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Capital Research Center Issues InfluenceWatch Wrapup on Jan. 23, 2026
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on Jan. 23, 2026:* * *
By Jonathan Harsh
InfluenceWatch, a project of Capital Research Center, is a comprehensive and ever-evolving compilation of our research into the numerous advocacy groups, foundations, and donors working to influence the public policy process. The website offers transparency into these influencers' funding, motives, and connections while providing insight often neglected by other watchdog groups.
The information compiled in InfluenceWatch gives news outlets and other interested ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following InfluenceWatch wrapup on Jan. 23, 2026: * * * By Jonathan Harsh InfluenceWatch, a project of Capital Research Center, is a comprehensive and ever-evolving compilation of our research into the numerous advocacy groups, foundations, and donors working to influence the public policy process. The website offers transparency into these influencers' funding, motives, and connections while providing insight often neglected by other watchdog groups. The information compiled in InfluenceWatch gives news outlets and other interestedparties research to use in reporting on significant topics that are often overlooked by the American public.
CRC is pleased to present some of the most significant additions to InfluenceWatch in the past week:
* The Sustainable Food Alliance is a left-of-center advocacy group that promotes what it calls "sustainable agriculture" and a transition towards using "sustainable food and farming systems." It works alongside the Sustainable Food Trust, a United Kingdom-based charity founded in 2011 by environmental advocate Patrick Holden. The Sustainable Food Alliance has received funding from foundations including the Tides Foundation, the Gordon E. and Betty I. Moore Foundation, the California Endowment, the Seattle Foundation, the National Philanthropic Trust, the Greater Kansas City Community Foundation, and the Atlantic Foundation.
* All of Us is a research program of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). It was created during the Obama Administration in 2015, through the NIH's Precision Medicine Initiative Working Group of the Advisory Committee to the Director. All of Us aims to collect genetic samples of up to 1 million participants to study the impact of ancestry and genetic traits. Its CEO Josh Denny is an elected member of the National Academy of Medicine.
* GoFundMe.Org is a nonprofit associated with the digital crowdfunding platform GoFundMe. As of 2026, its current and former partners include Leonardo DiCaprio, Laurene Powell Jobs, Ellen DeGeneres, and former first lady Michelle Obama. Its partner foundations and corporations have included the Obama Foundation, the Asian American Foundation, the TIME'S UP Legal Defense Fund, Welcome.US, Netflix, Google, and Microsoft.
* Hunt Alternatives is an advocacy group that claims to promote "global peace, equity, justice, and civil rights." It was founded by Swanee Hunt, a philanthropist and the former US Ambassador to Austria during the Clinton Administration. In recent years Hunt Alternatives has been largely funded by Swanee Hunt and the Swanee Hunt Family Foundation.
* Bank Information Center (BIC) is a Washington D.C.-based nonprofit that advocates for "transparency, accountability, sustainability, and inclusion in development finance." According to its website, BIC works to "monitor and influence the policies and operations of the World Bank Group" by partnering with other organizations to perform "research and advocacy aimed at improving and reforming [Multilateral Development Bank] policy and practices." BIC has received funding from left-of-center groups such as the Ford Foundation, the Climateworks Foundation, George Soros's Open Society Action Fund, and the National Endowment for Democracy.
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Jonathan Harsh holds a master's degree in political science from James Madison University and a bachelor's degree in political science from Beloit College. He edits entries and content of the InfluenceWatch website and contributes new content.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/influencewatch-friday-01-23-2026/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Japanese Energy Companies Step Up U.S. Investments
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 23, 2026:* * *
Japanese Energy Companies Step Up U.S. Investments
By Ben Cahill and Jane Nakano
Since mid-2025, some of Japan's largest exploration and production companies, gas and power utilities, and trading houses invested in U.S. natural gas assets. With the United States expected to supply up to one-third of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) volumes by the early 2030s, importers want to control more of their own supply base to mitigate the risk of rising U.S. gas prices. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 23, 2026: * * * Japanese Energy Companies Step Up U.S. Investments By Ben Cahill and Jane Nakano Since mid-2025, some of Japan's largest exploration and production companies, gas and power utilities, and trading houses invested in U.S. natural gas assets. With the United States expected to supply up to one-third of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) volumes by the early 2030s, importers want to control more of their own supply base to mitigate the risk of rising U.S. gas prices.Japanese companies also anticipate strong gas demand from the U.S. power sector and industry. Their recent investments show the appeal of U.S. shale gas and LNG assets, but also suggest some risks associated with the dominance of LNG supply from the United States.
