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Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Bloomberg Opinion: Can AI Financial Advice Help You Retire More Comfortably?
NEW YORK, May 28 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 27, 2026, by senior fellow Allison Schrager to Bloomberg Opinion:* * *
Can AI Financial Advice Help You Retire More Comfortably?
When someone told me recently that her favorite use of AI is for financial advice, I was horrified.
I am a retirement economist, and my first reaction was self pity: Now I know how doctors feel when people use AI for medical questions.
Then I went home and gave it a try. It was not terrible -- it gave a clear and engaging explanation of the conventional wisdom on saving ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, May 28 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 27, 2026, by senior fellow Allison Schrager to Bloomberg Opinion: * * * Can AI Financial Advice Help You Retire More Comfortably? When someone told me recently that her favorite use of AI is for financial advice, I was horrified. I am a retirement economist, and my first reaction was self pity: Now I know how doctors feel when people use AI for medical questions. Then I went home and gave it a try. It was not terrible -- it gave a clear and engaging explanation of the conventional wisdom on savingand investing.
It was the equivalent of a mediocre financial planner, but without the personal touch.
That's probably better than nothing, and it's bound to become more common as more brokerages offer AI advisers to less wealthy customers.
Continue reading the entire piece here at Bloomberg Opinion (https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-05-27/can-ai-financial-advice-help-you-retire-more-comfortably?srnd=undefined)
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Allison Schrager is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor of City Journal.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/can-ai-financial-advice-help-you-retire-more-comfortably
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Russian Authorities Seizing Ukrainian Property to Consolidate Occupation
WASHINGTON, May 28 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on May 27, 2026, by Contributing Editor Tatiana Vorozhko and senior researcher Victoriia Novikova, both of the Reckoning Project, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russian Authorities Seizing Ukrainian Property to Consolidate Occupation
Executive Summary:
* Many Ukrainian families have fled the occupied territories of Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion, fearing child deportations, forced conscription, and the hardships of life under Russian rule, often leaving homes, farms, and businesses ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 28 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on May 27, 2026, by Contributing Editor Tatiana Vorozhko and senior researcher Victoriia Novikova, both of the Reckoning Project, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russian Authorities Seizing Ukrainian Property to Consolidate Occupation Executive Summary: * Many Ukrainian families have fled the occupied territories of Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion, fearing child deportations, forced conscription, and the hardships of life under Russian rule, often leaving homes, farms, and businessesbehind that the occupation authorities then seize.
* For some Ukrainians, fleeing with nothing was the only way to save their children; for others, leaving a family member behind seemed the only way to protect what they owned. In December 2025, Putin signed a law allowing occupation authorities to confiscate so-called "ownerless" Ukrainian homes and transfer them without court approval.
* Russian authorities are attempting to legalize the appropriation of Ukrainian property and use property rights as a tool to reshape the demographic composition of the occupied territories. Ukrainian authorities call these actions an attempt "to legitimize outright looting," and are working with international partners to create a compensation mechanism for victims.
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On May 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that his war against Ukraine is "coming to an end" and suggested that he might meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a third country after a long-term agreement had been negotiated (President of Russia, May 9). On May 26, Zelenskyy told a meeting of the Servant of the People parliamentary faction that the "hot phase" of the war could be over by the end of 2026. He said Ukraine expects its European partners to appoint a mediator for the talks, and that the United States would send a delegation to Kyiv in preparation (TSN, May 26).
The Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced over nine million Ukrainian citizens to flee their homes, leaving their property behind (UNHCR, accessed May 11). Over 1.8 million Ukrainians had already been displaced by Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for the separatist republics in the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts in 2014 (Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, accessed May 11). Any durable peace agreement will require a workable mechanism to compensate these civilian victims of Russia's aggression.
For most Ukrainians, their home is their most valuable asset. When deciding whether to flee or remain under Russian occupation, many consider what would happen to their properties. Some even decide to stay, or leave one family member behind, to guard their houses. The Reckoning Project, an organization documenting human rights violations, has collected over 800 testimonies illustrating this trend.
The stories of two families from the southern region of Ukraine, occupied in the first days of Russia's full-scale invasion, vividly demonstrate these choices and their consequences. One family left in mid-April of 2022, leaving everything behind but staying together. Valentyna and Ivan (names changed for safety), both in their early 60s, had two biological children and had adopted 12 more. In February 2022, they had nine young children in their care. On the day when Russians invaded their village, the family awoke to explosions. Several Russian tanks and BMPs (Boyevaya Mashina Pyekhoty, Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)) were parked directly outside their house. Valentyna remembers her shock when she stepped outside, and a tank turned its turret toward her (Author's Interview, June 20, 2025).
The family decided to leave less than two months later, after the village head warned them that the Russians were removing adopted children from Ukrainian families and transferring them to Russia. Valentyna also feared for her two sons in their early 20s, who could be mobilized into the Russian military. Thirteen family members, including a newborn, squeezed into a seven-seat Mazda and drove west through heavy fighting between Mykolaiv and Kherson. Valentyna recalls that a car behind them was shot at by Russian troops. She believes they escaped because they carried nothing except documents and water and told Russian soldiers at checkpoints that they were simply "visiting nearby relatives" (Author's Interview, June 20, 2025).
Valentyna and her husband, children, and grandchildren now live in a much smaller house bought by one of their oldest sons, who now serves in the Ukrainian armed forces. Before the invasion, the parents had purchased land to build him a home in their village. Their oldest daughter's house, which her family abandoned when they fled, is now occupied by a Russian family. Valentyna says that their own house--with five bedrooms and a swimming pool--stands empty but now bears a sign: "Property of the Russian Federation" (Author's Interview, June 20, 2025).
Another family made a different choice. The mother and six children fled, while the father stayed behind to protect their family farm--a large house, 50 hectares of land, farm equipment, and livestock (Author's Interview, January 21). When Russian forces occupied their village, Olga and Andriy (names changed for safety), both in their late 50s, had four young children in their care and adult children in Ukraine-controlled territory in early 2022. After Russian occupation, the director of a nearby orphanage begged them to adopt two young sisters before their deportation to Russia. Olga and Andriy agreed and brought the girls home, trying to complete the adoption process across the front lines (Author's Interview, January 21).
