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Rand Issues Commentary: Students Who Disappear Before They Count
SANTA MONICA, California, Dec. 5 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Dec. 3, 2025:* * *
The Students Who Disappear Before They Count
By Rita T. Karam, Charles A. Goldman and David Mahan
U.S. community colleges are finally rebounding from the pandemic, though they are still not back to pre-2020 enrollment levels. Only about one-quarter of colleges have recovered their full student body. But there's a more troubling loss that institutions rarely measure: the new applicants who leave before the "census date," the point a few weeks into the term, when colleges finalize who is officially ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Dec. 5 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Dec. 3, 2025: * * * The Students Who Disappear Before They Count By Rita T. Karam, Charles A. Goldman and David Mahan U.S. community colleges are finally rebounding from the pandemic, though they are still not back to pre-2020 enrollment levels. Only about one-quarter of colleges have recovered their full student body. But there's a more troubling loss that institutions rarely measure: the new applicants who leave before the "census date," the point a few weeks into the term, when colleges finalize who is officiallyenrolled.
We recently looked at enrollment at community colleges in California, Texas, and Kentucky to analyze what happens between a student's application and the census date. We found that between 10 and 15 percent of students who registered for classes dropped before the census date. When measured from the point of application, however, as many as two-thirds of prospective students disappeared before their enrollment became official.
These early losses are largely ignored. Institutional data, state funding formulas, and federal financial aid all typically start at the census date, excluding precisely the students who might hold the key to reversing enrollment declines.
Our study found that early attrition is unrelated to motivation or academics. Instead, it stems from institutional complexity. Procedural barriers simply frustrate new applicants before they ever reach the classroom.
Students encounter fragmented application steps, unclear instructions, and limited support in the crucial period between when they apply and when classes start. Many also struggle with financial aid delays, conflicting information, or unclear deadlines. These obstacles can quickly compound, especially for those juggling a job, family responsibilities, or financial strain. Recent federal (PDF) and state (PDF) changes in financial aid eligibility have made these processes even more confusing.
Most colleges already collect data that could reveal where students disengage. But they aren't putting the pieces together. The data remain siloed across admissions, financial aid, and registration systems. Without a unified view of the applicant's journey, staff cannot spot the students at risk of giving up and intervene.
True enrollment recovery depends on keeping these applicants from falling through the cracks. Colleges' efforts on student retention need to start the moment a student shows interest--through the application and registration steps until they are sitting in class. The census date is too late.
Colleges and policymakers can take steps to close these early gaps.
Integrate and Use Data Proactively
Consolidate information from admissions, financial aid, and course registration systems to create a seamless picture of each applicant's progress. Creating clear milestones--from application to registration--will enable staff to pinpoint where students stall and target support before they vanish.
Simplify and Personalize Communication
New applicants receive a flood of confusing, inconsistent messages. Colleges can adopt text-based updates, shorter and sequenced emails, and step-by-step guidance that names a clear contact staff person for different parts of the application to enrollment phases. Communication should emphasize timing, clarity, and personalization rather than sheer volume.
Streamline Handoffs and Build Relationships
New applicants interact with one staff member during the application, another during enrollment, and yet another once classes begin. Each transition increases the risk that students, especially first-generation or returning adult learners, will lose momentum or feel disconnected.
Colleges need to deliver consistent guidance rather than a series of separate transactions. Interactions should foster trust and connection to the school. For many first-time collegegoers, a bit more hands-on support can make the difference between moving forward and quietly giving up.
Improve Financial Aid Timing and Transparency
Receipt of approved financial aid packages before classes start is one of the strongest predictors of a student's staying enrolled beyond the census date. Early reminders, clearer aid communications, and extending payment deadlines for students all might help. For those with pending aid or undeclared majors, proactive outreach can keep them engaged while financial aid paperwork is resolved.
Identify and Address Basic Needs Early
Many students disengage because of unmet needs such as food, housing, or childcare. A brief needs survey embedded in the application or registration process can help staff connect students to campus or community resources before they give up during the first few weeks into the term.
Establish Continuous Monitoring and Accountability
Few institutions systematically assess whether their early outreach efforts work. Creating a monitoring framework with measurable goals, regular data collection, and a feedback loop enables colleges to evaluate what's effective and refine efforts over time.
Align Policy and Funding with Early Retention Goals
Public funding structures typically reward colleges for students who remain enrolled past the census date. Expanding these frameworks to include pre-census tracking and support would incentivize colleges to invest in early interventions. States can also offer grants and technical assistance for data integration and cross-agency partnerships.
Reframing enrollment as a continuum would help colleges address both short-term losses and long-term equity gaps. Those who disappear early are disproportionately first-generation, low-income, or returning adult students--the very populations community colleges most aim to serve.
If the past few years have taught higher education anything, it is that enrollment can no longer be taken for granted. People who take the time to apply and register are demonstrating intent to learn. The short time between application and census is a moment, and colleges need to treat it that way.
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More About This Commentary
Rita T. Karam is a senior policy researcher and Charles A. Goldman is a senior economist, both at RAND. David Mahan is director of the Dallas College Research Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/12/the-students-who-disappear-before-they-count.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Terrorism Monitor: Nigerian Jihadists and Bandits Exploit Emerging Fintech
WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 4, 2025, in its Terrorism Monitor:* * *
Nigerian Jihadists and Bandits Exploit Emerging Fintech
By Aminah Mustapha
Executive Summary:
* Nigeria's rapid shift toward mobile money, Point of Sale (PoS) terminals, and fintech wallets has created new financial pathways for insurgents and bandit groups, according to a March 2025 assessment. Weak "Know Your Customer" (KYC) regulations and lightly supervised agent networks allow criminals to move ransom payments and insurgent taxes with reduced detection risk.
* ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 4, 2025, in its Terrorism Monitor: * * * Nigerian Jihadists and Bandits Exploit Emerging Fintech By Aminah Mustapha Executive Summary: * Nigeria's rapid shift toward mobile money, Point of Sale (PoS) terminals, and fintech wallets has created new financial pathways for insurgents and bandit groups, according to a March 2025 assessment. Weak "Know Your Customer" (KYC) regulations and lightly supervised agent networks allow criminals to move ransom payments and insurgent taxes with reduced detection risk. *Islamic State-West Africa Province (ISWAP) is integrating digital platforms into its revenue collection and logistics, using agent banking, civilian intermediaries, and fragmented transfers to shift funds without transporting bulk cash. Digital rails now enable cross-regional liquidity movement that complicates intelligence tracking.
* Northwestern bandit groups increasingly rely on PoS agents and low-tier fintech wallets to process ransom payments through coercion, intermediaries, and rapid cash-outs. Despite new CBN regulations, enforcement gaps in rural high-risk areas leave Nigeria's digital-finance ecosystem vulnerable to armed actors.
The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) reported in March 2025 that kidnapping ransom payments increasingly move through mobile-money platforms, Point of Sale (PoS) terminals, and fintech wallets. The report cited cases of rapid fund splitting and repeated small cash-outs, and identified weak Know Your Customer (KYC) compliance meant to prevent fraud, with some accounts opened with minimal verification in areas lacking state oversight. PoS transactions are especially relevant. A PoS terminal is a small device found in shops and kiosks that allows cash withdrawals and transfers without a bank branch, while a PoS agent is an independent vendor who acts as a micro-banking outlet, providing cash-in/cash-out services and transfers on behalf of banks and mobile-money operators. This novel digital economy has become a favored channel for illicit transactions, including by militant organizations.
The NFIU's findings indicate that Nigeria's accelerating shift toward a cashless economy has inadvertently created new financial pathways for insurgent and bandit groups. These developments hold implications for counterterrorism, anti-money laundering, and rural security governance.
Digital Rails in a Fragmented Security Environment
Nigeria's cashless transition expanded significantly after the 2022-2023 currency redesign and the push for electronic payments. Cash scarcity temporarily pushed millions of Nigerians toward instant transfers, Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) payments (where a mobile-phone protocol allows users to perform instant money transfers and banking actions through short numeric codes without internet access), and PoS transactions. The PoS agent banking sector now numbers several million terminals nationwide, concentrated in rural and conflict-affected areas where formal banking infrastructure is limited (Daily Trust, March 11, 2024).
The NFIU report nonetheless suggests that digitization without parallel regulatory expansion has widened opportunities for criminal finance innovation (NFIU, March 2025). Meanwhile, The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has repeatedly positioned the cashless framework as a modernization effort intended to promote financial inclusion and reduce illicit cash circulation. The speed of fintech growth, combined with uneven supervision across thousands of PoS agents, has produced what some Nigerian analysts describe as a "semi-formal" financial space: widely used, lightly monitored, and attractive to armed actors.
ISWAP's Adaptation to Mobile-Money Ecosystems
Islamic State-West Africa Province (ISWAP) facilitators have increasingly incorporated digital channels into existing financial practices (GNET, February 18). ISWAP has historically relied on a diversified revenue base. Sources of its income include taxation of farmers, traders, and transporters, smuggling, and ransom payments. The expansion of mobile-money services and agent networks deeper into rural Borno and Yobe provinces has only further enabled ISWAP to make use of these technologies for nefarious purposes.
ISWAP's adaptation appears to follow three patterns:
1. Digitization of revenue extracted in controlled areas
ISWAP enforces taxes on agricultural and commercial activities in parts of the Lake Chad Basin. Traders and transporters operating near ISWAP-influenced corridors increasingly use agent banking, creating opportunities for facilitators to collect or move funds without physically handling cash (Tribune Online, August 2).
2. Use of civilian intermediaries
Local traders, PoS operators, and transport workers have historically served as intermediaries between civilians and insurgent cells. The integration of fintech wallets and mobile money provides these intermediaries with a lower-risk way to transmit funds, particularly for fragmented transfers that attract less scrutiny (NFIU, March 2025).
3. Cross-regional liquidity movement
ISWAP has incentives to move funds from taxation zones toward logistics hubs and procurement networks. Digital rails (the digital systems and infrastructure that allow money to move electronically across regions) reduce the operational risks associated with transporting large quantities of cash across military checkpoints. Although open-source evidence cannot quantify ISWAP's digital finance footprint, Nigeria's intelligence assessments increasingly treat mobile-money exploitation as an insurgent tactic (NFIU, March 2025).
Northwestern Bandits and the Rise of Digital Ransom Economies
Criminal groups in Zamfara, Kaduna, Katsina, and Niger States have long relied on cash for ransom payments. Yet the NFIU report documents a growing shift toward digital facilitation. In one case, bandits compelled a victim's family to deposit ransom funds into an account controlled by an associate, who then withdrew the funds through multiple PoS terminals across state lines to avoid detection (NFIU, March 2025).
Several Nigerian media outlets have highlighted similar patterns of growing use of fintech by bandit groups. The Association of Mobile Money and Bank Agents of Nigeria (AMMBAN) acknowledged that PoS operators are often used as cash-out points for ransom proceeds, particularly in rural communities lacking bank branches (The Whistler, May 24, 2024). Some operators report receiving "red flag" transactions but have limited mechanisms for escalation or protection when confronting suspicious activity.
Bandit networks exploit three systemic weaknesses:
1. Coercible and accessible PoS infrastructure
PoS agents are ever-present in rural markets and transit points. Bandits have reportedly forced victims to withdraw funds directly from PoS terminals under duress or have directed intermediaries to conduct cash-outs on their behalf (The Whistler, May 24, 2024).
