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Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Islamic State's New Threats in Northern Azerbaijan
WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary by independent researcher Pawel Wojcik in its Terrorism Monitor:* * *
Islamic State's New Threats in Northern Azerbaijan
Executive Summary:
* Islamic State (IS) is actively expanding into northern Azerbaijan after officially establishing a new branch there in 2024. Authorities have recently thwarted multiple plots by Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) to attack diplomatic and religious targets in Baku.
* IS militants have directly engaged Azerbaijani security forces, notably during deadly clashes in the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary by independent researcher Pawel Wojcik in its Terrorism Monitor: * * * Islamic State's New Threats in Northern Azerbaijan Executive Summary: * Islamic State (IS) is actively expanding into northern Azerbaijan after officially establishing a new branch there in 2024. Authorities have recently thwarted multiple plots by Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) to attack diplomatic and religious targets in Baku. * IS militants have directly engaged Azerbaijani security forces, notably during deadly clashes in theQusar forests. The group leveraged these encounters to achieve propaganda successes despite strict government information bans.
* Azerbaijani extremist cells are integrated into a broader jihadist network managed by IS from Syria and Afghanistan, which signifies a continuously evolving and growing terrorist threat throughout the South Caucasus.
The persistent nature of jihadist influence in Azerbaijan was confirmed yet again in late January, after Azerbaijani authorities arrested three individuals preparing to attack the Israeli embassy in Baku at the behest of Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) (Reuters, January 27, 2026). In subsequent weeks, ISKP and their affiliates in Pakistan used two suicide bombers to attack a Chinese restaurant in Kabul and a Shia mosque in Islamabad, suggesting that the failed bombing in Baku may have been a part of this broader campaign (X/@Saladinaldronni, February 6). Azerbaijani authorities additionally arrested an 18-year-old ISKP operative in Baku in July 2025 for preparing an attack on the "Mountain Jews'" synagogue in northern Azerbaijan (APA, October 27, 2025).
ISKP's efforts to expand into Azerbaijan began in earnest in 2024. In the 461st issue of the Islamic State (IS)'s weekly newsletter, al-Naba, published on September 19, 2024, the organization revealed its newest branch located in northern Azerbaijan. In the newsletter, two pictures were released of jihadists, who were fully equipped with rifles and wore camouflaged military fatigues and supposedly pledged loyalty (baya') to the IS Caliph, Abu Hafs al-Hashimi. The uncovered faces of the two militants, which are rare for IS due to security concerns, suggest they had already died, and IS had little concern about their identities being known to the public (X/@saladinaldronni, September 20, 2024). The emergence of a northern Azerbaijan branch points to a continuously evolving terrorist threat in the South Caucasus. IS is evidently finding new vacuums to exploit amid military and intelligence pressure and an unstable global geopolitical situation.
Conflict in Qusar
The al-Naba newsletter also described a battle that the two militants' cell had allegedly orchestrated in the forests of Qusar, Azerbaijan. According to the newsletter, the battle had begun when the militants killed a policeman who approached their location. Later, Azerbaijani security forces brought reinforcements and imposed a siege in the region, resulting in clashes that allegedly left seven soldiers, including an officer, dead or wounded. IS accused the Azerbaijani government of implementing an information ban on the battle, with only a few local media services reporting that the event even took place (Al-Naba, September 19, 2024).
Media reporting was indeed scarce, with one researcher alleging that rumors of incidents in Qusar had been spreading since late August 2024. Videos did later surface, however, recorded by locals speaking the Leijin language. They showed military vehicles confronting unknown militants, who were initially believed to be the "Forest Brothers" (Derbent Jamaat). This salafi-jihadi group had been known for its presence in Azerbaijan, but was thought to have been largely destroyed (X/@chambersharold8, September 23, 2024).
Another media site reported a shootout in Qusar on September 5, 2024, with a timeline of events going back as far as mid-August, when a former employee of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, Akhmedov Ramik Radikoglu, went out hunting with his dog. He is believed to have been killed after discovering a cache of ammunition, which resembles what IS has described in al-Naba (Moderator, September 5, 2024). The timelines, however, do not seem to match. IS placed the battle date on September 15, suggesting either a significant delay in the news reaching IS's media apparatus or a convenient tweak by IS to fit its narratives and have that issue of al-Naba lead with a propaganda success. With the government's suppression of the media, however, only IS provided credible information on September 19, with no visible follow-up from official government sources (X/@SimNasr, September 19, 2024).
Information released months later sheds more light on IS's presence in Azerbaijan. In February 2025, official YouTube channels of the Azerbaijani security forces uploaded a video from another operation against militants in Qusar. The video displays materials found at the site, such as recordings and pictures, including the exact same baya' screenshot taken from the video that IS had presented of the two militants after the first Qusar battle (Azernews, February 11, 2025). Simultaneously, Azerbaijan and Russia announced the start of a new joint one-week-long border-clearing operation called "Border Shield," aimed at securing the northern Azerbaijani regions and dismantling terrorist and transnational organized crime organizations (Armenia News, February 3, 2025).
IS in Azerbaijan in Context
Azerbaijan, a majority Shia nation, has long been a subject of confrontation between various criminal and jihadi groups. The Forest Brothers, originating in Dagestan, were a separate unit nominally under the al-Qaeda-linked Imarat Kavkaz. In the last decade, however, these groups have been depleted of new recruits, mostly owing to IS's demise in Syria, defections, and counter-terrorism operations. Following the joining of IS by Doku Umarov in 2014 and the creation of IS's Wilayat Kavkaz that encompassed the region of the Caucasus, the Forest Brothers largely collapsed./[1] Investigations have revealed, however, that some jihadists had been long-term members of the group, and IS is now reviving their networks to conduct new operations (JAM news, February 2, 2025).
Azerbaijan itself had seen a few thousand Sunni jihadists leave the country for Syria during the peak of the civil war and the international coalition's war against IS. Following the group's loss of territory, many returned and were subsequently arrested. The first clear mention of IS's presence in Azerbaijan was in a 2019 publication after the death of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, when a jihadist cell pledged allegiance to his successor, Caliph Ibrahim (X/@azelin, November 30, 2019). More recently, the country has been mentioned alongside Turkiye and Georgia as part of the same structures running IS operations.
