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Report calls for awareness of regulations' adverse effects on Americans
WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 [Category: ThinkTank] (TNSbrep) -- The Competitive Enterprise Institute posted the following news release:
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New report calls for awareness of regulations' adverse effects on Americans
*
Federal regulations claim they exist to protect the public. But what happens when those regulations achieve the opposite by blocking cheaper, safer, and more innovative products from getting to consumers? A new Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) report aims to raise awareness of this problem and provide a framework to scrutinize the outcome of regulations, not their intention.
Regulations ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 [Category: ThinkTank] (TNSbrep) -- The Competitive Enterprise Institute posted the following news release: * * * New report calls for awareness of regulations' adverse effects on Americans * Federal regulations claim they exist to protect the public. But what happens when those regulations achieve the opposite by blocking cheaper, safer, and more innovative products from getting to consumers? A new Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) report aims to raise awareness of this problem and provide a framework to scrutinize the outcome of regulations, not their intention. Regulationsoften create systems where large companies establish competitive dominance, depriving small businesses of their chance to compete in the marketplace and depriving consumers of access to innovative products. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are two agencies where this paradoxical condition between regulation and the consumer exists. While OSHA and the SEC claim to promote workplace safety and protect against financial abuse respectively, the outcome of their regulations sometimes fail to achieve their intended outcomes and do the exact opposite.
"Utilizing the Protection Paradox as a framework for evaluating the regulatory system will help identify where our government is burdening consumer choice and business innovation and hopefully eliminate those burdens once and for all," said CEI Associate Counsel and co-author of the report, Marin Murdock.
The report (https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/OnPoint-312_THE-PROTECTION-PARADOX.pdf) identifies five core tenants of the Protection Paradox framework which can be used to identify how these regulations fall short of their objectives:
* A legitimate government objective with a genuine public purpose;
* Discretionary authority becomes concentrated;
* Structural barriers to market participation emerge;
* Competition and innovation decline, and;
* The intended beneficiaries of regulation bear the costs of policy implementation.
"Each year, federal agencies finalize approximately 3,000 final rules. Ongoing scrutiny of their outcome is essential to confirm they achieve their statutory objectives, especially those meant to safeguard the public. This is particularly important in light of the Supreme Court's 2024 decision in Corner Post, which gives newly affected parties the opportunity to challenge long-standing regulations." said CEI Senior Counsel and co-author of the report, Soriya Chhe. "Staying vigilant helps expand opportunity, preserve competition, and protect individual liberty."Read "The Protection Paradox: Good Intentions, Bad Market Outcomes" by Soriya Chhe and Marin Murdock on CEI.org.
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Original text here: https://cei.org/news_releases/new-report-calls-for-awareness-of-regulations-adverse-effects-on-americans/
* * *
New report calls for awareness of regulations' adverse effects on Americans
*
Federal regulations claim they exist to protect the public. But what happens when those regulations achieve the opposite by blocking cheaper, safer, and more innovative products from getting to consumers? A new Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) report aims to raise awareness of this problem and provide a framework to scrutinize the outcome of regulations, not their intention.
Regulations ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 [Category: ThinkTank] (TNSbrep) -- The Competitive Enterprise Institute posted the following news release: * * * New report calls for awareness of regulations' adverse effects on Americans * Federal regulations claim they exist to protect the public. But what happens when those regulations achieve the opposite by blocking cheaper, safer, and more innovative products from getting to consumers? A new Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) report aims to raise awareness of this problem and provide a framework to scrutinize the outcome of regulations, not their intention. Regulationsoften create systems where large companies establish competitive dominance, depriving small businesses of their chance to compete in the marketplace and depriving consumers of access to innovative products. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are two agencies where this paradoxical condition between regulation and the consumer exists. While OSHA and the SEC claim to promote workplace safety and protect against financial abuse respectively, the outcome of their regulations sometimes fail to achieve their intended outcomes and do the exact opposite.
"Utilizing the Protection Paradox as a framework for evaluating the regulatory system will help identify where our government is burdening consumer choice and business innovation and hopefully eliminate those burdens once and for all," said CEI Associate Counsel and co-author of the report, Marin Murdock.
The report (https://cei.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/OnPoint-312_THE-PROTECTION-PARADOX.pdf) identifies five core tenants of the Protection Paradox framework which can be used to identify how these regulations fall short of their objectives:
* A legitimate government objective with a genuine public purpose;
* Discretionary authority becomes concentrated;
* Structural barriers to market participation emerge;
* Competition and innovation decline, and;
* The intended beneficiaries of regulation bear the costs of policy implementation.
"Each year, federal agencies finalize approximately 3,000 final rules. Ongoing scrutiny of their outcome is essential to confirm they achieve their statutory objectives, especially those meant to safeguard the public. This is particularly important in light of the Supreme Court's 2024 decision in Corner Post, which gives newly affected parties the opportunity to challenge long-standing regulations." said CEI Senior Counsel and co-author of the report, Soriya Chhe. "Staying vigilant helps expand opportunity, preserve competition, and protect individual liberty."Read "The Protection Paradox: Good Intentions, Bad Market Outcomes" by Soriya Chhe and Marin Murdock on CEI.org.
***
Original text here: https://cei.org/news_releases/new-report-calls-for-awareness-of-regulations-adverse-effects-on-americans/
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to American Affairs: Housing Divergence - Why Texas Builds and California Stalls
NEW YORK, Aug. 20 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary by Director of Research and senior fellow Judge Glock to American Affairs:
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The Housing Divergence: Why Texas Builds and California Stalls
Texas and California are similar in many ways. They were the two largest states to emerge from the Mexican American War.
They were both, at least temporarily, their own countries before being incorporated into the United States.
At different times, they have both been symbols of a peculiarly American way of life, in a manner that could not be said of any other ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Aug. 20 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary by Director of Research and senior fellow Judge Glock to American Affairs: * * * The Housing Divergence: Why Texas Builds and California Stalls Texas and California are similar in many ways. They were the two largest states to emerge from the Mexican American War. They were both, at least temporarily, their own countries before being incorporated into the United States. At different times, they have both been symbols of a peculiarly American way of life, in a manner that could not be said of any otherstate in the Union.
Yet the two states have in recent years become symbols of the fundamental divide inside America itself.
California is the quintessential high-tax, high-regulation, socially liberal blue state; Texas is a quintessential low-tax, low-regulation, law-and-order red state.
Continue reading the entire piece here at American Affairs (https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2026/08/the-housing-divergence-why-texas-builds-and-california-stalls).
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/the-housing-divergence-why-texas-builds-and-california-stalls
[Category: ThinkTank]
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The Housing Divergence: Why Texas Builds and California Stalls
Texas and California are similar in many ways. They were the two largest states to emerge from the Mexican American War.
They were both, at least temporarily, their own countries before being incorporated into the United States.
At different times, they have both been symbols of a peculiarly American way of life, in a manner that could not be said of any other ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Aug. 20 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary by Director of Research and senior fellow Judge Glock to American Affairs: * * * The Housing Divergence: Why Texas Builds and California Stalls Texas and California are similar in many ways. They were the two largest states to emerge from the Mexican American War. They were both, at least temporarily, their own countries before being incorporated into the United States. At different times, they have both been symbols of a peculiarly American way of life, in a manner that could not be said of any otherstate in the Union.
Yet the two states have in recent years become symbols of the fundamental divide inside America itself.
California is the quintessential high-tax, high-regulation, socially liberal blue state; Texas is a quintessential low-tax, low-regulation, law-and-order red state.
Continue reading the entire piece here at American Affairs (https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2026/08/the-housing-divergence-why-texas-builds-and-california-stalls).
* * *
Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/the-housing-divergence-why-texas-builds-and-california-stalls
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Purges, Aging Set Stage for 21st Party Congress Turnover
WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary by senior fellow Willy Wo-Lap Lam in the foundation's China Brief Notes:
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Purges, Aging Set Stage for 21st Party Congress Turnover
Executive Summary:
* New additions to the Politburo Standing Committee, Central Committee, and Central Military Commission at the 21st Party Congress in 2027 are expected to follow General Secretary Xi Jinping's agenda, and decisions for promotions will follow cadres' proven ability to do so rather than any novel ideas they may hold.
* Although Xi will almost certainly stay in ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary by senior fellow Willy Wo-Lap Lam in the foundation's China Brief Notes: * * * Purges, Aging Set Stage for 21st Party Congress Turnover Executive Summary: * New additions to the Politburo Standing Committee, Central Committee, and Central Military Commission at the 21st Party Congress in 2027 are expected to follow General Secretary Xi Jinping's agenda, and decisions for promotions will follow cadres' proven ability to do so rather than any novel ideas they may hold. * Although Xi will almost certainly stay inpower, the Politburo Standing Committee will likely observe the "seven up, eight down" norm, under which members to retire at 68. This would mean a complete overhaul, with the exception of First Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang.
* No cadres have been promoted directly into the Politburo Standing Committee from the Central Committee since Xi himself, so any new members are likely already members of the Politburo. Prospective candidates include Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining, vice premiers Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, Tianjin Party Secretary Chen Min'er, and Head of the CCP Propaganda Department Li Shulei.
* Promotions to the roughly 200-member Central Committee might also provide glimpses of a post-Xi CCP, as members of the so-called "seventh generation" of Party leaders (i.e. those born in the 1970s) begin to accede to this key Party body.
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Chinese politics has lapsed into the dull continuum of General Secretary Xi Jinping's idealized "long rule and perennial stability" (People's Daily, August 5, 2022). Observers of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are consequently shifting their gaze to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) 21st National Congress--which is scheduled for some time in October or November 2027--for signs of change. Xi, who first rose to power in 2012, is likely to stay in power after this five-yearly congress. He may remain paramount leader at least until the subsequent congress in 2032, when he will be 79 years old (The Diplomat, February 5).
The capstone political event is also the moment when the Party ushers in a new Central Committee, Politburo, and Politburo Standing Committee (ThinkChina, March 16; Congressional Research Service, April 27). Preparations for personnel changes are likely already underway, with Xi overseeing the whole process. It is not known at this stage who will end up populating the various high-level bodies following the congress, but it is possible to highlight names that are currently circulating and suggest individuals who have a high chance of selection.
