether a revised USMCA would have to be sent to Congress, but some of the issues likely on the table, such as changes in U.S. trade law to accommodate regional or sectoral U.S. interests or changes in tariffs, would point in that direction. The complication this time is that there is no TPA to structure the congressional process, which means the agreement, if submitted, will be subject to normal legislative procedures, including possible delay and amendment. That creates two challenges for the administration. The first will be to try to avoid that possibility by negotiating an agreement that does not require approval and then dealing with congressional insistence that it be submitted anyway. The second will be the additional uncertainty created in Congress if it is submitted without any procedural limitations. In 2021, many in the business community urged the Biden administration to seek renewal of TPA even if there were no plans to use it. That did not happen, and the Trump administration may now have to deal with the consequences.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-has-opted-not-extend-usmca
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
The United States Has Opted Not to Extend the USMCA
The United States has opted not to renew the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) for another 16 years, triggering instead the annual review process that runs to 2036. But the decision settles little. Bilateral negotiations are set to continue without a clear timeline, tariff threats remain on the table, and businesses across North America face an extended stretch of uncertainty over the future of the region's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following statements on July 2, 2026: * * * The United States Has Opted Not to Extend the USMCA The United States has opted not to renew the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) for another 16 years, triggering instead the annual review process that runs to 2036. But the decision settles little. Bilateral negotiations are set to continue without a clear timeline, tariff threats remain on the table, and businesses across North America face an extended stretch of uncertainty over the future of the region'smost important trade pact. What comes next depends less on the July 1 announcement than on the agenda, sequencing, and political will that follow it. In this Experts React, CSIS scholars analyze the road ahead.
The USMCA's World Cup Summer: No Breakup, Just Extra Time
- Diego Marroquin Bitar, Fellow, Americas Program
The United States has opted not to pursue a clean, 16-year renewal of the USMCA. That doesn't mean the pact ends. Without an extension, the USMCA simply continues on its current terms until it expires on July 1, 2036. Still, the three countries have room to extend the agreement and preserve the trade pact that has helped U.S. businesses thrive, Mexican autoworkers earn higher wages, and Canadian farmers grow export markets. That window won't stay open on its own. The parties are heading into a longer, more protracted negotiation. The more it drags on, the more uncertainty compounds across supply chains, growth prospects, and the jobs and investment this integration supports. None of that will be easy to win back once it's gone. Firms will simply keep delaying expansion, hedging their bets, and steering investment elsewhere, and the damage will show up less as sudden decline than as absence: plants that don't get built, jobs that don't get created, supply chains that quietly settle somewhere else while everyone waits to see how this ends.
That waiting game is set to run through the summer, on two fronts. On the pitch, all three North American countries remain in contention in the World Cup, chasing a shot at the final. In trade policy, expect the same kind of drama: more tariff threats and more brinkmanship before the issue is resolved. The USMCA has a final whistle, too: July 1, 2036. The whole point of this review is making sure the game never goes that long. Every team left in this tournament knows exactly how many games stand between them and the final. Nobody in this negotiation can say the same about how many rounds stand between here and a renewed USMCA. That number, not another tariff threat, is what would actually move capital off the sidelines.
The USMCA Review: Welcome to the Hotel California
- Kellie Meiman Hock, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
Investors yearning for stability understood long ago that the July 1 USMCA "joint review" would offer little comfort, with a 16-year extension unimaginable. Under the USMCA, this means "the Commission shall meet to conduct a joint review every year" until 2036.
Yet, orderly annual trilateral meetings feel equally unimaginable--although it is positive that the parties met trilaterally on July 1. Instead, a "Hotel California"-style, ongoing review is likely. To quote the Eagles, "you can checkout anytime you like, but you can never leave."
Checking out (withdrawal from the agreement) will continue to be threatened, despite the USMCA representing roughly $2 trillion in trilateral trade, up nearly $400 billion since the agreement went into force in 2020, and one-third of all imported U.S. manufacturing inputs originating in Canada and Mexico. The Chamber of Commerce estimates that North American trade supports 13 million American jobs, and Canada and Mexico are the United States' top two agricultural export markets, by far.