In 2021, Turkish authorities busted the al-Faruq office, which was one of the key administrative wings of IS. The office was one of the nine components of global IS that, at the time, was responsible for managing finances, operations, and the movement of people in Turkiye, the Caucasus, and eastern Europe. After its dismantling, more IS branches were tasked with guiding the region, with the General Directorate of Provinces clearly experimenting amid rapid changes in Syria and Afghanistan, and ongoing global power competition, which lowered the priority of counterterrorism operations. Al-Farouq, for its part, was replaced by Syria-based operatives, only to be merged with the ISKP-based al-Siddiq office (UN, July 15, 2022; February 6, 2025). Al-Siddiq, as a result, encompasses networks from Southeast, Central, and South Asia, as well as Russia and the Caucasus, all integrated with other branches through Turkiye, the middleman location.
ISKP and Azerbaijan
Azerbaijani cells continue to closely follow IS operatives from Turkiye and Georgia in addition to receiving direct orders from ISKP. In 2023, Turkiye announced the arrest of a smuggling network connected to an IS military camp, further revealing a structure encompassing Turkiye, Georgia, and Azerbaijan (Sakartvelos Ambebi, July 26, 2023). The Public Prosecutor's office stated that the network was part of IS's Damascus province, working undercover in the bookstore "Journal of Morality and Sunnah" and likely connecting the organization's wings from Mali, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine, Chechnya, Uganda, and Sudan (Artigercek, August 25, 2023). Arrests in Tbilisi of foreigners of Azeri and Russian origin, and a high-level Azeri ISKP operative responsible for a Shiraz attack in 2022--nabbed in Iran while moving from Baku international airport, signal the interconnection of a deeply networked jihadist web jointly managed by IS from Syria and Afghanistan (Tehran Times, November 7, 2022; News Am, November 11, 2023).
In 2024, the United States and Turkiye announced terror designations against IS structures cooperating on sending recruits, weapons, and illegal cash flows to the Caucasus, Turkiye, and Central Asia. The designations notably included Wilayat Georgia, whose head was known for organizing operations abroad (US Department of the Treasury, June 14, 2024). Pakistan also conducted a series of arrests in 2024, targeting Azeri recruits hiding on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and who were likely instructed to return to Azerbaijan (X/@AfghanAnalyst2, May 24, 2025). In 2025, Pakistan again caught ISKP operatives frequently travelling back and forth between Pakistan and Turkey and having senior roles within the organization (AA, June 1; December 22, 2025).
Conclusion
The relative ease with which jihadists have access to weapons in the Caucasus will ensure the steady supply of recruits in Azerbaijan. Recent events in the wider region--including the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the decline of Hezbollah, and the intensifying conflicts in Pakistan and Iran--further affect the jihadist landscape in Azerbaijan. The recent transfers of IS members from Syrian prisons to Iraqi ones included many of Caucasian and Central Asian descent, with 55 Azeris among them (X/@BaxtiyarGoran, February 16). IS's seemingly successful expansion into the post-Soviet space signals it may not simply be Africa that is the main focus of the IS operations in the near future, but also Azerbaijan and the Caucasus (United Nations, July 24, 2025).
Notes:
[1] Cohen, Ronen A., and Dina Lisnyansky. "Salafism in Azerbaijan: Changing the Sunni-Shiite Balance from Within", Iran and the Caucasus 23, 4 (2019): 407-418, doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/1573384X-20190410
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Pawel Wojcik is an independent researcher specializing in Sunni jihadist groups, insurgencies, and armed conflicts involving Islamist actors, with a particular focus on the Middle East and West Africa.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/islamic-states-new-threats-in-northern-azerbaijan/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to War on the Rocks: Testing Denial - The Philippine Alliance in America's First Island Chain Strategy
WASHINGTON, March 13 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by Asia-Pacific security chair Patrick M. Cronin and Nathaniel Uy to War on the Rocks:* * *
Testing Denial: The Philippine Alliance in America's First Island Chain Strategy
An alliance is only as credible as the runway it can repair under fire.
The Pentagon's latest National Defense Strategy clarifies American aims in the Indo-Pacific while exposing what those aims demand of frontline allies such as the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by Asia-Pacific security chair Patrick M. Cronin and Nathaniel Uy to War on the Rocks: * * * Testing Denial: The Philippine Alliance in America's First Island Chain Strategy An alliance is only as credible as the runway it can repair under fire. The Pentagon's latest National Defense Strategy clarifies American aims in the Indo-Pacific while exposing what those aims demand of frontline allies such as thePhilippines. The strategy's emphasis on a "strong denial defense" shifts the metric of credibility. Though the strategy does not specify the objectives to be denied, its logic implies preventing a rapid Taiwan fait accompli and constraining the People's Liberation Army's ability to establish sustained sea and air control inside the chain. Whatever the precise intent, the question is no longer how many forces are forward deployed to signal resolve, but whether the United States and its allies can prevent an adversary from seizing control of critical maritime corridors at the outset of a crisis. When the unclassified strategy declares that allies "must shoulder their fair share," it signals that tangible hard power, and not rhetorical alignment, now defines the value of what it means to be an American ally.
If the United States is serious about denial strategy along the First Island Chain, credibility will be tested less in Taiwan than in the Philippines -- specifically in whether Manila can politically sustain resilient, repairable, and survivable infrastructure under pressure.
That test hinges on investing in resilience over symbolism. Hardened facilities, dispersed logistics, and rapid repair matter more than episodic presence. And those capabilities must be politically sustainable in Manila if deterrence by denial is to endure.
The Philippines as a Litmus Test
The Philippines is a revealing test case for whether denial can function politically as well as operationally. If China can exploit the weakness of the U.S.-Philippine alliance, however, the entire premise of a deterrence-by-denial strategy along the First Island Chain is suspect. In other words, the Pentagon's main strategy will turn on the interaction of geography, alliance structure, and domestic consent.
