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Ifo Institute: German Government Shifts Investments Between Debt Funds
MUNICH, Germany, July 9 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 8, 2026:
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German Government Shifts Investments Between Debt Funds
The German government is shifting investments from the Special Fund for Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality (SVIK) to debt-financed spending under the sectoral exemption for defense spending.
Without this shift, the 10 percent investment ratio would not be met. That's according to an initial analysis of the federal budget presented by the Federal Ministry of Finance. "Overall, the government is not doing enough to cut back on non-priority ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, July 9 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 8, 2026: * * * German Government Shifts Investments Between Debt Funds The German government is shifting investments from the Special Fund for Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality (SVIK) to debt-financed spending under the sectoral exemption for defense spending. Without this shift, the 10 percent investment ratio would not be met. That's according to an initial analysis of the federal budget presented by the Federal Ministry of Finance. "Overall, the government is not doing enough to cut back on non-priorityspending and increase investment, which is why it has to resort to accounting tricks," says ifo President Clemens Fuest.
What is particularly striking for the ifo experts is the EUR 4.2 billion that were previously earmarked from the SVIK for road and rail construction. These funds are now being allocated to the budget for the Ministry of Defense. According to the draft budget, that means they fall under the "sectoral exemption for defense spending" and can therefore also be financed through debt.
The rationale given is that these are "defense-related transport investments." According to calculations by the ifo Institute, without this reclassification, the federal budget's investment ratio would be 9.9%, not 10.8% - as stated in the draft budget. "It is only thanks to these measures that the required investment ratio of 10% is being met in the core budget," says ifo researcher Emilie Hoslinger. "We therefore see other shifts that are intended to mask the fact that overall infrastructure investment is too low." The 10% investment ratio in the core budget is necessary to ensure that new debt is lawful under the SVIK.
ifo expert Max Lay explains why such shifts are possible in the first place: They stem from the way in which the federal government calculates the investment rate.
Normally, all investments are divided by all expenditure from the core budget. "However, that works differently for investments under the sectoral exemption: Although they are included in the investments, they do not appear in the total expenditure. This makes the ratio appear higher than it actually is - and makes it easier to reach the 10 percent target."
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-08/german-government-shifts-investments-between-debt-funds
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
German Government Shifts Investments Between Debt Funds
The German government is shifting investments from the Special Fund for Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality (SVIK) to debt-financed spending under the sectoral exemption for defense spending.
Without this shift, the 10 percent investment ratio would not be met. That's according to an initial analysis of the federal budget presented by the Federal Ministry of Finance. "Overall, the government is not doing enough to cut back on non-priority ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, July 9 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on July 8, 2026: * * * German Government Shifts Investments Between Debt Funds The German government is shifting investments from the Special Fund for Infrastructure and Climate Neutrality (SVIK) to debt-financed spending under the sectoral exemption for defense spending. Without this shift, the 10 percent investment ratio would not be met. That's according to an initial analysis of the federal budget presented by the Federal Ministry of Finance. "Overall, the government is not doing enough to cut back on non-priorityspending and increase investment, which is why it has to resort to accounting tricks," says ifo President Clemens Fuest.
What is particularly striking for the ifo experts is the EUR 4.2 billion that were previously earmarked from the SVIK for road and rail construction. These funds are now being allocated to the budget for the Ministry of Defense. According to the draft budget, that means they fall under the "sectoral exemption for defense spending" and can therefore also be financed through debt.
The rationale given is that these are "defense-related transport investments." According to calculations by the ifo Institute, without this reclassification, the federal budget's investment ratio would be 9.9%, not 10.8% - as stated in the draft budget. "It is only thanks to these measures that the required investment ratio of 10% is being met in the core budget," says ifo researcher Emilie Hoslinger. "We therefore see other shifts that are intended to mask the fact that overall infrastructure investment is too low." The 10% investment ratio in the core budget is necessary to ensure that new debt is lawful under the SVIK.
ifo expert Max Lay explains why such shifts are possible in the first place: They stem from the way in which the federal government calculates the investment rate.
Normally, all investments are divided by all expenditure from the core budget. "However, that works differently for investments under the sectoral exemption: Although they are included in the investments, they do not appear in the total expenditure. This makes the ratio appear higher than it actually is - and makes it easier to reach the 10 percent target."
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-08/german-government-shifts-investments-between-debt-funds
[Category: ThinkTank]
TechFreedom: FCC Should Stop Meddling in Political Interviews
WASHINGTON, July 8 -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release on July 7, 2026:
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FCC Should Stop Meddling in Political Interviews
Yesterday, TechFreedom filed reply comments in response to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) request for comment regarding the petition by Disney's ABC asking the Commission to declare that The View qualifies to conduct bona fide news interviews so that it need not provide equal time to rivals of political candidates it interviews. As we explain, the FCC's hazy reinterpretation of Section 315(a) violates the First ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 8 -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release on July 7, 2026: * * * FCC Should Stop Meddling in Political Interviews Yesterday, TechFreedom filed reply comments in response to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) request for comment regarding the petition by Disney's ABC asking the Commission to declare that The View qualifies to conduct bona fide news interviews so that it need not provide equal time to rivals of political candidates it interviews. As we explain, the FCC's hazy reinterpretation of Section 315(a) violates the FirstAmendment, and comments filed in support of the FCC make clear just how arbitrary and dangerous the FCC's theory is.
"It is simply not the government's job to determine the correct balance of free expression," said Berin Szoka, President of TechFreedom. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no valid government interest in leveling the playing field between speakers or ideas, and it reaffirmed that fundamental principle in Moody v. NetChoice. "The very definition of 'bias' and 'fairness' is subjective. That's why the First Amendment leaves such assessments to speakers, not the government. Nowhere is that more important than in the realm of political speech."
"Conservatives fought the Fairness Doctrine for decades, but now the FCC is creating its own bizarro Fairness Doctrine," continued Szoka. TechFreedom's previous comments explained the unconstitutionality of the FCC's reinterpretation of Section 315(a) and the chill it now casts over political candidate interviews. "The Reagan FCC understood these threats and applied the equal time rule in a way that avoided meddling in constitutionally protected editorial decisions. That enabled radio and television shows of all political persuasions to thrive. Freedom for all is the only way to encourage more speech."
"This FCC is trying to suppress political speech it doesn't like," Szoka warned. "That Bureau's reinterpretation of Section 315(a) applies only to television, which arguably leans left, but not to radio, which certainly leans right, making clear how the Commission is stacking the deck. Further, the FCC's allies want the agency to determine whether a show is too political based on factors that are entirely subjective and undefinable, outright laughable, or both." Comments opposing ABC's petition proposed that the FCC examine the questions asked to candidates, whether the host has engaged in "partisan" speech, and even the facial expressions of interviewers to decide whether the "bona fide news interview" exemption to the equal time rule applies. "Interrogating the content of questions is exactly the type of regulatory inquiry that the First Amendment forbids, and no serious person believes that regulation by facial expression is constitutional. As President Reagan understood, the First Amendment aims 'to promote vigorous public debate and a diversity of viewpoints in the public forum as a whole, not in any particular medium, let alone in any particular journalistic outlet.'"
"Woe unto Republicans if a future Democratic FCC applies this new standard to radio," concluded Szoka. "Applying the inherently unconstitutional approach suggested by some commenters would basically wipe out conservative talk radio. The likes of Ben Shapiro, Mark Levin, and Dan Bongino would be so handcuffed by equal opportunity demands that they would likely flee radio for other media. Weaponization can go in both directions, and it likely will."
Separately, TechFreedom led reply comments joined by 50 scholars of the First Amendment, communications, and technology law, and civil society organizations dedicated to free speech.
* * *
Read these comments and share them on Twitter and Bluesky. We can be reached for comment at media@techfreedom.org. Read our related work, including:
* Our original comments in this proceeding (June 22, 2026)
* This Isn't Ronald Reagan's FCC, The Dispatch (Apr. 9, 2026)
* Letter to the FCC expressing concerns over the abuse of the "public interest" standard (Mar. 20, 2026)
* Petition filed with Protect Democracy asking the FCC to repeal its news distortion policy, (Nov. 13, 2025)
* The Future of Speech Online 2025: The Age of Constitutional Evasion, Day 2 (Oct. 29, 2025)
* Brendan Carr-leone's war on the First Amendment, The Hill (Oct 2, 2025)
* Coalition letter expressing concerns about threats by FCC Chairman Brendan Carr (Sep. 30, 2025)
* Comments to the FCC regarding the news distortion complaint involving CBS Broadcasting Inc., (Mar. 7, 2025)
* Comments in response to the FCC's NOI on whether any changes can or should be made to the current TV ratings system (May 22, 2026)
* Comments to the FTC regarding technology platform censorship (May 21, 2025)
* TechFreedom Policy Summit Day 1: Constitutional Limits of the FTC and DOJ (May 15, 2025)
* * *
About TechFreedom:
TechFreedom is a nonprofit, nonpartisan technology policy think tank. We work to chart a path forward for policymakers towards a bright future where technology enhances freedom, and freedom enhances technology.
* * *
Original text here: https://techfreedom.org/fcc-should-stop-meddling-in-political-interviews/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
FCC Should Stop Meddling in Political Interviews
Yesterday, TechFreedom filed reply comments in response to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) request for comment regarding the petition by Disney's ABC asking the Commission to declare that The View qualifies to conduct bona fide news interviews so that it need not provide equal time to rivals of political candidates it interviews. As we explain, the FCC's hazy reinterpretation of Section 315(a) violates the First ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 8 -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release on July 7, 2026: * * * FCC Should Stop Meddling in Political Interviews Yesterday, TechFreedom filed reply comments in response to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) request for comment regarding the petition by Disney's ABC asking the Commission to declare that The View qualifies to conduct bona fide news interviews so that it need not provide equal time to rivals of political candidates it interviews. As we explain, the FCC's hazy reinterpretation of Section 315(a) violates the FirstAmendment, and comments filed in support of the FCC make clear just how arbitrary and dangerous the FCC's theory is.
"It is simply not the government's job to determine the correct balance of free expression," said Berin Szoka, President of TechFreedom. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no valid government interest in leveling the playing field between speakers or ideas, and it reaffirmed that fundamental principle in Moody v. NetChoice. "The very definition of 'bias' and 'fairness' is subjective. That's why the First Amendment leaves such assessments to speakers, not the government. Nowhere is that more important than in the realm of political speech."