So, despite expected continued "checkout" threats, the devastating economic impact of withdrawal makes it unlikely, which explains why the USMCA enjoys unique carveouts from the administration's tariffs.
All of this means that North America "can never leave" the Hotel California that is this review. Deliberations--still bilaterally conducted--will not conclude quickly. Trade issues that never fully resolve (including lumber, dairy, cultural industries, digital trade, energy, labor, and seasonal produce) are challenging enough, and then there's U.S. efforts to further tighten auto rules of origin, already the most stringent in the world.
Core to the review, however, is addressing Chinese involvement in North America. U.S. imports from China have decreased significantly in recent years, but the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico has doubled since the USMCA came into force. Ensuring China does not deploy the USMCA as a backdoor for its overcapacity is a shared concern, lending heft to talks about unified tariff treatment, inbound investment and transshipment screenings, export controls, and sanctions. Evaluating origin of capital within rules of origin, with possible "de maximus" levels for Chinese content, is another concept reportedly under consideration. All are ideas worth discussing, but none will be easy given the global economy's overreliance on Chinese intermediate goods.
Meanwhile, Canada and Mexico are left questioning the value of the USMCA if Section 232 and 301 tariffs undercut market access. Recalling the late-stage deal on Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs in the NAFTA renegotiation, can another Hail Mary pass be expected late in the fourth quarter? Or will Canada and Mexico remain frustrated in their attempts to gain relief?
These dynamics do not point to a tidy resolution of the review, reinforcing transparent rules that have made the USMCA the vehicle of North American competitiveness. Meanwhile, companies delay major investment decisions and muddle onward. Hopefully the Hotel California has good room service, because unfortunately we are going to be here for a while.
The USMCA's Biggest Barrier Is Political, Not Economic
- Eric Miller, President, Rideau Potomac Strategy Group
To read the text, the review of the USMCA on July 1, 2026, should have been rather clinical. After assessing its operation and considering amendments, the United States, Canada, and Mexico had to say if they are ready to extend the deal for another 16 years. As the United States was not in agreement, the three countries now must revisit the "extension" question every year for the next decade.
This assumes that the USMCA survives. President Trump has made repeated statements expressing both indifference and hostility toward the agreement that he negotiated. In addition, the United States has initiated bilateral negotiations with Mexico and presumably at some future date will do the same with Canada. It is unclear how these agreements would relate to the existing USMCA framework.
Regardless of the ultimate architecture, politics will play a key role in any USMCA renewal. While U.S.-Mexico relations are always complicated, U.S.-Canada relations are at their lowest point in modern history. This constrains the political space available to leaders to make deals.
When the United States imposed tariffs on all its trading partners from February to April 2025, only Canada and China imposed counter-tariffs on U.S. goods. Washington took note. Canada has maintained a steadfast anti-tariff position, dairy notwithstanding. Moreover, threats in some quarters to use Canada's sizeable oil and electricity exports to the United States as leverage have been viewed as especially concerning. Senior U.S. officials have grown steadily more frustrated with Canada.
Canada sees things differently. U.S. tariffs are viewed as a threat to Canadian prosperity and a betrayal of the long-established partnership between the two nations. In addition, President Trump's repeated threats to annex Canada and make it the "51st state" have been seen by Canadians not only as deeply offensive, but as an existential challenge to their nation's survival. Former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper, historically a friend of the United States, stated in February 2026 that Canada must make "any sacrifice necessary" to urgently reduce its dependence on the United States.
Canada's national mood as it celebrated its 159th birthday on July 1 was proud and defiant. While this is a powerful combination, major USMCA compromises may be viewed with deep skepticism. On June 25, 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney had to remind the public that Canada must be ready to strike a USMCA deal if the right opportunity arises.
What may eventually save the USMCA is its eternal value proposition. Roughly one-quarter to one-third of the value of U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico is U.S. content. No other region of the world comes close. By contrast, U.S. content levels are in the single digits in its imports from Asia and Europe. The intensity of the intraregional trade linkages drove President Trump to exempt many USMCA originating goods in March 2025. It may eventually be the lynchpin to a full USMCA renewal--just not in July 2026.
