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Ifo Export Expectations in Germany Fall (March 2026)
MUNICH, Germany, March 27 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on March 26, 2026:
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ifo Export Expectations in Germany Fall (March 2026)
Sentiment in the German Export Industry Has Deteriorated. The ifo Export Expectations fell to -0.9 points in March, down from +2.7 points in February. "The war in Iran has significantly increased uncertainty among exporters," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "Many companies fear a decline in demand in important sales markets."
By contrast, car manufacturers expect a clear boost for exports, with the indicator rising to its highest
... Show Full Article
MUNICH, Germany, March 27 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on March 26, 2026:
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ifo Export Expectations in Germany Fall (March 2026)
Sentiment in the German Export Industry Has Deteriorated. The ifo Export Expectations fell to -0.9 points in March, down from +2.7 points in February. "The war in Iran has significantly increased uncertainty among exporters," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "Many companies fear a decline in demand in important sales markets."
By contrast, car manufacturers expect a clear boost for exports, with the indicator rising to its highestlevel since June 2020. The furniture and electronics sector as well as the beverage industry also expect international sales to increase. There is currently little momentum in mechanical engineering, and the situation is the same in metal production and processing. The paper, printing and chemical industries continue to expect exports to decline. "How export business will develop in the coming months depends heavily on how the conflict progresses," says Wohlrabe.
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More information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-03-26/ifo-export-expectations-germany-fall-march-2026)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-03-26/ifo-export-expectations-germany-fall-march-2026
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Russia's Influence Continues to Decline in Azerbaijan and Armenia
WASHINGTON, March 26 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on March 25, 2026, by Sertac Canalp Korkmaz, security studies expert on Turkiye, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Russia's Influence Continues to Decline in Azerbaijan and Armenia
Executive Summary:
* U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan in February 2026 are the most recent major indications of Baku and Yerevan's increasing diplomatic engagement with the West and distancing from Moscow.
* Moscow's influence in Azerbaijan and Armenia has declined sharply since its full-scale invasion
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, March 26 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on March 25, 2026, by Sertac Canalp Korkmaz, security studies expert on Turkiye, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Russia's Influence Continues to Decline in Azerbaijan and Armenia
Executive Summary:
* U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan in February 2026 are the most recent major indications of Baku and Yerevan's increasing diplomatic engagement with the West and distancing from Moscow.
* Moscow's influence in Azerbaijan and Armenia has declined sharply since its full-scale invasionof Ukraine in 2022. Moscow can no longer sustain the force posture that underpinned its role as the South Caucasus's security guarantor.
* Development of the Middle Corridor, TRIPP, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline all demonstrate that the South Caucasus is evolving into an energy and logistics hub independent of Russian leverage.
Moscow's influence in Azerbaijan and Armenia has declined sharply since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. With hundreds of thousands of troops occupied in Ukraine and an economic crisis at home, Moscow can no longer sustain the force posture that underpinned its role as the South Caucasus's security guarantor. The clearest evidence came in September 2023, when Russian peacekeepers stood by as Azerbaijan launched military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and quickly gained control of the territory. In the week following, more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled Nagorno-Karabakh--most of the population of the effectively Armenia-controlled region, which then had a population of around 120,000. Russia's deterrence against military action in the region had effectively collapsed, and the local government was fully disbanded on January 1, 2024 (OC Media, September 20, 2023).
U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance's visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan in February is the most recent major indication of Baku and Yerevan's increasing diplomatic engagement with the West and distancing from Moscow (see EDM, February 24). Vance signed a framework for up to $9 billion in U.S. nuclear investment in Armenia, a direct challenge to Rosatom's control over Yerevan's Metsamor plant, which generates roughly 40 percent of the country's electricity. Armenia also secured access to NVIDIA chips and an $11 million surveillance drone deal, the first U.S. defense technology transfer to Armenia. In Baku, Vance signed a Strategic Partnership Charter and agreed to supply patrol boats for Azerbaijan's Caspian waters. One Russian newspaper reported the visit occasioned disappointment, annoyance, and a sense of helplessness in Moscow (Kommersant, February 10; Aze.media, February 12). The trip followed the August 2025 Washington Peace Summit, at which Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and U.S. President Donald Trump signed a seven-point joint pledge to continue pursuing peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia (see EDM, August 12, 2025, February 10). European Council President Antonio Costa's March 11 meeting with Aliyev likewise demonstrates Baku's growing engagement with the European Union (see EDM, March 24)
Azerbaijan consolidated full authority over the Lachin Corridor, the only road linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, after restoring its control over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. After the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Moscow had been explicitly mandated to secure this road. In late 2022, however, Azerbaijani actors blocked the corridor, while Russian peacekeepers stood by (OC Media, August 31, 2023). After Baku's September 2023 offensive and the dissolution of Armenia-controlled authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia allowed Azerbaijan to replace it as the corridor's gatekeeper. Russia's inaction evaporated Armenian and Azerbaijani trust in Russian security guarantees (Novaya Gazeta; Interfax, December 27, 2022).