Olga and the six children left in early 2023, after occupation authorities began demanding that they register their children in the Russian social system or risk removal. Olga remembers living in constant fear, especially for her two teenage boys, who could eventually be drafted into the Russian army. She fled alone with six children by bus, taking only food, water, and documents. Like Valentyna, she told Russian soldiers at checkpoints that they were visiting relatives and would soon return.
At one checkpoint, Russian soldiers separated Olga from her children, who were placed in what she described as a cage outside, while she endured five hours of interrogation inside a trailer. At one point, an interrogator, a man about her age, insisted that Russia had come to liberate Ukrainians (Author's Interview, January 21).
"From what?" Olga asked. Apparently, from the poverty he imagined Ukrainians lived in.
"You are old enough to remember the Soviet Union," he told her. "The USSR meant wealth and abundance. We want everyone to live like that again. It is all about the economy."
Olga looked at her hands with dirt under her nails and replied, "I have six children. I have four cows. I have 50 geese, 18 sows, and dozens of piglets. What economy?"
In the end, they were allowed to leave. Olga believes her descriptions of the farm and the fact that her husband stayed behind convinced the Russians that the family intended to return.
Olga and her children are rebuilding their lives from scratch in a rented apartment, dependent on social assistance and support from their adult children. Her husband remains behind, working the land and caring for the animals. To keep ownership of the farm and house, he was forced to take a Russian passport. When recounting her story, Olga repeatedly shows photographs: their large house, a newly built traditional stove with decorative tile, wooden beds her husband just finished for their youngest children--reminders of the comfortable life they built for their family and lost to the war (Author's Interview, January 21).
In December 2025, Putin signed a law allowing occupation authorities to confiscate so-called "ownerless" houses. Properties can then be reassigned or rented out, with compensation available only to Russian citizens (Russian Federation's Official Publication of Legal Acts, December 15, 2025). This law is the latest development in efforts to legalize the seizure of property belonging to Ukrainians who fled occupation or resisted Russian rule. Between March and May of 2024, Russian-installed authorities in the occupied territories adopted regulations on so-called "ownerless" or "abandoned property," allowing homes to be transferred to municipal ownership if owners failed to re-register them under Russian law within 30 days (Ifl.Blog, November 28, 2024).
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented that between February 2022 and December 2025, occupation authorities designated 38,000 apartments and houses as "potentially abandoned," with 13,700 in Mariupol alone. Over 6,000 properties have already been registered as abandoned, over 80 percent of them in Mariupol (OHCHR, December 9, 2025).
The OHCHR report describes a case where the occupation authorities designated an apartment as "potentially abandoned" in Mariupol, even though the owner's sister was living there. The owner attempted to return to the occupied territory but was denied entry at Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport and banned from entering Russia for 20 years. A Russian court subsequently designated her property as abandoned and transferred it to municipal ownership.
Occupation authorities can now transfer properties to municipal ownership without a court decision because of the December 2025 law on "ownerless" homes. The OHCHR notes that "only Russian passport holders can register property in occupied territory, significantly limiting Ukrainians from protecting their ownership rights" (OHCHR, December 9, 2025).
The Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (KHRPG), one of Ukraine's oldest human rights organizations, concludes that Russian property law effectively eliminates any legal avenues for Ukrainian citizens to assert ownership rights while their property remains under occupation (KHRPG, December 8, 2025). The group also cautions against traveling to occupied territories, noting that ownership of valuable real estate there can itself become grounds for denial of entry (KHRPG, May 9, 2025). It further warns that Ukrainians who accept Russian citizenship to protect their ownership rights still face risks of abduction and prosecution, while becoming far harder to secure in prisoner exchanges (KHRPG, December 19, 2025).
These property laws and related practices are one of the ways that Russia is reshaping the demographics of the occupied Ukrainian territories (Meduza, May 19, 2025). Russians also have economic incentives to move there, including higher salaries and preferential access to land (Meduza, September 2, 2022). There is legal pressure on Ukrainians to accept Russian citizenship or to leave. Occupation authorities have deported Ukrainian civilians to Russia, including tens of thousands of Ukrainian children, and terrorize residents in frontline areas such as Kherson to drive residents away (GlobSec, June 16, 2025). Russian officials now offer preferential mortgages to Russian citizens purchasing real estate in occupied territories. As a result, Russians reportedly account for 70 percent of all housing purchases there (Interfax, March 16). The Kremlin's campaign to fill the occupied territories of Ukraine with Russian citizens, deliberately reshaping demographic reality, is meant to make those territories appear inherently Russian and to complicate any future reintegration into Ukraine (ISW, May 5).
Russia's "annexation" is not internationally recognized, and the territories legally remain part of Ukraine. Under international humanitarian law, Russia is an occupying power obligated to respect the property rights of lawful owners in occupied territories. Article 46 of the Hague Convention IV, which Russia is a signatory to, states that "private property ... must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated" (The Hague Convention (IV), accessed May 21). The prohibition extends beyond outright seizure or eviction to include threats, coercion, or other measures that deprive residents of their ability to exercise their ownership rights.
Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the December 2025 Russian property legislation an attempt "to legitimize outright looting." The ministry argues that these laws are part of the Kremlin's deliberate push to change the demographic composition of the occupied territories, violating international humanitarian law to make them more "Russian." Ukraine has called on international partners to hold the Russian Federation accountable. The Ukrainian government is documenting illegal property seizures so that it is possible to restore ownership rights after de-occupation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, December 10, 2025).
Ukraine and its partners are working on a compensation mechanism for victims. On November 14, 2022, the UN General Assembly supported the creation of an international compensation mechanism for citizens' losses because of Russia's war against Ukraine. The mechanism consists of three elements: the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the International Compensation Commission for Ukraine, and the compensation fund (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine's response to author's information request, April 8).
The Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has accepted 150,000 claims through Ukraine's Diia web-portal as of early May (Evropeys'ka Pravda, May 5). The register currently accepts 16 categories of claims from private individuals, including displacement, death or disappearance of family members, torture, sexual violence, and loss of housing. The register is gradually adding other categories for individuals, businesses, and state institutions. The Compensation Commission will review registered claims and determine compensation amounts. Thirty-five countries and the European Union have signed the convention to establish the commission, and five countries, including Ukraine, have ratified it. Kyiv expects that once at least 25 parliaments ratify the convention--likely by next year--the commission will begin reviewing its first claims. The Ukrainian government is working on the third element, the compensation fund, which will provide the money for victim compensation. Kyiv hopes frozen Russian assets abroad will become one of its main funding sources (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine's response to author's information request, April 8). Russia has inflicted approximately $195.1 billion in damage on Ukraine--including $61.1 billion in destroyed or damaged housing--between the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and December 2025 (Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, April 24). While the issue of Russia compensating Ukrainians for property loss, including housing, might not be at the top of the negotiation agenda, ignoring it would shift the burden onto the Ukrainian government, which has already suffered enormous financial losses due to Russian aggression. If Russia does not face financial responsibility for its crimes against Ukrainian citizens, further aggression could be encouraged.
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Tatiana Vorozhko is a Contributing Editor at The Reckoning Project.
Victoriia Novikova is a senior researcher on the Reckoning Project and an investigative journalist.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russian-authorities-seizing-ukrainian-property-to-consolidate-occupation/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Moscow Makes a New Step for Annexation of Georgian Territories
WASHINGTON, May 28 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on May 27, 2026, by journalist Giorgi Menabde in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Moscow Makes a New Step for Annexation of Georgian Territories
Executive Summary:
* Russia and the de facto government of Georgia's occupied Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia) signed the Treaty on Deepening Allied Cooperation on May 9, essentially allowing Moscow gain more control of the region and use it as a tool of pressure on Tbilisi.
* Moscow is toughening its policy toward Georgia amid major changes in the South Caucasus, the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 28 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on May 27, 2026, by journalist Giorgi Menabde in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Moscow Makes a New Step for Annexation of Georgian Territories Executive Summary: * Russia and the de facto government of Georgia's occupied Tskhinvali Region (South Ossetia) signed the Treaty on Deepening Allied Cooperation on May 9, essentially allowing Moscow gain more control of the region and use it as a tool of pressure on Tbilisi. * Moscow is toughening its policy toward Georgia amid major changes in the South Caucasus, thedrift of Armenia and Azerbaijan toward the West, and its ongoing war against Ukraine.
* This step demonstrates the futility of the policy of appeasement and complete loyalty that the Georgian leadership is pursuing toward Russia, in hopes of reciprocal steps from the Kremlin.
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On May 9, during Russia's toned down Victory Day celebration on Moscow's Red Square, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Alan Gagloev, the de facto leader of Georgia's Russian-occupied Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia), signed a "Treaty on Deepening Allied Cooperation" (TASS, May 9). This is not the first agreement signed by Moscow and the de facto government of Georgia's occupied Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions. In 2015, Russia signed the so-called "alliance and integration" treaties with the separatist authorities (see EDM, November 24, 2014). This latest agreement has attracted particular interest both because of its content and because of the broader context of developing relations between Georgia and Russia amid Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine. The May 9 agreement marks a new level of Russian occupation, opening the way for the final annexation of Georgian territories.
According to the new treaty, Russian citizens can hold state and municipal positions in South Ossetia, granting Moscow the right to place Russian officials directly in the de facto government (Media Center IR, May 11). The agreement requires that Moscow and South Ossetia equally recognize and protect all forms of property on their territories, and ensure equal rights of citizens to acquire, own, use, and dispose of property. In practice, Russians will be able to acquire and dispose of land and other real estate in this region under the same legal regime as the local population (Media Center IR, May 11). The parties also pledged to take additional steps toward creating a single economic space to improve citizens' well-being and living standards (Media Center IR, May 11).
The treaty also ensures the harmonization of legislation governing economic activity, including the Civil and Tax Codes, thereby further integrating the Tskhinvali region into Russia's economic and fiscal systems (Media Center IR, May 11). Moscow and Tskhinvali are continuing to take steps toward the gradual unification of energy infrastructure, including gas pipelines, as well as transport, communications, and telecommunications systems. Separate agreements will determine the management of shared infrastructure elements (Media Center IR, May 11). The Russian State Duma ratified the treaty on May 13, just four days after its initial signing (Russian State Duma, May 13).
Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili described the latest South Ossetia-Russia agreement as an example of Russia's attempt to annex Georgia's occupied regions. Speaking in Chisinau, Moldova, during the 135th session of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers, Botchorishvili linked the agreement to previous international court rulings on Russia's occupation of Georgia's territory. "The occupation, effective control, and Russia's responsibility for grave human rights violations have been confirmed by international courts, including judgments of the European Court of Human Rights," she underlined (JAM News, May 15).
Teona Akubardia, deputy secretary of Georgia's National Security Council from 2014 to 2018 and deputy chair of the Defense and Security Parliamentary Committee from 2021 to 2024, said in a May 16 interview with this author that Moscow's so-called new agreement with Tskhinvali's de facto regime further deepens the de facto annexation of Georgian territories without a formal declaration of annexation. Akubardia argued that "ultimately, Putin is using this calculated pressure on Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream regime right now to neutralize Georgia's sovereignty and force Tbilisi into subservience, effectively preventing its possible return to Western integration" (Author's interview, May 16).
Akubardia noted that Mikhail Kalugin, director of the Fourth Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries at the Russian Foreign Ministry, confirmed that the South Caucasus remains a vital region where Moscow is trying to reassert its influence amid setbacks in Ukraine and growing competition from the West, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Turkiye (Civil Georgia, May 13). Akubardia also asserted that "to survive Western sanctions, the Kremlin wants to secure the North-South Corridor to Iran, turning the total domination and usage of Georgia's transit geography into a critical geopolitical priority" (Author's interview, May 16).
