Featured Stories
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Reason: In Chicago, Putting a Hot Dog in a Bun Can Get You in Trouble
NEW YORK, Sept. 29 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary:
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In Chicago, Putting a Hot Dog in a Bun Can Get You in Trouble
By Jarrett Dieterle
Reason
September 26th, 2026
I've been working in law and public policy for over 15 years, and even I had a hard time making sense of Chicago's permit rules for food vendors.
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Like many large progressive cities, Chicago receives its fair share of criticism for overbearing regulations and sclerotic government. It clocks in at number five on the list of large American cities where it is hardest to obtain a business
... Show Full Article
NEW YORK, Sept. 29 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary:
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In Chicago, Putting a Hot Dog in a Bun Can Get You in Trouble
By Jarrett Dieterle
Reason
September 26th, 2026
I've been working in law and public policy for over 15 years, and even I had a hard time making sense of Chicago's permit rules for food vendors.
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Like many large progressive cities, Chicago receives its fair share of criticism for overbearing regulations and sclerotic government. It clocks in at number five on the list of large American cities where it is hardest to obtain a businesspermit. It has some of the highest commercial property tax and sales tax rates of any large city. And as with any overregulated locale, the burden of all this regulatory excess inevitably falls most heavily on the smallest businesses.
In Chicago, mobile food carts and food trucks face a particularly tough road. As one example, Chicago magazine recently highlighted the plight of the city's food cart operators, who are legally barred from preparing food at their actual carts. Instead, they are forced to do any food prep at a shared kitchen--necessitating a shared kitchen license, costing $330 for two years--and are only allowed to sell prepackaged and sealed food.
Continue reading the entire piece here at Reason (https://reason.com/2026/09/26/in-chicago-putting-a-hot-dog-in-a-bun-can-get-you-in-trouble)
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Jarrett Dieterle is a legal policy fellow at Manhattan Institute, where his work focuses on labor law, administrative law, and urban policy.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/in-chicago-putting-a-hot-dog-in-a-bun-can-get-you-in-trouble
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to New York Post: Mamdani's Claimed Triumph Over DoorDash 'Corporate Greed' Isn't All It Seems
NEW YORK, Sept. 29 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary:
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Mamdani's Claimed Triumph Over DoorDash 'Corporate Greed' Isn't All It Seems
By Santiago Vidal Calvo
New York Post
September 28th, 2026
Mayor Zohran Mamdani wants New Yorkers to think he got DoorDash, one of the country's biggest food delivery companies, to pay a huge $131.5 million settlement to its workers at his command.
"DoorDash underpaid more than 260,000 workers, and today we are getting that money back," he boasted last week.
Headlines aside, that's hardly the full story.
Yes,
... Show Full Article
NEW YORK, Sept. 29 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary:
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Mamdani's Claimed Triumph Over DoorDash 'Corporate Greed' Isn't All It Seems
By Santiago Vidal Calvo
New York Post
September 28th, 2026
Mayor Zohran Mamdani wants New Yorkers to think he got DoorDash, one of the country's biggest food delivery companies, to pay a huge $131.5 million settlement to its workers at his command.
"DoorDash underpaid more than 260,000 workers, and today we are getting that money back," he boasted last week.
Headlines aside, that's hardly the full story.
Yes,DoorDash made a mistake.
The company admitted that $6.6 million in payments never reached NYC Dashers, and that a further $5.7 million arrived late.
That's unacceptable: Gig-delivery workers deserve their earned wages, and the administration was right to ask for compensation and corrections.
Yet that doesn't mean $131.5 million was stolen from workers by a greedy delivery company, as Mamdani suggested Tuesday in a press conference complete with a giant prop check.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the New York Post (https://nypost.com/2026/09/28/opinion/mamdanis-triumph-over-doordash-greed-isnt-all-it-seems).
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Santiago Vidal Calvo is a Cities policy analyst at the Manhattan Institute.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/mamdanis-claimed-triumph-over-doordash-corporate-greed-isnt-all-it-seems
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Russian Elections Take Place Without Real Opposition
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 28, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Russian Elections Take Place Without Real Opposition
Richard Arnold
Executive Summary:
* Russia's September 18-20 Duma elections delivered United Russia its largest State Duma faction in history, while 49 war veterans won seats, advancing Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to build a "new elite" tied to the war against Ukraine.
