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Rand Issues Commentary: 25 Years After 9/11 - Lessons for Securing the Homeland
SANTA MONICA, California, Sept. 9 -- Rand issued the following commentary:
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25 Years After 9/11: Lessons for Securing the Homeland
Friday marks 25 years since the September 11 terror attacks. Americans are spending the week remembering those who lost their lives and honoring the first responders and others who sprang into action to help. The attacks cast a long shadow, stretching beyond Ground Zero, the Pentagon, and Flight 93 to transform not just the United States but the world.
RAND experts are reflecting on one of the most enduring aspects of this transformation: what we've learned ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Sept. 9 -- Rand issued the following commentary: * * * 25 Years After 9/11: Lessons for Securing the Homeland Friday marks 25 years since the September 11 terror attacks. Americans are spending the week remembering those who lost their lives and honoring the first responders and others who sprang into action to help. The attacks cast a long shadow, stretching beyond Ground Zero, the Pentagon, and Flight 93 to transform not just the United States but the world. RAND experts are reflecting on one of the most enduring aspects of this transformation: what we've learnedabout homeland security in the quarter-century since the attacks. Below, our researchers answer questions about protecting soft targets, mitigating risks from emerging technologies, and more.
Q: What has stayed with you most about September 11, 2001? How did that day shape the way you think about protecting the homeland?
A: Heather Williams: My professional trajectory has been shaped by many events, but it was set in motion by September 11. The attacks led me to focus on the Middle East and to join the U.S. Intelligence Community. That day stays with me as a reminder that solidarity is interwoven into the American fabric. This is comforting as we grapple with the current national divisions.
My thoughts on September 11 as a policy expert are more nuanced. Policymaking is so difficult because bureaucracy is complex and people are naturally resistant to change. September 11 allowed leaders to overcome much of the resistance, and I lived the positive effects of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. At the same time, the reactionary nature of those changes created a patchwork of organizations working on homeland security, largely focused on terrorism as the threat.
That enterprise is now reorienting toward today's multi-hazard environment but without the catalyst that September 11 provided. Like many others, I'm motivated to build the necessary protective institutions before another tragedy strikes.
Ryan Consaul: I think back to the tremendous sense of patriotism and unity born from the great tragedy of 9/11. Sadly, that unity has given way to controversy and division. Congressional oversight remains diffuse, and past bipartisan efforts to enact meaningful legislation to protect the homeland have given way to more-partisan priorities. Given the multitude of threats we continue to face, we need to stand together to tackle ongoing and emergent homeland security challenges.
What have we learned in the years since 9/11 about how best to protect soft targets? What does the evidence say about safeguarding communities from mass attacks by nonstate actors and others?
Brian Jackson: For protecting soft targets, we often think first about technology: cameras, weapon-detection systems, or other physical protection measures. But some of the most effective protection comes from the community working together to identify and respond to potential threats. This is called behavioral threat assessment and management, or BTAM, and it's now one of the ways that the majority of K-12 schools, many workplaces, and some police departments or community safety efforts protect themselves. Teams respond when someone's behavior suggests they may become violent. Much of what the teams using this approach do doesn't look like security. For example, they might get the people referred to them into counseling or other programs to redirect them from whatever is moving them toward violence.
BTAM is effective, but it relies on everyone buying in. You can't intervene with a kid who's reading violent websites or making threats if their classmate doesn't let the teacher know what's happening or if the kid's parent refuses to let the child work with a counselor. Building and maintaining trust is tough. We tried to use this approach in the years after 9/11; it was a central part of efforts to respond to radicalization to violent extremism. But because many of the other counterterrorism approaches undermined trust with key communities, the strategy was never able to strengthen homeland security as much as it could have.
John Hollywood: The evidence supports starting with layered security strategies in which multiple measures work together to improve the chance that an attack will be stopped or at least mitigated.
These security layers start with prevention. Tips from the public to police or on-site security have often helped to foil plots. Look for warning signs that incorporate a strong motivation to attack with concrete actions to prepare. Things like creating attack plans; researching how to attack; seeking to learn from extremists (including traveling to receive paramilitary training); accumulating large quantities of weapons or materials used in the construction of improvised explosives; and probing or breaching potential attack sites. Be aware that most motivations for mass attacks have been personal rather than ideological or partisan.
For on-site security, focus on the basics. Cases where attackers had direct access to a large crowd have tended to have the highest lethality, so consider how to put distance, barriers, and crowd movement between would-be attackers and crowds. Access-control systems--notably exterior and interior door locks, secured windows, and securable entryways--have all been effective and efficient. However, all require training and maintenance.
Bystanders and security have stopped attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters has been extremely effective. Again, training can make responses even more effective. That said, training needs to be low-stress and empowering without causing psychological injuries.
For communities, use interagency teams to support prevention, security training, and response planning. We need to establish and fund teams responsible for both educating the public about what to report and conducting diligent follow-up on reported cases. (Brian mentioned an approach for doing so, BTAM, above.) We then need to ensure advance planning and joint training with those agencies that will respond locally to a mass attack.
For many Americans, the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and changes to airport screening remain among the most visible legacies of 9/11. What has research found about the TSA?
Kelly Klima: Research over the past 25 years suggests that TSA has played a vital role in reducing the risk of terrorist attacks against U.S. aviation. Since 9/11, there has been no successful terrorist attack on a U.S. commercial flight that passed through TSA screening. This record reflects a layered defense-in-depth approach to screening passengers, baggage, and cargo, alongside intelligence, law-enforcement, and industry partners.
TSA has also balanced security with the need to move millions of travelers and large volumes of cargo efficiently and at reasonable cost. The passenger fee is less than $6 per flight, and the total TSA budget (which includes the development and procurement of screening technology) is about $8 billion in 2026.
That balance of security and reasonable cost continues to improve through better physical and chemical screening technologies, changes in checkpoint design and procedures, and risk-based approaches that focus attention where it's needed most.
But the threat continues to evolve. Terrorists and insiders may seek to conceal firearms, explosives, or other weapons in new ways. Emerging cyber and other nontraditional threats require constant assessment. Continued investment in advanced detection technologies, process redesign, and responsibly developed AI can help TSA identify threats more accurately and quickly, strengthen aviation security, and improve the passenger experience.
Williams: Americans associate TSA with the blue shirts they encounter at the security checkpoint, but the organization has a broader mandate than many realize. One of the other programs TSA manages is the Security Threat Assessment for multiple security credentials, including the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) and Hazardous Materials Endorsement for commercial driver's licenses. RAND research has found that TSA generally executes these programs effectively, at cost, and with timely resolution, in a way that reduces internal threats. For example, TWIC applicants who have no flags for possible disqualifying factors could find a physical card in their mailbox less than six days later.
Many anti-terrorism technologies and capabilities require collaborations between government and the private sector. What have we learned about how to effectively navigate those partnerships?
Thao Liz Nguyen: One of the enduring lessons is that the development, maturation, and operational adoption of anti-terrorism technologies can proliferate in well-structured public-private collaboration. After 9/11, the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, established the Office of SAFETY Act Implementation and created a statutory framework for evaluating and incentivizing anti-terrorism technologies. From a technology-evaluation perspective, the SAFETY Act not only encourages innovation in the abstract but applies a rigorous process to assessing technical performance, operational utility, and real-world deployment considerations of mature technologies to emerging capabilities.
Designation and Certification protections under the SAFETY Act have helped mature the market for proven security technologies and services by reducing liability uncertainty and signaling that a capability has undergone meaningful DHS review. At the same time, the Developmental Testing and Evaluation Designation protection has been especially important for emerging technologies, because it allows developers to generate operational evidence, refine concepts of use, and test performance in relevant environments before a capability is fully fielded.
What we've learned is that effective public-private partnership requires more than funding or policy encouragement; it requires credible evaluation pathways, clear incentives for participation, and mechanisms that help bridge the gap between innovation, validation, and scalable adoption for anti-terrorism technologies.
Of course, new technologies have also transformed the threat landscape. Let's start with unmanned aerial systems, commonly known as drones. How have drones emerged as a potential threat to people and infrastructure, and what do we know about how to mitigate that threat?
Brendan Toland: Drones have rapidly emerged as a threat because these systems have become more capable and more available. Parallel advances in a series of technologies (batteries, electric motors, precision manufacturing, optics) have shrunk the airframe for drones, increased their speed and endurance, and lowered their cost. Additionally, improvements in lightweight cameras, guidance via GPS waypoints, and wire-guided control have made it more difficult to detect and take over hostile drones. Finally, drones come in various forms. This lets bad actors select a drone that is optimal for the intended objective, whether that's maintaining an eye in the sky or delivering compact items (contraband, bombs) virtually anywhere at speed.
As part of RAND's work operating the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, we evaluated the capabilities of commercially available drones. We found that these systems continue to lower in cost while improving on operationally relevant metrics, such as speed, flight time, and payload capacity. We also developed several high-threat scenarios in which bad actors could use drones to threaten the homeland, including bombing a federal building or delivering a chemical agent outside a major sporting event. Looking across the market, we found more than 500 systems capable of conducting at least one of our high-threat scenarios. This number has only grown in the six years since our research was conducted.
The speed of drones and the ability to launch these systems from virtually anywhere constrains the response time for those working to defend the homeland. In our more recent simulation modeling, we found that defenders had only seconds to a few minutes to detect and defeat incoming drones, depending on the situation. If the adversary uses a drone to provide aerial surveillance, then in many cases the onboard camera enables a stand-off range that undermines detection. Any effective defense requires deploying layered mitigation capabilities in advance, putting these capabilities in the hands of trained personnel, sharing detection information across the homeland security enterprise, and empowering defenders on the ground to make quick decisions.
Christopher Scott Adams: Advances in drone technology have made the threat more salient, but the homeland security enterprise has some tools to help mitigate that threat. The Preventing Emerging Threats Act and the SAFER SKIES Act have given key counter-drone authorities to federal and state/local/tribal/territorial law enforcement, respectively. These include permissions, under certain circumstances, to intercept communications between drones and their operators, track and monitor drone flights, and disable, down, or destroy potential threats.
These authorities have allowed DHS and its partners to invest in counter-drone technologies. At RAND, we've advised our DHS sponsors on the requirements for effective counter-drone capabilities and the right technology mix. This analysis has informed ongoing counter-drone investments at the border and in defense of major events, such as the World Cup and the Olympics.
Across these assessments, we've found a few consistent effective practices to mitigate, though not eliminate, the threat. First, defense-in-depth is key; having multiple types of sensors and effectors (kinetic and non-kinetic) in the same location gives the best chance of detecting and defeating a variety of drone threats. Second, defenders need to plan ahead. This includes resolving authorities issues, developing rules of engagement that are well understood by all operators, and creating information-sharing agreements across responsible agencies. Third, employing automation in defense can provide the speed to respond to a similarly automated threat.
What about artificial intelligence? For example, concerns are rising that AI could enable biological attacks. What do we know about this emerging risk and how best to mitigate it?
Steph Guerra: Historically, biological attacks have been rare, unsuccessful, and difficult to execute. That's because of the technical, operational, and motivational barriers that bad actors face. But AI is increasingly able to lower these barriers by democratizing biological expertise, driving laboratory workflows, raising the ceiling of biological novelty, and circumventing existing biosecurity controls like gene synthesis screening. At RAND, we seek to assess these capabilities to help inform policy action that reduces the risk of misuse while still enabling beneficial scientific innovation.
Our team recently published a biosecurity strategy for the AI era to prevent AI-enabled biological attacks. The strategy is deliberately layered, because different mitigations stop different threat actors. For example, access controls like gene synthesis screening may stop a lone terrorist, but they probably can't stop a state bioweapons program. But a state program might be deterred from developing bioweapons by credible attribution and rapid response capabilities. Each layer is critical, but only having one is insufficient.
We know AI capabilities in biology are advancing fast, but thankfully the most hazardous thresholds haven't yet been crossed. That gives us a narrow window to build protective infrastructure before misuse becomes demonstrably easy.
Nguyen: Detection technology is being pushed to do more than it was originally built for. This is true for any emerging unforeseen threat. As AI lowers the barrier to entry of designing novel biological agents or even modifying existing ones, screening systems must improve at spotting unusual patterns, not just known signatures stored in their static reference libraries. In practice, that means detection equipment needs to keep pace with new compounds, new delivery methods, and changes in how material may be packaged or concealed.
