Think Tanks
Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
Featured Stories
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Potential for Kurdish Militants to Capture Territory in Iran
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by reporter and analyst Wladimir van Wilgenburg in its Terrorism Monitor:* * *
Potential for Kurdish Militants to Capture Territory in Iran
Executive Summary:
* The Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan--made up of 2,500 to 10,000 lightly armed fighters--recently formed amid reports that the United States and Israel were considering offering support to a Kurdish operation in Western Iran.
* The fighters in this coalition are drawn from a variety of armed groups. Participation by ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by reporter and analyst Wladimir van Wilgenburg in its Terrorism Monitor: * * * Potential for Kurdish Militants to Capture Territory in Iran Executive Summary: * The Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan--made up of 2,500 to 10,000 lightly armed fighters--recently formed amid reports that the United States and Israel were considering offering support to a Kurdish operation in Western Iran. * The fighters in this coalition are drawn from a variety of armed groups. Participation bythe Kurdistan Freedom Life Party (PJAK) is notable, as the PJAK operates from underground bases outside Iraqi Kurdish control.
* The PJAK's involvement in any potential operation, however, may be restricted due to its affiliation with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is currently engaged in peace talks with Turkiye.
* Holding captured territory remains the militants' biggest challenge in any potential operation. History shows that without firm, sustained foreign support, these forces are vulnerable to collapse or expulsion by Tehran.
In March, Western news outlets reported that the United States and Israel were considering supporting a Kurdish operation in Western Iran (Washington Post, March 5). The United States has reportedly abandoned this plan, however, possibly due to Turkish opposition (Jerusalem Post, March 8). The Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, created in late February, includes the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), Kurdistan Freedom Life Party (PJAK), Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala Party of Kurdistan, and Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI, February 22; Komala, March 4). This alliance reportedly has the manpower of 2,500-10,000 fighters and only light weapons (Economist, March 5;Foreign Policy in Focus, March 12). If the regime further weakens in the border areas and U.S. plans change again, it is possible this alliance would attempt to capture territory in Western Iran.
Iranian Kurdish Parties, Factions, and Militants
The PDKI (founded in 1945), led by Mustafa Hijri, and the left-wing Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan (founded in 1969), led by Abdullah Mohtadi, are the oldest Iranian Kurdish parties. They controlled large parts of Iranian Kurdistan from 1979 until 1983 (The Amargi, March 17)./[1] Both suffered from splits, with the PDKI reunifying in 2022, and the Komala Party still retaining splinter parties. Komala led a brief rebellion in Mahabad, Iran, in 2005, and the PDKI briefly resumed insurgent activity inside Iran in 2016 (Landinfo, February 13, 2017; see Terrorism Monitor, April 24, 2019). The PDKI is mainly based in Erbil and is estimated to have 1,500-2,000 fighters, while Komala and its offshoots are primarily based in Sulaymaniyah, Iraqi Kurdistan, and have around 1,000 fighters (UK Government, October 2025; Al Jazeera, March 5).
The Khabat party (founded in 1980), led by Baba Sheikh Hosseini, was created after 1979 (Sazmani Khabat, July 1, 2019). The party clashed with Tehran in the 1990s and maintains relations with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) (Sazmani Khabat site, July 1, 2019; Danish Immigration Service, January 1, 2024). The party is only active in the Erbil province and fought against Islamic State (IS) in Bashiqa, Iraq, between 2014 and 2017.
The Kurdish Freedom Party (PAK) is led by Hussein Yazdanpanah. Unlike other Kurdish parties, it is more militant and has fought Iran, IS, the Iraqi army, and Iran-backed Iraqi militias (Irish Times, December 26, 2019). PAK was also the only party that carried out armed attacks during the January 2026 protests in Iran (Long War Journal, January 15, 2026). PAK has around 500-1,000 fighters (UK Government, October 1, 2025; El Pais, March 25, 2026).
The Peculiar Case of PJAK
PJAK was established in 2004 and is led by co-chairs Amir Karimi and Peyman Viyan. The group is linked to the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and was designated as a terrorist organization by the Obama administration in 2009. PJAK agreed to a shaky ceasefire with Iran in 2011 (Landinfo, February 13, 2017). The organization could possibly benefit from manpower transferred from the PKK or Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as well as their drone capabilities.
PJAK is in areas under PKK control in Qandil and Penjwin near the Turkish-Iraqi border, separate from the other Kurdish parties operating from camps under the control of the Iraqi Kurds (Rudaw, March 28, 2021). As a result, PJAK is not under the control of the ruling Iraqi Kurdish parties, which are not interested in tensions with Iran. In 2023, a number of Iranian Kurdish parties (apart from PJAK) were moved from the Iranian border as part of a deal between Iran and Iraq (Middle East Eye, March 26).
PJAK also has underground bases, which shield the group from drone attacks (The Atlantic, March 29). Estimates suggest the group has between 1,000 and 3,000 members (Terrorism Monitor, May 15, 2008; Al Jazeera, March 5, 2026). PJAK's actions may be limited by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, however, who could oppose PJAK getting involved in the war in Iran for fear it could hurt the ongoing peace process between the PKK and Turkiye. A former PJAK member suggested that PJAK's involvement could potentially provoke a Turkish intervention in Iran, similar to how Turkiye intervened in Syria against the SDF/[2]
Conclusion
The Iranian Kurds lack the capability to topple Iran's regime./[3] With enough air support, however, they could capture the Kurdish areas in western Iran as they did in 1979. This would weaken the regime and provide a safe space for future U.S. and Israel operations and the Iranian opposition inside Iran. The full toppling of the regime would need a large ground force, as in 2003 in Iraq, a non-Kurdish armed Iranian opposition force backed with air power, or the collapse of the regime in Tehran by protests or an internal coup, but there is no indication that this is imminent.
The most significant challenge for the Iranian Kurds would be maintaining control over territory in Western Iran, as they would remain dependent on sustained foreign support. For instance, the Soviet-backed Kurdistan Republic in Iran collapsed in 1946 after the Soviets pulled out. In Syria, the SDF almost collapsed after they were abandoned by the United States in January 2026. After the fall of the Shah in 1979, they were also forced out by Tehran in 1983. Therefore, the Kurdish militants most likely want to receive firm guarantees before launching any offensive.
[1] Hassaniyan, Allan. Kurdish Politics in Iran: Crossborder Interactions and Mobilisation since 1947. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021.
[2] Author's interview with former PJAK member Shamal Bishir, April 1, 2026.
