Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
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Heritage Foundation President Honors the Life of Brian Tracy
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release:
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Heritage Foundation President Honors the Life of Brian Tracy
Nov 20, 2026
WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation honors the life and legacy of Brian Tracy, Heritage trustee emeritus.
Dr. Kevin Roberts, president of The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action, honored Tracy's legacy:
"Our country has lost a great American, and Heritage has lost a dear friend, with the passing of Brian Tracy. Brian spent his life helping people reach their full potential, pursue excellence, and achieve the American ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release: * * * Heritage Foundation President Honors the Life of Brian Tracy Nov 20, 2026 WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation honors the life and legacy of Brian Tracy, Heritage trustee emeritus. Dr. Kevin Roberts, president of The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action, honored Tracy's legacy: "Our country has lost a great American, and Heritage has lost a dear friend, with the passing of Brian Tracy. Brian spent his life helping people reach their full potential, pursue excellence, and achieve the Americandream. But for all his professional accomplishments, nothing mattered more to him than his family. The fact that his children proudly joined him in the work he built speaks volumes about the man he was and the example he set. Brian's love of family, faith in America, and commitment to helping others live better lives leave a powerful legacy that will endure for generations."
Barb Van Andel-Gaby, Chairman of the Heritage Board of Trustees, reflected on Tracy's leadership:
"Brian understood from a lifetime in business that great institutions do not happen by accident. They require principled leadership, sound governance, clear goals, accountability, and a relentless commitment to excellence. He brought those standards to Heritage's Board and generously shared his experience and judgment with all of us.
"I deeply valued Brian's candor, high expectations, and determination to make Heritage stronger. He challenged us not simply to have the right ideas, but to build an institution capable of advancing them effectively. We are stronger because of his leadership, and I am profoundly grateful to have served alongside him."
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Original text here: https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-foundation-president-honors-the-life-brian-tracy
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Heritage Foundation President Honors the Life of Brian Tracy
Nov 20, 2026
WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation honors the life and legacy of Brian Tracy, Heritage trustee emeritus.
Dr. Kevin Roberts, president of The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action, honored Tracy's legacy:
"Our country has lost a great American, and Heritage has lost a dear friend, with the passing of Brian Tracy. Brian spent his life helping people reach their full potential, pursue excellence, and achieve the American ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following news release: * * * Heritage Foundation President Honors the Life of Brian Tracy Nov 20, 2026 WASHINGTON--Today, The Heritage Foundation honors the life and legacy of Brian Tracy, Heritage trustee emeritus. Dr. Kevin Roberts, president of The Heritage Foundation and Heritage Action, honored Tracy's legacy: "Our country has lost a great American, and Heritage has lost a dear friend, with the passing of Brian Tracy. Brian spent his life helping people reach their full potential, pursue excellence, and achieve the Americandream. But for all his professional accomplishments, nothing mattered more to him than his family. The fact that his children proudly joined him in the work he built speaks volumes about the man he was and the example he set. Brian's love of family, faith in America, and commitment to helping others live better lives leave a powerful legacy that will endure for generations."
Barb Van Andel-Gaby, Chairman of the Heritage Board of Trustees, reflected on Tracy's leadership:
"Brian understood from a lifetime in business that great institutions do not happen by accident. They require principled leadership, sound governance, clear goals, accountability, and a relentless commitment to excellence. He brought those standards to Heritage's Board and generously shared his experience and judgment with all of us.
"I deeply valued Brian's candor, high expectations, and determination to make Heritage stronger. He challenged us not simply to have the right ideas, but to build an institution capable of advancing them effectively. We are stronger because of his leadership, and I am profoundly grateful to have served alongside him."
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Original text here: https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-foundation-president-honors-the-life-brian-tracy
[Category: ThinkTank]
Common Cause Names Wendy Fields as National Governing Board Chair
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- Common Cause posted the following news release:
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Common Cause Names Wendy Fields as National Governing Board Chair
Fields is the first woman of color to lead Common Cause's National Governing Board.
Nov 20, 2026
Today, democracy watchdog Common Cause announced Wendy Fields, a respected democracy and social justice leader and former Common Cause Vice President, has been elected chair of its National Governing Board. Fields is the first woman of color to lead Common Cause's National Governing Board.
Fields brings more than 30 years of organizing experience to Common ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- Common Cause posted the following news release: * * * Common Cause Names Wendy Fields as National Governing Board Chair Fields is the first woman of color to lead Common Cause's National Governing Board. Nov 20, 2026 Today, democracy watchdog Common Cause announced Wendy Fields, a respected democracy and social justice leader and former Common Cause Vice President, has been elected chair of its National Governing Board. Fields is the first woman of color to lead Common Cause's National Governing Board. Fields brings more than 30 years of organizing experience to CommonCause. She rose through union ranks to become chief of staff to the president of the United Auto Workers, then led the Democracy Initiative--a coalition of 72 labor, democracy, and social justice organizations. Most recently, she served as chief of staff to the president of the Service Employees International Union.
"This is a historic opportunity to build a better democracy that truly reflects and serves the people. I'm proud to chair the board as Common Cause meets this moment by connecting democratic principles to people's daily lived experiences," said Wendy Fields, Common Cause's National Governing Board Chair. "Guided by fairness, prosperity, and accountability our new board team will continue the work to increase our organizing power, building the people-powered muscle we need to secure these vital reforms that will empower communities and ensure every American can thrive."
"I am grateful for Wendy's expertise and partnership as we lead Common Cause into a bold new era," said Virginia Kase Solomon, president and CEO of Common Cause. "Wendy's impressive organizing credentials and visionary leadership will provide invaluable insight as we explore innovative ways for us to grow and reach our goal of building a democracy that works for everyone, not just the few."
Joining Fields on the new officer team are:
* Vice Chair Shareen Punian, Democracy Labs co-founder
- Treasurer Jennifer Gremmert, Energy Outreach Colorado CEO
- Secretary Vanessa Gonzalez, National Women's Law Center Vice President Campaigns and Communications
Founded over 55 years ago as the People's Lobby, Common Cause is a nonpartisan, grassroots organization dedicated to upholding the core values of American democracy. The organization works to create open, honest, and accountable government that serves the public interest; promote equal rights, opportunity, and representation for all; and empower all people to make their voices heard in the political process.
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Original text here: https://www.commoncause.org/press/common-cause-names-wendy-fields-as-national-governing-board-chair/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Common Cause Names Wendy Fields as National Governing Board Chair
Fields is the first woman of color to lead Common Cause's National Governing Board.
Nov 20, 2026
Today, democracy watchdog Common Cause announced Wendy Fields, a respected democracy and social justice leader and former Common Cause Vice President, has been elected chair of its National Governing Board. Fields is the first woman of color to lead Common Cause's National Governing Board.
Fields brings more than 30 years of organizing experience to Common ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- Common Cause posted the following news release: * * * Common Cause Names Wendy Fields as National Governing Board Chair Fields is the first woman of color to lead Common Cause's National Governing Board. Nov 20, 2026 Today, democracy watchdog Common Cause announced Wendy Fields, a respected democracy and social justice leader and former Common Cause Vice President, has been elected chair of its National Governing Board. Fields is the first woman of color to lead Common Cause's National Governing Board. Fields brings more than 30 years of organizing experience to CommonCause. She rose through union ranks to become chief of staff to the president of the United Auto Workers, then led the Democracy Initiative--a coalition of 72 labor, democracy, and social justice organizations. Most recently, she served as chief of staff to the president of the Service Employees International Union.
"This is a historic opportunity to build a better democracy that truly reflects and serves the people. I'm proud to chair the board as Common Cause meets this moment by connecting democratic principles to people's daily lived experiences," said Wendy Fields, Common Cause's National Governing Board Chair. "Guided by fairness, prosperity, and accountability our new board team will continue the work to increase our organizing power, building the people-powered muscle we need to secure these vital reforms that will empower communities and ensure every American can thrive."
"I am grateful for Wendy's expertise and partnership as we lead Common Cause into a bold new era," said Virginia Kase Solomon, president and CEO of Common Cause. "Wendy's impressive organizing credentials and visionary leadership will provide invaluable insight as we explore innovative ways for us to grow and reach our goal of building a democracy that works for everyone, not just the few."
Joining Fields on the new officer team are:
* Vice Chair Shareen Punian, Democracy Labs co-founder
- Treasurer Jennifer Gremmert, Energy Outreach Colorado CEO
- Secretary Vanessa Gonzalez, National Women's Law Center Vice President Campaigns and Communications
Founded over 55 years ago as the People's Lobby, Common Cause is a nonpartisan, grassroots organization dedicated to upholding the core values of American democracy. The organization works to create open, honest, and accountable government that serves the public interest; promote equal rights, opportunity, and representation for all; and empower all people to make their voices heard in the political process.
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Original text here: https://www.commoncause.org/press/common-cause-names-wendy-fields-as-national-governing-board-chair/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Minneapolis Data Centers - Mayor Vetoes Council
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Nov. 21 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
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Written by Darren Nelson
November 20, 2026
Minneapolis data centers: Mayor vetoes council
Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey is at odds with the Minneapolis City Council on data centers. And good thing too.
According to an email I received from the Office of City Clerk yesterday late afternoon:
"Mayor Frey vetoed the data center regulations ordinance this afternoon, and Council is meeting tomorrow morning ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Nov. 21 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * Written by Darren Nelson November 20, 2026 Minneapolis data centers: Mayor vetoes council Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey is at odds with the Minneapolis City Council on data centers. And good thing too. According to an email I received from the Office of City Clerk yesterday late afternoon: "Mayor Frey vetoed the data center regulations ordinance this afternoon, and Council is meeting tomorrow morningto reconsider this item."
The Mayor's office has not yet published the veto or a news release, but MPR stated that:
"In his veto letter, Frey wrote he would sign the regulatory framework originally presented to the council by staff, which he called "one of the strictest data center regulatory frameworks in the country."
"But Frey objected to a last-minute amendment that would require case-by-case council approval of any new data center in the city, arguing it would lead to "arbitrary rule making."
"Frey claims the ordinance that came before him would "result in a de facto ban."
Since then, KSTP just reported Council was unable to override the veto by supermajority:
"Council members voted on Frey's veto of the ordinance that would have added new regulations for data centers. The override effort failed 7-5. The council needed nine votes to overturn the mayor's action."
This is a welcome win for common sense, economic growth and energy affordability.
Regarding the latter, as I wrote earlier this week and last week:
People in the Twin Cities, and state of Minnesota, should be worried about affordability, but not because of data centers. The reasons are fourfold, as I recently submitted to the MN Public Utilities Commission's current energy affordability inquiry:
* The Bureau of Labor Statistics show Twin Cities electricity prices outpaced inflation between 2002-2024 by 131% to 67%.
* The University of Chicago prove that it was renewable mandates that substantially increased electricity prices, by 11-17% in the first 7-12 years.
* The Electric Power Research Institute found that, from 2019 to 2024, average residential rates fell by 6% due to data center growth.
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Darren Nelson is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
darren.nelson@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/minneapolis-data-centers-mayor-vetoes-council/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Written by Darren Nelson
November 20, 2026
Minneapolis data centers: Mayor vetoes council
Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey is at odds with the Minneapolis City Council on data centers. And good thing too.