The challenge is that detection is only as good as the data, calibration, and reference libraries it relies on, so if the libraries are outdated, then the equipment can miss something that doesn't look like the "expected" threat. That's why DHS and other stakeholders should continue investing in research, development, testing, and evaluation; field testing; and recalibration of sensors and screening tools. We also need to think about how these systems are integrated across layers of screening, because no single device is going to catch everything. We need to invest in innovative detection systems and the algorithms behind them so they can stay adaptive and agile as threats evolve.
David Luckey: The convergence of AI with advances in biotechnology and chemistry represents one of the most significant emerging risks to homeland security since 9/11. AI is rapidly lowering technical barriers in synthetic biology, genomics, and chemical engineering. This means that malicious actors could potentially leverage AI tools to design, synthesize, or optimize biological or chemical agents with unprecedented speed and precision.
This risk is not hypothetical. AI-driven platforms can already assist in protein folding, gene editing, and even the design of novel chemical compounds. Used by a bad actor, these capabilities could be repurposed to engineer pathogens or toxins that evade current detection and mitigation strategies. The dual-use nature of AI in life sciences poses unique governance and oversight challenges; the same tools that accelerate medical breakthroughs can also facilitate weaponization.
Mitigating this risk almost certainly requires a multi-layered approach that includes strengthening oversight, promoting responsible innovation, enhancing detection and response, and building cross-sector partnerships. Effective mitigation will likely depend on seamless collaboration between government, industry, and the research community. Proactive risk assessment, horizon scanning, and anticipatory governance are essential to stay ahead of adversaries who might exploit AI for catastrophic ends.
Twenty-five years later, what lesson from 9/11 feels most urgent in your work today?
Jackson: Responding to threats requires thinking about how we will maintain defenses in the long term, even when the need to respond is most urgent.
The human and financial costs of 9/11 were catastrophic, and so there was pressure to do everything possible to make sure that such a tragedy couldn't happen again. As time passed, it became clear that the costs of all the security and other measures added up over time--and that one of the most effective responses to that specific threat (reinforcing airplane cockpit doors) was one of the cheapest. While government needs to spend to protect the nation, the more expensive security measures are, the harder they are to maintain over time.
Though thinking about the cost-effectiveness of security may seem odd when we're concerned about the risk of disasters like 9/11, doing so is critical, particularly since it's often much cheaper for attackers to try something new than it is for defenders to update protections.
Hollywood: We need to stay vigilant but not overreactive.
This means maintaining a focus between overreaction to what have been extremely rare events and inattention to ongoing threats. Similarly, we must avoid getting distracted by a single part of the threat (e.g., focusing on a specific ideology when most attacks are personally motivated) or by a single security technology. Instead, what's needed is a strategic, layered approach that counters the full range of violent threats. Perhaps most importantly, vigilance means maintaining and developing partnerships between the public, security groups, and local, state, and federal agencies to provide ongoing prevention and protection.
Luckey: It's imperative to have imagination and adaptability in the face of evolving threats.
9/11 exposed the dangers of "failure of imagination," specifically the inability to anticipate how adversaries might exploit emerging or unexplored vulnerabilities. Today, as we confront the intersection of AI and biological or chemical weapons, that lesson is more urgent than ever.
Our adversaries are agile, opportunistic, and increasingly technologically sophisticated. The tools of mass disruption are no longer confined to nation-states or well-resourced groups; they're becoming accessible to a broader spectrum of actors. This reality demands that we continually reassess our assumptions, update our risk models, and foster a culture of innovation and vigilance across the homeland security enterprise.
I'm reminded daily that security is a dynamic process, not a static end state. The post-9/11 era amplified the value of intelligence sharing, public-private partnerships, and resilience. But it also illuminated that the next threat might not look like the last. Our greatest asset is the ability to anticipate, adapt, and act--before the unimaginable becomes reality.
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More About This Commentary
Heather Williams is director of research strategy and a senior policy researcher at RAND, and a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy.
Ryan Consaul is a senior policy researcher at RAND.
Brian Jackson is a senior physical scientist at RAND.
John Hollywood is a senior operations researcher at RAND.
Kelly Klima is a senior engineer at RAND and a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy.
Thao Liz Nguyen is associate director of the Infrastructure, Immigration, and Security Operations Program in the RAND Homeland Security Research Division, a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy, and a senior physical scientist at RAND.
Brendan Toland is director of the Navy and Marine Forces Program in the RAND National Security Research Division and a senior operations researcher at RAND.
Christopher Scott Adams is a senior policy analyst at RAND.
Steph Guerra is a biosecurity resident and head of AI x Bio at RAND.
David Luckey is a senior policy researcher at RAND and a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/09/25-years-after-911-lessons-for-securing-the-homeland.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
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25 Years After 9/11: Lessons for Securing the Homeland
Friday marks 25 years since the September 11 terror attacks. Americans are spending the week remembering those who lost their lives and honoring the first responders and others who sprang into action to help. The attacks cast a long shadow, stretching beyond Ground Zero, the Pentagon, and Flight 93 to transform not just the United States but the world.
RAND experts are reflecting on one of the most enduring aspects of this transformation: what we've learned ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Sept. 9 -- Rand issued the following commentary: * * * 25 Years After 9/11: Lessons for Securing the Homeland Friday marks 25 years since the September 11 terror attacks. Americans are spending the week remembering those who lost their lives and honoring the first responders and others who sprang into action to help. The attacks cast a long shadow, stretching beyond Ground Zero, the Pentagon, and Flight 93 to transform not just the United States but the world. RAND experts are reflecting on one of the most enduring aspects of this transformation: what we've learnedabout homeland security in the quarter-century since the attacks. Below, our researchers answer questions about protecting soft targets, mitigating risks from emerging technologies, and more.
Q: What has stayed with you most about September 11, 2001? How did that day shape the way you think about protecting the homeland?
A: Heather Williams: My professional trajectory has been shaped by many events, but it was set in motion by September 11. The attacks led me to focus on the Middle East and to join the U.S. Intelligence Community. That day stays with me as a reminder that solidarity is interwoven into the American fabric. This is comforting as we grapple with the current national divisions.
My thoughts on September 11 as a policy expert are more nuanced. Policymaking is so difficult because bureaucracy is complex and people are naturally resistant to change. September 11 allowed leaders to overcome much of the resistance, and I lived the positive effects of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. At the same time, the reactionary nature of those changes created a patchwork of organizations working on homeland security, largely focused on terrorism as the threat.
That enterprise is now reorienting toward today's multi-hazard environment but without the catalyst that September 11 provided. Like many others, I'm motivated to build the necessary protective institutions before another tragedy strikes.
Ryan Consaul: I think back to the tremendous sense of patriotism and unity born from the great tragedy of 9/11. Sadly, that unity has given way to controversy and division. Congressional oversight remains diffuse, and past bipartisan efforts to enact meaningful legislation to protect the homeland have given way to more-partisan priorities. Given the multitude of threats we continue to face, we need to stand together to tackle ongoing and emergent homeland security challenges.
What have we learned in the years since 9/11 about how best to protect soft targets? What does the evidence say about safeguarding communities from mass attacks by nonstate actors and others?
Brian Jackson: For protecting soft targets, we often think first about technology: cameras, weapon-detection systems, or other physical protection measures. But some of the most effective protection comes from the community working together to identify and respond to potential threats. This is called behavioral threat assessment and management, or BTAM, and it's now one of the ways that the majority of K-12 schools, many workplaces, and some police departments or community safety efforts protect themselves. Teams respond when someone's behavior suggests they may become violent. Much of what the teams using this approach do doesn't look like security. For example, they might get the people referred to them into counseling or other programs to redirect them from whatever is moving them toward violence.
BTAM is effective, but it relies on everyone buying in. You can't intervene with a kid who's reading violent websites or making threats if their classmate doesn't let the teacher know what's happening or if the kid's parent refuses to let the child work with a counselor. Building and maintaining trust is tough. We tried to use this approach in the years after 9/11; it was a central part of efforts to respond to radicalization to violent extremism. But because many of the other counterterrorism approaches undermined trust with key communities, the strategy was never able to strengthen homeland security as much as it could have.
John Hollywood: The evidence supports starting with layered security strategies in which multiple measures work together to improve the chance that an attack will be stopped or at least mitigated.
These security layers start with prevention. Tips from the public to police or on-site security have often helped to foil plots. Look for warning signs that incorporate a strong motivation to attack with concrete actions to prepare. Things like creating attack plans; researching how to attack; seeking to learn from extremists (including traveling to receive paramilitary training); accumulating large quantities of weapons or materials used in the construction of improvised explosives; and probing or breaching potential attack sites. Be aware that most motivations for mass attacks have been personal rather than ideological or partisan.
For on-site security, focus on the basics. Cases where attackers had direct access to a large crowd have tended to have the highest lethality, so consider how to put distance, barriers, and crowd movement between would-be attackers and crowds. Access-control systems--notably exterior and interior door locks, secured windows, and securable entryways--have all been effective and efficient. However, all require training and maintenance.
Bystanders and security have stopped attacks. Groups of bystanders tackling shooters has been extremely effective. Again, training can make responses even more effective. That said, training needs to be low-stress and empowering without causing psychological injuries.
For communities, use interagency teams to support prevention, security training, and response planning. We need to establish and fund teams responsible for both educating the public about what to report and conducting diligent follow-up on reported cases. (Brian mentioned an approach for doing so, BTAM, above.) We then need to ensure advance planning and joint training with those agencies that will respond locally to a mass attack.
For many Americans, the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and changes to airport screening remain among the most visible legacies of 9/11. What has research found about the TSA?
Kelly Klima: Research over the past 25 years suggests that TSA has played a vital role in reducing the risk of terrorist attacks against U.S. aviation. Since 9/11, there has been no successful terrorist attack on a U.S. commercial flight that passed through TSA screening. This record reflects a layered defense-in-depth approach to screening passengers, baggage, and cargo, alongside intelligence, law-enforcement, and industry partners.
TSA has also balanced security with the need to move millions of travelers and large volumes of cargo efficiently and at reasonable cost. The passenger fee is less than $6 per flight, and the total TSA budget (which includes the development and procurement of screening technology) is about $8 billion in 2026.
That balance of security and reasonable cost continues to improve through better physical and chemical screening technologies, changes in checkpoint design and procedures, and risk-based approaches that focus attention where it's needed most.
But the threat continues to evolve. Terrorists and insiders may seek to conceal firearms, explosives, or other weapons in new ways. Emerging cyber and other nontraditional threats require constant assessment. Continued investment in advanced detection technologies, process redesign, and responsibly developed AI can help TSA identify threats more accurately and quickly, strengthen aviation security, and improve the passenger experience.
Williams: Americans associate TSA with the blue shirts they encounter at the security checkpoint, but the organization has a broader mandate than many realize. One of the other programs TSA manages is the Security Threat Assessment for multiple security credentials, including the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) and Hazardous Materials Endorsement for commercial driver's licenses. RAND research has found that TSA generally executes these programs effectively, at cost, and with timely resolution, in a way that reduces internal threats. For example, TWIC applicants who have no flags for possible disqualifying factors could find a physical card in their mailbox less than six days later.
Many anti-terrorism technologies and capabilities require collaborations between government and the private sector. What have we learned about how to effectively navigate those partnerships?
Thao Liz Nguyen: One of the enduring lessons is that the development, maturation, and operational adoption of anti-terrorism technologies can proliferate in well-structured public-private collaboration. After 9/11, the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, established the Office of SAFETY Act Implementation and created a statutory framework for evaluating and incentivizing anti-terrorism technologies. From a technology-evaluation perspective, the SAFETY Act not only encourages innovation in the abstract but applies a rigorous process to assessing technical performance, operational utility, and real-world deployment considerations of mature technologies to emerging capabilities.
Designation and Certification protections under the SAFETY Act have helped mature the market for proven security technologies and services by reducing liability uncertainty and signaling that a capability has undergone meaningful DHS review. At the same time, the Developmental Testing and Evaluation Designation protection has been especially important for emerging technologies, because it allows developers to generate operational evidence, refine concepts of use, and test performance in relevant environments before a capability is fully fielded.
What we've learned is that effective public-private partnership requires more than funding or policy encouragement; it requires credible evaluation pathways, clear incentives for participation, and mechanisms that help bridge the gap between innovation, validation, and scalable adoption for anti-terrorism technologies.
Of course, new technologies have also transformed the threat landscape. Let's start with unmanned aerial systems, commonly known as drones. How have drones emerged as a potential threat to people and infrastructure, and what do we know about how to mitigate that threat?
