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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: In the Online Age, PRC Foreign Intelligence Evolves
WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 2, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief Notes:
* * *
In the Online Age, PRC Foreign Intelligence Evolves
Matt Brazil
Executive Summary:
* Chinese intelligence efforts are increasingly moving away from human intelligence (HUMINT) collection to digital operations launched from within the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Ministry of State Security (MSS), military intelligence, and others have started to employ online recruiting to replace face-to-face contact for foreign assets.
* Beijing likely adopted ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 2, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief Notes: * * * In the Online Age, PRC Foreign Intelligence Evolves Matt Brazil Executive Summary: * Chinese intelligence efforts are increasingly moving away from human intelligence (HUMINT) collection to digital operations launched from within the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Ministry of State Security (MSS), military intelligence, and others have started to employ online recruiting to replace face-to-face contact for foreign assets. * Beijing likely adoptedthe new model in response to the 2018 arrest of Xu Yanjun--the first MSS officer to be tried and convicted in the United States--which highlighted counterintelligence risks facing officers operating outside PRC borders.
* The MSS is using LinkedIn en masse to recruit and develop assets overseas. These operations frequently involve headhunter-style approaches and commercial pretexts to collect resumes and gather intelligence.
* Traditional HUMINT remains an important component of MSS tradecraft. MSS agents have started to integrate face-to-face contact in the PRC for managing their overseas contacts while their assets abroad deploy digital tools to facilitate operations.
-
Beijing's intelligence services are increasingly using massive, scattershot methods amenable to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to recruit foreign sources without sending their own officers abroad. They rely largely but not exclusively on online platforms, commercial consulting arrangements, and third-country intermediaries to identify, assess, and recruit targets, all while reducing the risk of counterintelligence detection. Meanwhile, People's Republic of China (PRC) intelligence officers and agents continue to employ traditional face-to-face human intelligence (HUMINT) methods outside of the PRC when they pose a better chance of success.
Numerous cases have surfaced in the last few months that indicate the scale and breadth of these espionage efforts. On the digital side, these include the seizure by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) of 13 Internet domains used to target U.S. citizens, including those with security clearances, as well as of additional domains used to target U.S. critical infrastructure (DOJ, June 10, August 26). On the HUMINT side, examples include the DOJ sentencing of a former senior adviser for the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to over three years in prison for "funneling sensitive Federal Reserve information to Chinese spies," and a former U.S. Army soldier pleading guilty to sending information on U.S. weapon systems to the PRC (DOJ, July 15, September 16; CNBC, September 30).[1]
Beijing may have perceived an inflection point beginning in 2018 when Xu Yanjun, the first Ministry of State Security (MSS) officer to be extradited to the United States, was arrested (Reuters, November 21, 2022; National Security Archive, accessed October 1). With advancements among foreign counterespionage services, the PRC's intelligence services may have concluded that recruiting and handling assets are best conducted from within the PRC's borders.
Prisoner Exchanges Highlight Risk and Suggest Change
Xu Yanjun was convicted in 2021, and his operative, Ji Chaoqun, was convicted shortly thereafter in 2022 (CNA, March 9, 2023; Guancha, Nov 28, 2024). In November 2024, however, both men were released and repatriated to the PRC, well before the end of their sentences. This was the first known instance where Beijing negotiated to recover intelligence personnel captured by the United States (Chicago Tribune, November 27, 2024; VOA Chinese, November 28, 2024)
In exchange, Beijing released two U.S. citizens convicted of "espionage" and one under a death sentence for drug trafficking. The lack of evidence from the Chinese side about these cases raises the possibility that Beijing decided to take the three individuals as hostages to trade for their nationals in the United States.[2] This swap was particularly notable as it marked the return of PRC intelligence personnel apprehended in the United States for the first time.[3]
As far as is publicly known, Beijing had previously eschewed efforts to recover its captured spies. In one prominent case, Chi Mak, who ran a highly effective and longstanding technology theft operation in southern California for 20 years before he was apprehended, was ignored after his 2007 conviction. He died there in October 2022 at age 82 (Substack/HUMINT, November 21, 2025; Sina.com, May 1, 2007).[4]
Commercial Platforms Keep Intelligence Officers at Home
Since the U.S.-PRC negotiated swap, PRC intelligence techniques have emphasized technology-enabled recruitment and handling, suggesting that Beijing views prisoner swaps as a tool only to be used on rare occasions. The MSS has developed a workflow that allows officers to remain within the PRC's borders, mitigating the risk of identification by hostile security services. As noted by the Belgian security service, the recruitment and handling of "individuals of interest" now "is often carried out in China or from China" (VSSE, January 14, 2025).
Five Eyes nation assessments covering cases across North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific between 2019-2026 describe a similar evolution in intelligence operations conducted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Chinese services increasingly conduct spotting and assessment at industrial scale through LinkedIn and other professional networking platforms, encourage targets to undertake seemingly legitimate paid consulting work as an initial step, and employ third-country and private-sector intermediaries as operational cut-outs. In this form, they have adopted the semiconductor industry's commercial talent-recruitment model (Five Eyes, March 6). The U.K. Security Service (MI5) has separately and specifically attributed comparable LinkedIn headhunter-style tradecraft--including two accounts identified as "Amanda Qiu" and "Shirly Shen"--to the MSS itself, indicating the online-recruitment shift spans both the civilian and military intelligence services rather than being unique to either (BBC, November 18, 2025).
The recruitment of former CIA and Defence Intelligence Agency officer Kevin Mallory in 2017 by the MSS was a precursor. Mallory, who was in financial difficulty, was approached on LinkedIn by a contact posing as a representative of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences--a think tank with documented ties to Chinese intelligence--and offered a paid "consulting" role. The relationship subsequently developed through in-person meetings in Shanghai rather than the United States (DOJ, May 17, 2019). Although Mallory was arrested before he could establish a long-term espionage operation, the case appears to have inspired, rather than discouraged, Beijing's confidence in remote recruitment methods.
Security services across Europe report similar patterns. MI5 Director General Ken McCallum disclosed in 2023 that approximately 20,000 Britons had been approached through LinkedIn by Chinese recruiters, more than double the roughly 10,000 users MI5 had said were being targeted online by all foreign intelligence services and criminals two years earlier (The Guardian, October 18, 2023). The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has separately warned that Chinese intelligence services advertise employment opportunities through front companies, leading applicants to unknowingly work on behalf of a hostile intelligence service. Comparable warnings have also been issued by Germany's Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the Netherlands' General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), and Czechia's Security Information Service (BIS) (BfV, 2020; AIVD, February 8, 2022; Euronews, September 16, 2024; CSIS Public Report, 2025). Such approaches continued this year, as demonstrated by the 2026 Kevin Zhang/Oriental Consulting operation, which reportedly netted substantial NATO and EU intelligence information (Hong Kong Free Press, March 28).
These industrial-scale approaches are particularly amenable to the deployment of artificial intelligence. AI systems can search and classify large numbers of publicly available professional profiles, identify combinations of access, expertise, foreign travel and possible financial or career vulnerability, and rank prospective targets for human review. Generative AI can then draft individualized approaches in the target's language, vary the supposed recruiter's identity and commercial pretext, and sustain preliminary conversations with many candidates simultaneously. The U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assesses that AI already provides a "capability uplift" in reconnaissance and social engineering, making both more effective; it also enables more convincing approaches without the linguistic mistakes that traditionally exposed foreign phishing and influence efforts (NCSC, January 24, 2024).
Human Recruiters Remain Valuable
Despite this growing reliance on online recruitment--likely enhanced by AI--traditional human intelligence operations have by no means disappeared. Instead, they complement digital approaches and are employed when they present the best chance of success.
Two recent cases show how human recruitment is fused with technology-enabled tradecraft. Singaporean academic Dickson Yeo was recruited by Chinese intelligence contacts he met while giving a talk in Beijing, then set up a fictitious political consulting firm and used LinkedIn's contact-suggestion algorithm to identify and approach potential sources almost daily; he received more than 400 resumes, roughly 90 percent from people with U.S. military or government security clearances, before he was caught (Straits Times, April 2, 2025). Estonian national Gerli Mutso travelled to the PRC for coordination with PLA intelligence officers who used the cover identity of a fictitious "Beijing Information Association"; she then returned to Europe and recruited Tarmo Kouts, an Estonian scientist with access to NATO's Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation, who subsequently supplied classified defense-research material to the PRC. Mutso was convicted in 2022 and sentenced to eight and a half years; Estonia's Supreme Court upheld her sentence in 2023 while partially annulling other elements of the conviction (ERR News, June 17, 2023).
Even with the shared linguistic background between the PRC and Taiwan, PRC intelligence officers follow a comparable trajectory over time. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has noted that PRC tradecraft moved from direct in-person contact to introductions via third parties met outside Taiwan, to an increasing recent focus on online recruitment (CNA, April 22, 2025; MND, April 23, 2025). This suggests the shift toward remote, intermediary-based recruitment is a general trend rather than one confined to harder-target Western countries.