According to an email I received from the Office of City Clerk yesterday late afternoon:
"Mayor Frey vetoed the data center regulations ordinance this afternoon, and Council is meeting tomorrow morning ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Nov. 21 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * Written by Darren Nelson November 20, 2026 Minneapolis data centers: Mayor vetoes council Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey is at odds with the Minneapolis City Council on data centers. And good thing too. According to an email I received from the Office of City Clerk yesterday late afternoon: "Mayor Frey vetoed the data center regulations ordinance this afternoon, and Council is meeting tomorrow morningto reconsider this item."
The Mayor's office has not yet published the veto or a news release, but MPR stated that:
"In his veto letter, Frey wrote he would sign the regulatory framework originally presented to the council by staff, which he called "one of the strictest data center regulatory frameworks in the country."
"But Frey objected to a last-minute amendment that would require case-by-case council approval of any new data center in the city, arguing it would lead to "arbitrary rule making."
"Frey claims the ordinance that came before him would "result in a de facto ban."
Since then, KSTP just reported Council was unable to override the veto by supermajority:
"Council members voted on Frey's veto of the ordinance that would have added new regulations for data centers. The override effort failed 7-5. The council needed nine votes to overturn the mayor's action."
This is a welcome win for common sense, economic growth and energy affordability.
Regarding the latter, as I wrote earlier this week and last week:
People in the Twin Cities, and state of Minnesota, should be worried about affordability, but not because of data centers. The reasons are fourfold, as I recently submitted to the MN Public Utilities Commission's current energy affordability inquiry:
* The Bureau of Labor Statistics show Twin Cities electricity prices outpaced inflation between 2002-2024 by 131% to 67%.
* The University of Chicago prove that it was renewable mandates that substantially increased electricity prices, by 11-17% in the first 7-12 years.
* The Electric Power Research Institute found that, from 2019 to 2024, average residential rates fell by 6% due to data center growth.
* * *
Darren Nelson is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
darren.nelson@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/minneapolis-data-centers-mayor-vetoes-council/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A: After a Collapsed Bank and an Impeached President, What Lies Ahead for Paraguay?
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Nov. 20, 2026, involving Associate Director Juliana Rubio, fellow Henry Ziemer and intern Olivia Licata of the Americas Program:
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After a Collapsed Bank and an Impeached President, What Lies Ahead for Paraguay?
On November 5, Paraguay's President Santiago Pena submitted his resignation to the nation's Congress. The legislature, however, declined to accept this, and the following day elected instead to impeach the leader, who would find himself under arrest before the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Nov. 20, 2026, involving Associate Director Juliana Rubio, fellow Henry Ziemer and intern Olivia Licata of the Americas Program: * * * After a Collapsed Bank and an Impeached President, What Lies Ahead for Paraguay? On November 5, Paraguay's President Santiago Pena submitted his resignation to the nation's Congress. The legislature, however, declined to accept this, and the following day elected instead to impeach the leader, who would find himself under arrest before theweekend was out. The proximate cause of this crisis in a country that had been assiduously cultivating a reputation for political stability was tied to the collapse of the Ueno Bank, one of Paraguay's largest financial institutions, and although the immediate crisis appears to have passed, its full reverberations continue to play out.
Q1: What caused Paraguay's banking crisis, and what are its economic consequences?
A1: The collapse of Ueno Bank is at the center of Paraguay's current banking crisis. An investigation by the Paraguayan central bank revealed that Ueno Bank held under half of the capital necessary to meet the minimum solvency requirements, leading the central bank to take control of Ueno on Monday, November 2, 2026.
Until this crisis, Paraguay had been gaining a global reputation as a strong economy and investment hub in Latin America. Paraguay has experienced an average annual GDP growth of 5.5 percent for three straight years, achieved an investment-grade sovereign credit rating every year since 2024, and maintained an annual inflation rate of 3.1 percent. Paraguay also has low public debt, composing just 38 percent of its GDP. These indicators reflect a generally healthy and growing economy.
The rise of Ueno Bank coincided with this positive economic trend. Ueno Bank, a Paraguayan digital bank, began as a local fintech firm and grew to become a linchpin of the Paraguayan financial sector in just a few years. While its meteoric rise was once viewed as an impressive result of Paraguay's regulatory openness and financial stability, the scandal revealed how the bank succumbed to clientelism, weak regulatory oversight, and questionable financial practices. Public funds, facilitated through President Santiago Pena, provided the bank with about $850 million in liquidity. These provided substantial capital and allowed the bank to provide low-interest loans to insider-owned companies, including companies that received government contracts. When regulatory institutions began investigating the bank's operations following reports of noncompliance, they discovered its inadequate solvency.
As a result of the collapse, Ueno Bank's 3 million customers were unable to withdraw cash or use their credit cards. To mitigate the economic crisis, especially since one-third of the $2.8 billion in deposits is not expected to be returned, the government utilized its deposit guarantee fund. This fund provides up to $38,000 per person, which should cover about 97 percent of Ueno depositors. According to the central bank, 93 percent of eligible Ueno customers received a payment from the state by November 11, the legal deadline for it to provide advance payments. The remaining 7 percent of depositors either have restricted accounts, hold certificates of deposit, or do not have accounts with other institutions.
The direct financial impact of the banking crisis is coupled with a significant loss of trust in financial and political institutions among Paraguayans. This distrust may discourage the population from using banks, reversing progress that the country made in recent years to expand access to credit and enroll people in formal financial institutions. Given that 60 percent of Paraguay's adult population used Ueno Bank and one million customers were first-time bank users, the hit on morale is widespread throughout the country.
Additionally, while the central bank emphasized that the wider financial system will not be impacted, credit rating agency Fitch has placed Paraguay's sovereign credit rating on watch for a potential downgrade, financial institutions are strained under the burden of the deposit guarantee program, and local economies are experiencing a significant decline in business. Thus, skepticism will likely linger around the stability of the economy and capacity of institutions to govern the financial sector, impacting Paraguay's long-term financial development and economic health.
Q2: How was President Santiago Pena implicated in the banking scandal, what led to his impeachment, and what has happened since his removal from office?
A2: Pena's involvement in the Ueno scandal centers on allegations of conflicts of interest, regulatory manipulation, diverted pension funds, and personal financial benefit. In addition, according to prosecutors, he influenced the allocation of public funds to the bank, prevented regulators from intervening in the bank, and appointed Carlos Carvallo, a former Ueno executive, as the president of Paraguay's central bank, the institution responsible for overseeing banks. There are still many questions to be answered, not only about Pena's involvement, but also about other actors involved in what seems to be not only a regulatory failure but also a criminal scheme.
The demise of Ueno Bank quickly became a political flashpoint. Pena lost support within his own party, and on November 5 submitted his resignation, which was rejected by Congress. Many argued that his resignation was an attempt to avoid the impeachment process and obtain the parliamentary immunity granted to former presidents who become senators for life under Paraguayan law. Very quickly, on November 6, the Senate voted to remove him, and Pena was arrested and placed in pretrial detention. Pena has denied wrongdoing. Meanwhile, Vice President Pedro Alliana assumed the presidency and is expected to complete the term until August 2028. Although the government acted quickly to leverage the deposit guarantee fund to reimburse the majority of eligible depositors, there are still hundreds of millions of dollars in public and pension funds that have not been recovered, and the larger question of where the money went remains unresolved.
This crisis raises questions about Paraguay's institutions and political accountability. The biggest question is why the institutions responsible for oversight failed to prevent the crisis in the first place. Some, like Paraguayan political analyst Esteban Caballero, point to other potential cases of wrongdoing that have not been fully investigated and question why the Prosecutor General delayed the execution of a search warrant. There have, in fact, been numerous allegations of corruption and clientelism during Pena's administration, such as millions of dollars in public contracts awarded to a company previously linked to Pena, and contracts awarded through Itaipu, the country's largest hydroelectric power plant, to the president's political allies. Many of these allegations had received little institutional scrutiny during his presidency, with limited investigation or accountability, which does raise the question about the timing of the investigation.
Alliana's government now has to deal with the banking crisis, recover public funds, and restore confidence in the financial system. So far, he has replaced the leadership of the central bank, made changes to his cabinet, and pledged to support the investigations and generally return stability to the country. Caballero argues that among the immediate priorities are restoring the autonomy of the central bank, recovering public funds, and genuinely allowing investigations to move forward. Perhaps the bigger question is whether these investigations will actually reach the broader network of political and financial actors involved, or whether accountability will be limited to Pena and a few others.
Q3: What are the politics behind Paraguay's banking scandal, and what could it mean for the country's political landscape?
A3: The crisis facing Paraguay also has political roots and implications. President Pena's rise to power was enabled by the highly influential--and equally controversial--businessman and political figure Horacio Cartes. Cartes was president of Paraguay from 2013 to 2018, but his true power stems from his enormous fortune and network of influence among Paraguay's elite, media, and the Colorado Party. His influence is disproportionate in Paraguayan politics, given that the Colorado Party has won every presidential election since Paraguay began its transition to democracy in 1989, bar the 2008 victory of opposition candidate Fernando Lugo.
While much of the Colorado Party, particularly the faction led by Cartes, "Honor Colorado," turned its back on Pena because of the Ueno crisis, friction had already emerged earlier this year. Pena's vice president, Pedro Alliana, whom Cartes had backed as the candidate for the party in the 2028 presidential election, didn't support Cartes's pick for vice president, saying it was too early to decide. Pena backed Alliana, thereby also defying Cartes's choice. Separately, Pena had also been promoting Marco Riquelme as a potential presidential candidate, a move interpreted as an attempt to maintain influence beyond his presidency. Interestingly, senators aligned with Cartes had started to raise questions about Ueno's operations and regulatory oversight in September 2026, and the eventual collapse of the bank gave Cartes an opportunity to distance himself from Pena and weaken his political ambitions, while also reasserting his influence within the party.
Pena's removal from office doesn't mean that the Colorado Party has been removed from power. In fact, some have argued that Pena's removal was a "controlled implosion" to preserve the Colorado Party's hold on power. While the crisis has affected public trust, it is still unclear whether most Paraguayans will blame the party and begin turning their backs on it, or whether efforts to distance the party from Pena, particularly by Honor Colorado and Cartes, will be enough to continue giving the party the upper hand in future elections. It also remains to be seen who Cartes will back for the 2028 presidential election, as Alliana, now president, cannot seek reelection under Paraguay's Constitution. Another question is whether Alliana will retreat from his previous defiance of Cartes, perhaps seeing Pena's downfall as a warning of the cost of such disobedience.
For the opposition, the crisis could create an opening, but so far, it does not seem to be "reading the historical moment" or seizing the opportunity to form an organized coalition; internal disputes and individual political ambitions continue to prevent cohesion. The question is then whether the opposition can capitalize on the crisis. The important victory of Soledad Nunez in Asuncion during the municipal elections held on October 4 could position the opposition to become a credible national alternative and raises questions about whether the now-battered Colorado Party can once again overcome its divisions and maintain power. More fundamentally, Pena's removal raises the question of whether institutional reforms will actually be implemented, or whether the crisis will lead only to political reshuffling within the same party.
Q4: What are the international implications of the situation in Paraguay?
