Think Tanks
Think Tanks
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Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Bloomberg Opinion: Working Women Are Doing Great, Except for the Pay
NEW YORK, Sept. 17 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Sept. 15, 2025, to Bloomberg Opinion:* * *
Working Women Are Doing Great, Except for the Pay
By Allison Schrager
The changing US economy will result in more opportunities and jobs for women, but not necessarily more compensation.
For male workers, the short-term news about wages is good but the long-term news isn't. For female workers, it's the other way around. As for the gender pay gap -- well, it's complicated.
Men experienced a significant real wage increase last quarter, up 1.7% from the previous ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Sept. 17 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Sept. 15, 2025, to Bloomberg Opinion: * * * Working Women Are Doing Great, Except for the Pay By Allison Schrager The changing US economy will result in more opportunities and jobs for women, but not necessarily more compensation. For male workers, the short-term news about wages is good but the long-term news isn't. For female workers, it's the other way around. As for the gender pay gap -- well, it's complicated. Men experienced a significant real wage increase last quarter, up 1.7% from the previousquarter. For women, wages fell slightly, by 0.2%. The result is a further widening of the gender pay gap, which had been narrowing but has been stubbornly persistent in recent years. In the medium term, however, women are doing slightly better than men -- their real wages are up 3.6% from last year, compared to 3.5% for men. And over the long term, the labor market is in their favor.
That doesn't mean the gender pay gap will go away, however. In fact, it may even grow.
Continue reading the entire piece here at Bloomberg Opinion (paywall) (https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-09-15/gender-pay-gap-is-stuck-but-what-about-the-gender-job-gap?srnd=undefined)
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Allison Schrager is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor of City Journal.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/working-women-are-doing-great-except-for-the-pay
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Germany Needs Changes to Its Innovation Policy
MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 17 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:* * *
Germany Needs Changes to its Innovation Policy
A new approach to innovation policy would make Germany more sustainable in the long term, as proposed by a research team at the ifo Institute. "Sustainable economic growth requires funding and innovation primarily in key technologies such as AI, biotechnology, microelectronics or quantum technology," says Oliver Falck, Director of the ifo Center for the Economics of Innovation and Digital Transformation and co-author of the study. At present, the policy tends to ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 17 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Germany Needs Changes to its Innovation Policy A new approach to innovation policy would make Germany more sustainable in the long term, as proposed by a research team at the ifo Institute. "Sustainable economic growth requires funding and innovation primarily in key technologies such as AI, biotechnology, microelectronics or quantum technology," says Oliver Falck, Director of the ifo Center for the Economics of Innovation and Digital Transformation and co-author of the study. At present, the policy tends tosubsidize large-scale projects of established companies. A mission-oriented innovation policy, on the other hand, would contribute to major social goals - such as climate neutrality or digitalization - and create competition for the best solutions.
Private R&D spending is currently concentrated in traditional sectors such as the automotive industry or mechanical engineering, while future fields remain underfunded. "If Germany wants to increase annual spending on R&D to at least 3.5 percent of GDP by 2030, as envisaged in the coalition agreement, it must create incentives for more private investment in future fields," says Nina Czernich, co-author of the study. A mission-oriented policy could support that by setting targets without giving preference to individual sectors.
However, such a policy requires strong framework conditions for it to be effective: competent institutions with specialist knowledge, competitive elements in allocating funds, and independence from short-term political interests. Added to that are better conditions for startups and private investors. "Although a mission-oriented policy is not a panacea," says Falck, "it can nevertheless help deploy resources in a more targeted way. Otherwise, Germany risks falling behind internationally in important future technologies."
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2025-09-15/germany-needs-changes-its-innovation-policy
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Reauthorizing and Reforming the Small Business Innovation Research Program Is Essential for U.S. National Security
WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2025:* * *
Reauthorizing and Reforming the Small Business Innovation Research Program Is Essential for U.S. National Security
By Jerry McGinn and Henry H. Carroll
The vitality of the United States' federal innovation ecosystem relies heavily on the nation's small businesses. Since 1982, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program has helped small firms translate ideas into prototypes and prototypes into solutions across the federal government. Its complement, the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Sept. 15, 2025: * * * Reauthorizing and Reforming the Small Business Innovation Research Program Is Essential for U.S. National Security By Jerry McGinn and Henry H. Carroll The vitality of the United States' federal innovation ecosystem relies heavily on the nation's small businesses. Since 1982, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program has helped small firms translate ideas into prototypes and prototypes into solutions across the federal government. Its complement, theSmall Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program, was created in 1992 to encourage commercialization of university research through partnerships with small businesses. SBIR and STTR funding has grown to almost $6 billion annually in recent years across 11 U.S. federal agencies.
Unfortunately, SBIR and STTR authorities will expire on September 30, and without congressional action, the United States risks undermining one of its core engines of technological innovation. Millions of dollars in SBIR awards could be delayed or potentially cancelled.
This moment calls not just for renewal but reform. To remain relevant and impactful, SBIR should continue to evolve--particularly by strengthening accountability and data collection on the transition rate of SBIR Phase II projects into actual programs of record. Reauthorization should be paired with improvements that make SBIR more measurable, effective, and aligned with national needs.
On September 9, 2025, Iowa Senator Joni Ernst came to CSIS to discuss the pressing need to reauthorize and reform SBIR. Senator Ernst called for reforms to SBIR outlined in her INNOVATE Act, which seeks to reorient the SBIR program away from what she calls "SBIR mills"--a select group of firms that are the most frequent SBIR awardees--and to increase the participation of firms that have never received a SBIR award before. SBIR is set to expire on September 30, and the debate over its future remains unresolved as negotiations continue in Congress.
SBIR and Innovation in the Federal Government
Leaders within the U.S. government are keenly interested in encouraging innovation. The use of SBIR and STTR grants, as well as Other Transactions (OTs), has dramatically grown as leaders view these efforts as a proxy for the federal government's innovation effort. The Baroni Center for Government Contracting at George Mason University recently released its Government Contracting Trends and Performance Index, which studied 200,000 firms across the federal industrial base. The study found that the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies' SBIR/STTR spending had grown to a total of almost $6 billion by 2023, nearly three times larger than in 2013, as illustrated in Figure 1.
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Jerry McGinn
Jerry McGinn
Director, Center for the Industrial Base and Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department
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Henry Carroll
Henry H. Carroll
Research Associate, Center for the Industrial Base
Programs & Projects
Center for the Industrial Base
Defense and Security
Remote Visualization
Congress created SBIR because of its view that small businesses are the principal drivers of innovation. Small businesses are agile and can be closer to the cutting edge of new technologies than larger defense primes or traditional contractors. This makes them invaluable contributors to federal missions that require speed, ingenuity, and novel approaches. CSIS's panel event on SBIR on September 9 explored the success stories of three small businesses that work for the federal government and highlighted how SBIR kick-started many of these firms' ability to deliver solutions to the government. The SBIR program has been the subject of numerous reviews, which have found that the program has successfully stimulated innovation and encouraged various federal agencies to include small businesses in their research and development (R&D) efforts.
However, SBIR is a small part of the overall government spending directed towards small businesses. Despite the common mental image in senior federal leadership that small businesses are consistently engines of innovation, the majority of work performed by small businesses for the federal government is largely unrelated to innovation. The categories of work dominated by small businesses include civil engineering, software installation and programming, facility utilities installation and repair, administrative services, and nontechnical manufacturing.
Within the DOD, small businesses play an important role, though not always in areas typically associated with innovation. As shown in Figure 2, the DOD is the leading agency distributing SBIR funding by total amount of funds dispersed and number of individual grants. These allocations have steadily increased over the past decade for both the DOD and all other federal agencies. Beyond just SBIR, small businesses account for around a fifth of the DOD's total contract obligations and a fourth of other federal agencies' contract obligations. However, DOD contracts for small businesses are largely for facility services, administrative services, wholesalers, nontechnical manufacturing, and computer software installation services, which are not often thought of as sectors driving innovation.
Remote Visualization
The Challenge of Converting Innovation into Programs of Record
SBIR is not without flaws. Perhaps the most persistent challenge is the transition gap. SBIR grants have three phases: (I) Feasibility, (II) Prototyping, and (III) Commercialization. While Phases I and II are funded by agencies' SBIR budgets, Phase III is not funded by the SBIR program and is designed to be the "success" condition--wherein the SBIR project accomplished the goal of becoming a commercially viable product with uptake by federal agencies or others. Small businesses can face great difficulty in moving from Phase II awards (where a prototype is developed) into Phase III or programs of record (where the government buys and scales the solution).
Improving transition rates from Phase II to Phase III requires more than just money. After all, SBIR funds cannot go towards Phase III commercialization spending. Instead, improving transition across what is commonly called the "valley of death" requires a deliberate effort to align SBIR awards with actual government needs, to involve program managers early in the process, and to track outcomes systematically. While not all innovative efforts should necessarily be adopted, a great loss for the federal government and its taxpayers is when SBIR projects succeed technically but fail bureaucratically, as they are unable to find champions in the acquisition system who can shepherd them into broader use.
A related challenge is that of proper metrics and data collection. While the usage of SBIR has exploded in the past several years, the U.S. federal government does not measure whether this funding is successfully serving the mission of creating innovation and commercialization. There is no public data that captures how many SBIR/STTR-funded prototype development programs have led to programs of record. Without the ability to quantify the conversion of SBIR programs from Phase II to Phase III, the federal government cannot see whether and where its spending is creating the desired effects. Moreover, in the absence of metrics, it is easy for critics to cast doubt on the program's efficacy. As government leaders often use SBIR funding (along with STTR and OTs) as a proxy for overall innovation, the inability to measure SBIR commercialization hampers the government's full understanding of its innovation ecosystem.
Considerations as SBIR Faces Reauthorization
SBIR is a powerful vehicle for translating U.S. ingenuity into solutions for the federal government. It has allowed small businesses to prove their ideas, and it has given the federal government access to a pool of innovation that may otherwise have been out of its view. Without reauthorization, the United States would be left with a weakened innovation pipeline, even as global competitors double down on state-backed technology development.
However, Congress should not ignore SBIR's current shortcomings. Some experts call for expanding participation beyond the current SBIR and STTR recipient base. They point to Government Accountability Office findings that 10 percent of Phase II dollars were awarded to 22 firms, which represent fewer than 1 percent of all Phase II awardees, from FY 2011 through FY 2020. Senator Ernst has championed the INNOVATE Act to cap lifetime SBIR awards to a single firm at $75 million. Other experts argue that multiple SBIR awards to the same firm can advance the goals of innovation by building momentum, creating expertise, and helping bridge the acquisition valley of death for small firms.