Conclusion
PRC intelligence officers increasingly direct foreign recruitment from the safety of the PRC, relying on online platforms, commercial intermediaries, and locally based facilitators to conduct much of the initial contact and relationship building that was traditionally done abroad. The result is a model that reduces, but does not necessarily eliminate, operational exposure for Chinese intelligence personnel while allowing recruitment efforts to expand simultaneously, even exponentially, across multiple countries.
* * *
Matt Brazil is a Senior Analyst at BluePath Labs and a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He pursued Chinese studies as an undergraduate at UC Berkeley, as an Army officer with tours in Korea and NSA, and as a graduate student at Harvard in their Regional Studies East Asia program.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/in-the-online-age-prc-foreign-intelligence-evolves/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
In the Online Age, PRC Foreign Intelligence Evolves
Matt Brazil
Executive Summary:
* Chinese intelligence efforts are increasingly moving away from human intelligence (HUMINT) collection to digital operations launched from within the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Ministry of State Security (MSS), military intelligence, and others have started to employ online recruiting to replace face-to-face contact for foreign assets.
* Beijing likely adopted ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 2, 2026, in the foundation's China Brief Notes: * * * In the Online Age, PRC Foreign Intelligence Evolves Matt Brazil Executive Summary: * Chinese intelligence efforts are increasingly moving away from human intelligence (HUMINT) collection to digital operations launched from within the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Ministry of State Security (MSS), military intelligence, and others have started to employ online recruiting to replace face-to-face contact for foreign assets. * Beijing likely adoptedthe new model in response to the 2018 arrest of Xu Yanjun--the first MSS officer to be tried and convicted in the United States--which highlighted counterintelligence risks facing officers operating outside PRC borders.
* The MSS is using LinkedIn en masse to recruit and develop assets overseas. These operations frequently involve headhunter-style approaches and commercial pretexts to collect resumes and gather intelligence.
* Traditional HUMINT remains an important component of MSS tradecraft. MSS agents have started to integrate face-to-face contact in the PRC for managing their overseas contacts while their assets abroad deploy digital tools to facilitate operations.
-
Beijing's intelligence services are increasingly using massive, scattershot methods amenable to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to recruit foreign sources without sending their own officers abroad. They rely largely but not exclusively on online platforms, commercial consulting arrangements, and third-country intermediaries to identify, assess, and recruit targets, all while reducing the risk of counterintelligence detection. Meanwhile, People's Republic of China (PRC) intelligence officers and agents continue to employ traditional face-to-face human intelligence (HUMINT) methods outside of the PRC when they pose a better chance of success.
Numerous cases have surfaced in the last few months that indicate the scale and breadth of these espionage efforts. On the digital side, these include the seizure by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) of 13 Internet domains used to target U.S. citizens, including those with security clearances, as well as of additional domains used to target U.S. critical infrastructure (DOJ, June 10, August 26). On the HUMINT side, examples include the DOJ sentencing of a former senior adviser for the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to over three years in prison for "funneling sensitive Federal Reserve information to Chinese spies," and a former U.S. Army soldier pleading guilty to sending information on U.S. weapon systems to the PRC (DOJ, July 15, September 16; CNBC, September 30).[1]
Beijing may have perceived an inflection point beginning in 2018 when Xu Yanjun, the first Ministry of State Security (MSS) officer to be extradited to the United States, was arrested (Reuters, November 21, 2022; National Security Archive, accessed October 1). With advancements among foreign counterespionage services, the PRC's intelligence services may have concluded that recruiting and handling assets are best conducted from within the PRC's borders.
Prisoner Exchanges Highlight Risk and Suggest Change
Xu Yanjun was convicted in 2021, and his operative, Ji Chaoqun, was convicted shortly thereafter in 2022 (CNA, March 9, 2023; Guancha, Nov 28, 2024). In November 2024, however, both men were released and repatriated to the PRC, well before the end of their sentences. This was the first known instance where Beijing negotiated to recover intelligence personnel captured by the United States (Chicago Tribune, November 27, 2024; VOA Chinese, November 28, 2024)
In exchange, Beijing released two U.S. citizens convicted of "espionage" and one under a death sentence for drug trafficking. The lack of evidence from the Chinese side about these cases raises the possibility that Beijing decided to take the three individuals as hostages to trade for their nationals in the United States.[2] This swap was particularly notable as it marked the return of PRC intelligence personnel apprehended in the United States for the first time.[3]
As far as is publicly known, Beijing had previously eschewed efforts to recover its captured spies. In one prominent case, Chi Mak, who ran a highly effective and longstanding technology theft operation in southern California for 20 years before he was apprehended, was ignored after his 2007 conviction. He died there in October 2022 at age 82 (Substack/HUMINT, November 21, 2025; Sina.com, May 1, 2007).[4]
Commercial Platforms Keep Intelligence Officers at Home
Since the U.S.-PRC negotiated swap, PRC intelligence techniques have emphasized technology-enabled recruitment and handling, suggesting that Beijing views prisoner swaps as a tool only to be used on rare occasions. The MSS has developed a workflow that allows officers to remain within the PRC's borders, mitigating the risk of identification by hostile security services. As noted by the Belgian security service, the recruitment and handling of "individuals of interest" now "is often carried out in China or from China" (VSSE, January 14, 2025).
Five Eyes nation assessments covering cases across North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific between 2019-2026 describe a similar evolution in intelligence operations conducted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Chinese services increasingly conduct spotting and assessment at industrial scale through LinkedIn and other professional networking platforms, encourage targets to undertake seemingly legitimate paid consulting work as an initial step, and employ third-country and private-sector intermediaries as operational cut-outs. In this form, they have adopted the semiconductor industry's commercial talent-recruitment model (Five Eyes, March 6). The U.K. Security Service (MI5) has separately and specifically attributed comparable LinkedIn headhunter-style tradecraft--including two accounts identified as "Amanda Qiu" and "Shirly Shen"--to the MSS itself, indicating the online-recruitment shift spans both the civilian and military intelligence services rather than being unique to either (BBC, November 18, 2025).
The recruitment of former CIA and Defence Intelligence Agency officer Kevin Mallory in 2017 by the MSS was a precursor. Mallory, who was in financial difficulty, was approached on LinkedIn by a contact posing as a representative of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences--a think tank with documented ties to Chinese intelligence--and offered a paid "consulting" role. The relationship subsequently developed through in-person meetings in Shanghai rather than the United States (DOJ, May 17, 2019). Although Mallory was arrested before he could establish a long-term espionage operation, the case appears to have inspired, rather than discouraged, Beijing's confidence in remote recruitment methods.
Security services across Europe report similar patterns. MI5 Director General Ken McCallum disclosed in 2023 that approximately 20,000 Britons had been approached through LinkedIn by Chinese recruiters, more than double the roughly 10,000 users MI5 had said were being targeted online by all foreign intelligence services and criminals two years earlier (The Guardian, October 18, 2023). The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has separately warned that Chinese intelligence services advertise employment opportunities through front companies, leading applicants to unknowingly work on behalf of a hostile intelligence service. Comparable warnings have also been issued by Germany's Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the Netherlands' General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), and Czechia's Security Information Service (BIS) (BfV, 2020; AIVD, February 8, 2022; Euronews, September 16, 2024; CSIS Public Report, 2025). Such approaches continued this year, as demonstrated by the 2026 Kevin Zhang/Oriental Consulting operation, which reportedly netted substantial NATO and EU intelligence information (Hong Kong Free Press, March 28).
These industrial-scale approaches are particularly amenable to the deployment of artificial intelligence. AI systems can search and classify large numbers of publicly available professional profiles, identify combinations of access, expertise, foreign travel and possible financial or career vulnerability, and rank prospective targets for human review. Generative AI can then draft individualized approaches in the target's language, vary the supposed recruiter's identity and commercial pretext, and sustain preliminary conversations with many candidates simultaneously. The U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assesses that AI already provides a "capability uplift" in reconnaissance and social engineering, making both more effective; it also enables more convincing approaches without the linguistic mistakes that traditionally exposed foreign phishing and influence efforts (NCSC, January 24, 2024).
Human Recruiters Remain Valuable
Despite this growing reliance on online recruitment--likely enhanced by AI--traditional human intelligence operations have by no means disappeared. Instead, they complement digital approaches and are employed when they present the best chance of success.
