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Rand Issues Commentary: Roadmap for Accelerating Therapies for Parkinson's Disease
SANTA MONICA, California, Dec. 12 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Dec. 11, 2025:* * *
A Roadmap for Accelerating Therapies for Parkinson's Disease
By Zachary Predmore, Shannon D. Donofry, Samantha Hutten, Catherine Kopil, Yuge Xiao, Tanya Fischer, Karl Kieburtz, Kalpana Merchant, Shalini Padmanabhan and Tanya Simuni
Parkinson's disease affects millions worldwide, and while current treatments address symptoms, none slow or stop the disease. The discovery of a gene pathway that contributes to Parkinson's risk has opened up a promising new avenue for developing therapies. Treatments ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Dec. 12 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Dec. 11, 2025: * * * A Roadmap for Accelerating Therapies for Parkinson's Disease By Zachary Predmore, Shannon D. Donofry, Samantha Hutten, Catherine Kopil, Yuge Xiao, Tanya Fischer, Karl Kieburtz, Kalpana Merchant, Shalini Padmanabhan and Tanya Simuni Parkinson's disease affects millions worldwide, and while current treatments address symptoms, none slow or stop the disease. The discovery of a gene pathway that contributes to Parkinson's risk has opened up a promising new avenue for developing therapies. Treatmentsthat act on this pathway are now being tested in clinics. As part of an initiative to address gaps in our understanding of this pathway, and to ensure success in trials, more than 80 experts convened in June 2025 to create a roadmap for accelerating therapies.
Mutations in genes affecting this pathway, known as leucine-rich repeat kinase 2, or LRRK2, account for around 1 or 2 percent of all Parkinson's cases. In some populations, though, they account for up to 40 percent of cases, making this the most common genetic cause of Parkinson's. Pathogenic variants in LRRK2 amplify the activity of a type of enzyme known as a kinase, disrupting cellular mechanisms, leading to Parkinson's. Kinases have been well studied as drug targets in other diseases, and partially blocking the LRRK2 pathway appears safe in humans. Growing evidence suggests this pathway also has a role in Parkinson's among a subset of patients who don't have the same genetic mutations. They have similar LRRK2 pathway dysfunction ("LRRK2-like" cases) and could benefit from the same therapies. That makes this one of the most promising routes toward treating Parkinson's.
Yet several challenges remain. One is just getting enough people for clinical trials. These variants are relatively rare, and not all carriers develop Parkinson's. Including people with LRRK2 pathway dysfunction but no mutation would expand the population for clinical trials, but there is no validated way to identify them.
These challenges complicate trial design for testing new therapeutics. Should studies focus only on those who carry the pathogenic mutation (which may be the most biologically justified but would make it harder to recruit)? Should they broaden to the LRRK2-like cases (who would be hard to identify)? Or should they include all Parkinson's cases and identify carriers of the LRRK2 mutation afterward (which could make it harder to track the efficacy of any treatments)?
The Michael J. Fox Foundation launched the LRRK2 Investigative Therapeutics Exchange (LITE) initiative in 2024 to address these challenges. The initiative creates a collaborative, precompetitive space where industry leaders, academics, and regulators can share tools, data, and insights. The June 2025 convening brought together attendees to define priorities for the initiative. In the short term, those include building an inventory of all known cohorts with pathogenic LRRK2 mutations worldwide and validating biomarkers to identify them. Medium-term priorities include finding a way to identify those patients without the mutation who would likely still benefit from these therapies and designing innovative trials to accelerate testing. In the long term, these efforts could build to a system of precision medicine for some Parkinson's patients, including biomarker-guided treatment selection and predictive tools to identify carriers before the onset of disease.
Call to Action
Delivering a therapy that slows or prevents Parkinson's progression will require intentional and sustained collaboration across stakeholders. Industry leaders will need to collaborate to validate biomarkers and share data. Researchers can help by coordinating methods, sharing results, and investing in analyses across patient cohorts. Patients and communities also have a role to play, by participating in genetic testing and observational studies that make these therapies possible. Finally, funders and foundations should continue supporting these collaborations as they scale up.
This effort could serve as a model for how cross-sector collaboration can change the trajectory of neurodegenerative diseases. With shared purpose, we are moving toward precision medicine approaches that address some of the underlying causes of Parkinson's Disease, not just the symptoms.
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More About This Commentary
Zach Predmore is a policy researcher and Shannon Donofry is a behavioral scientist at RAND. Samantha Hutten is vice president and head of Translational Biomarkers, Catherine Kopil is senior vice president and head of Clinical Research, and Yuge Xiao is a clinical research lead at the Michael J. Fox Foundation (MJFF). Tanya Fischer is the chief medical officer at Tenvie Therapeutics. Karl Kieburtz is a professor of neurology and community and preventative medicine at the University of Rochester Medical Center. Kalpana Merchant is the president of TransThera Consulting Co. Shalini Padmanabhan is senior vice president and head of Translational Research at MJFF. Tanya Simuni is director of the Parkinson's Disease and Movement Disorders Center and chief of movement disorders in the Department of Neurology, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/12/a-roadmap-for-accelerating-therapies-for-parkinsons.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to China Brief: PRC's Expanding Arms Control Agenda
WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 11, 2025, in its China Brief:* * *
The PRC's Expanding Arms Control Agenda
By Sabine Mokry
Executive Summary:
* The State Council has published a new arms control white paper that expands its arms-control agenda to include outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and technology governance, signaling Beijing's intentions to shape emerging security norms.
* The People's Republic of China's (PRC) now presents itself as a rule-shaper in global arms control, projecting leadership, offering "Chinese ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 11, 2025, in its China Brief: * * * The PRC's Expanding Arms Control Agenda By Sabine Mokry Executive Summary: * The State Council has published a new arms control white paper that expands its arms-control agenda to include outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and technology governance, signaling Beijing's intentions to shape emerging security norms. * The People's Republic of China's (PRC) now presents itself as a rule-shaper in global arms control, projecting leadership, offering "Chinesesolutions," and more forcefully contesting U.S. behavior while selectively embracing transparency and risk-reduction on its own terms.
* The PRC's long-standing arms control principles, defensive nuclear posture, no-first-use, minimal deterrence, and UN-centered multilateralism, have persisted over the past 30 years, indicating durable strategic principles despite major shifts in its capabilities and environment.
On November 27, the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) released its first standalone arms control white paper in two decades (State Council Information Office [SCIO], November 27). Amid acute global nuclear anxiety, escalating great-power competition, and the erosion of the post-Cold War arms control regime, Beijing is seeking to portray itself as a leader in the field.
