Think Tanks
Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
Featured Stories
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to China Brief Notes: Beijing Sees Opportunity in U.S. National Security Strategy
WASHINGTON, Dec. 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 17, 2025, in its China Brief Notes:* * *
Beijing Sees Opportunity in U.S. National Security Strategy
By Shijie Wang
Executive Summary:
* Chinese assessments of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) see it as confirmation of hegemonic decline, strategic retrenchment, and a shift to an evolving "neo-realist" posture that sees engaging with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as unavoidable.
* The official response has been minimal, as the PRC seeks to preserve negotiation space for a potential bargain ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 17, 2025, in its China Brief Notes: * * * Beijing Sees Opportunity in U.S. National Security Strategy By Shijie Wang Executive Summary: * Chinese assessments of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) see it as confirmation of hegemonic decline, strategic retrenchment, and a shift to an evolving "neo-realist" posture that sees engaging with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as unavoidable. * The official response has been minimal, as the PRC seeks to preserve negotiation space for a potential bargainat the April 2026 Trump-Xi summit.
* PRC analysts are weaponizing the document's framing of Taiwan to argue the U.S. views it merely as a geopolitical asset rather than a democratic partner.
* Interpreting the "Trump Corollary" and rhetoric on European civilizational decline, Beijing aims to fracture U.S. alliances by portraying Washington as a transactional power that treats partners as liabilities.
On December 4, the White House released its National Security Strategy (NSS), the first of three key strategy documents released by the Trump administration. (The other two are the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy.) (White House, December 4). The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the nation most frequently cited in the document, and Chinese observers have been quick to analyze its implications.
PRC Claims to Force 'Strategic Stalemate'
Beijing's official reaction to the NSS remains cautious. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has not commented beyond a careful statement from spokesperson Guo Jiakun in response to questions. Guo avoided emotional escalation, reiterating that economic and trade relations remain the "ballast" of the relationship and generate "mutual benefit" (MFA, December 8). This muted response might indicate that Beijing remains tactically committed to maintaining a diplomatic baseline. In doing so, the PRC side can preserve negotiating space for the anticipated presidential summit in April 2026 that, it hopes, will conclude with a favorable transactional deal.
PRC academia and think tanks are more cautiously triumphalist. They view the release of the NSS as further evidence of their long-held belief in the "rise of the East and the decline of the West". Reports from key state think tanks have not voiced alarm at the document, but instead view it as a signal that the United States has finally been forced to acknowledge the end of its unipolar hegemony, retreating from offensive liberalism to a posture of realism (WeChat/CICIR, December 9).
An analysis by Wang Wen, Executive Dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, points out that after failing in "four successive offensives"--military, ideological, economic, and the initial trade war--the United States has been forced into a "strategic stalemate" with the PRC (WeChat/Chongyang Institute, December 5). This assessment is reinforced by analysis from the cabinet-level think tank, the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), which highlights the NSS's reclassification of the PRC from a strategic threat to a "near-peer" competitor. The DRC characterizes this terminological shift as "toning down without changing the tune" (WeChat/DRC, December 12). Both analyses imply that Washington has realized the futility of broad ideological confrontation and has instead pivoted to a strategy of precise, high-tech suppression. This signifies an admission that Washington can no longer overwhelm the PRC across the board and must now concentrate all its resources on choking specific industrial bottlenecks.
Days before the NSS was released, Zheng Yongnian, Dean of the Institute for International Affairs at CUHK-Shenzhen, characterized Trump as a "neorealist". But unlike traditional neorealists, who see competition as baked into an anarchic international system, Zheng sees a development in neorealist thinking toward recognition that "the PRC has already risen and cannot be defeated", leaving Washington with no choice but to "deal with and engage with" Beijing (Guancha, December 5).
Commentary Highlights U.S. Rifts with Partners
The NSS has been poorly received by several U.S. partners. This presents an opportunity for Beijing, which is actively moving to exploit the document to drive wedges between the United States and its traditional partners.
An analysis from Xinhua characterized the strategy's "Trump corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine--an assertion of dominance in the Western Hemisphere--as a "haughty" declaration of a "right to intervention", arguing that it exposes U.S. hegemonic double standards to the Global South. It also highlighted the strategy's attitude toward European politics, framing the NSS's characterization of the "stark prospect of civilizational erasure" in Europe as "extremely combative" rhetoric (Xinhua, December 6)./[1]
Regional experts at the Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) note that the NSS's demands for Japan and South Korea to assume primary defense responsibilities, while ignoring allies like the Philippines, expose a systemic imbalance in which the United States demands "protection fees" while effecting a global strategic retrenchment (CICIR, December 9). This provides a strategic opportunity for the PRC to stabilize its periphery through economic means while U.S. credibility erodes.
The NSS contains strong language on Taiwan, calling for "preserving military overmatch" as a priority. PRC responses to this section of the strategy exhibit a calm cynicism, focusing on its framing of Taiwan's status as a geopolitical asset rather than a like-minded partner. Observers and scholars with military backgrounds note that the NSS focuses heavily on Taiwan's centrality to semiconductor supply chains and global trade routes and ignores democratic values. Military commentator Shi Yang described this as a "naked revelation of Taiwan's strategic utility to the United States", implying that Washington views the island merely as a geopolitical token to be secured for its own self-interest (Guancha, December 7). Professor Zhang Jiadong from the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, meanwhile, contended that this section does not represent a display of strength but rather reflects U.S. anxiety over the diminishing marginal utility of its "Taiwan Card" (Global Times, December 6).