Two recent cases show how human recruitment is fused with technology-enabled tradecraft. Singaporean academic Dickson Yeo was recruited by Chinese intelligence contacts he met while giving a talk in Beijing, then set up a fictitious political consulting firm and used LinkedIn's contact-suggestion algorithm to identify and approach potential sources almost daily; he received more than 400 resumes, roughly 90 percent from people with U.S. military or government security clearances, before he was caught (Straits Times, April 2, 2025). Estonian national Gerli Mutso travelled to the PRC for coordination with PLA intelligence officers who used the cover identity of a fictitious "Beijing Information Association"; she then returned to Europe and recruited Tarmo Kouts, an Estonian scientist with access to NATO's Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation, who subsequently supplied classified defense-research material to the PRC. Mutso was convicted in 2022 and sentenced to eight and a half years; Estonia's Supreme Court upheld her sentence in 2023 while partially annulling other elements of the conviction (ERR News, June 17, 2023).
Even with the shared linguistic background between the PRC and Taiwan, PRC intelligence officers follow a comparable trajectory over time. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has noted that PRC tradecraft moved from direct in-person contact to introductions via third parties met outside Taiwan, to an increasing recent focus on online recruitment (CNA, April 22, 2025; MND, April 23, 2025). This suggests the shift toward remote, intermediary-based recruitment is a general trend rather than one confined to harder-target Western countries.
Conclusion
PRC intelligence officers increasingly direct foreign recruitment from the safety of the PRC, relying on online platforms, commercial intermediaries, and locally based facilitators to conduct much of the initial contact and relationship building that was traditionally done abroad. The result is a model that reduces, but does not necessarily eliminate, operational exposure for Chinese intelligence personnel while allowing recruitment efforts to expand simultaneously, even exponentially, across multiple countries.
* * *
Matt Brazil is a Senior Analyst at BluePath Labs and a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He pursued Chinese studies as an undergraduate at UC Berkeley, as an Army officer with tours in Korea and NSA, and as a graduate student at Harvard in their Regional Studies East Asia program.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/in-the-online-age-prc-foreign-intelligence-evolves/
[Category: ThinkTank]
ICTD at the 2026 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings
BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 3 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news:
* * *
ICTD at the 2026 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings
ICTD is co-hosting two side events at the 2026 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings, taking place in Bangkok between 12 - 18 October.
The Annuals present a unique opportunity to connect with global leaders from governments, industry, international and multilateral organisations and civil society. In what ICTD describes ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 3 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news: * * * ICTD at the 2026 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings ICTD is co-hosting two side events at the 2026 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings, taking place in Bangkok between 12 - 18 October. The Annuals present a unique opportunity to connect with global leaders from governments, industry, international and multilateral organisations and civil society. In what ICTD describesas the tax era for development, domestic resource mobilisation is playing a central role to how lower-income countries finance their development priorities, in the face declining aid flows, rising debt burdens and growing financing needs. ICTD will
Roundtable: Enhancing Transparency, Accountability and Effectiveness of Tax Expenditures, 09:00-10:30, 15 October, Valia Hotel
Tax expenditures, including exemptions, deductions, credits and reduced rates, are among the most widely used tax policy tools, yet they are often costly, poorly governed and subject to limited scrutiny. Revenue foregone through tax expenditures worldwide amounts to around USD 4 trillion annual, equivalent to 3.7% of GDP and 23% of tax revenue on average. Amid growing fiscal pressures, improving the governance of tax expenditures offers governments an opportunity to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation and ensure that public resources are directed towards development priorities.
ICTD and IISD are hosting this side event as members of the Coalition on Tax Expenditure Reform (COATE), a global multi-stakeholder initiative launched in 2025 under the Sevilla Platform for Action. This event will bring together government officials, international organisations, researchers and civil society to discuss COATE's proposal for minimum voluntary standards on reporting and this could support transparency and reform.
* Alexandra Readhead, Director, Tax and Sovereign Debt, IISD
* Giovanni Occhiali, Senior Research Fellow, ICTD
* Juvy Danofrata, Assistant Secretary, Department of Finance and Head of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board, Republic of the Philippines
* Dr. Saliou Diallo, Economist, Director General, Strategy and Development Office, Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Budget, Republic of Guinea
* Shari Spiegel, Director, Financing for Sustainable Development Office, UN
This is an invitation-only event, please contact Hande Ayan Khanijo for more information.
Cashless Payments and State Capacity, 12:00-13:00, 15 October, Valia Hotel
This event, co-hosted with the Global Development Network and AfricaNenda, this event will explore how cashless-payment infrastructure can expand financial inclusion and strengthen state capacity, with tax as one use case. Focus on where digital models still fail or exclude users and merchants; the inclusion-informality-visibility trade-off; responsible reuse of payment data; and the safeguards needed to sustain trust.
Speakers
* Devendra Damle, GDN (tbc)
* Fabrizio Santoro, ICTD
* Kamal Andiwal, GSMA
* Lucia Rossel, ICTD
* Sabine Mensah, AfricaNenda Foundation
* Sridhar Ganapathy, Artha Global
This event will be followed by a networking lunch then a side event organised by AfricaNenda Foundation and the Africa Union Commission on Enabling Regulatory Harmonization for Instant Cross-Border Payments in Africa.
Please contact Hande Ayan Khanijo for more information on how to register for this event.
Meet the team and connect during the Annual Meetings
The Annual Meetings are also an opportunity to connect with partners, collaborators and others working on tax and development.
* Martin Hearson, Research Director
* Fabrizio Santoro, Senior Research Fellow (DPI)
* Giovanni Occhialli, Senior Research Fellow (COATE)
* Lucia Rossel, Research Affiliate
* Hande Ayan Khanijo, Policy Engagement Consultant
Please reach out to colleagues directly or contact Hande Ayan Khanijo (h.ayankhanijo@ictd.ac) to organise bilateral meetings and for other enquiries relating to the ICTD side events. .
For media enquiries, please contact Emilie Wilson at e.wilson@ids.ac.uk.
2 October 2026
* * *
Original text here: https://ictd.ac/general/ictd-at-the-2026-imf-world-bank-annual-meetings/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
ICTD at the 2026 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings
ICTD is co-hosting two side events at the 2026 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings, taking place in Bangkok between 12 - 18 October.
The Annuals present a unique opportunity to connect with global leaders from governments, industry, international and multilateral organisations and civil society. In what ICTD describes ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Oct. 3 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news: * * * ICTD at the 2026 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings ICTD is co-hosting two side events at the 2026 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings, taking place in Bangkok between 12 - 18 October. The Annuals present a unique opportunity to connect with global leaders from governments, industry, international and multilateral organisations and civil society. In what ICTD describesas the tax era for development, domestic resource mobilisation is playing a central role to how lower-income countries finance their development priorities, in the face declining aid flows, rising debt burdens and growing financing needs. ICTD will
Roundtable: Enhancing Transparency, Accountability and Effectiveness of Tax Expenditures, 09:00-10:30, 15 October, Valia Hotel
Tax expenditures, including exemptions, deductions, credits and reduced rates, are among the most widely used tax policy tools, yet they are often costly, poorly governed and subject to limited scrutiny. Revenue foregone through tax expenditures worldwide amounts to around USD 4 trillion annual, equivalent to 3.7% of GDP and 23% of tax revenue on average. Amid growing fiscal pressures, improving the governance of tax expenditures offers governments an opportunity to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation and ensure that public resources are directed towards development priorities.
ICTD and IISD are hosting this side event as members of the Coalition on Tax Expenditure Reform (COATE), a global multi-stakeholder initiative launched in 2025 under the Sevilla Platform for Action. This event will bring together government officials, international organisations, researchers and civil society to discuss COATE's proposal for minimum voluntary standards on reporting and this could support transparency and reform.
* Alexandra Readhead, Director, Tax and Sovereign Debt, IISD
* Giovanni Occhiali, Senior Research Fellow, ICTD
* Juvy Danofrata, Assistant Secretary, Department of Finance and Head of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board, Republic of the Philippines
* Dr. Saliou Diallo, Economist, Director General, Strategy and Development Office, Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Budget, Republic of Guinea
* Shari Spiegel, Director, Financing for Sustainable Development Office, UN
This is an invitation-only event, please contact Hande Ayan Khanijo for more information.
Cashless Payments and State Capacity, 12:00-13:00, 15 October, Valia Hotel
This event, co-hosted with the Global Development Network and AfricaNenda, this event will explore how cashless-payment infrastructure can expand financial inclusion and strengthen state capacity, with tax as one use case. Focus on where digital models still fail or exclude users and merchants; the inclusion-informality-visibility trade-off; responsible reuse of payment data; and the safeguards needed to sustain trust.
Speakers
* Devendra Damle, GDN (tbc)
* Fabrizio Santoro, ICTD
* Kamal Andiwal, GSMA
* Lucia Rossel, ICTD
* Sabine Mensah, AfricaNenda Foundation
* Sridhar Ganapathy, Artha Global
This event will be followed by a networking lunch then a side event organised by AfricaNenda Foundation and the Africa Union Commission on Enabling Regulatory Harmonization for Instant Cross-Border Payments in Africa.