[3] Author's interview with Sam Faddis, who was previously the head of the CIA team that operated in Kurdistan in 2002, March 18, 2026.
* * *
Wladimir van Wilgenburg is a reporter and analyst. He has covered the war against the Islamic State in northern Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as other subjects for international media and several think tanks.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/potential-for-kurdish-militants-to-capture-territory-in-iran/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: 'Unconditional Escalation' Marks Iran's Shifting Deterrence Strategy
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Javad Heiran-Nia, director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, Iran, in its Terrorism Monitor:* * *
'Unconditional Escalation' Marks Iran's Shifting Deterrence Strategy
Executive Summary:
* The weakening of Iran's traditional deterrence--combined with the advanced military capabilities of the United States and Israel--has led Iran to regionalize the conflict to increase the costs for its adversaries, with implications ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Javad Heiran-Nia, director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, Iran, in its Terrorism Monitor: * * * 'Unconditional Escalation' Marks Iran's Shifting Deterrence Strategy Executive Summary: * The weakening of Iran's traditional deterrence--combined with the advanced military capabilities of the United States and Israel--has led Iran to regionalize the conflict to increase the costs for its adversaries, with implicationsfor its future deterrence posture.
* The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its impact on the world economy have turned it from a hypothetical point of leverage into a strategic and deterrent asset vital to Iran in future conflicts.
* Although proxy forces no longer serve Iran's traditional deterrent role in a war, their capacity to share the burden of an existential conflict and to destabilize strategic transit points will remain important for Iran in the future.
The U.S.-Israeli February 28 joint military action against Iran quickly expanded across the region. Iran's response to the attacks--both in regionalizing the war (horizontal escalation) and in diversifying targets and shifting red lines (vertical escalation)--can be evaluated from a deterrence perspective. Prior to Hamas's October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel, Iran's deterrence was based on a set of strategic principles and operational tools shaped within the framework of the Islamic Republic's security doctrine and the experience of the Iran-Iraq War. This deterrence was largely asymmetric, consisting of three layers: the proxy layer, the missile-and-drone layer, and the threshold or potential nuclear capability layer.
At the regional level, Iran had sought to contain threats beyond its borders--known as "forward defense." [1] Given the military superiority of the United States and Israel, Iran has relied on lower-cost tools instead of symmetric competition, including missiles, drones, and proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (Middle East Monitor, January 15, 2025; Iran Analytica, March 25). Its continued attacks on the Gulf countries, however, mark a distinct shift in Iran's approach to regional conflicts.
Regional War Approach
Iranian leaders view the current conflict as existential to the continued existence of the Islamic Republic. For this reason, Iran had already raised the possibility of expanding the conflict into the region before the first U.S.-Israeli strikes. On February 1, for example, then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei emphasized: "The Americans should know that if they start a war this time, it will be a regional war" (Khamenei.ir, February 1). From Iran's perspective, regionalizing the war is a strategy to confront an enemy that enjoys technological superiority, including advanced air weaponry, high firepower, satellite infrastructure, and artificial intelligence (AI) integration. Iran's conventional weakness led to the decision to turn it into a war of attrition (Tabnak, March 15).
Instead of attempting to directly defeat Israel--whose geography and air defense layers limited such an objective--Iran sought to weaken the supporting infrastructure that underpinned Israel's operational freedom (Iran Analytica, March 25). Iran's regionalization of the war is also framed within Tehran's "Samson Doctrine," a strategy aimed at creating maximum chaos across the Persian Gulf region and the global economy (Arab Gulf States Institute, March 13).
Iran has notably adopted an "eye for an eye" approach (Asr Iran, March 10). This approach is based on proportionality, thereby discouraging the United States and Israel from targeting Iran's critical interests, particularly energy infrastructure. According to Thomas Schelling's theory, deterrence is not only dependent on the ability to attack but also on the risk of uncontrolled escalation. In this regard, Iran aims to create a situation in which events could spiral out of control if the opposing side does not retreat from its threats (Schelling, 1960). [2] After three weeks of war, Iran's strategy shifted from purely retaliatory responses to an offensive phase. For example, Tehran quickly warned that its response would include attacks on regional energy and technology infrastructure and targeting U.S. financial institutions if the United States carried out attacks against Iran's electrical infrastructure (Asr Iran, March 22).
This new pattern showed that Iran is attempting to turn military asymmetry into a strategic lever through expanding the battlefield and linking escalation across multiple domains. By expanding its targets to energy infrastructure and economic assets in the Persian Gulf, Iran increases pressure on its enemies while simultaneously raising tensions with neighboring countries (Iran Analytica, March 25). Although Tehran hopes these countries will seek de-escalation rather than intervention, the immediate consequence is regional instability and an increased risk of miscalculation and rapid escalation (Al Monitor, March 24).
Closing the Strait of Hormuz
After the second round of Iranian-U.S. negotiations in Geneva on February 17, the IRGC Navy temporarily closed the Strait of Hormuz during a large-scale exercise called "Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz" (Fars News Agency, February 18). Iran then officially closed the waterway following the start of the conflict. This action was based on Tehran's belief that symbolic responses to the United States are ineffective and merely perpetuate cycles of pressure and subsequent strikes. Accordingly, Iran not only closed the Strait but moved toward "targeted disruption of the global energy market," including attacks on production facilities, pipelines, export terminals, or oil tankers. Tehran's logic was based on deterrence through the creation of systemic risk in the energy market (KEDM Public Radio, February 16).
From Iran's perspective, keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed would shift the regional balance of power in its favor and force countries highly dependent on Persian Gulf energy to recalibrate their geopolitical considerations toward Iran. Thus, the continuation of war and rising uncertainty in the region could strengthen Iran's geopolitical role. In times of crisis, control over strategic chokepoints and regional deterrence becomes more significant. Consequently, Iran aims to leverage its geographic position and strategic capabilities to increase its bargaining power, influencing the behavior of both regional and extra-regional actors toward more cautious engagement with Tehran (Mehr News Agency, March 14).
According to Iranian officials, after the war, a "new protocol" is to be developed to ensure the safe passage of ships and define specific conditions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, March 17). The plan, titled the "Strategic Action Law for Peace and Endogenous and Sustainable Development of the Persian Gulf Region," includes four sections: Maritime security, environmental pollution charges, navigation service fees, and the establishment of a regional development fund (Fararu, March 30). The outlook for this new protocol faces challenges, however, including conflict with the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. Furthermore, unlike the Bosporus and Dardanelles--controlled by a single country (Turkiye)--the Strait of Hormuz is shared between Iran and Oman, which may not accept Iran's unilateral actions.