Conclusion
Beijing's reception of the 2025 NSS is characterized by calculated confidence. The PRC interprets the U.S. retreat toward "America First" as a confirmation of hegemonic decline. This assessment might drive Beijing to adopt a multi-layered strategy: globally, it can weaponize the "Trump Corollary" to fracture Washington and its allies and partners; regarding Taiwan, it can leverage a narrative that views the island as merely a geopolitical token rather than a democratic partner; and diplomatically, it can maintain a disciplined focus on its own economic core interests while minimizing overt criticism of the United States.
As both sides look toward the anticipated presidential summit in April 2026, Beijing appears convinced that the era of containment is yielding to an era of mutual transaction, positioning itself to negotiate a new global division of power with a Washington that it believes can no longer dictate the rules of the game.
[1] According to the NSS, the "Trump Corollary" refers to the administration's ambition to "restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere." This includes denying "non-Hemispheric competitors"--i.e., the PRC--the ability to "position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets," in the region (White House, December 4).
* * *
Shijie Wang is a Deputy Editor for China Brief. He is graduated from the Master of Public Policy Program at Georgetown University.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/beijing-sees-opportunity-in-u-s-national-security-strategy/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center: Conversation With The Nonprofit Crisis Author Greg Berman (Part 2 of 2)
WASHINGTON, Dec. 18 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Dec. 17, 2025, to the Giving Review:* * *
A conversation with The Nonprofit Crisis author Greg Berman (Part 2 of 2)
The editor, author, and former nonprofit leader talks about whether his critiques of the nonprofit sector apply more to grantmakers than grant recipients, whether there's a distinction between civil society and the nonprofit sector, generational differences within and mission creep on the part of nonprofits, the benefits of incrementalism in any practical change or policy reform of the sector, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 18 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Dec. 17, 2025, to the Giving Review: * * * A conversation with The Nonprofit Crisis author Greg Berman (Part 2 of 2) The editor, author, and former nonprofit leader talks about whether his critiques of the nonprofit sector apply more to grantmakers than grant recipients, whether there's a distinction between civil society and the nonprofit sector, generational differences within and mission creep on the part of nonprofits, the benefits of incrementalism in any practical change or policy reform of the sector,and his recommendations for nonprofit leaders in reacting to the nonprofit crisis.
By Michael E. Hartmann
Editorial note: this essay originally appeared at The Giving Review.
***
Greg Berman is co-editor of the New York-based Vital City, a leading journal on civic life and urban policy that features thoughtful contributions from scholars, activists, and practitioners with different underlying worldviews. Earlier this year, it devoted an entire issue to "Nonprofits and the City."
In 1996, Berman helped co-found a nonprofit group now called the Center for Justice Innovation, which focuses on criminal-justice policy research and programming. He was its executive director for nearly two decades--stepping down in 2020, when it was still called the Center for Court Innovation.
Berman, who is also a distinguished fellow of practice at the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, co-authored 2023's Gradual: The Case for Incremental Change in a Radical Age with Aubrey Fox. And his heedful new book The Nonprofit Crisis: Leadership Through the Culture Wars, has just been released.
The clear-headed and kind Berman joined me for a recorded conversation last month. During the first part of our discussion, which is here, after talking about Vital City and the Center for Court Innovation, he addresses the nature of the nonprofit crisis, the fairness of some (cross-ideological) critiques of the nonprofit sector that he writes about in The Nonprofit Crisis, the effects of political polarization on responding to the crisis, and the need for some introspection in and reform of the sector.
The just more than 16-minute video below is the second part, during which we discuss whether his critiques of the nonprofit sector apply more to grantmakers than grant recipients, whether there's a distinction between civil society and the nonprofit sector, generational differences within and mission creep on the part of nonprofits, the benefits of incrementalism in any practical change or policy reform of the sector, and his recommendations for nonprofit leaders in reacting to the crisis.
While he doesn't write about grantmaking institutions as much as he does about the grant-recipient nonprofits because "I've never been a grantmaker and I feel my relationship to grantmaking organizations is as recipient, or as professional supplicant as I sometimes like to refer to myself" and "just felt less qualified" to comment on grantmakers, Berman tells me, philanthropically supported nonprofits are in so many respects downstream of philanthropy and to the extent that the critique of nonprofits as out of touch with mainstream American thinking, unaccountable to any kind of interest other than their own operations, using language that ordinary Americans can't understand, arrogant, speaking down to people, yeah, sure those things are much, much worse in philanthropy than they are among the supported nonprofit groups.
Asked whether there's a difference between civil society and the nonprofit sector, he says, "It's funny that you mention that. I just published a piece in Vital City called 'Trump vs. Civil Society,'" which is here (https://www.vitalcitynyc.org/articles/how-should-nonprofits-and-foundations-respond-to-trump?utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=112125&utm_source=Vital+City+Newsletter+Contacts&utm_campaign=c5d5693c91-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2025_11_21_03_49&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_-c5d5693c91-620150878), and a friend of his sent me an e-mail complaining about the headline and that it was not an accurate headline. So, yes to be technical, I don't think the nonprofit sector and civil society are coterminous. I think that civil society is a broader category that includes a host of things--bowling leagues, Bible-study groups, book groups, neighborhood watch, a bunch of voluntary kind of gatherings that are beyond just the nonprofit sector.
