Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
Featured Stories
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: NYC's Socialist Movement Forcing Millionaires to Flee the State - Leaving Mamdani, DSA in a Bind
NEW YORK, July 15 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 13, 2026, by Judge Glock, director of research and senior fellow, to the New York Post:
* * *
NYC's Socialist Movement Forcing Millionaires to Flee the State - Leaving Mamdani, DSA in a Bind
Americans are some of the most mobile people on Earth: They move homes about three times more often than Europeans.
As a recent report shows, that mobility is a problem for New York's rising socialist movement.
A new Citizens Budget Committee report found that New York's share of millionaires, those earning ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, July 15 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 13, 2026, by Judge Glock, director of research and senior fellow, to the New York Post: * * * NYC's Socialist Movement Forcing Millionaires to Flee the State - Leaving Mamdani, DSA in a Bind Americans are some of the most mobile people on Earth: They move homes about three times more often than Europeans. As a recent report shows, that mobility is a problem for New York's rising socialist movement. A new Citizens Budget Committee report found that New York's share of millionaires, those earningmore than a million dollars a year, declined more than any other state since 2010.
The state went from having 12.7% of all millionaires in the nation to 8.7%.
Worse yet, in the more recent years, the state's highest earners have been leaving much faster than its lowest earners.
The flight of the millionaires leaves the rising Democratic Socialists of America movement, and Mayor Mamdani in particular, in a bind.
On one hand, DSA campaigns have centered around attacking the millionaires and billionaires whom they claim are squeezing working citizens.
On the other, the DSA needs those same people to pay exorbitant taxes to fund their social programs.
Mamdani in his campaign wanted to raise taxes on millionaires by 2%.
The New York City DSA's chapter suggests the state should raise taxes on those making over $300,000 a year and on capital gains and inheritances as well.
Continue reading the entire piece at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/07/13/opinion/nycs-socialist-movement-forcing-millionaires-to-flee-the-state-leaving-mamdani-dsa-in-a-bind)
* * *
Judge Glock is the director of research and a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor at City Journal.
* * *
Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/nycs-socialist-movement-forcing-millionaires-to-flee-the-state-leaving-mamdani-dsa-in-a-bind
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
NYC's Socialist Movement Forcing Millionaires to Flee the State - Leaving Mamdani, DSA in a Bind
Americans are some of the most mobile people on Earth: They move homes about three times more often than Europeans.
As a recent report shows, that mobility is a problem for New York's rising socialist movement.
A new Citizens Budget Committee report found that New York's share of millionaires, those earning ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, July 15 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 13, 2026, by Judge Glock, director of research and senior fellow, to the New York Post: * * * NYC's Socialist Movement Forcing Millionaires to Flee the State - Leaving Mamdani, DSA in a Bind Americans are some of the most mobile people on Earth: They move homes about three times more often than Europeans. As a recent report shows, that mobility is a problem for New York's rising socialist movement. A new Citizens Budget Committee report found that New York's share of millionaires, those earningmore than a million dollars a year, declined more than any other state since 2010.
The state went from having 12.7% of all millionaires in the nation to 8.7%.
Worse yet, in the more recent years, the state's highest earners have been leaving much faster than its lowest earners.
The flight of the millionaires leaves the rising Democratic Socialists of America movement, and Mayor Mamdani in particular, in a bind.
On one hand, DSA campaigns have centered around attacking the millionaires and billionaires whom they claim are squeezing working citizens.
On the other, the DSA needs those same people to pay exorbitant taxes to fund their social programs.
Mamdani in his campaign wanted to raise taxes on millionaires by 2%.
The New York City DSA's chapter suggests the state should raise taxes on those making over $300,000 a year and on capital gains and inheritances as well.
Continue reading the entire piece at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/07/13/opinion/nycs-socialist-movement-forcing-millionaires-to-flee-the-state-leaving-mamdani-dsa-in-a-bind)
* * *
Judge Glock is the director of research and a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor at City Journal.
* * *
Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/nycs-socialist-movement-forcing-millionaires-to-flee-the-state-leaving-mamdani-dsa-in-a-bind
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Domestic Repression Undermining Kremlin's Defense Capabilities
WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 14, 2026, by analyst Kassie Corelli in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Domestic Repression Undermining Kremlin's Defense Capabilities
Executive Summary:
* Ukraine's expanding drone strikes deep inside Russia, including the June 18 attack on Moscow, are prompting Kremlin-aligned media and military bloggers to demand treason charges against civilians who photograph or share footage of attacks online.
* Russia's new "confirming the delivery date of goods" (SPOT) import system is likely intended ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 14, 2026, by analyst Kassie Corelli in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Domestic Repression Undermining Kremlin's Defense Capabilities Executive Summary: * Ukraine's expanding drone strikes deep inside Russia, including the June 18 attack on Moscow, are prompting Kremlin-aligned media and military bloggers to demand treason charges against civilians who photograph or share footage of attacks online. * Russia's new "confirming the delivery date of goods" (SPOT) import system is likely intendedto prevent drone-component smuggling but is also disrupting parallel import networks that have helped Moscow circumvent sanctions and acquire critical military technologies.
* Expanded domestic repression, tighter import controls, and ongoing anti-corruption purges in the defense sector are straining Russia's military supply chains and are likely to undermine its long-term defense capabilities.
-
Inhabitants of several Moscow neighborhoods and suburbs experienced the largest Ukrainian drone attack since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the night of June 18. The drones struck south of Moscow and in its immediate suburbs, hitting the Moscow Oil Refinery, the Mega Belaya Dacha shopping and entertainment center, and the Sadovod shopping complex. There was a massive public outcry against clouds of black smoke, the smell of burning, and "oil rain" (Meduza, June 18).
Kyiv has attacked strategic and logistical targets inside Russia over recent months, causing significant damage to Russia's economy (see EDM, June 9). Pro-Kremlin media have responded to Ukrainian attacks by calling for repression of ordinary citizens, regardless of their views. The head of "Solovyev Live," Armen Gaspariyn, called for criminal charges of treason against Moscow residents making videos of the drone attacks, whom he characterized with expletives. One of the most prominent pro-Kremlin television personalities, Vladimir Solovyev, agreed with him (The Moscow Times, June 18).
Russian military analysts have said that people who publicize video from the sites of drone strikes "automatically become agents of enemy intelligence and carry out the work of real spies in checking the results of the attacks" (Topwar.ru, June 22). Andrey Medvedev, vice-speaker of the Moscow City Duma and a media figure who makes no secret of his close ties to the security services, has expressed the same view (Novaya Gazeta, January 23, 2023). Medvedev complains that posting photos of Ukrainian attacks does not lead to criminal charges of treason (Vzglyad, June 18).
It is unknown if the Kremlin will make arrests in response to these calls. The Ukrainian security services have learned, however, to effectively play upon the paranoia that reigns in the Russian information space. One Ukrainian Armed Forces unit made a post thanking the pro-war "Fighterbomber" Z-channel for a post about fuel shipments to Crimea. Following this, prominent Z-bloggers accused the "Fighterbomber" creator of "working for the enemy" (Telegram/@ve4niyvoy, June 22).
Arrests of Russians for posting pictures of damage from Ukrainian strikes could harm the Kremlin's military infrastructure. Excessive arrests and repression overload the security services, diminishing their ability to identify real saboteurs and Ukrainian agents. Z-bloggers play a critical role in raising funds and procuring equipment for Russian troops, and punishing them for posts about Ukrainian strikes would decrease their ability to do so.
The Kremlin's tightening of import restrictions via its new system for confirming the delivery date of goods (SPOT) has created difficulties for Russian troops. Following the June 2025 Ukrainian Operation Spiderweb drone attack, which destroyed Russian strategic aviation planes, it became evident that components for the drones were smuggled into Russia from neighboring countries (New Voice of Ukraine, December 10, 2025). Operation Spiderweb may have been the main impetus for tightening import procedures.
SPOT has been fully operational since June 1. It is designed to make the entire flow of imports arriving by road from the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU) countries transparent. Now all importers bringing goods in on trucks from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan must fill out a document on the pending delivery and specify all participants in the transaction, description of the goods, certificates and labeling, transport, and the planned date of import no later than two days before import. Experts estimate that SPOT will cause the price of imported goods to rise by 30-50 percent by the end of the year and complicate the transportation of mixed cargo (The Moscow Times, May 27). According to Director of the Association for Parallel Imports Anatoliy Semyenov, the new fiscal parameters for deals jeopardize "the very mechanisms that ensured the stability of imports under the sanctions regime" since "the more complicated the supply chain, the higher the risk that it will be unable to meet needs" (Telegram/@Hacker_in_Law, April 7).
