Think Tanks
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Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Wall Street Journal: Into the Mind of the Conspiracy Theorist
NEW YORK, Dec. 20 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Dec. 18, 2025, to the Wall Street Journal:
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Into the Mind of the Conspiracy Theorist
By James B. Meigs
The ability to see the dark patterns behind the sham of reality gives believers a sense of power.
It happens so fast now that I'm no longer surprised. Immediately after the terrorist shootings at Brown University and Australia's Bondi Beach, my social media feed became clotted with conspiracy theories about the attacks. "Biggest False Flag ever in Australia," one prominent trust-fund Communist
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NEW YORK, Dec. 20 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Dec. 18, 2025, to the Wall Street Journal:
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Into the Mind of the Conspiracy Theorist
By James B. Meigs
The ability to see the dark patterns behind the sham of reality gives believers a sense of power.
It happens so fast now that I'm no longer surprised. Immediately after the terrorist shootings at Brown University and Australia's Bondi Beach, my social media feed became clotted with conspiracy theories about the attacks. "Biggest False Flag ever in Australia," one prominent trust-fund Communistposted on X.com. Other accounts claimed the Brown shooting was a "psyop" designed to justify extreme gun-control measures.
It took several years before the John F. Kennedy assassination or 9/11 conspiracy theories migrated from the fringe to the mainstream. Today, the leap is instantaneous. It happened after the assassination attempt on Donald Trump, after Charlie Kirk's killing and after the attack on two National Guard soldiers in Washington. Every time something terrible occurs, conspiracy theorists tell us to reject common sense explanations. They know who really did it.
While we shouldn't put too much stock in individual posts from random people online, such fact-free counternarratives quickly spread. I was shocked to see an old college friend--someone I perceived to be liberal but not crazy--speculate on Facebook that both the Kirk and National Guard shootings were planned by Trump associates. Leading media figures amplify these sorts of claims. Late-night host Jimmy Kimmel briefly got in hot water after claiming the "MAGA gang" was trying to hide the fact that Mr. Kirk's killer was "one of them." On the right, Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens titillate their huge followings with endless conspiratorial conjectures.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the Wall Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/opinion/free-expression/into-the-mind-of-the-conspiracy-theorist-fdf418d4)
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James B. Meigs is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a City Journal contributing editor.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/into-the-mind-of-the-conspiracy-theorist
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Atlantic: Rescheduling Marijuana Is an Enormous Mistake
NEW YORK, Dec. 20 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Dec. 18, 2025, to the Atlantic:
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Rescheduling Marijuana Is an Enormous Mistake
By Charles Fain Lehman
Trump's executive order does little more than offer a tax cut to an industry that profits from addiction.
President Donald Trump signed an executive order today that committed the Justice Department to "rescheduling" marijuana. Although the order won't legalize pot, it will relax a series of restrictions that the federal government has long enforced. The move has a broad coalition of supporters,
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NEW YORK, Dec. 20 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Dec. 18, 2025, to the Atlantic:
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Rescheduling Marijuana Is an Enormous Mistake
By Charles Fain Lehman
Trump's executive order does little more than offer a tax cut to an industry that profits from addiction.
President Donald Trump signed an executive order today that committed the Justice Department to "rescheduling" marijuana. Although the order won't legalize pot, it will relax a series of restrictions that the federal government has long enforced. The move has a broad coalition of supporters,including many progressives, who say that it will enable medical research and alleviate mass incarceration. But in reality, rescheduling marijauna will do little more than hand a tax break to the corporations that spent millions of dollars lobbying for it.
The term rescheduling comes from the Controlled Substances Act, the legal foundation of America's drug-control regime. Under the CSA, controlled drugs (as opposed to uncontrolled ones, such as acetaminophen and ibuprofen) are sorted into five schedules. For decades, the government has listed marijuana under Schedule I, which it reserves for drugs that have no accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse. If the administration's plan goes through, marijuana will shift to Schedule III, a classification for drugs that have a medical use and a relatively low potential for abuse or dependence.
Continue reading the entire piece here at The Atlantic (https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2025/12/trump-marijuana-rescheduling-tax/685317)
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Charles Fain Lehman is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor of City Journal.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/rescheduling-marijuana-is-an-enormous-mistake
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to China Brief: PRC-Venezuela Relations Endure During U.S. Military Operation
WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 19, 2025, in its China Brief:
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PRC-Venezuela Relations Endure During U.S. Military Operation
By Dennis Yang
Executive Summary:
* Beijing's "all-weather strategic partnership" with Caracas rests on oil-for-loans arrangements, infrastructure projects, and military equipment sales.
