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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Institutions Outpace Ideas in 'Autonomous Knowledge System'
WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt, associate professor of Modern Chinese studies at the University of Zurich, in the foundation's China Brief:
* * *
Institutions Outpace Ideas in 'Autonomous Knowledge System'
Executive Summary:
* To establish sovereignty over ideas, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has since 2022 made the construction of an "autonomous knowledge system" an explicit objective, aiming to produce concepts and theories distinct from Western ones and capable of explaining the governance ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt, associate professor of Modern Chinese studies at the University of Zurich, in the foundation's China Brief: * * * Institutions Outpace Ideas in 'Autonomous Knowledge System' Executive Summary: * To establish sovereignty over ideas, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has since 2022 made the construction of an "autonomous knowledge system" an explicit objective, aiming to produce concepts and theories distinct from Western ones and capable of explaining the governanceand social reality of the People's Republic of China (PRC).
* The effort is directed at the level of objectives and distributed at the level of content. The center supplies the goal and the label, while ministries, funding bodies, universities, associations, publishers, and individual scholars each write it into the one part of the academic system they control.
* The consequence is expansion outpacing content. Institutional forms multiply well ahead of the concepts meant to fill them, because disciplines, colleges, degree points, journals, and textbook series can be created by decision and concepts cannot. Every instrument the Party-state controls is institutional, and institutions can require, fund, and reward original theory without being able to supply it. Four years on, the record therefore is highly uneven.
-
In December 2025 the Ministry of Public Security argued that police work should favor domestic dog breeds such as the Kunming dog over German Shepherds and Rottweilers, framing the shift as a response to "global competition in police dog technology" and a means of fostering "independent control" of police dog breed resources within the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Xinhua, December 18, 2025). As reporting by Reuters noted, however, the Kunming dog is not indigenous to the PRC, but the product of decades of artificial breeding from Alsatians and local dogs at a specialist canine center in Yunnan in the 1950s (Reuters, December 19).
The episode is illustrative of a much larger trend. Speaking at Renmin University in April 2022, General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that accelerating the construction of philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics is a matter of "constructing China's autonomous knowledge system" (People's Daily, April 26, 2022). Scholars describe the "autonomous knowledge system" (AKS) as cognition of the laws governing human society formed endogenously from China's own historical and contemporary practical experience (Yu & Huang, 2023).[1] To justify its emergence, Xi used the same speech to argue that Chinese socialism had "raised a large number of new problems" amid the acceleration of "great changes unseen in a century", casting inherited, largely Western frameworks as ill-equipped to address them. Another rationale is civilizational: Wang Yiwei of Renmin University argues that the ground of an autonomous system is Chinese civilization itself, which he describes as "independent and autonomous, continuous, and constantly renewing itself" (Beijing Daily, June 6, 2022).[2]
Calls to build an AKS date back to the Marxist Theory Research and Construction Project launched in 2004, but institutional efforts only began in 2019, when the Ministry of Education launched a New Liberal Arts initiative alongside parallel programs in engineering, medicine, and agriculture (Study Times, May 5, 2023). A dedicated work conference followed in November 2020, which led to the creation of interdisciplinary programs, laboratories, and curricular reforms (Guangming Daily, October 18, 2024). The AKS is therefore not strictly new, but its expansion in recent years has accelerated.
Management of the system is supervised by bodies that sit within the Party's propaganda system, such as the National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences (NOPSS, January 26, 2024). Responsibility for writing the concept into individual components of the academic system, however, falls to ministries, funding bodies, universities, associations, publishers, and scholars. As a result, political incentives and imperatives have enabled the AKS to become embedded across the education system in a short space of time.
Sites of Knowledge Production
The government has brought numerous academic disciplines under the expanding umbrella of the AKS. The Ministry of Education's primary contribution is the creation of new "first-level disciplines", the level at which degree-granting authority is assigned. Three created in a September 2022 catalog revision have been framed in AKS terms: CCP History and Party-building, Discipline Inspection and Supervision Studies, and Area Studies (State Council Academic Degrees Committee and Ministry of Education, September 13, 2022). The latter is rapidly expanding as a discipline. Area studies centers grew from 395 to 453 across 186 universities between 2017-2024 (Chinese Social Sciences Today [CSST], February 23, 2024, December 9, 2025). National Security Studies had been created in December 2020 as one of the two founding first-level disciplines of a new interdisciplinary category, alongside Integrated Circuit Science and Engineering. From 2022 onward, scholars began calling for the construction of an autonomous national security knowledge system, thereby appropriating it for the AKS (CSST, October 18, 2022).
Universities provide organizational homes for these disciplines. By the end of 2024, CCP History and Party-building consisted of 39 research institutes, 14 doctoral and 30 master's programs, and four specialized master's programs in Party affairs management, on the discipline alliance's own roster (Renmin University CCP History and Party-building Research Center, January 2, 2025).[3] Renmin University unveiled the country's first dedicated CCP History and Party-building college in March 2023 (CSST, March 24, 2023). By mid-2026, ten schools had been established.[4] The Ministry has also built a network of philosophy and social science laboratories, launched in December 2021 with a first batch of 30 and expanded to 55 by November 2025 (Ministry of Education [MOE], December 12, 2021; Guangming Daily, May 12).
Scholars stake out new territory within the frame. Zhou Ping of Yunnan University presents "ethnopolitics" as a branch of political science that has already built a theoretical system and counts as "an important achievement of autonomous knowledge production in political science" (Guangming Daily, April 7, 2023). Zhou is not alone. Calls to establish the AKS in different disciplines have proliferated, from diplomatic studies to history, public finance and taxation, and even Trade Union Studies (Workers' Daily, August 22, 2022; CSST, January 31, 2023; Qiushi, October 16, 2025, October 30, 2025).
The bodies that certify such claims are staffed by the same people who make them. Under rules issued in December 2025, meeting-based review of new doctoral degree authorizations is entrusted to "discipline review groups" or professional-degree steering committees, though final approval remains with the State Council Academic Degrees Committee. These rules relax conditions for programs deemed to serve central policy decisions and national security priorities (State Council Academic Degrees Committee, December 4, 2025). One scholar who sits on one of these steering committees is Yang Fengcheng of Renmin University. Yang submitted a proposal to establish CCP history and Party building as a first-level discipline and went on, as a member of that discipline's review group, to help draft and implement its construction scheme (Guangming Daily, April 16).
Steering Knowledge Production
Once sites exist for the production of "autonomous knowledge," a distributed process directs production through funding agencies, universities, disciplinary associations, and institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).
Funding agencies set priorities. By May 2026, the Ministry of Education's Major Special Projects in Research on Philosophy and Social Science with Chinese Characteristics had approved projects across all 29 first-level philosophy and social science disciplines, involving more than 100 universities (MOE, May 16). These are organized as coordinated clusters: in political science, Peking University's Wang Puqu serves as general convener of an AKS initiative comprising seven major projects led by scholars from several universities and research institutions (Fudan Development Institute, November 17, 2025). The program publishes no per-grant figure; the Ministry's parallel Major Key-Tackling Project tender for 2025 sets awards between renminbi (RMB) 500,000-800,000 ($75-120,000). At the national level, the National Social Science Fund named major basic theoretical problems bearing on the AKS among problem types constituting the "main thrust" of its 2025 major-project call (National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences, May 26, 2025). CASS's Philosophy and Social Science Innovation Project, meanwhile, was the recipient of a research-institution appropriation of almost RMB 2 billion ($300 million) in 2025 (CASS, March 2025).
Provinces and universities add their own money, though the figures come from the funders' own retrospectives. Guangdong, for example, budgeted RMB 450,000 ($67,000) in 2025 for 15 projects explicitly devoted to constructing AKSs in economics, political science, and law (Jinan University, May 30, 2025). Shanghai, meanwhile, reports assembling 58 research teams under a dedicated Major Research on the AKS program (Jiefang Daily, May 17). Since 2023, Nankai University has invested more than RMB 10 million ($1.5 million) in textbook development, providing RMB 50,000-100,000 ($7,500-15,000) in matching funds for each national-level project, and its Political Economy of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, published in December 2024 and now in use at more than 80 universities, is presented as a step toward building an AKS in economics (China Education Daily, April 3).
Disciplinary associations are among the most active actors. In November 2023, the "China Society of Supervision" was renamed the "China Discipline Inspection and Supervision Association" (CDISA), following the creation of a new discipline, Discipline Inspection and Supervision Studies, in 2022 (CDISA, April 15, 2024). In June 2024, it established a discipline-construction branch that was mandated with building disciplinary, academic, discourse, and knowledge systems (China University of Political Science and Law, June 12, 2024). Its designated supervising body is the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission (CCDI-NSC), while it is registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs; amendments to its charter require approval from both bodies. Alliances perform a parallel function: the CCP History and Party-building Discipline Construction Alliance, announced at Renmin University in November 2023, issued a five-point initiative covering autonomous knowledge, disciplinary, academic, discourse, and talent-training systems (CSST, November 17, 2023).
Institutions then define what good AKS scholarship looks like. A separate University Alliance for Constructing China's AKS, founded at Renmin University in April 2023, runs a quarterly results-release event vetted by a committee drawn from academia, publishing, and the central media (Renmin University, November 25, 2024).
Reproducing Knowledge
Degree pathways follow, so that core "autonomous" knowledge can "enter the minds" of students (Guangming Online, May 14). Dedicated schemes have been set up to cultivate talent for AKS construction. These include CASS's Youth Launch Plan, which supported 193 young scholars in 2024, as well as the Cultivate-the-Distant Plan, which lets scholars under 50 set their own topics and "undertake no assessment tasks for five years" (CASS, January 23, 2025; China Youth Daily, December 29, 2025; CSST, May 18).
The Ministry of Education has targeted the creation of thousands of textbooks to "accelerate the creation of an AKS". As of early 2026, the draft list contained 3,404 titles. Though substantial, this is well short of its aim of 1,000 key and 5,000 selected undergraduate textbooks (MOE, November 20, 2023; China Education Online, January 19).[5] Other institutions have added to the corpus of educational resources. The Educational Science Publishing House launched an RMB 10 million ($1.5 million) China Pedagogy AKS publishing program (China Youth Daily, December 22, 2025). The most elaborate case is a nine-volume unified textbook set for Discipline Inspection and Supervision Studies, jointly organized by the CCDI-NSC and the Ministry of Education and published in early 2026 (China Education Daily, February 13). A Handbook of the Chinese Legal Studies AKS (distills the signature concepts of 22 branches of law (MOE, May 16).
Scholars supply the specific vocabulary, from "incremental democracy" in political science to "interethnic political integration" in ethnopolitics (Guangming Daily, April 7, 2023). [6] The most cited candidates elsewhere, however, come from older fields with prior empirical cores rather than from the four disciplines built by institutional fiat.
Expansion Outpaces Innovation
The construction of the AKS faces several problems. The first concerns uneven institutional development. While infrastructure has expanded rapidly, talent cultivation is lagging. A 2023 survey found that the flagship discipline of Party History was contracting, even as the center created a first-level discipline for it. Over roughly a decade, institutions offering it at the master's level fell from 96 to 71, and those offering it for doctoral students dropped from 26 to 20. In 2021, only 11 doctoral programs enrolled anyone at all (Theory China, August 12, 2023). Area Studies shows the opposite pattern: rapid expansion and clustered applications have prompted debate over possible talent oversupply, although some scholars argue that high-level supply remains inadequate and that the more immediate risk is homogenization (China Brief, May 29). The only institution formally approved to offer the discipline as an undergraduate major, Beijing Foreign Studies University, reportedly did not recruit students externally in 2025 (Shanghai Observer, September 13, 2025).
