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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Moscow Aims to Treat Critical Minerals as Diplomatic Instruments
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Sergey Sukhankin, senior fellow and an advisor at Gulf State Analytics, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Moscow Aims to Treat Critical Minerals as Diplomatic Instruments
Executive Summary:
* Russia is increasingly treating critical minerals as instruments of foreign policy, using state-backed resource projects tos deepen long-term strategic partnerships across BRICS countries and the broader Global South rather than simply expanding commodity exports.
* Moscow's approach combines
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by Sergey Sukhankin, senior fellow and an advisor at Gulf State Analytics, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Moscow Aims to Treat Critical Minerals as Diplomatic Instruments
Executive Summary:
* Russia is increasingly treating critical minerals as instruments of foreign policy, using state-backed resource projects tos deepen long-term strategic partnerships across BRICS countries and the broader Global South rather than simply expanding commodity exports.
* Moscow's approach combinesupstream resource access with processing, technology cooperation, and existing nuclear-sector relationships. Sanctions, infrastructure constraints, and strong international competition, however, limit its ability to translate geological potential into industrial influence.
* Cooperation with India, Brazil, and Bolivia demonstrates that Russia's critical-minerals diplomacy is tailored to local political and economic conditions but consistently seeks to embed resource cooperation within broader state-to-state strategic relationships.
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On June 16, reports emerged that Moscow offered India access to the Tomtor rare-earth deposit in Yakutia. This deposit is one of the world's largest undeveloped rare earth element sites, with forecast resources of 154 million tons of ore and audited initial resources of 13.2 million tons of high-grade ore. India's state-owned IREL is reportedly discussing the delivery of samples, with preliminary processing expected in Russia before the material is sent to India for analysis (The Moscow Times, June 16). Earlier reporting indicated that Russia and India were discussing broader cooperation in rare earth and lithium exploration and processing, while India was simultaneously working with Argentina, Australia, Japan, Peru, and Chile (Kommersant, May 12). This creates room for Moscow, but not as a monopoly power since India's strategy is diversification, not dependence. Even without becoming India's principal supplier, Russia can still gain political influence, industrial cooperation, and commercial openings through India's diversification strategy.
These moves fit a broader Russian effort to use critical minerals to diversify away from hydrocarbons and to build state-backed industrial partnerships across the BRICS and the wider Global South (see EDM, April 27, 2023, February 13, April 24). [1] In that model, upstream resource access is linked to processing, technology cooperation, and existing ties in the nuclear sector. Moscow is not trying to replace the People's Republic of China (PRC)--the world's largest producer of critical metals--but to position itself as an additional strategic partner for countries seeking more room to maneuver.
Granting India access to Tomtor is the instrument through which Moscow is trying to turn geological potential into industrial leverage (The Moscow Times, June 16). The project, however, is geographically remote, infrastructure-heavy, technically difficult, and tied to sanctioned state-controlled actors. India may be able to analyze samples, but whether it has the technology, logistics, and risk appetite to process Siberian rare earths at industrial scale is uncertain. In the near term, Tomtor is less likely to deliver a supply breakthrough than to signal that Russia can bundle upstream access, state backing, and prospective processing cooperation into a longer-term political offer.
If Tomtor shows the upstream logic of Russia's strategy, Brazil shows how Moscow tries to scale that model through Rosatom's pre-existing institutional footprint in a core BRICS state. In March, Rosatom's Uranium One Group and Nucleo Brasil Energia Participacoes signed an agreement to create Nadina Minerals, a joint venture for critical mineral exploration and extraction in Brazil (World Nuclear News, March 26). Rosatom framed the project as covering permits, geological exploration, extraction, and processing facilities for metals critical to high-tech industries. Russian industry media also stressed Brazil's large reserves and Rosatom's existing medical-isotope business with Brazilian customers (Strana Rosatom, April 6). In this configuration, Brazil is especially attractive because Rosatom already has a nuclear foothold there, including uranium supply for Angra and a 2025 enrichment-services contract (Strana Rosatom, February 27).