* The People's Republic of China (PRC) has deployed People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels to the southern Caribbean, diplomatically invoking the 2014 Latin American "zone of peace" framework while avoiding security
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WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 19, 2025, in its China Brief:
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PRC-Venezuela Relations Endure During U.S. Military Operation
By Dennis Yang
Executive Summary:
* Beijing's "all-weather strategic partnership" with Caracas rests on oil-for-loans arrangements, infrastructure projects, and military equipment sales.
* The People's Republic of China (PRC) has deployed People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels to the southern Caribbean, diplomatically invoking the 2014 Latin American "zone of peace" framework while avoiding securitycommitments that could provoke direct confrontation with the United States.
* The PRC has framed recent U.S. military operations near Venezuela as violations of sovereignty and international law, positioning itself as a defender of Latin American autonomy against external interference.
On September 2, the United States launched Operation Southern Spear, initiating a series of strikes on vessels allegedly trafficking narcotics from Venezuela. By late November, approximately 15,000 U.S. troops had deployed to the region alongside the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier task group (CNN, November 11). Caracas responded by appealing to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia for support, testing the practical limits of Beijing's partnership declarations. But the PRC's response so far has centered on established diplomatic principles rather than concrete security commitments.
Foreign Ministry Voices Support While Criticizing United States
At an October 10 United Nations Security Council emergency meeting on Caribbean tensions, Chinese Ambassador to the UN Fu Cong emphasized that U.S. deployments and strikes near Venezuela "seriously infringe the sovereignty and security of another nation and its legal rights, violate international law, and threaten regional peace and security". He called for the United States to "immediately cease" operations ([Ministry of Foreign Affairs] MFA, October 11).
On October 15, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Lin Jian stated that the PRC "opposes external forces interfering in Venezuela's internal affairs under any pretext" (MFA, October 15). This formulation, repeated across multiple MFA briefings, deliberately avoids specifying consequences while establishing Beijing's position on the diplomatic record.
On November 4, the MFA's more senior spokesperson, Mao Ning, affirmed the PRC's commitment to Venezuela, describing their cooperation as "not aimed at a third party, and not affected by third party interference"./[1] She sidestepped allegations of Chinese weapons supplies, stating that "China's normal exchanges and cooperation with Venezuela are cooperation between sovereign states" (MFA, November 4).
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi called his Venezuelan counterpart Yvan Gil on December 17, stating that the PRC "opposes unilateral bullying and supports every nation's right to self-defense and ethnic dignity" (MFA, December 17). This language reflects Beijing's standard formula for defending partnerships that face Western criticism, framing bilateral ties as immune to external pressure while denying specific military dimensions.
The 'All-Weather Strategic Partnership' in Practice
The PRC and Venezuela have maintained an "all-weather strategic partnership" since 2023 (MFA, September 14, 2023). In the PRC's extensive taxonomy of diplomatic partnerships, "all-weather" is the adjective that carries the most weight. It implies that the PRC believes it will maintain very close relations with a country that will remain stable in the long term (China Brief, September 20, 2024)./[2]
During a May 2025 meeting with President Maduro in Moscow, General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that "the PRC will continue to firmly support Venezuela in safeguarding national sovereignty, national dignity, and social stability" and emphasized willingness to "strengthen exchanges on governance experience" (Xinhua, May 10). Wang Yi also received Yvan Gil in Beijing in May, where he praised Venezuela for "resolutely committing to self-reliance and achieving national development despite coercion and pressure". Wang also made similar commitments as those voiced by Xi (MFA, May 12). He also said the PRC would "defend the common interests of developing countries", highlighting Beijing's broader narrative of Global South solidarity against Western hegemony.
PRC officials have been explicit about Venezuela's shared role in resisting hegemony. PRC Ambassador to Venezuela Lan Hu penned an op-ed explicitly linked World War II commemorations to contemporary resistance against U.S. pressure. He praised Venezuela's weathering of German attacks on its oil infrastructure in the 1940s, before adding that both countries must "resolutely oppose hegemony and unilateralism" (MFA, September 7)./[3]
As part of its rhetorical efforts to mobilize resistance to U.S. activity in the region, MFA spokesperson Lin Jian used a December press conference to raise the 2014 Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace (MFA, December 3). The proclamation, signed by 33 states, commits members to resolving disputes peacefully and rejecting the use of force (United Nations, February 3, 2014). PRC diplomats regularly cite this principle to challenge U.S. military presence in the Western hemisphere.