Intellectual autonomy is a second strain. Xie Tao, dean of the School of International Relations at Beijing Foreign Studies University, observes that area studies lacks "an independent theoretical system, and therefore ... needs to borrow the theories of mature disciplines such as political science, history, economics, and sociology". [7] One account of the reform-era debate over the philosophy textbook system observes that understanding of Marxist philosophy in the PRC "has still not managed to depart from the ontological horizon of Western dualism". [8] A related weakness is fragmentation: Xu Yong of Central China Normal University is reported as arguing that indigenous concepts risk remaining "concept orphans", and that the task is to link them through hub concepts into a "concept family" (CSST, November 14, 2023). The diagnosis is not universally shared in this form. The philosopher Yang Guorongwarns against both "explaining China through China alone" and the opposite extreme of treating Western doctrines as a universal standard.[9] Finding the right balance between indigenization and continued openness is therefore a challenge.
Third, the incentives are administrative rather than epistemic, and they can work against the project. The 2023 survey's first finding is that academic evaluation negatively affects enthusiasm, resulting in "insufficient endogenous motivation". Because CCP History and Party-building overlaps with the established discipline of Marxist Theory, and results and teaching staff cannot be counted twice in evaluation, this leaves many universities with little incentive to apply to teach both (Theory China, August 12, 2023). Cheng Meidong, who directs Peking University's Research Center for CCP History, warns that unless method, path, and purpose are clarified, "it is easy to turn the construction of China's AKS into 'piling in all at once,' campaign-style scholarship" (Hubei Daily, May 25). Once funds and support dry up, so might scholarship.
Conclusion
Four years after Xi Jinping first articulated the concept, the AKS has evolved from a political formula into an institutional project that increasingly permeates the PRC's system of knowledge production. This approach rests on a wager familiar from other domains of the Party-state's statecraft: if you build the institutions, the substance comes. Whether that logic transfers from bridges and power grids to concepts remains an open question. While the AKS's objectives are set centrally, its content is filled in from many directions at once. The Ministry of Education creates disciplinary jurisdictions, funding bodies redirect research agendas, universities establish organizational homes, associations convene and certify, publishers develop teaching materials, and scholars elaborate concepts and canonical works. None of this is independent of the state, and the propaganda system supplies the coordination. While this explains the speed of institutional construction, it also helps explain why institutional expansion has so far outpaced theoretical innovation: the Party-state's apparatus can produce institutions and its instruments can compel attempts at theoretical innovation, but it cannot secure their success.
This decentralized process helps explain the project's uneven development. Different disciplines have advanced at different speeds, and many of the concepts intended to replace Western frameworks continue to rely on them. The AKS is therefore best understood as an ongoing process of institutional construction. Its future significance depends less on the political prominence of the formula than on whether the institutions and scholars it has assembled ultimately generate durable theories and concepts that are accepted beyond the institutional apparatus sustaining them.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/institutions-outpace-ideas-in-autonomous-knowledge-system/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Institutions Outpace Ideas in 'Autonomous Knowledge System'
Executive Summary:
* To establish sovereignty over ideas, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has since 2022 made the construction of an "autonomous knowledge system" an explicit objective, aiming to produce concepts and theories distinct from Western ones and capable of explaining the governance ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt, associate professor of Modern Chinese studies at the University of Zurich, in the foundation's China Brief: * * * Institutions Outpace Ideas in 'Autonomous Knowledge System' Executive Summary: * To establish sovereignty over ideas, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has since 2022 made the construction of an "autonomous knowledge system" an explicit objective, aiming to produce concepts and theories distinct from Western ones and capable of explaining the governanceand social reality of the People's Republic of China (PRC).
* The effort is directed at the level of objectives and distributed at the level of content. The center supplies the goal and the label, while ministries, funding bodies, universities, associations, publishers, and individual scholars each write it into the one part of the academic system they control.
* The consequence is expansion outpacing content. Institutional forms multiply well ahead of the concepts meant to fill them, because disciplines, colleges, degree points, journals, and textbook series can be created by decision and concepts cannot. Every instrument the Party-state controls is institutional, and institutions can require, fund, and reward original theory without being able to supply it. Four years on, the record therefore is highly uneven.
-
In December 2025 the Ministry of Public Security argued that police work should favor domestic dog breeds such as the Kunming dog over German Shepherds and Rottweilers, framing the shift as a response to "global competition in police dog technology" and a means of fostering "independent control" of police dog breed resources within the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Xinhua, December 18, 2025). As reporting by Reuters noted, however, the Kunming dog is not indigenous to the PRC, but the product of decades of artificial breeding from Alsatians and local dogs at a specialist canine center in Yunnan in the 1950s (Reuters, December 19).
The episode is illustrative of a much larger trend. Speaking at Renmin University in April 2022, General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that accelerating the construction of philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics is a matter of "constructing China's autonomous knowledge system" (People's Daily, April 26, 2022). Scholars describe the "autonomous knowledge system" (AKS) as cognition of the laws governing human society formed endogenously from China's own historical and contemporary practical experience (Yu & Huang, 2023).[1] To justify its emergence, Xi used the same speech to argue that Chinese socialism had "raised a large number of new problems" amid the acceleration of "great changes unseen in a century", casting inherited, largely Western frameworks as ill-equipped to address them. Another rationale is civilizational: Wang Yiwei of Renmin University argues that the ground of an autonomous system is Chinese civilization itself, which he describes as "independent and autonomous, continuous, and constantly renewing itself" (Beijing Daily, June 6, 2022).[2]
Calls to build an AKS date back to the Marxist Theory Research and Construction Project launched in 2004, but institutional efforts only began in 2019, when the Ministry of Education launched a New Liberal Arts initiative alongside parallel programs in engineering, medicine, and agriculture (Study Times, May 5, 2023). A dedicated work conference followed in November 2020, which led to the creation of interdisciplinary programs, laboratories, and curricular reforms (Guangming Daily, October 18, 2024). The AKS is therefore not strictly new, but its expansion in recent years has accelerated.
Management of the system is supervised by bodies that sit within the Party's propaganda system, such as the National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences (NOPSS, January 26, 2024). Responsibility for writing the concept into individual components of the academic system, however, falls to ministries, funding bodies, universities, associations, publishers, and scholars. As a result, political incentives and imperatives have enabled the AKS to become embedded across the education system in a short space of time.
Sites of Knowledge Production
The government has brought numerous academic disciplines under the expanding umbrella of the AKS. The Ministry of Education's primary contribution is the creation of new "first-level disciplines", the level at which degree-granting authority is assigned. Three created in a September 2022 catalog revision have been framed in AKS terms: CCP History and Party-building, Discipline Inspection and Supervision Studies, and Area Studies (State Council Academic Degrees Committee and Ministry of Education, September 13, 2022). The latter is rapidly expanding as a discipline. Area studies centers grew from 395 to 453 across 186 universities between 2017-2024 (Chinese Social Sciences Today [CSST], February 23, 2024, December 9, 2025). National Security Studies had been created in December 2020 as one of the two founding first-level disciplines of a new interdisciplinary category, alongside Integrated Circuit Science and Engineering. From 2022 onward, scholars began calling for the construction of an autonomous national security knowledge system, thereby appropriating it for the AKS (CSST, October 18, 2022).
Universities provide organizational homes for these disciplines. By the end of 2024, CCP History and Party-building consisted of 39 research institutes, 14 doctoral and 30 master's programs, and four specialized master's programs in Party affairs management, on the discipline alliance's own roster (Renmin University CCP History and Party-building Research Center, January 2, 2025).[3] Renmin University unveiled the country's first dedicated CCP History and Party-building college in March 2023 (CSST, March 24, 2023). By mid-2026, ten schools had been established.[4] The Ministry has also built a network of philosophy and social science laboratories, launched in December 2021 with a first batch of 30 and expanded to 55 by November 2025 (Ministry of Education [MOE], December 12, 2021; Guangming Daily, May 12).
Scholars stake out new territory within the frame. Zhou Ping of Yunnan University presents "ethnopolitics" as a branch of political science that has already built a theoretical system and counts as "an important achievement of autonomous knowledge production in political science" (Guangming Daily, April 7, 2023). Zhou is not alone. Calls to establish the AKS in different disciplines have proliferated, from diplomatic studies to history, public finance and taxation, and even Trade Union Studies (Workers' Daily, August 22, 2022; CSST, January 31, 2023; Qiushi, October 16, 2025, October 30, 2025).
The bodies that certify such claims are staffed by the same people who make them. Under rules issued in December 2025, meeting-based review of new doctoral degree authorizations is entrusted to "discipline review groups" or professional-degree steering committees, though final approval remains with the State Council Academic Degrees Committee. These rules relax conditions for programs deemed to serve central policy decisions and national security priorities (State Council Academic Degrees Committee, December 4, 2025). One scholar who sits on one of these steering committees is Yang Fengcheng of Renmin University. Yang submitted a proposal to establish CCP history and Party building as a first-level discipline and went on, as a member of that discipline's review group, to help draft and implement its construction scheme (Guangming Daily, April 16).
Steering Knowledge Production
Once sites exist for the production of "autonomous knowledge," a distributed process directs production through funding agencies, universities, disciplinary associations, and institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).
Funding agencies set priorities. By May 2026, the Ministry of Education's Major Special Projects in Research on Philosophy and Social Science with Chinese Characteristics had approved projects across all 29 first-level philosophy and social science disciplines, involving more than 100 universities (MOE, May 16). These are organized as coordinated clusters: in political science, Peking University's Wang Puqu serves as general convener of an AKS initiative comprising seven major projects led by scholars from several universities and research institutions (Fudan Development Institute, November 17, 2025). The program publishes no per-grant figure; the Ministry's parallel Major Key-Tackling Project tender for 2025 sets awards between renminbi (RMB) 500,000-800,000 ($75-120,000). At the national level, the National Social Science Fund named major basic theoretical problems bearing on the AKS among problem types constituting the "main thrust" of its 2025 major-project call (National Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences, May 26, 2025). CASS's Philosophy and Social Science Innovation Project, meanwhile, was the recipient of a research-institution appropriation of almost RMB 2 billion ($300 million) in 2025 (CASS, March 2025).
Provinces and universities add their own money, though the figures come from the funders' own retrospectives. Guangdong, for example, budgeted RMB 450,000 ($67,000) in 2025 for 15 projects explicitly devoted to constructing AKSs in economics, political science, and law (Jinan University, May 30, 2025). Shanghai, meanwhile, reports assembling 58 research teams under a dedicated Major Research on the AKS program (Jiefang Daily, May 17). Since 2023, Nankai University has invested more than RMB 10 million ($1.5 million) in textbook development, providing RMB 50,000-100,000 ($7,500-15,000) in matching funds for each national-level project, and its Political Economy of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, published in December 2024 and now in use at more than 80 universities, is presented as a step toward building an AKS in economics (China Education Daily, April 3).
Disciplinary associations are among the most active actors. In November 2023, the "China Society of Supervision" was renamed the "China Discipline Inspection and Supervision Association" (CDISA), following the creation of a new discipline, Discipline Inspection and Supervision Studies, in 2022 (CDISA, April 15, 2024). In June 2024, it established a discipline-construction branch that was mandated with building disciplinary, academic, discourse, and knowledge systems (China University of Political Science and Law, June 12, 2024). Its designated supervising body is the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission (CCDI-NSC), while it is registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs; amendments to its charter require approval from both bodies. Alliances perform a parallel function: the CCP History and Party-building Discipline Construction Alliance, announced at Renmin University in November 2023, issued a five-point initiative covering autonomous knowledge, disciplinary, academic, discourse, and talent-training systems (CSST, November 17, 2023).
Institutions then define what good AKS scholarship looks like. A separate University Alliance for Constructing China's AKS, founded at Renmin University in April 2023, runs a quarterly results-release event vetted by a committee drawn from academia, publishing, and the central media (Renmin University, November 25, 2024).
