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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary Entitled 'Russia Trying to Replace Starlink'
WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 23, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Russia Trying to Replace Starlink
John C. K. Daly
Executive Summary:
* Russia is accelerating development of its Rassvet satellite constellation after losing access to Starlink, seeking an indigenous communications network supporting military operations, civilian broadband, remote regions, and transportation.
* Rassvet faces substantial technical and industrial hurdles, including satellite failures, limited Russian spacecraft production capacity, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 23, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Trying to Replace Starlink John C. K. Daly Executive Summary: * Russia is accelerating development of its Rassvet satellite constellation after losing access to Starlink, seeking an indigenous communications network supporting military operations, civilian broadband, remote regions, and transportation. * Rassvet faces substantial technical and industrial hurdles, including satellite failures, limited Russian spacecraft production capacity,and an ambitious deployment schedule requiring hundreds of satellites and numerous Soyuz launches.
* Ukraine is seeking to disrupt Rassvet through diplomatic pressure and military strikes against Russia's space infrastructure, potentially delaying deployment as Poland and Finland pursue a competing satellite communications system.
-
After being cut off in February from SpaceX's Starlink global satellite communications system for illegally using the service, Russia has been racing to build its own version. The first 16 Rassvet-3 satellites, launched on a Soyuz-2.1b rocket on March 23, were followed by a second deployment of 16 Rassvet-3 satellites sent into orbit on July 19. According to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a satellite from the first batch, Rassvet-3 No. 4, failed to reach its orbit and reentered Earth's atmosphere on June 6. According to satellite tracking data, two satellites from the second launch, Rassvet-3 Nos. 17 and 23, have not performed a single observed orbital-raising maneuver since separating from their launch vehicle (United24 Media, August 26). Since separating from the launch vehicle on July 19, neither satellite has ignited its propulsion system or adjusted its altitude. The failures represent about 10 percent of the approximately 300 Rassvet-3 satellites Russia expects to have in orbit by the end of next year to provide communications for military and civilian users, including Internet to remote areas and transportation across the country.
Private Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 developed the Rassvet low-orbit satellite system. The company was founded in December 2020 in Moscow, is part of X Holding, and is designed for broadband data transmission to anywhere on the planet. Current information about Bureau 1440's owners and financial performance is confidential. The work is being carried out under Russia's Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media as part of its national project "Data Economy and Digital Transformation of the State" for 2025-2030 (Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media, accessed September 23).
Bureau 1440 conducted tests of satellite prototypes before the Rassvet-3 launches. On June 27, 2023, three test satellites were launched as part of the Rassvet-1 mission as secondary payloads during the launch of the Meteor-M #2-3 satellite from the Vostochnyi Cosmodrome in Amur oblast aboard a Soyuz-2.1 b launch vehicle. On May 17, 2024, three satellites of the second experimental Rassvet-2 mission were launched to conduct flight tests of devices and components. The Bureau 1440 satellites were launched from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk oblast aboard a Soyuz-2.1 b rocket. Following the tests, Bureau 1440 reported that the first 16 Rassvet-3 serial satellites of the eventual Rassvet constellation were launched on March 23 from Plesetsk aboard a Soyuz-2.1 b launch vehicle (TASS, July 20).
On June 18, 2025, Roscosmos Head Dmitrii Bakanov announced that the Rassvet constellation would comprise 350 satellites in the first phase, and approximately 900 in the second. He described the Rassvet project as Russia's answer to Starlink (TASS, July 20).
The main difference between Starlink and Rassvet will be a lack of direct compatibility with mobile devices. To increase throughput, the Rassvet-3 satellites operate in a different, higher-frequency wireless band and require a separate terminal (Techinsider.ru, September 4). Its advantage is direct communication between a smartphone and a satellite, without a ground satellite terminal.
Until February, the Russian military used contraband Starlink antennas. At the Ukrainian government's request, Starlink unilaterally deactivated the devices. On February 4, Z-Bloggers reported that Starlink satellite communication terminals were shut down en masse at the front (Meduza, February 6). The shutdown occurred when the Russian military had begun to massively and effectively utilize Starlink for drone strikes on the Ukrainian army rear echelons. In the first two years of Russia's "special military operation" (SVO), the Ukrainian military created an extensive communication and control system based on thousands of Starlink antennas donated by SpaceX (see EDM, February 10, June 4). It included information exchange networks, command and control of troops and, starting in 2023, a control system for long-range sea and air drones.
To counter its loss of Starlink access on March 19, Bureau 1440 announced the launch of its first 16 Rassvet-3 satellites into orbit to deploy an indigenous satellite communications system. Beyond its immediate military use, the Rassvet satellite constellation will eventually become the foundation of a domestic global broadband internet access network.
Full deployment will not be easy. Since the 1991 implosion of the Soviet Union, Russia's entire satellite manufacturing sector has produced just a few dozen spacecraft per year. Former Head of Russia's Roscosmos space agency Iuri Borisov said, "It turned out we were not ready for this" (Ars Technica, September 2).
Satellite Internet has quickly become one of the most crucial communications tools in Russia's SVO, utilized by troops from both sides. Russia was determined to use Starlink terminals to relay signals to its attack drones, allowing them to bypass typical jamming measures and receive instructions at extended range. The loss of these terminals propelled development of an indigenous alternative (see EDM, June 10).
Two years ago, Bureau 1440's satellite internet service was projected to cost approximately $5.28 billion (445 billion rubles), according to a preliminary version of the "Internet Access Infrastructure" project, part of the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media "Data Economy and Digital Transformation of the State" program. By the end of 2030, the Bureau 1440 constellation is expected to consist of 292 satellites, with a total of 383 satellites planned for launch (RBC, September 16, 2024).
Rassvet-3 will orbit one and a half times higher than Starlink, whose typical orbits are at an altitude of 342 miles (550 kilometers). This reduces the signal strength somewhat, but allows for coverage of the entire sky with a significantly smaller number of satellites--not thousands, as Elon Musk has proposed for his SpaceX projects, only hundreds (Meduza, June 30).
Promoting Rassvet's technology, on June 12, Russian President Vladimir Putin, during a meeting with military personnel participating in the war against Ukraine, commented that the Bureau 1440 Rassvet project was "in no way inferior to Starlink, and perhaps even superior in some ways" (President of Russia, June 12).
In early September, ICS Holding LLC CEO and co-founder and head of Bureau 1440 Aleksei Shelobkov discussed the Rassvet program on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF). He stated that in 2026, the project moved from the research stage to service testing, as the Rassvet team began initial tests with consumers in various regions of the country, adding, "The point is not whether Starlink is the answer; the point is that it is a key technology in communications ... We are talking about Russia creating its own satellite constellation ... In accordance with our plans, we are not only conducting our own internal tests, but have also begun the first tests with our customers, even ahead of schedule" (Vesti, September 3).
Bureau 1440 is now receiving funding from the Russian state budget to deploy the group as part of the federal "Data Economy and Digital Transformation of the State" project for 2025-2030 (Kodifikatskiia.ru, September 19). The initiative's includes a section on the "Creation of a low-orbit satellite constellation to provide high-speed Internet access throughout Russia, including on mobile devices." According to the document, $5.13 billion (431.9 billion rubles) is to be spent on this task by 2030, $3.92 billion (329 billion rubles) of which will come from Bureau 1440 itself.
Despite the system's ongoing problems, Ukrainian officials closely followed its deployment. Ukraine's Defense Intelligence (DIU) Chief Oleh Ivashchenko commented, "We know that the Russians are trying to launch satellites into orbit. But so far, there are not enough of them, and their effectiveness is low." (Ukrinform, September 7). On August 11, an advisor to Ukraine's minister of defense, Serhiy Beskrestnov, said Rassvet would create problems for Ukrainian troops (Profile.ru, August 29).
A Ukrainian television channel citing military sources reported that Western media reports about the low effectiveness of Russian Rassvet satellites are untrue. A source in the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that after the launch of the Rassvet satellites, Russian strikes became more accurate, as the Russian military gained additional capabilities to monitor equipment movements and identify Ukrainian military depots (Moskovskii Komsomolets, September 7).
According to satellite communications expert Vladimir Stepanets, Rassvet satellites are already effective. He observed, "We see that in fact a chain with good coverage has already been formed, which provides such good coverage about twice a day, but in fact there are more such arrivals, that is, several such chains can fly with coverage of certain regions about once every hour and a half. But the important thing is that these satellites already provide fairly dense coverage" (Militarny, July 31).
According to its projections, Bureau 1440 needs to launch another 125 spacecraft into low orbit by the end of the year, bringing the total to 156 Rassvet-3 satellites in orbit. This will require eight launches. If all goes according to plan, by the end of 2027, the Rassvet-3 constellation should number 292 active satellites delivered by 17 launches, and by the end of 2028, 318. By 2030, the total number of launched Rassvet satellites should be 383 from 24 launches, with 91 reserve satellites to replace those that have left service. Rassvet will operate 292 working satellites in continuous orbit (Comnews.ru, August 4).
Ukraine is attempting to blunt the Rassvet program, from diplomatic initiatives to military strikes. In a preemptive move, Ukraine's UN mission on August 29 officially appealed to the UN International Telecommunication Union (ITU), requesting that Ukraine's territory be excluded from the declared service areas of Rassvet's military satellite constellation coverage beams across all frequency bands (EurAsia Daily, August 29). The ITU allocates radio spectrum, maintains international registration of frequency assignments and satellite network parameters, and organizes technical coordination to prevent harmful radio interference. Seeking to broaden the requested ban, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrei Sibiga called on partners to take "all possible steps to block Rassvet's functioning not only over the sovereign territory of Ukraine, but also over the sovereign territories of other countries" (Kyiv Post, August 29).
Ukraine has extended its military attacks to include factories that produce the rockets used to lift satellites into orbit. Since 2022, Russia has carried out 84 launches into space: 71 using Soyuz-2, nine on Angara launch vehicles, and four on Proton rockets (Defense Express, August 19). Beyond launching satellites, the Soyuz-2 is the only launch vehicle in the Russian Federation that can deliver people into orbit, making it critical to resupplying the International Space Station (ISS).
Ukraine's two FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles struck the Progress Rocket Space Center in Samara on August 15, hitting the factory that produces Soyuz-2 launch vehicles used to deploy Russian military satellites and the Rassvet network (Defense Express, August 15). Russia needs at least 18 Soyuz-2.1b launches to deploy the planned Rassvet-3 satellite constellation (United24 Media, August 15). If the strike disabled the plant's final assembly shop, Russia will face significant problems with subsequent Rassvet-3 constellation launches and manned ISS resupply missions (Defense Express, August 25). To reach the minimum 288 satellites needed for operational readiness, Russia will need to launch 18 Soyuz-2.1b missions, each carrying 16 Rassvet-3 satellites (Defense Express, August 13).
Bureau 1440 maintains that the Rassvet-3 constellation will reach full capacity in the mid-2030s, when 900 satellites will be in orbit (Pravda, September 10). This timetable is complicated by Ukrainian airstrikes against facilities and sites critical to Russia's satellite and space industry, which hinder Russia's ability to launch satellites and further delay Russia's goal to establish its Rassvet satellite network in the near-term, including for use on the battlefield in Ukraine.
Poland's state-run defense giant PGZ, in conjunction with Finnish space company ICEYE, has signed a letter of intent to develop a military satellite communications system. On September 9 at the Miedzynarodowy Salon Przemyslu Obronnego (MSPO) 34th International Defense Industry Exhibition in Kielce, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said, "The culmination of the process that began today can and will be a Polish Starlink. Anyone closely following the Russian-Ukrainian war knows how important communications are. It is absolutely critical. Without communications, you have nothing to look for on the modern battlefield" (Defense News, September 11).
Given Finland's and Poland's stalwart support for Ukraine's defensive efforts, future support will likely include sharing real-time data from the "Polish Starlink." Given Rassvet's deployment difficulties, the only certainty seems to be that its problems will continue as two of Russia's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rivals develop a competing system.
* * *
Dr. John C. K. Daly is a Eurasian foreign affairs and defense policy expert for The Jamestown Foundation and a non-resident fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in Washington DC.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-trying-to-replace-starlink/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Russia Trying to Replace Starlink
John C. K. Daly
Executive Summary:
* Russia is accelerating development of its Rassvet satellite constellation after losing access to Starlink, seeking an indigenous communications network supporting military operations, civilian broadband, remote regions, and transportation.