Use of Proxy Forces
Iran's security strategy has been based on regional strategic depth, seeking to transfer conflicts beyond its borders. This strategy made use of proxy forces known as the "Axis of Resistance," including Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces, and Yemeni Houthis. Despite the weakening of this network--especially its ability to generate simultaneous firepower after Hamas's October 7 attack--the remnants of these forces have been activated as tools to expand the battlefield. The goal is to maximize the costs of conflict, with proxies contributing to regional destabilization. Their political-strategic function has remained an important tool for Iran, despite a decline in their operational capabilities (Atlantic Council, April 9, 2024; Tabnak, March 15).
Hezbollah, Iraqi PMF, and Yemeni Houthis have all entered the conflict. Hezbollah and the Houthis focused on targeting Israel, while Iraqi forces targeted U.S. and Israeli positions not only in Iraq but also in Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain. Offensively, the Houthis--beyond their ability to close the Bab al-Mandab chokepoint--possess the capacity to target U.S. military assets within the range of their strategic arsenal, which includes long-range drones and missiles (New Arab, March 30).
After the war, Iran is expected to focus on preserving and rebuilding proxy groups through tactical flexibility, resistance to disarmament, and shifts in support priorities. In Iraq, Iran's approach is heavily influenced by U.S. pressure and the central government's will to disarm militias. Unlike in the past, Tehran has signaled to these groups that they should cooperate with disarmament plans to avoid a destructive confrontation with the United States (Deutsche Welle, April 7, 2025). Iran's goal is to ensure these groups' survival by gradually integrating them into Iraq's official state structure rather than maintaining them as independent militias (Deutsche Welle, August 10, 2025).
Lebanon remains the most sensitive point for Iran. A different approach has been adopted due to the Lebanese government's alignment with U.S. disarmament plans for Hezbollah. Tehran openly opposes any disarmament of Hezbollah and considers it a red line (Khabar Online, August 7, 2025). Therefore, despite some rhetorical moderation under diplomatic pressure, Iran coordinates with Hezbollah to resist disarmament through political means (Al Alam, April 24, 2025). Tehran's immediate goal is to prevent the loss of Hezbollah's existing capabilities--especially its large missile arsenal--as a key deterrent against Israel (European Council on Foreign, June 5, 2024).
With Hamas and Hezbollah significantly weakened, the Yemeni Houthis have become Iran's most powerful regional ally (Euro News, December 8, 2025; New Arab, March 30). The Houthis view themselves as partners, however, rather than as fully controlled proxies. Despite this, their ability to destabilize the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Gulf of Aden increases their importance for Iran. If Tehran survives the current conflict, it will retain the ability to support its allies, even if some, such as Hezbollah, are weaker than before (New Arab, March 3).
Conclusion
Iran has moved away from its traditional deterrence doctrine and adopted a strategy of "unconditional escalation." This strategy involves regionalizing conflicts, targeting energy and financial infrastructure, closing the Strait of Hormuz, and activating proxy forces. This strategic shift--designed to turn military asymmetry into an economic-geoeconomic lever--increases the risk of regional instability and unpredictable escalation. Consequently, it could redefine Iran's role as a chokepoint power and lead to a new balance in the Middle East. In the future, therefore, maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis' capacity to control the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and missile and drone stockpiles will likely be of greater importance for Iran's deterrence capabilities than its latent nuclear program.
* * *
Javad Heiran-Nia, Ph.D., International Relations, Director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies, Tehran, Iran.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/unconditional-escalation-marks-irans-shifting-deterrence-strategy/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Outlook for Minority Rebel and Separatist Militants in Iran
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Andrew McGregor, former editor of Terrorism Monitor and Militant Leadership Monitor:* * *
Outlook for Minority Rebel and Separatist Militants in Iran
Executive Summary:
* Iran's marginalized ethnic minorities, who often endure state suppression, may view current U.S. and Israeli military operations as an opportunity to seize greater autonomy.
* Four minority groups--the Kurds, Balochs, Lurs, and Ahwazi Arabs--maintain armed factions. Additionally, the exiled Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) aggressively ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Andrew McGregor, former editor of Terrorism Monitor and Militant Leadership Monitor: * * * Outlook for Minority Rebel and Separatist Militants in Iran Executive Summary: * Iran's marginalized ethnic minorities, who often endure state suppression, may view current U.S. and Israeli military operations as an opportunity to seize greater autonomy. * Four minority groups--the Kurds, Balochs, Lurs, and Ahwazi Arabs--maintain armed factions. Additionally, the exiled Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) aggressivelypursues violent regime change, losing 100 fighters in a clash with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on February 25.
* Armed factions are most likely to hesitate before any action due to unclear American objectives, fears of brutal regime retaliation if abandoned, and the fact that ethnic Persian opposition figures often share the regime's hostile view of these minority groups as separatist threats.
Iranian officials frequently refer to Iran and its 93 million people as "ethnically homogenous." They often proclaim the unity of the Islamic Republic and obscure the existence of the country's numerous minority groups. Many of these groups have had a contentious relationship with the Iranian state since Reza Pahlavi's 1921 coup introduced the ideological supremacy of Persian and Twelver Shi'a identity.
Iranian leaders typically regard minority demands for greater autonomy as threats to state security. Many minority members are denied government identification, leaving them open to various abuses by administrators and security forces. Accusations of working for Israel's Mossad or the CIA are usually enough to justify internal repression by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regime's Basij militia. The sheer number of detainees imprisoned for alleged "collaboration" with Israel suggests the political convenience of the charges.
The current U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran may be viewed by some minority leaders as an opportunity to seize greater autonomy. The perils of challenging a regime facing an external existential threat, however, are both clear and significant.
Iran's Ethnic and Religious Composition
The closest Iran gets to homogeneity is in its religious makeup. Shi'ite Muslims constitute some 90 percent of Iran's population. Sunni Muslims represent 9 percent, while the remainder consists of Christians, Baha'i, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Sabean Mandaeans (Gnostic monotheists).
Persians make up 61 percent of the Iranian population. There is wide variation regarding the numbers and percentages of minority groups represented in the population, which are perhaps best outlined in general terms:
* Larger minority groups (10-17 percent of the population): Kurds and Azeri Turks,
* Mid-sized minority groups (5-9 percent): Lurs,
* Small minority groups (2-4 percent): Ahwazi Arabs, Balochs, Turkmen,
* Very small minority groups (1 percent or less): Georgians, Qashqai, Armenians, Circassians, Assyrians (Al Jazeera, June 20, 2025).