Reauthorization can be paired with reform. The administration could collaborate with Congress to collect and publicly disseminate greater data on SBIR/STTR to better quantify innovation spending and successes. Federal agencies should be required to measure and report transition outcomes. This data would enable the government to more clearly understand the innovation and commercialization cycle, as well as the impact of capabilities derived from SBIR spending. Over time, a data-driven approach would raise the overall effectiveness of the program.
Congress should act swiftly to reauthorize SBIR. At the same time, policymakers should address implementation issues. By building stronger metrics, ensuring better alignment with operational needs, and smoothing the transition from prototypes to programs of record, SBIR can continue powering U.S. innovation for the federal government in the decades ahead.
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Jerry McGinn is director of the Center for the Industrial Base and senior fellow with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Henry H. Carroll is a research associate with the Center for the Industrial Base at CSIS.
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The authors would like to express their thanks to Madison Bruno and Sabina Hung for their editing and visualization support. The authors also thank the Baroni Center for Government Contracting for its permission to use their data for the accompanying graphics.
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[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Introduction - How to Think About Modern Warfare
WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Sept. 16, 2025:* * *
Introduction: How to Think About Modern Warfare
This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Defense and Security Department entitled War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East (http://features.csis.org/war-modern-battlefield).
By Eliot A. Cohen
It is a long-standing habit of military historians to describe changes in warfare in terms of two biological paradigms: more or less steady evolution on the one hand and punctuated ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Sept. 16, 2025: * * * Introduction: How to Think About Modern Warfare This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Defense and Security Department entitled War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East (http://features.csis.org/war-modern-battlefield). By Eliot A. Cohen It is a long-standing habit of military historians to describe changes in warfare in terms of two biological paradigms: more or less steady evolution on the one hand and punctuatedequilibrium on the other./1 The messy truth is in between. Sometimes the practice of war--its art and science, the sources of military strength and weakness--advances by fits and starts, and sometimes it evolves at a steady pace.
It is reasonable to assert that the world is at a junction at which war is changing rapidly and that the pure evolutionary model no longer suffices. A confluence of political, social, and technological changes have collectively made war something very different than the practitioners and theorists of the Cold War expected and understood. That is why this collection of studies is so important: There are very large changes underway which have to be understood from multiple perspectives and which resist simple characterization.
The Cold War saw different forms of conflict: irregular wars, which characterized the end of the European empires and their sequels (as in Vietnam), and short, sharp conventional conflicts (as in the 1967, 1973, and 1982 Arab-Israeli wars, the 1971 India-Pakistan War, or the China-Vietnam war of 1979). These wars could be very costly, with casualties in the tens of thousands and possibly more, but by and large they were relatively brief and contained.
The conflicts occurring today in Ukraine and the Middle East have changed that paradigm. These have been two large and protracted wars, lasting not weeks or months but years. They have involved enormous damage to civilian infrastructure and opposed not individual actors but large coalitions of states assisting proxies or clients. Whereas the wars of the late twentieth century involved one-sided dominance of the air, in these wars, missiles, drones, and occasionally aircraft are able to penetrate deep into enemy territory. These wars are different.
Through them, the United States and its allies have rediscovered some old truths--chief among them the importance of industrial production of end items and munitions. In 2022, the United States' entire monthly production of 155 mm artillery rounds amounted to only somewhat more than what Ukraine expended every day--and considerably less than Russia's daily rate of use. European allies were even worse off. Even Russia, which had retained an industrial mobilization model for war production, has not been able to meet the demands of the Ukraine war and depended on poorer but industrially deeper clients, like North Korea and Iran, to make up the shortfalls.
Similarly, the West has rediscovered the phenomenon of irregular--or as we now prefer to call it, hybrid--warfare. All wars, including the World Wars, have included the extensive use of propaganda, subversion, and proxy and guerrilla warfare. In no case were these factors sufficient to change the fundamental balance of power, but they played their part nonetheless. However, these elements are playing an increasing role in contemporary warfare.
The nuclear dimension of strategy has also reappeared after a hiatus of more than a generation. While fears of nuclear proliferation helped trigger the Second Gulf War in 2003 and concerns about the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs have been important in U.S. foreign policy, nuclear weapons played only a minor role in the strategic thinking of the United States and other large powers from the end of the Cold War through the 2020s. That is no longer the case. The rise of China's nuclear arsenal is one reason for this: China had doubled its number of nuclear warheads in the last decade, and it looks to double them again by 2030. As a result, the United States now faces two potential nuclear opponents that equal or may even overmatch it. Even more troubling, the disruption of the United States' European alliances brought about by the Trump administration may very well launch a cascade of proliferation that will reshape geopolitics, for example, if countries like Poland and Finland feel they can no longer trust a U.S. deterrent.
There are, however, genuinely new developments in the techne of war. The widespread use of unmanned systems in the Ukraine war is a notable example. Some of the first drones appeared at the end of World War I--most notably the Kettering Bug--and they sporadically reappeared during World War II and in Vietnam. The first major use came in the 1982 Israel-Lebanon war. But the Russia-Ukraine war (like the Azeri-Armenian war of 2020) saw a massive development in drone warfare: a change in quantity that became a change in quality.
From a few hundred unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) at the beginning of the war, Ukraine began deploying thousands, then tens of thousands of drones, and is now manufacturing millions annually. Russia, of course, followed suit. The pattern of ground combat changed, as a UAS-saturated battlefield paralyzed vehicular movement, while an entire fleet--Russia's Black Sea Fleet--has suffered greater than 30 percent losses and was stopped in its tracks by the attacks of unmanned surface and subsurface systems.2 Unmanned ground-based systems have also begun to appear, which will no doubt evolve and proliferate as well.
The deployment of various forms of AI in a military context is also a genuine innovation that has become pervasive. Automatic target recognition and the processing of vast quantities of data has enabled Israel to conduct orders of magnitude more strikes in its wars with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon than it could have otherwise. Not only does AI enable the unmanned systems revolution, but it has increasingly transformed tactical- and even operational-level decisionmaking, with consequences for the degree of human control of combat in all of its domains.
It is reasonable to expect that soon enough even terrorist organizations will be able to launch swarms of drones that cooperate with each other to attack targets. Indeed, such a capability probably already exists. The use of sophisticated facial recognition and other targeting software means that the barriers to extensive assassination campaigns, once the prerogative only of the United States, will lessen. The planning and execution of long-range attacks enabled by AI will not completely level the playing field for war, but it will go a long way toward it.
War is changing in other respects as well. It has expanded to new realms, chiefly space and cyberspace. Space-based systems first played an important role in the 1991 Gulf War, but the consequences were one-sided and largely confined to reconnaissance, navigation, and communications. However, the recent explosion in satellite numbers is remarkable. In 2015, there were about 1,400 active satellites in orbit; in 2025, there are over 10,000, and the next decade may see that number quintupling.3 Already, all countries can make some use of space for communications, navigation, and reconnaissance whether or not they possess their own satellites. Further, the potential now exists for actual warfare in and from space, including kinetic and non-kinetic attacks on satellite systems and the delivery of kinetic weapons from space to Earth. Compounding this spread of space-based capabilities is the increased (if murky) interest of great powers in the use of space as an area of combat; the temptation of blinding an opponent, or delivering unanswerable strikes from outer space, may be too much to resist in the next war.
Meanwhile, conflict in cyberspace is now constant--albeit with spikes at particular moments, such as during the first months of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 or in the Russian attack on Estonia in 2007. What remains to be seen (but will almost surely occur) is the use of cyberattacks to conduct lethal forms of sabotage.
For the United States, all of these changes come at a time when its strategic predicament has become more global and multifaceted. Three large geopolitical challenges have emerged. The first of these is a coalition of hostile powers--China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea--that collude in several respects and have a common objective of bringing U.S. predominance to an end. Their collaboration across multiple domains--like the deployment of North Korean troops and Iranian drones to fight Ukraine, the sharing of advanced military technology and production, cooperation in disinformation campaigns, and probably sabotage operations against the West--is a challenge unparalleled since the early days of the Cold War.
The second challenge, which results from both geopolitics and technology, is the return of the threat of global war. Particularly after the Cold War, the U.S. military got into the habit of thinking about war as a regional matter, chiefly in the Middle East. Even as China rose, the United States continued to mostly conceptualize the challenge as a regional one in the Indo-Pacific. But because of the size of China's economy, the expanding nature of its forces, and the evolution of technology--as well as the emergence of the coalition described above--it is likely that a war with China would be global. Hypersonic missiles, space-based weapons, and long-range naval forces coupled with sabotage and covert action mean that even the U.S. mainland would be vulnerable for the first time since the nineteenth century.
Most troubling of all, the United States is no longer the dominant power it once was. To be sure, its relative decline has been exaggerated: Its military remains large and capable, and its share of global economic production (roughly one quarter) has been stable over a generation. Its research and development base remains unequalled, and its basic material ingredients of national power--geographical position, natural resources, and economic and financial strength--are substantial.
One of the great imponderables is what war will look like when all the dimensions, new and old, are woven together--information operations, irregular warfare, cyberattacks, space warfare, and even conceivably biological and nuclear warfare.
But with China, in particular, the United States faces a rival unlike any since Nazi Germany--and that confrontation occurred in a world where the next two leading powers, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, were U.S. allies. The Chinese economy is smaller than that of the United States, but not by an order of magnitude; increasingly, China's technological capabilities are comparable, and its manufacturing and shipbuilding base considerably superior. In such a world, the United States, with the many vulnerabilities created by its main source of strength--its open society--may be liable to receiving shattering surprises of a kind that have not occurred since Pearl Harbor.
One of the great imponderables is what war will look like when all the dimensions, new and old, are woven together--information operations, irregular warfare, cyberattacks, space warfare, and even conceivably biological and nuclear warfare. It would be unlike anything experienced before in scope and scale, even World War II.
In the essays that follow, CSIS scholars consider many dimensions of the changing character of war. Throughout, it is important to consider not just technology, which may evolve at tremendous speed, but also the relationship between the technical means of war, the politics that underly conflict, and the psychology of those who must direct it.
For example, historically it has been assumed that a large population of young people--and specifically young men--was essential for the waging of war. It is reasonable to ask whether the vast proliferation of unmanned weapons systems, and the reversion of humans to their direction and control, reduces the significance of demographic disadvantage. Or consider how old modes of warfare waged with new techniques have different efficacy because of new conditions. At one level, information warfare is as old as war itself. Propaganda and disinformation played their roles in the eighteenth century as much as the twentieth. But in an age of fragmented media, deepfakes, and bots, they may have a significantly different and possibly larger role to play.
Finally, technology will affect how political and military leaders--whose essential human characteristics, after all, have not evolved--direct war. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, modern technology has made it ever easier for leaders to exercise direct supervision and control over forces on the battlefield. Yet the nature of war remains: chaos and confusion are generated (as Clausewitz pointed out) not by the physical smoke over the battlefield but by the pressures it generates. There is no guarantee that new technologies will improve the quality of wartime leadership. Indeed, they may actually serve to weaken it.