Compared to the PRC's two previous white papers on the topic, released in 1995 and 2005, respectively, the latest iteration recasts the PRC from a reactive defender of the status quo to a proactive proponent of "global security governance" (SCIO, November 1995, September 1, 2005). This mirrors Beijing's ambitions for leadership in other fields of global governance. Tracing how the new white paper redefines Beijing's ambitions, instruments, and intended audiences indicates that the PRC is likely to be more active in future arms control negotiations while safeguarding its own modernization goals and avoiding constraints on its own behavior.
Continuities in the PRC's Arms Control Posture
Across all three white papers, the PRC presents arms control as an extension of its long-standing strategy of achieving peace through development and safeguarding a stable external environment for national modernization. The white papers maintain a consistent rejection of hegemonism and power politics. Just as in other areas of foreign policy, Beijing situates legitimate arms control within the UN-centered multilateral system. Despite major changes in the PRC's capabilities and in the international system, its ultimate normative horizon, a world without weapons of mass destruction, remains unchanged.
A second area of continuity lies in how the documents frame the PRC's own military posture. Beijing emphasizes that it pursues a defensive national defense policy, maintains only the capabilities required for self-defense, and "will never engage in any form of arms race". This consistency is most pronounced in the nuclear domain. The three documents repeatedly reaffirm the PRC's no-first-use policy, its commitment never to deploy nuclear weapons abroad, never to extend a nuclear umbrella, and its intention to keep its nuclear forces at the minimum level necessary for national security.
PRC Grows More Assertive and Expands Focus Areas
The three white papers differ significantly from each other. A first major difference relates to descriptions of the international environment. Characterized by cautious optimism, the 1995 white paper acknowledged challenges but mostly highlighted opportunities created by the end of the Cold War. The 2005 document saw arms-control-related issues at a "crucial crossroads" and pointed to emerging threats (SCIO, September 1, 2005). By contrast, the 2025 white paper portrays a world in deep systemic crisis, marked by escalating great-power rivalry, erosion of arms control treaties, and accelerating arms races across multiple domains. The document's introduction attributes this deterioration to the actions of "a certain country", a formulation that refers to the United States. /[1]
The most striking evolution across the three white papers is the expansion of issue areas. The 1995 document centered on traditional domains, that is, global disarmament principles, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) regimes, and conventional force reductions. It discussed domestic restraint, including troop cuts and low defense spending, at length. The 2005 white paper retained these themes but added distinct sections on missiles and arms races in outer space, while broadening the conventional dimension to include landmines, explosive remnants of war, and small arms and light weapons. The 2025 white paper marks a qualitative leap. It introduces a full chapter on "leading international security governance in emerging fields", covering outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence (AI), and technology controls. In this new framing, arms control becomes a multidomain governance project. The PRC explicitly articulates ambitions to shape norms and rules in these areas, mirroring its broader push to take on a leadership role in global governance (China Brief, September 5, October 31).
This new chapter primarily lays out the PRC's positions on international security governance in emerging domains. It also provides extensive accounts of its activities in these fields. Regarding outer space, the white paper reiterates the PRC's support for the UN playing a key role in strengthening outer space security governance, though it does not offer details on how this role could be fulfilled. The section on cybersecurity reiterates the PRC's principle of cyber sovereignty and emphasizes that its suggestions, such as creating a "community of common destiny in cyberspace", have been integrated into UN resolutions. Finally, regarding military applications of AI, the PRC reiterates its position that human primacy must be upheld and that AI systems "must remain under human control at all times". The white paper also calls for an international governance framework for the military application of AI and highlights the PRC's contributions to the development of a related UN framework. In addition, it highlights the need to reinforce measures of risk prevention and non-proliferation through strengthening AI-related military ethics and security education.
This expansion of issue areas reflects a shift in Beijing's self-positioning in the global arms control architecture over the last three decades. In 1995, it cast itself primarily as a "reliable force for peace," emphasizing unilateral restraint and domestic measures as evidence of its responsibility. The 2005 white paper portrayed it as a constructive supporter of international regimes, highlighting active participation in the negotiation and implementation of key treaties. By 2025, this posture has evolved into a more assertive identity: the PRC now describes itself as a "key promoter of international arms control" and, more broadly, a builder and defender of global security governance.
Expert Commentary Goes Beyond White Paper's Rhetoric
The timing of the latest white paper's release is symbolic, as the white paper itself notes. The year 2025 marks the 80th anniversaries of the end of the Second World War and the founding of the United Nations, and so is framed as an appropriate moment to reaffirm the PRC's longstanding support for multilateral disarmament. The document also argues that the world "once again stands at a historic crossroads", with rising geopolitical rivalry, the erosion of key arms-control regimes, and growing risks stemming from advanced technologies./[2] Considering these trends, Beijing claims an urgent need to reinvigorate multilateral arms control and articulate its positions on emerging domains such as outer space, cyberspace, and AI. Official statements around the release do not indicate why the paper has been published now, rather than 10 years ago, which would have matched the established rhythm.
State media presents the new white paper as both a timely response to a deteriorating global security environment and a demonstration of the PRC's responsible role as a major power. They see the global arms-control system facing severe erosion, with rising nuclear risks and the collapse of key treaties. They then argue that the PRC seeks to stabilize this system by reaffirming its nuclear restraint, articulating a new philosophy for arms control, and expanding the agenda to outer space, cyber, and AI governance (CCTV, November 28). State media also amplifies the white paper's criticism of U.S. missile defense, alliance politics, and Japan's failure to eliminate abandoned chemical weapons (Global Times, November 27; Sina, November 30).
Expert commentaries are well represented by Guo Xiaobing, an arms-control specialist at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, which is affiliated with the Ministry of State Security. He echoes official talking points but offers a more explicit interpretation of the PRC government's intentions. Guo argues that the reason the PRC issued the white paper now is that the international arms-control and nonproliferation regime faces "serious challenges", including rising nuclear dangers linked to Russia's war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, the collapse of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties, and U.S. efforts to expand global missile-defense networks. He frames the white paper as the PRC's effort to "contribute Chinese wisdom" and inject "positive energy" into the global arms-control process, presenting Beijing as a stabilizing force at a moment of strategic uncertainty (China National Radio, November 28).