USMCA Nonrenewal Is Not the End of North American Integration
- Juan Carlos Baker, Researcher, Foreign Trade and Investment Research Laboratory, Pan American University, and former Mexican Deputy Trade Minister
While some headlines portray this decision as a dramatic turning point for North American trade, the announcement itself should come as little surprise. President Trump spent months signaling his dissatisfaction with the agreement, and markets, businesses, and policymakers have had ample time to prepare for this outcome. Moreover, maintaining leverage rather than providing certainty has long been a defining feature of President Trump's negotiating style, and the USMCA review appears unlikely to be an exception.
Beyond the announcement itself, what is more important is what comes immediately afterward. Framing the nonrenewal as the beginning of a negotiation process, accompanied by a roadmap for further negotiations, with scheduled meetings, clearly identified issues, and a timeline for future deliverables, may actually reassure stakeholders, easing the uncertainty and tension that the nonrenewal may bring. Conversely, if the White House simply declares that the agreement will not be renewed and offers no path forward, uncertainty across North America will increase significantly.
Indeed, much of the current commentary assumes that the nonrenewal represents a major setback for Mexico and Canada; however, although prolonged uncertainty undoubtedly carries costs for both countries, those costs are by no means borne by them alone. The integrated nature of North American supply chains means that U.S. manufacturers, investors, and consumers also depend heavily on a predictable institutional framework. Automotive companies, agricultural exporters, machinery producers, and countless suppliers have structured investment decisions around the assumption of continued regional integration. Extending uncertainty indefinitely imposes costs on all three partners, including the United States itself--even if President Trump claims that the United States does not need anything from Mexico or Canada.
This is why domestic pressure on the White House as a result of President Trump's decision should not be disregarded. If uncertainty begins to delay investment decisions or disrupt supply chains, U.S. businesses are likely to become an increasingly influential constituency in favor of a negotiated outcome, especially in an election year.
Finally, the process ahead is likely to become more political, more contentious, and more closely linked to broader issues such as industrial policy, economic security, and relations with China, but after all, has that not been evident already for some time?
The nonrenewal, then, should not be mistaken for the collapse of North American economic integration. Instead, it marks the formal beginning of a new bargaining phase in which leverage, rather than certainty, will remain Washington's preferred negotiating instrument.
The real story begins after July 1. The announcement itself was largely expected. What will truly matter is the agenda the United States places on the table, and whether it leaves enough room for meaningful negotiations to continue.
The USMCA Question Nobody's Asking: Does Congress Even Get a Vote?
- William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business
The July 1 decision of the three countries party to the USMCA to not renew the agreement and instead trigger the 10-year annual review process opens the door to a potentially extended period of negotiation. It appears that talks will continue without interruption, which creates the possibilities of either an early conclusion--in time for Trump to declare victory before the midterm election--or extended talks, timing that could lead the United States to increase its demands once the election is over.
Either way, business will have to grapple with the continuing uncertainty of both the negotiations and the aftermath, where the issue is whether the resulting agreement must be submitted to Congress for approval. The initial USMCA agreement was submitted to Congress and approved pursuant to then-existing Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which expired in 2021. TPA, an updated version of procedures initially enacted in the Trade Act of 1974, created a trade-off for the president. If he followed the procedural consultation requirements and time limits, Congress would consider the agreement without delay, amendment, or filibuster, a significant advantage. However, recent administrations have taken the position that agreements only need congressional approval if they require changes in U.S. law. On that basis, a number of agreements, including Trump's with Japan and Biden's with Taiwan, were not sent to Congress. In the latter case, Congress rebelled and passed legislation--which Biden signed--retroactively approving the first half of the Taiwan agreement and requiring the second half to be submitted for approval. The congressional position has generally been that all agreements should be submitted for approval; just as the president's has been that as few as possible should be submitted.