Please contact Hande Ayan Khanijo for more information on how to register for this event.
Meet the team and connect during the Annual Meetings
The Annual Meetings are also an opportunity to connect with partners, collaborators and others working on tax and development.
* Martin Hearson, Research Director
* Fabrizio Santoro, Senior Research Fellow (DPI)
* Giovanni Occhialli, Senior Research Fellow (COATE)
* Lucia Rossel, Research Affiliate
* Hande Ayan Khanijo, Policy Engagement Consultant
Please reach out to colleagues directly or contact Hande Ayan Khanijo (h.ayankhanijo@ictd.ac) to organise bilateral meetings and for other enquiries relating to the ICTD side events. .
For media enquiries, please contact Emilie Wilson at e.wilson@ids.ac.uk.
2 October 2026
* * *
Original text here: https://ictd.ac/general/ictd-at-the-2026-imf-world-bank-annual-meetings/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Boulder Has No Business Making Foreign Policy
WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary to Wall Street Journal:
* * *
Oct 1, 2026
Wall Street Journal
Boulder Has No Business Making Foreign Policy
The Supreme Court takes up a lawsuit against oil companies that far exceeds legitimate local authority.
William P. Barr
When the Supreme Court returns for its new term on Monday, the first case it will hear is Suncor Energy v. Boulder County, which asks whether state and local governments may use state tort laws to ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary to Wall Street Journal: * * * Oct 1, 2026 Wall Street Journal Boulder Has No Business Making Foreign Policy The Supreme Court takes up a lawsuit against oil companies that far exceeds legitimate local authority. William P. Barr When the Supreme Court returns for its new term on Monday, the first case it will hear is Suncor Energy v. Boulder County, which asks whether state and local governments may use state tort laws toimpose liability on American companies for the effects of global climate change.
Boulder County and the city of Boulder sued Suncor and Exxon Mobil in a Colorado court, claiming their community has been harmed by global climate change. The plaintiffs seek damages for local harms. Liability would be based not on the company's actions in Colorado but on the extent its worldwide production and sale of fuels are found to have contributed to greenhouse gases in the global atmosphere. A trial would give a local jury the authority to determine what share of global climate change each American company should be held responsible for. It is part of a wave of such litigation by left-leaning states and localities that aim at bankrupting fossil-fuel companies.
Read in the Wall Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/opinion/boulder-has-no-business-making-foreign-policy-1a731264?mod=MorningEditorialReport&mod=djemMER_h).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/boulder-has-no-business-making-foreign-policy-william-barr
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Oct 1, 2026
Wall Street Journal
Boulder Has No Business Making Foreign Policy
The Supreme Court takes up a lawsuit against oil companies that far exceeds legitimate local authority.
William P. Barr
When the Supreme Court returns for its new term on Monday, the first case it will hear is Suncor Energy v. Boulder County, which asks whether state and local governments may use state tort laws to ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary to Wall Street Journal: * * * Oct 1, 2026 Wall Street Journal Boulder Has No Business Making Foreign Policy The Supreme Court takes up a lawsuit against oil companies that far exceeds legitimate local authority. William P. Barr When the Supreme Court returns for its new term on Monday, the first case it will hear is Suncor Energy v. Boulder County, which asks whether state and local governments may use state tort laws toimpose liability on American companies for the effects of global climate change.
Boulder County and the city of Boulder sued Suncor and Exxon Mobil in a Colorado court, claiming their community has been harmed by global climate change. The plaintiffs seek damages for local harms. Liability would be based not on the company's actions in Colorado but on the extent its worldwide production and sale of fuels are found to have contributed to greenhouse gases in the global atmosphere. A trial would give a local jury the authority to determine what share of global climate change each American company should be held responsible for. It is part of a wave of such litigation by left-leaning states and localities that aim at bankrupting fossil-fuel companies.
Read in the Wall Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/opinion/boulder-has-no-business-making-foreign-policy-1a731264?mod=MorningEditorialReport&mod=djemMER_h).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/boulder-has-no-business-making-foreign-policy-william-barr
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: How the DFL Trifecta Hiked Sales Taxes and Hit Affordability
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 3 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:
* * *
How the DFL trifecta hiked sales taxes and hit affordability
Written by John Phelan | October 2, 2026
In July 2022, Minnesota's average combined state and local sales tax rate was 7.49%, which was lower than in 16 other states, according to the Tax Foundation (Figure 1).
[View figure in the link at bottom]
For January this year, Tax Foundation data show that Minnesota's average combined state and local ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 3 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * How the DFL trifecta hiked sales taxes and hit affordability Written by John Phelan | October 2, 2026 In July 2022, Minnesota's average combined state and local sales tax rate was 7.49%, which was lower than in 16 other states, according to the Tax Foundation (Figure 1). [View figure in the link at bottom] For January this year, Tax Foundation data show that Minnesota's average combined state and localsales tax rate was up to 8.14%, which was now lower than in just 14 other states (Figure 2).
[View figure in the link at bottom]
The reason for this is a series of local sales tax impositions and hikes either passed or enabled by that "historic" 2023 DFL trifecta.
The first of these new taxes was a 1% sales tax imposed in the seven-county metro which came into effect on October 1, 2023: 0.75% to fund new transportation spending and 0.25% for new spending on housing.
In addition, the Legislature also authorized more than three dozen cities and counties to seek voter approval of local sales taxes ranging from 0.25% to 1.25%. Table 1 shows those sales and use taxes imposed or increased between October 1, 2023, and July 1, 2025. In June 2023, I gave this example of how these might work:
Consider a retailer in Woodbury where a sale of $100 is subject to Minnesota state sales tax (6.875%) and Washington County Transit sales tax (0.5%) so that total sales tax is $7.38. Just across the St. Croix in Hudson, Wisconsin, a similar retailer making a sale of $100 would levy Wisconsin state sales tax (5.00%) and St. Croix county sales tax (0.5%) so that total sales tax is $5.50. Now, add to that Woodbury sale the 1.0% metro sales tax and Woodbury's own proposed sales tax of 0.5% and the sales tax on that $100 transaction rises to $8.88, 61% higher than in Hudson.
* * *
Table 1: Changes to sales and use taxes
* * *
In November 2023, I noted that "sales taxes are not the worst way for a government to raise revenue," but I also pointed out that we have to ask, "how high are the other taxes the government levies?" and in Minnesota the answer is generally, "very," and they only ever get higher. Whether it is the property tax, gas tax, tab fees, or sales tax, the 2023/2024 trifecta made that heavy burden heavier and squeezed affordability for Minnesotans.
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John Phelan is an Economist at the Center of the American Experiment.
john.phelan@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/how-the-dfl-trifecta-hiked-sales-taxes-and-hit-affordability/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
How the DFL trifecta hiked sales taxes and hit affordability
Written by John Phelan | October 2, 2026
In July 2022, Minnesota's average combined state and local sales tax rate was 7.49%, which was lower than in 16 other states, according to the Tax Foundation (Figure 1).
[View figure in the link at bottom]
For January this year, Tax Foundation data show that Minnesota's average combined state and local ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Oct. 3 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * How the DFL trifecta hiked sales taxes and hit affordability Written by John Phelan | October 2, 2026 In July 2022, Minnesota's average combined state and local sales tax rate was 7.49%, which was lower than in 16 other states, according to the Tax Foundation (Figure 1). [View figure in the link at bottom] For January this year, Tax Foundation data show that Minnesota's average combined state and localsales tax rate was up to 8.14%, which was now lower than in just 14 other states (Figure 2).
[View figure in the link at bottom]
The reason for this is a series of local sales tax impositions and hikes either passed or enabled by that "historic" 2023 DFL trifecta.
The first of these new taxes was a 1% sales tax imposed in the seven-county metro which came into effect on October 1, 2023: 0.75% to fund new transportation spending and 0.25% for new spending on housing.
In addition, the Legislature also authorized more than three dozen cities and counties to seek voter approval of local sales taxes ranging from 0.25% to 1.25%. Table 1 shows those sales and use taxes imposed or increased between October 1, 2023, and July 1, 2025. In June 2023, I gave this example of how these might work:
Consider a retailer in Woodbury where a sale of $100 is subject to Minnesota state sales tax (6.875%) and Washington County Transit sales tax (0.5%) so that total sales tax is $7.38. Just across the St. Croix in Hudson, Wisconsin, a similar retailer making a sale of $100 would levy Wisconsin state sales tax (5.00%) and St. Croix county sales tax (0.5%) so that total sales tax is $5.50. Now, add to that Woodbury sale the 1.0% metro sales tax and Woodbury's own proposed sales tax of 0.5% and the sales tax on that $100 transaction rises to $8.88, 61% higher than in Hudson.