Geographically, northern Luzon sits astride sea and air routes linking the Philippine Sea and the northern South China Sea, including the Luzon Strait. Batanes lies roughly 120 miles away from Taiwan but more than 500 miles from Second Thomas Shoal near Palawan. The country's dispersed terrain supports distributed basing, mobility corridors, deception, and redundancy, which are advantages in an era when fixed infrastructure is vulnerable to missile strikes and cyber or electronic disruption.
Alliance architecture complicates the sprawling geography. The Philippines is bound to the United States under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which provides for consultation and a possible combined response to armed attack in the Pacific. After the Philippine Senate rejected renewal of the U.S. bases agreement in 1991, access evolved through the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement and the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The 2014 defense cooperation framework enables rotational presence, infrastructure development at agreed locations, and prepositioning, all without permanent basing.
The third variable of domestic politics injects extra uncertainty into the alliance's ability to act in a future crisis. U.S. military presence remains sensitive. A denial posture that cannot withstand democratic debate and leadership transitions is not durable. Former President Rodrigo Duterte's threat to terminate the bilateral forces agreement underscored that alliance access depends as much on domestic legitimacy not being questioned by the "political pendulum" as on military rationales.
Resilient Access
Denial ultimately depends on whether forces can operate under fire. Functioning well during a period of high disruption or combat puts a premium on resilience. That pushes the 2014 cooperation agreement toward distributed logistics, rapid repair, and redundant communications. Infrastructure and industrial capacity may matter more to deterrence than fleet numbers or episodic presence operations.
The defense agreement's "places not bases" design supports this organizing principle. It concentrates on infrastructure, access, and prepositioning rather than permanent footprints. Legal durability reinforces continuity of operations. In 2016, the Philippine Supreme Court upheld the 2014 accord's constitutionality, preserving the framework despite political contestation. Continuity matters because hardened infrastructure, stockpiles, and command networks require sustained investment and erode quickly if reversed by political turnover.
Risk management depends on how alliance commitments are defined and communicated. The Mutual Defense Treaty commits each party to act in accordance with its constitutional processes; it does not mandate automatic combined military action. By anchoring obligations in consultation and constitutional processes, the treaty tempers automaticity, creates shared risk, and leaves space for adversaries to test alliance cohesion.
U.S. declaratory policy has grown more specific in recent years. In 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo proclaimed that "any armed attack" on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea would trigger U.S. obligations under Article IV of the treaty. Such clarity strengthens deterrence messaging. It may also increase the perceived strategic value of Philippine facilities in a crisis, raising the likelihood of coercive actions short of war.
While more ambitious proposals, such as prepositioning Taiwan-related munitions at U.S. sites in the Philippines or permanently stockpiling munitions for Typhon missile systems, may be politically untenable at present, steady progress in upgrading infrastructure in northern Luzon and Palawan would provide a concrete measure of the alliance's deterrence credibility.
Philippine official messaging on the 2014 defense cooperation agreement consistently emphasizes sovereignty, the absence of permanent bases, and defensive missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response alongside deterrence and interoperability. This framing is essential because domestic consent functions as a Clausewitzian political center of gravity. If alliance defense infrastructure is viewed as enabling offensive operations disconnected from Philippine territorial defense, political resistance can weaken operational credibility.
Capabilities That Shape Credibility
In the Philippine context, denial is built on four elements: maritime sensing, coastal defense, mobility, and repair capacity.
First, maritime domain awareness and fused intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance cue both Philippine and allied systems while improving attribution of gray-zone coercion.
Second, mobile, survivable coastal defense capabilities integrated with sensing networks offer greater deterrent value than static and easily targeted platforms.
Third, dispersed logistics determine staying power. Fuel, munitions, spare parts, and runway or port repair under attack conditions define endurance. This operating concept aligns with distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced basing concepts that prioritize dispersion and survivability against precision strike.
Fourth, rapid repair and redundancy through hardening, deception, and alternative operating concepts sustain operations even against an anti-access precision strike threat. Alliance-related infrastructure, including storage, redundant communications, and repair capacity, contributes to deterrence only if it remains usable amid hostilities.
Denial along a chain is not a single engagement but a prolonged contest over attrition and sustainment. Maritime sensing enables everything; coastal defense imposes costs; logistics sustain operations; and repair allows for regeneration amid combat.
The Pathway to Philippine-Owned Denial
In a world where runway repair, dispersed logistics, mobile coastal defense, and domestic political durability define strategic relevance more than forward presence, policymakers should carefully consider and manage risk.
An immediate, first risk is that a focus on deterrence at the high-end is an invitation for what Beijing thinks of as peacetime offensive operations. If Philippine territory is seen as critical enabling infrastructure, China may employ cyber operations, sabotage, information campaigns, and other means short of war to raise the political cost of access without triggering military action. After flying a drone over Taiwan's Pratas Island in January, China could readily extend unmanned surveillance operations across the Bashi Channel to monitor U.S. and Philippine forces. As Indo-Pacific Command chief Adm. Samuel Paparo observed in Honolulu earlier this year, Beijing's coercion of the Philippines has intensified even as Washington has pursued strategic stability with China. Ramming, blocking, and water-cannon attacks by China's maritime forces have become routine.
At a moment when the United States expects allies like the Philippines to manage such gray-zone pressure, both Washington and Beijing are normalizing maritime coercion that edges toward gunboat diplomacy. It requires little imagination to see how Chinese officials might probe this dynamic for seams in the U.S.-Philippine alliance.
Probing alliance resolve becomes part of the competition, and the temptation for such coercion may be inherent in Washington's reorientation of U.S. strategic priorities; the reemphasis on defending the Western Hemisphere and Homeland security may signal to Beijing that Indo-Pacific commitments must compete for strategic attention.
A second risk is entanglement. Even if Manila frames defense cooperation sites and activities as defensive, adversary perceptions may diverge. Ambiguity in contingency signaling can magnify miscalculation.
During the Scarborough Shoal standoff, Manila dispatched the navy vessel BRP Gregorio del Pilar to detain Chinese fishermen, signaling a willingness to escalate and an expectation of alliance backing. Washington, however, emphasized de-escalation and did not clarify whether the Mutual Defense Treaty applied. To Beijing, that divergence suggested an alliance seam, one China exploited to consolidate control without triggering U.S. military intervention.
