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Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Davor Savicic: Bosnian Serb Recruiter for the Wagner Group
WASHINGTON, April 25 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 24, 2026, by Eurasia and terrorism associate Sam Jones in the foundation's Militant Leadership Monitor:* * *
Davor Savicic: Bosnian Serb Recruiter for the Wagner Group
Executive Summary:
* Davor Savicic--a Bosnian Serb with a deep paramilitary background--has become one of the most prominent foreign members of the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner, and actively recruits ethnic Serbs and other foreign fighters to join the Russian armed forces in its war against Ukraine.
* Savicic likely helps ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 25 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 24, 2026, by Eurasia and terrorism associate Sam Jones in the foundation's Militant Leadership Monitor: * * * Davor Savicic: Bosnian Serb Recruiter for the Wagner Group Executive Summary: * Davor Savicic--a Bosnian Serb with a deep paramilitary background--has become one of the most prominent foreign members of the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner, and actively recruits ethnic Serbs and other foreign fighters to join the Russian armed forces in its war against Ukraine. * Savicic likely helpsrecruits circumvent regional laws against mercenary work by using construction companies such as Wolf Group LLC as fronts, allowing fighters to register as temporary workers and avoid domestic prosecution.
SavicicHis extensive criminal and security networks provide a vital bridge that facilitates Russian intelligence and military operations. Moscow's increasing reliance on these irregular paramilitary units, however, could introduce significant long-term domestic liabilities and risks to political stability.
Foreign citizens have been signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) since November 2022. Since then, foreigners from at least 48 countries have joined the ranks of the Russian military. On February 26, Russian President Vladimir Putin further institutionalized this system by signing a law that prohibits the extradition of foreigners who have signed contracts to fight for the Russian Armed Forces (Government of Russia, February 26). Foreigners can additionally now apply for Russian citizenship on the basis of having participated in Russia's war against Ukraine (Government of Russia, November 5, 2025; The Moscow Times, March 8). These measures only make official what has long been a reality. Russian private military companies (PMCs), paramilitary groups, and other non-state armed groups, in particular, have long sought out foreign recruits to bolster their numbers. Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, originally intended to be over within ten days, has turned into a war of attrition. To sustain the war effort and avoid a full domestic mobilization, the Russian military has taken a page out of the PMC playbook and embraced foreign recruits. Ethnic Serbs make up the vast majority of those recruited from Europe, and are unique amongst all foreign contractors for having fought for Russia since its initial invasion of Ukraine in the spring of 2014 (Vazhnye Istorii, April 23, 2025).
In the fall of 2025, journalists from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) gained access to private Telegram groups where recruiters attempt to lure Serbs to join the Russian army in Ukraine. The BIRN journalists found that prospective recruits were indeed being offered Russian citizenship and lucrative contracts to join the armed forces. While posing as interested recruits, the journalists were told that "Davor" would meet them at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport and serve as their commander during training (Balkan Insight, October 30, 2025). Based on the photos they received, the journalists confirmed that the person they were speaking to was Davor Savicic.
Savicic, a Bosnian Serb, is one of the most prominent foreign members of the Russian PMC Wagner. Leaked Russian MOD documents, furthermore, list Savicic as a colonel in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), demonstrating his ties to formal military channels (Radio Svoboda, February 27, 2025). According to regional reporting, Savicic commands a Serb unit within Wagner named "Wolves," which took its name from his nom de guerre "Wolf" (novosti.rs, April 17, 2016; Balkan Insight, April 22, 2016; Slobodna Evropa, November 6, 2023).
Savicic comes from the first generation of Balkan recruits who joined Russia's burgeoning paramilitary sector in 2014. This generation is distinguished by its combat and criminal experience during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. He has also played an important role in recruiting a new generation of Balkan fighters for Russia since 2022. This new generation lacks the combat experience of the first, but is nonetheless motivated to join Russia's war for monetary or ideological reasons, and often joins PMCs and other paramilitary groups that contain large ethnic Serb contingents. Investigating the background, role, and methods of recruiters like Savicic is therefore important for understanding the opaque yet significant Russian paramilitary network, particularly since formal Russian security and military institutions continue to adapt and expand these methods.
Yugoslav Wars
According to data from the UK and Ukrainian governments, Savicic was born on October 1, 1980, in the town of Banovici, Bosnia and Herzegovina (War and Sanctions; UK Government, accessed March 20). Very little is known about his upbringing, but after the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars (1991-2001)--like many young men of Serb descent coming of age during the 1990s--he participated in paramilitary violence on behalf of the Serbian government. [1] Bosnian police records and local media suggest that Savicic was a member of the infamous Serb Volunteer Guard (Serbian: Srpska dobrovoljacka garda/SDG) during the Bosnian War (1991-1995), supposedly going by the callsign "Elvis" (Balkan Insight, April 22, 2016; December 27, 2017; Dobojski.info, October 19, 2023; klix.ba, November 4, 2024, Radio Sarajevo, November 8, 2024). The group, founded by Zeljko "Arkan" Raznatovic and better known as "Arkan's Tigers," was supported by Serbia's State Security Service (Serbian: Sluzba drzavne bezbednosti, SDB) and was responsible for numerous massacres and war crimes in Bosnia and Croatia (Radio Slobodna Evropa, June 20, 2023). Savicic's age, however, makes his participation in the Bosnian War and membership in the SDG unlikely. He would have been 11 at the beginning of the war, and only 15 by the end; too young to have had any significant role in hierarchical paramilitary groups. The SDG, moreover, was disbanded in 1996, leaving little time for him to have joined after the war (Balkan Insight, March 23, 2023). Despite doubts over his presence in the Bosnian War, Savicic likely fought in the Kosovo War (1998-1999) as a member of the Special Operations Unit (Serbian: Jedinica za specialne operacije, JSO).
The JSO was created in 1996 by merging paramilitary groups with the SDB. The group was placed under the oversight of Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic, then-head and deputy-head of the SDB, respectively (BBC News, March 26, 2003; Vreme, September 7, 2006). Serbian and Bosnian media outlets--as well as Bosnian police records--mention Savicic as a former member of the JSO (Vreme, April 2, 2003; republika.rs, October 17, 2017; avaz.ba, July 20, 2020; nova.rs, November 6, 2023). Kosovar media have additionally named Savicic as one of the perpetrators of the Panda Bar Massacre on December 14, 1998 (Telegrafi; Albanian Daily News, August 4, 2020; kosovapress.com, December 14, 2021). It has long been speculated that Serbian operatives were behind the massacre, but as of yet, no progress has been made in the court case (Balkan Insight, December 14, 2018).