A4: Paraguay has sought to market itself as a stable and attractive destination for foreign businesses. In recent years the country's low taxes, including no tax on income earned abroad, openness to foreigners, and cheap and abundant hydroelectricity have made it a particularly desirable South American haven for first cryptocurrency investors, and more recently data center developers. Meanwhile, steady progress in the country's agricultural and service sectors helped Paraguay become one of the fastest-growing economies in South America, although the Ueno crisis has raised questions about the country's economic stability. Beyond the economic domain, President Pena also sought to position himself as an important ally of the United States in South America, joining the Shield of the Americas grouping as well as signing a Status of Forces Agreement facilitating the temporary deployment of U.S. military personnel "to deepen and strengthen the security relationship" between the two countries.
For the time being, the crisis in Paraguay is unlikely to dramatically impact Paraguay's foreign policy outlook. President Alliana is likely to have enough on his hands wrangling his cabinet and Congress, as well as managing the economic fallout from Ueno's collapse. Still, Paraguay is likely to turn to its allies, especially the United States, for help in restoring its reputation as a stable and attractive investment destination. Early signs also point to the new president continuing his former boss's alignment with the United States on security issues in the hemisphere, as Alliana recently issued a spate of terrorist designations for Western Hemisphere-based criminal groups including the Tren de Aragua, Gulf Cartel, and National Liberation Army. However, if the United States is seen as failing to provide vital support in a time of need, it could not only weaken the new Alliana government but potentially prompt some within Paraguay to question whether close relations with the Trump administration are worthwhile.
Another key partner to watch will be Taiwan. Because it is the only country in South America that diplomatically recognizes Taiwan in lieu of the People's Republic of China, domestic developments in Paraguay can carry outsized geopolitical relevance. China has consistently sought to flip the country's diplomatic allegiances as it has elsewhere in the region, including by sponsoring trips by opposition lawmakers to China. While at present there are no signs that the impeachment scandal will immediately jeopardize Taiwan's status as a key partner for Paraguay, it underscores the importance of cultivating support for continued recognition across the political spectrum.
Indeed, Paraguay's diplomatic allegiances are liable to become a significant point of debate as presidential elections in the country approach in 2028. By continuing to press forward with key investments, such as a planned $200 million data center project supported by Taiwan's International Cooperation and Development Fund and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Taipei and Washington can provide an important vote of confidence in the Paraguayan economy. Still, the present scandal has underscored structural impediments to growth stemming from transparency and governance gaps that Paraguay's allies should encourage it to resolve.
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Juliana Rubio is associate director and associate fellow in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Henry Ziemer is a fellow in the Americas Program at CSIS. Olivia Licata is an intern in the Americas Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/after-collapsed-bank-and-impeached-president-what-lies-ahead-paraguay
[Category: ThinkTank]
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After a Collapsed Bank and an Impeached President, What Lies Ahead for Paraguay?
On November 5, Paraguay's President Santiago Pena submitted his resignation to the nation's Congress. The legislature, however, declined to accept this, and the following day elected instead to impeach the leader, who would find himself under arrest before the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Nov. 20, 2026, involving Associate Director Juliana Rubio, fellow Henry Ziemer and intern Olivia Licata of the Americas Program: * * * After a Collapsed Bank and an Impeached President, What Lies Ahead for Paraguay? On November 5, Paraguay's President Santiago Pena submitted his resignation to the nation's Congress. The legislature, however, declined to accept this, and the following day elected instead to impeach the leader, who would find himself under arrest before theweekend was out. The proximate cause of this crisis in a country that had been assiduously cultivating a reputation for political stability was tied to the collapse of the Ueno Bank, one of Paraguay's largest financial institutions, and although the immediate crisis appears to have passed, its full reverberations continue to play out.
Q1: What caused Paraguay's banking crisis, and what are its economic consequences?
A1: The collapse of Ueno Bank is at the center of Paraguay's current banking crisis. An investigation by the Paraguayan central bank revealed that Ueno Bank held under half of the capital necessary to meet the minimum solvency requirements, leading the central bank to take control of Ueno on Monday, November 2, 2026.
Until this crisis, Paraguay had been gaining a global reputation as a strong economy and investment hub in Latin America. Paraguay has experienced an average annual GDP growth of 5.5 percent for three straight years, achieved an investment-grade sovereign credit rating every year since 2024, and maintained an annual inflation rate of 3.1 percent. Paraguay also has low public debt, composing just 38 percent of its GDP. These indicators reflect a generally healthy and growing economy.
The rise of Ueno Bank coincided with this positive economic trend. Ueno Bank, a Paraguayan digital bank, began as a local fintech firm and grew to become a linchpin of the Paraguayan financial sector in just a few years. While its meteoric rise was once viewed as an impressive result of Paraguay's regulatory openness and financial stability, the scandal revealed how the bank succumbed to clientelism, weak regulatory oversight, and questionable financial practices. Public funds, facilitated through President Santiago Pena, provided the bank with about $850 million in liquidity. These provided substantial capital and allowed the bank to provide low-interest loans to insider-owned companies, including companies that received government contracts. When regulatory institutions began investigating the bank's operations following reports of noncompliance, they discovered its inadequate solvency.
As a result of the collapse, Ueno Bank's 3 million customers were unable to withdraw cash or use their credit cards. To mitigate the economic crisis, especially since one-third of the $2.8 billion in deposits is not expected to be returned, the government utilized its deposit guarantee fund. This fund provides up to $38,000 per person, which should cover about 97 percent of Ueno depositors. According to the central bank, 93 percent of eligible Ueno customers received a payment from the state by November 11, the legal deadline for it to provide advance payments. The remaining 7 percent of depositors either have restricted accounts, hold certificates of deposit, or do not have accounts with other institutions.
The direct financial impact of the banking crisis is coupled with a significant loss of trust in financial and political institutions among Paraguayans. This distrust may discourage the population from using banks, reversing progress that the country made in recent years to expand access to credit and enroll people in formal financial institutions. Given that 60 percent of Paraguay's adult population used Ueno Bank and one million customers were first-time bank users, the hit on morale is widespread throughout the country.
Additionally, while the central bank emphasized that the wider financial system will not be impacted, credit rating agency Fitch has placed Paraguay's sovereign credit rating on watch for a potential downgrade, financial institutions are strained under the burden of the deposit guarantee program, and local economies are experiencing a significant decline in business. Thus, skepticism will likely linger around the stability of the economy and capacity of institutions to govern the financial sector, impacting Paraguay's long-term financial development and economic health.
Q2: How was President Santiago Pena implicated in the banking scandal, what led to his impeachment, and what has happened since his removal from office?
A2: Pena's involvement in the Ueno scandal centers on allegations of conflicts of interest, regulatory manipulation, diverted pension funds, and personal financial benefit. In addition, according to prosecutors, he influenced the allocation of public funds to the bank, prevented regulators from intervening in the bank, and appointed Carlos Carvallo, a former Ueno executive, as the president of Paraguay's central bank, the institution responsible for overseeing banks. There are still many questions to be answered, not only about Pena's involvement, but also about other actors involved in what seems to be not only a regulatory failure but also a criminal scheme.
The demise of Ueno Bank quickly became a political flashpoint. Pena lost support within his own party, and on November 5 submitted his resignation, which was rejected by Congress. Many argued that his resignation was an attempt to avoid the impeachment process and obtain the parliamentary immunity granted to former presidents who become senators for life under Paraguayan law. Very quickly, on November 6, the Senate voted to remove him, and Pena was arrested and placed in pretrial detention. Pena has denied wrongdoing. Meanwhile, Vice President Pedro Alliana assumed the presidency and is expected to complete the term until August 2028. Although the government acted quickly to leverage the deposit guarantee fund to reimburse the majority of eligible depositors, there are still hundreds of millions of dollars in public and pension funds that have not been recovered, and the larger question of where the money went remains unresolved.
This crisis raises questions about Paraguay's institutions and political accountability. The biggest question is why the institutions responsible for oversight failed to prevent the crisis in the first place. Some, like Paraguayan political analyst Esteban Caballero, point to other potential cases of wrongdoing that have not been fully investigated and question why the Prosecutor General delayed the execution of a search warrant. There have, in fact, been numerous allegations of corruption and clientelism during Pena's administration, such as millions of dollars in public contracts awarded to a company previously linked to Pena, and contracts awarded through Itaipu, the country's largest hydroelectric power plant, to the president's political allies. Many of these allegations had received little institutional scrutiny during his presidency, with limited investigation or accountability, which does raise the question about the timing of the investigation.
Alliana's government now has to deal with the banking crisis, recover public funds, and restore confidence in the financial system. So far, he has replaced the leadership of the central bank, made changes to his cabinet, and pledged to support the investigations and generally return stability to the country. Caballero argues that among the immediate priorities are restoring the autonomy of the central bank, recovering public funds, and genuinely allowing investigations to move forward. Perhaps the bigger question is whether these investigations will actually reach the broader network of political and financial actors involved, or whether accountability will be limited to Pena and a few others.
Q3: What are the politics behind Paraguay's banking scandal, and what could it mean for the country's political landscape?
A3: The crisis facing Paraguay also has political roots and implications. President Pena's rise to power was enabled by the highly influential--and equally controversial--businessman and political figure Horacio Cartes. Cartes was president of Paraguay from 2013 to 2018, but his true power stems from his enormous fortune and network of influence among Paraguay's elite, media, and the Colorado Party. His influence is disproportionate in Paraguayan politics, given that the Colorado Party has won every presidential election since Paraguay began its transition to democracy in 1989, bar the 2008 victory of opposition candidate Fernando Lugo.
While much of the Colorado Party, particularly the faction led by Cartes, "Honor Colorado," turned its back on Pena because of the Ueno crisis, friction had already emerged earlier this year. Pena's vice president, Pedro Alliana, whom Cartes had backed as the candidate for the party in the 2028 presidential election, didn't support Cartes's pick for vice president, saying it was too early to decide. Pena backed Alliana, thereby also defying Cartes's choice. Separately, Pena had also been promoting Marco Riquelme as a potential presidential candidate, a move interpreted as an attempt to maintain influence beyond his presidency. Interestingly, senators aligned with Cartes had started to raise questions about Ueno's operations and regulatory oversight in September 2026, and the eventual collapse of the bank gave Cartes an opportunity to distance himself from Pena and weaken his political ambitions, while also reasserting his influence within the party.
Pena's removal from office doesn't mean that the Colorado Party has been removed from power. In fact, some have argued that Pena's removal was a "controlled implosion" to preserve the Colorado Party's hold on power. While the crisis has affected public trust, it is still unclear whether most Paraguayans will blame the party and begin turning their backs on it, or whether efforts to distance the party from Pena, particularly by Honor Colorado and Cartes, will be enough to continue giving the party the upper hand in future elections. It also remains to be seen who Cartes will back for the 2028 presidential election, as Alliana, now president, cannot seek reelection under Paraguay's Constitution. Another question is whether Alliana will retreat from his previous defiance of Cartes, perhaps seeing Pena's downfall as a warning of the cost of such disobedience.
For the opposition, the crisis could create an opening, but so far, it does not seem to be "reading the historical moment" or seizing the opportunity to form an organized coalition; internal disputes and individual political ambitions continue to prevent cohesion. The question is then whether the opposition can capitalize on the crisis. The important victory of Soledad Nunez in Asuncion during the municipal elections held on October 4 could position the opposition to become a credible national alternative and raises questions about whether the now-battered Colorado Party can once again overcome its divisions and maintain power. More fundamentally, Pena's removal raises the question of whether institutional reforms will actually be implemented, or whether the crisis will lead only to political reshuffling within the same party.
Q4: What are the international implications of the situation in Paraguay?