Several deals illustrate this investment trend. On January 16, 2026, Mitsubishi announced that it would acquire the equity interests of Aethon Energy, a large Haynesville Basin producer, for $5.2 billion (as well as $2.33 billion in assumed debt). Mitsubishi cited a desire to build an integrated natural gas supply chain in North America, and to increase production of gas that could supply domestic power plants, manufacturing and other industry, and, potentially, LNG export facilities. In December 2025, Tokyo Gas--one of Japan's largest gas utilities--stated that it plans to spend at least half of its $2.3 billion overseas investment budget in the coming three years in the United States. JAPEX, an exploration and production company with assets in Indonesia, Iraq, Norway, Russia, and the United States, spent $1.3 billion on oil and gas assets in Colorado and Wyoming. And several months earlier, Jera--Japan's largest power producer and one of the world's largest LNG buyers--made a $1.5 billion investment in the Haynesville Basin, which supplies numerous Gulf Coast LNG export facilities. These deals followed earlier investments by several other utilities and trading houses, and more acquisitions could follow.
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Table 1: Japanese Investments in U.S. Oil and Gas Assets
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Japanese acquisitions in the shale patch are not a new phenomenon. In an earlier period of the shale revolution, from 2010 to 2012, companies including Itochu, Mitsui, Mitsui Oil Exploration Company, Marubeni, and Sumitomo made substantial investments in unconventional oil and gas assets. Like other investors, these companies wanted a foothold in a large-scale, rapidly growing resource base. They also sought to learn the fundamentals of short-cycle oil and gas development, which requires continuous drilling and completions, and prizes efficiency gains that lower costs and increase the productivity of each drilling rig. Many of these ventures were unsuccessful, especially as the steep oil price downturn of 2014-15 took a heavy toll. For example, Sumitomo took a $1.5 billion impairment in 2014 on its liquids-focused Permian Basin assets, and the following year Mitsui wrote down approximately $490 million on its Eagle Ford shale assets.
Today, the motivations for U.S. unconventional gas investments have evolved. When Jera announced its purchase of a Haynesville producer in October 2025, it cited "enhanced diversification for Jera's LNG value chain, expanded global reach across the gas value chain, and overall risk mitigation in a volatile energy market." These are important factors for a company that signed four long-term supply deals last year for 5.5 million tons per year in U.S. LNG. Jera, like other U.S. LNG buyers, values the volume growth and diverse supply options in the U.S. LNG industry, as well as the flexibility and hub indexation associated with U.S. LNG. Yet Japanese buyers are now exposed to North American gas price dynamics.
A potential concern is that higher Henry Hub gas prices will create a margin squeeze, as more elevated feedgas costs in the United States and lower LNG spot prices in Asia and Europe reduce arbitrage potential. Over the 20-year lifespan of a typical long-term sales and purchase agreement for U.S. LNG, this exposure to higher U.S. gas prices is a key risk. Aggregators or portfolio players, who hold offtake agreements for U.S. LNG but need to find end-users for their cargoes, are most vulnerable.
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Figure 1: Japan LNG Imports by Origin
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One way for Japanese buyers to mitigate this risk is to move into the U.S. upstream sector. This allows them to enjoy the benefits of higher natural gas prices, rather than merely to suffer the knock-on effects as LNG buyers, thereby hedging their price risks. Greater integration may also be possible, if these companies use their operated gas supply as feedstock for LNG export facilities. Japanese companies may also gain some new insights into supply dynamics including service sector and labor costs. In short, Japanese companies that will increasingly depend on U.S. LNG want to be active rather than passive players in helping to control price risks.
There are parallels to past investments by Japanese companies in overseas gas development and liquefaction facilities, in countries including Australia, Qatar, and Southeast Asian exporters. It is debatable that such investments ultimately reduced supply risks--economic or otherwise--for Japanese LNG importers, but they helped develop Japan's global presence throughout the LNG value chain.
These business activities are occurring at a time when energy engagements between the United States and Japan are fast evolving in the context of bilateral tariff negotiations. As part of last year's U.S.-Japan trade agreement, Japan agreed to invest $550 billion in the United States. Energy is one of the seven areas that Japan has committed to investing in by January 2029, the end of Trump's second term.
Since Japan is the world's second largest LNG importer, a large U.S. LNG buyer--and the fifth-largest importer of U.S. crude oil and petroleum products--upstream gas assets would be a natural fit. To date, however, energy investments under discussion, as stipulated in a Japanese government fact sheet from late October, are primarily related to technology components and infrastructure, such as nuclear reactors, gas turbines, and generators. There has been no mention of energy resources as investment targets. As such, it is unclear if upstream oil and gas investment opportunities are shortlisted as the United States and Japan continue consultations. But recent deals are well aligned with the Japanese government view that investment in the gas sector can bolster energy security, with LNG identified as a practical means of energy transition. In fact, the country's Seventh Strategic Energy Plan (released in 2025) stresses the importance of direct Japanese involvement in upstream development and production. It states "Japan aims to increase its independent development ratio of oil and natural gas to 50 percent or more by 2030 and 60 percent or more by 2040."