New Standing Committee Will Toe Xi's Line
Xi is set to dominate personnel movements at the 21st Party Congress much in the same way that he controlled the 20th Party Congress in 2022 (China Leadership Monitor, December 2025). Primary focus will be on changes to the Politburo Standing Committee. In accordance with the Party norm commonly referred to as "seven up, eight down", in which cadres aged 67 and below can remain in office or be promoted, but those who have reached the age of 68 must retire, all incumbents except First Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang are set to retire. For example, Premier Li Qiang, second-ranked after Xi on the Politburo Standing Committee, is expected to retire since he will be 68 by the time of the Congress (Storm Media, August 2). This norm has been consistently observed for Politburo Standing Committee members--though not Party leaders--since the 16th Party Congress in 2002 (Ling Li, December 15, 2022). Some commentators, however, speculate that it may not hold at the 21st Party Congress (Wenxue City, May 5). Based on personnel decisions made during the 20th Party Congress in 2022, it appears that the same norms do not apply to either the wider Politburo or the Central Military Commission.[1]
At the upcoming congress, there may be as many as five slots open on the Politburo Standing Committee. Traditionally, this would present an opportunity for Beijing to bring in unfamiliar faces, and maybe even novel governance ideas. Under Xi, however, this is unlikely. Party favorites for potential promotion include eligible members of the incumbent Politburo, which Xi licked into shape at the previous congress, such as Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining, vice premiers Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, Tianjin Party Secretary Chen Min'er, and Head of the CCP Propaganda Department Li Shulei (Wenxue City, May 5).[2] It is unlikely--though not impossible--that anyone will be elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee from outside the current politburo. None have managed this feat in the Xi era, and the last to do so were Xi himself, alongside Li Keqiang in 2007.
A number of the CCP's fast-rising stars are tipped to be inducted to the Central Committee, which consists of roughly 200 members, as well as other important offices. These "seventh generation" politicians have typically first gained ministerial or vice-ministerial status under Xi. They include Lu Dongliang, governor of Shanxi Province; Zhuge Yujie, deputy Party secretary of Hubei Province; and Guo Ningning, deputy Party secretary of Fujian Province. Mainland media have focused on their achievements as factory managers, scientific talents or local-level administrators (South China Morning Post, December 6, 2022; People's Daily, May 23, 2025; RTI News, April 10). Zhuge and Guo have both long been seen as contenders for high office (Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2022; China Brief, December 16, 2022; CNA, October 16, 2023).
Another rising star, Wei Tao, chairman of the Guangxi Autonomous Region, was promoted to full Central Committee membership at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee in October 2025, along with ten others (Xinhua, October 23, 2025). As a current full Central Committee member, Wei, who was also the vice-governor of Shanxi Province from 2021-2025, has the best potential for promotion. Although none of them has been identified as a potential successor of Xi, one or two of this distinguished group could be inducted into the Politburo at the 21st Party Congress.
The political views of these individuals are less clear, though to remain in power and further gain promotion at the 21st and 22nd Party congresses, these potentates will simply have to continue implementing Xi's agenda rather than exhibiting any entrepreneurial ability.
Uncertainty Surrounds Military Leadership
During his third term in power, Xi has overseen a dramatic purge of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) officer class, with at least 36 generals and lieutenant generals and 65 officers removed, missing, or potentially having fallen into disgrace (CSIS, February 24). This will pose problems at the 21st Party Congress, where roughly 20 percent of CCP central committees traditionally have comprised officers of the PLA or the Party's paramilitary organization, the People's Armed Police. It is unclear whether Xi will choose to continue this trend, especially given that he has reduced the Central Military Commission (CMC)--already slimmed down to seven individuals at the last two Party congresses--to just himself as chairman and Zhang Shengmin as vice chair: the two previous vice chairs and three of the four members who began their terms in 2022 are now in jail (China Brief, January 26).
Xi's distrust of the military following the historic purges of recent years may lead him to slow-walk promotions (China Brief, April 16). His decision in early July to promote two lieutenant generals to full generals--with Zhang Shuguang also promoted to Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission--suggests he is seeking to balance this caution with the necessity of filling vacant posts in order to maintain his modernization agenda (Xinhua, July 3; China Brief; The Diplomat, July 6).
Conclusion
Uncertainly still clouds the Chinese body politic. While it is almost certain that Xi will remain in power until at least 2032, his constant demands for loyalty, coupled with the persistent purges that indicate those demands remain unheeded, suggest chinks in the supreme leader's armament.
Any "seventh generation" leaders promoted at the next party congress will have to continue to be faithful implementers of Xi's policy agenda. Their increased power and relative youthfulness, however, could cast them as key figures in a potential post-Xi PRC, and thus worth keeping an eye on. For the time being, the supreme leader resorting to various means to get rid of those he perceives as his enemies is a factor that could jeopardize the stability and solid control over the polity he seeks in order to maintain the PRC's pursuit of global preeminence. His power is therefore never absolute.
* * *
Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and a regular contributor to China Brief. He is an Adjunct Professor at the Center for China Studies, the History Department, and the Master's Program in Global Political Economy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/purges-aging-set-stage-for-21st-party-congress-turnover/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Purges, Aging Set Stage for 21st Party Congress Turnover
Executive Summary:
* New additions to the Politburo Standing Committee, Central Committee, and Central Military Commission at the 21st Party Congress in 2027 are expected to follow General Secretary Xi Jinping's agenda, and decisions for promotions will follow cadres' proven ability to do so rather than any novel ideas they may hold.
* Although Xi will almost certainly stay in ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary by senior fellow Willy Wo-Lap Lam in the foundation's China Brief Notes: * * * Purges, Aging Set Stage for 21st Party Congress Turnover Executive Summary: * New additions to the Politburo Standing Committee, Central Committee, and Central Military Commission at the 21st Party Congress in 2027 are expected to follow General Secretary Xi Jinping's agenda, and decisions for promotions will follow cadres' proven ability to do so rather than any novel ideas they may hold. * Although Xi will almost certainly stay inpower, the Politburo Standing Committee will likely observe the "seven up, eight down" norm, under which members to retire at 68. This would mean a complete overhaul, with the exception of First Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang.
* No cadres have been promoted directly into the Politburo Standing Committee from the Central Committee since Xi himself, so any new members are likely already members of the Politburo. Prospective candidates include Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining, vice premiers Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, Tianjin Party Secretary Chen Min'er, and Head of the CCP Propaganda Department Li Shulei.
* Promotions to the roughly 200-member Central Committee might also provide glimpses of a post-Xi CCP, as members of the so-called "seventh generation" of Party leaders (i.e. those born in the 1970s) begin to accede to this key Party body.
-
Chinese politics has lapsed into the dull continuum of General Secretary Xi Jinping's idealized "long rule and perennial stability" (People's Daily, August 5, 2022). Observers of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are consequently shifting their gaze to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) 21st National Congress--which is scheduled for some time in October or November 2027--for signs of change. Xi, who first rose to power in 2012, is likely to stay in power after this five-yearly congress. He may remain paramount leader at least until the subsequent congress in 2032, when he will be 79 years old (The Diplomat, February 5).
The capstone political event is also the moment when the Party ushers in a new Central Committee, Politburo, and Politburo Standing Committee (ThinkChina, March 16; Congressional Research Service, April 27). Preparations for personnel changes are likely already underway, with Xi overseeing the whole process. It is not known at this stage who will end up populating the various high-level bodies following the congress, but it is possible to highlight names that are currently circulating and suggest individuals who have a high chance of selection.
New Standing Committee Will Toe Xi's Line
Xi is set to dominate personnel movements at the 21st Party Congress much in the same way that he controlled the 20th Party Congress in 2022 (China Leadership Monitor, December 2025). Primary focus will be on changes to the Politburo Standing Committee. In accordance with the Party norm commonly referred to as "seven up, eight down", in which cadres aged 67 and below can remain in office or be promoted, but those who have reached the age of 68 must retire, all incumbents except First Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang are set to retire. For example, Premier Li Qiang, second-ranked after Xi on the Politburo Standing Committee, is expected to retire since he will be 68 by the time of the Congress (Storm Media, August 2). This norm has been consistently observed for Politburo Standing Committee members--though not Party leaders--since the 16th Party Congress in 2002 (Ling Li, December 15, 2022). Some commentators, however, speculate that it may not hold at the 21st Party Congress (Wenxue City, May 5). Based on personnel decisions made during the 20th Party Congress in 2022, it appears that the same norms do not apply to either the wider Politburo or the Central Military Commission.[1]
At the upcoming congress, there may be as many as five slots open on the Politburo Standing Committee. Traditionally, this would present an opportunity for Beijing to bring in unfamiliar faces, and maybe even novel governance ideas. Under Xi, however, this is unlikely. Party favorites for potential promotion include eligible members of the incumbent Politburo, which Xi licked into shape at the previous congress, such as Shanghai Party Secretary Chen Jining, vice premiers Liu Guozhong and Zhang Guoqing, Tianjin Party Secretary Chen Min'er, and Head of the CCP Propaganda Department Li Shulei (Wenxue City, May 5).[2] It is unlikely--though not impossible--that anyone will be elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee from outside the current politburo. None have managed this feat in the Xi era, and the last to do so were Xi himself, alongside Li Keqiang in 2007.
A number of the CCP's fast-rising stars are tipped to be inducted to the Central Committee, which consists of roughly 200 members, as well as other important offices. These "seventh generation" politicians have typically first gained ministerial or vice-ministerial status under Xi. They include Lu Dongliang, governor of Shanxi Province; Zhuge Yujie, deputy Party secretary of Hubei Province; and Guo Ningning, deputy Party secretary of Fujian Province. Mainland media have focused on their achievements as factory managers, scientific talents or local-level administrators (South China Morning Post, December 6, 2022; People's Daily, May 23, 2025; RTI News, April 10). Zhuge and Guo have both long been seen as contenders for high office (Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2022; China Brief, December 16, 2022; CNA, October 16, 2023).
Another rising star, Wei Tao, chairman of the Guangxi Autonomous Region, was promoted to full Central Committee membership at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee in October 2025, along with ten others (Xinhua, October 23, 2025). As a current full Central Committee member, Wei, who was also the vice-governor of Shanxi Province from 2021-2025, has the best potential for promotion. Although none of them has been identified as a potential successor of Xi, one or two of this distinguished group could be inducted into the Politburo at the 21st Party Congress.