I think that there are a lot of nonprofits that don't really feel like the kinds of civil associations that Tocqueville was talking about in Democracy in America, that feel more like businesses. So I take that point, but I think that there's large such large chunks of the nonprofit sector that I feel very comfortable saying are part and parcel of civil society. ... It is hard for me to think of the category of civil society without the nonprofit sector.
Workforce cohorts, social justice, and mission creep
Berman sees a major generational component to the nonprofit crisis. As Millennials became the dominant workforce cohort around 2016, they brought different political orientations and expectations about work, including a strong desire to "personalize" the workplace in accordance with their broader consumer and online experiences. In the nonprofit sector, this has had and continues to have particular ramifications.
"I write a lot about Millennials in the book and I hope it doesn't read just like a screed--an old person saying, you know, Get off my lawn," Berman says. "I try to be sympathetic to their perspective, even though I don't share it. I do think the advent of cell phones and the internet has fundamentally changed that generation from my generation."
He says he can understand why that generation came to work and felt like, Oh, why can't I personalize the workplace too? I can personalize anything else in my life.' So I do think the generation has had some negative impacts on the nonprofit workforce, but I don't want it to read as just an anti-Millennial screed, or I hope it doesn't read that way.
Related to both politics and charitable nonprofits' missions, Berman argues that social-justice commitments should not take priority over those missions. Citing the research of political scientist Matthew Grossman, as he does in The Nonprofit Crisis, Berman says when nonprofits expand beyond a narrow organizational focus and tie or allow themselves to be tied to the broader ideological project of the left, they are likely to undermine their influence and effectiveness.
In our conversation, as a specific example, Berman also cites David A. Farenthold's and Claire Brown's recent lengthy New York Times article about how the nonprofit Sierra Club's embrace of social justice harmed it and the pursuit of its mission. "[P]laces like the Sierra Club have done themselves a huge disservice over the past decade by losing their narrow focus on, or exclusive focus on, what their core mission is," according to Berman. Conservative groups can risk doing themselves the same disservice, of course.
Steps and suggestions
For nonprofits in general and their leaders in particular, Berman applies his earlier book Gradual's advocacy of continuous, incremental steps toward change or reform--which would mean, in this context, actively but carefully tightening focus on their core mission and avoiding any politically tinged or other "mission creep" beyond that, expanding democratic decision-making internally, and cultivating timely leadership turnover instead of having long, "retire-in-place" tenures. "[O]ne of the most-important leadership decisions that a CEO can make is deciding to actually step down and do it in a way that's thoughtful and in the best interests of their nonprofit," he says.
Asked how we would know whether and when the nonprofit crisis is over, Berman suggests several potential indicators: survey data showing rising public trust in the sectors, increases in the share of Americans donating and volunteering, and a cultural barometer of sorts--phrases like "nonprofit industrial complex" showing up less often in public discourse, signaling that the sector is no longer so widely viewed as so self-serving. "I think that would be an indicator that people's trust in the sector" is back, he concludes, "and the nonprofit crisis is beginning to dissipate."
* * *
Michael E. Hartmann is CRC's senior fellow and director of the Center for Strategic Giving, providing analysis of and commentary about philanthropy and giving. He also co-edits The Giving Review, a joint project of Philanthropy Daily and the Center for Strategic Giving.
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/a-conversation-with-the-nonprofit-crisis-author-greg-berman-part-2-of-2/
[Category: ThinkTank]
InfluenceWatch Podcast 389: Mainstreaming Race Communism
WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on Dec. 16, 2025:* * *
InfluenceWatch Podcast #389: Mainstreaming Race Communism
By Sarah Lee, Robert Stilson and Michael Watson
The Groups, the justly maligned nonprofit and otherwise-professional activist groups whom moderate Democrats blamed for the failures of the Biden administration on the economy and immigration, are back and bolder than ever. Joining us today is our colleague Robert Stilson to discuss his profile on one of the most well-funded and radical Groups you've probably never heard ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on Dec. 16, 2025: * * * InfluenceWatch Podcast #389: Mainstreaming Race Communism By Sarah Lee, Robert Stilson and Michael Watson The Groups, the justly maligned nonprofit and otherwise-professional activist groups whom moderate Democrats blamed for the failures of the Biden administration on the economy and immigration, are back and bolder than ever. Joining us today is our colleague Robert Stilson to discuss his profile on one of the most well-funded and radical Groups you've probably never heardof: PolicyLink.
* Capital Research Center: The ascent of PolicyLink (https://capitalresearch.org/article/the-ascent-of-policylink/)
* InfluenceWatch: PolicyLink (https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/policylink/)
* * *
Sarah Lee
Sarah Lee was born and raised in Atlanta, Ga., but found herself drawn to Washington, DC, the birthplace of her mother, after completing a master's degree in public administration from the University of Georgia in 2010.
*
Robert runs several of CRC's specialized projects.
*
Michael Watson
Michael is Research Director for Capital Research Center and serves as the managing editor for InfluenceWatch.
