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Ifo Institute: EU Funding Drives Growth in Structurally Weak German Regions
MUNICH, Germany, April 22 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on April 21, 2026:
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EU Funding Drives Growth in Structurally Weak German Regions
According to a study by the ifo Institute's Dresden Branch, EU structural funding has helped boost growth in structurally weak German regions. "Our calculations show that one euro of EU funding led to two euros of additional gross domestic product in the long term," says Joachim Ragnitz, Managing Director of the Dresden branch of the ifo Institute. "Above all, the funding for research, knowledge transfer, and innovation had
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MUNICH, Germany, April 22 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on April 21, 2026:
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EU Funding Drives Growth in Structurally Weak German Regions
According to a study by the ifo Institute's Dresden Branch, EU structural funding has helped boost growth in structurally weak German regions. "Our calculations show that one euro of EU funding led to two euros of additional gross domestic product in the long term," says Joachim Ragnitz, Managing Director of the Dresden branch of the ifo Institute. "Above all, the funding for research, knowledge transfer, and innovation hada positive impact, as these have a particularly significant impact on productivity."
During the 2014-2020 funding period, Germany received almost EUR 21 billion in structural funding from the European Union. Nearly two thirds of it went to the structurally weaker regions in Eastern Germany, as these are classified as particularly eligible beneficiaries under the EU criteria. The total funded investment here amounted to around EUR 700 per inhabitant, but only about EUR 150 per inhabitant in Western Germany. Without this support, public investment in Eastern Germany would have been significantly lower. Small and medium-sized enterprises also benefited from the funding programs co-financed by the EU.
"Due to the tight financial situation especially in the eastern German states and their municipalities, it would not have been possible to finance many investments in infrastructure and growth-boosting projects," says Ragnitz. In light of the current ongoing negotiations regarding the EU's 2028-2034 financial framework, he warns against cutting these funds: "A reduction in EU funding could have serious negative consequences."
The ifo Institute's Dresden Branch analyzed the European structural funding for 2014-2020 as part of a large-scale evaluation study together with the Gesellschaft fur Finanz- und Regionalanalysen (GEFRA) and Ramboll Management Consulting.
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Publication
2026 Article in Journal
EFRE-Forderung 2014 -2020: Fokus auf Wettbewerbsfahigkeit und Klimaschutz sowie Konvergenz Ostdeutschlands
Bjorn Alecke, Carola Harnischfeger, Timo Mitze, Joachim Ragnitz, Lukas Vonnahme, Gerhard Untiedt
ifo Dresden berichtet, 2026, 33, Nr. 02
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2026/article-journal/efre-foerderung-2014-2020-fokus-auf-wettbewerbsfaehigkeit)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-04-21/eu-funding-drives-growth-in-structurally-weak-german-regions
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for American Progress: Trump and Congressional Republicans' Budget Plan Funnels Billions to ICE And Border Patrol While Offering No Relief for American Families
WASHINGTON, April 22 (TNSrep) -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release on April 21, 2026:
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Trump and Congressional Republicans' Budget Plan Funnels Billions to ICE And Border Patrol While Offering No Relief for American Families
Senate Republicans' newly released budget resolution would direct roughly $70 billion toward immigration enforcement agencies while providing zero relief for American families facing high costs for health care, housing, and groceries, according to a new analysis (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trump-and-congressional-republicans-plan-to-pump-more-money-into-ice-and-border-patrol-is-a-missed-opportunity-to-help-americans/)
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WASHINGTON, April 22 (TNSrep) -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release on April 21, 2026:
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Trump and Congressional Republicans' Budget Plan Funnels Billions to ICE And Border Patrol While Offering No Relief for American Families
Senate Republicans' newly released budget resolution would direct roughly $70 billion toward immigration enforcement agencies while providing zero relief for American families facing high costs for health care, housing, and groceries, according to a new analysis (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trump-and-congressional-republicans-plan-to-pump-more-money-into-ice-and-border-patrol-is-a-missed-opportunity-to-help-americans/)from the Center for American Progress.
Congressional Republicans are using the reconciliation process to bypass a potential filibuster and pass legislation on a partisan basis. The resolution prioritizes funding for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Border Patrol through fiscal year 2029. A reconciliation bill stemming from this budget resolution is expected to move forward in the coming weeks. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) still has tens of billions of dollars in previously allocated funds that remain unobligated.
"Congressional Republicans are choosing to spend billions on DHS to continue to fund human rights violations instead of doing anything to help struggling Americans," said Bobby Kogan, senior director of federal budget policy at the Center for American Progress. "Budget decisions are about priorities. This resolution shows exactly who they're willing to spend on and who they're willing to leave behind."