The political views of these individuals are less clear, though to remain in power and further gain promotion at the 21st and 22nd Party congresses, these potentates will simply have to continue implementing Xi's agenda rather than exhibiting any entrepreneurial ability.
Uncertainty Surrounds Military Leadership
During his third term in power, Xi has overseen a dramatic purge of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) officer class, with at least 36 generals and lieutenant generals and 65 officers removed, missing, or potentially having fallen into disgrace (CSIS, February 24). This will pose problems at the 21st Party Congress, where roughly 20 percent of CCP central committees traditionally have comprised officers of the PLA or the Party's paramilitary organization, the People's Armed Police. It is unclear whether Xi will choose to continue this trend, especially given that he has reduced the Central Military Commission (CMC)--already slimmed down to seven individuals at the last two Party congresses--to just himself as chairman and Zhang Shengmin as vice chair: the two previous vice chairs and three of the four members who began their terms in 2022 are now in jail (China Brief, January 26).
Xi's distrust of the military following the historic purges of recent years may lead him to slow-walk promotions (China Brief, April 16). His decision in early July to promote two lieutenant generals to full generals--with Zhang Shuguang also promoted to Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission--suggests he is seeking to balance this caution with the necessity of filling vacant posts in order to maintain his modernization agenda (Xinhua, July 3; China Brief; The Diplomat, July 6).
Conclusion
Uncertainly still clouds the Chinese body politic. While it is almost certain that Xi will remain in power until at least 2032, his constant demands for loyalty, coupled with the persistent purges that indicate those demands remain unheeded, suggest chinks in the supreme leader's armament.
Any "seventh generation" leaders promoted at the next party congress will have to continue to be faithful implementers of Xi's policy agenda. Their increased power and relative youthfulness, however, could cast them as key figures in a potential post-Xi PRC, and thus worth keeping an eye on. For the time being, the supreme leader resorting to various means to get rid of those he perceives as his enemies is a factor that could jeopardize the stability and solid control over the polity he seeks in order to maintain the PRC's pursuit of global preeminence. His power is therefore never absolute.
* * *
Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and a regular contributor to China Brief. He is an Adjunct Professor at the Center for China Studies, the History Department, and the Master's Program in Global Political Economy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/purges-aging-set-stage-for-21st-party-congress-turnover/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Goldwater Institute: She Cooks for Her Neighbors. The Government Says It's an Illegal Restaurant
PHOENIX, Arizona, Aug. 20 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Goldwater Institute posted the following news:
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She Cooks for Her Neighbors. The Government Says It's an Illegal Restaurant
*
When the sun comes up in the small town of Harrisburg, Mo., there's really only one place to grab breakfast and meet up with friends-Kathy Kite's house. Every morning Kathy makes home-cooked breakfast at no charge for friends, neighbors, and anyone else who stops by. But now, her hospitality is threatened by the local health department, which is warning that she could face steep fines and criminal penalties ... Show Full Article PHOENIX, Arizona, Aug. 20 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Goldwater Institute posted the following news: * * * She Cooks for Her Neighbors. The Government Says It's an Illegal Restaurant * When the sun comes up in the small town of Harrisburg, Mo., there's really only one place to grab breakfast and meet up with friends-Kathy Kite's house. Every morning Kathy makes home-cooked breakfast at no charge for friends, neighbors, and anyone else who stops by. But now, her hospitality is threatened by the local health department, which is warning that she could face steep fines and criminal penaltiesif she doesn't stop making food without their permission and without installing a commercial kitchen.
That's wrong. Kathy isn't running a restaurant or a commercial food establishment-she's just a grandma who has a constitutional right to make breakfast for guests in her home. That's why today the Goldwater Institute sent a letter to leaders of the City of Columbia/Boone County health department asking them to explain the legal reasoning for their threats against Kathy.
"I love feeding people. So, when the local gas station stopped serving breakfast, I told everyone they could just come to my house," Kathy said. "Every morning, workers, retirees, and busy moms swing by to grab a bite to eat and talk. I don't see anything wrong with that. It's not a business. I'm just a grandma who cooks burritos for my friends."
Kathy was raised on a farm in rural Missouri. Her mother always kept a pitcher of cold tea ready and told the farm workers in the community that they were welcome to stop by for a cold drink or something to eat. Kathy internalized that lesson.
Now Kathy lives in Harrisburg, a rural town with a population of less than 300 people. There are only two businesses that provide any sort of food-the H-Town gas station and a small coffee shop. Kathy cooked for the gas station. Up until the Covid pandemic, H-Town sold breakfast in the mornings and was a community hub. Old-timers and farmers gathered there to eat, discuss crop prices, the weather, and local news. But after Covid, H-Town stopped serving breakfast and the community lost its morning gathering spot.
Following her mother's example, Kathy offered to cook breakfast and opened her home so her neighbors would have a place to eat and talk. Every morning she wakes up at 3:30 to make breakfast sandwiches, breakfast burritos, biscuits, waffles, and coffee for her neighbors. She has never charged for the food.
Apparently, not everyone is pleased with Kathy's neighborliness. In July, the Columbia/Boone County Department of Public Health and Human Services sent Kathy a warning letter stating that if she intends to continue providing food that is not covered by Missouri's "cottage food" law-a law that allows people to sell baked goods and canned jams without a license-she would need to install a commercial kitchen, get a food permit, and subject herself to the government's restaurant regulations.
Installing a commercial kitchen would not only cost tens of thousands of dollars, it would also subject Kathy's home to on-demand inspections by public health officials. Kathy has neither the means nor the desire to add a commercial kitchen to her home. In addition, a close reading of the Columbia Food Code indicates that Kathy could face up to $3,000 in criminal and civil fines and up to a year in jail each day she provides free food to guests in her home.
Kathy's story is a textbook example of bureaucracy run amok. Citizens should not be required to get the government's permission before offering passers-by some coffee and a bite to eat while they socialize.
The government exists to protect this sort of neighborly kindness, not to punish it. The Goldwater Institute intends to make sure that Kathy-and every other American-remains free to show hospitality to their neighbors without having to submit to government oversight or to face absurd, overbearing penalties.
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INFODOC: https://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Demand-Letter-to-Boone-County-Dept.-of-Public-Health-and-Human-Services_FINAL.pdf
***
Original text here: https://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/she-cooks-for-her-neighbors-the-government-says-its-an-illegal-restaurant/
* * *
She Cooks for Her Neighbors. The Government Says It's an Illegal Restaurant
*
When the sun comes up in the small town of Harrisburg, Mo., there's really only one place to grab breakfast and meet up with friends-Kathy Kite's house. Every morning Kathy makes home-cooked breakfast at no charge for friends, neighbors, and anyone else who stops by. But now, her hospitality is threatened by the local health department, which is warning that she could face steep fines and criminal penalties ... Show Full Article PHOENIX, Arizona, Aug. 20 [Category: ThinkTank] -- The Goldwater Institute posted the following news: * * * She Cooks for Her Neighbors. The Government Says It's an Illegal Restaurant * When the sun comes up in the small town of Harrisburg, Mo., there's really only one place to grab breakfast and meet up with friends-Kathy Kite's house. Every morning Kathy makes home-cooked breakfast at no charge for friends, neighbors, and anyone else who stops by. But now, her hospitality is threatened by the local health department, which is warning that she could face steep fines and criminal penaltiesif she doesn't stop making food without their permission and without installing a commercial kitchen.
That's wrong. Kathy isn't running a restaurant or a commercial food establishment-she's just a grandma who has a constitutional right to make breakfast for guests in her home. That's why today the Goldwater Institute sent a letter to leaders of the City of Columbia/Boone County health department asking them to explain the legal reasoning for their threats against Kathy.
"I love feeding people. So, when the local gas station stopped serving breakfast, I told everyone they could just come to my house," Kathy said. "Every morning, workers, retirees, and busy moms swing by to grab a bite to eat and talk. I don't see anything wrong with that. It's not a business. I'm just a grandma who cooks burritos for my friends."
Kathy was raised on a farm in rural Missouri. Her mother always kept a pitcher of cold tea ready and told the farm workers in the community that they were welcome to stop by for a cold drink or something to eat. Kathy internalized that lesson.
Now Kathy lives in Harrisburg, a rural town with a population of less than 300 people. There are only two businesses that provide any sort of food-the H-Town gas station and a small coffee shop. Kathy cooked for the gas station. Up until the Covid pandemic, H-Town sold breakfast in the mornings and was a community hub. Old-timers and farmers gathered there to eat, discuss crop prices, the weather, and local news. But after Covid, H-Town stopped serving breakfast and the community lost its morning gathering spot.
Following her mother's example, Kathy offered to cook breakfast and opened her home so her neighbors would have a place to eat and talk. Every morning she wakes up at 3:30 to make breakfast sandwiches, breakfast burritos, biscuits, waffles, and coffee for her neighbors. She has never charged for the food.
Apparently, not everyone is pleased with Kathy's neighborliness. In July, the Columbia/Boone County Department of Public Health and Human Services sent Kathy a warning letter stating that if she intends to continue providing food that is not covered by Missouri's "cottage food" law-a law that allows people to sell baked goods and canned jams without a license-she would need to install a commercial kitchen, get a food permit, and subject herself to the government's restaurant regulations.
Installing a commercial kitchen would not only cost tens of thousands of dollars, it would also subject Kathy's home to on-demand inspections by public health officials. Kathy has neither the means nor the desire to add a commercial kitchen to her home. In addition, a close reading of the Columbia Food Code indicates that Kathy could face up to $3,000 in criminal and civil fines and up to a year in jail each day she provides free food to guests in her home.
Kathy's story is a textbook example of bureaucracy run amok. Citizens should not be required to get the government's permission before offering passers-by some coffee and a bite to eat while they socialize.
The government exists to protect this sort of neighborly kindness, not to punish it. The Goldwater Institute intends to make sure that Kathy-and every other American-remains free to show hospitality to their neighbors without having to submit to government oversight or to face absurd, overbearing penalties.