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/influencewatch-podcast-389-mainstreaming-race-communism/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ceres: Updated federal legislation offers a clean trade strategy to boost U.S. manufacturing and competitiveness
BOSTON, Massachusetts, Dec. 17 [Category: ThinkTank] -- Ceres, a non-profit organization that is mobilizing companies and investors to take stronger action on climate change, water scarcity and global sustainability challenges, posted the following news release:* * *
Updated federal legislation offers a clean trade strategy to boost U.S. manufacturing and competitiveness
*
Ceres welcomes the introduction of the latest version of t he Clean Competition Act by U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), which would establish an American carbon border adjustment to protect and onshore domestic clean ... Show Full Article BOSTON, Massachusetts, Dec. 17 [Category: ThinkTank] -- Ceres, a non-profit organization that is mobilizing companies and investors to take stronger action on climate change, water scarcity and global sustainability challenges, posted the following news release: * * * Updated federal legislation offers a clean trade strategy to boost U.S. manufacturing and competitiveness * Ceres welcomes the introduction of the latest version of t he Clean Competition Act by U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), which would establish an American carbon border adjustment to protect and onshore domestic cleanmanufacturing and encourage cleaner production globally. The policy would generate revenue to strengthen U.S. leadership in innovation and exports of products and technologies that are increasing in global demand.
This bill is the latest proposal from both sides of the aisle to enact trade policy that assesses fees on imported goods that do not meet U.S. environmental standardssupporting domestic economic growth and encouraging cleaner manufacturing overseas, including through the export of U.S. technology. It sets the stage for negotiations on a final bill that advances the American economic, geopolitical, and national security interests shared by lawmakers on both sides of the aisle.
"The Clean Competition Act would establish a clear, strong, and predictable trade framework that strengthens U.S. competitiveness and reinforces America's leadership in clean industry and environmental stewardship. By encouraging businesses and governments around the world to cut pollution from their production of goods and materials, this bill will help ensure U.S. leadership in critical 21st century industries remains an advantage against China and other competitors," said Zach Friedman, senior director of federal policy, at Ceres. "This market-based approach will drive additional investment in clean manufacturing, spur innovation and high-quality jobs across the country, and reduce harmful pollution. We urge lawmakers on both sides of the aisle to work together on a final policy that gives America's businesses and workers a fair, level playing field to competeand winin the race to build an abundant, clean economic future for all."
* * *
About Ceres
Ceres is a nonprofit advocacy organization working to accelerate the transition to a cleaner, more just, and resilient economy. With data-driven research and expert analysis, we inspire investors and companies to act on the world's sustainability challenges and advocate for market and policy solutions. Together, our efforts transform industries, unlock new business opportunities, and foster innovation and job growth - proving that sustainability is the bottom line. For more information, visit ceres.org.
***
Original text here: https://www.ceres.org/resources/news/updated-federal-legislation-offers-a-clean-trade-strategy-to-boost-us-manufacturing-and-competitiveness
Capital Research Center: SPLC's 'Charitable' Wealth - Best of 2025
WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Dec. 16, 2025, to the Giving Review:* * *
SPLC's "Charitable" Wealth (Best of 2025)
And its costs.
By Robert Stilson
Editorial note: This article first appeared in The Giving Review on July 10, 2025. It was subsequently posted to the CRC, where it became one of the top performing posts of 2025.
***
The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) is among the most-controversial major left-of-center activist nonprofits in the country, and rightly so. To the extent Americans are familiar with the group, it is probably ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Dec. 16, 2025, to the Giving Review: * * * SPLC's "Charitable" Wealth (Best of 2025) And its costs. By Robert Stilson Editorial note: This article first appeared in The Giving Review on July 10, 2025. It was subsequently posted to the CRC, where it became one of the top performing posts of 2025. *** The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) is among the most-controversial major left-of-center activist nonprofits in the country, and rightly so. To the extent Americans are familiar with the group, it is probablyfor its "hate map," which notoriously lumps Klansmen, neo-Nazis, and other genuine extremists alongside mainstream conservative and religious organizations. It also conspicuously neglects to track extremist groups on the left, perhaps most glaringly under its suspiciously sparse antisemitism category.
Despite its bias, SPLC's hate-group designation--which it claims illustrates "the pervasive infrastructure of white supremacy in the U.S."--is regularly cited as authoritative by media outlets. Though it is organized as an Internal Revenue Code Sec. 501(c)(3) charity, SPLC makes little attempt to conceal its ideological--indeed, political--motivations. In this respect, it is far from unique. Much of the contemporary charitable sector is, regrettably, quite politicized.
What truly sets SPLC apart, even among its activist-charity peers, is how phenomenally wealthy it is. On the group's Form 990 covering its fiscal year 2023, SPLC reports $169.8 million in total revenue, with $109.7 million of that coming from grants and contributions and $57.2 million coming from investments. It spent over $122 million that year, including more than $56 million on employee compensation and benefits. Its fundraising expenses were over $17.4 million. In 2024, SPLC's total revenue dropped to $129 million, with $106.4 million of that coming from grants and contributions. Nevertheless, its net assets that year increased to an astonishing $786.7 million, more than doubling since 2016. "The S.P.L.C.--making hate pay" reportedly was a running joke among staffers at the so-called "Poverty Palace."
Charitable Comparisons
It is worth putting SPLC's vast "charitable" wealth in context, with 2023 being the most-recent year for which nonprofit financials are widely available. That year, it reports higher total revenues than the Special Olympics, which boasts millions of participants worldwide. The same is true of the United Service Organizations (USO), whose 250+ centers were visited more than 6.5 million times by members of the military community. The National Park Foundation, the Congressionally chartered nonprofit tasked with supporting America's national park system, reports less revenue than SPLC. So does the YMCA of the USA. The Make-A-Wish Foundation of America's 2023 revenues are some $34 million lower than SPLC's, while Helen Keller International's are $24 million lower.