SPOT will have the biggest impact on "parallel importation," the import of a branded product that is then sold without the trademark owner's consent. Parallel imports routed through EAEU intermediaries in countries have allowed Moscow to obtain components for its military industry from the European Union, bypassing sanctions. The Kremlin exploited the fact that intermediaries retained the legal right to ship goods in transit across Russian territory. In practice, however, once the components arrived in Russia, they remained there rather than being forwarded to the official buyer (The Bell, March 5). Russia actively repurchased tank and missile components that had previously been sold to markets in Asia (Nastoyashee Vremya, June 5, 2023).
Parallel imports will be significantly more difficult under SPOT. The inefficiency of Russia's system for manufacturing and operating drones and the ongoing arrests for corruption in the arms sector that lead to operational disruptions in arms production are also making defense manufacturing harder (see EDM, June 11, 23). Of course, one should not discount Moscow's military capabilities. Russia retains the potential to inflict significant damage on Ukrainian infrastructure, as occurred this winter (Re: Russia, June 16). New security measures, though capable of partially reducing the harm from Ukrainian attacks, also significantly affect Moscow's military capabilities.
* * *
Kassie Corelli is an analyst with The Jamestown Foundation.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/domestic-repression-undermining-kremlins-defense-capabilities/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Domestic Repression Undermining Kremlin's Defense Capabilities
Executive Summary:
* Ukraine's expanding drone strikes deep inside Russia, including the June 18 attack on Moscow, are prompting Kremlin-aligned media and military bloggers to demand treason charges against civilians who photograph or share footage of attacks online.
* Russia's new "confirming the delivery date of goods" (SPOT) import system is likely intended ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 14, 2026, by analyst Kassie Corelli in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Domestic Repression Undermining Kremlin's Defense Capabilities Executive Summary: * Ukraine's expanding drone strikes deep inside Russia, including the June 18 attack on Moscow, are prompting Kremlin-aligned media and military bloggers to demand treason charges against civilians who photograph or share footage of attacks online. * Russia's new "confirming the delivery date of goods" (SPOT) import system is likely intendedto prevent drone-component smuggling but is also disrupting parallel import networks that have helped Moscow circumvent sanctions and acquire critical military technologies.
* Expanded domestic repression, tighter import controls, and ongoing anti-corruption purges in the defense sector are straining Russia's military supply chains and are likely to undermine its long-term defense capabilities.
-
Inhabitants of several Moscow neighborhoods and suburbs experienced the largest Ukrainian drone attack since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the night of June 18. The drones struck south of Moscow and in its immediate suburbs, hitting the Moscow Oil Refinery, the Mega Belaya Dacha shopping and entertainment center, and the Sadovod shopping complex. There was a massive public outcry against clouds of black smoke, the smell of burning, and "oil rain" (Meduza, June 18).
Kyiv has attacked strategic and logistical targets inside Russia over recent months, causing significant damage to Russia's economy (see EDM, June 9). Pro-Kremlin media have responded to Ukrainian attacks by calling for repression of ordinary citizens, regardless of their views. The head of "Solovyev Live," Armen Gaspariyn, called for criminal charges of treason against Moscow residents making videos of the drone attacks, whom he characterized with expletives. One of the most prominent pro-Kremlin television personalities, Vladimir Solovyev, agreed with him (The Moscow Times, June 18).
Russian military analysts have said that people who publicize video from the sites of drone strikes "automatically become agents of enemy intelligence and carry out the work of real spies in checking the results of the attacks" (Topwar.ru, June 22). Andrey Medvedev, vice-speaker of the Moscow City Duma and a media figure who makes no secret of his close ties to the security services, has expressed the same view (Novaya Gazeta, January 23, 2023). Medvedev complains that posting photos of Ukrainian attacks does not lead to criminal charges of treason (Vzglyad, June 18).
It is unknown if the Kremlin will make arrests in response to these calls. The Ukrainian security services have learned, however, to effectively play upon the paranoia that reigns in the Russian information space. One Ukrainian Armed Forces unit made a post thanking the pro-war "Fighterbomber" Z-channel for a post about fuel shipments to Crimea. Following this, prominent Z-bloggers accused the "Fighterbomber" creator of "working for the enemy" (Telegram/@ve4niyvoy, June 22).
Arrests of Russians for posting pictures of damage from Ukrainian strikes could harm the Kremlin's military infrastructure. Excessive arrests and repression overload the security services, diminishing their ability to identify real saboteurs and Ukrainian agents. Z-bloggers play a critical role in raising funds and procuring equipment for Russian troops, and punishing them for posts about Ukrainian strikes would decrease their ability to do so.
The Kremlin's tightening of import restrictions via its new system for confirming the delivery date of goods (SPOT) has created difficulties for Russian troops. Following the June 2025 Ukrainian Operation Spiderweb drone attack, which destroyed Russian strategic aviation planes, it became evident that components for the drones were smuggled into Russia from neighboring countries (New Voice of Ukraine, December 10, 2025). Operation Spiderweb may have been the main impetus for tightening import procedures.
SPOT has been fully operational since June 1. It is designed to make the entire flow of imports arriving by road from the Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU) countries transparent. Now all importers bringing goods in on trucks from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan must fill out a document on the pending delivery and specify all participants in the transaction, description of the goods, certificates and labeling, transport, and the planned date of import no later than two days before import. Experts estimate that SPOT will cause the price of imported goods to rise by 30-50 percent by the end of the year and complicate the transportation of mixed cargo (The Moscow Times, May 27). According to Director of the Association for Parallel Imports Anatoliy Semyenov, the new fiscal parameters for deals jeopardize "the very mechanisms that ensured the stability of imports under the sanctions regime" since "the more complicated the supply chain, the higher the risk that it will be unable to meet needs" (Telegram/@Hacker_in_Law, April 7).
SPOT will have the biggest impact on "parallel importation," the import of a branded product that is then sold without the trademark owner's consent. Parallel imports routed through EAEU intermediaries in countries have allowed Moscow to obtain components for its military industry from the European Union, bypassing sanctions. The Kremlin exploited the fact that intermediaries retained the legal right to ship goods in transit across Russian territory. In practice, however, once the components arrived in Russia, they remained there rather than being forwarded to the official buyer (The Bell, March 5). Russia actively repurchased tank and missile components that had previously been sold to markets in Asia (Nastoyashee Vremya, June 5, 2023).
Parallel imports will be significantly more difficult under SPOT. The inefficiency of Russia's system for manufacturing and operating drones and the ongoing arrests for corruption in the arms sector that lead to operational disruptions in arms production are also making defense manufacturing harder (see EDM, June 11, 23). Of course, one should not discount Moscow's military capabilities. Russia retains the potential to inflict significant damage on Ukrainian infrastructure, as occurred this winter (Re: Russia, June 16). New security measures, though capable of partially reducing the harm from Ukrainian attacks, also significantly affect Moscow's military capabilities.
* * *
Kassie Corelli is an analyst with The Jamestown Foundation.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/domestic-repression-undermining-kremlins-defense-capabilities/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Understanding Russia-Iran Collaboration in Cyberspace
WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 14, 2026, by Nikita Shah, senior fellow with the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program:
* * *
Understanding Russia-Iran Collaboration in Cyberspace
Reports of Russia-Iran collaboration in the U.S.-Iran conflict are a real and live source of concern. Russia has shared intelligence with Iran that purportedly led to the targeting of U.S. soldiers in the Middle East, as well as drone technologies that have given Iran a substantive asymmetric edge in targeting regional ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 14, 2026, by Nikita Shah, senior fellow with the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program: * * * Understanding Russia-Iran Collaboration in Cyberspace Reports of Russia-Iran collaboration in the U.S.-Iran conflict are a real and live source of concern. Russia has shared intelligence with Iran that purportedly led to the targeting of U.S. soldiers in the Middle East, as well as drone technologies that have given Iran a substantive asymmetric edge in targeting regionaladversaries. However, collaboration on cyber operations has been repeatedly misread and misunderstood, including claims that Russia has supplied Iran with cyber support and that pro-Russia actors have formed a coalition with Iranian hackers, both of which have only a thin evidence base.
Based on the types of collaboration identified between the two countries, more evidence is needed before declaring that Russia and Iran's cooperation in cyberspace reaches the heights of collaboration portrayed through media reporting. Moreover, more nuanced language is needed in understanding the cyber threat and ecosystems of both states. Russia and Iran are uneasy strategic partners; there are risks inherent in sharing their best technical capabilities with a partner they do not fully trust, and the types of cyber activity identified in media reporting, based on the way the activity has been described, would do little to provide any meaningful edge or asymmetric advantage in either the Russia-Ukraine conflict or U.S.-Iran war. It is possible that Moscow and Tehran are engaging in or could engage in closer cyber cooperation now or in the future--across state agencies, private sector firms, universities, and more--but the currently cited evidence does not substantiate what some headlines have suggested. Different degrees of cooperation between Russia and Iran on cyber issues pose different challenges to the United States and allies, and would likely lead to different response options for policy and decisionmakers.