Reproducing Knowledge
Degree pathways follow, so that core "autonomous" knowledge can "enter the minds" of students (Guangming Online, May 14). Dedicated schemes have been set up to cultivate talent for AKS construction. These include CASS's Youth Launch Plan, which supported 193 young scholars in 2024, as well as the Cultivate-the-Distant Plan, which lets scholars under 50 set their own topics and "undertake no assessment tasks for five years" (CASS, January 23, 2025; China Youth Daily, December 29, 2025; CSST, May 18).
The Ministry of Education has targeted the creation of thousands of textbooks to "accelerate the creation of an AKS". As of early 2026, the draft list contained 3,404 titles. Though substantial, this is well short of its aim of 1,000 key and 5,000 selected undergraduate textbooks (MOE, November 20, 2023; China Education Online, January 19).[5] Other institutions have added to the corpus of educational resources. The Educational Science Publishing House launched an RMB 10 million ($1.5 million) China Pedagogy AKS publishing program (China Youth Daily, December 22, 2025). The most elaborate case is a nine-volume unified textbook set for Discipline Inspection and Supervision Studies, jointly organized by the CCDI-NSC and the Ministry of Education and published in early 2026 (China Education Daily, February 13). A Handbook of the Chinese Legal Studies AKS (distills the signature concepts of 22 branches of law (MOE, May 16).
Scholars supply the specific vocabulary, from "incremental democracy" in political science to "interethnic political integration" in ethnopolitics (Guangming Daily, April 7, 2023). [6] The most cited candidates elsewhere, however, come from older fields with prior empirical cores rather than from the four disciplines built by institutional fiat.
Expansion Outpaces Innovation
The construction of the AKS faces several problems. The first concerns uneven institutional development. While infrastructure has expanded rapidly, talent cultivation is lagging. A 2023 survey found that the flagship discipline of Party History was contracting, even as the center created a first-level discipline for it. Over roughly a decade, institutions offering it at the master's level fell from 96 to 71, and those offering it for doctoral students dropped from 26 to 20. In 2021, only 11 doctoral programs enrolled anyone at all (Theory China, August 12, 2023). Area Studies shows the opposite pattern: rapid expansion and clustered applications have prompted debate over possible talent oversupply, although some scholars argue that high-level supply remains inadequate and that the more immediate risk is homogenization (China Brief, May 29). The only institution formally approved to offer the discipline as an undergraduate major, Beijing Foreign Studies University, reportedly did not recruit students externally in 2025 (Shanghai Observer, September 13, 2025).
Intellectual autonomy is a second strain. Xie Tao, dean of the School of International Relations at Beijing Foreign Studies University, observes that area studies lacks "an independent theoretical system, and therefore ... needs to borrow the theories of mature disciplines such as political science, history, economics, and sociology". [7] One account of the reform-era debate over the philosophy textbook system observes that understanding of Marxist philosophy in the PRC "has still not managed to depart from the ontological horizon of Western dualism". [8] A related weakness is fragmentation: Xu Yong of Central China Normal University is reported as arguing that indigenous concepts risk remaining "concept orphans", and that the task is to link them through hub concepts into a "concept family" (CSST, November 14, 2023). The diagnosis is not universally shared in this form. The philosopher Yang Guorongwarns against both "explaining China through China alone" and the opposite extreme of treating Western doctrines as a universal standard.[9] Finding the right balance between indigenization and continued openness is therefore a challenge.
Third, the incentives are administrative rather than epistemic, and they can work against the project. The 2023 survey's first finding is that academic evaluation negatively affects enthusiasm, resulting in "insufficient endogenous motivation". Because CCP History and Party-building overlaps with the established discipline of Marxist Theory, and results and teaching staff cannot be counted twice in evaluation, this leaves many universities with little incentive to apply to teach both (Theory China, August 12, 2023). Cheng Meidong, who directs Peking University's Research Center for CCP History, warns that unless method, path, and purpose are clarified, "it is easy to turn the construction of China's AKS into 'piling in all at once,' campaign-style scholarship" (Hubei Daily, May 25). Once funds and support dry up, so might scholarship.
Conclusion
Four years after Xi Jinping first articulated the concept, the AKS has evolved from a political formula into an institutional project that increasingly permeates the PRC's system of knowledge production. This approach rests on a wager familiar from other domains of the Party-state's statecraft: if you build the institutions, the substance comes. Whether that logic transfers from bridges and power grids to concepts remains an open question. While the AKS's objectives are set centrally, its content is filled in from many directions at once. The Ministry of Education creates disciplinary jurisdictions, funding bodies redirect research agendas, universities establish organizational homes, associations convene and certify, publishers develop teaching materials, and scholars elaborate concepts and canonical works. None of this is independent of the state, and the propaganda system supplies the coordination. While this explains the speed of institutional construction, it also helps explain why institutional expansion has so far outpaced theoretical innovation: the Party-state's apparatus can produce institutions and its instruments can compel attempts at theoretical innovation, but it cannot secure their success.
This decentralized process helps explain the project's uneven development. Different disciplines have advanced at different speeds, and many of the concepts intended to replace Western frameworks continue to rely on them. The AKS is therefore best understood as an ongoing process of institutional construction. Its future significance depends less on the political prominence of the formula than on whether the institutions and scholars it has assembled ultimately generate durable theories and concepts that are accepted beyond the institutional apparatus sustaining them.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/institutions-outpace-ideas-in-autonomous-knowledge-system/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities: Four Years After the Inflation Reduction Act: Celebrating Clean Energy Progress and Looking Ahead
WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Mikaela Tajo, climate policy analyst on the Federal Fiscal Policy Team:
* * *
Four Years After the Inflation Reduction Act: Celebrating Clean Energy Progress and Looking Ahead
The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was one of the most significant climate laws in U.S. history. The IRA created and expanded clean energy tax incentives and established new programs for wind and solar projects in low-income communities, energy upgrades for affordable housing, climate resilience, environmental ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Mikaela Tajo, climate policy analyst on the Federal Fiscal Policy Team: * * * Four Years After the Inflation Reduction Act: Celebrating Clean Energy Progress and Looking Ahead The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was one of the most significant climate laws in U.S. history. The IRA created and expanded clean energy tax incentives and established new programs for wind and solar projects in low-income communities, energy upgrades for affordable housing, climate resilience, environmentaljustice, and more. While the Trump Administration and most congressional Republicans have pushed to gut the IRA's climate provisions -- and have taken other steps that have raised families' energy costs -- the IRA will have a lasting impact on the climate and energy landscape.
The IRA provided more than $145 billion in direct federal grants and loans to federal agencies, state, local, and tribal entities, nonprofits, and others for climate efforts; it also created and expanded tax credits for clean energy projects. Supported by the IRA's tax incentives, private and public entities invested more than $700 billion in clean energy projects between 2022 and 2025.
By design, many of these projects are in underinvested communities due in part to incentives like the Low-Income Bonus Credit, which gives an additional tax credit for small-scale clean energy projects in low-income areas, on tribal lands, or in federally subsidized housing. Groups leveraged the bonus credit to make $3.5 billion in investments across the country in 2023, the credit's first year.
The IRA's innovative tax credit system known as direct pay lets tax-exempt and public entities -- such as schools, nonprofits, and state and local governments -- use clean energy tax credits. For example, at least 82 schools across 17 states have received reimbursements for solar panels, heat pumps, and other clean energy projects that have improved aging facilities, reduced operating costs, and made schools healthier for students, according to one estimate using self-reported project data.
The IRA also provided billions of dollars for grants and loans that have supported clean energy development, lowered families' energy costs, improved the environment, and supported local economies. Importantly, roughly two-thirds of the grant funding for new IRA programs spent or obligated during the Biden Administration, meaning these foundational investments will continue to pay off. Examples include:
* Building state capacity for pollution reduction. States received much of the IRA's grant funding. For example, the IRA's Climate Pollution Reduction Grants program awarded $5 billion to state and local governments, tribes, and territories to develop and implement ambitious climate action plans through emissions-reduction projects. Sixteen states, all governed by Republicans, created climate action plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other harmful air pollution for the first time, and many others updated their plans for the first time in a decade (see map).
State and local governments also used the grant funding to build significant project planning infrastructure that they can use to pursue future funding opportunities and continue reducing pollution and advancing clean energy progress.
* Investing in rural communities. The IRA supported the largest investment in rural electrification since the 1936 Rural Electrification Act. For instance, the Department of Agriculture awarded more than $400 million for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in rural areas across the country.
* Expanding clean energy finance infrastructure. The IRA appropriated $11.7 billion for the Department of Energy's Loan Programs Office (LPO) to finance new clean energy projects, including projects that help lower the cost of energy and create economic opportunities in low-income and disadvantaged communities. For example, LPO provided a $72.8 million loan guarantee to finance the development of a solar system and microgrid on the tribal lands of the Viejas Band of the Kumeyaay Indians, which is expected to lower energy costs for the tribe.
Unfortunately, since early 2025, congressional Republicans and the Trump Administration have gutted much of the IRA's federal clean energy tax credits and federal funding for climate programs. These actions will raise households' energy costs, undermine economic opportunity in struggling communities, and hasten climate change at a time when households are struggling to meet their basic needs.
For example, the harmful 2025 Republican reconciliation law cut more than $280 billion in clean energy tax credits enacted in the IRA through 2034, $170 billion from efforts to cut vehicle pollution, and over $13 billion in grant and loan funding for environmental justice projects, improvements to the electric grid, and energy upgrades in affordable housing. One study estimates that households will face a 13 percent increase ($280 per year) in their energy bills by 2035 because of these cuts.
Additionally, the Administration has attacked IRA investments through grant cancellations, onerous delays and funding freezes, regulatory barriers, and agency staff and budget cuts. (Advocates are fighting the Trump Administration in court to release billions of dollars of frozen and cut clean energy funding, with some already winning court cases that have restored awarded funds.)
Cutting these funds is discouraging the private sector and state, local, and tribal governments from increasing investment in clean energy. For instance, businesses canceled or scaled back clean energy investments totaling more than $28 billion in 2025, according to one estimate. Energy policy analysts from Bloomberg have also estimated that projected clean energy installations will be more than 20 percent lower than they otherwise would have been if Republicans hadn't cut IRA investments.
While these actions likely will slow clean energy's replacement of fossil fuel generation, there's still reason for optimism about clean energy's future. Solar and wind, for example, are often the least expensive sources of new power generation, even without tax credits. As demand for energy grows, so will clean energy installations. Clean energy sources generated 90 percent of the new energy capacity added in the U.S. in 2025, and solar capacity is expected to grow between 100 percent and 235 percent through 2050, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates.
The IRA will continue to have other positive effects. For example, direct pay still exists in the tax code, so tax-exempt entities like state and local governments can continue to take advantage of robust incentives for technologies like geothermal heat pumps and battery storage.
The Inflation Reduction Act has shown the value in investing in the transition to clean energy. As policymakers consider future climate and energy proposals, they should prioritize those that will help the clean energy transition happen faster, more affordably, and more equitably.
* * *
Mikaela Tajo is a Climate Policy Analyst on the Federal Fiscal Policy team. Before coming to the Center, Mikaela worked at the Urban Institute as a Research Analyst focused on homelessness, racial equity, and community-engaged and participatory research methods. Mikaela received her bachelor's in political science and her master's in legislative affairs from the George Washington University in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/blog/four-years-after-the-inflation-reduction-act-celebrating-clean-energy-progress-and-looking
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Four Years After the Inflation Reduction Act: Celebrating Clean Energy Progress and Looking Ahead
The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was one of the most significant climate laws in U.S. history. The IRA created and expanded clean energy tax incentives and established new programs for wind and solar projects in low-income communities, energy upgrades for affordable housing, climate resilience, environmental ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Mikaela Tajo, climate policy analyst on the Federal Fiscal Policy Team: * * * Four Years After the Inflation Reduction Act: Celebrating Clean Energy Progress and Looking Ahead The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was one of the most significant climate laws in U.S. history. The IRA created and expanded clean energy tax incentives and established new programs for wind and solar projects in low-income communities, energy upgrades for affordable housing, climate resilience, environmentaljustice, and more. While the Trump Administration and most congressional Republicans have pushed to gut the IRA's climate provisions -- and have taken other steps that have raised families' energy costs -- the IRA will have a lasting impact on the climate and energy landscape.