Russia has taken another aggressive step against Georgia at a time when, paradoxically, Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has become Moscow's most accommodating partner in the South Caucasus (see EDM, January 12). During the May 14-15 Council of Europe meeting, Georgia refused to sign the new Enlarged Partial Agreement that will pave the way for a Special Tribunal to investigate the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine (UNN, May 16). Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili explained this decision by citing the "high risks" for her country (Interpressnews, May 16). Recent diplomatic disputes have strained Russia's relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan (see EDM, July 7, 2025, January 15, March 25, April 21, May 12). Baku and Yerevan are negotiating with Washington and European capitals to build new transport routes that bypass Russian territory. They are making every effort to demonstrate their independence from Putin's Russia (see EDM, February 6, 2025, February 24, April 16, April 28, May 11, May 12). In these circumstances, one might have expected Moscow to take a more restrained stance on Georgia's most painful issue, rather than accelerating the annexation process. The Kremlin did the opposite by signing the May 9 agreement.
Paata Zakareishvili, former Georgian state minister for reconciliation and civic equality from 2012 to 2016, argued in his May 16 interview with this author that the document signed in Moscow is a significant step toward the informal and unofficial annexation of the Tskhinvali region. Zakareishvili stipulated that "Moscow does not benefit from a worsening of relations with Tbilisi. Russia needs Georgia as an ally, but the Russian Federation is simultaneously trying to retain and incorporate South Ossetia and Abkhazia as much as possible." Zakareishvili noted that Russia's goal is "to plant its representatives in Tskhinvali" and "make it as difficult as possible for Georgia to resolve the South Ossetia and Abkhazian issues," even "if the Georgian government changes." He added that "under this agreement, any Russian can take a post in South Ossetia, even if he is not a citizen of South Ossetia and does not live there. Moscow gains leverage over South Ossetia" (Author's interview, May 16).
David Avalishvili, from the independent outlet Nation.ge, drew attention to the difference in the Kremlin's approaches to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He noted that Moscow has struggled to "obtain consent from the authorities of separatist Abkhazia for the creation of Russian settlements [so-called apartments] in Abkhazia and the intervention of Russian oligarchic capital there" (see EDM, February 12, March 25, 2025, March 5). He added that "Moscow is demonstrating to Sukhumi that South Ossetia, which seeks full integration with Russia, receives more economic and financial benefits than Abkhazia, whose leadership is trying to maintain formal independence and has not declared its desire to accede to the Russian Federation" (Author's interview, May 16).
Since 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, more than 100 South Ossetians have died fighting in eastern Ukraine. They were originally stationed at a Russian military base near Tskhinvali (Gazeta Respublika, March 30; Kavkaz Uzel, May 8). Many residents of South Ossetia expressed dissatisfaction that Ossetians were being sent to die in distant Ukraine. The local separatist authorities, however, appear far more concerned with demonstrating loyalty to the Kremlin in hopes of a swift absorption of South Ossetia into Russia.
One outcome of Putin's May 9 demarche is that it strengthens the arguments of Georgian politicians who demand the country's neutrality as a possible way to avoid the final annexation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Petre Mamradze, former head of the State Chancellery of Georgia and one of the leaders of the Neutral Georgia party, underscored in a May 16 interview with this author that in August 2008, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region and deployed military bases there. "It must be understood that Georgia will not be able to achieve international recognition of its neutrality under these conditions, even if it declares it," Mamradze asserted, adding that "Georgia will not be accepted into either [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)] or the European Union until these conditions change." In his view, Georgia's possible accession to these organizations, no matter who initiated it, "has been and remains a complete bluff" (Author's interview, May 16).
At the same time, Mamradze stated, "Pursuing a neutral foreign policy and declaring Georgia's goal of becoming a neutral state in the future undoubtedly reduces the risk of Russia formally annexing the former South Ossetia Autonomous Region." He added that Russia "has de facto annexed the aforementioned regions of Georgia" and "is prepared to formally annex them"--in the case of Abkhazia, to admit Abkhazia into the union state--but only when "the Kremlin decides such a step will boost Putin's approval ratings." Mamradze concluded, "Currently, Putin's advisers believe that punishing Georgia will not improve his approval ratings" (Author's Interview, May 16). In contrast to this view, Georgia's pro-Western forces have no doubt that the only adequate response to Putin's aggressive steps is to restore and strengthen Georgia's trajectory toward European institutions and Western society.
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Giorgi Menabde is a journalist based in Georgia.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/moscow-makes-a-new-step-for-annexation-of-georgian-territories/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Ukraine Military Situation Report on May 27, 2026
WASHINGTON, May 28 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on May 27, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Can Kasapoglu:* * *
Ukraine Military Situation Report | May 27
Political-military activity around Belarus is heating up and may constitute what intelligence analysis calls weak signals: ambiguous background noise that can presage major strategic shifts. After reviewing this episode, which may mark a potential political-military turning point, the report turns to its regular battlefield ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 28 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on May 27, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Can Kasapoglu: * * * Ukraine Military Situation Report | May 27 Political-military activity around Belarus is heating up and may constitute what intelligence analysis calls weak signals: ambiguous background noise that can presage major strategic shifts. After reviewing this episode, which may mark a potential political-military turning point, the report turns to its regular battlefieldassessment of the war in Ukraine.
Executive Summary
* Tensions over Belarus. Political and military machinations intensified over Belarus, as the likelihood of a Belarusian front against Ukraine--though still a low-probability, high-impact contingency--increased.
* Russian rhetoric intensifies. Russia signaled that its long-range salvos could reach "decision-making centers" in Kyiv, implicitly threatening allied diplomatic missions in the war-torn country.
* Ukrainian air strikes. Ukraine's deep-strike campaign continued to inflict serious damage on Russia's hydrocarbon infrastructure.