In sum, the world of war that may emerge in the remaining three-quarters of the twenty-first century is more extensive, less comprehensible, and possibly even more devastating than anything humanity has ever known. That alone should be enough to compel its study with the utmost care--and to that end, these essays are an excellent beginning.
Outline of the Report
This report is divided into three primary sections. The first addresses the implications of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East on war at the strategic, political, and societal levels. Chapter 1 argues that there is likely to be a deepening of relations going forward among U.S. competitors and adversaries. Chapter 2 demonstrates that societal resilience is a critical and integrated aspect of national security, which strategic planners should not relegate to a secondary consideration. And modern warfare for allies and adversaries alike will increasingly rely on nuclear weapons, as Chapter 3 articulates.
The second section of the report assesses the future of warfare in operations, tactics, and technology, addressing the implications of the current wars on particular domains and capability areas. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the impact of battle networks on operations before Chapter 5 highlights the continued significance of landpower in war. Chapter 6 argues that the experiences in Ukraine and the Middle East show that reigns of fire will endure, as offensive and defensive fires remain critical to combined operations. Technological advances, massive data analysis, and open-source intelligence have changed the world of intelligence and spycraft, as depicted in Chapter 7, but they have also contributed to a blurring of lines between state, industry, and academic actors.
Chapter 8 argues that the war in Ukraine has been a turning point in the role of space in warfare, demonstrating how space capabilities can create an advantage over a more capable military power. Other emerging technologies will push future conflicts into a competition of who can evolve and innovate more quickly, according to Chapter 9. This may be particularly true in the air domain, where Chapter 10 argues that AI-enabled decisionmaking will play an increasingly important role in a challenging environment shaped by increasingly sophisticated and diverse sensors. In the naval domain, Chapter 11 identifies that the Ukraine and Middle East wars, despite being predominantly land campaigns, yield some notable insights for current action, including expanding munitions inventories, accelerating uncrewed systems, and hedging on major surface combatants. Chapter 12 argues that the ongoing wars demonstrate that irregular warfare is not a relic of the past but a defining feature of contemporary conflict.
The third section of the report addresses implications for defense budgets, logistics, and acquisition. Chapter 13 discusses the growth in global defense spending among allies and competitors and trends in procurement patterns. Chapter 14 argues that logistics is more critically important today than in the past, and Chapter 15 addresses how industry must evolve given the acquisition patterns in conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. The report concludes by discussing how prepared the United States is for competition, deterrence, and warfare in this new era of conflict.
Please consult the PDF (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-09/250916_DSD_War_ModernBattlefield.pdf) for references.
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Eliot A. Cohen is the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/introduction-how-think-about-modern-warfare
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Evolution of Irregular Warfare
WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Sept. 16, 2025:* * *
The Evolution of Irregular Warfare
This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Defense and Security Department entitled War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East (http://features.csis.org/war-modern-battlefield).
By Daniel Byman, Seth G. Jones and Sofia Triana
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East offer many lessons for better understanding, conducting, and countering irregular warfare./1 On October 7, 2023, the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Sept. 16, 2025: * * * The Evolution of Irregular Warfare This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Defense and Security Department entitled War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East (http://features.csis.org/war-modern-battlefield). By Daniel Byman, Seth G. Jones and Sofia Triana The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East offer many lessons for better understanding, conducting, and countering irregular warfare./1 On October 7, 2023, theHamas attack on Israel combined attacks on Israeli military bases near Gaza, border security infrastructure, and military communications equipment with atrocities against Israeli civilians and the taking of civilian hostages. Russia, for its part, accompanied its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine with cyberattacks, attempts to kill President Volodymyr Zelensky, and a deepfake in March 2022 to try to encourage Ukraine's surrender. Ukraine has used guerrilla attacks, sabotage, and leadership assassinations to fight Moscow. Some combination of these and other forms of irregular warfare is likely in future conflicts.
U.S. and allied planning, posture, and doctrine must prepare for irregular warfare, incorporating the impact of civilians and recognizing the vital roles of special operations forces and intelligence services in conflict.
Drawing on the lessons from the Ukraine and Middle East wars, this chapter makes the following arguments about irregular warfare:
Irregular warfare often occurs as a prelude to, or side-by-side with, regular warfare and can inflict many casualties, undermine resilience, and raise the price of occupation.
Civilians are often at the heart of irregular warfare--as shields, as victims, and as targets of coercion--and governments must consider this when confronting opponents who use irregular warfare and in their own irregular warfare operations.
Intelligence is critical to counter irregular warfare, as Israel's successes show, and in general an effective response can limit the coercive power of irregular warfare.
U.S. and allied planning, posture, and doctrine must prepare for irregular warfare, incorporating the impact of civilians and recognizing the vital roles of special operations forces (SOF) and intelligence services in conflict. This, in turn, will require adaptation, including recognizing differences between irregular warfare involving great powers (as compared with past U.S. efforts against weaker insurgencies and terrorist groups) and ensuring that private sector technology and expertise are incorporated into U.S. efforts.
This chapter has three sections. The first section notes several lessons from the Ukraine and Middle East wars; the second examines Israeli and Ukrainian successes regarding irregular warfare; and the third discusses the implications of these lessons for the future of warfare.
Lessons from Ukraine and the Middle East
The experiences of Ukraine and the Middle East offer many lessons on how to think about irregular warfare now and in the future. First, irregular warfare often occurs side by side with conventional warfare, and it is necessary to prepare for the two happening simultaneously as well as in isolation. Second, the death toll and other costs of irregular warfare can be high, especially for enduring conflicts. Third, hostage taking, terrorism, assassination, and other means of conducting and fighting irregular warfare are often part of broader efforts to coerce and deter opponents.
Irregular and Conventional Warfare in Tandem
In both the Ukraine and Middle East wars, irregular warfare has occurred simultaneously with regular warfare. In parts of Ukraine occupied by Russia, Ukrainian partisans, directed by Ukrainian special operations forces, used guerrilla attacks to kill Russian forces, disrupt lines of supply and communication, and sabotage Russian weapons systems. These efforts disrupted the flow of military supplies and forced the Kremlin to divert resources from the front lines to the repair and defense of its rail infrastructure instead, placing additional strain on an already struggling railroad network. Ukrainians have also used nonviolent resistance, such as wearing yellow ribbons in solidarity and distributing information to counter Russian propaganda./2 Overall, Ukraine's efforts have hindered the movement of Russian troops and created supply bottlenecks./3 More importantly, they have also prevented Russia from successfully incorporating captured Ukrainian territory into Russia. The cost for Ukrainian civilians is high: The United Nations reports over 12,000 civilians have died so far, including many in territory occupied by Russia./4
Ukraine has also targeted Russian warships in the Baltic Sea as well as railway networks, blowing up the Sveromuysky tunnel in eastern Russia and damaging a critical railway bridge near the city of Kinel. In the case of the Sveromuysky tunnel attack, Ukraine's Security Service reportedly sabotaged a train's fuel tank, causing it to catch fire as it moved through the tunnel. Other trains scheduled to go through the tunnel were then rerouted to a bridge where they were damaged as explosive devices planted along the alternate route promptly detonated./5
In the Middle East, some groups, like the Lebanese Hezbollah, have integrated irregular approaches to warfare into their order of battle and military doctrine. Hezbollah has long fought Israel with rocket and missile strikes, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist attacks, and it has also trained groups--like Hamas--that have a similar set of capabilities, if less powerful. Israel, which has mostly fought a conventional war against its opponents, nonetheless has mixed a conventional invasion of Gaza with leadership strikes on Hamas throughout the Middle East and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The High Cost of Irregular Warfare
Irregular warfare is often considered a weapon of the weak, yet it can still inflict considerable costs on a strong opponent. Hamas was undeterred by Israel's military superiority and killed around 1,200 Israelis--mostly civilians--on October 7, inflicting an extremely high number of casualties on a small and casualty-sensitive country. Over 400 more Israeli soldiers have died in subsequent combat in Gaza, where Hamas has used hit-and-run attacks, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other indirect means to inflict casualties while avoiding a direct confrontation with the better-armed and better-trained Israel Defense Forces (IDF)./6 The ensuing conflagration has similarly led to the deaths of some 60,000 Palestinians, further illustrating the high costs of irregular warfare. In addition to the death toll in the Gaza war, the Hamas attacks pushed Israel into war not only in Gaza but also in Lebanon and Yemen.
Such irregular warfare measures have raised the price of occupation. Fighting insurgents, especially in densely populated areas like Gaza, requires a grinding counterinsurgency with high force levels. For the Gaza war and other Middle East conflicts, Israel mobilized some 360,000 reservists./7 As of August 2025, Israel has conducted a 22-month war to suppress Hamas, yet the group remains the strongest organization in Gaza. Similarly, Russia has not fully pacified the territory it occupies./8
Irregular Warfare as a Tool of Coercion and Deterrence
The threat of irregular warfare can also be used in attempts to coerce and deter. Iran, for example, relies heavily on Hezbollah and other proxy groups to impose costs on Israel, the United States, and its Arab enemies. The threat of Hezbollah rocket and terrorist attacks was in part meant to deter Israeli operations against Iran itself. In addition, Iran-backed groups like the Houthis attacked Red Sea shipping to coerce Israel into ending its war in Gaza. Russia has also engaged in a comprehensive campaign of sabotage in Europe to punish countries that supported Ukraine and limit future support. Moscow's increasingly brazen attacks have included jamming GPS systems to disrupt civil aviation, causing deliberate damage to undersea gas pipelines and telecommunications cables, sabotaging water utilities in Poland and France, and conducting arson attacks in the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, and Latvia.9 Russia has also targeted facilities with more direct links to the war in Ukraine, including a BAE Systems munitions factory in Wales and a U.S. military base in Bavaria./10
Hostage taking has proved an important part of both the Gaza and Ukraine wars. In Gaza, Hamas and other Palestinian groups initially took 251 hostages--including children, the elderly, and other noncombatants as well as many non-Israelis--and, as of August 2025, around 50 are still in captivity, although more than half of these are presumed dead. The presence of hostages has complicated Israeli targeting and offered a form of protection for Hamas leaders. In occupied Ukraine, Russia has engaged in forced deportations of almost 20,000 children to Russia, placing them with Russian families and refusing to return them to their Ukrainian relatives./11
In part because irregular forces hide among civilians, countering irregular warfare can involve considerable death and suffering in the civilian population. Hamas fighters have blended in with Gazan civilians and hidden arms and fighters in civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals and schools. Israel's response has been devastating for ordinary Gazans, with over 60,000 Gazans killed in total as of August 2025, most of them civilians, as well as most of Gaza's infrastructure destroyed. Operations that involve numerous civilian casualties place an additional burden on democracies, which are more likely to receive criticism when their military operations involve civilian deaths.