"Conservatives fought the Fairness Doctrine for decades, but now the FCC is creating its own bizarro Fairness Doctrine," continued Szoka. TechFreedom's previous comments explained the unconstitutionality of the FCC's reinterpretation of Section 315(a) and the chill it now casts over political candidate interviews. "The Reagan FCC understood these threats and applied the equal time rule in a way that avoided meddling in constitutionally protected editorial decisions. That enabled radio and television shows of all political persuasions to thrive. Freedom for all is the only way to encourage more speech."
"This FCC is trying to suppress political speech it doesn't like," Szoka warned. "That Bureau's reinterpretation of Section 315(a) applies only to television, which arguably leans left, but not to radio, which certainly leans right, making clear how the Commission is stacking the deck. Further, the FCC's allies want the agency to determine whether a show is too political based on factors that are entirely subjective and undefinable, outright laughable, or both." Comments opposing ABC's petition proposed that the FCC examine the questions asked to candidates, whether the host has engaged in "partisan" speech, and even the facial expressions of interviewers to decide whether the "bona fide news interview" exemption to the equal time rule applies. "Interrogating the content of questions is exactly the type of regulatory inquiry that the First Amendment forbids, and no serious person believes that regulation by facial expression is constitutional. As President Reagan understood, the First Amendment aims 'to promote vigorous public debate and a diversity of viewpoints in the public forum as a whole, not in any particular medium, let alone in any particular journalistic outlet.'"
"Woe unto Republicans if a future Democratic FCC applies this new standard to radio," concluded Szoka. "Applying the inherently unconstitutional approach suggested by some commenters would basically wipe out conservative talk radio. The likes of Ben Shapiro, Mark Levin, and Dan Bongino would be so handcuffed by equal opportunity demands that they would likely flee radio for other media. Weaponization can go in both directions, and it likely will."
Separately, TechFreedom led reply comments joined by 50 scholars of the First Amendment, communications, and technology law, and civil society organizations dedicated to free speech.
* * *
Read these comments and share them on Twitter and Bluesky. We can be reached for comment at media@techfreedom.org. Read our related work, including:
* Our original comments in this proceeding (June 22, 2026)
* This Isn't Ronald Reagan's FCC, The Dispatch (Apr. 9, 2026)
* Letter to the FCC expressing concerns over the abuse of the "public interest" standard (Mar. 20, 2026)
* Petition filed with Protect Democracy asking the FCC to repeal its news distortion policy, (Nov. 13, 2025)
* The Future of Speech Online 2025: The Age of Constitutional Evasion, Day 2 (Oct. 29, 2025)
* Brendan Carr-leone's war on the First Amendment, The Hill (Oct 2, 2025)
* Coalition letter expressing concerns about threats by FCC Chairman Brendan Carr (Sep. 30, 2025)
* Comments to the FCC regarding the news distortion complaint involving CBS Broadcasting Inc., (Mar. 7, 2025)
* Comments in response to the FCC's NOI on whether any changes can or should be made to the current TV ratings system (May 22, 2026)
* Comments to the FTC regarding technology platform censorship (May 21, 2025)
* TechFreedom Policy Summit Day 1: Constitutional Limits of the FTC and DOJ (May 15, 2025)
* * *
About TechFreedom:
TechFreedom is a nonprofit, nonpartisan technology policy think tank. We work to chart a path forward for policymakers towards a bright future where technology enhances freedom, and freedom enhances technology.
* * *
Original text here: https://techfreedom.org/fcc-should-stop-meddling-in-political-interviews/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Iran Contests Baku's Influence Over Georgia's Shia Community
WASHINGTON, July 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by Beka Chedia, professor of political science for the independent research institute Varieties of Democracy in the Political Science Department at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, and a political scientist from Tbilisi, Georgia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Iran Contests Baku's Influence Over Georgia's Shia Community
Executive Summary:
* On June 22-24, Tasu'a commemorations in Marneuli and Tbilisi--featuring imagery of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei--sparked a political ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by Beka Chedia, professor of political science for the independent research institute Varieties of Democracy in the Political Science Department at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, and a political scientist from Tbilisi, Georgia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Iran Contests Baku's Influence Over Georgia's Shia Community Executive Summary: * On June 22-24, Tasu'a commemorations in Marneuli and Tbilisi--featuring imagery of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei--sparked a politicalcontroversy in Georgia, with the opposition warning of an Iranian influence network in Kvemo Kartli and the government dismissing the claims as religious incitement.
* Since independence, Georgia's ethnic Azerbaijani community, now 268,832 people, up 15.4 percent since 2014, has been bound to Baku by ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties, a dynamic that reinforced Georgia-Azerbaijan cooperation. Iran's growing use of shared Shia identity as an instrument of soft power now threatens to displace that traditional influence.
* The contest carries risks for both capitals, including the erosion of Baku's cultural influence among Georgian Azerbaijanis, and a danger for Tbilisi that the politicization of a long-integrated community turns religious practice into a domestic fault line.
-
On June 22-24, Georgia's Shiite community held the annual Tasu'a mourning processions commemorating Imam Hussein in Tbilisi and in the town of Marneuli, the center of the Kvemo Kartli region, which is densely populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis (Facebook/MarneuliNews.ge, June 24). Georgia's Shiite community has observed the ritual for many years, although in recent years it has become more visible and larger in scale. This year, footage from the Imam Ali Mosque in Marneuli showing worshippers performing a religious chant in front of a poster of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei circulated widely (TV Pirveli, June 22). On social media, people raised the question, "Is this Iran or Georgia?" Certain elements of the event, including its visual style, religious symbols, attributes, and images of religious figures such as Ali Khamenei, were interpreted by some political circles and members of the public as reflecting growing Iranian cultural and religious influence.
The commemoration quickly became a political flashpoint. On June 22, the pro-Western opposition party "Droa!" issued a statement alleging the existence of an organized system of ideological indoctrination, radicalization, and recruitment of Georgian citizens, including children and young people, in Kvemo Kartli, backed by the Iranian regime. The party argued that Iranian influence in the region has reached a concerning level, that the Georgian government is creating conditions conducive to the expansion of an Iranian influence network, and that these developments threaten national security, stability, and peace (Interpressnews, June 22). The government categorically rejected these claims. On June 24, Deputy Speaker of Parliament Nino Tsilosani stated that Georgia faces no such foreign influence, accused opposition critics of attempting to incite hostility on religious grounds, and called for the free and peaceful practice of religion (Facebook/MarneuliNews.ge, June 24).
Coincidentally, on June 22, Georgia's National Statistics Office released the results of the 2024 population census. According to the data, Muslims now make up 11.1 percent of Georgia's population, or 437,458 people, an increase of 38,781, or 9.7 percent, over the 398,677 recorded in the 2014 census (Geostat, June 22). Over the past ten years, Georgia's population has increased by 215,777 people, reaching 3,929,581. This growth was primarily driven by migration rather than natural population increase. Since the Muslim population grew faster than the population as a whole, its share rose from roughly 10.7 percent in 2014 to 11.1 percent in 2024.
Georgia has two major Muslim communities. The first consists of ethnic Georgians, who live primarily in the Autonomous Republic of Adjara. During Ottoman rule, part of the region's population converted to Islam, and today, Adjara's Muslim population is predominantly Sunni. The second, and larger, consists of ethnic Azerbaijanis, who practice Shia Islam and are concentrated in Kvemo Kartli and areas around the capital. The growth of Georgia's Muslim population coincides with the expansion of this community. The census recorded 268,832 ethnic Azerbaijanis, up from 233,024 in 2014, an increase of 35,808, or 15.4 percent. The overwhelming majority are Georgian citizens, with around 8,000 holding Azerbaijani citizenship (Geostat, June 22). Ethnic Azerbaijanis are widely regarded as an integral part of Georgian society, although some do not speak the state language, and their religious affiliation has traditionally not been viewed as a national security concern.
Following independence, the Azerbaijani-populated areas came under dual influence from both Tbilisi and Baku. While their state affiliation was with Georgia, their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties were closely linked to Azerbaijan. This situation contributed to sustained cooperation between Georgia and Azerbaijan. A particularly notable example is that prior to Georgia's national elections, Baku was seen as supporting the ruling parties. This was done in various ways, including the role of the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), whose representatives were reportedly active in the region. The company has periodically denied allegations of involvement in political activities or of exerting pressure on local Azerbaijanis in support of Georgia's ruling party (1tv, October 26, 2018).
That dynamic now appears to be shifting, and seemingly not in Baku's favor. Reports from several Georgian media outlets indicate that Iran has recently intensified efforts to strengthen its cultural and religious presence in Kvemo Kartli and the Azerbaijani-populated areas around Tbilisi. Some local observers argue that it is precisely shared adherence to Shiism that makes Iran attractive to Georgian Azerbaijanis in a way that secular Baku and Sunni-majority Turkiye cannot easily replicate (Radio Tavisupleba, December 26, 2025). Tehran is increasingly leveraging religious and cultural ties as an instrument of its soft power among Georgia's Shiite population, gradually displacing the cultural influence of both Azerbaijan and Turkiye.
The small town of Marneuli is gradually becoming a focal point of this competition. During the same days that the mourning processions were held, the newly appointed Turkish ambassador visited the region on June 23 for introductory meetings with the leaders of the region's administration (Facebook/TurkiyeinGeorgia, June 23). Until recently, for most members of this community, whose population has been steadily increasing, Islam primarily functioned as a religious and cultural identity rather than a tool of political mobilization. Some external actors may now be seeking to use religion to expand their influence by transforming religious identity into a tool of political leverage. Such a development could, over time, create new challenges for both Tbilisi and Baku. For Georgia, this would relate to issues of domestic stability and national security, while for Azerbaijan it could result in the erosion of its traditional cultural and humanitarian influence among Georgian Azerbaijanis if religious affiliation begins to displace their longstanding ethnic and cultural ties with Azerbaijan.
