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Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: SPIEF'26 Highlighted Russia's Growing Economic Troubles
WASHINGTON, June 9 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by Pavel K. Baev, senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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SPIEF'26 Highlighted Russia's Growing Economic Troubles
Executive Summary:
* The annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2026 (SPIEF'26), which Russia held from June 3 to June 6, highlighted Russia's worsening economic troubles. Rosstat released data just before the forum showing that fixed investments in the first quarter of 2026 declined by 14.3 percent
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 9 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by Pavel K. Baev, senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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SPIEF'26 Highlighted Russia's Growing Economic Troubles
Executive Summary:
* The annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2026 (SPIEF'26), which Russia held from June 3 to June 6, highlighted Russia's worsening economic troubles. Rosstat released data just before the forum showing that fixed investments in the first quarter of 2026 declined by 14.3 percentcompared with the same period in 2025.
* Putin used his keynote address at the forum to reaffirm his commitment to the war in Ukraine, rejecting ceasefire proposals and portraying Russia as advancing militarily. Repeated Ukrainian drone strikes on strategic military and energy targets during the forum, however, undermined Kremlin claims of strong defenses and battlefield momentum.
* Ukraine's growing technological and strategic advantages are shifting the war's trajectory, increasing pressure for negotiations. Russia's business elites went through the motions of demonstrating loyalty to Putin by attending SPIEF'26 amid mounting economic and security challenges.
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The annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2026 (SPIEF'26), which Russia held from June 3 to June 6, has long lost the goal of attracting international investors and celebrating lucrative joint ventures with Western corporations attracted by low taxes and one-time unimpeded capital flows. Conversations about investments at the event last week were awkward since the official data for investments in fixed assets in the first quarter of 2026, which Rosstat released just before the forum, showed a 14.3 percent decline compared with the same period in 2025 (The Moscow Times, June 4). Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov claimed this decline was a statistical incident not representative of gross domestic product (GDP) and promised that these investments would "smooth out" over time (Interfax, June 4). The economic forum's key sessions firmly avoided discussions on the depth and duration of the unfolding economic recession in Russia, to the point that even mainstream media dared to criticize the trivial discourse amid the collapse of investments in Russia (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 4). Some observers thought the event's theme--"Pragmatic dialogue: The path to a stable future"--hinted at a possible easing of the Kremlin's unwavering commitment to continuing its deadlocked war against Ukraine, but the forum resolutely extinguished any such hopes (SPIEF'26, 3-6 June).
The keynote session with Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed any notion that the forum would signal some intention to de-escalate hostilities (Riddle, June 6). Ukrainian drone strikes in the morning of the forum's opening delivered a momentous foreword to Putin's address, and arriving guests observed a dense cloud of smoke (Meduza, June 3). Several oil terminal attacks in the days leading up to the forum followed the pattern of systematic Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, which has caused shortages at gas stations in many regions, including in St. Petersburg (Fontanka.ru, June 2; The Bell, June 5). On June 3, Ukrainian drones set fire to the Russian navy's Boikiy corvette ship, which was undergoing repairs in the Kronstadt dry dock (Meduza, May 5).
The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media to downplay the strikes. Putin still found it necessary to say that only a few foreign-supplied drones made some occasional hits, claiming that Russia had a strong air defense system and Ukraine does not (Kommersant, June 4). The follow-up attack on St. Petersburg on the last day of the forum, in which Ukrainian drones hit a naval arsenal and a submarine design bureau, proved him wrong (Current Time, June 6).
The main message of Putin's keynote address was that the war is going in Russia's favor and the army is on the offensive every day. Putin asserted the Russian army recently captured some 2,440 square kilometers (942 square miles), a bold departure from reality (RBC, June 4; NV.ua, June 5). In response to a long open letter from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy proposing a ceasefire and a face-to-face meeting, Putin told soldiers at the front lines to "Keep working, brothers" (Vzglyad; TopWar.ru, June 5). Putin lengthily explained his rejection of Zelenskyy's meeting proposal, arguing that Kyiv was merely desperate to avoid a looming defeat (Kommersant, June 5).