Of the minority groups, four are known to have armed factions--the Kurds, the Balochs, the Ahwazi Arabs, and the Lurs. While most of those arrested during the 2025 protests were Persian, large numbers of Balochs, Kurds, and Ahwazi Arabs were also detained (Iran International, July 23, 2025).
Many of Iran's ethnic minorities hoped to benefit from the overthrow of the Shah following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The new Islamic regime quickly suppressed their aspirations, except in Iranian Kurdistan, however, which continued to resist Persian rule. Marginalization--if not outright persecution--continued to be the shared experience of Iran's minorities after the Islamic Revolution. Surveillance and detention of minorities intensified after last June's Israeli and American bombing campaign.
The Azeris
The Shi'ite Azeris are well-integrated into the Persian power structure; the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's father was an Azeri Turk. The Azeri Turks dominated the Iranian state from 1501 to 1925, including both the Safavid dynasty--which established Twelver Shi'ism as the state religion--and the later Qajar dynasty. When the latter was brought down by the Pahlavis, Azeri influence was diminished, and the Azeri language repressed. Recently, Israeli media have encouraged "the South Azerbaijani nation [i.e., Iranian Azerbaijan] and other ethnic groups" in Iran to "wage a war of revolution" (Jerusalem Post, March 4).
The Ahwazi Arabs
Most of Iran's Ahwazi Arab population lives in the southwestern province of Khuzestan. This province is home to Iran's largest oil field, which accounts for 90 percent of Iranian oil production, as well as large shares of Iran's natural gas and water resources. A mix of Arabized locals and migrant tribes from Iraq, the Ahwazi Arabs are mostly Shi'a, with a small number of Sunnis. The community's main language is Farsi, and Arabic-language education is forbidden except for religious instruction.
Before an emerging oil industry brought in an influx of ethnic Persian workers, Khuzestan was known as Arabistan. The Persians are still favored for employment in the oil sector over the Arab population. Khuzestan's natural resources and its strategic location on the Persian Gulf have led to a low tolerance for Arab cultural and political aspirations (New Lines Institute, February 18).
Existing as an autonomous emirate (Muhammara) since 1812, the region was fully incorporated into Iran in 1925, with its Arab ruler and his son placed in detention in Tehran. Place names were Persianized, and efforts at assimilation were first launched by Reza Shah (1925-1941) and continued under the Islamic Republic. Protests against the repression of Arab culture or expressions of Arab identity are typically met with violence (Arab News, January 7, 2022). Some residents seek independence or autonomy in a federal state.
The Harakat al-Nidal al-'Arabi li-Tahrir al-'Ahwaz (Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz, ASMLA) is an armed group advocating the creation of an Arab state comprising Khuzestan and parts of several neighboring Iranian provinces. With rival leaderships based in Denmark and the Netherlands, the movement has carried out bombings and assassinations, leading to its designation as a terrorist group by the Iranian government.
As protests grew in Iran earlier this year, five Ahwazi political fronts agreed on February 9 to come under the authority of a single Coordinating Council of Ahwazi Organizations. The stated goals of the new umbrella group include preventing political violence, respecting human rights, and cooperating with other Iranian minorities (Middle East Online, February 24).
The Baloch
The Sunni Muslim Baloch people are spread across a region split between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In Iran, the Baloch are concentrated in the Sistan-Baluchestan province, bordering Pakistan's restless Balochistan province, which hosts a number of Baloch insurgent movements (there are differences between Pakistan and Iran in the official spelling of Balochistan/Baluchestan).
Sistan-Baluchestan has abundant resources, including oil, gas, coal, copper, uranium, and rare earth elements. Despite this, the Sunni Baloch of Iran have much lower living standards than their Shi'a Persian countrymen and suffer from state repression of their language, culture, and political aspirations (New Lines Institute, February 18). They are also ineligible to hold most elected positions in Iran.
Jaysh al-Adl (Army of Justice), a Balochi anti-Shi'a Islamist militant group, emerged around 2012 as a successor to the earlier Jundullah movement, after Tehran's capture and execution of Jundullah leader Abdelmalek Rigi in 2010 (see Terrorism Monitor, February 4, 2010). Jaysh al-Adl is designated as a terrorist organization by both Iran and the United States.
Fighters of Jaysh al-Adl often take refuge across the border in Pakistani Balochistan during the Iranian military operations that follow the group's attacks. Pakistan, on the other hand, accuses Iran of providing refuge to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) (see Terrorism Monitor, January 31, 2024). Cross-border strikes on Balochi insurgents have become common in recent years as Jaysh al-Adl and other armed Balochi groups carry out kidnappings, assassinations, suicide bombings, and attacks on police stations (Al Jazeera, January 17, 2024; Dawn, January 19, 2024).
In December 2025, Jaysh al-Adl announced it had merged with several other Baloch separatist movements to form the "Popular Fighters' Front." The new group intends to focus on civil disobedience "with full observance of personal and public security principles" while continuing attacks on Iranian security forces (Iran International, December 12, 2025).
Kurds
The Kurds are the second largest but most politically and militarily organized of Iran's minority groups. Mostly Sunni rather than Shi'ite, Iran's Kurds have experienced repression of their language, culture, and education.
The existence of significant and often restless Kurdish communities in Syria, Iraq, and Turkiye, as well as Iran, has opened the group up to allegations of separatist tendencies and foreign influence. Iran's four impoverished Kurdish-majority provinces notably lie along the Iraqi border, further contributing to the perception of separatist leanings. The Turkish government--now in the process of reconciling with its own Kurdish separatist movements--has no desire to see any kind of Kurdish political or military success in the region that might disrupt ongoing reconciliation processes in south-eastern Turkiye.
Iranian-Kurdish movements are insisting on an American-enforced no-fly zone over their operational area in northern Iran as well as the presence of U.S. land-based forces, before launching an offensive against the Iranian regime. This hesitancy stems from having witnessed fellow Kurds being burned several times in the past through alliances with the United States (France24, March 5). Reports indicate that the CIA began discussions on arming Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in early March and may have already begun supplying small arms (Al-Jazeera, March 4; El Pais, March 19). Since then, Iran has targeted the bases of these groups inside Iraq (France24, March 5).