A4: Paraguay has sought to market itself as a stable and attractive destination for foreign businesses. In recent years the country's low taxes, including no tax on income earned abroad, openness to foreigners, and cheap and abundant hydroelectricity have made it a particularly desirable South American haven for first cryptocurrency investors, and more recently data center developers. Meanwhile, steady progress in the country's agricultural and service sectors helped Paraguay become one of the fastest-growing economies in South America, although the Ueno crisis has raised questions about the country's economic stability. Beyond the economic domain, President Pena also sought to position himself as an important ally of the United States in South America, joining the Shield of the Americas grouping as well as signing a Status of Forces Agreement facilitating the temporary deployment of U.S. military personnel "to deepen and strengthen the security relationship" between the two countries.
For the time being, the crisis in Paraguay is unlikely to dramatically impact Paraguay's foreign policy outlook. President Alliana is likely to have enough on his hands wrangling his cabinet and Congress, as well as managing the economic fallout from Ueno's collapse. Still, Paraguay is likely to turn to its allies, especially the United States, for help in restoring its reputation as a stable and attractive investment destination. Early signs also point to the new president continuing his former boss's alignment with the United States on security issues in the hemisphere, as Alliana recently issued a spate of terrorist designations for Western Hemisphere-based criminal groups including the Tren de Aragua, Gulf Cartel, and National Liberation Army. However, if the United States is seen as failing to provide vital support in a time of need, it could not only weaken the new Alliana government but potentially prompt some within Paraguay to question whether close relations with the Trump administration are worthwhile.
Another key partner to watch will be Taiwan. Because it is the only country in South America that diplomatically recognizes Taiwan in lieu of the People's Republic of China, domestic developments in Paraguay can carry outsized geopolitical relevance. China has consistently sought to flip the country's diplomatic allegiances as it has elsewhere in the region, including by sponsoring trips by opposition lawmakers to China. While at present there are no signs that the impeachment scandal will immediately jeopardize Taiwan's status as a key partner for Paraguay, it underscores the importance of cultivating support for continued recognition across the political spectrum.
Indeed, Paraguay's diplomatic allegiances are liable to become a significant point of debate as presidential elections in the country approach in 2028. By continuing to press forward with key investments, such as a planned $200 million data center project supported by Taiwan's International Cooperation and Development Fund and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Taipei and Washington can provide an important vote of confidence in the Paraguayan economy. Still, the present scandal has underscored structural impediments to growth stemming from transparency and governance gaps that Paraguay's allies should encourage it to resolve.
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Juliana Rubio is associate director and associate fellow in the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Henry Ziemer is a fellow in the Americas Program at CSIS. Olivia Licata is an intern in the Americas Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/after-collapsed-bank-and-impeached-president-what-lies-ahead-paraguay
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Future of South American Militaries and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
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The Future of South American Militaries and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations
Commentary by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
November 19, 2026
The end of 2026 and early 2027 will be a challenging period for South American militaries. Their primary mission will remain unchanged: to be ready to defend their respective nations from external threats. At the same time, armed forces will also need sufficient capabilities to combat domestic irregular threats such as drug trafficking ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * The Future of South American Militaries and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations Commentary by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez November 19, 2026 The end of 2026 and early 2027 will be a challenging period for South American militaries. Their primary mission will remain unchanged: to be ready to defend their respective nations from external threats. At the same time, armed forces will also need sufficient capabilities to combat domestic irregular threats such as drug traffickingnetworks, narco-insurgents and their deadly drones, illegal mining, and environmental crimes including illegal fishing and wildlife trafficking. While preparing for interstate conflict and fighting domestic criminals and insurgents are priorities for the armed services, another regional, ever-present threat exists that cannot be defeated with conventional weapons: natural disasters.
The region is already prone to wildfires, droughts, torrential rains, and other extreme weather patterns and disasters, but climate change will worsen them. Weather forecasts predict a super El Nino in the coming months, which could be particularly devastating for South American countries. The region already has a long history of deadly and destructive natural disasters, including devastating earthquakes in Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela within the past six months, making the threat of a super El Nino especially urgent when considering broader regional security implications.
The tip of the proverbial spear to protect local populations will be South American armed forces, which will be deployed in significant numbers in the coming months to support populations and address natural disasters as part of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. Recent floods in Ecuador's Galapagos Islands, northern Peru, and Paraguay, as well as wildfires in Brazil, are early signs of what could be a very problematic summer for countries south of the equator.
Recent Operations
In recent weeks, massive storms have caused severe flooding across South America, while wildfires simultaneously affect other parts of the continent. The situation is expected to worsen as the southern hemisphere's summer months arrive. Recent military HA/DR operations help explain the urgency of preparing for environmental disasters, the need to improve the capacities of local civilian agencies, and how military forces can respond.
Heavy rains in northern Peru have flooded many areas. To help the affected populations, many units and assets have been deployed--for example, troops assigned to Artillery Group Crl. Jose Joaquin Inclan of the Peruvian Army brought rice, blankets, and other aid to the municipality of San Juan de Bigote, Piura region, helping affected families. Meanwhile, a field hospital was set up by the Army's 9th Armor Brigade in Tumbes region to help medical services cope with any outbreaks of dengue that may affect the local population; troops from the same unit are also busy unclogging and cleaning water canals. Peruvian marines, a component of the Navy, armed with shovels, buckets, and thick boots, have also been deployed to Tumbes to help clean the streets.
Meanwhile, in Paraguay, the Parana River overflowed, affecting communities in the Cerrito municipality, Neembucu department. As part of an immediate disaster response, a 6x6 truck assigned to the Paraguayan Army's Cavalry Regiment No. 4 transported food to the local population. The truck helped distribute kits to zones that "were flooded, isolated, or difficult to enter," demonstrating the military's essential role in disaster operations beyond civilian capacity. Moreover, three small riverine craft operated by military personnel were also deployed.
In Ecuador, heavy rains flooded the Galapagos Islands, especially the inhabited Santa Cruz Island, requiring a joint-force response. The Coast Guard patrol vessel Isla San Cristobal transported over 10 tons of food, blankets, medicine, mattresses, hoses, and other equipment from the mainland to the island. The transport vessel Imbabura was also deployed to Santa Cruz with medicine, food, stoves, water, and a power generator. Meanwhile, Air Force personnel are in the Galapagos helping people move their personal belongings from their homes and maintaining security in the streets. The service is also using a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft to move equipment and other aid.
While some parts of South America have too much water, others are being destroyed by wildfires. In Brazil, the government, including the armed forces, is battling wildfires in Amazonas state. Since October 12, the government, including defense agencies, has dropped a reported one million liters of water to combat the wildfires; around 250 military personnel from the Army, Air Force, and Navy are helping with the mission. The equipment and platforms deployed include two KC-390 Millennium multirole aircraft (Air Force), a UH-15 Super Cougar helicopter (Navy), and one HM-1A Pantera helicopter (Army) that transport both personnel and equipment. The KC-390s were "configured" for firefighting operations by carrying the Modular Airborne Firefighting System and Compressed Air Foam System.
Similarly, Chile, a country known for massive and destructive wildfires, is already preparing to combat them this upcoming summer. At the end of October, President Jose Antonio Kast led a conference at Tobalaba Airport to unveil and launch the Plan de Proteccion contra Incendios Forestales 2026-2027, a government plan to fight forest fires this summer. The armed forces were represented by Minister of Defense Fernando Barros, who emphasized the military's work to anticipate, plan, and prepare for what could be "a difficult wildfire season." In years past, in addition to personnel and platforms such as helicopters and aircraft, the armed forces have also used drones for reconnaissance missions during forest fires.
Looking Forward
When a disaster occurs, police and other law enforcement forces, medical services, firefighters, and other services also play critical roles. In several South American countries, special agencies are specifically tasked with managing disasters, such as Peru's Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil, Colombia's Defensa Civil Colombiana, and Brazil's Secretaria Nacional de Protecao e Defesa Civil. However, because of their organization and access to a variety of assets and platforms, armed forces will remain the cornerstone of future HA/DR missions.
Therefore, personnel training and the acquisition of necessary equipment must be addressed to improve local armed forces' disaster relief response. Some armed forces have created multipurpose units specifically trained for HA/DR missions. The Peruvian armed forces, for example, have established rapid reaction companies specifically trained, equipped, and organized for humanitarian operations. Similarly, the Colombian Army has a specialized brigade for these missions. Looking forward, regional forces may need to increase the size of HA/DR units and formations.
Next is the question of equipment, besides existing search-and-rescue equipment, medical equipment, ambulances, and portable field hospitals. Aircraft such as the C-130 Hercules or the Brazilian-built C-390 Millennium can help armed forces transport personnel, equipment, and food and evacuate casualties. Similarly, ground vehicles such as trucks can also support ground operations. For naval forces, multipurpose transport vessels can serve as hospitals and transport large amounts of equipment, food, water, and medicines to disaster-hit coastal areas. These specialized types of transport equipment are a critical component to maximize armed forces' HA/DR response capabilities. Additionally, HA/DR response equipment is multipurpose and strengthens regular military operations. Moving forward, armed services and defense ministries can leverage this multipurpose use to justify additional budget requests.
Regional armed forces are already prioritizing the acquisition of equipment that can support HA/DR missions as well as military operations. In recent years, Peru's SIMA shipyard has built two landing docks, Pisco and Paita, and recently launched two support vessels, Chimbote and Talara; Chile's ASMAR shipyard is building two multipurpose vessels, Magallanes and Rapa Nui. Regarding regional air forces, Brazil's domestically manufactured C-390 already supports aerial HA/DR missions, Argentina is acquiring helicopters that can transport Bambi buckets to combat wildfires, and Peru has acquired Textron Beechcraft King Air 360C aircraft to transport equipment and conduct medical evacuations.
A final issue regarding equipment is the potential acquisition of new technologies to support future HA/DR missions. Small ground robots can support search-and-rescue missions by entering collapsed structures to look for survivors without putting rescuers in danger. Similarly, aerial drones can provide a cheap but effective bird's-eye view of an area affected by flooding or mudslides and can inspect the size of a wildfire.
HA/DR missions also have one curious, but positive, effect: They are confidence-building mechanisms for regional governments and militaries. When a disaster occurs, state armed forces often deploy aircraft with aid, search-and-rescue personnel, doctors, or helicopters with Bambi buckets to support neighboring states. This cooperation strengthens military relations, builds new friendships, and arguably reduces the likelihood of tensions that could escalate into interstate conflict.
The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) recently hosted a conference on HA/DR missions. Captain Marcelo Eduardo Apolo Kubes from Ecuador's Navy explained in his remarks at the conference that, to improve partnerships and cooperation in HA/DR, the 2020 conference of Western Hemisphere ministers of defense "recommended the IADB to establish a mechanism" for HA/DR cooperation, now called the Directorate of the Mechanism for Cooperation during Disasters (MECODE). "Solidarity is never lacking. However, the aid does not always align with the actual needs of the moment," Captain Apolo Kubes explained. Hence, mechanisms like MECODE or the SICODE program, also known as the Cooperation System During Disasters, are meant to promote dialogue, training, and actual coordination and communication when a disaster occurs.
