Think Tanks
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Middle East Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and U.S.-Venezuela Tensions Are Top U.S. Security Concerns for 2026, CFR Report Finds
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 (TNSxrep) -- The Council on Foreign Relations issued the following news release:
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Middle East Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and U.S.-Venezuela Tensions Are Top U.S. Security Concerns for 2026, CFR Report Finds
The United States is reducing its efforts to prevent war and violence, while the level of armed conflict around the world and the risk to the United States continue to increase, argues the annual Preventive Priorities Survey produced by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). This year, over six hundred American foreign policy experts deemed five conflict-related
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 (TNSxrep) -- The Council on Foreign Relations issued the following news release:
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Middle East Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and U.S.-Venezuela Tensions Are Top U.S. Security Concerns for 2026, CFR Report Finds
The United States is reducing its efforts to prevent war and violence, while the level of armed conflict around the world and the risk to the United States continue to increase, argues the annual Preventive Priorities Survey produced by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). This year, over six hundred American foreign policy experts deemed five conflict-relatedscenarios as highly likely to emerge or escalate and to have high impact on U.S. interests in 2026.
Experts are most concerned about conflict-related risks in the Middle East and eastern Europe, including the potential for increased clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinians in the West Bank, renewed fighting in the Gaza Strip, and intensified attacks in the Russia-Ukraine war. The possibility of direct U.S. military strikes in Venezuela and of an increase in political violence and popular unrest in the United States are similarly worrying scenarios.
Experts further warn of renewed armed conflict between Iran and Israel; a disruptive, artificial intelligence-enabled cyberattack on U.S. infrastructure; and a cross-strait crisis between China and Taiwan.
"Over the course of nearly two decades, CFR's Preventive Priorities Survey has become a timely and trustworthy tool for leading policymakers to gauge and triage global conflict risks," said CFR President Michael Froman. "Amid an increasingly fragmented and complex international security environment, the insights in this year's survey are as critical as ever."
Unlike other forecasting tools, the Preventive Priorities Survey aims to help U.S. policymakers prioritize competing conflict prevention and crisis mitigation demands. Conducted by CFR's Center for Preventive Action (CPA) every November, the survey asks foreign policy experts to evaluate thirty ongoing or potential violent conflicts based on their likelihood of occurring or escalating next year, as well as their possible impact on U.S. interests. And, for the first time, this year's survey asks experts to identify opportunities for conflict prevention and remediation.
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More From Our Experts
Paul B. Stares
Conflicts to Watch in 2026
Michael Froman
Reflections on Trump's National Security Strategy
Linda Robinson
Visualizing 2026: Five Foreign Policy Trends to Watch
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Two categories of opportunities emerged. The first includes conflicts where the United States can use its influence to mitigate conflict, such as in the Russia-Ukraine war and fighting between Hamas militants and Israeli security forces. The second includes conflicts where the United States can increase its support for international efforts toward peace, such as the civil war in Sudan and sectarian violence and a resurgence of ISIS in Syria.
"The world continues to grow more violent and disorderly. Last year's unprecedented level of anxiety among experts about the rising risk of conflict remains undiminished," said Paul B. Stares, CPA director and General John W. Vessey senior fellow for conflict prevention. "The United States can and should do much more to promote peace and stability internationally."
Read the full results (https://www.cfr.org/report/conflicts-watch-2026) and view prior surveys (https://www.cfr.org/preventive-priorities-survey).
Listen to the latest podcast episode of Why It Matters for more from Stares about the top concerns experts see on the horizon.
To learn more or to request an interview, please contact the Global Communications team at Communications@cfr.org.
The Preventive Priorities Survey was made possible by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
CFR's Center for Preventive Action seeks to help prevent, defuse, or resolve deadly conflicts around the world and to expand the body of knowledge on conflict prevention.
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Original text here: https://www.cfr.org/news-releases/middle-east-conflict-russia-ukraine-war-and-us-venezuela-tensions-are-top-us-security
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Militant Leadership Monitor: Mushtaq Kohi - BLA Financier's Fate Obscured
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 18, 2025, in its Militant Leadership Monitor:
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Mushtaq Kohi: BLA Financier's Fate Obscured
By Imtiaz Baloch
Executive Summary:
* Mushtaq Kohi, a senior Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) financial and logistical coordinator, was widely reported to have been killed in early 2025, but conflicting accounts, organizational silence, and circumstantial indicators have left his fate unresolved.