Prospectively, as the Philippines acquires or even hosts coastal defense missiles, upgrades military bases in northern Luzon, and conducts naval patrols with Japan and others, China may miscalculate if it sees such defense strengthening as active attempts to interfere in a Taiwan contingency.
Legal stability alone does not eliminate vulnerability. Political sustainability requires a clear, sovereignty-centered rationale that resonates domestically.
The most secure path is for the Philippines to own resilience in its segment of the First Island Chain. Manila's "Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept" provides that foundation: distributed access, hardened and redundant communications, rapid repair, and prepositioning calibrated for both wartime sustainment and non-kinetic contingencies such as disaster response. Institutionalized crisis consultation mechanisms can further reduce misperception and escalation risk.
Such an approach strengthens deterrence by increasing uncertainty for potential aggressors while lowering political costs at home. It aligns with the defense strategy's emphasis on burden sharing by rooting credibility in Philippine-owned capabilities rather than symbolic access alone.
Geography ensures Philippine relevance. Politics will determine whether that relevance translates into durable deterrence. Denial only works if Manila can politically sustain the infrastructure required to make it credible.
Read in War on the Rocks (https://warontherocks.com/2026/03/testing-denial-the-philippine-alliance-in-americas-first-island-chain-strategy/).
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Patrick M. Cronin is the Asia-Pacific security chair at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/arms-control-nonproliferation/testing-denial-philippine-alliance-americas-first-island-chain-patrick-cronin
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: 64% Drop in MN Medicaid Rides Amid Fraud Probes--Minnesota Legislator Wants to Triple Driver Payments
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, March 13 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on March 11, 2026, by policy fellow Matt Dean:* * *
64% Drop in MN Medicaid Rides Amid Fraud Probes--Minnesota Legislator Wants to Triple Driver Payments
Minnesota's Non-Emergency Medical Transportation (NEMT) program was created to help Medicaid patients reach doctor appointments. Instead, it has become a runaway taxpayer-funded scandal riddled with fraud, weak oversight, and part of billions in potential ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, March 13 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on March 11, 2026, by policy fellow Matt Dean: * * * 64% Drop in MN Medicaid Rides Amid Fraud Probes--Minnesota Legislator Wants to Triple Driver Payments Minnesota's Non-Emergency Medical Transportation (NEMT) program was created to help Medicaid patients reach doctor appointments. Instead, it has become a runaway taxpayer-funded scandal riddled with fraud, weak oversight, and part of billions in potentialwaste. It is one of the DHS programs considered by regulators to be "at high risk of fraud."
In 2025 alone, the program served roughly 250,000 Minnesotans and racked up millions of trips at a cost of $127 million. Yet when the Department of Human Services finally noticed fraud --after NEMT became one of 14 high-risk Medicaid services--billed rides dropped by 64 percent.
While Governor Walz has responded by aggressively restricting the flow of money to these drivers, Minnesota Rep. Sydney Jordan is carrying a bill to increase the money paid per mile to the vendors by 300%. HF3058 actually triples the per mile reimbursement from $0.22 to $0.67.
DHS now has 71 open fraud investigations, has suspended payments to 14 providers, and is pursuing monetary recoveries in five cases. Inspector General James Clark laid out the playbook: "phantom billing" for trips with no matching medical appointment, excess mileage claims, and kickbacks to patients or recruiters. Low barriers to entry--anyone with a vehicle could become a provider--created ghost companies and unverifiable claims. Clark testified on the administration's attempts to stem the flow of fraud money in areas like NEMT while testifying before a Minnesota legislative panel on March 3rd.
Rep Jordan, for her part has been a fierce opponent of President Trump's focus on Minnesota fraud within the Somali community in Minnesota. While Youtuber Nick Shirley's assertions that 90% of NEMT contractors are Somali are not sourced, certainly the implication is that this investigation, like the Feeding our Future scandal will focus on the Somali community.
"I stand with our state's Somali community and I emphatically reject the disgusting and disingenuous attacks hurled at them by Donald Trump and his far-right cronies." Jordan said in a December 3rd legislative update, concluding: "They are our neighbors, family members, elected officials, doctors, teachers and more, no matter what lies and bile Donald Trump spews about Minnesota's Somali community, the simple truth is that our Somali neighbors make our state stronger."
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Matt Dean is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
matt.dean@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/64-drop-in-mn-medicaid-rides-amid-fraud-probes-minnesota-legislator-wants-to-triple-driver-payments/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Nepal's Election Marks a Generational Break-and a New Strategic Moment in the Himalayas
WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by Anjali Kaur, senior associate (non-resident) with the India and Emerging Asia Program:* * *
Nepal's Election Marks a Generational Break-and a New Strategic Moment in the Himalayas
Nepal's latest election has produced something the country has not seen in decades: a genuine generational rupture with its political past. But the significance extends well beyond Kathmandu. As a younger political figure rises to national leadership, Nepal is entering a new strategic moment--shaped ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by Anjali Kaur, senior associate (non-resident) with the India and Emerging Asia Program: * * * Nepal's Election Marks a Generational Break-and a New Strategic Moment in the Himalayas Nepal's latest election has produced something the country has not seen in decades: a genuine generational rupture with its political past. But the significance extends well beyond Kathmandu. As a younger political figure rises to national leadership, Nepal is entering a new strategic moment--shapedby intensifying geopolitical competition, shifting development partnerships, and a generation of voters who have run out of patience with institutions that promise reforms but rarely deliver.
The victory of former Kathmandu mayor Balendra "Balen" Shah places a leader at the helm who sits outside Nepal's traditional political establishment. At 35, Shah represents a stark contrast to the governing class that has defined Nepal's politics since the end of the monarchy--a small circle of senior party figures, many now in their 70s and 80s, whose influence has survived coalition after coalition with remarkably little accountability. His election signals that a growing share of Nepali voters, particularly younger ones, are no longer willing to accept political recycling as a governing philosophy.
But framing this solely as a story of generational change would miss what is actually driving it. Behind Shah's rise are years of accumulated frustration--with corruption, with institutional stagnation, with an economy that exports its young people as remittance workers rather than retaining them. The question now is whether Nepal's new leadership can convert that frustration into durable institutional reform.