Understanding Russia and Iran's Cyber Ecosystems
Russia's cyber ecosystem is expansive. State intelligence agencies, state-created front companies, state-coerced cybercriminals, relatively state-independent cybercriminals, private sector contractors, patriotic hackers, and many other actors form a complex, thorny web. But this nuance is often lost in open-source and media reporting, making it easy to forget that a "Russian hacker" can in fact mean one of many different things. Each Russian cyber actor is different, has its own sets of incentives, and brings its own capabilities to bear that threaten Western security in different ways. These cyber actors are neither a monolith nor the same threat.
Moscow has established some clear rules for its cyber ecosystem, such as that cybercriminals or patriotic hacking collectives should not undermine the Kremlin's objectives. But there is no one-size-fits-all model for how these groups interact with the state, and those interactions can vary widely. Some entities, such as cyber units of the Federal Security Service (FSB), are part of the government itself. Others, such as ransomware groups with ties to the FSB, are fused with the state but also subject to their own financial motives. And yet others benefit from state protection and corruption but may operate their own activities, such as patriotic hackers with genuinely nationalist views or cybercriminals who want to make money and do not support state hacking in the process.
Iran possesses an equally complex, though decentralized, cyber ecosystem. This comprises state actors across its military and civilian intelligence agencies, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); cyber criminals; proxy actors or hacktivist groups of widely varying affiliations; and private sector companies that provide services or capabilities into the state. The Iranian hacktivist landscape itself is fluid and fast-moving, where different groups possess differing degrees of affiliation with the Iranian state and diverse ideological motivations. This includes state-sponsored hacktivists linked to advanced persistent threats, such as Handala Hack (thought to be a front for the MOIS) and CyberAv3ngers (thought to be directly linked to the IRGC); pro-Iran regional hacktivists; and domestic, anti-regime hacktivists that allegedly operate from exiled communities outside Iran and target Iranian state institutions. Iran's state and non-state actors are supported by a robust private sector that provides technical capabilities and infrastructure into the state, offers a steady talent pipeline, can serve up contractors and front companies for cyber operations, and facilitates technology transfers and sanctions evasion. With the exception of the anti-regime hacktivists, these actors reflect Iran's historical use of proxy actors as an asymmetric advantage to achieve its broader strategic objectives: They enable domestic social control, regime survival and power projection, and the destabilisation of Iran's international adversaries.
Therefore, not specifying which specific actor or type of actor is supposedly involved in an activity undercuts a practical assessment of the threat it poses, what responsibility the state has, and which options are available to respond to or shape that type of cyber activity.
Historical to Current Collaboration
Russia and Iran's strategic partnership is fundamentally driven by self-interest and shared Western adversaries. In strategic terms, both states are working to distract the international community from their own respective conflicts (against Ukraine, and the United States and Israel, respectively) while also depleting U.S. weapons stocks. Moreover, they are also partners in both sanctions evasion and the provision of proprietary military technology, where the war in Ukraine is regarded by some as a particular turning point in the relationship, owing to cooperation on drone technology, the provision of Russian satellite imagery to inform Iranian targeting of U.S. assets, and the formation of working groups and commissions to share military learning from current conflicts. These are just some points of engagement.
In cyberspace, Russia and Iran's history of cooperation includes engagements such as:
* The 2001 signing of a treaty establishing a framework for future interstate cooperation;
* An agreement in 2021 formalizing cooperation on cyber and information security, which was largely defensive in nature and focused on thwarting threats to regime control;
* Russian private sector companies' provision of advanced digital surveillance and censorship software to the Iranian government in 2022-23, enhancing the Iranian state's ability to surveil its citizens, dissidents, and adversaries; and
* A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty agreed in 2025 that included strengthening state control of the internet.
Moreover, this cooperation is not confined to the state-to-state level. Russian universities have hosted delegations from Iranian state institutions, including its National Cybersecurity Authority. Russian companies have conducted business-to-business negotiations in information and communications technology with Iranian commerce delegations. And Iranian companies linked to the MOIS have attended Russian hacking competitions.
In the 2026 U.S.-Iran conflict, reporting suggested outright Russian and Iranian collaboration in cyberspace. These claims--stemming from an unverified Ukrainian intelligence assessment--include interactions between a variety of Russian groups, including Z-Pentest Alliance, NoName057(16), and DDoSia Project, and Iranian hacktivist group Handala Hack via Telegram, such as simultaneously publishing information about targeting Israeli energy facilities. There was also a suggestion that Iranian hacktivist actors used technical services by a hosting provider based in Chelyabinsk. Other reporting has also suggested the convergence of technical infrastructure, whereby Iranian cyber actors allegedly used Russian technical infrastructure to transmit their data.
Mitigating Factors to Consider
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to the nature of Russia-Iran cyber cooperation, and understanding which actors are engaging--and how--is vital to accurately understanding this partnership. Indeed, some researchers argue that the Russia-Iran cyber relationship is a partnership of strategic convenience, characterized by "mutual suspicion, ideological differences, and competition." However, there are important mitigating factors that future research or reporting should bear in mind from an analytical standpoint when examining future cyber activity between the two states, though they by no means constitute a comprehensive list:
* Hacktivist or criminal actors coordinating their activity do not necessarily equate to state-to-state collaboration. This is true even where a cyber actor has links back to a state agency. Both states operate with different degrees of state knowledge or approval, varied levels of closeness and duration, and even more varied degrees of operational or tactical alignment that need to be identified and understood.
* Oversight matters within state institutions. Some scenarios could unfold with ostensibly very little knowledge by their respective governments, such as Russian cybercriminal groups targeting Iran's perceived enemies of their own volition for financial reasons. Other scenarios would almost certainly require higher levels of state approval, such as close tactical cooperation between Russian and Iranian military cyber units, which open-source information does not currently corroborate.
* There is likely a history of distrust between the two states in cyberspace. This stems from when Russian cyber actor Turla" commandeered Iranian cyber espionage infrastructure to launch its own cyber operations--posing as Iranian actors to avoid attribution, effectively a "false-flag" operation. With this in mind, it may be unlikely that Russia or Iran would be willing to share their most sophisticated cyber capabilities with a partner, as these could be repurposed and used against them.
* Each state will have its own counterintelligence concerns and changing intelligence requirements. This includes suspicion of where the other may be conducting cyber espionage on its infrastructure or taking over technical infrastructure for its own purposes. Therefore use of technical infrastructure may not necessarily indicate joint capability development or deployment.
Conclusion
It is clear that there is some degree of cyber collaboration taking place between Russia and Iran. However, this does not necessarily amount to closely coordinated operations or joint capability development seen in other areas, such as drone technology or satellite imagery sharing. It is possible that some collaboration is ongoing, but the existing evidence cited to date does not substantiate a broader claim about Iranian-Russian cyber cooperation.
This has important policy implications. First, overstating the degree and types of Russia-Iran cyber engagement risks overinflating their partnership in cyberspace. In turn, this risks leading policymakers down the wrong path regarding the U.S.-Iran conflict; the low-level cyber activity reported by the media is highly unlikely to result in a high-impact cyberattack or game-changing event that will alter the trajectory of the conflict, especially relative to other technologies such as drones that have demonstrated high impact in the war. Second, in a period of U.S. overstretch and finite resources, chasing ill-defined activity in cyberspace risks detracting from other priorities; instead, for example, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic levers could be brought to bear to restrict Russia-Iran supply chains for drone capability development. In the longer term, on the assumption that the Russia-Iran partnership is likely to deepen, this presents a significant opportunity for a targeted and focused response by the United States to drive a wedge between the two states (whether in cyberspace or beyond), using offensive cyber operations, influence operations, and diplomatic and military levers to shape the conditions for distrust between them.
Over-interpreting Russia and Iran's activity does not lead to security-beneficial outcomes. Instead, U.S. and Western policymakers and practitioners are best served by clarifying the Russian and Iranian cyber entities in question; their degree of independence from the state; the level of the state at which they operate, if applicable; the specific activities undertaken; and the current and future impact on specific threats to the United States and the West. This is especially true as both states will continue to work together in current, and future, conflicts. As with all adversaries, it is vital to break down and understand their ecosystems with nuance based on verifiable evidence rather than mirror-imaging how we think they might operate.
* * *
Nikita Shah is a senior fellow with the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Justin Sherman is the founder and CEO of Global Cyber Strategies, a research and advisory firm based in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-russia-iran-collaboration-cyberspace
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Understanding Russia-Iran Collaboration in Cyberspace
Reports of Russia-Iran collaboration in the U.S.-Iran conflict are a real and live source of concern. Russia has shared intelligence with Iran that purportedly led to the targeting of U.S. soldiers in the Middle East, as well as drone technologies that have given Iran a substantive asymmetric edge in targeting regional ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 14, 2026, by Nikita Shah, senior fellow with the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program: * * * Understanding Russia-Iran Collaboration in Cyberspace Reports of Russia-Iran collaboration in the U.S.-Iran conflict are a real and live source of concern. Russia has shared intelligence with Iran that purportedly led to the targeting of U.S. soldiers in the Middle East, as well as drone technologies that have given Iran a substantive asymmetric edge in targeting regionaladversaries. However, collaboration on cyber operations has been repeatedly misread and misunderstood, including claims that Russia has supplied Iran with cyber support and that pro-Russia actors have formed a coalition with Iranian hackers, both of which have only a thin evidence base.