Brendan Toland: Drones have rapidly emerged as a threat because these systems have become more capable and more available. Parallel advances in a series of technologies (batteries, electric motors, precision manufacturing, optics) have shrunk the airframe for drones, increased their speed and endurance, and lowered their cost. Additionally, improvements in lightweight cameras, guidance via GPS waypoints, and wire-guided control have made it more difficult to detect and take over hostile drones. Finally, drones come in various forms. This lets bad actors select a drone that is optimal for the intended objective, whether that's maintaining an eye in the sky or delivering compact items (contraband, bombs) virtually anywhere at speed.
As part of RAND's work operating the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, we evaluated the capabilities of commercially available drones. We found that these systems continue to lower in cost while improving on operationally relevant metrics, such as speed, flight time, and payload capacity. We also developed several high-threat scenarios in which bad actors could use drones to threaten the homeland, including bombing a federal building or delivering a chemical agent outside a major sporting event. Looking across the market, we found more than 500 systems capable of conducting at least one of our high-threat scenarios. This number has only grown in the six years since our research was conducted.
The speed of drones and the ability to launch these systems from virtually anywhere constrains the response time for those working to defend the homeland. In our more recent simulation modeling, we found that defenders had only seconds to a few minutes to detect and defeat incoming drones, depending on the situation. If the adversary uses a drone to provide aerial surveillance, then in many cases the onboard camera enables a stand-off range that undermines detection. Any effective defense requires deploying layered mitigation capabilities in advance, putting these capabilities in the hands of trained personnel, sharing detection information across the homeland security enterprise, and empowering defenders on the ground to make quick decisions.
Christopher Scott Adams: Advances in drone technology have made the threat more salient, but the homeland security enterprise has some tools to help mitigate that threat. The Preventing Emerging Threats Act and the SAFER SKIES Act have given key counter-drone authorities to federal and state/local/tribal/territorial law enforcement, respectively. These include permissions, under certain circumstances, to intercept communications between drones and their operators, track and monitor drone flights, and disable, down, or destroy potential threats.
These authorities have allowed DHS and its partners to invest in counter-drone technologies. At RAND, we've advised our DHS sponsors on the requirements for effective counter-drone capabilities and the right technology mix. This analysis has informed ongoing counter-drone investments at the border and in defense of major events, such as the World Cup and the Olympics.
Across these assessments, we've found a few consistent effective practices to mitigate, though not eliminate, the threat. First, defense-in-depth is key; having multiple types of sensors and effectors (kinetic and non-kinetic) in the same location gives the best chance of detecting and defeating a variety of drone threats. Second, defenders need to plan ahead. This includes resolving authorities issues, developing rules of engagement that are well understood by all operators, and creating information-sharing agreements across responsible agencies. Third, employing automation in defense can provide the speed to respond to a similarly automated threat.
What about artificial intelligence? For example, concerns are rising that AI could enable biological attacks. What do we know about this emerging risk and how best to mitigate it?
Steph Guerra: Historically, biological attacks have been rare, unsuccessful, and difficult to execute. That's because of the technical, operational, and motivational barriers that bad actors face. But AI is increasingly able to lower these barriers by democratizing biological expertise, driving laboratory workflows, raising the ceiling of biological novelty, and circumventing existing biosecurity controls like gene synthesis screening. At RAND, we seek to assess these capabilities to help inform policy action that reduces the risk of misuse while still enabling beneficial scientific innovation.
Our team recently published a biosecurity strategy for the AI era to prevent AI-enabled biological attacks. The strategy is deliberately layered, because different mitigations stop different threat actors. For example, access controls like gene synthesis screening may stop a lone terrorist, but they probably can't stop a state bioweapons program. But a state program might be deterred from developing bioweapons by credible attribution and rapid response capabilities. Each layer is critical, but only having one is insufficient.
We know AI capabilities in biology are advancing fast, but thankfully the most hazardous thresholds haven't yet been crossed. That gives us a narrow window to build protective infrastructure before misuse becomes demonstrably easy.
Nguyen: Detection technology is being pushed to do more than it was originally built for. This is true for any emerging unforeseen threat. As AI lowers the barrier to entry of designing novel biological agents or even modifying existing ones, screening systems must improve at spotting unusual patterns, not just known signatures stored in their static reference libraries. In practice, that means detection equipment needs to keep pace with new compounds, new delivery methods, and changes in how material may be packaged or concealed.
The challenge is that detection is only as good as the data, calibration, and reference libraries it relies on, so if the libraries are outdated, then the equipment can miss something that doesn't look like the "expected" threat. That's why DHS and other stakeholders should continue investing in research, development, testing, and evaluation; field testing; and recalibration of sensors and screening tools. We also need to think about how these systems are integrated across layers of screening, because no single device is going to catch everything. We need to invest in innovative detection systems and the algorithms behind them so they can stay adaptive and agile as threats evolve.
David Luckey: The convergence of AI with advances in biotechnology and chemistry represents one of the most significant emerging risks to homeland security since 9/11. AI is rapidly lowering technical barriers in synthetic biology, genomics, and chemical engineering. This means that malicious actors could potentially leverage AI tools to design, synthesize, or optimize biological or chemical agents with unprecedented speed and precision.
This risk is not hypothetical. AI-driven platforms can already assist in protein folding, gene editing, and even the design of novel chemical compounds. Used by a bad actor, these capabilities could be repurposed to engineer pathogens or toxins that evade current detection and mitigation strategies. The dual-use nature of AI in life sciences poses unique governance and oversight challenges; the same tools that accelerate medical breakthroughs can also facilitate weaponization.
Mitigating this risk almost certainly requires a multi-layered approach that includes strengthening oversight, promoting responsible innovation, enhancing detection and response, and building cross-sector partnerships. Effective mitigation will likely depend on seamless collaboration between government, industry, and the research community. Proactive risk assessment, horizon scanning, and anticipatory governance are essential to stay ahead of adversaries who might exploit AI for catastrophic ends.
Twenty-five years later, what lesson from 9/11 feels most urgent in your work today?
Jackson: Responding to threats requires thinking about how we will maintain defenses in the long term, even when the need to respond is most urgent.
The human and financial costs of 9/11 were catastrophic, and so there was pressure to do everything possible to make sure that such a tragedy couldn't happen again. As time passed, it became clear that the costs of all the security and other measures added up over time--and that one of the most effective responses to that specific threat (reinforcing airplane cockpit doors) was one of the cheapest. While government needs to spend to protect the nation, the more expensive security measures are, the harder they are to maintain over time.
Though thinking about the cost-effectiveness of security may seem odd when we're concerned about the risk of disasters like 9/11, doing so is critical, particularly since it's often much cheaper for attackers to try something new than it is for defenders to update protections.
Hollywood: We need to stay vigilant but not overreactive.
This means maintaining a focus between overreaction to what have been extremely rare events and inattention to ongoing threats. Similarly, we must avoid getting distracted by a single part of the threat (e.g., focusing on a specific ideology when most attacks are personally motivated) or by a single security technology. Instead, what's needed is a strategic, layered approach that counters the full range of violent threats. Perhaps most importantly, vigilance means maintaining and developing partnerships between the public, security groups, and local, state, and federal agencies to provide ongoing prevention and protection.
Luckey: It's imperative to have imagination and adaptability in the face of evolving threats.
9/11 exposed the dangers of "failure of imagination," specifically the inability to anticipate how adversaries might exploit emerging or unexplored vulnerabilities. Today, as we confront the intersection of AI and biological or chemical weapons, that lesson is more urgent than ever.
Our adversaries are agile, opportunistic, and increasingly technologically sophisticated. The tools of mass disruption are no longer confined to nation-states or well-resourced groups; they're becoming accessible to a broader spectrum of actors. This reality demands that we continually reassess our assumptions, update our risk models, and foster a culture of innovation and vigilance across the homeland security enterprise.
I'm reminded daily that security is a dynamic process, not a static end state. The post-9/11 era amplified the value of intelligence sharing, public-private partnerships, and resilience. But it also illuminated that the next threat might not look like the last. Our greatest asset is the ability to anticipate, adapt, and act--before the unimaginable becomes reality.
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More About This Commentary
Heather Williams is director of research strategy and a senior policy researcher at RAND, and a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy.
Ryan Consaul is a senior policy researcher at RAND.
Brian Jackson is a senior physical scientist at RAND.
John Hollywood is a senior operations researcher at RAND.
Kelly Klima is a senior engineer at RAND and a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy.
Thao Liz Nguyen is associate director of the Infrastructure, Immigration, and Security Operations Program in the RAND Homeland Security Research Division, a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy, and a senior physical scientist at RAND.
Brendan Toland is director of the Navy and Marine Forces Program in the RAND National Security Research Division and a senior operations researcher at RAND.
Christopher Scott Adams is a senior policy analyst at RAND.
Steph Guerra is a biosecurity resident and head of AI x Bio at RAND.
David Luckey is a senior policy researcher at RAND and a professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/09/25-years-after-911-lessons-for-securing-the-homeland.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Optimism Rise in German Electronics Industry
MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 9 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
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Optimism Rise in German Electronics Industry
The business climate in Germany's electronics industry* improved again in August. The index rose to 16.0 points, up from 10.0 points in July, the highest level since May 2023. That was due primarily to the business expectations, which were significantly more optimistic. Although companies were more cautious than in the previous month in the assessment of their current situation, it continued to be clearly positive. "The electronics industry is currently one of the few ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 9 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Optimism Rise in German Electronics Industry The business climate in Germany's electronics industry* improved again in August. The index rose to 16.0 points, up from 10.0 points in July, the highest level since May 2023. That was due primarily to the business expectations, which were significantly more optimistic. Although companies were more cautious than in the previous month in the assessment of their current situation, it continued to be clearly positive. "The electronics industry is currently one of the fewindustrial sectors in which business is going well," says ifo expert Klaus Wohlrabe. "Although sentiment in the manufacturing sector as a whole has also improved recently, the electronics industry was already significantly more optimistic before that."
Confidence is being driven by international business: Export expectations in this sector jumped from minus 7.6 to plus 24.7 points. In general, the order situation is developing very well, with the number of new orders increasing steadily.
Accordingly, companies are looking to expand their production and hire additional employees. In the manufacturing sector as a whole, on the other hand, companies are continuing to plan job cuts. Demand in the electronics industry also picked up again, and capacity utilization rose to 81.2 percent in July, up from 79.7 percent in April. The supply of intermediate products poses a problem. A third of companies reported a shortage of materials.
Comparable positive trends can be seen in the similar field of electrical equipment manufacturing, where the business climate climbed to 13.7 points in August, up from 5.6 points in July. "The main driving force behind this development is digitalization," says Wohlrabe.
"The expansion of data centers, investments in artificial intelligence, and automation in customer industries are having a direct impact on the order books. This is no short-lived flash in the pan, but the result of long-term investments that will boost the industry for some time to come."
* Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products (WZ C26).
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Weitere Informationen
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-09-08/optimism-rise-german-electronics-industry)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-09-08/optimism-rise-german-electronics-industry
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Optimism Rise in German Electronics Industry
The business climate in Germany's electronics industry* improved again in August. The index rose to 16.0 points, up from 10.0 points in July, the highest level since May 2023. That was due primarily to the business expectations, which were significantly more optimistic. Although companies were more cautious than in the previous month in the assessment of their current situation, it continued to be clearly positive. "The electronics industry is currently one of the few ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 9 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Optimism Rise in German Electronics Industry The business climate in Germany's electronics industry* improved again in August. The index rose to 16.0 points, up from 10.0 points in July, the highest level since May 2023. That was due primarily to the business expectations, which were significantly more optimistic. Although companies were more cautious than in the previous month in the assessment of their current situation, it continued to be clearly positive. "The electronics industry is currently one of the fewindustrial sectors in which business is going well," says ifo expert Klaus Wohlrabe. "Although sentiment in the manufacturing sector as a whole has also improved recently, the electronics industry was already significantly more optimistic before that."
Confidence is being driven by international business: Export expectations in this sector jumped from minus 7.6 to plus 24.7 points. In general, the order situation is developing very well, with the number of new orders increasing steadily.
Accordingly, companies are looking to expand their production and hire additional employees. In the manufacturing sector as a whole, on the other hand, companies are continuing to plan job cuts. Demand in the electronics industry also picked up again, and capacity utilization rose to 81.2 percent in July, up from 79.7 percent in April. The supply of intermediate products poses a problem. A third of companies reported a shortage of materials.
Comparable positive trends can be seen in the similar field of electrical equipment manufacturing, where the business climate climbed to 13.7 points in August, up from 5.6 points in July. "The main driving force behind this development is digitalization," says Wohlrabe.