* The Kremlin further narrowed the space for electoral opposition by excluding Yabloko, while other opposition
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Sept. 28, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Russian Elections Take Place Without Real Opposition
Richard Arnold
Executive Summary:
* Russia's September 18-20 Duma elections delivered United Russia its largest State Duma faction in history, while 49 war veterans won seats, advancing Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to build a "new elite" tied to the war against Ukraine.
* The Kremlin further narrowed the space for electoral opposition by excluding Yabloko, while other oppositionfigures sought to coordinate protest voting and mobilize voters despite the risk of detention.
* Turnout reached 59.32 percent, the highest since 2011, amid reports of vote discrepancies, restrictions on independent observers, and the deployment of Cossacks and National Guard personnel at polling stations.
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On September 18-20, Russia held its elections for the Duma, the lower house of parliament. Observers signaled the importance of the elections in prompting the regime to pause before launching a second mobilization and perhaps formally declaring a state of war (see EDM July 23, September 14). Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine four and a half years ago, but it is unclear whether it has declared a formal, legal state of war. The legal status of war would permit harsher penalties on domestic dissidents and open the possibility of a full draft. The exodus of Russian men of conscription age in the last month suggests they see such actions as possible (Meduza, September 23). Ukrainian long-range drone attacks on Russian cities and oil refineries have also made it difficult for the regime to maintain the pretense that this is not a war within Russia. This was underscored by the heavy Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow on the final day of voting (Meduza, September 20). The timing could give the Kremlin additional justification for escalation.
Elections play several important roles in President Vladimir Putin's Russia. They still provide the regime with the semblance of legitimacy, send signals to elites about public sentiment, project stability, and can now also help Putin create a "new elite" from those who fought in his war against Ukraine. The ruling United Russia party initially said 86 war veterans had won seats, but later revised that figure to 49. Including war veterans rewards participation in the war while tying the political system more closely to the conflict (Meduza, September 21). Because the outcome was never in doubt and United Russia secured its largest State Duma faction in history, the Kremlin could sometimes allow opposition parties to act as a pressure-release valve in Russia's controlled political system (Meduza, September 21). The Russian Supreme Court's August 10 decision to remove the Yabloko opposition party's federal candidate list from the elections suggests that even limited avenues for electoral competition have narrowed (24 Kanal, August 15). Protests against the falsification of the 2011 Duma election results grew into the largest demonstrations against Putin in the post-Soviet period and brought Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny to fame. The Kremlin presumably remains wary of the "smart vote" campaign initiated by Navalny, which encouraged voters to support the candidate most likely to win other than United Russia, often from one of the loyal "systemic" opposition parties, such as A Just Russia or the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. On Sunday, September 20, the main election day, protest actions took place outside Russia, organized largely by the Russian diaspora (Meduza, September 20).
The "nonsystemic" opposition tried to influence the elections and the country's politics. Russian opposition leaders Maxim Kats and Yuliya Navalnaya put aside their differences in a "difficult search for a compromise" to recommend candidates and parties other than the ruling United Russia. They jointly published recommendations for single-member districts and urged voters to support parties other than United Russia in the party-list vote. Navalnaya also called on people to arrive at polling stations at noon on Sunday as part of a coordinated protest intended to show opposition to the Kremlin's policies and create visible lines at polling places (Meduza, September 14). Even such relatively innocuous actions can result in detentions or arrests in Russia's current political environment. Other ways for voters to express discontent include boycotting, voting "against all," or voting for any party other than United Russia (Meduza, September 14).
The Kremlin is accustomed to high turnout, and the 2026 elections saw the highest since 2011, at 59.32 percent (Meduza, September 21). Russian opposition politician Ilya Yashin said that he could not vote in Yerevan as planned because of physical threats against him. Independent observers from the Yabloko party reported being denied access to polling stations, and whistleblowers reported other restrictions and violations. Reports also emerged of discrepancies in vote counts in St. Petersburg and Sakhalin. Russian analyst Ivan Shushkin noted discrepancies in available data from Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. More legitimately, roving bears in Irkutsk oblast meant authorities had to provide transportation for anyone wishing to vote after curfew (Meduza, September 19). Taken together, these reports point to an electoral process in which participation was high while independent oversight and avenues to challenge the results remained constrained. The Kremlin secured the outcome it sought.