2. Fragmented oversight
High-volume agents in rural and semi-rural zones in Nigeria often operate far from regulatory scrutiny (The Whistler, May 24, 2024). Commercial banks and mobile-money operators oversee agent banking, although enforcement varies widely.
3. Low-tier fintech wallets.
Many digital wallets allow onboarding with minimal identification. These low-tier accounts, while critical for financial inclusion of people who may not have personal documents, enable bandit cells to open accounts linked only to a phone number to receive and distribute funds--leaving only a modest risk of detection.
These practices allow bandit groups to maintain operational liquidity and minimize exposure during ransom negotiations.
The CBN's Regulatory Tightening and Its Limitations
The CBN introduced regulations in 2025 requiring agents to link terminals to verifiable owners and to comply with enhanced monitoring standards. The Central Bank also introduced new cash-out limits, agent exclusivity rules, and KYC-strengthening measures for agent networks (CBN, October 6). However, implementation challenges persist. Agent networks in high-insecurity zones often struggle with identity verification because of weak civil registration systems. Fintech systems face high onboarding demands relative to their scale, and rural areas continue to rely on high-volume PoS cash-outs due to limited ATM infrastructure. As a result, the core vulnerabilities highlighted in the NFIU report remain only partially addressed.
Convergence of Insurgent and Criminal Economies
Both ISWAP and northwestern bandit groups increasingly exploit similar financial pathways. Several trends indicate growing convergence:
* Reduced reliance on bulk cash, as digital channels offer lower-risk alternatives.
* Increased use of intermediaries, including PoS operators, traders, and transport workers.
* Diversification of financial flows, with ransom funds fragmented into micro-transactions.
* Instant transfers and mobile wallets facilitate the mobility of funds across regions.
These patterns complicate the efforts of Nigerian security agencies to map financial networks. The volume of legitimate digital transactions, numbering in the hundreds of millions monthly, creates "transactional noise" in which illicit flows can hide. Without advanced analytics, law enforcement struggles to distinguish criminal activity from ordinary rural economic behavior.
Conclusion
Nigeria's cashless transition has brought financial inclusion and faster payment infrastructure along with new financial pathways for insurgent and bandit groups. ISWAP is integrating digital rails into its taxation and logistical systems, while northwestern bandits increasingly rely on PoS operators and mobile wallets to receive and distribute ransom proceeds.
Absent stronger KYC standards, targeted supervision in high-risk zones, and enhanced transaction monitoring, Nigeria's digital-finance architecture will remain vulnerable to exploitation. The country's security agencies and financial regulators face the challenge of safeguarding an expanding payments ecosystem while preventing its capture by armed networks.
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Aminah Mustapha is a researcher and policy analyst specializing in security governance, emerging technologies, and conflict dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/nigerian-jihadists-and-bandits-exploit-emerging-fintech/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Terrorism Monitor: Militias Assist PRC-Based Ventures Mining Rare Earth Elements in Myanmar
WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 -- he Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 4, 2025, in its Terrorism Monitor:* * *
Militias Assist PRC-Based Ventures Mining Rare Earth Elements in Myanmar
By Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan
Executive Summary:
* PRC-based firms are expanding rare-earth mining in Myanmar's Shan and Kachin States by partnering with militias that lease mines, provide security, and tax exports.
* Satellite imagery shows a rapid increase in REE sites since 2015, turning militia-held enclaves into major suppliers of dysprosium, terbium, and other critical minerals for the PRC.
* ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 -- he Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 4, 2025, in its Terrorism Monitor: * * * Militias Assist PRC-Based Ventures Mining Rare Earth Elements in Myanmar By Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan Executive Summary: * PRC-based firms are expanding rare-earth mining in Myanmar's Shan and Kachin States by partnering with militias that lease mines, provide security, and tax exports. * Satellite imagery shows a rapid increase in REE sites since 2015, turning militia-held enclaves into major suppliers of dysprosium, terbium, and other critical minerals for the PRC. *As United States-PRC competition intensifies, Myanmar's fragmented sovereignty enables armed groups with ties to Beijing to shape REE supply chains, complicating potential U.S. and Indian efforts to source Burmese minerals.
Introduction
Chinese firms have been engaging in large-scale extraction of rare earth elements (REEs) in Myanmar with the help of ethnic militias./[1] Much of this synergistic mining occurs in Shan and Kachin States (Global Witness, May 23, 2024; ISP Myanmar, June 10; Mongabay, September 16). With the absence of state authority in Myanmar, rebel groups have tightened, expanded, and concentrated their territorial grip over rare earth belts in those two states and increased the scale of REE mining. The PRC is believed to be "hoarding" REEs, reporting a 70 percent jump in their import in early 2023 (The Irrawaddy, December 28, 2024; ISP Myanmar, March 25). This REE mining boom and Chinese import dominance have drawn the attention of the United States and India, which may now consider sourcing REEs from Burmese mines (Mining, September 11; SCMP, September 18).
Main Rebel Groups and Militias Mining REEs in Myanmar
United Wa State Army (UWSA)
The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is a strongly pro-PRC ethnic militia of the Wa People. The UWSA traces its origins back to 1989, when the Bamar-led Communist Party of Burma (CPB) disintegrated and split into four ethnic armies, which later signed ceasefires with the Tatmadaw (The Irrawaddy, September 4)./[2]
The four ethnic armies are the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the Kachin Independence Army... Afterward, the UWSA formed its political wing, called the United Wa State Party (UWSP) based in Shan State. The group boasts 30,000 armed soldiers in its regular rank-and-file and 20,000 soldiers in strategic reserve, along with a provision of mandatory conscription from each Wa household (The Irrawaddy, February 26, 2020; The Irrawaddy, August 31, 2022).