Based on the types of collaboration identified between the two countries, more evidence is needed before declaring that Russia and Iran's cooperation in cyberspace reaches the heights of collaboration portrayed through media reporting. Moreover, more nuanced language is needed in understanding the cyber threat and ecosystems of both states. Russia and Iran are uneasy strategic partners; there are risks inherent in sharing their best technical capabilities with a partner they do not fully trust, and the types of cyber activity identified in media reporting, based on the way the activity has been described, would do little to provide any meaningful edge or asymmetric advantage in either the Russia-Ukraine conflict or U.S.-Iran war. It is possible that Moscow and Tehran are engaging in or could engage in closer cyber cooperation now or in the future--across state agencies, private sector firms, universities, and more--but the currently cited evidence does not substantiate what some headlines have suggested. Different degrees of cooperation between Russia and Iran on cyber issues pose different challenges to the United States and allies, and would likely lead to different response options for policy and decisionmakers.
Understanding Russia and Iran's Cyber Ecosystems
Russia's cyber ecosystem is expansive. State intelligence agencies, state-created front companies, state-coerced cybercriminals, relatively state-independent cybercriminals, private sector contractors, patriotic hackers, and many other actors form a complex, thorny web. But this nuance is often lost in open-source and media reporting, making it easy to forget that a "Russian hacker" can in fact mean one of many different things. Each Russian cyber actor is different, has its own sets of incentives, and brings its own capabilities to bear that threaten Western security in different ways. These cyber actors are neither a monolith nor the same threat.
Moscow has established some clear rules for its cyber ecosystem, such as that cybercriminals or patriotic hacking collectives should not undermine the Kremlin's objectives. But there is no one-size-fits-all model for how these groups interact with the state, and those interactions can vary widely. Some entities, such as cyber units of the Federal Security Service (FSB), are part of the government itself. Others, such as ransomware groups with ties to the FSB, are fused with the state but also subject to their own financial motives. And yet others benefit from state protection and corruption but may operate their own activities, such as patriotic hackers with genuinely nationalist views or cybercriminals who want to make money and do not support state hacking in the process.
Iran possesses an equally complex, though decentralized, cyber ecosystem. This comprises state actors across its military and civilian intelligence agencies, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS); cyber criminals; proxy actors or hacktivist groups of widely varying affiliations; and private sector companies that provide services or capabilities into the state. The Iranian hacktivist landscape itself is fluid and fast-moving, where different groups possess differing degrees of affiliation with the Iranian state and diverse ideological motivations. This includes state-sponsored hacktivists linked to advanced persistent threats, such as Handala Hack (thought to be a front for the MOIS) and CyberAv3ngers (thought to be directly linked to the IRGC); pro-Iran regional hacktivists; and domestic, anti-regime hacktivists that allegedly operate from exiled communities outside Iran and target Iranian state institutions. Iran's state and non-state actors are supported by a robust private sector that provides technical capabilities and infrastructure into the state, offers a steady talent pipeline, can serve up contractors and front companies for cyber operations, and facilitates technology transfers and sanctions evasion. With the exception of the anti-regime hacktivists, these actors reflect Iran's historical use of proxy actors as an asymmetric advantage to achieve its broader strategic objectives: They enable domestic social control, regime survival and power projection, and the destabilisation of Iran's international adversaries.
Therefore, not specifying which specific actor or type of actor is supposedly involved in an activity undercuts a practical assessment of the threat it poses, what responsibility the state has, and which options are available to respond to or shape that type of cyber activity.
Historical to Current Collaboration
Russia and Iran's strategic partnership is fundamentally driven by self-interest and shared Western adversaries. In strategic terms, both states are working to distract the international community from their own respective conflicts (against Ukraine, and the United States and Israel, respectively) while also depleting U.S. weapons stocks. Moreover, they are also partners in both sanctions evasion and the provision of proprietary military technology, where the war in Ukraine is regarded by some as a particular turning point in the relationship, owing to cooperation on drone technology, the provision of Russian satellite imagery to inform Iranian targeting of U.S. assets, and the formation of working groups and commissions to share military learning from current conflicts. These are just some points of engagement.
In cyberspace, Russia and Iran's history of cooperation includes engagements such as:
* The 2001 signing of a treaty establishing a framework for future interstate cooperation;
* An agreement in 2021 formalizing cooperation on cyber and information security, which was largely defensive in nature and focused on thwarting threats to regime control;
* Russian private sector companies' provision of advanced digital surveillance and censorship software to the Iranian government in 2022-23, enhancing the Iranian state's ability to surveil its citizens, dissidents, and adversaries; and
* A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty agreed in 2025 that included strengthening state control of the internet.
Moreover, this cooperation is not confined to the state-to-state level. Russian universities have hosted delegations from Iranian state institutions, including its National Cybersecurity Authority. Russian companies have conducted business-to-business negotiations in information and communications technology with Iranian commerce delegations. And Iranian companies linked to the MOIS have attended Russian hacking competitions.
In the 2026 U.S.-Iran conflict, reporting suggested outright Russian and Iranian collaboration in cyberspace. These claims--stemming from an unverified Ukrainian intelligence assessment--include interactions between a variety of Russian groups, including Z-Pentest Alliance, NoName057(16), and DDoSia Project, and Iranian hacktivist group Handala Hack via Telegram, such as simultaneously publishing information about targeting Israeli energy facilities. There was also a suggestion that Iranian hacktivist actors used technical services by a hosting provider based in Chelyabinsk. Other reporting has also suggested the convergence of technical infrastructure, whereby Iranian cyber actors allegedly used Russian technical infrastructure to transmit their data.
Mitigating Factors to Consider
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to the nature of Russia-Iran cyber cooperation, and understanding which actors are engaging--and how--is vital to accurately understanding this partnership. Indeed, some researchers argue that the Russia-Iran cyber relationship is a partnership of strategic convenience, characterized by "mutual suspicion, ideological differences, and competition." However, there are important mitigating factors that future research or reporting should bear in mind from an analytical standpoint when examining future cyber activity between the two states, though they by no means constitute a comprehensive list:
* Hacktivist or criminal actors coordinating their activity do not necessarily equate to state-to-state collaboration. This is true even where a cyber actor has links back to a state agency. Both states operate with different degrees of state knowledge or approval, varied levels of closeness and duration, and even more varied degrees of operational or tactical alignment that need to be identified and understood.
* Oversight matters within state institutions. Some scenarios could unfold with ostensibly very little knowledge by their respective governments, such as Russian cybercriminal groups targeting Iran's perceived enemies of their own volition for financial reasons. Other scenarios would almost certainly require higher levels of state approval, such as close tactical cooperation between Russian and Iranian military cyber units, which open-source information does not currently corroborate.
* There is likely a history of distrust between the two states in cyberspace. This stems from when Russian cyber actor Turla" commandeered Iranian cyber espionage infrastructure to launch its own cyber operations--posing as Iranian actors to avoid attribution, effectively a "false-flag" operation. With this in mind, it may be unlikely that Russia or Iran would be willing to share their most sophisticated cyber capabilities with a partner, as these could be repurposed and used against them.
* Each state will have its own counterintelligence concerns and changing intelligence requirements. This includes suspicion of where the other may be conducting cyber espionage on its infrastructure or taking over technical infrastructure for its own purposes. Therefore use of technical infrastructure may not necessarily indicate joint capability development or deployment.
Conclusion
It is clear that there is some degree of cyber collaboration taking place between Russia and Iran. However, this does not necessarily amount to closely coordinated operations or joint capability development seen in other areas, such as drone technology or satellite imagery sharing. It is possible that some collaboration is ongoing, but the existing evidence cited to date does not substantiate a broader claim about Iranian-Russian cyber cooperation.
This has important policy implications. First, overstating the degree and types of Russia-Iran cyber engagement risks overinflating their partnership in cyberspace. In turn, this risks leading policymakers down the wrong path regarding the U.S.-Iran conflict; the low-level cyber activity reported by the media is highly unlikely to result in a high-impact cyberattack or game-changing event that will alter the trajectory of the conflict, especially relative to other technologies such as drones that have demonstrated high impact in the war. Second, in a period of U.S. overstretch and finite resources, chasing ill-defined activity in cyberspace risks detracting from other priorities; instead, for example, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic levers could be brought to bear to restrict Russia-Iran supply chains for drone capability development. In the longer term, on the assumption that the Russia-Iran partnership is likely to deepen, this presents a significant opportunity for a targeted and focused response by the United States to drive a wedge between the two states (whether in cyberspace or beyond), using offensive cyber operations, influence operations, and diplomatic and military levers to shape the conditions for distrust between them.