Savicic's violent escapades seemed to continue after the end of the Kosovo War. Savicic--along with three other former JSO members--was accused of planting a bomb that killed six people in Berane, Montenegro, in 2001 (dan.co.me, September 14, 2022). He fled the Balkans shortly after and was tried in absentia before being sentenced to 20 years in prison. Montenegrin police and Interpol tracked him across Europe over the subsequent years, but were never able to arrest him (Vreme, April 2, 2003; Balkan Insight, December 27, 2017).
It is difficult to confirm any single accusation due to the intentionally vague and informal nature of paramilitary units. The amount of reporting from various regional sources--including material from before his time with Wagner--however, provides greater confidence in assessing his participation in non-state violence. In any case, Savicic's future role in Wagner seems to confirm his paramilitary past.
Fighting in Syria
After evading Montenegrin police for 15 years, Savicic resurfaced in 2016. The Russian investigative outlet Fontanka was the first to report on the presence of private mercenaries fighting on behalf of then-president Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Through conversations with Wagner mercenaries, Fontanka learned that Savicic was commanding an international, albeit predominantly Serb, Wagner battalion and that his relationship with Russian mercenaries dated back to before 2014 (Fontanka, March 29, 2016). Savicic initially denied fighting in Syria or Ukraine, stating that he was simply in the construction business. After providing him with their evidence, however, Fontanka's journalists learned that he had fought for Russia in Luhansk, Ukraine, in 2014. This confirmed the rumors of a Serb battalion within Wagner's precursor, the Slavic Corps, that had been circulating since Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 (Novaya Gazeta, February 8, 2023).
In March 2016, Syrian forces took back the city of Palmyra from Islamic State (IS) (Al Jazeera, March 27, 2016). Following Fontanka's investigation, Britain's Telegraph newspaper analyzed photos, social media posts, and Iranian, Russian, and Syrian media coverage of the March 2016 Palmyra Offensive. The Telegraph determined that the assault on the city was mainly led by Wagner and the 10th Brigade of GRU special forces, and that Savicic's platoon was indeed present at the battle (The Telegraph, April 9, 2016).
Full-Scale Invasion
Savicic has taken on a much more prominent role since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Savicic initially participated in the invasion and claimed that his battalion fought near Kyiv in Hostomel. The leaked Russian MOD database and a war correspondent Telegram channel further confirm that he was hospitalized after a shrapnel wound to his right shoulder in June 2022, somewhere in Eastern Ukraine (Telegram/@SrbijaRusija, February 16, 2025; Radio Svoboda, February 27, 2025). He has seemingly moved to a full-time recruiter and trainer role since then.
On August 21, 2023--almost two months after former Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin's failed rebellion against the Russian MOD--Savicic appeared on the famous Russian propagandist and TV personality Vladimir Solovyov's show (see EDM, June 26; July 11, 2023). Savicic pitched his battalion and sought to calm fears about Wagner's future during the appearance, stating, "I want to invite both Russians and Serbs ... The unit is operating and will continue to operate." In a likely attempt to dissuade suspicions from Russian authorities of his role in Prigozhin's rebellion, he further stated, "We are now officially signing a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Soldiers go through the Krasnogorsk military registration and enlistment office." Savicic appeared on the program with another Serb, Dejan Beric, who added that "Most of the foreign volunteers in the Russian army are from Serbia" (Telegram/@SolovievLive, August 21, 2023).
Recruitment Pipeline
Foreign mercenary work is illegal in the three main countries Savicic recruits from: Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Council of Europe, February 26, 2024; Balkan Insight, October 31, 2025). Savicic is likely able to help recruits avoid local police, however, by procuring temporary workers' permits under the guise of construction work. In fall 2023, the BBC Russian Service obtained a phone call between Savicic and unnamed officials in Moscow, in which Savicic promised to recruit up to 1,000 Serbian nationals who would form their own battalion as part of the 106th Tula Airborne Division (BBC Russian Service, October 6, 2023). In the Russian business database RusProfile, the construction company "Wolf Group LLC" lists Davor Savicic and Raiko Batskovich as its owners (RusProfile, Accessed April 20). The company was established in December 2023, shortly after Savicic declared his plan for a Serb airborne battalion.
RusProfile also lists Batskovich as the founder of the company "Monte Gradnya" (RusProfile, Accessed April 20). A Serb recruit, "Dragan," who agreed to talk to Radio Svoboda about his experience in the Russian army, shed light on this company. He showed Radio Svoboda a photo displaying a contract he signed before going to Russia. The contract stated that he went to Russia to work for "Monte Gradnya" and disclosed nothing about his joining the Russian army. Dragan said he was instructed to show this to the Serbian authorities to avoid any trouble (Radio Svoboda, September 23, 2024). This scheme seems to be widespread. In 2023, the mother of a Serbian volunteer fighting for Russia told the BBC that her son "works at a construction site" (BBC Russian Service, October 6, 2023). Bosnian police have also mentioned this scheme, telling BIRN journalists that they believe recruits are often "registered as temporary workers in Russia to avoid prosecution at home as foreign fighters" (Balkan Insight, April 22, 2016).
It is impossible to confirm with complete certainty that Wolf Group LLC is used as a front to grant foreign mercenaries workers' permits. The company's founding date and connections with Batskovich, however, provide strong evidence to support this conclusion. Additionally, Savicic's 2016 statement that he is in Russia for construction work suggests he has been using this loophole for at least a decade.
Conclusion
Speaking at a gathering of local Serb leaders in 1991, then-president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, announced his intention to foster paramilitary units, stating, "The government has an assignment to prepare additional groups which will make us safe and enable us to defend the interests of our republic, but also the interests of Serbs outside Serbia" (Detektor.ba, June 28, 2021). During the Yugoslav wars, paramilitary groups worked closely with Serbian intelligence, military, and political leaders, despite Milosevic's continued denials of cooperation. Russia's own deployment of paramilitary and non-state armed groups seems to have taken much from Serbia's example.