* Rassvet faces substantial technical and industrial hurdles, including satellite failures, limited Russian spacecraft production capacity, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 23, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Trying to Replace Starlink John C. K. Daly Executive Summary: * Russia is accelerating development of its Rassvet satellite constellation after losing access to Starlink, seeking an indigenous communications network supporting military operations, civilian broadband, remote regions, and transportation. * Rassvet faces substantial technical and industrial hurdles, including satellite failures, limited Russian spacecraft production capacity,and an ambitious deployment schedule requiring hundreds of satellites and numerous Soyuz launches.
* Ukraine is seeking to disrupt Rassvet through diplomatic pressure and military strikes against Russia's space infrastructure, potentially delaying deployment as Poland and Finland pursue a competing satellite communications system.
-
After being cut off in February from SpaceX's Starlink global satellite communications system for illegally using the service, Russia has been racing to build its own version. The first 16 Rassvet-3 satellites, launched on a Soyuz-2.1b rocket on March 23, were followed by a second deployment of 16 Rassvet-3 satellites sent into orbit on July 19. According to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a satellite from the first batch, Rassvet-3 No. 4, failed to reach its orbit and reentered Earth's atmosphere on June 6. According to satellite tracking data, two satellites from the second launch, Rassvet-3 Nos. 17 and 23, have not performed a single observed orbital-raising maneuver since separating from their launch vehicle (United24 Media, August 26). Since separating from the launch vehicle on July 19, neither satellite has ignited its propulsion system or adjusted its altitude. The failures represent about 10 percent of the approximately 300 Rassvet-3 satellites Russia expects to have in orbit by the end of next year to provide communications for military and civilian users, including Internet to remote areas and transportation across the country.
Private Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 developed the Rassvet low-orbit satellite system. The company was founded in December 2020 in Moscow, is part of X Holding, and is designed for broadband data transmission to anywhere on the planet. Current information about Bureau 1440's owners and financial performance is confidential. The work is being carried out under Russia's Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media as part of its national project "Data Economy and Digital Transformation of the State" for 2025-2030 (Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media, accessed September 23).
Bureau 1440 conducted tests of satellite prototypes before the Rassvet-3 launches. On June 27, 2023, three test satellites were launched as part of the Rassvet-1 mission as secondary payloads during the launch of the Meteor-M #2-3 satellite from the Vostochnyi Cosmodrome in Amur oblast aboard a Soyuz-2.1 b launch vehicle. On May 17, 2024, three satellites of the second experimental Rassvet-2 mission were launched to conduct flight tests of devices and components. The Bureau 1440 satellites were launched from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk oblast aboard a Soyuz-2.1 b rocket. Following the tests, Bureau 1440 reported that the first 16 Rassvet-3 serial satellites of the eventual Rassvet constellation were launched on March 23 from Plesetsk aboard a Soyuz-2.1 b launch vehicle (TASS, July 20).
On June 18, 2025, Roscosmos Head Dmitrii Bakanov announced that the Rassvet constellation would comprise 350 satellites in the first phase, and approximately 900 in the second. He described the Rassvet project as Russia's answer to Starlink (TASS, July 20).
The main difference between Starlink and Rassvet will be a lack of direct compatibility with mobile devices. To increase throughput, the Rassvet-3 satellites operate in a different, higher-frequency wireless band and require a separate terminal (Techinsider.ru, September 4). Its advantage is direct communication between a smartphone and a satellite, without a ground satellite terminal.
Until February, the Russian military used contraband Starlink antennas. At the Ukrainian government's request, Starlink unilaterally deactivated the devices. On February 4, Z-Bloggers reported that Starlink satellite communication terminals were shut down en masse at the front (Meduza, February 6). The shutdown occurred when the Russian military had begun to massively and effectively utilize Starlink for drone strikes on the Ukrainian army rear echelons. In the first two years of Russia's "special military operation" (SVO), the Ukrainian military created an extensive communication and control system based on thousands of Starlink antennas donated by SpaceX (see EDM, February 10, June 4). It included information exchange networks, command and control of troops and, starting in 2023, a control system for long-range sea and air drones.
To counter its loss of Starlink access on March 19, Bureau 1440 announced the launch of its first 16 Rassvet-3 satellites into orbit to deploy an indigenous satellite communications system. Beyond its immediate military use, the Rassvet satellite constellation will eventually become the foundation of a domestic global broadband internet access network.
Full deployment will not be easy. Since the 1991 implosion of the Soviet Union, Russia's entire satellite manufacturing sector has produced just a few dozen spacecraft per year. Former Head of Russia's Roscosmos space agency Iuri Borisov said, "It turned out we were not ready for this" (Ars Technica, September 2).
Satellite Internet has quickly become one of the most crucial communications tools in Russia's SVO, utilized by troops from both sides. Russia was determined to use Starlink terminals to relay signals to its attack drones, allowing them to bypass typical jamming measures and receive instructions at extended range. The loss of these terminals propelled development of an indigenous alternative (see EDM, June 10).
Two years ago, Bureau 1440's satellite internet service was projected to cost approximately $5.28 billion (445 billion rubles), according to a preliminary version of the "Internet Access Infrastructure" project, part of the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media "Data Economy and Digital Transformation of the State" program. By the end of 2030, the Bureau 1440 constellation is expected to consist of 292 satellites, with a total of 383 satellites planned for launch (RBC, September 16, 2024).
Rassvet-3 will orbit one and a half times higher than Starlink, whose typical orbits are at an altitude of 342 miles (550 kilometers). This reduces the signal strength somewhat, but allows for coverage of the entire sky with a significantly smaller number of satellites--not thousands, as Elon Musk has proposed for his SpaceX projects, only hundreds (Meduza, June 30).
Promoting Rassvet's technology, on June 12, Russian President Vladimir Putin, during a meeting with military personnel participating in the war against Ukraine, commented that the Bureau 1440 Rassvet project was "in no way inferior to Starlink, and perhaps even superior in some ways" (President of Russia, June 12).
In early September, ICS Holding LLC CEO and co-founder and head of Bureau 1440 Aleksei Shelobkov discussed the Rassvet program on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF). He stated that in 2026, the project moved from the research stage to service testing, as the Rassvet team began initial tests with consumers in various regions of the country, adding, "The point is not whether Starlink is the answer; the point is that it is a key technology in communications ... We are talking about Russia creating its own satellite constellation ... In accordance with our plans, we are not only conducting our own internal tests, but have also begun the first tests with our customers, even ahead of schedule" (Vesti, September 3).
Bureau 1440 is now receiving funding from the Russian state budget to deploy the group as part of the federal "Data Economy and Digital Transformation of the State" project for 2025-2030 (Kodifikatskiia.ru, September 19). The initiative's includes a section on the "Creation of a low-orbit satellite constellation to provide high-speed Internet access throughout Russia, including on mobile devices." According to the document, $5.13 billion (431.9 billion rubles) is to be spent on this task by 2030, $3.92 billion (329 billion rubles) of which will come from Bureau 1440 itself.
Despite the system's ongoing problems, Ukrainian officials closely followed its deployment. Ukraine's Defense Intelligence (DIU) Chief Oleh Ivashchenko commented, "We know that the Russians are trying to launch satellites into orbit. But so far, there are not enough of them, and their effectiveness is low." (Ukrinform, September 7). On August 11, an advisor to Ukraine's minister of defense, Serhiy Beskrestnov, said Rassvet would create problems for Ukrainian troops (Profile.ru, August 29).
A Ukrainian television channel citing military sources reported that Western media reports about the low effectiveness of Russian Rassvet satellites are untrue. A source in the Ukrainian General Staff claimed that after the launch of the Rassvet satellites, Russian strikes became more accurate, as the Russian military gained additional capabilities to monitor equipment movements and identify Ukrainian military depots (Moskovskii Komsomolets, September 7).
According to satellite communications expert Vladimir Stepanets, Rassvet satellites are already effective. He observed, "We see that in fact a chain with good coverage has already been formed, which provides such good coverage about twice a day, but in fact there are more such arrivals, that is, several such chains can fly with coverage of certain regions about once every hour and a half. But the important thing is that these satellites already provide fairly dense coverage" (Militarny, July 31).
According to its projections, Bureau 1440 needs to launch another 125 spacecraft into low orbit by the end of the year, bringing the total to 156 Rassvet-3 satellites in orbit. This will require eight launches. If all goes according to plan, by the end of 2027, the Rassvet-3 constellation should number 292 active satellites delivered by 17 launches, and by the end of 2028, 318. By 2030, the total number of launched Rassvet satellites should be 383 from 24 launches, with 91 reserve satellites to replace those that have left service. Rassvet will operate 292 working satellites in continuous orbit (Comnews.ru, August 4).
Ukraine is attempting to blunt the Rassvet program, from diplomatic initiatives to military strikes. In a preemptive move, Ukraine's UN mission on August 29 officially appealed to the UN International Telecommunication Union (ITU), requesting that Ukraine's territory be excluded from the declared service areas of Rassvet's military satellite constellation coverage beams across all frequency bands (EurAsia Daily, August 29). The ITU allocates radio spectrum, maintains international registration of frequency assignments and satellite network parameters, and organizes technical coordination to prevent harmful radio interference. Seeking to broaden the requested ban, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrei Sibiga called on partners to take "all possible steps to block Rassvet's functioning not only over the sovereign territory of Ukraine, but also over the sovereign territories of other countries" (Kyiv Post, August 29).
Ukraine has extended its military attacks to include factories that produce the rockets used to lift satellites into orbit. Since 2022, Russia has carried out 84 launches into space: 71 using Soyuz-2, nine on Angara launch vehicles, and four on Proton rockets (Defense Express, August 19). Beyond launching satellites, the Soyuz-2 is the only launch vehicle in the Russian Federation that can deliver people into orbit, making it critical to resupplying the International Space Station (ISS).
Ukraine's two FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles struck the Progress Rocket Space Center in Samara on August 15, hitting the factory that produces Soyuz-2 launch vehicles used to deploy Russian military satellites and the Rassvet network (Defense Express, August 15). Russia needs at least 18 Soyuz-2.1b launches to deploy the planned Rassvet-3 satellite constellation (United24 Media, August 15). If the strike disabled the plant's final assembly shop, Russia will face significant problems with subsequent Rassvet-3 constellation launches and manned ISS resupply missions (Defense Express, August 25). To reach the minimum 288 satellites needed for operational readiness, Russia will need to launch 18 Soyuz-2.1b missions, each carrying 16 Rassvet-3 satellites (Defense Express, August 13).
Bureau 1440 maintains that the Rassvet-3 constellation will reach full capacity in the mid-2030s, when 900 satellites will be in orbit (Pravda, September 10). This timetable is complicated by Ukrainian airstrikes against facilities and sites critical to Russia's satellite and space industry, which hinder Russia's ability to launch satellites and further delay Russia's goal to establish its Rassvet satellite network in the near-term, including for use on the battlefield in Ukraine.
Poland's state-run defense giant PGZ, in conjunction with Finnish space company ICEYE, has signed a letter of intent to develop a military satellite communications system. On September 9 at the Miedzynarodowy Salon Przemyslu Obronnego (MSPO) 34th International Defense Industry Exhibition in Kielce, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said, "The culmination of the process that began today can and will be a Polish Starlink. Anyone closely following the Russian-Ukrainian war knows how important communications are. It is absolutely critical. Without communications, you have nothing to look for on the modern battlefield" (Defense News, September 11).
Given Finland's and Poland's stalwart support for Ukraine's defensive efforts, future support will likely include sharing real-time data from the "Polish Starlink." Given Rassvet's deployment difficulties, the only certainty seems to be that its problems will continue as two of Russia's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) rivals develop a competing system.