A Youth Movement Finds Electoral Expression
Shah's victory did not come from nowhere.
For several electoral cycles, younger Nepalis have been signaling dissatisfaction with entrenched leadership--at first at the margins, then with increasing force. That trajectory reached a turning point in 2025, when youth-led protests erupted across the country in response to corruption scandals, economic stagnation, and government attempts to restrict social media platforms. The protests were organized through digital networks by a generation that has grown up connected to global conversations about governance, transparency, and opportunity--and that has drawn its own conclusions about the gap between those conversations and what Nepali institutions actually deliver.
Shah became the clearest political embodiment of that demand. A former rapper turned independent political figure, he first captured national attention by winning the Kathmandu mayoral race in 2022 on a reformist, anti-corruption platform built on digital outreach and grassroots mobilization rather than traditional party structures. His national campaign followed the same logic--and this time, at a much larger scale.
For many voters, Shah represents not simply a younger face but the possibility of a different governing style: one that prioritizes transparency, responsiveness, and measurable results. Whether that expectation can survive contact with Nepal's political system is, of course, an entirely different matter.
Part of a Wider Regional Pattern
Nepal's election also fits within a broader shift visible across South Asia.
In Sri Lanka, mass protests in 2022 forced a sitting president from office following a severe economic crisis. In Bangladesh and Pakistan, younger voters have increasingly organized around governance and accountability through digital networks and new political formations. Across the region, a generation that grew up connected to global information flows--and global expectations--is demonstrating a growing willingness to challenge political hierarchies that have dominated governance for decades.
Nepal's election adds an important data point to this pattern. In the right conditions, that energy can move from street protests to electoral outcomes. The deeper question--for Nepal and for the region--is whether these generational political shifts translate into more effective governance, or whether they simply install new personalities into systems that remain structurally resistant to reform.
Governing Will Be Harder Than Winning
Shah's victory carries enormous symbolic weight, but Nepal's political terrain does not reward symbolism for long.
The country's history is one of frequent coalition collapses, constitutional crises, and slow policy implementation. Anti-corruption demands were central to both the protest movement and the election results, which means that the new government's credibility will be tested early and measured against concrete action--not rhetoric. Nepal's 2015 constitution created a federal structure intended to bring governance closer to citizens, but provincial and local governments still face significant gaps in administrative capacity and fiscal authority. That incomplete decentralization represents both a reform opportunity and a governance liability. And while Nepal has made genuine progress in poverty reduction over the past two decades, its economy remains structurally dependent on remittances from citizens working abroad--a dependence that no amount of political goodwill can address without serious structural reform.
If the new government cannot demonstrate meaningful progress on at least one of these fronts in its early months, the political momentum that carried Shah to power will dissipate quickly.
India and China Are Recalibrating
For Nepal's two giant neighbors, the election introduces a new variable into calculations that both have managed carefully for years.
India maintains deep and multidimensional ties with Nepal--an open border, extensive trade links, and a growing energy relationship built on hydropower development and electricity trade that has made political stability in Kathmandu a direct Indian economic interest. New Delhi has invested significantly in deepening regional energy integration, and it monitors shifts in Nepal's domestic politics accordingly.
China has steadily expanded its own economic and political footprint over the past decade, investing in transportation corridors, cross-border connectivity, and infrastructure financing tied to the Belt and Road Initiative. More recently, Beijing has extended its presence into areas historically supported by Western development partners--digital connectivity, public-sector capacity programs, and governance training--positioning itself as a comprehensive long-term partner rather than simply an infrastructure financier. That positioning has become more visible and more deliberate, as the dismantling of major U.S. development assistance programs has created openings in Nepal's development landscape.
Shah's rise introduces a different dynamic into this regional equation. As a political outsider, he is less embedded in the networks through which both India and China have historically managed relationships with Nepali political elites. That does not necessarily mean a dramatic reorientation of Nepal's foreign policy--the structural constraints of geography and economic dependence are powerful stabilizing forces. But it may produce a more independent diplomatic posture as the new government seeks to demonstrate autonomy while managing relationships with neighbors whose interests do not always align.
The immediate question for Beijing and New Delhi is not whether Nepal will shift alignment, but whether a new generation of leadership in Kathmandu will govern in less legible--and less predictable--ways than the political networks they have long understood.
The Himalayan Strategic Stakes
Nepal's political trajectory also matters because of its position within a broader Himalayan strategic landscape that is rapidly acquiring new significance.
The Himalayas are increasingly recognized as a critical nexus for climate security, water resources, and regional energy systems--and Nepal sits at the center of that geography. Its river systems feed into major South Asian water basins; its hydropower potential could play a meaningful role in regional clean energy transitions. As climate change accelerates glacier melt and alters water flows across the Himalayan region, governance quality and political stability in countries like Nepal will carry consequences that extend well beyond their borders. Decisions made in Kathmandu on hydropower development, water management, and cross-border energy trade will shape downstream outcomes across South Asia for decades.
This is the context in which Nepal's political shift is unfolding--not simply a domestic democratic story, but a governance transition at a geographically strategic moment.
Why the United States Should Be Paying Attention
For decades, U.S. development programs helped support Nepal's democratic institutions, local governance systems, and economic reforms. Those programs worked with national and provincial institutions to strengthen democratic processes, expand economic participation, and improve public-sector transparency. They helped build institutional foundations--in local governance capacity, civil society oversight, and anti-corruption systems--that Nepal continues to rely on today.
The dismantling of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and broader reductions in U.S. foreign assistance have created real gaps in Nepal's development ecosystem--gaps visible enough that the Asian Development Bank's own 2025-2029 Country Partnership Strategy explicitly named them. Thirty-four active programs were terminated, affecting over 300 NGOs and cutting support to local governance systems that Nepal's still-young federal structure depends on. The Millennium Challenge Corporation compact survived a funding freeze and was reinstated, but its scope is infrastructure: transmission lines and highways. The governance, civil society, and institutional capacity work that distinguished U.S. development engagement in Nepal has no current substitute--and unlike infrastructure, where other actors are moving to fill the gap, this work is simply not being replaced. That gap has strategic consequences that outlast any development program.