Alongside falsification, the regime also relies on the tried and tested method of voter intimidation. In Krasnodar krai, which can be considered a frontline region because of its proximity to the war, Cossacks and the National Guard provided security at polling places throughout the three days of the election. This falls under their remit of providing security to objects of critical infrastructure (Komsomolskaya Pravda Kuban, August 11). In the city of Shakhty, in Rostov oblast, Cossacks acted as aides to the police "and living symbols of the history of our country" (Shakhty-media.ru, September 19). Cossacks of the Orenburg host were also preparing to "protect the rights of every voter" by standing guard at the elections in the Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk oblasts (Kazachestvo, August 26). These deployments also illustrate how the boundaries between electoral administration and the state's security apparatus have become blurred. Uniformed security personnel at polling stations can intimidate voters, particularly in an already heavily controlled electoral environment.
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Professor Richard Arnold teaches at Muskingum University and is a member of the PONARS network. He is the author of Russian Nationalism and Ethnic Violence: Symbolic Violence, Lynching, Pogrom, and Massacre (Routledge, 2016) and the editor of Russia and the 2018 FIFA World Cup (Routledge, 2021).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russian-elections-take-place-without-real-opposition/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Making the Greenland Agreement Work - Building Distributed Arctic Deterrence
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, posted the following commentary to RealClearDefense:
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Sep 26, 2026
RealClearDefense
Making the Greenland Agreement Work: Building Distributed Arctic Deterrence
The new US-Greenland-Kingdom of Denmark agreement offers an opportunity to strengthen Arctic deterrence through distributed capabilities, resilient networks, and coalition capability alignment.
Liselotte Odgaard
Executive Summary
The security agreement signed by the United States, Greenland,
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, posted the following commentary to RealClearDefense:
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Sep 26, 2026
RealClearDefense
Making the Greenland Agreement Work: Building Distributed Arctic Deterrence
The new US-Greenland-Kingdom of Denmark agreement offers an opportunity to strengthen Arctic deterrence through distributed capabilities, resilient networks, and coalition capability alignment.
Liselotte Odgaard
Executive Summary
The security agreement signed by the United States, Greenland,and the Kingdom of Denmark on September 22, 2026, creates an important opportunity to strengthen Arctic security. Its significance lies not primarily in expanded U.S. access or military presence, but in its potential to support a new approach to Arctic defense based on distributed capabilities, resilient networks, and coalition capability alignment.
The Arctic is becoming increasingly contested because of growing Russian military activity, expanding Chinese engagement, and the strategic consequences of climate change. At the same time, long-range precision strike systems, persistent surveillance, cyber operations, and electronic warfare are increasing the vulnerability of concentrated forces and fixed infrastructure.
As a result, traditional approaches centered on large platforms, major bases and permanent force presence are becoming less effective. Arctic deterrence should instead focus on denial: the ability to prevent an adversary from achieving military objectives quickly, easily, or at acceptable cost.
This brief argues that Arctic allies should align capabilities rather than pursue deeper force integration. Effective Arctic defense depends on generating three operational effects:
* Persistent awareness
* Distributed denial
* Operational resilience
The new U.S.-Greenland-Kingdom of Denmark agreement provides a practical framework for advancing this approach. Its success should be measured not by the number of troops deployed or facilities constructed, but by whether it enables:
* Persistent Arctic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) networks
* Resilient command and control systems
* Distributed maritime denial capabilities
* Critical infrastructure protection
* Distributed sustainment networks
The agreement should therefore serve as a foundation for coalition capability development across the Arctic and North Atlantic.
Introduction
The Arctic is emerging as a critical theater of strategic competition. Russia continues to expand military capabilities across its northern territories, while China is increasing its political, economic, and scientific engagement in the region. Climate change is gradually expanding access to Arctic waters, increasing the region's geopolitical and military significance.[i]
The security agreement signed by the United States, Greenland, and the Kingdom of Denmark at the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, 2026, creates an important opportunity to strengthen Arctic security.[ii] While public attention has focused on sovereignty and military access, the agreement's greatest strategic value lies elsewhere. It offers a framework for developing the distributed capabilities needed to deter aggression in an increasingly contested Arctic operating environment.