* The ambiguity surrounding Kohi's status underscores the BLA's ability to obscure leadership outcomes, complicating
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Dec. 18, 2025, in its Militant Leadership Monitor:
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Mushtaq Kohi: BLA Financier's Fate Obscured
By Imtiaz Baloch
Executive Summary:
* Mushtaq Kohi, a senior Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) financial and logistical coordinator, was widely reported to have been killed in early 2025, but conflicting accounts, organizational silence, and circumstantial indicators have left his fate unresolved.
* The ambiguity surrounding Kohi's status underscores the BLA's ability to obscure leadership outcomes, complicatingPakistani counterterrorism assessments and reducing confidence in claims of successful leadership decapitation.
* Kohi's case illustrates how compartmentalized, non-public figures can sustain militant financing and coordination even when removed from public view, highlighting an adaptive insurgent security culture capable of absorbing--or concealing--senior leadership losses without immediate operational collapse.
Mushtaq Kohi has been among the key figures of the Baloch Liberation Army faction led by Aslam Baloch and Bashir Zaib. Kohi has played a decisive role in overseeing financial operations, managing the flow of resources, and ensuring the continuation of the militant campaign across the region since his rise as a student activist./[1] While he is widely believed to have been killed in February 2025, a combination of unconfirmed reporting, organizational silence, and circumstantial indicators has fueled speculation that he may have survived the attack and withdrawn from public view.
Background: The BLA's Fragmentation
The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has experienced significant fragmentation and restructuring over the past seven years that has reshaped the militant separatist landscape in Pakistan's Balochistan province. The first major split occurred in 2012, triggered by disputes between the Marri brothers--Hairbyar Marri and his younger brother Mehran Marri--over allegations of financial misconduct and mismanagement within the organization (Dawn, June 1, 2015). This initial division weakened the group temporarily, but later internal disagreements and power struggles led to a more comprehensive organizational restructuring.
These new changes not only altered the command structure but also increased the frequency and scale of attacks carried out by the group. The restructuring further affected key leadership positions, including members of the BLA's highest decision-making body, the "Command Council," as well as the management of BLA operations, logistics, and finances. Over time, these developments allowed the BLA to adapt to counterinsurgency pressures while maintaining its ability to coordinate militant activities across Balochistan.
The restructuring triggered a significant escalation of violence by the group. After a period of internal fragmentation, a new faction identifying itself as the BLA emerged under the leadership of Aslam Baloch and Bashir Zaib, along with four other senior members of its command council (Terrorism Monitor, December 1, 2023). This faction assumed responsibility for key operational, logistical, and financial decisions, strengthening the group's overall structure and coordination.
Biography and Career in the BLA
Mustaq Kohi, the son of Mir Afzal Mengal, is originally from Noshki but moved with his family to the provincial capital. Known by the alias "Kohi" ("pertaining to the mountains"), he comes from the Qazi Abad area of Noshki. His nickname reflects both his roots and the rugged landscape associated with his involvement in the armed movement, which has shaped much of his identity. Kohi began his political involvement through the Baloch Student Organization (BSO-Azad) during his university years at the University of Balochistan. Though not academically serious, he was active in student circles and political gatherings. In his early days as a student activist, Kohi led the BSO at the university. This experience strengthened his interest in political participation and helped him rise to higher positions in the organization, eventually becoming a member of its Central Committee. Despite his active role, however, he was often seen as someone who was more supportive of armed struggle than political activism (Humgaam News, September 29, 2014).
Kohi later joined the BLA and quickly became an active and trusted member after his deployment to the Bolan region. During this period, he developed a close relationship with Aslam Baloch, the BLA's leader, who acted as a fatherly figure and mentored him in organizational and operational matters. Baloch's mentorship helped Kohi rise steadily through the ranks, eventually taking responsibility for the group's financial operations. In this role, he managed and oversaw funds collected through various means, including extortion from coal mining areas in Bolan, Quetta, and Dukki.
