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Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Financing Loan Signed
WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 27, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Financing Loan Signed
By Syed Fazl-e-Haider
Executive Summary:
* The CKU Railway Company LLC signed a $4.7 billion loan agreement in December 2025 that advances the long-delayed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is providing over half the funding through a 35-year loan to the joint venture.
* The CKU railway is a technically complex project with extensive tunnels and bridges, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 27, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Financing Loan Signed By Syed Fazl-e-Haider Executive Summary: * The CKU Railway Company LLC signed a $4.7 billion loan agreement in December 2025 that advances the long-delayed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is providing over half the funding through a 35-year loan to the joint venture. * The CKU railway is a technically complex project with extensive tunnels and bridges,and will significantly reduce transit times between the PRC and Europe, boosting Central Asia's role as a critical Eurasian transit hub.
* This railway creates a bypass route that avoids transit routes in Russia, diminishing Moscow's regional transit influence and elevating Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as key partners in diversified Eurasian trade routes.
CKU Railway Company LLC, a joint venture formed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan and a syndicate of PRC banks, signed a loan agreement to finance the $4.7 billion China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway construction project on December 16 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Times of Central Asia, December 17, 2025). Under the deal, the PRC will provide $2.3 billion, approximately half of the project's cost, as a 35-year loan to be repaid by the joint venture company. The remaining amount will be provided by the three countries, with the PRC contributing 51 percent and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each contributing 24.5 percent. Speaking at the signing ceremony, Kyrgyzstan's Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Bakyt Torobayev said, "This achievement deserves high praise and clearly demonstrates the readiness of the Joint Project Company, created by the three countries, to implement international-level projects" (Government of Kyrgyzstan, December 16, 2025). The agreement to finance the CKU railway is a milestone that has laid the foundation for the connectivity project, which has faced delays for three decades due to financial issues and geopolitical concerns (see EDM, May 7, July 17, 2024, April 8, December 4, 2025).
Initially conceived in the 1990s, the CKU railway made little headway over the following three decades due to financial, technical, and geopolitical constraints. The project emerged from cold storage in 2012, when then-Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev went to the PRC on an official visit (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2, 2012). From 2012 onward, the project faced continuous delays due to financing issues and changing geopolitical realities in the region (see EDM, February 13, 2024). In 2023, Beijing and Bishkek discussed the need to begin construction of the CKU railway project during Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov's official visit to Beijing (PRC State Council Information Office, May 18, 2023). In June 2024, the PRC, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan signed an agreement to finance and begin construction for the CKU railway project (Xinhua, June 6, 2024; see EDM, July 17, 2024). In December 2024, the project was launched at a ceremony held in Kyrgyzstan's border city of Jalal-Abad (see EDM, May 7, 2024, April 8, 2025; President of Kyrgyzstan; PRC State Council, December 27, 2024).
The CKU route starts in Kashgar, PRC, enters Kyrgyzstan via the Torugart Pass, traverses the Makmal and Jalal-Abad stations, and ends in Andijan, Uzbekistan. The railroad will run up to 213 kilometers (approximately 130 miles) in the PRC, 260 kilometers (approximately 160 miles) in Kyrgyzstan, and 50 kilometers (approximately 30 miles) in Uzbekistan (News Central Asia, December 23, 2025).
As one of the most technically complex and formidable engineering projects in the region, the CKU railway involves the construction of 50 bridges and 29 tunnels, which together account for 40 percent of the entire route (Gazeta, December 18, 2025). Construction of two-section railway lines with different gauges will take an estimated six years. In the first section, a 165.5-kilometer (approximately 100-mile) line with a 1435 mm gauge, as per the PRC standard, will be built from the PRC border to Makmal station in Kyrgyzstan. In the second section, a 146.2-kilometer (approximately 90-mile) railway line with a 1520 mm gauge will be built from Makmal station to Jalal-Abad in Kyrgyzstan. Trains will be reorganized, and cargo will be reloaded at Makmal station due to differences in gauge line (Spot.uz, June 19, 2024).
The CKU railroad is estimated to transport up to 15 million tons of cargo annually. It will shorten transit distance by thousands of kilometers and reduce delivery times from the PRC to Europe by seven days. It could serve as a bridge between the East and the West. In the future, it could be integrated with other regional connectivity corridors such as the Trans-Afghan corridor (see EDM, January 15, November 12, 2025). Such an integration will strengthen transport and communication links between the PRC, Central Asia, and South Asia (Gazeta, December 30, 2024).
The 530-kilometer (approximately 330-mile) long CKU railroad is a geopolitically ambitious regional transport project aimed at bolstering connectivity across Central and South Asia. The project will underscore Central Asia's position as a transit hub between the PRC and Europe. The CKU line will lead to the diversification of Eurasian trade routes, turning landlocked Central Asian states into land-linked countries, boosting their economic potential (The Times of Central Asia, December 17, 2025).
While addressing the launching ceremony of the CKU railway project in December 2024, Japarov highlighted the importance of this project, stating:
This route will ensure the delivery of goods from the PRC to Kyrgyzstan, as well as to the countries of Central Asia and the Middle East, including Turkiye, and further to the European Union. The project will strengthen interregional ties, help diversify transport routes, and increase the region's competitiveness as an international transport and transit hub, aligning with the goals of Central Asian countries (President of Kyrgyzstan, December 27, 2024; Gazeta, December 30, 2024).
Presently, the PRC uses transit routes through Kazakhstan and Russia. The CKU railway could be a game-changer for the region, as it will expand the PRC's connectivity to Eurasian and European markets. As a project of the PRC's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, it will connect the PRC directly with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, reduce its dependence on Russian transit, and create a shorter, faster, and direct southern corridor for freight between the PRC, Europe, and the Middle East (EurasiaNet, January 7, 2025; News Central Asia, December 23, 2025).