* * *
Table 1: Changes to sales and use taxes
* * *
In November 2023, I noted that "sales taxes are not the worst way for a government to raise revenue," but I also pointed out that we have to ask, "how high are the other taxes the government levies?" and in Minnesota the answer is generally, "very," and they only ever get higher. Whether it is the property tax, gas tax, tab fees, or sales tax, the 2023/2024 trifecta made that heavy burden heavier and squeezed affordability for Minnesotans.
* * *
John Phelan is an Economist at the Center of the American Experiment.
john.phelan@americanexperiment.org
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/how-the-dfl-trifecta-hiked-sales-taxes-and-hit-affordability/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: What Should the U.S. Government Do in Response to the FBI Hack?
WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
What Should the U.S. Government Do in Response to the FBI Hack?
Commentary by Nikita Shah
October 2, 2026
Last week, the job application website of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was hacked, with sensitive data of at least 5,000 FBI agents exfiltrated by a cybercriminal group known as the ShinyHunters. Although the actors claim they will not publish this data, there is a strong expectation that they have made copies of the dataset and will sell them on the dark web for ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * What Should the U.S. Government Do in Response to the FBI Hack? Commentary by Nikita Shah October 2, 2026 Last week, the job application website of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was hacked, with sensitive data of at least 5,000 FBI agents exfiltrated by a cybercriminal group known as the ShinyHunters. Although the actors claim they will not publish this data, there is a strong expectation that they have made copies of the dataset and will sell them on the dark web forsubsequent exploitation by other malicious actors.
The incident has already been labeled a counterintelligence disaster. Beyond causing significant reputational damage to the FBI, the incident poses a longer-term national security threat to the United States. But it also offers a clear-cut case for an urgent, targeted, and proportionate use of offensive cyber capabilities, and for sending a clear message about what is off-limits for cybercriminals.
Shifting from Cybercrime to a National Security Threat
Cybercriminals are traditionally financially motivated, but, in this case, the ShinyHunters hacked the FBI in retaliation for an advisory the agency published in May, which they considered defamatory to their criminal business operations. The ramifications are disproportionate: Estimates suggest the incident may have exposed the personally identifiable information of tens of thousands of former and current employees, including Social Security numbers and family details and employees' intelligence assignments and medical records. This stems in part from the nature of the underlying software vulnerability that led to the hack, supposedly enabling the breach of multiple FBI systems, including its jobs portal, its system for background checks, medical records, and investigations information. It is unclear how long this vulnerability was in place and whether it has been remediated, leaving open the possibility that the exploit itself may prove even more valuable to U.S. adversaries and criminals than the FBI dataset alone.
The severity of the incident ultimately stems from two factors: how the data can be exploited by others and the cumulative advantage it provides over time. In the short term, the incident poses a serious personnel security threat, as other cybercriminals could exploit the stolen data to conduct credit card or identity fraud using federal employees' details. However, the more time passes, the more the threat becomes acute: Should the ShinyHunters sell the data--whether to other cybercriminal groups, states, or, worse, data brokers or resellers--the risk arises of the data being available ad infinitum. This raises serious risks of retaliation against FBI personnel--and potentially their relatives, and even informants--from serious and organized crime groups or cartels. In the longer term, the counterintelligence risks grow significantly. The U.S. track record of data breaches against federal employee data paints an ugly picture. Some state adversaries--particularly China--are already thought to have stolen or acquired data on millions of U.S. federal employees through historical incidents, including the Office of Personnel Management hack in 2015. Layering the stolen FBI data on top of existing intelligence repositories would go some way to enriching adversaries' visibility of U.S. agents and operatives, aggregating multiple stolen datasets to build detailed profiles of individual personnel.
What Should the U.S. Government's Response Look Like?
Below are four suggested options for the U.S. government to respond to the breach.
1. Do nothing. This would comprise a reactive effort, essentially providing protective security advice and services to FBI personnel, basic online data protection monitoring services, and other welfare support to affected employees. This approach would offer minimal deterrent or signaling value to the actors in question and do little other than to bandage over a long-term vulnerability for the United States. It is unlikely to sit well domestically, with members of the House Intelligence Committee having already requested a formal briefing from the FBI on the hack.
2. Mount a traditional law enforcement-led response. As the next tier of response, U.S. law enforcement could investigate and seek to prosecute the ShinyHunters--building upon Dutch law enforcement's quick arrest of one ShinyHunters member--as well as other actors responsible for the breach and distribution of FBI data. This has successful precedents, with U.S. interagency operations between law enforcement and intelligence partners having resulted in the arrests and prosecutions of high-profile cybercriminals such as LockBit's Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev, REvil's Yaroslav Vasinskyi, and Oleksii Oleksiyovych Lytvynenko, who was recently convicted of an elaborate ransomware operation that extorted victims for over $150 million. However, these operations are painstaking, resource-intensive, and slow, weakening any potential signaling value that might come from a fast U.S. government response.
3. Mount a multi-agency offensive cyber operation to retrieve the stolen data and any copies. An offensive cyber operation offers an urgent, targeted, and proportionate response to an urgent problem. The U.S. government should mount an offensive cyber operation led by U.S. Cyber Command to steal back the data from the ShinyHunters group and to disrupt its infrastructure. Such an operation could be tightly scoped; limited to locating, authenticating, and exfiltrating the dataset and destroying any copies found; and exiting without leaving traces on the criminal groups' systems. Messaging from senior FBI officials suggests that law enforcement knows the location of the perpetrators. Aided by forensic evidence from a seized laptop belonging to one of the perpetrators, the United States may therefore be able to locate the data before it is sold to other adversaries or distributed further.
Pursuing this via Cyber Command would not be the usual route: A cybercriminal incident usually merits a law enforcement-led operation by the FBI. However, given the speed of response required, U.S. Cyber Command should take the lead, along with the FBI and other relevant partners, similar to the takedown of the REvil ransomware group in 2021. This would enable the execution of an offensive cyber operation at speed, given the greater latitude that Cyber Command has to move through overseas-based infrastructure. It would also enable a law enforcement operation to take place in parallel, and for notifications to be issued to any potential future victims identified from digital forensics efforts. Although Cyber Command's threshold for offensive cyber operations usually involves nation-state actors, in this case, the clear threat posed to U.S. equities offers a national security justification.
4. Mount an aggressive campaign against the group, its infrastructure, and the wider ecosystem. On the furthest end of the spectrum, the U.S. government could undertake disruption operations to dismantle the infrastructure, finances, and leadership of ShinyHunters, and to degrade the broader cybercrime ecosystem in which it operates. Maintaining an aggressive tempo of offensive cyber operations, it could disrupt and dismantle the ShinyHunters' infrastructure and defame the group in underground criminal fora, noting how much the cybercriminal ecosystem trades on reputation and bravado. This would bring the added benefit of preventing other actors (including states) from hacking the ShinyHunters themselves to steal the stolen FBI data.
Why stop there? A maximum response could also look beyond the ShinyHunters--to known affiliates, enablers, or service providers, selectively disrupting their operations, or even unmasking individual actors. It could also exploit rivalries and tensions between different groups; for example, the ShinyHunters recently hacked Cl0p, a prolific ransomware group, and also showed signs of internal divisions over its brand. Accompanying this range of activity with messaging in cybercriminal fora--that the United States knows ShinyHunters' identities, whereabouts, and operations--may help to deter less sophisticated or determined cybercriminals. And to maintain a steady operational tempo and enhanced posture, the administration could bring in private sector companies under a recent presidential memorandum authorizing a program to enable private sector offensive cyber operations against cybercrime, as a useful test case.
That said, it is just as important that any maximum response is followed by a reversion to norms where the United States can leverage its broader tools of cyber statecraft. This might include measures such as sanctioning the perpetrators and any identified affiliates to deny them the gains of their attacks, longer-term diplomatic efforts on international norms against data theft, continued technical intelligence gathering, and effects operations to shape the broader cybercriminal ecosystem.
What Would an Offensive Cyber Operation Achieve?
This incident offers a prime target for demonstrating U.S. offensive cyber capabilities. In the immediate term, an offensive cyber operation by the U.S. government could go some way to mitigating a significant national security risk. In addition to the seized devices that Dutch law enforcement already have in their possession, an offensive cyber operation could provide a wealth of intelligence on the ShinyHunters, their affiliates, enablers--both actors and services--and even future targets they may have been planning to attack.
But timing is key: If it acts quickly, the U.S. government might be able to retrieve the dataset and identified copies. If the data is already gone--i.e., sold to other actors--the operation shifts to becoming about shaping cybercriminal behavior over the longer term. Over the last few years, organizations that were once considered off-limits, such as hospitals, schools, and airports, are now routinely targeted by cybercrime. It is therefore vital that the U.S. government impose real costs on the actors responsible for this incident to prevent this from becoming a new norm or an acceptable target for cybercriminals.