More broadly, Rosatom uses existing nuclear relationships to enter adjacent strategic sectors (see EDM, March 11). In Brazil, rare earths look less like a standalone business line than an extension of Russia's state-led engagement model. Despite a promising future, Brazil also reveals the limits of Russian ambition. Moscow is entering a crowded field in which the European Union, the United States, India, and Japan all seek access to Brazilian critical minerals (Indian Embassy in Brazil, July 8, 2025; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2, 2024; U.S. Embassy in Brazil, March 18; Folha de S.Paulo, June 16). Because Brasilia prizes strategic autonomy, Russia is likely to be one partner among many rather than an indispensable patron. There is no guarantee that an agreement, which at this stage looks more like a declaration of intent than a joint strategic agreement, will lead to substantive cooperation between the two parties. Sanctions also complicate financing, insurance, technology transfer, and access to Western equipment. Brazil may welcome Russian expertise where it is useful and cost-effective, but it is likely to avoid arrangements that jeopardize its broader economic and geopolitical options.
Russia's presence in Bolivia illustrates how Moscow is attempting to apply the same strategic logic to lithium diplomacy beyond rare earths (see EDM, February 23). Although lithium is distinct from rare earth elements, both belong to the broader category of critical minerals that Russia increasingly views as instruments of long-term geopolitical engagement. Early reporting on the Rodrigo Paz administration (in office since 2025) suggests greater continuity than rupture. The Bolivian side is more likely to honor existing lithium agreements while seeking broader regulatory and contractual clarity than to end cooperation with Moscow abruptly (Russia's Pivot to Asia, January 2). For Russia, Bolivian lithium is not only a technology export opportunity but also a sanctions-era supply-security issue. Russian analysis notes that Argentina and Chile curtailed lithium exports to Russia after 2022, while Russia's own industrial production remains delayed. Bolivia could become critical for Russian battery projects and so-called "technological sovereignty" (RIAC, May 15).
Moscow also benefits politically if it can portray Bolivia as another Global South partner resisting Western dominance. Bolivia also has alternatives. For instance, the PRC is already deeply involved in the country's resource sector. In contrast, the United States and the European Union have shown growing interest in Bolivian lithium, even if neither has yet matched the scale of Chinese and Russian positioning there. German sources previously emphasized how Russia and the PRC outpaced German firms in Bolivia's lithium race (DW, December 28, 2023). The current situation, however, creates a more beneficial competitive landscape for Bolivia's European partners. Bolivia can use this competition to renegotiate terms, demand transparency, and extract better fiscal, environmental, and social concessions. Additionally, local resistance in Potosi, indigenous consultation requirements, and environmental concerns further constrain Russia's room for maneuver.
Russia's comparative advantage is not supply-chain dominance on the Chinese model. It is state coordination. Rosatom, Rosneft-linked assets, diplomatic backing, and BRICS rhetoric allow Moscow to package minerals as elements of broader strategic partnerships rather than simple commodity sales. That model can appeal to some Global South governments because it offers training, pilot projects, political support, and fewer governance conditions than Western-backed arrangements. This appeals to some Global South governments seeking leverage against the West. That advantage remains narrow. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that Russia produced 2,600 metric tons of rare earths in 2025, compared with the PRC's 270,000 metric tons and a global total of 390,000 metric tons, leaving Russia at well under 1 percent of global mining output (USGS, 2026). Russia still lacks the separation, refining, and magnet ecosystem that gives the PRC system-wide leverage. At the same time, sanctions, capital shortages, and the incomplete implementation of earlier state plans continue to constrain rapid scaling (NedraDV, 2022). The weaknesses are substantial and, realistically speaking, quite challenging to overcome in a short period of time. Additionally, Russia faces sanctions, suffers from capital and technology constraints, and often depends on partners that are themselves diversifying away from overdependence.
Earlier government plans in Russia to expand rare earth output were not fully implemented, while the 2026-2030 period is more likely to bring limited industrial growth than rapid scaling (Dprom, January 27; Institute of International Market Research, May 20). Therefore, Russia's critical-minerals diplomacy could be seen more as a bid to convert geological potential into geopolitical leverage, not as a ready-made alternative to PRC dominance. Its success--which, at the moment, appears vague--will depend on whether Moscow can move beyond upstream extraction and prove useful in processing, financing, and politically durable industrial partnerships.
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Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and an Advisor at Gulf State Analytics (Washington, D.C.).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/moscow-aims-to-treat-critical-minerals-as-diplomatic-instruments/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Sentiment in German Automotive Industry Deteriorates
MUNICH, Germany, July 3 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
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Sentiment in German Automotive Industry Deteriorates
The Business Climate Index in the German automotive industry fell to -21.4 points in June, down from -20.7* points in May. Companies assessed their current business situation as considerably worse than in the previous month.