Kohi became a key figure in distributing finances among BLA cells and compounds. His influence reached both the group's top leadership and regional commanders, allegedly placing him on the same level as senior commander Bashir Zaib. Although the BLA's internal financial system is difficult to understand since it relies heavily on cash and informal transactions, Kohi's role was to manage these funds while generating new resources. His control over financial distribution strengthened his position and helped the group hide its financial routes and networks across Bolan, Makran, the Rakshan division, and the Jhalawan regions. Moreover, the networks' links to Bolan provided it a foothold in a strategic area that has long served as a natural hideout and a major source of funds, especially through its wide stretch of coal-mining regions (South Asia Times, February 2). These resources, which are considered vital to the BLA's operations, further expanded Kohi's influence.
Within the group, Kohi's followers--along with the loyalists of former BLA head Aslam--are often referred to as "Aslamists" and "Bolani," referring to Aslam Baloch and Kohi himself, respectively. In addition, a list of Balochistan's separatist leaders showed that the Balochistan Counter Terrorism Department and the provincial interior ministry announced a bounty of around $3,500 on him in 2016 (Daily Azadi, March 17, 2016).
Doubts Surrounding Death
Kohi is one of the few high-ranking senior members of the BLA who has remained largely out of sight of Pakistan's counterinsurgency actors. His strategy also became visible during an incident in which reports claimed he had been stabbed to death in a taxi in Afghanistan by an unknown killer--an allegation the BLA has neither confirmed nor denied (Balochistan Pulse, February 3). His reported death was portrayed as a major success for the state and the most important assassination of a BLA commander since the killing of Aslam Baloch in 2018. However, the continued flow of finances and the unchanged intensity of the group's attacks suggest that the celebration may have been premature (Khbarkhada, February 3).
A former close associate of Kohi dismissed the reports of his death. He explained that although Kohi had been seriously injured during the incident, he was quickly rescued by members of the group. The associate added that Kohi received immediate medical attention, was kept in a secure location, and recovered. However, the associate did not mention the location where Kohi was attacked, which further complicated the media's claims and added uncertainty to the reports about the incident./[2]
The BLA, for its part, has learned to remain silent about failed attacks or rumors surrounding the deaths of its senior commanders, including Majeed Brigade commander Captain Rahman Gul (Militant Leadership Monitor, August 13). A similar pattern was seen when Kohi narrowly survived a knife attack. Although the BLA regularly glorifies its fallen members as martyrs and uses their stories as propaganda to attract recruits, it has shown a different approach in this case, prompting room for speculation (The Balochistan Post, August 17).
This year's commemoration of slain BLA fighters notably included no references to Kohi. The group commemorates its dead every year on November 13, the day it dedicates to Baloch fighters and political workers who have been killed, disappeared, or suppressed. On this occasion, it releases images and brief tributes to its "martyrs," highlighting their roles and sacrifices. During its most recent online concert, the group displayed photos of several slain fighters as part of its commemorative visuals, but did not include Kohi's image or offer any indication that he had been killed. This stands in clear contrast to claims made by Pakistani media, which reported his death as a certainty, despite lacking confirmation from the group itself (The Balochistan Post, November 13).
Conclusion
Kohi held an important role in maintaining the operation of his faction of the BLA. His assignments included managing finances, operations, and to some extent ensuring the logistic supply line for the group. Moreover, his familiarity with guerrilla strategy, staying beyond the reach of Pakistan's counter-terrorism authorities and leaving no footprints on the battlefield or in digital spaces, indicates a closed communication network and the compartmentalization of the BLA's approach. However, his unconfirmed rescue after being stabbed--if true--highlights the BLA's ability to secure its leadership's safety even under intense spontaneous threats.
Kohi's prolonged absence from public militant discourse has itself become analytically significant. This reflects the group's preference for opacity when leadership outcomes are uncertain or strategically sensitive. The BLA's silence following reports of his death, combined with the lack of definitive confirmation and the continued functioning of financial and operational networks associated with his portfolio, underscores the difficulty facing Pakistani counterterrorism authorities in accurately assessing leadership attrition within the insurgency.
For Pakistani counter-terrorism forces, Kohi poses significant challenges in tracking the Baloch insurgency's leadership and understanding its expanding operational capabilities. Furthermore, the failed early 2025 attempt to assassinate Kohi is likely to prompt the BLA to adopt stricter security measures to safeguard its senior commanders. This speaks to the group's resilience, mobility, and ability to continue to maintain control over contested areas.