UWSA forces are equipped with sophisticated weaponry. Their materiel includes vehicles, helicopters, military-grade drones, and anti-aircraft missiles. The militia also possesses its own weapons factory and has frequently supplied small arms to other allied ethnic armies (Grey Dynamics, June 20). Further, it chairs the largest and most powerful ethnic army alliance in Myanmar, known as the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) (PRIO, September 10, 2024)./[3]
The UWSA governs the autonomous Wa Self-Administration Division (Wa-SAD). The Wa-SAD is also known as Shan State Special Region 2 and popularly called Wa State. This state is divided into two separate northern and southern enclaves bordering the PRC and Thailand respectively (Global Asia, December 1, 2023). The capital and headquarters of Wa State and UWSA is Pangkham (Wa: Pang Kham) also known as Panghsang. Wa State is modelled as a one-party socialist state, with its own governance, education, administration, justice, taxation, and law enforcement structures independent of Myanmar's central government. Wa leader Bao Youxiang (Wa: Tax Log Pang) is the de facto president, party secretary, and supreme commander of Wa State, UWSP, and UWSA (ISP Myanmar, June 17).
The UWSA is infamous for being one of the largest drug traffickers in Myanmar. As a result, UWSA and UWSP had officially been sanctioned since 2005 by the U.S. Treasury Department for narcotics trafficking (Modern Insurgent, January 17, US Department of Treasury, November 5, 2005). Wa State traditionally produced heroin, but partially switched to amphetamine products as a result of declining poppy cultivation in the 2000s (The Irrawaddy, November 2008),
The group is now focused on a new revenue source from the boom of rare earth mining inside its territory. Satellite images reveal mines have increased at least eightfold since 2015, with at least 26 mining sites as of February 2025. These mines are leased to Chinese companies in exchange for a share of profit. UWSA soldiers ensure the security of Chinese ventures as well as smooth shipments of REEs to the PRC (SHRF, June 19; Al Jazeera, August 7; TDS, June 12).
Wa State is also a critical node for the world's tin supply chain. As of 2022, it produces around 10 percent of all global tin concentrate, with at least 70 percent of all Burmese tin sourced from Wa State (International Tin Association, April 17, 2023)./[4] In 2023, the UWSA stopped tin production to conserve the remaining tin in its territories, triggering a tin shortage for Chinese smelters. This past July, however, the UWSA decided to resume operations of these tin mines (The Irrawaddy, July 23).
National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)
The National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA, popularly known as the Mong La Army) is a small but significant ethnic army based in Shan State. It is another one of the four major ethnic armies established after the disintegration of the CPB (ISP Myanmar, August 20). Its official principle is "peace, unity, and development" and practices a non-aligned political stance. The political wing of NDAA is known as the Peace and Solidarity Committee (Myanmar Peace Monitor, September 9). The estimated strength of the NDAA is around 5,000 men distributed in four brigades, controlling Shan State Special Region 4, with Mong La District as its capital. NDAA-controlled territories have not yet been designated under official Self-Administered Zone (SAZ) status, but function under their own parallel governance structures similar to the UWSA (ISP Myanmar, August 20; Myanmar Peace Monitor, September 9).
NDAA-governed territories had been infamous for harboring criminal syndicates that operate narcotics, gambling, and prostitution rings (Time, March 9, 2014; Vice, December 14, 2015). The territories are also highly dependent on cross-border economic exchanges with neighboring Yunnan (province in the PRC. Additionally, NDAA-controlled areas are crucial for connecting projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), part of the PRC's Belt and Road Initiative (ISP Myanmar, August 20).
The Mong La region under the NDAA has seen a surge in mining operations. At least 19 new REE mines have been observed operating in 2025--up from only three in 2021, as per satellite images. These mines, similar to the UWSA model, are mostly operated by Chinese stakeholders and are guarded by NDAA soldiers in exchange for revenues and levies (SHRF, August 25; Mizzima, August 26; SHAN, August 26).
Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
The Kachin Independence Army (Kachin: Wunpawng Mungdan Shanglawt Hpyen Dap, KIA) was formed in 1961 to achieve an independent state for the Kachin people. It is one of the oldest militias in contemporary Myanmar. Contrary to most other militias, the organization's political wing, the Kachin Independence Organization (Kachin: Wunpawng Gumrawng Gumtsa Mungdan, KIO), was formed first, followed by its military wing. The KIA now envisions establishing Kachin State as part of a federal system that ensures self-governance and autonomy (ISEAS Perspective, March 7; ISP Myanmar, August 20).
The KIA is composed of 11 brigades and an estimated 15,000 soldiers in its ranks. These 11 brigades operate in both Kachin and Shan States, and include two mobile regiments, three special battalions, 24 regionally based battalions, and 27 mobile battalions (ISP Myanmar, August 20). KIA fighters are predominantly Christians, with most recruits coming from Jingpo, the largest Kachin subgroup. These Kachin rebels are headquartered in Laiza near the Chinese border (Frontier Myanmar, February 25, 2020; The Irrawaddy, December 9).
The nearly two-decades-long KIA-Myanmar ceasefire broke down in 2011 (Tamil Guardian, October 15, 2023; CSIS, July 17, 2024). Since the 2021 military coup, the KIA has also allied with the pro-democracy National Unity Government (GNU) and its armed wing, the People's Defense Forces (PDF), in waging a full-on insurgency against the Tatmadaw. The KIA also plays a leading role in the central military command and control structure of other pro-democratic rebel groups in Myanmar (The Irrawaddy, December 9, 2024; The Irrawaddy, August 25).
The group funds itself primarily through jade mining, checkpoint levies, and informal cross-border trade with the PRC (Geopolitical Monitor, February 27, 2024). Unlike other Burmese militias, the KIA does not rely on narcotics production and trade for revenue (BNI, February 28, 2019). Instead, the KIA oversees jade mines run by Chinese nationals and corporations, which provide the KIA with taxes and revenues (RFA, February 26, 2024).
