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Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Ukraine Military Situation Report on Oct. 28, 2026
WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary:
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Ukraine Military Situation Report | October 28
Can Kasapoglu
Executive Summary
* Battlefield assessment. The front lines remained largely stable despite an intensifying Russian ballistic missile campaign, while Ukraine reported improved interception rates against jet-powered drones.
* Ukraine's subterranean warfare campaign. Ukraine is now taking the offensive underground near Kupiansk, contesting pipelines used ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary: * * * Ukraine Military Situation Report | October 28 Can Kasapoglu Executive Summary * Battlefield assessment. The front lines remained largely stable despite an intensifying Russian ballistic missile campaign, while Ukraine reported improved interception rates against jet-powered drones. * Ukraine's subterranean warfare campaign. Ukraine is now taking the offensive underground near Kupiansk, contesting pipelines usedfor Russian infiltration across the Oskil River.
* What to monitor. Russia's new Filin cruise missile could place additional pressure on Ukrainian air defenses if produced at scale.
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1. Battlefield Assessment
Last week's fighting brought little change to the battlefield geometry and a slightly lower operational tempo. For most of the week, daily tactical engagements remained below 200, a deviation from a months-long trend toward more frequent combat. Pokrovsk once again bore the brunt of the fighting.
With Kyiv facing a dwindling stock of interceptors, Russian forces launched more ballistic missile salvos against Ukrainian population centers. Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) estimates that the Russian military has no shortage of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones, for its air raids. Russia continues to produce missiles using Chinese machine tools and dual-use components and subcomponents from Western sources.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported an improving interception rate, at times up to 80 percent, against Russian jet-powered drones. A growing number of battlefield visuals vindicate Kyiv's claims of higher interception rates against these weapons. However, larger datasets collected over several months will be needed to draw firm conclusions.
2. Ukraine's Subterranean Operation Gains Ground
The most important development in last week's fighting was Ukraine's Veles campaign, the most notable tunnel warfare effort of the ongoing conflict. Beneath the Kupiansk front, Ukrainian and Russian troops have been fighting inside gas pipelines barely four feet in diameter. These narrow passages offer concealment from drones observing combat formations from above, but leave combatants little room to move, engage the enemy, or evacuate the wounded. The tactical engagement is placing unusual demands on both Ukraine's and Russia's militaries.
Ukraine's Operation Veles has brought this subterranean contest into focus. The operation combines combat inside pipelines with surface operations designed to disrupt a Russian infiltration route beneath the Oskil River. Since summer 2025, Russian forces have used the Shebelynka-Ostrohozk gas pipeline to reach the river's Ukraine-controlled western bank. The underground corridor lets Russian infantry penetrate the wooded areas north of Kupiansk and enter the city while reducing exposure to Ukrainian surveillance and fire. Ukraine's subterranean campaign, conducted by the Ukrainian 2nd Khartiia Corps alongside other combat formations, aims to close a persistent vulnerability in the country's defenses.
Closing the corridor through which Russian forces have entered Kupiansk has required Ukraine to do more than attack its entrances. Russian troops have reportedly bypassed damaged sections of the pipeline, cut new openings, and resumed movement through the ducts. As a result, Ukrainian forces have repeatedly found themselves tasked with intercepting Russian forces before they enter the underground route or engaging them after they emerge.
Operation Veles seeks to end this vulnerability by allowing Ukraine to establish control inside the passage itself. Visuals from the combat operations show Ukrainian forces working with a high degree of coordination. Sappers, engineers, mini unmanned ground vehicles, and elite combat troops are working continuously to seize the subterranean offensive edge.
This fighting has placed exceptional demands on Ukrainian assault units. Troops have advanced through confined spaces where firefights could occur at close range. Soldiers from the 425th Separate Assault Regiment, Skelia, have participated alongside other formations.
Ukrainian accounts describe drones monitoring Russian personnel at distances as short as approximately 65 feet. Ukrainian social-media posts have further detailed the construction of sandbag barricades, the installation of machine guns, and the demolition of selected pipeline sections. The collective effort has also required Ukrainian units to maintain underground ventilation and sustain communications with command-and-control hubs and follow-on troops as they fight their way into Russian lines. They have coordinated this underground advance with surface maneuver and drone strikes.