Recent research from the Hudson Institute's Center for Defense Concepts and Technology (CDCT) suggests that military effectiveness increasingly depends on distributed networks of sensors, decision-making systems, communications, and strike capabilities rather than on a small number of concentrated, high-value platforms.[iii] This insight is particularly relevant in the Arctic, where vast distances, limited infrastructure, harsh environmental conditions, and growing technological threats magnify the vulnerabilities of traditional force structures.
This brief argues that Arctic defense cooperation should focus on capability alignment rather than force integration. Instead of building large permanent force deployments, Arctic allies should align national capabilities to generate three shared operational effects: persistent awareness, distributed denial, and operational resilience. The U.S.-Greenland-Kingdom of Denmark agreement provides an opportunity to operationalize this approach.
Strategic Context: The Arctic as a Contested Operational Environment
The Arctic is undergoing a strategic transformation. Russia continues to treat the region as a strategic location and has invested heavily in military infrastructure, air and missile defenses, maritime capabilities, and dual-use facilities. Meanwhile, China has expanded its Arctic presence through scientific activities, investment, and political engagement, positioning itself as a stakeholder in regional governance and development.[iv]
Climate change is accelerating this transformation. Greater access to Arctic waters is increasing economic activity and expanding operational opportunities for military and civilian actors. Although the region remains one of the world's most demanding environments, its strategic importance is steadily rising.
At the same time, military-technological developments are reshaping the operational environment. Long-range precision strike systems, persistent surveillance, cyber operations and electronic warfare are increasing the vulnerability of concentrated forces and fixed infrastructure.[v] These developments are particularly significant in the Arctic, where geography, sparse infrastructure and long distances already impose substantial operational constraints.
The Arctic's maritime character reinforces these challenges. Critical sea routes, chokepoints, undersea infrastructure, and maritime approaches connect the region to North America, Europe, and the broader global economy. The Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea remain strategically important operational spaces.
The central challenge for Arctic allies is therefore not maintaining continuous presence across the region but denying adversaries the ability to exploit these spaces at an acceptable cost. Effective deterrence depends on the ability to create uncertainty, friction, and operational risk through resilient operational networks capable of generating military effects across the theater.[vi]
From Integration to Capability Alignment in Arctic Defense
Arctic cooperation has expanded significantly following Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO. Yet geographic realities, national sovereignty concerns, differing escalation thresholds and largely national logistics systems limit the feasibility of deeply integrated force structures. The principal challenge is therefore not institutional integration but capability alignment. The goal should be to ensure that nationally controlled capabilities can generate shared operational effects across the Arctic theatre.
Three operational effects are particularly important.
Persistent Awareness
The first is persistent awareness, which is the ability to detect, identify, and track military activity across vast maritime, air, and subsea domains. Given the size of the Arctic, no nation can maintain comprehensive situational awareness independently. Effective monitoring requires integrating satellites, maritime patrol aircraft, seabed sensors, autonomous systems and national intelligence assets.
Distributed Denial
The second is distributed denial, which is the ability to impose costs and restrict adversary freedom of maneuver. Rather than relying on concentrated deployments, allies should establish overlapping sensing, targeting and strike networks capable of contesting activity across critical approaches and infrastructure nodes.
Operational Resilience
The third is operational resilience, which is the ability to sustain military effectiveness despite attacks against communications, logistics, infrastructure and command and control systems. Arctic operations must assume degraded connectivity, environmental disruption, and adversary interference.
Together, these three operational effects provide a practical framework for Arctic capability development. Different allies will contribute different capabilities. What matters is that those capabilities reinforce one another and collectively generate awareness, denial, and resilience across the theater.
Arctic Force Design for Denial
The Arctic favors distributed, resilient, and adaptable force designs over large permanent deployments. Military effectiveness depends on connecting dispersed sensors, decision-makers, sustainment systems, and strike capabilities into operationally coherent networks.