The rise and fall of Prigozhin--and the subsequent subordination of Wagner under the GRU--mirrors the fate of Arkan and his unit's absorption into the SDB (Gow, 2003; Vazhnye Istorii, September 8, 2023). [2] The usefulness of those like Savicic to Russian security leaders is therefore unsurprising. His experience in kinetic war and covert criminal and sub-state operations in the Balkans proved valuable for Russia's goals in Ukraine and Syria. For example, Wagner members who spoke with Fontanka stated that Savicic was highly valued by his superiors for his extensive battlefield experience and that he received his nom de guerre "Wolf" due to his strength and courage in combat (Fontanka, March 29, 2016; Balkan Insight, April 22, 2016). His connections with the criminal underworld and among security services in both Russia and the Balkans, however, are arguably more consequential.
Savicic seems to have recently become involved in recruiting operatives for intelligence operations as well. On February 24, Colombian officers arrested Denis Alimov at El Dorado International Airport in Bogota, responding to an Interpol Red Notice filed by the Southern District of New York. Alimov, a veteran of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), has been a senior member of the GRU's newly established Center 795 unit since 2023 (Vazhnye Istorii, March 13). An FBI investigation revealed that Alimov had planned and directed an operation to kidnap or murder two well-known Russian dissidents abroad. He offered Darko Durovic--a citizen of Serbia and Montenegro living in the United States--$1.5 million to "neutralize" each target (U.S. Attorney's Office, February 27). It was not immediately clear how Alimov and Durovic first came into contact, but the inclusion of Savicic in Alimov's contact list offers a likely explanation (The Insider, March 13). Alimov's and Center 795's activities provide yet another example of cooperation between members of Russia's security sector and individuals from the Balkans. Much of this cooperation would be impossible without those like Savicic--who possess the credibility and established network--serving as the bridge between the two groups.
Leveraging PMCs and other non-state groups for military and intelligence operations has allowed Moscow to bolster its traditional security capabilities and offset vulnerabilities associated with risky operations. Increased reliance on these actors, however, could turn into a liability. Serbia offers a salient case. Milosevic's patronage of the JSO did not cultivate any loyalty towards him or Serbia's political institutions. During the September-October 2000 protests that led to Milosevic's ouster, the JSO reached an agreement with opposition leaders Vojislav Kostunica and Zoran Dindic and refrained from intervening on Milosevic's behalf. After becoming the first post-communist prime minister of Serbia, Dindic focused on combating organized crime and cultivating democratic institutions. These measures directly threatened the JSO, however, and rather than accept democratic reform, the group took action. On March 12, 2003, Zvezdan Jovanovic--a JSO veteran--shot and killed Dindic, derailing Serbia's path towards democratization (Balkan Insight, March 10, 2023).
Some now estimate that irregular units make up as much as 40 percent of Russian-commanded troops fighting against Ukraine (WOTR, August 22, 2025). In the event of the war's termination, Moscow will likely find it difficult to manage these groups' place in society. Prigozhin's mutiny proved short-lived, and the subsequent merger of Wagner into formal structures has so far stabilized the most notable of these units. As Serbia's history shows, however, these groups will likely remain loyal to Moscow only if they continue to receive lucrative contracts and access to criminal revenue. The assassination of PMC Espanola leader Stanislav Orlov by Russian security forces in December 2025 underscores Moscow's continued suspicion of these groups (see EDM, January 29). Paramilitary veterans such as Savicic have become a vital--if often unseen--pillar of Russia's war effort, but if the political winds ever change, the question of their continued loyalty to Moscow will be worth monitoring.
Notes:
[1] The term "Yugoslav wars" refers to the separate but related conflicts that occurred following the breakup of Yugoslavia. These conflicts were notable for the proliferation of paramilitary and other non-state armed groups. For example, it is estimated that as many as 83 paramilitary groups operated during the Bosnian War, with 56 on the "Serbian side," 13 on the "Croatian side," and 14 supporting the Bosnian government. For the "Serbian side" specifically, see Iva Vukusic, Serbian Paramilitaries and the Breakup of Yugoslavia: State Connections and Patterns of Violence. Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Routledge, 2023. ISBN 9781032044453 (hbk); ISBN 9781032044477 (pbk). 230pp.
[2] James, Gow. The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes. McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt130hhk5.
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Sam Jones is an Eurasia and Terrorism Associate at The Jamestown Foundation.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/davor-savicic-bosnian-serb-recruiter-for-the-wagner-group/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute President Fuest Issues Statement on Business Climate Index
MUNICH, Germany, April 25 -- ifo Institute issued the following statement on April 24, 2026, by President Clemens Fuest on the Business Climate Index:* * *
ifo Business Climate Index Down (April 2026)
Sentiment among companies in Germany has significantly deteriorated. The ifo Business Climate Index fell in April to 84.4 points, down from 86.3 in March. This is the lowest level since May 2020. Companies are considerably more pessimistic about the coming months. They also assessed their current situation as worse. The German economy is being hit hard by the Iran crisis.
In manufacturing, the ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, April 25 -- ifo Institute issued the following statement on April 24, 2026, by President Clemens Fuest on the Business Climate Index: * * * ifo Business Climate Index Down (April 2026) Sentiment among companies in Germany has significantly deteriorated. The ifo Business Climate Index fell in April to 84.4 points, down from 86.3 in March. This is the lowest level since May 2020. Companies are considerably more pessimistic about the coming months. They also assessed their current situation as worse. The German economy is being hit hard by the Iran crisis. In manufacturing, thebusiness climate deteriorated. This was due to significantly more pessimistic expectations, especially in the chemical industry. By contrast, companies assessed their current situation as somewhat better. They did, however, increasingly report supply bottlenecks.
In the service sector, the index fell considerably. Expectations continued to deteriorate. Assessments of the current situation were also worse. The logistics industry in particular is under pressure. The outlook there is grim.
In trade, the business climate dropped significantly. Companies noticeably adjusted their assessments both for expectations and the current situation downward. Retailers are worried in particular that consumers will be more reticent due to rising inflation.
In construction, the business climate plummeted. Expectations fell by almost 10 points. Companies were considerably less satisfied with current business. Hopes for an upswing have been dashed for now.