PRC Energy and Economic Ties with Venezuela
Venezuela's value to the PRC rests primarily on energy security and supply. According to shipping data compiled by Reuters, Venezuela exported an average of 921,000 barrels per day in November 2025, of which approximately 746,000 barrels (80 percent) destined for the PRC (Reuters, December 3). Even after the U.S. seizure of Venezuelan oil tankers on December 10, PRC imports are predicted to hit 600,000 barrels per day in December (Reuters, December 15). This represents a significant increase from the 268,000 barrels per day reported in mid-2024, suggesting Chinese refineries have absorbed a larger share of Venezuelan output as alternative suppliers face constraints.
Chinese firms maintain direct operational stakes in Venezuelan energy infrastructure. State-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) holds shares in four joint ventures producing heavy crude from the Orinoco Belt, while another state-owned giant, Sinopec, operates refineries processing Venezuelan oil for Asian markets.
This dynamic follows a "loans-for-oil" structure established during the Hugo Chavez regime. Between 2007-2025, the PRC provided Venezuela with more than $60 billion in development loans, typically secured against future oil shipments at predetermined prices. While new lending has largely ceased due to Venezuela's economic collapse and repayment difficulties, existing debt obligations continue to structure bilateral trade. PRC media reported in July 2025 that Venezuela's oil-backed debts exceed $20 billion. Recently, China Concord Resources Corp signed a 20-year production sharing contract with Venezuela, which includes $1 billion in investments (Reuters, August 22; QQ News, October 7). Beyond petroleum, Chinese engagement is largely focused in mining and infrastructure, though it is attempting to broaden the relationship (Chinalco, April 11; PRC Embassy in Venezuela, October 29).
PRC Arms Sales and PLA Deployments
PRC officials deny providing Venezuela with offensive weapons, but evidence suggests a growing defense relationship. A recent meeting between Ambassador Lan Hu and Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez affirmed PRC-Venezuela aerospace cooperation and expressed a hope to "strengthen exchanges and deepen cooperation" in the field (PRC Embassy in Venezuela, November 28).
PRC equipment, alongside Russian materiel, is starting to underpin the Venezuelan military. Commentators note that Venezuela's defense posture now relies on Russian-made Su-30MK2 fighter jets, as well as Chinese-made VN-18 infantry fighting vehicles, Type 05 amphibious assault vehicles, and SH-16A howitzers (163.com, September 2; China News, November 7). Multiple Chinese media outlets have reported that Venezuela is negotiating to purchase 20 J-10CE fighters from the PRC, which would represent Caracas's first acquisition of Chinese combat aircraft. An August 31 article described a potential J-10CE offering as a possibility but recognized the geopolitical and logistical hurdles for the PRC to export the aircraft to Venezuela. The article also noted that Venezuela's existing F-16A/B aircraft imported from the United States in the 1980s have lost combat effectiveness due to years of technical blockades (163.com, September 2). While official confirmation remains absent, Chinese defense observers have discussed the sale openly, suggesting at least exploratory talks have taken place.
The J-10CE discussion reflects broader Chinese willingness to fill equipment gaps created by Western sanctions. Venezuela has a history of purchasing Chinese military equipment, including K-8 trainer aircraft, Y-8 transport aircraft, and most recently, JY-27A air defense radars in 2019 (Infodefensa, September 27, 2019; Beraud-Sudreau et al., July 2022)./4 These systems are not the PRC's most advanced capabilities but will provide Venezuela with options unavailable from traditional suppliers.
The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has established its presence in the Caribbean in response to the American military deployment. In August 2025, the Type 815A electronic reconnaissance ship Liaowang appeared in international waters near Venezuela's Paria Gulf, operating in overlapping zones with U.S. naval forces (Baidu/Guojidabiaojie, September 2). Chinese military commentators cited the PLA doctrine of "weishe" and described the deployment as demonstrating "asymmetric deterrence" capabilities. Roughly translated as deterrence/coercion, weishe refers to the means of making an enemy submit to one's will (Rice, August 21)./[5] While the Liaowang eventually departed without incident, its presence signaled the PRC's capacity to monitor U.S. operations in the Western hemisphere.