Chicago's famous Field Museum--which had more than 1.1 million visitors in 2023--reports lower revenues and net assets than SPLC. The same is true for the Central Park Conservancy, which is responsible for New York City's eponymous urban green space. The Georgia Aquarium--the largest in the country--keeps a representative sampling of the planet's aquatic life happy in 11 million gallons of water with less revenue than SPLC. The National World War II Museum's 2023 revenues are less than half those of SPLC.
SPLC's 2023 revenues are more than twice (and closer to three times) the revenues of the professional football, baseball, and basketball halls of fame combined. Speaking of basketball, Springfield College, where the sport was famously invented in 1891 and which is currently attended by nearly 3,000 students, reports less total revenue on its 2023 Form 990 than SPLC. So does Rhodes College, Morehouse College, the Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, Niagara University, and many other institutes of higher education. Both the Brooklyn and Queens public libraries in New York City, which are funded almost entirely by government grants, report less revenue than SPLC.
On its Form 990 covering July 2022 through June 2023, the Food Bank for New York City reports $164.2 million in total revenue. It distributed 80.7 million pounds of food during that time period, which it said was equivalent to 66 million meals provided to those in need. Seattle-based Food Lifeline reports $157.4 million in total revenue that year and distributed over 73 million pounds of food, the equivalent of 233,457 meals per day. Both managed this with less revenue than SPLC. The Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption's 2023 revenues are less than one-third of SPLC's, yet it helped to finalize more than 1,000 adoptions that year. The American Battlefield Trust, which protected over 1,200 new acres of battlefield land in 2023, did so with revenues less than one-fifth of SPLC's.
In SPLC's home state of Alabama, Habitat for Humanity Greater Birmingham built 26 homes and performed "critical repairs" on an additional 296 in 2023, all with revenues less than one-tenth of SPLC's. SPLC's revenues are almost 45 times greater than the Ronald McDonald House Charities of Alabama, which provided over 19,000 room nights and over 13,000 individual meals to the families of children requiring hospital care in '23. SPLC's '23 revenues are over 85 times greater than Birmingham-based Smile-A-Mile, which provided recreational programming and support to over 2,500 pediatric cancer patients and family members.
Opportunity Costs
How else does SPLC compare to--or, contrast with--these groups and countless others? Like them, it is a (c)(3) charity the activities of which are incentivized by the American public through tax-exemption and tax-deductible contributions. Is there a qualitative difference in the "charity" in which they engage?
SPLC has amassed a veritable fortune painting its ideological/political opponents as malevolent extremists, and there is a major opportunity cost to the hundreds of millions of charitable dollars warehoused in its investment accounts. How is that money helping anyone? How many nonprofits across the country could use those funds to perform real, on-the-ground charity in their communities?
*
Robert Stilson
Robert runs several of CRC's specialized projects.
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/splcs-charitable-wealth-best-of-2025/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Questions to Ask After a Terrorist Attack
WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Dec. 16, 2025:* * *
Questions to Ask After a Terrorist Attack
By Daniel Byman
Terrorist attacks and plots have dominated headlines in the last week. In Sydney, Australia, two gunmen killed 15 people at a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach on December 14. The same day, a gunman--currently on the loose--killed two students at Brown University in Rhode Island. A day later, the FBI announced the arrest of what it claimed were four pro-Palestine, left-wing terrorists who planned to bomb ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Dec. 16, 2025: * * * Questions to Ask After a Terrorist Attack By Daniel Byman Terrorist attacks and plots have dominated headlines in the last week. In Sydney, Australia, two gunmen killed 15 people at a Hanukkah celebration at Bondi Beach on December 14. The same day, a gunman--currently on the loose--killed two students at Brown University in Rhode Island. A day later, the FBI announced the arrest of what it claimed were four pro-Palestine, left-wing terrorists who planned to bombmultiple targets in California on New Year's Eve. Less noticed, on Saturday, a gunman shot over 20 bullets into a Hanukkah-decorated home in Redlands, California, and shouted "fuck Jews."
The immediate aftermath of one such attack, let alone such a large number over one weekend, is marked by shock, grief, anger, and profound uncertainty. In those first hours and days, there is little that can or should be done to blunt the emotional impact of violence deliberately designed to horrify. Yet the confusion that follows often compounds the harm. Misinformation is common, particularly on social media. Rumor spreads faster than verified information; speculation outpaces evidence; and early media narratives--however tentative--can influence perceptions of the event and terrorism in general, even if mainstream sources debunk the false information.
Initial reporting after major attacks has repeatedly, though usually unintentionally, repeated conspiracies, overstated organizational involvement, or misunderstood attackers' motives. Long after the September 11 attacks, for example, claims about al Qaeda financing itself through African blood diamonds or planning waves of imminent follow-on attacks persisted in public discourse, despite authoritative investigations that discredited them. The 2016 attack on the Pulse nightclub, where Omar Mateen, an Islamic State supporter, killed 49, is the deadliest attack on the LGBTQ+ community in the United States, and it was widely believed that he deliberately targeted this community. Mateen, however, originally targeted another nightclub not associated with the LGBTQ+ community, but security concerns probably led him to reconsider. Such persistent narratives matter because they influence how Americans understand the threat, whom they fear, and which policies they support.
Similarly, investigative leads that seem promising often prove to be false trails. After the Brown University shooting, authorities detained a "person of interest" who was initially thought to be complicit but later released him due to a lack of incriminating evidence. Such mistakes are common in high-profile investigations (and, indeed, the relatively quick release of the subject is a sign the system is protecting the innocent as well as trying to find the guilty), but they can further the confusion generated after a terrorist attack.