Chinese commentators also go beyond the white paper in three notable ways. First, they present the PRC as offering unprecedented transparency, pointing to its voluntary missile-launch notifications and closure of historic nuclear weapons facilities. They frame these as trust-building measures rather than long-standing policy positions (Global Times, November 28; Sina, November 30). Second, they articulate a sharper critique of the United States and Japan than the white paper itself does. U.S. missile defense, alliance activity, AUKUS, and the golden dome are described as "destroying the strategic balance" (Sina, November 30). Third, experts directly connect emerging technology governance to lessons drawn from recent wars, including drones, unmanned vessels, cyberattacks, and commercial satellites like Starlink, offering a more operational and conflict-driven justification for the PRC's expanded arms-control agenda (CCTV, November 28). This reflects a common feature of PRC foreign policy discourse where experts are given wider latitude to fill the government's often vague concepts with substance (Mokry, 2025)./[3]
Conclusion
The 2025 white paper suggests that the PRC government sees arms control in more expansive and assertive terms than earlier iterations implied. It preserves long-standing principles but no longer presents Beijing as a cautious and largely reactive participant in existing regimes. Instead, the PRC now frames arms control as an arena in which it must both safeguard its modernization and actively shape emerging global rules. This results in realpolitik in practice and a normative role in discourse. The PRC maintains its criticism of U.S. alliances, missile defense, and strategic dominance, yet promotes a Chinese philosophy for arms control and insists on greater fairness, balance, and inclusiveness. The expanded coverage to encapsulate outer space, cyberspace, AI, and export controls positions arms control as a multidomain governance project allows the PRC to defend its interests and influence international standards. At the same time, Beijing emphasizes risk-reduction and selective transparency as tools to project responsibility without accepting symmetric constraints, though it remains to be seen whether these initiatives will translate into behavioral change.
PRC white papers always have a messaging function, and often to an international audience. Little is currently known, however, about how Beijing's evolving arms control posture is perceived among states in the Global South. The 2025 white paper's emphasis on fairness, technological equity, and the rights of developing countries suggests a deliberate appeal to audiences who feel marginalized in existing export-control and governance regimes. But the proliferation of PRC-manufactured weapons in ongoing African conflicts, for example, may undermine the official rhetoric coming from Beijing (China Brief, June 7, October 28). At the same time, the document avoids engaging with Western demands for greater transparency about the PRC's rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, sidestepping one of the central concerns in contemporary arms-control debates.
The white paper signals that the PRC will be a more assertive actor in arms control, but not a participant in traditional bilateral arms-reduction negotiations. Beijing will resist any framework that caps its growing nuclear forces, while positioning itself as a defender of multilateralism and a contributor of "Chinese solutions"--a phrase that appears four times in the document--to global governance. Going forward, Beijing is likely to expand its involvement in UN-based forums and dialogues among the "P5" permanent members of the UN Security Council, promote norms in emerging domains, and deepen engagement with the Global South on export controls and technological equity. It will continue to combine limited operational transparency and risk-reduction measures with strict secrecy on capabilities, avoiding symmetric constraints. The PRC will likely act as an issue-driven rule-shaper--assertive in new governance arenas, guarded in traditional nuclear arms control, and increasingly vocal in contesting U.S. strategic behavior.
[1] The original Chinese formulation, can be ambiguous, and does not necessarily refer to an individual country. The official English translation... Such direct attribution of blame specified through repeated references to unilateral withdrawals, bloc politics, and forward deployments is absent from earlier versions.
[2] This phrase "historic crossroads" has been used frequently in recent white papers and messaging this year (China Brief, May 23)
[3] Mokry, Sabine. Chinese Scholars and Think Tanks' Constructions of China's National Interest: Hidden Hand on Demand. Routledge, 2025.These commentaries build a more pointed narrative than the official text, sharpening the PRC's positioning as an aspiring architect of global security governance.
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Sabine Mokry, PhD, is a researcher at the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/the-prcs-expanding-arms-control-agenda/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to China Brief: Authorities Securitize Response to Tai Po Fire
WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 11, 2025, in its China Brief:* * *
Authorities Securitize Response to Tai Po Fire
By Eric Y.H. Lai
Executive Summary:
* Hong Kong authorities have deployed national security measures to manage the aftermath of a fire in Tai Po that killed over 150. They have turned to censorship and intimidation, and used state-aligned civic organizations to suppress grassroots responses and facilitate centralized relief efforts.
* Official efforts to seek justice and accountability appear largely symbolic. Hong Kong ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 11, 2025, in its China Brief: * * * Authorities Securitize Response to Tai Po Fire By Eric Y.H. Lai Executive Summary: * Hong Kong authorities have deployed national security measures to manage the aftermath of a fire in Tai Po that killed over 150. They have turned to censorship and intimidation, and used state-aligned civic organizations to suppress grassroots responses and facilitate centralized relief efforts. * Official efforts to seek justice and accountability appear largely symbolic. Hong KongChief Executive John Lee has created an "independent committee," but it is unable to open a commission of inquiry, limiting its ability to produce credible and substantive findings.
* Information control and the national security framing emerged after Xia Baolong, director of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, met with mainland officials, underscoring the increasing synergies between governance in Hong Kong and that of the mainland.
On November 26, two weeks before Hong Kong's second "patriots-only" Legislative Council (LegCo) election, a catastrophic fire swept through Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po, killing more than 150 residents and injuring many others. The tragedy drew global attention not only for its scale but for how the Hong Kong government quickly framed its response through a national security lens.
This shift became evident after Xia Baolong, director of the Hong Kong and Macao Work Office of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, received briefings in Shenzhen on December 1. From that point on, the Hong Kong government increasingly adopted stability-maintenance rhetoric and tools more commonly associated with mainland governance. In doing so, Hong Kong's authorities transformed a domestic disaster response operation into an exercise in regime security, relying on information control, weakened accountability mechanisms, and the monopolization of community relief through state-aligned groups. The governance model emerging from the Wang Fuk Court fire reflects a deeper integration of Hong Kong's local administration into the CCP's national security apparatus.
Blame Shifts from 'Scaffolding' to 'Foreign Forces'
In the days after the fire, public discussion focused on the devastating loss of life. Soon, however, mainland outlets began to promote a narrative that blamed the building's flammable bamboo scaffolding for the rapid spread of the fire (Xinhua, November 27; Global Times, November 28; Initium Media, November 30). This explanation was echoed by some international media before independent reporting revealed deeper systemic failures: longstanding resident grievances about repair delays, possible negligence by government departments, and evidence that pro-government actors were involved in vendor selection (The Independent, November 27; New York Times [NYT], November 28). As scrutiny began shifting toward institutional accountability, authorities moved to constrain the flow of information with criminalization and censorship.
Police arrested several individuals, including a 71-year-old man, under the local national security law for allegedly circulating "seditious" materials related to the fire (hk01, December 6). University student Miles Kwan was detained after distributing flyers promoting an online petition calling for an investigation by the statutory commission of inquiry (The Witness, December 1; Change.org, accessed December 8). His arrest drew global attention because authorities deployed national security charges, which are typically reserved for political cases. At least three others were arrested for similar offences, creating a chilling effect on petitions, commentary, and community-driven initiatives (InMediaHK, December 1; Lianhe Zaobao, December 7).
