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Ifo Institute: Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany Improves Slightly
MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 18 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on Aug. 17, 2026:
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Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany Improves Slightly
Sentiment in residential construction in Germany improved somewhat in July. The business climate rose from -30.6 to -29.3 points. Companies assessed their current situation as better. Expectations, on the other hand, were slightly gloomier and remain pessimistic.
"The increase in building permits is slowly making its way through the industry," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "However, there is still a long ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 18 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on Aug. 17, 2026: * * * Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany Improves Slightly Sentiment in residential construction in Germany improved somewhat in July. The business climate rose from -30.6 to -29.3 points. Companies assessed their current situation as better. Expectations, on the other hand, were slightly gloomier and remain pessimistic. "The increase in building permits is slowly making its way through the industry," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "However, there is still a longway to go before it leads to a broad recovery."
There are also signs of slight easing in the order situation. The share of companies reporting too few orders fell from 43.7 to 41.2%. At the same time, however, cancellations increased considerably. 13.1% of companies reported canceled projects, up from 11.4% in previous month.
The material supply situation has eased somewhat: The share of companies experiencing bottlenecks for key intermediate products fell from 9.7 to 8.5%. "The order situation is slowly moving in the right direction, but at the same time, more projects are being canceled again," says Wohlrabe. "That shows just how fragile recovery in residential construction continues to be."
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More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-08-17/business-climate-residential-construction-germany-improves-slightly)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-08-17/business-climate-residential-construction-germany-improves-slightly
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany Improves Slightly
Sentiment in residential construction in Germany improved somewhat in July. The business climate rose from -30.6 to -29.3 points. Companies assessed their current situation as better. Expectations, on the other hand, were slightly gloomier and remain pessimistic.
"The increase in building permits is slowly making its way through the industry," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "However, there is still a long ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Aug. 18 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on Aug. 17, 2026: * * * Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany Improves Slightly Sentiment in residential construction in Germany improved somewhat in July. The business climate rose from -30.6 to -29.3 points. Companies assessed their current situation as better. Expectations, on the other hand, were slightly gloomier and remain pessimistic. "The increase in building permits is slowly making its way through the industry," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "However, there is still a longway to go before it leads to a broad recovery."
There are also signs of slight easing in the order situation. The share of companies reporting too few orders fell from 43.7 to 41.2%. At the same time, however, cancellations increased considerably. 13.1% of companies reported canceled projects, up from 11.4% in previous month.
The material supply situation has eased somewhat: The share of companies experiencing bottlenecks for key intermediate products fell from 9.7 to 8.5%. "The order situation is slowly moving in the right direction, but at the same time, more projects are being canceled again," says Wohlrabe. "That shows just how fragile recovery in residential construction continues to be."
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More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-08-17/business-climate-residential-construction-germany-improves-slightly)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-08-17/business-climate-residential-construction-germany-improves-slightly
[Category: ThinkTank]
ICTD Suspends Flagship Course on Research on Tax and Development
BRIGHTON, England, Aug. 18 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news on Aug. 17, 2026:
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ICTD suspends flagship course on Research on Tax and Development
The International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) will not be running its flagship Research on Tax and Development course, due to start in autumn 2026. The difficult decision to suspend the course is due to a reduction in funding for the ICTD's teaching and learning programme ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Aug. 18 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news on Aug. 17, 2026: * * * ICTD suspends flagship course on Research on Tax and Development The International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) will not be running its flagship Research on Tax and Development course, due to start in autumn 2026. The difficult decision to suspend the course is due to a reduction in funding for the ICTD's teaching and learning programmefrom 2027 onward, with the current cycle formally concluding in December 2026.
Whilst ICTD is seeking to secure new funds to continue this area of work, the team behind the successful course is taking the opportunity to review the experiences of the past decade and explore innovations in the course's structure and content for future iterations.
Celebrating a decade of building research and tax capacity
The course has served as a cornerstone for ICTD's capacity-building efforts. It provided a programme of training and mentorship to 245 participants from revenue authorities, ministries, and civil society organisations from lower-income countries since it was first launched in 2015. What set the course apart was both the diversity of its participants and the depth of engagement it offers. Delivered over the course of a year, the programme combined seven intensive modules covering qualitative and quantitative research methods, data analysis, and the communication of evidence to policy audiences.
Max Gallien, ICTD Research Director and co-lead of the course, reflected on the programme's legacy:
"For over a decade, this course has been at the heart of ICTD's mission to foster locally led research that makes tax systems fairer and more effective. The fact that year after year we received over 600 applications for only a small number of slots demonstrates the immense and growing demand for research skills around tax and development."
Alumni at the helm of reform
The impact of the course is evident from its alumni, many of whom have gone on to lead major reforms in their home countries or build lasting academic careers supported by ICTD scholarships.
In Somalia, Najibullah Nor Isak progressed from a junior officer to Director of the Customs Department at the Ministry of Finance, applying research skills to develop a Medium-Term Revenue Roadmap and establish a Research and Analytical Unit. These efforts contributed to a significant increase in domestic revenue, supporting broader goals of fiscal independence.
In Nigeria, Rafat Gambo played a central role in a major legislative reform process, serving as Secretariat Lead for a task force that contributed to the development of four landmark tax laws adopted in 2025.
"The course gave me the analytical tools and policy lens to contribute meaningfully to national reform," he said.
For her part, Rosa Maria Rodrigues De Abreu highly regarded the course's inclusive approach:
"That inclusiveness meant a great deal to me especially that I applied at a later stage in my life and career when universities would have rejected me because of my age. ICTD on the other hand, offered me an invaluable opportunity," she said.
Giovanni Occhiali, ICTD Senior Research Fellow and co-lead of the course, said:
"We are of course sad to have to make the difficult decision to suspend the programme, but are also immensely proud of what our alumni have achieved. Over the years, the course has contributed to creating a community of researchers and practitioners committed to building fairer tax systems, all of whom will continue to thrive. We hope that this is just a pause rather than an end as we look for new ways to continue this essential work."
New directions for delivering tax and development training and mentoring
Suspending the course does not mark the end of ICTD's capacity-building efforts. These include continuing to deliver bespoke training to our partners, supporting PhD research and developing free online learning materials on new areas of tax and development work. ICTD will continue to advocate for the importance of practical and accessible training and mentoring on research and evidence in tax and development. It will also explore partnerships that will allow the resumption of similar teaching and learning programmes in the future.
Hear from our alumni: (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWrrNDpyCWhezVwrWGWdYDg)
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Original text here: https://www.ictd.ac/news/ictd-suspends-flagship-course-research-tax-development/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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ICTD suspends flagship course on Research on Tax and Development
The International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) will not be running its flagship Research on Tax and Development course, due to start in autumn 2026. The difficult decision to suspend the course is due to a reduction in funding for the ICTD's teaching and learning programme ... Show Full Article BRIGHTON, England, Aug. 18 -- The International Centre for Tax and Development, an independent research centre that says it focuses on improving tax policy and administration in lower-income countries, issued the following news on Aug. 17, 2026: * * * ICTD suspends flagship course on Research on Tax and Development The International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) will not be running its flagship Research on Tax and Development course, due to start in autumn 2026. The difficult decision to suspend the course is due to a reduction in funding for the ICTD's teaching and learning programmefrom 2027 onward, with the current cycle formally concluding in December 2026.
Whilst ICTD is seeking to secure new funds to continue this area of work, the team behind the successful course is taking the opportunity to review the experiences of the past decade and explore innovations in the course's structure and content for future iterations.
Celebrating a decade of building research and tax capacity
The course has served as a cornerstone for ICTD's capacity-building efforts. It provided a programme of training and mentorship to 245 participants from revenue authorities, ministries, and civil society organisations from lower-income countries since it was first launched in 2015. What set the course apart was both the diversity of its participants and the depth of engagement it offers. Delivered over the course of a year, the programme combined seven intensive modules covering qualitative and quantitative research methods, data analysis, and the communication of evidence to policy audiences.