Armenia and Azerbaijan no longer rely on Russia alone to mediate their conflicts, with increasing U.S. and EU involvement. Baku increasingly relies on Turkiye for military and diplomatic partnership. In the 1990s and into the 2000s, Russia was Azerbaijan's largest trading partner. It now ranks third for overall trade with Azerbaijan, after Italy and Turkiye, and second in imports after the People's Republic of China (PRC) (see EDM, May 1, 2025). Russia remains Armenia's largest trading partner for both imports and exports, but its overall trade share is declining (Eurasianet, November 1, 2023).
Russia's relationship with Azerbaijan has deteriorated since 2023. The December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines crash near Aktau, Kazakhstan, added a volatile dimension when leaked audio raised credible allegations that Russian air defense systems downed the aircraft (see EDM, May 20, 2025; Minval Politika, July 1, 2025). In June 2025, a police raid in Russia that killed two Azerbaijani nationals further inflamed bilateral relations (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 1, 2025; see EDM, July 7, 2025). Azerbaijan's shift from Russian-origin military platforms, which has been underway since Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones proved decisive in Azerbaijan's 2020 offensive, is accelerating, with Baku sourcing systems from Turkiye and Israel (Civil Net, April 1, 2024). Ankara has been the most decisive regional actor in occupying the space Russia vacated. The Shusha Declaration of June 2021 formalized a comprehensive defense alliance with Azerbaijan, and Turkiye's energy engagement across the Caucasus and Central Asia is expanding rapidly (President of Azerbaijan, June 16, 2021; CACI Analyst, March 27, 2024).
Russia's failure to back Armenia in the 2020 and 2023 Karabakh conflicts has driven Yerevan toward effectively divorcing its security from Moscow (see EDM, January 15). Disillusioned by the Collective Security Treaty Organization's ineffectiveness, Pashinyan's government suspended Armenia's participation in the organization and has pursued Western partnerships since (Novaya Gazeta, February 24, 2024; Andalou, February 23, 2024; see EDM, March 5, 2024).
Pashinyan's June 2025 visit to Istanbul signaled Yerevan's intent to diversify security dependencies and pursue more multi-vector diplomacy. Around the same time, Moscow echoed the Armenian Apostolic Church's criticism of Pashinyan, which some in Pashinyan's administration took as a Russian attempt to undermine Pashinyan's support within Armenia and among its diaspora (Armenian Weekly, June 17, 2025; see EDM, July 23, 2025). Russian Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "[Russia] would very much not like this church to be subjected to unjustified attacks essentially without any serious grounds," prompting Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan to accuse Russia of meddling in Armenian affairs (Azatutyun, June 30, 2025).
The centerpiece of Washington's engagement with Azerbaijan and Armenia is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). The TRIPP, formerly known as the Zangezur Corridor in Azerbaijan, is a 43-kilometer (26.7-mile) road-and-rail corridor through Armenian territory linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave (see EDM, October 15, 2025). Aliyev and Pashinyan agreed to allow the United States to manage the route under a lease of up to 99 years during their August 2025 meeting at the White House. The project transforms the Zangezur question from a source of conflict into a U.S.-managed commercial artery bypassing both Russia and Iran (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 6).
The Zangezur question, now reframed through TRIPP, remains the sharpest test of Russia's residual leverage. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards have long manned access points along the Armenian-Iranian border, and whether Moscow retains any role in the corridor's security framework will measure its remaining influence. Ankara's cooperation with Yerevan and Baku is pragmatic, not confrontational. Turkiye's energy dependence on Russia, possession of Russian S-400 air defenses, and Russia-Turkiye cooperation in Syria impose limits on Ankara's willingness to upset Moscow. For Moscow, Turkish advances may be a preferable alternative to deeper Western penetration in Azerbaijan and Armenia, as they represent a form of competitive cooperation rather than outright rivalry. Iran views both the original Zangezur concept and the U.S.-managed TRIPP as threats. Either could consolidate a corridor from Turkiye to Central Asia, diminishing Iran's geographic leverage, disrupting Iran-Armenia trade routes, and reducing the relevance of its Aras Corridor project (see EDM, September 11, 2025).
The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, or the Middle Corridor), which links the PRC to Europe via Kazakhstan, is another connectivity project emerging as a viable alternative to Russian-controlled routes (see EDM, December 4, 2025). Georgia's Anaklia Deep Sea Port would be one anchor of the network, though Georgian Dream's increasingly Moscow-leaning posture introduces political risk (see EDM, November 20, 2025). The TITR, TRIPP, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, and Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) all indicate that the South Caucasus is evolving into an energy and logistics hub independent of Russian leverage.