The KIA found a new source of revenue by seizing control of Chipwi and Pangwa townships and their rare earth mines from a rival pro-Tatmadaw militia. These mines possess dysprosium and terbium, which are essential in the production of electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced defense systems. KIA now governs these key resource zones, manages export taxation, and negotiates directly with the PRC when it exports these REEs (ISP Myanmar, September 26; Stimson Center, June 24).
New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K)
New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K) has a history of entanglement with other militias. It was formed as part of the KIA, later joining the CPB in 1968 before breaking away in 1989. In 2009, it became part of the official government-run militia program and rebranded itself as the Kachin Border Guard Force (DVB, November 21, 2024). By doing so, it became integrated with the official military command structure, received government salaries, and enjoyed autonomy in the territory it controls, called Kachin State Special Region 1 (The Irrawaddy, December 9: BNI, November 2, 2024). The group is manned mainly by three battalions consisting of around 1,000 men and has been led by Zahkung Ting Ying, a former member of parliament. He has profited significantly from REE revenues in NDA-K-controlled territories (BNI, November 2, 2024; Frontier Myanmar, August 15).
NDA-K has maintained a pro-Tatmadaw and anti-KIA stance following the 2021 military coup. During the October 2024 KIA offensive, NDA-K lost control of Chipwi and Pangwa Townships, where it operated over 100 REE mines close to the Myanmar-PRC border (The Irrawaddy, November 18, 2024; RFA, October 15, 2024). These mines had been leased by NDA-K to PRC-based companies in exchange for revenues (The Irrawaddy, July 15, 2023). Currently, KIA has taken over this leasing mechanism and has reached an understanding in REE trading with the PRC (The Irrawaddy, November 29, 2024; Frontier Myanmar, August 1; ISP Myanmar, September 26).
Conclusion
Armed groups govern Myanmar's resource-rich peripheries as a result of the country's fractured sovereignty (PRIO, December 1, 2021; ACLED, November 26, 2024). The PRC has developed strong ties with most of these groups, alongside a warm relationship with the Tatmadaw (9DASHLINE, April 22). Factors like the growing global demand for REEs and increased U.S.-PRC competition are now driving the United States and India to rethink their engagement with Myanmar. The Tatmadaw, however, has been pragmatic in maintaining some semblance of control over REE supplies within its borders, which it uses to help secure international relationships. The cooperation of Burmese militias with opportunistic PRC-based ventures is nothing new, but signals increasingly close ties between the Tatmadaw and the PRC over a crucial international trade issue, as militant groups indirectly mediate the relationship.
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[2] The four ethnic armies are the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), and the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K).
[3] FNPCC consists of seven prominent ethnic armed groups active in Myanmar: the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the United Wa State Army (UWSA).
[4] Myanmar is the third-largest tin producer in the world as of 2022.
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Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan is a Research Data Analyst (RDA) at the Bangladesh Peace Observatory under the Centre for Alternatives (CA), a Dhaka-based think tank focused on international, national, and societal security and politics.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/militias-assist-prc-based-ventures-mining-rare-earth-elements-in-myanmar/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Middle Corridor Expands Through New Multimodal Routes
WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 4, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Middle Corridor Expands Through New Multimodal Routes
By Vusal Guliyev
Executive Summary:
* A new multimodal freight corridor launched on October 15--which moves cargo from the People's Republic of China (PRC) through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to the Caspian Sea for onward transport to Western markets via the Baku-Tblisi-Kars route--demonstrates the potential of emerging east-west transport networks.
* This initiative aligns with Uzbekistan's transit ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 4, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Middle Corridor Expands Through New Multimodal Routes By Vusal Guliyev Executive Summary: * A new multimodal freight corridor launched on October 15--which moves cargo from the People's Republic of China (PRC) through Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to the Caspian Sea for onward transport to Western markets via the Baku-Tblisi-Kars route--demonstrates the potential of emerging east-west transport networks. * This initiative aligns with Uzbekistan's transithub ambitions and introduces important geographical diversification, reducing reliance on northern routes through Russia while enhancing the resilience of Eurasian supply chains.
* The route strengthens the Middle Corridor's infrastructure, deepening regional cooperation and transforming Central Asia from a landlocked space into a land-linked crossroads.
The opening ceremony of a new multimodal freight corridor on October 15 marked a notable milestone in the ongoing transformation of Eurasia's logistics architecture. A pilot shipment departed from Kashgar, a key commercial hub in the People's Republic of China's (PRC) Xinjiang region, and proceeded toward the PRC-Kyrgyzstan border. After successfully transiting Kyrgyz territory, the convoy entered Uzbekistan on October 21. The cargo then continued westward, reaching Turkmenistan on October 24, where part of the shipment was prepared for onward movement across the Caspian Sea. Utilizing maritime links to Azerbaijan via the Middle Corridor, the goods were ultimately directed toward markets further west via the Baku-Tblisi-Kars rail line (Uzdaily, October 16; Caliber, October 16). This initial multimodal operation demonstrates not only the technical viability of the route but also its potential to reinforce emerging east-west transport networks, diversify regional supply chains, and enhance connectivity between Central Asia and the South Caucasus within the broader Eurasian transportation system.
Central Asia's role in global supply chains has previously remained narrowly defined as a supplier of raw materials moving along inherited transport arteries with limited flexibility and minimal geopolitical autonomy (CAREC Program, May 2024; The Diplomat, May 14). The emergence of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan multimodal corridor has the potential to change this role. By integrating Uzbekistan into a continuous overland chain stretching from the PRC to the Caspian Sea, the initiative injects both strategic depth and infrastructural coherence into the region (Global Times, October 15; Uzdaily, October 17). It materially advances Tashkent's long-articulated objective of transforming a double-landlocked state into a transit hub, capable of channeling east-west and north-south flows across its territory (Asian Transport Observatory, August 2025; see EDM, November 12). This new corridor has become more viable because the Northern Corridor--the long-favored route that sends trains from the PRC across Kazakhstan and Russia into Europe--is less attractive for many Western shippers following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Geopolitical Monitor, November 8, 2022; Market Insights, February 21, 2023).