Over-interpreting Russia and Iran's activity does not lead to security-beneficial outcomes. Instead, U.S. and Western policymakers and practitioners are best served by clarifying the Russian and Iranian cyber entities in question; their degree of independence from the state; the level of the state at which they operate, if applicable; the specific activities undertaken; and the current and future impact on specific threats to the United States and the West. This is especially true as both states will continue to work together in current, and future, conflicts. As with all adversaries, it is vital to break down and understand their ecosystems with nuance based on verifiable evidence rather than mirror-imaging how we think they might operate.
* * *
Nikita Shah is a senior fellow with the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Justin Sherman is the founder and CEO of Global Cyber Strategies, a research and advisory firm based in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-russia-iran-collaboration-cyberspace
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Reflections From URC 2026 - Ukraine's Reconstruction Has Become Wartime Resilience
WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 14, 2026, by Sergiy Tsivkach, adjunct fellow (non-resident) for the Project on Prosperity and Development:
* * *
Reflections from URC 2026: Ukraine's Reconstruction Has Become Wartime Resilience
On June 25-26, 2026, Poland hosted the fifth Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in its port city of Gdansk. The flagship event that began in Lugano, Switzerland, in 2022 as a war recovery conference has now turned into a platform that supports Ukraine's strategic industries and infrastructure ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 14, 2026, by Sergiy Tsivkach, adjunct fellow (non-resident) for the Project on Prosperity and Development: * * * Reflections from URC 2026: Ukraine's Reconstruction Has Become Wartime Resilience On June 25-26, 2026, Poland hosted the fifth Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in its port city of Gdansk. The flagship event that began in Lugano, Switzerland, in 2022 as a war recovery conference has now turned into a platform that supports Ukraine's strategic industries and infrastructureand embeds Ukraine deeper into European security architecture. The most noticeable outcome of this year's conference is a foreseeable shift toward wartime resilience. This shift matters, as recovery is no longer about the day after the war. It is about keeping the economy afloat, operating and rebuilding energy systems that are actively under attack, developing defense capabilities, protecting critical infrastructure, and financing municipalities.
During the conference, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko announced 160 deals worth Euros10 billion. However, this amount should not be read as pure cash on the table. These are primarily loans, guarantees, investments, and grants that still require disciplined implementation and reporting. The needs are enormous: According to the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5) conducted by Ukrainian government, the World Bank, the European Commission, and United Nations, Ukraine will require an estimated $588 billion for recovery projects and modern reconstruction. Hence, what was pledged in Gdansk is not enough to close Ukraine's reconstruction gap--or even meet its annual financing needs--but it marks a turning point: a shift from political will to concrete projects and from conference diplomacy to an operational architecture for wartime resilience. Now all that remains is to see whether agreements will be disbursed, insured, contracted and implemented on the ground.
Ukraine has managed to maintain its strategic advantage of being a strong ally for the European Union and a wider circle of international partners, which is critical for the ability to withstand Russia during and after the war, both for Ukraine and Europe. Supporting Ukraine's resilience now can only become a full-scale reconstruction effort if current programs are implemented in a transparent and effective way. This moment is about translating political pledges into implementation mechanisms that would ultimately shape the final form and size of the future reconstruction.
URC's Main Achievements
The current URC 2026 became distinct from its predecessors since it connected the themes of recovery with Ukraine's security and wartime reconstruction. The resilience ecosystem took clear shape, with projects in the areas of power generation, municipal services, logistics, defense, dual-use technologies, and domestic industrial capacity. The announced support programs and agreements are practical, actionable, and have strong implementation potential rather than constituting a mere wish list of projects.
The projects that came out of this year's conference can serve two critical purposes: (1) ensuring resilience during the war and (2) landscaping the path for the entry of bigger private sector backed capital into Ukraine. Bankability and scalability of projects featured more prominently in Gdansk than in previous conferences.
Financial Support for Ukraine's Stability
The European Union's support remains the strongest of all international partners, focusing on Ukraine's economy, defense, and reconstruction efforts. Noticeably, the bloc sees a priority in underwriting Ukraine's state capacity and ability to defend itself. The bridge is being built to connect Ukraine's immediate needs, reconstruction efforts, and long-term EU accession agenda. The Euros90 billion Ukraine Support Loan (USL) is the evidence of that, designed to provide Euros30 billion in economic and budgetary support and Euros60 billion in defense assistance over the next two years. The first installment of Euros3.2 billion in budgetary support and Euros3.9 billion of defense funding have already been disbursed under the USL.
The European Union's Ukraine Investment Framework (UIF) illustrates another important dimension--an aid delivery shift toward provisioning guarantees and blended finance tools. The current Euros1.1 billion commitment in Gdansk under the UIF brings the current program size to Euros8.5 billion and is expected to mobilize up to Euros26 billion in investments. This commitment is important not due to its size, but due to its efforts at building investor confidence in the Ukrainian market during the war.
The same logic is applied by the European Flagship Fund for Ukraine with Euros220 million in initial capital. It is projected to attract up to Euros7 billion for infrastructure and industrial projects. This is one of the key advances in the recovery process--public money is being used to de-risk and attract private capital, making investments into Ukraine more disciplined and structured.
An additional layer of support in Gdansk was provided by International Finance Institutions (IFIs). IFIs maintain a close link to players on the ground in Ukraine, and have the valuable ability to directly deploy capital to state-owned enterprises, municipalities and the private sector. Among the major IFI announcements were $3.39 billion linked to reforms via the Development Policy Operation agreement by the World Bank, the Euros500 million in investments and finance from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the European Investment Bank's Euros470 million to finance housing and broader infrastructure along with an Euros80 million commitment to the European Flagship Fund.
The IFIs efforts to advance project pipelines and reform-linked financing also continued in Gdansk. These institutions bring more than money: They offer strong technical expertise, world class project preparation standards, and long-term implementation discipline.
A note of caution: The figures pledged should not be confused with immediate expenditure in Ukraine. The ultimate value of this assistance will depend on Ukraine's ability to translate these commitments into implemented projects and, over time, demonstrate successful outcomes that build confidence and catalyze future investment.
Energy Development as a Key Priority
Energy security has emerged as the clearest sectoral priority during the conference, as Ukraine's power systems remain a strategic target of Russia's attacks. This sector has arguably the strongest link between recovery and security, and is a pillar of Ukraine's wartime economy. The energy agenda is focused on rebuilding a system that would be more effective and harder to destroy, and shifting toward distributed, investor-ready projects.
The following are among the main initiatives:
* The Renewable Acceleration and Market Development for Ukraine Programme (RAMP-UP), announced by the World Bank and the EBRD, has the same logic and focuses on the attraction of private investment into Ukraine's renewable energy sector. The EBRD signed letters of intent at the URC with Germany and Norway for Euros45 million and Euros10 million respectively to support the program. According to the World Bank, RAMP-UP can support the development of around 1,000 megawatts (MW) of new power generation and battery storage facilities and can mobilize around Euros1.5 billion in private capital investments.
* The EBRD has also signed a Euros90 million loan to Ukrenergo (the main state-owned electricity transmission system operator in Ukraine) for the reconstruction of several substations, a Euros50 million loan for the GNG Group 189 MW wind project, and a Euros65 million loan for Notus Energy to build a 120 MW wind plant.
* State company Naftogas has agreed to begin work on financing mechanism of up to $300 million with the U.S. Export-Import Bank for direct lending to U.S. suppliers and contractors.
* Private energy company DTEK has signed a Euros900 million MOU with GE Vernova to build a 650 MW gas powered power generation plant with targeted commercial operation before 2032, and a $100 million deal with Octopus Energy (Project RISE) to build a 100-rooftop solar and battery storage project.
* EBRD, Amber Dragon Ukraine Infrastructure Fund I and Negen have signed a mandate letter for EBRD's intention to provide long-term debt finance to Power One Phase II for a distributed power generation project with estimated cost of over for Euros90 million, adding nearly 170 MW across six sites.
* Just before URC 2026, at the G7 summit, Energoatom and Urenco signed a pound sterling210 million loan guarantee deal backed by the UK Export Finance to supply enriched uranium to Ukrainian nuclear power stations.
Defense, Security and Dual-Use Technology Gain Prominence
One of the most notable and important outcomes from Gdansk was the increase in defense and dual-use projects for Ukraine's reconstruction. This reflects a wartime reality, and Europe's future security vision for the decades to come. Ukrainian defense projects are no longer seen as separate from recovery, but rather as one of its key elements. Ukraine must protect itself during and after the war, which will be no less important for attracting capital and Ukraine's ability to rebuild itself long-term.