Nepal occupies a position where U.S. and Indian strategic interests converge. Both share an interest in a stable, institutionally coherent, and strategically autonomous Nepal--and neither is well-served by the governance vacuum that is now deepening. Neither Washington nor New Delhi has a coherent answer to that question yet. The longer that remains true, the more Nepal's institutional landscape will be shaped by actors whose interests in Nepal's political trajectory may not align with those of Washington or New Delhi.
What Comes Next
Balendra Shah's victory opens a genuine inflection point in Nepal's political trajectory. What it does not do is guarantee the transformation that brought him to power.
Nepali voters have demonstrated that they are willing to break from long-standing political patterns in pursuit of something different. That is not a small thing--in a region where incumbency and patronage networks have proven deeply durable, the willingness to disrupt them electorally is itself significant.
But the real test is institutional. Generational change in leadership matters only if it translates into different governance outcomes--greater accountability, more effective public institutions, and an economy that can retain the talent it currently exports. Shah's government will be judged on that standard, quickly and without much patience for excuses.
And beyond Nepal's borders, the Himalayan region is entering a period of intensifying competition and strategic consequence--one in which how Kathmandu governs itself will matter far more than it has in decades.
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Anjali Kaur is a senior associate (non-resident) with the India and Emerging Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/nepals-election-marks-generational-break-and-new-strategic-moment-himalayas
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: How to Lose a Navy in 10 Days
WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by Benjamin Jensen, director of the Futures Lab and senior fellow for the CSIS Defense and Security Department:* * *
How to Lose a Navy in 10 Days
While air strikes in Iran have captured the headlines, the naval campaign offers a harbinger of future battles likely to unfold at sea. Iran lost the majority of its naval capability in less than 10 days, as pulsed operations in the first 48 hours disrupted Tehran's ability to disperse its submarines and ships to wage the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 12, 2026, by Benjamin Jensen, director of the Futures Lab and senior fellow for the CSIS Defense and Security Department: * * * How to Lose a Navy in 10 Days While air strikes in Iran have captured the headlines, the naval campaign offers a harbinger of future battles likely to unfold at sea. Iran lost the majority of its naval capability in less than 10 days, as pulsed operations in the first 48 hours disrupted Tehran's ability to disperse its submarines and ships to wage theasymmetric maritime campaign it had planned for decades. As of March 11, the United States and Israel had hit and taken out more than 60 Iranian ships, according to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper. As a result, Iran can still threaten commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz but will struggle to counter U.S. convoys in the weeks ahead. Looking further ahead, the campaign carries a cautionary tale for Taiwan, the United States, and Japan about how to survive the initial salvo likely in any Pacific war.
What We Know About the Naval Campaign
Based on open-source reporting and official announcements, the United States appears to have prioritized destroying Iran's ability to counterattack by sea in the opening hours of its combined strikes with Israel. With sorties by both states averaging more than 1,000 a day--combined with information warfare commingling effects in space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum--Washington and Tel Aviv struck command-and-control systems, degraded air defenses, and targeted Iran's ballistic missiles. These dramatic attacks, which included an opening decapitation strike, set conditions for an equally audacious series of naval strikes. As shown in the table below, the strikes reflect a distinct targeting logic indicative of a clear campaign: a sequence of tactical actions designed to disrupt Tehran's plan and deny the regime the ability to launch a coordinated naval campaign in the Persian Gulf.
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Table 1: Reported U.S. Strikes on the Iranian Navy
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From Battle Damage to Naval Theory
The range of targets reveals a larger story. In naval theory, a guiding adage is "fire effectively first." The phrase comes from Wayne Hughes and his study of the attritional character of naval battles, which is only exacerbated by the missile age. Modern naval battles are a salvo exchange defined by a mix of intelligence, decisionmaking, and offensive and defensive munitions. Sinking ships requires blinding the adversary, disrupting their command and control, and firing pulses--missile salvos combined with electronic attacks and even cyber and space operations--that increase the probability the strike overwhelms the defense. This approach has evolved since the first modern naval battle of the missile age that took place during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. During the Battle of Latakia, Israel used electronic deception and antiship missiles to defeat a larger Syrian fleet, but the underlying logic remains the same--the objective is not simply to target a ship but to blind it by breaking its targeting complex. This approach is often referred to as "C-C5ISR-T" and plays a key role in how both the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander and chief of naval operations describe joint maritime campaigns.
At the campaign level, the goal is not just to blind ships to fire salvos. Instead, the objective is to also destroy the adversary's ability to generate combat power. Pulsed operations target munition storage facilities, piers, and key equipment like loading cranes and dry docks necessary for maintenance. This infrastructure enables force generation. The enemy, therefore, will have fewer options to launch naval counterattacks. Operational art in the naval campaign lies in sequencing these attacks in time and space to force the enemy to culminate. In attritional contests, the side that can generate more salvos over time tends to prevail, putting a premium on defense and logistics.
Based on this logic, U.S. planners appear to have executed a four-phase initial campaign. First, the naval services set conditions by building up combat power in theater to generate strike options. Over the course of 60 days, multiple ships deployed to the Middle East. These forces provided the president with immediate military options during negotiations with Iran while also setting conditions for a larger mobilization. During crises, naval assets often move early while diplomats negotiate access, basing, and overflight for air and ground forces. The advantage of the U.S. Navy is that it can operate from international waters while diplomacy and joint planning come online. Given the defensive capabilities of modern ships, their presence also reassures partners and allies, signaling that the United States is willing to protect them in the event of a preemptive strike.
During this phase of the campaign, the often unseen side of the naval services also likely came online. Logisticians began moving munitions and fuel to prepare for the possibilities of a sustained campaign. Marines and sailors in the Maritime Operation Center build a common operating picture to support distributed naval groups and formations as a synchronized whole (i.e., distributed maritime operations). Intelligence analysts refine targeting packets built over years using processes like target systems analysis and other targeting methodologies. Information warfare specialists coordinated with other agencies and other services to build a menu of novel attack options that support the convergence of kinetic and non-kinetic fires, a key aspect of C-C5ISR-T. These activities set conditions for generating tempo (i.e., salvos over time) in the campaign.