Zelensky's June 4 letter argued that the nature of the war is changing, notably in tune with Putin's speculations about a "new quality" of the hostilities (TASS, June 2; Gazeta.ru, June 6). Putin may have only a vague articulation about the fast transformation of the war, but even Russia's jingoist commentators cannot ignore the impact of Ukrainian middle-range strikes, which have turned the supply route to Crimea into a "road of death" (Tsargrad, June 4). At the same time, Ukrainian long-distance strikes are eroding Russia's economy, and the accelerating introduction of Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles and combat robots are giving Kyiv a new tactical edge in battles (Re: Russia, June 2; The Insider, June 5).
The shift of the tide of war in Ukraine's favor makes it urgent for Moscow to engage in peace talks. Zelenskyy argues that waiting for U.S. attention, which is presently focused on Iran, makes little sense (Radio Svoboda, June 5). Putin, to the contrary, persists with referring to agreements allegedly made with U.S. President Donald Trump at the Anchorage summit in August 2025, even if Washington has stated that no understanding on Russia's full control over Donbas was reached (RBC.ru, May 13; Vedomosti, June 4). Europe has taken on the main burden of supporting Ukraine and is preparing to open a "window for dialogue" with Russia together with Zelenskyy, who travelled to London on June 7 for talks with the leaders of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Lenta.ru, June 3; Izvestiya, June 8). Putin has expressed interest in exploring these opportunities but also argues that Europe cannot play the role of a mediator because it is entirely on Ukraine's side (Versiya.ru, June 4). His mixed messages are meant to exacerbate disagreements inside the European Union, specifically concerns about the reductions of U.S. commitments in Northern Europe (RIAC, June 5). Russian strategic planning indicates that northern Europe would be the most likely theater in a confrontation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Rossiiskaya Gazeta; Novaya Gazeta Europe, June 5; KP.ru, June 6).
Putin's fixation on subjugating Ukraine and prevailing in his confrontation with Europe departs far from the preferences of the bureaucratic and business elites that flocked to St. Petersburg expecting to get at least some value for the pricey entry tickets. For Putin, their attendance was a manifestation of loyalty, which was habitually provided, but the background of drone attacks exposed the cracks of this performance.
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Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/spief26-highlighted-russias-growing-economic-troubles/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Mobilization Could Lead to More Russian Deserters From Moscow's War
WASHINGTON, June 9 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by analyst Kassie Corelli:
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Mobilization Could Lead to More Russian Deserters From Moscow's War
Executive Summary:
* Russian President Vladimir Putin has only two options regarding his war against Ukraine. He either has to end the war without achieving its goals or announce a new mobilization of both Russian society and the economy.
* The number of Russian deserters fleeing to European countries will sharply increase should there be a mobilization. European states rarely provide political asylum
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 9 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by analyst Kassie Corelli:
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Mobilization Could Lead to More Russian Deserters From Moscow's War
Executive Summary:
* Russian President Vladimir Putin has only two options regarding his war against Ukraine. He either has to end the war without achieving its goals or announce a new mobilization of both Russian society and the economy.
* The number of Russian deserters fleeing to European countries will sharply increase should there be a mobilization. European states rarely provide political asylumto former military personnel, fearing their possible aggressive behavior or involvement in war crimes.
* Organizations to aid and clear deserters are springing up. The number of countries that could be called safe for deserters and dissidents persecuted by the Russian government, however, is shrinking.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin likely has only two options ahead of him for his war against Ukraine. He either needs to end the war without achieving its goals or announce a new mobilization of its economy and society. In May, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published a report by Nigel Gould-Davies arguing that without a new mobilization of human resources and restrictions on personal liberty, the Kremlin cannot pursue the conflict with the same intensity (IISS, May 18). Russian opposition journalist Michael Nucky stated that even if Russian President Vladimir Putin avoids unpopular decisions to the end, he will soon be forced to make a hard choice. If a new mobilization is announced, the Russian government will have to close the borders and massively exterminate the dissatisfied (YouTube/@MackNack, May 20). New restrictions, including the Kremlin's internet blocking, may signal preparations for a mobilization. Should Russia initiate a mobilization, it will likely not be possible for those who do not want to fight to leave the country, as it was nearly four years ago during the 2022 partial mobilization. The most probable way to avoid dying in one of the Kremlin's meat assaults will be to desert from a military unit or flee directly from the battlefield.