If societies cannot eliminate the chaos that follows terrorist violence, they can at least impose some analytical discipline on it. As I originally wrote in a 2017 Lawfare piece, asking the right questions--early and repeatedly--can help policymakers, journalists, and the public distinguish signal from noise, avoid costly overreaction, and better prepare for future threats. Since then, I've added new questions to my original list and modified how I think about some of the possible answers. The questions and issues I present below are not ideological, but rather ways to gauge the danger and the best responses.
A first and overriding question after any attack is whether additional violence is imminent. Security officials must determine whether the perpetrators are dead or at large, whether accomplices remain active, and whether the attack was part of a coordinated campaign rather than an isolated act. History offers sobering examples of both possibilities. Some attackers die at the scene; others evade capture, as occurred after the Boston Marathon bombing. In still other cases, organizations deliberately stage multicell operations across different locations, as happened in 2015 in Paris, when Islamic State terrorists targeted a soccer stadium, concert hall, and bars and restaurants. Faced with incomplete information about the risk of future violence, authorities often err on the side of caution, shutting down cities, grounding flights, or deploying extraordinary security measures. While these responses are disruptive, the political and moral cost of underreacting to a real follow-on threat is far higher.
Another question concerns whether the violence is a hate crime or terrorism. The FBI defines a hate crime as "a criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender's bias against race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity," though the FBI also notes that "hate itself is not a crime." Terrorism, in contrast, has a political and psychological element--the goal is to change government policy or otherwise advance a broader agenda and to influence a wide set of people. Often, observers are quick to use the terrorism label when the goal, while hateful, was narrower and does not fit the definition. Misclassifying terrorist attacks as just another form of violence, however, risks understating their strategic intent and societal impact and thus may lead to under-resourcing the danger.
A related question concerns organizational involvement. Terrorist violence is frequently mislabeled as either the work of isolated "lone wolves" or the product of tightly directed, sophisticated organizations, when in fact most plots and attacks exist along a continuum between these two extremes. Public pledges of allegiance--especially those made online after an attack--are a particularly imprecise indicator. Anyone can declare loyalty to a terrorist organization without ever having met a recruiter, received training, or taken orders. The San Bernardino husband and wife who killed 14 people in 2015 supposedly pledged loyalty to the Islamic State on Facebook after the attack, a pledge the media quickly trumpeted and led to pressure on social media companies. In reality, the attackers did not make such a post. They did declare their allegiance, but they did so only in private communication and, according to the FBI, did not have direct links to the group. Amplifying the confusion, the Islamic State seized the propaganda coup offered to it, claiming the attackers as "soldiers of Caliphate."
Conversely, some attackers with minimal public signaling have maintained sustained contact with foreign handlers. The 2015 Paris attackers, for example, traveled from the caliphate in Syria to conduct their attacks and were otherwise under the direction of Islamic State leaders. Stronger evidence of organizational direction includes pre-attack martyrdom videos, encrypted communications, or logistical support, all of which suggest prior contact and some degree of control.
At times, there is a middle ground. Attackers may not be directed by the Islamic State or other group leaders, but senior jihadists might encourage attacks in email or chats, provide resources for obtaining weapons, or otherwise go beyond issuing propaganda. Al Qaeda leader Anwar al-Awlaki, for example, both issued propaganda and often engaged directly with would-be jihadists or helped facilitate their travel to jihadist hotspots like Yemen.
Understanding where an attacker falls on this operational spectrum matters enormously. At one end are individuals whose ideological affinities are real but whose operational ties are weak or nonexistent. At the other end are operatives embedded in networks that provide training, guidance, financing, and target selection. Many recent attacks occupy the murky middle ground, where online interaction and remote encouragement blur the line between autonomy and direction. Treating all these cases as identical leads to distorted threat assessments and misallocated resources. If a broader network is involved, that network must be uprooted for the danger to become manageable, and this may require operations overseas. On the other hand, if the danger is primarily from radicalized individuals, counter-radicalization programs and more engaged law enforcement may be the most important counterterrorism measures.
Even when an attack itself is executed by only one or two individuals, it is rarely socially isolated, and it is important to ask if a broader network was implicated. Attackers often emerge from broader ideological ecosystems--informal communities, online forums, prison networks, or political subcultures--that normalize or encourage violence. Timothy McVeigh's path to the Oklahoma City bombing, for example, was shaped by years of immersion in anti-government extremist circles rather than by a single organization issuing orders. Disrupting these permissive environments is often more important for long-term counterterrorism than dismantling any single cell.
Another critical question is whether foreign actors are involved and, if so, how. Foreign links trigger different legal authorities, investigative tools, and bureaucratic responses. The policy implications of a locally radicalized individual differ sharply from those of a plot facilitated by overseas operatives. If a group is foreign-based, military strikes might be considered against hostile or weak states, while intelligence cooperation might increase with some potential partners.
If there is a foreign link, the next question is whether a hostile foreign government played a role, and if so, what kind? Some actively sponsor terrorist groups, as Iran has done with Hezbollah since its inception in the 1980s. Others tolerate fundraising, travel, or propaganda activity that enables violence elsewhere. Russia has become more active, working with an array of criminal and right-wing individuals to sow chaos in Europe. Even allied governments can, through neglect or political calculation, create permissive conditions that extremist organizations exploit.