It is too soon to say whether a revised USMCA would have to be sent to Congress, but some of the issues likely on the table, such as changes in U.S. trade law to accommodate regional or sectoral U.S. interests or changes in tariffs, would point in that direction. The complication this time is that there is no TPA to structure the congressional process, which means the agreement, if submitted, will be subject to normal legislative procedures, including possible delay and amendment. That creates two challenges for the administration. The first will be to try to avoid that possibility by negotiating an agreement that does not require approval and then dealing with congressional insistence that it be submitted anyway. The second will be the additional uncertainty created in Congress if it is submitted without any procedural limitations. In 2021, many in the business community urged the Biden administration to seek renewal of TPA even if there were no plans to use it. That did not happen, and the Trump administration may now have to deal with the consequences.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-has-opted-not-extend-usmca
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Reflecting on U.S. Development Policy on the United States' 250th Anniversary
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Hadeil Ali, chief of staff of the Global Development Department:
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Reflecting on U.S. Development Policy on the United States' 250th Anniversary
The 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States offers a window to reflect on the country's identity and leadership. This reflection exercise is common in conversations about immigration, innovation, and the economy, yet the picture is incomplete without an honest analysis of the U.S. relationship with the world ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Hadeil Ali, chief of staff of the Global Development Department: * * * Reflecting on U.S. Development Policy on the United States' 250th Anniversary The 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States offers a window to reflect on the country's identity and leadership. This reflection exercise is common in conversations about immigration, innovation, and the economy, yet the picture is incomplete without an honest analysis of the U.S. relationship with the worldand what that means for development moving forward. While much of the conversation recently has focused on the dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the steep decline of official development assistance globally, and the growing fear among Americans of international entanglements, there is a unique opportunity to broaden the conversation to a strategic assessment of the U.S. relationship with development that examines who the United States is to the world, who it wants to be, and how it gets there.
What makes this moment even more ripe for reflection is the scale of disruption the sector has experienced juxtaposed with domestic and global forward-looking conversations on its future role. The fundamental question is why development matters for U.S. engagement and what it means for U.S. global leadership moving forward. There is a need to understand and reflect on how the world perceives the United States and how development has been, and can be, a core component of U.S. global posture and image.
The History of U.S. Development Policy
The roots of U.S. foreign assistance date back to the early days of the republic. The 1900-1940 period saw an increase in foreign assistance efforts due to a number of factors, including the recognition that the United States had a moral and strategic role to play on the global stage and that development assistance was a key tool in advancing U.S. security interests. As a rising superpower, the United States recognized that aid could bolster its image abroad, facilitate investments in strategic regions, and play a role in making the world safer and more prosperous. After World War II, the United States was key in building institutions and partnerships that are the foundation of the current foreign assistance ecosystem. What unfolded in that time frame and beyond is a recognition that foreign assistance is a policy tool that can be leveraged for domestic and global outcomes.
The period during and after the Cold War is arguably one of the most important in the history of U.S. development assistance. Development became part of a broader soft power strategy through investment abroad that fought against communist expansion and aligned with the United States' desired world order. The Cold War period coincided with countries gaining independence and the expansion of U.S. engagement through humanitarian, public health, and agriculture programs; one pertinent example is President Eisenhower's Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act, later known as Food for Peace. Many of the institutions that continue to shape the development agenda today emerged during that time frame, including USAID, created by President Kennedy in 1961. Internationally, several regional development banks were established during that time, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.
The Future of U.S. Development Policy
Throughout these periods and beyond, investments in foreign assistance and development have sat at the intersection of values and interests. Presidents, members of Congress, and policymakers have justified foreign assistance and development through several recurring narratives. The United States has often framed foreign assistance as a moral responsibility, particularly through humanitarian and public health responses that provide services to those most in need around the world. This argument--that the United States should help provide public goods to vulnerable communities in developing countries--has historically resonated with many Americans, and still does today. Another core rationale has centered on national security: Development assistance can strengthen allies, counter adversaries, and facilitate investment in stable, prosperous societies that ultimately benefit Americans at home. A third rationale has focused on strategic economic investments that open markets, create jobs, and elevate the U.S. private sector, producing returns both domestically and abroad.