"The expansion of data centers, investments in artificial intelligence, and automation in customer industries are having a direct impact on the order books. This is no short-lived flash in the pan, but the result of long-term investments that will boost the industry for some time to come."
* Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products (WZ C26).
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Weitere Informationen
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-09-08/optimism-rise-german-electronics-industry)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-09-08/optimism-rise-german-electronics-industry
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Declining PISA Performance Threatens Prosperity
MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 9 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
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Declining PISA Performance Threatens Prosperity
Ludger Woessmann, Director of the ifo Center for the Economics of Education, warns of the economic consequences of poor PISA performance. "The population's basic skills are vital to economic productivity, individual incomes, and overall economic growth," says Woessmann. "That's why the dramatic decline of PISA results in Germany must spark a rethinking of education policy. Teaching basic skills must have top priority."
The decline in math and reading performance ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 9 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Declining PISA Performance Threatens Prosperity Ludger Woessmann, Director of the ifo Center for the Economics of Education, warns of the economic consequences of poor PISA performance. "The population's basic skills are vital to economic productivity, individual incomes, and overall economic growth," says Woessmann. "That's why the dramatic decline of PISA results in Germany must spark a rethinking of education policy. Teaching basic skills must have top priority." The decline in math and reading performancesince the last study in 2022 equates to an average loss in earnings of 3 to 4 percent in the long term. Compared to the pre-COVID levels of 2018, the figure is even as high as 9 to 10 percent. From a macroeconomic perspective as well, the German economy is losing trillions. People with lower basic skills are less productive in their economic activities and are more likely to work in occupations with lower value added. Furthermore, a lower level of education goes hand in hand with a lack of innovativeness. "To be internationally competitive in well-paying high-tech professions, we need an education system that fosters excellence," says Woessmann. Since artificial intelligence (AI) can easily provide answers to factual questions, it will be all the more important in the future to ask the right questions, scrutinize answers, and develop solutions to problems. That means good basic skills will likely even gain in importance.
The PISA study published today shows that, following the decline during the COVID-19 pandemic (2018-2022), the reading, math, and scientific performance of 15-year-olds in Germany fell significantly again by 2025, reaching all-time lows. "It's no condolence that many other Western countries are also seeing declines," says Woessmann. "That simply means that prosperity is also at risk there - especially since students in many East Asian countries are several school years ahead of ours in terms of academic performance."
The decline in the PISA results must lead to a renewed focus on teaching basic skills in policymaking and in society. In schools, teachers would need to raise the standards, which fell during the COVID-19 pandemic, back to their previous level of aspiration. Grade inflation must be reversed. Within families, too, parents need to motivate and inspire their children to learn. In education policy, annual nationally standardized tests could increase transparency. At the same time, schools should be given more autonomy to find the best way to achieve the goals. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds should receive targeted support through tutoring and mentoring programs. Finally, problems must be tackled early on: All children should take a language test at age four and a half, as they do in Hamburg, and those who do not meet a minimum level should automatically receive support.
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-09-08/declining-pisa-performance-threatens-prosperity
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Declining PISA Performance Threatens Prosperity
Ludger Woessmann, Director of the ifo Center for the Economics of Education, warns of the economic consequences of poor PISA performance. "The population's basic skills are vital to economic productivity, individual incomes, and overall economic growth," says Woessmann. "That's why the dramatic decline of PISA results in Germany must spark a rethinking of education policy. Teaching basic skills must have top priority."
The decline in math and reading performance ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Sept. 9 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Declining PISA Performance Threatens Prosperity Ludger Woessmann, Director of the ifo Center for the Economics of Education, warns of the economic consequences of poor PISA performance. "The population's basic skills are vital to economic productivity, individual incomes, and overall economic growth," says Woessmann. "That's why the dramatic decline of PISA results in Germany must spark a rethinking of education policy. Teaching basic skills must have top priority." The decline in math and reading performancesince the last study in 2022 equates to an average loss in earnings of 3 to 4 percent in the long term. Compared to the pre-COVID levels of 2018, the figure is even as high as 9 to 10 percent. From a macroeconomic perspective as well, the German economy is losing trillions. People with lower basic skills are less productive in their economic activities and are more likely to work in occupations with lower value added. Furthermore, a lower level of education goes hand in hand with a lack of innovativeness. "To be internationally competitive in well-paying high-tech professions, we need an education system that fosters excellence," says Woessmann. Since artificial intelligence (AI) can easily provide answers to factual questions, it will be all the more important in the future to ask the right questions, scrutinize answers, and develop solutions to problems. That means good basic skills will likely even gain in importance.
The PISA study published today shows that, following the decline during the COVID-19 pandemic (2018-2022), the reading, math, and scientific performance of 15-year-olds in Germany fell significantly again by 2025, reaching all-time lows. "It's no condolence that many other Western countries are also seeing declines," says Woessmann. "That simply means that prosperity is also at risk there - especially since students in many East Asian countries are several school years ahead of ours in terms of academic performance."
The decline in the PISA results must lead to a renewed focus on teaching basic skills in policymaking and in society. In schools, teachers would need to raise the standards, which fell during the COVID-19 pandemic, back to their previous level of aspiration. Grade inflation must be reversed. Within families, too, parents need to motivate and inspire their children to learn. In education policy, annual nationally standardized tests could increase transparency. At the same time, schools should be given more autonomy to find the best way to achieve the goals. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds should receive targeted support through tutoring and mentoring programs. Finally, problems must be tackled early on: All children should take a language test at age four and a half, as they do in Hamburg, and those who do not meet a minimum level should automatically receive support.
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-09-08/declining-pisa-performance-threatens-prosperity
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary: History of Homecare Fraud - NGO's, Bureaucrats, and Labor Unions Undermined Medicaid Fraud Prevention
WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary:
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The history of homecare fraud: NGO's, bureaucrats, and labor unions undermined Medicaid fraud prevention
The Medicaid "homecare" program is probably the most defrauded welfare program in America today, and it got that way because a cabal of nonprofits, the Medicaid "deep state," and big labor has quietly worked to sandbag Electronic Visit Verification (EVV), a federally required anti-fraud policy.
By Parker Thayer
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Since 2024, dozens of people in multiple states have been accused of and convicted for ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary: * * * The history of homecare fraud: NGO's, bureaucrats, and labor unions undermined Medicaid fraud prevention The Medicaid "homecare" program is probably the most defrauded welfare program in America today, and it got that way because a cabal of nonprofits, the Medicaid "deep state," and big labor has quietly worked to sandbag Electronic Visit Verification (EVV), a federally required anti-fraud policy. By Parker Thayer - Since 2024, dozens of people in multiple states have been accused of and convicted fortheir participation in brazen Medicaid fraud schemes that have highlighted how obvious and lucrative some of these Medicaid fraud operations are. The sudden popularity of fraud-busting might give the impression that industrial-scale Medicaid fraud is a recent development. While Medicaid fraud has certainly gotten much worse in recent years, it's actually a very old problem that the federal and state governments have permitted to grow thanks to a cocktail of incompetence, apathy, and special-interest meddling.
The best example of how long industrial-scale fraud has existed is the Home-Based Community Services (HCBS) program.
Back in April 1992, for instance, a convicted drug dealer fresh out of prison started a "home health care" business in Los Angeles. By the end of the year, he had already ripped off at least $1.5 million and possibly as much as $2.5 million ($3.5 million to $5.8 million in 2026 dollars) by billing for patients that didn't exist and care that was never provided. Testifying anonymously as "Mr. A" in November 1995, the convicted scam artist told a U. S. Senate committee exactly how easy it was to loot tax dollars through the program.
Recent headlines about homecare fraud rings show the same loopholes "Mr. A" exploited over three decades ago remain wide open, and the HCBS program remains easy to defraud. Earlier this month, for example, federal authorities busted a homecare fraud operation being run from inside a federal prison in Philadelphia with the man behind the operation being quoted as saying "this home health care is the best kept secret cuz [...] Everyone is doing this, if this is a problem you'll have to arrest the whole city."
While outrage has been the predominant response to these headlines, bewilderment has been a close second. Why have so many fraudsters been able to operate so blatantly for so long? The reasons are manifold, but one of the most important is that a determined and complicated web of special interest groups has been fighting against one of the only tools for combatting fraud in the HCBS program. The list of bad actors includes healthcare companies, labor unions, nonprofits, government officials, and trade associations.
History of HCBS
". . we were billing Medicare for patients who either did not live at the address we submitted to Medicare, had not been seen by a doctor in over 5 years, were not home bound, were in a hospital, or were deceased. Medicare did not require any paperwork. . ." -- "Mr. A" in 1995
The HCBS "homecare" program was not necessarily a bad idea when section 1915(c) HCBS waivers were created in 1981. The waivers were supposed to be used by Medicare and state Medicaid programs to pay for certain types of care for the impoverished disabled and elderly; to be performed in their own homes rather than a traditional long-term care or nursing home facility. The policy was backed by both Democrats and Republicans who believed it would cut costs while allowing for family members to provide better care to patients.
Though several researchers published papers supporting the idea in 1981, the original HCBS waiver proposal seems to have come from a 1971 report to the Senate Special Committee on Aging by Dr. Robert Morris of the Levinson Gerontological Policy Institute at Brandeis University. Dr. Morris's program was created with funding from the Max and Anna Levinson Foundation, which tested a prototype form of the homecare program in Massachusetts. Morris would later go on to publish a 1991 book, Personal Assistance: The Future of Home Care, which proposed further expansion and deregulation of the home care program.
It wasn't long before the program was mugged by reality.
In addition to "Mr. A," the aforementioned November 1995 U.S. Senate hearing featured several other witnesses who had been prosecuted for home health care fraud. Mr. A told the committee "how easy it was for me to open a home health care agency" that he used to steal millions of dollars. He submitted bogus paperwork and got paid for homecare visits that never happened because there was no real mechanism to easily identify fraud.
As he told the Senate:
All we needed was a name, a health insurance number, and a code for the diagnosis. In fact, by January 1993 we were billing Medicare for patients who either did not live at the address we submitted to Medicare, had not been seen by a doctor in over 5 years, were not home bound, were in a hospital, or were deceased. Medicare did not require any paperwork at the time we sent the claim in electronically.
Mr. A was caught because of a savvy state employee spotting discrepancies in his bogus paperwork, but not before he got a taste of the good life:
We were making so much money that I was able to have a custom home built in Bel Air for $2.5 million, of which I put down $1.2 million. I also leased a Rolls Royce and leased a 500 SL Mercedes Benz. I also invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in a movie production company and movie script about my life. I have also published a book about my life that includes a chapter about United Care Home Health Services, which I will have to revise to include my guilty plea and what awaits me now.
Today, dozens of recent fraud convictions in the homecare program reveal the scam hasn't changed much since Mr. A's days. His methods for defrauding Medicare are the same ones currently being used to defraud Medicaid, which has replaced Medicare as the focal point of HCBS spending. Doctors are still taking bribes, fake billing requests are still being approved, patient identities are still being fabricated or stolen, and Medicaid millionaires are still buying mansions and fancy cars.
The problem persists because the homecare program relies mostly upon the honesty of just two people, often family members, who are usually alone together where nothing can be verified. This is the fatal flaw that inhibits reform. Relatiely few would be willing to lie to get themselves placed in a state-run nursing home. But many have been willing to lie about their symptoms, or the hours worked, so the taxpayers will pay family or close friends for taking care of them in their home. This is especially true if the "patient" is getting a cut of the revenue.
Further weakening the program is the fact that many of the "personal care services" the program will pay for require no medical experience or training at all. This includes such tasks as "light housekeeping" and "providing companionship and conversation" that could never be verified even if there was an investigator checking for fraud. You don't even need a special license to get in on this scam.
On top of that, while the tools for fighting fraud in the HCBS program have stayed essentially the same since Mr. A's day, the HCBS program has exploded in size. When he testified in 1995, HCBS spending accounted for $10.3 billion, or less than 20 percent of all Medicaid Long-Term Services and Supports (LTSS) expenditures that year. Had it merely kept pace with inflation, HCBS would have spent just $72.9 billion by 2023. Instead, the Medicaid HCBS program in 2023 spent twice that amount, $145.9 billion, or the majority of Medicaid LTSS expenditures.