Japan's appetite for natural gas continues to set the tone for strategic energy engagements between the two countries. Tokyo's latest trade commitments to Washington--separate yet related to the investment commitments--include "stable and long-term incremental purchases of U.S. energy, including LNG, totaling $7 billion per year, while exploring a new Alaskan offtake agreement for such LNG." Japanese companies likely see strategic value in the ability to influence gas production as they anticipate growing offtake from U.S. LNG projects. Japanese companies may be demonstrating a cautious approach in differentiating between gas investments in the Lower 48 versus Alaska LNG, with its extremely challenging project economics.
Japanese investments in U.S. oil and gas assets show the continued appeal of the country's resource base and the abundance of opportunities on offer in unconventional gas and LNG. Japan's energy security planning, the importance of U.S. LNG supply in Japanese portfolios, and the trade agenda and geopolitical backdrop suggest this trend will continue.
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Ben Cahill is a senior associate (non-resident) for the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Jane Nakano is a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/japanese-energy-companies-step-us-investments
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: How Syria Can Succeed in Integrating the Kurds
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 22, 2026:* * *
How Syria Can Succeed in Integrating the Kurds
By Mona Yacoubian and Will Todman
Intensified conflict between the Syrian transition government (STG) and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) poses the most significant threat to Syria's fragile transition to date. The SDF overplayed its hand in negotiations with the STG, but now President Ahmed al-Sharaa risks similar overreach. A shaky four-day ceasefire is set to expire on January 24. Good faith gestures ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 22, 2026: * * * How Syria Can Succeed in Integrating the Kurds By Mona Yacoubian and Will Todman Intensified conflict between the Syrian transition government (STG) and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) poses the most significant threat to Syria's fragile transition to date. The SDF overplayed its hand in negotiations with the STG, but now President Ahmed al-Sharaa risks similar overreach. A shaky four-day ceasefire is set to expire on January 24. Good faith gesturesfrom Sharaa that bridge the gap between the imperatives of a unified Syria and Kurdish demands for community-led protection and local autonomy in Kurdish-majority areas are critical at this moment and can serve as an important off-ramp for conflict. Otherwise, Syria's transition could be derailed, with significant ripple effects across Syria and the wider region.
Background to Tensions
Early in Syria's post-Assad transition, Kurdish integration stood out as among the most challenging issues facing the transition government. A March 2025 integration agreement aimed to establish a process for folding Kurdish-led governance and security entities into the Damascus-led transition government by the end of 2025. It called for border crossings and oil and gas facilities in SDF-controlled areas of Syria's northeast to come under transition government control but did not offer details on the thornier challenge of integrating the Kurdish-led SDF.
The agreement's implementation remained stalled over the intervening months, which were punctuated by periods of tension and even clashes between the transition government and the SDF. These tensions flared more significantly in early January, when simmering disputes between the two sides erupted into larger conflict in Aleppo. STG forces successfully pushed Kurdish fighters out of the Aleppo neighborhoods, a prelude to a broader lightning offensive by Damascus, effectively routing Kurdish forces from Arab-majority regions of the Raqqa and Deir Zor governorates.
The SDF Overplayed Its Hand
Several key miscalculations facilitated the SDF's rout. First, the SDF miscalculated the degree to which power dynamics had shifted in favor of the STG. President Sharaa had gradually secured his position internationally and concentrated his focus on Syria's territorial integrity. U.S.-mediated talks between Israelis and Syrians in Paris in early January decreased tensions in southern Syria and allowed Sharaa to focus his attention on the northeast. Yet, despite Sharaa's growing power, the SDF continued to adopt a maximalist stance in integration talks and refused to make concessions.
Second, the SDF overestimated U.S. backing. In fact, the STG essentially replaced the SDF as the United States' primary partner in Syria, particularly following Sharaa's decision to join the anti-ISIS coalition in November 2025, which dramatically eroded the SDF's unique value to the United States. In the following months, the STG demonstrated its ability to contribute to anti-ISIS efforts through several partnered operations with U.S. forces. The STG reportedly floated operations into SDF-held territory in the Paris meetings with U.S. and Israeli officials and received no objections. Damascus's operation against Kurdish fighters in Aleppo revealed U.S. reticence to push back on the government's anti-SDF operations.
Third, the SDF failed to secure the backing of local populations in many Arab-majority parts of the territory it controlled. As the STG advanced, Arab elements of the SDF defected and locals rose up in support of the STG. The SDF lost control of key strategic assets, such as oil and gas fields and dams, key sources of its leverage over Damascus.