* * *
INFODOC: https://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Demand-Letter-to-Boone-County-Dept.-of-Public-Health-and-Human-Services_FINAL.pdf
***
Original text here: https://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/she-cooks-for-her-neighbors-the-government-says-its-an-illegal-restaurant/
CSIS Issues Commentary: Rice at a Crossroads - Rethinking Japan's Food Security
WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary by Ryosuke Inoue, visiting fellow from Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting Co. Ltd. with the Japan Chair:
* * *
Rice at a Crossroads: Rethinking Japan's Food Security
A Shock at the Rice Counter
Rice is Japan's staple food, and it reaches nearly every dinner table in the country. In early 2024, a five-kilogram bag of rice cost the average Japanese household about Yen2,000 ($13). A year later the price had nearly doubled, reaching its highest level in decades (see Figure 1). The political ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary by Ryosuke Inoue, visiting fellow from Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting Co. Ltd. with the Japan Chair: * * * Rice at a Crossroads: Rethinking Japan's Food Security A Shock at the Rice Counter Rice is Japan's staple food, and it reaches nearly every dinner table in the country. In early 2024, a five-kilogram bag of rice cost the average Japanese household about Yen2,000 ($13). A year later the price had nearly doubled, reaching its highest level in decades (see Figure 1). The politicalreaction came quickly. In May 2025, the agriculture minister resigned after saying he had never bought rice with his own money, a remark widely seen as out of touch. Rice prices became a national issue and a factor in that year's elections. Since then, prices have peaked and eased somewhat, though they remain much higher than before the surge. Continued high rice prices have also added to the recent rise in the cost of living, pushing the government to cut the consumption tax on food despite fiscal concerns.
The surge exposed an issue that Japan had mostly overlooked. For decades, its food security debate centered on a single fear: that the country's heavy dependence on imports would leave it vulnerable if supply were ever cut off. The current rice crisis raises a different question: Can an ordinary household reliably afford its daily food? Japan must address two different problems: how to guarantee national self-sufficiency during a crisis and how to ensure household food security in everyday life. To effectively balance these goals, the Japanese government should focus on strengthening agricultural production capacity through policies that promote the effective use of different types of farmland, create safety nets for farmers during price downturns, and support the adoption of technologies that lower production costs.
* * *
Figure 1: Average Japanese Retail Rice Prices (JPY/5kg)
* * *
Why Rice Prices Surged
According to a report by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), several forces working simultaneously pushed rice demand above supply. The government's demand forecasts had assumed a continued decline in line with a shrinking population, but consumption instead rose, driven by inbound tourism and higher household purchases. On the supply side, extreme summer heat lowered milling yields, so more brown rice was needed to produce the same amount of table rice. Production fell short of demand, and private stocks had to be drawn down to make up the gap.
This gap in supply and demand was not large, but the change in price was, partly due to how staple crops behave. In general, demand for rice has low price elasticity: When the price rises, households cut back only a little rather than sharply, because rice is not something easily dropped from the daily diet. Because demand barely falls, a small gap between supply and demand can move prices sharply.
Long-standing Japanese government rice policy may also have played a part. For decades, Japan has managed rice supply to match projected demand, holding output down so that prices would not collapse. The government stopped assigning production targets to each region and farmers in 2018, but it still pays them to shift paddy fields from rice to other crops such as wheat, soybeans, and feed grains. Due to these constraints, supply remained tight and could not easily absorb an unexpected jump in demand.
The Japanese Government's Response: No Easy Answer
As a short-term measure, the Japanese government released rice from its emergency reserves, beginning in March 2025. But prices did not fall right away: The released rice was slow to reach store shelves, and much of the effect took months to show up in what shoppers actually paid.
The long-term question for the government was whether Japan should produce more rice overall. In August 2025, the Ishiba administration announced a shift toward higher production to bring prices down. However, two months later, under the Takaichi administration, Agriculture Minister Norikazu Suzuki pulled back, framing the goal as production aligned with demand rather than expansion. Both positions have a logic to them. Growing more rice lowers prices and helps households, but it also drives farmers out of business and therefore takes paddies out of use. Growing less protects farmers but pushes prices back up, causing hardship for consumers.
One option the government did not take was to allow more foreign rice into the Japanese market. Normally, imports would fill the gap and cap a price spike. But Japanese rice imports are restricted by a World Trade Organization (WTO) import quota; any imports above this quota are subject to a tariff of Yen341 per kilogram, which mostly keeps foreign rice out. The quota allows about 770,000 tons a year, and even the 2025 U.S.-Japan trade deal only raised the U.S. share within that quota rather than opening the market. Of that amount, at most 100,000 tons are sold as staple rice, while the rest is directed to processing, feed, and other uses. A finance ministry panel has suggested making greater use of imported rice when supply is at risk. Since the 100,000-ton limit is set domestically, Japan could in principle allocate more of the quota to staple rice without renegotiating its WTO commitments. However, the government has stayed cautious overall, apparently concerned about the impact on domestic production.
The issue is complicated because rice plays two roles at once. Paddy fields and rice farms are the core of Japan's domestic food supply: More than half of Japan's farmland is paddy and more than half of its farms primarily grow rice. At the same time, rice is what households eat every day. Price ties the two together. A high price keeps farmers on the land but strains households; a low price relieves households but drives farmers off their land. Steering the price cannot serve both, so the real question for the government is not how to set the price, but what else policy can do for food security.
Rethinking Food Security: What Matters Is Production Capacity
Japan's food security has usually been measured by one number: the self-sufficiency rate, the share of calories the country produces for itself. At about 38 percent, Japan's is the lowest in the G7, and it is often treated as a warning. However, self-sufficiency is an imperfect measure of food security. Researchers have long noted that a country can score high on the ratio and still not be food secure. Self-sufficiency and food security are not the same thing.
In normal times, indeed, imports are what keep food affordable. Japan was the fourth-largest market for U.S. agricultural exports in 2025, buying about $13 billion in farm goods such as corn, beef, pork, and soybeans, with Australia and Canada supplying much of the rest. Export restrictions among such trusted suppliers are rare. Japan can rely on them in normal times and need not emphasize self-sufficiency at the expense of households.
What matters instead is production capacity for a crisis. If imports were ever cut off, whether by a regional conflict, a blocked shipping lane, or a pandemic, the country would have to feed itself. That capacity rests on farmland, farmers, and technology, and it can only be built in advance. MAFF's own estimate is alarming: With today's production capacity, a complete cutoff of imports would leave Japan unable to meet its people's daily calorie needs, unless farmland were shifted to potatoes and other high-calorie crops on a national scale. However, the capacity upon which Japan would rely in a crisis is quietly eroding in peacetime: Farmland is decreasing, and the farming population is shrinking and growing older (see Figure 2).
Strengthening agricultural production capacity could help on the household side as well. A stronger production base would allow steadier output at lower cost, easing prices in normal times and proactively preparing for times of crisis. Protecting production capacity may thus serve both ends at once, while price is left to the market.
* * *
Figure 2: Japanese Farmland and Farmers in Decline (2005-2025)
* * *
Recommendations to Strengthen Production Capacity
To protect agricultural production capacity, the Japanese government must engage directly with the three foundations on which it rests: farmland, farmers, and technology.
Farmland: Protect the Right Land, for the Right Reason
All farmland contributes to production capacity, but not all of it should be treated the same way in government policy (see Table 1). For example, productive flatland is easier to keep in use, as successors are more readily found and the risk of abandonment is relatively low. In this case, the government should focus on consolidating plots into larger, lower-cost operations. Lower costs raise competitiveness and keep food affordable.
In contrast, less productive land is more likely to fall out of use, yet it can still deliver great public benefits--known as multifunctionality--such as flood control, groundwater recharge, scenic landscapes, and biodiversity. Therefore, this land deserves support from the government to keep it farmed and preserve those functions. Some of this support already exists: Direct payments for hilly and mountainous areas have been in place since 2000, and evidence suggests they have slowed the abandonment of farmland. Another payment scheme supports the multifunctionality of farming more broadly. Ideally, such payments would be tied more closely to the specific benefits each type of land provides, measured and supported accordingly.
In the case of land that is neither productive nor rich in public benefits, government policy should focus on maintenance, so the land is ready as a reserve in a crisis. Since farmland is hard to restore, it should not be abandoned. Even basic maintenance is a challenge, however. MAFF's survey found that over 30 percent of farmland has no identified successor a decade from now.
* * *
Table 1: Designing Agricultural Policy Based on Farmland Productivity and Public Benefits
* * *
Farmers: A Safety Net that Switches On Only in Downturns
Japan's farmers are aging fast. The average farmer is now in their late sixties, and the farming population has roughly halved in two decades (see Figure 2). Some further decline is unavoidable, and consolidation into larger operations is part of the answer. But scale alone will not keep committed farmers in business or bring new entrants in. That requires income stability.
One option is a safety net that activates only when prices fall below a set floor that covers production costs to a reasonable degree without overly distorting the market. This safety net would cushion farmers in downturns and make farming a safer career to enter, while leaving the market alone when prices remain above the support floor, so households are not overcharged in normal times. The U.S. Price Loss Coverage program offers a useful model. Although setting the appropriate floor is difficult, Japan may be able to use a recently established reference point as a basis: In April 2026, a government-authorized body published a national cost indicator for rice, putting total costs from production through retail at Yen2,816 ($18) per five kilograms of milled rice.
Technology: Cooperate with the United States to Cut Costs
Lower production costs are the one path that serves both goals at once: cheaper food for households and more viable farms. Japan can learn from the United States. For example, precision agriculture is widely used in the United States but is only beginning to spread in Japan. Similarly, direct seeding is standard in the United States and helps cut costs, while in Japan nearly all rice is still transplanted. Both techniques can reduce operational costs, and deeper cooperation with the United States on farm technology would give Japan a way to keep rice affordable without squeezing its farmers.
Conclusion
The rice price shock should be a wake-up call for Japan to rethink its approach to food security. Japan should invest in the farmland, farmers, and technology needed to maintain its production capacity for a crisis. A stronger production base would make Japan more resilient in emergencies while also helping keep food affordable in normal times.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/rice-crossroads-rethinking-japans-food-security
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Rice at a Crossroads: Rethinking Japan's Food Security
A Shock at the Rice Counter
Rice is Japan's staple food, and it reaches nearly every dinner table in the country. In early 2024, a five-kilogram bag of rice cost the average Japanese household about Yen2,000 ($13). A year later the price had nearly doubled, reaching its highest level in decades (see Figure 1). The political ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary by Ryosuke Inoue, visiting fellow from Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting Co. Ltd. with the Japan Chair: * * * Rice at a Crossroads: Rethinking Japan's Food Security A Shock at the Rice Counter Rice is Japan's staple food, and it reaches nearly every dinner table in the country. In early 2024, a five-kilogram bag of rice cost the average Japanese household about Yen2,000 ($13). A year later the price had nearly doubled, reaching its highest level in decades (see Figure 1). The politicalreaction came quickly. In May 2025, the agriculture minister resigned after saying he had never bought rice with his own money, a remark widely seen as out of touch. Rice prices became a national issue and a factor in that year's elections. Since then, prices have peaked and eased somewhat, though they remain much higher than before the surge. Continued high rice prices have also added to the recent rise in the cost of living, pushing the government to cut the consumption tax on food despite fiscal concerns.