In November, the hospital ship Silk Road Ark made its first port call to Nicaragua as part of the "Harmonious Mission 2025" deployment. The vessel, which had departed from Fujian in September, was scheduled to visit over ten Latin American countries to provide medical services. Nicaragua was not on the original itinerary, and the unannounced port call at the authoritarian nation--and close Venezuelan ally--seemed to signal low-level weishe deterrence efforts. State media also framed the voyage as part of the PRC's contribution to maintaining global order, describing it as "realizing of a community of common destiny for mankind" (Xinhua, September 5).
Implications for the PRC's Latin America Strategy
On December 10, the MFA released a "Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean". This was the third iteration of the document, following versions published in 2008 and 2016. The policy paper frames the region as a core component of the Global South and emphasizes sovereignty, non-interference, opposition to unilateral coercion, and rejection of bloc confrontation as the foundation of the PRC's engagement. It praises the majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries for "strictly observing the One China Principle" and "opposing any form of Taiwan independence" (MFA, December 10).
The policy paper signals an intent to deepen military ties with the region through regular engagement and institutionalized dialogue. It points to increased interaction among defense leaders, a wider range of exchanges including naval visits and delegations, and closer cooperation in areas such as training, professional education, and peacekeeping operations. Beyond traditional military links, the document also encourages cooperation on humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and other non-traditional security challenges, alongside an expanded role for arms trade and defense industrial collaboration. Beijing also presents multilateral forums as key platforms for this engagement, pledging to continue hosting regional defense dialogues and encouraging Latin American participation in PRC-led security forums.
The current crisis reveals the limits of PRC support for Venezuela, however, as Beijing appears unwilling to bear any costs. Chinese loans to Venezuela have effectively ceased since 2020, with existing exposure already considered problematic. The Trump administration's recently announced blockades of sanctioned oil tankers leaving and entering Venezuela present additional complications for the PRC's oil trade with Venezuela (New York Times, July 28). As with all PRC partnerships, there are no mutual defense obligations, and MFA spokespersons have consistently demurred on questions of military support for Venezuela. On November 4, when questioned about alleged weapons supplies, Mao Ning vaguely referenced combating transnational crime before pointing at the U.S. use of military force to pursue such goals (MFA, November 4).
PRC media coverage of the crisis has also been notably restrained compared to Beijing's responses to perceived U.S. provocations elsewhere. While MFA spokespersons issue routine statements defending Venezuela's sovereignty, state media outlets have avoided inflammatory rhetoric that might complicate U.S.-PRC relations. Contrasts between the treatment of Venezuela and disputes in Asia suggest that Beijing views supporting Venezuela ultimately as secondary to mitigating tensions with Washington.
Conclusion
The PRC's response to U.S. military operations near Venezuela is characterized by vocal diplomatic support, continued economic engagement, and carefully calibrated military sales, but no security guarantees or significant new financial commitments. PRC officials have framed U.S. actions as violations of sovereignty and international law; but while they position Beijing as a defender of Latin American autonomy, they have avoided escalatory rhetoric or actions of their own.
Beijing's broader calculation is that maintaining access to Venezuelan oil and preserving its reputation as a reliable partner serve its interests, but not to the extent of jeopardizing U.S.-PRC relations or exposing Chinese assets to risks. Venezuela's crisis will test whether Beijing's "all-weather" partnerships offer only rhetoric without concrete support when pressure intensifies, or if the PRC's model of economic statecraft can sustain relations when partners face existential threats.
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[1] Mao Ning is also the Department Chief of the Press Department in the MFA, while Lin Jian is the Deputy Chief in the Press Department. Therefore, Mao outranks Lin even though they are both referred to as "spokesperson."
[2] "All-weather" partners also include Pakistan, Belarus, Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, and Hungary, and Africa as a whole. Kazakhstan is on a similar level, but referred to as a "permanent" partner.
[3] In the original Spanish, Lan Hu wrote, "oponernos firmemente a la hegemonia y al intervencionismo."
[4] Lucie Beraud-Sudreau, David Brewster, Christopher Cairns, Roger Cliff, R. Evan Ellis, April Herlevi, Roy Kamphausen Mr., Roderick Lee, Paul Nantulya, Meia Nouwens, Rebecca Pincus, and Joel Wuthnow, "Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA." 2020 PLA Conference Papers (US Army War College Press), July 2022. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/951
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Dennis Yang is a Research Assistant at the Jamestown Foundation.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/prc-venezuela-relations-endure-during-u-s-military-operation/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Arab News: U.S. Should Seek to Elevate Ties With Turkic Bloc
WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Dec. 19, 2025, to Arab News:
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US Should Seek to Elevate Ties with Turkic Bloc
By Luke Coffey
Washington on Monday played host to an unusually quiet but geopolitically significant visit. Kubanychbek Omuraliev, the secretary-general of the Organization of Turkic States, arrived in the US capital for meetings with State Department officials, members of Congress and policy leaders. This was an important visit that could
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WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Dec. 19, 2025, to Arab News:
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US Should Seek to Elevate Ties with Turkic Bloc
By Luke Coffey
Washington on Monday played host to an unusually quiet but geopolitically significant visit. Kubanychbek Omuraliev, the secretary-general of the Organization of Turkic States, arrived in the US capital for meetings with State Department officials, members of Congress and policy leaders. This was an important visit that couldlead to closer relations between the Turkic world and the US.