At the same time, they are significantly less pessimistic about the coming months. "The zigzag course we saw in sentiment in the automotive industry during 2025 has so far continued this year," says ifo industry expert Anita Wolfl.
Business
... Show Full Article
MUNICH, Germany, July 3 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
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Sentiment in German Automotive Industry Deteriorates
The Business Climate Index in the German automotive industry fell to -21.4 points in June, down from -20.7* points in May. Companies assessed their current business situation as considerably worse than in the previous month.
At the same time, they are significantly less pessimistic about the coming months. "The zigzag course we saw in sentiment in the automotive industry during 2025 has so far continued this year," says ifo industry expert Anita Wolfl.
Businessin Germany and other European countries is providing support for the industry. Electromobility continues to be a growth driver in Germany, as Wolfl explains. From January through May 2026, just under 284,000 new battery electric vehicles (BEVs) were registered in Germany.
That's 40% more than in the same period last year, bringing the average share of BEVs among all new registrations so far in 2026 to just under 24%. From January through May 2025, the figure stood at 17%.
*Seasonally adjusted
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More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-07-03/sentiment-german-automotive-industry-deteriorates)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-07-03/sentiment-german-automotive-industry-deteriorates
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Walz and Ellison Pardon Man Who Raped a 10-year-old Girl So That He Can Stay in Minnesota
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, July 3 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by economist John Phelan:
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Walz and Ellison pardon man who raped a 10-year-old girl so that he can stay in Minnesota
The Pioneer Press reports:
"A three-person Minnesota panel including Gov. Tim Walz granted a pardon to an immigrant convicted of sexually abusing a child, drawing accusations that he and other Democrats are impeding federal efforts to expel dangerous foreign criminals eligible
... Show Full Article
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, July 3 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on July 2, 2026, by economist John Phelan:
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Walz and Ellison pardon man who raped a 10-year-old girl so that he can stay in Minnesota
The Pioneer Press reports:
"A three-person Minnesota panel including Gov. Tim Walz granted a pardon to an immigrant convicted of sexually abusing a child, drawing accusations that he and other Democrats are impeding federal efforts to expel dangerous foreign criminals eligiblefor deportation."
"The Minnesota Board of Pardons granted the reprieve June 10 to Tou Lue Vang, 42, who came to the United States as a child and was set to be deported to Laos imminently. Vang had submitted a letter to the board expressing regret for the actions that led to his 2005 conviction, and said a pardon could help him stay in the country with his wife and six children.
"Vang's victim, who was 10 when the abuse began, also submitted a letter supporting the pardon. Vang pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct in a plea deal that spared him from serving time in prison.
"The pardon effectively wiped clean Vang's criminal record, providing him an avenue to fight deportation.
"Trump administration officials criticized the pardon, denouncing Walz and other Democratic leaders in the state. The other two members of the pardon board are Attorney General Keith Ellison and the state's chief Supreme Court justice, Natalie Hudson."
Bill Melugin of Fox News shares the following:
[View image in the link at bottom.]
The Pioneer Press report goes on:
""Tou Lue Vang lost his legal status following his conviction for repeatedly sexually assaulting a 10-year-old girl," [Lauren Bis, a spokesperson for the Department of Homeland Security] said, confirming that the pardon would remove the criminal sexual conduct conviction underlying Vang's removal order."
"In response to a request for comment, Walz's office pointed to the letter the victim provided the board, and said such pleas for clemency carry significant weight...
""The Minnesota Board of Pardons made a unanimous decision to grant Tou Vang this pardon after an exhaustive process which included a statement of support for the pardon from the victim, a recommendation to grant the pardon from the Clemency Review Commission and a large number of community support letters," Ellison's office said in a statement to The New York Times. It noted President Donald Trump's own expansive use of executive pardon power."
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John Phelan is an Economist at the Center of the American Experiment.
john.phelan@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/walz-and-ellison-pardon-man-who-raped-a-10-year-old-girl-so-that-he-can-stay-in-minnesota/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS: U.S. Has Opted Not to Extend the USMCA
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following statements on July 2, 2026:
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The United States Has Opted Not to Extend the USMCA
The United States has opted not to renew the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) for another 16 years, triggering instead the annual review process that runs to 2036. But the decision settles little. Bilateral negotiations are set to continue without a clear timeline, tariff threats remain on the table, and businesses across North America face an extended stretch of uncertainty over the future of the region's
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following statements on July 2, 2026:
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The United States Has Opted Not to Extend the USMCA
The United States has opted not to renew the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) for another 16 years, triggering instead the annual review process that runs to 2036. But the decision settles little. Bilateral negotiations are set to continue without a clear timeline, tariff threats remain on the table, and businesses across North America face an extended stretch of uncertainty over the future of the region'smost important trade pact. What comes next depends less on the July 1 announcement than on the agenda, sequencing, and political will that follow it. In this Experts React, CSIS scholars analyze the road ahead.