The PRC's development of logistics routes such as the CKU railway, which bypasses Russia, continues to erode Moscow's influence in Central Asia. The PRC's OBOR infrastructure projects pose a direct challenge to Russia's position as the primary Eurasian trade conduit in the region. The CKU, which provides alternatives to traditional routes via Russian territory, is set to undermine Russia's influence and redirect trade flows around it. The CKU corridor will provide the PRC with direct access to European and Middle Eastern countries without transiting Russian territory (Special Eurasia, November 19, 2024).
The CKU railway is against the interests of Russia and Kazakhstan, the PRC's most influential partners in the region. The proposed railway will curtail the use of transit routes passing through Russia and Kazakhstan. It will sideline Moscow and Astana, making Tashkent and Bishkek more important transit partners for PRC exports. The CKU railway could become the shortest route between the PRC and Europe because Uzbekistan is already connected to Turkmenistan and Iran (see EDM, May 7, 2024).
The shifting geopolitics in Central Asia following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have revived interest in the CKU project after 25 years. The project will run without Russia's participation, which is not in a position to oppose the CKU railway following the imposition of Western sanctions on Moscow over its war against Ukraine. The sanctioned and isolated Russia currently relies mainly on the PRC for trade, while the PRC is working on expanding trade and transit cooperation without Moscow.
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Syed Fazl-e-Haider is a contributing analyst at the South Asia desk of Wikistrat. He is a freelance columnist and the author of several books, including the Economic Development of Balochistan (2004).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/china-kyrgyzstan-uzbekistan-railway-financing-loan-signed/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Belarus Liable for Oreshnik But Lacks Control
WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 27, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Belarus Liable for Oreshnik but Lacks Control
By Alexander Taranov
Executive Summary:
* The Kremlin's December 2025 placement of the Oreshnik missile battalion on combat duty in Belarus is the highest readiness level for potential strikes against Ukraine and Europe. The deployment of up to ten launchers is temporary, while permanent infrastructure remains in Russia.
* Russia's use of mobile launchers has not been confirmed--Moscow's January strike on Ukraine's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 27, 2026, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Belarus Liable for Oreshnik but Lacks Control By Alexander Taranov Executive Summary: * The Kremlin's December 2025 placement of the Oreshnik missile battalion on combat duty in Belarus is the highest readiness level for potential strikes against Ukraine and Europe. The deployment of up to ten launchers is temporary, while permanent infrastructure remains in Russia. * Russia's use of mobile launchers has not been confirmed--Moscow's January strike on Ukraine'sLviv Oblast used a stationary launcher in Kapustin Yar, Russia, indicating that the Oreshnik has not been successfully integrated with the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT, Minskii Zavod Kolesnykh Tiagashei) mobile chassis.
* The missile battalion in Belarus is fully subordinate to Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN, Raketniye Voiska Strategisheskovo Naznacheniia) Main Command, leaving Minsk without real influence over launch orders or target selection but with political and military culpability for potential strikes against Ukraine and Europe.
During his address to the All-Belarusian People's Assembly, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka confirmed that the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) system entered combat duty in Belarus on December 17, 2025 (President of Belarus, December 18, 2025). The day before, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the Oreshnik would enter combat duty by the end of the year, and Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, confirmed the formation of an Oreshnik-equipped missile brigade in Belarus (President of Russia, December 17, 2025; Telegram/@mod_russia, December 18, 2025). These synchronized announcements point to coordinated political and military signaling that the system is transitioning from testing to deployment, projecting new missile and nuclear threats to Ukraine and Europe.
In December 2025, Lukashenka explicitly denied reports of Oreshnik deployment near Slutsk, Belarus (see EDM, December 2, 2025; Interfax, December 19, 2025). The site near Pavlovka in the Slutsk District is purportedly a military-industrial production facility, not a missile site. In 2026, the facility is expected to produce 120,000-180,000 122-millimeter Grad Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and 180,000-270,000 152-millimeter artillery shells, supporting Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine and preparations for a potential large-scale conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Belpol, December 21, 2025).
The most recent assessments identify the former Soviet airfield, Krichev-6 in Mogilev oblast, as the likely Oreshnik deployment site inside Belarus, approximately five kilometers (3.1 miles) from Russia's Smolensk oblast. Satellite imagery shows intensive construction from August 2025, including new buildings and reconstruction of rail lines and stations, aligning with earlier assessments identifying the Chausy-Krichev-Cherikov and Krichev-Bykhov-Kirovsky triangles as potential deployment sites (Reformation, December 27, 2025). Krichev-6 conforms to Russian tactics for mobile missile systems--dense forest cover, low population density, pre-existing Soviet-era military infrastructure, robust road and rail connectivity, layered Russian and Belarusian air defenses, and the absence of water barriers hindering maneuvering (see EDM, March 13, 2025). The Krichev-6 site would allow Oreshnik units to withdraw rapidly into Russian territory following missile launches, placing them under Russia's nuclear escalation umbrella and complicating the feasibility of limited retaliatory action against them (see EDM, October 2, November 26, 2024, June 26, 2025).
Video footage released by the Belarusian and Russian Defense Ministries on December 30, 2025, documenting the Oreshnik system's entry into combat duty, provides important insight into the command-and-control structure of the deployment. The ceremony was overseen by Russian Lieutenant Colonel Roman Ostroushko, former commander of a battalion of the 54th Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN, Raketniye Voiska Strategisheskovo Naznacheniia) in Teykovo, which is equipped with Yars Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) (Radio Svaboda, December 31, 2025). Ostroushko confirmed completion of personnel training, operational readiness of combat crews, organization of combat duty according to RVSN manuals and regulations, patrol zone definition, and ongoing reconnaissance.
The ceremony highlighted Russian primacy over Belarus, featuring one Belarusian state flag and three Russian flags--the Russian state flag, the Russian Ministry of Defense flag, and the Russian Strategic Missile Forces flag. Personnel uniforms were mixed, with Russian All-season Field Uniform Set (VKPO, Vsesezonniy Komplekt Polevogo Obmundirovaniia) combat uniforms alongside Belarusian field attire. This visual and organizational composition suggests an integrated formation in which Belarusian forces perform secondary logistical, security, and support functions, while operational control remains firmly in Russian hands (Telegram/@modmilby; Telegram/@mod_russia, December 30, 2025).