European countries only rarely grant political asylum to former soldiers. Germany has refused asylum to deserters. According to Mediazona, Germany based these refusals on Putin's claim that mobilization in Russia was at an end and that Russia does consider deserters "political opponents." Criminal cases, however, are almost always initiated in Russia against persons who leave a military unit without permission (Mediazona, January 30). Over just the first nine months of 2025, Finland deported 104 Russians who had applied for political asylum, including deserters (The Insider, September 5, 2025).
Attitudes toward Russians fighting in Ukraine will only worsen. On January 12, Estonia forbade entry into the country to those who fought in Ukraine for the Russian military. Deputy General Secretary of the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs Yoosep Kaasik noted that the ban extends to deserters (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, January 31). There are ongoing active discussions in Europe about extending this rule throughout the European Union (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, March 25).
Alarm about Russian deserters is understandable. At the beginning of May, Yevgeniy Brazhnikov, who worked at a secret prison in Donetsk where Ukrainian prisoners were tortured, was arrested in France. He participated in extracting confessions, employed force and torture, abused people, and applied psychological pressure on them. Brazhnikov has been in France since 2021 and applied for political asylum (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, May 9). The likelihood of finding war criminals among Russian deserters will probably continue.
Russian soldiers have been choosing to flee to Kazakhstan, Armenia, and other non-visa countries. Even there, they cannot feel safe, as Kazakhstan has refused asylum to deserters (Telegram/@iditelesom, February 13). This spring, Kazakhstan began frequently returning not only deserters and draft dodgers but also ordinary dissidents to Russia (Carnegie Politika, March 11). Armenia generally does not extradite deserters at Russia's request. There are numerous cases, however, of abduction of former military personnel in Armenia by Russian security forces. The abductees are held at a military base in Gyumri and then taken to Russia (Current Time, April 9). Attempts at such abductions are a common occurrence (Doxa.team, July 21, 2025).
Several human rights organizations are helping former Russian soldiers. The former Russian soldiers receiving this assistance are largely deserters. The "Get lost" project mainly focuses on the evacuation of military personnel from the front line. The organizations "A Farewell to Arms" (France) and "Hard Sign" (Armenia) focus on assistance with the legalization and adaptation of deserters abroad, as well as with obtaining asylum in the West. Representatives of these organizations point out that they are prepared to help anyone leave the front and stop killing Ukrainians. The organizations carefully vet each person before offering them any further assistance. One means of verification is through checking with the Prosecutor General of Ukraine to see if a deserter participated in war crimes (Forum Daily, May 20).
The dilemma between the need to reduce the size of the Russian army and the security of the countries receiving deserters is quite complex. If "third countries" outside of the European Union did not extradite those deserters or dissidents who have passed the necessary verification and proved the fact of persecution by Russia, perhaps more would be willing to desert. This could reduce the number of people wishing to enter the European Union and undermine the combat effectiveness of the Russian army.
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Kassie Corelli is an analyst with The Jamestown Foundation.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/mobilization-could-lead-to-more-russian-deserters-from-moscows-war/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Xi's Calculated Return to Pyongyang
WASHINGTON, June 9 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by Asia-Pacific Security Chair Patrick M. Cronin:
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Xi's Calculated Return to Pyongyang
Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang this week signals that Northeast Asia's power balance is recalibrating. Returning to North Korea for the first time since 2019, Xi is deploying his personal political capital at a moment when North Korea has gained leverage from its advancing nuclear program and a nascent Moscow partnership.
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, June 9 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by Asia-Pacific Security Chair Patrick M. Cronin:
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Xi's Calculated Return to Pyongyang
Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang this week signals that Northeast Asia's power balance is recalibrating. Returning to North Korea for the first time since 2019, Xi is deploying his personal political capital at a moment when North Korea has gained leverage from its advancing nuclear program and a nascent Moscow partnership.For Kim Jong Un, sustained high-level attention from major powers, including Beijing, is key as Pyongyang seeks to project itself as a member of the club of nuclear great powers.