The long-stagnant China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway project has finally entered the construction phase after decades of geopolitical hesitation, financing complexities, and technical negotiations (see EDM, July 17, 2024, April 8). Once operational, the CKU line will establish a second east-west rail axis that bypasses Kazakhstan, linking Kashgar directly to Andijan, onward to Tashkent, and further into Central Asia's wider rail network (Global Times, December 27, 2024; Caspian Policy Center, October 10).
Unlike traditional freight flows that rely heavily on northern routes through Russia and Kazakhstan, the new China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan multimodal corridor introduces geographical diversification, reduces dependence on a single north-bound transit axis, and enhances the resilience of Eurasian supply chains amid shifting geopolitical pressures (WITA, June 16, 2024; Organization of Turkic States, May 2025). Uzbekistan's active participation underscores Tashkent's broader goal to transform Central Asia from a peripheral landlocked zone into a transit power center linking the PRC with the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and Europe (Caspian Policy Center, March 14, 2024; NATO Defense College Foundation, May 23).
The corridor's extension to the Caspian Sea introduces a new layer of geopolitical and geo-economic significance for both the South Caucasus and the Caspian littoral states (Caspian Policy Center, July 28). Turkmenistan's modernized Port of Turkmenbashi has rapidly evolved into one of the key maritime gateways of Central Asia (Turkmenbashi International Seaport, accessed December 4). Already connected to Baku, Aktau, and several Russian ports through regular roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) and container ferry services, Turkmenbashi is now positioned as the critical hinge between Central Asia's rail networks and the trans-Caspian maritime segment of the Middle Corridor.
This route represents an opportunity for Ashgabat to recalibrate Turkmenistan's regional economic role (CAREC Program, May 22, 2024). Historically dependent on hydrocarbons as its primary source of revenue, the country has long sought avenues to diversify its external economic engagement. The consolidation of Turkmenbashi as a transit hub allows Turkmenistan to expand logistics services, port-based industries, and multimodal trade facilitation. Deeper integration into trans-Caspian transport chains enhances Turkmenistan's connectivity with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkiye, while creating incentives for more structured participation in broader Eurasian initiatives, whether under the Middle Corridor framework, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), or emerging PRC-Central Asian connectivity formats (Business Turkmenistan, October 12).
The Port of Baku serves simultaneously as a maritime gateway, a railroad junction, and a multimodal integration hub (see EDM, April 23; Port of Baku, accessed in November). Baku's infrastructure enables cargo arriving from Central Asia to be redistributed across multiple geoeconomic axes. Westward, freight can continue along the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, linking Azerbaijan to Turkiye and further into Europe's rail and port systems. Southward, Baku connects to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a major route facilitating trade flows between Russia, the South Caucasus, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and as far as India (Transport Events, 2024; Eurasia Review, July 16).
The greater the volume of cargo reaching the Caspian from the east--whether through Kazakhstan's Aktau and Kuryk ports or now through Turkmenistan's Turkmenbashi port via Uzbekistan's new multimodal route--the more Baku becomes a transit bridge linking Central Asia to both European and Middle Eastern markets. The expansion of the Port of Baku at Alat, the development of the Alat Free Economic Zone, and the modernization of national railways were all designed to strengthen Azerbaijan's position as the central node of the Middle Corridor (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, accessed in November; UN Trade & Development, October 23).
Uzbekistan's increased involvement in transit routes helps consolidate the trans-Caspian logistical ecosystem. Central Asian, Caspian, and South Caucasus states are becoming increasingly interdependent (Journal of Eurasian Studies, July 24; Trends Research, September 17). Their collective success now hinges on the ability to synchronize tariffs, harmonize schedules, expand port capacities, standardize customs procedures, and invest jointly in digital transport solutions.
This evolving corridor architecture binds the region's economies together, compelling cooperation and raising the cost of unilateral policy choices. The push to optimize and digitalize these trade arteries is gathering significant momentum across the Turkic geopolitical space (see EDM, June 26). For example, Azerbaijan, Turkiye, and Uzbekistan signed the Ankara Agreement in January 2025, through which they pledged to adopt coordinated measures to expand cross-continental container flows in both east-west and west-east directions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkiye, January 29). These initiatives are reinforced by a growing body of agreements facilitated by the OTS, which increasingly serves as the primary multilateral forum for coordinating standards, aligning infrastructure planning, and institutionalizing policy reforms across member and observer states (Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, September 7, 2024).The successful launch of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan multimodal route represents a step toward creating a resilient, diversified, and geopolitically balanced Eurasian transport ecosystem. Uzbekistan's participation not only strengthens the Middle Corridor but also amplifies the role of the Caspian states, particularly Azerbaijan, as essential connectors in the wider East-West transport architecture. As cargo begins flowing more regularly along this path, the corridor is poised to reshape supply chains, deepen regional cooperation, and accelerate the shift toward a more multipolar Eurasian connectivity model. Central Asia is transforming a "landlocked" space into a "land-linked" crossroads, with new corridors enabling states to capture greater value from logistics, trade facilitation, and industrial spillovers. This shift not only strengthens regional autonomy but also enhances the strategic relevance of the Middle Corridor as a competitive, politically diversified alternative within the broader Eurasian transport landscape.