Israel has devastated Hamas and Hezbollah through assassinations, and both Russia and Ukraine have used assassinations as well. Although Ukrainian authorities rarely claim responsibility for their covert actions, they have carried out high-profile assassinations in occupied Ukrainian territories as well as on Russian soil. Among the individuals successfully targeted by Kyiv are Vladlen Tatarsky, a Russian military blogger; Igor Kirillov, the chief of Russia's radioactive, chemical, and biological defense forces; and Illya Kyva, a pro-Russia former Ukrainian member of parliament who fled to Russia during the war. Ukraine has also targeted leaders in occupied Ukraine who collaborated with Russia.12 Moscow, for its part, has also undertaken a broad campaign of targeted assassinations in Ukraine and across Europe, poisoning the wife of Ukraine's military intelligence chief, killing a senior Ukrainian covert action leader, plotting to assassinate the chief executive of German arms maker Rheinmetall, and gunning down a Russian military defector in Spain./13
Countering Irregular Warfare
Although irregular warfare is difficult to combat, both Israel and Ukraine have scored many victories. The Lebanese Hezbollah, one of the world's premier guerrilla organizations and one that fought Israel to a standstill in their last all-out clash in 2006, largely failed in its use of irregular warfare against Israel and ended up taking tremendous losses. Israeli intelligence deeply penetrated Hezbollah, sabotaging its pagers and walkie-talkies and gaining precise information on the locations of Hezbollah leaders. With this intelligence, Israel was able to decimate Hezbollah's senior leadership, including killing the group's longtime secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, and inflicting significant losses on its rank and file. Israel also successfully targeted much of the group's rocket and missile arsenal. This stockpile, estimated to contain between 120,000 and 200,000 projectiles, was reduced by half due to Israeli airstrikes.14 Hezbollah was forced to sue for peace, ending its attacks on Israel and agreeing to withdraw its forces from the Lebanon-Israel border, with Israel making few concessions.
Iran's ties to Hezbollah, militant groups in Iraq, and the Houthis did not deter the United States or Israel from acting against it militarily. Israel in particular targeted Iranian military leaders in Syria and Lebanon and the leader of Hamas when he was in Iran. Tehran did try to restore its credibility with drone and missile attacks on Israel, but this too was a failure, with Israel--helped by the United States, Jordan, and other countries--tracking and downing most of the attacking force. When Israel and Iran fought a bigger battle in June 2025, Hezbollah avoided joining the fray.
Hamas's seizure of Israeli hostages has likewise not proven an effective deterrent. Despite the presence of over 200 hostages, Israel launched an all-out assault on Gaza, and in its operations has conducted highly destructive attacks that have threatened the hostages as well as their Hamas kidnappers. Israeli ground forces have also accidentally killed hostages./15
Finally, Israel and the United States have prevented Iran from escalating irregular warfare into conventional success; indeed, Tehran's efforts to do so have led to embarrassing failures. After the killing of Iranian, Hezbollah, and Hamas leaders, Iran twice launched large salvos of rocket, missile, and drone attacks on Israel, and Israel responded with limited but precise attacks--the first time Iran and Israel have directly attacked each other's territory. Effective intelligence and air defense, however, prevented Iran's salvos from causing significant casualties in Israel, displaying Tehran's conventional military weakness in a highly public way. In part due to threats from Israel and the United States, Iran also hesitated to escalate further and counseled some of its proxies, such as those in Iraq, to limit attacks on U.S. bases.16 When Iran and Israel (joined by the United States) entered into the larger conflict in June 2025, Israel was quick to gain air supremacy and, in a short but effective air campaign, set back Iran's nuclear program and killed many Iranian leaders, with only a small number of casualties on the Israeli side.
Implications for the Future of Irregular Warfare
During the Cold War, the most frequent type of competition between the Soviet Union and the United States was irregular warfare, as the two sides fought proxy wars in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. The same may be true in the coming years as China expands its global presence. Although a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is possible, more likely are cyberattacks, disinformation, sabotage, and military threats to coerce Taipei and undermine morale.
In addition, the staggering cost of the Ukraine war in both money and lives suggests that an exhausted but predatory Russia may in the future prefer to use irregular war instead of conventional attacks to expand its influence. Russia's Main Directorate (GRU), Foreign Intelligence Service, semiprivate military companies, and other state and nonstate organizations are likely to continue assassinations, sabotage operations, offensive cyber campaigns, disinformation operations, intelligence collection, and other clandestine activities. The GRU's Service for Special Activities is likely to be particularly active, including Unit 29155 (also known as the 161 Center or, more formally, the 161 Intelligence Specialists Training Center), Unit 54654, and the GRU's headquarters and planning department.17 Russia will also likely continue to wage a disinformation campaign against the United States, conduct offensive cyber campaigns against U.S. and Western government agencies and companies, and engage in a range of other activities such as assassinations and sabotage.
Iran, for its part, emphasizes irregular warfare given the weakness of its conventional forces. It will continue to pose an irregular warfare threat to the United States and its allies and partners across the Middle East using a range of partner forces such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and other groups in the Palestinian territories, and the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. In addition, Iranian government entities such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as their nonstate partners, will likely improve their offensive cyber capabilities and their ability to conduct attacks against the United States and its allies and partners at home and abroad. Although Iran and its proxies' setbacks in 2024 and 2025 will make Iran more hesitant to take on Israel, Tehran has little choice but to fall back on irregular warfare, as its conventional forces are poorly armed.
In addition to excelling at high-end conflict, the United States and its allies must be prepared for irregular operations with attacks on civilians and the use of civilians as shields, ensure there are civil affairs officers who can repair civilian infrastructure, create partnerships with private sector companies with cyber and other expertise, and develop other capabilities to better counter irregular warfare.
Even as the United States emphasizes great power competition, it must not lose the knowledge gained after its interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of the world in the post-9/11 era--as happened when the U.S. military deliberately tried to put the Vietnam War behind it and, at high cost, had to relearn how to fight insurgencies. In addition, unlike in the Vietnam era, insurgents and other irregular forces may have great power support, including better weapons, funding, and intelligence. There is also a risk of escalation that must be managed when irregular forces have a great power sponsor.
Fighting irregular opponents often risks large numbers of civilian deaths. In some theaters there will be media and international scrutiny of the impact of military operations on the civilian population. Countries fighting in these regions will require a media and public relations strategy to go along with their operations, all while targeting procedures that seek to minimize harm to civilians. In addition, countries must be prepared for disinformation about their operations, specifically regarding their harmful impact on civilians.
Assassination and sabotage are likely to remain part of irregular warfare, both on offense and defense. If the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a guide, some of these assassinations are likely to occur far from the front lines, requiring new security protocols in more remote bases and even in faraway homelands. Sabotage of U.S. bases and supply lines, as well as those of allies, is also highly likely.
SOF will play a particularly critical role in combatting irregular warfare in the future. SOF need to adapt given the many differences between fighting against forces of or supported by a great power versus fighting terrorists. Russian forces, for example, have persistent surveillance and airpower that will make clandestine operations against them far harder for U.S. forces compared with U.S. efforts fighting terrorist groups. It will also be important to develop programs to raise forces to gather intelligence and fight behind enemy lines. Hostage rescue may also be required, even as military operations occur in close proximity.
Success in irregular warfare requires superb intelligence. Targeting adversary leadership (and protecting one's own) necessitates detailed information on leadership movements and communications. Striking irregular forces while limiting harm to civilians also requires excellent knowledge about the locations of fighters and the presence of nearby civilians. Sabotage, such as what Russia is currently conducting in Europe, needs to be disrupted, attributed, and called out to rally unified allied support. In addition, some intelligence may need to be released to counter claims that, for instance, the United States has targeted civilian infrastructure without military purpose.
Authoritarian states are also vulnerable to irregular warfare, of course, including information warfare. By leveraging commercial technologies, the United States and its partners should target the domestic populations of China, Russia, Iran, and other countries through covert, clandestine, and overt means, where appropriate. The commercial sector can be helpful in developing and utilizing AI, large language models, and software that directs information to specific audiences that Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and other regimes are attempting to control. Offensive information operations could focus on a range of issues, including domestic grievances and societal divisions, human rights abuses, economic problems, and corruption.
Military operations and intelligence units will likely need to develop greater capabilities to compete in the information space, including for such activities as covert influence and counter-value operations (targeting an adversary's civilian population). In cooperation with the commercial sector, AI and large language models have significant potential for irregular warfare applications. AI translation and message crafting can provide government officials with the ability to rapidly communicate in any language with anyone in the world. Advances in natural language processing will accelerate intelligence work, helping analysts sort through reams of text and drawing connections a human brain might not.
The military and intelligence communities need to fundamentally change the way they work with the commercial sector to compete more effectively in irregular warfare--both on offense and defense. Commercial innovation and commercial production capacity provide a major advantage for the United States and its allies and partners in irregular warfare, including for intelligence and military-related activities. But the United States has not adequately leveraged this advantage because of risk aversion, slow and burdensome contracting and acquisitions regulations, and a failure to adequately understand viable options in the commercial sector. There is a significant need to rethink the framework of government collaboration with this sector and to treat commercial entities as partners serving a common goal.
There is also a growing need to improve next-generation intelligence platforms, systems, and software that can quickly collect and analyze vast amounts of information on adversary activities for irregular warfare. Adversaries will likely attempt to hide their actions in a variety of terrains, including jungles, mountains, dense forests, subsurface locations, and tightly packed megacities. They will also attempt to use denial and deception tactics and techniques.18
Finally, an important goal is to limit the escalation of irregular warfare into conventional conflict. This can occur when major powers feel the need to respond to attacks on their proxies or when proxy attacks compel their targets to respond against the ultimate source. Israel and the United States achieved this with Iran in 2024, where Tehran's fear of U.S. and Israeli escalation led Iran to try to calibrate its initial attacks to avoid escalation and to avoid additional attacks after its failed drone and missile salvos.19
Conclusion
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East demonstrate that irregular warfare is not a relic of the past, but a defining feature of contemporary conflict--one that democratic states must be institutionally and operationally prepared to confront. Civilians are often the primary victims, caught between actors that deliberately use population centers for tactical advantage and militaries that must operate under intense legal and normative scrutiny. Indeed, in dense urban environments like Gaza City, civilians are often used as shields, and in Ukraine, noncombatants are the principal victims of coercive tactics intended to undermine resilience and morale. The persistent threat of assassination, sabotage, and hostage taking--often executed through or with support from intelligence and SOF--will remain a central feature of irregular campaigns. As adversaries grow more adept in their use of irregular means, democracies must invest not only in better intelligence, cyber defense, and targeting capabilities, but also in public communication strategies to counter disinformation and preserve legitimacy.