The South Caucasus is shifting from a Russian-dominated space to a contested multipolar arena in which the United States has emerged as an active player for the first time in decades. The region's near-term trajectory will be shaped by first, whether Washington follows through on TRIPP, nuclear investments, and defense transfers or whether its engagement proves episodic; second, Turkiye's response to a U.S.-managed corridor (TRIPP) on its doorstep; and third, Iran's reaction to a route operated by its principal adversary. Should Russia's war against Ukraine resolve, Moscow may attempt to reassert itself, but its credibility deficit would severely limit such efforts. In any event, Russian primacy in the South Caucasus is ending.
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Sertac Canalp Korkmaz was a specialist at the Presidency of the Republic of Turkiye from 2019 to 2024. He holds a PhD and an MA in security studies from the Turkish National Police Academy, along with a BA in International Relations from Selcuk University. He served as an assistant researcher at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) from 2016 to 2019.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russias-influence-continues-to-decline-in-azerbaijan-and-armenia/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Orban Doubles Down On Anti-Ukrainian Campaign To Secure Reelection
WASHINGTON, March 26 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on March 25, 2026, by political analyst Peter Fazekas in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Orban Doubles Down On Anti-Ukrainian Campaign To Secure Reelection
Executive Summary:
* Hungary's ruling Fidesz-KDNP alliance is doubling down on its anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in a desperate move to win Hungary's most competitive parliamentary election in 16 years.
* Fidesz has exploited a series of recent events, including the disruption of the vital Druzhba pipeline, to label the main opposition Tisza party as a "Ukrainian
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, March 26 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on March 25, 2026, by political analyst Peter Fazekas in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Orban Doubles Down On Anti-Ukrainian Campaign To Secure Reelection
Executive Summary:
* Hungary's ruling Fidesz-KDNP alliance is doubling down on its anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in a desperate move to win Hungary's most competitive parliamentary election in 16 years.
* Fidesz has exploited a series of recent events, including the disruption of the vital Druzhba pipeline, to label the main opposition Tisza party as a "Ukrainianagent," pushing bilateral relations with Kyiv to a historic low.
* The outcome of the April 12 election remains uncertain, as shown by polling inconsistencies, with long-running anti-Ukrainian sentiment likely to play a key role in the final result.
Hungary's relations with Ukraine have reached a historic low amid a series of recent events. Budapest is heading into its most competitive parliamentary election in 16 years. On February 23, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban vetoed a critical, 90 billion euro ($104 billion) EU package for Ukraine and the European bloc's 20th sanctions package against Russia. Reinforced during the March 19-20 EU Council meeting, this follows the recent disruption of Russia's Druzhba pipeline, which supplies Hungary with Russian oil via Ukraine. Orban justified his veto by citing Ukraine's alleged unwillingness to reopen oil flows, accusing Kyiv of creating an "oil blockade" and even of deploying the military to protect Hungarian energy infrastructure (Prime Minister of Hungary, February 27). Ukraine first attributed the disruption to prior Russian attacks, then to ongoing repair work, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy now expects the pipeline to reopen by the end of April.
The Druzhba dispute became the starting point for a series of events that further strained Ukraine-Hungary relations. This included Zelenskyy's initial response, who suggested that if Hungary does not lift its veto on EU aid, he may "simply give the address of that person [Orban] to our Armed Forces--our guys can call him and speak to him in their own language" (The Kyiv Independent, March 5) Despite being taken out of context, the Ukrainian President's poorly chosen words were quickly interpreted as a threat against Orban, while his expressed hope for a change of government in Budapest also added fuel to the fire.
In parallel, Hungary's pro-government media started alleging that "the Ukrainians have threatened Orban's children and grandchildren" (Magyar Nemzet, March 12). The allegation came after Hryhoriy Omelchenko, a controversial Ukrainian political figure who retired as a Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) general 30 years ago and is not part of Ukraine's leadership, referred to Orban's family during an interview. While his actual words did not constitute an explicit threat but a call on the Hungarian prime minister to sympathize with Ukraine's war-torn children, a whole social media campaign was built on reinforcing the narrative about the alleged threat (444.hu, March 12).
Further raising tensions, Hungary's Counter-Terrorism Center seized two armored vehicles from Ukraine's state-owned Oschadbank carrying $80 million in cash and gold while en route from Austria on March 5, detaining the bank's employees for alleged money-laundering. While the employees were quickly released, indicating no crime, the Hungarian government has continued to promote unsubstantiated claims that Ukraine may have wanted to use the money to secretly fund the Hungarian opposition (Origo, March 7).
This situation is developing as Hungary is scheduled to hold much-anticipated parliamentary elections on April 12 that threaten to end Orban's rule. Led by former ruling party insider Peter Magyar, the main opposition Respect and Freedom Party (Tisza) has become the first individual formation in 16 years polling higher than the ruling bloc, injecting genuine uncertainty into the election. Opposition-linked and independent Hungarian pollsters have been consistently showing a decisive Tisza advantage since late 2024, while pro-government pollsters continue to anticipate a Fidesz victory (2026-valasztas.hu, March 18).