The Krichev-6 facility appears subordinated to the RVSN Main Command and to the authority of Putin. This arrangement preserves Moscow's exclusive prerogative to authorize missile launches against pre-designated and pre-reconnoitered targets. In a crisis scenario, Moscow could formally transfer the unit under the operational control of the Joint Command of Russian and Belarusian Regional Troops Grouping to share political responsibility with Minsk for strikes. The Kremlin has additional flexibility to conduct strikes with reduced transparency, without notifying Washington through the Russian National Center for Nuclear Risk Reduction, because Belarus is not a party to the New START Treaty and the Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches (see EDM, December 18, 2025). The Russian state news agency, TASS, indirectly confirmed this command structure by withdrawing an "erroneous" statement by Belarusian Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin, who claimed that Belarus would be able to independently designate targets for Oreshnik strikes (TASS, December 23, 2025).
Video from Krichev-6 does not show missile launchers, suggesting deliberate concealment or incomplete integration of Russian missiles with Belarusian Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant chassis. Pavel Podvig, Senior Researcher at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, noted the lack of mobile launchers with missiles and permanent storage and maintenance infrastructure. U.S. analysts, including the Center for Naval Analyses' Decker Eveleth, assess Krichev-6 as a battalion-level technical base, not a permanent deployment site for Oreshnik (Radiyo Svaboda, December 31, 2025). This interpretation aligns with earlier assessments suggesting that Belarus' Mogilev oblast hosts temporary positions and combat duty patrol routes rather than permanent basing points likely located in Russia (see EDM, March 13, 2025).
Observed equipment during the Oreshnik combat duty ceremony included a 15V180 command vehicle, 15V240M support vehicles, 15M69M engineering/camouflage vehicle, and Typhoon-K armored escort vehicles (K-63968 or variants). By analogy with Yars and Topol-M missile units, a deployed Oreshnik battalion also likely comprises three autonomous launchers on MZKT-79291 chassis, a 15V190 communications vehicle, a UTM-80M thermal support vehicle, and additional engineering, training, and escort platforms (Military Russia, January 1).
Deputy Head of the General Staff Faculty at the Belarusian Military Academy, Colonel Andrei Bagadzel, confirmed that the first Oreshnik battalion with three launchers has entered combat duty in Belarus. There are plans to expand to a regiment of up to ten launchers, potentially evolving into a division under the Union State framework as a response to Germany's deployment of U.S. Typhon IRBMs (RIA Novosti, December 23, 2025). Alternative assessments argue that Belarus is more likely to host a highly autonomous missile brigade with 9-12 launchers, which--unlike standard Russian Mobile Ground-based Missile Systems (PGRK, Podvizhnyi Gruntovyi Raketnyi Kompleks), regiments reliant on divisional engineering and logistical support--would provide greater mobility, self-sufficiency, and operational autonomy (Telegram/@milioptimist, December 22, 2025).
Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces, Paval Muraveika, confirmed that Belarus has designated combat patrol areas for Oreshnik. Belarus and Russia have linked crews and geodetic coordinates to ensure rapid and accurate deployment and minimize missile launch preparation time, marking the system's highest state of readiness (RIA Novosti, December 26, 2025). Muraveika previously described Belarus's security environment as "even more complex than in June 1941," on the eve of World War II, framing preparations--including Russian tactical nuclear weapons and Oreshnik deployment--as deterrence against potential Western aggression (BelTA, December 9, 2025). Khrenin reinforced this stance, stating that Oreshnik, capable of nuclear and conventional strikes up to 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles), is a defensive response to NATO's preparations against Belarus and Russia. Khrenin framed Oreshnik's positioning in Belarus as a reaction to Western "aggression" against Belarus with no intent for an attack from Minsk (BelTA, December 26, 2025).
RVSN Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Igor Fazletdinov, and retired colonels Sergey Tarazevich and Alexander Reznik from the Russian Ministry of Defense's fourth Central Research Institute, explained the role of non-nuclear weapons such as Avangard and Oreshnik in Russia's defense in the December 2025 issue of the Russian Ministry of Defense-affiliated journal, Military Thought. According to Fazletdinov, Tarazevich, and Reznik, non-nuclear high-precision systems are not intended to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary. Their ability to engage critical targets on enemy territory provides a deterrent against "aggression" toward Russia. These authors believe that early use of these systems in a conflict could effectively counter aggression and compel an adversary to cease hostilities under conditions favorable to Russia. Non-nuclear strategic systems, unlike nuclear weapons, do not carry an immediate risk of triggering global nuclear war, making them a more acceptable instrument for achieving the Kremlin's military objectives. The authors assert, however, that strategic nuclear forces remain the primary means of deterring aggression against Russia, with no viable alternative available. High-precision conventional systems within the RVSN can strike critical enemy infrastructure, causing significant damage to military and energy assets, thereby deterring aggression and facilitating Russia's version of "de-escalation" (RG.RU; RIA Novosti, December 26, 2025; Voennaya Mysl', December 2025, 85-91).
The second confirmed combat use of Oreshnik on January 8 served as an operational validation of this concept. Russia launched the missile from Kapustin Yar against targets in Ukraine's Lviv oblast--including the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev linked the strike to discussions between Ukraine, Europe, and the United States on security guarantees, asserting Russia would not tolerate foreign troops in Ukraine (X/@MedvedevRussiaE, January 10). The use of a stationary launcher for the recent strike further supports assessments that full integration of Belarusian chassis and Russian missiles remains incomplete.