Some sources indicate that in 1995 the HCBS program had fewer than 150,000 patients, but it grew to roughly 8.4 million patients by 2023. If that 1995 statistic is remotely valid, then the program experienced an increase of more than 500 percent during an era when the total American population grew by just 27 percent. Even the 2023 figure alone means 1 of every 40 Americans in 2023 (2.5 percent of us) was enrolled as a patient in the federal homecare program.
And that's making the dubious assumption that all 8.4 million patients were both real and still alive.
Electronic Visit Verification (EVV)
Unfortunately, the same groups and people advising states on how to construct EVV are also leading the fight against its existence and effective implementation.
There was one policy change that enabled state agencies to do something to crack down on the rampant fraud in the HCBS program. It has been fought relentlessly by those powerful special interest groups.
Electronic Visit Verification (EVV) is the practice of using digital monitoring devices with GPS capability and medical record keeping software to help verify, with real time data, that a homecare visit occurred. A 2018 report on the EVV system credited Ohio nurse Michelle Boasten with creating it 1996, as part of her "career combatting fraud and waste in home healthcare." But Ohio has become an ironic birthplace for EVV, as allegations of Medicaid fraud that occurred despite the state's electronic monitoring recently made headlines, prompting an overhaul of the state's EVV system.
In 2016, the 21st Century Cares Act made EVV a requirement for state Medicaid agencies. This was the first meaningful anti-fraud improvement in the program's history. Today, all 50 states have some form of EVV, usually taking the form of a smart phone app that a homecare worker or company uses to log hours, confirm location, and submit it all to the state Medicaid agency before the billing request is submitted.
Sometimes the app will also collect information such as fingerprint data or a signature to verify the patient is truly present. It isn't a fool proof system. Providers can still just bribe doctors with kickbacks for prescribing unnecessary homecare to patients who don't really need it. And EVV can be circumvented by providers sitting on the street outside a patient's house to fool the GPS system and bill for imaginary hours. However, despite its flaws, requiring EVV has still been a huge step forward for fraud prevention in a program that was operating on the honor system for decades.
But having EVV doesn't mean anything if the systems aren't designed and implemented well and if states aren't really using it. Unfortunately, the same groups and people advising states on how to construct EVV are also leading the fight against its existence and effective implementation.
The 21st Century Cares Act initially gave states a deadline of 2019 to start using EVV for personal care services and threatened their Medicaid program with financial penalties if they did not meet the deadline. The deadline was delayed, thanks in part to pressure from a group now calling itself ADvancing States, formerly the National Association of States United for Aging and Disabilities. ADvancing States issued a letter explaining that most states were behind schedule because of confusion supposedly created by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).
Congress ultimately passed legislation moving the deadline to January 2020. Then, in March 2020, ADvancing States and two other groups, the National Association of Medicaid Directors and the National Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services, sent another letter claiming that even though the already-moved-back deadline had passed, COVID-19 had made meeting the new deadline impossible and the financial penalties for non-compliance with EVV needed to be moved back at least another year. The delays just kept coming, and states kept requesting and receiving exemptions from the financial penalties by promising that they were working in good faith to finish an EVV system.
Then, in December 2021 the same three groups that authored the second request for delay sent a third letter that called for the abolition of EVV. The letter was written in response to the proposed 21st Century Cures 2.0 Act which, among other things, would have made it illegal for states to use GPS and biometric fingerprint data as part of their EVV programs. The letter stated that more than 40 states had already built an EVV program that relied on GPS data, and that banning states from using GPS would render all existing EVV systems useless and require each state to start over from scratch. They saved the end of the letter to recommend killing the fraud prevention tool altogether:
The EVV provision was originally projected to reduce costs due to a reduction in spending on personal care and home healthcare services. However, we believe that the cost of developing and implementing the systems has already greatly exceeded the projected savings. Due to all of the challenges discussed above, we believe that there would be positive policy outcomes as well as savings associated with completely repealing EVV instead of moving forward with these proposed changes.
This was a major departure from what these groups had said about EVV in the past. In May 2020 ADvancing States, the most influential of the three, had written a separate letter strongly opposing the GPS ban but making no mention of abolishing EVV entirely. In 2018, the group had written that "An effective, well-planned and implemented EVV system strengthens state Medicaid personal care and home health care services, by detecting and preventing fraud, waste, and abuse and improving the quality of PCS and HHCS." Several more recent publications, including the letters asking for delays, had spoken of EVV systems positively.
But then, after years of helping states design their EVV systems and fighting repeatedly to give them more time for implementation, ADvancing States and its allies were calling for the repeal of EVV requirements entirely because, they claimed, it was costing too much money and not producing any savings. They don't provide any evidence for this claim, though.
Then, in April 2026, the Medicaid trade associations changed directions once again.
As a new presidential administration took over and headlines about fraud in HCBS programs became common, ADvancing States, the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD), and the National Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services (NASDDDS) jointly published a toolkit explaining the best ways to fight "waste, fraud, and abuse" in Medicaid programs. EVV, which all three groups had called for a total abolition of in 2021, is reviewed glowingly as one of the main tools for preventing fraud. The toolkit even recommends greatly expanding the use of EVV, integrating EVV data further into fraud detection agencies, and increasing the amount of information EVV systems collect to close more loopholes.
Just a few years ago they had called for the elimination of EVV. Now they are showering it with praise. The flip-flopping is a hint that fighting fraud just might not be a major concern for the homecare industry's leading representatives.
Sabotaged from the start
This past spring, joint reporting by the Daily Wire and Capital Research Center exposed a massive network of suspicious payments, providers, and fraud in the homecare program surrounding Columbus, Ohio.
EVV can work as a fraud prevention tool, though not a perfect one, but only if states use it properly. Unfortunately, many state agencies led by high-ranking members of the same Medicaid trade associations that opposed and delayed EVV are spending piles of money to implement EVV without using it as intended, or at all, and then claiming EVV doesn't work.
For example, there is Bonny Silva, current Director of the Office of Community Living at the Colorado Department of Health, which runs portions of the state's homecare program. She is also president of the ADvancing States board of directors.
In 2026, the federal Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General published the results of an audit of Colorado's EVV compliance. The audit found 56 percent of personal care services (PCS) claims had EVV compliance problems yet were paid anyway. Auditors discovered that Colorado was allowing users to perform unlimited manual entries of EVV data, a leniency offered in case homecare attendants forgot to clock in or out on their app. But manual entry circumvented the EVV system by allowing providers to enter their own unverifiable data themselves that was often full of errors. In total, 62 out of 160 claims reviewed in the sample were entered manually. This likely means more than one-third of EVV entries statewide aren't performing the basic EVV independent verification functions.
Auditors found that one provider had submitted every single EVV record that year manually. Another 17 of the sampled claims (10.6 percent) weren't entered into the EVV at all, yet payments were still made, showing EVV entry isn't necessary for receiving payment. Even when EVV was submitted with GPS info, Colorado's system didn't use it, since another 10 percent of claims had EVV GPS data "exceptions" where GPS locations didn't match known patient addresses, with no explanation provided. These claims were paid out regardless because, according to the state "although GPS exceptions are flagged in the EVV system, the State agency does not require those exceptions to be corrected or addressed for a visit to be verified."
In short, Colorado wasn't requiring EVV at all.
Colorado's EVV system was designed by Sandata, the same firm that designed Ohio's EVV system at a price of more than $66 million, and the Ohio EVV system was recently discovered to have nearly identical problems. In Ohio, state auditors found nearly 56 percent of homecare visit claims were not processed through EVV at all, and that, as of July 2024, the GPS verification function was inexplicably switched from a requirement to an opt-in feature, and a signed consent form from the patient was required to turn it on.
The director of the Ohio Department of Aging which jointly administers the HCBS program is Ursel McElroy, the former president of ADvancing States. The Ohio government has also paid ADvancing States nearly $450,000 since 2021 for membership dues, employee training sessions, and administrative consulting services, and Sandata has sponsored both ADvancing States and the NAMD.
This past spring, joint reporting by the Daily Wire and Capital Research Center exposed a massive network of suspicious payments, providers, and fraud in the homecare program surrounding Columbus, Ohio. Governor Mike DeWine, who initially boasted about the strength of the state's EVV system, issued a series of executive orders that made GPS verification mandatory, and made submitting EVV information necessary for receiving payment. The reporting also led to a statewide moratorium on the enrollment of new homecare companies through Medicaid and a nationwide moratorium on the enrollment of new home healthcare companies through Medicare.
Still worse is New York, where a state audit of EVV compliance found that from January 2021 to March 2023, more than $14.5 billion was paid out for 82 million personal care services claims that did not have any matching EVV records. This was roughly 44 percent of personal care services submitted during that time. The auditors reported that "DOH and GDIT officials stated eMedNY has a feature that will prevent payment of fee-for-service claims that do not have a matching EVV record, but this feature was not turned on." This meant that, "According to DOH officials, to date, no providers have had claims pended or denied, nor have any been issued a letter seeking recoupment for lack of EVV data [emphasis added]." (DOH is the New York Department of Health and GDIT is General Dynamics Information Technology, a contractor that once performed data aggregation for New York's EVV system.)
In other words, despite having a nominally working EVV system, New York just hasn't been using it for anything. Amir Bassiri, Medicaid director for the New York State Department of Health since 2021, sits on the board of the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD), which, as previously noted, jointly called for EVV requirements to be abolished.
Colorado, Ohio, and New York are the only three states that have undergone a publicly available audit of their EVV systems so far. All three have failed. All three have HCBS programs overseen by bureaucrats that also serve as board members of the nonprofits that jointly delayed and then called for the total removal of EVV requirements. Both the president and vice president of ADvancing States are overseeing HCBS programs that have been caught dragging their feet on EVV in virtually every possible way, even when working EVV systems were already available.
The "Deep State" of Medicaid
Medicaid's "deep state" delayed and delayed EVV, and shielded states from the consequences of not creating an EVV system.
ADvancing States and its cosigners aren't just ordinary nonprofit advocacy groups. They're nonprofit advocacy groups created and led by the senior government officials who are running state Medicaid programs.
Current ADvancing State board members include high level employees of the governments of Ohio, Colorado, California, Arizona, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Utah. The National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD) is the same, with board members employed at high levels within the Medicaid agencies of Georgia, Washington, Iowa, Maine, New Hamshire, Oregon, California, Michigan, Nebraska, Texas, Louisianna, New York, New Jersey, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. National Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services (NASDDDS) has board members high-up within the state health department of Missouri, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, Maine, Delaware, Tennessee, and New York.
Think of them as the "deep state" of Medicaid. Most of the revenue for these nonprofits flows from contributions and program service fees from states and healthcare companies, many of which are contracted to run state Medicaid programs. It's a shady intersection of interests without clear incentives to stop fraud. They have incentives to ignore fraud or cut EVV programs to reduce costs and improve their bottom line. Applied Self-Direction, one of the sponsors of the ADvancing States 2021 summit, for example, explicitly stated that their dream was to "Get rid of EVV altogether."
Medicaid's "deep state" delayed and delayed EVV, and shielded states from the consequences of not creating an EVV system. Then they hypocritically pivoted to complain that EVV systems were over budget and behind schedule and called for eliminating them entirely. And when the Medicaid fraud flourished on their watch because of their malicious compliance with EVV requirements and became so politically salient that the federal government started to clamp down on state Medicaid funds, the Medicaid "deep state" changed tack and began praising EVV once again as an amazing tool for fighting fraud.
With all this flip flopping, lobbying, and perverse incentive structure in mind, the struggles of EVV and the exploding size of the HCBS program start to look less like ordinary bureaucratic incompetence and more like intentional sabotage.
And the next generation of the Medicaid "deep state" is already in training.
Since 2022, ADvancing States has been running the Next Gen HCBS Leaders Program that "[encourages] up-and-coming professionals to seek senior leadership opportunities" in state HCBS programs by pairing them with mentors already in the industry and giving them scholarships to attend the ADvancing State HCBS Conferences.
Those conferences and their sessions are sponsored, attended, and led by numerous healthcare companies that profit from the Medicaid HCBS program. The Next Gen HCBS Leaders Program is sponsored by United Healthcare, Molina Healthcare, and Pulselight. United Healthcare and Molina Healthcare generate mountains of revenue through their work as contracted managed care organizations (MCOs) for state Medicaid agencies, while Pulselight sells a software called "Trace" that provides analytics for data collected by EVV systems. In total, the Next Gen HCBS Leaders Program has trained 79 bureaucrats that are now ascending through the ranks of Medicaid agencies in 43 different states.
One famous definition of insanity is doing the same thing over again and expecting a different result. If these "Next Gen" leaders are learning from people like ADvancing States board members, then the outlook for the future of EVV is bleak.