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Survey
25 April 2026
ifo Business Climate Index for Germany
ifo Business Climate Index Down (April 2026)
Sentiment among companies in Germany has significantly deteriorated. The ifo Business Climate Index fell in April to 84.4 points, down from 86.3 in March . This is the lowest level since May 2020. Companies are considerably more pessimistic about the coming months. They also assessed their current situation as worse. The German economy is being hit hard by the Iran crisis.
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-04-25/ifo-business-climate-index-down-april-2026)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-04-24/ifo-business-climate-index-down-april-2026
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Washington Post: Private Industry Needs Anti-Drone Defenses Too
WASHINGTON, April 25 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on April 24, 2026, by adjunct fellow Alexander Benard to the Washington Post:* * *
Private Industry Needs Anti-Drone Defenses Too
Critical infrastructure is vulnerable to drone attacks and the government can't defend it all.
*
For the United States, the lesson has been immediate and powerful. Over the course of the war, U.S. installations across the Persian Gulf have proved highly vulnerable, as Iranian drone attacks have ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 25 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on April 24, 2026, by adjunct fellow Alexander Benard to the Washington Post: * * * Private Industry Needs Anti-Drone Defenses Too Critical infrastructure is vulnerable to drone attacks and the government can't defend it all. * For the United States, the lesson has been immediate and powerful. Over the course of the war, U.S. installations across the Persian Gulf have proved highly vulnerable, as Iranian drone attacks havedamaged critical assets in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and elsewhere.
These strikes have not been limited to military bases and airfields. Ports, airports, refineries and energy terminals have also been targeted. Many of these sites were effectively defenseless. The attacks have caused tens of billions of dollars in damage and significantly affected the global economy. The attack on the Ras Laffan liquefied natural gas plant in Qatar, the largest in the world, reduced Qatar's LNG export capacity by 17 percent. Repairs could take up to five years.
In the U.S., recent incidents have made this issue more urgent. In March, sophisticated drones appeared over military bases in Louisiana and D.C., raising concerns that hostile forces are already unafraid to breach American borders. They may have even positioned capabilities within the U.S.
The Pentagon has moved to install more robust defenses on its bases, but the harder question is what to do about everything else. The age of drone warfare means that the universe of targets vulnerable to attacks has expanded far beyond what government alone can reasonably protect. The government cannot station military-grade air defenses at every refinery, power plant or industrial facility.
That's why private operators need the authority to adopt basic defenses to protect their own assets. This may sound radical, but it shouldn't.
Owners of sensitive facilities already secure their perimeters on land. They erect fences, control access points and even employ armed guards. The same goes for cybersecurity, with companies that operate important infrastructure deploying their own systems to guard against attacks. In a crisis, companies still rely on public authorities -- the police, the military, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security -- but in-house security measures deter intrusion and buy time.
Airspace requires the same attention. The first step to securing the sky is establishing a defensible perimeter above critical sites -- a virtual fence. The Federal Aviation Administration already restricts airspace around major events and sensitive government locations. It needs to develop a mechanism to do the same for critical infrastructure.
But what happens when a drone crosses that boundary?
That's when the second layer of security kicks in: electronic defenses. Directed-energy tools such as high-powered microwaves and electronic jamming can neutralize threats without the need to fire a projectile into crowded airspace.
However, even these countermeasures pose risks. Anti-drone systems can interfere with civilian aviation and must therefore operate within strict limits. To ensure defensive effects remain contained, these systems will require range constraints, geofenced boundaries and automatic shutoffs.
These capabilities already exist. Modern systems can define precise technical boundaries, ensuring they do not impact aircraft above a set altitude. They can also automatically cease operation if manned aircraft are detected within range. The missing link is policy. The government must establish a regulatory framework that allows for private sales of this technology but also includes a rigorous testing and certification process to ensure that only systems that meet strict containment standards are available for private use.
This availability must also extend to key locations overseas. This includes vital business facilities in foreign countries that are critical to the U.S. economy, but also dual-use infrastructure that serves a national security purpose. Across the Pacific and elsewhere, U.S. forces increasingly depend on privately owned assets -- commercial ports, private airstrips, fuel depots and maintenance facilities -- to sustain operations. These assets are exposed, and without enabling the same elements of self-defense that are required for critical infrastructure within U.S. borders, they will remain soft targets.
The Iran conflict has made clear that the drone threat is only going to grow, and major civilian infrastructures are at a heightened risk as a result. The government and the private sector must work together to establish a strategy and regulatory framework to build a shield and protect the infrastructure facing new danger from the sky.
Read the full article in the Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/04/24/drones-are-threat-private-infrastructure/).
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At A Glance:
Alexander Benard is an adjunct fellow at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/private-industry-needs-anti-drone-defenses-too-alexander-bernard
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to RealClearDefense: How We Turn the Northern Sea Route Into an Advantage
WASHINGTON, April 25 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on April 24, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Liselotte Odgaard to RealClearDefense:* * *
How We Turn the Northern Sea Route Into an Advantage
As the Northern Sea Route gains global significance, Russia's tightening control threatens to turn it into a geopolitical chokepoint. Yet the NSR could become an advantage rather than a vulnerability if Indo-Pacific and Nordic partners combine commercial capacity with allied Arctic ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 25 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on April 24, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Liselotte Odgaard to RealClearDefense: * * * How We Turn the Northern Sea Route Into an Advantage As the Northern Sea Route gains global significance, Russia's tightening control threatens to turn it into a geopolitical chokepoint. Yet the NSR could become an advantage rather than a vulnerability if Indo-Pacific and Nordic partners combine commercial capacity with allied Arcticsecurity tools. Here's how to flip the script.
*
Russia's Expanding Leverage over the NSR
Russia's war in Ukraine has not diminished Moscow's determination to strategically develop its vast Arctic region, stretching from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait. Along this coastline runs the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a corridor that links Russian Arctic ports with the North Pacific and offers China a shorter maritime path to Europe. As the Sino-Russian relationship deepens, both countries are using the NSR to expand cooperation in energy, shipping, and military-strategic presence. This partnership is creating new risks for the United States and its allies across the Arctic. Russia already employs the NSR as a naval mobility corridor, enabling the re-deployment of forces between the Arctic and Pacific without transiting interdiction-prone choke points.