The Oreshnik deployment in Belarus fits an offensive pattern despite Minsk's claim that it is purely defensive (see EDM, December 2, 2025). Ukrainian analysts and officials note that Oreshnik's primary targets are likely Europe, not Ukraine, as much of Ukraine, including Kyiv, lies outside Oreshnik's minimum engagement range of approximately 700 kilometers (435 miles). From this perspective, Kyiv is roughly 660 kilometers (410 miles) from Belarus' farthest point and 380 kilometers (236 miles) from Krichev-6, complicating the targeting trajectory (Defence Express, December 19, 2025). Head of Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service Oleh Ivashchenko stated that the deployment aims to pressure Europe and NATO while shielding the system from Ukrainian counterstrikes. Stationing in Belarus also shifts escalation burdens onto Minsk and reduces missile flight times to European targets (Ukrinform, December 13, 2025).
Alternative assessments suggest a shorter minimum range of 500 kilometers (310 miles) combined with northern or northwestern maneuvering actions and/or an increase in the apogee of the missile's trajectory, which could theoretically bring Kyiv within Oreshnik's reach from Belarus (Telegram/@infantmilitario, November 21, 2024). Lukashenka claimed Moscow considered striking decision-making centers in Kyiv with Oreshnik, but Putin allegedly rejected the plan, a narrative repeated after a Kremlin-fabricated drone attack on Putin's Novgorod residence (BelTA, August 22, 2025; BelTA, December 31, 2025; see EDM, January 12).
On the eve of the Lviv strike, Kremlin-aligned experts reinforced escalatory signaling. Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of the Russian National Defense magazine, reacted to the U.S. detention of the Russian-flagged Mariner tanker by calling for an Oreshnik strike against a NATO naval base in the Baltic or North Sea, framing the action as a precursor to nuclear escalation should Western pressure persist (Telegram/@igor_korotchenko, January 7). Retired lieutenant general and State Duma deputy, Andrey Gurulev, advocated for preemptive Oreshnik strikes on European defense-industrial facilities, including Rheinmetall (Telegram/@readovkanews, January 7). Colonel Oleg Ivannikov, an advisor to the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences, included major Ukrainian defense-industrial enterprises and port infrastructure in Odesa oblast used for Western arms deliveries in Oreshnik's target list (Argumenty i Facty, January 9).
Oreshnik launches from Belarus against Ukrainian or European targets may be preferable for Moscow. Any first retaliatory strikes would primarily affect Belarusian territory and its senior military-political leadership, who continue to publicly claim, contrary to reality, that they select the targets rather than Moscow. Lukashenka continues to deny that the deployment of Oreshnik transforms Belarus into a primary target for an attacking or retaliating adversary, placing the country under constant threat (see EDM, December 2, 2025). He also fails to explain the strategic rationale for deploying such systems in Belarus when, by his own admission, Russia already guarantees the country's strategic defense (BelTA, December 18, 2025). This contradiction suggests either that the Belarusian leadership lacks genuine insight into Russian operational and strategic intentions or that it is deliberately performing a disinformation function in support of Moscow's broader objectives.
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Alexander Taranov is an expert on Russian military and nuclear affairs.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/belarus-liable-for-oreshnik-but-lacks-control/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Welfare State Reform Plans in Germany are Heading in the Right Direction
MUNICH, Germany, Jan. 28 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:* * *
Welfare State Reform Plans in Germany are Heading in the Right Direction
The ifo Institute endorses the reform plans in Germany as they have now been presented in the Welfare State Commission's report. In particular, merging social benefits, digitizing administration, and improving work incentives match proposals that the ifo Institute has been making since 2019, says Andreas Peichl, Director of the ifo Center for Macroeconomics and Surveys: "The Commission's report on the welfare state reform is, on ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Jan. 28 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Welfare State Reform Plans in Germany are Heading in the Right Direction The ifo Institute endorses the reform plans in Germany as they have now been presented in the Welfare State Commission's report. In particular, merging social benefits, digitizing administration, and improving work incentives match proposals that the ifo Institute has been making since 2019, says Andreas Peichl, Director of the ifo Center for Macroeconomics and Surveys: "The Commission's report on the welfare state reform is, onthe whole, bold, and is basically in line with our reform deliberations, even though many details regarding the actual implementation are not yet clear."
"Merging social benefits in one uniform system makes sense," says Maximilian Blomer, Head of Ex-Ante Policy Evaluation at the ifo Center for Macroeconomics and Surveys, and adds: "Reforming benefit withdrawal is heading in the right direction: lower additional earnings for mini jobs, higher additional earnings for jobs subject to social insurance."
Current studies by the ifo Institute show that there needs to be greater differentiation in such a reform with regard to additional earnings so that households with children are not worse off, and that work incentives reach the right people. "Work incentives can still be strengthened, especially for households without children," says Lilly Fischer, doctoral student at the ifo Institute.
However, the ifo experts point out that there is still a lot of work to do before the actual reforms take shape: "The German government now needs to turn this into a sensible bill. In the implementation, many details will determine whether or not it's a tour de force," says Peichl.
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Publications
2025 Article in Journal
Mission Sozialstaat: Wie eine Reform an den eigenen Zielen scheitern konnte
Maximilian Joseph Blomer, Lilly Fischer, Theresa Lange, Andreas Peichl
ifo Schnelldienst, 2025, 78, Nr. 12 04-09
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2025/article-journal/mission-sozialstaat)
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2025 Article in Journal
Zukunft des Sozialstaats: IntegriertesTransfersystem oder EinzelmaBnahmen?
Maximilian Blomer, Lilly Fischer, Andreas Peichl
ifo Schnelldienst, 2025, 78, Nr. 11 37-41
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2025/article-journal/zukunft-des-sozialstaats)
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2025 Monograph (Authorship)
Designing an Integrated Social Transfer System
Maximilian Joseph Blomer, Eike Johannes Eser, Lilly Fischer, Andreas Peichl
ifo Forschungsberichte / 159
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2025/monograph-authorship/designing-integrated-social-transfer-system)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-01-27/welfare-state-reform-plans-in-germany-are-heading-in-the-right-direction
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Friendly Advice for Pierre Poilievre, From a Former Conservative Leader
WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 27, 2026, to the Walrus:* * *
Friendly Advice for Pierre Poilievre, from a Former Conservative Leader
Channel Teddy Roosevelt. No, seriously.