The bureaucrats, trade associations, and the healthcare companies are one part of this equation, but large, public sector labor unions have also inserted themselves into the EVV debate. Their incentives likewise put them in favor of ignoring problems rather than finding solutions.
Forcibly unionizing the homecare industry by labeling all Medicaid homecare workers as government employees has been one of Big Labor's white whales for a very long time. The dues harvested from such a maneuver would have been a huge shot in the arm for national unions with dwindling membership, and their push for unionizing homecare has continued even after the Supreme Court ruled against the unions in 2014.
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 2015 in California represents a huge number of homecare workers and uses dues and fees it collects to donate generously to the Democratic politicians that run California's Medicaid program. SEIU Local 2015 and other California unions have been advocating against EVV since 2017, calling it "inherently burdensome," and seemingly urging California to consider not creating an EVV system and taking the financial penalties instead. Ever since, California has been fighting a battle with federal regulators about what their EVV system will look like and do, and California's In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program has ballooned to an almost comically large size at twice the rate of any other state in the country.
The situation is now so bad, and the unions are so involved, that, in a recent op-ed, Dr. Mehmet Oz, Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), explained that the agency had frozen funds to California specifically because California's pandering to the labor unions had created "a vicious cycle: Lax program integrity standards mean more demand for caregivers, more caregivers mean more union dues and more union dues mean more donations for the elected officials who are supposed to be guarding the cash register."
Labor unions are similarly pushing for the unionization of hundreds of thousands of homecare workers in New York, where homecare has grown so large that one in nine members of the New York City workforce is a home health aide and New York state now has three times more home health aides per capita than the national average. The Department of Justice has sued the New York Department of Health and Public Partnerships LLC, a company contracted to run New York's homecare program, alleging that the two are working to enable fraud at a massive scale.
The selection of Public Partnerships LLC to run the program was allegedly tainted by the improper influence of 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (UHE), the homecare union, which allegedly rigged the bidding process by telling the Hochul administration which company to award the contract to, based on the company's willingness to concede to the union's demands. The list of demands has not been made public yet. But it seems likely that the company's approach to EVV policy and the further unionization of homecare was a major component of the union's concerns.
Ignore the Fraud-Ignorers
To get serious about stopping fraud in the HCBS program federal and state lawmakers will have to tune out the Medicaid "deep state." Nonprofits such as ADvancing States, the National Association of Medicaid Directors, and the National Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services, along with their labor union allies, simply can't be trusted to fix the massive problems they've helped create, but lawmakers are still treating these groups as trustworthy sources.
Certainly, they are not "pro-fraud" by any means, but their constant flip-flopping and foot-dragging on a relatively mundane issue such as EVV proves that they're incapable of taking a meaningful stand against rampant fraud when stopping it might lead to awkward questions, embarrassing investigations, and possible budget cuts for their bureaucratic and for-profit constituents. If meaningful anti-fraud policies are going to be made, then it's time for lawmakers to start ignoring the "experts" who let things get this bad in the first place. They had their chance. It's time to go back and listen to "Mr. A" and find a new approach.
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Parker Thayer is an Investigative Researcher at Capital Research Center. A native of Michigan, he recently graduated from Hillsdale College.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/the-history-of-homecare-fraud-ngos-bureaucrats-and-labor-unions-undermined-medicaid-fraud-prevention/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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The history of homecare fraud: NGO's, bureaucrats, and labor unions undermined Medicaid fraud prevention
The Medicaid "homecare" program is probably the most defrauded welfare program in America today, and it got that way because a cabal of nonprofits, the Medicaid "deep state," and big labor has quietly worked to sandbag Electronic Visit Verification (EVV), a federally required anti-fraud policy.
By Parker Thayer
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Since 2024, dozens of people in multiple states have been accused of and convicted for ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary: * * * The history of homecare fraud: NGO's, bureaucrats, and labor unions undermined Medicaid fraud prevention The Medicaid "homecare" program is probably the most defrauded welfare program in America today, and it got that way because a cabal of nonprofits, the Medicaid "deep state," and big labor has quietly worked to sandbag Electronic Visit Verification (EVV), a federally required anti-fraud policy. By Parker Thayer - Since 2024, dozens of people in multiple states have been accused of and convicted fortheir participation in brazen Medicaid fraud schemes that have highlighted how obvious and lucrative some of these Medicaid fraud operations are. The sudden popularity of fraud-busting might give the impression that industrial-scale Medicaid fraud is a recent development. While Medicaid fraud has certainly gotten much worse in recent years, it's actually a very old problem that the federal and state governments have permitted to grow thanks to a cocktail of incompetence, apathy, and special-interest meddling.
The best example of how long industrial-scale fraud has existed is the Home-Based Community Services (HCBS) program.
Back in April 1992, for instance, a convicted drug dealer fresh out of prison started a "home health care" business in Los Angeles. By the end of the year, he had already ripped off at least $1.5 million and possibly as much as $2.5 million ($3.5 million to $5.8 million in 2026 dollars) by billing for patients that didn't exist and care that was never provided. Testifying anonymously as "Mr. A" in November 1995, the convicted scam artist told a U. S. Senate committee exactly how easy it was to loot tax dollars through the program.
Recent headlines about homecare fraud rings show the same loopholes "Mr. A" exploited over three decades ago remain wide open, and the HCBS program remains easy to defraud. Earlier this month, for example, federal authorities busted a homecare fraud operation being run from inside a federal prison in Philadelphia with the man behind the operation being quoted as saying "this home health care is the best kept secret cuz [...] Everyone is doing this, if this is a problem you'll have to arrest the whole city."
While outrage has been the predominant response to these headlines, bewilderment has been a close second. Why have so many fraudsters been able to operate so blatantly for so long? The reasons are manifold, but one of the most important is that a determined and complicated web of special interest groups has been fighting against one of the only tools for combatting fraud in the HCBS program. The list of bad actors includes healthcare companies, labor unions, nonprofits, government officials, and trade associations.
History of HCBS
". . we were billing Medicare for patients who either did not live at the address we submitted to Medicare, had not been seen by a doctor in over 5 years, were not home bound, were in a hospital, or were deceased. Medicare did not require any paperwork. . ." -- "Mr. A" in 1995
The HCBS "homecare" program was not necessarily a bad idea when section 1915(c) HCBS waivers were created in 1981. The waivers were supposed to be used by Medicare and state Medicaid programs to pay for certain types of care for the impoverished disabled and elderly; to be performed in their own homes rather than a traditional long-term care or nursing home facility. The policy was backed by both Democrats and Republicans who believed it would cut costs while allowing for family members to provide better care to patients.
Though several researchers published papers supporting the idea in 1981, the original HCBS waiver proposal seems to have come from a 1971 report to the Senate Special Committee on Aging by Dr. Robert Morris of the Levinson Gerontological Policy Institute at Brandeis University. Dr. Morris's program was created with funding from the Max and Anna Levinson Foundation, which tested a prototype form of the homecare program in Massachusetts. Morris would later go on to publish a 1991 book, Personal Assistance: The Future of Home Care, which proposed further expansion and deregulation of the home care program.
It wasn't long before the program was mugged by reality.
In addition to "Mr. A," the aforementioned November 1995 U.S. Senate hearing featured several other witnesses who had been prosecuted for home health care fraud. Mr. A told the committee "how easy it was for me to open a home health care agency" that he used to steal millions of dollars. He submitted bogus paperwork and got paid for homecare visits that never happened because there was no real mechanism to easily identify fraud.
As he told the Senate:
All we needed was a name, a health insurance number, and a code for the diagnosis. In fact, by January 1993 we were billing Medicare for patients who either did not live at the address we submitted to Medicare, had not been seen by a doctor in over 5 years, were not home bound, were in a hospital, or were deceased. Medicare did not require any paperwork at the time we sent the claim in electronically.
Mr. A was caught because of a savvy state employee spotting discrepancies in his bogus paperwork, but not before he got a taste of the good life:
We were making so much money that I was able to have a custom home built in Bel Air for $2.5 million, of which I put down $1.2 million. I also leased a Rolls Royce and leased a 500 SL Mercedes Benz. I also invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in a movie production company and movie script about my life. I have also published a book about my life that includes a chapter about United Care Home Health Services, which I will have to revise to include my guilty plea and what awaits me now.
Today, dozens of recent fraud convictions in the homecare program reveal the scam hasn't changed much since Mr. A's days. His methods for defrauding Medicare are the same ones currently being used to defraud Medicaid, which has replaced Medicare as the focal point of HCBS spending. Doctors are still taking bribes, fake billing requests are still being approved, patient identities are still being fabricated or stolen, and Medicaid millionaires are still buying mansions and fancy cars.
The problem persists because the homecare program relies mostly upon the honesty of just two people, often family members, who are usually alone together where nothing can be verified. This is the fatal flaw that inhibits reform. Relatiely few would be willing to lie to get themselves placed in a state-run nursing home. But many have been willing to lie about their symptoms, or the hours worked, so the taxpayers will pay family or close friends for taking care of them in their home. This is especially true if the "patient" is getting a cut of the revenue.
Further weakening the program is the fact that many of the "personal care services" the program will pay for require no medical experience or training at all. This includes such tasks as "light housekeeping" and "providing companionship and conversation" that could never be verified even if there was an investigator checking for fraud. You don't even need a special license to get in on this scam.
On top of that, while the tools for fighting fraud in the HCBS program have stayed essentially the same since Mr. A's day, the HCBS program has exploded in size. When he testified in 1995, HCBS spending accounted for $10.3 billion, or less than 20 percent of all Medicaid Long-Term Services and Supports (LTSS) expenditures that year. Had it merely kept pace with inflation, HCBS would have spent just $72.9 billion by 2023. Instead, the Medicaid HCBS program in 2023 spent twice that amount, $145.9 billion, or the majority of Medicaid LTSS expenditures.
Some sources indicate that in 1995 the HCBS program had fewer than 150,000 patients, but it grew to roughly 8.4 million patients by 2023. If that 1995 statistic is remotely valid, then the program experienced an increase of more than 500 percent during an era when the total American population grew by just 27 percent. Even the 2023 figure alone means 1 of every 40 Americans in 2023 (2.5 percent of us) was enrolled as a patient in the federal homecare program.
And that's making the dubious assumption that all 8.4 million patients were both real and still alive.
Electronic Visit Verification (EVV)
Unfortunately, the same groups and people advising states on how to construct EVV are also leading the fight against its existence and effective implementation.
There was one policy change that enabled state agencies to do something to crack down on the rampant fraud in the HCBS program. It has been fought relentlessly by those powerful special interest groups.
Electronic Visit Verification (EVV) is the practice of using digital monitoring devices with GPS capability and medical record keeping software to help verify, with real time data, that a homecare visit occurred. A 2018 report on the EVV system credited Ohio nurse Michelle Boasten with creating it 1996, as part of her "career combatting fraud and waste in home healthcare." But Ohio has become an ironic birthplace for EVV, as allegations of Medicaid fraud that occurred despite the state's electronic monitoring recently made headlines, prompting an overhaul of the state's EVV system.
In 2016, the 21st Century Cares Act made EVV a requirement for state Medicaid agencies. This was the first meaningful anti-fraud improvement in the program's history. Today, all 50 states have some form of EVV, usually taking the form of a smart phone app that a homecare worker or company uses to log hours, confirm location, and submit it all to the state Medicaid agency before the billing request is submitted.
Sometimes the app will also collect information such as fingerprint data or a signature to verify the patient is truly present. It isn't a fool proof system. Providers can still just bribe doctors with kickbacks for prescribing unnecessary homecare to patients who don't really need it. And EVV can be circumvented by providers sitting on the street outside a patient's house to fool the GPS system and bill for imaginary hours. However, despite its flaws, requiring EVV has still been a huge step forward for fraud prevention in a program that was operating on the honor system for decades.
But having EVV doesn't mean anything if the systems aren't designed and implemented well and if states aren't really using it. Unfortunately, the same groups and people advising states on how to construct EVV are also leading the fight against its existence and effective implementation.
The 21st Century Cares Act initially gave states a deadline of 2019 to start using EVV for personal care services and threatened their Medicaid program with financial penalties if they did not meet the deadline. The deadline was delayed, thanks in part to pressure from a group now calling itself ADvancing States, formerly the National Association of States United for Aging and Disabilities. ADvancing States issued a letter explaining that most states were behind schedule because of confusion supposedly created by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).