At present, the available evidence is insufficient to conclusively determine Kohi's fate. What can be stated with greater confidence is that the ambiguity surrounding his status highlights the BLA's adaptive security culture, its reliance on compartmentalized leadership roles, and its ability to absorb--or obscure--the loss of senior figures without immediate operational collapse. For Pakistani security services, this uncertainty complicates efforts to measure the effectiveness of targeted killings and underscores the need for caution in declaring strategic success absent corroboration.
[1] "Chadda," a Guidebook of BLA." Hakkal, 2023, p. 53.
[2] Former Member of BSO-Azad. Mushtaq Kohi. Oct. 2025. Spoke on condition of anonymity.
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Imtiaz Baloch is an Islamabad-based journalist and researcher covering a diverse range of topics particularly security and conflict in Balochistan and Iran.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/mushtaq-kohi-bla-financiers-fate-obscured/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: German Export Expectations Up Only Slightly - December 2025
MUNICH, Germany, Dec. 19 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
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German Export Expectations up Only Slightly (December 2025)
Sentiment in the German Export Industry has brightened marginally. The ifo Export Expectations rose to -3.1 points in December, up from -3.8 points in November. "The export economy is ending the year on a disappointing note," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The outlook for the first quarter of 2026 is rather subdued. Any real revival in exports just isn't happening."
The automotive industry and mechanical engineering are predominantly cautious
... Show Full Article
MUNICH, Germany, Dec. 19 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
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German Export Expectations up Only Slightly (December 2025)
Sentiment in the German Export Industry has brightened marginally. The ifo Export Expectations rose to -3.1 points in December, up from -3.8 points in November. "The export economy is ending the year on a disappointing note," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The outlook for the first quarter of 2026 is rather subdued. Any real revival in exports just isn't happening."
The automotive industry and mechanical engineering are predominantly cautiousand expect exports to decline. The food industry also expects declines, albeit to a lesser extent than in the previous month. Manufacturers of electronic and optical products, on the other hand, are largely optimistic about the coming months. They expect growth in international business. Exports for beverage manufacturers are also picking up - the indicator rose to its highest level since April. Among manufacturers of electrical equipment, the temporary euphoria of recent months has evaporated, and they now expect only slight growth in exports.
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More information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2025-12-18/german-export-expectations-only-slightly-december-2025)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2025-12-18/german-export-expectations-only-slightly-december-2025
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Companies in Germany Continue to Cut Jobs - December 2025
MUNICH, Germany, Dec. 19 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
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Companies in Germany Continue to Cut Jobs (December 2025)
Companies in Germany are more cautious again about hiring new staff, and most of them are cutting jobs. The ifo Employment Barometer fell to 91.9 points in December, down from 92.5 points in November, the lowest level since May 2020. "In 2025, we experienced gradual job cuts, especially in industry," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The weak economy is continuing to slow down the labor market."
In industry, almost all sectors are continuing
... Show Full Article
MUNICH, Germany, Dec. 19 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:
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Companies in Germany Continue to Cut Jobs (December 2025)
Companies in Germany are more cautious again about hiring new staff, and most of them are cutting jobs. The ifo Employment Barometer fell to 91.9 points in December, down from 92.5 points in November, the lowest level since May 2020. "In 2025, we experienced gradual job cuts, especially in industry," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "The weak economy is continuing to slow down the labor market."
In industry, almost all sectors are continuingto cut jobs. Clothing manufacturers in particular want to cut staff. Service providers also remain reluctant to hire new staff; the barometer fell here again. The picture is similar in trade, with companies planning to employ fewer staff in the new year. In construction, positive and negative expectations are currently in balance - the construction industry plans to keep its headcount unchanged. The tourism industry and management consultancies have a positive outlook: They plan to hire more staff in the new year.