By Erin O'Toole
For my party--the Conservative Party of Canada--2025 was an annus horribilis. We suffered a string of strategic missteps, failed to break through to voters on the issues that dominated the national conversation, and paid the price in both public confidence ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 27, 2026, to the Walrus: * * * Friendly Advice for Pierre Poilievre, from a Former Conservative Leader Channel Teddy Roosevelt. No, seriously. By Erin O'Toole For my party--the Conservative Party of Canada--2025 was an annus horribilis. We suffered a string of strategic missteps, failed to break through to voters on the issues that dominated the national conversation, and paid the price in both public confidenceand political momentum. I won't revisit every episode here, but we must acknowledge the reality of a very difficult year and learn from it.
It's important to acknowledge that Conservatives set the agenda on most of the critical issues facing Canada. From working with Alberta to get Canadian energy to market, to a focus on sovereignty in the Arctic, to a more serious approach to trade negotiations with the Americans, to the cost-of-living crisis facing Canadian households, Conservatives have generally been the first to point out the issues on the horizon facing the country and our place in the world.
Setting the national agenda is an important part of the role for the opposition in a parliamentary democracy. The next step for the opposition needs to be overcoming the barriers that prevent us from winning a general election, so that Conservatives can be trusted by Canadians to govern and effect change ourselves.
I know, on a personal level, how challenging it can be to lead the federal Conservative Party in a country where being "conservative" means different things to different people depending on their background and where they live. It is also extra challenging in this new age of social media polarization, where algorithms create a blend of news and entertainment that only seems to harden people's views. To some of these social media groups, compromise has become a dirty word, and that makes it even more difficult to reach swing voters.
I was not able to effectively maintain the balance of keeping all parts of the conservative base satisfied alongside gaining the trust of more swing voters who decide elections. I tried hard to find the right balance--particularly on health measures during the unique challenges of the pandemic--but ultimately, I was not successful and lost the confidence of a majority of the caucus.
I am on the record saying that Pierre Poilievre should remain the leader of the Conservatives and be given a second opportunity to win an election. I know the pressures on him and his family, and I respect their service to the country. But as a leader, he needs to be introspective and courageous enough to overcome the adversity of the last year and learn from it. Political leaders have the dual priorities of focusing on what is best for their country or province and what is best for them politically to win the next election. In this age of polarization, however, it is critical that a leader understand that those priorities come in that exact order. Country first. Winning elections second.
With this in mind, I have just one piece of advice for my former colleagues as they begin to tackle those dual priorities in 2026. I would remind them that this advice is worth the price they are paying for it. Nothing.
Here it is: Channel Teddy Roosevelt.
It may sound strange that I am asking Canada's Conservatives to follow the lead of an American president at this time of deep tensions with our neighbour to the south. You might think that someone like me, who deeply admires Sir Robert Borden, would choose a quote from him to start the year. Or that I would find an old chestnut from Sir Winston Churchill to meet the moment we are in.
That is not the case. We are living in hard times that may get even more difficult in the years to come. We need our elected officials to be strong. We need them to be fearless. We also need them to be examples of conviction and character. Roosevelt fits that mould to a tee. He overcame tragedy and disability in his youth to become a pillar a strength for his country and the world. He advocated for living a life of strenuous activity, personal challenge, and moral purpose that I believe can be a touchstone for us in this age of anxiety and polarization.
For the last century, politicians in the Western world have felt a kinship with a speech Roosevelt delivered at the Sorbonne in France, in 1910, shortly after his time as American president. "Citizenship in a Republic" was a lengthy speech on citizenship delivered by the former leader of one great republic to an audience comprised of civic leaders from another. It has become one of the most famous political speeches ever given because of a short excerpt within it, known as "The Man in the Arena."
Politicians love this passage because it tells them to ignore the critics and to get back up when they have stumbled or fallen short. The section speaks to the nobility of service and the need to strive to do great things despite the setbacks that come with leadership. "The Man in the Arena" has always had great meaning to me, and I have looked to it for inspiration many times. Perhaps the most meaningful time I heard these words was when they were recited by Scott Brison, in his touching eulogy to the late Jim Flaherty in the House of Commons, after Flaherty's sudden passing in April 2014.
It is the prelude to the most well-known portion of the "The Man in the Arena" that I believe is most helpful to the Conservative caucus as they embark on a year to move past the setbacks of 2025.
The poorest way to face life is to face it with a sneer. There are many men who feel a kind of twisted pride in cynicism; there are many who confine themselves to criticism of the way others do what they themselves dare not even attempt. There is no more unhealthy being, no man less worthy of respect, than he who either really holds, or feigns to hold, an attitude of sneering disbelief toward all that is great and lofty, whether in achievement or in that noble effort which, even if it fails, comes second to achievement.
Being the official opposition in the House of Commons means that we have come second to the party that will govern. We have given a noble effort but have come up short again and again. This is incredibly frustrating. I know this myself on a deep, personal level. It does not mean, however, that this frustration should lead to the role of opposition being approached with a constant sneer or with some form of angry patriotism.
The leader of the opposition must always project an unwavering faith in the country and its people, alongside a visible optimism about its future. Don't only point out where things are broken but offer the peace of mind that comes with repair and improvement. This is especially true when the country is facing pressures on our unity and our sovereignty from forces that are both external and internal.
I had such respect for Premier Danielle Smith recently when she defended Canada and the recent energy agreement Alberta signed with Ottawa despite the heckles and boos from her own supporters in the room. That type of leadership embodies the Rooseveltian spirit the party needs at this moment.