Congress ultimately passed legislation moving the deadline to January 2020. Then, in March 2020, ADvancing States and two other groups, the National Association of Medicaid Directors and the National Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services, sent another letter claiming that even though the already-moved-back deadline had passed, COVID-19 had made meeting the new deadline impossible and the financial penalties for non-compliance with EVV needed to be moved back at least another year. The delays just kept coming, and states kept requesting and receiving exemptions from the financial penalties by promising that they were working in good faith to finish an EVV system.
Then, in December 2021 the same three groups that authored the second request for delay sent a third letter that called for the abolition of EVV. The letter was written in response to the proposed 21st Century Cures 2.0 Act which, among other things, would have made it illegal for states to use GPS and biometric fingerprint data as part of their EVV programs. The letter stated that more than 40 states had already built an EVV program that relied on GPS data, and that banning states from using GPS would render all existing EVV systems useless and require each state to start over from scratch. They saved the end of the letter to recommend killing the fraud prevention tool altogether:
The EVV provision was originally projected to reduce costs due to a reduction in spending on personal care and home healthcare services. However, we believe that the cost of developing and implementing the systems has already greatly exceeded the projected savings. Due to all of the challenges discussed above, we believe that there would be positive policy outcomes as well as savings associated with completely repealing EVV instead of moving forward with these proposed changes.
This was a major departure from what these groups had said about EVV in the past. In May 2020 ADvancing States, the most influential of the three, had written a separate letter strongly opposing the GPS ban but making no mention of abolishing EVV entirely. In 2018, the group had written that "An effective, well-planned and implemented EVV system strengthens state Medicaid personal care and home health care services, by detecting and preventing fraud, waste, and abuse and improving the quality of PCS and HHCS." Several more recent publications, including the letters asking for delays, had spoken of EVV systems positively.
But then, after years of helping states design their EVV systems and fighting repeatedly to give them more time for implementation, ADvancing States and its allies were calling for the repeal of EVV requirements entirely because, they claimed, it was costing too much money and not producing any savings. They don't provide any evidence for this claim, though.
Then, in April 2026, the Medicaid trade associations changed directions once again.
As a new presidential administration took over and headlines about fraud in HCBS programs became common, ADvancing States, the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD), and the National Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services (NASDDDS) jointly published a toolkit explaining the best ways to fight "waste, fraud, and abuse" in Medicaid programs. EVV, which all three groups had called for a total abolition of in 2021, is reviewed glowingly as one of the main tools for preventing fraud. The toolkit even recommends greatly expanding the use of EVV, integrating EVV data further into fraud detection agencies, and increasing the amount of information EVV systems collect to close more loopholes.
Just a few years ago they had called for the elimination of EVV. Now they are showering it with praise. The flip-flopping is a hint that fighting fraud just might not be a major concern for the homecare industry's leading representatives.
Sabotaged from the start
This past spring, joint reporting by the Daily Wire and Capital Research Center exposed a massive network of suspicious payments, providers, and fraud in the homecare program surrounding Columbus, Ohio.
EVV can work as a fraud prevention tool, though not a perfect one, but only if states use it properly. Unfortunately, many state agencies led by high-ranking members of the same Medicaid trade associations that opposed and delayed EVV are spending piles of money to implement EVV without using it as intended, or at all, and then claiming EVV doesn't work.
For example, there is Bonny Silva, current Director of the Office of Community Living at the Colorado Department of Health, which runs portions of the state's homecare program. She is also president of the ADvancing States board of directors.
In 2026, the federal Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General published the results of an audit of Colorado's EVV compliance. The audit found 56 percent of personal care services (PCS) claims had EVV compliance problems yet were paid anyway. Auditors discovered that Colorado was allowing users to perform unlimited manual entries of EVV data, a leniency offered in case homecare attendants forgot to clock in or out on their app. But manual entry circumvented the EVV system by allowing providers to enter their own unverifiable data themselves that was often full of errors. In total, 62 out of 160 claims reviewed in the sample were entered manually. This likely means more than one-third of EVV entries statewide aren't performing the basic EVV independent verification functions.
Auditors found that one provider had submitted every single EVV record that year manually. Another 17 of the sampled claims (10.6 percent) weren't entered into the EVV at all, yet payments were still made, showing EVV entry isn't necessary for receiving payment. Even when EVV was submitted with GPS info, Colorado's system didn't use it, since another 10 percent of claims had EVV GPS data "exceptions" where GPS locations didn't match known patient addresses, with no explanation provided. These claims were paid out regardless because, according to the state "although GPS exceptions are flagged in the EVV system, the State agency does not require those exceptions to be corrected or addressed for a visit to be verified."
In short, Colorado wasn't requiring EVV at all.
Colorado's EVV system was designed by Sandata, the same firm that designed Ohio's EVV system at a price of more than $66 million, and the Ohio EVV system was recently discovered to have nearly identical problems. In Ohio, state auditors found nearly 56 percent of homecare visit claims were not processed through EVV at all, and that, as of July 2024, the GPS verification function was inexplicably switched from a requirement to an opt-in feature, and a signed consent form from the patient was required to turn it on.
The director of the Ohio Department of Aging which jointly administers the HCBS program is Ursel McElroy, the former president of ADvancing States. The Ohio government has also paid ADvancing States nearly $450,000 since 2021 for membership dues, employee training sessions, and administrative consulting services, and Sandata has sponsored both ADvancing States and the NAMD.
This past spring, joint reporting by the Daily Wire and Capital Research Center exposed a massive network of suspicious payments, providers, and fraud in the homecare program surrounding Columbus, Ohio. Governor Mike DeWine, who initially boasted about the strength of the state's EVV system, issued a series of executive orders that made GPS verification mandatory, and made submitting EVV information necessary for receiving payment. The reporting also led to a statewide moratorium on the enrollment of new homecare companies through Medicaid and a nationwide moratorium on the enrollment of new home healthcare companies through Medicare.
Still worse is New York, where a state audit of EVV compliance found that from January 2021 to March 2023, more than $14.5 billion was paid out for 82 million personal care services claims that did not have any matching EVV records. This was roughly 44 percent of personal care services submitted during that time. The auditors reported that "DOH and GDIT officials stated eMedNY has a feature that will prevent payment of fee-for-service claims that do not have a matching EVV record, but this feature was not turned on." This meant that, "According to DOH officials, to date, no providers have had claims pended or denied, nor have any been issued a letter seeking recoupment for lack of EVV data [emphasis added]." (DOH is the New York Department of Health and GDIT is General Dynamics Information Technology, a contractor that once performed data aggregation for New York's EVV system.)
In other words, despite having a nominally working EVV system, New York just hasn't been using it for anything. Amir Bassiri, Medicaid director for the New York State Department of Health since 2021, sits on the board of the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD), which, as previously noted, jointly called for EVV requirements to be abolished.
Colorado, Ohio, and New York are the only three states that have undergone a publicly available audit of their EVV systems so far. All three have failed. All three have HCBS programs overseen by bureaucrats that also serve as board members of the nonprofits that jointly delayed and then called for the total removal of EVV requirements. Both the president and vice president of ADvancing States are overseeing HCBS programs that have been caught dragging their feet on EVV in virtually every possible way, even when working EVV systems were already available.
The "Deep State" of Medicaid
Medicaid's "deep state" delayed and delayed EVV, and shielded states from the consequences of not creating an EVV system.
ADvancing States and its cosigners aren't just ordinary nonprofit advocacy groups. They're nonprofit advocacy groups created and led by the senior government officials who are running state Medicaid programs.
Current ADvancing State board members include high level employees of the governments of Ohio, Colorado, California, Arizona, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Utah. The National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD) is the same, with board members employed at high levels within the Medicaid agencies of Georgia, Washington, Iowa, Maine, New Hamshire, Oregon, California, Michigan, Nebraska, Texas, Louisianna, New York, New Jersey, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. National Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services (NASDDDS) has board members high-up within the state health department of Missouri, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, Maine, Delaware, Tennessee, and New York.
Think of them as the "deep state" of Medicaid. Most of the revenue for these nonprofits flows from contributions and program service fees from states and healthcare companies, many of which are contracted to run state Medicaid programs. It's a shady intersection of interests without clear incentives to stop fraud. They have incentives to ignore fraud or cut EVV programs to reduce costs and improve their bottom line. Applied Self-Direction, one of the sponsors of the ADvancing States 2021 summit, for example, explicitly stated that their dream was to "Get rid of EVV altogether."
Medicaid's "deep state" delayed and delayed EVV, and shielded states from the consequences of not creating an EVV system. Then they hypocritically pivoted to complain that EVV systems were over budget and behind schedule and called for eliminating them entirely. And when the Medicaid fraud flourished on their watch because of their malicious compliance with EVV requirements and became so politically salient that the federal government started to clamp down on state Medicaid funds, the Medicaid "deep state" changed tack and began praising EVV once again as an amazing tool for fighting fraud.
With all this flip flopping, lobbying, and perverse incentive structure in mind, the struggles of EVV and the exploding size of the HCBS program start to look less like ordinary bureaucratic incompetence and more like intentional sabotage.
And the next generation of the Medicaid "deep state" is already in training.
Since 2022, ADvancing States has been running the Next Gen HCBS Leaders Program that "[encourages] up-and-coming professionals to seek senior leadership opportunities" in state HCBS programs by pairing them with mentors already in the industry and giving them scholarships to attend the ADvancing State HCBS Conferences.
Those conferences and their sessions are sponsored, attended, and led by numerous healthcare companies that profit from the Medicaid HCBS program. The Next Gen HCBS Leaders Program is sponsored by United Healthcare, Molina Healthcare, and Pulselight. United Healthcare and Molina Healthcare generate mountains of revenue through their work as contracted managed care organizations (MCOs) for state Medicaid agencies, while Pulselight sells a software called "Trace" that provides analytics for data collected by EVV systems. In total, the Next Gen HCBS Leaders Program has trained 79 bureaucrats that are now ascending through the ranks of Medicaid agencies in 43 different states.
One famous definition of insanity is doing the same thing over again and expecting a different result. If these "Next Gen" leaders are learning from people like ADvancing States board members, then the outlook for the future of EVV is bleak.
The bureaucrats, trade associations, and the healthcare companies are one part of this equation, but large, public sector labor unions have also inserted themselves into the EVV debate. Their incentives likewise put them in favor of ignoring problems rather than finding solutions.
Forcibly unionizing the homecare industry by labeling all Medicaid homecare workers as government employees has been one of Big Labor's white whales for a very long time. The dues harvested from such a maneuver would have been a huge shot in the arm for national unions with dwindling membership, and their push for unionizing homecare has continued even after the Supreme Court ruled against the unions in 2014.
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 2015 in California represents a huge number of homecare workers and uses dues and fees it collects to donate generously to the Democratic politicians that run California's Medicaid program. SEIU Local 2015 and other California unions have been advocating against EVV since 2017, calling it "inherently burdensome," and seemingly urging California to consider not creating an EVV system and taking the financial penalties instead. Ever since, California has been fighting a battle with federal regulators about what their EVV system will look like and do, and California's In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program has ballooned to an almost comically large size at twice the rate of any other state in the country.
The situation is now so bad, and the unions are so involved, that, in a recent op-ed, Dr. Mehmet Oz, Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), explained that the agency had frozen funds to California specifically because California's pandering to the labor unions had created "a vicious cycle: Lax program integrity standards mean more demand for caregivers, more caregivers mean more union dues and more union dues mean more donations for the elected officials who are supposed to be guarding the cash register."
Labor unions are similarly pushing for the unionization of hundreds of thousands of homecare workers in New York, where homecare has grown so large that one in nine members of the New York City workforce is a home health aide and New York state now has three times more home health aides per capita than the national average. The Department of Justice has sued the New York Department of Health and Public Partnerships LLC, a company contracted to run New York's homecare program, alleging that the two are working to enable fraud at a massive scale.
The selection of Public Partnerships LLC to run the program was allegedly tainted by the improper influence of 1199 SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (UHE), the homecare union, which allegedly rigged the bidding process by telling the Hochul administration which company to award the contract to, based on the company's willingness to concede to the union's demands. The list of demands has not been made public yet. But it seems likely that the company's approach to EVV policy and the further unionization of homecare was a major component of the union's concerns.
Ignore the Fraud-Ignorers
To get serious about stopping fraud in the HCBS program federal and state lawmakers will have to tune out the Medicaid "deep state." Nonprofits such as ADvancing States, the National Association of Medicaid Directors, and the National Association of State Directors of Developmental Disabilities Services, along with their labor union allies, simply can't be trusted to fix the massive problems they've helped create, but lawmakers are still treating these groups as trustworthy sources.