Distributed Maritime Denial
The Arctic's geography is defined by maritime approaches and choke points. Rather than attempting continuous naval presence across enormous distances, Arctic allies should prioritize distributed maritime denial capabilities that exploit geography as a force multiplier.[vii]
Such capabilities may include mobile anti-ship missile systems, distributed coastal defense networks, long-range precision fires, and deployable sensing architectures. The objective is not continuous sea control but the ability to deny adversaries uncontested access to critical maritime approaches.
Persistent ISR Networks
Persistent surveillance is one of the Arctic's greatest operational challenges. Long-endurance uncrewed aerial vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles, autonomous surface vessels, satellites, and seabed sensors can provide continuous awareness even under conditions where traditional platforms may be unavailable, vulnerable, or prohibitively expensive.
Resilient Kill Chains and Command and Control
Deterrence increasingly depends on resilient kill chains that connect sensing, decision-making, communications, and strike functions despite disruption.
In the Arctic, adversaries are likely to target communications networks, navigation systems, and command nodes through cyberattacks, electronic warfare and kinetic strikes. Effective force design therefore requires redundant sensing pathways, decentralized decision-making, interoperable communications systems, and multiple routes for transmitting information and commands.
Infrastructure Resilience and Sustainment
Fixed infrastructure is among the most vulnerable elements of Arctic defense. Airfields, ports, fuel depots, and command centers are limited in number and often difficult to replace.
Arctic allies should therefore emphasize dispersed operations, infrastructure hardening, mobile air defenses, deception, and distributed sustainment concepts. The objective is not invulnerability, but the ability to sustain military operations and continue imposing costs even after initial attacks.
Leveraging the U.S.-Greenland-Kingdom of Denmark Agreement
The September 2026 agreement creates the first major political framework through which distributed Arctic deterrence can be operationalized. Its significance extends beyond questions of access and military presence. The agreement's greatest strategic value lies in its ability to support coalition capability development across the Arctic and North Atlantic while limiting opportunities for strategic competitors to establish military positions or pursue sensitive investments in Greenland.
Its success should therefore not be measured by the number of troops deployed or facilities built. Such metrics reflect a traditional basing paradigm that is increasingly ill-suited to a contested operating environment.
Instead, policymakers should assess whether the agreement enables:
* Persistent Arctic ISR networks.
* Resilient command-and-control architectures.
* Distributed maritime denial capabilities across the GIUK Gap and adjacent Arctic approaches.
* Protection of critical infrastructure, including ports, energy installations, communications networks and subsea cables.
* Distributed sustainment networks capable of supporting operations in austere environments.
Viewed through this lens, the agreement should function not primarily as a basing arrangement but as an enabling framework for capability alignment among Arctic allies and partners.
Greenland's greatest strategic value is not as a location for concentrated military forces. Rather, it is a critical node within a distributed operational network connecting North America, the GIUK Gap, and the European Arctic. Leveraging Greenland in this manner would strengthen deterrence while reducing vulnerabilities associated with large concentrations of military infrastructure.
This approach aligns closely with current U.S. defense priorities emphasizing resilient kill chains, distributed operations, and campaigning in contested environments. The agreement provides an opportunity to translate these concepts into practical Arctic force design.
Policy Recommendations
Establish a U.S.-Greenland-Kingdom of Denmark Arctic Capability Initiative
Washington, Nuuk, and Copenhagen should establish a trilateral capability initiative focused on distributed defense capabilities rather than traditional basing arrangements. Priority areas should include ISR, communications resilience, autonomous systems, infrastructure security, and operational sustainment.
Develop a Persistent Arctic Sensing Network
The three partners should develop a layered network integrating satellites, maritime patrol aircraft, seabed sensors, autonomous systems and NATO ISR capabilities. The objective should be continuous domain awareness across critical Arctic and North Atlantic approaches.
Build Resilient Arctic Command and Control Architecture
The United States, Denmark and Arctic allies should develop redundant communications systems and secure data-sharing mechanisms capable of operating despite cyberattacks, electronic warfare or disruptions to space-based assets.