As commercial activity expands, Moscow has tightened its grip on all traffic along the route. It now requires prior transit permission, mandatory Russian pilots, and icebreaker escort, asserting that the NSR is a historically established national route consisting largely of internal waters. In reality, the Law of the Sea permits such requirements only in limited segments. Russia's attempt to impose them across the full NSR is legally questionable and strategically motivated, enabling close monitoring of foreign vessels operating near high-value Russian military installations.
A North Pacific-Nordic Alignment Emerges
In response to these disruptions, a North Pacific-Nordic alignment is beginning to take shape. Instability across global trade routes only heightens the relevance of the NSR. The joint 2026 US-Israeli military operation against Iran has closed the Hormuz Strait, while shipping through the Suez Canal remains severely constrained due to the threat of attacks by Iran and its Houthi proxies in the Red Sea. The cumulative cost of these disruptions is immense. A long-term closure of the Strait of Hormuz alone could impose losses on the global economy estimated between $330 billion and $2.2 trillion.
In search of some relief during this crisis, many of America's allies are likely to look north to the Arctic. For South Korea and Japan--advanced maritime nations highly exposed to chokepoints--the NSR offers an alternative artery for trade. Both countries have signaled not only a willingness to explore the NSR commercially but also an interest in playing a meaningful defense role in partnership with NATO allies across the Arctic. In February 2026, Canada opened a consulate in Nuuk, Greenland's capital, and signed an agreement with South Korea on the protection of military and defense-related classified information, mirroring the Canadian-Japanese Agreement on the Security of Information concluded in July 2025. These initiatives demonstrate Ottawa's determination to participate in joint maritime mobility efforts stretching from the High North to the North Pacific.
All of these adjustments open the door to a new North Pacific-Nordic alignment. Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway and Sweden collectively possess Arctic infrastructure, governance credibility and operational expertise that make them natural partners for Seoul and Tokyo. The NSR may run along Russia's coast, but the supporting systems that enable commerce through it--shipbuilding, departure ports, insurance, safety standards, logistics hubs, and monitoring--do not have to be Russian. With the right architecture, allies can operate the NSR with military surveillance, communications networks, and logistical support underpinning it, allowing commercial actors to navigate with predictability and safety.
Building the Architecture for a Western-Aligned Arctic
South Korea and Japan are already positioning themselves for this future. Both view the NSR as a way to bypass the vulnerabilities of Hormuz and Suez, shorten transit time by up to ten days, and reduce fuel consumption by an estimated 25 per cent. South Korea aims to make Busan an Indo-Pacific NSR hub, with plans for industrial clusters focused on ice-capable shipbuilding, green fuels, and Arctic port operations. South Korea's Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries is preparing a September 2026 container transit of the NSR to test the viability of emulating China's Arctic container route, launched in 2025. South Korea's shipyards lead the world in building large ice-class commercial carriers, while Japan has unique experience constructing research icebreakers, giving Tokyo a technological foundation highly transferable to Arctic shipping.
Japan's northern ports on Hokkaido and Honshu are ideally positioned to support routes linking the North Pacific, the Arctic, and Europe. Together with Busan, they can form a Pacific gateway feeding into Nordic ports along the NSR's western approach. On the European side, Norwegian ports such as Kirkenes and Tromso, along with hubs in Iceland, can serve as transfer points between NSR shipping and North Atlantic routes. These nodes could support bunkering, maintenance, cold-weather trials, and certification for Arctic-capable vessels.
Denmark and Norway, with their large merchant fleets and strong safety reputations, could contribute Arctic-ready commercial vessels to joint Indo-Pacific-Nordic operations. Shared best practices in insurance, risk management, and routing, combined with joint training and crew-exchange programs, would further strengthen maritime resilience. Merchant fleets would become strategic enablers of a Western-aligned Arctic maritime system rather than merely commercial assets.
Still, Russia's attempt to monopolize access and escort rights along the NSR poses operational risks. Allied icebreaking capability is therefore essential. The United States, Canada, and Finland are jointly expanding icebreaker production under the ICE Pact, enabling the provision of non-Russian escort services. This reduces dependence on Russia's state-controlled icebreaker fleet and undermines Moscow's claim that only Russian pilots and icebreakers may operate along the route. Under the Law of the Sea, if a waterway functions as an international strait, all vessels enjoy the right of innocent passage even when portions include internal waters. Regular allied transits, including by research vessels from Norway, Denmark, Canada, South Korea, and Japan, can help reinforce that legal principle. Russia may contest early attempts, but establishing consistent practice is crucial before a full icebreaker-assistance and innocent-passage regime can take hold.
Security cooperation can further mitigate Russian control. NATO's Arctic Sentry vigilance activity, launched in February 2026, provides integrated monitoring across the High North. Combined with new air and maritime infrastructure in Norway, Finland, and Sweden, this gives commercial actors greater visibility and reduces exposure to operational unknowns. Within this framework, NATO allies can track Russian naval movements, monitor waters adjacent to NSR, and produce shared intelligence that South Korea and Japan can use for Arctic route planning.
Toward an Integrated Arctic Security Framework
Taken together, these elements--North Pacific logistics hubs, Nordic infrastructure, non-Russian icebreaking assistance, allied surveillance and legal reinforcement of innocent passage--can turn the NSR from a vulnerability into an advantage. Rather than allowing Russia and China to set the terms of Arctic navigation, the United States and its allies can shape a stable, commercially viable, and legally grounded operating environment. If implemented with ambition, this approach would safeguard maritime freedom, expand global trade options, and strengthen Western strategic influence in the Arctic.
A crucial next step is to anchor the emerging Indo-Pacific-Nordic alignment in a more durable security framework than ad hoc cooperation. Commercial actors can generate early momentum, but only government-level planning can guarantee that the NSR becomes a resilient maritime corridor rather than a fair-weather experiment. This requires treating the NSR not as a discrete route, but as part of a broader Arctic operating system spanning communications, sensing, logistics, and force posture. The Arctic's harsh environment and vast distances mean that small gaps in surveillance, satellite coverage and search-and-rescue capacity quickly become strategic vulnerabilities. Closing those gaps is essential if allies want to operate with confidence near a region where Russian and Chinese military activity is increasing.