The USMCA's World Cup Summer: No Breakup, Just Extra Time
- Diego Marroquin Bitar, Fellow, Americas Program
The United States has opted not to pursue a clean, 16-year renewal of the USMCA. That doesn't mean the pact ends. Without an extension, the USMCA simply continues on its current terms until it expires on July 1, 2036. Still, the three countries have room to extend the agreement and preserve the trade pact that has helped U.S. businesses thrive, Mexican autoworkers earn higher wages, and Canadian farmers grow export markets. That window won't stay open on its own. The parties are heading into a longer, more protracted negotiation. The more it drags on, the more uncertainty compounds across supply chains, growth prospects, and the jobs and investment this integration supports. None of that will be easy to win back once it's gone. Firms will simply keep delaying expansion, hedging their bets, and steering investment elsewhere, and the damage will show up less as sudden decline than as absence: plants that don't get built, jobs that don't get created, supply chains that quietly settle somewhere else while everyone waits to see how this ends.
That waiting game is set to run through the summer, on two fronts. On the pitch, all three North American countries remain in contention in the World Cup, chasing a shot at the final. In trade policy, expect the same kind of drama: more tariff threats and more brinkmanship before the issue is resolved. The USMCA has a final whistle, too: July 1, 2036. The whole point of this review is making sure the game never goes that long. Every team left in this tournament knows exactly how many games stand between them and the final. Nobody in this negotiation can say the same about how many rounds stand between here and a renewed USMCA. That number, not another tariff threat, is what would actually move capital off the sidelines.
The USMCA Review: Welcome to the Hotel California
- Kellie Meiman Hock, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
Investors yearning for stability understood long ago that the July 1 USMCA "joint review" would offer little comfort, with a 16-year extension unimaginable. Under the USMCA, this means "the Commission shall meet to conduct a joint review every year" until 2036.
Yet, orderly annual trilateral meetings feel equally unimaginable--although it is positive that the parties met trilaterally on July 1. Instead, a "Hotel California"-style, ongoing review is likely. To quote the Eagles, "you can checkout anytime you like, but you can never leave."
Checking out (withdrawal from the agreement) will continue to be threatened, despite the USMCA representing roughly $2 trillion in trilateral trade, up nearly $400 billion since the agreement went into force in 2020, and one-third of all imported U.S. manufacturing inputs originating in Canada and Mexico. The Chamber of Commerce estimates that North American trade supports 13 million American jobs, and Canada and Mexico are the United States' top two agricultural export markets, by far.
So, despite expected continued "checkout" threats, the devastating economic impact of withdrawal makes it unlikely, which explains why the USMCA enjoys unique carveouts from the administration's tariffs.
All of this means that North America "can never leave" the Hotel California that is this review. Deliberations--still bilaterally conducted--will not conclude quickly. Trade issues that never fully resolve (including lumber, dairy, cultural industries, digital trade, energy, labor, and seasonal produce) are challenging enough, and then there's U.S. efforts to further tighten auto rules of origin, already the most stringent in the world.
Core to the review, however, is addressing Chinese involvement in North America. U.S. imports from China have decreased significantly in recent years, but the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico has doubled since the USMCA came into force. Ensuring China does not deploy the USMCA as a backdoor for its overcapacity is a shared concern, lending heft to talks about unified tariff treatment, inbound investment and transshipment screenings, export controls, and sanctions. Evaluating origin of capital within rules of origin, with possible "de maximus" levels for Chinese content, is another concept reportedly under consideration. All are ideas worth discussing, but none will be easy given the global economy's overreliance on Chinese intermediate goods.
Meanwhile, Canada and Mexico are left questioning the value of the USMCA if Section 232 and 301 tariffs undercut market access. Recalling the late-stage deal on Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs in the NAFTA renegotiation, can another Hail Mary pass be expected late in the fourth quarter? Or will Canada and Mexico remain frustrated in their attempts to gain relief?