As an example, Ukraine received a Euros3.9 billion as the first disbursement of the Euros5.01 billion defense tranche under the USL. Also, the European Union announced a package of Euros343 million in grants and guarantees for defense and dual-use projects, further showing commitment to support development of Ukraine's defense capabilities. The URC's security and defense dimension covered air defense, intelligence coordination, unmanned technologies, protection of energy infrastructure, demining, and countering disinformation. These are not traditional reconstruction categories, and prove, once again, how far the process has moved from postwar recovery planning toward wartime resilience.
Defense production, energy security, and overall reconstruction are increasingly being shaped as part of the same strategic agenda. That doesn't mean that recovery has become militarized--it just indicates the reality that Ukraine cannot rebuild schools, homes, factories, and power plants unless it can also protect these assets. In addition, the Gdansk conference made it clear that Ukraine's recovery and its ability to sustain itself are no longer only about Ukraine, but also concern European security and geopolitical challenges. Defense cooperation with Ukraine is increasingly becoming part of Europe's security policy. Ukraine's battlefield innovation and experience will become relevant to strategic matters far beyond the current war.
The Role of Subnational Governments and the Local Dimension
Attention to regions during the URC conference was significant, as ultimately, this is where reconstruction efforts have no choice but to succeed. Ukrainian municipalities have huge needs, but not always the strong capacity to implement projects. Hence, there is a strong need to ensure effective collaboration between central authorities, international partners, and Ukrainian regions, specifically in the context of public-private partnerships.
The URC announcements have a direct effect on Ukrainian regions and local recovery action. For instance, one of the main commitments announced was the Euros478 million package under UIF in grants and guarantees for municipal infrastructure and essential services. Ukrainians measure reconstruction progress through public services including the availability of heating, electricity, water, and internet.
In this regard, public-private-partnerships (PPP) can play important role as an implementation instrument for Ukraine's recovery, applicable to all key sectors, at state and local levels. The PPP pipeline can be treated as one of the key project-delivery tools for Ukraine's recovery, and as a de-risked and structured investment attraction mechanism. However, PPPs are not magic: They need thorough planning, strong implementation discipline, and capacity, as well as an effective and transparent regulatory environment. There was much discussion of PPPs at the conference, and more related activity now and after the war is likely.
Insurance is another important de-risking element for private investments in Ukraine. The role of private capital in Ukraine's reconstruction cannot be underestimated. Since the 2023 URC in London, Ukraine and its partners have continuously declared that recovery needs cannot be covered by public funds alone. Hence, de-risking mechanisms have a paramount importance for the implementation of projects in Ukraine and the attraction of new investments. The agreement between the Development Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) signed in Gdansk established an insurance framework linked to the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund and is intended to mobilize additional private investment alongside the fund's projects. MIGA has issued $948 million in political-risk insurance for investments in Ukraine since 2022 and over $600 million in new guarantees. This result is small compared with Ukraine's needs but is an achievement worth scaling up. The next URC in 2027 should focus more on presenting the deals that were able to reach financial close, obtain insurance, attract coinvestment, and effectively operate in Ukraine. The announcement of programs and platforms is important, but nothing gathers the attention of private investors like success cases.
Key Takeaways and the Road Ahead
The 2026 URC in Gdansk has demonstrated a practical shift from general planning and broad commitments for Ukraine's reconstruction to more practical projects, a focus on resilience, and overall European security. Unlike previous conferences, the 2026 URC has treated recovery, security, industrial policy, and European integration as part of the same agenda: resilience during the war. This architecture is dictated by real conditions on the ground and can be scaled up with the ongoing reconstruction efforts or remain limited and fragmented. Much will depend on Ukraine's ability to convert these commitments into bankable projects: usable and protected assets wrapped in the EU-focused long-term agenda.
Ukraine is backed by significant EU economic and budgetary support, and its wartime investment landscape is mainly focused on energy, defense, and critical infrastructure. Ukraine has significant potential, but it does not yet have the resources required to undertake the scale of reconstruction ahead.
The next recovery phase should focus on a transparent and effective delivery of commitments rather than political announcements. Trust must be built between Ukraine and the international investor community, specifically with the private sector players. New dimensions and sectors must be added to the conference agenda and to Ukraine's investment menu: issues and solutions related to human capital, SMEs, agri-processing, wider industrial and manufacturing scope, healthcare and rehabilitation, IT and tech--all should be included. Focus on science development, technologies of the future, and sustainable AI application for the reconstruction of Ukraine is also timely and critical.
The URC in Gdansk has secured resilience potential, laid out new support programs based on the situation on the ground, and passed the implementation baton to Ukraine. The upcoming 2027 conference in Estonia will reveal the results of this cooperation, and hopefully more movement toward Ukraine's deeper economic recovery.
* * *
Sergiy Tsivkach is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) for the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/reflections-urc-2026-ukraines-reconstruction-has-become-wartime-resilience
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Reflections from URC 2026: Ukraine's Reconstruction Has Become Wartime Resilience
On June 25-26, 2026, Poland hosted the fifth Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in its port city of Gdansk. The flagship event that began in Lugano, Switzerland, in 2022 as a war recovery conference has now turned into a platform that supports Ukraine's strategic industries and infrastructure ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 14, 2026, by Sergiy Tsivkach, adjunct fellow (non-resident) for the Project on Prosperity and Development: * * * Reflections from URC 2026: Ukraine's Reconstruction Has Become Wartime Resilience On June 25-26, 2026, Poland hosted the fifth Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in its port city of Gdansk. The flagship event that began in Lugano, Switzerland, in 2022 as a war recovery conference has now turned into a platform that supports Ukraine's strategic industries and infrastructureand embeds Ukraine deeper into European security architecture. The most noticeable outcome of this year's conference is a foreseeable shift toward wartime resilience. This shift matters, as recovery is no longer about the day after the war. It is about keeping the economy afloat, operating and rebuilding energy systems that are actively under attack, developing defense capabilities, protecting critical infrastructure, and financing municipalities.
During the conference, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko announced 160 deals worth Euros10 billion. However, this amount should not be read as pure cash on the table. These are primarily loans, guarantees, investments, and grants that still require disciplined implementation and reporting. The needs are enormous: According to the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5) conducted by Ukrainian government, the World Bank, the European Commission, and United Nations, Ukraine will require an estimated $588 billion for recovery projects and modern reconstruction. Hence, what was pledged in Gdansk is not enough to close Ukraine's reconstruction gap--or even meet its annual financing needs--but it marks a turning point: a shift from political will to concrete projects and from conference diplomacy to an operational architecture for wartime resilience. Now all that remains is to see whether agreements will be disbursed, insured, contracted and implemented on the ground.
Ukraine has managed to maintain its strategic advantage of being a strong ally for the European Union and a wider circle of international partners, which is critical for the ability to withstand Russia during and after the war, both for Ukraine and Europe. Supporting Ukraine's resilience now can only become a full-scale reconstruction effort if current programs are implemented in a transparent and effective way. This moment is about translating political pledges into implementation mechanisms that would ultimately shape the final form and size of the future reconstruction.
URC's Main Achievements
The current URC 2026 became distinct from its predecessors since it connected the themes of recovery with Ukraine's security and wartime reconstruction. The resilience ecosystem took clear shape, with projects in the areas of power generation, municipal services, logistics, defense, dual-use technologies, and domestic industrial capacity. The announced support programs and agreements are practical, actionable, and have strong implementation potential rather than constituting a mere wish list of projects.
The projects that came out of this year's conference can serve two critical purposes: (1) ensuring resilience during the war and (2) landscaping the path for the entry of bigger private sector backed capital into Ukraine. Bankability and scalability of projects featured more prominently in Gdansk than in previous conferences.
Financial Support for Ukraine's Stability
The European Union's support remains the strongest of all international partners, focusing on Ukraine's economy, defense, and reconstruction efforts. Noticeably, the bloc sees a priority in underwriting Ukraine's state capacity and ability to defend itself. The bridge is being built to connect Ukraine's immediate needs, reconstruction efforts, and long-term EU accession agenda. The Euros90 billion Ukraine Support Loan (USL) is the evidence of that, designed to provide Euros30 billion in economic and budgetary support and Euros60 billion in defense assistance over the next two years. The first installment of Euros3.2 billion in budgetary support and Euros3.9 billion of defense funding have already been disbursed under the USL.
The European Union's Ukraine Investment Framework (UIF) illustrates another important dimension--an aid delivery shift toward provisioning guarantees and blended finance tools. The current Euros1.1 billion commitment in Gdansk under the UIF brings the current program size to Euros8.5 billion and is expected to mobilize up to Euros26 billion in investments. This commitment is important not due to its size, but due to its efforts at building investor confidence in the Ukrainian market during the war.
The same logic is applied by the European Flagship Fund for Ukraine with Euros220 million in initial capital. It is projected to attract up to Euros7 billion for infrastructure and industrial projects. This is one of the key advances in the recovery process--public money is being used to de-risk and attract private capital, making investments into Ukraine more disciplined and structured.