Tisza's rise in popularity consolidated despite multiple failed efforts from Fidesz to counter the new challenger through various tactics. These include a since debunked artificial intelligence-generated document promoted as Tisza's "secret austerity program," personal attacks against Magyar over his private life, and labeling him as a Ukrainian agent (Telex, March 6). A likely reason for this escalation is that Fidesz is increasingly uncertain about the election outcome, which has pushed the ruling bloc to exploit geopolitical fears of Hungarians, a third of whom are critical of Ukraine and receptive to pro-Kremlin disinformation (DRI Hungary Chapter 2024, November 21, 2024).
Widely seen as Russian President Vladimir Putin's top EU ally, Orban is well known for representing anti-Ukrainian positions both at home and abroad. He notably framed Hungary's 2022 election as a choice between war and peace, arguing that the then- (and since disbanded) opposition alliance would drag Hungary into the war on Ukraine's side. Fueled by disinformation, his "pro-peace messaging" was key in securing Fidesz's two-thirds victory in April 2022 (see EDM, May 16, 2025).
Orban was widely expected to use his "pro-peace" narrative to boost Fidesz's reelection bid. He has openly doubled down on his anti-Ukraine rhetoric, however, shifting his message from the need to stay out of the neighboring war to openly fearing an alleged Ukrainian attack on Hungary. Employing the same propaganda narratives, Fidesz has accordingly orchestrated all recent events in Ukraine-Hungary relations to claim that Kyiv secretly funds Tisza and wants Hungary to join the war on Ukraine's side. These recent events also include an alleged Hungarian secret service operation targeting Tisza's IT experts, which the government claims was an investigation to reveal the opposition's hidden connections to Ukraine (Hirado, March 24).
Ever since entering politics in early 2024, Tisza's leader notably chose not to discuss Ukraine--and foreign policy, in general--understanding that not only Fidesz voters are overwhelmingly anti-Ukrainian but that the majority of opposition voters is also against providing Kyiv with military aid, despite acknowledging that Russia is the aggressor (Nepszava, December 19, 2025). While Tisza organized an advisory referendum in which 60 percent of the 1.1 million respondents voted in favor of Ukraine's EU membership, the party opposes fast-tracking Ukraine's membership and providing Kyiv with military assistance (see EDM, May 16, 2025). Consequently, Tisza's strategy has largely been to counter Orban based on his domestic track record, including state capture and institutional corruption, the poor state of the healthcare system, and the country's cost-of-living and housing crisis, among others.
Disrupting Tisza's election strategy, the recent escalation with Ukraine has forced Magyar to respond. Reacting to Zelenskyy's controversial remarks, he stressed that no foreign leader can threaten Orban, whoever they may be (HVG, March 5). At the same time, Magyar--unlike Orban--criticized Putin. The Russian leader, while in a meeting with Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Peter Szijjarto on March 4, claimed that "Russia remains ready to supply natural gas to ... Hungary provided that they continue to follow the same policy as today," indirectly threatening Hungary with a gas blockade if Fidesz loses the election (Portfolio, March 5). Unlike most EU states, Hungary remains reliant on Russia through a long-term gas contract with Moscow.
Orban's anti-Ukrainian messaging culminated on March 15. During a Fidesz campaign rally, he claimed that "either him or Zelenskyy will form the next [Hungarian] government" (Prime Minister of Hungary, March 15). In addition to actively using all aforementioned events to portray Fidesz as the defender of Hungary's sovereignty, a Fidesz-linked group even planted a large Ukrainian flag in the rival Tisza rally to double down on the foreign agent claims against the opposition, which was later promoted via a coordinated campaign (HVG, March 18). On the rival Tisza rally on the same day, Magyar rejected Orban's fearmongering rhetoric, while warning Russia to stay out of the election following reports of alleged Russian interference (VSquare, March 6).
The current tensions with Ukraine are certain to disrupt Tisza's campaign in its most critical phase, giving Fidesz much-needed momentum as the ruling bloc visibly lacks trust in its own public policy track record. It is yet to be seen whether Fidesz's fearmongering will be successful, especially given the polling inconsistencies. Orban has fully subordinated foreign policy to serve domestic campaign interests, as evidenced by his multiple aggressive statements against Ukraine, rather than seeking a diplomatic solution to the oil pipeline disruption, in which Moscow also played a key role.
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Peter Fazekas is a political analyst based in Budapest, Hungary.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/orban-doubles-down-on-anti-ukrainian-campaign-to-secure-reelection/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Ukraine Military Situation Report
WASHINGTON, March 26 (TNSxrep) -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on March 25, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Can Kasapoglu:
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Ukraine Military Situation Report
Executive Summary
* Battlefield assessment: The battlespace saw an intensified operational tempo last week, suggesting that a Russian spring offensive may be forthcoming. The front lines near Lyman saw heightened combat action, while Pokrovsk remained fiercely contested.