Max Gallien, ICTD Research Director and co-lead of the course, reflected on the programme's legacy:
"For over a decade, this course has been at the heart of ICTD's mission to foster locally led research that makes tax systems fairer and more effective. The fact that year after year we received over 600 applications for only a small number of slots demonstrates the immense and growing demand for research skills around tax and development."
Alumni at the helm of reform
The impact of the course is evident from its alumni, many of whom have gone on to lead major reforms in their home countries or build lasting academic careers supported by ICTD scholarships.
In Somalia, Najibullah Nor Isak progressed from a junior officer to Director of the Customs Department at the Ministry of Finance, applying research skills to develop a Medium-Term Revenue Roadmap and establish a Research and Analytical Unit. These efforts contributed to a significant increase in domestic revenue, supporting broader goals of fiscal independence.
In Nigeria, Rafat Gambo played a central role in a major legislative reform process, serving as Secretariat Lead for a task force that contributed to the development of four landmark tax laws adopted in 2025.
"The course gave me the analytical tools and policy lens to contribute meaningfully to national reform," he said.
For her part, Rosa Maria Rodrigues De Abreu highly regarded the course's inclusive approach:
"That inclusiveness meant a great deal to me especially that I applied at a later stage in my life and career when universities would have rejected me because of my age. ICTD on the other hand, offered me an invaluable opportunity," she said.
Giovanni Occhiali, ICTD Senior Research Fellow and co-lead of the course, said:
"We are of course sad to have to make the difficult decision to suspend the programme, but are also immensely proud of what our alumni have achieved. Over the years, the course has contributed to creating a community of researchers and practitioners committed to building fairer tax systems, all of whom will continue to thrive. We hope that this is just a pause rather than an end as we look for new ways to continue this essential work."
New directions for delivering tax and development training and mentoring
Suspending the course does not mark the end of ICTD's capacity-building efforts. These include continuing to deliver bespoke training to our partners, supporting PhD research and developing free online learning materials on new areas of tax and development work. ICTD will continue to advocate for the importance of practical and accessible training and mentoring on research and evidence in tax and development. It will also explore partnerships that will allow the resumption of similar teaching and learning programmes in the future.
Hear from our alumni: (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWrrNDpyCWhezVwrWGWdYDg)
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Original text here: https://www.ictd.ac/news/ictd-suspends-flagship-course-research-tax-development/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to New India Abroad Entitled 'India-U.S. and Indo-Pacific'
WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by senior fellow Aparna Pande to New India Abroad:
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India-U.S. and Indo-Pacific
For three and a half decades after the end of the Cold War, five successive American presidents recognized the need for a strategic partnership with India. The U.S.-led Indo Pacific strategy was also predicated upon building a lattice of interlinked partnerships and alliances across Asia.
A strategic partnership with the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by senior fellow Aparna Pande to New India Abroad: * * * India-U.S. and Indo-Pacific For three and a half decades after the end of the Cold War, five successive American presidents recognized the need for a strategic partnership with India. The U.S.-led Indo Pacific strategy was also predicated upon building a lattice of interlinked partnerships and alliances across Asia. A strategic partnership with theworld's largest democracy, India, that sits astride the Indian Ocean, was key. This was reflected in successive National Security and National Defense strategies over the last two and a half decades.
American grand strategy, since the end of the Second World War, has centered around preventing the rise of a peer competitor. During the Cold War, the focus of containment was the Soviet Union; over the last decade, China has received that attention.
For many American policymakers, India has long been the ideal counterweight to China because of the size of its population, its democratic example, and its economic and military potential. That India views China as a threat has helped reinforce this view within Washington, shaping the contours of the India-U.S. strategic partnership.
The China challenge has long been the strategic imperative underlying defense cooperation. American hope has been that as India builds its military capability it will project power in the Indo Pacific and be a willing partner in countering China's military aggression. This has aligned with an India that views itself as the net security provider and first responder in the Indian Ocean region.
As two countries in differing geographies with different histories the U.S. and India had differing views of Soviet Russia and Pakistan. Similarly, as a protectionist state, trade related tensions with India date back to the 1990s. However, these differences were rarely allowed to derail the broader strategic relationship.
The first Trump administration sought to deepen the partnership with India and supported India's "leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region." The 2022 NSS of the Biden administration continued this by stating that the two countries would work together bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally in the Indo Pacific.
Both administrations viewed India as a key security partner in the region, which directly ties into the American strategy to create a security architecture for the Indo-Pacific.
There is a broad absence of grand strategy underwriting the second Trump administration's policies globally, however, when it comes to a non-security ally like India, the lack of strategic focus is glaring. The NSS and NDS of the administration mention India but solely in terms of improving commercial relations and the need for India to contribute to Indo Pacific security.
The energetic ambassadorship of Sergio Gor, the frequent phone calls between PM Modi and President Trump, and Secretary of State Rubio's four-day long visit to India in May 2026 notwithstanding, the relationship lacks a strategic push. The Secretary's public comments that India remains a valuable ally and is not being singled out are great optics but do not change the reality.
Four ministerial level Quad summits cannot compensate for the lack of a Quad Leaders level summit over two years. The change in nomenclature of the Indo Pacific Command back to Pacific Command, and the focus on homeland and hemispheric defense means the Indo Pacific is no longer the premier center of gravity.
This administration's vision of partnership appears to focus upon burden sharing and burden shifting instead of building capacities and capabilities. This combined with what appears to be an old European balance of power approach to China is changing the strategic foundations of the Washington-Delhi partnership.
This geopolitical and geoeconomic churn of the last year and a half has in turn led India to double down on multi-alignment and strategic autonomy. In the month of May, India hosted the Quad Foreign Ministers meeting just a few weeks after hosting the foreign ministers of the BRICS plus grouping.
At the end of the day, the relationship continues to move forward at the operational level, with commercial, defense, and diplomatic cooperation. However, it lacks the strategic underpinning that is critical to taking it forward.
The partnership with the United States remains the most important relationship for India. However, at a time when American policy appears isolationist, mercantilist and mercurial, India is balancing and hedging to ensure it secures its interests, both regional and global.
Read in New India Abroad (https://www.newindiaabroad.com/english/india-independence-day/india-us-and-indo-pacific).
* * *
Aparna Pande is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute where her work focuses on India and South Asia.
Dr. Pande wrote her PhD dissertation on Pakistan's foreign policy. Her major field of interest is South Asia with a special focus on India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, foreign policy, and security. She has contributed to the American Interest, the Hindustan Times, the Times of India, the Live Mint, Huffington Post, the Sunday Guardian, The Print, and RealClearWorld.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/india-us-indo-pacific-aparna-pande
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
India-U.S. and Indo-Pacific
For three and a half decades after the end of the Cold War, five successive American presidents recognized the need for a strategic partnership with India. The U.S.-led Indo Pacific strategy was also predicated upon building a lattice of interlinked partnerships and alliances across Asia.
A strategic partnership with the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by senior fellow Aparna Pande to New India Abroad: * * * India-U.S. and Indo-Pacific For three and a half decades after the end of the Cold War, five successive American presidents recognized the need for a strategic partnership with India. The U.S.-led Indo Pacific strategy was also predicated upon building a lattice of interlinked partnerships and alliances across Asia. A strategic partnership with theworld's largest democracy, India, that sits astride the Indian Ocean, was key. This was reflected in successive National Security and National Defense strategies over the last two and a half decades.
American grand strategy, since the end of the Second World War, has centered around preventing the rise of a peer competitor. During the Cold War, the focus of containment was the Soviet Union; over the last decade, China has received that attention.
For many American policymakers, India has long been the ideal counterweight to China because of the size of its population, its democratic example, and its economic and military potential. That India views China as a threat has helped reinforce this view within Washington, shaping the contours of the India-U.S. strategic partnership.
The China challenge has long been the strategic imperative underlying defense cooperation. American hope has been that as India builds its military capability it will project power in the Indo Pacific and be a willing partner in countering China's military aggression. This has aligned with an India that views itself as the net security provider and first responder in the Indian Ocean region.
As two countries in differing geographies with different histories the U.S. and India had differing views of Soviet Russia and Pakistan. Similarly, as a protectionist state, trade related tensions with India date back to the 1990s. However, these differences were rarely allowed to derail the broader strategic relationship.