Communities that surround a terrorist can play an indispensable role in preventing attacks and apprehending a terrorist, should prevention fail, but they can also be part of the problem--where they stand is important to determine. In the United States, sustained collaboration between Muslim communities and law enforcement has contributed significantly to counterterrorism success. Where communities are alienated, distrustful, or stigmatized, as is true with many Muslim communities in Europe, cooperation erodes--and security suffers. This lesson applies equally to other forms of extremism. Communities that refuse to confront violence committed in the name of their political causes inadvertently create space for radicalization.
Additional questions arise if the attack might involve left- or right-wing terrorism. There is no large U.S. Muslim organization calling for the imposition of Islamic law or promoting other jihadist ideas. In contrast, right- and left-wing extremism often overlaps with legitimate political debates over guns, abortion, federal authority, or immigration. Violent actors exploit grievances that millions of peaceful citizens share in nonviolent form. Racism and antisemitism, while diminished from past levels, remain problems. This proximity to politics complicates prevention and accountability. Particular care is necessary when evaluating politically sensitive issues, such as immigration. Trump administration officials, for example, seized on an inaccurate news report that Shamsud-Din Jabbar, who conducted the January 1, 2025, vehicle ramming attack in New Orleans, had entered the United States illegally. Similarly, many on the left are lionizing Luigi Mangione, who is accused of killing healthcare CEO Brian Thompson in 2024, embracing the anticorporate political agenda and ignoring the violence. While communities should reject violence unequivocally, they often hesitate to police their own ideological fringes, especially when sympathy for the underlying cause blurs moral boundaries.
Understanding an attack also requires situating it within broader trends, and these are often confusing and involve many ambiguities. Terrorism is designed to feel existential, but perception often diverges sharply from reality. Although the Bondi Beach massacre in Australia shows the limits of gun control laws, the rarity of mass casualty events in that country also shows their success. In the United States, deaths from jihadist-linked terrorism since September 11 have been far lower than many feared in the immediate aftermath of those attacks. Although attacks like that in New Orleans show the continued danger of jihadist violence, it is important to recognize that jihadist violence has fallen significantly in the last 10 years. These patterns reflect not inevitability, but sustained intelligence, law enforcement, and preventive efforts. Without long-term context, each new attack risks being misinterpreted as evidence of inexorable escalation rather than as part of a fluctuating but often contained threat environment.
Inevitably, attention then turns to government performance--and here there can be many questions. Terrorism is difficult to prevent completely, and counterterrorism success often means fewer attacks rather than no attacks at all--a difficult standard to accept when people are grieving after a bloody strike. Failures occur, but they are often systemic rather than personal. Fragmented intelligence structures, poor information sharing, legal constraints, and resource imbalances frequently matter more than individual negligence. The temptation to scapegoat after tragedy is understandable, but serious reform requires diagnosing institutional weaknesses rather than assigning blame reflexively. It is vital to ensure that there are review mechanisms, transparency requirements, and other ways to ensure that government structures are adjusting to the threat of terrorism.
Even when errors come to light, reform is not automatically warranted. Every new authority or security measure carries costs: Tighter borders impede commerce; expanded surveillance raises civil-liberties concerns; and broader information sharing risks misuse or overload. Democracies must resist the illusion that perfect security is achievable. Demanding absolute prevention risks undermining resilience--the very quality that allows societies to absorb shocks without surrendering core values.
Political leadership is therefore central. After terrorist violence, leaders are expected to reassure the public, affirm democratic values, and reinforce trust in institutions. When leaders instead inflame divisions, legitimize extremist rhetoric, or undermine confidence in law enforcement, they inadvertently advance terrorists' goals. Although there should always be room for legitimate and peaceful politics, a line should be drawn when it comes to justifying violence. Rhetoric that excuses or minimizes extremist movements, even indirectly, can embolden perpetrators and weaken community cooperation at precisely the moment it is most needed.
Ultimately, the most important questions after a terrorist attack are not only operational but civic. How societies interpret violence shapes how they respond to it. Misinformation, fear-driven overreaction, and politicization can inflict damage long after physical wounds have healed. A failure of government to address community fears and concerns can undermine trust in institutions and social cohesion--a goal of many terrorists. Conversely, disciplined analysis, institutional accountability, political leadership, and societal resilience can deny terrorists their broader objectives.
No single framework can anticipate every attack or eliminate uncertainty. Each incident brings unique facts, actors, and consequences. But by consistently asking hard, informed questions--about organization, networks, state involvement, community dynamics, trends, governance, and proportional response--we can impose order on chaos.
* * *
Daniel Byman is the director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/questions-ask-after-terrorist-attack
[Category: ThinkTank]
Brookings' Hutchins Center Forms Task Force on Reducing Impact of Extreme Weather on Insurance Costs and Availability
WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 -- The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, a part of the Brookings Institution, issued the following news release:* * *
Brookings' Hutchins Center forms task force on reducing impact of extreme weather on insurance costs and availability
The Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at the Brookings Institution announced the launch of the Task Force on Reducing Impact of Extreme Weather on Insurance Costs & Availability, which will make policy recommendations to federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector.
The 11-member task force ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 -- The Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, a part of the Brookings Institution, issued the following news release: * * * Brookings' Hutchins Center forms task force on reducing impact of extreme weather on insurance costs and availability The Hutchins Center on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at the Brookings Institution announced the launch of the Task Force on Reducing Impact of Extreme Weather on Insurance Costs & Availability, which will make policy recommendations to federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector. The 11-member task forceis chaired by Steve Barlett, a former mayor of Dallas and congressman and former chief executive of the Financial Services Roundtable, and Robert Litan, a practicing lawyer and economist who is a non-resident senior fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings.