Concerns and Next Steps for South American Militaries
The ongoing, and potentially increasing, role of South American armed forces in HA/DR missions also raises questions and concerns about the future. First, troops may be overextended because they must carry out many missions simultaneously. South American militaries are not particularly numerous; hence, creating HA/DR-focused formations such as battalions and companies can be problematic. While all armed service personnel must be ready for combat operations, focusing the training of dozens or hundreds of troops on HA/DR missions means they will not be trained or readily available to carry out other combat missions. With the creation of dedicated HA/DR units, countries must question the quantity of resources and required recruitment for them. Furthermore, considerations must also include whether such formations would strengthen the overall capabilities of existing armed forces.
Another concern is the equipment itself. As the previous section noted, South American naval forces are acquiring multipurpose vessels that can serve both combat and HA/DR operations. The modernization is mandatory; however, with limited budgets, the question remains whether naval commands prioritize acquiring multipurpose vessels over, for example, new combat surface ships or submarines to maintain minimal deterrence capabilities in case of interstate tensions.
Ultimately, the larger question is overreliance on armed forces for noncombat operations. Law enforcement agencies and other nonmilitary security services are primarily tasked with domestic security operations such as combating narco-insurgents and drug traffickers, cracking down on illegal mining, and daily street patrols to improve citizen security, while military personnel are supposed to train primarily to protect the nation from foreign threats. In reality, however, South American militaries are deployed to fight alongside law enforcement agencies, and often instead of those agencies, within their nation's territory.
The same situation can be applied to HA/DR missions. Ideally, each country should have a strong civilian disaster management office with sufficient personnel and its own equipment, such as helicopters capable of transporting Bambi buckets, to avoid overrelying on military platforms and troops. Without a doubt, when a natural disaster occurs, local armed forces would certainly participate to support their fellow citizens. Nevertheless, the question is whether certain HA/DR missions would be more effective if civilian agencies were better funded and had more personnel and equipment, so they would not have to rely too much on the armed services.
While the courage of military personnel to combat wildfires or rescue citizens affected by floods cannot be questioned, the growing role of South American militaries in HA/DR missions deserves a wider discussion about governments overrelying on armed forces for noncombat operations. The future makeup of the services themselves should also be considered. Their role in HA/DR operations mean that regional armed forces are tasked with additional and long-enduring missions that will put stress on services with a limited number of troops, budget, and equipment.
South American armies, air forces, and navies will be heavily involved in response to future natural disasters across the region, which are expected to be particularly severe due to the upcoming super El Nino. Still, the question is whether armed forces should remain the tip of the HA/DR spear, or whether civilian agencies should be better equipped, staffed, and budgeted to take over the primary role in these operations.
* * *
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-south-american-militaries-and-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
The Future of South American Militaries and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations
Commentary by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
November 19, 2026
The end of 2026 and early 2027 will be a challenging period for South American militaries. Their primary mission will remain unchanged: to be ready to defend their respective nations from external threats. At the same time, armed forces will also need sufficient capabilities to combat domestic irregular threats such as drug trafficking ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * The Future of South American Militaries and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations Commentary by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez November 19, 2026 The end of 2026 and early 2027 will be a challenging period for South American militaries. Their primary mission will remain unchanged: to be ready to defend their respective nations from external threats. At the same time, armed forces will also need sufficient capabilities to combat domestic irregular threats such as drug traffickingnetworks, narco-insurgents and their deadly drones, illegal mining, and environmental crimes including illegal fishing and wildlife trafficking. While preparing for interstate conflict and fighting domestic criminals and insurgents are priorities for the armed services, another regional, ever-present threat exists that cannot be defeated with conventional weapons: natural disasters.
The region is already prone to wildfires, droughts, torrential rains, and other extreme weather patterns and disasters, but climate change will worsen them. Weather forecasts predict a super El Nino in the coming months, which could be particularly devastating for South American countries. The region already has a long history of deadly and destructive natural disasters, including devastating earthquakes in Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela within the past six months, making the threat of a super El Nino especially urgent when considering broader regional security implications.
The tip of the proverbial spear to protect local populations will be South American armed forces, which will be deployed in significant numbers in the coming months to support populations and address natural disasters as part of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. Recent floods in Ecuador's Galapagos Islands, northern Peru, and Paraguay, as well as wildfires in Brazil, are early signs of what could be a very problematic summer for countries south of the equator.
Recent Operations
In recent weeks, massive storms have caused severe flooding across South America, while wildfires simultaneously affect other parts of the continent. The situation is expected to worsen as the southern hemisphere's summer months arrive. Recent military HA/DR operations help explain the urgency of preparing for environmental disasters, the need to improve the capacities of local civilian agencies, and how military forces can respond.
Heavy rains in northern Peru have flooded many areas. To help the affected populations, many units and assets have been deployed--for example, troops assigned to Artillery Group Crl. Jose Joaquin Inclan of the Peruvian Army brought rice, blankets, and other aid to the municipality of San Juan de Bigote, Piura region, helping affected families. Meanwhile, a field hospital was set up by the Army's 9th Armor Brigade in Tumbes region to help medical services cope with any outbreaks of dengue that may affect the local population; troops from the same unit are also busy unclogging and cleaning water canals. Peruvian marines, a component of the Navy, armed with shovels, buckets, and thick boots, have also been deployed to Tumbes to help clean the streets.
Meanwhile, in Paraguay, the Parana River overflowed, affecting communities in the Cerrito municipality, Neembucu department. As part of an immediate disaster response, a 6x6 truck assigned to the Paraguayan Army's Cavalry Regiment No. 4 transported food to the local population. The truck helped distribute kits to zones that "were flooded, isolated, or difficult to enter," demonstrating the military's essential role in disaster operations beyond civilian capacity. Moreover, three small riverine craft operated by military personnel were also deployed.
In Ecuador, heavy rains flooded the Galapagos Islands, especially the inhabited Santa Cruz Island, requiring a joint-force response. The Coast Guard patrol vessel Isla San Cristobal transported over 10 tons of food, blankets, medicine, mattresses, hoses, and other equipment from the mainland to the island. The transport vessel Imbabura was also deployed to Santa Cruz with medicine, food, stoves, water, and a power generator. Meanwhile, Air Force personnel are in the Galapagos helping people move their personal belongings from their homes and maintaining security in the streets. The service is also using a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft to move equipment and other aid.
While some parts of South America have too much water, others are being destroyed by wildfires. In Brazil, the government, including the armed forces, is battling wildfires in Amazonas state. Since October 12, the government, including defense agencies, has dropped a reported one million liters of water to combat the wildfires; around 250 military personnel from the Army, Air Force, and Navy are helping with the mission. The equipment and platforms deployed include two KC-390 Millennium multirole aircraft (Air Force), a UH-15 Super Cougar helicopter (Navy), and one HM-1A Pantera helicopter (Army) that transport both personnel and equipment. The KC-390s were "configured" for firefighting operations by carrying the Modular Airborne Firefighting System and Compressed Air Foam System.
Similarly, Chile, a country known for massive and destructive wildfires, is already preparing to combat them this upcoming summer. At the end of October, President Jose Antonio Kast led a conference at Tobalaba Airport to unveil and launch the Plan de Proteccion contra Incendios Forestales 2026-2027, a government plan to fight forest fires this summer. The armed forces were represented by Minister of Defense Fernando Barros, who emphasized the military's work to anticipate, plan, and prepare for what could be "a difficult wildfire season." In years past, in addition to personnel and platforms such as helicopters and aircraft, the armed forces have also used drones for reconnaissance missions during forest fires.
Looking Forward
When a disaster occurs, police and other law enforcement forces, medical services, firefighters, and other services also play critical roles. In several South American countries, special agencies are specifically tasked with managing disasters, such as Peru's Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil, Colombia's Defensa Civil Colombiana, and Brazil's Secretaria Nacional de Protecao e Defesa Civil. However, because of their organization and access to a variety of assets and platforms, armed forces will remain the cornerstone of future HA/DR missions.
Therefore, personnel training and the acquisition of necessary equipment must be addressed to improve local armed forces' disaster relief response. Some armed forces have created multipurpose units specifically trained for HA/DR missions. The Peruvian armed forces, for example, have established rapid reaction companies specifically trained, equipped, and organized for humanitarian operations. Similarly, the Colombian Army has a specialized brigade for these missions. Looking forward, regional forces may need to increase the size of HA/DR units and formations.
Next is the question of equipment, besides existing search-and-rescue equipment, medical equipment, ambulances, and portable field hospitals. Aircraft such as the C-130 Hercules or the Brazilian-built C-390 Millennium can help armed forces transport personnel, equipment, and food and evacuate casualties. Similarly, ground vehicles such as trucks can also support ground operations. For naval forces, multipurpose transport vessels can serve as hospitals and transport large amounts of equipment, food, water, and medicines to disaster-hit coastal areas. These specialized types of transport equipment are a critical component to maximize armed forces' HA/DR response capabilities. Additionally, HA/DR response equipment is multipurpose and strengthens regular military operations. Moving forward, armed services and defense ministries can leverage this multipurpose use to justify additional budget requests.
Regional armed forces are already prioritizing the acquisition of equipment that can support HA/DR missions as well as military operations. In recent years, Peru's SIMA shipyard has built two landing docks, Pisco and Paita, and recently launched two support vessels, Chimbote and Talara; Chile's ASMAR shipyard is building two multipurpose vessels, Magallanes and Rapa Nui. Regarding regional air forces, Brazil's domestically manufactured C-390 already supports aerial HA/DR missions, Argentina is acquiring helicopters that can transport Bambi buckets to combat wildfires, and Peru has acquired Textron Beechcraft King Air 360C aircraft to transport equipment and conduct medical evacuations.
A final issue regarding equipment is the potential acquisition of new technologies to support future HA/DR missions. Small ground robots can support search-and-rescue missions by entering collapsed structures to look for survivors without putting rescuers in danger. Similarly, aerial drones can provide a cheap but effective bird's-eye view of an area affected by flooding or mudslides and can inspect the size of a wildfire.
HA/DR missions also have one curious, but positive, effect: They are confidence-building mechanisms for regional governments and militaries. When a disaster occurs, state armed forces often deploy aircraft with aid, search-and-rescue personnel, doctors, or helicopters with Bambi buckets to support neighboring states. This cooperation strengthens military relations, builds new friendships, and arguably reduces the likelihood of tensions that could escalate into interstate conflict.
The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) recently hosted a conference on HA/DR missions. Captain Marcelo Eduardo Apolo Kubes from Ecuador's Navy explained in his remarks at the conference that, to improve partnerships and cooperation in HA/DR, the 2020 conference of Western Hemisphere ministers of defense "recommended the IADB to establish a mechanism" for HA/DR cooperation, now called the Directorate of the Mechanism for Cooperation during Disasters (MECODE). "Solidarity is never lacking. However, the aid does not always align with the actual needs of the moment," Captain Apolo Kubes explained. Hence, mechanisms like MECODE or the SICODE program, also known as the Cooperation System During Disasters, are meant to promote dialogue, training, and actual coordination and communication when a disaster occurs.
Concerns and Next Steps for South American Militaries
The ongoing, and potentially increasing, role of South American armed forces in HA/DR missions also raises questions and concerns about the future. First, troops may be overextended because they must carry out many missions simultaneously. South American militaries are not particularly numerous; hence, creating HA/DR-focused formations such as battalions and companies can be problematic. While all armed service personnel must be ready for combat operations, focusing the training of dozens or hundreds of troops on HA/DR missions means they will not be trained or readily available to carry out other combat missions. With the creation of dedicated HA/DR units, countries must question the quantity of resources and required recruitment for them. Furthermore, considerations must also include whether such formations would strengthen the overall capabilities of existing armed forces.