* * *
Dr. Beka Chedia is a political scientist from Tbilisi, Georgia. He is currently a professor of political science and a Tbilisi-based Country Expert (Georgia) for the independent research institute Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) at the Department of Political Science of the University of Gothenburg, in Sweden.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/iran-contests-bakus-influence-over-georgias-shia-community/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Iran Contests Baku's Influence Over Georgia's Shia Community
Executive Summary:
* On June 22-24, Tasu'a commemorations in Marneuli and Tbilisi--featuring imagery of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei--sparked a political ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by Beka Chedia, professor of political science for the independent research institute Varieties of Democracy in the Political Science Department at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, and a political scientist from Tbilisi, Georgia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Iran Contests Baku's Influence Over Georgia's Shia Community Executive Summary: * On June 22-24, Tasu'a commemorations in Marneuli and Tbilisi--featuring imagery of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei--sparked a politicalcontroversy in Georgia, with the opposition warning of an Iranian influence network in Kvemo Kartli and the government dismissing the claims as religious incitement.
* Since independence, Georgia's ethnic Azerbaijani community, now 268,832 people, up 15.4 percent since 2014, has been bound to Baku by ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties, a dynamic that reinforced Georgia-Azerbaijan cooperation. Iran's growing use of shared Shia identity as an instrument of soft power now threatens to displace that traditional influence.
* The contest carries risks for both capitals, including the erosion of Baku's cultural influence among Georgian Azerbaijanis, and a danger for Tbilisi that the politicization of a long-integrated community turns religious practice into a domestic fault line.
-
On June 22-24, Georgia's Shiite community held the annual Tasu'a mourning processions commemorating Imam Hussein in Tbilisi and in the town of Marneuli, the center of the Kvemo Kartli region, which is densely populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis (Facebook/MarneuliNews.ge, June 24). Georgia's Shiite community has observed the ritual for many years, although in recent years it has become more visible and larger in scale. This year, footage from the Imam Ali Mosque in Marneuli showing worshippers performing a religious chant in front of a poster of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei circulated widely (TV Pirveli, June 22). On social media, people raised the question, "Is this Iran or Georgia?" Certain elements of the event, including its visual style, religious symbols, attributes, and images of religious figures such as Ali Khamenei, were interpreted by some political circles and members of the public as reflecting growing Iranian cultural and religious influence.
The commemoration quickly became a political flashpoint. On June 22, the pro-Western opposition party "Droa!" issued a statement alleging the existence of an organized system of ideological indoctrination, radicalization, and recruitment of Georgian citizens, including children and young people, in Kvemo Kartli, backed by the Iranian regime. The party argued that Iranian influence in the region has reached a concerning level, that the Georgian government is creating conditions conducive to the expansion of an Iranian influence network, and that these developments threaten national security, stability, and peace (Interpressnews, June 22). The government categorically rejected these claims. On June 24, Deputy Speaker of Parliament Nino Tsilosani stated that Georgia faces no such foreign influence, accused opposition critics of attempting to incite hostility on religious grounds, and called for the free and peaceful practice of religion (Facebook/MarneuliNews.ge, June 24).
Coincidentally, on June 22, Georgia's National Statistics Office released the results of the 2024 population census. According to the data, Muslims now make up 11.1 percent of Georgia's population, or 437,458 people, an increase of 38,781, or 9.7 percent, over the 398,677 recorded in the 2014 census (Geostat, June 22). Over the past ten years, Georgia's population has increased by 215,777 people, reaching 3,929,581. This growth was primarily driven by migration rather than natural population increase. Since the Muslim population grew faster than the population as a whole, its share rose from roughly 10.7 percent in 2014 to 11.1 percent in 2024.
Georgia has two major Muslim communities. The first consists of ethnic Georgians, who live primarily in the Autonomous Republic of Adjara. During Ottoman rule, part of the region's population converted to Islam, and today, Adjara's Muslim population is predominantly Sunni. The second, and larger, consists of ethnic Azerbaijanis, who practice Shia Islam and are concentrated in Kvemo Kartli and areas around the capital. The growth of Georgia's Muslim population coincides with the expansion of this community. The census recorded 268,832 ethnic Azerbaijanis, up from 233,024 in 2014, an increase of 35,808, or 15.4 percent. The overwhelming majority are Georgian citizens, with around 8,000 holding Azerbaijani citizenship (Geostat, June 22). Ethnic Azerbaijanis are widely regarded as an integral part of Georgian society, although some do not speak the state language, and their religious affiliation has traditionally not been viewed as a national security concern.
Following independence, the Azerbaijani-populated areas came under dual influence from both Tbilisi and Baku. While their state affiliation was with Georgia, their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic ties were closely linked to Azerbaijan. This situation contributed to sustained cooperation between Georgia and Azerbaijan. A particularly notable example is that prior to Georgia's national elections, Baku was seen as supporting the ruling parties. This was done in various ways, including the role of the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), whose representatives were reportedly active in the region. The company has periodically denied allegations of involvement in political activities or of exerting pressure on local Azerbaijanis in support of Georgia's ruling party (1tv, October 26, 2018).
That dynamic now appears to be shifting, and seemingly not in Baku's favor. Reports from several Georgian media outlets indicate that Iran has recently intensified efforts to strengthen its cultural and religious presence in Kvemo Kartli and the Azerbaijani-populated areas around Tbilisi. Some local observers argue that it is precisely shared adherence to Shiism that makes Iran attractive to Georgian Azerbaijanis in a way that secular Baku and Sunni-majority Turkiye cannot easily replicate (Radio Tavisupleba, December 26, 2025). Tehran is increasingly leveraging religious and cultural ties as an instrument of its soft power among Georgia's Shiite population, gradually displacing the cultural influence of both Azerbaijan and Turkiye.
The small town of Marneuli is gradually becoming a focal point of this competition. During the same days that the mourning processions were held, the newly appointed Turkish ambassador visited the region on June 23 for introductory meetings with the leaders of the region's administration (Facebook/TurkiyeinGeorgia, June 23). Until recently, for most members of this community, whose population has been steadily increasing, Islam primarily functioned as a religious and cultural identity rather than a tool of political mobilization. Some external actors may now be seeking to use religion to expand their influence by transforming religious identity into a tool of political leverage. Such a development could, over time, create new challenges for both Tbilisi and Baku. For Georgia, this would relate to issues of domestic stability and national security, while for Azerbaijan it could result in the erosion of its traditional cultural and humanitarian influence among Georgian Azerbaijanis if religious affiliation begins to displace their longstanding ethnic and cultural ties with Azerbaijan.
* * *
Dr. Beka Chedia is a political scientist from Tbilisi, Georgia. He is currently a professor of political science and a Tbilisi-based Country Expert (Georgia) for the independent research institute Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) at the Department of Political Science of the University of Gothenburg, in Sweden.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/iran-contests-bakus-influence-over-georgias-shia-community/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Putin's Aging Inner Circle Resembles Brezhnev Elite
WASHINGTON, July 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Putin's Aging Inner Circle Resembles Brezhnev Elite
Executive Summary:
* The death of Sergei Ivanov, a longtime Russian official and close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, at 73, has focused new attention on Putin's age and the certainty that at some point he too will pass from the scene.
* At the same time, it called attention to the aging of the entire Putin elite ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Putin's Aging Inner Circle Resembles Brezhnev Elite Executive Summary: * The death of Sergei Ivanov, a longtime Russian official and close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, at 73, has focused new attention on Putin's age and the certainty that at some point he too will pass from the scene. * At the same time, it called attention to the aging of the entire Putin eliteand the likelihood that there will be a parade of funerals among it in the near future, much as happened between the death of Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev.
* That historical comparison, in turn, has intensified speculation that Russia may change radically after Putin leaves the scene, something that he and his team want to prevent but that many others hope to see happen.
-
Sergei Ivanov, a longtime Russian official and close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, died on June 26 at the age of 73--the same age as the Kremlin leader. His death has unsurprisingly focused new attention on Putin's age and the certainty that, at some point, he too will pass from the scene (Radio Svoboda, July 1). At the same time, it has drawn attention to the aging of the entire Putin elite and the likelihood of a parade of funerals among its ranks in the near future, much as happened between the death of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev. It is clear to everyone that the passing of an elite whose members have been in power for a long time, as was the case in Brezhnev's time and is now the case in Putin's, could open the way to radical and unexpected change. That possibility is certainly on the minds of both those in the current elite who want to see their policies continue after they leave the scene and those who want to replace them and see radical policy changes. It is thus likely to define how each will deal with the other and this evolving situation in the coming months and years.
Putin's time in office has lengthened and now exceeds even that of Brezhnev. The current ruler's country has entered a period of stagnation and foreign policy challenges much like his Soviet predecessor. Ever more analysts inside Russia and abroad have drawn parallels between the two rulers and how the length of their time in office affected and will affect the future (MK.ru, June 28, 2025). Ivanov's death has only increased the frequency of such comparisons. One recent survey collected a dozen of them, with many of them noting that Putin, like Brezhnev before him, has brought this problem on himself (Radio Svoboda, July 1). He keeps officials around for a long time to promote an image of stability rather than allowing the gradual replacement of the current members of the elite with new blood.
Two of the comments about Ivanov's passing that this selection includes seem especially prescient. In the words of one, the death of Ivanov shows that "Putin's entourage is thinning" and that soon the country will enter into a period "with a series of high-profile funerals." Another was even more direct in making that comparison, noting that Ivanov's demise has "something very Brezhnev-like to it." Then, a half century ago, "it also seemed that the leaders of the country were as much part of the permanent landscape as the Kremlin wall; but then it turned out that they were mortal," and so too was the system they had led for so long (Radio Svoboda, July 1).
Comparing the Brezhnev elite and the Putin elite is not without problems. It is certainly far more difficult to define the top elite now than it was to specify who was in it under Brezhnev. Under the latter, there was near-universal agreement that the members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union constituted that elite and thus tracked how those aged as Brezhnev remained in power. Now, there is no one institution everyone would agree is the equivalent. Perhaps the one that comes closest, especially given the Kremlin leader's use of it in recent years, is the Russian Security Council, which Putin chairs. The Russian Security Council decides on a broad swath of issues far beyond national security as typically defined. In addition to Putin, the Security Council has 12 permanent members and 20 additional members (President of Russia, accessed July 7). The members of Putin's council thus resemble the full members of the Politburo in Soviet times and others the candidate members of that earlier regime. That is especially the case if one considers the ages of the full permanent members of this Putin-era institution.