CAP's analysis finds:
* Massive enforcement funding with broad deficit authority: The resolution allows up to $70 billion in deficit increases each for the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee, creating a potential ceiling of $140 billion, while current plans indicate roughly $70 billion in new DHS spending.
* No investment in lowering everyday costs for families: Despite authorizing tens of billions in new spending for DHS, the proposal includes $0 to lower health care costs, reduce grocery prices, or ease housing expenses.
* New funding layered on top of unused resources: DHS is set to receive additional funding even though it still holds tens of billions in unobligated funds from legislation enacted just nine months ago.
* Deficit spending with minimal guardrails: By going it alone in reconciliation, this funding is likely to have significantly less oversight and fewer constraints than typical DHS funding.
Read the analysis: "Trump and Congressional Republicans' Plan To Pump More Money Into ICE and Border Patrol Is a Missed Opportunity To Help Americans" (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trump-and-congressional-republicans-plan-to-pump-more-money-into-ice-and-border-patrol-is-a-missed-opportunity-to-help-americans/) by Bobby Kogan
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Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release-trump-and-congressional-republicans-budget-plan-funnels-billions-to-ice-and-border-patrol-while-offering-no-relief-for-american-families/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Illinois' Energy Leadership at Risk Without a Pragmatic Climate Strategy, New PPI Report Warns
WASHINGTON, April 21 [Category: ThinkTank] (TNSrpt) -- The Progressive Policy Institute posted the following news release:
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Illinois' Energy Leadership at Risk Without a Pragmatic Climate Strategy, New PPI Report Warns
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A new report from the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) finds that Illinois has built one of the nation's cleanest and most affordable energy systems, but warns that calendar-driven mandates to phase out natural gas generation could undermine grid reliability, drive up costs, and push investment to neighboring states.
Authored by Neel Brown, Managing Director at PPI,
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 21 [Category: ThinkTank] (TNSrpt) -- The Progressive Policy Institute posted the following news release:
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Illinois' Energy Leadership at Risk Without a Pragmatic Climate Strategy, New PPI Report Warns
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A new report from the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) finds that Illinois has built one of the nation's cleanest and most affordable energy systems, but warns that calendar-driven mandates to phase out natural gas generation could undermine grid reliability, drive up costs, and push investment to neighboring states.
Authored by Neel Brown, Managing Director at PPI,and John Kemp, an internationally recognized energy markets expert, " The Illinois Challenge: Balancing Decarbonization with Economic Reality," outlines a strategy grounded in reliability, technological maturity, and economic competitiveness.
Illinois has reduced emissions faster than the national average, driven largely by its dominant nuclear fleet and a steady, market-led shift from coal to natural gas. Emissions fell 2.1% annually between 2005 and 2023, compared to 1.2% nationwide, and the state now emits 188 tons of carbon dioxide per $1 million of economic output, more than 10% below the national average and well below every other Midwest state. Household energy spending is nearly 12% below the national average, underscoring the affordability gains that have sustained public support for continued climate progress.
"Illinois' progress shows that durable emissions reductions come from markets, innovation, and firm low-carbon generation, not from rigid calendar deadlines," said Brown. "The state already leads the country in clean nuclear power. The next phase requires a pragmatic strategy that protects reliability and affordability while continuing to drive emissions down."
The authors note that the 2021 Climate and Equitable Jobs Act mandates a full phaseout of natural gas generation by 2045, a timeline that the state's own 2025 Resource Adequacy Study warns could open significant capacity gaps just as electricity demand is surging. Illinois is currently the country's fifth-largest electricity generator and a net exporter, but eliminating in-state gas generation is projected to turn it into a net importer reliant on the PJM and Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) regional grids, both of which are expected to face capacity shortfalls by 2030.
Upward pressure on prices is already emerging. Wholesale electricity costs in the PJM region serving northern Illinois surged more than 40% in 2025 amid rapid data center growth, and residential rates jumped 11% in a single year. The authors caution that retiring firm generation before proven replacements are in place will pull energy-intensive industries to higher-emission states such as Indiana and Ohio, exporting both jobs and carbon emissions. Illinois Gov. JB Pritzker has taken a constructive step by committing to two gigawatts of new nuclear generation and lifting the state's longstanding moratorium on new reactor construction, reflecting the kind of pragmatic, state-specific policymaking the report recommends.
To navigate this transition, the authors outline three core principles for policymakers:
1. Embrace new nuclear as the foundation of a clean, firm electricity system capable of supporting 24/7 industrial loads and backstopping intermittent renewables.
2. Reform gas transition timelines so infrastructure retirements are aligned with the proven readiness of replacement technologies rather than calendar deadlines.