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More information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2025-12-19/companies-germany-continue-cut-jobs-december-2025)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2025-12-19/companies-germany-continue-cut-jobs-december-2025
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Hill: How Tolerant Australia Became a Hotbed of Antisemitism
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Dec. 18, 2025, to the Hill:
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How Tolerant Australia Became a Hotbed of Antisemitism
By John Lee
There is a bipartisan consensus amongst Australians that we are the most successful multicultural country in the world. This refers to a national and societal approach that celebrates a diversity of cultures, faiths, and even values coexisting peacefully, if not harmoniously.
Yet this week, at least 15 Jews celebrating
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Dec. 18, 2025, to the Hill:
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How Tolerant Australia Became a Hotbed of Antisemitism
By John Lee
There is a bipartisan consensus amongst Australians that we are the most successful multicultural country in the world. This refers to a national and societal approach that celebrates a diversity of cultures, faiths, and even values coexisting peacefully, if not harmoniously.
Yet this week, at least 15 Jews celebratingHanukkah were just shot and killed, with many more injured. How then, do we make sense of the worst terrorist attack against Jews since the Oct. 7, 2023 atrocity, right here at the iconic Bondi Beach in Sydney?
Australian elites have clearly failed in their role as self-appointed custodians of multiculturalism. But there is likely to be little accountability for any of them. To paraphrase political scientist Hannah Arendt in her study into the evils of Nazism, when too many people are guilty, no one will be blamed. Regarding the creeping anti-Semitism which has occurred in Australia since the attacks on October 7, there are too many elites at fault. The national grieving might be sincere. But it will be accompanied by a national washing of collective hands from blame.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu directs his ire toward Prime Minister Anthony Albanese because the latter "let the disease of antisemitism spread." The Australian leader is not alone. Days after the October 7, 2023 attacks, the Israeli flag was beamed onto the architectural sails of the Sydney Opera House to offer support for Israelis. On that very evening, pro-Palestinian protesters marched to the Opera House chanting slogans such as "F-- the Jews" and "F-- Israel," denying Jewish Australian Jewish mourners their opportunity to grieve together in a public place. The state government in New South Wales tolerated the protest on the basis that it was more dangerous to public peace to prevent the pro-Palestinian march.
Indeed, the most notable arrest that evening was of an Australian Jewish businessman holding an Israeli flag -- supposedly detained for his own protection.
Those early responses set the standard for what has been permitted since. Since 2023, and under the banner of supporting Palestinian justice and statehood, Jewish Australians have suffered significant increases in harassment, intimidation and threats. Synagogues and Jewish shops have been targeted by arsonists and graffitied with insults and hate slogans. University leaders have allowed students and academics to camp out on campuses to rally against Jews and Zionism on behalf of the Palestinian cause.
There have been almost weekly protests permitted by state governments and police forces in major cities that involve not just pro-Palestinian chants of 'From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free," but at times the burning of Australian and Israeli flags, placards with images of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and symbols of Hamas, even though it has been listed as a terrorist group by the Australian government since 2003.
Political violence becomes ever more likely when hostility toward Jews becomes commonplace, normalized, and eventually legitimized. However, there was a further insidious role played by Australia's elites in the legitimization of hostility towards Jews and Israel. From Albanese to provincial and community leaders, Islamophobia was elevated alongside antisemitism as an evil of equal standing and prevalence, despite the threats and intimidation being against Jewish rather than Muslim Australians.
False equivalence in the moral identification of threats is dishonest. It plays down and even delegitimizes instances of blatant antisemitism by downgrading it as a national priority. In response to the widespread targeting of Jews, and at the same time a Special Envoy to Combat antisemitism was announced by Albanese in September 2024, a Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia was also appointed. This muddied the waters as to who the victims really were in a divided Australia. It deepened the false narrative that bias in favor of Jews is as much a problem as bias against them.
There is a further piece of the antisemitic puzzle. The twisting of political and social truths and loss of perspective by Australian elites must be understood in the context of the typical, lackadaisical Australian attitude toward religious and historical rivalries. To many Australians, these are problems of little concern and relevance to their country. Some Australians with no true interest in geopolitics joined the marches and protests because they became fashionable. But, assured by many elites that the anti-Semitic problem in Australia was exaggerated, many more simply tuned it all out.
This meant that there was little ground-up interest to speak out against and oppose what is now clear to all regarding the gathering tide of elite-sponsored anti-Semitism taking root in Australia since 2023. Even after the Bondi Beach shootings, social sites and media are awash with comments warning against the importation of foreign and ancient rivalries to our shores, ignoring the ample evidence that they have already taken root.