For Xi, the Pyongyang trip advances several foreign policy imperatives. It strengthens his credentials ahead of a likely fourth term in 2027, reinforces Beijing's bid to be seen as a global stabilizer and the champion of a multipolar order, and projects unity while reasserting China's sway in Pyongyang. Beijing remains North Korea's principal economic lifeline, supplying goods, services, and connectivity that Moscow cannot fully substitute. Xi has every reason to warn Kim that North Korea's expanding alignment with Moscow must not come at China's expense, a message that simultaneously signals Beijing's willingness to defend its core interests while resisting coercive pressure from other major powers.
Xi arrives as a mediator, not a meddler. He can convey Washington's views to Kim while committing to nothing on negotiations. Beijing's interest is to deter North Korea from being drawn into renewed nuclear dialogue, since overt pressure would likely backfire. Kim's September 2025 Beijing meeting placed no public emphasis on nuclear issues, highlighting a shared preference for managing risk over provoking new rounds of bargaining.
Kim enters the encounter from a position of greater confidence than at any point since the pandemic. Hosting Beijing's leader underscores his country's diplomatic rehabilitation and signals the regime's success in restoring its strategic relevance. North Korea now enjoys "dual patronage" from both Russia and China. The Kremlin's dependence on Pyongyang's manpower, munitions, and military support for its war in Ukraine reduces North Korea's traditional reliance on China, while Beijing and Moscow can be played off against one another to extract concessions. Kim Il Sung would be proud of his grandson, whose leverage is growing and whose autonomy within the Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang triangle is expanding.
North Korea's expanding nuclear and missile capabilities reduce its reliance on both China and Russia while strengthening its ability to deter or complicate US intervention. Kim's recent visit to a new uranium enrichment facility last week underscores how he sees nuclear weapons as shoring up his ability to deal with major powers, including China. Meanwhile, these capabilities provide Pyongyang with greater coercive leverage over both Washington and Seoul.
What should allies do? The implications for the United States and South Korea are fourfold:
First, recognize the limits of diplomacy. Washington and Seoul should acknowledge the boundaries of diplomacy with Pyongyang. Strategic communications remain essential to reduce risk and avoid miscalculation, but expecting North Korea to surrender its nuclear arsenal is unrealistic. The objective is risk management, stability, and a controlled diplomatic horizon, not magical thinking about negotiated denuclearization.
Second, accelerate alliance modernization. Focus on deterrence and military effectiveness, not symbolic gestures. Concrete steps include supporting South Korea's development of a nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarine to bolster undersea deterrence; expanding production in shipbuilding, semiconductors, and emerging technologies; and deepening Korea-Japan-US trilateral cooperation to build a more integrated regional deterrence-by-denial architecture.
Third, secure critical supply chains. Deepen cooperation with like-minded partners to safeguard access to processed rare earths, critical minerals, and other essential technologies, while diversifying suppliers and investing in resilient domestic capabilities, including offshore and domestic production capacity. The allies may not be able to halt North Korea's nuclear industry, but it can bolster US and South Korean industrial strength.
Finally, strengthen extended deterrence. The United States should demonstrate credible deterrence in a more contested nuclear environment. This should include ongoing modernization of US forces and capabilities, with visible demonstrations as appropriate, and coordinated signals ahead of future summits involving major leaders.
If Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang are using military modernization to shape perceptions of power, the United States and its allies should respond with credible deterrence and a resolute commitment to maintaining the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
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Patrick M. Cronin is the Asia-Pacific security chair at Hudson Institute.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/xis-calculated-return-pyongyang-patrick-cronin
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: No-class-required Test That Gives Students Immediate College Credit
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, June 9 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary by policy fellow Josiah Padley:
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The no-class-required test that gives students immediate college credit
Prospective college students should know that there are simple, affordable tests available that can allow them to test out of many basic college courses.
The College-Level Examination Program (CLEP exam) lets students prove their mastery of introductory academic material via a test. The idea is simple:
... Show Full Article
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, June 9 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary by policy fellow Josiah Padley:
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The no-class-required test that gives students immediate college credit
Prospective college students should know that there are simple, affordable tests available that can allow them to test out of many basic college courses.