Key Constraints to a U.S. Response
Two key hurdles stand between the U.S. government and retrieving the stolen data. The first is speed: The United States would need to have a strong enough intelligence picture or forensics clues to be able to locate the data, as well as technical capabilities that it could quickly tailor and deploy for the intended operational outcome. The second is whether the perpetrators made copies of the dataset. Whether sold to other actors, disseminated to the media, or stolen--or even altered or manipulated--by state actors, each copy undermines the U.S. government's ability to contain the damage incurred, causing any response to descend into a whack-a-mole operation.
Additionally, any offensive cyber operation to retrieve the data would also need rapid coordination and deconfliction, both with domestic partners, to avoid colliding with existing intelligence or law enforcement operations by other U.S. agencies, and with international partners, particularly where the criminal infrastructure sits in an overseas jurisdiction. And any law enforcement investigation would also be reliant on partner nations' capabilities to bring the cybercriminals to justice and extradite them into U.S. jurisdiction, which risks running into obstacles including lack of capacity, limited resources, legal barriers, or even permissive jurisdictions that keep cybercriminals out of the reach of U.S. law enforcement.
Conclusion
This incident goes beyond the bounds of traditional cybercrime and poses a clear and enduring threat to U.S. national security. Therefore, a robust response by the U.S. government is vital and should deploy U.S. offensive cyber capabilities appropriately: not to up the stakes with cybercriminals or to ignite "hack back" wars, but rather to mitigate a genuine and urgent national security threat to the United States. The key rests on executing a response with speed and precision that is tied to a longer-term campaign to degrade these actors and the wider cybercriminal ecosystem.
If done correctly, a U.S. government response could demonstrate how offensive cyber capabilities can be an effective and credible lever of statecraft when pointed at the right type of issue or problem set. Moreover, it could also show how offensive cyber operations do not preclude, but rather help to set the conditions for, a longer-term, sustained response against adversaries in cyberspace. Although the ShinyHunters incident offers a clear-cut use case, it also leaves open a longer-term discussion about norms in cyberspace: At what point is it right to go after stolen datasets when states steal them? This incident raises longer-term ramifications for intelligence gathering and disruption in cyberspace that the cyber policy community must address if the United States is to maintain strategic advantage relative to its adversaries.
* * *
Nikita Shah is senior fellow in the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-should-us-government-do-response-fbi-hack
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
What Should the U.S. Government Do in Response to the FBI Hack?
Commentary by Nikita Shah
October 2, 2026
Last week, the job application website of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was hacked, with sensitive data of at least 5,000 FBI agents exfiltrated by a cybercriminal group known as the ShinyHunters. Although the actors claim they will not publish this data, there is a strong expectation that they have made copies of the dataset and will sell them on the dark web for ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * What Should the U.S. Government Do in Response to the FBI Hack? Commentary by Nikita Shah October 2, 2026 Last week, the job application website of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was hacked, with sensitive data of at least 5,000 FBI agents exfiltrated by a cybercriminal group known as the ShinyHunters. Although the actors claim they will not publish this data, there is a strong expectation that they have made copies of the dataset and will sell them on the dark web forsubsequent exploitation by other malicious actors.
The incident has already been labeled a counterintelligence disaster. Beyond causing significant reputational damage to the FBI, the incident poses a longer-term national security threat to the United States. But it also offers a clear-cut case for an urgent, targeted, and proportionate use of offensive cyber capabilities, and for sending a clear message about what is off-limits for cybercriminals.
Shifting from Cybercrime to a National Security Threat
Cybercriminals are traditionally financially motivated, but, in this case, the ShinyHunters hacked the FBI in retaliation for an advisory the agency published in May, which they considered defamatory to their criminal business operations. The ramifications are disproportionate: Estimates suggest the incident may have exposed the personally identifiable information of tens of thousands of former and current employees, including Social Security numbers and family details and employees' intelligence assignments and medical records. This stems in part from the nature of the underlying software vulnerability that led to the hack, supposedly enabling the breach of multiple FBI systems, including its jobs portal, its system for background checks, medical records, and investigations information. It is unclear how long this vulnerability was in place and whether it has been remediated, leaving open the possibility that the exploit itself may prove even more valuable to U.S. adversaries and criminals than the FBI dataset alone.
The severity of the incident ultimately stems from two factors: how the data can be exploited by others and the cumulative advantage it provides over time. In the short term, the incident poses a serious personnel security threat, as other cybercriminals could exploit the stolen data to conduct credit card or identity fraud using federal employees' details. However, the more time passes, the more the threat becomes acute: Should the ShinyHunters sell the data--whether to other cybercriminal groups, states, or, worse, data brokers or resellers--the risk arises of the data being available ad infinitum. This raises serious risks of retaliation against FBI personnel--and potentially their relatives, and even informants--from serious and organized crime groups or cartels. In the longer term, the counterintelligence risks grow significantly. The U.S. track record of data breaches against federal employee data paints an ugly picture. Some state adversaries--particularly China--are already thought to have stolen or acquired data on millions of U.S. federal employees through historical incidents, including the Office of Personnel Management hack in 2015. Layering the stolen FBI data on top of existing intelligence repositories would go some way to enriching adversaries' visibility of U.S. agents and operatives, aggregating multiple stolen datasets to build detailed profiles of individual personnel.
What Should the U.S. Government's Response Look Like?
Below are four suggested options for the U.S. government to respond to the breach.
1. Do nothing. This would comprise a reactive effort, essentially providing protective security advice and services to FBI personnel, basic online data protection monitoring services, and other welfare support to affected employees. This approach would offer minimal deterrent or signaling value to the actors in question and do little other than to bandage over a long-term vulnerability for the United States. It is unlikely to sit well domestically, with members of the House Intelligence Committee having already requested a formal briefing from the FBI on the hack.
2. Mount a traditional law enforcement-led response. As the next tier of response, U.S. law enforcement could investigate and seek to prosecute the ShinyHunters--building upon Dutch law enforcement's quick arrest of one ShinyHunters member--as well as other actors responsible for the breach and distribution of FBI data. This has successful precedents, with U.S. interagency operations between law enforcement and intelligence partners having resulted in the arrests and prosecutions of high-profile cybercriminals such as LockBit's Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev, REvil's Yaroslav Vasinskyi, and Oleksii Oleksiyovych Lytvynenko, who was recently convicted of an elaborate ransomware operation that extorted victims for over $150 million. However, these operations are painstaking, resource-intensive, and slow, weakening any potential signaling value that might come from a fast U.S. government response.
3. Mount a multi-agency offensive cyber operation to retrieve the stolen data and any copies. An offensive cyber operation offers an urgent, targeted, and proportionate response to an urgent problem. The U.S. government should mount an offensive cyber operation led by U.S. Cyber Command to steal back the data from the ShinyHunters group and to disrupt its infrastructure. Such an operation could be tightly scoped; limited to locating, authenticating, and exfiltrating the dataset and destroying any copies found; and exiting without leaving traces on the criminal groups' systems. Messaging from senior FBI officials suggests that law enforcement knows the location of the perpetrators. Aided by forensic evidence from a seized laptop belonging to one of the perpetrators, the United States may therefore be able to locate the data before it is sold to other adversaries or distributed further.
Pursuing this via Cyber Command would not be the usual route: A cybercriminal incident usually merits a law enforcement-led operation by the FBI. However, given the speed of response required, U.S. Cyber Command should take the lead, along with the FBI and other relevant partners, similar to the takedown of the REvil ransomware group in 2021. This would enable the execution of an offensive cyber operation at speed, given the greater latitude that Cyber Command has to move through overseas-based infrastructure. It would also enable a law enforcement operation to take place in parallel, and for notifications to be issued to any potential future victims identified from digital forensics efforts. Although Cyber Command's threshold for offensive cyber operations usually involves nation-state actors, in this case, the clear threat posed to U.S. equities offers a national security justification.
4. Mount an aggressive campaign against the group, its infrastructure, and the wider ecosystem. On the furthest end of the spectrum, the U.S. government could undertake disruption operations to dismantle the infrastructure, finances, and leadership of ShinyHunters, and to degrade the broader cybercrime ecosystem in which it operates. Maintaining an aggressive tempo of offensive cyber operations, it could disrupt and dismantle the ShinyHunters' infrastructure and defame the group in underground criminal fora, noting how much the cybercriminal ecosystem trades on reputation and bravado. This would bring the added benefit of preventing other actors (including states) from hacking the ShinyHunters themselves to steal the stolen FBI data.
Why stop there? A maximum response could also look beyond the ShinyHunters--to known affiliates, enablers, or service providers, selectively disrupting their operations, or even unmasking individual actors. It could also exploit rivalries and tensions between different groups; for example, the ShinyHunters recently hacked Cl0p, a prolific ransomware group, and also showed signs of internal divisions over its brand. Accompanying this range of activity with messaging in cybercriminal fora--that the United States knows ShinyHunters' identities, whereabouts, and operations--may help to deter less sophisticated or determined cybercriminals. And to maintain a steady operational tempo and enhanced posture, the administration could bring in private sector companies under a recent presidential memorandum authorizing a program to enable private sector offensive cyber operations against cybercrime, as a useful test case.