* * *
Dr. John C. K. Daly is a Eurasian foreign affairs and defense policy expert for The Jamestown Foundation and a non-resident fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in Washington DC.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-trying-to-replace-starlink/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2026 - Recovery Under Structural Stress - Fiscal Policy on Slippery Ground
MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 24 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
* * *
24 September 2026
Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2026: Recovery under structural stress -fiscal policy on slippery ground
The German economy has been recovering since the end of 2025. This recovery, although stronger than expected in spring, remains modest. The leading economic research institutes expect GDP growth of 1.3% for the current year and 1.1% and 0.4% for the following two years, respectively. Compared with the spring forecast, the outlook for 2026 has been revised upward by 0.7 and that for 2027 by ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 24 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * 24 September 2026 Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2026: Recovery under structural stress -fiscal policy on slippery ground The German economy has been recovering since the end of 2025. This recovery, although stronger than expected in spring, remains modest. The leading economic research institutes expect GDP growth of 1.3% for the current year and 1.1% and 0.4% for the following two years, respectively. Compared with the spring forecast, the outlook for 2026 has been revised upward by 0.7 and that for 2027 by0.2 percentage points. "The economy has developed more robustly than expected. However, the recovery rests on a narrow foundation, as high energy prices and structural problems continue to weigh on economic activity," says Oliver Holtemoller, Head of Macroeconomic Forecasting at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). In the current quarter, low water levels are also temporarily dampening economic activity. The government deficit continues to increase, leading to a growing need for fiscal consolidation.
The German economy performed significantly better in the first half of 2026 than had been expected in spring. In particular, exports and value added in the manufacturing sector increased markedly. Growth was supported by a robust global economy and the worldwide AI boom, while competitors in the Gulf region suffered significant production disruptions as a result of the Iran war. Government consumption also expanded markedly. By contrast, business investment and private consumption remained weak. Although the energy price shock associated with the Iran war has weighed on the German economy, the higher prices for motor fuels and heating oil have so far had little spillover effect on broader consumer prices.
The recovery temporarily slowed in the third quarter. While sentiment indicators continue to improve, the latest hard economic data have come in weaker. In particular, the low water levels that have persisted since mid-July are hampering production in the chemical industry. At the same time, higher energy prices are weighing on purchasing power and, consequently, on private consumption. Real GDP is estimated to have increased by only 0.1% in the third quarter. As water levels return to normal, however, the production constraints are expected to ease from the fourth quarter onward. The recovery will then be supported by robust foreign demand and rising public expenditure on defense and infrastructure.
The institutes expect the recovery to continue in 2027, driven primarily by domestic demand. Private consumption is projected to increase moderately in line with real disposable incomes, while residential construction investment is expected to gradually recover. Overall, however, private investment activity is likely to remain subdued. In 2028, economic expansion is expected to lose momentum. The recovery will increasingly be constrained by structural factors: the labour force is shrinking due to demographic change, and potential growth continues to decline. As a result, even relatively low growth rates will in the future be sufficient to fully utilise the economy's productive capacity.
Overall, the institutes forecast real GDP growth of 1.3% in 2026, 1.1% in 2027, and 0.4% in 2028. Compared with the spring forecast, the projection for 2026 has been revised upward by 0.7 percentage points and that for 2027 by 0.2 percentage points. Inflation is expected to increase from 2.8% this year to 3.2% in 2027 before easing to 2.0% in 2028. The labour market is likely to respond only with a lag: employment is expected to decline further for the time being, while the unemployment rate falls from 6.4% in 2026 to 6.2% in 2027 and 5.8% in 2028.
The institutes see a growing need for action in fiscal policy. The general government budget deficit is projected to increase from 4.1% of GDP in the current year to 4.7% in 2028. Growth in net primary expenditure is expected to exceed significantly the path envisaged under the European fiscal framework. Even if the reformed national debt brake is complied with, the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to continue rising over the medium term; moreover, interest expenditure is set to increase substantially. As a result, the need for fiscal consolidation is growing.
[View table in the link at bottom.]
Economic Forecast
Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2026 (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-09-24/joint-economic-forecast-autumn-2026-recovery-under-structural-stress-fiscal-policy)
* * *
Appendix
Full-length version of the report (in German)
Joint Economic Forecast Project Group: Aufschwung mit Strukturproblemen - Finanzpolitik auf Abwegen. Autumn 2026. Halle (Saale) 2026.
The full-length version of the report will be available on 24 September 2026 at 10:00 a.m. at www.gemeinschaftsdiagnose.de/category/gutachten/
* * *
About the Joint Economic Forecast
The Joint Economic Forecast is published twice a year on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. The following institutes participated in the autumn report 2026:
* German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
* ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in cooperation with Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) Vienna
* Kiel Institute for the World Economy
* Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association
* RWI - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research
Scientific contacts
Professor Dr Oliver Holtemoller
Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association
Phone +49 345 7753 800
Oliver.Holtemoeller@iwh-halle.de
-
Dr Geraldine Dany-Knedlik
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
Phone +49 30 89789 486
GDanyknedlik@diw.de
-
Professor Dr Stefan Kooths
Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Phone +49 431 8814 579 or +49 30 2067 9664
Stefan.Kooths@kielinstitut.de
-
Professor Dr Torsten Schmidt
RWI - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research
Phone +49 201 8149 287
Torsten.Schmidt@rwi-essen.de
-
Professor Dr Timo Wollmershauser
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
Phone +49 89 9224 1406
Wollmershaeuser@ifo.de
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-09-24/joint-economic-forecast-autumn-2026-recovery-under-structural-stress
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
24 September 2026
Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2026: Recovery under structural stress -fiscal policy on slippery ground
The German economy has been recovering since the end of 2025. This recovery, although stronger than expected in spring, remains modest. The leading economic research institutes expect GDP growth of 1.3% for the current year and 1.1% and 0.4% for the following two years, respectively. Compared with the spring forecast, the outlook for 2026 has been revised upward by 0.7 and that for 2027 by ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 24 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * 24 September 2026 Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2026: Recovery under structural stress -fiscal policy on slippery ground The German economy has been recovering since the end of 2025. This recovery, although stronger than expected in spring, remains modest. The leading economic research institutes expect GDP growth of 1.3% for the current year and 1.1% and 0.4% for the following two years, respectively. Compared with the spring forecast, the outlook for 2026 has been revised upward by 0.7 and that for 2027 by0.2 percentage points. "The economy has developed more robustly than expected. However, the recovery rests on a narrow foundation, as high energy prices and structural problems continue to weigh on economic activity," says Oliver Holtemoller, Head of Macroeconomic Forecasting at the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). In the current quarter, low water levels are also temporarily dampening economic activity. The government deficit continues to increase, leading to a growing need for fiscal consolidation.
The German economy performed significantly better in the first half of 2026 than had been expected in spring. In particular, exports and value added in the manufacturing sector increased markedly. Growth was supported by a robust global economy and the worldwide AI boom, while competitors in the Gulf region suffered significant production disruptions as a result of the Iran war. Government consumption also expanded markedly. By contrast, business investment and private consumption remained weak. Although the energy price shock associated with the Iran war has weighed on the German economy, the higher prices for motor fuels and heating oil have so far had little spillover effect on broader consumer prices.
The recovery temporarily slowed in the third quarter. While sentiment indicators continue to improve, the latest hard economic data have come in weaker. In particular, the low water levels that have persisted since mid-July are hampering production in the chemical industry. At the same time, higher energy prices are weighing on purchasing power and, consequently, on private consumption. Real GDP is estimated to have increased by only 0.1% in the third quarter. As water levels return to normal, however, the production constraints are expected to ease from the fourth quarter onward. The recovery will then be supported by robust foreign demand and rising public expenditure on defense and infrastructure.
The institutes expect the recovery to continue in 2027, driven primarily by domestic demand. Private consumption is projected to increase moderately in line with real disposable incomes, while residential construction investment is expected to gradually recover. Overall, however, private investment activity is likely to remain subdued. In 2028, economic expansion is expected to lose momentum. The recovery will increasingly be constrained by structural factors: the labour force is shrinking due to demographic change, and potential growth continues to decline. As a result, even relatively low growth rates will in the future be sufficient to fully utilise the economy's productive capacity.
Overall, the institutes forecast real GDP growth of 1.3% in 2026, 1.1% in 2027, and 0.4% in 2028. Compared with the spring forecast, the projection for 2026 has been revised upward by 0.7 percentage points and that for 2027 by 0.2 percentage points. Inflation is expected to increase from 2.8% this year to 3.2% in 2027 before easing to 2.0% in 2028. The labour market is likely to respond only with a lag: employment is expected to decline further for the time being, while the unemployment rate falls from 6.4% in 2026 to 6.2% in 2027 and 5.8% in 2028.
The institutes see a growing need for action in fiscal policy. The general government budget deficit is projected to increase from 4.1% of GDP in the current year to 4.7% in 2028. Growth in net primary expenditure is expected to exceed significantly the path envisaged under the European fiscal framework. Even if the reformed national debt brake is complied with, the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to continue rising over the medium term; moreover, interest expenditure is set to increase substantially. As a result, the need for fiscal consolidation is growing.
[View table in the link at bottom.]
Economic Forecast
Joint Economic Forecast Autumn 2026 (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-09-24/joint-economic-forecast-autumn-2026-recovery-under-structural-stress-fiscal-policy)
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Appendix
Full-length version of the report (in German)
Joint Economic Forecast Project Group: Aufschwung mit Strukturproblemen - Finanzpolitik auf Abwegen. Autumn 2026. Halle (Saale) 2026.
The full-length version of the report will be available on 24 September 2026 at 10:00 a.m. at www.gemeinschaftsdiagnose.de/category/gutachten/
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About the Joint Economic Forecast
The Joint Economic Forecast is published twice a year on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. The following institutes participated in the autumn report 2026:
* German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
* ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in cooperation with Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) Vienna
* Kiel Institute for the World Economy
* Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association
* RWI - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research
Scientific contacts
Professor Dr Oliver Holtemoller
Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association
Phone +49 345 7753 800
Oliver.Holtemoeller@iwh-halle.de
-
Dr Geraldine Dany-Knedlik
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)
Phone +49 30 89789 486
GDanyknedlik@diw.de
-
Professor Dr Stefan Kooths
Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Phone +49 431 8814 579 or +49 30 2067 9664
Stefan.Kooths@kielinstitut.de
-
Professor Dr Torsten Schmidt
RWI - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research
Phone +49 201 8149 287
Torsten.Schmidt@rwi-essen.de
-
Professor Dr Timo Wollmershauser
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
Phone +49 89 9224 1406
Wollmershaeuser@ifo.de
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-09-24/joint-economic-forecast-autumn-2026-recovery-under-structural-stress
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Digitalization Poses a Health Risk Outside Traditional Office Jobs
MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 24 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
* * *
23 September 2026
Digitalization Poses a Health Risk Outside Traditional Office Jobs
Greater workplace digitalization is associated with poorer health and more sick days among employees whose jobs primarily involve physical tasks. This is the finding of a new study by the ifo Institute, the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), and the University of Konstanz. "As their workplaces become more digitalized, employees outside typical office jobs report reduced well-being and more sickness absences," says Oliver ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 24 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * 23 September 2026 Digitalization Poses a Health Risk Outside Traditional Office Jobs Greater workplace digitalization is associated with poorer health and more sick days among employees whose jobs primarily involve physical tasks. This is the finding of a new study by the ifo Institute, the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), and the University of Konstanz. "As their workplaces become more digitalized, employees outside typical office jobs report reduced well-being and more sickness absences," says OliverSchlenker, Deputy Director of the Ludwig Erhard ifo Center for Social Market Economy in Furth. "Our findings suggest that the digital transformation could exacerbate existing health inequalities."
The study compares two groups: employees whose jobs primarily involve physical tasks and employees with a predominantly cognitive or office-based task profile. As digitalization - meaning the use of intelligently connected software and hardware, which also includes AI - advances, both groups experience similar changes in their workplace: Tasks become more complex, while time and performance pressure increase. Nevertheless, only employees in predominantly manual workplaces report that their health has significantly deteriorated. On average, they report around 20 percent more sick days per year when their workplaces become more digitalized. By contrast, the study finds no detectable adverse relationship among office and knowledge-based occupations. Digitalization could therefore exacerbate existing health inequalities, since employees who perform predominantly physical work and have lower levels of formal education already tend to face greater health burden. "One possible explanation is technostress: New digital demands can be particularly stressful when employees lack the necessary skills and experience," says Schlenker.