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East demonstrate that irregular warfare is not a relic of the past, but a defining feature of contemporary conflict--one that democratic states must be institutionally and operationally prepared to confront.
Still, the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have also demonstrated that well-coordinated efforts can reduce the impact of irregular warfare. Ukraine has disrupted numerous plots to assassinate President Volodymyr Zelensky. For Israel, timely and effective intelligence allowed it to decimate Hezbollah's ranks and quickly neutralize massive Iranian drone and rocket attacks.
Strategic adaptation is essential. The United States and its allies must preserve hard-won knowledge from post-9/11 counterinsurgency operations while recognizing that great power-backed irregular warfare poses far more sophisticated challenges than ever before. This includes preparing SOF for operations against technologically capable adversaries, building rapid and resilient intelligence-sharing platforms, and rethinking how the government works with commercial innovators to harness advances in AI and data analytics for irregular conflict. Future military operations will require increased readiness for irregular methods such as assassinations and sabotage, excellent intelligence, better cooperation with the private sector, and preparation for irregular warfare in an environment of great power competition. Future success will also depend on mitigating escalation risks--particularly when attacks by proxies or in the gray zone threaten to pull major powers into direct confrontation. The lessons from Ukraine and Israel point to a critical imperative: Irregular warfare is not only a tactical reality but a strategic domain in its own right, and ignoring it would be a grave miscalculation in an era of persistent geopolitical competition.
Please consult the PDF (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-09/250916_DSD_War_ModernBattlefield.pdf) for references.
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Daniel Byman is the director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Seth G. Jones is president of the Defense and Security Department at CSIS. Sofia Triana is a program coordinator and research assistant with the CSIS Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-12-irregular-warfare
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Evolution of Airpower
WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Sept. 16, 2025:* * *
The Evolution of Airpower
This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Defense and Security Department entitled War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East (http://features.csis.org/war-modern-battlefield).
By Clayton Swope
"Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the change in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur." - Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air, 1921
Giulio ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Sept. 16, 2025: * * * The Evolution of Airpower This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Defense and Security Department entitled War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East (http://features.csis.org/war-modern-battlefield). By Clayton Swope "Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the change in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur." - Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air, 1921 GiulioDouhet, an Italian general who directed the first wartime use of airplanes in 1911, called the airplane the "offensive weapon par excellence," alone capable of deciding the outcome of wars./1 The core military functions of airpower today--long-range bombardment, support to military surface forces, surveillance and reconnaissance, and transportation, as well as counterair operations--would look remarkably familiar to Douhet.
However, the tools and tactics used to perform these functions are constantly changing, having experienced a particularly rapid evolution on the battlefield in Ukraine. Air operations there and in the Middle East have been shaped by the mass production and deployment of both armed and unarmed uncrewed systems at scale, operational challenges arising from the lack of air superiority, and the effectiveness of electronic warfare and signal jamming. The convergence of these developments has produced new ways to carry out long-range bombardment and support to military surface forces, as well as tested and honed counterair operations using modern, layered integrated air defenses.
The future of military airpower will undoubtedly reflect warfighting experiences from Ukraine and the Middle East. But trends observed from recent conflicts should only serve as jumping off points for the future, rather than the playbook for air operations in the next war. As Douhet observed, wars are won by those who can anticipate changes in warfighting and not through merely adapting to the last war.
Anticipating the future, it is quite likely that thinking machines will play a major role in air and counterair operations. AI-enabled lethal autonomous weapons, which to date have barely been deployed, will play a prominent role, which in turn presages a diminishing role for human-piloted aircraft. Air operations in the future will also be challenged by the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated and diverse sensors, which will make it harder to maintain air superiority over any given area.
The Character and Functions of Military Airpower
The basic functions of military airpower have been apparent since at least the end of World War I and are likely to remain fairly unchanged, though the weapons and how those weapons are used will evolve./2 Aircraft, missiles, one-way drones, and other airborne projectiles are used for long-range bombardment, attacking an enemy's ability to make war by striking targets located well behind the front lines, such as economic and national infrastructure. Airpower is also used to attack elements of an enemy's armed forces engaged in warfighting and to support joint operations across all domains. Additionally, airpower can provide surveillance and reconnaissance (e.g., scouting, one of the earliest proposed military uses for the airplane) and transportation capabilities./3
To provide for the command of the air--allowing one's own forces to use airpower for the aforementioned aims and preventing an adversary from doing so--the final basic function of military airpower is counterair operations./4 All sides of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have used air power for long-range bombardment, support to military surface forces, surveillance and reconnaissance, and transportation, and have all engaged in counterair operations. Of these functions, airpower used for transportation has played only a minor role in both conflicts due to the compact geography of their zones of operation.
Adapting to Change: Lessons from Ukraine and the Middle East
The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East provide a window into the evolution of military airpower and presage the rough outlines of the challenges and opportunities that will confront military planners in future air operations. Key observations relate to the role of modern counterair measures in obstructing the establishment and maintenance of air superiority, the increased use of uncrewed airborne systems, and the widespread disruptions to the use of radio frequency spectrum caused by effective electronic warfare measures. Though undoubtedly airpower will continue to evolve--during both peacetime and subsequent conflicts--these developments provide insights into how military airpower will be used in future wars.
Challenges to Achieving Air Superiority
Typically, air superiority, also sometimes called command of the air, has been viewed as a spectrum of balance between two opposing air forces. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines it as the "degree of dominance in the air battle by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats."5 There is a range of relative airpower in any given conflict or arena. On one end is air denial--being denied the ability to operate in the air domain by an opposing force. Air parity is a situation in which neither side has control of the air and is "typified by fleeting, intensely contested battles at critical points," as defined by U.S. Air Force doctrine./6 Next is air superiority, an advantage in the air domain that may still be contested by an opponent. Finally, air supremacy is the ultimate level of superiority, when one side is not capable of any resistance or interference to the opposing side's air operations.
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Figure 10.1: Spectrum of Air Power
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Throughout the war in Ukraine, neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces have been able to establish a recognizable level of air superiority, though--as detailed more thoroughly in the following section--each side has been able to interfere with each other's air operations./7 Neither side has demonstrated the means to disable or destroy the opposing side's integrated air defenses, resulting in a prolonged state of air parity. According to analysis by the CSIS Futures Lab, Russia launched over 11,000 missiles, one-way suicide drones, and other munitionized airborne systems into Ukraine from September 2022 to October 2024./8 Though Ukrainian counterair operations have proven mostly effective, they have not been able to deny Russian forces the ability to launch air attacks./9 Similarly, Russian air defenses have been able to down and disable many, but not all, Ukrainian drones aiming at targets inside Russia./10 Ukraine's Operation Spider's Web, a radical departure from conventional thinking, however, introduced low-altitude munitionized airborne systems into an environment in which Russia had not deployed countermeasures and, in so doing, managed to circumvent Russian air defenses./11
In stark contrast to the situation in Ukraine, Israel has managed to establish an effective degree of air superiority throughout the surrounding region, defending the skies over Israel and showing that it can strike targets in Iran, Lebanon, and Syria without interference./12 In October 2023, Hamas fired thousands of rockets and missiles at Israel--but nearly 90 percent of them were intercepted by Israel's air defenses./13 In October 2024, Iran launched 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles at Israel. Of the entire barrage, all but a handful of the ballistic missiles were shot down./14 But the overall intercept rate may obscure important nuances. Subsonic cruise missiles and one-way drones are almost all getting shot down, while supersonic cruise and ballistic missiles are much harder to intercept, even if they are still getting shot down in large numbers./15 In addition to maintaining air superiority over Israel, Israeli forces have achieved that same feat over Iran; Israel arguably achieved total air supremacy over Iran by mid-June 2025. Israel used its command of the air to carry out sustained air attacks on Iranian military targets and laid the foundation for the U.S.-led Operation Midnight Hammer, which targeted Iranian nuclear facilities./16 For both homeland defense and the projection of airpower, Israel achieved its air superiority by maximining the use of cutting-edge technologies, training, and tactics and, in the case of operations over Iran, spycraft and the element of surprise./17
Future conflicts may very well look like the one that has played out in the Middle East since late 2023. In that notional case, a technologically advanced, well-resourced, and well-trained force operating a layered air defense system would have a leg up on the opposing force. But pitting two peers who are roughly equivalent in terms of technology, resources, and training against each other might easily result in a conflict that looks more like the persistent state of air parity over Ukraine's skies. To gain superiority, each side in a future conflict will aim to disable or destroy its opponent's air defenses on both a sector-by-sector and a layer-by-layer basis, possibly through sheer numbers and mass--an approach Russia has tried in Ukraine without using enough mass to actually gain air superiority--or through attacks coming from unexpected directions that rely extensively on the element of surprise, as was the case in Operation Spider's Web. The effectiveness of attacks from unexpected directions was also demonstrated in Israel, for instance, when a lone Houthi drone came in from an unusual trajectory and was able to penetrate Israel's air defenses.18 This also foreshadows the importance of keeping counterair defenses in the dark as long as possible, blinding kill chains to allow temporary access, and using decoys and deception--another lesson from Israel's operations in Iran and Ukraine's Operation Spider's Web, during which drones were transported undetected closer to their targets.
Proliferation of Uncrewed Systems
Unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) can be grouped into two main categories: systems intended for one-way, single-use munitionized applications (e.g., missiles, rockets, guided bombs, loitering munitions, and kamikaze or suicide drones) and systems designed for return and reuse. Either type of system can be used for attack, surveillance, or transportation. Both types can be operated under the direct control of a human operator or use various degrees of autonomy to perform their operations. UASs designed for return and reuse can serve as carriers for one-way, single-use systems, such as one-way drones, missiles, or mines.19 The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have seen widespread use of both single-use systems and systems designed for return and reuse, as well as extensive use of counterair operations using integrated air defense systems. In these conflicts, one-way systems have primarily been used to deliver munitions, while reusable systems have been primarily used for intelligence and surveillance purposes.
Both Ukraine and Russia have relied heavily on the use of one-way systems during the conflict in Ukraine.20 Since February 2022, Ukraine has been subjected to almost daily attacks by Russian airpower, primarily by one-way UASs.21 These one-way weapons have conducted long-range bombardment of national infrastructure--including infrastructure that was primarily civilian in nature, such as power and energy facilities./22 Small one-way drones have also been used to great effect against surface forces, like tanks and individual soldiers.23 Many of the one-way drones used by both sides are based on mass-produced, inexpensive, commercially available models that have been retrofitted to carry a small munition. This approach has allowed the economical deployment of one-way munitionized drones on a vast scale and facilitated a trial-and-error approach to developing new drone systems and tactics.