Each of these arguments has merit, but when presented together they can create ambiguity about the ultimate purpose of U.S. engagement. If development assistance is meant to serve moral, national security, and economic interests simultaneously, it becomes difficult to comprehend how to define success and assess impact. When measurable outcomes are more important than ever, a clearer understanding of U.S. interests can offer clarity on (1) why the United States should be involved in global development, (2) how it defines its goals, and (3) how development assistance fits into a broader vision of global U.S. leadership. At a critical moment for the United States' future role in the world, it must articulate a coherent strategy for its involvement abroad. In order to do that, it must recognize the shortcomings of the current system, which present opportunities to reexamine and redefine U.S. leadership in the evolving landscape.
* Terminology Conflation: The United States has used "foreign aid," "foreign assistance," and "development" interchangeably when the meanings might have differed. While this is not the sole reason Americans might not understand the tools and approaches at the government's disposal, a lack of clarity has been at least a factor in fueling polarization around the issue. "Foreign aid" has often been the term used to describe the broad range of activities that make up U.S. international development efforts. "Foreign assistance" should be seen as a tool employed by the U.S. government with other countries and may fit under humanitarian, health, democracy, or economic support. "Development" can be characterized as a policy goal that fits the interests of the United States. Development may leverage foreign assistance, but there is a wider toolbox within this framing. A clearer understanding and application of definitions is key in this next phase.
* Domestic Connection: Connected to clarity on terminology is the ability to communicate to constituents why this issue matters and what the return on investment is. The lack of reaction to the dismantling of USAID tells a painful story, and perhaps provides a lesson, on the role that narrative and framing need to play. While Americans do benefit at home from sound investments abroad, that story has not always been well communicated, and misinformation further complicates the picture. In a world with constrained resources and increasing domestic challenges, making clear the connection between the domestic and the global is more important than ever.
* Clarity on the Full Range of Tools: The American public needs a more comprehensive understanding of the full range of development tools that the United States uses, why particular tools are selected, and how they advance U.S. goals and interests. A post-USAID narrative asserted that aid money spent on other countries was wasteful and thus did not accomplish necessary objectives. While concerns about impact and cost-effectiveness may be valid in some cases, this narrative underscored a broader gap in public understanding of the full range of tools and instruments available--including both diplomacy-based aid and trade-based development finance--and, even more importantly, why they are chosen.
* Matching Policy Goals to the Right Tools: Development tools are only effective when the goals and objectives are clearly defined from the outset and, as a result, drive the selection of the tools used to execute. Too often, the development policy ecosystem has missed opportunities to specify the desired outcomes, select the best-suited tools, and determine metrics of success accordingly. An effective alignment between policy objectives, instruments, and evaluation metrics is key for assessing impact and ensuring strategic U.S. engagement.
* Strategic Localization: A key element of this reflection endeavor is to be clear-eyed about how partners and the rest of the world view the United States, and, in turn, what their priorities are. The exercise requires a serious understanding and adoption of a development model that is more equitable and driven by local governments and communities. This approach would be more strategic and sustainable for the United States over the long term. An investment in local structures, institutions, and governments--rather than creating duplicative efforts--can improve efficiency and strengthen the sustainability of these investments. The necessary political will is key to implementing this approach, acknowledging the historical harm the development system has inflicted, and honestly reflecting on its current structural failures. With the emergence of a range of coalitions and initiatives within the Global South--including the Accra Reset, the Abidjan Consensus, and the Durban Promise--calling for system reform, country ownership, and genuine partnership, it is a critical moment for the United States to build its agenda and posture in alignment with its interests and the evolving landscape. The United States must view this agenda as an opportunity to build strong alliances and restore trust.
This complex picture, coinciding with the 250th anniversary of the United States, could provide an avenue to shape what the next 250 years might look like. A new landscape requires more innovative and targeted models, approaches, and tools. The motivation should not be about who will fill the gap instead of the United States--although that is a factor--but rather what honest, bold leadership this moment demands from the United States and how it wants to position itself globally.