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1. Concerning Developments in Belarus Raise Tensions
More than four years into Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine, Kyiv is again focusing its attention on Belarus--not because Minsk is preparing to send large contingents of troops into the fray, but because Russia is increasingly using Belarus as a base for its own operations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's official reception of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Belarus's exiled opposition leader, in Kyiv on May 25 was less a diplomatic courtesy than a calculated move to respond to this dynamic. Ukraine is warning the world that the regime of Belarusian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko, while avoiding directly entering the war, is enabling Russia in ways that matter. Belarus currently serves Moscow as a rear base, a sanctions-evasion hub, a protected defense-industrial zone, and a source of Soviet-vintage military stocks. The country is now also a potential haven for Russian drone operations and nuclear signaling efforts.
This situation has been many years in the making. After Belarus's fraudulent 2020 presidential election, Lukashenko emerged triumphant but isolated, weakened, and largely unrecognized by the West. The ensuing mass protest movement led by Tsikhanouskaya exposed his regime's political vulnerabilities.
Lukashenko responded to these developments by increasing his country's dependence on Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin, a former Soviet-era spy chief, exploited this opportunity craftily. In November 2021, Russia and Belarus endorsed a set of 28 so-called Union State programs that, in practice, revived an integrationist agenda designed to harmonize the countries' legal systems, align the two nations on energy, finance, customs, and tax policy, and shrink what remained of Belarusian sovereignty.
Since then, the territory of Belarus, already a launchpad for Moscow's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has evolved from a Russian staging ground to a source of strategic depth for the Kremlin. Ukrainian officials now argue that Russia may use Belarusian territory to support larger attacks against Ukraine and possibly against nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Minsk's participation in Russian-led tactical nuclear drills has only sharpened that concern.
Available writings comparing Russian-controlled military activity in Belarus between January and May 2024 and January and May 2026 reveal a clear evolution in Belarusian drills and military signaling. The 2024 cycle involved mostly conventional readiness drills, with a layer of nuclear signaling. The cycle featured battalion- and brigade-level drills, air-defense and communications training, firing exercises, and the preparation of mechanized forces.
The 2026 cycle is different--and more dangerous. This year's activity has prioritized survivability, dispersal, command continuity, layered air defense, and operational resilience. Repeated drills now involve radar-surveillance and electronic-warfare units combined with tactical and strategic surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), including Tor-M2, S-300, and S-400 variants. Airspace-monitoring tasks also suggest a more coherent effort to protect high-value assets and operational corridors. More important, the 2026 cycle of Russian military activity in Belarus suggests that the militaries have conducted command-and-control and staff training under dispersal and force-protection measures. Taken together, such activity provides a textbook smoking-gun indicator of wartime preparations.
Moreover, for the past three years Russian strategic forces have gradually absorbed the Belarusian state. In 2023, Putin announced plans to station Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and build a dedicated nuclear storage site there, after Belarusian crews had trained on the Russian Iskander system for potential nuclear missions. Independent monitors have not confirmed the deployment of Russian nuclear warheads to Belarus, but in 2024 Minsk adopted a new military doctrine that permitted the deployment and possible use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on its territory.
Minsk called this move a step toward deterrence; in practice, it expanded Russian leverage near NATO's borders while further reducing Belarusian autonomy. Integration between the two countries then deepened further. The arrival in Belarus of Russian MiG-31K aircraft carrying Kinzhal hypersonic missiles kept Ukraine's air defenses on alert, while the December 2024 Treaty on Security Guarantees within the framework of the Union State paved the way for permanent Russian deployments and bases in Belarus.
The Belarusian military is not particularly strong on its own. But the Kremlin values the country for its location and its support systems. Before Moscow's full-scale attack on Ukraine, Russian and Belarusian planners worked to make Belarus more conducive to hosting, moving, and supplying Russian troops by improving the country's railways and establishing larger storage sites for supplies and gear for both countries' troops. As a result, Russia can now enter Belarus more quickly than before, keep its forces there longer, and, if needed, use Belarus to attack further to the west or north.
Recent Hudson Institute assessments highlight that Belarus was more than a sideshow in Russia's 2022 invasion plans. Moscow's initial northern thrust on the city of Kyiv, initially aimed at decapitating the Ukrainian government, came from Belarusian territory; likewise the axis toward Bucha and Irpin, now synonymous with Russian atrocities. Additionally, Minsk has been accused of involvement in the abduction of Ukrainian children.
Today, Belarusian airspace still offers Russian drones and missiles a relatively safer corridor to access western Ukraine. The possibility of Lukashenko sending his own forces into Ukraine may seem remote, but Hudson Institute assessments underscore how Belarus, as Russia searches for ways to alter the battlefield momentum after four years of war, cannot be treated merely as a static rear area, but should be seen as a potential staging ground.
Ukraine is certainly taking the Belarusian threat seriously. Robert "Magyar" Brovdi, the commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, recently warned Lukashenko that Kyiv has already identified its first 500 targets inside Belarus should a new Russian invasion be launched from the north.
2. Battlefield Assessment
Land warfare raged intensely last week, with Russian and Ukrainian forces often waging more than 200, and sometimes more than 260, tactical engagements each day. Kramatorsk, Huliaipole, Lyman, Oleksandrivka, Pokrovsk, Orikhiv, and Kostiantynivka saw heavy clashes.
Russian forces made territorial gains in the sector around Kostiantynivka. Pokrovsk, on the other hand, absorbed intense combat that resulted in minimal changes in territorial control. In southern Ukraine, the Ukrainian military's drone strikes continued to disrupt Russian logistics routes, a trend that should be monitored closely in the coming weeks.
While ground activity increased, long-range strikes from both Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to shape the conflict. On the night of May 23-24, Russian forces launched one of the largest combined strikes of the war, firing 90 missiles and 600 drones against Ukraine. The attack involved a mix of loitering munitions and air-, sea-, and ground-launched missiles, and demonstrated Moscow's ongoing goal of saturating Ukrainian air defenses through the size, variety, and timing of its strikes.