The Alliance of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (a coalition of six Kurdish political movements) stated that "the struggle for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic and the realization of the national rights of the Kurdish nation" would continue unabated following Iranian attacks on Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and other places in Iraqi Kurdistan where Iranian Kurdish dissidents are based (PDKI.org; Anadolu Ajansi, March 8). Though there have been some intimations of a possible Kurdish offensive in western Iran, Iraq's prime minister, Muhammad Shi'a al-Sudani, and Kurdistan regional president Nechirvan Barzani, have united in declaring that "Iraqi territory must not be used as a launching point for attacks against neighboring countries" (Al-Jazeera, March 7).
The United States has sent mixed signals regarding the desirability of a Kurdish entry into the campaign in Iran. On March 5, U.S. President Donald Trump considered the possibility of a Kurdish attack, stating, "I think it's wonderful that they want to do that, I'd be all for it" (Al-Jazeera, March 6). Two days later, however, the president remarked: "We're very friendly with the Kurds, as you know, but we don't want to make the war any more complex than it already is ... I don't want the Kurds going in. I don't want to see the Kurds get hurt, get killed" (Anadolu Ajansi, March 8). The IRGC warned at the same time that "If separatist groups in the region [of Kurdistan] make any move against Iran's territorial integrity, we will crush them" (Al-Arabiya, March 7).
During the nationwide protests in Iran earlier this year, Kurdish opposition parties agreed to carry out strikes rather than protests in order to avoid the massacres that followed similar protests in the past. Nonetheless, raids by security forces followed the strikes, even in Kurdish Shi'ite communities.
The Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)
One exiled Iranian insurgent group--though not an ethnic minority--must be included in the list of movements seeking the violent downfall of the Iranian regime. The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI, better known as Mujahedin-e-Khalq - MEK) is a Marxist-Islamist group initially formed in 1965 to oppose the rule of the Pahlavi monarchy. The MEK is a designated terrorist group within Iran and appeared on the American Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list from 1997 to 2012.
The movement backed the Iranian Revolution in 1978-1979, believing they could leverage their support into a power-sharing agreement. Instead, they found themselves targeted by the new regime, forcing their leadership to flee to Paris while surviving members relocated to Iraq. The movement responded with suicide attacks, bombings, assassinations, and attacks on Iranian embassies abroad (Al-Jazeera, August 4, 2011).
MEK operated from bases in Iraq after being banned by Iran's post-revolution Islamic regime, carrying out credibility-damaging attacks on Iran during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-88) (Israel Hayom, January 13). In exchange for MEK support in suppressing Kurdish and Shi'ite rebellions in Iraq, Saddam Hussein provided the movement with military training, armor, and artillery (Times of Israel, March 5). The UN and the United States asked Albania to relocate the movement from Iraq in 2013 after it came under pressure from Shi'ite and Kurdish groups seeking revenge for their collaboration with Saddam Hussein. Some 3,000 members of MEK have since been based in an Albanian village (Deutsche Welle, January 20).
By June 2023, however, the MEK had worn out its welcome in Albania. 1,000 Albanian security officers raided the MEK compound during an organized crime investigation related to terrorist financing on June 20, 2023. Fifteen police officers and 21 MEK members were injured when MEK members attempted to prevent the seizure of computers and laptops (EuroNews, June 21, 2023; Times of Israel, March 5).
The MEK now presents itself as a human-rights-focused "democratic alternative" to the clerical regime in Iran. Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has visited the group's camp in Albania and described MEK leader Maryam Rajavi as "laying the groundwork for a free, sovereign, and democratic republic in Iran" (Iran International, May 17, 2022). The movement's official leader, Massoud Rajavi, has not been seen since March 2003, and the MEK has gained a reputation as a cult-like group exercising strict control over its members. Dissident members are typically described as agents of Iranian intelligence and subject to retaliation.
The IRGC reported killing at least 100 MEK fighters during a MEK operation near the Tehran headquarters of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, just days before the launch of the Israeli-American bombing campaign began (the incident and losses were confirmed by the MEK) (Jerusalem Post, February 25).
Despite broad American political support, the MEK's legitimacy as an Iranian opposition group suffers from its historical collaboration with Iraq, its long period of exile, and its socialist ideology.
Conclusion
Iranian minorities are likely to be alarmed by any upsurge in Persian support for the return of a Pahlavi monarchy known for Persian supremacism. Would-be king of Iran, Reza Pahlavi--son of the late Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi--recently described the Kurds and other minorities as "contemptible" separatists, stating, "Iran's territorial integrity is the ultimate red line of our great and united nation. Any individual or group that crosses this red line, or collaborates with those who do, will face the resolute response of the Iranian nation" (X/@PahlaviReza).
Ethnic Persian opposition groups have little in common with the ethnic minority factions, often sharing the regime's view of these groups as separatist threats to Iranian sovereignty. The MEK leadership has, in the past, even encouraged its members to kill Kurdish fighters before taking on the IRGC (Al-Jazeera, August 4, 2011).
The lack of clear goals or timelines for the U.S.-Israeli military campaign has discouraged the entry of armed Iranian ethnic minority factions into the conflict. If Washington declares it has achieved its objectives and withdraws its forces, these groups are likely to find themselves facing the fury of a wounded regime ready to see treasonous cooperation with Israelis and Americans behind any signs of opposition.
* * *
Andrew McGregor is a former Terrorism Monitor Editor and Militant Leadership Monitor Editor for the Jamestown Foundation (which he assumed in 2007), and Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues related to the Islamic world.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/outlook-for-minority-rebel-and-separatist-militants-in-iran/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Interest Rate Concerns Weigh on Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany
MUNICH, Germany, April 18 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on April 17, 2026:* * *
Interest Rate Concerns Weigh on Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany
Sentiment in residential construction in Germany deteriorated again in March. The business climate fell from -17.7 to -19.5 points, due to noticeably more pessimistic expectations. By contrast, the current situation was assessed as somewhat better. "Concerns about renewed rises in interest rates are weighing on expectations in residential construction," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "Higher ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, April 18 -- ifo Institute issued the following news release on April 17, 2026: * * * Interest Rate Concerns Weigh on Business Climate for Residential Construction in Germany Sentiment in residential construction in Germany deteriorated again in March. The business climate fell from -17.7 to -19.5 points, due to noticeably more pessimistic expectations. By contrast, the current situation was assessed as somewhat better. "Concerns about renewed rises in interest rates are weighing on expectations in residential construction," says Klaus Wohlrabe, Head of Surveys at ifo. "Higherfinancing costs would once again dampen the housebuilding ambitions of many households."