The surge exposed an issue that Japan had mostly overlooked. For decades, its food security debate centered on a single fear: that the country's heavy dependence on imports would leave it vulnerable if supply were ever cut off. The current rice crisis raises a different question: Can an ordinary household reliably afford its daily food? Japan must address two different problems: how to guarantee national self-sufficiency during a crisis and how to ensure household food security in everyday life. To effectively balance these goals, the Japanese government should focus on strengthening agricultural production capacity through policies that promote the effective use of different types of farmland, create safety nets for farmers during price downturns, and support the adoption of technologies that lower production costs.
* * *
Figure 1: Average Japanese Retail Rice Prices (JPY/5kg)
* * *
Why Rice Prices Surged
According to a report by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), several forces working simultaneously pushed rice demand above supply. The government's demand forecasts had assumed a continued decline in line with a shrinking population, but consumption instead rose, driven by inbound tourism and higher household purchases. On the supply side, extreme summer heat lowered milling yields, so more brown rice was needed to produce the same amount of table rice. Production fell short of demand, and private stocks had to be drawn down to make up the gap.
This gap in supply and demand was not large, but the change in price was, partly due to how staple crops behave. In general, demand for rice has low price elasticity: When the price rises, households cut back only a little rather than sharply, because rice is not something easily dropped from the daily diet. Because demand barely falls, a small gap between supply and demand can move prices sharply.
Long-standing Japanese government rice policy may also have played a part. For decades, Japan has managed rice supply to match projected demand, holding output down so that prices would not collapse. The government stopped assigning production targets to each region and farmers in 2018, but it still pays them to shift paddy fields from rice to other crops such as wheat, soybeans, and feed grains. Due to these constraints, supply remained tight and could not easily absorb an unexpected jump in demand.
The Japanese Government's Response: No Easy Answer
As a short-term measure, the Japanese government released rice from its emergency reserves, beginning in March 2025. But prices did not fall right away: The released rice was slow to reach store shelves, and much of the effect took months to show up in what shoppers actually paid.
The long-term question for the government was whether Japan should produce more rice overall. In August 2025, the Ishiba administration announced a shift toward higher production to bring prices down. However, two months later, under the Takaichi administration, Agriculture Minister Norikazu Suzuki pulled back, framing the goal as production aligned with demand rather than expansion. Both positions have a logic to them. Growing more rice lowers prices and helps households, but it also drives farmers out of business and therefore takes paddies out of use. Growing less protects farmers but pushes prices back up, causing hardship for consumers.
One option the government did not take was to allow more foreign rice into the Japanese market. Normally, imports would fill the gap and cap a price spike. But Japanese rice imports are restricted by a World Trade Organization (WTO) import quota; any imports above this quota are subject to a tariff of Yen341 per kilogram, which mostly keeps foreign rice out. The quota allows about 770,000 tons a year, and even the 2025 U.S.-Japan trade deal only raised the U.S. share within that quota rather than opening the market. Of that amount, at most 100,000 tons are sold as staple rice, while the rest is directed to processing, feed, and other uses. A finance ministry panel has suggested making greater use of imported rice when supply is at risk. Since the 100,000-ton limit is set domestically, Japan could in principle allocate more of the quota to staple rice without renegotiating its WTO commitments. However, the government has stayed cautious overall, apparently concerned about the impact on domestic production.
The issue is complicated because rice plays two roles at once. Paddy fields and rice farms are the core of Japan's domestic food supply: More than half of Japan's farmland is paddy and more than half of its farms primarily grow rice. At the same time, rice is what households eat every day. Price ties the two together. A high price keeps farmers on the land but strains households; a low price relieves households but drives farmers off their land. Steering the price cannot serve both, so the real question for the government is not how to set the price, but what else policy can do for food security.
Rethinking Food Security: What Matters Is Production Capacity
Japan's food security has usually been measured by one number: the self-sufficiency rate, the share of calories the country produces for itself. At about 38 percent, Japan's is the lowest in the G7, and it is often treated as a warning. However, self-sufficiency is an imperfect measure of food security. Researchers have long noted that a country can score high on the ratio and still not be food secure. Self-sufficiency and food security are not the same thing.
In normal times, indeed, imports are what keep food affordable. Japan was the fourth-largest market for U.S. agricultural exports in 2025, buying about $13 billion in farm goods such as corn, beef, pork, and soybeans, with Australia and Canada supplying much of the rest. Export restrictions among such trusted suppliers are rare. Japan can rely on them in normal times and need not emphasize self-sufficiency at the expense of households.
What matters instead is production capacity for a crisis. If imports were ever cut off, whether by a regional conflict, a blocked shipping lane, or a pandemic, the country would have to feed itself. That capacity rests on farmland, farmers, and technology, and it can only be built in advance. MAFF's own estimate is alarming: With today's production capacity, a complete cutoff of imports would leave Japan unable to meet its people's daily calorie needs, unless farmland were shifted to potatoes and other high-calorie crops on a national scale. However, the capacity upon which Japan would rely in a crisis is quietly eroding in peacetime: Farmland is decreasing, and the farming population is shrinking and growing older (see Figure 2).
Strengthening agricultural production capacity could help on the household side as well. A stronger production base would allow steadier output at lower cost, easing prices in normal times and proactively preparing for times of crisis. Protecting production capacity may thus serve both ends at once, while price is left to the market.
* * *
Figure 2: Japanese Farmland and Farmers in Decline (2005-2025)
* * *
Recommendations to Strengthen Production Capacity
To protect agricultural production capacity, the Japanese government must engage directly with the three foundations on which it rests: farmland, farmers, and technology.
Farmland: Protect the Right Land, for the Right Reason
All farmland contributes to production capacity, but not all of it should be treated the same way in government policy (see Table 1). For example, productive flatland is easier to keep in use, as successors are more readily found and the risk of abandonment is relatively low. In this case, the government should focus on consolidating plots into larger, lower-cost operations. Lower costs raise competitiveness and keep food affordable.
In contrast, less productive land is more likely to fall out of use, yet it can still deliver great public benefits--known as multifunctionality--such as flood control, groundwater recharge, scenic landscapes, and biodiversity. Therefore, this land deserves support from the government to keep it farmed and preserve those functions. Some of this support already exists: Direct payments for hilly and mountainous areas have been in place since 2000, and evidence suggests they have slowed the abandonment of farmland. Another payment scheme supports the multifunctionality of farming more broadly. Ideally, such payments would be tied more closely to the specific benefits each type of land provides, measured and supported accordingly.
In the case of land that is neither productive nor rich in public benefits, government policy should focus on maintenance, so the land is ready as a reserve in a crisis. Since farmland is hard to restore, it should not be abandoned. Even basic maintenance is a challenge, however. MAFF's survey found that over 30 percent of farmland has no identified successor a decade from now.
* * *
Table 1: Designing Agricultural Policy Based on Farmland Productivity and Public Benefits
* * *
Farmers: A Safety Net that Switches On Only in Downturns
Japan's farmers are aging fast. The average farmer is now in their late sixties, and the farming population has roughly halved in two decades (see Figure 2). Some further decline is unavoidable, and consolidation into larger operations is part of the answer. But scale alone will not keep committed farmers in business or bring new entrants in. That requires income stability.
One option is a safety net that activates only when prices fall below a set floor that covers production costs to a reasonable degree without overly distorting the market. This safety net would cushion farmers in downturns and make farming a safer career to enter, while leaving the market alone when prices remain above the support floor, so households are not overcharged in normal times. The U.S. Price Loss Coverage program offers a useful model. Although setting the appropriate floor is difficult, Japan may be able to use a recently established reference point as a basis: In April 2026, a government-authorized body published a national cost indicator for rice, putting total costs from production through retail at Yen2,816 ($18) per five kilograms of milled rice.
Technology: Cooperate with the United States to Cut Costs
Lower production costs are the one path that serves both goals at once: cheaper food for households and more viable farms. Japan can learn from the United States. For example, precision agriculture is widely used in the United States but is only beginning to spread in Japan. Similarly, direct seeding is standard in the United States and helps cut costs, while in Japan nearly all rice is still transplanted. Both techniques can reduce operational costs, and deeper cooperation with the United States on farm technology would give Japan a way to keep rice affordable without squeezing its farmers.
Conclusion
The rice price shock should be a wake-up call for Japan to rethink its approach to food security. Japan should invest in the farmland, farmers, and technology needed to maintain its production capacity for a crisis. A stronger production base would make Japan more resilient in emergencies while also helping keep food affordable in normal times.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/rice-crossroads-rethinking-japans-food-security
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Oil in the Shadows - Dark Shipping Evades Sanctions
WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on Aug. 19, 2026, by Trade Policy Director Jacob Jensen:
* * *
Oil in the Shadows: Dark Shipping Evades Sanctions
Executive Summary
* As the United States increasingly relies on economic sanctions as a strategic tool, sanctioned countries are expanding their use of "dark shipping" practices to evade Western enforcement, creating significant environmental, humanitarian, and geopolitical risks.
* The "shadow fleet" of shipping vessels transported approximately 3.7 billion barrels of oil in 2025, representing nearly ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on Aug. 19, 2026, by Trade Policy Director Jacob Jensen: * * * Oil in the Shadows: Dark Shipping Evades Sanctions Executive Summary * As the United States increasingly relies on economic sanctions as a strategic tool, sanctioned countries are expanding their use of "dark shipping" practices to evade Western enforcement, creating significant environmental, humanitarian, and geopolitical risks. * The "shadow fleet" of shipping vessels transported approximately 3.7 billion barrels of oil in 2025, representing nearly7 percent of global crude oil flows, thereby allowing countries to circumvent sanctions, preserve billions of dollars in export revenue, and reroute oil toward alternative markets.