It came on the heels of last month's historic meeting between President Donald Trump and his Central Asian counterparts at the White House to mark the 10th anniversary of the C5+1 format, as well as the US-brokered diplomatic breakthrough between Armenia and Azerbaijan earlier this year. Taken together, these developments underscore the growing strategic relevance of the organization and help explain why this was the right moment for the secretary-general's visit.
The Organization of Turkic States -- made up of Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan -- is an increasingly important intergovernmental organization on the global stage. The original idea for more formalized Turkic cooperation was proposed as early as 2006 by then-Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. It was subsequently founded in 2009 as the Turkic Council by Turkiye, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan, with the aim of strengthening shared cultural, historical, linguistic and economic ties among ethnically Turkic countries.
Uzbekistan later joined as a full member in 2019, while Turkmenistan, Hungary and the de facto administration in northern Cyprus participate as observers. The organization's headquarters and secretariat are in Istanbul and it meets regularly throughout the year to advance cooperation and integration among its members.
The countries of the bloc are in one of the most geopolitically significant regions of the world, set at the heart of the Eurasian landmass, and they possess considerable economic and energy potential. Collectively, the organization's members and observers represent more than 158 million people across about 1.64 million square miles, with a combined gross domestic product approaching $2 trillion.
Except for Turkiye, all current members were formerly part of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. Since regaining independence in the 1990s, these ethnically Turkic states have rediscovered and embraced their Turkic roots and identity after, in some cases, centuries of having it marginalized.
This rediscovery has not been merely symbolic. It has included deliberate efforts to abandon the Cyrillic alphabet in favor of Latin-based scripts and to move toward a common Turkic alphabet framework, alongside broader initiatives to revive shared language, culture and historical identity among Turkic peoples.
Beyond the millions of ethnic Turks who live within the borders of the organization's member states, there are millions more ethnic Turkic populations residing in nonmember countries across Eurasia. These communities are strongly influenced by Turkic soft power, particularly through television, cinema and music. Turkic languages are spoken across a vast geographic belt, stretching from Southeastern Europe through Central Asia into Western China and northward toward Russia's Arctic regions.
Although the Organization of Turkic States represents a relatively modest share of the global economy, its strategic importance far outweighs its members' combined economic size. The region is rich in oil, natural gas and rare earth minerals, resources that are increasingly central to global supply chains and economic security. It is also home to some of the world's most important transit routes and trade chokepoints, including the Turkish Straits and the Middle Corridor, which connects Europe and Asia while bypassing Russia. For these reasons, the bloc has attracted increasing attention from Western policymakers.
At a time when the geopolitics of the Eurasian landmass are largely shaped by Russian and Chinese influence, the reassertion of Turkic identity and the expanding role of the Organization of Turkic States provide an additional strategic pull across Eurasia. What began as an organization rooted primarily in shared cultural identity has steadily evolved. Over the years, it has made tangible progress on economic integration, trade cooperation and connectivity initiatives.
More recently, it has begun exploring avenues for cooperation on security-related matters. Discussions among member states now include joint training, defense coordination and the prospect of future multilateral military exercises.
Looking ahead, member states are likely to experience strong economic growth and favorable demographic trends, with population growth rates that many European countries would envy. This combination of youthful populations, expanding markets and strategic geography makes the organization an increasingly important actor in Eurasian affairs.
If the Trump administration is serious about implementing a policy of global leadership and engagement, particularly one that emphasizes business, trade and economic diplomacy, working more closely with groupings like the Organization of Turkic States makes strategic sense. It is composed of countries that want to do business, deepen trade ties and engage globally as actors in their own right.
Trump has already demonstrated a keen interest in engaging with Central Asia and the South Caucasus and he enjoys a strong relationship with Turkiye, which serves as the economic, political and security motor of the organization.