The College-Level Examination Program (CLEP exam) lets students prove their mastery of introductory academic material via a test. The idea is simple:prospective college students who already know the material shouldn't waste time and money in simplistic classes. They can use the CLEP exam to test out of basic college courses, saving hundreds of dollars and working hours in the process.
The CLEP exam, launched in 1967 by the College Board, has high levels of national institutional trust. Thousands of colleges accept passing CLEP exams in lieu of introductory coursework. (For example, the University of Minnesota - Twin Cities campus accepts CLEP credits for College Mathematics, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics.)
CLEP isn't the only way for prospective students to gain college credit. Many high schools offer Advanced Placement (AP) courses, which are also administered through the nonprofit College Board. At the end of the yearlong course, teachers proctor a final exam. If students score well enough, their AP scores may qualify them to skip introductory college courses.
While an AP course is an excellent opportunity for many high schoolers, the CLEP exam offers far more flexibility. CLEP exams are offered to students of any age, at any time throughout the year, and allow for unlimited retakes. The exams, usually around two hours, are comprised solely of multiple-choice questions and cost $97. With 34 exams to choose from, enterprising students could knock out thousands of dollars worth of basic college credits and focus their time in college on major-specific coursework.
Accessibility and flexibility are significant strengths of the CLEP exam, but this pathway to college credit has challenges. Unlike AP exams, which are taken at the end of a yearlong course, CLEP exams have no required course attached to them. The exams (which are rigorous enough to be considered stand-ins for college credit) can be an excellent choice for autodidacts and self-motivated learners. However, the majority of learners need high-structure courses to retain information.
Thankfully, there are completely free online courses designed to prepare students for the CLEP test, offered through the nonprofit Modern States Education Alliance. Since the program launched in 2017, 800,000 students have taken free courses through Modern States in preparation for CLEP exams. Modern States also provides a test cost voucher for all students who pass a Modern States course.
Depending on the academic strength of a student, test preparation might not be necessary.(On an anecdotal level, I passed several CLEP tests in high school without any previous studying.) Especially for adult students seeking a degree for the first time, CLEP might be an easy way to earn credit for knowledge they've already won through workplace and life experience.
From CLEP, PSEO, and AP options, Minnesota's prospective college students have many robust opportunities to gain college credit. Parents and students should be aware that high school effort towards a CLEP test could translate to thousands of saved dollars, semesters of freed college schedules, and maybe even the ability to add an extra major or minor.
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Josiah Padley is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
josiah.padley@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/the-no-class-required-test-that-gives-students-immediate-college-credit/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Federal Budget Crisis
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, June 9 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by economist John Phelan:
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The federal budget crisis
In every year since 2001, the federal government has spent more money than it collects in taxes. As Figure 1 shows, while federal revenues have increased from $2.0 trillion in 2001 to 5.2 trillion in 2025 -- a rise of 163% -- outlays have risen from $1.9 trillion to $7.0 trillion, an increase of 276%. As a result, a near balance in the
... Show Full Article
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, June 9 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by economist John Phelan:
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The federal budget crisis
In every year since 2001, the federal government has spent more money than it collects in taxes. As Figure 1 shows, while federal revenues have increased from $2.0 trillion in 2001 to 5.2 trillion in 2025 -- a rise of 163% -- outlays have risen from $1.9 trillion to $7.0 trillion, an increase of 276%. As a result, a near balance in thefederal budget in 2001 has turned into a deficit of $1.8 trillion in 2025.
Figure 1: Federal government finances, trillions
Figure 1 also shows that the federal government's finances are set to get even worse. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasts that revenues will rise by 59% by 2036 to $8.3 trillion but that outlays will rise by 63% to $11.4 trillion. As a result, the budget deficit will hit $3.1 trillion.
As Figure 2 shows, the result of all this borrowing is that federal "Debt held by the public" has risen from $3.3 trillion in 2001 to $30.2 trillion in 2025. And, because this debt has generally increased at a faster rate than national income (Gross Domestic Product or GDP), it has risen as a share of national income from 31.5% in 2001 to 99.4% in 2025.