That said, it is just as important that any maximum response is followed by a reversion to norms where the United States can leverage its broader tools of cyber statecraft. This might include measures such as sanctioning the perpetrators and any identified affiliates to deny them the gains of their attacks, longer-term diplomatic efforts on international norms against data theft, continued technical intelligence gathering, and effects operations to shape the broader cybercriminal ecosystem.
What Would an Offensive Cyber Operation Achieve?
This incident offers a prime target for demonstrating U.S. offensive cyber capabilities. In the immediate term, an offensive cyber operation by the U.S. government could go some way to mitigating a significant national security risk. In addition to the seized devices that Dutch law enforcement already have in their possession, an offensive cyber operation could provide a wealth of intelligence on the ShinyHunters, their affiliates, enablers--both actors and services--and even future targets they may have been planning to attack.
But timing is key: If it acts quickly, the U.S. government might be able to retrieve the dataset and identified copies. If the data is already gone--i.e., sold to other actors--the operation shifts to becoming about shaping cybercriminal behavior over the longer term. Over the last few years, organizations that were once considered off-limits, such as hospitals, schools, and airports, are now routinely targeted by cybercrime. It is therefore vital that the U.S. government impose real costs on the actors responsible for this incident to prevent this from becoming a new norm or an acceptable target for cybercriminals.
Key Constraints to a U.S. Response
Two key hurdles stand between the U.S. government and retrieving the stolen data. The first is speed: The United States would need to have a strong enough intelligence picture or forensics clues to be able to locate the data, as well as technical capabilities that it could quickly tailor and deploy for the intended operational outcome. The second is whether the perpetrators made copies of the dataset. Whether sold to other actors, disseminated to the media, or stolen--or even altered or manipulated--by state actors, each copy undermines the U.S. government's ability to contain the damage incurred, causing any response to descend into a whack-a-mole operation.
Additionally, any offensive cyber operation to retrieve the data would also need rapid coordination and deconfliction, both with domestic partners, to avoid colliding with existing intelligence or law enforcement operations by other U.S. agencies, and with international partners, particularly where the criminal infrastructure sits in an overseas jurisdiction. And any law enforcement investigation would also be reliant on partner nations' capabilities to bring the cybercriminals to justice and extradite them into U.S. jurisdiction, which risks running into obstacles including lack of capacity, limited resources, legal barriers, or even permissive jurisdictions that keep cybercriminals out of the reach of U.S. law enforcement.
Conclusion
This incident goes beyond the bounds of traditional cybercrime and poses a clear and enduring threat to U.S. national security. Therefore, a robust response by the U.S. government is vital and should deploy U.S. offensive cyber capabilities appropriately: not to up the stakes with cybercriminals or to ignite "hack back" wars, but rather to mitigate a genuine and urgent national security threat to the United States. The key rests on executing a response with speed and precision that is tied to a longer-term campaign to degrade these actors and the wider cybercriminal ecosystem.
If done correctly, a U.S. government response could demonstrate how offensive cyber capabilities can be an effective and credible lever of statecraft when pointed at the right type of issue or problem set. Moreover, it could also show how offensive cyber operations do not preclude, but rather help to set the conditions for, a longer-term, sustained response against adversaries in cyberspace. Although the ShinyHunters incident offers a clear-cut use case, it also leaves open a longer-term discussion about norms in cyberspace: At what point is it right to go after stolen datasets when states steal them? This incident raises longer-term ramifications for intelligence gathering and disruption in cyberspace that the cyber policy community must address if the United States is to maintain strategic advantage relative to its adversaries.
* * *
Nikita Shah is senior fellow in the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-should-us-government-do-response-fbi-hack
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: State of Global Development - Key Takeaways From UNGA 2026
WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
The State of Global Development: Key Takeaways from UNGA 2026
Commentary by Hadeil Ali
October 2, 2026
Development experts and practitioners would say that this year's United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) surfaced a mix of existentialism and necessary optimism. Thousands traveling from across the world entered rooms carrying the weight of shrinking Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets, a tension between dealing with current acute threats and long-term anticipatory planning, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * The State of Global Development: Key Takeaways from UNGA 2026 Commentary by Hadeil Ali October 2, 2026 Development experts and practitioners would say that this year's United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) surfaced a mix of existentialism and necessary optimism. Thousands traveling from across the world entered rooms carrying the weight of shrinking Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets, a tension between dealing with current acute threats and long-term anticipatory planning,the need for better financing mechanisms and trust in the multilateral system, and what AI means for development. All of these themes triggered discussions on what is present and what is missing in the sector's current language, tools, resources, and solutions.
Three high-level threads emerged repeatedly across the week's events: (1) disagreement over what the future of development should look like, (2) the rising importance of Global South countries' voice and agency, and (3) the detrimental effect of siloes.
1. Who and what needs to adapt to allow new development approaches and models to become the norm? This question, central to numerous dialogues, garnered energy and angst on the need to reimagine development cooperation in today's ecosystem--for a variety of different actors, but especially donors. Part of that equation is a genuine shift in viewing beneficiaries (i.e., partner countries) as agents and drivers of their own development agenda, allowing for a more sustainable partnership-based model. In addition, there is a need for diversified sources of capital through a variety of sources--international and domestic, public and private--while not losing sight of the issue of debt relief. Philanthropy is key in this equation, and although it cannot fill the gap alone, it can support practical, innovative solutions. Overall, it is critical to ensure investment is being made in true systems solutions, whether in health, AI, or infrastructure.
Two different layers of conversations were occurring simultaneously at UNGA: the conceptual and the tangible. On the tangible side, specific examples of successful approaches and models were elevated, including the Africa Diaspora Network (focused on the importance of leveraging remittances on the African continent), the Pawanka Fund (indigenous-led finance mechanisms in Nicaragua), ShikshaLokam (education equity in India through locally-led solutions), and Kuja (an African social enterprise led by Adeso). These examples showcase that innovative and practical solutions exist in the Global South but are not always elevated, supported, or funded.
On the other hand, more conceptual conversations discussed whether "development" is even the right word to use, the sector's purpose, and the need for an overall system shift. Concerns revolved around the structure of the development sector as a whole that is still upholding a power dynamic between Global North and Global South countries, the lack of political will to truly shift that system, and the need to acknowledge the trust that has been broken between donors and countries around the world.
While both layers of discussions are necessary, they can also be in tension and create hurdles to move forward collectively. The right scope, purpose, and framing of these conversations must be identified in order to move toward action. Many participants, regardless of the type of conversation, agreed that there is an abundance of initiatives focused on the future of development flourishing at different levels, and there seems to be consensus that more is not necessarily needed. What is necessary is leveraging new tools (such as the comprehensive Funders' Roundtable Initiative Mapping), to (1) ensure new initiatives are not created unless they are truly additive or complimentary and (2) to examine the commonalities, tensions, and gaps between these initiatives.
2. Locally led development and leadership are no longer an aside. As one member of a Caribbean country delegation put it: "Smaller countries are the ones driving the moral and ethical agendas globally." This statement, along with others throughout the week, signaled a tone shift from small countries and middle powers: that they are and should be in the driver's seat. This year's convening focused less on why local leadership matters and instead showcased that many foreign governments and delegations increasingly do not want to be lectured about the state of affairs and what priorities should look like from Western entities. That desire isn't new, and foreign governments have repeatedly asserted the desire to take charge of their own destiny, but this year's posture felt more assertive.
In the development sector, this is referred to as locally-led development. The premise is that long-lasting, sustainable development challenges require local solutions and leadership. But the discourse can often be disconnected from the financing needs. In recent years, only 11 percent of cross-border philanthropic funding went directly to local organizations. The gap goes beyond the financial--it reflects how funders must view, approach, and partner with local actors. A coalition of funders through the Funders Roundtable on the Future of Development has committed to backing Global South-led efforts. But an honest conversation on true systems change in the development sector is still needed to ensure trust between Western philanthropy and Global South institutions.
3. Siloes still dominate the development space. Topics including health sovereignty, climate finance, humanitarian aid, multilateral reform, and above all, AI were covered in breadth across the week. But these conversations continue to be siloed when they need to be tackled simultaneously. In a world of interconnected crises, disconnected conversations lead to missed cross-sectoral solutions. This is not a new challenge, but it felt more acute this year, when these agendas depend more than ever on one another. True collaboration is a discipline that must surface more seriously across the sector. The world and the development sector especially are in dire need of conversations, solutions, and actions that are truly intersectional.