Kyiv was the main target of these Russian strikes, which reportedly involved one Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) launched against the Bila Tserkva district. Russia also hit Ukraine with Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, 3M22 Zircon missiles, Iskander ballistic missiles (including North Korean KN-23 variants), modified air-defense interceptors for ground attacks, Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles, Iskander-K cruise missiles, and Kalibr naval cruise missiles.
According to initial reports from the Ukrainian Air Force, the country's air-defense and electronic-warfare units intercepted or suppressed 604 aerial threats, including 55 missiles and 549 drones. As of the time of writing, several Russian drones remained in Ukrainian airspace. Confirmation of the final operational picture of these attacks awaits the confirmation of impact sites, missile failure rates, and post-strike damage assessments.
Political indicators also suggest that Russia may soon intensify its targeting of the city of Kyiv. On May 25, the Kremlin's rhetoric shifted from post-strike justifications to explicit pre-strike signaling. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Russian forces were preparing systematic strikes against facilities in Kyiv often used by Ukraine's armed forces and the "decision-making centers" directing them. Lavrov also urged the US and other nations to evacuate their diplomatic personnel and citizens from the Ukrainian capital.
More than routine diplomacy, Lavrov's words served as a coercive warning, and reflected Moscow's attempts to normalize a strike campaign that is likely forthcoming. The Kremlin's rhetoric aimed to frame any upcoming campaign as retaliatory in nature, to pressure Western embassies to lessen their presence in Ukraine, and to magnify the political-warfare effects of Russia's repeated missile and drone salvos against Kyiv. In response, European diplomats voiced harsh criticisms of the Kremlin's threat that Russian missile and drone salvos could place their diplomatic missions in harm's way.
For its part, Ukraine responded to Russia's long-range strikes by targeting the energy infrastructure that funds Moscow's war machine. Ukraine also widened its campaign against Russian command, drone, logistics, fuel, and air-defense nodes in occupied Ukraine. On May 25 and overnight on May 25-26, Ukrainian forces struck Russian command posts in Ocheretyne, Donetsk Oblast, and Verkhnia Krynytsia in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
Ukraine also targeted Russian ground-control stations near Nesterianka and Novohrodivka, a drone warehouse and logistics depot near Novopetrykivka, a logistics site in the city of Donetsk, and a railway fuel tanker near Debaltseve. Ukraine also confirmed the results from earlier deep strikes inside Russia: Moscow shut down the Syzran oil refinery after Ukrainian attacks on May 21, while a Ukrainian strike on May 25 damaged equipment and fuel tanks at the linear production and dispatch station in Yaroslavl.
As a result of these strikes, Russia began to weigh imposing restrictions on the export of diesel and jet fuel from the country. Interfax, a Russian news agency, reported that Russia's refinery utilization rates fell to multi-year lows under intensifying Ukrainian pressure. The news service further reported that Russian oil companies, after a Tuesday meeting on the domestic fuel market chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, had been advised to limit foreign sales of refined products. Interfax, citing several people familiar with the matter, reported that an export ban on diesel and jet fuel is now in the advanced stages of consideration, though no date has yet been set for implementing such a move.
3. What to Monitor in the Coming Weeks
Belarus is deliberately using fabricated claims of Ukrainian drone incursions to build a political case for possible military escalation. The Belarusian Security Council recently claimed that 166 drones entered Belarusian airspace over the past week, and that the country activated its air defenses 59 times. This claim is misleading, as many drones crossing into Belarus are not of Ukrainian origin, but Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) diverted by electronic warfare. For now, a joint Russian-Belarusian attack remains a low-probability but high-impact scenario worth monitoring.
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At A Glance:
Can Kasapoglu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/ukraine-military-situation-report-may-27-can-kasapoglu
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: How the $1.2B Bonding Budget Could Worsen Minnesota's Fiscal Troubles
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, May 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on May 27, 2026, by economist Martha Njolomole:* * *
How the $1.2B bonding budget could worsen Minnesota's fiscal troubles
Back in February, I warned against the budgetary impact of passing a massive bonding bill. Governor Walz's bonding budget proposal was then $907 million. But in the 2026 session, the legislature passed a $1.2 billion bonding bill -- $300 million above Walz's proposal.
This has several implications. ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, May 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on May 27, 2026, by economist Martha Njolomole: * * * How the $1.2B bonding budget could worsen Minnesota's fiscal troubles Back in February, I warned against the budgetary impact of passing a massive bonding bill. Governor Walz's bonding budget proposal was then $907 million. But in the 2026 session, the legislature passed a $1.2 billion bonding bill -- $300 million above Walz's proposal. This has several implications.Most notably, rising debt service costs could further weaken the state's already deteriorating fiscal outlook.
High borrowing costs put pressure on present and future tax revenues
Every year since 2014, Minnesota has spent over $500 million in general funds to service debt.
In the February 2026 forecast, Minnesota Management and Budget (MMB) estimated that debt service costs would grow from $559 million in 2025 to $708 million in 2032, assuming the legislature passed a $1.1 billion bonding budget during each even-numbered year between 2026 and 2032. This would mean an additional $796 million in debt service costs during that entire period.
With the legislature passing a $1.2 billion bonding bill, debt service costs will likely outpace MMB's February forecast. If lawmakers dont rein in the size of future capital budgets, this temporary bump will become a fixture of the budget.
[View table in the link at bottom.]
Historically, debt service has averaged 3 percent of general funds between 1990 and 2018. Due to a growing budget, that share declined to 2 percent between 2018 and 2024.
But while still lower than before 2024, debt service rose slightly as a share of the budget in 2025. It will remain elevated between 2026 and 2029 when compared to 2024.
Figure 1: Debt Service as a Share of General Fund Spending, FY2019-2029
On its own, this increase would not present a significant budgetary hurdle. But with Health and Human Services (HHS) taking up a large and growing share of state resources, there is little to no room for the legislature to expand other areas of the budget.
Without accounting for additional spending enacted in the 2026 session, HHS will account for 38 percent of general funds in 2029, up from 30 percent in 2023. Rising debt service costs will be competing with other public services for a small and shrinking share of available resources -- if any.