The two shooters were father and son. The former came to Australia in 1998, and the latter was born and raised locally. Australians are in shock, even though it was an entirely foreseeable attack.
Australians are going to have to rethink what successful multiculturalism looks like. When the term gained in popularity in the 1990s, it was a rejection of homogeneity or integration as the organizing principle for society. But multiculturalism at that time still meant equal responsibilities and rights for all identities that made up Australian society.
That recipe for tolerance is giving way to a ranking of social identities and causes based on notions of separating groups into victims and oppressors. The causes linked to perceived victims, such as the Palestinians, means their advocates enjoy maximum rights and minimal responsibilities. If it continues, multiculturalism in Australia will become a failed experiment.
Read in The Hill (https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5653018-how-tolerant-australia-became-a-hotbed-of-antisemitism/).
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John Lee is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/how-tolerant-australia-became-hotbed-antisemitism-john-lee
[Category: ThinkTank]
Heritage Expert: Rescheduling Cannabis is Bad for America, Good for the CCP
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following statement on Dec. 18, 2025:
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Heritage Expert: Rescheduling Cannabis is Bad for America, Good for the CCP
The Heritage Foundation released the following statement today from John, Barbara & Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Research Fellow Paul Larkin, responding to President Donald J. Trump's executive order relisting cannabis, otherwise known as marijuana, from Schedule I to Schedule III under the Controlled Substances Act:
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"President Trump's decision to relist cannabis and make it more widely accessible is misguided
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 -- The Heritage Foundation issued the following statement on Dec. 18, 2025:
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Heritage Expert: Rescheduling Cannabis is Bad for America, Good for the CCP
The Heritage Foundation released the following statement today from John, Barbara & Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Research Fellow Paul Larkin, responding to President Donald J. Trump's executive order relisting cannabis, otherwise known as marijuana, from Schedule I to Schedule III under the Controlled Substances Act:
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"President Trump's decision to relist cannabis and make it more widely accessible is misguidedfor several reasons.
"First, cannabis sold today is far more powerful than the version smoked at Woodstock. Then, the THC content was 3-6%. Now, some concentrated products approach a 100% THC content. That difference is like comparing 'near beer' to grain alcohol.
"Second, there is growing evidence that links marijuana with adverse physical problems, such as oral, head, and neck cancers, cardiovascular disorders, pulmonary disease, earlier onset of psychosis, Cannabis Hyperemesis Syndrome, and other serious issues. Heavy cannabis users and people who begin its use as minors and continue into adulthood are particularly susceptible.
"Third, moving cannabis to Schedule III ensures the likelihood of more use, which we know leads to worse outcomes socially and physically for people on this drug. For example, states that have allowed more relaxed cannabis use have experienced higher accident rates, injuries, and fatalities from drivers under the influence.
"The real beneficiaries of today's rescheduling decision are not Americans or patients suffering from pain, but the Chinese transnational criminal organizations, which control 75% of the illegal marijuana industry. This means America's enemy, the Chinese Communist Party, benefits as well.
"An unsafe drug like cannabis cannot be placed in any category but Schedule I. It's up to policymakers to classify this harmful drug correctly."
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For 87 years, the nation has trusted the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to decide what substances are "drugs" and what drugs are "safe," "effective," and "uniformly made." Schedule I is for drugs that have no proven medical use. The FDA has not found and could not find that the cannabis plant is safe. Cannabis belongs in Schedule I.