Another concern is the equipment itself. As the previous section noted, South American naval forces are acquiring multipurpose vessels that can serve both combat and HA/DR operations. The modernization is mandatory; however, with limited budgets, the question remains whether naval commands prioritize acquiring multipurpose vessels over, for example, new combat surface ships or submarines to maintain minimal deterrence capabilities in case of interstate tensions.
Ultimately, the larger question is overreliance on armed forces for noncombat operations. Law enforcement agencies and other nonmilitary security services are primarily tasked with domestic security operations such as combating narco-insurgents and drug traffickers, cracking down on illegal mining, and daily street patrols to improve citizen security, while military personnel are supposed to train primarily to protect the nation from foreign threats. In reality, however, South American militaries are deployed to fight alongside law enforcement agencies, and often instead of those agencies, within their nation's territory.
The same situation can be applied to HA/DR missions. Ideally, each country should have a strong civilian disaster management office with sufficient personnel and its own equipment, such as helicopters capable of transporting Bambi buckets, to avoid overrelying on military platforms and troops. Without a doubt, when a natural disaster occurs, local armed forces would certainly participate to support their fellow citizens. Nevertheless, the question is whether certain HA/DR missions would be more effective if civilian agencies were better funded and had more personnel and equipment, so they would not have to rely too much on the armed services.
While the courage of military personnel to combat wildfires or rescue citizens affected by floods cannot be questioned, the growing role of South American militaries in HA/DR missions deserves a wider discussion about governments overrelying on armed forces for noncombat operations. The future makeup of the services themselves should also be considered. Their role in HA/DR operations mean that regional armed forces are tasked with additional and long-enduring missions that will put stress on services with a limited number of troops, budget, and equipment.
South American armies, air forces, and navies will be heavily involved in response to future natural disasters across the region, which are expected to be particularly severe due to the upcoming super El Nino. Still, the question is whether armed forces should remain the tip of the HA/DR spear, or whether civilian agencies should be better equipped, staffed, and budgeted to take over the primary role in these operations.
* * *
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-south-american-militaries-and-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Between a Rock and a Hard Place - Evaluating the Risks of Chinese Memory Chips
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Evaluating the Risks of Chinese Memory Chips
Commentary by Lauryn Williams
November 19, 2026
The United States is experiencing an increasingly sharp memory chip supply shortage as a limited number of suppliers prioritize high bandwidth memory (HBM) bound for hyperscaler customers building AI data centers, shifting capacity away from conventional dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips and contributing to rising prices for consumers.
DRAM chips, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Evaluating the Risks of Chinese Memory Chips Commentary by Lauryn Williams November 19, 2026 The United States is experiencing an increasingly sharp memory chip supply shortage as a limited number of suppliers prioritize high bandwidth memory (HBM) bound for hyperscaler customers building AI data centers, shifting capacity away from conventional dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips and contributing to rising prices for consumers. DRAM chips,which act as a computer's short-term memory, are found in consumer products including cell phones, laptops, gaming consoles, cars, and medical devices. They are also a key component across defense technologies: For example, drone manufacturers are leveraging DRAM to integrate increasingly autonomous capabilities. HBM, a higher-end product formed by stacking and connecting conventional DRAM chips, is shaping today's memory market in significant ways as AI infrastructure demand skyrockets.
The vast majority of DRAM and HBM supply is produced by just three firms--Micron, SK hynix, and Samsung--and much of their limited supply is spoken for. In September, Micron announced 26 total strategic customer agreements extending into the 2030s that ensure long-term supply for well-resourced hyperscaler customers. In late October, SK hynix stated it was sold out of DRAM and HBM through 2029. Micron warned customers to expect "supply-demand conditions to be much tighter" in coming years, with the shortage unlikely to abate before 2030 as demand outstrips supply and HBM demand consumes up to 70 percent of available capacity.
These firms are meanwhile building new facilities in the United States and elsewhere to expand production. Yet future construction plans cannot alleviate today's short-term realities, due to the expected lag time (up to four years) between investments and facilities coming online. And, in some cases, a newly announced project will not address the heart of the challenge: SK hynix's new $4 billion Indiana facility will be used for HBM packaging and research and development, not DRAM fabrication.
The memory crunch is not limited to the United States. Supply in Asia is also stretched, with the International Data Corporation projecting that regional PC shipments would decline nearly 14 percent in 2026 as suppliers prioritize HBM. In China, leading firm CXMT's capacity is reportedly booked through 2027, while Chinese firms are locking in their own supply.
In this constrained global market, U.S. companies seeking access to conventional DRAM chips find themselves between a rock and a hard place. They must weigh short-term needs against longer-term considerations. Sustainable solutions are urgently needed to leverage U.S. allies and partners to expand future memory chip supply, with current manufacturers' capacity committed through the 2030s. As a result, some firms are exploring alternative solutions in the next-largest memory market: China.
A Rock and a Hard Place
Attempts to source new memory chip supply from China are sparking discussions across the tech industry and policy community. Two key suppliers form China's memory ecosystem: CXMT (ChangXin Memory Technologies) and YMTC (Yangtze Memory Technologies). CXMT is already the fourth-largest global DRAM manufacturer, and NAND flash memory supplier YMTC's market position is growing. Yet with Washington slow to introduce short- or long-term solutions to relieve the supply crunch and much of the Big Three's current supply already committed, some firms are pursuing alternatives. Former Apple CEO Tim Cook reportedly engaged the Trump administration regarding using Chinese chips for China-destined products, and new CEO John Ternus recently reasserted that "all options should be on the table." Other laptop manufacturers are already reportedly introducing CXMT DRAM chips into a limited subset of laptops for non-U.S. markets.
With the Beijing question unlikely to disappear while DRAM chip supply remains limited, a clear cost-benefit analysis of sourcing Chinese memory supply is essential. U.S. firms considering CXMT DRAM chips should base their evaluation on numerous risk factors, including procurement and export control considerations, cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities, product sensitivities, and destination market, as well as long-term economic competitiveness. Figure 1 evaluates use of CXMT DRAM chips across these dimensions and introduces a tiered risk framework for consideration by policymakers and companies alike.
* * *
Figure 1: Tiered, Risk-Based Approach to Incorporating China-Produced DRAM
* * *
Procurement and Export Control Hurdles
Today, companies looking to Chinese DRAM as an emergency measure should consider whether their use introduces procurement exposure, and whether possible export controls could make future sourcing unsustainable. Companies face two categories of U.S. policy hurdles. The first is procurement restrictions, limiting whether the U.S. government and its contractors can do business with CXMT and YMTC. These include the Pentagon's 1260H List, which includes both firms, and the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 5949 prohibition, coming December 2027. The second is export controls, including the Entity List, which currently includes YMTC but not CXMT. The Department of Commerce limits what U.S. technology can flow to firms on the list. While export controls do not prevent a U.S. company from buying Chinese DRAM, they do shape whether China is a sustainable source and how U.S. companies might think about anything beyond off-the-shelf purchases.
The Pentagon's 1260H List, established in the FY 2021 NDAA, lists by name firms it considers "Chinese military companies" with ties to the People's Liberation Army. As of June 8, 2026, both CXMT and YMTC are included on the list (after being briefly removed in February 2026). Listing carries legal consequences under Section 805 of the FY 2024 NDAA. The Department of Defense has been barred since June 30, 2026, from contracting directly with 1260H-listed companies, and from June 30, 2027, from purchasing goods or services from these entities indirectly through third parties. U.S. companies incorporating CXMT chips as components are not directly implicated, but should be aware of possible reputational consequences and heightened scrutiny from defense customers.
Additionally, the FY 2023 NDAA Section 5949 statute specifically prevents federal agencies and government contractors from buying semiconductors from CXMT, YMTC, and SMIC--another Chinese firm--beginning December 2027, a prohibition that will apply across the federal government. While this does not formally prevent U.S. firms from procuring DRAM from these companies, or individuals from purchasing laptops with these chips, it is likely to heighten scrutiny on business with these firms and should impact U.S. firms' calculus.
Perhaps most well-known, the Department of Commerce's Entity List requires a license for exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of items to listed foreign parties subject to U.S. export controls. Since December 2022, YMTC has been a listed entity, with a license requirement covering all such items and a presumption of denial. CXMT is not currently on the Entity List, but a possible listing is a prospective risk, though the Department of Commerce has not published new additions since October 2025 amid active trade discussions with Beijing. As experts have noted, if listed, CXMT could face reduced access to the U.S. tools, materials, and servicing its facilities require, impacting long-term reliability. And, while U.S. firms buying off-the-shelf chips is not considered an export, activities such as sharing product roadmaps or producing customized products with a listed supplier could require an export license that is likely to be denied.
Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Risks
Chinese DRAM also raises distinct cybersecurity and supply chain questions. Potential risks of embedding Chinese memory in U.S. companies' products, none of which are particularly new, could arise on two different fronts.
1. Established Regulatory Risks Derived from China's Software Vulnerability Regulations
Since 2021, Western researchers have drawn attention to a Chinese regulation that has raised significant concerns across the software vulnerability ecosystem: the Regulations on Management of Security Vulnerabilities in Network Products, introduced by the Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), and Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The most notable provision requires reporting "information on relevant vulnerabilities" to MIIT in 48 hours. Chinese companies discovering vulnerabilities cannot publish them before developing a patch, or share unpublished details overseas other than to the provider. In sum, the law guarantees ministries access to vulnerability information within two days of a company learning about it, often before a fix exists.
The national security implications of this policy represent an ongoing cost of doing business with Chinese chip suppliers such as CXMT. These concerns are noteworthy, as a growing number of companies are actively considering incorporating CXMT chips. Indeed, HP, Asus, and Acer have reportedly already begun introducing CXMT chips in limited laptop models sold outside the United States (the companies did not confirm the reports). As cybersecurity experts have recently expressed, the law effectively provides China access to critical vulnerability information, potentially before downstream customers are aware. Before a fix is available, foreign companies could find themselves exposed to flaws the Chinese government is already aware of. With the law in effect for several years, these dynamics are not hypothetical; they are a reality to be baked into U.S. companies' chip sourcing decisions.
The possible risks are greatest for sensitive government and critical infrastructure systems and connected or safety-critical devices, with lower but nonzero risk to mainstream consumer electronic products. Companies considering CXMT DRAM, and chips produced by U.S. and allied firms in China, should build in safeguards, patch vulnerabilities, and engage in component testing.
2. Lower-Probability Risk of an Embedded "Back Door"
Known evidence does not definitively establish that CXMT DRAM products contain an embedded hardware back door, so the risk is hypothetical rather than a corroborated feature of the threat landscape. Importantly, DRAM chips, which serve as temporary memory storage, are not designed to store user data once disconnected from power. They are volatile memory, with information lost once turned off, and do not independently maintain network connections or transmit communications outside a particular environment. The technical parameters of DRAM technology thus severely limit the possibility of a Chinese-supplier-introduced hidden back door operating independently of the processor or operating system. It is not impossible that chip hardware could be compromised, but DRAM is less likely to provide surveillance or espionage opportunities for threat actors.