Sharaa Risks Overplaying His Hand
The SDF overplayed its hand, and Sharaa must not do the same. If the ceasefire collapses and the STG advances into Kurdish-majority urban centers such as Hasakeh and Kobane, violence will escalate significantly. Even if the STG secures control of these areas, a prolonged Kurdish-led insurgency is likely. The STG's rapid advances have garnered warnings from senior U.S. officials such as Senator Lindsey Graham, who threatened that the United States could reimpose sanctions on Syria. Reports of besiegement and abuses against Kurdish fighters and civilians risk escalating intercommunal tensions significantly, particularly amid an apparent internet blackout in Kobane.
Other Syrian minorities, such as the Druze in southern Syria, will watch the events in northeast Syria closely. For Sharaa to avoid further rounds of conflict, he must prove that his quest to entrench his sovereignty over all of Syria's territory does not pose an existential threat to minority-led factions. Additional concessions and confidence-building measures are critical.
Unresolved tensions between the Syrian Kurds and the transition government would generate broader negative reverberations. Ongoing conflict with the Kurds could allow for an ISIS resurgence in both Syria and Iraq. Already, amid the current violence, the U.S. military estimates that 200 low-level ISIS fighters have escaped from Shaddadi prison, although many have been recaptured. Fearful of the potential for larger-scale prison breaks, CENTCOM launched an operation to transfer ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq, transporting 150 prisoners and noting that up to 7,000 could be moved to Iraq.
Certainly, the ensuing chaos of deepening conflict between the Kurds and the transition government would create conditions favorable to an ISIS resurgence. ISIS cells are well placed to exploit the security and governance vacuums that could emerge in some of these areas. Moreover, distracted by Kurdish threats and at times lacking discipline, Syrian transition security forces may not effectively secure ISIS-related detention sites, leading to prison breaks that can replenish ISIS forces on the ground. And Syria's often porous border with Iraq underscores that the threat would not be contained to Syria but could reverberate back into Iraq.
A Kurdish insurgency in northeast Syria would also contribute to broader regional instability centered on mounting separatism.
Separatist threats and actions have already provoked even greater instability in south Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. Failure to successfully integrate the Kurds in Syria would add yet another active separatist conflict to the region and could also encourage other Syrian separatists, notably in Druze-majority areas of southern Syria.
Building Trust
While the transition government has emerged in a more powerful position with this latest episode of violence, failure to integrate the Kurds successfully could derail transition efforts. Elements of the January 18 integration agreement could be amended to bridge the most serious gaps:
* Perhaps the most pressing SDF demand is protection in Kurdish-majority areas, which SDF head General Mazloum Abdi termed a "red line." Establishing Kurdish community police forces that report to the Ministry of Interior in all Kurdish-majority regions could assuage these most visceral fears.
* The presidential decree appointing a governor of Hasakeh governorate should explicitly reference General Mazloum as governor and perhaps grant him authority over a list of SDF members to serve in leadership positions in the central government military and security structures.
* Presidential Decree No. 13 (2026), which recognizes Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights, should be elevated to a constitutional amendment, enshrining these rights into law. Renaming the Syrian Arab Republic to the Syrian Republic could serve as a broader signal of inclusion to Syria's many minorities.
These workarounds could go far in cementing the ceasefire and advancing Kurdish integration into a new Syria. If successful, the agreement could also serve as an important template for other minority groups such as the Druze. It could launch a virtuous cycle in which compromise to secure the buy-in of one key minority group engenders faith by others that they too can find a place in the new united Syria.
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Mona Yacoubian is director and senior adviser of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Will Todman is the chief of staff of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-syria-can-succeed-integrating-kurds
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Canada and the European Union - Two New Wins for Chinese Exports in the West
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 22, 2026:* * *
Canada and the European Union: Two New Wins for Chinese Exports in the West
By Ilaria Mazzocco
Last week was full of surprises for trade disputes between China and U.S. allies in what has become a highly controversial sector in recent years: electric vehicles (EVs). Both Canada and the European Union appear to have reached agreements with China that would allow for more Chinese-made EVs to enter their markets. The United States should take note. Both the European ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 22, 2026: * * * Canada and the European Union: Two New Wins for Chinese Exports in the West By Ilaria Mazzocco Last week was full of surprises for trade disputes between China and U.S. allies in what has become a highly controversial sector in recent years: electric vehicles (EVs). Both Canada and the European Union appear to have reached agreements with China that would allow for more Chinese-made EVs to enter their markets. The United States should take note. Both the EuropeanUnion and Canada were converging with the United States on their approach toward Chinese industrial policy, overcapacity, and trade disputes, but these deals suggest more willingness to engage with China on commercial matters, despite the country's record exports (see Figure 1). Indeed, at a time when Washington is increasingly focused on technological competition with China, it appears as though some close allies may be considering a more diversified approach to technological stacks--one which may include some reliance and cooperation with China. Although derisking may still be a priority for Brussels and Ottawa in some specific sectors, neither government is espousing a broad strategy to isolate China at the moment.