The first Trump administration sought to deepen the partnership with India and supported India's "leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region." The 2022 NSS of the Biden administration continued this by stating that the two countries would work together bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally in the Indo Pacific.
Both administrations viewed India as a key security partner in the region, which directly ties into the American strategy to create a security architecture for the Indo-Pacific.
There is a broad absence of grand strategy underwriting the second Trump administration's policies globally, however, when it comes to a non-security ally like India, the lack of strategic focus is glaring. The NSS and NDS of the administration mention India but solely in terms of improving commercial relations and the need for India to contribute to Indo Pacific security.
The energetic ambassadorship of Sergio Gor, the frequent phone calls between PM Modi and President Trump, and Secretary of State Rubio's four-day long visit to India in May 2026 notwithstanding, the relationship lacks a strategic push. The Secretary's public comments that India remains a valuable ally and is not being singled out are great optics but do not change the reality.
Four ministerial level Quad summits cannot compensate for the lack of a Quad Leaders level summit over two years. The change in nomenclature of the Indo Pacific Command back to Pacific Command, and the focus on homeland and hemispheric defense means the Indo Pacific is no longer the premier center of gravity.
This administration's vision of partnership appears to focus upon burden sharing and burden shifting instead of building capacities and capabilities. This combined with what appears to be an old European balance of power approach to China is changing the strategic foundations of the Washington-Delhi partnership.
This geopolitical and geoeconomic churn of the last year and a half has in turn led India to double down on multi-alignment and strategic autonomy. In the month of May, India hosted the Quad Foreign Ministers meeting just a few weeks after hosting the foreign ministers of the BRICS plus grouping.
At the end of the day, the relationship continues to move forward at the operational level, with commercial, defense, and diplomatic cooperation. However, it lacks the strategic underpinning that is critical to taking it forward.
The partnership with the United States remains the most important relationship for India. However, at a time when American policy appears isolationist, mercantilist and mercurial, India is balancing and hedging to ensure it secures its interests, both regional and global.
Read in New India Abroad (https://www.newindiaabroad.com/english/india-independence-day/india-us-and-indo-pacific).
* * *
Aparna Pande is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute where her work focuses on India and South Asia.
Dr. Pande wrote her PhD dissertation on Pakistan's foreign policy. Her major field of interest is South Asia with a special focus on India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, foreign policy, and security. She has contributed to the American Interest, the Hindustan Times, the Times of India, the Live Mint, Huffington Post, the Sunday Guardian, The Print, and RealClearWorld.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/india-us-indo-pacific-aparna-pande
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Daily Wire: Trump's Break With South Korea Projects Weakness in the Pacific
WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by senior fellow Michael Sobolik to Daily Wire:
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Trump's Break with South Korea Projects Weakness in the Pacific
Trump's idiosyncratic view of international relations risks unwittingly empowering America's enemies.
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Confusing adversaries and allies is a basic foreign policy mistake. Leveraging enemies to attack friends is a deeper failure. President Trump committed both errors on Sunday when he announced ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by senior fellow Michael Sobolik to Daily Wire: * * * Trump's Break with South Korea Projects Weakness in the Pacific Trump's idiosyncratic view of international relations risks unwittingly empowering America's enemies. - Confusing adversaries and allies is a basic foreign policy mistake. Leveraging enemies to attack friends is a deeper failure. President Trump committed both errors on Sunday when he announcedthat he was ordering the Pentagon to "substantially reduce the Joint Military Exercises" with South Korea. According to his post on social media, the president's justifications were his "very good relationship" with Pyongyang's dictator Kim Jong-un, and Seoul's failure to help Washington in its war with Tehran.
Trump's explanation contradicts his dismissal of Seoul five months ago: "WE NEVER DID" need South Korea's help to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Nor did America, in Trump's telling, need anyone's help. Now, months later, the president is revisiting a gambit he played in his first term: scaling down joint exercises with Seoul, apparently as an olive branch to Kim.
Trump may have legitimate reasons to be frustrated with South Korea. The liberal party in Seoul has an established track record of engagement with China, and has actively sought to weaken American sanctions on North Korea in years past. We should expect allies to act as allies.
It is equally true that America's partners should expect the global hegemony to act predictably in its own interests. Regardless of Seoul's behavior, Washington benefits when Pyongyang is hemmed in and deterred from adventurism and belligerence. More broadly, America's interests demand that North Korea never unify the peninsula. For these reasons alone, military exercises with South Korea should persist.
Trump's idiosyncratic view of international relations risks unwittingly empowering America's enemies. To be sure, Kim is delighted by any indication of American weakness, and will move to exploit any daylight between Washington and Seoul. Of greater import is how Pyongyang's northern neighbor views this move.
Xi Jinping has had ample opportunity to take the measure of Donald Trump. His first interaction with the president in 2017 consisted of Trump temporarily leaving the dining hall in Mar-a-Lago to order a strike on Syria. Trump's choreographed bravado signaled strength and resolve to Xi, as did the president's successful operation against Nicholas Maduro in his second term.
But Xi has also witnessed Trump's fundamental rejection of traditional categories for America's friends and enemies. Trump has accused Volodymyr Zelensky of starting the war with Russia. He heard Trump scold Taiwan earlier this year as he left Beijing, insisting that Taipei lower the temperature with China. He also took note of Trump's delay of arms sales to Taiwan. And, of course, the whole world witnessed Trump's repeated attempts last year to downgrade America's alliance with South Korea.
Confusing allies and adversaries risks misallocating trust and threats, like a chef mistaking sugar for salt. Trump needs to maintain deterrence in East Asia. Two wars are already raging in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In response to the latter, the Pentagon recently redeployed the USS George Washington from the Indo-Pacific to the Persian Gulf to relieve the USS Abraham Lincoln. No carriers are now in or near East Asia. Compounding this capability shortfall is the drawdown of Tomahawk missiles and other standoff platforms the Pentagon would need in a China scenario. Trump is coupling a numbers problem with a judgment problem.
These intersecting trends present Xi, and any other anti-American despot, with an easy response: follow Kim's lead. Convince Trump that you're "unthreatening and respectful," and reap the windfall of unilateral concessions from America. As a bonus, the administration in Washington may blame America's allies for being "hostile." Trump already fell into these patterns with Taiwan earlier this summer. Xi will likely seek to pull the president further down this road.
To a point, the president's frustrations with allies are understandable. More than any of his predecessors, Trump has called on America's partners to do their part and contribute to their own security. For that, he deserves great credit. But nixing readiness exercises on the Korean Peninsula, with nuclear table stakes, smacks of poor judgment and misplaced optimism in the president's own ability to untangle intractable challenges that go back to 1950. Ignoring the historical roots of the present is a quick ticket to catastrophe. The challenge of North Korea isn't the lack of dealmaking presidents or petulant partners in Seoul, but Pyongyang's Communist ideology, Washington's failure to prevent its nuclearization, and haphazard policies that have oscillated from confrontation to conciliation.
Trump is unknowingly playing into that perverse pattern. By doing so, he is projecting weakness to Kim Jong-un's northern neighbor and East Asia's most powerful dictator. Canceling military exercises with South Korea is likely unfinished business from Trump's first term. The day may come when the president sees the wisdom of his former advisors who counseled against doing so.
Read in Daily Wire (https://www.dailywire.com/news/trumps-break-with-south-korea-projects-weakness-in-the-pacific?author=Michael+Sobolik&category=News&elementPosition=0&row=0&rowType=Vertical+List&title=Trump%E2%80%99s+Break+With+South+Korea+Projects+Weakness+In+The+Pacific).
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Michael Sobolik is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. He specializes in United States-China relations and great power competition with a focus on geopolitics, net assessments, and competitive strategies. He is the author of Countering China's Great Game: A Strategy for American Dominance (Naval Institute Press, 2024). He is also a contributing writer at The Dispatch, a contributing editor at Providence: A Journal of Christianity and American Foreign Policy, and an advisory board member at the Vandenberg Coalition.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/trumps-break-south-korea-projects-weakness-pacific-michael-sobolik
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Trump's Break with South Korea Projects Weakness in the Pacific
Trump's idiosyncratic view of international relations risks unwittingly empowering America's enemies.