The United States has an opportunity to reassess and redefine its leadership on development for years to come. The next chapter will not mirror the last 250 years. The moral, national security, and economic interests that have long shaped U.S. engagement on foreign assistance and development remain relevant, but the environment has changed. How will the United States communicate the relevance of development to its global strategic leadership? The development agenda is not merely a budgetary or a policy question; it is a strategic question on how the United States chooses to define its global leadership in a moment of fragmentation and disruption.
* * *
Hadeil Ali is chief of staff of the Global Development Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The author is grateful to Global Development intern Omar Malik for his assistance with background research.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/reflecting-us-development-policy-united-states-250th-anniversary
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Reflecting on U.S. Development Policy on the United States' 250th Anniversary
The 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States offers a window to reflect on the country's identity and leadership. This reflection exercise is common in conversations about immigration, innovation, and the economy, yet the picture is incomplete without an honest analysis of the U.S. relationship with the world ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Hadeil Ali, chief of staff of the Global Development Department: * * * Reflecting on U.S. Development Policy on the United States' 250th Anniversary The 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States offers a window to reflect on the country's identity and leadership. This reflection exercise is common in conversations about immigration, innovation, and the economy, yet the picture is incomplete without an honest analysis of the U.S. relationship with the worldand what that means for development moving forward. While much of the conversation recently has focused on the dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the steep decline of official development assistance globally, and the growing fear among Americans of international entanglements, there is a unique opportunity to broaden the conversation to a strategic assessment of the U.S. relationship with development that examines who the United States is to the world, who it wants to be, and how it gets there.
What makes this moment even more ripe for reflection is the scale of disruption the sector has experienced juxtaposed with domestic and global forward-looking conversations on its future role. The fundamental question is why development matters for U.S. engagement and what it means for U.S. global leadership moving forward. There is a need to understand and reflect on how the world perceives the United States and how development has been, and can be, a core component of U.S. global posture and image.
The History of U.S. Development Policy
The roots of U.S. foreign assistance date back to the early days of the republic. The 1900-1940 period saw an increase in foreign assistance efforts due to a number of factors, including the recognition that the United States had a moral and strategic role to play on the global stage and that development assistance was a key tool in advancing U.S. security interests. As a rising superpower, the United States recognized that aid could bolster its image abroad, facilitate investments in strategic regions, and play a role in making the world safer and more prosperous. After World War II, the United States was key in building institutions and partnerships that are the foundation of the current foreign assistance ecosystem. What unfolded in that time frame and beyond is a recognition that foreign assistance is a policy tool that can be leveraged for domestic and global outcomes.
The period during and after the Cold War is arguably one of the most important in the history of U.S. development assistance. Development became part of a broader soft power strategy through investment abroad that fought against communist expansion and aligned with the United States' desired world order. The Cold War period coincided with countries gaining independence and the expansion of U.S. engagement through humanitarian, public health, and agriculture programs; one pertinent example is President Eisenhower's Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act, later known as Food for Peace. Many of the institutions that continue to shape the development agenda today emerged during that time frame, including USAID, created by President Kennedy in 1961. Internationally, several regional development banks were established during that time, such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.
The Future of U.S. Development Policy
Throughout these periods and beyond, investments in foreign assistance and development have sat at the intersection of values and interests. Presidents, members of Congress, and policymakers have justified foreign assistance and development through several recurring narratives. The United States has often framed foreign assistance as a moral responsibility, particularly through humanitarian and public health responses that provide services to those most in need around the world. This argument--that the United States should help provide public goods to vulnerable communities in developing countries--has historically resonated with many Americans, and still does today. Another core rationale has centered on national security: Development assistance can strengthen allies, counter adversaries, and facilitate investment in stable, prosperous societies that ultimately benefit Americans at home. A third rationale has focused on strategic economic investments that open markets, create jobs, and elevate the U.S. private sector, producing returns both domestically and abroad.