While Omuraliev's visit to Washington was an important step, the US should build on the momentum created by Trump's recent engagement with the region. It should seek to elevate US-Turkic relations, with the long-term goal of hosting a summit at the foreign ministerial level. Doing so would help unlock new economic and trade opportunities in a region that has too often been overlooked by Western policymakers, while reinforcing America's strategic presence at the heart of Eurasia. Such an outcome would be beneficial to all involved.
Read in Arab News (https://www.arabnews.com/node/2626836).
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Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/us-should-seek-elevate-ties-turkic-bloc-luke-coffey
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues InfluenceWatch Wrapup on Dec. 19, 2025
WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on Dec. 19, 2025:
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By Jonathan Harsh
InfluenceWatch, a project of Capital Research Center, is a comprehensive and ever-evolving compilation of our research into the numerous advocacy groups, foundations, and donors working to influence the public policy process. The website offers transparency into these influencers' funding, motives, and connections while providing insight often neglected by other watchdog groups.
The information compiled in InfluenceWatch gives news outlets and other interested
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on Dec. 19, 2025:
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By Jonathan Harsh
InfluenceWatch, a project of Capital Research Center, is a comprehensive and ever-evolving compilation of our research into the numerous advocacy groups, foundations, and donors working to influence the public policy process. The website offers transparency into these influencers' funding, motives, and connections while providing insight often neglected by other watchdog groups.
The information compiled in InfluenceWatch gives news outlets and other interestedparties research to use in reporting on significant topics that are often overlooked by the American public.
CRC is pleased to present some of the most significant additions to InfluenceWatch in the past week:
* Health Care Without Harm (HCWH) is a group that promotes left-of-center environmental policies in a healthcare context. Practice Greenhealth, a membership and networking nonprofit created to share information among hospital systems, was created through a collaboration of HCWH, the American Hospital Association, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the American Nurses Association. HCWH has received funding from the MacArthur Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Kresge Foundation, and the Commonwealth Fund.
* Fairness for Iowa is a coalition of advocacy groups and labor unions that advocates for left-of-center policies in the state. Members include state chapters of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the AFL-CIO, as well as Iowa Citizen Action Network (ICAN), Health Care for America Now (HCAN), and Lower Drug Prices Now Iowa. The coalition opposed the federal Limit, Save, Grow Act of 2023, which would have repealed certain environmental tax credits, including those for electric vehicles, as well as expanded work requirements for the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP). The legislation did not become law.
* The Center for Earth, Energy and Democracy (CEED) is an environmental advocacy group that promotes a transition to a "just and equitable climate, energy, and environmental policy" through research and education. CEED previously worked with the Center for American Progress and the Natural Resources Defense Council to develop an Equitable and Just National Climate Platform, advocating for a "national climate action that confronts racial, economic, and environmental injustice." Donors to CEED include Earthjustice, the Sierra Club, the Windward Fund, the Rockefeller Family Fund, and the Energy Foundation.
* The Sundance Institute is an organization founded by the late actor Robert Redford that supports independent filmmakers and their films. The Institute operates an "Equity, Impact, and Belonging Program" to support audiences and filmmakers "across ethnicities, genders, abilities, sexual orientations, and geographic regions." Funders of the Sundance Institute include the Open Society Foundations (OSF), the John Templeton Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, and the Ford Foundation.
* CenterLink is a coalition of LGBT community centers. It promotes leadership development, networking, and advocacy for the LGBT community. National CenterLink partners include the Equality Federation, GLAAD, PFLAG, and the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. Donors to CenterLink have included the Trevor Project, the National LGBTQ Task Force, Panorama Global, the Pride Foundation, the Tides Foundation, and ImpactAssets Inc.
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Jonathan Harsh holds a master's degree in political science from James Madison University and a bachelor's degree in political science from Beloit College. He edits entries and content of the InfluenceWatch website and contributes new content.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/influencewatch-friday-12-19-2025/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Which U.S. Government Agencies Are Facilitating the Trump Administration's Commercial Diplomacy in Africa?
WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Dec. 19, 2025:
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Which U.S. Government Agencies Are Facilitating the Trump Administration's Commercial Diplomacy in Africa?
By Khasai Makhulo, Catherine Nzuki and Oge Onubogu
The second Trump administration's formal approach to Africa is centered on commercial diplomacy, a "trade, not aid" approach to Africa that is in line with President Trump's dealmaking diplomacy. In the process of dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the broader U.S. foreign
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Dec. 19, 2025:
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Which U.S. Government Agencies Are Facilitating the Trump Administration's Commercial Diplomacy in Africa?