The Nordic countries have already laid the foundation for such a system. They are accelerating a shift from national to integrated Arctic domain awareness, combining maritime patrol aircraft, satellite constellations, undersea sensors, and intelligence sharing. The addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO makes it possible to knit national systems into a coherent northern surveillance architecture extending from the Baltic to the Arctic Ocean. Linking this network with Japanese and South Korean advanced space and maritime monitoring capabilities would allow the allies to create a shared operational picture across the entire NSR corridor. Such visibility would give commercial shippers unprecedented predictability while limiting Russia's ability to manipulate information about ice conditions, traffic flows, or incidents at sea.
Normalizing Allied Presence Along the NSR
A second pillar is allied mobility. The Arctic environment punishes platforms not specifically designed for it, which is why strengthened allied ability to move forces, supplies, and commercial cargo along Arctic routes is essential to avoiding reliance on Russian infrastructure. Coordinating airfields, ports, pre-positioned equipment, and fuel stocks would allow them to sustain both routine commercial operations and emergency responses, even during periods of friction with Moscow. Canada and the Nordic states have the geography. South Korea and Japan have world-class shipbuilding and logistics industries. Together they could field an Arctic-ready commercial and naval support fleet capable of operating independently of Russian services.
Finally, establishing regular, lawful allied presence along the NSR is critical. If the route is to evolve into a corridor governed by international norms rather than Russian discretion, freedom-of-navigation practice needs to be continuous and multinational. Mixed flotillas of research vessels, ice-capable commercial ships, and allied icebreakers can steadily socialize the principle that the NSR is not a Russian internal waterway but an international passageway. The goal is not confrontation, but normalization, so that the rules of the High North reflect global interests--not unilateral control. A stable, accessible NSR strengthens the resilience of the world's maritime system and positions Indo-Pacific and Nordic partners as co-architects of the Arctic's future.
Read in RealClearDefense (https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/04/24/how_we_turn_the_northern_sea_route_into_an_advantage_1178556.html).
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At A Glance:
Liselotte Odgaard is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/how-we-turn-northern-sea-route-advantage-liselotte-odgaard
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Louisiana's Early Literacy Reform Includes Strong New Tutoring Voucher Program
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 25 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary by policy fellow Josiah Padley:* * *
Louisiana's early literacy reform includes strong new tutoring voucher program
The ed-reform conversation has been abuzz with talk about the Southern Surge, a thrilling run at the top of the educational achievement charts by states like Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama. As my colleague Catrin Wigfall wrote, "Using demographically-weighted results, Louisiana fourth ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 25 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary by policy fellow Josiah Padley: * * * Louisiana's early literacy reform includes strong new tutoring voucher program The ed-reform conversation has been abuzz with talk about the Southern Surge, a thrilling run at the top of the educational achievement charts by states like Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama. As my colleague Catrin Wigfall wrote, "Using demographically-weighted results, Louisiana fourthgraders now rank second highest in reading scores nationwide, right behind Mississippi." The Southern Surge states have achieved results through a holistic package of reform pieces, including science of literacy reform in early grades, third grade retention policies, legal teacher protections, and an aggressive focus on academic achievement.
Over the past five years, Louisiana has enacted another small reform experiment: state-funded vouchers for afterschool tutoring sessions. While tutoring can be a highly effective academic tool, high quality tutoring sessions are often expensive and remain out of reach for many families. Louisiana decided to expand accessibility.
Originally passed in 2021 and expanded in 2024, the state now yearly spends $5 million in state funds and $5 million in federal grants on the Steve Carter Tutoring Program. (Louisiana spent $4.7 billion in 2025 on their education system. For context, Minnesota spent $25.73 billion.) The program, part of the larger Louisiana Tutoring Initiative, provides $1500 vouchers to qualifying K-12 students for afterschool tutoring.
The Louisiana Tutoring Initiative also provides "high-dosage" tutoring to students below grade level proficiency in grades K-5 during the school day. Currently, the program utilizes $30 million in state funds to serve around 178,000 students. Due to a widespread perception of the program's success, lawmakers are pushing to expand the program to higher grades in the future.
The Pelican State has seen positive effects from both programs, including the afterschool Steve Carter Tutoring Program. This success is likely due in part to the gold standard construction of the tutoring programs themselves.
Recipients of the Steve Carter tutoring vouchers must be approved through the state's Department of Education. Louisiana requires that all tutoring program curricula must be fully aligned with the state's standards, with the science of literacy, with numeracy foundational skills, and with locally adopted curricula. This ensures that students are gaining direct support for the concepts and skills that are being learned in their own local classroom.
Additionally, Louisiana requires that tutoring class sizes are small. Groups cannot exceed more than 4 students at a time. Tutoring programs can charge up to $60 for a one-on-one session and up to $40 for a group session.
The tutors themselves are required to receive state-approved numeracy and literacy training. Tutors are required to either be current teachers, paraprofessionals, college students, or hold an associate's or bachelor's degree. Providers are required to regularly supervise and assess tutors. All providers must serve all learners, including students with disabilities and English learners.
The state's largest tutoring provider, Canopy, hires teachers directly. Teachers are paid $30-$60 per hour to tutor after school at the same school where they work during the day.
According to The 74, nearly 2,000 Louisiana students received tutoring last year through Canopy across 298 schools. Schedules are flexible and depend on each family's needs. The afterschool timing means that parents don't have to drive their students to and from a tutoring session, expanding accessibility.
To qualify, students have to score below grade level proficiency in reading and mathematics. Last year, demand for the program was so high that acceptance eligibility was limited to only the lowest performing students. School districts notify families when their students are eligible for the program.
The results have been strong, especially for a state that has struggled with academics for a long time.
On average, a Canopy student participates in tutoring for less than six months and achieves 11 months of academic growth. East Baton Rouge Parish students receiving afterschool tutoring from Studyville, another tutoring provider, had similar gains. Almost four in ten struggling kindergarteners reached proficiency by the end of the year, and 40 percent of upper elementary students moved up at least one achievement level. The State Superintendent of Education Cade Brumley has pointed to the state's high-dosage tutoring program as a major reason why the state has seen so much educational progress across the board.