* Russia has maintained oil exports by rerouting discounted crude to major buyers such as China and India via the shadow fleet, weakening Western sanctions; effective policy must target the demand for sanctioned oil while removing existing shadow vessels and limiting access to replacement tankers.
-
Introduction
As the United States increasingly relies on economic sanctions as a strategic tool, sanctioned countries are expanding their use of "dark shipping" practices to evade Western enforcement, creating significant environmental, humanitarian, and geopolitical risks--and giving rise to a growing "shadow fleet" of shipping vessels. By operating outside Western maritime regulations, the shadow fleet transported approximately 3.7 billion barrels of oil in 2025, representing nearly 7 percent of global crude oil flows, thereby allowing countries to circumvent sanctions, preserve billions of dollars in export revenue, and reroute oil toward alternative markets.
Russia has maintained oil exports by rerouting discounted crude to major buyers such as China and India, weakening Western sanctions and demonstrating why enforcement must address both the supply and demand for sanctioned oil. While sanctions-evasion networks continue to evolve, effective policy must shift beyond targeting individuals and vessels, increasing focus on the financial infrastructure that enables illicit oil trade and sustains demand. The Senate-passed Sanctioning of Russia Act of 2026 reflects this shift by targeting major purchases of Russian energy and broadening enforcement beyond the vessels transporting it.
What Is Dark Shipping and How Does It Work?
Dark shipping refers to maritime practices used to conceal the location, origin, ownership, or movement of goods to evade international laws and regulatory oversight. The most common dark shipping tactic is "going dark," where vessels intentionally disable or manipulate their Automatic Identification System (AIS), preventing authorities from tracking their identity and location. This allows vessels to load and unload commodities, including crude oil, refined petroleum products, minerals, and weapons, without being tracked or reported, often through waters in jurisdictions with weaker enforcement or limited oversight.
Another common dark shipping practice is ship-to-ship (STS) transfers, the movement of cargo between vessels at sea to disguise product origin, particularly for sanctioned oil. While STS transfers are widely used for legitimate commercial purposes, sanctioned operators use them to make it appear as though oil originated from another vessel or country before entering international markets. Other evasion methods include ownership concealment, using "shell" companies to hide the true owners and origin of cargo; flag switching, registering vessels under jurisdictions with weaker oversight; and the use of older or recycled "zombie ships." Together, these tactics illustrate the wide range of methods used to circumvent international regulations, embargoes, and sanctions, enabling shadow fleets to transport illicit goods while minimizing the risk of detection.
How and Why Are Ships Tracked at Sea?
Ships are primarily tracked at sea through AIS technology, with signals received by satellites and coastal stations. In 2002, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) began phasing in mandatory AIS requirements, which were fully implemented by the end of 2004. AIS is required for ships of 300 gross tonnage (GT) or more on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 GT or more on domestic voyages (covering virtually every commercial oil tanker), and all passenger ships. Signals are collected by governments, port authorities, and satellite operators, allowing multiple entities to monitor vessel movements across international waters.
AIS was created for maritime safety and navigation, automatically broadcasting a vessel's identity, position, course, and speed to prevent collisions, manage maritime traffic, and reduce environmental risks. While vessels are required to keep AIS operating, captains may turn it off when broadcasting their location creates a security risk, such as threats of piracy. Even when AIS has been turned off, ships can still be tracked and identified through satellite imagery, radar, port records, and other tracking systems. Over time, however, vessels have become increasingly sophisticated at exploiting gaps in these safety and tracking systems. Given the financial reward for successfully evading sanctions, tankers and other vessels continue to pursue new and better tools to obscure their identity and movements, conceal sanctioned trade, and exploit the gaps in safety systems.
What Is the Shadow Fleet?
The "ghost" or "dark" fleet refers to the tankers used by sanctioned countries and other illicit actors to transport crude oil and petroleum products outside Western maritime regulations, insurance, and oversight. Rather than a centralized network, it is a loosely connected system that relies on aging vessels and dark shipping practices to evade sanctions. The shadow fleet, associated primarily with Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, transported approximately 3.7 billion barrels of oil in 2025, accounting for nearly 7 percent of the world's annual crude oil flows. As of June 2026, the shadow fleet consisted of an estimated 2,500 to 3,000 vessels and transported approximately 287.2 million barrels of crude oil.
The majority of these tankers operate under dangerous conditions, as many vessels are over 15 years old and inadequately maintained. Tankers are often staffed by unlicensed recruitment agencies that lure in low-income individuals, trafficking and trapping them at sea. In addition, the shadow fleet exploits "flags of convenience" to hide their identity by registering vessels under foreign jurisdictions with weaker regulatory oversight. Fake registries make it easier to obscure vessel ownership and evade sanctions enforcement under false flags. The primary "flags of convenience" exploited by the dark fleet include Panama and Liberia.
Who Utilizes the Shadow Fleet?
Russia
Russia, the largest user of the shadow fleet, increasingly relies on these vessels to maintain oil export revenue. In the spring of 2022, Russia was earning over $100 per barrel on its oil sales, with world spot prices rising higher than $140 per barrel. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States and allied countries imposed various sanctions and embargos targeting Russia's energy sector, its largest source of export. A central component was the G7 oil price cap, which took effect in December 2022, initially setting a maximum purchase price of $60 per barrel for Russian seaborne crude.
As these restrictions tightened, Russia increasingly relied on the shadow fleet to transport crude outside Western sanctions and sustain export revenue. Figure 1 illustrates the growing amount of Russian crude transported by shadow fleet tankers, increasing from approximately 1.53 million barrels per day in December 2022 to 2.60 million barrels per day in December 2024--a 69.6 percent increase.
This trend suggests the shadow fleet became a critical tool to undermine sanctions placed on Russia following the start of the war, as Russia has remained one of the world's top oil suppliers, accounting for 8.1 percent of global crude exports alone in 2025. More recently, in May 2026, an estimated 62 percent of Russia's seaborne crude exports were transported by sanctioned shadow tankers, while another 7 percent were transported by illicit (but not sanctioned) shadow vessels. These estimates were derived by tracking individual tanker movements and Russian oil loadings, then identifying vessels through their IMO numbers and cross-referencing their ownership, insurance, and sanctions status. This suggests that even in 2026, nearly 70 percent of Russia's seaborne crude was being transported outside the traditional G7+ tanker fleet. This alternative transportation network has allowed Russia to maintain substantial crude exports despite Western restrictions, limiting sanctions' ability to isolate Russian oil from global markets
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Figure 1: Russian Seaborne Crude Oil Exports Transported by the Shadow Fleet (Thousand Barrels per Day)
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Venezuela
Other sanctioned countries, including Iran and Venezuela, have also relied on shadow fleets to sustain exports despite international laws and sanctions. For example, in January 2026, following the U.S. blockade targeting sanctioned Venezuelan oil, the dark vessel Bella 1 evaded enforcement by renaming itself Marinera and changing its registration from Guyana to Russia. The flag switch allowed Russia to claim the ship and deterred further U.S. action, illustrating how shadow vessels can create geopolitical dilemmas by turning simple sanctions enforcement into possible confrontation with another state.
Iran
Iran continues to serve as an example of how effective the shadow fleet can be at navigating around economic sanctions. Despite years of U.S. sanctions, Iranian oil exports still accounted for 12 percent of China's overall crude imports in 2025. In February 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned more than 30 individuals, entities, and vessels, including 12 shadow fleet tankers used to transport Iranian petroleum. These networks facilitated the movement of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian oil, underscoring how enforcement has shifted to continually identifying new vessels, shell companies, and financial intermediaries, rather than the countries purchasing discounted oil.
What Are the Impacts of the Shadow Fleet?
Economic and Geopolitical Impact
The growth of the shadow fleet has reshaped global oil trade by rerouting petroleum products to alternative markets willing to purchase discounted oil despite Western restrictions. China and India have become the primary destinations for these lower-priced oil exports. Over the past five years, Russia has redirected its crude to Asia, exporting an average of 1.31 million barrels per day to China and 1.68 million barrels per day to India in 2025 (Figure 2). China is also the largest buyer of Iranian crude, importing an estimated 1.38 million barrels per day in 2025, accounting for approximately 12 percent of China's total crude imports. Sanctioned crude from Iran, Russia, and Venezuela traded at discounts reaching $10-15 per barrel during 2025, allowing China to save an estimated $28.8 million per day at peak discount levels.
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Figure 2: Russia's Rerouted Crude Oil
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More recently, the continued flow of Iranian crude to China during the current U.S.-Iran war further illustrates the role of the shadow fleet in sustaining sanctioned oil exports. Despite increased U.S. pressure on Iran's petroleum trade, Iranian crude continued reaching China through opaque maritime networks. Following the April 2026 U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, satellite imagery and vessel tracking data identified 13 tankers conducting STS transfers of roughly 22 million barrels of Iranian crude near Indonesia's Riau Archipelago, with many of the ships' cargoes bound for Chinese markets.
These exports allow China to secure lower-cost energy and build its oil reserves while providing sanctioned countries with continued access to a major market and critical source of export revenue. This relationship weakens the long-term effectiveness of Western energy sanctions by sustaining demand for sanctioned oil and allowing these trade flows to remain competitive in global markets.
Environmental Impact
The shadow fleet also presents growing environmental and humanitarian risks. Many vessels are out-of-date, inadequately maintained tankers with an increased likelihood of maritime accidents and oil spills. In 2023, Pablo, a 232-meter tanker known for transporting sanctioned Iranian and Russian oil, caught fire and exploded off the southern coast of Malaysia, near Indonesia's Riau Islands. The explosion killed three crew members and released bunker fuel that contaminated nearly 14 square kilometers of ocean. Environmental and humanitarian incidents such as this one create costs that extend beyond the vessels and oil involved, potentially shifting the burden of cleanup, emergency response, and maritime safety onto governments and coastal communities nearby. Overall, as dark shipping continues, governments must devote more legal, financial, and military resources to preserve the enforcement of international maritime safety regulations.
Policy Considerations to Combat Dark Shipping
Current maritime enforcement strategies are becoming ineffective. Regulatory efforts and sanctions have struggled to keep up with state-backed evasion networks, especially when sanctioned countries possess the financial resources, shipping capacity, and geopolitical support to continually adapt their tactics. Rather than focusing primarily on intercepting shipments and individual vessels, policymakers should place greater emphasis on reducing the demand for sanctioned oil by targeting the economic incentives that encourage major importers such as China and India to continue purchasing it.