The IRA provided more than $145 billion in direct federal grants and loans to federal agencies, state, local, and tribal entities, nonprofits, and others for climate efforts; it also created and expanded tax credits for clean energy projects. Supported by the IRA's tax incentives, private and public entities invested more than $700 billion in clean energy projects between 2022 and 2025.
By design, many of these projects are in underinvested communities due in part to incentives like the Low-Income Bonus Credit, which gives an additional tax credit for small-scale clean energy projects in low-income areas, on tribal lands, or in federally subsidized housing. Groups leveraged the bonus credit to make $3.5 billion in investments across the country in 2023, the credit's first year.
The IRA's innovative tax credit system known as direct pay lets tax-exempt and public entities -- such as schools, nonprofits, and state and local governments -- use clean energy tax credits. For example, at least 82 schools across 17 states have received reimbursements for solar panels, heat pumps, and other clean energy projects that have improved aging facilities, reduced operating costs, and made schools healthier for students, according to one estimate using self-reported project data.
The IRA also provided billions of dollars for grants and loans that have supported clean energy development, lowered families' energy costs, improved the environment, and supported local economies. Importantly, roughly two-thirds of the grant funding for new IRA programs spent or obligated during the Biden Administration, meaning these foundational investments will continue to pay off. Examples include:
* Building state capacity for pollution reduction. States received much of the IRA's grant funding. For example, the IRA's Climate Pollution Reduction Grants program awarded $5 billion to state and local governments, tribes, and territories to develop and implement ambitious climate action plans through emissions-reduction projects. Sixteen states, all governed by Republicans, created climate action plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other harmful air pollution for the first time, and many others updated their plans for the first time in a decade (see map).
State and local governments also used the grant funding to build significant project planning infrastructure that they can use to pursue future funding opportunities and continue reducing pollution and advancing clean energy progress.
* Investing in rural communities. The IRA supported the largest investment in rural electrification since the 1936 Rural Electrification Act. For instance, the Department of Agriculture awarded more than $400 million for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in rural areas across the country.
* Expanding clean energy finance infrastructure. The IRA appropriated $11.7 billion for the Department of Energy's Loan Programs Office (LPO) to finance new clean energy projects, including projects that help lower the cost of energy and create economic opportunities in low-income and disadvantaged communities. For example, LPO provided a $72.8 million loan guarantee to finance the development of a solar system and microgrid on the tribal lands of the Viejas Band of the Kumeyaay Indians, which is expected to lower energy costs for the tribe.
Unfortunately, since early 2025, congressional Republicans and the Trump Administration have gutted much of the IRA's federal clean energy tax credits and federal funding for climate programs. These actions will raise households' energy costs, undermine economic opportunity in struggling communities, and hasten climate change at a time when households are struggling to meet their basic needs.
For example, the harmful 2025 Republican reconciliation law cut more than $280 billion in clean energy tax credits enacted in the IRA through 2034, $170 billion from efforts to cut vehicle pollution, and over $13 billion in grant and loan funding for environmental justice projects, improvements to the electric grid, and energy upgrades in affordable housing. One study estimates that households will face a 13 percent increase ($280 per year) in their energy bills by 2035 because of these cuts.
Additionally, the Administration has attacked IRA investments through grant cancellations, onerous delays and funding freezes, regulatory barriers, and agency staff and budget cuts. (Advocates are fighting the Trump Administration in court to release billions of dollars of frozen and cut clean energy funding, with some already winning court cases that have restored awarded funds.)
Cutting these funds is discouraging the private sector and state, local, and tribal governments from increasing investment in clean energy. For instance, businesses canceled or scaled back clean energy investments totaling more than $28 billion in 2025, according to one estimate. Energy policy analysts from Bloomberg have also estimated that projected clean energy installations will be more than 20 percent lower than they otherwise would have been if Republicans hadn't cut IRA investments.
While these actions likely will slow clean energy's replacement of fossil fuel generation, there's still reason for optimism about clean energy's future. Solar and wind, for example, are often the least expensive sources of new power generation, even without tax credits. As demand for energy grows, so will clean energy installations. Clean energy sources generated 90 percent of the new energy capacity added in the U.S. in 2025, and solar capacity is expected to grow between 100 percent and 235 percent through 2050, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates.
The IRA will continue to have other positive effects. For example, direct pay still exists in the tax code, so tax-exempt entities like state and local governments can continue to take advantage of robust incentives for technologies like geothermal heat pumps and battery storage.
The Inflation Reduction Act has shown the value in investing in the transition to clean energy. As policymakers consider future climate and energy proposals, they should prioritize those that will help the clean energy transition happen faster, more affordably, and more equitably.
* * *
Mikaela Tajo is a Climate Policy Analyst on the Federal Fiscal Policy team. Before coming to the Center, Mikaela worked at the Urban Institute as a Research Analyst focused on homelessness, racial equity, and community-engaged and participatory research methods. Mikaela received her bachelor's in political science and her master's in legislative affairs from the George Washington University in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/blog/four-years-after-the-inflation-reduction-act-celebrating-clean-energy-progress-and-looking
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities: At Its 30th Anniversary, TANF Is Neither A Success Nor A Model for Other Programs
WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Ife Finch Floyd, director of income security with the Housing and Income Security Team:
* * *
At Its 30th Anniversary, TANF Is Neither A Success Nor A Model for Other Programs
Every family, from Atlanta to Boise, should be able to afford their basic needs and have a foundation of financial stability that creates long-term opportunity for parents and children. Direct cash assistance is a vital lifeline that families with the lowest incomes can use to keep the lights on, buy medicine ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Ife Finch Floyd, director of income security with the Housing and Income Security Team: * * * At Its 30th Anniversary, TANF Is Neither A Success Nor A Model for Other Programs Every family, from Atlanta to Boise, should be able to afford their basic needs and have a foundation of financial stability that creates long-term opportunity for parents and children. Direct cash assistance is a vital lifeline that families with the lowest incomes can use to keep the lights on, buy medicinefor a sick child, and put gas in the car. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is still one of the only ways these families can receive cash assistance directly.
When it created TANF, however, Congress weakened direct cash assistance through major policy changes. These included:
* Funding the program through a fixed $16.5 billion block grant, which has lost half of its inflation-adjusted value over 30 years. Over that time period, states have reduced how much TANF funding they allocate toward direct cash assistance. In 2024, 20 states spent 10 percent or less of TANF funds on basic assistance, based on CBPP analysis of TANF financial data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
* Enshrining policies that take away essential cash assistance for people not meeting a work requirement.
* Establishing a 60-month federal time limit. Several states set shorter time limits for TANF families.
Since TANF's creation, most states have used their flexibility to reduce the accessibility and adequacy of cash assistance dramatically (see chart). In some states, primarily in the South where Black children are likelier to live, TANF cash assistance has all but disappeared, and many parents who don't have secure employment can't access cash assistance to help them meet their basic needs.
Although TANF's model is not successful in moving families to economic stability, Republicans adopted some of its approach in the harmful 2025 reconciliation law, expanding SNAP's harsh work requirement and introducing a work requirement for Medicaid.
The stricter work requirement in SNAP would take away food assistance from 2.4 million people "in an average month over the 2025-2034 period," the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated. CBO assumed that this provision would begin to take effect in fiscal year 2026, when about 75 percent of the full annual impact would occur, meaning about 1.8 million people would be cut from SNAP in an average month in 2026.
Meanwhile, most states are preparing to implement the Medicaid work requirement without enough time and haphazard guidance from federal regulators. Seven million or more people could have their health coverage through Medicaid taken away due to the work requirement.
Evidence from a number of rigorous evaluations shows us that conditioning assistance that people need to afford their basic needs on work doesn't alleviate poverty or promote stable employment.
Federal leaders should learn the lesson of 30 years of TANF and invest more in economic support for people with the lowest incomes. First, Congress must undo the harm of the Republican reconciliation law, which is taking SNAP and Medicaid away from millions of people and making it harder for them to afford their basic needs. Then lawmakers should look at ending TANF's punitive policies, which push people deeper into hardship, and requiring states to invest more TANF resources into direct cash assistance to help families with the lowest income better afford the growing cost of living.
* * *
Ife Finch Floyd is the Director of Income Security with the Housing and Income Security team. Previously, Ife was the Director of Economic Justice at the Georgia Budget and Policy Institute and led the organization's proactive work to promote economic security. She created and led the first TANF advocacy group and the first SNAP coalition in Georgia.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/blog/at-its-30th-anniversary-tanf-is-neither-a-success-nor-a-model-for-other-programs
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
At Its 30th Anniversary, TANF Is Neither A Success Nor A Model for Other Programs
Every family, from Atlanta to Boise, should be able to afford their basic needs and have a foundation of financial stability that creates long-term opportunity for parents and children. Direct cash assistance is a vital lifeline that families with the lowest incomes can use to keep the lights on, buy medicine ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Ife Finch Floyd, director of income security with the Housing and Income Security Team: * * * At Its 30th Anniversary, TANF Is Neither A Success Nor A Model for Other Programs Every family, from Atlanta to Boise, should be able to afford their basic needs and have a foundation of financial stability that creates long-term opportunity for parents and children. Direct cash assistance is a vital lifeline that families with the lowest incomes can use to keep the lights on, buy medicinefor a sick child, and put gas in the car. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is still one of the only ways these families can receive cash assistance directly.
When it created TANF, however, Congress weakened direct cash assistance through major policy changes. These included:
* Funding the program through a fixed $16.5 billion block grant, which has lost half of its inflation-adjusted value over 30 years. Over that time period, states have reduced how much TANF funding they allocate toward direct cash assistance. In 2024, 20 states spent 10 percent or less of TANF funds on basic assistance, based on CBPP analysis of TANF financial data from the Department of Health and Human Services.
* Enshrining policies that take away essential cash assistance for people not meeting a work requirement.
* Establishing a 60-month federal time limit. Several states set shorter time limits for TANF families.
Since TANF's creation, most states have used their flexibility to reduce the accessibility and adequacy of cash assistance dramatically (see chart). In some states, primarily in the South where Black children are likelier to live, TANF cash assistance has all but disappeared, and many parents who don't have secure employment can't access cash assistance to help them meet their basic needs.
Although TANF's model is not successful in moving families to economic stability, Republicans adopted some of its approach in the harmful 2025 reconciliation law, expanding SNAP's harsh work requirement and introducing a work requirement for Medicaid.
The stricter work requirement in SNAP would take away food assistance from 2.4 million people "in an average month over the 2025-2034 period," the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated. CBO assumed that this provision would begin to take effect in fiscal year 2026, when about 75 percent of the full annual impact would occur, meaning about 1.8 million people would be cut from SNAP in an average month in 2026.
Meanwhile, most states are preparing to implement the Medicaid work requirement without enough time and haphazard guidance from federal regulators. Seven million or more people could have their health coverage through Medicaid taken away due to the work requirement.
Evidence from a number of rigorous evaluations shows us that conditioning assistance that people need to afford their basic needs on work doesn't alleviate poverty or promote stable employment.
Federal leaders should learn the lesson of 30 years of TANF and invest more in economic support for people with the lowest incomes. First, Congress must undo the harm of the Republican reconciliation law, which is taking SNAP and Medicaid away from millions of people and making it harder for them to afford their basic needs. Then lawmakers should look at ending TANF's punitive policies, which push people deeper into hardship, and requiring states to invest more TANF resources into direct cash assistance to help families with the lowest income better afford the growing cost of living.