Six of the 12 permanent members, other than Putin, are now over 70. Four of those are older than Putin and Ivanov (Aleksandr Bortnikov, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), 74; Nikolai Patrushev, aide to the president, 74; Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister, 76; and Valentina Matviyenko, head of the Federation Council, 77). Five are between 60 and 70, and only one (Anton Vaino, chief of the staff of the Presidential Administration, 54) is younger than that. Many of the oldest have been with Putin for decades. The actuarial tables suggest that those over 70 and perhaps some of those in their 60s will not be able to continue in office either because of declining health or death in the future. They will thus have to be replaced, and the most likely source of new blood will be the other, still non-permanent, members of the Russian Security Council, just as was the case when the Soviet Politburo typically promoted candidate members to full membership. Of these analogs to the candidate members of the Politburo, the situation is somewhat different. Only five of the 20 are over 70, 13 are in their 60s, and two are in their 50s.
The existence of this reserve suggests the analogy between Putin's situation and Brezhnev's may not be as extreme as some have suggested. There are available, slightly younger cadres who could be promoted more or less naturally into permanent membership in the Russian Security Council. There are, however, three caveats to that. First, those permanent members are unlikely to go quietly or even be asked to do so because Putin, like most leaders, feels most comfortable with those he has known and worked with for a long time. Second, the age data presented here, if anything, understates the gap between those closest to the throne and those slightly more removed, with the former also the oldest and the latter the most likely to have different views. Third, while Putin and others talk about the renewal of the Russian elites, they are unlikely to have the chance to do it calmly and rationally, but instead be forced to do so by deaths or illnesses. This pattern opens the way for major changes in Russia's rule, if not in the first round, then in the second or third.
Looming behind that, of course, is something that makes the analogy between the end of the Brezhnev era and the approaching end of Putin's. When Brezhnev died and was succeeded by two other aging leaders, the Russian people could see that the regime had come to an end and were thus more ready for the radical changes that Gorbachev introduced. It is not unthinkable that, however powerful the current elite appears and however many steps it takes to prevent change, something similar will happen once again in Russia.
* * *
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/putins-aging-inner-circle-resembles-brezhnev-elite/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Putin's Aging Inner Circle Resembles Brezhnev Elite
Executive Summary:
* The death of Sergei Ivanov, a longtime Russian official and close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, at 73, has focused new attention on Putin's age and the certainty that at some point he too will pass from the scene.
* At the same time, it called attention to the aging of the entire Putin elite ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 8 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Putin's Aging Inner Circle Resembles Brezhnev Elite Executive Summary: * The death of Sergei Ivanov, a longtime Russian official and close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, at 73, has focused new attention on Putin's age and the certainty that at some point he too will pass from the scene. * At the same time, it called attention to the aging of the entire Putin eliteand the likelihood that there will be a parade of funerals among it in the near future, much as happened between the death of Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev.
* That historical comparison, in turn, has intensified speculation that Russia may change radically after Putin leaves the scene, something that he and his team want to prevent but that many others hope to see happen.
-
Sergei Ivanov, a longtime Russian official and close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, died on June 26 at the age of 73--the same age as the Kremlin leader. His death has unsurprisingly focused new attention on Putin's age and the certainty that, at some point, he too will pass from the scene (Radio Svoboda, July 1). At the same time, it has drawn attention to the aging of the entire Putin elite and the likelihood of a parade of funerals among its ranks in the near future, much as happened between the death of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev. It is clear to everyone that the passing of an elite whose members have been in power for a long time, as was the case in Brezhnev's time and is now the case in Putin's, could open the way to radical and unexpected change. That possibility is certainly on the minds of both those in the current elite who want to see their policies continue after they leave the scene and those who want to replace them and see radical policy changes. It is thus likely to define how each will deal with the other and this evolving situation in the coming months and years.
Putin's time in office has lengthened and now exceeds even that of Brezhnev. The current ruler's country has entered a period of stagnation and foreign policy challenges much like his Soviet predecessor. Ever more analysts inside Russia and abroad have drawn parallels between the two rulers and how the length of their time in office affected and will affect the future (MK.ru, June 28, 2025). Ivanov's death has only increased the frequency of such comparisons. One recent survey collected a dozen of them, with many of them noting that Putin, like Brezhnev before him, has brought this problem on himself (Radio Svoboda, July 1). He keeps officials around for a long time to promote an image of stability rather than allowing the gradual replacement of the current members of the elite with new blood.
Two of the comments about Ivanov's passing that this selection includes seem especially prescient. In the words of one, the death of Ivanov shows that "Putin's entourage is thinning" and that soon the country will enter into a period "with a series of high-profile funerals." Another was even more direct in making that comparison, noting that Ivanov's demise has "something very Brezhnev-like to it." Then, a half century ago, "it also seemed that the leaders of the country were as much part of the permanent landscape as the Kremlin wall; but then it turned out that they were mortal," and so too was the system they had led for so long (Radio Svoboda, July 1).
Comparing the Brezhnev elite and the Putin elite is not without problems. It is certainly far more difficult to define the top elite now than it was to specify who was in it under Brezhnev. Under the latter, there was near-universal agreement that the members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union constituted that elite and thus tracked how those aged as Brezhnev remained in power. Now, there is no one institution everyone would agree is the equivalent. Perhaps the one that comes closest, especially given the Kremlin leader's use of it in recent years, is the Russian Security Council, which Putin chairs. The Russian Security Council decides on a broad swath of issues far beyond national security as typically defined. In addition to Putin, the Security Council has 12 permanent members and 20 additional members (President of Russia, accessed July 7). The members of Putin's council thus resemble the full members of the Politburo in Soviet times and others the candidate members of that earlier regime. That is especially the case if one considers the ages of the full permanent members of this Putin-era institution.
Six of the 12 permanent members, other than Putin, are now over 70. Four of those are older than Putin and Ivanov (Aleksandr Bortnikov, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), 74; Nikolai Patrushev, aide to the president, 74; Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister, 76; and Valentina Matviyenko, head of the Federation Council, 77). Five are between 60 and 70, and only one (Anton Vaino, chief of the staff of the Presidential Administration, 54) is younger than that. Many of the oldest have been with Putin for decades. The actuarial tables suggest that those over 70 and perhaps some of those in their 60s will not be able to continue in office either because of declining health or death in the future. They will thus have to be replaced, and the most likely source of new blood will be the other, still non-permanent, members of the Russian Security Council, just as was the case when the Soviet Politburo typically promoted candidate members to full membership. Of these analogs to the candidate members of the Politburo, the situation is somewhat different. Only five of the 20 are over 70, 13 are in their 60s, and two are in their 50s.
The existence of this reserve suggests the analogy between Putin's situation and Brezhnev's may not be as extreme as some have suggested. There are available, slightly younger cadres who could be promoted more or less naturally into permanent membership in the Russian Security Council. There are, however, three caveats to that. First, those permanent members are unlikely to go quietly or even be asked to do so because Putin, like most leaders, feels most comfortable with those he has known and worked with for a long time. Second, the age data presented here, if anything, understates the gap between those closest to the throne and those slightly more removed, with the former also the oldest and the latter the most likely to have different views. Third, while Putin and others talk about the renewal of the Russian elites, they are unlikely to have the chance to do it calmly and rationally, but instead be forced to do so by deaths or illnesses. This pattern opens the way for major changes in Russia's rule, if not in the first round, then in the second or third.
Looming behind that, of course, is something that makes the analogy between the end of the Brezhnev era and the approaching end of Putin's. When Brezhnev died and was succeeded by two other aging leaders, the Russian people could see that the regime had come to an end and were thus more ready for the radical changes that Gorbachev introduced. It is not unthinkable that, however powerful the current elite appears and however many steps it takes to prevent change, something similar will happen once again in Russia.
* * *
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/putins-aging-inner-circle-resembles-brezhnev-elite/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Washington Times: Long Shadow of Delay
WASHINGTON, July 8 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by senior fellow Jason Hsu and Mark Montgomery to the Washington Times:
* * *
The Long Shadow of Delay
US-Taiwan arms delivery backlogs and the future of deterrence.
-
President Trump's recent suggestion that he could use arms sales to Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China is a stark reminder of what a political issue arms sales to Taiwan can be. The Department of War's comments that they are pausing the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 8 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by senior fellow Jason Hsu and Mark Montgomery to the Washington Times: * * * The Long Shadow of Delay US-Taiwan arms delivery backlogs and the future of deterrence. - President Trump's recent suggestion that he could use arms sales to Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China is a stark reminder of what a political issue arms sales to Taiwan can be. The Department of War's comments that they are pausing the$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, supposedly due to the war in Iran, present a major concern that Mr. Trump is taking a dovish turn toward China.
But this is not the only challenge these arms sales face; they have been dogged by excessive delays for decades.
For more than a decade, Taiwan's defense planning has lived with a structural contradiction. Washington regularly signals political support by approving arms sales, yet the actual delivery of those systems often arrives years later.
The problem is widely referred to as the "arms backlog." Yet the term obscures more than it reveals. The backlog is a complex set of procurement cases shaped by industrial constraints, bureaucratic processes, and political incentives on both sides of the Pacific. Understanding why delays occur -- and why they matter -- is essential to restoring confidence in the defense relationship between Washington and Taipei.
The political theater of arms sales
Arms sales to Taiwan have been an integral part of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which was passed to address the political, economic, and military relationship between the United States and Taiwan after America switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Beijing, in turn, always reacts sharply whenever Washington announces a major sale, signaling both its opposition to external support for Taiwan and an effort to raise the political cost of approving arms sales in Washington. Over time, this dynamic has encouraged some U.S. policymakers to manage the timing of arms sales announcements carefully, occasionally delaying notifications to avoid diplomatic escalation.
This political choreography creates a subtle but important distortion. Arms sales announcements often function as signals of U.S. commitment, yet the equipment itself may not arrive for years. The arms backlog is an estimated $29.7 billion today, according to the Taiwan Security Monitor at George Mason University, and average deliveries over the past decade have been between $4 billion and $5 billion per year.
The four factors in the "backlog" story
In Taiwan's public debate, the arms backlog is often portrayed as a simple story: Taiwan orders weapons, pays for them, and then waits while Washington fails to deliver.
The reality is far more complicated. The backlog comprises numerous procurement cases across categories of weapons, timelines, and sales mechanisms. Some systems are partially delivered while others are impacted by production constraints. Four recurring constraints account for most of the backlog.
The first is industrial capacity, as modern weapons systems utilize specialized manufacturing lines that cannot easily scale. The wars in Ukraine and Iran have placed an enormous strain on the U.S. defense industrial base. Many of the systems Taiwan seeks are also in high demand from the U.S. military and NATO allies. While the United States is working aggressively to increase munitions output, it cannot expand production overnight.