These risks are likely less immediate than those posed by China's regulatory environment but require consideration. CXMT products have reportedly been evaluated by independent security researchers far less extensively than chips produced by their competitors. A lack of documented concerns therefore cannot be completely disentangled from the absence of substantial independent security research overall or taken as evidence of security. Existing uncertainties thus support two policies: (1) excluding CXMT DRAM from U.S. government and sensitive critical infrastructure uses, and (2) investing in testing and other mitigations to reduce potential consumer product risks. In addition, U.S. and allied companies--which have their own qualification and testing processes--can use such procedures or engage independent third parties to further the identification of any potential vulnerabilities.
U.S. Economic Competitiveness Considerations
Discussions around alternative chip supply take place against a backdrop in which U.S.-based Micron, and South Korea-based SK hynix and Samsung, are market-leading suppliers, accounting for roughly 90 percent of global DRAM revenue as of mid-2026, while CXMT holds a smaller, growing position. Samsung holds the largest revenue share at roughly 39 percent in Q2 2026, after reclaiming the top spot from SK hynix, which leads in HBM.
All three major firms are investing in manufacturing capacity on U.S. soil. Micron has committed more than $250 billion to U.S. fabrication and research and development through 2035, while SK hynix's U.S. footprint centers on a roughly $4 billion HBM packaging plant in Indiana, with mass production targeted for 2029. Samsung's largest U.S. project, its $37 billion Taylor, Texas, facility, is a logic foundry, so neither Korean firm's U.S. investment has as yet added DRAM fabrication capacity.
In 2026, the Trump administration regularly threatened tariffs to pressure South Korean suppliers many U.S. firms currently rely on, a measure likely to exacerbate current challenges. In this context, introducing CXMT or YMTC chips into the U.S. market even for Type 2 or 3 products with moderate or low risk profiles could be inconsistent with broader administration efforts to onshore and friendshore chip capacity (see Figure 1). Further, with CXMT today accounting only for about 10 percent of global DRAM revenues (up from 4 percent in 2025), some experts are skeptical that introducing Chinese memory supply will meaningfully address current shortages.
How short-term introduction of CXMT chips into the U.S. market could affect competitiveness of U.S. and allied firms is a critical question for policymakers in search of solutions. Policymakers should consider whether potential purchases could affect the competitiveness of U.S. and allied memory suppliers over time. If they adopt measures to facilitate sales, they should tailor policies to ensure that any approach, including a temporary one, does not undermine U.S. and allied long-term memory investments.
Non-U.S. Market Segmentation
Policymakers evaluating Chinese-supplied DRAM chips should take a clear-eyed approach to weighing risks against potential benefits. In addition to the factors described above, a risk-based approach should also consider any potential benefits of permitting consumer firms to incorporate limited CXMT chips for non-U.S. customers. These include the fact that any additional chip supply allows U.S. companies to produce consumer products they might otherwise forgo (or raise prices on during a supply shortage), while also strengthening their ability to maintain market share. In limiting potential products containing CXMT DRAM to Chinese markets, U.S. firms could reallocate memory supplied by U.S. and South Korean firms to U.S. and allied customers while potentially establishing a stronger foothold with Chinese customers.
Today's export control and procurement landscape makes opportunities for introducing CXMT DRAM into U.S.-destined products high-risk for companies, particularly for Type 1 U.S. government, defense, and critical infrastructure uses. Type 2 connected or safety-critical products, such as cars, medical devices, or smart-home products, also face elevated risks due to China's regulatory and cybersecurity landscape. Finally, Type 3 mainstream consumer products sold exclusively in China would present less exposure to sensitive U.S. government systems and U.S.-based users--though the company could still face cybersecurity and compliance risks (see Figure 1).
If, as some firms argue, limited use of CXMT DRAM could enable the manufacture of consumer products that would otherwise not be produced, then non-U.S. market segmentation could be one limited, short-term approach introducing the least risk to Americans. However, it is not a complete safeguard.
Risk-Informed Recommendations for Policymakers and Industry
There are few easy solutions to today's memory chip supply crunch. As U.S. companies urgently seek sources of conventional DRAM and supply is increasingly constrained by demand for HBM to fuel data centers, previously unheard-of policy solutions are now openly discussed. U.S. companies considering incorporating CXMT chips into their supply chains should take into account the risks presented in this analysis.
As policymakers actively develop solutions to U.S. firms' and consumers' needs, they should avoid binaries and consider the following risk-informed recommendations:
* Maintain current restrictions on CXMT DRAM for Type 1 use cases. Procurement restrictions should remain in place to reduce exposure to existing and potential risks to the most sensitive U.S.
systems and users.
* Adopt a tiered risk framework to assess CXMT DRAM beyond Type 1. U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security, should develop a tiered risk framework for assessing procurement exposure, cybersecurity and supply chain risks, market segmentation, and potential long-term effects on U.S. and allied competitiveness.
* Conduct independent technical research on CXMT chips. Companies should subject these products to rigorous hardware and firmware testing and assessments and treat them neither as inherently secure nor vulnerable.
* Invest in allied and partner national semiconductor ecosystems for sustainable future supply. Instead of threatening counterproductive tariffs, the Trump administration should clearly communicate the importance of expanding supply from trusted allies and partners as they make significant investments on U.S. soil. Long-term, the United States should secure and diversify the trusted memory supply available to U.S. and allied firms through intentional engagement with South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.
* * *
Lauryn Williams is deputy director and senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/index%2Ephp/analysis/between-rock-and-hard-place-evaluating-risks-chinese-memory-chips
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Evaluating the Risks of Chinese Memory Chips
Commentary by Lauryn Williams
November 19, 2026
The United States is experiencing an increasingly sharp memory chip supply shortage as a limited number of suppliers prioritize high bandwidth memory (HBM) bound for hyperscaler customers building AI data centers, shifting capacity away from conventional dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips and contributing to rising prices for consumers.
DRAM chips, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Evaluating the Risks of Chinese Memory Chips Commentary by Lauryn Williams November 19, 2026 The United States is experiencing an increasingly sharp memory chip supply shortage as a limited number of suppliers prioritize high bandwidth memory (HBM) bound for hyperscaler customers building AI data centers, shifting capacity away from conventional dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips and contributing to rising prices for consumers. DRAM chips,which act as a computer's short-term memory, are found in consumer products including cell phones, laptops, gaming consoles, cars, and medical devices. They are also a key component across defense technologies: For example, drone manufacturers are leveraging DRAM to integrate increasingly autonomous capabilities. HBM, a higher-end product formed by stacking and connecting conventional DRAM chips, is shaping today's memory market in significant ways as AI infrastructure demand skyrockets.
The vast majority of DRAM and HBM supply is produced by just three firms--Micron, SK hynix, and Samsung--and much of their limited supply is spoken for. In September, Micron announced 26 total strategic customer agreements extending into the 2030s that ensure long-term supply for well-resourced hyperscaler customers. In late October, SK hynix stated it was sold out of DRAM and HBM through 2029. Micron warned customers to expect "supply-demand conditions to be much tighter" in coming years, with the shortage unlikely to abate before 2030 as demand outstrips supply and HBM demand consumes up to 70 percent of available capacity.
These firms are meanwhile building new facilities in the United States and elsewhere to expand production. Yet future construction plans cannot alleviate today's short-term realities, due to the expected lag time (up to four years) between investments and facilities coming online. And, in some cases, a newly announced project will not address the heart of the challenge: SK hynix's new $4 billion Indiana facility will be used for HBM packaging and research and development, not DRAM fabrication.
The memory crunch is not limited to the United States. Supply in Asia is also stretched, with the International Data Corporation projecting that regional PC shipments would decline nearly 14 percent in 2026 as suppliers prioritize HBM. In China, leading firm CXMT's capacity is reportedly booked through 2027, while Chinese firms are locking in their own supply.
In this constrained global market, U.S. companies seeking access to conventional DRAM chips find themselves between a rock and a hard place. They must weigh short-term needs against longer-term considerations. Sustainable solutions are urgently needed to leverage U.S. allies and partners to expand future memory chip supply, with current manufacturers' capacity committed through the 2030s. As a result, some firms are exploring alternative solutions in the next-largest memory market: China.
A Rock and a Hard Place
Attempts to source new memory chip supply from China are sparking discussions across the tech industry and policy community. Two key suppliers form China's memory ecosystem: CXMT (ChangXin Memory Technologies) and YMTC (Yangtze Memory Technologies). CXMT is already the fourth-largest global DRAM manufacturer, and NAND flash memory supplier YMTC's market position is growing. Yet with Washington slow to introduce short- or long-term solutions to relieve the supply crunch and much of the Big Three's current supply already committed, some firms are pursuing alternatives. Former Apple CEO Tim Cook reportedly engaged the Trump administration regarding using Chinese chips for China-destined products, and new CEO John Ternus recently reasserted that "all options should be on the table." Other laptop manufacturers are already reportedly introducing CXMT DRAM chips into a limited subset of laptops for non-U.S. markets.
With the Beijing question unlikely to disappear while DRAM chip supply remains limited, a clear cost-benefit analysis of sourcing Chinese memory supply is essential. U.S. firms considering CXMT DRAM chips should base their evaluation on numerous risk factors, including procurement and export control considerations, cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities, product sensitivities, and destination market, as well as long-term economic competitiveness. Figure 1 evaluates use of CXMT DRAM chips across these dimensions and introduces a tiered risk framework for consideration by policymakers and companies alike.
* * *
Figure 1: Tiered, Risk-Based Approach to Incorporating China-Produced DRAM
* * *
Procurement and Export Control Hurdles
Today, companies looking to Chinese DRAM as an emergency measure should consider whether their use introduces procurement exposure, and whether possible export controls could make future sourcing unsustainable. Companies face two categories of U.S. policy hurdles. The first is procurement restrictions, limiting whether the U.S. government and its contractors can do business with CXMT and YMTC. These include the Pentagon's 1260H List, which includes both firms, and the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 5949 prohibition, coming December 2027. The second is export controls, including the Entity List, which currently includes YMTC but not CXMT. The Department of Commerce limits what U.S. technology can flow to firms on the list. While export controls do not prevent a U.S. company from buying Chinese DRAM, they do shape whether China is a sustainable source and how U.S. companies might think about anything beyond off-the-shelf purchases.
The Pentagon's 1260H List, established in the FY 2021 NDAA, lists by name firms it considers "Chinese military companies" with ties to the People's Liberation Army. As of June 8, 2026, both CXMT and YMTC are included on the list (after being briefly removed in February 2026). Listing carries legal consequences under Section 805 of the FY 2024 NDAA. The Department of Defense has been barred since June 30, 2026, from contracting directly with 1260H-listed companies, and from June 30, 2027, from purchasing goods or services from these entities indirectly through third parties. U.S. companies incorporating CXMT chips as components are not directly implicated, but should be aware of possible reputational consequences and heightened scrutiny from defense customers.
Additionally, the FY 2023 NDAA Section 5949 statute specifically prevents federal agencies and government contractors from buying semiconductors from CXMT, YMTC, and SMIC--another Chinese firm--beginning December 2027, a prohibition that will apply across the federal government. While this does not formally prevent U.S. firms from procuring DRAM from these companies, or individuals from purchasing laptops with these chips, it is likely to heighten scrutiny on business with these firms and should impact U.S. firms' calculus.