Joint doctrine describes target development as grounded in joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, with products that provide baseline analysis and characterization that inform target systems analysis. This target development produces detailed target folders and electronic target folders that can be pulled into force assignment and mission planning.
That matters because it changes the tempo problem. If the hardest work is done precrisis, then the order to attack is not the start of planning. It is the start of execution. The joint force can translate the commander's intent into a joint integrated prioritized target list, tasking orders, and repeatable assessment. The targeting playbook also formalizes how to decide what gets hit, when, and for what effect, illustrating how targeting is increasingly a key component of modern operational art. Joint targeting doctrine explicitly treats electronic warfare and cyberspace operations as integrated parts of the targeting cycle, meant to coordinate lethal and nonlethal fires in strike operations. It also highlights the role of joint space support in giving commanders access to space capabilities beyond organic assets. In practice, that convergence can create strike corridors: suppress radars, degrade networks, confuse command nodes, and open seams for Tomahawks and carrier aviation.
Second, the naval forces not supporting the initial strikes on Iranian political and military leaders could pull on those targeting packets to shape the battlespace. This included suppressing enemy air defenses, destroying enemy aircraft, and hitting any Iranian naval assets at sea capable of immediately retaliating. This included attacking frigates in the Indian Ocean, as highlighted in the table above. It also included strikes on key assets like antiship cruise missile radars and batteries. By reducing Iran's immediate ability to retaliate and protect its navy, these actions allowed for follow-on strikes designed to significantly degrade Iran's ability.
This phase relies on reducing the time it takes to execute kill chains. Naval forces need high-quality target tracks, low latency, and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to both strike targets in rapid succession and support battle damage assessment. This part of the campaign is where targeting starts to shift from deliberate to dynamic as naval forces prosecute time-sensitive targets. Furthermore, fog and friction alongside enemy counteraction tend to create new targets and devalue older targets once the chaos of battle starts. That means the naval campaign is always balancing offense and defense since it must protect intelligence assets and communications networks critical to supporting dynamic targeting and battle damage assessment.
Third, with Iranian naval forces in disarray and counterattack options limited, follow-on strikes could target naval infrastructure like ports, piers, and munitions stores. In the current campaign, this appears to have been done in rapid succession, essentially catching large numbers of Iranian ships pier-side and even limiting the ability of Iran to sortie key assets like minelayers and attack subs. It also included maritime patrol aircraft like the P-3, highlighted in the table above. This highlights that modern navies fight from the seabed to space. Coordinated pulse operations have to target subs, subsea sensors, ships, ports, aircraft, radars, and ground stations for satellite communications. For example, consider Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Had a second attack wave hit fuel stores, it would have significantly delayed the ability of the U.S. to counterattack across the Pacific.
Fourth, the naval campaign likely had to balance sustained strikes with consolidating gains. That is, the navy had to rotate ships and aircraft to repair and rearm while ensuring it had enough assets to strike new targets that emerged. As seen in the table above, this included maintaining intelligence coverage of Iran's minelaying ships so that the second they attempted to leave port, they were destroyed. It also likely includes monitoring suspected launch points for drones, ranging from one-way attack to unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles, to limit Iran's ability to target naval forces and ships in the Strait of Hormuz. The art of this phase is balancing the demand for current operations with the activities required to support future operations, thus limiting the ability to focus purely on sustained offensive strikes.
What Does This Campaign Highlight About the Future of Naval Battles
The campaign's early pattern suggests a deliberate-to-dynamic sequence: prepared target system analysis and target folders enabling rapid execution, cross-domain convergence to open corridors for strikes, a cordon to prevent escape and dispersal, then BDA-driven dynamic targeting. The open question is whether ship counts are a distraction from the real measure of effectiveness: whether Iran's mine, USV, and small-boat denial toolset was actually neutralized, or merely displaced. That uncertainty will drive sustained intelligence operations and generate rapid strike options similar to the use of MQ-9 drones to strike ballistic missile launchers. For the U.S. Navy, this means accelerating its introduction of collaborative combat aircraft and even buying long-dwell drones that can conduct armed reconnaissance, given the flight time limitations (and costs) associated with manned helicopters and fighter jets conducting the same mission.
For countries watching like Taiwan, it means ensuring that its navy is never concentrated in port and that it retains a dispersed network of unmanned counterattack options. Beijing is well-positioned to launch the kind of naval campaign the United States executed against Iran in Taiwan. In fact, it could likely strike even more targets on shorter notice, given the close proximity of the states. Therefore, the only way to preserve deterrence is to signal resilience. Taiwan will need to ensure it constantly rotates its naval forces while expanding the number of submarines and inventory of unmanned surface and subsurface attack options capable of attacking ships in its immediate surroundings. Like the Ukrainians in the Black Sea, these drones should include anti-air missiles and be integrated with electronic warfare and mobile coast defense cruise missiles. Beijing has to always wonder what other options Taiwan has left to strike its fleet after a strike against Taiwan's command and control, air defenses, and naval forces.
For China, the lesson is not "the United States can sink ships." It is that modern campaigns try to sink the fleet, blind the sensors, and break the ports at the same time. And if that is the benchmark, every navy has to ask whether it is built to fight effectively first, or to be found and finished fast. The strikes in Iran will likely rekindle concerns that even a limited war with the United States could quickly involve mainland strikes against ports and fuel depots alongside communications networks. It will also push Beijing to create more resilient battle networks that allow it to survive C-5ISR-T strikes.
Finally, for the United States, the success of the initial naval campaign suggests a need to expand investment in the force. The U.S. Navy needs more ships--particularly unmanned systems--as well as improved maintenance capacity and larger munitions stockpiles to execute future campaigns. The campaign also illustrates the reality that all war is inherently joint and all-domain. The U.S. Navy will need to perfect integrating ground-based fires from Multi-Domain Task Forces and Marine Littoral Regiments with U.S. Air Force bombers supporting offensive mining. It must also be prepared to fight globally and conduct operations on the scale of the Iran campaign in multiple geographic theaters simultaneously against more capable adversaries.