Each of these arguments has merit, but when presented together they can create ambiguity about the ultimate purpose of U.S. engagement. If development assistance is meant to serve moral, national security, and economic interests simultaneously, it becomes difficult to comprehend how to define success and assess impact. When measurable outcomes are more important than ever, a clearer understanding of U.S. interests can offer clarity on (1) why the United States should be involved in global development, (2) how it defines its goals, and (3) how development assistance fits into a broader vision of global U.S. leadership. At a critical moment for the United States' future role in the world, it must articulate a coherent strategy for its involvement abroad. In order to do that, it must recognize the shortcomings of the current system, which present opportunities to reexamine and redefine U.S. leadership in the evolving landscape.
* Terminology Conflation: The United States has used "foreign aid," "foreign assistance," and "development" interchangeably when the meanings might have differed. While this is not the sole reason Americans might not understand the tools and approaches at the government's disposal, a lack of clarity has been at least a factor in fueling polarization around the issue. "Foreign aid" has often been the term used to describe the broad range of activities that make up U.S. international development efforts. "Foreign assistance" should be seen as a tool employed by the U.S. government with other countries and may fit under humanitarian, health, democracy, or economic support. "Development" can be characterized as a policy goal that fits the interests of the United States. Development may leverage foreign assistance, but there is a wider toolbox within this framing. A clearer understanding and application of definitions is key in this next phase.
* Domestic Connection: Connected to clarity on terminology is the ability to communicate to constituents why this issue matters and what the return on investment is. The lack of reaction to the dismantling of USAID tells a painful story, and perhaps provides a lesson, on the role that narrative and framing need to play. While Americans do benefit at home from sound investments abroad, that story has not always been well communicated, and misinformation further complicates the picture. In a world with constrained resources and increasing domestic challenges, making clear the connection between the domestic and the global is more important than ever.
* Clarity on the Full Range of Tools: The American public needs a more comprehensive understanding of the full range of development tools that the United States uses, why particular tools are selected, and how they advance U.S. goals and interests. A post-USAID narrative asserted that aid money spent on other countries was wasteful and thus did not accomplish necessary objectives. While concerns about impact and cost-effectiveness may be valid in some cases, this narrative underscored a broader gap in public understanding of the full range of tools and instruments available--including both diplomacy-based aid and trade-based development finance--and, even more importantly, why they are chosen.
* Matching Policy Goals to the Right Tools: Development tools are only effective when the goals and objectives are clearly defined from the outset and, as a result, drive the selection of the tools used to execute. Too often, the development policy ecosystem has missed opportunities to specify the desired outcomes, select the best-suited tools, and determine metrics of success accordingly. An effective alignment between policy objectives, instruments, and evaluation metrics is key for assessing impact and ensuring strategic U.S. engagement.
* Strategic Localization: A key element of this reflection endeavor is to be clear-eyed about how partners and the rest of the world view the United States, and, in turn, what their priorities are. The exercise requires a serious understanding and adoption of a development model that is more equitable and driven by local governments and communities. This approach would be more strategic and sustainable for the United States over the long term. An investment in local structures, institutions, and governments--rather than creating duplicative efforts--can improve efficiency and strengthen the sustainability of these investments. The necessary political will is key to implementing this approach, acknowledging the historical harm the development system has inflicted, and honestly reflecting on its current structural failures. With the emergence of a range of coalitions and initiatives within the Global South--including the Accra Reset, the Abidjan Consensus, and the Durban Promise--calling for system reform, country ownership, and genuine partnership, it is a critical moment for the United States to build its agenda and posture in alignment with its interests and the evolving landscape. The United States must view this agenda as an opportunity to build strong alliances and restore trust.
This complex picture, coinciding with the 250th anniversary of the United States, could provide an avenue to shape what the next 250 years might look like. A new landscape requires more innovative and targeted models, approaches, and tools. The motivation should not be about who will fill the gap instead of the United States--although that is a factor--but rather what honest, bold leadership this moment demands from the United States and how it wants to position itself globally.