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Figure 1: Chinese Vehicle Exports by Type
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There are big differences between Canada and the European Union and their respective relationships with China. Moreover, the breakthroughs of this week don't address the structural issues that have raised tensions between China and many of its trading partners in recent years. However, taken together, the developments are significant because of the signal they send. One reasonable conclusion is that Western countries are still interested in Chinese technology and are mainly focused on reducing the volume or price competition rather than blocking trade altogether. A key background element in both cases is Chinese investments, which governments in Europe and Canada hope may boost domestic employment and innovation through potential technology transfers. Indeed, in the case of Europe, the investments already exist, and the debate has already shifted to how to manage and ensure that Chinese manufacturing can benefit long-term competitiveness and innovation goals. In other words, European and Canadian leaders believe that there are economic benefits to maintaining some trade and allowing some investment from China.
What Is the European Union's Deal?
On January 12, 2026, the European Commission released a guidance document providing information to companies on how to submit offers for voluntary price undertakings for battery EV exports from China, signaling it would welcome such an approach in some cases as an alternative to the tariffs imposed after its anti-subsidy investigation on battery electric vehicles made in China. This came as reports broke that not only had Volkswagen already submitted an application for the CUPRA Tavascan, which is produced in China, but that the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) had endorsed such an approach, reversing its earlier position.
For the European Union, the debate over EV imports has been both drawn out and high profile due to the large-scale economic implications of the rapid shift in the automotive balance of trade with China (see Figure 2). When tariffs on Chinese-made battery electric vehicles ranging from 7.8 percent for Tesla to 35.3 percent for SAIC Motor were introduced in 2024, the European Commission explicitly indicated that some alternative mechanisms could be utilized to avoid tariffs. However, over the next year, little progress was achieved between Beijing and Brussels when it came to finding an agreement. To complicate matters, European automakers such as Volkswagen that have extensive production capacity in China were also affected by the tariffs, while Chinese companies, including BYD, have been investing in Europe to localize more of their production and avoid duties. Indeed, European policymakers have faced tough choices due to the complex trade and investment ties between the two economies and the large number of cars exported from China to Europe by Western automakers such as Tesla, Volkswagen, and others.
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Figure 2: China-EU Automotive Trade by Type of Vehicle (Electric Vehicle vs. Internal Combustion Engine), Q1 2019-Q3 2025
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The issue with a price undertaking is that it may not solve the European Union's competitiveness or EV deployment problems, but it may help alleviate Chinese firms' "involution" struggles. Indeed, MOFCOM may turn out to be very pleased with the outcome, even if it wasn't an early vocal supporter of this solution. While tariffs require companies to pay a duty, a price undertaking would allow them to retain higher margins and potentially reinvest the money in expanding further production or research and development. Either way, consumers should see a similar, if higher, price tag. However, although much concern has been raised about the possibility of this outcome benefiting Chinese firms, it is worth noting that so far, Volkswagen, a German company, is the only one that has submitted a request for a price undertaking. Whether others will follow remains to be seen.
What Is Canada's Deal?
Only a few days after the news from Europe, during Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's visit to Beijing on January 16, the first such state visit in eight years, the Canadian government indicated that a series of commercial deals had been reached between the two countries. Among other things, the Canadian side agreed to allow 49,000 Chinese EVs into Canada at a most-favored-nation rate of 6.1 percent. This is far lower than the 100 percent rate that was imposed in 2024 following the United States' lead under then-President Joe Biden, which effectively stopped imports (see Figure 3). Some reports indicated that the number of vehicles would then increase to 70,000 over five years. In exchange, China has reportedly committed to lowering tariffs on Canadian agricultural products such as canola oil and to increasing investment in Canada, among other things.
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Figure 3: China EV Exports to Canada
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Prime Minister Carney and much of the reporting have highlighted that 49,000 cars is a small number compared to Canada's overall light vehicle market, which was roughly 1.8 million in 2025. However, when looking at EV sales, the number becomes far more significant. After a record year in 2024, when almost 251,000 EVs were sold in Canada, in 2025 the number dropped significantly, reaching less than 165,000 by the end of November, according to EV Volumes, an industry data provider. Thus, it is possible that 50,000 vehicles could inject some momentum into the market, especially if their price point can entice consumers. This is clearly part of the calculation--the Canadian official statement points to the hope that a significant portion of the vehicles would cost less than C$35,000 (about $25,000).
The Canadian deal is particularly opaque right now, and much remains unexplained, including which brands will be included in the 49,000 vehicles. For example, Tesla, a U.S. company, is a major exporter of EVs from China, but its vehicles would be in the more expensive range, and it is not clear that Beijing or Ottawa would prioritize a foreign firm's exports.