Meanwhile, one-way drones--particularly drones manufactured by Iran--have been used extensively by Iran and the Houthis in the Middle East.24 Hamas used a variety of one-way and reusable drones during its October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks on Israel, especially for targeting monitoring and communications systems and dropping munitions on tanks, soldiers, and emergency responders.25 Israel has deployed a specific variant of one-way attack drone, usually called a loitering munition, which is designed to circle a designated area over a period of time, waiting for direction from a human operator or sensor-triggered action to strike its target.26 Israel's Harpy drone is a loitering munition designed to detect and destroy air defense radars by homing in on radar signals. Iran's Shahed drone is another example of a loitering munition.27 During the conflict in the Middle East, UASs have also been used for surveillance, not only by Israel and Iran but also by nonstate actors like Hezbollah.28
Based on their use and evolution in Ukraine and the Middle East, there can be little doubt that UASs will play significant roles in future conflicts. Drones will be manufactured and deployed on massive scales--Ukraine alone claims it can manufacture 2.5 million drones per year.29 Whereas operations in Ukraine or the Middle East may have involved dozens or hundreds of UASs, future operations may include thousands of drones operating according to pre-programed instructions or under the control of a human operator or AI-enabled algorithm. Drones will be used for long-range bombardment, support to military surface forces, surveillance and reconnaissance, and transportation. Due to their cost-effectiveness, drones will also be used for counterair operations, with Ukrainian forces having already demonstrated the use of one-way drones for intercepting and destroying their hostile Russian counterparts.30 Additionally, reusable loitering drones are likely to become more important, possibly as carriers for one-way attack drones or missiles.31 Finally, as both Israel's operations in Iran and Operation Spider's Web demonstrate, the impact of munitionized drones increases when they can be conveyed--for example, by suitcase or truck--without detection into areas without specialized counter-drone defenses./32
Effectiveness of Electronic Warfare
The effectiveness of pervasive signal jamming in Ukraine as a tool of counterair operations has underlined that battlefield communications are fragile and easily disrupted. This has the potential of interfering with the ability of human operators to control uncrewed systems, including those operating in the air domain. Russian signal jamming in Ukraine has also impacted the reception of position, navigation, and timing (PNT) signals received from GPS satellites, eroding the accuracy and effectiveness of missiles and drones that rely on GPS to find their targets. The architecture of proliferated satellite constellations has offered some protection against jamming, but Russia is increasingly successful at degrading Starlink service and has consistently been able to disrupt many other signals--like GPS and drone command and control links./33
Experts have been trying to enhance the jam resistance of weapons systems as part of the cat-and-mouse game between the jammers and the jammed, with each side racing to develop technologies that defeat the other's latest and greatest capabilities./34 As a result, the ability to remotely command and control uncrewed systems and communicate with crewed ones can never be assured from mission to mission. It also means that it may not be possible to rely entirely on GPS or any signal-based PNT technology. In support of counterair operations, based on its effectiveness in Ukraine, electronic warfare--and electronic countermeasures--will feature prominently in future conflicts. The threats to signal-based positioning, navigation, and links used for timing and command and control communications emphasize the need for incorporating greater autonomous decisionmaking into UASs.
Anticipating the Future: Looking Over the Horizon
Though there are lessons for the future of airpower that can be directly gleaned from Ukraine and the Middle East, there are also trends that can be seen through a glass, darkly, with only the rough contours visible on the horizon. In the future, AI-enabled lethal autonomous weapons, which to date have not been extensively--if at all--used in combat, will play a main role. Such a development will lead over time--it is too early to say whether that time is measured in years or decades--to a decreasing need for human-piloted aircraft. The proliferation of sensors, and AI-enabled solutions making sense of that data at machine speeds, will make it more difficult for airborne systems to evade detection, leaving air platforms exposed to kill chains enabled by these technologies and making it harder to maintain air superiority.
AI-Enabled Autonomy
Automated decisionmaking for weapons that operate in the air and other domains is not a new concept. Heat-seeking missiles, mines, and torpedoes, as well as systems like the Phalanx radar-guided gun and Israel's Harpy drone, make lethal decisions autonomously, albeit following a very tight script that probably falls short of being considered artificial intelligence.35 Though a magnetic underwater mine detonating is an automatic reaction to it coming near a metallic warship hull, the action--the "decision" made--looks more like the instincts of a closing Venus flytrap than human decisionmaking. AI-enabled solutions using machine learning, trained to make decisions like people, are the evolution of these "Venus flytrap" platforms.
The designers of these legacy weapons turned to autonomy for one of two reasons: a requirement to make sense of a situation and act faster than would be possible with a human in the loop, or a need to make a decision in the absence of human input. Looking to the future, airpower will rely on autonomous decisionmaking for these same two reasons--but unlike today, decisions with lethal consequences will be made by AI-enabled algorithms trained using machine learning. One new driver for this shift is the increasing effectiveness and impact of electronic warfare and its ability to sever the links between uncrewed machines and human operators. Another evolving driver is the availability and need to quickly make sense of the deluge of data collected from a myriad of sensors monitoring the battlespace. The amount of data is already so enormous that it cannot be completely assessed at operationally relevant timescales using human input.36
There are interim solutions on the horizon that attempt to keep the human in the loop for UASs in highly jammed signal environments. In Ukraine, some operators have resorted to fiber-optic lines to maintain the ability to communicate with their drones.37 This solution is unwieldy and will not scale to a future battlefield environment in which thousands if not millions of drones are operating together. The long-term response will involve implementing more AI-enabled autonomous decisionmaking in uncrewed aircraft, including decisionmaking that involves the use of deadly force. Defenses operating at machine speeds can deploy countermeasures much faster against hypersonic weapons and drone swarms than a system relying on human reaction times. The United States is already buying an AI-enabled counter-drone system--the Bullfrog robotic gun system--capable of fully autonomous operations.38
Though researchers have observed that AI-enabled decisionmaking cannot today replicate human judgment, AI-enabled problem solving will probably improve over time.39 But exactly when that could happen is hard to predict. Until that point--when machines make as good as or better warfighting decisions than people--AI-enabled airborne systems will have to operate side-by-side with human pilots and crews. This creates challenges for both the human and machine, as each will struggle to operate most efficiently and effectively unless both sides learn how to predict and understand how the other side reacts in situations encountered on the battlefield.
Next-Generation Camouflage and the Element of Surprise
The conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated the importance of early-warning and fire-control radars for detecting, tracking, and defeating airborne threats.40 Today, air threat detection and tracking systems supporting long-, medium-, and short-range integrated air defense systems rely on radar.41 In some applications, infrared seekers are used as guidance systems for missiles, which hone in on the heat or thermal signatures of their targets rather than their radar signatures. In addition to radar and infrared, other types of sensors play increasingly prominent detection and tracking roles, including acoustic, visual, and LiDAR-based sensor networks.42 To date, these non-radar sensors have been primarily used in counterair point defense systems intended for defeating airborne threats in close proximity to their targets.
Due to the reliance on radar for all but close-proximity point defense systems, stealth technology has enabled strikes against a wide range of important and presumably well-defended military targets by Israel in Iran and Syria, such as during Operation Midnight Hammer. While terrestrial radar will likely continue playing a central role to enable kill chains for airborne targets, space-based systems, including electro-optical sensors, will begin to serve similar purposes. Future space-based sensor webs will be able to detect, identify, and track objects in real-time using a combination of phenomenologies beyond just radar.43 This will pose a challenge to stealth aircraft trying to avoid detection by an adversary's air defenses: Though designed to avoid detection by radar, stealth aircraft can certainly be seen by the naked eye and, thus, are susceptible to optical space-based sensors.
It is not difficult to imagine a time in the near future when every point on the globe is observable by a space-based sensor at all times, with no break in coverage. This can be achieved by a constellation of satellites in lower Earth orbits or by a series of high-resolution satellites in geostationary orbits. Notably, China has already deployed a number of electro-optical satellites in geostationary orbit.44 The United States is investigating the use of satellites for tracking targets in the air.45 Pairing data from space-based sensors with AI-enabled processing will produce systems capable of identifying and tracking aircraft, including those using stealth technologies.
Challenging the efficacy of traditional stealth will challenge the ability of air forces that rely on it to secure and maintain air superiority. However, new uses of electro-optical space-based sensors in kill chains do not foreshadow the obsolescence of stealth technology. Because radar can see through weather phenomena (such as clouds) that render electro-optical sensors less effective, radar will likely retain its critical place in integrated air defense detection and tracking architectures. But stealth platforms will have to operate in environments in which optical sensors play a greater role in kill chains. This development will require improved tactics--perhaps flying most sorties when there is cloud cover or inventing new types of high-tech camouflage that can hide aircraft from space-based optical sensors.46
Future conflicts may see greater use of the undersea domain to deploy airpower, as undersea systems offer unique opportunities for stealth and surprise. Because submarines can be designed to minimize their detectability, crewed and uncrewed submarines may see greater use as platforms from which drones are deployed, aiming to reduce the time air defense systems have to identify, acquire, track, and neutralize hostile airborne targets. Just like suitcases and trucks were used by Israel and Ukraine in June 2025 to smuggle drones closer to their intended targets, undersea systems may be used for a similar effect in future wars.
Conclusion
The contribution of airpower to future wars will be shaped by the evolution and use of technologies and tactics that have appeared on the battlefield in Ukraine and the Middle East. That future will see greater use of uncrewed systems, AI-enabled lethal autonomous weapon systems, and improved camouflage technologies masking radar, thermal, sound, and--possibly--visual signatures. These technologies and the evolving tactics for deploying them, such as AI-enabled systems working side-by-side with humans, will be required to operate under the shadow of ever more sophisticated counterair capabilities.
The goal will be to provide sufficient command of the air to execute core military airpower functions. This is unlikely to mean total air supremacy--but Israel has shown that it is still possible to obtain and maintain near-total control of the skies in certain circumstances. However, command of the air will probably be a balancing act, perhaps a temporary one, on the edge of a razor--air superiority may be ephemeral or something that is never fully achievable. Ultimately, there is probably a lot that cannot be foreseen about the future of military airpower based on lessons from today. It is worth keeping in mind the advice of the father of the U.S. Air Force, Billy Mitchell, who opined: "in the development of airpower one has to look ahead and not backward and figure out what is going to happen, not too much what has happened."47
Please consult the PDF (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-09/250916_DSD_War_ModernBattlefield.pdf) for references.
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Clayton Swope is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-10-evolution-airpower
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Adversaries and the Future of Competition
WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Sept. 16, 2025:* * *
Adversaries and the Future of Competition
This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Defense and Security Department entitled War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East (http://features.csis.org/war-modern-battlefield).