An additional layer of support in Gdansk was provided by International Finance Institutions (IFIs). IFIs maintain a close link to players on the ground in Ukraine, and have the valuable ability to directly deploy capital to state-owned enterprises, municipalities and the private sector. Among the major IFI announcements were $3.39 billion linked to reforms via the Development Policy Operation agreement by the World Bank, the Euros500 million in investments and finance from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the European Investment Bank's Euros470 million to finance housing and broader infrastructure along with an Euros80 million commitment to the European Flagship Fund.
The IFIs efforts to advance project pipelines and reform-linked financing also continued in Gdansk. These institutions bring more than money: They offer strong technical expertise, world class project preparation standards, and long-term implementation discipline.
A note of caution: The figures pledged should not be confused with immediate expenditure in Ukraine. The ultimate value of this assistance will depend on Ukraine's ability to translate these commitments into implemented projects and, over time, demonstrate successful outcomes that build confidence and catalyze future investment.
Energy Development as a Key Priority
Energy security has emerged as the clearest sectoral priority during the conference, as Ukraine's power systems remain a strategic target of Russia's attacks. This sector has arguably the strongest link between recovery and security, and is a pillar of Ukraine's wartime economy. The energy agenda is focused on rebuilding a system that would be more effective and harder to destroy, and shifting toward distributed, investor-ready projects.
The following are among the main initiatives:
* The Renewable Acceleration and Market Development for Ukraine Programme (RAMP-UP), announced by the World Bank and the EBRD, has the same logic and focuses on the attraction of private investment into Ukraine's renewable energy sector. The EBRD signed letters of intent at the URC with Germany and Norway for Euros45 million and Euros10 million respectively to support the program. According to the World Bank, RAMP-UP can support the development of around 1,000 megawatts (MW) of new power generation and battery storage facilities and can mobilize around Euros1.5 billion in private capital investments.
* The EBRD has also signed a Euros90 million loan to Ukrenergo (the main state-owned electricity transmission system operator in Ukraine) for the reconstruction of several substations, a Euros50 million loan for the GNG Group 189 MW wind project, and a Euros65 million loan for Notus Energy to build a 120 MW wind plant.
* State company Naftogas has agreed to begin work on financing mechanism of up to $300 million with the U.S. Export-Import Bank for direct lending to U.S. suppliers and contractors.
* Private energy company DTEK has signed a Euros900 million MOU with GE Vernova to build a 650 MW gas powered power generation plant with targeted commercial operation before 2032, and a $100 million deal with Octopus Energy (Project RISE) to build a 100-rooftop solar and battery storage project.
* EBRD, Amber Dragon Ukraine Infrastructure Fund I and Negen have signed a mandate letter for EBRD's intention to provide long-term debt finance to Power One Phase II for a distributed power generation project with estimated cost of over for Euros90 million, adding nearly 170 MW across six sites.
* Just before URC 2026, at the G7 summit, Energoatom and Urenco signed a pound sterling210 million loan guarantee deal backed by the UK Export Finance to supply enriched uranium to Ukrainian nuclear power stations.
Defense, Security and Dual-Use Technology Gain Prominence
One of the most notable and important outcomes from Gdansk was the increase in defense and dual-use projects for Ukraine's reconstruction. This reflects a wartime reality, and Europe's future security vision for the decades to come. Ukrainian defense projects are no longer seen as separate from recovery, but rather as one of its key elements. Ukraine must protect itself during and after the war, which will be no less important for attracting capital and Ukraine's ability to rebuild itself long-term.
As an example, Ukraine received a Euros3.9 billion as the first disbursement of the Euros5.01 billion defense tranche under the USL. Also, the European Union announced a package of Euros343 million in grants and guarantees for defense and dual-use projects, further showing commitment to support development of Ukraine's defense capabilities. The URC's security and defense dimension covered air defense, intelligence coordination, unmanned technologies, protection of energy infrastructure, demining, and countering disinformation. These are not traditional reconstruction categories, and prove, once again, how far the process has moved from postwar recovery planning toward wartime resilience.
Defense production, energy security, and overall reconstruction are increasingly being shaped as part of the same strategic agenda. That doesn't mean that recovery has become militarized--it just indicates the reality that Ukraine cannot rebuild schools, homes, factories, and power plants unless it can also protect these assets. In addition, the Gdansk conference made it clear that Ukraine's recovery and its ability to sustain itself are no longer only about Ukraine, but also concern European security and geopolitical challenges. Defense cooperation with Ukraine is increasingly becoming part of Europe's security policy. Ukraine's battlefield innovation and experience will become relevant to strategic matters far beyond the current war.
The Role of Subnational Governments and the Local Dimension
Attention to regions during the URC conference was significant, as ultimately, this is where reconstruction efforts have no choice but to succeed. Ukrainian municipalities have huge needs, but not always the strong capacity to implement projects. Hence, there is a strong need to ensure effective collaboration between central authorities, international partners, and Ukrainian regions, specifically in the context of public-private partnerships.
The URC announcements have a direct effect on Ukrainian regions and local recovery action. For instance, one of the main commitments announced was the Euros478 million package under UIF in grants and guarantees for municipal infrastructure and essential services. Ukrainians measure reconstruction progress through public services including the availability of heating, electricity, water, and internet.
In this regard, public-private-partnerships (PPP) can play important role as an implementation instrument for Ukraine's recovery, applicable to all key sectors, at state and local levels. The PPP pipeline can be treated as one of the key project-delivery tools for Ukraine's recovery, and as a de-risked and structured investment attraction mechanism. However, PPPs are not magic: They need thorough planning, strong implementation discipline, and capacity, as well as an effective and transparent regulatory environment. There was much discussion of PPPs at the conference, and more related activity now and after the war is likely.
Insurance is another important de-risking element for private investments in Ukraine. The role of private capital in Ukraine's reconstruction cannot be underestimated. Since the 2023 URC in London, Ukraine and its partners have continuously declared that recovery needs cannot be covered by public funds alone. Hence, de-risking mechanisms have a paramount importance for the implementation of projects in Ukraine and the attraction of new investments. The agreement between the Development Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) signed in Gdansk established an insurance framework linked to the U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund and is intended to mobilize additional private investment alongside the fund's projects. MIGA has issued $948 million in political-risk insurance for investments in Ukraine since 2022 and over $600 million in new guarantees. This result is small compared with Ukraine's needs but is an achievement worth scaling up. The next URC in 2027 should focus more on presenting the deals that were able to reach financial close, obtain insurance, attract coinvestment, and effectively operate in Ukraine. The announcement of programs and platforms is important, but nothing gathers the attention of private investors like success cases.
Key Takeaways and the Road Ahead
The 2026 URC in Gdansk has demonstrated a practical shift from general planning and broad commitments for Ukraine's reconstruction to more practical projects, a focus on resilience, and overall European security. Unlike previous conferences, the 2026 URC has treated recovery, security, industrial policy, and European integration as part of the same agenda: resilience during the war. This architecture is dictated by real conditions on the ground and can be scaled up with the ongoing reconstruction efforts or remain limited and fragmented. Much will depend on Ukraine's ability to convert these commitments into bankable projects: usable and protected assets wrapped in the EU-focused long-term agenda.
Ukraine is backed by significant EU economic and budgetary support, and its wartime investment landscape is mainly focused on energy, defense, and critical infrastructure. Ukraine has significant potential, but it does not yet have the resources required to undertake the scale of reconstruction ahead.
The next recovery phase should focus on a transparent and effective delivery of commitments rather than political announcements. Trust must be built between Ukraine and the international investor community, specifically with the private sector players. New dimensions and sectors must be added to the conference agenda and to Ukraine's investment menu: issues and solutions related to human capital, SMEs, agri-processing, wider industrial and manufacturing scope, healthcare and rehabilitation, IT and tech--all should be included. Focus on science development, technologies of the future, and sustainable AI application for the reconstruction of Ukraine is also timely and critical.
The URC in Gdansk has secured resilience potential, laid out new support programs based on the situation on the ground, and passed the implementation baton to Ukraine. The upcoming 2027 conference in Estonia will reveal the results of this cooperation, and hopefully more movement toward Ukraine's deeper economic recovery.
* * *
Sergiy Tsivkach is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) for the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/reflections-urc-2026-ukraines-reconstruction-has-become-wartime-resilience
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: House to Senate - SAVE America is a Must-Pass Piece of Legislation
WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 14, 2026:
* * *
House to Senate: SAVE America is a Must-Pass Piece of Legislation
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) applauds the House, under the leadership of Speaker Mike Johnson, for designating the SAVE America Act as a must-pass piece of legislation by merging it with the State Department appropriations package that will be sent to the Senate.