In operating business, however, initial signs of improvement can be seen, as the order situation slowly eases. The share of companies reporting too few orders fell considerably to 43.4%, the lowest level since July 2023. The reason for that is a recent increase in building permits. Cancellations also declined and stood most recently at 10.8%. "The order situation is slowly improving, but uncertainty remains high," says Wohlrabe.
* * *
More Information
Survey (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-04-17/interest-rate-concerns-weigh-business-climate-residential-construction)
ifo Podcast: A Closer Look at Distorted Rental Markets in Inner Cities (https://www.ifo.de/en/media-center/2026-02-13/ifo-podcast-mieten-wohnungsnot)
* * *
Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-04-17/interest-rate-concerns-weigh-business-climate-residential-construction
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: This is No Time to Explore "Novel Territory"
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 18 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by public safety policy fellow David Zimmer:* * *
This is no time to explore "novel territory"
The status of criminal investigations against on duty ICE agents working as part of Operation Metro Surge was provided this week in press conferences by officials in both Ramsey and Hennepin counties. The precedent they are setting by investigating and charging on duty federal agents will only ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, April 18 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by public safety policy fellow David Zimmer: * * * This is no time to explore "novel territory" The status of criminal investigations against on duty ICE agents working as part of Operation Metro Surge was provided this week in press conferences by officials in both Ramsey and Hennepin counties. The precedent they are setting by investigating and charging on duty federal agents will onlycompound the six plus years of anti-law enforcement sentiment that progressives have fueled here in Minnesota - a sentiment that has damaged our collective public safety.
Let me be clear - I am not supporting improper behavior by federal agents. If such action occurred, it should be investigated and dealt with, but there is a robust and long-standing process already in place. These local political figures are upending that process and creating a damaging precedent that will make it even more difficult for Minnesota to rebound and return to a place of reasonableness, respect for law and order, and justice.
Traditionally, if a citizen made an allegation against an on-duty federal agent to local law enforcement, the local law enforcement agency would document the complaint in detail and collect any evidence that may potentially degrade or disappear if not collected in a timely manner. The local agency would then stop and contact the appropriate federal entity - perhaps the FBI or the Justice Department - and turn over the allegation and evidence it had collected.
The appropriate federal entity would then complete a comprehensive investigation applying all appropriate safeguards to ensure justice for both the citizen and the agent was maintained. If criminal charges were warranted, they would be brought in federal court, where case law dictates allegations against an on-duty federal agent should be litigated. If internal discipline was deemed appropriate, that process would follow seamlessly. If civil action against the federal agent(s) was appropriate, the information collected by the appropriate federal agency would be accessible to that court.
Unfortunately, the politically charged rhetoric over Operation Metro Surge coupled with recent history that seems to value criminally overcharging law enforcement officers in a misguided effort to achieve "justice," make much of Minnesota's metro area the last place the federal government should passively allow local officials to upend important and reasoned processes for impartially evaluating allegations of misconduct by federal agents.
Consider this
In the history of our state, no law enforcement officer had ever been charged with a crime related to their fatal use of force while on duty - until 2016.
Since the 2016 death of Philando Castile, eight (8) Minnesota peace officers have been charged with various levels of murder and manslaughter related to their fatal use of force during on-duty incidents - all of them in Ramsey and Hennepin Counties.
The book ends cases from above - the 2nd degree manslaughter charges against Officer Jeronimo Yanez in the death of Castile in 2016, and the 2nd degree murder charges against Minnesota State Trooper Ryan Londregan in the death of Ricky Cobb in 2023, didn't end well for the county attorneys who brought those cases forward.
In 2017, a jury acquitted Yanez of the charges brought by Ramsey County Attorney John Choi.
In 2024, Hennepin County Attorney Mary Moriarty was forced to embarrassingly drop all charges against Trooper Londregan after allegations surfaced showing she had ignored evidence and advice from her own attorneys that failed to support murder charges against Londregan. A year later, following more public criticism over the progressive political bent in her decision making, Moriarty announced her decision not to seek re-election after her first term in office concluded.
Ramsey County announcement
On Monday, Ramsey County officials held a press conference to update the public on the status of their criminal investigation into the actions of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents on Sunday, January 18th 2026, in St. Paul.
The investigation is focusing on possible kidnapping and/or false imprisonment charges. As an experienced investigator, listening to the facts presented, it seems to be a leap to equate the temporary detention of a man during a fugitive immigration investigation, by on duty agents, with kidnapping or false imprisonment - the elements for which just don't fit the situation. Agents didn't detain anyone for ransom or profit, or to force someone into involuntary servitude, or to facilitate a crime, and they certainly weren't acting "without authority" when they temporarily restrained occupants of the house as they conducted their investigation.
That's not to say that ICE shouldn't have handled the situation with more care - one of the two fugitives they were seeking was already in custody, and ICE's reliance on an internal legal opinion authorizing them to use forced entry absent a judicial warrant is worthy of scrutiny, but that scrutiny should happen via established and long standing processes, not criminal charges brought by local prosecutors.
During the press conference, County Attorney John Choi acknowledged the investigation represents "novel territory" in that local law enforcement rarely if ever investigates or considers criminally charging federal agents for actions on duty.
Sheriff Bob Fletcher commented about federal authorities who have refused, up to this point, to respond to inquiries by his investigators, saying, "This is very simple, common sense law enforcement. Share your information with other agencies so they can make a determination if there has been a violation of the law." Choi also lamented that he wished we were in place where authorities cooperated with one another as they traditionally have.
Choi and Fletcher are both respected law enforcement officials, but their comments calling for cooperation between local jurisdictions and ICE come off as tone deaf given recent history.
For years ICE has worked to establish lines of communication and cooperation with local jurisdictions in Minnesota - only to be repeatedly rebuffed, and to have firewalls established to prevent them from traditional access to information. Minnesota's political leadership became all too comfortable to proudly espouse that "we don't work with ICE on immigration matters."
Well, ICE got the message and recognized that, in Minnesota, if it was to successfully locate and deport those here illegally it needed to carry that mission out on its own. As such, Minnesota leaders should accept responsibility for their part in creating the need for Operation Metro Shield. They need to stop fueling the unnecessary and unhelpful fires against federal agents - fires that are more likely to undermine faith in federal law enforcement and damage local/fed relations, than they are to uncover a prosecutable criminal offense.
Hennepin County announcement
Not to be outdone, on Thursday, Mary Moriarty held a press conference to announce her office had formally charged an ICE agent with two counts of 2nd degree assault - which she described as an "important milestone" in navigating the aftermath of Operation Metro Surge.