3. Prioritize grid reliability by heeding regional capacity warnings and avoiding policies that risk blackouts, price spikes, or the loss of in-state generation.
The authors conclude that Illinois' path to decarbonization must reflect its unique position as the nation's top nuclear producer and a major electricity exporter. A successful strategy will build on the state's market-driven progress while avoiding mandates that risk destabilizing the grid, raising costs for households and businesses, or pushing investment across state lines.
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Founded in 1989, PPI is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Find an expert and learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org. Follow us at @PPI.
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REPORT: https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Illinois-Climate-Goals.pdf
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Original text here: https://www.progressivepolicy.org/illinois-energy-leadership-at-risk-without-a-pragmatic-climate-strategy-new-ppi-report-warns/
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Capitol Watch - Big Victory for Mining From Congress
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 21 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 20, 2026, by Vice President of Communications Bill Walsh:
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Capitol Watch: Big victory for mining from Congress
Capitol Watch normally refers to the Minnesota Capitol in St. Paul but action taken this week by the U. S. Senate deserves our attention. A bill to reverse the ban on mining in northern Minnesota passed the Senate 50-49 with Minnesota's Senators Klobuchar and Smith voting "no." The
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GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 21 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 20, 2026, by Vice President of Communications Bill Walsh:
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Capitol Watch: Big victory for mining from Congress
Capitol Watch normally refers to the Minnesota Capitol in St. Paul but action taken this week by the U. S. Senate deserves our attention. A bill to reverse the ban on mining in northern Minnesota passed the Senate 50-49 with Minnesota's Senators Klobuchar and Smith voting "no." Thebill originated in the House under the leadership of Congressman Pete Stauber.
As Bill Glahn wrote, at a time when Congress can't even pass a bill as simple as funding the Department of Homeland Security, Rep. Stauber got a bill passed that could mean tens of billions of dollars (with a "b") in economic activity for Minnesota. This new mining activity, centered on copper, nickel, cobalt, and other valuable metals, could create many high-paying, family-supporting union jobs that everyone claims they want.
This event should be celebrated with parades and fireworks. Instead, the media, both local and national, are treating the occasion as some species of catastrophe. Despite what you read in the Star Tribune, there will be no mining in the BWCA and there will be no mining in the buffer zone around the BWCA.
Look for this issue to reappear in the governor's race this fall. Speaker of the House Lisa Demuth wasted no time criticizing Amy Klobuchar for her vote.
House moves to impeach Walz and Ellison
House Republicans brought impeachment resolutions against Gov. Tim Walz and Attorney General Keith Ellison to the House Rules Committee last week. The resolution regarding Walz charges him with "knowingly concealing or permitting others to conceal widespread fraud within Minnesota state-administered programs despite repeated warnings, audits, reports, and public indicators of systematic abuse." Hard to argue with that.
The resolution regarding Ellison cited the now-famous recording of him telling fraudsters he would run interference with state agencies on their behalf days before he received campaign contributions from some of them for his reelection effort. As we reported here, he quietly returned the donations. Rep. Ben Davis, the author of HR 7 also charged that Ellison "engaged in conduct that brings disrepute upon the Office of Attorney General, including undermining the rule of law; weakening the protection for religious liberty; and damaging public trust in Minnesota's justice system."
Democrats on the Rules Committee fought back eloquently. Rep. Mike Howard and Rep. Erin Koegel used the age-old argument, "I know you are, but what am I?" bringing up Donald Trump. Rep. Sidney Jordan called the resolutions "dumb," and said it made her mad as a millennial. Rep. Nathan Coulter called it "harebrained."
The resolution to send the impeachment articles to the House Fraud Prevention Committee suffered the same fate befalling every contentious issue this session. It died on a tie vote.
2025 per capita spending was higher in Minnesota than in 45 other states
With the final committee deadline passed and no budget targets announced by legislative leaders, we thought it would be a good time to remind readers that Minnesota has a spending problem. Economist John Phelan gave it some national context in this post.
Using data on General Fund spending and population, we can calculate the per person amount of government spending in each state. As Figure 1 shows, in 2025, Minnesota's state government spent $6,098 per person, an amount higher than in 45 other states.
Adjusting for inflation, we can calculate the increase in per capita state government spending over time in real terms. As Figure 2 shows, adjusted for inflation, Minnesota's level of state government spending per person increased by 18.5% between 2019 and 2025. This was a greater increase than in 42 other states; indeed, in 12 states government spending per person fell in inflation adjusted terms over the same period.
Phelan ends his piece with a few questions for taxpayers. Are you getting more out of your state government than the residents of those 45 lower spending states? Are you getting 18.5% more out of your state government than you were in 2019?