There is a lot to be optimistic about for the country despite our challenges. There is also a lot to be optimistic about when it comes to the Conservative Party. Younger voters are more open to voting Conservative than ever before. Union members are identifying as conservative and voting that way in greater numbers than ever before. The party is polling at consistently high levels and has organization and representation in almost every part of the country.
Years ago, I wrote about how hard it is to go from government to opposition as a politician. The famous adage that "the worst day in government is better than the best day in opposition" does ring true. For me, it was the tone change that I felt so difficult to balance as someone who is generally very optimistic. My wife and my friends from outside politics would often ask me why I seemed so angry as a member of Parliament or when running for leader.
The truth is it's hard not to seem angry and cynical when you are always pointing out how the other man stumbles. You are in a job that requires you to oppose. This challenge is even more daunting now that most of the national agenda is being set by voices on social media, but it means it is even more important for elected officials to get the balance between criticism and optimism right.
Read in The Walrus (https://thewalrus.ca/advice-for-pierre-poilievre/).
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Erin O'Toole is a distinguished fellow at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/politics-government/friendly-advice-pierre-poilievre-former-conservative-leader-erin-otoole
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Minnesota Sees Positive Net Domestic Migration for First Time Since 2018
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Jan. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary:* * *
Minnesota sees positive net domestic migration for first time since 2018
By John Phelan
The Census Bureau released its estimates today for state and national populations in 2025. Minnesota's population now stands at an official 5,830,405. That is up 33,000 -- or 0.6% -- since 2024, a rate of growth which ranks 21st out of 50 states, as Figure 1 shows.
Figure 1: Population growth, 2024 to 2025
What ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Jan. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary: * * * Minnesota sees positive net domestic migration for first time since 2018 By John Phelan The Census Bureau released its estimates today for state and national populations in 2025. Minnesota's population now stands at an official 5,830,405. That is up 33,000 -- or 0.6% -- since 2024, a rate of growth which ranks 21st out of 50 states, as Figure 1 shows. Figure 1: Population growth, 2024 to 2025 Whatwas behind this?
The Census Bureau breaks these changes into two main categories. The first is "Natural Change," which is just Births minus Deaths. The second is Net Migration, which is the sum of net International and Domestic migration, both calculated by subtracting the outflow from the inflow. Owing to the existence of a "residual [which] represents the change in population that cannot be attributed to any specific demographic component," it is difficult to break that overall figure for population change down into those shares arising from these various sources. This mysterious residual ranges from very small -- just three people in Georgia, or 0.0% of the total change -- to quite large, such as 145 people in New York, or 14.4% of its total population change.
What we can do is calculate the rate per 100,000 of the 2024 population of each of these four sources. As Table 1 shows, Minnesota ranks 23rd out of 50 states for its birth rate, 39th for its death rate, 35th for its rate of net international migration, and 22nd for its rate of net domestic migration. That is the big story here: Between 2024 and 2025, the Census Bureau records more people moving to Minnesota from the rest of the United States than moved out of our state.
Table 1: Rates and ranks of components of population change, 2024 to 2025
The data is seldom kind to Minnesota, so this should be welcomed. As I have written before, if we are to improve our relatively poor performance in per capita GDP growth, we need the people moving here to be more likely to be employed and/or more skilled than those people already resident here. Let us hope for further good news on this front.
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John Phelan is an Economist at the Center of the American Experiment.
john.phelan@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/minnesota-sees-positive-net-domestic-migration-for-first-time-since-2018/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: How Civil Society Exposes the Human Rights Risks of the Digital Silk Road
WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 27, 2026:* * *
How Civil Society Exposes the Human Rights Risks of the Digital Silk Road
By Andrew Friedman
No one understands the human rights implications of technology better than those who have been attacked by it. As new surveillance technologies like facial recognition cameras and "safe city" command centers proliferate, collectively understanding them requires the input of those on the ground--people are regularly the targets of new technology and push back on surveillance ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 27, 2026: * * * How Civil Society Exposes the Human Rights Risks of the Digital Silk Road By Andrew Friedman No one understands the human rights implications of technology better than those who have been attacked by it. As new surveillance technologies like facial recognition cameras and "safe city" command centers proliferate, collectively understanding them requires the input of those on the ground--people are regularly the targets of new technology and push back on surveillanceoverreach. CSIS's Human Rights Initiative recently explored these deepening global challenges during a roundtable co-hosted with the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies. As Beijing expands its technological partnerships with countries across the globe through the Digital Silk Road (DSR), it has never been more important to work with local civil society organizations to understand the surveillance implications of these relationships and share strategies for addressing their risks. This roundtable, conducted under the Chatham House Rule of non-attribution, included representatives from civil society, the private sector, think tanks, and government. This analysis, while informed by the roundtable, is solely the work of the author.
The Digital Silk Road and Surveillance
The DSR is the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s "ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership." This initiative sits at the crossroads of Beijing's engagement with the world, in particular the Global South, and it positions the PRC as a critical provider of digital infrastructure and emerging technologies to governments. In the last 10 years, China and affiliated companies have invested billions of dollars into digital infrastructure projects across the world. A leading facet of PRC tech influence is telecom infrastructure, which is present in 83 percent of the 100 countries surveyed by Doublethink Lab's China Index. Other areas with major implications for privacy in importing states include the construction of subsea or land internet cables and the ownership of popular social media or messaging apps.
The DSR has led to a significant spread of surveillance equipment. Of the countries surveyed by Doublethink, 42 percent have received biometric surveillance technology from China. Further, this technology is often provided to governments with widely documented human rights concerns, such as Egypt, Venezuela, Tajikistan, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar, and procured through opaque purchases without the possibility of public oversight. In one example, in Serbia, some such purchases were made under "confidential order" and were "particularly controversial because its use is not provided for under Serbian law. Serbian authorities maintain that facial-recognition software is not yet deployed through the Safe City project, but they have tried to legalize biometric surveillance multiple times before withdrawing their legislative efforts following intense public pressure." This equipment was "provided by Huawei at a substantial discount" without stated reasoning.