Regardless, this signals a far more dramatic shift in policy compared to that of the European Union. While Europe is already an importer of EVs from China and many European manufacturers are deeply dependent on the Chinese market and Chinese value chains, Canada is in a different position, as it has adopted a similar approach to the United States, effectively closing its market to Chinese automotive exports in 2024. By opening its market, even in such a limited fashion, it is effectively signaling a willingness to create more linkages with the Chinese market--especially given Prime Minister Carney's emphasis on the potential investment that would flow to Canada as part of this deal.
The fact that Canada is willing to cut such a deal with China and involve a hot-button issue such as EVs is significant also in relation to Ottawa's relationship with Washington, which, as Carney's speech at Davos this week indicates, is evolving rapidly. Lower tariffs on Chinese EVs and, more broadly, a deal with China will certainly come under scrutiny during United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement negotiations. Mexico is also a major importer of Chinese-made EVs as well as ICE vehicles, ensuring that this will indeed be a complicated discussion. Indeed, if the deal were to increase Chinese investment in Canada, that would raise concerns in Washington, even if, as of now, it seems that the main target of Chinese negotiations is access to the Canadian market.
Looking Ahead: A Complicated Path Forward
It is difficult to look at the data and conclude that Chinese manufacturing and EV producers won't play a major role in the future of the automotive industry. However, the deals discussed in this piece do not solve some of the broader issues that the industry faces in China, including over-competition and low margins and profitability. Meanwhile, although the European Union and Canada have signaled some interest in retaining or reestablishing some trade in the sector, they are far from swinging open the floodgates. In both cases, the governments are expecting some level of productive investment from China to mitigate the negative effects of changing trade dynamics. As argued above, both U.S. allies are effectively signaling a strong interest in the technologies that Chinese firms can offer.
For the United States, this raises interesting questions. Firstly, at a time when U.S. automakers have reined in their plans for electrification and federal policy has rolled back incentives for EV deployment, the growth of EV trade in other countries should be taken as a serious signal of future global trends. Second, Washington's strategy toward many of its allies, including Ottawa and Brussels, has been to utilize its leverage, whether it be military or economic, to secure more concessions. In several instances, this has proven a remarkably effective strategy. However, it has also created a new set of incentives for countries to, among other things, seek to stabilize their commercial relationship with Beijing, which is now portraying itself as a more reliable partner. While not necessarily always detrimental to U.S. national security in the short term, it could nonetheless carry long-term consequences. A more holistic foreign policy approach would consider both the motivations and interests of allies that can be leveraged to mutual benefit, in addition to the pressure points that can be used to pursue U.S. interests in a more direct way.
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Ilaria Mazzocco is deputy director and senior fellow with the Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/canada-and-european-union-two-new-wins-chinese-exports-west
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Building a True Trusted Trade Partnership With the United Kingdom
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 22, 2026:* * *
Building a True Trusted Trade Partnership with the United Kingdom
By Meredith Broadbent
On December 1, 2025, the United States and the United Kingdom struck a win-win agreement for innovation, bilateral investment, and growth in the pharmaceutical and medical technology sectors. In what is the third elaboration of the U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal (EPD), first announced by leaders on May 5, 2025, the new deal, called the Agreement in Principle with the United ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 22, 2026: * * * Building a True Trusted Trade Partnership with the United Kingdom By Meredith Broadbent On December 1, 2025, the United States and the United Kingdom struck a win-win agreement for innovation, bilateral investment, and growth in the pharmaceutical and medical technology sectors. In what is the third elaboration of the U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal (EPD), first announced by leaders on May 5, 2025, the new deal, called the Agreement in Principle with the UnitedKingdom on Pharmaceutical Pricing, moves a step closer toward establishing a true, trusted trade partner relationship with the United Kingdom and should be applauded for what it accomplishes.
The December 1 deal allows the United Kingdom to export pharmaceutical and medical products to the U.S. duty-free by exempting these products from tariffs, including future action under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 or Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. In exchange, the United Kingdom has made a precedent-setting commitment to increase its National Health Service (NHS) budget by 25 percent for new drugs, aiming to bring the country's spending on new drugs closer to that of the United States.
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Background
The NHS enforces several key policies to limit UK government expenditures on branded medicines, including (1) cost-effectiveness thresholds, and (2) price cuts (taxes on companies) through the Voluntary Scheme for Branded Medicines Pricing and Access (VPAG).
Cost-effectiveness thresholds, set by the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE), are used to determine the level of government payment based on how much benefit a drug provides in relation to its price. NICE economists calculate quality-adjusted life year (QALY), which is an estimate of how many years of good health a drug can be expected to provide. The current QALY threshold of 20,000 pounds to 30,000 pounds allocated per year has been in place with no change since 1999. NICE generally won't pay for a drug if the pharmaceutical company refuses to provide the drug at a price within the threshold. The agreement commits the United Kingdom to increasing this threshold from 25,000 pounds to 35,000 pounds starting in April 2026.