The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which the Senate passed by a vote of 86-11 in early August, would place additional sanctions on Russia's energy sector and top leadership. It would target the major purchasers of Russian energy, with the aim of stifling Russia's economy and ending the war in Ukraine. Other provisions of the bill could extend its impact to cover Iran as well. If enacted, President Trump would have broad tariff authority, potentially imposing rates of up to 100 percent on the top five importers of Russian oil and gas. This legislation would likely act as a major deterrent for countries attempting to purchase Russian energy products due to the severe economic consequences they would face through reduced access to the U.S. market. At the same time, if additional tariffs are added, costs would increase for U.S. consumers and businesses, meaning the U.S. economy would also suffer higher prices and reduced growth. Moreover, such tariffs could effectively cut off vital trade partners. Finally, the legislation's provision of broad enforcement discretion to the president, unclear criteria for identifying major purchasers, and undefined tariff structure weaken its potential effectiveness and create significant implementation challenges. Establishing clearer enforcement standards would strengthen the legislation and could reduce the likelihood of a president misusing the tariff authorities.
Beyond the Senate legislation, U.S. policymakers could reduce the dark fleet by targeting both its existing vessels and its supply of replacements. A clearer licensing process would allow reputable ship recyclers to purchase sanctioned or seized tankers for permanent dismantling, building on the recent U.S.-approved sale of two sanctioned vessels to GMS, an Asia-based company that purchases ships for safe and environmentally responsible recycling. Congress could also require greater due diligence and ownership disclosure when U.S. shipowners sell aging tankers to buyers in high-risk jurisdictions, while encouraging similar restrictions among G7 allies. For example, an analysis of the ownership histories of 75 Russian shadow-fleet tankers found that nearly 60 percent had been sold by Western European owners.
Together, these policies could reduce current shadow fleet vessels while making it harder for nations to replace them through Western secondhand markets. As sanction evasion networks continue to evolve, policymakers will need increasingly sophisticated, coordinated, and adaptable strategies to keep pace with these highly resilient illicit maritime networks.
Conclusion
Dark shipping has evolved from a niche sanction-evasion tactic into a significant challenge to U.S. economic and foreign policy, breathing life into the shadow fleet. By enabling sanctioned countries to continue exporting oil through opaque maritime networks, the shadow fleet reduces the effectiveness of Western sanctions while encouraging major exporters to rely on alternative, non-Western trade channels. Beyond undermining international maritime laws, it creates environmental, humanitarian, and security risks that impose growing burdens on governments worldwide.
As sanctioned states continue to adapt their shipping practices, the long-term effectiveness of economic sanctions will depend on limiting the ability of hidden trade networks to circumvent international restrictions and maintain access to global markets. Without stronger international cooperation and sustained enforcement, the shadow fleet is likely to remain a persistent feature of global energy trade, continuing to challenge the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of economic statecraft.
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/oil-in-the-shadows-dark-shipping-evades-sanctions/
[Category: Think Tank]
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Oil in the Shadows: Dark Shipping Evades Sanctions
Executive Summary
* As the United States increasingly relies on economic sanctions as a strategic tool, sanctioned countries are expanding their use of "dark shipping" practices to evade Western enforcement, creating significant environmental, humanitarian, and geopolitical risks.
* The "shadow fleet" of shipping vessels transported approximately 3.7 billion barrels of oil in 2025, representing nearly ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on Aug. 19, 2026, by Trade Policy Director Jacob Jensen: * * * Oil in the Shadows: Dark Shipping Evades Sanctions Executive Summary * As the United States increasingly relies on economic sanctions as a strategic tool, sanctioned countries are expanding their use of "dark shipping" practices to evade Western enforcement, creating significant environmental, humanitarian, and geopolitical risks. * The "shadow fleet" of shipping vessels transported approximately 3.7 billion barrels of oil in 2025, representing nearly7 percent of global crude oil flows, thereby allowing countries to circumvent sanctions, preserve billions of dollars in export revenue, and reroute oil toward alternative markets.
* Russia has maintained oil exports by rerouting discounted crude to major buyers such as China and India via the shadow fleet, weakening Western sanctions; effective policy must target the demand for sanctioned oil while removing existing shadow vessels and limiting access to replacement tankers.
-
Introduction
As the United States increasingly relies on economic sanctions as a strategic tool, sanctioned countries are expanding their use of "dark shipping" practices to evade Western enforcement, creating significant environmental, humanitarian, and geopolitical risks--and giving rise to a growing "shadow fleet" of shipping vessels. By operating outside Western maritime regulations, the shadow fleet transported approximately 3.7 billion barrels of oil in 2025, representing nearly 7 percent of global crude oil flows, thereby allowing countries to circumvent sanctions, preserve billions of dollars in export revenue, and reroute oil toward alternative markets.
Russia has maintained oil exports by rerouting discounted crude to major buyers such as China and India, weakening Western sanctions and demonstrating why enforcement must address both the supply and demand for sanctioned oil. While sanctions-evasion networks continue to evolve, effective policy must shift beyond targeting individuals and vessels, increasing focus on the financial infrastructure that enables illicit oil trade and sustains demand. The Senate-passed Sanctioning of Russia Act of 2026 reflects this shift by targeting major purchases of Russian energy and broadening enforcement beyond the vessels transporting it.
What Is Dark Shipping and How Does It Work?
Dark shipping refers to maritime practices used to conceal the location, origin, ownership, or movement of goods to evade international laws and regulatory oversight. The most common dark shipping tactic is "going dark," where vessels intentionally disable or manipulate their Automatic Identification System (AIS), preventing authorities from tracking their identity and location. This allows vessels to load and unload commodities, including crude oil, refined petroleum products, minerals, and weapons, without being tracked or reported, often through waters in jurisdictions with weaker enforcement or limited oversight.
Another common dark shipping practice is ship-to-ship (STS) transfers, the movement of cargo between vessels at sea to disguise product origin, particularly for sanctioned oil. While STS transfers are widely used for legitimate commercial purposes, sanctioned operators use them to make it appear as though oil originated from another vessel or country before entering international markets. Other evasion methods include ownership concealment, using "shell" companies to hide the true owners and origin of cargo; flag switching, registering vessels under jurisdictions with weaker oversight; and the use of older or recycled "zombie ships." Together, these tactics illustrate the wide range of methods used to circumvent international regulations, embargoes, and sanctions, enabling shadow fleets to transport illicit goods while minimizing the risk of detection.
How and Why Are Ships Tracked at Sea?
Ships are primarily tracked at sea through AIS technology, with signals received by satellites and coastal stations. In 2002, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) began phasing in mandatory AIS requirements, which were fully implemented by the end of 2004. AIS is required for ships of 300 gross tonnage (GT) or more on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 GT or more on domestic voyages (covering virtually every commercial oil tanker), and all passenger ships. Signals are collected by governments, port authorities, and satellite operators, allowing multiple entities to monitor vessel movements across international waters.
AIS was created for maritime safety and navigation, automatically broadcasting a vessel's identity, position, course, and speed to prevent collisions, manage maritime traffic, and reduce environmental risks. While vessels are required to keep AIS operating, captains may turn it off when broadcasting their location creates a security risk, such as threats of piracy. Even when AIS has been turned off, ships can still be tracked and identified through satellite imagery, radar, port records, and other tracking systems. Over time, however, vessels have become increasingly sophisticated at exploiting gaps in these safety and tracking systems. Given the financial reward for successfully evading sanctions, tankers and other vessels continue to pursue new and better tools to obscure their identity and movements, conceal sanctioned trade, and exploit the gaps in safety systems.
What Is the Shadow Fleet?
The "ghost" or "dark" fleet refers to the tankers used by sanctioned countries and other illicit actors to transport crude oil and petroleum products outside Western maritime regulations, insurance, and oversight. Rather than a centralized network, it is a loosely connected system that relies on aging vessels and dark shipping practices to evade sanctions. The shadow fleet, associated primarily with Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, transported approximately 3.7 billion barrels of oil in 2025, accounting for nearly 7 percent of the world's annual crude oil flows. As of June 2026, the shadow fleet consisted of an estimated 2,500 to 3,000 vessels and transported approximately 287.2 million barrels of crude oil.
The majority of these tankers operate under dangerous conditions, as many vessels are over 15 years old and inadequately maintained. Tankers are often staffed by unlicensed recruitment agencies that lure in low-income individuals, trafficking and trapping them at sea. In addition, the shadow fleet exploits "flags of convenience" to hide their identity by registering vessels under foreign jurisdictions with weaker regulatory oversight. Fake registries make it easier to obscure vessel ownership and evade sanctions enforcement under false flags. The primary "flags of convenience" exploited by the dark fleet include Panama and Liberia.
Who Utilizes the Shadow Fleet?
Russia
Russia, the largest user of the shadow fleet, increasingly relies on these vessels to maintain oil export revenue. In the spring of 2022, Russia was earning over $100 per barrel on its oil sales, with world spot prices rising higher than $140 per barrel. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States and allied countries imposed various sanctions and embargos targeting Russia's energy sector, its largest source of export. A central component was the G7 oil price cap, which took effect in December 2022, initially setting a maximum purchase price of $60 per barrel for Russian seaborne crude.
As these restrictions tightened, Russia increasingly relied on the shadow fleet to transport crude outside Western sanctions and sustain export revenue. Figure 1 illustrates the growing amount of Russian crude transported by shadow fleet tankers, increasing from approximately 1.53 million barrels per day in December 2022 to 2.60 million barrels per day in December 2024--a 69.6 percent increase.