By Khasai Makhulo, Catherine Nzuki and Oge Onubogu
The second Trump administration's formal approach to Africa is centered on commercial diplomacy, a "trade, not aid" approach to Africa that is in line with President Trump's dealmaking diplomacy. In the process of dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the broader U.S. foreignassistance architecture, however, platforms that facilitated U.S.-Africa trade and investment were swept along with it. The Africa Trade and Investment Activity (AITA) for example, was part of Prosper Africa, a six-year-old initiative created during the first Trump administration designed to bolster U.S.-Africa trade and investment. The AITA was housed in USAID. With the dissolution of USAID, the AITA went with it.
Some agencies that survived the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)-led government cuts remain, albeit on shaky ground. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which landed on the DOGE chopping block earlier this year, survived the cuts but a significant portion of its programs are set to be for cancellation. The U.S International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the United States' answer to China's Belt and Road Initiative, received a six-year reauthorization and expanded authorities under the fiscal year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, signed into law by President Trump on December 18, 2025.
Beyond government agencies, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a preferential trade program that offered duty-free access to the U.S. market for eligible goods from designated sub-Saharan African countries, also lapsed in October when Congress failed to renew the bill. Despite AGOA having bipartisan support, it was not renewed under the Biden administration. AGOA has also suffered under President Trump's "reciprocal" tariffs, which functionally nullify the preferential trade treatment under AGOA. On December 10, 2025, the House Ways and Means Committee passed the AGOA Extension Act, legislation to extend AGOA until December 31, 2028. This clears the way for the bill to be considered by the House, although a timeline has not yet been determined. In addition, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, while not a government agency, has been significantly active since January, hosting African heads of state and connecting U.S. and African private companies.
So, which U.S. government bodies are left to facilitate President Trump's commercial diplomacy strategy in Africa? The infographic below identifies the remaining major U.S. government agencies that work on U.S.-Africa trade, their mandate, and their status.
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Khasai Makhulo is the research assistant for the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Catherine Nzuki is the associate fellow for the Africa Program at CSIS. Oge Onubogu is director and senior fellow of the Africa Program at CSIS.
This commentary was made possible by the generous support of Open Society Foundations.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/which-us-government-agencies-are-facilitating-trump-administrations-commercial-diplomacy
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Back in Play - U.S.-India Nuclear Partnership Finds a New Opening
WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Dec. 19, 2025:
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Back in Play: U.S.-India Nuclear Partnership Finds a New Opening
By Gaurav Sansanwal
India's new nuclear energy law is New Delhi's most significant step to unlock the promise of nuclear power and finally fulfill the promise of U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation. The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act opens India's tightly controlled nuclear power market to private players, while reforming India's liability
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WASHINGTON, Dec. 20 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Dec. 19, 2025:
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Back in Play: U.S.-India Nuclear Partnership Finds a New Opening
By Gaurav Sansanwal
India's new nuclear energy law is New Delhi's most significant step to unlock the promise of nuclear power and finally fulfill the promise of U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation. The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act opens India's tightly controlled nuclear power market to private players, while reforming India's liabilityregime to bring it closer to global norms--as part of a broader national strategy to attract greater investment from key trade partners, and install 100 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear energy by 2047.
Given that prices for renewables plus storage continue to beat new nuclear in most cases, this may not be the nuclear "renaissance" India hopes for. Still, the reform creates some tangible openings for U.S. firms. With supplier liability removed, U.S. companies can now compete in India's market for reactors, fuel services, and R&D partnerships for advanced technologies like small modular reactors--without the liability exposure that previously made India's market untenable.
Overall, while the reform moves the needle, its impact will depend on what comes next: India should further build credible indemnity backstops, clarify existing regulatory ambiguities through coherent rules and bilateral agreements, strengthen regulatory independence, and right-size its 100 GW nuclear target to better reflect economic realities--without crowding out investment in other technologies, including renewables.
From State Monopoly to Market Reform
The new law introduces four structural reforms, setting the stage for effectively remaking the nuclear power market. First, it opens nuclear power generation to private companies and joint ventures, ending the state monopoly over building and operating reactors. Second, the act consolidates and revises the liability regime to provide for a graded liability cap ranging from about $12 million (100 crore) to about $360 million (3,000 crore), depending on plant size, in alignment with global norms under the Paris and Vienna conventions. Third, the act grants statutory authority to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, providing a regulatory structure to the industry. Finally, the act exempts research and development activities from licensing requirements, enabling private companies to innovate and attract foreign investment in advanced nuclear technologies--including small and modular reactors.