In addition to low reimbursement prices by the NHS, U.S. pharmaceutical companies have been subject to tax assessments by the UK government, which are aimed at ensuring that total government health expenditures do not exceed a pre-determined budget cap. Pharmaceutical companies are subject to steep so-called claw-back taxes on sales of innovative medicines under the VPAG when spending on branded drugs exceeds the cap.
In the agreement, the United Kingdom has committed to reducing the repayment rate owed by companies under the current VPAG scheme from a peak of 25.5 percent to 15 percent starting in 2026, with the rate capped at or below 15 percent for the life of the scheme.
As geopolitical friction with China escalates, and the goal of securing medical supply lines takes center stage, the Trump administration and many Republican members of Congress take the view that the U.S. healthcare system bears a disproportionate burden of subsidizing pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) that is used in the UK market as well as throughout the world. Low levels of pricing reimbursement and VPAG claw-backs have functioned as serious nontariff trade barriers aimed at the U.S. industry exporting to the United Kingdom and have enabled the United Kingdom to rely on medical innovations developed through U.S. R&D efforts.
Breaking New Ground
However, when 35 members of Congress and 18 senators wrote U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer in July, urging him to "ensure foreign nations pay their fair share toward the cost of pharmaceutical research and development," few trade practitioners and industry experts saw this as a realistic negotiating objective for trade agreements. For years, the pharmaceutical industry has petitioned unsuccessfully for USTR to achieve improved market access in the form of fair pricing for reimbursements of its products through government healthcare systems. The executive order of May 12, 2025, appears to have shifted the U.S. government's focus, making drug pricing and securing "fair share" contributions of trading partners to global pharmaceutical R&D costs a key priority in trade negotiations.
The perceived political sensitivity of trade negotiations with the United States, encompassing domestic healthcare spending and drug pricing, and the impact of higher drug reimbursements on government healthcare budgets, has heretofore made trading partners--even those embarking on comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations with the United States--extremely reluctant to accede to U.S. pressure to make concessions in this area. While the U.S.-Australia and U.S.-South Korea FTAs included provisions to boost the transparency of government pricing and reimbursement processes and ensure a right of appeal of pricing decisions to an independent body, these objectives were abandoned by the Obama administration in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations.
Key Elements of the Agreement in Principle
While the written text of the agreement has not yet been made public, the core of this agreement, as reflected in government documents, is a UK commitment to boost NHS reimbursement prices for new pharmaceutical products. As discussed above, this will involve a 25 percent increase in the QALY benchmark for new drugs to pound sterling25,000-35,000 per year. The increase will apply to new National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) technology appraisals and those currently in progress, but will not be retroactive for drugs already on the market. According to NICE, the agency currently recommends 91 percent of the treatments it evaluates, around 70 per year. Estimates are that raising the payment threshold will mean approving up to five more drugs per year. Additionally, the UK government will ensure that higher prices for new medicines "are not materially eroded" by the rebates payable under the United Kingdom's VPAG scheme.
In return, the United States has promised to exempt new UK-origin pharmaceuticals, pharmaceutical ingredients, and medical technology from Section 232 tariffs for at least three years and refrain from targeting UK pharmaceutical pricing practices in any future Section 301 investigation--meaning that pharmaceuticals from the United Kingdom will enjoy duty-free access to the U.S. market.
Secure Medical Supply Chains and the Administration's Most-Favored-Nation Drug Pricing Scheme
The U.S.-UK agreement on pharmaceutical pricing stands as an important precedent as the United States works to rebuild secure medical supply chains with sustainable revenue streams to support the development of innovative medicines to combat cancer and other diseases and guard against the next pandemic. It is also a breakthrough for the president's MFN drug pricing scheme, which aims to both lower U.S. drug prices and boost foreign prices. The deal also puts pressure on other major drug exporters, such as the European Union, to seek similar deals.
In the new world of tough competitive and security threats from China, where steady capital investment in R&D is essential, the agreement, if implemented, represents an important breakthrough that will help sustain and grow a foundational industry in both countries. UK officials have hailed the agreement as a vital economic and health achievement, aimed at securing medicine access for patients and boosting the United Kingdom's life sciences sector. The United Kingdom is currently the only country to have secured zero-percent U.S. tariffs on pharmaceutical and medical technology products for the duration of President Trump's term, safeguarding a sector worth over pound sterling11 billion annually to the United Kingdom. UK Business and Trade Secretary Peter Kyle said, "This deal guarantees that UK pharmaceutical exports... will enter the [United States] tariff free, protecting jobs, boosting investment and paving the way for the United Kingdom to become a global hub for life sciences."