* * *
Ife Finch Floyd is the Director of Income Security with the Housing and Income Security team. Previously, Ife was the Director of Economic Justice at the Georgia Budget and Policy Institute and led the organization's proactive work to promote economic security. She created and led the first TANF advocacy group and the first SNAP coalition in Georgia.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/blog/at-its-30th-anniversary-tanf-is-neither-a-success-nor-a-model-for-other-programs
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Telehealth Investment Can Mitigate Minnesota's Labor Demographic Time Bomb
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Aug. 7 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Aug. 5, 2026, by intern Carter Johnson:
* * *
Telehealth investment can mitigate Minnesota's labor demographic time bomb
Minnesota is a state that prioritizes expanding healthcare access. Expanding access can be achieved by implementing telehealth to create healthcare expansion across the state. But what exactly is telehealth? Telehealth is the use of digital information and communication technologies to access ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Aug. 7 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Aug. 5, 2026, by intern Carter Johnson: * * * Telehealth investment can mitigate Minnesota's labor demographic time bomb Minnesota is a state that prioritizes expanding healthcare access. Expanding access can be achieved by implementing telehealth to create healthcare expansion across the state. But what exactly is telehealth? Telehealth is the use of digital information and communication technologies to accesshealth care services, such as remote check in or prescriptions. The response to the Covid-19 pandemic solidified telehealth's position as a healthcare service that can help treat patients in a remote setting.
Today Minnesota must increase its investment in telehealth development as the state faces rising labor force imbalances. The current MN labor demographics show stagnation, with the labor force only growing 0.2% annually since 2019. At the same time, Minnesota's labor force is aging, and birth rates show a steady decline. Figures 1 and 2 highlight these trends.
Figure 1: Minnesota Workforce Aging by Region, 2014-2024
Figure 2: Minnesota total births, 2014-2024
The result of an aging workforce leads to an increase in demand of healthcare services often funded through Medicare and Medicaid. The rate at which demand for direct support and senior care services is growing 10 times faster compared to the actual growth of Minnesota's working-age labor force, with a projected nursing staff shortage of 30,000 by 2030. The declining birth rates across the state reinforce the need for a capable healthcare labor force to facilitate these demands.
Telehealth offers excellent benefits for patient access and cost efficiency. Telehealth allows for a shrinking pool of clinical staff to reach more patients per hour and keeps costs low for seniors and individuals most exposed to Medicaid cuts. Plus, it draws on federal telehealth financial support. Telehealth functions as a genuine efficiency tool for a system straining for both manpower and money. Implementation of AI developments will continue to strengthen telehealth capabilities to empower its already beneficial services.
There are some concerns with telehealth worth noting. Care quality must be met for each patient. Private companies already invest significant amounts of money into telehealth creating questions about the role of Medicare and Medicaid dollars spent on telehealth. Broadband access is not available to every corner of the state. AI risks include technological difficulties and privacy concerns. These are valid concerns.
However, inaction to move forward will result in less access and innovation to improve the telehealth product. By implementing investment in telehealth now, increased time in the marketplace can improve its care quality. The same goes for broadband expansion and innovative developments such as Starlink that lead to quality internet across remote Minnesota areas. Delaying telehealth expansion will lead to loss in care access while telehealth innovation and improvement stagnates.
The state of Minnesota can utilize federal funding through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) to support telehealth expansion. A provision in OBBBA includes the federal Rural Health Transformation Program (RHTP), which will be spending $50 billion over 5 fiscal years. Minnesota is expected to receive $1 billion for the next five fiscal years including $193 million for FY 2026. The $193 million must be spent by 2027 to continue receiving the expected funding. One of five core RHTP initiatives which is "Invest in Technology, Infrastructure, and Collaboration for Financial Viability," which applies to telehealth investments across states. Using RHTP funding provides the financial backing necessary to expand telehealth and healthcare access. Private companies investment in telehealth, along with RHTP, provide the financial support to develop telehealth's capabilities for cheaper and more efficient care quality despite the decreases in Minnesota's healthcare labor force.
Even with an upcoming healthcare workforce shortage, Minnesotans can innovate around the demographic cliff by using federal money to invest in telehealth.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/telehealth-investment-can-mitigate-minnesotas-labor-demographic-timebomb/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Telehealth investment can mitigate Minnesota's labor demographic time bomb
Minnesota is a state that prioritizes expanding healthcare access. Expanding access can be achieved by implementing telehealth to create healthcare expansion across the state. But what exactly is telehealth? Telehealth is the use of digital information and communication technologies to access ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Aug. 7 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Aug. 5, 2026, by intern Carter Johnson: * * * Telehealth investment can mitigate Minnesota's labor demographic time bomb Minnesota is a state that prioritizes expanding healthcare access. Expanding access can be achieved by implementing telehealth to create healthcare expansion across the state. But what exactly is telehealth? Telehealth is the use of digital information and communication technologies to accesshealth care services, such as remote check in or prescriptions. The response to the Covid-19 pandemic solidified telehealth's position as a healthcare service that can help treat patients in a remote setting.
Today Minnesota must increase its investment in telehealth development as the state faces rising labor force imbalances. The current MN labor demographics show stagnation, with the labor force only growing 0.2% annually since 2019. At the same time, Minnesota's labor force is aging, and birth rates show a steady decline. Figures 1 and 2 highlight these trends.
Figure 1: Minnesota Workforce Aging by Region, 2014-2024
Figure 2: Minnesota total births, 2014-2024
The result of an aging workforce leads to an increase in demand of healthcare services often funded through Medicare and Medicaid. The rate at which demand for direct support and senior care services is growing 10 times faster compared to the actual growth of Minnesota's working-age labor force, with a projected nursing staff shortage of 30,000 by 2030. The declining birth rates across the state reinforce the need for a capable healthcare labor force to facilitate these demands.
Telehealth offers excellent benefits for patient access and cost efficiency. Telehealth allows for a shrinking pool of clinical staff to reach more patients per hour and keeps costs low for seniors and individuals most exposed to Medicaid cuts. Plus, it draws on federal telehealth financial support. Telehealth functions as a genuine efficiency tool for a system straining for both manpower and money. Implementation of AI developments will continue to strengthen telehealth capabilities to empower its already beneficial services.
There are some concerns with telehealth worth noting. Care quality must be met for each patient. Private companies already invest significant amounts of money into telehealth creating questions about the role of Medicare and Medicaid dollars spent on telehealth. Broadband access is not available to every corner of the state. AI risks include technological difficulties and privacy concerns. These are valid concerns.
However, inaction to move forward will result in less access and innovation to improve the telehealth product. By implementing investment in telehealth now, increased time in the marketplace can improve its care quality. The same goes for broadband expansion and innovative developments such as Starlink that lead to quality internet across remote Minnesota areas. Delaying telehealth expansion will lead to loss in care access while telehealth innovation and improvement stagnates.
The state of Minnesota can utilize federal funding through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) to support telehealth expansion. A provision in OBBBA includes the federal Rural Health Transformation Program (RHTP), which will be spending $50 billion over 5 fiscal years. Minnesota is expected to receive $1 billion for the next five fiscal years including $193 million for FY 2026. The $193 million must be spent by 2027 to continue receiving the expected funding. One of five core RHTP initiatives which is "Invest in Technology, Infrastructure, and Collaboration for Financial Viability," which applies to telehealth investments across states. Using RHTP funding provides the financial backing necessary to expand telehealth and healthcare access. Private companies investment in telehealth, along with RHTP, provide the financial support to develop telehealth's capabilities for cheaper and more efficient care quality despite the decreases in Minnesota's healthcare labor force.
Even with an upcoming healthcare workforce shortage, Minnesotans can innovate around the demographic cliff by using federal money to invest in telehealth.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/telehealth-investment-can-mitigate-minnesotas-labor-demographic-timebomb/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Gone From School for a Doctor's Visit, or Just Avoiding a Test? The Distinction Between Excused and Unexcused Absences Matters
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Aug. 7 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Aug. 5, 2026, by policy fellow Josiah Padley:
* * *
Gone from school for a doctor's visit, or just avoiding a test? The distinction between excused and unexcused absences matters
About one in four Minnesota students are chronically absent, meaning they miss 10 percent or more of the academic year. Their absence leads to a predictable cascade of avoidable issues, including learning loss, classroom disruption, ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Aug. 7 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Aug. 5, 2026, by policy fellow Josiah Padley: * * * Gone from school for a doctor's visit, or just avoiding a test? The distinction between excused and unexcused absences matters About one in four Minnesota students are chronically absent, meaning they miss 10 percent or more of the academic year. Their absence leads to a predictable cascade of avoidable issues, including learning loss, classroom disruption,and heightened behavior issues.
Yet, all absences are not created equal. While one student may miss a Friday for wisdom tooth surgery, another absentee might be avoiding a test or a newly estranged best friend. The former absence will likely have few long-term consequences, while the latter lays the foundation for a destructive pattern of truant behavior.
A new report authored by Nat Malkus and Sam Hollom of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) studied the difference between excused absences and unexcused absences using Indiana attendance records from 2015-2024. That report found that unexcused absences are meaningfully different from excused absences, especially as it pertains to test scores. The pattern of unexcused absences indicate a minority high-risk group of students that have many absences.
Excused absences occur when a student can present a note from a doctor or parent justifying their absence, and unexcused absences occur when a student cannot provide a justification. The classification accuracy has strong limitations; it is of course possible for a parent to lie to the school and say their child is sick, or for a previously sick child to forget a doctor's note at home, with both examples producing inaccurate bookkeeping. In general, however, the attendance data produced strong takeaways that can safely lend insight to chronic absentee trends.
It remains true that the majority of students have relatively few absences, and in the converse, a minority of students hold a majority of all absences. But the distinction between excused and unexcused absences makes that generalization more precise. Malkus found that excused absences increased sequentially as the absence-rate deciles moved up, meaning that there was no unexpected spike in the number of excused absences among the most chronically absent students. In contrast, unexcused absences did spike among the most chronically absent students. As Malkus puts it,
"[S]tudents in the 10th absence-rate decile (the 10 percent of students who are most absent) have more than twice as many unexcused absences, on average, as students in the ninth decile, with unexcused-absence rates of 19 and 7 percent, respectively, in 2024. Strikingly, students in the 10th decile had, on average, more unexcused absences than students in the ninth decile had total absences."
[View figure in the link at bottom.]
Put another way, the students who are most chronically absent don't necessarily have parents who prolifically write them excuse notes -- at some point, they no longer have the desire or ability to procure justification.
That's not to say that excuses don't abound. Despite the fact that every absence has an impact on a student's classroom experience and academic performance, Malkus found that chronically absent students still had about half (48 percent) of their absences excused. Students who were not chronically absent had the majority (68 percent) of their absences excused. With this in mind, it's possible that many chronically absent students do not initially raise red flags indicating that they will become chronically absent, as absences are more likely to be excused by parents and trusted by school offices at the beginning of the year.
For the least absent 80 percent of students, unexcused absences remained consistent across grades, with about two per year from kindergarten to 12th grade. However, the most absent 20 percent of students had far more unexcused absences as they matriculated into high school, meaning that, when taken as a unified student group, unexcused absences for 12th graders nearly doubled those of 3rd graders. This implies the existence of a large subset of high schoolers with chronically unexcused absences, whose consistent absence from the classroom is highly noticeable. The data does not imply an Indiana social norm that encourages most high schoolers to play hooky on Fridays, but instead points policymakers in the direction of a group of high-need, at-risk students.
Unexcused absences climb steadily throughout the year, increasing strongly in April and May. Malkus points out that this is when students and parents alike typically lose steam, and front offices become increasingly credulous of shoddy excuses. Poor and otherwise disadvantaged students make up a disproportionate amount of unexcused absences. Assuming that these absence classifications are accurate, this implies that the large subset of students who are worryingly absent from the classroom tend to be disadvantaged in a number of ways. This knowledge should empower (and propel) administrators to target absentee reduction efforts to these student groups in particular.