Censors even targeted state-aligned media. Ta Kung Pao briefly published and then removed an investigative report on the fire, along with social media posts containing critical commentary (Ta Kung Pao, November 28; RTI, December 3). This signaled that narrative cohesion, rather than transparency, guided editorial decisions.
The Hong Kong-based Office for Safeguarding National Security (OSNS--a Beijing-controlled agency empowered under the 2020 National Security Law--issued a statement accusing "anti-China, Hong Kong-destabilizing forces" of spreading false information and attacking the government's rescue efforts (OSNS, November 29). It praised the authorities for "promptly clarifying the facts" and curbing improper acts by individuals allegedly exploiting the crisis (OSNS, November 29). OSNS's involvement framed the fire not as a governance failure but as a battleground for national security, elevating the stakes and enabling more aggressive intervention in public discourse.
After Xia Baolong's Shenzhen meeting, information control intensified (hk01, December 2). A planned press conference by professionals and community organizers on building-repair policies was abruptly canceled after organizers reportedly received contact from national security police (Yahoo News, December 1; The Collective, December 2). Prominent online commentators, namely Hailey Cheng and Ellie Yuen, who had been documenting the incident or archiving public information, also announced they would cease commentary due to "irresistible forces" (RFI, December 4). Before their announcements, Cheng created a database on GitHub, titled "Tai Po Wang Fuk Court Fire Archive," collecting information and various documents related to the fire for public access (LinkedIn/Hailey Cheng, December 2). She has also given interviews to foreign media, explaining the incident and details of the archive. The original archive has since been taken down, but mirrored sites remain active (WFC Fire Collection, accessed December 6). Ellie Yuen produced English-language videos explaining the fire's cause, including issues related to corruption and bid-rigging in major repair works (Instagram/ellieyuen.said, accessed December 9). The videos have collectively garnered more than 5.5 million views.
On December 3, both the OSNS and the Hong Kong government issued statements condemning unnamed actors for "using the disaster to stir up chaos" (news.gov.hk, December 3). They further warned that "those who use the disaster to create chaos in Hong Kong will be punished, no matter how far they may be" (OSNS, December 3). Both statements characterized those involved as "hostile foreign forces" and their reporting as "fake news", although they provided no details or evidence (news.gov.hk; OSNS, December 3). The OSNS claimed these forces were "copying the tactics used during the extradition law amendment turmoil" and "supporting and manipulating their Hong Kong 'proxies' to recreate the chaos of 'black-clad violence'" (OSNS, December 3). Days later, the OSNS summoned foreign journalists and warned them against interference in Hong Kong's internal affairs. By restricting public access to information and pressuring intermediaries who facilitate the flow of local data to foreign media, authorities sought to limit external scrutiny and pre-empt demands for accountability.
Weak Accountability Mechanisms Protect Officials
Local police swiftly arrested employees linked to the Wang Fuk Court repair project on manslaughter and corruption charges. However, no government officials were subject to investigation, and Hong Kong's institutional mechanisms for independent oversight appeared increasingly symbolic.
On December 4, over a week after the fire, Chief Executive John Lee announced the formation of an "independent committee" to evaluate the disaster, citing a similar arrangement following a 2018 traffic incident (Ming Pao, December 4). Yet this mechanism lacks the statutory authority to open a commission of inquiry, which can compel testimony, summon officials, and require the production of evidence. Without such powers, the committee's ability to establish responsibility or produce credible findings is limited. Despite calling for efficiency and flexibility, the government has rejected mechanisms that could subject officials to legal accountability.
This reflects a broader pattern of weakened oversight, in which the Hong Kong government invokes investigative bodies with limited legal force. For instance, in 2019, the government insisted on using a so-called "Independent Police Complaint Council" instead of a statutory commission of inquiry to investigate police misconduct, But the IPCC is not an independent body; and its power to check law enforcement agencies is severely restricted (Time, May 15, 2020). Statutory commissions, which the government has previously reached for, historically have been seen as a neutral legal tool. But the government increasingly portrays them as seditious, further narrowing the space for institutional accountability (NHK World, December 2).
Before the 2021 electoral overhaul, LegCo elections and public debates often served as venues for discussing policy failures and proposing reforms. With opposition candidates now systematically barred under the doctrine of "patriots administering Hong Kong", legislative oversight has weakened considerably. Debates for the most recent elections were government-organized, and several were canceled after the fire (GovHK, November 10). Candidates avoided substantive commentary on the incident, while authorities concentrated on boosting voter turnout by mobilizing mainland enterprises, civil servants, and other loyalist groups, including religious leaders (GovHK, November 14; YouTube/Catholic Way, December 5; Chinese Banking Association of Hong Kong, accessed December 9). Although the government secured its desired turnout, the reconfigured legislature shows little prospect of initiating a robust inquiry unless its members demonstrate unprecedented political will to use their parliamentary privileges for investigative purposes (The Collective, December 7).
Authorities Rely on Suppression and Centralized Response
The primary reason the authorities treated the fire as a national security issue likely lies in the rapid, grassroots mobilization of Hong Kong residents. Volunteers coordinated transportation, supplies, and on-site assistance using Telegram channels and neighborhood networks. Petitions and flyers calling for accountability circulated widely. These efforts, while humanitarian in nature, resembled the decentralized mobilization tactics seen during the 2019 protests, raising political sensitivities for a government intent on preventing renewed collective action.
Hong Kong's civil society has long emphasized mutual aid and community problem-solving. Despite years of repression, following the fire residents demonstrated the capacity to organize relief without state involvement. Yet such spontaneous mobilization conflicts with the governance model now shaping Hong Kong, which is characterized by control and political loyalty over civic autonomy.
In place of local volunteer networks, the government quickly deployed "Care Teams" (CTs) to assume control of relief operations (Home Affairs Department, accessed December 9). First created in 2022 after the restructuring of district-level governance, CTs are composed largely of pro-government community figures and are designed to support the government's district work while cultivating patriotic networks (YouTube/Green Bean Media, December 3). In practice, they serve as state-aligned and state-funded intermediaries that channel resources, organize activities, and extend political influence into local communities (The Collective, June 18).