This trend suggests the shadow fleet became a critical tool to undermine sanctions placed on Russia following the start of the war, as Russia has remained one of the world's top oil suppliers, accounting for 8.1 percent of global crude exports alone in 2025. More recently, in May 2026, an estimated 62 percent of Russia's seaborne crude exports were transported by sanctioned shadow tankers, while another 7 percent were transported by illicit (but not sanctioned) shadow vessels. These estimates were derived by tracking individual tanker movements and Russian oil loadings, then identifying vessels through their IMO numbers and cross-referencing their ownership, insurance, and sanctions status. This suggests that even in 2026, nearly 70 percent of Russia's seaborne crude was being transported outside the traditional G7+ tanker fleet. This alternative transportation network has allowed Russia to maintain substantial crude exports despite Western restrictions, limiting sanctions' ability to isolate Russian oil from global markets
* * *
Figure 1: Russian Seaborne Crude Oil Exports Transported by the Shadow Fleet (Thousand Barrels per Day)
* * *
Venezuela
Other sanctioned countries, including Iran and Venezuela, have also relied on shadow fleets to sustain exports despite international laws and sanctions. For example, in January 2026, following the U.S. blockade targeting sanctioned Venezuelan oil, the dark vessel Bella 1 evaded enforcement by renaming itself Marinera and changing its registration from Guyana to Russia. The flag switch allowed Russia to claim the ship and deterred further U.S. action, illustrating how shadow vessels can create geopolitical dilemmas by turning simple sanctions enforcement into possible confrontation with another state.
Iran
Iran continues to serve as an example of how effective the shadow fleet can be at navigating around economic sanctions. Despite years of U.S. sanctions, Iranian oil exports still accounted for 12 percent of China's overall crude imports in 2025. In February 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned more than 30 individuals, entities, and vessels, including 12 shadow fleet tankers used to transport Iranian petroleum. These networks facilitated the movement of hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of Iranian oil, underscoring how enforcement has shifted to continually identifying new vessels, shell companies, and financial intermediaries, rather than the countries purchasing discounted oil.
What Are the Impacts of the Shadow Fleet?
Economic and Geopolitical Impact
The growth of the shadow fleet has reshaped global oil trade by rerouting petroleum products to alternative markets willing to purchase discounted oil despite Western restrictions. China and India have become the primary destinations for these lower-priced oil exports. Over the past five years, Russia has redirected its crude to Asia, exporting an average of 1.31 million barrels per day to China and 1.68 million barrels per day to India in 2025 (Figure 2). China is also the largest buyer of Iranian crude, importing an estimated 1.38 million barrels per day in 2025, accounting for approximately 12 percent of China's total crude imports. Sanctioned crude from Iran, Russia, and Venezuela traded at discounts reaching $10-15 per barrel during 2025, allowing China to save an estimated $28.8 million per day at peak discount levels.
* * *
Figure 2: Russia's Rerouted Crude Oil
* * *
More recently, the continued flow of Iranian crude to China during the current U.S.-Iran war further illustrates the role of the shadow fleet in sustaining sanctioned oil exports. Despite increased U.S. pressure on Iran's petroleum trade, Iranian crude continued reaching China through opaque maritime networks. Following the April 2026 U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, satellite imagery and vessel tracking data identified 13 tankers conducting STS transfers of roughly 22 million barrels of Iranian crude near Indonesia's Riau Archipelago, with many of the ships' cargoes bound for Chinese markets.
These exports allow China to secure lower-cost energy and build its oil reserves while providing sanctioned countries with continued access to a major market and critical source of export revenue. This relationship weakens the long-term effectiveness of Western energy sanctions by sustaining demand for sanctioned oil and allowing these trade flows to remain competitive in global markets.
Environmental Impact
The shadow fleet also presents growing environmental and humanitarian risks. Many vessels are out-of-date, inadequately maintained tankers with an increased likelihood of maritime accidents and oil spills. In 2023, Pablo, a 232-meter tanker known for transporting sanctioned Iranian and Russian oil, caught fire and exploded off the southern coast of Malaysia, near Indonesia's Riau Islands. The explosion killed three crew members and released bunker fuel that contaminated nearly 14 square kilometers of ocean. Environmental and humanitarian incidents such as this one create costs that extend beyond the vessels and oil involved, potentially shifting the burden of cleanup, emergency response, and maritime safety onto governments and coastal communities nearby. Overall, as dark shipping continues, governments must devote more legal, financial, and military resources to preserve the enforcement of international maritime safety regulations.
Policy Considerations to Combat Dark Shipping
Current maritime enforcement strategies are becoming ineffective. Regulatory efforts and sanctions have struggled to keep up with state-backed evasion networks, especially when sanctioned countries possess the financial resources, shipping capacity, and geopolitical support to continually adapt their tactics. Rather than focusing primarily on intercepting shipments and individual vessels, policymakers should place greater emphasis on reducing the demand for sanctioned oil by targeting the economic incentives that encourage major importers such as China and India to continue purchasing it.
The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which the Senate passed by a vote of 86-11 in early August, would place additional sanctions on Russia's energy sector and top leadership. It would target the major purchasers of Russian energy, with the aim of stifling Russia's economy and ending the war in Ukraine. Other provisions of the bill could extend its impact to cover Iran as well. If enacted, President Trump would have broad tariff authority, potentially imposing rates of up to 100 percent on the top five importers of Russian oil and gas. This legislation would likely act as a major deterrent for countries attempting to purchase Russian energy products due to the severe economic consequences they would face through reduced access to the U.S. market. At the same time, if additional tariffs are added, costs would increase for U.S. consumers and businesses, meaning the U.S. economy would also suffer higher prices and reduced growth. Moreover, such tariffs could effectively cut off vital trade partners. Finally, the legislation's provision of broad enforcement discretion to the president, unclear criteria for identifying major purchasers, and undefined tariff structure weaken its potential effectiveness and create significant implementation challenges. Establishing clearer enforcement standards would strengthen the legislation and could reduce the likelihood of a president misusing the tariff authorities.
Beyond the Senate legislation, U.S. policymakers could reduce the dark fleet by targeting both its existing vessels and its supply of replacements. A clearer licensing process would allow reputable ship recyclers to purchase sanctioned or seized tankers for permanent dismantling, building on the recent U.S.-approved sale of two sanctioned vessels to GMS, an Asia-based company that purchases ships for safe and environmentally responsible recycling. Congress could also require greater due diligence and ownership disclosure when U.S. shipowners sell aging tankers to buyers in high-risk jurisdictions, while encouraging similar restrictions among G7 allies. For example, an analysis of the ownership histories of 75 Russian shadow-fleet tankers found that nearly 60 percent had been sold by Western European owners.
Together, these policies could reduce current shadow fleet vessels while making it harder for nations to replace them through Western secondhand markets. As sanction evasion networks continue to evolve, policymakers will need increasingly sophisticated, coordinated, and adaptable strategies to keep pace with these highly resilient illicit maritime networks.
Conclusion
Dark shipping has evolved from a niche sanction-evasion tactic into a significant challenge to U.S. economic and foreign policy, breathing life into the shadow fleet. By enabling sanctioned countries to continue exporting oil through opaque maritime networks, the shadow fleet reduces the effectiveness of Western sanctions while encouraging major exporters to rely on alternative, non-Western trade channels. Beyond undermining international maritime laws, it creates environmental, humanitarian, and security risks that impose growing burdens on governments worldwide.
As sanctioned states continue to adapt their shipping practices, the long-term effectiveness of economic sanctions will depend on limiting the ability of hidden trade networks to circumvent international restrictions and maintain access to global markets. Without stronger international cooperation and sustained enforcement, the shadow fleet is likely to remain a persistent feature of global energy trade, continuing to challenge the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of economic statecraft.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/oil-in-the-shadows-dark-shipping-evades-sanctions/
[Category: Think Tank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to American Mind Entitled 'Havana's Long Shadow'
WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Aug. 19, 2026, by Western Hemisphere Initiative Director Melissa Ford Maldonado to American Mind:
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Havana's Long Shadow
Thirty-two Cubans died when American forces entered Caracas on January 3, 2026, to capture Nicolas Maduro. Cuba and Venezuela are more than a thousand miles apart.
Why were Cubans dying in defense of Maduro? How did a small Caribbean island become so deeply invested in the survival of another country's dictatorship?
To answer those questions, we have to go back ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Aug. 19, 2026, by Western Hemisphere Initiative Director Melissa Ford Maldonado to American Mind: * * * Havana's Long Shadow Thirty-two Cubans died when American forces entered Caracas on January 3, 2026, to capture Nicolas Maduro. Cuba and Venezuela are more than a thousand miles apart. Why were Cubans dying in defense of Maduro? How did a small Caribbean island become so deeply invested in the survival of another country's dictatorship? To answer those questions, we have to go backnearly seven decades to a revolution that promised liberation but spent a lifetime exporting authoritarianism and reshaping the politics of an entire hemisphere.
To read the full article, click here (https://americanmind.org/salvo/havanas-long-shadow/).
* * *
Melissa Ford Maldonado is the Director of the Western Hemisphere Initiative at the America First Policy Institute (AFPI), where she leads efforts to strengthen U.S. leadership and influence throughout Latin America. In this role, she advances policies that prioritize American interests, promote regional stability, and reinforce AFPI's position as a leading voice on Western Hemisphere affairs. Melissa is committed to ensuring American sovereignty and leadership shape the region's future.
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URL: American Mind
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/havanas-long-shadow
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Havana's Long Shadow
Thirty-two Cubans died when American forces entered Caracas on January 3, 2026, to capture Nicolas Maduro. Cuba and Venezuela are more than a thousand miles apart.
Why were Cubans dying in defense of Maduro? How did a small Caribbean island become so deeply invested in the survival of another country's dictatorship?
To answer those questions, we have to go back ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Aug. 19, 2026, by Western Hemisphere Initiative Director Melissa Ford Maldonado to American Mind: * * * Havana's Long Shadow Thirty-two Cubans died when American forces entered Caracas on January 3, 2026, to capture Nicolas Maduro. Cuba and Venezuela are more than a thousand miles apart. Why were Cubans dying in defense of Maduro? How did a small Caribbean island become so deeply invested in the survival of another country's dictatorship? To answer those questions, we have to go backnearly seven decades to a revolution that promised liberation but spent a lifetime exporting authoritarianism and reshaping the politics of an entire hemisphere.
To read the full article, click here (https://americanmind.org/salvo/havanas-long-shadow/).
* * *
Melissa Ford Maldonado is the Director of the Western Hemisphere Initiative at the America First Policy Institute (AFPI), where she leads efforts to strengthen U.S. leadership and influence throughout Latin America. In this role, she advances policies that prioritize American interests, promote regional stability, and reinforce AFPI's position as a leading voice on Western Hemisphere affairs. Melissa is committed to ensuring American sovereignty and leadership shape the region's future.
* * *
URL: American Mind
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/havanas-long-shadow
[Category: ThinkTank]