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BACKGROUND:
The Heritage Foundation: Illegal, Chinese-Owned Marijuana Farms Have Consumed Rural America
The Heritage Foundation: Rescheduling Cannabis Downwards Would Be a Huge Mistake
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Original text here: https://www.heritage.org/press/heritage-expert-rescheduling-cannabis-bad-america-good-the-ccp
[Category: ThinkTank]
CEPR Paper Finds More Errors Behind Claims That Sanctions on Venezuela Don't Drive Migration
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 (TNSrept) -- The Center for Economic and Policy Research issued the following news release:
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New CEPR Paper Finds More Errors Behind Claims that Sanctions on Venezuela Don't Drive Migration
A new CEPR paper (https://cepr.net/publications/why-bahar-and-hausmann-tell-us-nothing-about-venezuelan-migration-flows-to-the-united-states/) finds new problems with analysis purporting to show that economic sanctions on Venezuela do not drive migration. The paper, by CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodriguez and economist Giancarlo Bravo, examines methodology used by Dany
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 (TNSrept) -- The Center for Economic and Policy Research issued the following news release:
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New CEPR Paper Finds More Errors Behind Claims that Sanctions on Venezuela Don't Drive Migration
A new CEPR paper (https://cepr.net/publications/why-bahar-and-hausmann-tell-us-nothing-about-venezuelan-migration-flows-to-the-united-states/) finds new problems with analysis purporting to show that economic sanctions on Venezuela do not drive migration. The paper, by CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodriguez and economist Giancarlo Bravo, examines methodology used by DanyBahar and Ricardo Hausmann earlier this year in which Bahar and Hausmann claimed to find evidence against the hypothesis that oil sanctions on Venezuela lead to increased migration flows to the United States. Rodriguez and Bravo find that Bahar and Hausmann incorrectly applied cointegration methods, and that once this misspecification was corrected, Bahar and Hausmann's evidence of cointegration in the data disappeared.
"Data clearly show that economic sanctions on Venezuela have directly and significantly negatively affected millions of Venezuelans," Rodriguez said. "Data also show that millions of people have left Venezuela after these sanctions were enacted. No one has been able to show that sanctions haven't been a factor in pushing people to leave Venezuela, let alone that somehow sanctions lead to less migration."
The CEPR paper examines claims made by Bahar and Hausmann that sanctions on Venezuela's oil industry do not drive migration to the United States and finds no support for these claims in their own data. The CEPR economists have shown that Bahar and Hausmann's results were based on an error: the use of a nonstandard and misspecified test to evaluate the existence of a long-run relationship between Venezuelan migration to the US and Venezuelan oil revenues.
Rodriguez and Bravo explain that Bahar and Hausmann used a method known as cointegration testing to assess whether there was a long-run relationship between migration and oil revenues, but applied the method incorrectly. "This method is designed to be applied to the levels of variables, but Bahar and Hausmann mistakenly took first-differences of the series before running the test," explained Rodriguez. "Once you correct that mistake, their results disappear."
Rodriguez and Bravo tested Bahar and Hausmann's methodology by running Monte Carlo simulations on time series of the length that Bahar and Hausmann used. Rodriguez and Bravo found that these yielded a false positive rate of 100 percent, identifying a long-term relationship even when two variables were completely unrelated. "These results imply that the Bahar-Hausmann approach is guaranteed to find evidence of cointegration even when no such relationship exists."
This is not the first time that CEPR researchers found problems in the research of Bahar and Hausmann. In April of this year, Rodriguez and Bravo uncovered a coding error in Bahar and Hausmann's paper that claimed that sanctions led to lower migration. Bahar and Hausmann acknowledged the mistake and corrected it, yet still claimed that their results supported their thesis. "This was a very odd response, as their coefficients had turned statistically insignificant after correcting the coding error," said Rodriguez. "The norm in economics research is that you don't claim that you have found evidence of an effect unless you can establish that it is statistically significant," said Rodriguez. "Bahar and Hausmann have deviated substantially from this norm."
Bahar and Hausmann cited US border encounters with Venezuelan nationals "to assess hypotheses about the effects of sanctions on migration flows," but Rodriguez and Bravo point out that "A large share of Venezuelans who attempt to enter the United States today have spent several years living outside of Venezuela, often in countries like Colombia, Peru, or Mexico. It is unclear why their decisions to migrate to the United States would be affected by fluctuations in the resources under the control of Nicolas Maduro's government."
CEPR has also noted that Bahar and Hausmann failed to consider the possible impact of US labor market conditions on Venezuelan migration, and Rodriguez and Bravo note that while "Bahar (2025) argues that labor market conditions in the US are a key determinant of border crossings, [...] Bahar and Hausmann make no effort to control for this effect."
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Original text here: https://cepr.net/newsroom/new-cepr-paper-finds-more-errors-behind-claims-that-sanctions-on-venezuela-dont-drive-migration/
[Category: ThinkTank]