* Ukrainian air strikes: Ukrainian robotic
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, March 26 (TNSxrep) -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on March 25, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Can Kasapoglu:
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Ukraine Military Situation Report
Executive Summary
* Battlefield assessment: The battlespace saw an intensified operational tempo last week, suggesting that a Russian spring offensive may be forthcoming. The front lines near Lyman saw heightened combat action, while Pokrovsk remained fiercely contested.
* Ukrainian air strikes: Ukrainian roboticwarfare systems hit the Saratov oil refinery in Russia.
* A drone downs a Russian helicopter: A Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone downed a Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter, marking another instance of a drone intercepting a manned rotary-wing aircraft.
1. Battlefield Assessment
After weeks of relatively mid-tempo combat in Ukraine, the battlespace is now showing signs that Russian combat formations are preparing to launch a spring offensive.
The average number of daily tactical engagements climbed again last week to over two hundred. Russian forces gained territory, albeit at the tactical level, in the Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk, Novopavlivka, Kupiansk, Huliaipole, and Udachne sectors.
Approximately twenty percent of the overall fighting revolved around Pokrovsk, which remained hotly contested. Nonetheless, field assessments of engagements in February suggest that the combat performance of Russian artillery, a principal ground-warfare asset, has been particularly poor due to ammunition shortages and formidable Ukrainian resistance.
In addition to Pokrovsk, fierce fighting also raged around Lyman last week. On March 19, Russian forces launched a coordinated assault along the Lyman-Borova front, an attack which Ukrainian reporting described as Russia's largest breakthrough attempt in the sector to date. The operation involved elements of Russia's 1st Tank Army and 20th Combined Arms Army conducting simultaneous attacks across seven axes.
These units employed more than 500 servicemen, supported by armored vehicles and numerous light-mobility platforms, including motorcycles and buggies. Because elements of Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps contained and reversed the assault within hours, Russia's attempted breakthrough failed to achieve operational penetration, and resulted in significant materiel losses. These losses included dozens of light vehicles, multiple infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs), and several main battle tanks.
Along the Lyman axis, Ukrainian forces reported localized gains despite numerous Russian assault waves. These advances were not the result of massed attacks, but instead reflected a deliberate shift in operational methods. Field reporting indicates that Ukrainian units have deprioritized direct engagements with Russian infantry formations and are instead targeting the enabling architecture behind those formations, including drone operators, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launch sites, artillery systems, logistics corridors, and forward shelters.
This shift is reshaping patterns of engagement. Russian assault activity has declined in both frequency and coherence. Furthermore, Ukraine's disruption of supply routes and staging areas is degrading Moscow's ability to reinforce forward positions. Ukrainian elements are exploiting this friction to incrementally retake previously contested ground.
This new approach reflects a core Ukrainian assessment of Russian force employment. The Kremlin continues to accept significant personnel losses but has become more cautious in its use of critical enablers, including equipment, logistics networks, and trained technical specialists. Ukrainian targeting priorities increasingly reflect this asymmetry.
Open-source intelligence also indicates a growing density of FPV drone operations in the Lyman sector. These systems are being employed not only for tactical strikes but also to sustain pressure on critical support nodes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Cumulative armor losses attributed to Ukrainian drone warfare are also trending upward. As a result, Russian combat effectiveness at the tactical edge is gradually eroding, less from direct confrontation than from Ukraine's systematic dismantling of Moscow's battlefield support systems.
March 24-March 25 saw a record increase in the Russian Shahed strike activity, with 948 drones launched within a 24-hour period. Lviv's city center was among the highest-priority targets of the attack waves.
Ukraine also continued to target Russian energy infrastructure last week. Overnight on March 20, Kyiv employed drones to strike the Saratov oil refinery as part of a large-scale salvo involving approximately 300 robotic warfare systems.
2. Ukraine Uses Unmanned Systems to Target Russian Rotary-Wing Assets
Elements from Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reportedly employed a fiber-optic FPV drone to destroy a Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter along the Pokrovsk axis. Initial reporting on the incident emerged from Ukrainian Telegram accounts, including the country's official combat-data outlet, which attributed the strike to the 59th Separate Assault Brigade.
Open-source footage of the incident shows the Ka-52 burning on the ground after impact. Aerial visuals indicate that an FPV system tracked the aircraft prior to the strike. Although the Russian crew attempted to withdraw from the aircraft after a forced landing, subsequent drone activity--reportedly from Ukraine's 414th "Magyar's Birds" combat group--prevented the escape attempt.
Following a strike on a Russian Mi-8 in late September 2025, this incident marks the second helicopter kill attributed to drone units of Ukraine's 59th Brigade. The attack underscores the expanding role of FPV drone systems in targeting high-value rotary-wing assets in contested air-defense environments.