Clearing the Liability Hurdle
The toughest impediment to nuclear commerce in India has always been its liability law. Given its refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India developed its indigenous nuclear capabilities largely in conditions of international isolation. The 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear deal was a significant breakthrough, as it enabled India's nuclear trade by permitting imports of nuclear fuel, among other things. But its commercial promise stalled after the 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act diverged significantly from global norms. Unlike the Paris and Vienna conventions on liability, which assigned capped liability solely to the operators--the Indian law introduced a more extensive liability regime that extended to the suppliers. This created legal exposure for foreign equipment vendors, who viewed the risk as commercially unviable, dimming prospects of real cooperation. The Obama administration attempted a workaround in 2015 by creating a Nuclear Liability Insurance Pool, but the mechanism failed to gain traction--largely due to industry concerns over the cost of insurance and continued exposure to liability risk.
The new SHANTI Act addresses this by effectively eliminating supplier liability. Under the previous law, plant operators could recover compensation from suppliers in the event of an accident. This explicit right to supplier recourse has been taken away under Section 16 of the new act, except in cases where such a right is expressly provided for in a supplier-operator contract. While operators now bear exclusive liability, that too has been circumscribed in a graded manner, ranging from roughly $12 million (100 crore) to roughly $360 million (3,000 crore). While these changes are likely to ease industry concerns, the liability caps may be inadequate to cover damages in cases of catastrophic nuclear accidents. As such, the government should look to establish a dedicated Nuclear Liability Fund that can cover exceedances. Committing fiscal resources toward such an "indemnity backstop" will help not only provide more contractual and legal certainty but also boost the overall confidence of both consumers as well as investors. Resolving such ambiguities through a bilateral agreement is another pathway for the United States, especially given that U.S. companies would be competing with state-backed Russian and French enterprises for more investment in the Indian market.
Barriers Removed, but Discretion Remains
While the new act's elevation of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is a welcome step, its operational autonomy needs to be strengthened. Distancing government from the tariff regulation process will be critical--a suggestion that was made by the Central Electricity Authority but not accepted in the legislation. Framing rules that firm up regulatory independence from executive discretion in operator licensing and tariff-setting decisions will help maintain a level playing field between domestic and foreign investors.
The 100 GW Question: Is the Promise of Nuclear Energy Real?
India's plan to grow nuclear capacity from around 8 GW today to 100 GW by 2047 is ambitious--especially given that, on cost, pace, and scale of deployment, nuclear remains firmly behind renewable energy, which has already crossed 250 GW in installed capacity. Analysis by the University of California, Berkeley, suggests that recent solar and storage auctions in India have discovered prices between cents34 and cents39 (3.1 and 3.5 per kilowatt hour, or kWh). By contrast, India's Central Electricity Authority finds the levelized tariff of nuclear reactors to be over cents67 approximately (6 per kWh). Additionally, given the high capital costs and long gestation periods for projects, financing risk also remains a big constraint for advancing nuclear energy in India.
India's nuclear plans should also contend with global realities. In the United States, nuclear energy stands at an inflection point, having largely been stagnant past few decades due to regulatory delays, financing issues, and some public distrust. As such, what happens with U.S. participation in India's nuclear future may ultimately depend on whether the U.S. industry sees new life at home, in light of some recent momentum.
While nuclear's role in India's energy mix can rise from a low base, it is unlikely to be the workhorse of India's energy transition goals. In this context, right-sizing the 100 GW target will send appropriate market signals and help avoid cannibalizing capital flows needed for faster-deploying, lower-cost renewable energy plus storage projects. Commissioning more independent modeling studies could help inform a more balanced plan that ensures India's energy security and energy transition goals are met without over-reliance on any single technology choice.
Taking It Home: Shaping Market Signals
Seventeen years after the U.S.-India nuclear agreement, New Delhi has finally broken the policy inertia with a big legal reset. It's a meaningful move--but delivering results will require India to follow through with clear rules, stronger regulatory independence, and targets grounded in economic reality. The ongoing U.S.-India trade negotiations offer a timely opportunity to translate this legal reform into real commercial gains for both sides.
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Gaurav Sansanwal is a fellow for the Chair on India and Emerging Asia Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/back-play-us-india-nuclear-partnership-finds-new-opening
[Category: ThinkTank]