Operation Veles's central objective is to deny Russian combat formations a concealed route across the Oskil River and limit their ability to sustain infiltration into Kupiansk. According to official Ukrainian statements, forces participating in the operation have advanced more than nine miles through underground infrastructure. Last week Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that more than 100 Russian personnel had been eliminated in the campaign, and over 30 captured, though these figures have not been independently verified.
The operation has also revealed the broader military utility of underground infrastructure. Beyond infiltration, protected subterranean passages can support resupply, casualty evacuation, and troop rotation efforts. Maintaining these functions, however, requires ventilation, reliable communications, secure access points, and sustained engineering work. Without such support, a route that conceals movement from aerial observation can quickly become a confined, hazardous environment with few escape options.
Subterranean warfare has a long history. But modern surveillance and precision strike capabilities are renewing its importance. Drones make it increasingly difficult for land forces to assemble, move supplies, or approach defensive positions without detection. Tunnels, utility networks, and pipelines offer these forces opportunities to preserve concealment and complicate enemy targeting.
The value of such underground structures is especially pronounced in urban warfare and on static battlefield geometries, where familiar infrastructure can be adapted for sustained military use. For modern forces like Russia's and Ukraine's, this creates a need to understand and contest the battlefield below ground alongside the surface and the airspace above. Success in a subterranean environment depends upon engineers, specialized reconnaissance teams, communications, and coordination among troops operating in different physical environments. Moreover, control of a narrow underground passage can influence infiltration, logistics, and the security of positions across a much larger area.
3. What to Monitor in the Coming Weeks
Russia's new Filin cruise missile could bring a dangerous new dimension to Moscow's long-range strike deterrent. The missile is a ground-launched weapon with a reported range of roughly 760 miles, and can fly at very low altitudes while carrying a 110- or 220-pound warhead. According to Ukrainian intelligence, the missile combines 3D-printed parts, Chinese-made inertial navigation equipment, and electronics common to other Russian weapons.
The missile's significance lies in its potential for mass production. If the Russian defense technological and industrial base can manufacture the Filin inexpensively and in substantial numbers, it could expand Moscow's strike capacity and, alongside existing missile and drone attacks, further strain Ukraine's beleaguered air defenses. To assess whether Moscow is mass-producing the Filin in the coming weeks, look for larger and more frequent combined salvos, strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure, and evidence that the missile is accurate and resistant to electronic warfare. Wreckage and production data will also help establish whether the Filin is becoming a reliable, scalable weapon--or whether its advertised capabilities exceed its battlefield performance.
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Can Kasapoglu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/ukraine-military-situation-report-october-28-can-kasapoglu
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Ukraine Military Situation Report | October 28
Can Kasapoglu
Executive Summary
* Battlefield assessment. The front lines remained largely stable despite an intensifying Russian ballistic missile campaign, while Ukraine reported improved interception rates against jet-powered drones.
* Ukraine's subterranean warfare campaign. Ukraine is now taking the offensive underground near Kupiansk, contesting pipelines used ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary: * * * Ukraine Military Situation Report | October 28 Can Kasapoglu Executive Summary * Battlefield assessment. The front lines remained largely stable despite an intensifying Russian ballistic missile campaign, while Ukraine reported improved interception rates against jet-powered drones. * Ukraine's subterranean warfare campaign. Ukraine is now taking the offensive underground near Kupiansk, contesting pipelines usedfor Russian infiltration across the Oskil River.
* What to monitor. Russia's new Filin cruise missile could place additional pressure on Ukrainian air defenses if produced at scale.
-
1. Battlefield Assessment
Last week's fighting brought little change to the battlefield geometry and a slightly lower operational tempo. For most of the week, daily tactical engagements remained below 200, a deviation from a months-long trend toward more frequent combat. Pokrovsk once again bore the brunt of the fighting.