These dynamics do not point to a tidy resolution of the review, reinforcing transparent rules that have made the USMCA the vehicle of North American competitiveness. Meanwhile, companies delay major investment decisions and muddle onward. Hopefully the Hotel California has good room service, because unfortunately we are going to be here for a while.
The USMCA's Biggest Barrier Is Political, Not Economic
- Eric Miller, President, Rideau Potomac Strategy Group
To read the text, the review of the USMCA on July 1, 2026, should have been rather clinical. After assessing its operation and considering amendments, the United States, Canada, and Mexico had to say if they are ready to extend the deal for another 16 years. As the United States was not in agreement, the three countries now must revisit the "extension" question every year for the next decade.
This assumes that the USMCA survives. President Trump has made repeated statements expressing both indifference and hostility toward the agreement that he negotiated. In addition, the United States has initiated bilateral negotiations with Mexico and presumably at some future date will do the same with Canada. It is unclear how these agreements would relate to the existing USMCA framework.
Regardless of the ultimate architecture, politics will play a key role in any USMCA renewal. While U.S.-Mexico relations are always complicated, U.S.-Canada relations are at their lowest point in modern history. This constrains the political space available to leaders to make deals.
When the United States imposed tariffs on all its trading partners from February to April 2025, only Canada and China imposed counter-tariffs on U.S. goods. Washington took note. Canada has maintained a steadfast anti-tariff position, dairy notwithstanding. Moreover, threats in some quarters to use Canada's sizeable oil and electricity exports to the United States as leverage have been viewed as especially concerning. Senior U.S. officials have grown steadily more frustrated with Canada.
Canada sees things differently. U.S. tariffs are viewed as a threat to Canadian prosperity and a betrayal of the long-established partnership between the two nations. In addition, President Trump's repeated threats to annex Canada and make it the "51st state" have been seen by Canadians not only as deeply offensive, but as an existential challenge to their nation's survival. Former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper, historically a friend of the United States, stated in February 2026 that Canada must make "any sacrifice necessary" to urgently reduce its dependence on the United States.
Canada's national mood as it celebrated its 159th birthday on July 1 was proud and defiant. While this is a powerful combination, major USMCA compromises may be viewed with deep skepticism. On June 25, 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney had to remind the public that Canada must be ready to strike a USMCA deal if the right opportunity arises.
What may eventually save the USMCA is its eternal value proposition. Roughly one-quarter to one-third of the value of U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico is U.S. content. No other region of the world comes close. By contrast, U.S. content levels are in the single digits in its imports from Asia and Europe. The intensity of the intraregional trade linkages drove President Trump to exempt many USMCA originating goods in March 2025. It may eventually be the lynchpin to a full USMCA renewal--just not in July 2026.
USMCA Nonrenewal Is Not the End of North American Integration
- Juan Carlos Baker, Researcher, Foreign Trade and Investment Research Laboratory, Pan American University, and former Mexican Deputy Trade Minister
While some headlines portray this decision as a dramatic turning point for North American trade, the announcement itself should come as little surprise. President Trump spent months signaling his dissatisfaction with the agreement, and markets, businesses, and policymakers have had ample time to prepare for this outcome. Moreover, maintaining leverage rather than providing certainty has long been a defining feature of President Trump's negotiating style, and the USMCA review appears unlikely to be an exception.
Beyond the announcement itself, what is more important is what comes immediately afterward. Framing the nonrenewal as the beginning of a negotiation process, accompanied by a roadmap for further negotiations, with scheduled meetings, clearly identified issues, and a timeline for future deliverables, may actually reassure stakeholders, easing the uncertainty and tension that the nonrenewal may bring. Conversely, if the White House simply declares that the agreement will not be renewed and offers no path forward, uncertainty across North America will increase significantly.
Indeed, much of the current commentary assumes that the nonrenewal represents a major setback for Mexico and Canada; however, although prolonged uncertainty undoubtedly carries costs for both countries, those costs are by no means borne by them alone. The integrated nature of North American supply chains means that U.S. manufacturers, investors, and consumers also depend heavily on a predictable institutional framework. Automotive companies, agricultural exporters, machinery producers, and countless suppliers have structured investment decisions around the assumption of continued regional integration. Extending uncertainty indefinitely imposes costs on all three partners, including the United States itself--even if President Trump claims that the United States does not need anything from Mexico or Canada.