Their activation at Wang Fuk Court displaced resident-led mutual-aid efforts and centralized relief under government supervision. This mirrors the PRC mainland's grid-management system, which divides neighborhoods into sub-units staffed by politically reliable personnel responsible for social surveillance and stability maintenance (China Brief, June 18, 2021; Mittelstaedt, 2023; China Leadership Monitor, June 7, 2023)./[1] The CTs represent the reliance on loyalists at the grassroots level, replacing organic civil society with a politicized, top-down model of social management (Ong & Luo, 2024; Ming Pao, November 29)./[2]
Conclusion
The Wang Fuk Court fire highlights a central contradiction in Hong Kong's post-2020 governance: enhanced national security measures were unable to prevent disaster. The official claim that Hong Kong is now on a new journey "from stability to prosperity" masks a reality in which information transparency, civic participation, and statutory accountability have been subordinated to political security (Hong Kong CEO, accessed December 11). Safeguarding the state through crisis management has eclipsed public safety.
The "Hong Kong model" of procedural autonomy and public accountability has faded. Disaster relief is monopolized by the state, information flows are restricted, and even advocating for lawful inquiry may constitute a security offence. Neighborhood administration is now integrated into the broader apparatus of the PRC's comprehensive security concept, suggesting that preventive repression and surveillance will continue to shape the city's political environment.
The fire also revealed that civic engagement persists. Residents mobilized rapidly to support victims, documented information, and pushed for accountability despite facing risks. These actions underscored a persistent civic agency that continues to adapt under repression. Understanding the evolving relationship between top-down repression and bottom-up resilience will be essential for interpreting Hong Kong's trajectory. Domestic crises like the Wang Fuk Court fire expose how residents navigate and resist constraints, how the state recalibrates control, and how the struggle over information and accountability shapes the city's future.
The Wang Fuk Court fire was both a human tragedy and a political watershed. It illuminated the extent to which Hong Kong's governance has shifted toward a national security paradigm that prioritizes control over transparency, state-aligned mobilization over genuine civic action, and regime stability over public accountability. At the same time, it revealed the enduring capacities of Hong Kongers to mobilize, document, and advocate, highlighting a continuing contest between authoritarian consolidation and civic resilience.
[1] Mittelstaedt, Jean Christopher. "From Social Management to Mobilisation: The Evolving Grid Management System in Shenzhen". China Perspectives, 133 (2023).
[2] Ong, Lynette H, and Kevin Wei Luo. "Stability Maintenance, Preventive Repression, and Contentious Politics in China under Xi Jinping's Rule." Issues & Studies 60, no. 4 (2024).
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Eric Y.H. Lai, PhD is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Asian Law of Georgetown University Law Center, Washington D.C. He received PhD in Law at SOAS University of London.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/authorities-securitize-response-to-tai-po-fire/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute Sees Growth in Germany of 0.8 Percent in 2026
MUNICH, Germany, Dec. 12 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:* * *
ifo Institute Sees Growth in Germany of 0.8 Percent in 2026
The ifo Institute has revised its growth forecast for Germany downward. For 2026, it expects growth of 0.8 percent. The Institute now also expects growth of only 0.1 percent for this year. "The German economy is adapting only slowly and at great expense to the structural shift through innovation and new business models," says Timo Wollmershauser, Head of Forecasts at ifo. "In addition, companies and start-ups in particular are hindered by bureaucratic ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Dec. 12 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * ifo Institute Sees Growth in Germany of 0.8 Percent in 2026 The ifo Institute has revised its growth forecast for Germany downward. For 2026, it expects growth of 0.8 percent. The Institute now also expects growth of only 0.1 percent for this year. "The German economy is adapting only slowly and at great expense to the structural shift through innovation and new business models," says Timo Wollmershauser, Head of Forecasts at ifo. "In addition, companies and start-ups in particular are hindered by bureaucratichurdles and an outdated infrastructure."
Compared to the autumn forecast, the ifo Institute has reduced its forecast for 2025 by 0.1 percentage points, and by 0.5 percentage points for 2026 and 2027 respectively. The growth forecast for 2027 is now 1.1 percent. The US tariff policy is continuing to have a noticeable negative impact on the German export industry. According to the ifo forecast, the higher US tariffs will dampen growth by 0.3 percentage points in 2025 and by 0.6 percentage points in 2026. "The uncertainty caused by the tariffs remains high, even though the acute conflicts between the US and the EU have been defused," says Wollmershauser. Although the global economy will grow moderately by an average of 2.5 percent per year in the period 2025 to 2027, German industry will not benefit and will continue to lose competitiveness.
The planned government investments from the special funds for infrastructure and defense, as well as further relief for companies and consumers will only have a delayed effect. A growth effect of 0.3 percentage points is expected for 2026 and 0.7 percentage points for 2027. "The German government's measures will help in the short term but are insufficient to expand the production capacities of the German economy in the long term," warns Wollmershauser.
The ifo Institute has therefore revised the production potential significantly downward: For 2027, it is 0.7 percentage points lower than forecast in autumn. "The German economy is losing momentum because the workforce potential, corporate investment, and productivity growth are declining," explains Wollmershauser. "Without structural reforms, there is a risk of further erosion of the business location. Measures are needed that strengthen the supply of labor through additional incentives to increase working hours or participation in the labor market, and boost productivity through comprehensive digitalization, and simplification of the state system."
According to the ifo forecast, unemployment will rise by 161,000 people to 6.3 percent in 2025 before stagnating in 2026 and falling slightly to 5.9 percent in 2027. Inflation will remain just below the 2 percent mark (2025: 2.2 percent, 2026: 2.2 percent, 2027: 2.3 percent). Energy prices will continue to fall, while service prices and wage costs keep core inflation above 2 percent.
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Table: Key Forecast Figures, ifo Economic Forecast Winter 2025
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Forcast (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2025-12-11/ifo-economic-forecast-winter-2025-structural-change-has-germany-firmly-its-grip)
Publication (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2025/article-journal/ifo-konjunkturprognose-winter-2025)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2025-12-11/ifo-institute-sees-growth-germany-2026
[Category: ThinkTank]
Empire Center: From Promises to Vetoes - Hochul's Actions Belie Her Commitment to Transparency
ALBANY, New York, Dec. 12 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following commentary on Dec. 11, 2025:* * *
From Promises to Vetoes: Hochul's Actions Belie Her Commitment to Transparency
By Cam Macdonald
Governor Kathy Hochul made news this fall when she used her legislative veto power in a way that looked personal. That's how Albany watchers and the target, Senator James Skoufis, took it when her first vetoes of 2025 were on bills Skoufis sponsored, including a bill aimed at placing agencies under stricter disclosure deadlines under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL).