Such dissemination of surveillance technology does not stand alone. Tech dependence on PRC entities most often goes hand-in-hand with heavy PRC influence in other domains like the economy, the military, and academia.
How Do We Know?
The opaque nature of deals in which surveillance and other technological equipment are procured creates significant knowledge gaps that hinder policy responses. If the United States and its allies do not know where or what the focus of the DSR is, it is impossible to craft effective policies to counter its attacks on human rights and democracy. There has been no greater contributor to understanding the efforts, the geographies, or the implications of the DSR than local civil society organizations.
Local connections and on-the-ground trust are imperative in pulling back curtains on deals that are conducted in secret. This can require deep and long-running investigations conducted by civil society and journalists to understand processes that result in the procurement of surveillance equipment through the DSR. It can also require understanding stakeholders, power centers, and relationships that are well known to on-the-ground actors but more difficult to parse for outsiders. On-the-ground networks spanning different perspectives and areas of expertise may also be required to fully understand the scope of the problem.
The Serbian example is telling. As organizer of the #hiljadekamera (thousands of cameras) movement, the SHARE Foundation worked with the local community, crowdsourcing a map of cameras as well as information on their technical details. According to the organization's director, "the picture it presented was starkly at odds with the modest official list of camera locations the police had issued."
The value of strong civil society networks is not limited to discovering information but also includes effectively sharing it with the relevant stakeholders. In the roundtable, a representative of a country's civil society shared that a coalition of 20 organizations to which they belonged had briefed government officials on potential national security risks of a joint venture with a PRC telecom company. Their actions led to legislative reform that opened the telecom industry to more competition and introduced national security investment screenings.
The U.S. Role
Historically, many of the civil society organizations most involved in pushing back on authoritarian overreach, including excessive surveillance technology, have been grantees of USAID, the Department of State, the National Endowment for Democracy, or other U.S. agencies. The withdrawal from and pressure on this type of funding, including the cancellation of grants for pro-democracy and human rights groups, the dismantling of USAID, and the reorganization of the Department of State--which removed much of its funding and expertise on democracy and human rights issues--creates a financial gap that will make the work of local civil society organizations far more difficult to sustain.
Beyond funding, diplomatic support for human rights defenders has been a key role of U.S. embassies abroad. Both public engagement and private diplomacy with the host government have been used to raise issues and offer support for the causes of human rights defenders, including those investigating surveillance and government overreach. The United States, as recently as January 20, 2025, has provided guidance for human rights defenders on how to engage with U.S. embassies. This support has been limited and undermined by comments about civil society and its partnerships with the United States. Statements by the Trump administration and its allies have led to investigations of former recipients of USAID funding in multiple countries, including Hungary, Serbia, Slovakia, Nigeria, and others.
Funding and diplomatic support are not the only roles that the United States has traditionally played in this type of work. While they are on the frontlines, local civil society organizations are not alone in their capabilities. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), a longstanding product of Cold War competition, has historically had a substantial and trusted presence in former Eastern Bloc countries, giving it complementary access to invaluable context and sources. RFE/RL Investigates has worked with local civil society organizations to bring vital stories with national security implications to the fore, such as Serbian government efforts to skirt sanctions against Russia for dual-use technology or the construction of a secret military base in Belarus for use in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As the United States pulls back its presence and funding of efforts such as RFE/RL, the only remaining actors with such connections, presence, and trust are local civil society organizations.
Conclusion
For nearly two decades, the world has been becoming less free. Emboldened authoritarian actors are no longer content to consolidate control and repress human rights in their own countries but feel confident in their ability to share their tactics, strategies, and technology across borders. Beijing's DSR both enables this reality and benefits from it, fostering partnerships with governments and creating a more deeply surveilled and authoritarian world. Local civil society organizations stand at the front line against these mounting threats to freedom, conducting investigations into how such surveillance is manifesting and raising awareness about the dangers of surveillance and overzealous partnerships with the PRC. These actors provide a vital window for the U.S. and its allies into the tactics, strategies, and partnerships Beijing uses to expand its authoritarian influence.
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Andrew Friedman is the director and senior fellow in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-civil-society-exposes-human-rights-risks-digital-silk-road
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Deepening U.S.-Japan Economic Ties Through Workforce Development Cooperation
WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 27, 2026:* * *
Deepening U.S.-Japan Economic Ties Through Workforce Development Cooperation
By Taisuke Kassai
Japanese firms remain deeply committed to the U.S. market, which continues to be Japan's most important investment destination. Recent high-profile announcements of Japanese investments in the U.S. by companies such as Nippon Steel and Softbank Group and the creation of the $550 billion U.S.-Japan strategic investment initiative are signs of growing opportunities for U.S.-Japan ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 27, 2026: * * * Deepening U.S.-Japan Economic Ties Through Workforce Development Cooperation By Taisuke Kassai Japanese firms remain deeply committed to the U.S. market, which continues to be Japan's most important investment destination. Recent high-profile announcements of Japanese investments in the U.S. by companies such as Nippon Steel and Softbank Group and the creation of the $550 billion U.S.-Japan strategic investment initiative are signs of growing opportunities for U.S.-Japaneconomic engagement. Yet the private sector faces growing operational challenges. Labor shortages have persistently constrained the profitability of Japanese firms operating in the United States, and recent survey data show that these challenges have been exacerbated by negative impacts from tariffs, underscoring the need to move beyond headline investment figures. To anchor Japanese investment more firmly in U.S. local economies and industrial competitiveness and to deepen the bilateral economic relationship, greater policy predictability and a shared approach to workforce development are critical.
Policy Context: A Stabilizing Agreement with Open Questions
The U.S.-Japan agreement concluded in July 2025 helped contain tariff risk and improved business predictability for Japanese firms operating in the United States. For the United States, the agreement offers tangible economic benefits, including potential job creation and industrial strengthening through inward investment that could reach up to $550 billion.