According to the formal complaint, on February 5th, 2026, ICE agent Gregory Morgan, was driving east on Hwy 62 returning to the Whipple Building at the end of his shift. Morgan was allegedly driving on the shoulder of the road as the lanes narrow near Portland Ave. when a citizen pulled out into the shoulder to prevent him from passing. Morgan eventually pulled up alongside the citizen's car and allegedly brandished his duty pistol and identified himself as law enforcement by yelling "police." Agent Morgan then continue on and returned to the Whipple Building.
The citizen called 911 and reported the incident to the Minnesota State Patrol (MSP). The MSP determined that Morgan was and ICE agent driving a rented truck as part of Operation Metro Surge. The MSP investigated the incident by speaking to the complainant, Agent Morgan, and other witnesses. The case was submitted to Moriarty's office for review and the Hennepin County Attorney's Office filed formal charges of 2nd degree assault against Agent Morgan.
There are a couple of concerns with the complaint.
First, the allegations simply do not rise to the level of 2nd degree assault charges. 2nd degree assault is the charge the Hennepin County Attorney's Office most often uses against offenders who actually shoot someone. Often, when shots are fired, but no one is actually hit, the office will charge the incident as a "reckless discharge of a firearm." Charging Agent Morgan with two counts of 2nd degree assault, with an attached mandatory minimum 36-month prison sentence, for brandishing his firearm during this on-duty traffic encounter, is another example of politically motivated, selective over-prosecution.
Second, Moriarty's office requested an arrest warrant rather than a summons for Agent Morgan, claiming it was unlikely that Morgan would respond to a summons. Agent Morgan does not represent a threat, and serving the summons via the Department of Homeland Security would have been the appropriate approach given the circumstances. Treating a federal agent who cooperated and spoke with investigators as if he's a fugitive is simply unprofessional.
Third, Moriarty's office placed Agent Morgan's apparent home address on the complaint - again completely uncalled for, especially given the outward hostility fomented against ICE agents, including the documented incidents of agitators doxing and harassing agents at their homes. This has been the chief driver in ICE agents having to wear face coverings.
Fourth, Moriarty's office described Agent Morgan in the complaint as the "gunman." This is just ridiculous.
It's worth noting, yet wasn't noted in the complaint, that this was a very volatile time in the metro area with violent anti-ICE demonstrations being carried out daily at the Whipple Building. ICE and other law enforcement vehicles were being routinely blocked in and law enforcement were frequently pelted with objects thrown by protestors. Barricades set up around the Whipple Building were spray painted with violent messages such as "Kill ICE" and "F*** Fascists." Minnesota's political leadership openly encouraged the demonstrations, while they dehumanized ICE agents and labeled them as terrorists and a "threat." These facts are important because they provide important context about the environment ICE agents were working in, and the hostility they faced nearly everywhere they went in the metro area during that time.
The allegations against Agent Morgan, if true, deserve attention - but they deserve attention by the appropriate federal investigative agency, not local prosecutors. The State Patrol should have documented the allegations and then turned them over to the appropriate federal entity for follow-up. Instead, they turned the allegations over to Moriarty, who has been outspoken in her desire to prosecute law enforcement, and who has demonstrated a lack of judgement when doing so.
Agent Morgan will undoubtedly move to bring the case into federal court. If successful, that will help level the playing field. If Moriarty is successful in maintaining the current level of charges in state court, an injustice will take place.
Final thoughts
A huge percentage of the conflicts that occurred during Operation Metro Surge would never have occurred if politicians hadn't stoked fires and if activists hadn't been encouraged to take to the streets to obstruct ICE at every turn. These incidents emerged from that environment, and the agents put in the middle deserve far more professional discretion than is being applied.
No one is arguing agents should be immune from oversight and repercussion if they violate policy or break the law. But there are long standing and far more appropriate processes to ensure accountability than the "novel territory" that Minnesota authorities are entering.
Using those established processes would ensure that agents were appropriately insulated from the politically motivated, anti-ICE environment that has been stoked in Minnesota, allowing for a true measure of justice to emerge.
* * *
David Zimmer is a Public Safety Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
David.Zimmer@americanexperiment.org
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/this-is-no-time-to-explore-novel-territory/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Why 'Mowing the Grass' Won't Work in Iran
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Mona Yacoubian, director and senior adviser of the Middle East Program:* * *
Why "Mowing the Grass" Won't Work in Iran
At some point--whether sooner or later--major hostilities against Iran will come to an end. When the formal war with Iran concludes, Israel may hope that the United States would agree to pivot to a "mowing the grass" strategy against Iran--periodic attacks to degrade Iran's missile and drone capabilities and keep Tehran off balance. Yet this approach ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Mona Yacoubian, director and senior adviser of the Middle East Program: * * * Why "Mowing the Grass" Won't Work in Iran At some point--whether sooner or later--major hostilities against Iran will come to an end. When the formal war with Iran concludes, Israel may hope that the United States would agree to pivot to a "mowing the grass" strategy against Iran--periodic attacks to degrade Iran's missile and drone capabilities and keep Tehran off balance. Yet this approachwill not work. Instead, it will lay the foundation for prolonged regional instability and global disruption.
In search of an Iran war off-ramp, President Trump has signaled his desire for an exit strategy--whether through a successful ceasefire negotiation or by some other, yet to be announced, deus ex machina. His claims of regime change, entombed enriched uranium, and a devastated Iranian military set the stage for a near-term U.S. withdrawal from the conflict. Yet, the president has also highlighted the possibility that the United States could return to undertake "spot hits" on Iran as needed. In practice, such a plan could easily evolve into "mowing the grass" in Iran, enduring low-intensity conflict punctuated by more intensive interventions.
Israel is well acquainted with this strategy. Two Israeli academics coined the term in 2013 for a strategy to address Israel's "protracted intractable conflict" with "hostile non-state groups." The strategy became synonymous with Israel's longstanding conflict with Hamas in Gaza. While the approach may have served as a stopgap measure to manage conflict with Hamas, the strategy was often criticized for its dehumanizing framing, resulting disproportionate civilian deaths, and its failure to address the conflict's political underpinnings. Following Hamas's unprecedented October 7 attack on Israel, the longer-term limitations of "mowing the grass" became painfully clear.