-
Confusing adversaries and allies is a basic foreign policy mistake. Leveraging enemies to attack friends is a deeper failure. President Trump committed both errors on Sunday when he announced ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by senior fellow Michael Sobolik to Daily Wire: * * * Trump's Break with South Korea Projects Weakness in the Pacific Trump's idiosyncratic view of international relations risks unwittingly empowering America's enemies. - Confusing adversaries and allies is a basic foreign policy mistake. Leveraging enemies to attack friends is a deeper failure. President Trump committed both errors on Sunday when he announcedthat he was ordering the Pentagon to "substantially reduce the Joint Military Exercises" with South Korea. According to his post on social media, the president's justifications were his "very good relationship" with Pyongyang's dictator Kim Jong-un, and Seoul's failure to help Washington in its war with Tehran.
Trump's explanation contradicts his dismissal of Seoul five months ago: "WE NEVER DID" need South Korea's help to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Nor did America, in Trump's telling, need anyone's help. Now, months later, the president is revisiting a gambit he played in his first term: scaling down joint exercises with Seoul, apparently as an olive branch to Kim.
Trump may have legitimate reasons to be frustrated with South Korea. The liberal party in Seoul has an established track record of engagement with China, and has actively sought to weaken American sanctions on North Korea in years past. We should expect allies to act as allies.
It is equally true that America's partners should expect the global hegemony to act predictably in its own interests. Regardless of Seoul's behavior, Washington benefits when Pyongyang is hemmed in and deterred from adventurism and belligerence. More broadly, America's interests demand that North Korea never unify the peninsula. For these reasons alone, military exercises with South Korea should persist.
Trump's idiosyncratic view of international relations risks unwittingly empowering America's enemies. To be sure, Kim is delighted by any indication of American weakness, and will move to exploit any daylight between Washington and Seoul. Of greater import is how Pyongyang's northern neighbor views this move.
Xi Jinping has had ample opportunity to take the measure of Donald Trump. His first interaction with the president in 2017 consisted of Trump temporarily leaving the dining hall in Mar-a-Lago to order a strike on Syria. Trump's choreographed bravado signaled strength and resolve to Xi, as did the president's successful operation against Nicholas Maduro in his second term.
But Xi has also witnessed Trump's fundamental rejection of traditional categories for America's friends and enemies. Trump has accused Volodymyr Zelensky of starting the war with Russia. He heard Trump scold Taiwan earlier this year as he left Beijing, insisting that Taipei lower the temperature with China. He also took note of Trump's delay of arms sales to Taiwan. And, of course, the whole world witnessed Trump's repeated attempts last year to downgrade America's alliance with South Korea.
Confusing allies and adversaries risks misallocating trust and threats, like a chef mistaking sugar for salt. Trump needs to maintain deterrence in East Asia. Two wars are already raging in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. In response to the latter, the Pentagon recently redeployed the USS George Washington from the Indo-Pacific to the Persian Gulf to relieve the USS Abraham Lincoln. No carriers are now in or near East Asia. Compounding this capability shortfall is the drawdown of Tomahawk missiles and other standoff platforms the Pentagon would need in a China scenario. Trump is coupling a numbers problem with a judgment problem.
These intersecting trends present Xi, and any other anti-American despot, with an easy response: follow Kim's lead. Convince Trump that you're "unthreatening and respectful," and reap the windfall of unilateral concessions from America. As a bonus, the administration in Washington may blame America's allies for being "hostile." Trump already fell into these patterns with Taiwan earlier this summer. Xi will likely seek to pull the president further down this road.
To a point, the president's frustrations with allies are understandable. More than any of his predecessors, Trump has called on America's partners to do their part and contribute to their own security. For that, he deserves great credit. But nixing readiness exercises on the Korean Peninsula, with nuclear table stakes, smacks of poor judgment and misplaced optimism in the president's own ability to untangle intractable challenges that go back to 1950. Ignoring the historical roots of the present is a quick ticket to catastrophe. The challenge of North Korea isn't the lack of dealmaking presidents or petulant partners in Seoul, but Pyongyang's Communist ideology, Washington's failure to prevent its nuclearization, and haphazard policies that have oscillated from confrontation to conciliation.
Trump is unknowingly playing into that perverse pattern. By doing so, he is projecting weakness to Kim Jong-un's northern neighbor and East Asia's most powerful dictator. Canceling military exercises with South Korea is likely unfinished business from Trump's first term. The day may come when the president sees the wisdom of his former advisors who counseled against doing so.
Read in Daily Wire (https://www.dailywire.com/news/trumps-break-with-south-korea-projects-weakness-in-the-pacific?author=Michael+Sobolik&category=News&elementPosition=0&row=0&rowType=Vertical+List&title=Trump%E2%80%99s+Break+With+South+Korea+Projects+Weakness+In+The+Pacific).
* * *
Michael Sobolik is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. He specializes in United States-China relations and great power competition with a focus on geopolitics, net assessments, and competitive strategies. He is the author of Countering China's Great Game: A Strategy for American Dominance (Naval Institute Press, 2024). He is also a contributing writer at The Dispatch, a contributing editor at Providence: A Journal of Christianity and American Foreign Policy, and an advisory board member at the Vandenberg Coalition.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/trumps-break-south-korea-projects-weakness-pacific-michael-sobolik
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary Entitled 'Enemies of Energy - Climateworks Foundation'
WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 (TNSrpt) -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by Managing Editor and Director of Content Ken Braun:
* * *
Enemies of Energy: Climateworks Foundation
A major pass through donor to anti-energy NGOs, Climateworks claims to have disbursed at least $2 billion since 2008.
Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center. The page for the full report is here: Enemies of Energy.
-
Donor type: pass-through grant maker
The mission statement of the Climateworks ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 (TNSrpt) -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by Managing Editor and Director of Content Ken Braun: * * * Enemies of Energy: Climateworks Foundation A major pass through donor to anti-energy NGOs, Climateworks claims to have disbursed at least $2 billion since 2008. Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center. The page for the full report is here: Enemies of Energy. - Donor type: pass-through grant maker The mission statement of the ClimateworksFoundation, according to the grant maker's IRS filings, is "to end the climate crisis by amplifying the power of philanthropy."[i]
As explained in the first section of this report, rising global temperatures are real, but the "climate crisis" is not. Skepticism on this point has been growing. A January 2026 report in Politico claimed there is "a schism within the Democratic Party about whether talking about climate change is the right message to win back control of Washington."[ii]
"Now Democrats are increasingly showing they have decided it's a losing message to tout the ways in which they'd curb fossil fuel production to thwart the most dire effects of climate change," reported Politico. "Instead, they're choosing to focus on policies that would lower energy costs and lean hard into affordability talking points embraced by Trump and congressional Republicans."[iii]
But that "losing message" remains central to Climateworks. "The climate crisis is here," the foundation's home page proclaims.[iv]
In its most recent publicly available IRS report, covering 2024, Climateworks reported $334.8 million in total revenue and $229.8 million in grants paid out, or 68 percent of total revenue taken in for the year. Grants for the anti-energy NGOs profiled in this report and to other donors to anti-energy NGOs that are profiled in this section accounted for $20.9 million of the 2024 total.[v]
Eight of the fifteen anti-energy NGOs (plus an advocacy affiliate of one of them) received a combined total of $11.5 million from Climateworks in 2024:[vi]
* Environmental Defense Fund: $4.2 million
* Natural Resources Defense Council: $2.8 million
* Rocky Mountain Institute: $2 million
* World Resources Institute: $1.5 million
* Sierra Club Foundation: $750,000
* Earthjustice: $100,000
* Union of Concerned Scientists: $75,000
* Earthjustice Action: $70,000
* World Wildlife Fund: $25,000
Two of the other pass-through donors on this list received a combined total of nearly $9.3 million in grants from Climateworks in 2024: [vii]
* U.S. Energy Foundation: $9 million
* Windward Fund: $259,000
Climateworks was created in 2008 as a joint project of three huge left-wing grantmaking foundations: the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, and the McKnight Foundation. As of their last publicly available IRS filings, these three founders had combined net assets of $24.6 billion.[viii]
As of April 2026, Climateworks claims to have granted more than $2 billion since 2008 and worked alongside 80 different funders.[ix]
* * *
Endnotes
[i] Climateworks Foundation. (EIN: 26-2303250). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/262303250/202512959349301466/full
[ii] Davidson, Amelia; and Kelsey Brugger. "Democrats are shying away from climate messaging. One of their own is fighting back." Politico. January 25, 2026. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/25/democrats-climate-affordability-trump-00745597
[iii] Davidson, Amelia; and Kelsey Brugger. "Democrats are shying away from climate messaging. One of their own is fighting back." Politico. January 25, 2026. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/25/democrats-climate-affordability-trump-00745597
[iv] Climateworks home page. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://www.climateworks.org/
[v] Climateworks Foundation. (EIN: 26-2303250). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/262303250/202512959349301466/full
[vi] Climateworks Foundation. (EIN: 26-2303250). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/262303250/202512959349301466/full
[vii] Climateworks Foundation. (EIN: 26-2303250). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/262303250/202512959349301466/full
[viii] History. ClimateWorks Foundation. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20150309034613/https://www.climateworks.org/about-us/our-history/ (Previously: https://www.climateworks.org/about-us/our-history/)
David And Lucile Packard Foundation. (EIN: 94-2278431). Propublica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/942278431
Mcknight Foundation. (EIN: 41-0754835). Propublica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/410754835
William & Flora Hewlett Foundation. (EIN: 94-1655673). Propublica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/941655673
[ix] "About Us." Climateworks. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://www.climateworks.org/about-us/
* * *
Ken Braun
As managing editor and director of content of CRC, Ken Braun edits Capital Research magazine. He also conducts investigative research and drafts profiles for InfluenceWatch.org.