High-impact tutoring programs have grown in popularity nationwide post-COVID as an attempt to assuage learning loss. They offer flexibility to school days that can occasionally feel stuffed, and ensure personalized connection to students who may be struggling. Additionally, they can create teacher pipelines to classrooms by bringing in college students as tutors. Experts note that gold standard tutoring programs (like Louisiana's) can have impressive academic results because they help to create a stronger community system.
States that have opted into the new federal tax credit scholarship will allow students to use the money donated to scholarship-granting organizations to attend more afterschool tutoring. Minnesota has not yet opted into the program.
As a former Louisiana teacher and a family member to another former Louisiana teacher, I'm overjoyed to see the success of this program. Geaux Tigers!
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Josiah Padley is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
josiah.padley@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/louisianas-early-literacy-reform-includes-strong-new-tutoring-voucher-program/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for American Progress: How States Are Delivering Real Benefits Through Climate and Clean Energy Policy
WASHINGTON, April 25 (TNSrep) -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release on April 24, 2026:* * *
How States Are Delivering Real Benefits Through Climate and Clean Energy Policy
As the Trump administration rolls back federal climate protections and undermines clean power, states are stepping up to advance policies that tackle climate change, lower energy bills, improve air quality, and support good-paying clean energy jobs.
A new report (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/state-climate-action-in-2026-how-states-are-delivering-real-benefits-through-climate-and-clean-energy-policy/) ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 25 (TNSrep) -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release on April 24, 2026: * * * How States Are Delivering Real Benefits Through Climate and Clean Energy Policy As the Trump administration rolls back federal climate protections and undermines clean power, states are stepping up to advance policies that tackle climate change, lower energy bills, improve air quality, and support good-paying clean energy jobs. A new report (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/state-climate-action-in-2026-how-states-are-delivering-real-benefits-through-climate-and-clean-energy-policy/)from the Center for American Progress shows how states are working to build out affordable clean energy faster and strengthen accountability for utility and data centers. They are also pairing climate action with near-term benefits around affordability, public health, extreme weather resilience, and jobs.
"State and local governments have always played a leadership role on climate, but the conditions of 2026 have raised the stakes," said Frederick Bell, associate director for state climate policy at CAP and author of the report. "In the face of the Trump administration's rollback of pollution standards and attacks on clean energy, the choices states make now will shape affordability, resilience to extreme weather, and clean energy growth in the years ahead."
The report examines key gubernatorial and legislative actions so far in 2026, with special attention to executive orders and bills that are moving, have passed at least one chamber, or have been signed into law. It also analyzes that activity across four key areas: the power sector, transportation, buildings, and industrial policy.
* In the power sector, some states are reworking how their electricity system is planned, built, and paid for, with a growing focus on ensuring households benefit from affordable clean energy and energy storage.
* In transportation policy, some states are actively building out their electric vehicle (EV) charging stations to address range anxiety and support broader EV adoption. Some state lawmakers are also looking to crack down on emissions from warehouses, distribution centers, and freight systems.
* Buildings sector policy is focused on lowering energy bills, reducing emissions, and improving how homes hold up to extreme weather.
* Industrial policy is focused on how and where clean industry facilities are built, with states moving to lower costs, attract investment, and strengthen domestic manufacturing to remain competitive.
Read the report: "State Climate Action in 2026: How States Are Delivering Real Benefits Through Climate and Clean Energy Policy" (https://www.americanprogress.org/article/state-climate-action-in-2026-how-states-are-delivering-real-benefits-through-climate-and-clean-energy-policy/) by Frederick Bell
For more information or to speak with an expert, please contact Sam Hananel at shananel@americanprogress.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release-how-states-are-delivering-real-benefits-through-climate-and-clean-energy-policy/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary: 2026 Proxy Preview Reports Far Fewer ESG Resolutions
WASHINGTON, April 25 (TNSrep) -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on April 24, 2026, by senior research analyst Robert Stilson:* * *
2026 Proxy Preview reports far fewer ESG resolutions
The annual compilation of ESG shareholder activism registered a notable drop in resolutions this year.
*
The 2026 Proxy Preview report (https://www.proxypreview.org/2026-proxy-season-preview-webinar) was released last week, detailing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) shareholder resolutions which have been filed with public companies this year. Such resolutions have traditionally ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 25 (TNSrep) -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on April 24, 2026, by senior research analyst Robert Stilson: * * * 2026 Proxy Preview reports far fewer ESG resolutions The annual compilation of ESG shareholder activism registered a notable drop in resolutions this year. * The 2026 Proxy Preview report (https://www.proxypreview.org/2026-proxy-season-preview-webinar) was released last week, detailing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) shareholder resolutions which have been filed with public companies this year. Such resolutions have traditionallybeen a core component of ESG activism, and their purpose is generally to pressure corporations into taking actions that are aligned with the left-of-center sociopolitical objectives of those activists.
The Proxy Preview is an annual report that is jointly produced by the 501(c)(3) nonprofit As You Sow and the ESG consulting firm Proxy Impact. In 2024, As You Sow reported total revenues of $4.15 million. Funders which made six-figure grants to As You Sow in their respective fiscal years ending in 2024 included the Ford Foundation ($325,000), the Sunrise Project ($250,000), the Fidelity Investments Charitable Gift Fund ($162,200), the Park Foundation ($150,000), the Flora L. Thornton Foundation ($100,000), Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors ($100,000), and the Wallace Global Fund ($100,000).
Major Trends
Continuing a trend that was evident in 2025--and in keeping with an ongoing backlash against ESG more broadly--there was a steep decline in the number of activist resolutions profiled in the report. The 2026 Proxy Preview recorded just 184 resolutions that had been filed as of the report's March 17 cutoff. This was down markedly from 355 as of February 2025 and 527 as of February 2024. Significant categorical drops from years past were also evident: the 2026 report detailed just 39 climate change resolutions, while in 2023 that number was 122. Similarly, there were just 15 workplace diversity resolutions in 2026, while the 2021 Proxy Preview (reflecting the aftermath of the previous year's Black Lives Matter protests) recorded 69 of them.