UK Science and Technology Secretary Liz Kendall noted that the "deal will help ensure UK patients get the cutting-edge medicines they need sooner, and our world-leading UK firms keep developing the treatments that can change lives." The deal will reinforce confidence in the United Kingdom as an investment destination, confidence that had been wavering as firms like AstraZeneca and Bristol-Myers Squibb struggled to be competitive in the old UK regulatory environment. Many investment decisions in the United Kingdom were on hold, and there was awareness in the government that firms might begin shuttering certain operations.
Implementation Challenges
The trade negotiating environment is hectic and complex as the administration pushes to conclude simultaneous bilateral trade negotiations with key trading partners all over the world. But notable wins are being scored that will stand as important precedents for U.S. industry.
The new structure that the administration is pursuing on trade, while still emerging, so far seems to be iterative in nature, with sectoral accomplishments announced as they are agreed to. This process contrasts with the traditional U.S. method of aiming for comprehensive agreements in which "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." The old approach, as slow and cumbersome as it was, did result in enforceable agreements, often knitted together by cross-sectoral, bilateral trade-offs.
If no approval of the U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal by Congress is contemplated, including earlier gains for U.S. beef and ethanol exports contained in the EPD, members of Congress will need to focus on how implementation will be monitored and assured, particularly as governments change. Congress could exercise its authority to pull back on tariff benefits in the event the United Kingdom fails to follow through on its commitments.
This U.S.-UK pharmaceutical deal could be a big win in terms of building a true, trusted trade partnership so that the two countries can lead in R&D spending, build global market share, and work together to diversify the supply of critical inputs. Much will depend on whether Congress takes a role in monitoring implementation, particularly as governments change. If Congress and the Trump administration work together, the agreement is a precedent that should stand the test of time, even as governments turn over and struggle to fund necessary investments.
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Meredith Broadbent serves as a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-true-trusted-trade-partnership-united-kingdom
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary: Trump Owned Davos
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following commentary on Jan. 23, 2026, to American Greatness:* * *
Trump Owned Davos
By Fred Fleitz
European leaders worked themselves up into full-blown hysteria before President Trump spoke to the World Economic Forum this week with wild claims that Trump planned a U.S. invasion of Greenland that would destroy the NATO alliance and the rules-based international order. A couple of dozen European troops were hurriedly sent to Greenland. French President Macron called for an emergency G7 summit. European leaders also discussed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following commentary on Jan. 23, 2026, to American Greatness: * * * Trump Owned Davos By Fred Fleitz European leaders worked themselves up into full-blown hysteria before President Trump spoke to the World Economic Forum this week with wild claims that Trump planned a U.S. invasion of Greenland that would destroy the NATO alliance and the rules-based international order. A couple of dozen European troops were hurriedly sent to Greenland. French President Macron called for an emergency G7 summit. European leaders also discussedimplementing a "bazooka" trade retaliation against the United States.
But when Trump spoke at the Davos Summit on Wednesday, these hair-on-fire claims melted away in the face of his masterful speech, which laid out in depth his successful record of promoting global security and ending wars. The president also turned the tables on European leaders by challenging them over policies that have endangered their security and the welfare of their citizens.
Trump mocked Europe's reliance on windmills and green energy, noting that electricity prices have soared by 139% in some European countries, and criticized the UK for energy policies that make it impossible to drill for oil in the North Sea.
To read the full article, click here (https://amgreatness.com/2026/01/23/trump-owned-davos/).
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Fred Fleitz is originally from Lansdowne, Pennsylvania, and serves as Vice Chair of AFPI's American Security.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/trump-owned-davos
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Celebrates the End of Human Fetal Tissue in Taxpayer-Funded Research
WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on Jan. 23, 2026:* * *
AFPI Celebrates the End of Human Fetal Tissue in Taxpayer-Funded Research
Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement:
"AFPI applauds the NIH for ending the use of human fetal tissue in taxpayer funded, NIH supported research. Instead, the Trump Administration is advancing innovative technologies to conduct more effective bio medical testing without the cost to unborn life. This decision marks a turning point for gold-standard science in the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on Jan. 23, 2026: * * * AFPI Celebrates the End of Human Fetal Tissue in Taxpayer-Funded Research Today, the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement: "AFPI applauds the NIH for ending the use of human fetal tissue in taxpayer funded, NIH supported research. Instead, the Trump Administration is advancing innovative technologies to conduct more effective bio medical testing without the cost to unborn life. This decision marks a turning point for gold-standard science in theUnited States.
For too long, the abortion industry has insisted that any breakthroughs in science rely on elective abortions; instead, Director Bhattacharya has shown that you can be pro-life and pro-science. On this 52nd annual March for Life, we celebrate the advances in medicine that are done without harm to the most innocent or promote a culture of death."
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-celebrates-the-end-of-human-fetal-tissue-in-taxpayer-funded-research
[Category: ThinkTank]