* * *
REPORT: https://capitalresearch.org/app/uploads/FINAL-PDF_CRC_EnemiesofEnergy.pdf
Original tex there: https://capitalresearch.org/article/enemies-of-energy-climateworks-foundation/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Enemies of Energy: Climateworks Foundation
A major pass through donor to anti-energy NGOs, Climateworks claims to have disbursed at least $2 billion since 2008.
Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center. The page for the full report is here: Enemies of Energy.
-
Donor type: pass-through grant maker
The mission statement of the Climateworks ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 (TNSrpt) -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by Managing Editor and Director of Content Ken Braun: * * * Enemies of Energy: Climateworks Foundation A major pass through donor to anti-energy NGOs, Climateworks claims to have disbursed at least $2 billion since 2008. Editor's note: The following is an excerpt from Enemies of Energy, a research report created for the Capital Research Center. The page for the full report is here: Enemies of Energy. - Donor type: pass-through grant maker The mission statement of the ClimateworksFoundation, according to the grant maker's IRS filings, is "to end the climate crisis by amplifying the power of philanthropy."[i]
As explained in the first section of this report, rising global temperatures are real, but the "climate crisis" is not. Skepticism on this point has been growing. A January 2026 report in Politico claimed there is "a schism within the Democratic Party about whether talking about climate change is the right message to win back control of Washington."[ii]
"Now Democrats are increasingly showing they have decided it's a losing message to tout the ways in which they'd curb fossil fuel production to thwart the most dire effects of climate change," reported Politico. "Instead, they're choosing to focus on policies that would lower energy costs and lean hard into affordability talking points embraced by Trump and congressional Republicans."[iii]
But that "losing message" remains central to Climateworks. "The climate crisis is here," the foundation's home page proclaims.[iv]
In its most recent publicly available IRS report, covering 2024, Climateworks reported $334.8 million in total revenue and $229.8 million in grants paid out, or 68 percent of total revenue taken in for the year. Grants for the anti-energy NGOs profiled in this report and to other donors to anti-energy NGOs that are profiled in this section accounted for $20.9 million of the 2024 total.[v]
Eight of the fifteen anti-energy NGOs (plus an advocacy affiliate of one of them) received a combined total of $11.5 million from Climateworks in 2024:[vi]
* Environmental Defense Fund: $4.2 million
* Natural Resources Defense Council: $2.8 million
* Rocky Mountain Institute: $2 million
* World Resources Institute: $1.5 million
* Sierra Club Foundation: $750,000
* Earthjustice: $100,000
* Union of Concerned Scientists: $75,000
* Earthjustice Action: $70,000
* World Wildlife Fund: $25,000
Two of the other pass-through donors on this list received a combined total of nearly $9.3 million in grants from Climateworks in 2024: [vii]
* U.S. Energy Foundation: $9 million
* Windward Fund: $259,000
Climateworks was created in 2008 as a joint project of three huge left-wing grantmaking foundations: the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, and the McKnight Foundation. As of their last publicly available IRS filings, these three founders had combined net assets of $24.6 billion.[viii]
As of April 2026, Climateworks claims to have granted more than $2 billion since 2008 and worked alongside 80 different funders.[ix]
* * *
Endnotes
[i] Climateworks Foundation. (EIN: 26-2303250). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/262303250/202512959349301466/full
[ii] Davidson, Amelia; and Kelsey Brugger. "Democrats are shying away from climate messaging. One of their own is fighting back." Politico. January 25, 2026. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/25/democrats-climate-affordability-trump-00745597
[iii] Davidson, Amelia; and Kelsey Brugger. "Democrats are shying away from climate messaging. One of their own is fighting back." Politico. January 25, 2026. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/25/democrats-climate-affordability-trump-00745597
[iv] Climateworks home page. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://www.climateworks.org/
[v] Climateworks Foundation. (EIN: 26-2303250). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/262303250/202512959349301466/full
[vi] Climateworks Foundation. (EIN: 26-2303250). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/262303250/202512959349301466/full
[vii] Climateworks Foundation. (EIN: 26-2303250). 2024 IRS Form 990. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/262303250/202512959349301466/full
[viii] History. ClimateWorks Foundation. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://web.archive.org/web/20150309034613/https://www.climateworks.org/about-us/our-history/ (Previously: https://www.climateworks.org/about-us/our-history/)
David And Lucile Packard Foundation. (EIN: 94-2278431). Propublica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/942278431
Mcknight Foundation. (EIN: 41-0754835). Propublica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/410754835
William & Flora Hewlett Foundation. (EIN: 94-1655673). Propublica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/941655673
[ix] "About Us." Climateworks. Accessed April 21, 2026. https://www.climateworks.org/about-us/
* * *
Ken Braun
As managing editor and director of content of CRC, Ken Braun edits Capital Research magazine. He also conducts investigative research and drafts profiles for InfluenceWatch.org.
* * *
REPORT: https://capitalresearch.org/app/uploads/FINAL-PDF_CRC_EnemiesofEnergy.pdf
Original tex there: https://capitalresearch.org/article/enemies-of-energy-climateworks-foundation/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Are SBIR 'Mills' Truly a Problem?
WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by Jerry McGinn, director of the Center for the Industrial Base and senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department, and Jacob Schwandt:
* * *
Are SBIR "Mills" Truly a Problem?
Last year's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) reauthorization debate was among the most contentious in the program's four-decade history. Authorities lapsed for six months before April's Small Business Innovation and Economic Security Act funded the program through 2031. As CSIS ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by Jerry McGinn, director of the Center for the Industrial Base and senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department, and Jacob Schwandt: * * * Are SBIR "Mills" Truly a Problem? Last year's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) reauthorization debate was among the most contentious in the program's four-decade history. Authorities lapsed for six months before April's Small Business Innovation and Economic Security Act funded the program through 2031. As CSISanalysis noted during the debate, because the federal government does not produce standardized measures of SBIR performance, "it is easy for critics to cast doubt on the program's efficacy."