Nevertheless, the agreement's durability remains uncertain. As Ambassador Daniel Kritenbrink noted at a recent CSIS event, its implementation ultimately depends on whether concrete investment projects materialize. The memorandum on the U.S.-Japan investment initiative stipulates that the United States will refrain from raising tariffs on Japan so long as Japan funds investment in the United States. In other words, failure to implement such investments could expose Japan to the risk of higher U.S. tariffs.
Since December, the United States and Japan have convened three meetings of the "consultative committee" as part of the investment framework, and Japan has indicated that announcements regarding the first projects may be forthcoming. While final decisions on the projects rest with President Donald Trump, it is critical for Japan that the selected projects align with its national interests and lead to the steady and credible implementation of investment commitments. Beyond these uncertainties, additional policy or implementation "pitfalls" could still emerge.
Business Conditions: Strong Commitment, Rising Cost Pressures
Japanese firms continue to lead foreign direct investment in the United States. According to data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), of the $5.7 trillion in U.S. inward foreign direct investment stock in 2024, Japan accounted for $820 billion (14 percent), ranking first among all countries for the sixth consecutive year. With Nippon Steel's large-scale investment commitments and potential investments under the $550 billion framework, Japan is likely to retain this position into 2026.
A November 2025 survey from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Japan's trade and investment promotion agency, offers additional evidence to support this trend. It shows that 48 percent of Japanese-affiliated firms operating in the United States plan to expand their business over the next one to two years, attracted by strong demand and the size of the U.S. market. Only 3.7 percent anticipate downsizing.
At the same time, profitability is under pressure. According to the JETRO survey, 30 percent of surveyed firms expect operating profits in 2025 to decline year over year. Tariffs are a key factor, with nearly 70 percent of firms reporting negative impacts. The continued 15 percent reciprocal tariff is raising procurement costs and eroding cost competitiveness. Only 54 percent of firms report attempting to pass these higher costs on to customers, indicating that many are absorbing them internally, reducing their profit margins.
Even if the Supreme Court were to rule that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act tariffs are unlawful, similar measures could likely be pursued by the U.S. government under alternative legal authorities as a "Plan B," meaning that the issue would continue to pose a challenge. Therefore, for Japanese firms operating business in the United States, eliminating tariff exposure is likely unrealistic. What companies seek instead is predictability--above all, the avoidance of abrupt policy shifts. From a U.S. perspective, making the most of investment from allies such as Japan as a strategic asset for economic security and industrial resilience requires strengthening institutional trust and policy predictability.
Workforce Development as a Shared Strategic Investment Issue
In addition to the recent shock of tariffs, labor constraints present a persistent challenge to investment sustainability. Chronic labor shortages and rising wages have long affected Japanese firms in the United States and show little sign of easing. According to the November JETRO survey, 47 percent of surveyed firms report no improvement in U.S. labor market conditions over the past two years, while 27 percent report further deterioration.
Japanese firms are making efforts to address these challenges. However, workforce availability should not be left solely to individual firms but addressed as a shared U.S.-Japan investment challenge. The U.S. and Japanese national governments and U.S. state governments can play a complementary role by supporting workforce pipelines aligned with strategic sectors.
The semiconductor sector UPWARDS for the Future Network initiative illustrates this approach. Launched at the G7 Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, the initiative brings together Tokyo Electron, Micron Technology, and 11 universities in both countries to support the development of next-generation talent while advancing cutting-edge research and development. Comparable models, in which both governments serve as a bridge between industry and educational institutions across the two countries while clearly demonstrating their commitment to international talent development frameworks, could be applied to other strategic fields of shared interest between Japan and the United States. For example, through the $550 billion investment framework, both governments have identified areas of cooperation not only in semiconductors but also in pharmaceuticals, metals, critical minerals, shipbuilding, energy, and AI and quantum technologies.
In parallel, both governments should support Japanese companies that are currently struggling to secure workers in the United States. As Japanese investment continues to grow, ensuring a reliable workforce has become a key factor in maintaining business continuity and competitiveness. To address this challenge, JETRO and Japanese consulates have partnered with U.S. regional economic development organizations, including the Indiana Economic Development Corporation, to host student-focused career fairs in the Midwest United States. By directly linking Japanese investment to regional labor markets, these efforts can create a virtuous cycle that offers high-quality employment opportunities for U.S. workers while providing Japanese companies with a stable supply of talent.
Cooperation on workforce development and job creation represents a natural next phase in U.S.-Japan economic relations. Beyond addressing near-term labor shortages, such cooperation can strengthen regional economic resilience, improve regional affordability, and reinforce industrial bases in strategically important sectors. Institutionalizing these efforts would help shift the bilateral economic relationship from a focus on investment volume to one centered on durability, integration, and long-term competitiveness.
The Path Ahead
Although U.S.-Japan economic relations appear stable on the surface, supported by bilateral agreements and strong Japanese investment, uncertainty over agreement continuity and ongoing pressures from tariffs and labor shortages risk weakening the long-term impact of that investment. From a U.S. policy perspective, the key issue is not whether Japanese firms will continue to invest, but whether those investments can be sustained at scale and aligned with U.S. strategic priorities over time. Japanese capital is already deeply embedded in advanced manufacturing, critical materials, and technology supply chains that underpin U.S. economic security. If policy uncertainty and labor shortages weaken the business case for continued expansion, the risk is less one of disinvestment than of gradual erosion--slower reinvestment, constrained innovation, and diminished long-term competitiveness.
Such dynamics have direct implications for U.S. industrial policy. Federal efforts to reshore production and strengthen domestic supply chains depend not only on attracting capital, but on maintaining a stable operating environment and a reliable pipeline of skilled labor. With complementary investments in policy predictability and workforce development, investment from allies such as Japan can contribute to durable resilience and long-term competitiveness gains in the United States.
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Taisuke Kassai is a visiting fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/deepening-us-japan-economic-ties-through-workforce-development-cooperation
[Category: ThinkTank]