Perhaps most well-known, the Department of Commerce's Entity List requires a license for exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of items to listed foreign parties subject to U.S. export controls. Since December 2022, YMTC has been a listed entity, with a license requirement covering all such items and a presumption of denial. CXMT is not currently on the Entity List, but a possible listing is a prospective risk, though the Department of Commerce has not published new additions since October 2025 amid active trade discussions with Beijing. As experts have noted, if listed, CXMT could face reduced access to the U.S. tools, materials, and servicing its facilities require, impacting long-term reliability. And, while U.S. firms buying off-the-shelf chips is not considered an export, activities such as sharing product roadmaps or producing customized products with a listed supplier could require an export license that is likely to be denied.
Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Risks
Chinese DRAM also raises distinct cybersecurity and supply chain questions. Potential risks of embedding Chinese memory in U.S. companies' products, none of which are particularly new, could arise on two different fronts.
1. Established Regulatory Risks Derived from China's Software Vulnerability Regulations
Since 2021, Western researchers have drawn attention to a Chinese regulation that has raised significant concerns across the software vulnerability ecosystem: the Regulations on Management of Security Vulnerabilities in Network Products, introduced by the Cyberspace Administration of China, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), and Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The most notable provision requires reporting "information on relevant vulnerabilities" to MIIT in 48 hours. Chinese companies discovering vulnerabilities cannot publish them before developing a patch, or share unpublished details overseas other than to the provider. In sum, the law guarantees ministries access to vulnerability information within two days of a company learning about it, often before a fix exists.
The national security implications of this policy represent an ongoing cost of doing business with Chinese chip suppliers such as CXMT. These concerns are noteworthy, as a growing number of companies are actively considering incorporating CXMT chips. Indeed, HP, Asus, and Acer have reportedly already begun introducing CXMT chips in limited laptop models sold outside the United States (the companies did not confirm the reports). As cybersecurity experts have recently expressed, the law effectively provides China access to critical vulnerability information, potentially before downstream customers are aware. Before a fix is available, foreign companies could find themselves exposed to flaws the Chinese government is already aware of. With the law in effect for several years, these dynamics are not hypothetical; they are a reality to be baked into U.S. companies' chip sourcing decisions.
The possible risks are greatest for sensitive government and critical infrastructure systems and connected or safety-critical devices, with lower but nonzero risk to mainstream consumer electronic products. Companies considering CXMT DRAM, and chips produced by U.S. and allied firms in China, should build in safeguards, patch vulnerabilities, and engage in component testing.
2. Lower-Probability Risk of an Embedded "Back Door"
Known evidence does not definitively establish that CXMT DRAM products contain an embedded hardware back door, so the risk is hypothetical rather than a corroborated feature of the threat landscape. Importantly, DRAM chips, which serve as temporary memory storage, are not designed to store user data once disconnected from power. They are volatile memory, with information lost once turned off, and do not independently maintain network connections or transmit communications outside a particular environment. The technical parameters of DRAM technology thus severely limit the possibility of a Chinese-supplier-introduced hidden back door operating independently of the processor or operating system. It is not impossible that chip hardware could be compromised, but DRAM is less likely to provide surveillance or espionage opportunities for threat actors.
These risks are likely less immediate than those posed by China's regulatory environment but require consideration. CXMT products have reportedly been evaluated by independent security researchers far less extensively than chips produced by their competitors. A lack of documented concerns therefore cannot be completely disentangled from the absence of substantial independent security research overall or taken as evidence of security. Existing uncertainties thus support two policies: (1) excluding CXMT DRAM from U.S. government and sensitive critical infrastructure uses, and (2) investing in testing and other mitigations to reduce potential consumer product risks. In addition, U.S. and allied companies--which have their own qualification and testing processes--can use such procedures or engage independent third parties to further the identification of any potential vulnerabilities.
U.S. Economic Competitiveness Considerations
Discussions around alternative chip supply take place against a backdrop in which U.S.-based Micron, and South Korea-based SK hynix and Samsung, are market-leading suppliers, accounting for roughly 90 percent of global DRAM revenue as of mid-2026, while CXMT holds a smaller, growing position. Samsung holds the largest revenue share at roughly 39 percent in Q2 2026, after reclaiming the top spot from SK hynix, which leads in HBM.
All three major firms are investing in manufacturing capacity on U.S. soil. Micron has committed more than $250 billion to U.S. fabrication and research and development through 2035, while SK hynix's U.S. footprint centers on a roughly $4 billion HBM packaging plant in Indiana, with mass production targeted for 2029. Samsung's largest U.S. project, its $37 billion Taylor, Texas, facility, is a logic foundry, so neither Korean firm's U.S. investment has as yet added DRAM fabrication capacity.
In 2026, the Trump administration regularly threatened tariffs to pressure South Korean suppliers many U.S. firms currently rely on, a measure likely to exacerbate current challenges. In this context, introducing CXMT or YMTC chips into the U.S. market even for Type 2 or 3 products with moderate or low risk profiles could be inconsistent with broader administration efforts to onshore and friendshore chip capacity (see Figure 1). Further, with CXMT today accounting only for about 10 percent of global DRAM revenues (up from 4 percent in 2025), some experts are skeptical that introducing Chinese memory supply will meaningfully address current shortages.
How short-term introduction of CXMT chips into the U.S. market could affect competitiveness of U.S. and allied firms is a critical question for policymakers in search of solutions. Policymakers should consider whether potential purchases could affect the competitiveness of U.S. and allied memory suppliers over time. If they adopt measures to facilitate sales, they should tailor policies to ensure that any approach, including a temporary one, does not undermine U.S. and allied long-term memory investments.
Non-U.S. Market Segmentation
Policymakers evaluating Chinese-supplied DRAM chips should take a clear-eyed approach to weighing risks against potential benefits. In addition to the factors described above, a risk-based approach should also consider any potential benefits of permitting consumer firms to incorporate limited CXMT chips for non-U.S. customers. These include the fact that any additional chip supply allows U.S. companies to produce consumer products they might otherwise forgo (or raise prices on during a supply shortage), while also strengthening their ability to maintain market share. In limiting potential products containing CXMT DRAM to Chinese markets, U.S. firms could reallocate memory supplied by U.S. and South Korean firms to U.S. and allied customers while potentially establishing a stronger foothold with Chinese customers.
Today's export control and procurement landscape makes opportunities for introducing CXMT DRAM into U.S.-destined products high-risk for companies, particularly for Type 1 U.S. government, defense, and critical infrastructure uses. Type 2 connected or safety-critical products, such as cars, medical devices, or smart-home products, also face elevated risks due to China's regulatory and cybersecurity landscape. Finally, Type 3 mainstream consumer products sold exclusively in China would present less exposure to sensitive U.S. government systems and U.S.-based users--though the company could still face cybersecurity and compliance risks (see Figure 1).
If, as some firms argue, limited use of CXMT DRAM could enable the manufacture of consumer products that would otherwise not be produced, then non-U.S. market segmentation could be one limited, short-term approach introducing the least risk to Americans. However, it is not a complete safeguard.
Risk-Informed Recommendations for Policymakers and Industry
There are few easy solutions to today's memory chip supply crunch. As U.S. companies urgently seek sources of conventional DRAM and supply is increasingly constrained by demand for HBM to fuel data centers, previously unheard-of policy solutions are now openly discussed. U.S. companies considering incorporating CXMT chips into their supply chains should take into account the risks presented in this analysis.
As policymakers actively develop solutions to U.S. firms' and consumers' needs, they should avoid binaries and consider the following risk-informed recommendations:
* Maintain current restrictions on CXMT DRAM for Type 1 use cases. Procurement restrictions should remain in place to reduce exposure to existing and potential risks to the most sensitive U.S.
systems and users.
* Adopt a tiered risk framework to assess CXMT DRAM beyond Type 1. U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security, should develop a tiered risk framework for assessing procurement exposure, cybersecurity and supply chain risks, market segmentation, and potential long-term effects on U.S. and allied competitiveness.
* Conduct independent technical research on CXMT chips. Companies should subject these products to rigorous hardware and firmware testing and assessments and treat them neither as inherently secure nor vulnerable.
* Invest in allied and partner national semiconductor ecosystems for sustainable future supply. Instead of threatening counterproductive tariffs, the Trump administration should clearly communicate the importance of expanding supply from trusted allies and partners as they make significant investments on U.S. soil. Long-term, the United States should secure and diversify the trusted memory supply available to U.S. and allied firms through intentional engagement with South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.
* * *
Lauryn Williams is deputy director and senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/index%2Ephp/analysis/between-rock-and-hard-place-evaluating-risks-chinese-memory-chips
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: SCOTUS Must Uphold U.S. Immigration Law
WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:
* * *
SCOTUS Must Uphold U.S. Immigration Law
November 20, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. - The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) applauds the Supreme Court for granting cert in Mullin v. Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, an important immigration case which will determine the legality of President Trump's January 2025 proclamation which suspended the illegal entry of aliens into the United States across the southern border and precluded those in violation of the proclamation ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * SCOTUS Must Uphold U.S. Immigration Law November 20, 2026 WASHINGTON, D.C. - The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) applauds the Supreme Court for granting cert in Mullin v. Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, an important immigration case which will determine the legality of President Trump's January 2025 proclamation which suspended the illegal entry of aliens into the United States across the southern border and precluded those in violation of the proclamationfrom access to asylum.
"The Supreme Court has an opportunity to correct a serious mistake," said Chad Mizelle, Chair of Litigation at AFPI and former Department of Justice Chief of Staff. "The President has the authority to exclude and remove illegal aliens from the United States.
Without the ability to carry out those removals, the President's authority to enforce our immigration laws is severely undermined. Lower courts have significantly hampered the administration's ability to address the illegal immigration crisis. The Supreme Court now has the opportunity to correct that and reaffirm the President's authority."
Securing America's borders, enforcing our immigration laws, and protecting the safety, sovereignty, and interests of the American people are more important than ever before. Read more about AFPI's work on homeland security and immigration here (https://americafirstpolicy.com/policy-areas/homeland-security-and-immigration/).
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Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/scotus-must-uphold-us-immigration-law/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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SCOTUS Must Uphold U.S. Immigration Law
November 20, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. - The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) applauds the Supreme Court for granting cert in Mullin v. Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, an important immigration case which will determine the legality of President Trump's January 2025 proclamation which suspended the illegal entry of aliens into the United States across the southern border and precluded those in violation of the proclamation ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 21 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * SCOTUS Must Uphold U.S. Immigration Law November 20, 2026 WASHINGTON, D.C. - The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) applauds the Supreme Court for granting cert in Mullin v. Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, an important immigration case which will determine the legality of President Trump's January 2025 proclamation which suspended the illegal entry of aliens into the United States across the southern border and precluded those in violation of the proclamationfrom access to asylum.
"The Supreme Court has an opportunity to correct a serious mistake," said Chad Mizelle, Chair of Litigation at AFPI and former Department of Justice Chief of Staff. "The President has the authority to exclude and remove illegal aliens from the United States.
Without the ability to carry out those removals, the President's authority to enforce our immigration laws is severely undermined. Lower courts have significantly hampered the administration's ability to address the illegal immigration crisis. The Supreme Court now has the opportunity to correct that and reaffirm the President's authority."
Securing America's borders, enforcing our immigration laws, and protecting the safety, sovereignty, and interests of the American people are more important than ever before. Read more about AFPI's work on homeland security and immigration here (https://americafirstpolicy.com/policy-areas/homeland-security-and-immigration/).
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Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/scotus-must-uphold-us-immigration-law/
[Category: ThinkTank]