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Bill Walsh is the Vice President of Communications at Center of the American Experiment.
bill.walsh@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/capitol-watch-big-victory-for-mining-from-congress/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for American Progress: State Strategies for Protecting Higher Education Funding After the 'Big Beautiful Bill'
WASHINGTON, April 21 (TNSrep) -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release on April 20, 2026:
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State Strategies for Protecting Higher Education Funding After the 'Big Beautiful Bill'
Colleges and universities across the United States are facing a funding crisis thanks to the Trump administration's Big Beautiful Bill (BBB), enacted into law in July 2025.
The BBB will slash $186 billion in food assistance and more than $1 trillion in health care spending over the next decade. As states absorb these costs, a new analysis (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/stabilizing-and-strengthening-state-funding-for-public-higher-education-after-the-big-beautiful-bill/)
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WASHINGTON, April 21 (TNSrep) -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release on April 20, 2026:
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State Strategies for Protecting Higher Education Funding After the 'Big Beautiful Bill'
Colleges and universities across the United States are facing a funding crisis thanks to the Trump administration's Big Beautiful Bill (BBB), enacted into law in July 2025.
The BBB will slash $186 billion in food assistance and more than $1 trillion in health care spending over the next decade. As states absorb these costs, a new analysis (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/stabilizing-and-strengthening-state-funding-for-public-higher-education-after-the-big-beautiful-bill/)from the Center for American Progress pinpoints public higher education as one of the most vulnerable sectors for budget cuts.
The report compares each state's higher education funding level to its overall fiscal capacity, identifying the states that allocate relatively little support for higher education relative to their wealth. The report identifies promising ways to boost state tax revenue for public colleges and universities based on existing strategies at play in Massachusetts, Colorado, Washington, and Oregon. It also highlights the importance of building robust rainy day funds and creating dedicated funds for education.
Key findings from the CAP analysis include:
* Following the Great Recession, inflation-adjusted state funding per full-time equivalent student dropped from $10,714 to $8,213 from 2008 to 2012, resulting in an 18 percent spike in average tuition.
* Currently, 21 states fall below the national average in both per-student funding levels and state funding effort.
* New Mexico, Wyoming, and Hawaii boast both high postsecondary education funding and state effort.
* In contrast, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Colorado, Rhode Island, and Delaware all rank low on both funding levels and funding effort.
* Federal funding cuts disproportionately affect community colleges, which are important lanes of opportunity for low-income students.
"State leaders have a choice to make," said Sara Partridge, associate director of Higher Education at CAP and author of the report. "They can let public higher education become a budget casualty, or they can take proactive steps to ensure program quality remains high and degrees remain accessible to future generations."
Read the report: "Stabilizing and Strengthening State Funding for Public Higher Education After the Big Beautiful Bill" (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/stabilizing-and-strengthening-state-funding-for-public-higher-education-after-the-big-beautiful-bill/) by Sara Partridge
For more information on this topic or to speak with an expert, contact Mishka Espey at eespey@americanprogress.org.
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Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release-state-strategies-for-protecting-higher-education-funding-after-the-big-beautiful-bill/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Nordic Nukes - Seeking Strategic Agency in Uncertain Times
WASHINGTON, April 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 20, 2026, by visiting fellow Astrid Chevreuil, former visiting fellow Gine Lund Bolling and former intern Sara von Bonsdorff, all of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program:
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Nordic Nukes: Seeking Strategic Agency in Uncertain Times
Following French President Emmanuel Macron's March 2 speech at Ile-Longue, most Nordic countries--Sweden, Denmark, and Norway--have expressed interest in an additional European nuclear protection, to complement U.S. extended deterrence. For the
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, April 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 20, 2026, by visiting fellow Astrid Chevreuil, former visiting fellow Gine Lund Bolling and former intern Sara von Bonsdorff, all of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program:
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Nordic Nukes: Seeking Strategic Agency in Uncertain Times
Following French President Emmanuel Macron's March 2 speech at Ile-Longue, most Nordic countries--Sweden, Denmark, and Norway--have expressed interest in an additional European nuclear protection, to complement U.S. extended deterrence. For theNordics, once the world's most vocal advocates for nuclear disarmament, the recent transition to a formal reliance on nuclear deterrence, and primarily U.S. extended deterrence, has been a profound strategic coming of age. Yet this pivot has birthed a unique dilemma: These states have anchored their survival to NATO's nuclear posture at the exact moment the U.S. National Defense Strategy has begun to increasingly prioritize domestic interests over international commitments.