Certainly, they are not "pro-fraud" by any means, but their constant flip-flopping and foot-dragging on a relatively mundane issue such as EVV proves that they're incapable of taking a meaningful stand against rampant fraud when stopping it might lead to awkward questions, embarrassing investigations, and possible budget cuts for their bureaucratic and for-profit constituents. If meaningful anti-fraud policies are going to be made, then it's time for lawmakers to start ignoring the "experts" who let things get this bad in the first place. They had their chance. It's time to go back and listen to "Mr. A" and find a new approach.
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Parker Thayer is an Investigative Researcher at Capital Research Center. A native of Michigan, he recently graduated from Hillsdale College.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/the-history-of-homecare-fraud-ngos-bureaucrats-and-labor-unions-undermined-medicaid-fraud-prevention/
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Insight: Tracker - Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight:
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Tracker: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
By Thomas Kingsley
Introduction
This tracker follows the Federal Reserve's (Fed) total consolidated assets, held on its balance sheet, as the best indicator of the Fed's direct intervention in the economy.
Context
The Fed's dual mandate requires it to ensure both stable prices and maximum employment. The traditional tool the Fed uses to accomplish these goals is the adjustment of the federal funds rate, the short-term interest rate that determines how much ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight: * * * Tracker: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets By Thomas Kingsley Introduction This tracker follows the Federal Reserve's (Fed) total consolidated assets, held on its balance sheet, as the best indicator of the Fed's direct intervention in the economy. Context The Fed's dual mandate requires it to ensure both stable prices and maximum employment. The traditional tool the Fed uses to accomplish these goals is the adjustment of the federal funds rate, the short-term interest rate that determines how muchit costs for banks to lend to each other overnight. The 2007-2008 financial crisis, however, demonstrated that even lowering the interest rate to zero was considered insufficient to shore up economies in freefall, and the Fed turned to more unusual tactics. One of these measures was what the Fed refers to as "large-scale asset purchases," which is more commonly known as "quantitative easing." Under this process, the Fed enters the market to buy securities, typically mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and Treasuries, injecting both capital and liquidity into the market. This approach is not without risks - for the first time in its history, the Fed is regulator, supervisor, and now participant in the economy.
The development of quantitative easing as a go-to tool for the Fed in times of crisis has led to an unprecedented focus on one of its traditionally unremarkable aspects - the Fed total assets. Just as with any other firm, securities that the Fed purchases are considered assets and therefore are represented on the Fed's balance sheet. This therefore is the most reflective guide of the state of quantitative easing and, by extension, the degree to which the Fed has deemed it necessary to intervene in the economy.
Each week, the Federal Reserve publishes its balance sheet, typically on Wednesday afternoon around 4:30 p.m.
As of September 2, the Fed's assets stand at $6.7 trillion, up $6 billion from the prior week and over $135 billion higher than a year ago.
Sources:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB
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Thomas Kingsley is the Director of Financial Services Policy at the American Action Forum.
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/tracker-the-federal-reserves-balance-sheet/
[Category: Think Tank]
* * *
Tracker: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets
By Thomas Kingsley
Introduction
This tracker follows the Federal Reserve's (Fed) total consolidated assets, held on its balance sheet, as the best indicator of the Fed's direct intervention in the economy.
Context
The Fed's dual mandate requires it to ensure both stable prices and maximum employment. The traditional tool the Fed uses to accomplish these goals is the adjustment of the federal funds rate, the short-term interest rate that determines how much ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight: * * * Tracker: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Assets By Thomas Kingsley Introduction This tracker follows the Federal Reserve's (Fed) total consolidated assets, held on its balance sheet, as the best indicator of the Fed's direct intervention in the economy. Context The Fed's dual mandate requires it to ensure both stable prices and maximum employment. The traditional tool the Fed uses to accomplish these goals is the adjustment of the federal funds rate, the short-term interest rate that determines how muchit costs for banks to lend to each other overnight. The 2007-2008 financial crisis, however, demonstrated that even lowering the interest rate to zero was considered insufficient to shore up economies in freefall, and the Fed turned to more unusual tactics. One of these measures was what the Fed refers to as "large-scale asset purchases," which is more commonly known as "quantitative easing." Under this process, the Fed enters the market to buy securities, typically mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and Treasuries, injecting both capital and liquidity into the market. This approach is not without risks - for the first time in its history, the Fed is regulator, supervisor, and now participant in the economy.
The development of quantitative easing as a go-to tool for the Fed in times of crisis has led to an unprecedented focus on one of its traditionally unremarkable aspects - the Fed total assets. Just as with any other firm, securities that the Fed purchases are considered assets and therefore are represented on the Fed's balance sheet. This therefore is the most reflective guide of the state of quantitative easing and, by extension, the degree to which the Fed has deemed it necessary to intervene in the economy.
Each week, the Federal Reserve publishes its balance sheet, typically on Wednesday afternoon around 4:30 p.m.
As of September 2, the Fed's assets stand at $6.7 trillion, up $6 billion from the prior week and over $135 billion higher than a year ago.
Sources:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TREAST
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WSHOMCB
* * *
Thomas Kingsley is the Director of Financial Services Policy at the American Action Forum.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/tracker-the-federal-reserves-balance-sheet/
[Category: Think Tank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to RealClear Energy: America Depends on Small Businesses. Small Businesses Depend on Reliable Energy
WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary:
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America Depends on Small Businesses. Small Businesses Depend on Reliable Energy
By Ted Ellis
Originally published by RealClear Energy
The American dream is electric-powered, from the lights of Times Square to the neon sign that says "Open" at a neighborhood shop. But most people don't think about the electric grid that powers their lives until something goes wrong--and then, they're caught off guard when the lights go out.
Our policymakers have similarly been caught off guard as ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary: * * * America Depends on Small Businesses. Small Businesses Depend on Reliable Energy By Ted Ellis Originally published by RealClear Energy The American dream is electric-powered, from the lights of Times Square to the neon sign that says "Open" at a neighborhood shop. But most people don't think about the electric grid that powers their lives until something goes wrong--and then, they're caught off guard when the lights go out. Our policymakers have similarly been caught off guard astwo decades of slow demand growth have quickly given way to a sharp increase in demand from emerging technologies and revived industry. Coupled with policies from previous administrations that prioritized intermittent and expensive energy sources, this pinch is squeezing families and small businesses.
And this pinch can hurt: The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), a group that represents small businesses, found that 81% of surveyed businesses say that energy costs are significant in their operations. Yet the electric grid is not keeping up with small business needs: two thirds experienced an outage in the last year, more often due to grid reliability than weather, and 80% report that over the past three years, costs have risen significantly.
To read the full article, click here (https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2026/09/07/america_depends_on_small_businesses_small_businesses_depend_on_reliable_energy_1204222.html).
* * *
Ted Ellis is the Deputy Director of Energy and Environment Policy at AFPI, where he spearheads strategic initiatives to strengthen America's energy dominance. He joins AFPI after serving as vice president for government affairs at Energy Freedom Fund and is a former professional staffer for the Republican Study Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. In all, he has more than a decade of experience in public policy, government affairs, coalition building, and strategic communications.
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URL: RealClear Energy
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-depends-on-small-businesses-small-businesses-depend-on-reliable-energy
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
America Depends on Small Businesses. Small Businesses Depend on Reliable Energy
By Ted Ellis
Originally published by RealClear Energy
The American dream is electric-powered, from the lights of Times Square to the neon sign that says "Open" at a neighborhood shop. But most people don't think about the electric grid that powers their lives until something goes wrong--and then, they're caught off guard when the lights go out.
Our policymakers have similarly been caught off guard as ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary: * * * America Depends on Small Businesses. Small Businesses Depend on Reliable Energy By Ted Ellis Originally published by RealClear Energy The American dream is electric-powered, from the lights of Times Square to the neon sign that says "Open" at a neighborhood shop. But most people don't think about the electric grid that powers their lives until something goes wrong--and then, they're caught off guard when the lights go out. Our policymakers have similarly been caught off guard astwo decades of slow demand growth have quickly given way to a sharp increase in demand from emerging technologies and revived industry. Coupled with policies from previous administrations that prioritized intermittent and expensive energy sources, this pinch is squeezing families and small businesses.
And this pinch can hurt: The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), a group that represents small businesses, found that 81% of surveyed businesses say that energy costs are significant in their operations. Yet the electric grid is not keeping up with small business needs: two thirds experienced an outage in the last year, more often due to grid reliability than weather, and 80% report that over the past three years, costs have risen significantly.
To read the full article, click here (https://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2026/09/07/america_depends_on_small_businesses_small_businesses_depend_on_reliable_energy_1204222.html).
* * *
Ted Ellis is the Deputy Director of Energy and Environment Policy at AFPI, where he spearheads strategic initiatives to strengthen America's energy dominance. He joins AFPI after serving as vice president for government affairs at Energy Freedom Fund and is a former professional staffer for the Republican Study Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. In all, he has more than a decade of experience in public policy, government affairs, coalition building, and strategic communications.
* * *
URL: RealClear Energy
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-depends-on-small-businesses-small-businesses-depend-on-reliable-energy
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI Backs Arizona's Authority to Verify Voter Citizenship in Republican National Committee Vs. Mi Familia Vota to Protect Election Integrity
WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release:
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AFPI Backs Arizona's Authority to Verify Voter Citizenship in Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota to Protect Election Integrity
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) filed an amicus brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to ensure elections remain secure by upholding Arizona's authority to verify that voter-registration applicants using the state form are U.S. citizens and to maintain accurate voter rolls.
AFPI's amicus brief in Republican National Committee v. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * AFPI Backs Arizona's Authority to Verify Voter Citizenship in Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota to Protect Election Integrity WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) filed an amicus brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to ensure elections remain secure by upholding Arizona's authority to verify that voter-registration applicants using the state form are U.S. citizens and to maintain accurate voter rolls. AFPI's amicus brief in Republican National Committee v.Mi Familia Vota explains that Arizona's elected legislature adopted objective citizenship-verification rules in 2022, four years after private parties and state officials entered a consent decree governing registration procedures. That earlier agreement should not permanently displace later public lawmaking, particularly as government data and verification tools improve.
"Citizenship is the most basic qualification for voting, and states must be able to verify it. Arizona built a public verification system with notice and meaningful opportunities to correct errors. A private agreement from 2018 should not freeze the state's election law after its elected legislature has acted and the available technology has changed," said Nick Wanic, Attorney for Litigation at AFPI.
The brief emphasizes that election integrity and voter access work together when rules are clear, evidence is reliable and eligible citizens can cure mistakes. AFPI asks the Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit's ruling and allow Arizona to implement its publicly enacted safeguards consistent with federal law.
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-backs-arizonas-authority-to-verify-voter-citizenship-in-republican-national-committee-v-mi-familia-vota-to-protect-election-integrity
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
AFPI Backs Arizona's Authority to Verify Voter Citizenship in Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota to Protect Election Integrity
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) filed an amicus brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to ensure elections remain secure by upholding Arizona's authority to verify that voter-registration applicants using the state form are U.S. citizens and to maintain accurate voter rolls.
AFPI's amicus brief in Republican National Committee v. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release: * * * AFPI Backs Arizona's Authority to Verify Voter Citizenship in Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota to Protect Election Integrity WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) filed an amicus brief urging the U.S. Supreme Court to ensure elections remain secure by upholding Arizona's authority to verify that voter-registration applicants using the state form are U.S. citizens and to maintain accurate voter rolls. AFPI's amicus brief in Republican National Committee v.Mi Familia Vota explains that Arizona's elected legislature adopted objective citizenship-verification rules in 2022, four years after private parties and state officials entered a consent decree governing registration procedures. That earlier agreement should not permanently displace later public lawmaking, particularly as government data and verification tools improve.
"Citizenship is the most basic qualification for voting, and states must be able to verify it. Arizona built a public verification system with notice and meaningful opportunities to correct errors. A private agreement from 2018 should not freeze the state's election law after its elected legislature has acted and the available technology has changed," said Nick Wanic, Attorney for Litigation at AFPI.
The brief emphasizes that election integrity and voter access work together when rules are clear, evidence is reliable and eligible citizens can cure mistakes. AFPI asks the Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit's ruling and allow Arizona to implement its publicly enacted safeguards consistent with federal law.
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-backs-arizonas-authority-to-verify-voter-citizenship-in-republican-national-committee-v-mi-familia-vota-to-protect-election-integrity
[Category: ThinkTank]