"The increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events -- hurricanes, windstorms, wildfires, and floods -- is driving up the cost and shrinking the availability of homeowners' insurance," Bartlett and Litan said. "This is a growing issue across the U.S. and demands a multi-faceted policy response, implemented with urgency."
The task force will evaluate a wide variety of potential policy responses -- including the role of building codes, incentives for homeowners to strengthen the resilience of their homes, harnessing capital markets, and improving regulation.
It will draw from academic research commissioned by the Hutchins Center. The task force plans to issue its report and recommendations in the first half of 2027. David Wessel, senior fellow and director of the Hutchins Center, will coordinate the work.
The work is supported, in part, by Arnold Ventures. Brookings Is committed to quality, independence, and impact. In line with its values and policies, Brookings' publications represent the sole views of its authors or task force members.
Members of the task force are:
Steve Bartlett, Co-Chair: Bartlett was CEO of The Financial Services Roundtable from June 1999 to October 2012. Previously, he was the mayor of Dallas, Texas (1991-95), a member of the U.S. Congress (1983-91), and on the Dallas City Council (1977-81). While in Congress, Bartlett served on the House Banking Committee (now the House Financial Services Committee).
Robert (Bob) Litan, Co-Chair: Litan is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, where he was previously vice president and director of Economic Studies. He is also a practicing attorney specializing in complex antitrust and business litigation as a shareholder of Berger Montague, based in Philadelphia. He served during the first term of the Clinton administration as principal deputy assistant attorney general in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.
Sean Becketti: Becketti is an economist and financial industry veteran with three decades of experience in academics, government, and private industry and most recently joined the Coastal Risk Advisory Board. Over the past two decades, Becketti led proprietary research teams at several leading financial firms, responsible for the models underlying the valuation, hedging and relative value analysis of some of the largest fixed-income portfolios in the world. During his tenure as chief economist at Freddie Mac, Becketti authored one of the first articles published by a government-sponsored enterprise exploring the impacts of climate change on housing.
Richard (Dick) Berner: Berner is Clinical Professor of Management Practice in the Department of Finance and is Co-Director of the Stern Volatility and Risk Institute. Professor Berner served as the first director of the Office of Financial Research (OFR) from 2013 until 2017. He was counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury from April 2011 to 2013. Before that, he was co-head of global economics and chief US economist at Morgan Stanley.
Patricia (Patty) Born: Born is the Midyette Eminent Scholar in Risk Management and Insurance in the Department of Risk Management/Insurance, Real Estate and Legal Studies at Florida State University's College of Business. She also serves as doctoral coordinator of the Ph.D. program with a major in risk management. Her research interests include insurance market structure and performance, professional liability, health insurance, and the management of catastrophic risks. Born is a member of the board of the American Risk and Insurance Association and serves on the editorial board of the Risk Management and Insurance Review and Journal of Insurance Issues.
Karen Clark: Clark is the CEO and co-founder of modeling firm KC & Co. A leading global authority on catastrophe risk assessment and management, Clark founded the first catastrophe modeling company in 1987 (AIR, acquired by ISO/Verisk in 2002) and is widely credited with creating the catastrophe modeling industry. The probabilistic catastrophe modeling techniques and innovative technologies she pioneered decades ago revolutionized the way insurers, reinsurers, and other financial institutions assess and manage extreme event risk.
Douglas Heller: Heller is Consumer Federation of America's director of Insurance. He has two decades of work on public policy and regulatory matters related to property-casualty insurance and, for nine years, served as the executive director of the national consumer advocacy organization, Consumer Watchdog. Heller is a board member of the California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan (CAARP), which oversees that state's innovative Low-Cost Auto Insurance Program for low-income drivers, and he serves on the Executive Board of the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud.
Dave Jones: Jones is the Director of the Climate Risk Initiative at UC Berkeley's Center for Law, Energy and the Environment (CLEE). Jones served two terms as California's Insurance Commissioner from 2011 to 2018.
David Long: Long is the former chairman and CEO of Liberty Mutual Insurance and now sits on the board of MassMutual. Long began his career at Liberty Mutual Insurance in 1985, being appointed president in 2010, CEO in 2011, and chairman in 2013. Under his leadership as CEO, Liberty Mutual became the sixth-largest global property and casualty (P&C) insurer.
Kevin Stiroh: Stiroh is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future, where he leads research efforts on climate-related financial and macroeconomic risks and policy implications. Most recently, Stiroh was a senior advisor in the Division of Supervision and Regulation at the Board of Governors where he designed and led the Fed's microprudential approach to the financial risks of climate change. He also served as cochair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Risks. Prior to that role, Stiroh served as executive vice president and head of the Supervision Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and was a member of the Federal Reserve's Supervision Committee and Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (LISCC), co-lead of the Basel Committee's Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Risks, and chair of the Senior Supervisors Group.
Nancy Wallace: Wallace is a professor of Finance and Real Estate and holds the Lisle and Roslyn Payne Chair in Real Estate and Capital Markets at the Haas School of Business, the University of California, Berkeley. She is chair of the Real Estate Group, co-chair of the Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, and directs the Real Estate and Financial Markets Laboratory.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.brookings.edu/news/brookings-hutchins-center-forms-task-force-on-reducing-impact-of-extreme-weather-on-insurance-costs-availability/
[Category: ThinkTank]