Targeted digital training and support from employers appear to mitigate this relationship. Affected workers who participate in training show almost no deterioration in health and no additional sickness absence days. A supportive leadership culture also seems to ease the burden. Employees who feel well supported by their superiors have considerably fewer additional sick days as their workplaces become more digitalized. At the same time, the researchers find no evidence that wage increases offset the adverse health outcomes.
The study draws a clear distinction between digitalization and conventional computerization. While computers and standard software have long been part of everyday working life for many employees, digitalization in this context refers primarily to smart technology. That includes connected machines, sensors, big data applications, robotics, artificial intelligence, or virtual and augmented reality.
For their analysis, the researchers use representative surveys of establishments and employees on the use of digital technologies, together with administrative social security data covering 2011 to 2019. The study measures health in two ways. First, respondents rate their own health on a scale of 0 to 10. Second, respondents report the number of sickness absence days in the year prior to the survey. Other factors, such as age, income, education, prior health status, personality, sector, occupation, and company characteristics, are taken into account in the analysis.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-09-23/digitalization-poses-health-risk-outside-traditional-office-jobs
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
23 September 2026
Digitalization Poses a Health Risk Outside Traditional Office Jobs
Greater workplace digitalization is associated with poorer health and more sick days among employees whose jobs primarily involve physical tasks. This is the finding of a new study by the ifo Institute, the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), and the University of Konstanz. "As their workplaces become more digitalized, employees outside typical office jobs report reduced well-being and more sickness absences," says Oliver ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 24 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * 23 September 2026 Digitalization Poses a Health Risk Outside Traditional Office Jobs Greater workplace digitalization is associated with poorer health and more sick days among employees whose jobs primarily involve physical tasks. This is the finding of a new study by the ifo Institute, the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), and the University of Konstanz. "As their workplaces become more digitalized, employees outside typical office jobs report reduced well-being and more sickness absences," says OliverSchlenker, Deputy Director of the Ludwig Erhard ifo Center for Social Market Economy in Furth. "Our findings suggest that the digital transformation could exacerbate existing health inequalities."
The study compares two groups: employees whose jobs primarily involve physical tasks and employees with a predominantly cognitive or office-based task profile. As digitalization - meaning the use of intelligently connected software and hardware, which also includes AI - advances, both groups experience similar changes in their workplace: Tasks become more complex, while time and performance pressure increase. Nevertheless, only employees in predominantly manual workplaces report that their health has significantly deteriorated. On average, they report around 20 percent more sick days per year when their workplaces become more digitalized. By contrast, the study finds no detectable adverse relationship among office and knowledge-based occupations. Digitalization could therefore exacerbate existing health inequalities, since employees who perform predominantly physical work and have lower levels of formal education already tend to face greater health burden. "One possible explanation is technostress: New digital demands can be particularly stressful when employees lack the necessary skills and experience," says Schlenker.
Targeted digital training and support from employers appear to mitigate this relationship. Affected workers who participate in training show almost no deterioration in health and no additional sickness absence days. A supportive leadership culture also seems to ease the burden. Employees who feel well supported by their superiors have considerably fewer additional sick days as their workplaces become more digitalized. At the same time, the researchers find no evidence that wage increases offset the adverse health outcomes.
The study draws a clear distinction between digitalization and conventional computerization. While computers and standard software have long been part of everyday working life for many employees, digitalization in this context refers primarily to smart technology. That includes connected machines, sensors, big data applications, robotics, artificial intelligence, or virtual and augmented reality.
For their analysis, the researchers use representative surveys of establishments and employees on the use of digital technologies, together with administrative social security data covering 2011 to 2019. The study measures health in two ways. First, respondents rate their own health on a scale of 0 to 10. Second, respondents report the number of sickness absence days in the year prior to the survey. Other factors, such as age, income, education, prior health status, personality, sector, occupation, and company characteristics, are taken into account in the analysis.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-09-23/digitalization-poses-health-risk-outside-traditional-office-jobs
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Report Entitled 'Enemies of Energy - U.S. Energy Foundation'
WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following excerpts of a report:
* * *
Enemies of Energy: U.S. Energy Foundation
The U.S. Energy Foundation's 2024 grants to anti-energy NGOs was at least $11.4 million.
by Ken Braun
September 23, 2026
Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center. The page for the full report is here: Enemies of Energy.
-
Donor type: pass-through grant maker
Until 2020, what is now known as "Energy Foundation China" and the United States Energy Foundation were the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following excerpts of a report: * * * Enemies of Energy: U.S. Energy Foundation The U.S. Energy Foundation's 2024 grants to anti-energy NGOs was at least $11.4 million. by Ken Braun September 23, 2026 Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center. The page for the full report is here: Enemies of Energy. - Donor type: pass-through grant maker Until 2020, what is now known as "Energy Foundation China" and the United States Energy Foundation were thesame grantmaking foundation, known as simply the "Energy Foundation." When they split in 2020, the Energy Foundation (EIN: 94-3126848) began doing business as Energy Foundation China and thus retained the original EIN. The 2020 IRS filings from both foundations show a transfer of $57.7 million from Energy Foundation China to the newly formed U.S. Energy Foundation (EIN: 83-1740146).[i]
The IRS filing from the U.S. Energy Foundation covering 2024 shows $261.4 million in total revenue collected and $166.3 million paid out in grants--or 64 percent of total revenue. The grants included a cumulative $8.7 million sent to ten of the fifteen anti-energy nonprofits profiled in this report. In addition, the report shows grants totaling more than $2.7 million in 2024 for nine state affiliates of the League of Conservation voters.[ii]
* League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $1.2 million
* LCV state groups: $2.7 million total
- North Carolina League of Conservation Voters Foundation: $650,000
- Georgia Conservation Voters (GCV) Education Fund: $630,000
- Virginia League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $460,000
- Conservation Voters of South Carolina Education Fund: $377,500
- Maryland League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $183,000
- Michigan League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $171,500
- New Jersey League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $150,000
- Conservation Voters New Mexico Education Fund: $65,000
- Oregon League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $40,000
* Natural Resources Defense Council: $2.1 million
* Rocky Mountain Institute: $1.6 million
* Sierra Club Foundation: $1.6 million
* Environmental Defense Fund: $983,958
* Union of Concerned Scientists: $550,000
* Center for Biological Diversity: $245,005
* World Wildlife Fund: $125,000
* World Resources Institute: $125,000
* GRID Alternatives: $70,000
The U.S. Energy Foundation's combined total 2024 grants to the anti-energy NGOs and donors to same profiled in this report was $11.4 million.[iii]
PDF hyperlink to full report (https://capitalresearch.org/app/uploads/FINAL-PDF_CRC_EnemiesofEnergy.pdf)
* * *
Endnotes
[i] The Energy Foundation (EIN: 94-3126848). 2020 IRS Form 990. Accessed March 31, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/943126848/202113199349330331/full
United States Energy Foundation (EIN: 83-1740146). 2020 IRS Form 990. Accessed March 31, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/831740146/202133149349306568/full
The Energy Foundation (EIN: 94-3126848). ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed March 31, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/943126848
United States Energy Foundation (EIN: 83-1740146). ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed March 31, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/831740146
[ii] United States Energy Foundation (EIN: 83-1740146). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 6, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/831740146/202542839349301689/full
[iii] United States Energy Foundation (EIN: 83-1740146). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 6, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/831740146/202542839349301689/full
* * *
Ken Braun
As managing editor and director of content of CRC, Ken Braun edits Capital Research magazine. He also conducts investigative research and drafts profiles for InfluenceWatch.org.
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/enemies-of-energy-u-s-energy-foundation/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Enemies of Energy: U.S. Energy Foundation
The U.S. Energy Foundation's 2024 grants to anti-energy NGOs was at least $11.4 million.
by Ken Braun
September 23, 2026
Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center. The page for the full report is here: Enemies of Energy.
-
Donor type: pass-through grant maker
Until 2020, what is now known as "Energy Foundation China" and the United States Energy Foundation were the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following excerpts of a report: * * * Enemies of Energy: U.S. Energy Foundation The U.S. Energy Foundation's 2024 grants to anti-energy NGOs was at least $11.4 million. by Ken Braun September 23, 2026 Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center. The page for the full report is here: Enemies of Energy. - Donor type: pass-through grant maker Until 2020, what is now known as "Energy Foundation China" and the United States Energy Foundation were thesame grantmaking foundation, known as simply the "Energy Foundation." When they split in 2020, the Energy Foundation (EIN: 94-3126848) began doing business as Energy Foundation China and thus retained the original EIN. The 2020 IRS filings from both foundations show a transfer of $57.7 million from Energy Foundation China to the newly formed U.S. Energy Foundation (EIN: 83-1740146).[i]
The IRS filing from the U.S. Energy Foundation covering 2024 shows $261.4 million in total revenue collected and $166.3 million paid out in grants--or 64 percent of total revenue. The grants included a cumulative $8.7 million sent to ten of the fifteen anti-energy nonprofits profiled in this report. In addition, the report shows grants totaling more than $2.7 million in 2024 for nine state affiliates of the League of Conservation voters.[ii]
* League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $1.2 million
* LCV state groups: $2.7 million total
- North Carolina League of Conservation Voters Foundation: $650,000
- Georgia Conservation Voters (GCV) Education Fund: $630,000
- Virginia League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $460,000
- Conservation Voters of South Carolina Education Fund: $377,500
- Maryland League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $183,000
- Michigan League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $171,500
- New Jersey League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $150,000
- Conservation Voters New Mexico Education Fund: $65,000
- Oregon League of Conservation Voters Education Fund: $40,000
* Natural Resources Defense Council: $2.1 million
* Rocky Mountain Institute: $1.6 million
* Sierra Club Foundation: $1.6 million
* Environmental Defense Fund: $983,958
* Union of Concerned Scientists: $550,000
* Center for Biological Diversity: $245,005
* World Wildlife Fund: $125,000
* World Resources Institute: $125,000
* GRID Alternatives: $70,000
The U.S. Energy Foundation's combined total 2024 grants to the anti-energy NGOs and donors to same profiled in this report was $11.4 million.[iii]
PDF hyperlink to full report (https://capitalresearch.org/app/uploads/FINAL-PDF_CRC_EnemiesofEnergy.pdf)
* * *
Endnotes
[i] The Energy Foundation (EIN: 94-3126848). 2020 IRS Form 990. Accessed March 31, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/943126848/202113199349330331/full
United States Energy Foundation (EIN: 83-1740146). 2020 IRS Form 990. Accessed March 31, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/831740146/202133149349306568/full
The Energy Foundation (EIN: 94-3126848). ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed March 31, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/943126848
United States Energy Foundation (EIN: 83-1740146). ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed March 31, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/831740146
[ii] United States Energy Foundation (EIN: 83-1740146). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 6, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/831740146/202542839349301689/full
[iii] United States Energy Foundation (EIN: 83-1740146). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 6, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/831740146/202542839349301689/full
* * *
Ken Braun
As managing editor and director of content of CRC, Ken Braun edits Capital Research magazine. He also conducts investigative research and drafts profiles for InfluenceWatch.org.
* * *
Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/enemies-of-energy-u-s-energy-foundation/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Kim's Second Byungjin - 21 Years After the Six-Party Talks Agreement
WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
Kim's Second Byungjin: 21 Years After the Six-Party Talks Agreement
Commentary by Sydney Seiler
September 23, 2026
It has been 21 years since the six parties with the deepest interest in the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula concluded the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks in 2005. In exchange for North Korea's commitment to denuclearization, the other five parties agreed to provide security assurances, diplomatic recognition, and energy and economic assistance ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Kim's Second Byungjin: 21 Years After the Six-Party Talks Agreement Commentary by Sydney Seiler September 23, 2026 It has been 21 years since the six parties with the deepest interest in the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula concluded the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks in 2005. In exchange for North Korea's commitment to denuclearization, the other five parties agreed to provide security assurances, diplomatic recognition, and energy and economic assistancein an incremental, action-for-action manner. The agreement was less than perfect, glaringly so in its silence on North Korea's uranium enrichment program, but disablement actions such as the destruction of the iconic cooling tower at Yongbyon's graphite-moderated reactor gave hope that a viable path to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula existed. The agreement and the subsequent documents outlining first- and second-phase actions also allowed Pyongyang to probe what benefits it would receive for moving down that path.