[View figure in the link at bottom.]
Every absence matters, but some types of absences are more destructive than others. Malkus found that every type of absence had a negative effect on student test scores, but unexcused absences had much harsher effects on student performance. In a way, this is unsurprising; an unexcused absence is far less likely than an excused absence to have teacher or parent involvement that can help ensure a student gets back on track seamlessly. Absenteeism's significant effect on academic performance underscores the urgent need to identify and reconnect with student groups that are slipping through the cracks.
[View figure in the link at bottom.]
While more analyses will need to be done before we can know for sure, there's no reason to believe that Minnesota students have significantly different absentee patterns than Indiana students. Chronic absenteeism generally behaves similarly from state to state.
If anything, Minnesota may be in a place of greater need than Indiana; in 2024, 19 percent of Indiana students were considered chronically absent, and 24.5 percent of Minnesota students were chronically absent.
As I have written previously, Minnesota is in significant need of an attendance systems refresh. It's time for the Minnesota Department of Education to create standardized attendance codes and publish attendance data in a timely manner. MDE has noted that they plan to release a chronic absenteeism tracking dashboard, which could prove to be an incredibly fruitful first step in identifying the students most in need and forming a plan to turn their (excused or unexcused) absences into a solid attendance record.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/gone-from-school-for-a-doctors-visit-or-just-avoiding-a-test-the-distinction-between-excused-and-unexcused-absences-matters/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Gone from school for a doctor's visit, or just avoiding a test? The distinction between excused and unexcused absences matters
About one in four Minnesota students are chronically absent, meaning they miss 10 percent or more of the academic year. Their absence leads to a predictable cascade of avoidable issues, including learning loss, classroom disruption, ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, Aug. 7 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Aug. 5, 2026, by policy fellow Josiah Padley: * * * Gone from school for a doctor's visit, or just avoiding a test? The distinction between excused and unexcused absences matters About one in four Minnesota students are chronically absent, meaning they miss 10 percent or more of the academic year. Their absence leads to a predictable cascade of avoidable issues, including learning loss, classroom disruption,and heightened behavior issues.
Yet, all absences are not created equal. While one student may miss a Friday for wisdom tooth surgery, another absentee might be avoiding a test or a newly estranged best friend. The former absence will likely have few long-term consequences, while the latter lays the foundation for a destructive pattern of truant behavior.
A new report authored by Nat Malkus and Sam Hollom of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) studied the difference between excused absences and unexcused absences using Indiana attendance records from 2015-2024. That report found that unexcused absences are meaningfully different from excused absences, especially as it pertains to test scores. The pattern of unexcused absences indicate a minority high-risk group of students that have many absences.
Excused absences occur when a student can present a note from a doctor or parent justifying their absence, and unexcused absences occur when a student cannot provide a justification. The classification accuracy has strong limitations; it is of course possible for a parent to lie to the school and say their child is sick, or for a previously sick child to forget a doctor's note at home, with both examples producing inaccurate bookkeeping. In general, however, the attendance data produced strong takeaways that can safely lend insight to chronic absentee trends.
It remains true that the majority of students have relatively few absences, and in the converse, a minority of students hold a majority of all absences. But the distinction between excused and unexcused absences makes that generalization more precise. Malkus found that excused absences increased sequentially as the absence-rate deciles moved up, meaning that there was no unexpected spike in the number of excused absences among the most chronically absent students. In contrast, unexcused absences did spike among the most chronically absent students. As Malkus puts it,
"[S]tudents in the 10th absence-rate decile (the 10 percent of students who are most absent) have more than twice as many unexcused absences, on average, as students in the ninth decile, with unexcused-absence rates of 19 and 7 percent, respectively, in 2024. Strikingly, students in the 10th decile had, on average, more unexcused absences than students in the ninth decile had total absences."
[View figure in the link at bottom.]
Put another way, the students who are most chronically absent don't necessarily have parents who prolifically write them excuse notes -- at some point, they no longer have the desire or ability to procure justification.
That's not to say that excuses don't abound. Despite the fact that every absence has an impact on a student's classroom experience and academic performance, Malkus found that chronically absent students still had about half (48 percent) of their absences excused. Students who were not chronically absent had the majority (68 percent) of their absences excused. With this in mind, it's possible that many chronically absent students do not initially raise red flags indicating that they will become chronically absent, as absences are more likely to be excused by parents and trusted by school offices at the beginning of the year.
For the least absent 80 percent of students, unexcused absences remained consistent across grades, with about two per year from kindergarten to 12th grade. However, the most absent 20 percent of students had far more unexcused absences as they matriculated into high school, meaning that, when taken as a unified student group, unexcused absences for 12th graders nearly doubled those of 3rd graders. This implies the existence of a large subset of high schoolers with chronically unexcused absences, whose consistent absence from the classroom is highly noticeable. The data does not imply an Indiana social norm that encourages most high schoolers to play hooky on Fridays, but instead points policymakers in the direction of a group of high-need, at-risk students.
Unexcused absences climb steadily throughout the year, increasing strongly in April and May. Malkus points out that this is when students and parents alike typically lose steam, and front offices become increasingly credulous of shoddy excuses. Poor and otherwise disadvantaged students make up a disproportionate amount of unexcused absences. Assuming that these absence classifications are accurate, this implies that the large subset of students who are worryingly absent from the classroom tend to be disadvantaged in a number of ways. This knowledge should empower (and propel) administrators to target absentee reduction efforts to these student groups in particular.
[View figure in the link at bottom.]
Every absence matters, but some types of absences are more destructive than others. Malkus found that every type of absence had a negative effect on student test scores, but unexcused absences had much harsher effects on student performance. In a way, this is unsurprising; an unexcused absence is far less likely than an excused absence to have teacher or parent involvement that can help ensure a student gets back on track seamlessly. Absenteeism's significant effect on academic performance underscores the urgent need to identify and reconnect with student groups that are slipping through the cracks.
[View figure in the link at bottom.]
While more analyses will need to be done before we can know for sure, there's no reason to believe that Minnesota students have significantly different absentee patterns than Indiana students. Chronic absenteeism generally behaves similarly from state to state.
If anything, Minnesota may be in a place of greater need than Indiana; in 2024, 19 percent of Indiana students were considered chronically absent, and 24.5 percent of Minnesota students were chronically absent.
As I have written previously, Minnesota is in significant need of an attendance systems refresh. It's time for the Minnesota Department of Education to create standardized attendance codes and publish attendance data in a timely manner. MDE has noted that they plan to release a chronic absenteeism tracking dashboard, which could prove to be an incredibly fruitful first step in identifying the students most in need and forming a plan to turn their (excused or unexcused) absences into a solid attendance record.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/gone-from-school-for-a-doctors-visit-or-just-avoiding-a-test-the-distinction-between-excused-and-unexcused-absences-matters/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: How Tehran's Use of Cyber Operations in the U.S.-Iran Conflict Has Evolved
WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Nikita Shah, senior fellow with the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program:
* * *
How Tehran's Use of Cyber Operations in the U.S.-Iran Conflict Has Evolved
In the week since July 26, concurrent cyberattacks have impacted water facilities across at least six U.S. states. Reflecting the scope and seriousness of the risk posed to the water sector, the attacks prompted the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to upgrade an advisory it had ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Nikita Shah, senior fellow with the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program: * * * How Tehran's Use of Cyber Operations in the U.S.-Iran Conflict Has Evolved In the week since July 26, concurrent cyberattacks have impacted water facilities across at least six U.S. states. Reflecting the scope and seriousness of the risk posed to the water sector, the attacks prompted the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to upgrade an advisory it hadpublished just days before, warning operators to disconnect operational or publicly exposed technology from the internet as soon as possible. Although these attacks are yet to be attributed, signs point towards Iranian cyber actors as the likely culprit. This provides a useful moment to evaluate how Iran has used its cyber capabilities so far in its conflict against the United States and Israel, and whether this constitutes an escalation.
This commentary provides an updated analysis as to how Iran's use of cyber operations and capabilities have evolved since the conflict broke out in February 2026, revisiting the author's initial take. So far, the original assumptions have held: Iranian cyber actors are active, but shaped and likely still constrained by various environmental and doctrinal factors. That said, there has been a discernible uptick in Iran's cyber operations over the last 4-6 months; Iran's cyber apparatus has firmly re-geared in direct support and alignment with Iran's war effort against the United States, Israel, and regional rivals, and is using cyber operations to shape the operating environment in a way that is favorable to its interests.
Key Strategic Trends in Iran's Use of Cyber Capabilities
Since the outbreak of the conflict, Iran has undertaken a broader shift in its military strategy, centered around asymmetric means to frustrate its global and regional adversaries. This includes exploiting the vulnerabilities of U.S. and Israeli conventional forces, cutting off access to the Strait of Hormuz to impose costs to global energy markets and regional rivals, and a concerted information warfare campaign to shape global narratives on the conflict. Across each of these methods, but especially Iran's information warfare objectives, cyber capabilities are a critical enabler, and they have played a vital part in causing attrition to Iran's adversaries, as well as enabling power projection across the globe.
This has been reflected in a notable uptick in Iran's cyber operations since March 2026. This has encompassed a broad range of activity, including (1) cyber espionage, (2) establishing technical accesses, (3) disruptive cyber operations, (4) cyber-enabled information operations, (5) deploying spyware, and (6) conflict-themed cyber crime. Three strategic trends have become apparent from this increased activity:
1. Iran's Cyber Apparatus Has Directly Shifted to Support Its War Effort
In the earlier stages of the conflict, Iran's cyber activity could be understood primarily as "opportunistic disruption," whereby Iran's operators were utilizing existing technical accesses they had already accumulated to throw quick, unsophisticated cyber operations at targets with weak cyber defenses, or conducting hacktivist attacks (such as website defacements, or hack-and-leak attacks) with little strategic effect. This was accompanied by some cyber espionage, and cyber-enabled information operations.
That activity has since evolved into a more concerted approach that reflects a recalibrated cyber apparatus, working in clearer and direct strategic alignment with Iran's wartime objectives. Nowhere is this better reflected than through the prioritization of cyber espionage operations to support Iran's war effort. In July 2026, it was discovered that Iran had hacked SS7 (a technical protocol to route data through telecommunications networks) to identify the location of U.S. troops stationed in the Middle East, directly informing kinetic strikes against them that resulted in injuries. Iran has also targeted high-value U.S. and Israeli senior officials with the likely intent to understand strategic decisionmaking, particularly pertaining to diplomatic negotiations with the United States to end the conflict. Iran has hacked security cameras in various countries, both to inform kinetic targeting by drones or missiles, and to assess post-strike damage. Reporting also points to an expansion of Iranian cyber espionage against the aviation, aerospace, defense manufacturing, telecommunications,, and space and satellite sectors--all of which are relevant to the defense industrial base critical to the conflict.
2. Iran Is Using Offensive Cyber Capabilities to Proactively Shape the Operating Environment
Just as the United States and Israel reportedly used offensive cyber capabilities to degrade Iran's infrastructure in the opening stages of this conflict, Iran has also been utilizing cyber capabilities to shape the operative environment to its advantage. Iranian cyber actors are increasingly waging cyberattacks for information warfare purposes; Iran considers the key battlespace to be in the information domain, and from a doctrinal perspective, it relies upon information warfare as a key lever to achieve strategic depth by projecting power far beyond its borders.