Nowhere was that clearer than in the debate over SBIR "mills." Senator Joni Ernst (R-IA), whose INNOVATE Act typified the reform push, argued that firms with Beltway connections and grant-writing expertise "have been able to collect an outsized portion of the funding, with fewer results to show for it," citing findings that the most frequent winners "were less productive in terms of commercialization, investments, and patents." While Ernst's proposed $75 million lifetime cap for grant recipients did not make it into law, similar reforms did, including agency-set annual proposal caps and a new premium award tier tied to matching private funds.
This prioritization of commercialization sits somewhat uneasily with the program's origins. In 1945, Vannevar Bush, America's wartime R&D cheif, published Science, the Endless Frontier, which argued that the government should fund the risky, long-term research that private industry would not. SBIR was an attempt to support such innovation outside of government labs and major corporations. The SBIR mill critique inverts this philosophy, treating the ability to attract private investment as the principal test of whether a firm deserves support from a program built to fund work the private sector would not.
Two business models coexist within the program today. Firms on the dual-use route develop commercial technology for both defense and civilian customers and finance that work partly with venture capital (VC). Firms on the defense route build for a single customer--the Pentagon--finance development through contracts, and are judged by the follow-on business they win. The two models are complementary: One imports commercial innovation into defense; the other sustains specialized capability that often has little commercial market. Any measure of efficacy must account for both.
Funding Efficiency Metrics Can Be Reconstructed from Public Records
Whether firms that win large numbers of SBIR contracts create demonstrably valuable innovation, as measured by conversion into follow-on defense contracts, patents, and private investment, sits at the heart of the debate. Conversion here means moving from subsidized awards to winning regular defense business, and it is the program's own yardstick: SBIR's statutory purpose is commercialization, and for defense technologies the paying customer is the Department of Defense (DOD). Fortunately, the question is answerable with records the government already publishes. Award histories sit on SBIR.gov. Federal contracts, including a flag identifying SBIR awards, appear on USAspending.gov. Patents and published measures of their significance are open data, and venture-style equity raises appear in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form D filings. New analysis links these records for all 10,280 firms that have won the more than 100,000 DOD SBIR awards since 1983. The combined dataset allows for the comparison of the 69 firms with 50 or more Phase II advanced-development awards (so-called SBIR mills) against awardees with three to nine awards (principally VC-backed firms).
Three Misconceptions, Measured
Critics have argued that SBIR mills exploit permissive size rules and bureaucratic expertise to capture disproportionate funding, crowd out small innovators, and weaken technology transitions. Others have claimed the program has become a subsidy for grant-dependent research houses rather than a launchpad for innovation. Such arguments have spawned proposals to impose award caps, first-time-recipient requirements, and commercialization-focused funding. This drive to restructure the program, however, is informed by three structural misperceptions regarding the SBIR program:
1. Mills win awards but rarely "demonstrate commercial traction or follow-on contracts with non-SBIR dollars." By that standard, however, the heaviest winners actually lead the program. Within five years of its first SBIR award, 71 percent of the 50-plus award group won at least one DOD contract of $50,000 or more outside the SBIR program, compared with 44 percent of the 3-9 award group (Figure 1). Over its time in the program, the median "mill" has won roughly 50 cents in non-SBIR DOD contract dollars for every SBIR dollar received, compared with 16 cents for the median firm in the 3-9 group. Nine in 10 of the heaviest winners have won production contracts at some point, compared with fewer than half of the 3-9 group. Reaching procurement is the norm for these firms, not the exception. Essentially, the firms that critics call mills are more likely than other awardees to become substantial defense contractors themselves, but they cross the "valley of death" through follow-on procurement rather than private investments. The public records show such transitions as contract activity; no dataset currently captures development into programs of record.
* * *
Figure 1: SBIR's Heaviest Repeat Winners Convert into DOD Procurement at Higher Rates
* * *
2. Mills innovate less. The Government Accountability Office found that the most frequent winners generate fewer patents per SBIR dollar. But at a per-firm rather than per-dollar level, the picture inverts: 55 percent of the heaviest winners produced at least one patent within five years of an award, compared with 30 percent of the 3--9 group. On the standardized metrics of individual patent significance, the average mill patent scores about the same as patents produced by other SIBR recipients.
3. Mills rarely merit private investment. Here the record does show a gap. In the five years after an award, about one in 20 mills report a venture-style equity raise with the SEC, compared with roughly one in 10 of the 3-9 group (Figure 2). The problem is the presumption behind the critique: that every SBIR firm is, or should be, pursuing the dual-use venture model, and that those that do not are failing. That is a poor way to measure value, not least because the two pathways are complimentary: VC flocks to firms with dual-use potential, while defense specialists can continue to tap SBIR funds and pursue follow-on production contracts.
* * *
Figure 2: Repeat Winners Rarely Take the Venture Capital Route
* * *
A firm with dual-use technology may take a single award to signal defense procurement expertise before raising private capital; in fact, some investors view repeated SBIR awards as a negative signal. Meanwhile, firms building defense-exclusive technology have historically faced difficulty raising private capital, making follow-on awards critical to their ability to deliver capabilities the DOD requires.
Together, these findings suggest mills are not gaming the system. Most are established defense contractors and patent holders in their own right. The dataset shows that only 7 percent of the mills are based in the Washington, D.C. area. Additionally, 59 percent of the heaviest winners held a $50,000-plus DOD contract before their first recorded SBIR award, and 55 percent issued a patent, each at least twice the rate of the 3-9 group. Additionally, approximately 80 percent of mills have pursued this business model for over 20 years. They simply commercialize through procurement rather than through the venture-and-exit track.
Where the Evidence Supports Reform
Congress appropriately prioritized swift reauthorization while also creating the Strategic Breakthrough Allocation, which offers awards of up to $30 million to firms that secure matching private capital or non-SBIR government funding. The provision is voluntary and could help all firms in the SBIR program. Its underlying assumption deserves scrutiny, however. The heaviest repeat winners already secure non-SBIR defense contracts at higher rates than other awardees, making award frequency a poor proxy for dependence on the program. Future reforms should focus on demonstrated outcomes.
Better measurement would make these outcomes more visible. Phase II applicants could disclose whether they intend to commercialize through private investment, commercial sales, federal procurement, or some combination of the three. The Pentagon's November 2025 acquisition overhaul calls for clearer pathways from successful prototypes to production contracts. Establishing specific benchmarks for SBIR-derived technologies to qualify for sole-source Phase III awards would give that commitment a practical mechanism.
Reauthorization has secured the SBIR program through 2031. The next task is to build a system to better measure its results. Every finding in this analysis comes from public records that the government could systematize. They suggest that many repeat winners follow a distinct business model: develop technologies through SBIR funding and commercialize them through federal procurement. Venture-backed firms generally pursue a different path. Both models can generate meaningful value, and metrics that account for their complementary roles would help future discussions of the SBIR program more clearly assess its value.
* * *
Jacob Schwandt received his bachelor's in economics at the London School of Economics and recently completed his master's in economics and data science at the University of Cambridge, where he specialized on government procurement and in particular the SBIR program. Jerry McGinn is the director of the Center for the Industrial Base and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
The authors would like to thank Oliver Buntin, research assistant in the Center for the Industrial Base at CSIS, for his support on this piece.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sbir-mills-truly-problem
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Are SBIR "Mills" Truly a Problem?
Last year's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) reauthorization debate was among the most contentious in the program's four-decade history. Authorities lapsed for six months before April's Small Business Innovation and Economic Security Act funded the program through 2031. As CSIS ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by Jerry McGinn, director of the Center for the Industrial Base and senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department, and Jacob Schwandt: * * * Are SBIR "Mills" Truly a Problem? Last year's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) reauthorization debate was among the most contentious in the program's four-decade history. Authorities lapsed for six months before April's Small Business Innovation and Economic Security Act funded the program through 2031. As CSISanalysis noted during the debate, because the federal government does not produce standardized measures of SBIR performance, "it is easy for critics to cast doubt on the program's efficacy."