Skoufis ... Show Full Article ALBANY, New York, Dec. 12 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following commentary on Dec. 11, 2025: * * * From Promises to Vetoes: Hochul's Actions Belie Her Commitment to Transparency By Cam Macdonald Governor Kathy Hochul made news this fall when she used her legislative veto power in a way that looked personal. That's how Albany watchers and the target, Senator James Skoufis, took it when her first vetoes of 2025 were on bills Skoufis sponsored, including a bill aimed at placing agencies under stricter disclosure deadlines under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). Skoufiscalled Hochul's vetoes retaliation for his inquiries into the Hochul administration's efforts to cut costs under the state's Consumer Directed Personal Assistance Program, or CDPAP, through a single provider Skoufis alleged to be hand-picked by Hochul's team. Hochul's office denied there was anything personal in the vetoes, despite appearances.
Hochul sent mixed signals in her latest round of bill signings and vetoes. Skoufis celebrated getting four bills he sponsored signed into law. But Hochul also vetoed a bill Skoufis sponsored in the Senate that contained an important change to FOIL.
If Hochul let bygones be bygones with Skoufis, then in the long term the FOIL bill vetoes are dispiriting for transparency advocates.
The most recently vetoed FOIL bill addressed decisions by the First Department Appellate Division that limit transparency under FOIL. The court has held that an agency can withhold a public record from disclosure in its entirety if that agency asserts an exception from disclosure for a portion of the record.
The First Department decision misconstrues Court of Appeals precedent that requires agencies to produce redacted records if a privacy exception applies to part of the record, e.g., a social security number or a private citizen's home address, among others.
The First Department does not apply the Court of Appeal's redaction rule to other exceptions from disclosure -- like information that would "impair present or imminent contract awards," "interfere with law enforcement investigations," or "endanger the life or safety of any person," if disclosed.
A popular exception agencies assert is one for certain "inter-agency or intra-agency materials" that are not factual data or statistics, instructions to staff affecting the public, or final agency policy or determinations. The idea behind this exception for deliberative materials being one to promote the free flow of opinions and thoughts in government agencies that are not chilled by fears of future disclosure under FOIL.
Under the First Department's decisions, an agency can withhold in its entirety an email that contains one paragraph of opinion or deliberative material in a ten-paragraph narrative, rather than disclose the email with the paragraph subject to the exception redacted. Thus, an agency can withhold an entire record that may be 90 percent facts important to the public because ten percent contains someone's thoughts or opinions.
Yet even if an agency need not disclose the entire body of an email communication under FOIL, there's an argument that it still should provide a redacted record. First, the public has a right to know whether a record relating to a topic even exists. And second, the who, when and subject of an email may be as important for the public to know as the email's contents.
The bill mandated that where an agency may withhold only a portion or portions of a record, the agency may redact such portion(s) but must disclose the remaining portions not subject to any exception from disclosure.
Hochul argued in her veto message that the bill was "unnecessary and duplicative of current law." But that's not true. The bill's language came straight from the Committee on Open Government, which is composed mostly of Hochul administration personnel and gubernatorial appointees, as a direct solution to the problem caused by the First Department's decisions.
Redacting the portions of records that FOIL does not require to be disclosed is standard practice outside the First Department's Bronx and New York counties. But the bill was important because the First Department handles FOIL cases involving significant records repositories -- most New York City agencies, including the NYPD, and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority.
Hochul's earlier FOIL bill veto nixed a plan to place agencies under tighter deadlines for responding to FOIL requests. The bill addressed the age-old problem of "information delayed being information denied." FOIL responses delayed by months or years can be too late to be useful in policy debates or holding public officials accountable.
To be sure, fulfilling records requests promptly can require more resources than agencies typically possess. (Something that more proactive disclosure and better records system management could address.) And Hochul noted in her veto message that the Legislature failed to "allocate additional resources to agencies to ensure they are able to comply."
Hochul took office in 2021 a new era of greater transparency and accountability. But none of the four executive budgets she since proposed contained meaningful additional resources for agencies to reduce FOIL response delays. And she vetoed a bill aimed at fixing a disclosure loophole identified by her own administration.
With Hochul's actions speaking louder than her words, New Yorkers who favor greater transparency may have preferred the Skoufis FOIL bill vetoes to be personal and not more business as usual.
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Cameron J. "Cam" Macdonald is General Counsel for the Empire Center and Legal Director for the Government Justice Center.
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Original text here: https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/from-promises-to-vetoes-hochuls-actions-belie-her-commitment-to-transparency/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for Economic and Policy Research: Senate Health Care Votes: Major Reforms Are Urgently Needed
WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 -- The Center for Economic and Policy Research issued the following news release on Dec. 11, 2025:* * *
Senate Health Care Votes: Major Reforms Are Urgently Needed
Today the Senate is expected to vote on two different bills meant to address the looming premium spikes for insurance purchased on the Affordable Care Act marketplace. Both proposals are expected to fail.
Brandon Novick, Domestic Policy Coordinator at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), released the following statement:
"The American health insurance system is broken. While neither of these ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 -- The Center for Economic and Policy Research issued the following news release on Dec. 11, 2025: * * * Senate Health Care Votes: Major Reforms Are Urgently Needed Today the Senate is expected to vote on two different bills meant to address the looming premium spikes for insurance purchased on the Affordable Care Act marketplace. Both proposals are expected to fail. Brandon Novick, Domestic Policy Coordinator at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), released the following statement: "The American health insurance system is broken. While neither of thesebills fixes that, the Republican proposal is far worse.
"Over 20 million Americans who purchase health coverage on the ACA marketplace get enhanced subsidies from the federal government that help them afford skyrocketing premiums. The Republican bill allows these enhanced subsidies to expire, leaving low- and middle-class Americans to pay thousands more to afford their health plan premiums. Instead, the bill will allow certain Americans to get $1,000 - or $1,500 for those 50-64 years old - in 2026 and 2027 for Health Savings Accounts. These payments don't go to premiums but they partially cover deductibles. Yet, the only Americans who qualify are those enrolled in Catastrophic and Bronze plans - which have the highest deductibles and out-of-pocket payments that far exceed $1,500.
"To put it simply, the Republican plan is to massively increase the premium payments for millions of Americans while allowing a fraction of them to spend up to $1,000 or $1,500 a year on health care expenses, which are a fraction of the deductible they have to pay anyway before insurance coverage would kick in.
"The Democratic plan is simpler: Three more years of the enhanced subsidies. If this bill passes, Americans won't have to pay an abrupt spike of thousands of dollars to afford their premiums ... at least until 2029. Without further legislation, Americans will face a similar crisis three years from now.
"It is essential to point out that neither bill addresses the fundamental issues of why health insurance and health care costs are much higher in the United States while we suffer worse health outcomes. Both public and private insurers in the US pay more than in other countries for the same goods and services due to massive consolidation, lack of transparency, higher payments for doctors (especially specialists), and patent monopolies.