The Proxy Preview attributed this falloff in part to recent changes in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's proxy review process, but it also claimed that "the landscape is shifting from voting on proxies at annual general meetings to direct private engagement" with ESG activists. Additionally, the report noted a relatively higher rate of withdrawn resolutions, which can be the product of negotiations with companies. The introductory letter to this year's Proxy Preview acknowledged that "many shareholders are feeling a chill," but argued that it represented "a period of turbulence" while ESG shareholder activists act "as the midwives of [a] transformation" from "a Milton Friedman model of extraction to a Joseph Stiglitz vision of a regenerative, inclusive [economic] system."
Major Proponents
A total of 114 different companies were listed in the 2026 Proxy Preview's index as having received at least one ESG shareholder resolution. Amazon, Alphabet (Google), and Meta (Facebook) received the most with five each, while Home Depot, PepsiCo, and Walmart each received four. Though approximately 40 different proponents were identified as having filed at least one shareholder resolution, a disproportionate share of the 152 individually listed resolutions were filed by just a handful of them. As You Sow, Chevedden Corporate Governance, Amalgamated Bank, and Green Century Capital Management together accounted for over half of all resolutions profiled in the report.
In addition to publishing the Proxy Preview, As You Sow was also the report's most prolific proponent. It was listed as either the sole filer or a co-filer of 34 different resolutions--more than 22 percent of the total. Even so, this undercounts the group's influence. As You Sow also helped file resolutions on behalf of other proponents, and on its website the group lists a total of 48 resolutions on which it "represents investors" in 2026.
Though As You Sow submitted a handful of "racial equity audit" proposals, asking Coca-Cola, PulteGroup, Pilgrim's Pride, and Royal Gold to publicly report on their diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) efforts, most of the group's resolutions were focused on the environmental prong of ESG. For example, a resolution filed with Berkshire Hathaway requested a public report "disclosing the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the Company's underwriting and insuring activities." A resolution filed with Adobe asked for a report "disclosing if and how the Company is protecting retirement plan beneficiaries...from increased future portfolio risk created by present-day investments in high-carbon companies." A pair of resolutions at Home Depot and Lowe's asked the retailers to report on how they could reduce their use of plastic packaging.
One notable resolution submitted by As You Sow to Wells Fargo claimed that since banks might supposedly "be held accountable for their contributions to climate-related damages," the company should issue a public report "that evaluates and describes the range of climate-related litigation risks associated with its financing of high-carbon activities." Wells Fargo responded, quite reasonably, that it already evaluates litigation risks as a matter of course, and that such a report "would not yield useful information to our shareholders, and could instead increase risks for Wells Fargo without providing value to the Company or our shareholders." Indeed, it is hard to imagine it benefiting anyone other than those who might seek to sue the bank (and by extension, its shareholders) on ideologically-motivated grounds.
The publicly traded financial institution Amalgamated Bank was listed as a proponent of 10 resolutions in the 2026 Proxy Preview, which appear to have been filed by As You Sow on the bank's behalf. About 38 percent of Amalgamated Bank's equity is owned by Workers United--a labor union affiliated with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)--and this is reflected in the bank's ESG priorities. Amalgamated filed a pair of resolutions at Kroger and SkyWest designed to bolster employee unionization efforts by asking those companies to publicly report on their alignment with the International Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
Approximately 15 percent of the resolutions listed in the Proxy Preview (24 total) were filed by "corporate gadfly" John Chevedden. Each dealt with corporate political or lobbying expenditure disclosures. An example is the resolution submitted by Chevedden at Huntington Ingalls Industries, requesting an annual report on the company's election-related spending. The proposal argued that absent such a report, "directors and shareholders cannot sufficiently assess whether our company's election-related spending aligns with or conflicts with its policies on climate change and sustainability and other areas of concern."
Finally, the ESG-focused investment firm Green Century Capital Management had 12 resolutions listed in the 2026 Proxy Preview. Examples include a resolution at Harley-Davidson requesting "a climate transition plan, above and beyond existing disclosure, describing if and how the company intends to achieve its climate-related goals," and a resolution at Verizon requesting a board report describing "whether and how Verizon is bringing operational and supply chain emissions into alignment with its existing climate-related goals."
Artificial Intelligence and Other Topics
Some other resolutions worth noting:
A union-affiliated ESG shareholder activist organization called SOC Investment Group filed resolutions at Alphabet (Google), Amazon and Walmart, requesting details regarding how the Trump Administration's immigration policies were impacting their operations. A similar resolution filed at Tyson Foods by the Sisters of St. Francis Charitable Trust garnered 3 percent of the vote at the company's February annual meeting, according to the Proxy Preview.
The 2026 Proxy Preview included a category for artificial intelligence (AI) shareholder resolutions, and anticipated that this topic would be an area of increasing interest for activists going forward. The report slotted this category under the "social" prong of ESG, although AI resolutions also involve environmental and governance issues. One example is a resolution filed at Walmart by the activist group United for Respect, asking the company to report on how it will "address and measure the social implications on its workforce of the growing adoption of advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence and automation."
Multiple shareholder resolutions dealt with emissions from electricity generation to power new data centers. Amazon received a resolution from Mercy Investment Services, asking for a report on how the company planned to meet the "climate change-related commitments it has made on greenhouse gas emissions, given the massively growing energy demand from artificial intelligence and data centers that Amazon is planning to build." Nearly identical resolutions were filed at Alphabet (Google) and Meta (Facebook) by Trillium Asset Management and the Presbyterian Church USA/As You Sow, respectively.
Finally, NVIDIA received a remarkable resolution from an activist group called Open MIC, asking the company to explain its "strategic rationale for engaging in military sales and contracts," including with respect to AI. Among other things, the proposal claimed that "these relationships may expose the company to reputational risks, particularly in regions where military activities are controversial or subject to heightened scrutiny." It is difficult to imagine a better illustration of the ultimate purpose of ESG activism--advancing ideological objectives on divisive sociopolitical issues, instead of creating value for shareholders--than a resolution asking the largest company in the world to explain why it seeks to sell its products to customers.
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Robert Stilson, Senior Research Analyst
Robert runs several of CRC's specialized projects. Originally from Indiana, he has a B.A. from Hanover College and a J.D. from University of Richmond School of Law, where he graduated magna cum laude.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/2026-proxy-preview-reports-far-fewer-esg-resolutions/
[Category: ThinkTank]