While none of these observations should be surprising, these challenges are compounded in today's multipolar ecosystem, and more important than ever in an increasingly vulnerable world as a result of conflict, climate change, and economic inequities. Next year's UNGA should produce fewer new initiatives, more explicit cross-sector coordination, and more urgent action from philanthropy and donors broadly. Until then, institutions representing the full spectrum of sectors should identify ways to build on and enhance existing work. The development sector must start with what it has already accomplished collectively before moving into new commitments and initiatives.
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Hadeil Ali is chief of staff of the Global Development Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/state-global-development-key-takeaways-unga-2026
[Category: ThinkTank]
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The State of Global Development: Key Takeaways from UNGA 2026
Commentary by Hadeil Ali
October 2, 2026
Development experts and practitioners would say that this year's United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) surfaced a mix of existentialism and necessary optimism. Thousands traveling from across the world entered rooms carrying the weight of shrinking Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets, a tension between dealing with current acute threats and long-term anticipatory planning, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * The State of Global Development: Key Takeaways from UNGA 2026 Commentary by Hadeil Ali October 2, 2026 Development experts and practitioners would say that this year's United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) surfaced a mix of existentialism and necessary optimism. Thousands traveling from across the world entered rooms carrying the weight of shrinking Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets, a tension between dealing with current acute threats and long-term anticipatory planning,the need for better financing mechanisms and trust in the multilateral system, and what AI means for development. All of these themes triggered discussions on what is present and what is missing in the sector's current language, tools, resources, and solutions.
Three high-level threads emerged repeatedly across the week's events: (1) disagreement over what the future of development should look like, (2) the rising importance of Global South countries' voice and agency, and (3) the detrimental effect of siloes.
1. Who and what needs to adapt to allow new development approaches and models to become the norm? This question, central to numerous dialogues, garnered energy and angst on the need to reimagine development cooperation in today's ecosystem--for a variety of different actors, but especially donors. Part of that equation is a genuine shift in viewing beneficiaries (i.e., partner countries) as agents and drivers of their own development agenda, allowing for a more sustainable partnership-based model. In addition, there is a need for diversified sources of capital through a variety of sources--international and domestic, public and private--while not losing sight of the issue of debt relief. Philanthropy is key in this equation, and although it cannot fill the gap alone, it can support practical, innovative solutions. Overall, it is critical to ensure investment is being made in true systems solutions, whether in health, AI, or infrastructure.
Two different layers of conversations were occurring simultaneously at UNGA: the conceptual and the tangible. On the tangible side, specific examples of successful approaches and models were elevated, including the Africa Diaspora Network (focused on the importance of leveraging remittances on the African continent), the Pawanka Fund (indigenous-led finance mechanisms in Nicaragua), ShikshaLokam (education equity in India through locally-led solutions), and Kuja (an African social enterprise led by Adeso). These examples showcase that innovative and practical solutions exist in the Global South but are not always elevated, supported, or funded.
On the other hand, more conceptual conversations discussed whether "development" is even the right word to use, the sector's purpose, and the need for an overall system shift. Concerns revolved around the structure of the development sector as a whole that is still upholding a power dynamic between Global North and Global South countries, the lack of political will to truly shift that system, and the need to acknowledge the trust that has been broken between donors and countries around the world.
While both layers of discussions are necessary, they can also be in tension and create hurdles to move forward collectively. The right scope, purpose, and framing of these conversations must be identified in order to move toward action. Many participants, regardless of the type of conversation, agreed that there is an abundance of initiatives focused on the future of development flourishing at different levels, and there seems to be consensus that more is not necessarily needed. What is necessary is leveraging new tools (such as the comprehensive Funders' Roundtable Initiative Mapping), to (1) ensure new initiatives are not created unless they are truly additive or complimentary and (2) to examine the commonalities, tensions, and gaps between these initiatives.
2. Locally led development and leadership are no longer an aside. As one member of a Caribbean country delegation put it: "Smaller countries are the ones driving the moral and ethical agendas globally." This statement, along with others throughout the week, signaled a tone shift from small countries and middle powers: that they are and should be in the driver's seat. This year's convening focused less on why local leadership matters and instead showcased that many foreign governments and delegations increasingly do not want to be lectured about the state of affairs and what priorities should look like from Western entities. That desire isn't new, and foreign governments have repeatedly asserted the desire to take charge of their own destiny, but this year's posture felt more assertive.
In the development sector, this is referred to as locally-led development. The premise is that long-lasting, sustainable development challenges require local solutions and leadership. But the discourse can often be disconnected from the financing needs. In recent years, only 11 percent of cross-border philanthropic funding went directly to local organizations. The gap goes beyond the financial--it reflects how funders must view, approach, and partner with local actors. A coalition of funders through the Funders Roundtable on the Future of Development has committed to backing Global South-led efforts. But an honest conversation on true systems change in the development sector is still needed to ensure trust between Western philanthropy and Global South institutions.
3. Siloes still dominate the development space. Topics including health sovereignty, climate finance, humanitarian aid, multilateral reform, and above all, AI were covered in breadth across the week. But these conversations continue to be siloed when they need to be tackled simultaneously. In a world of interconnected crises, disconnected conversations lead to missed cross-sectoral solutions. This is not a new challenge, but it felt more acute this year, when these agendas depend more than ever on one another. True collaboration is a discipline that must surface more seriously across the sector. The world and the development sector especially are in dire need of conversations, solutions, and actions that are truly intersectional.
While none of these observations should be surprising, these challenges are compounded in today's multipolar ecosystem, and more important than ever in an increasingly vulnerable world as a result of conflict, climate change, and economic inequities. Next year's UNGA should produce fewer new initiatives, more explicit cross-sector coordination, and more urgent action from philanthropy and donors broadly. Until then, institutions representing the full spectrum of sectors should identify ways to build on and enhance existing work. The development sector must start with what it has already accomplished collectively before moving into new commitments and initiatives.
* * *
Hadeil Ali is chief of staff of the Global Development Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/state-global-development-key-takeaways-unga-2026
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to RedState: California Changed the Title of Proposition 39. Voters Should Know Why.
WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Oct. 2, 2026, to RedState:
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California Changed the Title of Proposition 39. Voters Should Know Why.
Words matter. And when those words come from the government and appear on a ballot, they matter even more.
When ballots drop on October 5th, Californians will begin voting on Proposition 39, a constitutional amendment concerning voter identification and citizenship verification. But before voters ever reach the substance of the measure, they will encounter something worth examining: ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Oct. 2, 2026, to RedState: * * * California Changed the Title of Proposition 39. Voters Should Know Why. Words matter. And when those words come from the government and appear on a ballot, they matter even more. When ballots drop on October 5th, Californians will begin voting on Proposition 39, a constitutional amendment concerning voter identification and citizenship verification. But before voters ever reach the substance of the measure, they will encounter something worth examining:the words the State of California has chosen to describe it.
When the initiative that became Proposition 39 qualified for the ballot, the Secretary of State announced it using the Attorney General's circulating title: "Establishes Additional Voter Identification and Citizenship Verification Requirements."
To read the full article, click here (https://redstate.com/mike-garcia/2026/10/02/california-changed-the-title-of-proposition-39-voters-should-know-why-n2207636).
Originally published by RedState (https://redstate.com/mike-garcia/2026/10/02/california-changed-the-title-of-proposition-39-voters-should-know-why-n2207636)
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Mike Garcia
Chair, America First California
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Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/california-changed-the-title-of-proposition-39-voters-should-know-why/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
California Changed the Title of Proposition 39. Voters Should Know Why.
Words matter. And when those words come from the government and appear on a ballot, they matter even more.
When ballots drop on October 5th, Californians will begin voting on Proposition 39, a constitutional amendment concerning voter identification and citizenship verification. But before voters ever reach the substance of the measure, they will encounter something worth examining: ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Oct. 2, 2026, to RedState: * * * California Changed the Title of Proposition 39. Voters Should Know Why. Words matter. And when those words come from the government and appear on a ballot, they matter even more. When ballots drop on October 5th, Californians will begin voting on Proposition 39, a constitutional amendment concerning voter identification and citizenship verification. But before voters ever reach the substance of the measure, they will encounter something worth examining:the words the State of California has chosen to describe it.
When the initiative that became Proposition 39 qualified for the ballot, the Secretary of State announced it using the Attorney General's circulating title: "Establishes Additional Voter Identification and Citizenship Verification Requirements."
To read the full article, click here (https://redstate.com/mike-garcia/2026/10/02/california-changed-the-title-of-proposition-39-voters-should-know-why-n2207636).
Originally published by RedState (https://redstate.com/mike-garcia/2026/10/02/california-changed-the-title-of-proposition-39-voters-should-know-why-n2207636)
* * *
Mike Garcia
Chair, America First California
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Original text here: https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/california-changed-the-title-of-proposition-39-voters-should-know-why/
[Category: ThinkTank]