"Our private insurance system is massively inefficient; we pay more for administrative expenses than other wealthy countries. We could save hundreds of billions of dollars through lower administrative costs and ensure health coverage for every American by moving to a Medicare For All, single-payer health care system. Republicans argue that the Affordable Care Act wastes money and enriches private insurers; there is a way to stop this waste while expanding access to health care rather than limiting it: Medicare For All."
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Original text here: https://cepr.net/newsroom/senate-health-care-votes-major-reforms-are-urgently-needed/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Navigating the Divide - Why the U.S. Navy Must Resume FONOPs in Indonesia
WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Dec. 11, 2025:* * *
Navigating the Divide: Why the U.S. Navy Must Resume FONOPs in Indonesia
By Patrick Panjeti
The Decisive Detour: A Crisis in the Making
It's 2027. Tensions between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan have reached a boiling point. After a recent port visit to Perth, a U.S. Navy carrier strike group (CSG) is ordered to make best speed from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. The CSG sets a course for the Sunda Strait to the Java Sea, then north via ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Dec. 11, 2025: * * * Navigating the Divide: Why the U.S. Navy Must Resume FONOPs in Indonesia By Patrick Panjeti The Decisive Detour: A Crisis in the Making It's 2027. Tensions between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan have reached a boiling point. After a recent port visit to Perth, a U.S. Navy carrier strike group (CSG) is ordered to make best speed from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. The CSG sets a course for the Sunda Strait to the Java Sea, then north viathe Makassar Strait--the routes normally used for international navigation.
During the CSG's transit, a message arrives from Jakarta. Citing its long-standing "bebas-aktif" (free and active) non-aligned policy, Indonesia has closed its archipelagic waters and airspace to all foreign military ships and aircraft to preserve its neutrality.
The CSG is suddenly forced into a costly detour. Instead of a direct high-speed transit, the ships must now skirt the southern corridor of the Indonesian archipelago, funneling east through the Timor and Arafura Seas and then navigating north into the open Pacific just to approach the South China Sea. This diversion doesn't just add thousands of miles to the transit; the U.S. Seventh Fleet loses one of the most valuable assets in a maritime contingency: time. The detour adds approximately six days to the route; in a fight to defend Taiwan, days are decisive. It also channels naval forces into predictable chokepoints where they are most vulnerable to attack and burns an estimated $11 million in critical fuel.
This scenario is not a remote possibility: it is the logical and likely outcome of a dangerous disconnect between U.S. policy and operational practice.
For the better part of a decade, the U.S. Navy, in a well-intentioned effort to avoid straining ties, has de facto stopped asserting navigational rights inside the Indonesian archipelagic baseline. The United States' quiet acquiescence to Jakarta's creeping sovereignty over its archipelagic waters is setting a precedent that will have catastrophic operational consequences. The United States is, in effect, trading its operational access for a "good partner" sticker, and the ink on that sticker is fading fast.
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Figure 1: Hypothetical Intended Course and Detour
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Indications and Warnings Are Flashing Red
The Navy's operational "niceness" has not been reciprocated with flexibility. Instead, it has been met with a hardening, confident, and increasingly assertive stance from the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI). Several recent events--some public, others quietly handled--should serve as a fleet-wide alarm bell:
* Incident 1: The Public Accusation (July 2023): Admiral Yudo Margono, a former commander of the TNI, testified before the Indonesian parliament that the United States was the biggest violator of Indonesian airspace. He wasn't whispering this in a private military channel; he was declaring it in an open political forum, citing eight U.S. military aircraft "violations" in the first half of that year alone. This public shaming was a clear signal. The core issue is that Indonesia contends these flights violated its sovereign airspace, while the United States largely views them as a legitimate exercise of international air navigation rights.
* Incident 2: The New Red Line (February 2025): Three U.S. Air Force C-130s transited from Darwin to Japan then back to Darwin that same day via the designated Archipelagic Sea Lane-3 (ASL-III). These flights were perfectly legal under any interpretation of international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNLOS). Despite this, the Department of Defense (DOD) country team in Jakarta was informed that TNI headquarters staff (MABES-TNI) "should have been notified" before the flights took place. This is a dangerous and unprecedented claim. Indonesia is no longer just restricting where military vessels can transit, but if they can transit at all without prior consent--a clear violation of the "unobstructed" passage rights afforded by UNCLOS.
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Figure 2: The Three Designated North-South Archipelagic Sea Lanes
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* Incident 3: The Coincidental Threat (April 2025): Coincidence is rare in this business. Just two months after the C-130 incident, the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) conducted an internal exercise. The scenario involved three TNI-AU F-16 fighter aircraft launching a simulated intercept and forced grounding of a C-130 "violating Indonesian air space" operating out of ASL-3. This was a clear, unambiguous signal, dramatically increasing the risk of a tactical miscalculation between U.S. forces and the TNI.
* Incident 4: The Narrative Hardens (June 2025): During a multinational course on security cooperation hosted by the DOD in Honolulu, an Indonesian law professor publicly asked the lecturer why the United States "will sometimes violate the UNCLOS," referencing an alleged 2003 incident where aircraft from the USS Carl Vinson allegedly violated airspace over Bawean Island. (Note: This is known within the TNI as the "Bawean Incident," and was no small matter; it involved Indonesian F-16s intercepting U.S. F/A-18s, resulting in a dogfight, missile locks, and a formal diplomatic demarche from Jakarta. From the U.S. perspective, this was a textbook example of miscalculation; a diplomatic clearance request for the overflight had been submitted and approved by Jakarta, but this approval was never passed down to the local TNI-AU air controllers due to internal stovepipes.) While international law can be arcane to the general public, when "experts" and educators begin treating historical misunderstandings as fact, it signals a deeper entrenchment of the narrative that shapes Indonesia's future leaders and public opinion.
The "Grand Bargain" at the Heart of the Dispute
This entire disagreement stems from a central, hard-fought compromise at the heart of UNCLOS. Indonesia, as a nation of over 17,000 islands, effectively created the concept of the "archipelagic state." With its 1957 Djuanda Declaration, it boldly declared that all waters inside its baselines were not high seas, but sovereign internal waters.
For over two decades, the United States, the former Soviet Union, and other major maritime powers forcefully rejected this. It was seen as a radical attempt to close off vast swaths of the ocean, including critical routes like the Sunda Strait and Java Sea. The deadlock was finally broken during the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). This was the "grand bargain": the United States and other powers, in a major concession, finally agreed to formally recognize the "archipelagic state" concept. In return, Indonesia and other new archipelagic states had to accept that these waters would not be "internal waters" but a new category: "archipelagic waters."