This is why domestic pressure on the White House as a result of President Trump's decision should not be disregarded. If uncertainty begins to delay investment decisions or disrupt supply chains, U.S. businesses are likely to become an increasingly influential constituency in favor of a negotiated outcome, especially in an election year.
Finally, the process ahead is likely to become more political, more contentious, and more closely linked to broader issues such as industrial policy, economic security, and relations with China, but after all, has that not been evident already for some time?
The nonrenewal, then, should not be mistaken for the collapse of North American economic integration. Instead, it marks the formal beginning of a new bargaining phase in which leverage, rather than certainty, will remain Washington's preferred negotiating instrument.
The real story begins after July 1. The announcement itself was largely expected. What will truly matter is the agenda the United States places on the table, and whether it leaves enough room for meaningful negotiations to continue.
The USMCA Question Nobody's Asking: Does Congress Even Get a Vote?
- William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business
The July 1 decision of the three countries party to the USMCA to not renew the agreement and instead trigger the 10-year annual review process opens the door to a potentially extended period of negotiation. It appears that talks will continue without interruption, which creates the possibilities of either an early conclusion--in time for Trump to declare victory before the midterm election--or extended talks, timing that could lead the United States to increase its demands once the election is over.
Either way, business will have to grapple with the continuing uncertainty of both the negotiations and the aftermath, where the issue is whether the resulting agreement must be submitted to Congress for approval. The initial USMCA agreement was submitted to Congress and approved pursuant to then-existing Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which expired in 2021. TPA, an updated version of procedures initially enacted in the Trade Act of 1974, created a trade-off for the president. If he followed the procedural consultation requirements and time limits, Congress would consider the agreement without delay, amendment, or filibuster, a significant advantage. However, recent administrations have taken the position that agreements only need congressional approval if they require changes in U.S. law. On that basis, a number of agreements, including Trump's with Japan and Biden's with Taiwan, were not sent to Congress. In the latter case, Congress rebelled and passed legislation--which Biden signed--retroactively approving the first half of the Taiwan agreement and requiring the second half to be submitted for approval. The congressional position has generally been that all agreements should be submitted for approval; just as the president's has been that as few as possible should be submitted.
It is too soon to say whether a revised USMCA would have to be sent to Congress, but some of the issues likely on the table, such as changes in U.S. trade law to accommodate regional or sectoral U.S. interests or changes in tariffs, would point in that direction. The complication this time is that there is no TPA to structure the congressional process, which means the agreement, if submitted, will be subject to normal legislative procedures, including possible delay and amendment. That creates two challenges for the administration. The first will be to try to avoid that possibility by negotiating an agreement that does not require approval and then dealing with congressional insistence that it be submitted anyway. The second will be the additional uncertainty created in Congress if it is submitted without any procedural limitations. In 2021, many in the business community urged the Biden administration to seek renewal of TPA even if there were no plans to use it. That did not happen, and the Trump administration may now have to deal with the consequences.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-has-opted-not-extend-usmca
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI on the Walz-Ellison Pardon: Minnesota's Leaders Handed a Child Rapist a Clean Slate
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 2, 2026:
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AFPI on the Walz-Ellison Pardon: Minnesota's Leaders Handed a Child Rapist a Clean Slate
MINNEAPOLIS, MN -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released the following statement after the Minnesota Board of Pardons cleared the record of Tou Lue Vang, an illegal alien convicted of repeatedly sexually assaulting a 10-year-old girl. The pardon strips away the convictions that made him deportable, just a week before he was set to be removed from the country.
Zach Freimark, Executive
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 2, 2026:
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AFPI on the Walz-Ellison Pardon: Minnesota's Leaders Handed a Child Rapist a Clean Slate
MINNEAPOLIS, MN -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released the following statement after the Minnesota Board of Pardons cleared the record of Tou Lue Vang, an illegal alien convicted of repeatedly sexually assaulting a 10-year-old girl. The pardon strips away the convictions that made him deportable, just a week before he was set to be removed from the country.
Zach Freimark, ExecutiveDirector of AFPI Minnesota, responded:
"A convicted child rapist was one week from deportation, and Governor Walz and Attorney General Ellison went out of their way to wipe his record clean and keep him here. Let that sink in.
A man who repeatedly assaulted a 10-year-old girl and tried to buy her silence for ten dollars is walking free with a pardon. This is what their sanctuary politics protects, and our children are the ones who pay for it. It is disgraceful, and every family in this state should be furious."