Figure 2: Share of General Fund Spending, FY2023 vs. FY2029
Certainly, bonds fund infrastructure essential for a well-functioning state. By spreading costs over a long period, the bonding process also ensures that future beneficiaries contribute to the cost of undertaking such durable projects. However, that is likely not true for every dollar included in the $1.2 billion bonding bill. For instance, does it benefit taxpayers when the state goes into debt to maintain the Minnesota Zoo? Highly unlikely.
And since, by law, the state cannot default on general obligation bonds -- which make up the majority of state debt -- absent spending cuts, funding for other essential public services could likely suffer as rising borrowing costs, together with an expanding HHS, exert increasing pressure on tax revenues.
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Martha Njolomole is an Economist at Center of the American Experiment.
martha.njolomole@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/how-the-1-2b-bonding-budget-could-worsen-minnesotas-fiscal-troubles/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: NASA Changes Course on Commercial Space Stations
WASHINGTON, May 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on May 27, 2026, by Clayton Swope, deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department:* * *
NASA Changes Course on Commercial Space Stations
On March 24, 2026, NASA unveiled a strategy, called Ignition, to sustain U.S. leadership in space exploration and science. The strategy outlines a new plan to maintain a human presence in low Earth orbit (LEO), making changes to NASA's Commercial LEO Destinations (CLD) program. These changes ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on May 27, 2026, by Clayton Swope, deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department: * * * NASA Changes Course on Commercial Space Stations On March 24, 2026, NASA unveiled a strategy, called Ignition, to sustain U.S. leadership in space exploration and science. The strategy outlines a new plan to maintain a human presence in low Earth orbit (LEO), making changes to NASA's Commercial LEO Destinations (CLD) program. These changesare the latest chapter in a saga that began in 2019, when NASA rolled out its strategy for commercial LEO development, describing plans to transition to commercially operated space stations after the retirement of the International Space Station (ISS). But NASA now says the business case for companies building commercial space stations does not make sense and that these companies cannot deliver an operational capability anytime soon.
But the business model is not to blame. The main issue is that NASA and Congress have not allocated sufficient funding, over many years, to successfully execute NASA's commercial LEO development strategy--a problem compounded by a lack of consistency with CLD requirements. The funding and requirements issues trace back to the inadequacy of the answer to one question: Why does the United States need another space station? The answer to this question is simple, but it requires a dogmatic belief that, at some point in the future, humans will live elsewhere in the solar system and beyond. If NASA too believes in this vision, it should provide consistent direction and funding and not give up on the companies that have been developing a commercial foundation for LEO--with the help of significant private investment--over the last several years.
NASA's Shifting Vision for Commercial LEO
NASA's 2019 commercial LEO development strategy, among other things, called for commercially operated modules attached to the ISS and free-flying space stations. A 2021 update to the plan outlined the CLD program, which again called for free-flying stations, an architecture also reinforced in an August 2025 NASA directive laying out the program's next phase. The Ignition announcement changes direction: NASA now says it wants to build a core module that would be owned and operated by NASA and initially attached to the ISS, which NASA is planning to decommission in 2030. NASA is asking companies to build and dock commercial modules to the core module. Eventually, this core module and the attached commercial ones would detach from the ISS and become a free-flying space station. Today, several U.S. companies are working to build free-flying commercial space stations--but none of them have been building exactly what NASA now wants. The new changes proposed by NASA throw a wrench in the gears of what these companies have been doing for years.
NASA Is the Market
NASA argues that the changes to CLD are needed for two main reasons. For one, NASA says that the market does not support the business cases of the companies developing commercial space stations. This is a curious argument, as the market for commercial space stations is mainly what NASA is willing to spend on them. In the 1920s, the U.S. government was the primary customer for commercial air transportation-as-a-service and contracted with private airlines to deliver mail, helping airlines close their business cases before the maturation of a strong nongovernment market for commercial aviation. At the dawn of commercial aviation, private airlines could not turn a profit without the government as the main customer. The fact that NASA would be the core customer for commercial space stations need not jeopardize the viability or wisdom of the as-a-service model. NASA is the anchor customer for transportation services to and from the Moon, yet it is moving forward, and even doubling down, on the Commercial Lunar Payload Services program. It also wants to buy transportation services on the lunar surface using an as-a-service model. NASA is also discussing as-a-service communications for Mars.
Would anyone argue that NASA is not the main customer for any of these services, as well as the long-running, successful Commercial Crew Program? The "market" problem for commercial stations is that NASA has not wanted to spend, and Congress has not wanted to appropriate, enough money for the program. Without NASA money, there is no real market--and this should not be a surprise. NASA noted back in 2021 that only one day in the future would NASA be "one of many customers in LEO." One issue is that the companies building commercial space stations have somewhat obscured this fact, speaking of the market in a way that avoids emphasizing that NASA is the main buyer today and that, without NASA as a customer, the business case does not close.
To date, less than $600 million has gone to industry (in 2020 and 2021) from NASA to support commercial space station developments. In comparison, it cost over $150 billion, with over two-thirds of that cost paid for directly by NASA and the rest by international partners, to build the ISS. As the NASA Office of Inspector General noted, "future low Earth orbit platforms will likely not be viable without continued significant Government support." In 2024 congressional testimony, an industry representative noted that NASA was only covering 5 percent of her company's costs to develop a commercial space station, whereas NASA had covered between 80 and 90 percent of the costs for developing commercial crew vehicles. Private investors have invested over $3 billion in companies developing stations, meaning every $1 invested by NASA has been complemented by $5 in private investment--a force multiplier for NASA.