Iran's cyber-enabled information operations can be viewed in two ways: breadth and depth of targets. In terms of breadth, Iranian cyber actors have conducted various disruptive cyber operations across the United States (e.g., targeting local government systems in St Joseph's Country, Indiana, in April, breaching tank readers at gas stations in May, hacking water facilities in California in June, and likely conducting the current attack against U.S. water facilities), whilst pro-Iranian hacktivist groups have continuously attacked organizations across the Middle East. In terms of depth, Iranian cyber actors and hacktivists have persistently targeted cyberattacks against U.S. and Israeli current and former officials--particularly hack-and-leak attacks--including against former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and former Israeli Army Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi, and the alleged publishing of personal data of U.S. Marines stationed in the Gulf and Israeli military and intelligence personnel. It is worth noting that the presence of hacktivists itself is important, demonstrating another core component of Iran's cyber ecosystem mobilizing in direct alignment with the war effort.
Though these appear as disruptive cyber operations at first glance, itIt is crucial to understand these attacks through an information warfare lens: First, they play into Iranian goals of power projection to different global audiences, specifically by demonstrating an ability to reach directly into the Israeli ruling elite and U.S. military, chipping away at their reputations of competence and security. Second, by generating a constant layer of friction that is felt by ordinary citizens and businesses, Iran generates a sense of fear, division, and chaos. In other words, the secondary, informational impact of these cyberattacks is key--it enables Iran to impose cost on its adversaries from a distance, shaping a more favorable information environment for Iran, particularly where it results in reduced support for the conflict among global, online audiences.
Artificial intelligence (AI) has been a vital enabling tool for Iran in shaping the environment. Recent threat intelligence reporting has shown that Iran has deployed AI across the full life cycle of its cyber and information operations, including initial target reconnaissance (e.g., actors linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps using ChatGPT in 2024 to understand the technological components impacted in the current U.S. water facility attacks), code writing and malware developing, social engineering operations, and content creation and manipulation. Using AI has served to fundamentally enhance Iran's modus operandi when it comes to cyber capabilities, by boosting their speed, scale, reach, and impact, rather than by changing the "strategic logic" with which Iran operates in a conflict.
3. Iran Is Still Operating in a Relatively Constrained Way
The scale of the cyberattacks against U.S. water facilities is certainly concerning. If the actor behind them is in fact Iran (which is not yet confirmed), these attacks have the potential to be escalatory; they disabled critical systems in the U.S. homeland, representing a threat to U.S. public safety. However, it is vital to contextualize these attacks within a much longer-term pattern of how Iran operates against its adversaries. Iran has a history of targeting multiple sectors of U.S. critical infrastructure with disruptive operations--especially the water sector (going back to at least 2013)--both in peacetime, and now, during conflict. As detailed above, this would not be the first time Iran has targeted U.S. infrastructure during this conflict.
Indeed, across the full spectrum of Iranian cyber operations so far in this conflict, Iran is effectively operating to the same blueprint that it used in the 12-day conflict with Israel in 2025: Its target base is similar (i.e., the defense industrial base, Israeli infrastructure, the satellite and space sector, and high-value individuals), its use of state actors and hacktivists is the same, and its tactics are remarkably similar, including cyber espionage, hacking cameras, low-sophistication attacks, and information operations. Together, these methods reflect Iran's use of cyber operations to shape and augment the broader operating environment to its advantage, and to inform subsequent operations, whether for kinetic or cognitive effect. An important feature of Iranian military doctrine is "calibrated escalation"--moves that extend or exacerbate the conflict, but without reaching full-scale war. If the cyberattacks on U.S. water facilities are in fact attributed to Iran, they should be viewed as "opportunistic targeting," inflicting costs on its adversaries, but without reaching the heights of escalation that other attack types have (including kinetic attacks).
Moreover, Iran may still be subject to operating constraints. Reporting in March 2026 suggested Israel and the United States had struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' cyber and information warfare headquarters early on in their campaign, and Iran also shut down its own domestic internet, impeding its ability to conduct cyber operations. But it is unknown how much of Iran's cyber capacity has been restored. The uptick of cyber activity described in this commentary demonstrates that more of Iran's cyber apparatus is online than previously thought--perhaps due to Iran's "two-tier" internet, which created a parallel structure for elite and state internet access to stay online even as domestic connections were severed, as well as suggestions that Iran is using satellite connectivity to resume its operations. However, U.S. air strikes have hit Iranian telecommunications infrastructure since the conflict began, including one attack in July that took out 100 telecommunications masts, disrupting internet services in southern Iran. Disruptions to Iranian's digital infrastructure will no doubt be a significant constraint upon Iran's ability to operate in cyberspace.
Conclusion
It is still too early to fully understand how organizational changes in Iran's military forces (from a conventional military into a decentralized web of operational commands) trickles down into its cyber apparatus. Nonetheless, its reliance upon asymmetric warfare is clear, as well as where cyber capabilities generate important advantage.
Iran has come to realize that its stranglehold over the Strait of Hormuz is its primary leverage. Cyber capabilities play a vital (albeit secondary) and enabling role: They help to inform, refine, and amply Iran's kinetic and economic activity, while also proactively shaping the conditions Iran prefers to operate in, giving Iran important strategic advantage. If the cyberattacks on the U.S. water sector are confirmed to be from Iran, they should be evaluated relative to Iran's wider capabilities--as another asymmetric lever of statecraft that Iran can pull to attrite the United States--but still a constrained lever, relative to its use of drones, missiles, or economic leverage. Iran's doctrine, degraded physical infrastructure, and historic patterns of targeting are important constraints on how it decides to deploy cyber operations, and will be for some time.
Iran's cyber operators will likely be working on preparing new technical accesses, and possibly new cyber capabilities to leverage, should the conflict continue over the longer-term or negotiations falter. The key strategic point on the horizon for the United States is the midterms, noting that Iran has a history of targeting U.S. elections and campaigns. This makes the need for cyber resilience across U.S. infrastructure critical. One point of success from the U.S. water facility attacks was that officials quickly reverted to manual processes and reserves, preventing impact upon public water supply. Sustained vigilance will be critical: As stated by Iranian hacktivist group Handala in April 2026, "the cyber war did not begin with the military conflict, and it will not end with any military ceasefire."
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-tehrans-use-cyber-operations-us-iran-conflict-has-evolved
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
How Tehran's Use of Cyber Operations in the U.S.-Iran Conflict Has Evolved
In the week since July 26, concurrent cyberattacks have impacted water facilities across at least six U.S. states. Reflecting the scope and seriousness of the risk posed to the water sector, the attacks prompted the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to upgrade an advisory it had ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Aug. 6, 2026, by Nikita Shah, senior fellow with the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program: * * * How Tehran's Use of Cyber Operations in the U.S.-Iran Conflict Has Evolved In the week since July 26, concurrent cyberattacks have impacted water facilities across at least six U.S. states. Reflecting the scope and seriousness of the risk posed to the water sector, the attacks prompted the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to upgrade an advisory it hadpublished just days before, warning operators to disconnect operational or publicly exposed technology from the internet as soon as possible. Although these attacks are yet to be attributed, signs point towards Iranian cyber actors as the likely culprit. This provides a useful moment to evaluate how Iran has used its cyber capabilities so far in its conflict against the United States and Israel, and whether this constitutes an escalation.
This commentary provides an updated analysis as to how Iran's use of cyber operations and capabilities have evolved since the conflict broke out in February 2026, revisiting the author's initial take. So far, the original assumptions have held: Iranian cyber actors are active, but shaped and likely still constrained by various environmental and doctrinal factors. That said, there has been a discernible uptick in Iran's cyber operations over the last 4-6 months; Iran's cyber apparatus has firmly re-geared in direct support and alignment with Iran's war effort against the United States, Israel, and regional rivals, and is using cyber operations to shape the operating environment in a way that is favorable to its interests.
Key Strategic Trends in Iran's Use of Cyber Capabilities
Since the outbreak of the conflict, Iran has undertaken a broader shift in its military strategy, centered around asymmetric means to frustrate its global and regional adversaries. This includes exploiting the vulnerabilities of U.S. and Israeli conventional forces, cutting off access to the Strait of Hormuz to impose costs to global energy markets and regional rivals, and a concerted information warfare campaign to shape global narratives on the conflict. Across each of these methods, but especially Iran's information warfare objectives, cyber capabilities are a critical enabler, and they have played a vital part in causing attrition to Iran's adversaries, as well as enabling power projection across the globe.
This has been reflected in a notable uptick in Iran's cyber operations since March 2026. This has encompassed a broad range of activity, including (1) cyber espionage, (2) establishing technical accesses, (3) disruptive cyber operations, (4) cyber-enabled information operations, (5) deploying spyware, and (6) conflict-themed cyber crime. Three strategic trends have become apparent from this increased activity:
1. Iran's Cyber Apparatus Has Directly Shifted to Support Its War Effort
In the earlier stages of the conflict, Iran's cyber activity could be understood primarily as "opportunistic disruption," whereby Iran's operators were utilizing existing technical accesses they had already accumulated to throw quick, unsophisticated cyber operations at targets with weak cyber defenses, or conducting hacktivist attacks (such as website defacements, or hack-and-leak attacks) with little strategic effect. This was accompanied by some cyber espionage, and cyber-enabled information operations.
That activity has since evolved into a more concerted approach that reflects a recalibrated cyber apparatus, working in clearer and direct strategic alignment with Iran's wartime objectives. Nowhere is this better reflected than through the prioritization of cyber espionage operations to support Iran's war effort. In July 2026, it was discovered that Iran had hacked SS7 (a technical protocol to route data through telecommunications networks) to identify the location of U.S. troops stationed in the Middle East, directly informing kinetic strikes against them that resulted in injuries. Iran has also targeted high-value U.S. and Israeli senior officials with the likely intent to understand strategic decisionmaking, particularly pertaining to diplomatic negotiations with the United States to end the conflict. Iran has hacked security cameras in various countries, both to inform kinetic targeting by drones or missiles, and to assess post-strike damage. Reporting also points to an expansion of Iranian cyber espionage against the aviation, aerospace, defense manufacturing, telecommunications,, and space and satellite sectors--all of which are relevant to the defense industrial base critical to the conflict.
2. Iran Is Using Offensive Cyber Capabilities to Proactively Shape the Operating Environment
Just as the United States and Israel reportedly used offensive cyber capabilities to degrade Iran's infrastructure in the opening stages of this conflict, Iran has also been utilizing cyber capabilities to shape the operative environment to its advantage. Iranian cyber actors are increasingly waging cyberattacks for information warfare purposes; Iran considers the key battlespace to be in the information domain, and from a doctrinal perspective, it relies upon information warfare as a key lever to achieve strategic depth by projecting power far beyond its borders.
Iran's cyber-enabled information operations can be viewed in two ways: breadth and depth of targets. In terms of breadth, Iranian cyber actors have conducted various disruptive cyber operations across the United States (e.g., targeting local government systems in St Joseph's Country, Indiana, in April, breaching tank readers at gas stations in May, hacking water facilities in California in June, and likely conducting the current attack against U.S. water facilities), whilst pro-Iranian hacktivist groups have continuously attacked organizations across the Middle East. In terms of depth, Iranian cyber actors and hacktivists have persistently targeted cyberattacks against U.S. and Israeli current and former officials--particularly hack-and-leak attacks--including against former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and former Israeli Army Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi, and the alleged publishing of personal data of U.S. Marines stationed in the Gulf and Israeli military and intelligence personnel. It is worth noting that the presence of hacktivists itself is important, demonstrating another core component of Iran's cyber ecosystem mobilizing in direct alignment with the war effort.
Though these appear as disruptive cyber operations at first glance, itIt is crucial to understand these attacks through an information warfare lens: First, they play into Iranian goals of power projection to different global audiences, specifically by demonstrating an ability to reach directly into the Israeli ruling elite and U.S. military, chipping away at their reputations of competence and security. Second, by generating a constant layer of friction that is felt by ordinary citizens and businesses, Iran generates a sense of fear, division, and chaos. In other words, the secondary, informational impact of these cyberattacks is key--it enables Iran to impose cost on its adversaries from a distance, shaping a more favorable information environment for Iran, particularly where it results in reduced support for the conflict among global, online audiences.