By Seth G. Jones
This chapter examines cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.1 It asks several questions: How has cooperation evolved between China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 17 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Sept. 16, 2025: * * * Adversaries and the Future of Competition This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Defense and Security Department entitled War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East (http://features.csis.org/war-modern-battlefield). By Seth G. Jones This chapter examines cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.1 It asks several questions: How has cooperation evolved between China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, andother actors, including during the Ukraine war? How might cooperation evolve over the next three to five years? What are the implications for modern warfare?
This chapter outlines three possible security arrangements between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea: (1) weakening engagement, (2) deepening bilateral relations, or (3) a multilateral alliance. Under weakening engagement, cooperation between one or more of these axis members wanes because of divisions and diverging interests. There is greater infighting among countries and a decline in the overall degree of cooperation. Under deepening bilateral relations, cooperation between the axis countries increases in such areas as the defense industrial base, though cooperation remains largely bilateral. Under a multilateral alliance, axis countries establish multilateral arrangements that include higher levels of cooperation, such as a multilateral treaty or other agreement that commits three or more signers to collective assistance in case of external attack.
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are most likely headed toward deepening bilateral relations . . . which has significant implications for the future of warfare.
This chapter concludes that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are most likely headed toward deepening bilateral relations. This arrangement would involve axis countries increasing military and dual-use exports and imports, expanding the scale and scope of bilateral and, potentially, multilateral exercises and training, deepening defense industrial cooperation, establishing bilateral treaties or pacts that commit the signatories to greater military cooperation and even mutual defense in case of attack, and deploying soldiers to fight in the wars of other axis countries.
There are still likely to be areas of disagreement and tension between these countries, as well as limits to their cooperation. But the overall trend is likely to be greater cooperation, which has significant implications for the future of warfare. For example, closer cooperation increases the possibility of inter-theater military aid among axis countries in case of war and raises the prospect that two or more major wars could occur simultaneously in different theaters. It is prudent for such countries as the United States to be prepared to fight two wars at the same time, rather than focus on one region such as the Indo-Pacific.
The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first provides an overview of lessons from Ukraine and the Middle East regarding axis cooperation. The second examines the possible evolution of the axis. And the third outlines possible indications and warnings to help gauge whether cooperation between axis countries is strengthening or weakening.
Lessons from Ukraine and Other Wars
Security cooperation between two or more powers is a routine occurrence in international politics. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea see aspects of the Western-led liberal order as a set of rules designed to benefit the United States and its allies while forestalling potential rivals. In addition, these countries believe U.S. and allied efforts to promote democracy, support a free and independent press, maintain a free market, and encourage the free flow of ideas directly conflict with their goals of regime stability.2 All four powers are also revanchist. As the historian Philip Zelikow argued, they are "fundamentally revisionist powers. Their leaders regard themselves as men of destiny, with values and historical perspectives quite different from the consumerist or social metrics that suffuse much of the world." He continued that they "all feel boxed in by extensions of American power they regard as fragile, though formidable in parts. All have long been preparing for a great reckoning."3
In addition, each country has its own reasons for pursuing cooperation. China likely wants partners to help achieve what Chinese leader Xi Jinping called the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."4 China needs access to critical minerals, bases, ports, and markets. Russia has needed assistance following its February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine to keep its economy afloat, energize its defense industrial base, and ensure it can continue waging war. Iran and North Korea both seek to circumvent international sanctions, are desperate for outside investment, and desire both great power diplomatic protection and military aid in the event of a conflict with the United States or their pro-U.S. neighbors, such as Israel and South Korea, respectively.
Beginning in 2022, China provided substantial aid to Russia's full-scale war in Ukraine, including tooling machines, semiconductors, microelectronics for use in Russian weapons systems, spare parts, drones, gunpowder, and military contractors. Chinese companies such as Xiamen Limbach helped design and develop Russia's Garpiya series long-range attack unmanned aircraft system, in collaboration with Russian defense firms like Joint Stock Company Aerospace Defense Concern Almaz-Antey.5 China also provided satellite imagery analysis and aid to improve Russian satellite and other space-based capabilities for use in Ukraine.6 Chinese companies even provided cotton cellulose, nitrocellulose, and critical ingredients for nitrocellulose (such as cotton pulp), which are explosive precursors that the Russian military uses to produce gunpowder, rocket propellants, and other explosives.7
This list of Chinese aid likely excludes many systems and components that are shipped clandestinely and whose status is not reported. China has apparently used cargo ships, trains, trucks, and aircraft to send material to Russia.8 Several Chinese-based companies, such as Poly Technologies, Fujian Nanan Baofeng Electronic Company, China Taly Aviation Technologies Corporation, Juhang Aviation Technology Shenzhen, Finder Technology Limited, Tulun International Holding Limited, and many others, have likely exported material.9 Although vital to Russia, some of the Chinese material, such as chips, is of low quality compared with more advanced chips from the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Iran has exported drones to Russia, as well as artillery shells, ammunition, and short-range ballistic missiles.10 Russia and Iran have strengthened industrial base ties and set up production of Iranian drones--especially the Shahed-136--in Russia's Tatarstan region.11 Russia has supplied Iran with Su-35 multirole fighter jets and other weapons systems, as well as aid to Iran's space and missile programs.12 Finally, North Korea has provided artillery rounds (including 152 mm and 122 mm), multiple launch rocket systems, KN-23 and KN-24 solid-propellant short-range ballistic missiles, soldiers, and other defense materiel to Russia.13 Table 1.1 provides an overview of some types of military cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
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Table 1.1: Security Cooperation Between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea
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Not all cooperation has centered on the Ukraine war. Chinese and Russian companies and agencies have also provided weapons components and intelligence (including satellite imagery) to Iran and the Houthis, an ally of Iran that conducted strikes against U.S. warships in the Red Sea and Israel.14
Despite these examples of cooperation, there have been some limitations. Chinese leaders have expressed concern about Russia's warming military relations with an erratic North Korea, including the strengthening of Pyongyang's missile capabilities.15 Beijing has generally been reluctant to help Pyongyang with its nuclear program.16 Iranian leaders have expressed dismay with Russia and China for their diplomatic positions in a spat between Iran and the United Arab Emirates over the sovereignty of islands in the Persian Gulf--including Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa--which dominate the approach to the strategic Strait of Hormuz.17 During Iran and Israel's 12-day war in June 2025, China, Russia, and North Korea did not provide substantial aid to Iran as Israel and the United States gained air dominance and struck targets across the country. China and Russia issued pro forma denunciations of U.S. actions, but they did not provide significant military assistance.
Future Evolution of the Axis
Several factors are likely to impact the type of security arrangement among the axis countries in the future. First is the degree of common threat. Since countries tend to increase cooperation to prevent stronger powers from dominating them, axis countries facing a growing external power or threat will likely increase security cooperation. The severity of the threat could be affected by the military power of an adversary country or alliance, including its offensive military capabilities; geographic proximity, since closer adversaries likely pose a greater threat; and the assessed intentions of the adversary country or alliance, which could vary from benign to malign intentions.18 Second is the level of ideological solidarity, including shared political, cultural, or other traits or interests.19 The more interests countries share in common, the likelier they are to want to cooperate.20 Third is domestic politics, including the preferences and decisions of leaders.21 Regime change--including the death of a leader--could impact the degree of cooperation and the type of security arrangement. Alternatively, leaders could develop stronger bonds that increase the prospect for cooperation.
Table 1.2 provides an overview of the three possible security arrangements: weakening engagement, deepening bilateral relations, and a multilateral alliance. These possibilities are not meant to be exhaustive but rather serve to illustrate plausible future security arrangements.
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Table 1.2: Overview of Axis Security Cooperation
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Weakening Engagement
In this scenario, bilateral relations between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea become more tenuous, though axis countries might continue to cooperate in some form. This scenario assumes a weakening of bilateral security arrangements and declining levels of cooperation. Examples include decreasing exports and imports of military and dual-use items, as well as conducting joint exercises and training that are more symbolic than substantive. There are already periodic disagreements between the countries that could worsen over time.22
In sum, weakening engagement would include a general fraying of military and security ties between axis countries. Several factors could lead to such an outcome. First is a declining threat environment, which would reduce the need for aggregating power.23 The end of the war in Ukraine or between Israel and Iran (including Iranian-linked groups), a substantial weakening of NATO, or a significant decrease in defense spending among major powers in Europe or Asia could weaken the impetus for cooperation by decreasing the threat. A second factor is fraying common interests. Examples include growing divisions on such issues as territorial disputes (such as a flaring up of Sino-Soviet border disputes or the sovereignty of islands in the Persian Gulf), diplomatic detentes that create fissures, and even warming relations between some axis countries that threaten others (such as between Russia and North Korea, raising concerns in China). Third, domestic challenges could weaken bilateral relations. The death or removal of a leader--including Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, or North Korean leader Kim Jong Un--could lead to a shift in foreign policy and a decision to decrease axis cooperation.
The anchor of the relationship is likely Beijing because of its size and military, economic, and technological power, though relations between Beijing and Moscow are likely the core of the axis.
Deepening Bilateral Relations
Under deepening bilateral relations, cooperation between axis countries increases. The anchor of the relationship is likely Beijing because of its size and military, economic, and technological power, though relations between Beijing and Moscow are likely the core of the axis. Overall, axis countries continue to develop closer bilateral ties in defense industrial production, including emerging technologies that have significant military capability, such as AI and quantum computing. A deepening coalition could include growing cooperation in several areas.
Arms exports and imports among axis countries continue under deepening bilateral relations, but they increase in scale and scope. Axis countries also expand arms sales to the Global South, continuing recent trends. Between 2020 and 2024, for example, the main suppliers of arms to Africa were Russia (which accounted for 21 percent of total African imports of major arms) and China (18 percent).24
Axis countries might broaden the scope, frequency, and geographic location of exercises and training missions to improve joint warfighting, intelligence sharing, command and control arrangements, and interoperability. Between January 2019 and July 2025, China and Russia conducted nearly a dozen combined strategic aerial patrols, including with Russian Tu-95 and Chinese H-6N and H-6K bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons.25 These patrols could increase in number and geographic scope, including in the western Pacific and off the U.S. coast. While many of these exercises and training missions could be bilateral, there might also be an increase in multilateral exercises and training missions. In March 2025, for example, Iran, Russia, and China conducted a joint naval exercise--called Marine Security Belt 2025--in the Gulf of Oman, marking the fifth year of joint drills.26 Several other countries, including Azerbaijan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Sri Lanka, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates, observed the exercise.
In addition, axis countries could deepen bilateral defense industrial base cooperation. A modern-day defense industrial base involves the production of defense and dual-use items by commercial companies and state-owned enterprises across multiple domains. Key domains include maritime, air, ground, space, cyber, and nuclear. Axis countries could increase cooperation in areas such as unmanned and autonomous platforms, integrated air and missile defense, space and counterspace, submarines, missiles, and emerging technologies such as AI and quantum.27 Cooperation could take several forms: the codevelopment, coproduction, and co-sustainment of weapons systems or components involving industrial firms from two or more axis countries, joint ventures, or transnational mergers and acquisitions.