The second constraint is program complexity. Large platforms require years to assemble, test, and integrate, involving hundreds of components and extensive training pipelines. Even after delivery, a system may not be fully operational without spare parts, maintenance infrastructure and properly trained personnel.
Third, bureaucratic procedures slow the process. U.S. arms sales move through multiple stages: technology release reviews, policy approvals, congressional notifications, contracting and production. These procedures ensure oversight and compliance but were not designed for speed. Even repeat purchases can take years to process.
Finally, buyer-side factors also play a role. Changes in Taiwan's requirements, delays in funding approvals or gaps in training infrastructure can slow deliveries or reduce readiness once systems arrive. Procurement is not simply about acquiring hardware; it requires an entire ecosystem capable of absorbing and effectively employing the equipment.
Taken together, these four factors compound to slow nearly every defense procurement decision that runs through Washington. In the case of Taiwan, however, these flaws are exacerbated by the two mechanisms Taipei uses to acquire most U.S. defense equipment: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS).
Under the FMS system, the U.S. government acts as an intermediary between the purchasing country and American defense contractors. Taiwan submits a request outlining the capabilities it seeks, which is then evaluated and, if both governments agree, signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), which formalizes the government-to-government agreement. The United States then contracts with industry, manages procurement, and oversees delivery, training, and sustainment. FMS provides transparency and integration support with U.S. forces, but the main downside is that it can move slowly.
DCS purchases are when Taiwan contracts directly with U.S. defense companies and obtains export licenses from the U.S. government. These arrangements can sometimes proceed more quickly and offer greater flexibility for certain types of equipment, particularly components, software, or niche capabilities. Unfortunately, many advanced weapons systems cannot be transferred through direct commercial contracts due to government oversight requirements. DCS purchases may also provide less integration support and logistical coordination than FMS. As a result, Taiwan must balance speed against interoperability and long-term sustainment.
These procedures make even simple purchases very complicated, yet these complexities rarely appear in political discourse.
Instead, the dominant narrative on both sides of the Pacific is the most corrosive, transforming defense procurement into a credibility test for both governments. In Taiwan, it fuels skepticism about the value of defense spending. Opposition politicians can argue that the government is wasting money on weapons that never arrive. In Washington, political infighting over defense spending risks being read as a lack of commitment and casts doubts about whether Taiwan can absorb and employ the systems it purchases.
The strategic costs of delay
Delivery delays have consequences that extend beyond inventory shortages. Defense spending in democratic societies is always contested. Arms delivery delays amplify that tension by providing a simple and emotionally powerful grievance: Taiwan paid for weapons but has not received them.
Critics then argue that Taipei should diversify suppliers or rely more heavily on domestic defense production. Both options face serious limitations, but the argument gains traction when delays persist.
The result is that debates over military strategy become partisan identity markers rather than strategic discussions. When procurement becomes entangled in political conflict, the continuity necessary for long-term deterrence begins to weaken.
These issues also come to the fore directly at the water's edge. Taiwan's defense strategy increasingly emphasizes denying China from achieving a quick military victory. That strategy depends on survivable command systems, dispersed forces, and sufficient stockpiles of munitions to sustain combat in the opening phase of a conflict.
If key weapons are delayed, Taiwan risks having systems approved on paper but unavailable when needed. Conversely, even when equipment arrives, insufficient training or integration can limit its operational impact.
Delays in arms purchases due to political controversy or bureaucratic delays in Taiwan can cause U.S. policymakers to misinterpret Taiwan's commitment to self-defense. Additionally, delays can appear as an opportunity for Beijing. If Chinese planners believe Taiwan cannot rearm quickly, they may perceive a window to intensify coercion or test the limits of deterrence. Even if that perception is mistaken, it can increase the risk of miscalculation.
How to break the cycle
The top priority is industrial capacity. Washington must treat weapons production for Taiwan not merely as a diplomatic commitment but as a top manufacturing priority. Expanding production lines for key munitions would benefit U.S. forces, Taiwan, and other allies. Congress should provide sustained funding and long-term demand signals for industry.
Second, the arms sales process itself needs modernization. A dedicated interagency "Taiwan fast lane" could accelerate case processing and coordinate across agencies responsible for export controls, congressional notifications, and contracting. Streamlining repeat purchases -- especially for systems already approved for other allies -- would significantly reduce bureaucratic delays.
Third, Washington should make greater use of flexible delivery mechanisms, such as stock transfers, to help bridge the gap between procurement approval and full system delivery.
Taiwan must also adapt its procurement strategy. Taipei should prioritize capabilities that can be fielded quickly and that strengthen denial: mobile missile systems, sea mines, drones, resilient communications networks and munitions stockpiles. Large platforms still play an important role, but they should not crowd out investments that deliver immediate operational value.
Equally important, Taiwan must invest in the infrastructure needed to absorb new systems. Training pipelines, logistics networks and maintenance capacity determine whether delivered equipment becomes operational capability.
Finally, political discipline is essential. Defense procurement should be a bipartisan national priority in Taiwan, not a political "football." Sustained deterrence cannot depend on short-term political cycles.
Deterrence now depends on delivery
In earlier decades, the approval of an arms sale was considered a sufficient political symbol. Today, symbolism is no longer enough. Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait depends on what can actually be produced, delivered, trained, and deployed within the relevant timeframe.
The arms backlog, therefore, offers a warning for both sides to both match defense spending with institutional discipline and to ensure the industrial base can translate policy decisions into operational capabilities.
If Washington and Taipei treat the backlog as a shared operational challenge rather than a political talking point, meaningful progress is possible. Faster production, smarter procurement, greater transparency, and stronger political consensus can restore confidence in the system.
Those steps will not eliminate the risks facing Taiwan. But they will convince any potential aggressor that war would be neither quick nor decisive -- and therefore not worth starting.
Read in the Washington Times (https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jul/2/long-shadow-delay/?trueLinkId=xMYHNhLaesfO0e816yG8%2BP7%2BOq8eFVHKObzLhDs4RZdW5J7NiIIkYLnWvQSh9kdk10NctWimNHYrRjACmUhR3A%3D%3D&trueLinkTs=1782235317&trueLinkExpiry=43200).
* * *
At A Glance:
Jason Hsu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/long-shadow-delay-jason-hsu-mark-montgomery
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
The Long Shadow of Delay
US-Taiwan arms delivery backlogs and the future of deterrence.
-
President Trump's recent suggestion that he could use arms sales to Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China is a stark reminder of what a political issue arms sales to Taiwan can be. The Department of War's comments that they are pausing the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 8 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by senior fellow Jason Hsu and Mark Montgomery to the Washington Times: * * * The Long Shadow of Delay US-Taiwan arms delivery backlogs and the future of deterrence. - President Trump's recent suggestion that he could use arms sales to Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China is a stark reminder of what a political issue arms sales to Taiwan can be. The Department of War's comments that they are pausing the$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, supposedly due to the war in Iran, present a major concern that Mr. Trump is taking a dovish turn toward China.
But this is not the only challenge these arms sales face; they have been dogged by excessive delays for decades.
For more than a decade, Taiwan's defense planning has lived with a structural contradiction. Washington regularly signals political support by approving arms sales, yet the actual delivery of those systems often arrives years later.
The problem is widely referred to as the "arms backlog." Yet the term obscures more than it reveals. The backlog is a complex set of procurement cases shaped by industrial constraints, bureaucratic processes, and political incentives on both sides of the Pacific. Understanding why delays occur -- and why they matter -- is essential to restoring confidence in the defense relationship between Washington and Taipei.
The political theater of arms sales
Arms sales to Taiwan have been an integral part of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which was passed to address the political, economic, and military relationship between the United States and Taiwan after America switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Beijing, in turn, always reacts sharply whenever Washington announces a major sale, signaling both its opposition to external support for Taiwan and an effort to raise the political cost of approving arms sales in Washington. Over time, this dynamic has encouraged some U.S. policymakers to manage the timing of arms sales announcements carefully, occasionally delaying notifications to avoid diplomatic escalation.
This political choreography creates a subtle but important distortion. Arms sales announcements often function as signals of U.S. commitment, yet the equipment itself may not arrive for years. The arms backlog is an estimated $29.7 billion today, according to the Taiwan Security Monitor at George Mason University, and average deliveries over the past decade have been between $4 billion and $5 billion per year.
The four factors in the "backlog" story
In Taiwan's public debate, the arms backlog is often portrayed as a simple story: Taiwan orders weapons, pays for them, and then waits while Washington fails to deliver.
The reality is far more complicated. The backlog comprises numerous procurement cases across categories of weapons, timelines, and sales mechanisms. Some systems are partially delivered while others are impacted by production constraints. Four recurring constraints account for most of the backlog.
The first is industrial capacity, as modern weapons systems utilize specialized manufacturing lines that cannot easily scale. The wars in Ukraine and Iran have placed an enormous strain on the U.S. defense industrial base. Many of the systems Taiwan seeks are also in high demand from the U.S. military and NATO allies. While the United States is working aggressively to increase munitions output, it cannot expand production overnight.
The second constraint is program complexity. Large platforms require years to assemble, test, and integrate, involving hundreds of components and extensive training pipelines. Even after delivery, a system may not be fully operational without spare parts, maintenance infrastructure and properly trained personnel.
Third, bureaucratic procedures slow the process. U.S. arms sales move through multiple stages: technology release reviews, policy approvals, congressional notifications, contracting and production. These procedures ensure oversight and compliance but were not designed for speed. Even repeat purchases can take years to process.
Finally, buyer-side factors also play a role. Changes in Taiwan's requirements, delays in funding approvals or gaps in training infrastructure can slow deliveries or reduce readiness once systems arrive. Procurement is not simply about acquiring hardware; it requires an entire ecosystem capable of absorbing and effectively employing the equipment.
Taken together, these four factors compound to slow nearly every defense procurement decision that runs through Washington. In the case of Taiwan, however, these flaws are exacerbated by the two mechanisms Taipei uses to acquire most U.S. defense equipment: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS).
Under the FMS system, the U.S. government acts as an intermediary between the purchasing country and American defense contractors. Taiwan submits a request outlining the capabilities it seeks, which is then evaluated and, if both governments agree, signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), which formalizes the government-to-government agreement. The United States then contracts with industry, manages procurement, and oversees delivery, training, and sustainment. FMS provides transparency and integration support with U.S. forces, but the main downside is that it can move slowly.