Momentum was lost, unfortunately, in 2008, as it became increasingly evident that there could be no authentic and credible talks without North Korea's uranium enrichment program, which Pyongyang omitted from the declaration it submitted to the Six-Party Talks in June 2008. Its determination not to address the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program showed in its refusal to grant the verification measures necessary to understand and eventually dismantle it. Privately, on the sidelines of the talks, North Korean diplomats told U.S. officials that denuclearization would no longer be a legitimate diplomatic topic for negotiation. Efforts by the Obama administration to nudge Pyongyang back to the Six-Party Talks while advancing U.S.-North Korea relations were rebuffed, and from 2012 onward North Korea has consistently refused meaningful dialogue on its nuclear program.
Nevertheless, the September 19 Joint Statement retains enduring value for three main reasons:
1. It provides a fundamental framework for an incremental, step-by-step approach to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
2. It provides a framework for compensating North Korea's denuclearization steps with security assurances, economic and energy aid and assistance, and normalization of relations among all the member states
3. It demonstrates, as did the Leap Day Understanding of 2012 and the progress made and then lost in U.S.-North Korea summitry in 2018-2019, that North Korea's entire uranium enrichment program must be on the table. There can be no authentic and credible discussion of denuclearization, arms control, or even peace so long as North Korea robustly and unabatedly expands its inventory of weapons-usable nuclear material through undeclared uranium enrichment.
Implications for Today
In the broadest sense, North Korea's walking away from the Six-Party Talks and from its commitments under the Joint Statement in late 2008 was a clear proclamation of its lack of interest in denuclearization and, by extension, in any conciliatory, non-confrontational relationship with the United States. The "action statements" of February and October 2007 laid out agreed denuclearization steps by North Korea, the economic and energy assistance North Korea would receive, and expedited paths toward normalization of U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations. They demonstrated both the practicality and the proportionality of denuclearization-driven diplomacy. These reciprocal, step-by-step actions were built to address real North Korean needs, build confidence, and show Pyongyang an alternative path to peace and prosperity through denuclearization. Normalized relations, reduced tensions, economic aid and assistance, and even security guarantees were not enough to keep Pyongyang interested in the process. That is most likely to remain the case going forward, whether the goal is complete denuclearization, a mere halt to the program, or something in between.
That is in part why arguing for a "peace first" approach is met with skepticism today. A peace-first approach might reduce tensions and create an environment in which incremental reductions in the North Korean nuclear threat become possible, but it has been tried repeatedly. Implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement rested on a step-by-step approach that front-loaded numerous benefits for North Korea. In walking away from the Six-Party Talks beginning in 2008, Pyongyang rejected that approach. It has since passed up opportunities to make serious progress toward normalization with the United States under three different presidents (Obama, Trump, and Biden), each of whom front loaded benefits North Korea would enjoy while recognizing that the heavy lifting of complete and verifiable denuclearization would take time. Pyongyang has simply been uninterested in exploring what a better relationship with the United States, or with South Korea for that matter, might yield in security, economic, and diplomatic benefits.
Kim's Second Byungjin
What is Kim Jong-un seeking at this time? Since late 2017, when the November launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile was messaged as having "completed the state's nuclear force," North Korean rhetoric and behavior have pointed toward a diplomacy that locks in international acceptance of North Korea as a "responsible nuclear power" and moves beyond sanctions and pressure. Just as Pyongyang confidently proclaimed in 2013 that it would pursue "byungjin" (simultaneous development of both nuclear and economic development), it could now be said to be pursuing a "second byungjin" that advances its nuclear program while also seeking to normalize relations with countries willing to tolerate (if not necessarily accept) North Korea as a nuclear power. Pyongyang believes it can have both, which complicates any peace-first approach that purports to slow the growth of the North Korean threat.
North Korea remains committed to securing nuclear and conventional forces that clearly establish its dominance over South Korea. That shows both in its openly aggressive rhetoric aimed at Seoul over the past few years and in its development of capabilities messaged as a first-strike option against South Korea with tactical nuclear weapons. In the context of the repeated authoritative North Korean statements warning of continued qualitative and quantitative growth of its nuclear force as well as Pyongyang's actions, there is little room for optimism that Kim would consider ways to reduce or limit the size of his arsenal, create mechanisms for crisis management or trust building, or seek rapprochement with South Korea.
Can Kim and Trump Meet Halfway?
Kim Jong-un most likely believes there is value in diplomacy with the United States that falls short of a formal proclamation by Washington that denuclearization is no longer a goal. When the time is right, Pyongyang can easily drop or suspend its requirement that the United States cease insisting on denuclearization. Washington has comparable flexibility: The State Department can continue to assert that denuclearization is the goal, the president can avoid language that would antagonize Kim, and the two leaders can meet in the spirit of advancing peace in a dangerous region. Pyongyang has at times stated that it needs no one's "recognition" of an established reality. The benefits of securing a meeting with President Trump could be seen as more valuable than dogmatic adherence to its goal of locking in some nuclear power title.
The president could take an approach that troubles both his supporters and his detractors, perhaps a sign he is on the right track. Advocates of a "realistic" acknowledgment of North Korea as a "nuclear power" and of abandoning the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) formulation greatly overestimate the value to Pyongyang of such a statement, particularly measured against the harm it would do to the United States' North Korea policy and to U.S. cooperation with allies such as South Korea. Equally wrong is the worry that all hope for denuclearization vanishes with any meeting between the two leaders in which denuclearization takes a back seat to relationship building and broad-brush discussion of the need for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Given the cards he has been dealt, dealt not by his predecessors but by Pyongyang, there is value in President Trump's current approach to North Korea, both in his pursuit of summit-level dialogue with Kim Jong-un and in the cautious pace he has set in the face of Pyongyang's absolute rejection of U.S. overtures. There seems to be more intentionality and pragmatism in play than critics of the president's outreach acknowledge. That said, defenders of his approach outside the administration have not made a compelling case that the potential gain from a Trump-Kim summit would be worth the risk. The temptation to point fingers at the efforts of previous administrations for failing to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue sooner must be resisted. Lessons from past summits, including from Singapore and Hanoi, should be discussed in a more objective and non-political manner. A more sophisticated discussion may be worth considering related to reinvigorating pressure on North Korea from China and Russia, since both have greater interests with the United States that might incentivize a cooperative approach, in spite of setbacks in such efforts over the past decade.
Pyongyang Said It Plainly in 2009
As the Six-Party Talks collapsed in the final months of 2008, the North Korean Foreign Ministry stated on January 17, 2009, days before President Obama's inauguration:
"This is a revelation of the true colors of the U.S. as a big power which regards the normalization of the relations as a gift to the DPRK and a distortion of the essence of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is miscalculating if it considers the normalization of the DPRK-U.S. relations as a reward for the DPRK's nuclear abandonment. It is the reality on the Korean Peninsula that we can live without normalizing the relations with the U.S. but not without nuclear deterrent. We have lived for decades without normalizing the relations with the U.S. and live on still with dignity."
Two key points are worth considering. First, nothing has changed in regard to North Korea's posture toward the United States. Second, from the U.S. perspective, the inextricable ties between North Korea's nuclear capability and instability on the Korean Peninsula make it impossible to find a path to U.S.-North Korea detente or inter-Korean reconciliation independent of the nuclear issue. Rhetoric emphasizing CVID is not an affront to Pyongyang or a maximalist and unnecessary obstacle complicating efforts to engage, reduce tension and threat, and achieve peace. The logic behind the United States' insistence that authentic and credible progress on denuclearization be achieved for peace to be promoted is unchanged. The problem is that the two sides' fundamental goals are antithetical and irreconcilable: Pyongyang intends to build a nuclear arsenal capable of decisively dominating and subjugating South Korea, and the United States pursues denuclearization, peace, and prosperity for the whole Korean Peninsula.
The Good News: Deterrence Is Working
Recent rhetoric from Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing shares a common theme: growing concern about and anger toward the U.S. military presence and U.S. actions in the region, closer U.S.-South Korea coordination on nuclear issues within the Nuclear Consultative Group, the remilitarization of Japan, and trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation. That is encouraging. Concern in these three capitals contradicts premature proclamations of the United States' demise in East Asia. It reflects frustration and fear that efforts by China, Russia, and North Korea to dominate their respective spheres are not working, particularly North Korea's costly efforts to intimidate and subjugate South Korea. The strengthening of U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation, driven in large part by the surge in North Korea's nuclear and missile threat over the past few years, has negative implications for China's security and intentions vis-a-vis Taiwan. Russia has long been concerned about how North Korea's actions sustain a Northeast Asian demand signal for U.S. military presence.
All that said, it is difficult to deny that, through no fault of their own, neither President Obama nor President Biden was an attractive dialogue partner for Kim. President Trump is uniquely positioned to engage Kim with sufficient credibility, even if such talks yield limited fruit. His cards are not the greatest, but he seems to know it. Whatever the outcome, the United States would do well to remind both China and Russia that North Korean behavior damages their national interests and will continue to do so until the three parties can cooperate once again, as during the Six-Party Talks, to lead North Korea down a different path than the one it has been on.
* * *
Sydney Seiler is a non-resident senior adviser with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this submission are the author's and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/kims-second-byungjin-21-years-after-six-party-talks-agreement
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Kim's Second Byungjin: 21 Years After the Six-Party Talks Agreement
Commentary by Sydney Seiler
September 23, 2026
It has been 21 years since the six parties with the deepest interest in the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula concluded the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks in 2005. In exchange for North Korea's commitment to denuclearization, the other five parties agreed to provide security assurances, diplomatic recognition, and energy and economic assistance ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Kim's Second Byungjin: 21 Years After the Six-Party Talks Agreement Commentary by Sydney Seiler September 23, 2026 It has been 21 years since the six parties with the deepest interest in the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula concluded the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks in 2005. In exchange for North Korea's commitment to denuclearization, the other five parties agreed to provide security assurances, diplomatic recognition, and energy and economic assistancein an incremental, action-for-action manner. The agreement was less than perfect, glaringly so in its silence on North Korea's uranium enrichment program, but disablement actions such as the destruction of the iconic cooling tower at Yongbyon's graphite-moderated reactor gave hope that a viable path to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula existed. The agreement and the subsequent documents outlining first- and second-phase actions also allowed Pyongyang to probe what benefits it would receive for moving down that path.
Momentum was lost, unfortunately, in 2008, as it became increasingly evident that there could be no authentic and credible talks without North Korea's uranium enrichment program, which Pyongyang omitted from the declaration it submitted to the Six-Party Talks in June 2008. Its determination not to address the highly enriched uranium (HEU) program showed in its refusal to grant the verification measures necessary to understand and eventually dismantle it. Privately, on the sidelines of the talks, North Korean diplomats told U.S. officials that denuclearization would no longer be a legitimate diplomatic topic for negotiation. Efforts by the Obama administration to nudge Pyongyang back to the Six-Party Talks while advancing U.S.-North Korea relations were rebuffed, and from 2012 onward North Korea has consistently refused meaningful dialogue on its nuclear program.
Nevertheless, the September 19 Joint Statement retains enduring value for three main reasons:
1. It provides a fundamental framework for an incremental, step-by-step approach to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
2. It provides a framework for compensating North Korea's denuclearization steps with security assurances, economic and energy aid and assistance, and normalization of relations among all the member states
3. It demonstrates, as did the Leap Day Understanding of 2012 and the progress made and then lost in U.S.-North Korea summitry in 2018-2019, that North Korea's entire uranium enrichment program must be on the table. There can be no authentic and credible discussion of denuclearization, arms control, or even peace so long as North Korea robustly and unabatedly expands its inventory of weapons-usable nuclear material through undeclared uranium enrichment.