Consequently, the nuclear debate in the Nordic countries has reached a historical fever pitch. Spanning the traditional NATO umbrella, the provocative concept of an indigenous "Nordic Nuke," and the European path of Macron's forward deterrence, these discussions signal a move beyond traditional disarmament to champion a more autonomous form of strategic thinking. This article explores these evolving options and how they might provide the Nordic countries with greater agency in an increasingly uncertain nuclear landscape.
Nordic Nuclear Trajectories: From Disarmament Champions to Deterrence Realists
For decades, the Nordic region's security architecture was defined by a delicate balance: While Norway and Denmark relied on NATO's nuclear umbrella, nonaligned Sweden and Finland acted as global champions for arms control and nonproliferation. Even as NATO members, Oslo and Copenhagen maintained strict "peacetime bans" on nuclear stationing to avoid provoking Moscow--even though it was revealed in the 1990s that Denmark secretly allowed U.S. storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland from 1958 to 1965. Meanwhile, Stockholm and Helsinki leveraged their neutrality to lead initiatives like the 1975 Helsinki Accords and the 2013 humanitarian impact conference, framing the Nordics as the moral conscience of the nuclear order. This political positioning was reinforced by strong popular support for unilateral disarmament across the region, particularly in Norway and Denmark.
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine shattered this equilibrium. Finland and Sweden's subsequent NATO accession was characterized by a "no preconditions" strategy, prioritizing immediate Article 5 guarantees over traditional caveats. In Helsinki and Stockholm, governing Social Democratic parties--once the ideological backbone of the disarmament movement--orchestrated rapid internal reviews to align with the alliance's nuclear posture. In Sweden, then-opposition leader Ulf Kristersson publicly pledged support for following the Norwegian and Danish model of prohibiting nuclear weapons in peacetime to build domestic consensus. The speed of the process--spanning only from February to May 2022--deliberately prioritized a swift accession, leaving little space for opposition movements to organize for a deep public debate on the nuclear implications of membership. This marked a profound shift in the region from being the world's fiercest advocates for disarmament to becoming frontline states in a nuclear alliance.
Today, the Nordic region is in a state of legislative and political flux. While Norway, Denmark, and Sweden maintain their non-stationing policies through political commitments and defense cooperation agreements, these remain executive policy choices rather than hard law. Finland stands as the starkest exception, with its 1987 Nuclear Energy Act that explicitly criminalizes the import and transport of nuclear weapons. However, the current government's proposal to repeal these restrictions signals a move toward an alignment with other NATO members in the region--a move designed to maximize preventative deterrence that has instead sparked a domestic political debate. It is worth noting that leaders who once avoided the topic now speak openly of nuclear realities: Finnish President Alexander Stubb has highlighted the increasing role of nuclear assets, and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson has indicated openness to hosting them in wartime scenarios.
This internal realignment is colliding with a fundamental shift in Washington. Following the June 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague--where President Trump demanded allies reach a 5 percent GDP defense spending target by 2035--the subsequent 2026 Greenland crisis acted as a strategic shock to the Nordic region. By threatening military force to annex Danish territory, the United States transformed from an unconditional protector into an unpredictable strategic risk. For the Nordics, the U.S. nuclear umbrella, while still present, is no longer perceived as an absolute or unconditional guarantee. This erosion of trust has turned strategic agency from a theoretical goal into an existential necessity, prompting a search for more predictable forms of European security.
Options on the Table: Navigating the New Deterrence Landscape
In response to heightened geopolitical tensions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and growing uncertainty about U.S. security guarantees, Nordic countries are now actively debating three main strategic options.
1. Doubling Down on U.S. Security Guarantee
The foremost strategic priority for the Nordic countries remains the preservation of U.S. engagement in NATO, specifically the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear guarantee. This focus stems from a stark military reality: Europe remains structurally dependent on U.S. nuclear capabilities. This deterrence is embedded in a dense network of transatlantic institutions and operational arrangements that underpin its durability. Even amid shifting U.S. domestic politics, many in Washington argue that a stable Europe is a prerequisite for a pivot to the Indo-Pacific. This reinforces the Nordic view that extended deterrence is a mutual strategic interest rather than a liability, making sustained U.S. leadership the indispensable cornerstone of regional security.
Within this framework, Nordic states have solidified their roles as essential strategic partners. Their advanced capabilities, Arctic warfare expertise, and proximity to Russia's Northern Fleet strengthen the alliance's posture. This commitment is reflected in full institutional support for NATO's nuclear policy, as all Nordic members now participate in the Nuclear Planning Group.
Norway continues to play a sophisticated balancing act, marrying fierce alliance solidarity with a commitment to transparency. The Norwegian National Security Strategy and the Long-Term Defence Plan for 2025-2036 explicitly reaffirm that that while nuclear weapons exist, a mix of forces remains essential. Simultaneously, Oslo promotes arms control and nonproliferation as core elements of its security policy, enabling it to balance participation in NATO's nuclear framework with a long-standing domestic commitment to restraint.