DCS purchases are when Taiwan contracts directly with U.S. defense companies and obtains export licenses from the U.S. government. These arrangements can sometimes proceed more quickly and offer greater flexibility for certain types of equipment, particularly components, software, or niche capabilities. Unfortunately, many advanced weapons systems cannot be transferred through direct commercial contracts due to government oversight requirements. DCS purchases may also provide less integration support and logistical coordination than FMS. As a result, Taiwan must balance speed against interoperability and long-term sustainment.
These procedures make even simple purchases very complicated, yet these complexities rarely appear in political discourse.
Instead, the dominant narrative on both sides of the Pacific is the most corrosive, transforming defense procurement into a credibility test for both governments. In Taiwan, it fuels skepticism about the value of defense spending. Opposition politicians can argue that the government is wasting money on weapons that never arrive. In Washington, political infighting over defense spending risks being read as a lack of commitment and casts doubts about whether Taiwan can absorb and employ the systems it purchases.
The strategic costs of delay
Delivery delays have consequences that extend beyond inventory shortages. Defense spending in democratic societies is always contested. Arms delivery delays amplify that tension by providing a simple and emotionally powerful grievance: Taiwan paid for weapons but has not received them.
Critics then argue that Taipei should diversify suppliers or rely more heavily on domestic defense production. Both options face serious limitations, but the argument gains traction when delays persist.
The result is that debates over military strategy become partisan identity markers rather than strategic discussions. When procurement becomes entangled in political conflict, the continuity necessary for long-term deterrence begins to weaken.
These issues also come to the fore directly at the water's edge. Taiwan's defense strategy increasingly emphasizes denying China from achieving a quick military victory. That strategy depends on survivable command systems, dispersed forces, and sufficient stockpiles of munitions to sustain combat in the opening phase of a conflict.
If key weapons are delayed, Taiwan risks having systems approved on paper but unavailable when needed. Conversely, even when equipment arrives, insufficient training or integration can limit its operational impact.
Delays in arms purchases due to political controversy or bureaucratic delays in Taiwan can cause U.S. policymakers to misinterpret Taiwan's commitment to self-defense. Additionally, delays can appear as an opportunity for Beijing. If Chinese planners believe Taiwan cannot rearm quickly, they may perceive a window to intensify coercion or test the limits of deterrence. Even if that perception is mistaken, it can increase the risk of miscalculation.
How to break the cycle
The top priority is industrial capacity. Washington must treat weapons production for Taiwan not merely as a diplomatic commitment but as a top manufacturing priority. Expanding production lines for key munitions would benefit U.S. forces, Taiwan, and other allies. Congress should provide sustained funding and long-term demand signals for industry.
Second, the arms sales process itself needs modernization. A dedicated interagency "Taiwan fast lane" could accelerate case processing and coordinate across agencies responsible for export controls, congressional notifications, and contracting. Streamlining repeat purchases -- especially for systems already approved for other allies -- would significantly reduce bureaucratic delays.
Third, Washington should make greater use of flexible delivery mechanisms, such as stock transfers, to help bridge the gap between procurement approval and full system delivery.
Taiwan must also adapt its procurement strategy. Taipei should prioritize capabilities that can be fielded quickly and that strengthen denial: mobile missile systems, sea mines, drones, resilient communications networks and munitions stockpiles. Large platforms still play an important role, but they should not crowd out investments that deliver immediate operational value.
Equally important, Taiwan must invest in the infrastructure needed to absorb new systems. Training pipelines, logistics networks and maintenance capacity determine whether delivered equipment becomes operational capability.
Finally, political discipline is essential. Defense procurement should be a bipartisan national priority in Taiwan, not a political "football." Sustained deterrence cannot depend on short-term political cycles.
Deterrence now depends on delivery
In earlier decades, the approval of an arms sale was considered a sufficient political symbol. Today, symbolism is no longer enough. Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait depends on what can actually be produced, delivered, trained, and deployed within the relevant timeframe.
The arms backlog, therefore, offers a warning for both sides to both match defense spending with institutional discipline and to ensure the industrial base can translate policy decisions into operational capabilities.
If Washington and Taipei treat the backlog as a shared operational challenge rather than a political talking point, meaningful progress is possible. Faster production, smarter procurement, greater transparency, and stronger political consensus can restore confidence in the system.
Those steps will not eliminate the risks facing Taiwan. But they will convince any potential aggressor that war would be neither quick nor decisive -- and therefore not worth starting.
Read in the Washington Times (https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/jul/2/long-shadow-delay/?trueLinkId=xMYHNhLaesfO0e816yG8%2BP7%2BOq8eFVHKObzLhDs4RZdW5J7NiIIkYLnWvQSh9kdk10NctWimNHYrRjACmUhR3A%3D%3D&trueLinkTs=1782235317&trueLinkExpiry=43200).
* * *
At A Glance:
Jason Hsu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/long-shadow-delay-jason-hsu-mark-montgomery
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Attorney General Ellison Pulls the Plug on His "Conviction Review Unit"
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, July 8 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by public safety policy fellow David Zimmer:
* * *
Attorney General Ellison pulls the plug on his "Conviction Review Unit"
Last week Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison advised the 16-person Conviction Review Advisory Board that he was suspending operation of his office's Conviction Review Unit (CRU). Ellison did not issue an official press release, though several media outlets reported ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, July 8 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by public safety policy fellow David Zimmer: * * * Attorney General Ellison pulls the plug on his "Conviction Review Unit" Last week Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison advised the 16-person Conviction Review Advisory Board that he was suspending operation of his office's Conviction Review Unit (CRU). Ellison did not issue an official press release, though several media outlets reportedthe suspension.
In his responses to media inquiries Ellison cited budget constraints brought on after a federal grant that had supplemented the CRU's efforts was discontinued. Under the circumstances Ellison said that his office could no longer fund the CRU without compromising other core responsibilities of his office.
Previous reports described the CRU as operating with five full-time employees, including a director. The unit was funded by an undisclosed amount from the Attorney General's budget, reportedly for two full time employees. The remaining funding came from two federal grants totaling $800,000. We can safely estimate that the amount spent on this effort since its creation in 2021 approaches $2 million - an amount difficult to justify given the results it produced.
No Loss
I have written about my concerns with the CRU and other efforts like the Hennepin County Attorney's Conviction Integrity Unit. These extra-judicial efforts simply undermine faith in our justice system, and their demise is no loss to justice in Minnesota.
Here's an excerpt of an article I wrote for Thinking Minnesota in 2024 - it has aged well.
""Perhaps the most problematic reform mechanism is the attorney general's Conviction Review Unit (CRU). This extra-judicial mechanism offers convicted persons a new form of potential relief from the conviction they received in the court system."
"In August 2021, Atty. Gen. Keith Ellison announced the creation of the CRU within his office. The CRU is a full-time unit operating in partnership with the Great North Innocence Project. The endeavor has been heavily funded by federal grants in the initial stages. It is one of only four such units nationally to reside in a state AG's office. The number of conviction review units across the U.S. has expanded considerably in recent years, from approximately 30 in 2018 to around 100 today.
"The CRU's charter proudly states that it was modeled after a special directive from L.A. County District Attorney George Gascon, a national figure in the progressive prosecutor movement. This emulation of West Coast progressive policies is cause for concern.
"According to the Great North Innocence Project, "The purpose of the CRU is to prevent, identify, and remedy wrongful convictions."
"It is telling that the AG's own charter acknowledges the CRU is an "extrajudicial" process. Webster's Dictionary defines "extrajudicial" as 1) "not forming a valid part of regular legal proceedings," 2) "delivered without legal authority," and 3) "done in contravention of due process of law."
"In his report "Overstating America's Wrongful Conviction Rate?" Prof. Paul G. Cassell of Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah clearly established the national rate of innocent people being wrongly convicted at between .016 percent and .062 percent. Putting this figure into useful context, Cassell concluded that a U.S. citizen was 30,000 times more likely to become a victim of violent crime than to be wrongfully convicted and sent to prison for a violent crime he or she did not commit.
"Despite this extreme rarity, of which an appropriate judicial remedy of appeal already exists, Minnesota has decided to invest energy and resources in overturning convictions, commuting sentences, and reducing accountability for those found guilty by our judicial system.
"Throughout our state's history, we have invested in and valued a robust and credible court system. That system has allowed for appeals that have merit. Those appeals go through an appropriate adversarial process where each side is represented, and an impartial group of judges make decisions based on the law -- not emotion or public opinion.
"Expanding the number of groups that now "re-investigate" cases that have already been adjudicated only serves to undermine the legitimacy and authority we have rightly bestowed upon our court system. These efforts are often fueled by emotion and take advantage of the misguided notion that it is appropriate to apply today's morality and conventions to decisions made in the past.
"The emotional aspect of these "re-investigations" leaves the results vulnerable to subjective whim rather than an established process based on fact, as does the tendency to give more credibility to new information than information vetted contemporaneously with the events of the case. These tendencies make for good theater, but they make for poor public policy in determining whether justice was appropriately meted out decades earlier.""
"Accomplishments" of the CRU
Since becoming operational in 2021, the CRU has received over 1,100 requests from convicted offenders looking to have their convictions reinvestigated and vacated. According to the CRU, 850 cases (77%) were closed without offering relief after an unbiased initial screening.
Of the remaining 250 cases, the CRU officially completed just four formal reports. These cases had been prominently linked on the CRU's website prior to the unit being shuttered. A search for those links now results in an "error" message:
[View image in the link at bottom.]
Each of the four cases involves a 1st degree murder in which the defendant was found guilty and had exhausted the appeals process decades earlier. The cases were:
1. Thomas Rhodes, District Court File 34-K6-97-001529, convicted in 1998 in Kandiyohi County of killing his wife while boating at midnight, then reporting her death as an accident. The CRU's efforts focused on discrediting the medical examiner and other experts who testified in the trial nearly two and a half decades earlier. Ultimately, Rhodes ended up pleading guilty to an amended charge of 2nd degree manslaughter - culpable negligence, in exchange for his murder conviction being vacated and his release from prison.
2. Brian Pippitt, District Court File 01-K4-99-000325, convicted in 2001 in Aitken County of 1st degree murder involving the strangulation and beating death of an 80-year-old woman during the burglary. The CRU effort again focused on discrediting witness testimony from decades earlier.