Implications for Today
In the broadest sense, North Korea's walking away from the Six-Party Talks and from its commitments under the Joint Statement in late 2008 was a clear proclamation of its lack of interest in denuclearization and, by extension, in any conciliatory, non-confrontational relationship with the United States. The "action statements" of February and October 2007 laid out agreed denuclearization steps by North Korea, the economic and energy assistance North Korea would receive, and expedited paths toward normalization of U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea relations. They demonstrated both the practicality and the proportionality of denuclearization-driven diplomacy. These reciprocal, step-by-step actions were built to address real North Korean needs, build confidence, and show Pyongyang an alternative path to peace and prosperity through denuclearization. Normalized relations, reduced tensions, economic aid and assistance, and even security guarantees were not enough to keep Pyongyang interested in the process. That is most likely to remain the case going forward, whether the goal is complete denuclearization, a mere halt to the program, or something in between.
That is in part why arguing for a "peace first" approach is met with skepticism today. A peace-first approach might reduce tensions and create an environment in which incremental reductions in the North Korean nuclear threat become possible, but it has been tried repeatedly. Implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement rested on a step-by-step approach that front-loaded numerous benefits for North Korea. In walking away from the Six-Party Talks beginning in 2008, Pyongyang rejected that approach. It has since passed up opportunities to make serious progress toward normalization with the United States under three different presidents (Obama, Trump, and Biden), each of whom front loaded benefits North Korea would enjoy while recognizing that the heavy lifting of complete and verifiable denuclearization would take time. Pyongyang has simply been uninterested in exploring what a better relationship with the United States, or with South Korea for that matter, might yield in security, economic, and diplomatic benefits.
Kim's Second Byungjin
What is Kim Jong-un seeking at this time? Since late 2017, when the November launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile was messaged as having "completed the state's nuclear force," North Korean rhetoric and behavior have pointed toward a diplomacy that locks in international acceptance of North Korea as a "responsible nuclear power" and moves beyond sanctions and pressure. Just as Pyongyang confidently proclaimed in 2013 that it would pursue "byungjin" (simultaneous development of both nuclear and economic development), it could now be said to be pursuing a "second byungjin" that advances its nuclear program while also seeking to normalize relations with countries willing to tolerate (if not necessarily accept) North Korea as a nuclear power. Pyongyang believes it can have both, which complicates any peace-first approach that purports to slow the growth of the North Korean threat.
North Korea remains committed to securing nuclear and conventional forces that clearly establish its dominance over South Korea. That shows both in its openly aggressive rhetoric aimed at Seoul over the past few years and in its development of capabilities messaged as a first-strike option against South Korea with tactical nuclear weapons. In the context of the repeated authoritative North Korean statements warning of continued qualitative and quantitative growth of its nuclear force as well as Pyongyang's actions, there is little room for optimism that Kim would consider ways to reduce or limit the size of his arsenal, create mechanisms for crisis management or trust building, or seek rapprochement with South Korea.
Can Kim and Trump Meet Halfway?
Kim Jong-un most likely believes there is value in diplomacy with the United States that falls short of a formal proclamation by Washington that denuclearization is no longer a goal. When the time is right, Pyongyang can easily drop or suspend its requirement that the United States cease insisting on denuclearization. Washington has comparable flexibility: The State Department can continue to assert that denuclearization is the goal, the president can avoid language that would antagonize Kim, and the two leaders can meet in the spirit of advancing peace in a dangerous region. Pyongyang has at times stated that it needs no one's "recognition" of an established reality. The benefits of securing a meeting with President Trump could be seen as more valuable than dogmatic adherence to its goal of locking in some nuclear power title.
The president could take an approach that troubles both his supporters and his detractors, perhaps a sign he is on the right track. Advocates of a "realistic" acknowledgment of North Korea as a "nuclear power" and of abandoning the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) formulation greatly overestimate the value to Pyongyang of such a statement, particularly measured against the harm it would do to the United States' North Korea policy and to U.S. cooperation with allies such as South Korea. Equally wrong is the worry that all hope for denuclearization vanishes with any meeting between the two leaders in which denuclearization takes a back seat to relationship building and broad-brush discussion of the need for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Given the cards he has been dealt, dealt not by his predecessors but by Pyongyang, there is value in President Trump's current approach to North Korea, both in his pursuit of summit-level dialogue with Kim Jong-un and in the cautious pace he has set in the face of Pyongyang's absolute rejection of U.S. overtures. There seems to be more intentionality and pragmatism in play than critics of the president's outreach acknowledge. That said, defenders of his approach outside the administration have not made a compelling case that the potential gain from a Trump-Kim summit would be worth the risk. The temptation to point fingers at the efforts of previous administrations for failing to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue sooner must be resisted. Lessons from past summits, including from Singapore and Hanoi, should be discussed in a more objective and non-political manner. A more sophisticated discussion may be worth considering related to reinvigorating pressure on North Korea from China and Russia, since both have greater interests with the United States that might incentivize a cooperative approach, in spite of setbacks in such efforts over the past decade.
Pyongyang Said It Plainly in 2009
As the Six-Party Talks collapsed in the final months of 2008, the North Korean Foreign Ministry stated on January 17, 2009, days before President Obama's inauguration:
"This is a revelation of the true colors of the U.S. as a big power which regards the normalization of the relations as a gift to the DPRK and a distortion of the essence of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. is miscalculating if it considers the normalization of the DPRK-U.S. relations as a reward for the DPRK's nuclear abandonment. It is the reality on the Korean Peninsula that we can live without normalizing the relations with the U.S. but not without nuclear deterrent. We have lived for decades without normalizing the relations with the U.S. and live on still with dignity."
Two key points are worth considering. First, nothing has changed in regard to North Korea's posture toward the United States. Second, from the U.S. perspective, the inextricable ties between North Korea's nuclear capability and instability on the Korean Peninsula make it impossible to find a path to U.S.-North Korea detente or inter-Korean reconciliation independent of the nuclear issue. Rhetoric emphasizing CVID is not an affront to Pyongyang or a maximalist and unnecessary obstacle complicating efforts to engage, reduce tension and threat, and achieve peace. The logic behind the United States' insistence that authentic and credible progress on denuclearization be achieved for peace to be promoted is unchanged. The problem is that the two sides' fundamental goals are antithetical and irreconcilable: Pyongyang intends to build a nuclear arsenal capable of decisively dominating and subjugating South Korea, and the United States pursues denuclearization, peace, and prosperity for the whole Korean Peninsula.
The Good News: Deterrence Is Working
Recent rhetoric from Pyongyang, Moscow, and Beijing shares a common theme: growing concern about and anger toward the U.S. military presence and U.S. actions in the region, closer U.S.-South Korea coordination on nuclear issues within the Nuclear Consultative Group, the remilitarization of Japan, and trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation. That is encouraging. Concern in these three capitals contradicts premature proclamations of the United States' demise in East Asia. It reflects frustration and fear that efforts by China, Russia, and North Korea to dominate their respective spheres are not working, particularly North Korea's costly efforts to intimidate and subjugate South Korea. The strengthening of U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation, driven in large part by the surge in North Korea's nuclear and missile threat over the past few years, has negative implications for China's security and intentions vis-a-vis Taiwan. Russia has long been concerned about how North Korea's actions sustain a Northeast Asian demand signal for U.S. military presence.
All that said, it is difficult to deny that, through no fault of their own, neither President Obama nor President Biden was an attractive dialogue partner for Kim. President Trump is uniquely positioned to engage Kim with sufficient credibility, even if such talks yield limited fruit. His cards are not the greatest, but he seems to know it. Whatever the outcome, the United States would do well to remind both China and Russia that North Korean behavior damages their national interests and will continue to do so until the three parties can cooperate once again, as during the Six-Party Talks, to lead North Korea down a different path than the one it has been on.
* * *
Sydney Seiler is a non-resident senior adviser with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this submission are the author's and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/kims-second-byungjin-21-years-after-six-party-talks-agreement
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Is the United States Abandoning Saudi Arabia at Its Moment of Need?
WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
Is the United States Abandoning Saudi Arabia at Its Moment of Need?
Commentary by Michael Ratney
September 23, 2026
The Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia that began on July 13--and are still ongoing--recall nothing so much as the strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure of September 2019. But this time it is worse, and the stakes are much higher.
In 2019, drones struck a major crude oil stabilization facility in Abqaiq and a huge oil field in Khurais, both in Saudi Arabia's Eastern ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Is the United States Abandoning Saudi Arabia at Its Moment of Need? Commentary by Michael Ratney September 23, 2026 The Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia that began on July 13--and are still ongoing--recall nothing so much as the strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure of September 2019. But this time it is worse, and the stakes are much higher. In 2019, drones struck a major crude oil stabilization facility in Abqaiq and a huge oil field in Khurais, both in Saudi Arabia's EasternProvince. The impact, not only on Saudi Arabia but potentially on global energy markets, could have been grave. The Houthis at first claimed responsibility, but the attacks were more likely the work of Iran or its Iraqi proxies. At the time, President Trump condemned the attack and famously claimed that the United States was "locked and loaded" to launch a reprisal. But in the end, the United States imposed additional sanctions on Iran and did not respond militarily. The reason, Trump implied, was that the United States is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The tepid U.S. response left Saudi Arabia with an enduring grievance: Its principal defense partner sat by while the kingdom was brazenly attacked by its principal adversary.
By 2022, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis had negotiated a ceasefire. It held imperfectly until July 2026, when Saudi Arabia was attacked again--this time most definitely by the Houthis. The attacks plunged Saudi Arabia into a conflict it had hoped to avoid.
Houthi missiles, mostly intercepted, began targeting Saudi Arabia on July 13. The Houthis announced a naval blockade on July 22 and began targeting oil tankers carrying Saudi crude in the Red Sea. They then began attacking Saudi energy infrastructure, culminating in a strike on an oil refinery in Jazan on August 9. On September 10, an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq--plausibly coordinating with the Houthis--struck the critical East-West Pipeline that had allowed the country to reroute its oil exports from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea. And on September 18, a Houthi ballistic missile targeting Riyadh was intercepted by Saudi air defenses.
These attacks come as global oil inventories are at historically low levels, a product of the continued blockades--U.S. and Iranian--on the Strait of Hormuz. Oil prices are edging higher, and gas and diesel prices in the United States are the highest since 2022. And although the Houthis are thus far limiting their strikes to Saudi targets, it is worth recalling that between 20 and 30 percent of global container traffic goes through the Bab al-Mandab at the mouth of the Red Sea.
U.S. support for Saudi Arabia could take various forms beyond air strikes, including intelligence sharing and targeting recommendations. But credible reports suggest that direct U.S. military engagement is what Saudi Arabia really wants, and what President Trump has reportedly declined to provide. There are several possible explanations for Trump's disinclination:
* Although the White House and the Pentagon tend to downplay the issue, it seems clear that the war thus far has taken its toll on U.S. forces. The U.S. military is reportedly facing serious challenges, including shortages of some sophisticated interceptors, according to the Pentagon's own inspector general. There are also reports that U.S. naval vessels deployed to the Gulf badly need maintenance. This comes as U.S. military installations in the region, including the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, suffered extensive damage in the early days of the war.
* President Trump may be disinclined to break the U.S. ceasefire with the Houthis that was implemented, with Omani mediation, in May 2025. Or, President Trump may not want to open a new front in the Iran war, which would effectively rebut his narrative that the war is all but over.
* Meanwhile, as a political matter, President Trump has seemed anxious to declare the war over, to move on, and to stop talking about it as the November midterm elections grow nearer. If Trump agreed to launch military operations against the Houthis, effectively opening a new front in the U.S. war, it would put the lie to the notion that this war is all but over.
U.S. reluctance to get involved stokes the perception that the United States has abandoned a partner at its moment of greatest need. While the United States' Saudi ally is under attack, the U.S. president is telling the world that he is not helping the ally. Rather, he is talking to that ally's enemy--mostly to convince it not to attack the United States.
This puts the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, in a difficult spot. Prince Mohammed's nearly exclusive focus for much of the past decade has been inward-looking, investing heavily in transforming Saudi society, diversifying its economy, and creating opportunities for young Saudis, particularly women. The last thing the Saudi leadership wanted was rockets, missiles, and drones launched toward the kingdom from Iran or Iraq or Yemen.
After the 2019 attacks, the Saudi leadership may have felt aggrieved, though its approach was not to walk away from the United States, but to seek greater clarity in the relationship. Arguably, the experience led directly to the effort that began in 2022 to negotiate a mutual defense treaty with the United States, an arrangement that would have brought maximum clarity about Saudi and U.S. expectations in the event of a major conflict (and would have led to Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel).