Critically, this new category came with a nonnegotiable right of ASL passage for all ships and aircraft. This right of passage, both through designated ASLs and "routes normally used for international navigation," was sacrosanct. It was the quid pro quo for recognizing the archipelagic state. When the United States challenges Indonesia's "creeping sovereignty" now, it is not simply arguing over a minor legal point; it is defending a central bargain of UNCLOS. Indonesia's attempts to impose notification requirements or restrict "normal routes" are a direct attempt to renege on that bargain, taking the concession of "sovereignty" while ignoring the "passage" obligation that came with it.
The Policy-Practice Disconnect
The U.S. legal position, articulated in State Department's Limits in the Seas No. 141, published in 2014, is clear:
* * *Partial Designation: Indonesia's designation of three north-south ASLs was accepted by the International Maritime Organization only as a "partial designation," since the government of Indonesia did not designate an east-west ASL.
* "Normal Routes" Apply: Under UNCLOS Article 53(12), if an archipelagic state "does not designate sea lanes" (i.e., east-west routes), the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage "may be exercised through the routes normally used for international navigation."
* U.S. Stance: Limits in the Seas No. 141 explicitly concludes that Indonesian attempts to restrict east-west routes (like the Java Sea) are "inconsistent with the navigational rights reflected in the LOS Convention."
This is U.S. policy, but U.S. practice tells a different story.
The last publicly documented freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) that directly challenged Indonesia's excessive maritime claims in the Java Sea was on May 12, 2017, conducted by USS John Paul Jones. Since then, U.S. Navy warships and aircraft have meticulously avoided the Java Sea and other non-designated routes, citing the desire to avoid unnecessary diplomatic strain.
This operational avoidance has been interpreted by Jakarta not as a gesture of goodwill, but as a tacit acceptance of their restrictive interpretation. U.S. policy is legally clear but operationally muddled, and that lack of clarity is now being capitalized on by TNI's de facto policy.
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Figure 3: Indonesia's Archipelagic Baselines
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Understanding the TNI's Sovereignty Red Line
To be clear, the TNI's actions are not random or rooted in anti-Americanism. From the Indonesian military's perspective, their actions are the logical, professional, and required defense of their nation's sovereignty. The United States cannot expect the TNI to "bend the rules" at the operational level when policymakers in Jakarta have not changed national policy.
This stance is underpinned by several key factors from the operational environment:
* Political: Indonesia's "bebas-aktif" (free and active) non-aligned foreign policy is the bedrock of its national identity. In a U.S.-PRC conflict, the default position will be a rigid, legalistic neutrality. Granting special access to U.S. and allied forces would be seen as a violation of this core principle.
* Military: The TNI's primary function, and the very core of its institutional identity, is to defend the nation's sovereignty. MABES-TNI will formally protest any action by the United States or the PRC that it deems an infringement. The F-16 exercise (Incident 3) was a clear demonstration that Indonesia has the capability and the political will to enforce its interpretation of the law. Enforcing this sovereignty is a core institutional interest for the TNI, justifying its budget, modernization, and political influence.
* Social/Information: There is a deep, cross-political sensitivity to sovereignty, born from the archipelago's colonial history. The "Bawean Incident" and Admiral Margono's testimony are not just random military data points; they are powerful information campaigns that shape public and political opinion, reinforcing the narrative that Indonesia's sovereignty is under constant threat.
The TNI will continue to execute its duty as it sees it: detecting, challenging, and intercepting perceived unauthorized transits until Indonesia's political policy is clarified. The United States' operational assertions should therefore not be aimed at forcing the TNI to back down, but at forcing this legal disconnect to be resolved at the political level.
The Two-Pronged Solution: FONOPs and Diplomatic Transparency
The current path is trending toward failure. The United States is not preserving the bilateral relationship, and current policy is empowering a neutral partner that, in a crisis, will default to the "safe" position of blocking everyone, including the United States and its allies. Indonesia's bebas-aktif foreign policy is, at its core, about maintaining the country's own autonomy. It is folly to assume Indonesia will automatically bend to U.S. needs in a conflict.
To correct this policy-practice drift, international law must be enforced. This requires a deliberate, two-pronged strategy that synchronizes U.S. operational mandates with U.S. bilateral engagement: The United States must resume specific operational assertions while simultaneously executing a focused diplomatic initiative to message U.S. actions and legal standing.
1. A Targeted Return to Freedom of Navigation
The United States must resume FONOPs that challenge Indonesia's specific excessive claims. This is not about escalation; it is about reestablishing the status quo ante.
* Challenge the east-west route. Conduct high-profile transit passage (not innocent passage, which Indonesia could interpret differently) through the Java Sea with no notification. The transit must be continuous, expeditious, and professionally broadcast as "archipelagic sea lanes passage" in accordance with UNCLOS Art. 53(12).
* Challenge the "consent" requirement. Continue to conduct military overflights through the designated ASLs without notification. Make it so routine that it becomes the normal pattern of life and directly refutes the new, dangerous claim from the February 2025 C-130 incident. This also upholds the right of "normal mode" transit, which for aircraft means no pre-notification.
2. Conveying Diplomatic Transparency Operational assertions must be paired with high-level diplomacy to message U.S. intent clearly: The U.S. Navy is upholding international law, not attacking a partner.
* Engage in formal diplomatic protest. A diplomatic demarche should be submitted to Jakarta, specifically contesting any requirement from MABES-TNI for pre-notification in designated ASLs and Indonesia's restrictive interpretation of its own Government Regulation 37 of 2002. This re-establishes the legal record of non-acquiescence.
* Leverage the alliance network. The United States should not act alone. It must actively encourage and support its allies, particularly the Five Eyes and Japan, to conduct their own transits through these routes. This demonstrates that this is not a U.S.-Indonesia dispute, but a united international community upholding the rules-based order.
* Engage at the top. Use existing annual bilateral and multilateral exercises like Super Garuda Shield, Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), and Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) to integrate blunt discussions on international law. The goal is to reach a common understanding that UNCLOS, including the right of ASL transit, is a benefit to Indonesia's security, not a threat to its sovereignty.
Indonesia's leaders are not bluffing. They are building a legal, political, and military framework to enforce a version of sovereignty that is fundamentally incompatible with the U.S. Navy's operational requirements. The United States cannot wait for a crisis to discover maritime commons through the Java Sea and Sunda Strait are closed. The United States must use FONOPs--the tool designed for this exact problem. By reasserting rights now, in peacetime, the United States is not picking a fight; it is preventing a future one.
Good partners are transparent partners. It is time to be transparent.
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Patrick Panjeti is a military fellow with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views or policy of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government. No federal endorsement is implied or intended.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/navigating-divide-why-us-navy-must-resume-fonops-indonesia
[Category: ThinkTank]