The Historical Case for Publicly Seeded Space Markets
The as-a-service model is still a good one and one that NASA should not abandon. NASA cannot create a nongovernment market, but through as-a-service models, it can help build the foundation that underpins one in the future--an approach with parallels in history. In 1860, Congress passed a law that provided funds to support the construction of a transcontinental telegraph line and a series of repair stations that were owned and operated by the private sector. The law gave the government priority rights to use the network, but it gave operators the right to sell telegraph services to nongovernment customers. In the late 1890s, before anyone realized the commercial potential of the radio, the British navy became one of the earliest customers for Guglielmo Marconi's wireless technology, laying the groundwork for a global network of coastal radio stations and shipborne radios, which Marconi leased to customers using an as-a-service model. If CLD received the funding proposed by House appropriators in charge of NASA--$400 million for FY 2027--industry representatives have publicly affirmed that would be sufficient to support two as-a-service space stations with the government as the core customer, avoiding vendor lock in and creating competition for NASA's business. Such an approach could create opportunities for commercial space stations to capitalize on new non-government business in LEO.
NASA's Revised Plan Faces the Same Technical Challenges
The second reason NASA provided for the shift in CLD plans is that the companies aiming to operate commercial space stations are simply not technically ready to take on such a task in the foreseeable future. If this is true, how would the new plan address this issue? NASA is still turning to industry as part of its revised plan and will, no doubt, ask industry to build its core module, which will include power, environmental control, life-support subsystems, and other infrastructure functions needed for a free-flying station. Whatever technical and operational challenges companies building commercial space stations face today will be the same ones that any prospective developer and builder of a core module will face in the coming years. If NASA intends to help a core module developer address its technical and operational challenges, it makes sense for NASAto help companies like Axiom, Blue Origin, Vast, and Voyager address any identified technical challenges today.
Today, around seven years after the introduction of NASA's first plan to replace the ISS with commercial space stations, there is only so much that can be done to minimize the gap between ISS retirement and a successor capability. Is a new plan the right answer to close that gap sooner and potentially save NASA money over the long term? Switching contractors in the middle of a home renovation is not typically the best plan to save time and money. Companies are already well into building hardware on the path to flight test iterative approaches to operating free-flying commercial space stations. Rather than change the plan, NASA could provide those companies a path to obtain a long-term contract or some other mechanism to obtain NASA funds as a way to close their business cases and move their efforts forward. Ideally, NASA could allocate enough funding to buy services from two providers, but should it only have enough funding for one, starting with a sufficiently funded services contract for a single vendor is a viable path. To craft such a contract, NASA needs to decide what exactly it wants and stop revising or drastically changing its requirements.
Human Expansion Beyond Earth Starts in LEO
This goes back to the heart of the issue and possibly the underlying disease that has afflicted CLD from the start: What is the reason NASA wants to maintain a space station? Back in 2018, NASA first issued a white paper to forecast its demand for human spaceflight in LEO. NASA most recently attempted to answer that question with its microgravity strategy, released in late 2024. But many of the 13 goals and 44 objectives identified in the strategy can be accomplished with automation and robots, without the need for humans. Boiled down to the simplest explanation, perhaps the reason to have a space station with people in LEO is that it is a critical step on the road to a future in which humans are living elsewhere in the solar system and beyond. A critical element of any architecture to reach that goal is the maintenance of a permanent human presence in LEO that would be used to work out the technical details and operational procedures to enable humans living much farther afield. The ISS has served its purpose for 25 years, but if one accepts this dogmatic vision, another station must take its place. Human expansion beyond Earth starts in LEO. NASA should clearly make this argument.
The Best Path Forward for CLD
If CLD were a play, it would be a Greek tragedy--but hopefully a comedic tragedy, as they usually have happy endings. But it is a tragedy nonetheless for several reasons. NASA blames the companies that have been trying to interpret and follow its demand signals, using private capital alongside NASA money, for their inability to deliver on the vision of commercial LEO development. But the fundamental issue is endemically insufficient funding--for which both NASA and Congress should share the blame--and changing requirements. At this stage, no new plan can fully right the ship and make sure there is no interruption to the United States' continuous human presence in space after the ISS retirement. But a drastic change in plans only adds new delays and new costs. News of another leak on the ISS may call into question whether it is safe to extend the station past 2030, giving little time to design, build, launch, and operate a new core module attached to the ISS.
Sticking to the CLD plan--with more NASA funding to close the business case for commercial space station providers and NASA support to address any technical concerns--is the best way to minimize the gap between ISS retirement and the operationalization of a new space station. NASA should not give up on the as-a-service model. There are few nongovernment customers today for commercial space stations--NASA is nearly the whole market. But when NASA buys things as a service, it creates opportunities for companies that may one day, like SpaceX, end up playing important roles in the space economy. As NASA decides its next steps based on inputs to its space station request for information and Congress debates FY 2027 funding priorities for NASA, NASA should reconsider staying the course on CLD--preferably with more funding. With this approach, NASA gives the seeds of the U.S.-led space economy, which will stretch from LEO to the Moon and beyond, the greatest chance to take root and grow.
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Clayton Swope is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/nasa-changes-course-commercial-space-stations
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Releases New Report on the White House
WASHINGTON, May 28 (TNSrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on May 27, 2026:* * *
AFPI Releases New Report on the White House
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) has released a new expert insight, "Hardening the People's House: The National Security Case for White House Modernization."
This report details the infrastructural updates that are sorely needed in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), which has not been significantly renovated since its construction in 1942.
The PEOC communications failed during our nation's worst domestic ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 28 (TNSrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on May 27, 2026: * * * AFPI Releases New Report on the White House The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) has released a new expert insight, "Hardening the People's House: The National Security Case for White House Modernization." This report details the infrastructural updates that are sorely needed in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), which has not been significantly renovated since its construction in 1942. The PEOC communications failed during our nation's worst domesticemergency, September 11, 2001, and still remains to be fully updated over two decades later.
"The increasing threats against the president and public officials should concern every American, regardless of politics," said Brett Tolman, chair for American Justice at AFPI.
"Strengthening secure infrastructure on White House grounds is a necessary step to protect the administration, heads of state, staff, law enforcement, media, and civilians attending official events now and for generations to come."
Toplines from the report are available here, and the full report is available here.
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REPORT: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/assets/uploads/files/Hardening_the_People_s_House-_The_National_Security_Case_for_White_House_Modernization.pdf
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-releases-new-report-on-the-white-house
[Category: ThinkTank]