For Finland, the need to counter Russian nuclear signaling and the inherent asymmetry of a nonnuclear state facing a revisionist neighbor have motivated a rapid integration into NATO structures. Finland's recent contribution of F/A-18 Hornet aircraft and personnel to the Steadfast Noon 2025 nuclear deterrence exercise served as a powerful signal of both military interoperability and political resolve.
Denmark has followed a similar trajectory; despite its decades-old nonnuclear policy, its recent participation in Steadfast Noon and its Security and Defence towards 2035 strategy underscore a newfound urgency. Copenhagen's strategy explicitly highlights the need for advanced nuclear crisis management expertise at both military and civilian levels.
Ultimately, this first option represents a collective Nordic effort to reinforce U.S. commitment through deeper integration. By demonstrating significant burden-sharing and avoiding unilateral actions that could fragment the alliance, the Nordic states hope to anchor Washington to Northern Europe. While Sweden and Finland have considered adopting peacetime restrictions similar to the Norwegian and Danish models, the overarching trend is toward a "harder" form of alignment with NATO's deterrence requirements.
2. The European Insurance Policy
A second, newer path involves exploring European nuclear options as an additional backstop. The search for a European complementary security insurance gained decisive momentum with the 2025 Northwood Declaration, which committed London and Paris to enhanced nuclear coordination while maintaining national command.
Following the March 2, 2026, speech at Ile-Longue, Macron's assertion that France's "vital interests" possess a European dimension has gained renewed urgency, particularly through his proposal for a "forward deterrence" (dissuasion avancee) model unveiled at Ile-Longue. The address catalyzed a notable strategic shift in Stockholm and Copenhagen, which signaled their willingness to join French nuclear dialogues. While Stockholm remains firm that it has no intention of hosting nuclear weapons in peacetime, its historical nuclear research legacy and sophisticated defense industrial base make it a uniquely relevant partner. Some analysts suggest that Sweden's technological expertise could allow it to play a supporting role in a future Northern European deterrence framework integrated with French or British assets. Even Oslo, traditionally the most Atlanticist of the three, has begun signaling an openness to this framework, leaving Finland as the sole regional holdout focused exclusively on the NATO nuclear track.
Ultimately, for the Nordics, engaging with Paris and London provides a way to reclaim strategic agency. By fostering closer intra-European cooperation, they are not seeking a substitute for the transatlantic guarantee, but rather a more predictable, localized backstop in an era of deepening geopolitical uncertainty.
3. Indigenous Capabilities, or the "Nordic Nuke" Debate
A third option--the development of an indigenous Nordic nuclear capability--has recently gained traction in academic and expert debate. While it remains a conceptual hedge rather than active policy, its resurgence signals a profound reassessment of the region's security assumptions. Proponents, most notably former Danish Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod, argue that a Nordic nuclear deterrent is becoming a "strategic necessity" to ensure regional survival in an era when the U.S. umbrella is perceived as functionally hollow. Today's proponents envision a cooperative regional framework where Nordic states share financial, technological, and operational responsibilities to maximize strategic autonomy.
The primary function of this Nordic nuke debate is not immediate weaponization, but strategic signaling. However, it is worth noting these debates dismiss the political, technical and financial cost that a nuclear program would impose on Nordic countries if they were to choose that perilous path. Legally, any move toward an indigenous arsenal would require a withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; a move that would shatter the Nordics' international standing and create deep fractures within alliances. While some, such as analyst Johannes Kibsgaard, suggest that a "cooperative nuclear hedge" could potentially be integrated into a NATO framework, this interpretation remains highly contested. Technically, while Sweden has a history of pursuing a nuclear weapons program in the 1960s, establishing an independent value chain to produce nuclear weapons would require decades of investment and a level of political consensus that does not yet exist in any Nordic country.
Ultimately, the indigenous option remains a theoretical fallback. The persistence of this debate confirms that the Nordic states are no longer content to be subjects of a shifting nuclear order but are instead laying the intellectual and political groundwork to become its active architects.
Strategic Maturity: Reimagining the Nordic Contribution to Allied Security
Nordic countries currently face a strategic paradox: They must embrace NATO's nuclear umbrella, the cornerstone of collective security, precisely when the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee is being questioned. This dilemma necessitates cautious and calibrated steps toward nuclear deterrence, avoiding both the radicalism of the abolitionist movement and the extreme risk of proliferation. Given their long-standing commitment to disarmament and their robust contributions to NATO's defense posture, Nordic states are uniquely positioned to offer constructive proposals to European nuclear debates.