In 2025, the Minnesota Parole Board consisting of Governor Walz, Attorney General Ellison, and Supreme Court Chief Justice Hudson, commuted Pippitt's sentence and he was freed from prison in January 2026. However, the Aitken County Attorney has not agreed with the movement to completely vacate Pippitt's conviction in court. The court has scheduled an evidentiary hearing for November 2026.
In June 2026, an independent consultant who had been hired by the Minnesota BCA to conduct an independent review of the conclusions drawn by the CRU filed an affidavit which amounts to a damning assessment of the credibility and accuracy of the CRU's work. The consultant, Neil Nelson, is a highly respected retired St. Paul Police homicide detective and would not jeopardize his credibility by issuing a faulty affidavit. An exerpt of Nelson's affidavit follows, and it should concern us all:
"During the course of the review of the CRU's report, the Independent Consultants found the CRU relied heavily on selective pieces of information and ignored other relevant information to reach overstated and unfounded conclusions that are not supported by all the facts. Moreover, there are alarming inaccuracies and misstatements made in the CRU Report and by Pippitt's representatives that call into question the overall accuracy and credibility of their findings and, therefore, the claim of innocence."
3. Edgar Barrientos, District Court File 27-cr-08-53942, convicted in 2009 of 1st degree murder for the drive by shooting of an 18-year-old innocent victim in South Minneapolis. The CRU's effort once again focused on discrediting witnesses and eyewitness identifications, and rehashing evidence that was considered and evaluated by the jury contemporaneous with the crime, not decades later by a unit biased by its own mission.
Hennepin County Attorney Mary Moriarty bought into the CRU's claims and joined in their effort to overturn Barrientos's conviction. When the prosecutor takes this position, rather than maintaining their adversarial role, the fix is in and justice suffers. In November 2024 the court vacated Barrientos's conviction and Moriarty dismissed charges against him. Barrientos was freed from custody that day.
4. Phillip Vance, District Court File 19-K6-04-736, convicted in 2004 in Dakota County of 1st degree murder for the shooting death of a store clerk in South St. Paul. Vance exhausted all of his appeals, then applied to the CRU for reinvestigation. Vance's claims mirrored many of the common claims of coerced and faulty witnesses and alibis and alternative suspects that the police did not properly investigate.
After a reported four-year investigation, to its credit, the CRU issued a formal report stating it had uncovered no reliable evidence to support Philip Vance's claims of innocence and formally recommended against vacating his conviction.
Takeaway
Out of 1,100 claims of innocence the CRU issued just four (4) formal reports over nearly six years.
One (1) concluded there was no evidence to vacate the conviction; one (1) resulted in a change of plea from 1st degree murder to 2nd degree manslaughter; one (1) resulted in a vacated sentence that was uncontested by the Hennepin County Attorney's Office; and one (1) resulted in the Board of Pardons commuting a sentence, but the court and the Aitken County Attorney's Office not yet agreeing to exonerate, and an independent evaluator calling into serious question the credibility and accuracy of the CRU investigation.
Given the questionable results of nearly six years of work by the CRU, it makes sense that Attorney General Ellison determined the effort was not worth reprioritizing resources within the office to keep it afloat.
There's an old tongue-in-cheek saying that prisons are full of innocent people. $2 million and six years of effort by the CRU failed to support the statement in any definitive way. Many argue, as I do, that such efforts do far more to harm our sense of justice than to help it.
* * *
David Zimmer is a Public Safety Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
David.Zimmer@americanexperiment.org
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/attorney-general-ellison-pulls-the-plug-on-his-conviction-review-unit/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Attorney General Ellison pulls the plug on his "Conviction Review Unit"
Last week Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison advised the 16-person Conviction Review Advisory Board that he was suspending operation of his office's Conviction Review Unit (CRU). Ellison did not issue an official press release, though several media outlets reported ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, July 8 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on July 7, 2026, by public safety policy fellow David Zimmer: * * * Attorney General Ellison pulls the plug on his "Conviction Review Unit" Last week Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison advised the 16-person Conviction Review Advisory Board that he was suspending operation of his office's Conviction Review Unit (CRU). Ellison did not issue an official press release, though several media outlets reportedthe suspension.
In his responses to media inquiries Ellison cited budget constraints brought on after a federal grant that had supplemented the CRU's efforts was discontinued. Under the circumstances Ellison said that his office could no longer fund the CRU without compromising other core responsibilities of his office.
Previous reports described the CRU as operating with five full-time employees, including a director. The unit was funded by an undisclosed amount from the Attorney General's budget, reportedly for two full time employees. The remaining funding came from two federal grants totaling $800,000. We can safely estimate that the amount spent on this effort since its creation in 2021 approaches $2 million - an amount difficult to justify given the results it produced.
No Loss
I have written about my concerns with the CRU and other efforts like the Hennepin County Attorney's Conviction Integrity Unit. These extra-judicial efforts simply undermine faith in our justice system, and their demise is no loss to justice in Minnesota.
Here's an excerpt of an article I wrote for Thinking Minnesota in 2024 - it has aged well.
""Perhaps the most problematic reform mechanism is the attorney general's Conviction Review Unit (CRU). This extra-judicial mechanism offers convicted persons a new form of potential relief from the conviction they received in the court system."
"In August 2021, Atty. Gen. Keith Ellison announced the creation of the CRU within his office. The CRU is a full-time unit operating in partnership with the Great North Innocence Project. The endeavor has been heavily funded by federal grants in the initial stages. It is one of only four such units nationally to reside in a state AG's office. The number of conviction review units across the U.S. has expanded considerably in recent years, from approximately 30 in 2018 to around 100 today.
"The CRU's charter proudly states that it was modeled after a special directive from L.A. County District Attorney George Gascon, a national figure in the progressive prosecutor movement. This emulation of West Coast progressive policies is cause for concern.
"According to the Great North Innocence Project, "The purpose of the CRU is to prevent, identify, and remedy wrongful convictions."
"It is telling that the AG's own charter acknowledges the CRU is an "extrajudicial" process. Webster's Dictionary defines "extrajudicial" as 1) "not forming a valid part of regular legal proceedings," 2) "delivered without legal authority," and 3) "done in contravention of due process of law."
"In his report "Overstating America's Wrongful Conviction Rate?" Prof. Paul G. Cassell of Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah clearly established the national rate of innocent people being wrongly convicted at between .016 percent and .062 percent. Putting this figure into useful context, Cassell concluded that a U.S. citizen was 30,000 times more likely to become a victim of violent crime than to be wrongfully convicted and sent to prison for a violent crime he or she did not commit.
"Despite this extreme rarity, of which an appropriate judicial remedy of appeal already exists, Minnesota has decided to invest energy and resources in overturning convictions, commuting sentences, and reducing accountability for those found guilty by our judicial system.
"Throughout our state's history, we have invested in and valued a robust and credible court system. That system has allowed for appeals that have merit. Those appeals go through an appropriate adversarial process where each side is represented, and an impartial group of judges make decisions based on the law -- not emotion or public opinion.
"Expanding the number of groups that now "re-investigate" cases that have already been adjudicated only serves to undermine the legitimacy and authority we have rightly bestowed upon our court system. These efforts are often fueled by emotion and take advantage of the misguided notion that it is appropriate to apply today's morality and conventions to decisions made in the past.
"The emotional aspect of these "re-investigations" leaves the results vulnerable to subjective whim rather than an established process based on fact, as does the tendency to give more credibility to new information than information vetted contemporaneously with the events of the case. These tendencies make for good theater, but they make for poor public policy in determining whether justice was appropriately meted out decades earlier.""
"Accomplishments" of the CRU
Since becoming operational in 2021, the CRU has received over 1,100 requests from convicted offenders looking to have their convictions reinvestigated and vacated. According to the CRU, 850 cases (77%) were closed without offering relief after an unbiased initial screening.
Of the remaining 250 cases, the CRU officially completed just four formal reports. These cases had been prominently linked on the CRU's website prior to the unit being shuttered. A search for those links now results in an "error" message:
[View image in the link at bottom.]
Each of the four cases involves a 1st degree murder in which the defendant was found guilty and had exhausted the appeals process decades earlier. The cases were:
1. Thomas Rhodes, District Court File 34-K6-97-001529, convicted in 1998 in Kandiyohi County of killing his wife while boating at midnight, then reporting her death as an accident. The CRU's efforts focused on discrediting the medical examiner and other experts who testified in the trial nearly two and a half decades earlier. Ultimately, Rhodes ended up pleading guilty to an amended charge of 2nd degree manslaughter - culpable negligence, in exchange for his murder conviction being vacated and his release from prison.
2. Brian Pippitt, District Court File 01-K4-99-000325, convicted in 2001 in Aitken County of 1st degree murder involving the strangulation and beating death of an 80-year-old woman during the burglary. The CRU effort again focused on discrediting witness testimony from decades earlier.
In 2025, the Minnesota Parole Board consisting of Governor Walz, Attorney General Ellison, and Supreme Court Chief Justice Hudson, commuted Pippitt's sentence and he was freed from prison in January 2026. However, the Aitken County Attorney has not agreed with the movement to completely vacate Pippitt's conviction in court. The court has scheduled an evidentiary hearing for November 2026.
In June 2026, an independent consultant who had been hired by the Minnesota BCA to conduct an independent review of the conclusions drawn by the CRU filed an affidavit which amounts to a damning assessment of the credibility and accuracy of the CRU's work. The consultant, Neil Nelson, is a highly respected retired St. Paul Police homicide detective and would not jeopardize his credibility by issuing a faulty affidavit. An exerpt of Nelson's affidavit follows, and it should concern us all:
"During the course of the review of the CRU's report, the Independent Consultants found the CRU relied heavily on selective pieces of information and ignored other relevant information to reach overstated and unfounded conclusions that are not supported by all the facts. Moreover, there are alarming inaccuracies and misstatements made in the CRU Report and by Pippitt's representatives that call into question the overall accuracy and credibility of their findings and, therefore, the claim of innocence."
3. Edgar Barrientos, District Court File 27-cr-08-53942, convicted in 2009 of 1st degree murder for the drive by shooting of an 18-year-old innocent victim in South Minneapolis. The CRU's effort once again focused on discrediting witnesses and eyewitness identifications, and rehashing evidence that was considered and evaluated by the jury contemporaneous with the crime, not decades later by a unit biased by its own mission.