The America First Policy Institute stands for a simple principle: protect the innocent, hold the guilty accountable, and put American families first. We condemn Minnesota's leaders who just failed all three principles.
To learn more about AFPI Minnesota, click here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/state-chapter/america-first-minnesota).
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-on-the-walz-ellison-pardon-minnesotas-leaders-handed-a-child-rapist-a-clean-slate
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Urges Supreme Court to Protect Religious Liberty in St. Mary Catholic Parish vs. Roy
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 2, 2026:
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AFPI Urges Supreme Court to Protect Religious Liberty in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today filed an amicus brief in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, urging the U.S. Supreme Court to provide much-needed clarity on the meaning of "religion" under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court has never adopted a clear definition of religion for Free Exercise Clause cases. As a result, lower courts have applied inconsistent
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 2, 2026:
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AFPI Urges Supreme Court to Protect Religious Liberty in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today filed an amicus brief in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, urging the U.S. Supreme Court to provide much-needed clarity on the meaning of "religion" under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court has never adopted a clear definition of religion for Free Exercise Clause cases. As a result, lower courts have applied inconsistentand often subjective tests, leaving religious Americans, faith-based schools, charities, ministries and courts without a stable rule upon which they may rely.
This case centers on Colorado's exclusion of faith-based schools from its universal preschool program based on religious beliefs and practices. AFPI's brief argues the First Amendment's protection for the "free exercise" of religion cannot be fully enforced unless courts understand what the Constitution means by "religion."`
"Religious liberty is a natural right the Constitution recognizes and protects," said Leigh Ann O'Neill, chief legal affairs officer at AFPI. "The First Amendment protects more than private belief. It protects the ability of religious Americans and religious institutions to live out sincere duties of faith in public life."
AFPI argues the Founders understood religion as more than personal philosophy, ideology, ethics or private conscience. The brief asks the court to recognize religion as a system of sincere beliefs and practices derived from duties owed to a sacred authority that is prior to and beyond human relations and that receives allegiance and worship.
To read more about AFPI's fight to defend American values in the courts, click here (https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/policy-areas/litigation).
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-urges-supreme-court-to-protect-religious-liberty-in-st-mary-catholic-parish-v-roy
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Launches America First Warfighters Coalition
WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 2, 2026:
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AFPI Launches America First Warfighters Coalition
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) announced the launch of America First Warfighters, a new coalition dedicated to educating, engaging, and mobilizing veterans and military families around policies that strengthen military readiness, improve veterans' healthcare, support military families, and ensure America remains the strongest and most prepared fighting force in the world.
"Many veterans still feel the effect of
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WASHINGTON, July 3 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 2, 2026:
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AFPI Launches America First Warfighters Coalition
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) announced the launch of America First Warfighters, a new coalition dedicated to educating, engaging, and mobilizing veterans and military families around policies that strengthen military readiness, improve veterans' healthcare, support military families, and ensure America remains the strongest and most prepared fighting force in the world.
"Many veterans still feel the effect ofObama and Biden-era policies both abroad and at home. From the Afghanistan withdrawal, to worsening VA services, to rising veteran homelessness, Americans can see firsthand the consequences of weak and neglectful policies," said Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Keith Kellogg, AFPI's Co Chair for American Security. "America First Warfighters is committed to standing with these men and women by supporting policies that give them the care and respect they have earned through their service."
"As someone who has served in combat, I know the mission doesn't end when you take off the uniform," said Amber Smith, AFPI's Senior Advisor for America First Warfighters. "The responsibility to support our veterans and military families is ongoing. America First Warfighters exists to ensure they have a strong voice, stronger opportunities, and leaders who never stop fighting for them."
This coalition will engage active-duty service members, veterans, and military families in advancing policies that honor their service, defend the America they fought for, and address the issues they care about most, including:
* Veterans' Healthcare & Benefits Reform -- improving the quality of veterans' care, reducing VA bureaucracy, expanding patient choice, and ensuring veterans receive the benefits they have earned.
* Military Readiness -- strengthening recruitment and retention, restoring merit-based leadership, efficient and appropriate defense budgets, and ensuring our military remains the most capable fighting force in the world.
* Veteran Integration Support -- advancing practical solutions that help veterans integrate successfully to civilian life and access the resources they need to thrive.
To learn more about AFPI Warfighters and our work to support veterans and service members, click here (https://afpiwarfighters.com/).
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-launches-america-first-warfighters-coalition
[Category: ThinkTank]