First, Nordic countries could lead the defense of NATO's nuclear burden-sharing arrangements, which are increasingly under fire from China and Russia in international disarmament forums. While the United States has signaled no intent to retreat from NATO's nuclear mission, official U.S. strategic documents and statements have increasingly emphasized the conventional aspects of burden sharing, assuming the nuclear dimension remains a settled matter. In this context, the Nordic states are uniquely positioned to translate the same security imperatives that shifted their own domestic opinion toward a nuclear alliance into a broader NATO narrative: proving that robust burden sharing in the face of an aggressive neighbor is actually the most effective tool for preventing further regional proliferation. By doing so, they can engage in a form of intellectual burden sharing, and take up policy leadership in nonproliferation forums at a time when U.S. diplomatic capacity is overextended. The nuanced Nordic perspective is likely to resonate more effectively with the Non-Aligned Movement countries, which has been a primary target of Beijing's narratives against NATO.
Second, the Nordic countries should utilize their existing cooperation frameworks to cultivate a shared strategic culture on nuclear deterrence. Rather than treating nuclear policy as a remote NATO mandate, the region should leverage NORDEFCO to bridge the gap between operational military integration and high-level nuclear doctrine. The unique alignment in military planning in the region--with the consolidation of the Nordic region into a unified NATO theater under Joint Force Command Norfolk, supplemented by the recent suite of bilateral defence cooperation agreements with the United States--could contribute to forging a common perspective on how nuclear deterrence interacts with conventional dynamics in the region. Furthermore, in NATO, the perspectives of Finland and Sweden as new members is unencumbered by decades of Cold War path-dependency, allowing them to offer more innovative contributions to the alliance's nuclear posture than established allies might provide.
Finally, a unified Nordic strategic culture could play a pivotal role in shaping emerging European nuclear options, particularly those spearheaded by France and the United Kingdom. Practical signaling of this cooperation is already visible; for instance, the spring 2025 deployment of nuclear-capable French Rafales to Sweden's Lulea airbase during exercise Pegase Grand Nord demonstrated a newfound readiness to build a more autonomous and resilient European deterrence strategy. In the framework of their nuclear dialogues with France, Nordic countries could also leverage the "total defence" model, which entails a high level of societal resilience from peacetime to conflict, to contribute to European reflections on escalation management under the nuclear threshold.
Nordic governments have embraced deeper integration into NATO's nuclear architecture at a moment of profound systemic tension. This transition has carved out a unique role for the region: acting as a bridge between a foundational commitment to disarmament and a cold-eyed pragmatism toward nuclear deterrence. If they can successfully navigate their domestic political sensitivities, the Nordics will offer a vital new perspective to nascent European security initiatives, demonstrating that even the most reluctant nuclear allies can become the most effective architects of a multilayered deterrence framework.
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Astrid Chevreuil is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia (ERE) Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. Gine Lund Bolling is a former visiting fellow in the ERE Program. Sara von Bonsdorff is a former intern in the ERE Program.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/nordic-nukes-seeking-strategic-agency-uncertain-times
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Iran's Strait of Hormuz Gambit and the Limits of U.S. Military Power
WASHINGTON, April 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 20, 2026, by Daniel Byman, director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program:
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Iran's Strait of Hormuz Gambit and the Limits of U.S. Military Power
The current standoff between the United States and Iran is no longer a clash of capabilities but rather a struggle of political endurance and bargaining leverage. The United States began the conflict with broad, but often unclear, goals that included stopping Iran's nuclear program, weakening Iran's missile and
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WASHINGTON, April 21 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 20, 2026, by Daniel Byman, director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program:
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Iran's Strait of Hormuz Gambit and the Limits of U.S. Military Power
The current standoff between the United States and Iran is no longer a clash of capabilities but rather a struggle of political endurance and bargaining leverage. The United States began the conflict with broad, but often unclear, goals that included stopping Iran's nuclear program, weakening Iran's missile andconventional military capabilities, and regime change. It is now a contest involving maritime coercion, domestic political constraints, and even great power competition. The result is a war whose trajectory is less defined by battlefield outcomes than by each side's expectations about the other's willingness to bear costs.
At the operational level, the conflict has settled into a paradoxical equilibrium: Iran has sought to disrupt global energy flows through a de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, while the United States has responded by "blockading the blockaders," blocking traffic to and from Iranian ports. Tehran's tool kit--drones, naval mines, and swarming small boats--imposes risk and uncertainty, even if it is no match for the U.S. Navy. The U.S. blockade is inflicting severe economic pain on a country that, even before the war, faced a disastrous economic situation.