Hennepin County Attorney Mary Moriarty bought into the CRU's claims and joined in their effort to overturn Barrientos's conviction. When the prosecutor takes this position, rather than maintaining their adversarial role, the fix is in and justice suffers. In November 2024 the court vacated Barrientos's conviction and Moriarty dismissed charges against him. Barrientos was freed from custody that day.
4. Phillip Vance, District Court File 19-K6-04-736, convicted in 2004 in Dakota County of 1st degree murder for the shooting death of a store clerk in South St. Paul. Vance exhausted all of his appeals, then applied to the CRU for reinvestigation. Vance's claims mirrored many of the common claims of coerced and faulty witnesses and alibis and alternative suspects that the police did not properly investigate.
After a reported four-year investigation, to its credit, the CRU issued a formal report stating it had uncovered no reliable evidence to support Philip Vance's claims of innocence and formally recommended against vacating his conviction.
Takeaway
Out of 1,100 claims of innocence the CRU issued just four (4) formal reports over nearly six years.
One (1) concluded there was no evidence to vacate the conviction; one (1) resulted in a change of plea from 1st degree murder to 2nd degree manslaughter; one (1) resulted in a vacated sentence that was uncontested by the Hennepin County Attorney's Office; and one (1) resulted in the Board of Pardons commuting a sentence, but the court and the Aitken County Attorney's Office not yet agreeing to exonerate, and an independent evaluator calling into serious question the credibility and accuracy of the CRU investigation.
Given the questionable results of nearly six years of work by the CRU, it makes sense that Attorney General Ellison determined the effort was not worth reprioritizing resources within the office to keep it afloat.
There's an old tongue-in-cheek saying that prisons are full of innocent people. $2 million and six years of effort by the CRU failed to support the statement in any definitive way. Many argue, as I do, that such efforts do far more to harm our sense of justice than to help it.
* * *
David Zimmer is a Public Safety Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
David.Zimmer@americanexperiment.org
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/attorney-general-ellison-pulls-the-plug-on-his-conviction-review-unit/
[Category: ThinkTank]
As Trump Pockets $1.2 Billion From Crypto, New Poll Finds Voters Want the Industry and Self-Dealing Officials Reined In
WASHINGTON, July 8 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Progressive Policy Institute posted the following news release:
* * *
As Trump Pockets $1.2 Billion From Crypto, New Poll Finds Voters Want the Industry and Self-Dealing Officials Reined In
*
Support for tough anti-fraud rules is overwhelming and bipartisan, and it survives the industry's best arguments. 89% of Democrats say they'd be less likely to back a candidate who lets Trump and his family profit from a crypto law.
WASHINGTON (July 8, 2026) -Days after a federal disclosure filing revealed that President Trump personally took in roughly ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 8 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Progressive Policy Institute posted the following news release: * * * As Trump Pockets $1.2 Billion From Crypto, New Poll Finds Voters Want the Industry and Self-Dealing Officials Reined In * Support for tough anti-fraud rules is overwhelming and bipartisan, and it survives the industry's best arguments. 89% of Democrats say they'd be less likely to back a candidate who lets Trump and his family profit from a crypto law. WASHINGTON (July 8, 2026) -Days after a federal disclosure filing revealed that President Trump personally took in roughly$1.2 billion from crypto ventures last year, a new national survey from the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) and Democratic polling firm GBAO shows voters want the industry, and the officials cashing in on it, reined in.
The filing, analyzed by the Associated Press, shows Trump collected more than $500 million from his World Liberty Financial token sales and over $600 million from "meme" coins stamped with his face, even as the ordinary investors who bought in were left holding the losses. World Liberty's tokens have fallen roughly 80%, and the meme coin has collapsed from a peak above $74 to under $2. Trump built that windfall while his own administration dismantled the Biden-era crackdown on the very industry enriching him. Asked about it, the president shrugged: "We're all profiting."
Voters see the arrangement for what it is, and the poll shows they want it stopped.
The numbers are lopsided. Voters view crypto unfavorably by more than 3-to-1 (57% to 17%), and crypto companies fare no better (55% to 19%). The hostility runs across the spectrum and is sharpest among Democrats, 69% of whom view crypto unfavorably. Voters reserve their trust for Main Street institutions instead: community banks are seen favorably 62% to 10%. And with the cost of living dominating, crypto barely registers as a concern; fewer than 1% name promoting it as a top priority for Congress, against 45% who name inflation.
That skepticism translates into demand for guardrails, on a striking bipartisan basis:
* 83% want crypto companies held to the same anti-money-laundering reporting rules banks already follow, including 80% of Republicans.
* 81% want federal prosecutors and local law enforcement to be given more tools to investigate crypto crime.
* 71% want federal officials and their families barred from promoting, issuing, or profiting from crypto, including 67% of Republicans.
Crucially, this support is durable. After a balanced back-and-forth weighing the strongest arguments on both sides, the backing held firm. Support for walling officials off from crypto profits actually rose from 71% to 75%, while the transaction-reporting requirement held at 80%.
Even after voters heard President Trump was defended as a successful businessman, a 66% majority, including 55% of Republicans, still wanted officials barred from profiting off crypto.
The electoral implications are hard to miss: against the backdrop of Trump's $1.2 billion windfall, 89% of Democrats say they'd be less likely to support a candidate who backed a crypto law that lets Trump and his family profit, including 74% of Democrats currently undecided in the 2026 generic ballot, exactly the voters in play.
"Voters have watched the President turn the office into a crypto cash machine while regulating the very industry enriching him, and they want it to stop," said economist Paul Weinstein Jr, PPI Senior Fellow and Board Member. "They want crypto playing by the same anti-fraud rules as everyone else, and they will hold candidates accountable for any law that lets the President's family cash in at the public's expense."
The full polling memo is available here.
Based on a national survey of 1,000 likely voters, including an 800-person representative sample with a Democratic oversample (532 Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents) weighted to the 2026 likely-voter electorate. Conducted May 22-28, 2026, by telephone with live interviewers and text-to-online.
Founded in 1989, PPI is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Find an expert and learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org. Follow us at @ppi.
Media Contact: Ian O'Keefe - iokeefe@ppionline.org
***
Original text here: https://www.progressivepolicy.org/as-trump-pockets-1-2-billion-from-crypto-new-poll-finds-voters-want-the-industry-and-self-dealing-officials-reined-in/
* * *
As Trump Pockets $1.2 Billion From Crypto, New Poll Finds Voters Want the Industry and Self-Dealing Officials Reined In
*
Support for tough anti-fraud rules is overwhelming and bipartisan, and it survives the industry's best arguments. 89% of Democrats say they'd be less likely to back a candidate who lets Trump and his family profit from a crypto law.
WASHINGTON (July 8, 2026) -Days after a federal disclosure filing revealed that President Trump personally took in roughly ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 8 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Progressive Policy Institute posted the following news release: * * * As Trump Pockets $1.2 Billion From Crypto, New Poll Finds Voters Want the Industry and Self-Dealing Officials Reined In * Support for tough anti-fraud rules is overwhelming and bipartisan, and it survives the industry's best arguments. 89% of Democrats say they'd be less likely to back a candidate who lets Trump and his family profit from a crypto law. WASHINGTON (July 8, 2026) -Days after a federal disclosure filing revealed that President Trump personally took in roughly$1.2 billion from crypto ventures last year, a new national survey from the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) and Democratic polling firm GBAO shows voters want the industry, and the officials cashing in on it, reined in.
The filing, analyzed by the Associated Press, shows Trump collected more than $500 million from his World Liberty Financial token sales and over $600 million from "meme" coins stamped with his face, even as the ordinary investors who bought in were left holding the losses. World Liberty's tokens have fallen roughly 80%, and the meme coin has collapsed from a peak above $74 to under $2. Trump built that windfall while his own administration dismantled the Biden-era crackdown on the very industry enriching him. Asked about it, the president shrugged: "We're all profiting."
Voters see the arrangement for what it is, and the poll shows they want it stopped.
The numbers are lopsided. Voters view crypto unfavorably by more than 3-to-1 (57% to 17%), and crypto companies fare no better (55% to 19%). The hostility runs across the spectrum and is sharpest among Democrats, 69% of whom view crypto unfavorably. Voters reserve their trust for Main Street institutions instead: community banks are seen favorably 62% to 10%. And with the cost of living dominating, crypto barely registers as a concern; fewer than 1% name promoting it as a top priority for Congress, against 45% who name inflation.
That skepticism translates into demand for guardrails, on a striking bipartisan basis:
* 83% want crypto companies held to the same anti-money-laundering reporting rules banks already follow, including 80% of Republicans.
* 81% want federal prosecutors and local law enforcement to be given more tools to investigate crypto crime.
* 71% want federal officials and their families barred from promoting, issuing, or profiting from crypto, including 67% of Republicans.
Crucially, this support is durable. After a balanced back-and-forth weighing the strongest arguments on both sides, the backing held firm. Support for walling officials off from crypto profits actually rose from 71% to 75%, while the transaction-reporting requirement held at 80%.
Even after voters heard President Trump was defended as a successful businessman, a 66% majority, including 55% of Republicans, still wanted officials barred from profiting off crypto.
The electoral implications are hard to miss: against the backdrop of Trump's $1.2 billion windfall, 89% of Democrats say they'd be less likely to support a candidate who backed a crypto law that lets Trump and his family profit, including 74% of Democrats currently undecided in the 2026 generic ballot, exactly the voters in play.
"Voters have watched the President turn the office into a crypto cash machine while regulating the very industry enriching him, and they want it to stop," said economist Paul Weinstein Jr, PPI Senior Fellow and Board Member. "They want crypto playing by the same anti-fraud rules as everyone else, and they will hold candidates accountable for any law that lets the President's family cash in at the public's expense."
The full polling memo is available here.
Based on a national survey of 1,000 likely voters, including an 800-person representative sample with a Democratic oversample (532 Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents) weighted to the 2026 likely-voter electorate. Conducted May 22-28, 2026, by telephone with live interviewers and text-to-online.
Founded in 1989, PPI is a catalyst for policy innovation and political reform based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to create radically pragmatic ideas for moving America beyond ideological and partisan deadlock. Find an expert and learn more about PPI by visiting progressivepolicy.org. Follow us at @ppi.
Media Contact: Ian O'Keefe - iokeefe@ppionline.org
***
Original text here: https://www.progressivepolicy.org/as-trump-pockets-1-2-billion-from-crypto-new-poll-finds-voters-want-the-industry-and-self-dealing-officials-reined-in/