Artificial intelligence (AI) has been a vital enabling tool for Iran in shaping the environment. Recent threat intelligence reporting has shown that Iran has deployed AI across the full life cycle of its cyber and information operations, including initial target reconnaissance (e.g., actors linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps using ChatGPT in 2024 to understand the technological components impacted in the current U.S. water facility attacks), code writing and malware developing, social engineering operations, and content creation and manipulation. Using AI has served to fundamentally enhance Iran's modus operandi when it comes to cyber capabilities, by boosting their speed, scale, reach, and impact, rather than by changing the "strategic logic" with which Iran operates in a conflict.
3. Iran Is Still Operating in a Relatively Constrained Way
The scale of the cyberattacks against U.S. water facilities is certainly concerning. If the actor behind them is in fact Iran (which is not yet confirmed), these attacks have the potential to be escalatory; they disabled critical systems in the U.S. homeland, representing a threat to U.S. public safety. However, it is vital to contextualize these attacks within a much longer-term pattern of how Iran operates against its adversaries. Iran has a history of targeting multiple sectors of U.S. critical infrastructure with disruptive operations--especially the water sector (going back to at least 2013)--both in peacetime, and now, during conflict. As detailed above, this would not be the first time Iran has targeted U.S. infrastructure during this conflict.
Indeed, across the full spectrum of Iranian cyber operations so far in this conflict, Iran is effectively operating to the same blueprint that it used in the 12-day conflict with Israel in 2025: Its target base is similar (i.e., the defense industrial base, Israeli infrastructure, the satellite and space sector, and high-value individuals), its use of state actors and hacktivists is the same, and its tactics are remarkably similar, including cyber espionage, hacking cameras, low-sophistication attacks, and information operations. Together, these methods reflect Iran's use of cyber operations to shape and augment the broader operating environment to its advantage, and to inform subsequent operations, whether for kinetic or cognitive effect. An important feature of Iranian military doctrine is "calibrated escalation"--moves that extend or exacerbate the conflict, but without reaching full-scale war. If the cyberattacks on U.S. water facilities are in fact attributed to Iran, they should be viewed as "opportunistic targeting," inflicting costs on its adversaries, but without reaching the heights of escalation that other attack types have (including kinetic attacks).
Moreover, Iran may still be subject to operating constraints. Reporting in March 2026 suggested Israel and the United States had struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' cyber and information warfare headquarters early on in their campaign, and Iran also shut down its own domestic internet, impeding its ability to conduct cyber operations. But it is unknown how much of Iran's cyber capacity has been restored. The uptick of cyber activity described in this commentary demonstrates that more of Iran's cyber apparatus is online than previously thought--perhaps due to Iran's "two-tier" internet, which created a parallel structure for elite and state internet access to stay online even as domestic connections were severed, as well as suggestions that Iran is using satellite connectivity to resume its operations. However, U.S. air strikes have hit Iranian telecommunications infrastructure since the conflict began, including one attack in July that took out 100 telecommunications masts, disrupting internet services in southern Iran. Disruptions to Iranian's digital infrastructure will no doubt be a significant constraint upon Iran's ability to operate in cyberspace.
Conclusion
It is still too early to fully understand how organizational changes in Iran's military forces (from a conventional military into a decentralized web of operational commands) trickles down into its cyber apparatus. Nonetheless, its reliance upon asymmetric warfare is clear, as well as where cyber capabilities generate important advantage.
Iran has come to realize that its stranglehold over the Strait of Hormuz is its primary leverage. Cyber capabilities play a vital (albeit secondary) and enabling role: They help to inform, refine, and amply Iran's kinetic and economic activity, while also proactively shaping the conditions Iran prefers to operate in, giving Iran important strategic advantage. If the cyberattacks on the U.S. water sector are confirmed to be from Iran, they should be evaluated relative to Iran's wider capabilities--as another asymmetric lever of statecraft that Iran can pull to attrite the United States--but still a constrained lever, relative to its use of drones, missiles, or economic leverage. Iran's doctrine, degraded physical infrastructure, and historic patterns of targeting are important constraints on how it decides to deploy cyber operations, and will be for some time.
Iran's cyber operators will likely be working on preparing new technical accesses, and possibly new cyber capabilities to leverage, should the conflict continue over the longer-term or negotiations falter. The key strategic point on the horizon for the United States is the midterms, noting that Iran has a history of targeting U.S. elections and campaigns. This makes the need for cyber resilience across U.S. infrastructure critical. One point of success from the U.S. water facility attacks was that officials quickly reverted to manual processes and reserves, preventing impact upon public water supply. Sustained vigilance will be critical: As stated by Iranian hacktivist group Handala in April 2026, "the cyber war did not begin with the military conflict, and it will not end with any military ceasefire."
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-tehrans-use-cyber-operations-us-iran-conflict-has-evolved
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: Exporting American AI to Create Jobs, Grow Our Economy, and Beat China
WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 (TNSLrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following brief on August 6, 2026, by Cole Salvador and Yusuf Mahmood entitled "Exporting American AI to Create Jobs, Grow Our Economy, and Beat China":
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Introduction
America must export its world-leading AI stack abroad. Promoting the export of American AI technology is one of three pillars in the White House's AI Action Plan and, as President Trump said, we must "turn America into an AI export powerhouse" (Kratsios et al., 2025). Doing so will create American jobs, grow the economy, and reshore ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 (TNSLrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following brief on August 6, 2026, by Cole Salvador and Yusuf Mahmood entitled "Exporting American AI to Create Jobs, Grow Our Economy, and Beat China": Here are excerpts: * * * Introduction America must export its world-leading AI stack abroad. Promoting the export of American AI technology is one of three pillars in the White House's AI Action Plan and, as President Trump said, we must "turn America into an AI export powerhouse" (Kratsios et al., 2025). Doing so will create American jobs, grow the economy, and reshoremanufacturing.
The history of international technology competition shows that the companies and countries with the largest ecosystem for developers and users win, including in open source. America must also export AI to counter the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s hard and soft international power. The PRC seeks to push its values and economic system onto unaligned third countries through financing and technology exports, which the U.S. can disrupt by exporting its own superior products.
In doing so, however, the U.S. must ensure that it does not inadvertently aid its adversaries by allowing chipmaking equipment, semiconductors, or cloud computing resources to be diverted. The U.S. can prevent this by establishing rigorous and consistent security rules for exports. Finally, as American technology diffuses abroad, so too will our usage and development standards, which will determine the values and victors of the future. As U.S. AI becomes the global default, and we ensure that AI products and hardware are developed in America by American workers, we can create growth that boosts employment and national strength.
In 2025, the U.S. government created two landmark programs to achieve these goals while promoting and protecting U.S. AI exports: the American AI Exports Program and the Pax Silica economic security agreements (Trump, 2025; Department of State, n.d.). This issue brief describes how these programs can succeed as they enter the implementation phase and deploy capital. They need more funding and incentives for participation, more provisions that protect American business, and stronger security guarantees to prevent adversaries from accessing or tampering with our technology.
By implementing a vigorous strategy to improve and expand these programs, the U.S. can secure its economic and national security interests while ensuring robust American employment. This report lays out such a strategy to equip policymakers for the opportunity of the moment.
What is the American AI Exports Program?
President Trump established the American AI Exports Program by Executive Order in July 2025 (Trump, 2025). The Program, headed by the Department of Commerce, aims to promote "full-stack AI export packages." The "stack" of AI includes energy infrastructure, data centers, chips, data, models, and applications. Companies are asked to form "consortia" to create these packages, which would include data center hardware, data pipelines, AI models and systems, security and cybersecurity measures, and AI applications.
These consortia will then receive financial, diplomatic, and other support mechanisms from the government. The Economic Diplomacy Action Group (EDAG) will coordinate financing for the program through various organizations, including the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM), International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Trade and Development Agency (TDA). Diplomatic and other support mechanisms may include dissuading burdensome foreign regulation, incentivizing countries to adopt these packages, and approving the export of advanced AI technology under certain conditions.
The Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration (ITA) opened a call for proposals on April 1, 2026 (Kimmitt, 2026). It considered proposals in its first iteration on a rolling basis until June 30 and issues consortia designations under the program within 60 days of submission.
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View the full report at: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/assets/uploads/files/Exporting_American_AI_to_Create_Jobs%2C_Grow_Our_Economy%2C_and_Beat_China.pdf
[Category: ThinkTank]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Introduction
America must export its world-leading AI stack abroad. Promoting the export of American AI technology is one of three pillars in the White House's AI Action Plan and, as President Trump said, we must "turn America into an AI export powerhouse" (Kratsios et al., 2025). Doing so will create American jobs, grow the economy, and reshore ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 7 (TNSLrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following brief on August 6, 2026, by Cole Salvador and Yusuf Mahmood entitled "Exporting American AI to Create Jobs, Grow Our Economy, and Beat China": Here are excerpts: * * * Introduction America must export its world-leading AI stack abroad. Promoting the export of American AI technology is one of three pillars in the White House's AI Action Plan and, as President Trump said, we must "turn America into an AI export powerhouse" (Kratsios et al., 2025). Doing so will create American jobs, grow the economy, and reshoremanufacturing.
The history of international technology competition shows that the companies and countries with the largest ecosystem for developers and users win, including in open source. America must also export AI to counter the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s hard and soft international power. The PRC seeks to push its values and economic system onto unaligned third countries through financing and technology exports, which the U.S. can disrupt by exporting its own superior products.
In doing so, however, the U.S. must ensure that it does not inadvertently aid its adversaries by allowing chipmaking equipment, semiconductors, or cloud computing resources to be diverted. The U.S. can prevent this by establishing rigorous and consistent security rules for exports. Finally, as American technology diffuses abroad, so too will our usage and development standards, which will determine the values and victors of the future. As U.S. AI becomes the global default, and we ensure that AI products and hardware are developed in America by American workers, we can create growth that boosts employment and national strength.
In 2025, the U.S. government created two landmark programs to achieve these goals while promoting and protecting U.S. AI exports: the American AI Exports Program and the Pax Silica economic security agreements (Trump, 2025; Department of State, n.d.). This issue brief describes how these programs can succeed as they enter the implementation phase and deploy capital. They need more funding and incentives for participation, more provisions that protect American business, and stronger security guarantees to prevent adversaries from accessing or tampering with our technology.
By implementing a vigorous strategy to improve and expand these programs, the U.S. can secure its economic and national security interests while ensuring robust American employment. This report lays out such a strategy to equip policymakers for the opportunity of the moment.
What is the American AI Exports Program?
President Trump established the American AI Exports Program by Executive Order in July 2025 (Trump, 2025). The Program, headed by the Department of Commerce, aims to promote "full-stack AI export packages." The "stack" of AI includes energy infrastructure, data centers, chips, data, models, and applications. Companies are asked to form "consortia" to create these packages, which would include data center hardware, data pipelines, AI models and systems, security and cybersecurity measures, and AI applications.
These consortia will then receive financial, diplomatic, and other support mechanisms from the government. The Economic Diplomacy Action Group (EDAG) will coordinate financing for the program through various organizations, including the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM), International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Trade and Development Agency (TDA). Diplomatic and other support mechanisms may include dissuading burdensome foreign regulation, incentivizing countries to adopt these packages, and approving the export of advanced AI technology under certain conditions.
The Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration (ITA) opened a call for proposals on April 1, 2026 (Kimmitt, 2026). It considered proposals in its first iteration on a rolling basis until June 30 and issues consortia designations under the program within 60 days of submission.
* * *
View the full report at: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/assets/uploads/files/Exporting_American_AI_to_Create_Jobs%2C_Grow_Our_Economy%2C_and_Beat_China.pdf
[Category: ThinkTank]