The helicopter downed by Ukraine last week was a Kamov Ka-52 "Alligator," known by its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reporting name as "Hokum B." Developed by the Kamov Design Bureau, an organization known for its coaxial rotor designs, the Ka-52 entered service in the early 2010s as a replacement for the Ka-50 "Black Shark." The Ka-52 is a twin-seat, all-weather attack helicopter designed for high-intensity combat. Its configuration allows it to carry a second crew member, reducing pilot workload and improve performance during complex missions.
The aircraft's defining feature is its coaxial rotor system, which eliminates the need for a tail rotor. This configuration increases agility, minimizes vulnerability to ground fire, and enables operations in confined terrain. Although the platform's performance has been mixed, Russia has employed the Ka-52 extensively in Ukraine since 2022 for close air support, anti-armor strikes, reconnaissance, and counter-drone missions. As last week's helicopter kill underscores, Ukrainian air-defense pressure remains strong and sustained across the battlespace.
3. What to Monitor in the Coming Weeks:
To bolster their defenses against Iran, several Gulf Arab states appear poised to move beyond exploratory engagement with Ukraine toward full-scale procurement. This shift could usher in formal contracts between Ukraine and its Gulf Arab partners, likely followed by advisor deployments and deliveries of counter-drone systems. Such commitments in the near term would serve as key indicators of evolving strategic dynamics in the Gulf region.
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At A Glance:
Can Kasapoglu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/ukraine-military-situation-report-march-25-can-kasapoglu
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Assessing the Air Campaign After Three Weeks - Iran War By the Numbers
WASHINGTON, March 26 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 25, 2026, by Mark F. Cancian, senior adviser with the CSIS Defense and Security Department, and Chris H. Park, research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy:
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Assessing the Air Campaign After Three Weeks: Iran War By the Numbers
As the war with Iran enters its fourth week, there is an opportunity to look at data on the air campaign to understand what has happened and the combatants' intentions.
* U.S. Strike Campaign: The U.S. strike campaign has settled into
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, March 26 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 25, 2026, by Mark F. Cancian, senior adviser with the CSIS Defense and Security Department, and Chris H. Park, research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy:
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Assessing the Air Campaign After Three Weeks: Iran War By the Numbers
As the war with Iran enters its fourth week, there is an opportunity to look at data on the air campaign to understand what has happened and the combatants' intentions.
* U.S. Strike Campaign: The U.S. strike campaign has settled intoa sustainable pace of bombing between 300 and 500 targets per day. U.S. forces also now predominantly use far less expensive, short-range munitions. This "munitions transition" has vastly lowered the daily war costs.
* Iranian Launches: Iran's drone and missile launches declined rapidly after the first four days. While rebounding slightly since, these launches remain far lower than earlier large salvos. The "lingering launch capacity," however, continues to inflict damage--particularly, to energy facilities.
* Interceptions: Some Gulf states report very high interception rates, ranging from 80 to 90 percent. If true, that aligns with the best rates that Ukraine has achieved.
U.S. Strike Campaign
In the first 24 hours of Operation Epic Fury, U.S. forces struck over 1,000 targets as they worked from the long-standing U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) target list. The Israeli Air Force struck over 750 additional targets during this time. After that, the pace eased. CENTCOM likely was being judicious in using expensive and scarce long-range missiles like the Tomahawk and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)--both around $3.5 million per shot.
The intensity of the U.S. bombing campaign picked up between Days 7 and 10 as the coalition took advantage of its air dominance over large parts of Iran. Operational success in diminishing Iran's air defense meant U.S. planes could fly with few limitations and use less expensive, more plentiful munitions like Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which costs less than $100,000 per shot.
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Figure 1: Aggregate Number of Targets Struck by U.S. Forces, Days 1-24
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After Day 10, the pace settled down to 300-500 targets per day as the campaign needed to maintain a sustainable tempo. Aircraft required maintenance, and crews needed rest. Further, the rate of adding targets likely declined as the original list was exhausted. Developing new targets takes time as they need to be identified, validated to ensure the identification was correct, and developed into an attack package.
Department of Defense (DOD) officials reported that the United States and Israel together have struck over 15,000 targets by Day 14. Based on CENTCOM releases represented in Figure 1, Israeli strikes appear to account for more than half of those strikes.
Air Defense Campaign: Iranian Launches
The DOD has provided only a few updates so far on Iranian uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) and missile launches. The released data show a pronounced decline in launches after the first few days. This drop occurred as the U.S. and Israeli strike campaign actively attacked Iran's missile and drone inventories, manufacturing capacity, and launchers; the Israel Defense Forces reported 70 percent of Iran's ballistic missile launchers were disabled by Day 16. Breakdown in command and control after strikes against leadership targets may have contributed, particularly to the initial drop. Iran also may be taking a more deliberate approach to expending its diminishing inventories of munitions and putting at risk its launchers.