Nowhere was that clearer than in the debate over SBIR "mills." Senator Joni Ernst (R-IA), whose INNOVATE Act typified the reform push, argued that firms with Beltway connections and grant-writing expertise "have been able to collect an outsized portion of the funding, with fewer results to show for it," citing findings that the most frequent winners "were less productive in terms of commercialization, investments, and patents." While Ernst's proposed $75 million lifetime cap for grant recipients did not make it into law, similar reforms did, including agency-set annual proposal caps and a new premium award tier tied to matching private funds.
This prioritization of commercialization sits somewhat uneasily with the program's origins. In 1945, Vannevar Bush, America's wartime R&D cheif, published Science, the Endless Frontier, which argued that the government should fund the risky, long-term research that private industry would not. SBIR was an attempt to support such innovation outside of government labs and major corporations. The SBIR mill critique inverts this philosophy, treating the ability to attract private investment as the principal test of whether a firm deserves support from a program built to fund work the private sector would not.
Two business models coexist within the program today. Firms on the dual-use route develop commercial technology for both defense and civilian customers and finance that work partly with venture capital (VC). Firms on the defense route build for a single customer--the Pentagon--finance development through contracts, and are judged by the follow-on business they win. The two models are complementary: One imports commercial innovation into defense; the other sustains specialized capability that often has little commercial market. Any measure of efficacy must account for both.
Funding Efficiency Metrics Can Be Reconstructed from Public Records
Whether firms that win large numbers of SBIR contracts create demonstrably valuable innovation, as measured by conversion into follow-on defense contracts, patents, and private investment, sits at the heart of the debate. Conversion here means moving from subsidized awards to winning regular defense business, and it is the program's own yardstick: SBIR's statutory purpose is commercialization, and for defense technologies the paying customer is the Department of Defense (DOD). Fortunately, the question is answerable with records the government already publishes. Award histories sit on SBIR.gov. Federal contracts, including a flag identifying SBIR awards, appear on USAspending.gov. Patents and published measures of their significance are open data, and venture-style equity raises appear in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form D filings. New analysis links these records for all 10,280 firms that have won the more than 100,000 DOD SBIR awards since 1983. The combined dataset allows for the comparison of the 69 firms with 50 or more Phase II advanced-development awards (so-called SBIR mills) against awardees with three to nine awards (principally VC-backed firms).
Three Misconceptions, Measured
Critics have argued that SBIR mills exploit permissive size rules and bureaucratic expertise to capture disproportionate funding, crowd out small innovators, and weaken technology transitions. Others have claimed the program has become a subsidy for grant-dependent research houses rather than a launchpad for innovation. Such arguments have spawned proposals to impose award caps, first-time-recipient requirements, and commercialization-focused funding. This drive to restructure the program, however, is informed by three structural misperceptions regarding the SBIR program:
1. Mills win awards but rarely "demonstrate commercial traction or follow-on contracts with non-SBIR dollars." By that standard, however, the heaviest winners actually lead the program. Within five years of its first SBIR award, 71 percent of the 50-plus award group won at least one DOD contract of $50,000 or more outside the SBIR program, compared with 44 percent of the 3-9 award group (Figure 1). Over its time in the program, the median "mill" has won roughly 50 cents in non-SBIR DOD contract dollars for every SBIR dollar received, compared with 16 cents for the median firm in the 3-9 group. Nine in 10 of the heaviest winners have won production contracts at some point, compared with fewer than half of the 3-9 group. Reaching procurement is the norm for these firms, not the exception. Essentially, the firms that critics call mills are more likely than other awardees to become substantial defense contractors themselves, but they cross the "valley of death" through follow-on procurement rather than private investments. The public records show such transitions as contract activity; no dataset currently captures development into programs of record.
* * *
Figure 1: SBIR's Heaviest Repeat Winners Convert into DOD Procurement at Higher Rates
* * *
2. Mills innovate less. The Government Accountability Office found that the most frequent winners generate fewer patents per SBIR dollar. But at a per-firm rather than per-dollar level, the picture inverts: 55 percent of the heaviest winners produced at least one patent within five years of an award, compared with 30 percent of the 3--9 group. On the standardized metrics of individual patent significance, the average mill patent scores about the same as patents produced by other SIBR recipients.
3. Mills rarely merit private investment. Here the record does show a gap. In the five years after an award, about one in 20 mills report a venture-style equity raise with the SEC, compared with roughly one in 10 of the 3-9 group (Figure 2). The problem is the presumption behind the critique: that every SBIR firm is, or should be, pursuing the dual-use venture model, and that those that do not are failing. That is a poor way to measure value, not least because the two pathways are complimentary: VC flocks to firms with dual-use potential, while defense specialists can continue to tap SBIR funds and pursue follow-on production contracts.
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Figure 2: Repeat Winners Rarely Take the Venture Capital Route
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A firm with dual-use technology may take a single award to signal defense procurement expertise before raising private capital; in fact, some investors view repeated SBIR awards as a negative signal. Meanwhile, firms building defense-exclusive technology have historically faced difficulty raising private capital, making follow-on awards critical to their ability to deliver capabilities the DOD requires.
Together, these findings suggest mills are not gaming the system. Most are established defense contractors and patent holders in their own right. The dataset shows that only 7 percent of the mills are based in the Washington, D.C. area. Additionally, 59 percent of the heaviest winners held a $50,000-plus DOD contract before their first recorded SBIR award, and 55 percent issued a patent, each at least twice the rate of the 3-9 group. Additionally, approximately 80 percent of mills have pursued this business model for over 20 years. They simply commercialize through procurement rather than through the venture-and-exit track.
Where the Evidence Supports Reform
Congress appropriately prioritized swift reauthorization while also creating the Strategic Breakthrough Allocation, which offers awards of up to $30 million to firms that secure matching private capital or non-SBIR government funding. The provision is voluntary and could help all firms in the SBIR program. Its underlying assumption deserves scrutiny, however. The heaviest repeat winners already secure non-SBIR defense contracts at higher rates than other awardees, making award frequency a poor proxy for dependence on the program. Future reforms should focus on demonstrated outcomes.
Better measurement would make these outcomes more visible. Phase II applicants could disclose whether they intend to commercialize through private investment, commercial sales, federal procurement, or some combination of the three. The Pentagon's November 2025 acquisition overhaul calls for clearer pathways from successful prototypes to production contracts. Establishing specific benchmarks for SBIR-derived technologies to qualify for sole-source Phase III awards would give that commitment a practical mechanism.
Reauthorization has secured the SBIR program through 2031. The next task is to build a system to better measure its results. Every finding in this analysis comes from public records that the government could systematize. They suggest that many repeat winners follow a distinct business model: develop technologies through SBIR funding and commercialize them through federal procurement. Venture-backed firms generally pursue a different path. Both models can generate meaningful value, and metrics that account for their complementary roles would help future discussions of the SBIR program more clearly assess its value.
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Jacob Schwandt received his bachelor's in economics at the London School of Economics and recently completed his master's in economics and data science at the University of Cambridge, where he specialized on government procurement and in particular the SBIR program. Jerry McGinn is the director of the Center for the Industrial Base and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
The authors would like to thank Oliver Buntin, research assistant in the Center for the Industrial Base at CSIS, for his support on this piece.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sbir-mills-truly-problem
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary Entitled 'Value of U.S. Land Power'
WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by Director Jerry McGinn and research assistant A.J. Dilts, both of the Center for the Industrial Base.
McGinn is also a senior fellow at the CSIS Defense and Security Department:
* * *
The Value of U.S. Land Power
The emergence of drone warfare, AI-infused targeting cycles, and the "transparent battlefield" in Ukraine and Iran today have intensified debates over the role of U.S. ground forces within the nation's joint force. In response, CSIS has launched a yearlong ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by Director Jerry McGinn and research assistant A.J. Dilts, both of the Center for the Industrial Base. McGinn is also a senior fellow at the CSIS Defense and Security Department: * * * The Value of U.S. Land Power The emergence of drone warfare, AI-infused targeting cycles, and the "transparent battlefield" in Ukraine and Iran today have intensified debates over the role of U.S. ground forces within the nation's joint force. In response, CSIS has launched a yearlongFuture of Land Power study to explore the enduring importance of U.S. land forces, their contribution to deterrence and stability across key regions, and how they must adapt to remain effective in an era defined by great power rivalry, technological change, and all-domain warfare.