Next, axis countries could increase their commitment to defend each other in case of external attack through a deeper bilateral treaty or other agreement that commits signers to collective assistance. The most important relationship is likely between China and Russia, which agreed to a "no limits" friendship in February 2022 and reaffirmed it in February 2025.28 Chinese-Russian relations could deepen if their leadership committed to collective assistance in the case of an armed attack. In addition, bilateral relations have strengthened between other axis countries, except Iran and North Korea, which do not have a formal alliance. In March 2021, for example, China and Iran agreed to a 25-year strategic partnership, which included Chinese investment in Iran and imports of discounted Iranian oil to China.29 In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which commits the countries to mutual military and other assistance if the other is invaded.30 In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a 20-year pact that formalized close ties between the two countries.31 However, the pact did not constitute a military alliance and required no direct obligations from either party. Overall, a future development that deepens bilateral relations would likely involve building and expanding these commitments.
Finally, a deepening coalition could include increased combat assistance--including the deployment of soldiers--to other axis members engaged in wars. There have already been several examples. China, Iran, and North Korea have provided military assistance to Russia for its war against Ukraine. In late 2024, North Korea sent approximately 12,000 combat forces to Russia's Kursk Oblast, where Ukraine seized Russian territory. In early 2025, North Korea deployed roughly 3,000 additional soldiers for combat against Ukrainian forces.32 Future examples could include growing Chinese and Russian security and intelligence assistance to Iran and its partner forces in the Middle East, Russian and Chinese aid to North Korea in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, or Russian and North Korean assistance to China in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or East China Sea.
Several factors could lead to deepening bilateral relations. First is an increased threat, such as an arms race with the United States, European countries, or Asian countries such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Significant increases in defense spending and potential offensive capabilities--such as fifth- and sixth-generation aircraft, nuclear weapons, bombers, submarines, and ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles by the United States, Europe, and Asian countries--could increase the threat perception in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang. An escalating conflict in the Middle East, a protracted war in Ukraine, or an escalating crisis in the South China Sea, East China Sea, or Taiwan Strait could also increase the perception of threat among axis countries. A second factor is growing common interests, including those against the West. As Stephen Hadley, President George W. Bush's national security adviser, wrote, "There is a shared anti-Westernism, opposition to democracy, and embrace of authoritarian alternatives. What truly binds the axis is not ideology but a common opposition to U.S. power and the international system it sustains."33 Third is the persistence or deepening of strong ties between axis leaders. Most significant would be a deepening of ties between Xi and Putin, whose relationship could serve as the lynchpin of axis relations.
Multilateral Alliance
A final scenario is a multilateral alliance. In this case, axis countries begin to establish multilateral arrangements and include high levels of cooperation, such as an agreement that commits signers to collective assistance in case of external attack.34 A multilateral alliance would likely involve strengthened relations in several areas, such as multilateral joint exercises and training and integrated defense industrial cooperation across three or more countries. There would be several differences from previous scenarios.
Axis countries could establish a multilateral arrangement--such as a treaty, defense pact, nonaggression pact, entente, or other agreement--committing signers to collective assistance in case of external attack or other types of arrangements. The agreement could be overt or covert. Historical examples include the Treaty of the Holy Alliance of 1815 between Austria, Prussia, and Russia; the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which established NATO; and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, which included the Soviet Union and Soviet satellite countries in Eastern Europe.35 Axis countries could also establish a multilateral military structure that includes a military committee, joint war plans, and other committees to cooperate at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Warsaw Pact had a unified command under Soviet leadership. The command structure included a Combined Armed Forces Command, located in Moscow, which comprised military officers from all the Warsaw Pact countries.36
Several factors could lead to a multilateral alliance. The first is a major increase in the nature or scope of the threat, such as the outbreak of war between an axis member and the United States, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, or one or more European countries. Another cause could be nuclear proliferation to South Korea, Japan, Poland, or another country, which could increase the perception of threat in one or more axis members. A second factor is growing ideological solidarity or other common interests between axis countries. Third is domestic politics. Regime change in one or more axis countries could bring to power a leader who is willing to expand axis cooperation for their own interests. Strong, ambitious, and expansionist leaders in Beijing or Moscow could push for greater multilateral collaboration to aggregate power among axis countries.
Conclusion
The most likely future security arrangement is deepening bilateral relations. Under this arrangement, axis countries might increase military and dual-use exports and imports, expand the scale and scope of bilateral and potentially multilateral exercises and training, integrate defense industrial cooperation, deepen bilateral treaties or pacts that commit the signatories to greater military cooperation and even mutual defense in case of attack, and deploy soldiers to fight in the wars of other axis countries. This scenario is likely for several reasons.
First, the degree of common threat is likely to increase. European and Asian countries--such as France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea--are likely to raise defense spending and strengthen their defense industrial bases. Defense spending is rising among these countries and across the globe more broadly, with global defense spending increasing from $2.23 trillion in 2023 to $2.46 trillion in 2024.37 Defense budgets across the European Union are likely to rise by as much as $84 billion by 2027, equivalent to approximately 0.5 percent of GDP.38 In June 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte called for a 400 percent increase in Europe's air and missile defense budget.39 Defense budgets in Asia are also rising. As one analysis concluded, "strategic drivers--such as China's military modernization and increasing assertiveness, and North Korea's advancing nuclear weapons program--galvanize threat perceptions in the region."40
Consequently, an arms race is more likely than a detente. In addition, war involving Russia is likely to continue in Eastern Europe, and conflict is likely to persist between Israel and Iran (including Iranian partners) in the Middle East, with China and Russia providing some assistance to Iran and its partners. Further, there is a significant risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and Korean Peninsula. Consequently, security competition between axis countries and democratic countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East is likely to remain significant and could increase in intensity.
Second, there is likely to be a deepening of common interests between axis countries, which aim to undermine democracy and increase their power and influence in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and other international and regional institutions.41 A particular focus may be balancing against what they view as U.S. imperialism or hegemony.
Third, domestic factors will likely increase security cooperation among axis countries. Whereas Khamenei's health has been the subject of speculation, Xi and Putin--the lynchpins of the axis--are unlikely to step down in the next three to five years, and their relationship has strengthened, not weakened.42 There is also little evidence that Putin will curb his revanchist interests in Ukraine or other areas, such as Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; that Iran will walk away from its partners and proxies in the Middle East; or that Xi will curb his expansionist ambitions in Asia and other areas.
Growing collaboration between axis countries would have significant implications for the future of warfare. For example, cooperation could increase the possibility of multi-theater war. Would Russia take advantage of a U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea to move into the Baltics or other regions? Would China or Russia take advantage of a war in the Korean Peninsula that pulls in North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and other countries? Between World War II and 2012, the United States sized its military to fight two wars at the same time.43 But that changed with the Defense Strategic Guidance, which altered the two-war standard to "secur[ing] territory and populations and facilitat[ing] a transition to stable governance" in one region, while "denying the objectives of--or imposing unacceptable costs on--an opportunistic aggressor in a second region."44 However, this force construct is likely inadequate for tomorrow's challenges that could require fighting two wars simultaneously.
Looking forward, there are several indications and warnings that could provide clues to the future evolution of the axis and the implications for the future of warfare:
* Arms Exports and Imports: Is there an increase or decrease in exports and imports of military and dual-use items between axis countries? Are axis countries shipping more or fewer military and dual-use items by ship, rail, truck, or air? Is the scope of trade expanding or shrinking, including in sensitive areas such as nuclear weapons, space, stealth, hypersonics, quantum, and emerging technology?
* Joint Exercises and Training: Are exercises and training efforts primarily bilateral or multilateral? Do exercises and training efforts prepare for large-scale combat against the United States and European and Asian countries, including across land, air, maritime, space, and cyber domains? Do they include closer command and control arrangements and sensitive intelligence sharing?
* Defense Industrial Base: Is there an increase or decrease in bilateral or multilateral defense industrial cooperation between axis companies and state-owned enterprises, including codevelopment, coproduction, co-sustainment, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions? If there is greater cooperation, in what areas is it occurring? And what is the scope of cooperation?
* Treaties and Defense Pacts: Do axis countries create or deepen bilateral or multilateral treaties or other agreements that commit signers to collective assistance in case of external attack? Or is there a weakening of commitments? Are agreements formal or informal? Are they overt or covert? Are there indications of warming or cooling relationships between the leaders of axis countries?
* Military Aid During War: Do countries provide military assistance--such as weapons, troops, and intelligence--to other axis countries during wars? Or do they refrain from providing aid, especially for short wars? What types of aid are they willing to provide? Are axis countries willing to shed blood for each other, including through combat deployments?
* Military Structure: Do axis countries establish a military organizational structure, develop joint war plans, or create other types of cooperative arrangements at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels? Or is there insufficient trust or interest to establish a multilateral military structure?
In addition, there are several indications and warnings that might cause axis relations to strengthen or weaken:
* Arms Buildup: Is there an arms race, including a significant increase in defense spending, between axis countries and their competitors in Europe, Asia, and the United States? Are countries building offensive military capabilities?
* Nuclear Proliferation: Is there a proliferation of nuclear weapons, including in such countries as South Korea, Japan, and even Iran? Or do potential nuclear states refrain from building nuclear weapons?
* War: Does war persist in Europe and the Middle East? Is there a new outbreak of war involving an axis country? Is there an end to a major war, such as a ceasefire or peace agreement in Ukraine? Is there a major decrease in the intensity of conflict, such as between Israel and Iran (including Iranian partners and proxies)?
* Regime Change: Is there a change in leadership in one or more axis countries? Is a new leader more or less inclined to strengthen axis relations or to expand territory? Or is there continuity of leadership in core axis countries, especially China and Russia?
Domestic Instability: Is there significant domestic economic, social, or political instability in one or more axis countries that could impact axis relations? Or is there relative stability within axis countries?
* Future of Security Institutions: Does NATO grow stronger or weaker over the next three to five years? Is there a deepening of security ties--including a multilateral security institution--between the United States and countries in Asia such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea?
* Divisions and Fissures: Are there increases or decreases in policy fissures between axis countries? How serious are the differences and in what areas?
Answers to these questions will provide useful and timely indicators of the strength or weakness of axis relations. They will also have significant implications for the future of warfare, including the possibility of multi-theater wars involving more than one axis country. Growing cooperation increases the possibility that a war with one axis country could expand to multiple fronts, causing simultaneous demands for such countries as the United States.
Please consult the PDF (https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2025-09/250916_DSD_War_ModernBattlefield.pdf) for references.
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Seth G. Jones is president of the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-1-adversaries-and-future-competition
[Category: ThinkTank]