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Vusal Guliyev is a Sinologist and Policy Analyst specializing in the geopolitical affairs of Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/middle-corridor-expands-through-new-multimodal-routes/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Business Climate in Germany Stagnated in 2025
MUNICH, Germany, Dec. 5 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on Dec. 4, 2025:* * *
Business Climate in Germany Stagnated in 2025
The business climate in Germany saw hardly any movement over the course of 2025 and remains significantly below the figures in previous years. From January to November, the index only rose by around 2.8 points overall, which is practically tantamount to a standstill. The business situation scarcely changed (minus 0.4 points), while expectations rose slightly over the course of the year (plus 5.9 points). "Companies are taking a sober and concerned view ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Dec. 5 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on Dec. 4, 2025: * * * Business Climate in Germany Stagnated in 2025 The business climate in Germany saw hardly any movement over the course of 2025 and remains significantly below the figures in previous years. From January to November, the index only rose by around 2.8 points overall, which is practically tantamount to a standstill. The business situation scarcely changed (minus 0.4 points), while expectations rose slightly over the course of the year (plus 5.9 points). "Companies are taking a sober and concerned viewof economic development," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of ifo Surveys. "We are seeing a stabilization of the business climate driven only by expectations, and the euphoria from the start of the year has already faded again."
The business climate in industry has improved noticeably since the start of the year. Nevertheless, almost all sectors remain in negative territory and are still predominantly pessimistic about the future. Although the business climate among manufacturers of electrical equipment improved significantly over the year by 29.4 points, sentiment still remained subdued, with the indicator reaching minus 2.1 points in November. Sentiment in the chemical industry deteriorated particularly in October and November. Overall, the indicator fell by 8.6 points. Among manufacturers of food and animal feed, the barometer fell by 12.7 points.
Sentiment in trade recovered somewhat but remained at a very low level at the end of the year and was worse overall than in previous years. Construction showed an upward trend over the course of the year, although the sector was emerging from a very low point and had still not made it out of negative territory by November. There was hardly any movement among the service providers surveyed, even though sentiment in warehousing and storage improved significantly by 13.1 points. The hospitality industry is also in a better mood at the end of the year, up 6.8 points compared to January. By contrast, the business climate in publishing fell by 14.9 points. "Overall, it is evident across all sectors of the economy that it would be wrong to speak of a recovery," says Wohlrabe.
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2025-12-04/business-climate-germany-stagnated-2025
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for Economic & Policy Research: OCCRP Investigation Exposes More Evidence of Ecuadorian President's Family's Connections to Drug Trafficking
WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Economic and Policy Research issued the following news release:* * *
New OCCRP Investigation Exposes More Evidence of Ecuadorian President's Family's Connections to Drug Trafficking
OCCRP Report Follows Previous Reports of Cocaine Found in Noboa Trading Banana Shipments
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A new investigative report (https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-crime-messenger/cocaine-and-bananas-how-balkan-traffickers-used-fruit-shipments-from-the-ecuadorian-presidents-family-firm-to-smuggle-drugs) from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) has ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Economic and Policy Research issued the following news release: * * * New OCCRP Investigation Exposes More Evidence of Ecuadorian President's Family's Connections to Drug Trafficking OCCRP Report Follows Previous Reports of Cocaine Found in Noboa Trading Banana Shipments * A new investigative report (https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-crime-messenger/cocaine-and-bananas-how-balkan-traffickers-used-fruit-shipments-from-the-ecuadorian-presidents-family-firm-to-smuggle-drugs) from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) hasuncovered new evidence that suggests that a company linked to Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa and his family may be involved in trafficking cocaine to Europe. The investigation by Stevan Dojcinovic, Nathan Jaccard, Dragana Peco, Brian Fitzpatrick, and Kevin G. Hall follows previous news reports on multiple seizures of cocaine that police have discovered hidden in Europe-bound banana shipments from the Noboa Trading Company. OCCRP reports that at least 26 million euros' worth of cocaine has been found in Noboa Trading banana shipments.
"This is a hugely important story that has received little attention in English-language media outlets, despite ongoing reporting in Ecuadorian and other Latin American media and despite a damning report by Colombian outlet Revista RAYA earlier this year," Jake Johnston, International Research Director for the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) said.
The OCCRP report is based on new evidence from encrypted messages among alleged organized crime figures in the Balkans, prosecutorial documents, shipping logs, and other material evidence. Investigative journalists were able to match specific deliveries that drug traffickers in Croatia were discussing in advance with Noboa Trading Company shipments that later departed from Ecuador. In messages examined by the journalists, a notorious Balkans organized crime figure discusses his group's exclusive ability to smuggle cocaine in Noboa Trading shipments.
Among other details, Revista RAYA reported that a contractor for Noboa Trading, Jose Luis Rivera Baquerizo, had been arrested multiple times in Ecuador in connection with cocaine busts, and that in at least one instance Noboa's then-advisor, and now head of Ecuador's social security system, Edgar Jose Lama Von Buchwald, had secured the contractor's release. Noboa's cousin Roberto Jorge Ponce Noboa was CEO of Noboa Trading at the time of the drug seizures detailed in the RAYA report.
"The new disclosure comes at an awkward time for President Noboa, who has pitched himself as an anti-drug crusader, and earlier this year called on US and European armies to join his 'war' against what he called 'narco-terrorists,'" the OCCRP report states.
"The revelations expose a massive conflict of interest for a president who has based his entire political career on a narrative of combating violence and curbing the corrosive influence of drug cartels," Johnston is quoted as saying in the article.
While Daniel Noboa has denied knowledge of the drug smuggling and has distanced himself from Noboa Trading in public comments, OCCRP reports that "company records and the presidency's own website show historical ties with him, and ongoing links to his family."
"President Noboa's father Alvaro Noboa, who unsuccessfully ran for the Ecuadorian presidency five times, leads both Noboa Corporation and Noboa Group, the umbrella companies for a vast business conglomerate that includes Noboa Trading, according to the websites of both Alvaro Noboa and the company," OCCRP notes, adding that Daniel Noboa worked for the Noboa Corporation before successfully running for president. OCCRP explains other Noboa family members' ties to the company at the time of the drug busts.
An organized crime expert told OCCRP that the evidence "indicate[s] that someone with control over the physical container-stuffing and departure process is complicit or has been captured by criminals."