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Table 1: DOD-Released Figures on Iranian Launches
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Four Gulf coalition partners--Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)--have released more frequent updates on Iranian launches. Most have been providing daily updates; Saudi Arabia has reported interceptions as they have occurred. In terms of metrics, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have shared the number of intercepted Iranian drones and missiles. The UAE reported detections and interceptions until March 9, then reported only detections. Kuwait has reported on both since March 6. It is unclear whether the reported interceptions reflect those carried out solely by respective militaries or if they include U.S. interceptions. Given the high levels, the latter may be more likely.
Figure 2 aggregates the four Gulf countries' reports to illustrate the general trend of Iranian launches. The data below (930 drones and 269 missiles at Day 4) represent about half of the total reported launches (more than 2,000 drones and 500 ballistic missiles at Day 4). As a point of comparison, Russian missile and drone launches have routinely reached 700 a day. Iran achieved that level for maybe the first two or three days of the war.
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Figure 2: UAS and Missile Detections or Interceptions, as Reported by Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, Days 1-23
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Figures 3 through 6 show the reporting by each of the four Gulf partners. Despite statements about wanting to avoid conflict with its Gulf Arab neighbors, Iran continues to fire missiles and drones at them. The Bahraini (Figure 3) and UAE (Figure 4) missile and drone interceptions show the initial large Iranian salvos that, as the DOD reported, have declined significantly--albeit not completely.
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Figure 3: Bahrani-Reported UAS and Missile Interceptions, Days 1-23
Figure 4: UAE-Reported UAS and Missile Detections, Days 1-23
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The Kuwaitis (Figure 5) reported a resurgence of Iranian launches on Day 15. For the Saudis (Figure 6), Iranian attacks were initially at a low level but increased after Day 7. Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia has threatened Iran that it will strike back if attacks continue. The UAE, which has faced the greatest share of Iranian attacks so far, reportedly considers doing the same.
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Figure 5: Kuwaiti-Reported UAS and Missile Detections and Interceptions, Days 7-23
Figure 6: Saudi-Reported UAS and Missile Interceptions, Days 3-23
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The direction and focus of Iran's strike campaign remain unclear. Although the data is incomplete, updates from Saudi Arabia--which have included the general location where interceptions took place--provide partial insights into Iranian targeting practice. In the past three weeks, nearly 70 percent of Saudi-reported intercepted drones and missiles were on course for the oil-rich Eastern Province or specific oil facilities. Targets included the Shaybah Oil Field near the de facto Saudi-UAE border and the Samref refinery on the Red Sea coast.
The Saudi reports suggest that Iranian strikes may be increasingly focusing on Gulf states' economic foundations and civilian infrastructure--not solely on U.S. regional military presence. Figure 7 breaks down the Saudi-reported targets of Iranian drone and missile launches.
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Figure 7: Saudi-Reported Location of Interception or Likely Target, Days 3-23
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Air Defense Campaign: Interceptions
Drones and missiles that have made past defenses have caused widely-reported damages and disruptions. Based on reports from two Gulf states, the overall interception rate appears high. Table 2 shows these reported numbers from the UAE and Kuwait, where most Iranian projectiles are being shot down. Although not independently verified by the United States, these rates are consistent with Ukrainian interception rates when Ukraine has an adequate inventory of air defense systems.
Both the United States and the Gulf states use Patriot missiles to intercept Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles. They are generally not used against Iranian UASs. Instead, the Gulf states use helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and ground-based short-range defenses. The United States also has systems like the Coyote, Roadrunner, and the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) specifically designed to intercept drones.
The Gulf states' inventories of interceptors are reportedly running low. The recently announced arms sales will replenish inventories postwar. However, if the Gulf states need resupply before then, the munitions will need to come out of existing U.S. stocks. That would trigger a major policy debate.
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Table 2: UAV Interception Rate, as Reported by the UAE and Kuwait
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Looking Ahead
The air war is not over. U.S. and Israeli strikes continue with an expanded target set. Every day of the air war furthers the Trump administration's goals of reducing Iran's nuclear, missile, and naval capabilities. Iranian officials, however, show few indications of wanting a ceasefire. Its residual missile and drone capacities continue to attack Gulf neighbors and Israel, though at a much lower level. Unclear is how many missiles and drones Iran still has, and, with that, its ability to inflict pain on its neighbors and keep the Strait of Hormuz closed. A U.S. military operation to open the straits--as seems possible given the deployment of Marines to the region--will give an answer.
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Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Chris H. Park is a research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.
The authors appreciate Madison Bruno's and Sabina Hung's work in publishing this commentary.