Figure 2: Federal government debt
Again, this is all set to get worse. As Figure 2 also shows, the CBO forecasts that, by 2036, federal government debt will hit $56.2 trillion or 120.2% of national income.
What has driven this explosion of debt and what will drive it from now until 2036?
The federal budget is split between "discretionary" and "mandatory" items. Discretionary spending is the portion of the federal budget that Congress controls through annual appropriations acts. It includes things like defense, which makes up 47.7% of the discretionary total, up from 47.2% in 2001. Mandatory, or "non-discretionary" spending is the portion of the federal budget dictated by ongoing statutory laws rather than the annual congressional appropriations process; it is essentially on autopilot. It includes things like Social Security and Medicare, which make up 66.1% of the mandatory total.
Figure 3 shows that mandatory spending is the culprit. While discretionary spending increased by 188% between 2001 and 2025, mandatory spending increased by 314%. Looking forward to 2036, the CBO forecasts discretionary spending rising by another 20% while mandatory spending increases by 69%. In short, federal entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare are eating the budget alive.
Figure 3: Federal government spending, trillions
There is a third category of federal government spending: "Net interest." This is simply the interest on all that debt the federal government has accumulated on our behalf. Until 2021, this chugged along at about $200 billion annually. Since then, partly as a result of increased borrowing (deficits) and partly as a result of higher borrowing costs (interest rates), it has spiked to $1.0 trillion; indeed, in 2024, the federal government spent more on net interest than on defense for the first time. And, again, this is forecast to get worse. Net interest payments are forecast to hit $2.1 trillion in 2036, when it will equal the total of discretionary spending. This is with interest rates of 4.3%; if they go above that so will forecast net interest payments.
We cannot tax our way out of this.
The CBO forecasts that federal government spending will rise from 23.1% of GDP in 2025 to 24.4% in 2036. Yet, as Figure 4 shows, in the best year ever for federal government revenues as a share of GDP - 2000 - the amount taken was 20.0% of GDP. In other words, even if taxes as a share of national income could rise to match the highest level since 1962, there would still be a deficit of 4.4 percentage points in 2036.
Figure 4: Federal government finances, share of GDP
This ought to be the biggest issue in American politics, but there is depressingly little appetite on either side of the aisle to tackle this growing crisis. Its effects will be felt by all of us, and one way it will manifest is through increasing pressure on state budgets.
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John Phelan is an Economist at the Center of the American Experiment.
john.phelan@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/the-federal-budget-crisis/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: DOJ Moves to Strip 17 of Citizenship
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, June 9 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by policy fellow Bill Glahn:
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DOJ moves to strip 17 of citizenship
You know that one of them had to be from Minnesota. From a U.S. Dept. of Justice press release,
"Justice Department Moves to Strip U.S. Citizenship from 17 Naturalized Sex Offenders, Fraudsters, Drug Dealers, and More."
The DOJ profile of our Minnesota Man is self-explanatory,
"Abdikadir Ali Kadiye (Age 54/Somalia): On
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MINNETONKA, Minnesota, June 9 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by policy fellow Bill Glahn:
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DOJ moves to strip 17 of citizenship
You know that one of them had to be from Minnesota. From a U.S. Dept. of Justice press release,
"Justice Department Moves to Strip U.S. Citizenship from 17 Naturalized Sex Offenders, Fraudsters, Drug Dealers, and More."
The DOJ profile of our Minnesota Man is self-explanatory,
"Abdikadir Ali Kadiye (Age 54/Somalia): OnJune 3, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota filed a civil denaturalization complaint in District of Minnesota against Abdikadir Ali Kadiye. Beginning in April of 1997, Kadiye sought admission to the United States by filing applications under two separate identities. Kadiye initially sought admission to the United States under the identity Liban M. Degel and he claimed that he was married with no children. After an immigration judge denied his application for immigration benefits, Kadiye submitted a second application under the identity of Abdikadir Ali Kadiye. After his naturalization, Kadiye admitted to a customs and border patrol agent that he had previously used two identities for admission."