A treaty and normalization deal never got over the finish line. But Saudi Arabia continued to seek a closer security partnership with the United States, and during his November 2025 visit to Washington, Prince Mohammed seemed to attain just that. The United States designated Saudi Arabia a major non-NATO ally, agreed to sell the kingdom the F-35 fighter jet, and inked a new strategic defense agreement with the kingdom. And yet, less than a year later, at this moment of need, the "upgraded" relationship seems to count for little.
This doesn't bring the U.S.-Saudi relationship to a point of rupture. Saudi Arabia and the United States have invested decades in their military partnership, including training, exercises, integration into U.S. Central Command planning, and, of course, arms sales. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to walk away from that partnership, but going forward it will likely continue to seek greater clarity, even guarantees. If the kingdom is attacked again by its mortal enemy, what will the United States do? What precisely is the import of a major non-NATO ally designation? To what degree should Saudi Arabia expect to be part of major decisions on U.S. military operations in the region that implicated Saudi Arabia and its neighbors directly? And the United States should also expect Saudi Arabia to look for other defense partners--not as replacements, but to supplement and bolster its defenses. The recent Mecca Pact that brought Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey together in what is described as a mutual defense pact is a good example.
In the immediate term, Saudi Arabia is faced with the same two options it has always had: military operations and diplomacy. The kingdom is currently pursuing military operations against the Houthis and, in a sense, it cannot afford not to. The kingdom is under attack, and as a political matter, it has to retaliate. But ultimately, we should expect a return to diplomacy--imperfect, unsatisfying diplomacy that nonetheless deescalates the conflict. That diplomacy may actually have to start with Iran, and there have been reports that the Arab Gulf states had plans to meet with Iranian negotiators in Oman. That seems to be postponed, but it is the direction this conflict is likely headed: a diplomatic process that doesn't necessarily involve the United States, one that reaches an uncomfortable and incomplete modus vivendi with Iran and sets the stage for deescalating the conflict with the Houthis.
* * *
Michael Ratney is a senior adviser (non-resident) in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-abandoning-saudi-arabia-its-moment-need
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Is the United States Abandoning Saudi Arabia at Its Moment of Need?
Commentary by Michael Ratney
September 23, 2026
The Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia that began on July 13--and are still ongoing--recall nothing so much as the strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure of September 2019. But this time it is worse, and the stakes are much higher.
In 2019, drones struck a major crude oil stabilization facility in Abqaiq and a huge oil field in Khurais, both in Saudi Arabia's Eastern ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Is the United States Abandoning Saudi Arabia at Its Moment of Need? Commentary by Michael Ratney September 23, 2026 The Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia that began on July 13--and are still ongoing--recall nothing so much as the strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure of September 2019. But this time it is worse, and the stakes are much higher. In 2019, drones struck a major crude oil stabilization facility in Abqaiq and a huge oil field in Khurais, both in Saudi Arabia's EasternProvince. The impact, not only on Saudi Arabia but potentially on global energy markets, could have been grave. The Houthis at first claimed responsibility, but the attacks were more likely the work of Iran or its Iraqi proxies. At the time, President Trump condemned the attack and famously claimed that the United States was "locked and loaded" to launch a reprisal. But in the end, the United States imposed additional sanctions on Iran and did not respond militarily. The reason, Trump implied, was that the United States is no longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil. The tepid U.S. response left Saudi Arabia with an enduring grievance: Its principal defense partner sat by while the kingdom was brazenly attacked by its principal adversary.
By 2022, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis had negotiated a ceasefire. It held imperfectly until July 2026, when Saudi Arabia was attacked again--this time most definitely by the Houthis. The attacks plunged Saudi Arabia into a conflict it had hoped to avoid.
Houthi missiles, mostly intercepted, began targeting Saudi Arabia on July 13. The Houthis announced a naval blockade on July 22 and began targeting oil tankers carrying Saudi crude in the Red Sea. They then began attacking Saudi energy infrastructure, culminating in a strike on an oil refinery in Jazan on August 9. On September 10, an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq--plausibly coordinating with the Houthis--struck the critical East-West Pipeline that had allowed the country to reroute its oil exports from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea. And on September 18, a Houthi ballistic missile targeting Riyadh was intercepted by Saudi air defenses.
These attacks come as global oil inventories are at historically low levels, a product of the continued blockades--U.S. and Iranian--on the Strait of Hormuz. Oil prices are edging higher, and gas and diesel prices in the United States are the highest since 2022. And although the Houthis are thus far limiting their strikes to Saudi targets, it is worth recalling that between 20 and 30 percent of global container traffic goes through the Bab al-Mandab at the mouth of the Red Sea.
U.S. support for Saudi Arabia could take various forms beyond air strikes, including intelligence sharing and targeting recommendations. But credible reports suggest that direct U.S. military engagement is what Saudi Arabia really wants, and what President Trump has reportedly declined to provide. There are several possible explanations for Trump's disinclination:
* Although the White House and the Pentagon tend to downplay the issue, it seems clear that the war thus far has taken its toll on U.S. forces. The U.S. military is reportedly facing serious challenges, including shortages of some sophisticated interceptors, according to the Pentagon's own inspector general. There are also reports that U.S. naval vessels deployed to the Gulf badly need maintenance. This comes as U.S. military installations in the region, including the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, suffered extensive damage in the early days of the war.
* President Trump may be disinclined to break the U.S. ceasefire with the Houthis that was implemented, with Omani mediation, in May 2025. Or, President Trump may not want to open a new front in the Iran war, which would effectively rebut his narrative that the war is all but over.
* Meanwhile, as a political matter, President Trump has seemed anxious to declare the war over, to move on, and to stop talking about it as the November midterm elections grow nearer. If Trump agreed to launch military operations against the Houthis, effectively opening a new front in the U.S. war, it would put the lie to the notion that this war is all but over.
U.S. reluctance to get involved stokes the perception that the United States has abandoned a partner at its moment of greatest need. While the United States' Saudi ally is under attack, the U.S. president is telling the world that he is not helping the ally. Rather, he is talking to that ally's enemy--mostly to convince it not to attack the United States.
This puts the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, in a difficult spot. Prince Mohammed's nearly exclusive focus for much of the past decade has been inward-looking, investing heavily in transforming Saudi society, diversifying its economy, and creating opportunities for young Saudis, particularly women. The last thing the Saudi leadership wanted was rockets, missiles, and drones launched toward the kingdom from Iran or Iraq or Yemen.
After the 2019 attacks, the Saudi leadership may have felt aggrieved, though its approach was not to walk away from the United States, but to seek greater clarity in the relationship. Arguably, the experience led directly to the effort that began in 2022 to negotiate a mutual defense treaty with the United States, an arrangement that would have brought maximum clarity about Saudi and U.S. expectations in the event of a major conflict (and would have led to Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel).
A treaty and normalization deal never got over the finish line. But Saudi Arabia continued to seek a closer security partnership with the United States, and during his November 2025 visit to Washington, Prince Mohammed seemed to attain just that. The United States designated Saudi Arabia a major non-NATO ally, agreed to sell the kingdom the F-35 fighter jet, and inked a new strategic defense agreement with the kingdom. And yet, less than a year later, at this moment of need, the "upgraded" relationship seems to count for little.
This doesn't bring the U.S.-Saudi relationship to a point of rupture. Saudi Arabia and the United States have invested decades in their military partnership, including training, exercises, integration into U.S. Central Command planning, and, of course, arms sales. Saudi Arabia is unlikely to walk away from that partnership, but going forward it will likely continue to seek greater clarity, even guarantees. If the kingdom is attacked again by its mortal enemy, what will the United States do? What precisely is the import of a major non-NATO ally designation? To what degree should Saudi Arabia expect to be part of major decisions on U.S. military operations in the region that implicated Saudi Arabia and its neighbors directly? And the United States should also expect Saudi Arabia to look for other defense partners--not as replacements, but to supplement and bolster its defenses. The recent Mecca Pact that brought Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey together in what is described as a mutual defense pact is a good example.
In the immediate term, Saudi Arabia is faced with the same two options it has always had: military operations and diplomacy. The kingdom is currently pursuing military operations against the Houthis and, in a sense, it cannot afford not to. The kingdom is under attack, and as a political matter, it has to retaliate. But ultimately, we should expect a return to diplomacy--imperfect, unsatisfying diplomacy that nonetheless deescalates the conflict. That diplomacy may actually have to start with Iran, and there have been reports that the Arab Gulf states had plans to meet with Iranian negotiators in Oman. That seems to be postponed, but it is the direction this conflict is likely headed: a diplomatic process that doesn't necessarily involve the United States, one that reaches an uncomfortable and incomplete modus vivendi with Iran and sets the stage for deescalating the conflict with the Houthis.
* * *
Michael Ratney is a senior adviser (non-resident) in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-abandoning-saudi-arabia-its-moment-need
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Insight: Diesel Export Ban Won't Solve High Fuel Prices
WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight:
* * *
September 23, 2026
A Diesel Export Ban Won't Solve High Fuel Prices
Shuting Pomerleau
Executive Summary
* President Trump is considering an export ban on diesel fuel after retail prices surged to a record-high level of $6.53 per gallon on September 21, even though the United States remains a structural surplus diesel producer--refining roughly 5.3 million barrels per day (b/d) with domestic demand of 3.6 million b/d.
* An export ban would not lower pump prices because existing pipeline bottlenecks force ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight: * * * September 23, 2026 A Diesel Export Ban Won't Solve High Fuel Prices Shuting Pomerleau Executive Summary * President Trump is considering an export ban on diesel fuel after retail prices surged to a record-high level of $6.53 per gallon on September 21, even though the United States remains a structural surplus diesel producer--refining roughly 5.3 million barrels per day (b/d) with domestic demand of 3.6 million b/d. * An export ban would not lower pump prices because existing pipeline bottlenecks forceregions such as New England and the West Coast to rely on waterborne imports; an export ban would trap Gulf Coast supplies in the region and compel refiners to cut daily output, driving up prices for gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel.
* With U.S. exports supplying 1.5 million barrels per day--about one-fifth of global seaborne diesel trade--an export ban would severely tighten world markets; instead, policymakers should ease winter supply frictions by extending the Jones Act waiver and removing burdensome preclearance rules.
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Introduction
On September 21, 2026, U.S. diesel prices reached a record-high level of $6.53/gallon, a significant jump from the average $3.50/gallon in January, prior to the Middle East conflicts. This has surpassed the previous nominal record of $5.81 per gallon set in June 2022 following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and pushed retail prices toward historical inflation-adjusted peaks seen in July 2008.
Amid the ongoing Middle East conflicts and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz for more than six months, President Trump indicated that the administration is considering an export ban on diesel to lower prices and said that the decision would be coming fast. Some Republican lawmakers, such as Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), have also called for an export ban to address the high diesel prices.
The United States remains a structural surplus diesel producer--refining roughly 5.3 million barrels per day (b/d) with domestic demand of 3.6 million b/d. An export ban would not lower pump prices because existing pipeline bottlenecks force regions such as New England and the West Coast to rely on waterborne imports. An export ban would effectively trap Gulf Coast supplies in the region and compel refiners to cut daily refining output, driving up prices for gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel.
With U.S. exports supplying 1.5 million barrels per day (about one-fifth of global seaborne diesel trade), an export ban would severely tighten world markets. Instead, policymakers should ease winter supply frictions by extending the Jones Act waiver and removing burdensome preclearance rules.
What's driving record-high U.S. diesel prices?
Soaring U.S. diesel prices are driven by global supply and demand, as diesel is a commodity traded in the world market. American Action Forum's previous insight laid out the major factors that have been driving up U.S. diesel prices, including: 1) the substantial disruption in the Middle East maritime chokepoints; 2) Russia's diesel export ban due to Ukraine's attacks on its refinery facilities; 3) U.S. refiners' high utilization rate and competition from jet fuel; and 4) the inelastic demand for diesel in the industrial and agricultural sectors. More in-depth analysis is available in the paper.
Why is an export ban not a cure for high U.S. energy prices?