The United States has an opportunity to reassess and redefine its leadership on development for years to come. The next chapter will not mirror the last 250 years. The moral, national security, and economic interests that have long shaped U.S. engagement on foreign assistance and development remain relevant, but the environment has changed. How will the United States communicate the relevance of development to its global strategic leadership? The development agenda is not merely a budgetary or a policy question; it is a strategic question on how the United States chooses to define its global leadership in a moment of fragmentation and disruption.
* * *
Hadeil Ali is chief of staff of the Global Development Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The author is grateful to Global Development intern Omar Malik for his assistance with background research.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/reflecting-us-development-policy-united-states-250th-anniversary
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Urges Supreme Court to Protect Religious Liberty in St. Mary Catholic Parish vs. Roy
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 2, 2026:
* * *
AFPI Urges Supreme Court to Protect Religious Liberty in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today filed an amicus brief in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, urging the U.S. Supreme Court to provide much-needed clarity on the meaning of "religion" under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court has never adopted a clear definition of religion for Free Exercise Clause cases. As a result, lower courts have applied inconsistent ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 2, 2026: * * * AFPI Urges Supreme Court to Protect Religious Liberty in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today filed an amicus brief in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, urging the U.S. Supreme Court to provide much-needed clarity on the meaning of "religion" under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court has never adopted a clear definition of religion for Free Exercise Clause cases. As a result, lower courts have applied inconsistentand often subjective tests, leaving religious Americans, faith-based schools, charities, ministries and courts without a stable rule upon which they may rely.
This case centers on Colorado's exclusion of faith-based schools from its universal preschool program based on religious beliefs and practices. AFPI's brief argues the First Amendment's protection for the "free exercise" of religion cannot be fully enforced unless courts understand what the Constitution means by "religion."`
"Religious liberty is a natural right the Constitution recognizes and protects," said Leigh Ann O'Neill, chief legal affairs officer at AFPI. "The First Amendment protects more than private belief. It protects the ability of religious Americans and religious institutions to live out sincere duties of faith in public life."
AFPI argues the Founders understood religion as more than personal philosophy, ideology, ethics or private conscience. The brief asks the court to recognize religion as a system of sincere beliefs and practices derived from duties owed to a sacred authority that is prior to and beyond human relations and that receives allegiance and worship.
To read more about AFPI's fight to defend American values in the courts, click here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/policy-areas/litigation).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-urges-supreme-court-to-protect-religious-liberty-in-st-mary-catholic-parish-v-roy
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
AFPI Urges Supreme Court to Protect Religious Liberty in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today filed an amicus brief in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, urging the U.S. Supreme Court to provide much-needed clarity on the meaning of "religion" under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court has never adopted a clear definition of religion for Free Exercise Clause cases. As a result, lower courts have applied inconsistent ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 2, 2026: * * * AFPI Urges Supreme Court to Protect Religious Liberty in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today filed an amicus brief in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, urging the U.S. Supreme Court to provide much-needed clarity on the meaning of "religion" under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court has never adopted a clear definition of religion for Free Exercise Clause cases. As a result, lower courts have applied inconsistentand often subjective tests, leaving religious Americans, faith-based schools, charities, ministries and courts without a stable rule upon which they may rely.
This case centers on Colorado's exclusion of faith-based schools from its universal preschool program based on religious beliefs and practices. AFPI's brief argues the First Amendment's protection for the "free exercise" of religion cannot be fully enforced unless courts understand what the Constitution means by "religion."`
"Religious liberty is a natural right the Constitution recognizes and protects," said Leigh Ann O'Neill, chief legal affairs officer at AFPI. "The First Amendment protects more than private belief. It protects the ability of religious Americans and religious institutions to live out sincere duties of faith in public life."
AFPI argues the Founders understood religion as more than personal philosophy, ideology, ethics or private conscience. The brief asks the court to recognize religion as a system of sincere beliefs and practices derived from duties owed to a sacred authority that is prior to and beyond human relations and that receives allegiance and worship.
To read more about AFPI's fight to defend American values in the courts, click here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/policy-areas/litigation).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-urges-supreme-court-to-protect-religious-liberty-in-st-mary-catholic-parish-v-roy
[Category: ThinkTank]