The DOJ provides a link (https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1444666/dl) to the case filed on June 3 (26-cv-2832).
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Bill Glahn is a Policy Fellow with Center of the American Experiment.
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/doj-moves-to-strip-17-of-citizenship/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary: Labor Department Toughens Union Transparency Rules
WASHINGTON, June 9 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by Michael Watson, research director and managing editor for InfluenceWatch:
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Labor Department toughens union transparency rules
Upgrades help ensure that union members, prospective union recruits, and the public can track the use of member dues and compulsory fees required of workers in non-right-to-work states.
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The often-forgotten third-wheel prong of my three-pronged "Taft-Hartley Consensus" principles of good labor policy is subjecting labor union operations to public scrutiny as a
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WASHINGTON, June 9 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following commentary on June 8, 2026, by Michael Watson, research director and managing editor for InfluenceWatch:
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Labor Department toughens union transparency rules
Upgrades help ensure that union members, prospective union recruits, and the public can track the use of member dues and compulsory fees required of workers in non-right-to-work states.
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The often-forgotten third-wheel prong of my three-pronged "Taft-Hartley Consensus" principles of good labor policy is subjecting labor union operations to public scrutiny as aprice of labor unions' extensive, government-granted special powers. The most important law upholding that principle is the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, enacted to require unions (and certain management-side consultants) to publicly report on their finances after Congressional hearings exposed extensive corruption in organized labor, especially the Eisenhower administration-friendly Teamsters Union.
In the mid-2000s, the George W. Bush administration gave the disclosure rules in LMRDA teeth, allowing union members and the public to see their dues money going to dive bars, baseball teams, and radical-left political-advocacy organizations. Now, the Trump administration Labor Department has issued a final rule expanding the disclosures and making them more comprehensive.
DOL's Changes
In its new final rule, the Department of Labor made a major change to the annual reports filed by the largest labor unions (those reporting more than $40 million in annual receipts). Starting in union fiscal years beginning July 1, the Labor Department will require the roughly 100 labor organizations that meet that threshold to file a "Form LM-2 Long Form" with additional disclosure schedules. According to the Office of Labor Management Standards, the DOL agency that administers the LMRDA:
This new form has 32 schedules, including a schedule that requires disclosure of foreign transactions, and new itemization requirements that will provide union members and the public with more detailed information about the financial condition and operations of the nation's largest and most financially complex labor organizations.
Notable changes to the LM-2 Long Form (relative to the current Form LM-2) include separating the present "representational activities" schedule into an organizing expenditures schedule and a contract-administration schedule, separating the present "political activities and lobbying" schedule into those component parts on separate schedules, requiring unions to itemize receipts for revenue collections exceeding $5,000 in a single transaction (for instance, a large remittance of per capita tax from a local union to a national union), and requiring unions to itemize investment and asset transactions exceeding $5,000.
The purpose of the changes (and less substantial changes to the LM-2 for unions reporting receipts of $350,000 to $39,999,999) are to carry out the purposes of the LMRDA (and the consensus principle it codified): Ensure union members, prospective union recruits, and the public can appropriately track the use of member dues and compulsory fees required of workers in non-right-to-work states.
Further Improvements
The Labor Department's work is to be commended. But there are still some changes that Congress could make to union reports if it wanted to deviate from its current practice of supporting union bosses and actually empower workers.
First, while breaking up the political-campaign and lobbying spending on the LM-2 Long Form is useful and helpful to watchdogs, there is still a problem with separate segregated fund transfers. Congress should revise the statutes or otherwise direct the Labor Department to account for separate segregated fund transfers on their own schedule to ensure that union members can determine without doubt whether their dues payments or optional political contributions funded independent-expenditure campaigning.
Second, Congress needs to expand coverage of the LMRDA to unions of government workers. When LMRDA was passed, most union members were private-industry workers, so focusing on private-sector unions made sense. Today, roughly half of union members work for a government, and they should have the same powers to scrutinize their unions that their private-sector counterparts enjoy.
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Michael Watson
Michael is Research Director for Capital Research Center and serves as the managing editor for InfluenceWatch.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/labor-department-toughens-union-transparency-rules/
[Category: ThinkTank]