The high U.S. diesel price is not due to domestic fuel shortages. In fact, the United States is a diesel surplus producer. U.S. refiners produce approximately 5.3 million barrels of distillates (including diesel fuel and heating oil) per day (b/d), well exceeding domestic demand of about 3.6 million b/d, according to petroleum analyst Patrick De Haan.
With the excess supply of U.S. diesel, if the Trump Administration were to enact a diesel export ban, wouldn't that lead to plenty of diesel supply at home and bring down the fuel prices?
The answer is no.
This is because major U.S. diesel production capacity is concentrated in the Gulf Coast, and not all regions in the country have easy access to that ample supply due to infrastructure constraints.
New England relies heavily on diesel imports (mostly from Canada) to supplement the domestic supply from the Gulf Coast, as the region does not have operating refineries or pipeline infrastructure. As pipeline-delivered fuel from the Gulf Coast terminates in the Mid-Atlantic, moving that product into New England requires secondary transport by tanker, rail, or truck. Consequently, importing directly from Canada is often more economical than sourcing domestic barrels.
In 2025, the United States imported an average of roughly 164,384 b/d of ultra-low sulfur distillate (ULSD)--the major diesel fuel type consumed domestically. This accounted for about 4 percent of total domestic ULSD consumption.
In addition to New England, other regions in the country, such as the West Coast, Hawaii, and Alaska, also rely on imports to supplement domestic supply of diesel, due to infrastructure and economic constraints.
A diesel export ban would initially suppress the wholesale fuel prices in the Gulf Coast, as the supply is trapped in the area. But the lower fuel prices in the Gulf Coast would not necessarily translate into lower prices for the entire country, since the infrastructure and logistics challenges remain. According to S&P Global Energy's analysis of how an export ban could impact the U.S. market, the retail price effects of the export ban are difficult to estimate, as it would be determined by "transportation costs, local inventories, fuel specifications and the availability of domestic shipping."
Over time, a sustained export ban would force U.S. refiners to cut their refining output as they run out of options to absorb the excess supply via shifting yield away from diesel toward jet fuel, storing the fuel, or selling more to domestic consumers. S&P Global estimates that a full diesel export ban would ultimately cause U.S. refiners to reduce more than 10 percent of their daily crude input at about 2 million b/d in order to eliminate the diesel surplus.
The impact of U.S. refiners reducing output would be devastating, as it would lead to higher prices of all fuels, including diesel, jet fuel, gasoline, and other petroleum products--running counter to the policy objective of an export ban.
Why would an export ban exacerbate the global energy shock?
Not only would an export ban not lower U.S. energy prices, it would also bring an additional shock to the global energy market. U.S. exports of diesel fuel of 1.5 million b/d account for one fifth of the total seaborne trading volume of diesel at 8 million b/d, per American Petroleum Institute's analysis. Wiping off 20 percent of the world's diesel supply from the United States would further tighten the global market and push up diesel prices. This would impose additional costs on U.S. consumers that rely on diesel imports from the world market.
The impact would be particularly severe for Latin America as its diesel imports from the United States account for one third of total consumption, according to S&P Global. Europe would be affected as reliance on U.S. petroleum exports has increased significantly this year after the Middle East conflicts started.
An export ban could prove counterproductive, risking the U.S. competitive advantage as a leading global energy producer and exporter. Yielding to political pressures with government interventions that run contrary to basic market economics would lead to broad market distortions and undermine the Trump Administration's goals of strengthening U.S. energy security and increasing U.S. energy exports.
What could actually help?
As refining capacity is now the main bottleneck for global energy supplies, the Trump Administration should allow maximum flexibility for U.S. refiners to adapt to the global market disruptions, rather than imposing politically driven restrictions.
The Jones Act waiver, in place since March, has helped unlock significant movements of petroleum products from the Gulf Coast to the rest of the country. The recent extension of the waiver until November 15 will continue to help meet domestic demand. Notably, however, the latest waiver extension has introduced complex preclearance procedures that require international shipping lines to obtain approval on a case-by-case basis, which has contributed to declining utilization of the waiver.
With winter fast approaching, demand for heating oil, especially in New England, will rise substantially. This will further drive up diesel prices. Further extending the Jones Act waiver and eliminating the pre-clearance requirements would help facilitate more waterborne shipments of diesel and heating oil from the Gulf Coast to the rest of the country. There is not a silver bullet for solving the high U.S. energy prices, but easing arbitrary logistics challenges can certainly help incrementally.
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Shuting Pomerleau is the Director of Energy and Environmental Policy at the American Action Forum
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/a-diesel-export-ban-wont-solve-high-fuel-prices/
[Category: Think Tank]
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September 23, 2026
A Diesel Export Ban Won't Solve High Fuel Prices
Shuting Pomerleau
Executive Summary
* President Trump is considering an export ban on diesel fuel after retail prices surged to a record-high level of $6.53 per gallon on September 21, even though the United States remains a structural surplus diesel producer--refining roughly 5.3 million barrels per day (b/d) with domestic demand of 3.6 million b/d.
* An export ban would not lower pump prices because existing pipeline bottlenecks force ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 24 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight: * * * September 23, 2026 A Diesel Export Ban Won't Solve High Fuel Prices Shuting Pomerleau Executive Summary * President Trump is considering an export ban on diesel fuel after retail prices surged to a record-high level of $6.53 per gallon on September 21, even though the United States remains a structural surplus diesel producer--refining roughly 5.3 million barrels per day (b/d) with domestic demand of 3.6 million b/d. * An export ban would not lower pump prices because existing pipeline bottlenecks forceregions such as New England and the West Coast to rely on waterborne imports; an export ban would trap Gulf Coast supplies in the region and compel refiners to cut daily output, driving up prices for gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel.
* With U.S. exports supplying 1.5 million barrels per day--about one-fifth of global seaborne diesel trade--an export ban would severely tighten world markets; instead, policymakers should ease winter supply frictions by extending the Jones Act waiver and removing burdensome preclearance rules.
-
Introduction
On September 21, 2026, U.S. diesel prices reached a record-high level of $6.53/gallon, a significant jump from the average $3.50/gallon in January, prior to the Middle East conflicts. This has surpassed the previous nominal record of $5.81 per gallon set in June 2022 following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and pushed retail prices toward historical inflation-adjusted peaks seen in July 2008.
Amid the ongoing Middle East conflicts and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz for more than six months, President Trump indicated that the administration is considering an export ban on diesel to lower prices and said that the decision would be coming fast. Some Republican lawmakers, such as Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), have also called for an export ban to address the high diesel prices.
The United States remains a structural surplus diesel producer--refining roughly 5.3 million barrels per day (b/d) with domestic demand of 3.6 million b/d. An export ban would not lower pump prices because existing pipeline bottlenecks force regions such as New England and the West Coast to rely on waterborne imports. An export ban would effectively trap Gulf Coast supplies in the region and compel refiners to cut daily refining output, driving up prices for gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel.
With U.S. exports supplying 1.5 million barrels per day (about one-fifth of global seaborne diesel trade), an export ban would severely tighten world markets. Instead, policymakers should ease winter supply frictions by extending the Jones Act waiver and removing burdensome preclearance rules.
What's driving record-high U.S. diesel prices?
Soaring U.S. diesel prices are driven by global supply and demand, as diesel is a commodity traded in the world market. American Action Forum's previous insight laid out the major factors that have been driving up U.S. diesel prices, including: 1) the substantial disruption in the Middle East maritime chokepoints; 2) Russia's diesel export ban due to Ukraine's attacks on its refinery facilities; 3) U.S. refiners' high utilization rate and competition from jet fuel; and 4) the inelastic demand for diesel in the industrial and agricultural sectors. More in-depth analysis is available in the paper.
Why is an export ban not a cure for high U.S. energy prices?
The high U.S. diesel price is not due to domestic fuel shortages. In fact, the United States is a diesel surplus producer. U.S. refiners produce approximately 5.3 million barrels of distillates (including diesel fuel and heating oil) per day (b/d), well exceeding domestic demand of about 3.6 million b/d, according to petroleum analyst Patrick De Haan.
With the excess supply of U.S. diesel, if the Trump Administration were to enact a diesel export ban, wouldn't that lead to plenty of diesel supply at home and bring down the fuel prices?
The answer is no.
This is because major U.S. diesel production capacity is concentrated in the Gulf Coast, and not all regions in the country have easy access to that ample supply due to infrastructure constraints.
New England relies heavily on diesel imports (mostly from Canada) to supplement the domestic supply from the Gulf Coast, as the region does not have operating refineries or pipeline infrastructure. As pipeline-delivered fuel from the Gulf Coast terminates in the Mid-Atlantic, moving that product into New England requires secondary transport by tanker, rail, or truck. Consequently, importing directly from Canada is often more economical than sourcing domestic barrels.
In 2025, the United States imported an average of roughly 164,384 b/d of ultra-low sulfur distillate (ULSD)--the major diesel fuel type consumed domestically. This accounted for about 4 percent of total domestic ULSD consumption.
In addition to New England, other regions in the country, such as the West Coast, Hawaii, and Alaska, also rely on imports to supplement domestic supply of diesel, due to infrastructure and economic constraints.
A diesel export ban would initially suppress the wholesale fuel prices in the Gulf Coast, as the supply is trapped in the area. But the lower fuel prices in the Gulf Coast would not necessarily translate into lower prices for the entire country, since the infrastructure and logistics challenges remain. According to S&P Global Energy's analysis of how an export ban could impact the U.S. market, the retail price effects of the export ban are difficult to estimate, as it would be determined by "transportation costs, local inventories, fuel specifications and the availability of domestic shipping."
Over time, a sustained export ban would force U.S. refiners to cut their refining output as they run out of options to absorb the excess supply via shifting yield away from diesel toward jet fuel, storing the fuel, or selling more to domestic consumers. S&P Global estimates that a full diesel export ban would ultimately cause U.S. refiners to reduce more than 10 percent of their daily crude input at about 2 million b/d in order to eliminate the diesel surplus.
The impact of U.S. refiners reducing output would be devastating, as it would lead to higher prices of all fuels, including diesel, jet fuel, gasoline, and other petroleum products--running counter to the policy objective of an export ban.
Why would an export ban exacerbate the global energy shock?
Not only would an export ban not lower U.S. energy prices, it would also bring an additional shock to the global energy market. U.S. exports of diesel fuel of 1.5 million b/d account for one fifth of the total seaborne trading volume of diesel at 8 million b/d, per American Petroleum Institute's analysis. Wiping off 20 percent of the world's diesel supply from the United States would further tighten the global market and push up diesel prices. This would impose additional costs on U.S. consumers that rely on diesel imports from the world market.
The impact would be particularly severe for Latin America as its diesel imports from the United States account for one third of total consumption, according to S&P Global. Europe would be affected as reliance on U.S. petroleum exports has increased significantly this year after the Middle East conflicts started.
An export ban could prove counterproductive, risking the U.S. competitive advantage as a leading global energy producer and exporter. Yielding to political pressures with government interventions that run contrary to basic market economics would lead to broad market distortions and undermine the Trump Administration's goals of strengthening U.S. energy security and increasing U.S. energy exports.
What could actually help?
As refining capacity is now the main bottleneck for global energy supplies, the Trump Administration should allow maximum flexibility for U.S. refiners to adapt to the global market disruptions, rather than imposing politically driven restrictions.
The Jones Act waiver, in place since March, has helped unlock significant movements of petroleum products from the Gulf Coast to the rest of the country. The recent extension of the waiver until November 15 will continue to help meet domestic demand. Notably, however, the latest waiver extension has introduced complex preclearance procedures that require international shipping lines to obtain approval on a case-by-case basis, which has contributed to declining utilization of the waiver.
With winter fast approaching, demand for heating oil, especially in New England, will rise substantially. This will further drive up diesel prices. Further extending the Jones Act waiver and eliminating the pre-clearance requirements would help facilitate more waterborne shipments of diesel and heating oil from the Gulf Coast to the rest of the country. There is not a silver bullet for solving the high U.S. energy prices, but easing arbitrary logistics challenges can certainly help incrementally.
* * *
Shuting Pomerleau is the Director of Energy and Environmental Policy at the American Action Forum
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/a-diesel-export-ban-wont-solve-high-fuel-prices/
[Category: Think Tank]