Strengthen Maritime Denial Across the Greenland-GIUK Corridor
Partners should pursue distributed maritime denial capabilities based on long-range sensing, autonomous systems, anti-ship capabilities and rapidly deployable assets designed to complicate adversary operations across critical maritime approaches.
Protect Critical Arctic Infrastructure
The three governments should establish a joint framework to monitor and protect ports, communications infrastructure, energy installations, satellite ground stations, and subsea cables. Infrastructure resilience should become a central component of Arctic deterrence.
Develop Distributed Arctic Sustainment Networks
Policymakers should pursue distributed sustainment logistics concepts based on prepositioned equipment, dual-use infrastructure, autonomous resupply systems and interoperable support arrangements among Arctic allies and partners.
Expand Capability Alignment Across the Arctic
The agreement should serve as a catalyst for broader capability alignment among the United States, Greenland, Denmark, the Faroe Islands, Canada, Norway, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Investments should focus on complementary operational effects rather than duplicative national force structures.
Conclusion
The strategic value of the September 2026 U.S.-Greenland-Kingdom of Denmark agreement lies not primarily in expanded U.S. access or military presence, but in its potential to support a new model of Arctic deterrence.
The Arctic's geography, climate, and operational challenges favor distributed and resilient force designs over concentrated deployments and fixed infrastructure. Effective deterrence therefore depends on allies' ability to generate persistent awareness, distributed denial, and operational resilience across the theater.
The agreement provides a practical framework for aligning capabilities among Arctic allies and partners. It can be used to develop integrated sensing networks, resilient command-and-control systems, maritime denial capabilities, infrastructure protection, and distributed sustainment arrangements. It can become a foundation for a more effective approach to Arctic security.
Greenland's most important contribution is therefore not as a site for concentrated military forces, but as a strategically positioned node within a distributed network spanning North America, the GIUK Gap and the European Arctic. The success of the agreement should ultimately be measured by the military effects it enables, not by the military footprint it creates.
Read in RealClearDefense (https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/09/26/making_the_greenland_agreement_work_building_distributed_arctic_deterrence_1208421.html#google_vignette).
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Liselotte Odgaard is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Her work focuses on geopolitical, military-strategic, and institutional aspects of great power relations with a particular focus on China, Russia, and the United States, as well as the implications of great power dynamics for medium and small powers in regions such as the Arctic, the Indo-Pacific, and Europe.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/making-greenland-agreement-work-building-distributed-arctic-deterrence-liselotte-odgaard
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Insight: Tracker - Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight:
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September 28, 2026
Tracker: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
Thomas Kingsley
Introduction
This tracker follows the Federal Reserve's (Fed) total consolidated assets, held on its balance sheet, as the best indicator of the Fed's direct intervention in the economy.
Context
The Fed's dual mandate requires it to ensure both stable prices and maximum employment. The traditional tool the Fed uses to accomplish these goals is the adjustment of the federal funds rate, the short-term interest rate that
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight:
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September 28, 2026
Tracker: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
Thomas Kingsley
Introduction
This tracker follows the Federal Reserve's (Fed) total consolidated assets, held on its balance sheet, as the best indicator of the Fed's direct intervention in the economy.
Context
The Fed's dual mandate requires it to ensure both stable prices and maximum employment. The traditional tool the Fed uses to accomplish these goals is the adjustment of the federal funds rate, the short-term interest rate thatdetermines how much it costs for banks to lend to each other overnight. The 2007-2008 financial crisis, however, demonstrated that even lowering the interest rate to zero was considered insufficient to shore up economies in freefall, and the Fed turned to more unusual tactics. One of these measures was what the Fed refers to as "large-scale asset purchases," which is more commonly known as "quantitative easing." Under this process, the Fed enters the market to buy securities, typically mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and Treasuries, injecting both capital and liquidity into the market. This approach is not without risks - for the first time in its history, the Fed is regulator, supervisor, and now participant in the economy.
The development of quantitative easing as a go-to tool for the Fed in times of crisis has led to an unprecedented focus on one of its traditionally unremarkable aspects - the Fed total assets. Just as with any other firm, securities that the Fed purchases are considered assets and therefore are represented on the Fed's balance sheet. This therefore is the most reflective guide of the state of quantitative easing and, by extension, the degree to which the Fed has deemed it necessary to intervene in the economy.