"The Department of Homeland Security designates election infrastructure as critical infrastructure, and this is not by accident," said Ken ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 14, 2026: * * * House to Senate: SAVE America is a Must-Pass Piece of Legislation The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) applauds the House, under the leadership of Speaker Mike Johnson, for designating the SAVE America Act as a must-pass piece of legislation by merging it with the State Department appropriations package that will be sent to the Senate. "The Department of Homeland Security designates election infrastructure as critical infrastructure, and this is not by accident," said KenBlackwell, chair for Election Integrity at AFPI.
"This is because election security is national security. The American people deserve to know that their votes are protected, and that lawmakers are implementing policies to protect their votes."
The SAVE America Act puts policy behind the basic American principle that American elections belong to Americans--not to foreign nationals or those who have no stake in our Nation's future.
Requiring proof of citizenship to vote and securing our elections is not a partisan issue; this is an American issue. The Senate now has an opportunity to pass the SAVE America Act and protect the rights of our citizens.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/house-to-senate-save-america-is-a-must-pass-piece-of-legislation
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
House to Senate: SAVE America is a Must-Pass Piece of Legislation
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) applauds the House, under the leadership of Speaker Mike Johnson, for designating the SAVE America Act as a must-pass piece of legislation by merging it with the State Department appropriations package that will be sent to the Senate.
"The Department of Homeland Security designates election infrastructure as critical infrastructure, and this is not by accident," said Ken ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 14, 2026: * * * House to Senate: SAVE America is a Must-Pass Piece of Legislation The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) applauds the House, under the leadership of Speaker Mike Johnson, for designating the SAVE America Act as a must-pass piece of legislation by merging it with the State Department appropriations package that will be sent to the Senate. "The Department of Homeland Security designates election infrastructure as critical infrastructure, and this is not by accident," said KenBlackwell, chair for Election Integrity at AFPI.
"This is because election security is national security. The American people deserve to know that their votes are protected, and that lawmakers are implementing policies to protect their votes."
The SAVE America Act puts policy behind the basic American principle that American elections belong to Americans--not to foreign nationals or those who have no stake in our Nation's future.
Requiring proof of citizenship to vote and securing our elections is not a partisan issue; this is an American issue. The Senate now has an opportunity to pass the SAVE America Act and protect the rights of our citizens.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/house-to-senate-save-america-is-a-must-pass-piece-of-legislation
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Applauds USDA's FIELDS Program to Rebuild America's Fertilizer Supply
WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 14, 2026:
* * *
AFPI Applauds USDA's FIELDS Program to Rebuild America's Fertilizer Supply
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) has issued the following statement in response to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) newly announced Fertilizer Investment & Expansion for Long-term Domestic Supply (FIELDS) program, a $500 million effort to expand domestic fertilizer production for American farmers.
The FIELDS program will help build more fertilizer plants here in America, so farmers have ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 14, 2026: * * * AFPI Applauds USDA's FIELDS Program to Rebuild America's Fertilizer Supply The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) has issued the following statement in response to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) newly announced Fertilizer Investment & Expansion for Long-term Domestic Supply (FIELDS) program, a $500 million effort to expand domestic fertilizer production for American farmers. The FIELDS program will help build more fertilizer plants here in America, so farmers havemore options and don't have to depend so heavily on foreign suppliers for the products they need every planting season.
"American farmers should not have to worry about whether fertilizer will show up on time or at a price they can afford," said Kip Tom, vice chair of Rural Policy at AFPI. "For too long, we've depended on other countries for something as basic as the nutrients that grow our food. USDA's investments are part of a long-term strategy to establish durable U.S. supply chains for agricultural inputs. These are real resources being placed behind strategically selected American-made fertilizer projects that will further bring down input costs and make U.S. food production secure and affordable to consumers."
AFPI has long championed the reshoring of the production of essential goods. Total reliance on foreign nations for items that are essential to protecting American food security is a national security concern. Not only will reshoring the production of fertilizer close the national security loop, but it will create employment opportunities and reduce input costs to farmers and lower consumer food prices. This program will create a stronger and more reliable fertilizer supply for the farmers who feed America.
To learn more about AFPI's Farmers First Agenda, click here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/agriculture/farmers-first).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-applauds-usdas-fields-program-to-rebuild-americas-fertilizer-supply
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
AFPI Applauds USDA's FIELDS Program to Rebuild America's Fertilizer Supply
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) has issued the following statement in response to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) newly announced Fertilizer Investment & Expansion for Long-term Domestic Supply (FIELDS) program, a $500 million effort to expand domestic fertilizer production for American farmers.
The FIELDS program will help build more fertilizer plants here in America, so farmers have ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 14, 2026: * * * AFPI Applauds USDA's FIELDS Program to Rebuild America's Fertilizer Supply The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) has issued the following statement in response to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) newly announced Fertilizer Investment & Expansion for Long-term Domestic Supply (FIELDS) program, a $500 million effort to expand domestic fertilizer production for American farmers. The FIELDS program will help build more fertilizer plants here in America, so farmers havemore options and don't have to depend so heavily on foreign suppliers for the products they need every planting season.
"American farmers should not have to worry about whether fertilizer will show up on time or at a price they can afford," said Kip Tom, vice chair of Rural Policy at AFPI. "For too long, we've depended on other countries for something as basic as the nutrients that grow our food. USDA's investments are part of a long-term strategy to establish durable U.S. supply chains for agricultural inputs. These are real resources being placed behind strategically selected American-made fertilizer projects that will further bring down input costs and make U.S. food production secure and affordable to consumers."
AFPI has long championed the reshoring of the production of essential goods. Total reliance on foreign nations for items that are essential to protecting American food security is a national security concern. Not only will reshoring the production of fertilizer close the national security loop, but it will create employment opportunities and reduce input costs to farmers and lower consumer food prices. This program will create a stronger and more reliable fertilizer supply for the farmers who feed America.
To learn more about AFPI's Farmers First Agenda, click here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/agriculture/farmers-first).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-applauds-usdas-fields-program-to-rebuild-americas-fertilizer-supply
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Applauds Common-Sense Policies That Put Students Ahead of Bureaucracy
WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 14, 2026:
* * *
AFPI Applauds Common-Sense Policies that Put Students Ahead of Bureaucracy
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Michael Shires, Ph.D., vice chair of Education Opportunity at AFPI, regarding policies that would return education to the states:
"America First means putting students, families, and taxpayers ahead of the Washington bureaucracy. For 50 years the federal government has spent more on education and delivered less, and parents ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 14, 2026: * * * AFPI Applauds Common-Sense Policies that Put Students Ahead of Bureaucracy Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Michael Shires, Ph.D., vice chair of Education Opportunity at AFPI, regarding policies that would return education to the states: "America First means putting students, families, and taxpayers ahead of the Washington bureaucracy. For 50 years the federal government has spent more on education and delivered less, and parentshave paid the price.
President Trump promised to change that by returning education to the states and to the people closest to our kids. Today, the Trump Administration is keeping that promise.
Common-sense reform means asking a simple question: who can actually deliver results for students? The answer is rarely a distant federal agency. It's parents, teachers, and communities, backed by a government that does its job efficiently and gets out of the way. The Committee and the Department thankfully are recognizing this."
The House Education and Workforce Committee has currently introduced 10 bills that would codify the Trump Administration's plan on this policy topic.
AFPI applauds efforts to modernize education and stands firmly behind President Trump's vision of an America First education system that serves every American family, not the bureaucracy.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-applauds-common-sense-policies-that-put-students-ahead-of-bureaucracy
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
AFPI Applauds Common-Sense Policies that Put Students Ahead of Bureaucracy
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Michael Shires, Ph.D., vice chair of Education Opportunity at AFPI, regarding policies that would return education to the states:
"America First means putting students, families, and taxpayers ahead of the Washington bureaucracy. For 50 years the federal government has spent more on education and delivered less, and parents ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 15 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 14, 2026: * * * AFPI Applauds Common-Sense Policies that Put Students Ahead of Bureaucracy Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement from Michael Shires, Ph.D., vice chair of Education Opportunity at AFPI, regarding policies that would return education to the states: "America First means putting students, families, and taxpayers ahead of the Washington bureaucracy. For 50 years the federal government has spent more on education and delivered less, and parentshave paid the price.
President Trump promised to change that by returning education to the states and to the people closest to our kids. Today, the Trump Administration is keeping that promise.
Common-sense reform means asking a simple question: who can actually deliver results for students? The answer is rarely a distant federal agency. It's parents, teachers, and communities, backed by a government that does its job efficiently and gets out of the way. The Committee and the Department thankfully are recognizing this."
The House Education and Workforce Committee has currently introduced 10 bills that would codify the Trump Administration's plan on this policy topic.
AFPI applauds efforts to modernize education and stands firmly behind President Trump's vision of an America First education system that serves every American family, not the bureaucracy.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-applauds-common-sense-policies-that-put-students-ahead-of-bureaucracy
[Category: ThinkTank]