Beyond the shortcomings of "mowing the grass" against nonstate adversaries, the strategy was never intended for state actors. Indeed, the authors specifically reference Iran as a challenge of a different magnitude--given Iran's nuclear ambitions--that "requires separate treatment." The last sentence of the Israeli scholars' article is prescient; the authors warn, "if the non-state actors are to acquire statist characteristics and/or more powerful capabilities, 'Mowing the Grass' might become an outdated military strategy."
Fast forward to today. It will be virtually impossible to entirely eliminate Iran's drone and missile capabilities. Rather than return to full-scale war, the United States and/or Israel may be tempted to "mow the grass"--conduct periodic strikes to degrade Iran's drone and missile capabilities whenever assessments point to Tehran significantly reconstituting its arsenal. Under this logic, the United States and Israel can simply "manage" the threat from Iran, returning to conduct strikes as needed without engaging the political challenges inherent in the conflict with Iran--a Sisyphean attrition strategy without end.
Except that it won't work. Iran is not Hamas. It is the second-largest country in the Middle East with a population of more than 90 million; it currently possesses 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and now exercises de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz. Most importantly, Iran will continue to have enough drones and missiles to re-up its newfound disruption strategy if it feels significantly threatened. Even if current negotiations yield an arrangement on the strait, Tehran has demonstrated both the ability and the will to disrupt traffic through the strategic chokepoint if attacked. (Interestingly, Tehran adapted this approach from the Houthis--the Yemeni terrorist group that deployed the tactic to great effect in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait after October 7.)
In essence, a Rubicon has been crossed. At least for the foreseeable future, Iran can wield its asymmetric drone and missile threat to wreak regional chaos and global disruption if it believes circumstances dictate. Iranian drone attacks on ships attempting to traverse the Strait of Hormuz or on airports in Dubai or Doha, let alone Gulf energy infrastructure, will once again plunge the region and global markets into disarray.
Nor will a "mowing the grass" strategy address the challenge of Iran's nuclear ambitions. Instead, pursuing a policy of episodic attacks on Iran will reaffirm Tehran's ambitions for lasting deterrence--likely via pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Following multiple attacks on Iran starting in 2024, Iran's leadership already may have concluded that possessing even a crude nuclear device could be its hope for deterrence. "Mowing the grass" in Iran will only further incentivize these ambitions.
In its original inception, "mowing the grass" was designed to erode capabilities of terror groups, not resolve conflict or even address political dimensions of the challenge. The doctrine accepts conflict as inevitable and enduring, only seeking to extend periods of relative calm between wars. Yet in the case of Iran, adopting this approach would yield a more ominous reality. "Mowing the grass" in Iran would trigger Tehran to respond with destabilizing drone and missile strikes. Even a badly degraded Iran can create the conditions for more acute challenges, with dangerous regional and global repercussions. It could leave the region highly unstable, destroy investor confidence and, with it, Gulf economies, shatter Gulf aspirations for a globally connected region, and usher the Middle East into a Hobbesian era devoid of norms, laws, and order.
* * *
Mona Yacoubian is director and senior adviser of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-mowing-grass-wont-work-iran
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Case for a Sustained U.S. Presence on the Moon
WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Dan Dumbacher, a professor at Purdue University's School of Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering:* * *
The Case for a Sustained U.S. Presence on the Moon
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
*
Human progress and economic opportunity are born out of curiosity, exploration, and ultimately the utilization of new technologies ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 18 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on April 17, 2026, by Dan Dumbacher, a professor at Purdue University's School of Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering: * * * The Case for a Sustained U.S. Presence on the Moon This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration. * Human progress and economic opportunity are born out of curiosity, exploration, and ultimately the utilization of new technologieswithin new markets. The growth of the United States from 13 colonies to ultimately 50 states is one example.
Expansion to the west in the 1800s developed the economic infrastructure, railroads, supply chain, and economic opportunity of the United States to the point where today, one state--California, is the fifth largest gross domestic product in the world--comparable to all of India.
Similarly, being present and developing the necessary infrastructure between the Earth and the Moon to build and grow the economic opportunity for both today and future generations is at the heart of the United States value system. The United States and its allies must lead so that its principles and values drive the benefit for the United States citizens and all global citizens.
In today's world, the United States' future as a global leader depends on being seen as a leader in space. Being present at the Moon, building the infrastructure from the Earth to the Moon, and on the Moon, importantly, results in economic opportunity and growth for our citizens. The United States should also recognize that its economic security is protected by its national security.
Therefore, the United States' continuous engagement in space exploration, space utilization, and U.S. national security in space is essential for the protection and growth of American citizens.
As NASA develops a bold vision for returning to the Moon--with regular landings and progress toward a Moon base--it is important to articulate more precisely why such a return is necessary.
Human understanding of the Moon has dramatically improved based on the Apollo missions, with the human experience and the returned samples that are sources of new knowledge to this day. Available evidence suggests that certain minerals and materials on the Moon could be used on Earth for power generation (e.g., helium-3), as well as for rare earth metals applicable to both terrestrial and lunar technological innovations. There is also a significantly improved understanding of how the Moon can provide an observation post to better understand and predict consequences of space weather and provide a unique listening post for radio astronomy and understanding of the cosmos.
Considering the economic impact of the May 2024 Gannon Solar Storm--including an estimated $500 million loss in agricultural production due to induced GPS inaccuracies affecting farmers across the United States--it is clear that the Moon provides benefits to life on Earth. Similarly, knowledge gained from studying human health in a one-sixth gravity environment, the lunar cosmic radiation environment, and findings from the International Space Station on human health in microgravity--including application to the human ageing process--further underscores the Moon's value for life on Earth.
Given the clear potential of exploring and utilizing the Moon, it should also be obvious that there is a true global competition to establish lunar infrastructure and the "rules of the road" in the operation and application of this critical infrastructure. United States allies, near peers, and adversaries are proactively working to return humans to the Moon and institute protocols and infrastructure based on their value systems. For the United States to retain its clear leadership throughout the space ecosystem, the United States must now sustain and expand its presence on the Moon. If the United States chooses to shy away from the Moon and its possibilities, it risks ceding the high ground and future economic opportunity.
The history and thus the accomplishment of the United States, which is the envy of the world, is based on its innovation and exploratory ethos. Economic opportunity, scientific understanding that leads directly to innovation and new markets, mitigated impacts on Earth, and a better understanding of human health are specific reasons for returning to the Moon.
Extending the human neighborhood to the Moon and beyond continues the United States' manifest destiny.
* * *
Dan Dumbacher is a professor of engineering practice at Purdue University's School of Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/case-sustained-us-presence-moon
[Category: ThinkTank]