Each week, the Federal Reserve publishes its balance sheet, typically on Wednesday afternoon around 4:30 p.m.
As of September 23, the Fed's assets stand at $6.7 trillion, up $1 billion from the prior week and over $139 billion higher than a year ago.
Sources:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB
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Thomas Kingsley is the Director of Financial Services Policy at the American Action Forum.
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/tracker-the-federal-reserves-balance-sheet/
[Category: Think Tank]
AFPI Responds to California's Sweeping New Election Laws That Undermine Election Integrity
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:
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AFPI Responds to California's Sweeping New Election Laws That Undermine Election Integrity
September 28, 2026
Recently, Governor Gavin Newsom signed a 13-bill election package that he described as protecting California elections. The bulk of this package, however, is intended to create roadblocks for any Federal investigation into California's election system. Moreover, this package adds toxic ingredients to the witches' brew of bad election laws that plague the state of California.
At a time
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:
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AFPI Responds to California's Sweeping New Election Laws That Undermine Election Integrity
September 28, 2026
Recently, Governor Gavin Newsom signed a 13-bill election package that he described as protecting California elections. The bulk of this package, however, is intended to create roadblocks for any Federal investigation into California's election system. Moreover, this package adds toxic ingredients to the witches' brew of bad election laws that plague the state of California.
At a timewhen most Americans are demanding more verification before a vote is cast, California officials are doing everything they can to make sure we have less. Laws that chip away at verification requirements encourage people to stay home, ultimately suppressing the vote and deteriorating public confidence in election results.
"Californians deserve elections they can trust, and that starts with transparency, verification, and accountability," said Mike Garcia, chairman of America First California. "Instead of putting common sense safeguards in place that give voters confidence in the process, Sacramento continues to move in the opposite direction.
Every eligible Californian should be able to vote knowing that our election laws protect the integrity of their ballot and the legitimacy of the outcome."
Californians deserve an election system built on transparency, verification, and accountability. Policies that move away from those principles risk further eroding public confidence in election results.
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Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-responds-to-californias-sweeping-new-election-laws-that-undermine-election-integrity/
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Applauds Senate Passage of the Protect College Sports Act
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:
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AFPI Applauds Senate Passage of the Protect College Sports Act
September 28, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) applauds the U.S. Senate for passing the bipartisan Protect College Sports Act, a major step toward bringing the stability, consistency, and certainty to college athletics that student athletes deserve.
For too long, athletes, coaches, and schools have been forced to navigate an increasingly uncertain and complex athletics landscape. Senate passage of
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Sept. 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:
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AFPI Applauds Senate Passage of the Protect College Sports Act
September 28, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) applauds the U.S. Senate for passing the bipartisan Protect College Sports Act, a major step toward bringing the stability, consistency, and certainty to college athletics that student athletes deserve.
For too long, athletes, coaches, and schools have been forced to navigate an increasingly uncertain and complex athletics landscape. Senate passage ofthe Protect College Sports Act is an important step in bringing Congress one step closer to providing clear, consistent rules that protect student-athletes and preserve the future of college sports. But the work is not finished. We look forward to swift consideration and passage in the House.
"Current and future college athletes deserve to know that the sports they love will still be there for them and the next generation," said Athletes for America's Ella Brooks, who is a member of the women's track and field team at Clemson University. "The Protect College Sports Act provides the clarity and stability that college athletics desperately needs. I'm grateful to see that the Senate has taken action to move this legislation through and look forward to seeing the House do the same."
"The Protect College Sports Act is a critical step forward to preserve opportunities for student-athletes across the country, including those at HBCUs and smaller programs. College sports cannot be built only for elite athletes at the biggest schools. Every athlete who earns a spot deserves a shot to compete, to grow, and to build a future through sports. It's time to get this legislation through the end zone," said Frank Murphy, Chair of Athletes for America and former NFL player.
The Protect College Sports Act establishes a clear framework while protecting opportunities for student athletes and helping preserve women's, Olympic, and non-revenue sports. AFPI urges the House to build on the bipartisan momentum and pass this legislation.
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Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-applauds-senate-passage-of-the-protect-college-sports-act/
[Category: ThinkTank]