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Benjamin Jensen is director of the Futures Lab and a senior fellow for the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-lose-navy-10-days
[Category: ThinkTank]
CPA Commends Trump Administration for Launching Section 301 Investigations Targeting Global Manufacturing Overcapacity, Forced Labor
WASHINGTON, March 13 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Coalition for a Prosperous America posted the following news release:* * *
CPA Commends Trump Administration for Launching Section 301 Investigations Targeting Global Manufacturing Overcapacity, Forced Labor
The Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA) today welcomed the Trump administration's launch of sweeping new Section 301 investigations into structural excess capacity in global manufacturing sectors, as well as a separate set of investigations examining whether countries are failing to take action against forced labor in their supply chains.
The ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Coalition for a Prosperous America posted the following news release: * * * CPA Commends Trump Administration for Launching Section 301 Investigations Targeting Global Manufacturing Overcapacity, Forced Labor The Coalition for a Prosperous America (CPA) today welcomed the Trump administration's launch of sweeping new Section 301 investigations into structural excess capacity in global manufacturing sectors, as well as a separate set of investigations examining whether countries are failing to take action against forced labor in their supply chains. Theinvestigations, announced by U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Jamieson Greer, will examine whether policies and practices in major manufacturing economies-including China, the European Union, Japan, India, Mexico, and others-are contributing to structural overproduction that burdens U.S. commerce. A second investigation will examine roughly 60 countries to determine whether they maintain adequate legal frameworks to prohibit the import of goods made with forced labor, similar to the protections contained in Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
"The Trump administration's decision to launch these investigations led by Ambassador Greer reflects a serious and long-overdue effort to address the structural forces that have hollowed out large parts of America's manufacturing base," said Jon Toomey, President of CPA. "For decades, many foreign governments have pursued industrial strategies built on subsidies, suppressed wages, state-owned enterprises, and other policies that generate massive excess production and push that surplus into global markets-a surplus that has been largely absorbed by the U.S market with devastating consequences for American producers and workers. These investigations recognize that those practices directly undermine U.S. manufacturing and investment."
CPA noted that the administration's focus on structural overcapacity and global trade imbalances reflects concerns the organization has highlighted for many years. In its research and policy work, CPA has consistently warned that persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficits-driven largely by chronic trade deficits in goods, which has reached more than $1 trillion in recent years-have contributed to the erosion of America's manufacturing base and the loss of millions of industrial jobs. Foreign industrial policies that generate excess production and push that surplus into global markets have been a major driver of these imbalances.
CPA has previously outlined a range of policy tools designed to restore balance to the global trading system, including the use of tariffs and capital-flow measures such as a Market Access Charge (MAC) on foreign capital inflows to address structural distortions that keep the U.S. dollar overvalued and sustain large trade deficits. The organization said the administration's decision to investigate structural overcapacity and unfair labor practices represents an important step toward confronting the systemic policies that have long disadvantaged American producers.
"Section 301 is a powerful tool for addressing foreign policies that distort global markets and disadvantage American producers," Toomey added. "When foreign governments explicitly pursue overproduction and then export the resulting surplus into the United States, the effect is to displace domestic output and deter new investment in American manufacturing."
CPA also praised the administration for examining forced labor practices as part of its broader trade enforcement agenda.
"Ensuring that global supply chains are free from forced labor is both a moral and economic imperative," Toomey said. "Countries that fail to prohibit the use of forced labor should not be allowed to gain a competitive advantage in the U.S. market."
The administration's actions represent an important step toward restoring balance to global manufacturing trade and strengthening the economic foundation of U.S. national security. Foreign overcapacity and unfair labor practices have distorted global markets for decades. By confronting these structural challenges head-on, the administration is demonstrating its commitment to rebuilding American industry and ensuring that U.S. workers and manufacturers compete on fair terms.
CPA looks forward to participating in the Section 301 investigation process and providing input to ensure that the resulting actions strengthen domestic manufacturing capacity and supply chain resilience.
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Original text here: https://prosperousamerica.org/cpa-commends-trump-administration-for-launching-section-301-investigations-targeting-global-manufacturing-overcapacity-and-forced-labor/
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to Daily Wire: Parent Trap - The Detransition Reality Schools Tried To Hide From Moms And Dads
WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 12, 2026, by Director of American Values Jennifer Bauwens to the Daily Wire:* * *
The Parent Trap: The Detransition Reality Schools Tried To Hide From Moms And Dads
Last week, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an important ruling in Mirabelli v. Bonta, a case addressing whether schools can implement policies that deliberately exclude parents from critical decisions about their children's well-being. The Court answered that question with a clear and resounding no.
In ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 13 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 12, 2026, by Director of American Values Jennifer Bauwens to the Daily Wire: * * * The Parent Trap: The Detransition Reality Schools Tried To Hide From Moms And Dads Last week, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an important ruling in Mirabelli v. Bonta, a case addressing whether schools can implement policies that deliberately exclude parents from critical decisions about their children's well-being. The Court answered that question with a clear and resounding no. Inits order, the Court reinstated a prior injunction, barring California schools from enforcing policies that conceal students' gender transitions from parents or require teachers to use names or pronouns inconsistent with biological sex. Under these rules, this information was withheld from parents unless the child consented. Naturally, many parents and teachers challenged these policies, arguing that they violated constitutional rights.
The Court agreed that the parents raising religious objections are likely to win their claims under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The justices also found that the policies are likely to interfere with parents' long-recognized constitutional right to direct the upbringing and care of their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.
To continue reading, click here (https://www.dailywire.com/news/the-parent-trap-the-detransition-reality-schools-tried-to-hide-from-moms-and-dads?topStoryPosition=undefined&author=Jennifer+Bauwens&category=DW+Opinion&elementPosition=1&row=1&rowHeadline=Top+Stories&rowType=Top+Stories&title=The+Parent+Trap%3A+The+Detransition+Reality+Schools+Tried+To+Hide+From+Moms+And+Dads).
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Dr. Jennifer Bauwens serves as the Director of American Values. She is responsible for leading the research agenda and the development of policy priorities pertaining to family, faith, and pro-life issues.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/the-parent-trap-the-detransition-reality-schools-tried-to-hide-from-moms-and-dads
[Category: ThinkTank]