If you are interested in learning more about this topic, explore CSIS's Executive Education courses Meeting China's Military Challenge and Inside DOD's FY 2027 Budget.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-air-campaign-after-three-weeks-iran-war-numbers
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: Minnesota Fails to Advance SNAP Reform Policy Amid Ongoing Fraud Concerns
WASHINGTON, March 26 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on March 25, 2026:
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Minnesota Fails to Advance SNAP Reform Policy Amid Ongoing Fraud Concerns
Zach Freimark, Executive Director of the America First Policy Institute's (AFPI) Minnesota Chapter, issued the following statement after Minnesota failed to advance policy that would have implemented income and asset verification measures for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP):
"Despite a growing number of fraud cases coming to light in Minnesota, progressives failed to take even the most
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, March 26 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on March 25, 2026:
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Minnesota Fails to Advance SNAP Reform Policy Amid Ongoing Fraud Concerns
Zach Freimark, Executive Director of the America First Policy Institute's (AFPI) Minnesota Chapter, issued the following statement after Minnesota failed to advance policy that would have implemented income and asset verification measures for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP):
"Despite a growing number of fraud cases coming to light in Minnesota, progressives failed to take even the mostbasic steps to protect taxpayer dollars and restore public trust. This policy would have implemented common-sense guardrails, including income and asset verification, to ensure that programs like SNAP are reserved for those who truly need them, while also giving county caseworkers the tools they need to reduce payment errors, strengthen oversight, and protect nearly $100 million in state funding at risk due to high error rates. Instead, Minnesota chose to preserve a system vulnerable to abuse--one that has allowed individuals like Rob Undersander to collect benefits meant for struggling Minnesotans. Minnesota should prioritize policies that offer accountability, integrity, and stewardship of public resources."
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/minnesota-fails-to-advance-snap-reform-policy-amid-ongoing-fraud-concerns
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Holds Ending Human Trafficking Roundtable
WASHINGTON, March 26 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on March 25, 2026:
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AFPI Holds Ending Human Trafficking Roundtable
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today hosted a roundtable event focused on Ending Human Trafficking, convening national leaders, law enforcement officials, and advocates to discuss policy solutions to end human trafficking, support victims and the vulnerable, and restore safety across the nation.
The event was led by Bob Unanue, AFPI Chair of America Combats Trafficking Initiative (ACT), who was joined by featured special
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, March 26 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on March 25, 2026:
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AFPI Holds Ending Human Trafficking Roundtable
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today hosted a roundtable event focused on Ending Human Trafficking, convening national leaders, law enforcement officials, and advocates to discuss policy solutions to end human trafficking, support victims and the vulnerable, and restore safety across the nation.
The event was led by Bob Unanue, AFPI Chair of America Combats Trafficking Initiative (ACT), who was joined by featured specialguests:
* Congressman Chris Smith (NJ-4)
* AFPI Vice Chair of America Combats Trafficking Initiative (ACT), Betsy Sheehy
* Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Lee Rizzuto
* U.S. Customs and Border Protection Senior Advisor, Ronald Vitiello
* AFPI Homeland Security & Immigration Senior Fellow, Tony Pham
* Anti-trafficking activist and founder of Booyens Ministries, Pasto Jaco Booyens
Below are select quotes from today's event:
Bob Unanue
* "We are all called by name. But in trafficking you lose your name, and even your humanity. You're a commodity, not a person."
* "[From 2021 to 2024], the US permitted the largest, sanctioned trafficking and exploitation operation in the world. 400,000 kids were trafficked here in that time, and the US government became the middleman."
* "Thank God we have AFPI, people like Congressman Smith, and people like President Trump who will lead this country with our hearts and defeat this evil, which is on the rise."
Congressman Chris Smith
* "There are so many in this world who are not safe, cherished, and free. At the top of that list are those who are victim to human trafficking."
* "This President is a great leader and that has made such a tremendous difference. And AFPI is a source of firepower and the road map [for issues like border security and human trafficking]."
Betsy Sheehy
* "There is something wrong with a civilization that doesn't protect its most vulnerable and innocent citizens."
Ambassador Lee Rizutto
* "The America First approach, is to make clear that ending human trafficking isn't a secondary issue for the US, it's a primary issue."
Ronald Vitiello
* "We have to codify our border policies into law so that people cannot abuse the refugee and asylum system in the United States. We don't want the cartels, traffickers, and organized smugglers to abuse our generous immigration system."
Tony Pham
* "The policy decisions of the Trump administration focused on physical barriers, enhancing personnel at the border, reimplementing mandatory detention which functions as a deterrent, and ending catch and release policies. This shocked the system [of illegal immigration and human trafficking]."
Pastor Jaco Booyens
* "Every American should understand your Christian citizenship and your American citizenship mandates that you lock arms [with victims and those helping them]."
Human trafficking is one of the most urgent human rights crises facing our nation today, and a direct assault on the liberty and dignity that define the American experience. With our southern border now successfully closed, AFPI remains focused on confronting the human toll caused by the previous administration's failures while holding traffickers accountable and returning safety and justice to American communities.
Ending the scourge of human trafficking is an America First priority. Learn more here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/homeland-security/human-trafficking).
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-holds-ending-human-trafficking-roundtable
[Category: ThinkTank]