Noboa is a Trump ally and earlier this year Secretary of State Rubio spoke of the importance of his cooperation in combating drug trafficking in the region.
Last month, Noboa suffered the most serious political defeat of his presidency so far when voters overwhelmingly went against four referenda questions he had put forward, as CEPR Senior Research Fellow and former Foreign Minister of Ecuador Guillaume Long explains in Project Syndicate today. Noboa's repeated states of "emergency" and draconian measures to crack down on crime have failed to lower the country's record-high homicide rate.
CEPR has previously documented Daniel Noboa's conflict of interest through his family's partial ownership of a mining company that would stand to directly benefit from a trade agreement Noboa is seeking to finalize with Canada. Peru's La Republica and Brazil's Folha de Sao Paulo have reported on Noboa's holdings of offshore assets, even though it is illegal for public office holders in Ecuador to have such assets.
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Original text here: https://cepr.net/newsroom/new-occrp-investigation-exposes-more-evidence-of-ecuadorian-presidents-familys-connections-to-drug-trafficking/
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Lawmakers Introduce Legislation to Fund FAA Activities During Future Shutdowns
WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on Dec. 4, 2025:* * *
Lawmakers Introduce Legislation to Fund FAA Activities During Future Shutdowns
By Jordan Haring
Executive Summary
* A bipartisan group of lawmakers in the House and Senate have introduced legislation to ensure funding for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) activities is available during future government shutdowns; one of the largest costs of the recent 43-day shutdown was the disruption to FAA activities.
* Air traffic controllers were among the essential federal employees required to ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on Dec. 4, 2025: * * * Lawmakers Introduce Legislation to Fund FAA Activities During Future Shutdowns By Jordan Haring Executive Summary * A bipartisan group of lawmakers in the House and Senate have introduced legislation to ensure funding for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) activities is available during future government shutdowns; one of the largest costs of the recent 43-day shutdown was the disruption to FAA activities. * Air traffic controllers were among the essential federal employees required towork during the shutdown without pay; however, many did not show up to work for a litany of reasons, causing flight delays and cancellations at airports across the country.
* The House and Senate bills are a step in the right direction to prevent one of the largest disruptions and costs of past shutdowns from occurring in the future.
Introduction
A bipartisan group of lawmakers in the House and Senate have introduced legislation to ensure funding for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) activities is available during future federal government shutdowns. The 43-day shutdown that began on October 1 and ended on November 12 imposed costs on both the federal budget and the U.S. economy. One of the largest costs was the disruption of FAA activities and the subsequent impact on air travel. Air traffic controllers were among the roughly 730,000 essential federal employees required to work during the shutdown without pay. Many air traffic controllers chose not to report to work, causing long delays and cancellations at major airports across the country. The FAA issued an emergency order in early November requiring airlines to scale down daily flights at 40 major airports across the country by as much as 10 percent (these restrictions were lifted on November 16).
The House's Aviation Funding Solvency Act (H.R. 6086) and the Senate's Aviation Funding Stability Act of 2025 (S. 1045) are a step in the right direction to prevent the recurrence of one of the largest and costliest disruptions of past government shutdowns. This insight reviews both bills.
The House Bill
The Aviation Funding Solvency Act was introduced in the House by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), along with Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA), House Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Troy Nehls (R-TX), and Representative Andre Carson (D-IN).
The bill would use funding from the Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund to fund FAA activities during any future government shutdown. The fund typically covers war risk insurance claims by airlines and currently has a balance of about $2.6 billion. During a shutdown, the funds would be available to fund the activities of two FAA accounts: Operations, and Facilities and Equipment. The funds would be available from the start of any lapse in appropriations legislation until new appropriations legislation or a continuing resolution (CR) is signed into law.
The bill would effectively establish a cap on the amount of funding that could be withdrawn from the Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund by requiring the fund to maintain a $1 billion balance. So, for example, if its balance is still $2.6 billion when the next government shutdown starts, a maximum of $1.6 billion could be withdrawn to cover FAA activities. If the FAA administrator determines the amount is insufficient to fund all activities during a shutdown, the bill mandates that paying air traffic controllers be the priority.
When a shutdown ends either through the enactment of appropriations legislation or a CR, H.R. 6086 would require the total sum withdrawn from the Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund to cover FAA activities to be charged to the appropriation fund or authorization that finances the activities when the government is not shut down. This would ensure repayment of the "borrowed" funds to the Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund.
The Senate Bill
The Aviation Funding Stability Act of 2025 was introduced in the Senate by Aviation, Space, and Innovation Subcommittee Chairman Jerry Moran (R-KS).
The bill would use funding from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF) to fund FAA activities during a government shutdown. The AATF is the primary funding source for federal aviation programs, and its primary source of income is taxes paid by users of the national aviation system. The AATF currently has a balance of about $20 billion. During a shutdown, the funds would be available to finance the activities of four FAA accounts: Operations; Facilities and Equipment; Research, Engineering, and Development; and Grants-in-Aid for Airports. The funds would be available from the start of any lapse in appropriations until new appropriations legislation or a CR is signed into law.
When a shutdown ends, either through the enactment of appropriations legislation or a CR, the bill would require the total sum withdrawn from the Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund to cover FAA activities to be charged to the appropriation fund or authorization that funds the activities when the government is not shut down. This would ensure repayment of the "borrowed" funds to the AATF.
Budgetary Impact
The Congressional Budget Office has not provided an official cost estimate of H.R. 6086 or S. 1045. It is not unreasonable to assume the bills would score differently given their different funding mechanisms, parameters for using those funding mechanisms, and the individual FAA accounts that would be funded by the bills during a shutdown.
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Jordan Haring is the Director of Fiscal Policy at the American Action Forum
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/lawmakers-introduce-legislation-to-fund-faa-activities-during-future-shutdowns/
[Category: Think Tank]