Washington retains the capacity to clear mines, escort shipping, and suppress Iranian naval assets using Marines and special operations forces. Yet this is not a costless proposition. President Donald Trump is worried, rightly, that even limited Iranian successes in killing U.S. ground troops in such operations could prove a political disaster for him.
Iranian leaders--particularly within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)--appear to believe, with some justification, that they can endure economic and military pressure longer than the United States. The conflict demonstrated Iran's ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz. Prior to the war, this capability was often discussed but never tested; now it constitutes Iran's best lever to pressure the United States in negotiations. For the Iranian regime, the conflict is existential, while for most Americans, it is best over and forgotten, with the hope that prices at the pump will fall soon.
This divergence shapes expectations about escalation. If Iranian actors assume that Washington will ultimately seek an exit, they have incentives to prolong the confrontation, betting that incremental pressure will yield concessions. Conversely, U.S. policymakers face a credibility trap: Threats of further escalation must be balanced against the risk that carrying them out would deepen a conflict that domestic audiences may not support. Bluffing, which Trump is apt to do, only risks convincing the Iranians that U.S. red lines are not real.
The internal consequences for Iran are equally consequential, though harder to assess with confidence. The war has tilted the balance of power toward more hardline elements within the Iranian political system. Yet the system was never monolithic, and now it is even more chaotic: In the first round of talks, Pakistani mediators spent more time helping the Iranians negotiate among themselves than they did with the U.S.-Iran negotiations.
A plausible outcome is a return to an agreement resembling the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the 2015 U.S.-Iran agreement in which Iran accepted strict, verifiable limits on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief from the United States, the European Union, and other major powers, albeit with modifications. The United States is pushing for a 20-year enrichment freeze, while Iran is proposing single digits: a big difference, but also a bridgeable one. Such an arrangement would represent meaningful, if partial, progress. Still, it echoes the Obama deal that Trump vehemently criticized on the campaign trail and ultimately abrogated in his first term.
Iran's internal divisions complicate negotiations, which are already proceeding only in fits and starts and likely to continue that way. Iran in the past was a difficult negotiating partner, and allies, including Israel, fear that the United States may handle the negotiations poorly due to its inexperienced negotiating team and president who regularly changes his position.
Divergences between U.S. and Israeli priorities further complicate both the conduct of the war and its potential resolution. While both countries share a core objective of constraining Iran's nuclear program, their threat perceptions differ in important ways. For Israel, Iran's capabilities--particularly its medium-range ballistic missiles and its proxy network, especially Hezbollah--are existential concerns. The sustained Iranian missile strikes during the war reinforce this perception. By contrast, the United States has placed greater emphasis on Iran's regional military capabilities, including its naval forces, its ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, and its short-range missiles targeting Gulf partners.
An agreement that satisfies Washington by addressing maritime threats and nuclear constraints may fall short of Israel's requirements if it leaves intact Iran's missile arsenal and proxy networks. Conversely, efforts to fully dismantle those capabilities would likely require a level of escalation that Washington is unwilling to sustain or even support. The timing of domestic political calendars--both countries face elections in the fall--adds another layer of complexity. Leaders in both capitals will seek to present outcomes that can be framed as victories, but the political stakes are higher in Israel, where public sensitivity to Iranian threats is more acute.
The role of China introduces an additional strategic dimension. As a major purchaser of Iranian oil and a potential conduit for illicit trade, Beijing has the capacity to mitigate the economic pressure imposed by U.S. sanctions. China also allows the sale of commercial imagery to Iran and has provided chemicals that can be used for missile propellants. Beijing was also reported to be considering providing air defense systems to Iran, but Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth claims Beijing assured him these reports were false.
The United States faces difficult choices in responding to Chinese involvement, even if it is only to purchase Iranian oil. Interdicting Chinese-flagged vessels would risk escalation with a peer competitor. Even the threat of such actions carries significant implications for global trade and alliance relationships.
The United States must now reconcile maximalist aspirations with limited means and political constraints. The likely outcome is neither decisive victory nor clear defeat, but rather a negotiated settlement shaped as much by perceptions of resilience and resolve as by the balance of forces on the ground.
Looking beyond the immediate conflict, Iran has demonstrated that it can impose costs on global energy markets through limited disruption. Whether this takes the form of outright blockades, intermittent harassment, or even quasi-institutionalized "tolls" on Gulf shipping, the precedent is now established. If the United States does not develop the capability and the credibility to manage this threat, what is now a short-term, if painful, disruption will harden into a durable feature of the global energy system--raising the long-term costs of both the war and the peace that follows.
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Daniel Byman is the director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He is also a professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-strait-hormuz-gambit-and-limits-us-military-power
[Category: ThinkTank]