The project's first working paper, "The Value of U.S. Land Power," argues that land power, or "the ability--by threat, force, or occupation--to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people," is essential for the United States to determine political outcomes and achieve strategic objectives. Through integrating historical, institutional, and policy perspectives, the report finds that the roles and responsibilities of land power are rooted in certain inherent characteristics that transcend changing technologies and threats:
1. Through its persistent, human presence, land power offers the ability to secure, hold, and control territory and the power to deter and decisively defeat foreign aggression.
2. Land forces, or the personnel and capabilities in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, are the binding agents of the joint force, enabling power projection far from U.S. shores by protecting ports, airfields, and command and control infrastructure; holding enemy air and naval assets at risk; and transporting U.S. personnel and supplies across terrain.
3. Land forces' wide-ranging capabilities and modular force structures equip policymakers with a flexible and cost-effective range of military options across the spectrum of conflict.
4. U.S. land power is expeditionary and dependent upon allies and partners for access, basing, and overflight, enabling U.S. force projection to distant regions.
5. The use of land power has greater potential for casualties and therefore carries a higher political risk.
Since World War II, the introduction of new military technologies, domains, and doctrines has repeatedly called into question the utility of land power. The advent of nuclear weapons, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "massive retaliation" doctrine in the 1950s, and the display of precision airpower in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 fueled strategic thinking that relied less on ground forces in favor of technology-driven, seemingly less risky options in the air and sea domains. In recent years, advanced technologies such as AI, cyber, and unmanned autonomous systems; domestic political aversion to large-scale ground campaigns after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the perceived capabilities needed for the Asia-Pacific theater have led to questions about the function that land power can and should play within U.S. military strategy.
Yet current trends in modern warfare and recent conflicts in Ukraine and Iran have reinforced the central role that land forces play in achieving battlefield outcomes. In Europe, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has showcased the growing importance of standoff, long-range strikes to devastate an adversary's supply depots, rear units, and energy infrastructure. Relative power in conflict still depends on the physical control of territory, and drone and missile strikes have proven indecisive as Russia and Ukraine continue campaigns of attritional, positional warfare along static frontlines on land. The incorporation of autonomous systems within Ukraine's military, moreover, has arguably increased both the number of ground soldiers and the range of skills required within the force. While AI can "optimize the kill chain," it has yet to supplant basic human intuition and situational awareness.
In Operation Epic Fury, the United States has struck more than 13,000 Iranian military and industrial targets, but it has not brought a conclusive end to the conflict. Iranian attacks against U.S. bases and Gulf partner infrastructure across the region have also demonstrated the centrality of air and missile defense to modern warfare, capabilities that land power provides. As U.S. strategists plan for contingencies in the Asia-Pacific, where supply lines are stretched across vast distances and separated by large bodies of water, the U.S. Army's leading logistics function and the U.S. Marine Corps' littoral combat power make U.S. ground forces essential to the fight.
In short, this working paper showed that U.S. land power retains immense value as part of the joint force. The Future of Land Power study team will next explore how land power institutions--including acquisition, personnel, and force structure--can be built and transformed to advance U.S. interests in a changing global security environment. Together, these working papers provide the foundation upon which the study's final report will make recommendations for how U.S. land forces can continue to deter adversaries, enable the joint force, and decisively deliver strategic results for the nation when called upon. While the character of war is evolving, the nature of war fundamentally remains the pursuit of political aims through force. So long as governments exercise political authority over physical territory, land power will be a decisive domain to protect the United States and defend its interests abroad.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/value-land-power
[Category: ThinkTank]
McGinn is also a senior fellow at the CSIS Defense and Security Department:
* * *
The Value of U.S. Land Power
The emergence of drone warfare, AI-infused targeting cycles, and the "transparent battlefield" in Ukraine and Iran today have intensified debates over the role of U.S. ground forces within the nation's joint force. In response, CSIS has launched a yearlong ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 17, 2026, by Director Jerry McGinn and research assistant A.J. Dilts, both of the Center for the Industrial Base. McGinn is also a senior fellow at the CSIS Defense and Security Department: * * * The Value of U.S. Land Power The emergence of drone warfare, AI-infused targeting cycles, and the "transparent battlefield" in Ukraine and Iran today have intensified debates over the role of U.S. ground forces within the nation's joint force. In response, CSIS has launched a yearlongFuture of Land Power study to explore the enduring importance of U.S. land forces, their contribution to deterrence and stability across key regions, and how they must adapt to remain effective in an era defined by great power rivalry, technological change, and all-domain warfare.
The project's first working paper, "The Value of U.S. Land Power," argues that land power, or "the ability--by threat, force, or occupation--to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people," is essential for the United States to determine political outcomes and achieve strategic objectives. Through integrating historical, institutional, and policy perspectives, the report finds that the roles and responsibilities of land power are rooted in certain inherent characteristics that transcend changing technologies and threats:
1. Through its persistent, human presence, land power offers the ability to secure, hold, and control territory and the power to deter and decisively defeat foreign aggression.
2. Land forces, or the personnel and capabilities in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, are the binding agents of the joint force, enabling power projection far from U.S. shores by protecting ports, airfields, and command and control infrastructure; holding enemy air and naval assets at risk; and transporting U.S. personnel and supplies across terrain.
3. Land forces' wide-ranging capabilities and modular force structures equip policymakers with a flexible and cost-effective range of military options across the spectrum of conflict.
4. U.S. land power is expeditionary and dependent upon allies and partners for access, basing, and overflight, enabling U.S. force projection to distant regions.
5. The use of land power has greater potential for casualties and therefore carries a higher political risk.
Since World War II, the introduction of new military technologies, domains, and doctrines has repeatedly called into question the utility of land power. The advent of nuclear weapons, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "massive retaliation" doctrine in the 1950s, and the display of precision airpower in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 fueled strategic thinking that relied less on ground forces in favor of technology-driven, seemingly less risky options in the air and sea domains. In recent years, advanced technologies such as AI, cyber, and unmanned autonomous systems; domestic political aversion to large-scale ground campaigns after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; and the perceived capabilities needed for the Asia-Pacific theater have led to questions about the function that land power can and should play within U.S. military strategy.
Yet current trends in modern warfare and recent conflicts in Ukraine and Iran have reinforced the central role that land forces play in achieving battlefield outcomes. In Europe, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has showcased the growing importance of standoff, long-range strikes to devastate an adversary's supply depots, rear units, and energy infrastructure. Relative power in conflict still depends on the physical control of territory, and drone and missile strikes have proven indecisive as Russia and Ukraine continue campaigns of attritional, positional warfare along static frontlines on land. The incorporation of autonomous systems within Ukraine's military, moreover, has arguably increased both the number of ground soldiers and the range of skills required within the force. While AI can "optimize the kill chain," it has yet to supplant basic human intuition and situational awareness.
In Operation Epic Fury, the United States has struck more than 13,000 Iranian military and industrial targets, but it has not brought a conclusive end to the conflict. Iranian attacks against U.S. bases and Gulf partner infrastructure across the region have also demonstrated the centrality of air and missile defense to modern warfare, capabilities that land power provides. As U.S. strategists plan for contingencies in the Asia-Pacific, where supply lines are stretched across vast distances and separated by large bodies of water, the U.S. Army's leading logistics function and the U.S. Marine Corps' littoral combat power make U.S. ground forces essential to the fight.
In short, this working paper showed that U.S. land power retains immense value as part of the joint force. The Future of Land Power study team will next explore how land power institutions--including acquisition, personnel, and force structure--can be built and transformed to advance U.S. interests in a changing global security environment. Together, these working papers provide the foundation upon which the study's final report will make recommendations for how U.S. land forces can continue to deter adversaries, enable the joint force, and decisively deliver strategic results for the nation when called upon. While the character of war is evolving, the nature of war fundamentally remains the pursuit of political aims through force. So long as governments exercise political authority over physical territory, land power will be a decisive domain to protect the United States and defend its interests abroad.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/value-land-power
[Category: ThinkTank]