With Kyiv facing a dwindling stock of interceptors, Russian forces launched more ballistic missile salvos against Ukrainian population centers. Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) estimates that the Russian military has no shortage of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones, for its air raids. Russia continues to produce missiles using Chinese machine tools and dual-use components and subcomponents from Western sources.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported an improving interception rate, at times up to 80 percent, against Russian jet-powered drones. A growing number of battlefield visuals vindicate Kyiv's claims of higher interception rates against these weapons. However, larger datasets collected over several months will be needed to draw firm conclusions.
2. Ukraine's Subterranean Operation Gains Ground
The most important development in last week's fighting was Ukraine's Veles campaign, the most notable tunnel warfare effort of the ongoing conflict. Beneath the Kupiansk front, Ukrainian and Russian troops have been fighting inside gas pipelines barely four feet in diameter. These narrow passages offer concealment from drones observing combat formations from above, but leave combatants little room to move, engage the enemy, or evacuate the wounded. The tactical engagement is placing unusual demands on both Ukraine's and Russia's militaries.
Ukraine's Operation Veles has brought this subterranean contest into focus. The operation combines combat inside pipelines with surface operations designed to disrupt a Russian infiltration route beneath the Oskil River. Since summer 2025, Russian forces have used the Shebelynka-Ostrohozk gas pipeline to reach the river's Ukraine-controlled western bank. The underground corridor lets Russian infantry penetrate the wooded areas north of Kupiansk and enter the city while reducing exposure to Ukrainian surveillance and fire. Ukraine's subterranean campaign, conducted by the Ukrainian 2nd Khartiia Corps alongside other combat formations, aims to close a persistent vulnerability in the country's defenses.
Closing the corridor through which Russian forces have entered Kupiansk has required Ukraine to do more than attack its entrances. Russian troops have reportedly bypassed damaged sections of the pipeline, cut new openings, and resumed movement through the ducts. As a result, Ukrainian forces have repeatedly found themselves tasked with intercepting Russian forces before they enter the underground route or engaging them after they emerge.
Operation Veles seeks to end this vulnerability by allowing Ukraine to establish control inside the passage itself. Visuals from the combat operations show Ukrainian forces working with a high degree of coordination. Sappers, engineers, mini unmanned ground vehicles, and elite combat troops are working continuously to seize the subterranean offensive edge.
This fighting has placed exceptional demands on Ukrainian assault units. Troops have advanced through confined spaces where firefights could occur at close range. Soldiers from the 425th Separate Assault Regiment, Skelia, have participated alongside other formations.
Ukrainian accounts describe drones monitoring Russian personnel at distances as short as approximately 65 feet. Ukrainian social-media posts have further detailed the construction of sandbag barricades, the installation of machine guns, and the demolition of selected pipeline sections. The collective effort has also required Ukrainian units to maintain underground ventilation and sustain communications with command-and-control hubs and follow-on troops as they fight their way into Russian lines. They have coordinated this underground advance with surface maneuver and drone strikes.
Operation Veles's central objective is to deny Russian combat formations a concealed route across the Oskil River and limit their ability to sustain infiltration into Kupiansk. According to official Ukrainian statements, forces participating in the operation have advanced more than nine miles through underground infrastructure. Last week Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that more than 100 Russian personnel had been eliminated in the campaign, and over 30 captured, though these figures have not been independently verified.
The operation has also revealed the broader military utility of underground infrastructure. Beyond infiltration, protected subterranean passages can support resupply, casualty evacuation, and troop rotation efforts. Maintaining these functions, however, requires ventilation, reliable communications, secure access points, and sustained engineering work. Without such support, a route that conceals movement from aerial observation can quickly become a confined, hazardous environment with few escape options.
Subterranean warfare has a long history. But modern surveillance and precision strike capabilities are renewing its importance. Drones make it increasingly difficult for land forces to assemble, move supplies, or approach defensive positions without detection. Tunnels, utility networks, and pipelines offer these forces opportunities to preserve concealment and complicate enemy targeting.
The value of such underground structures is especially pronounced in urban warfare and on static battlefield geometries, where familiar infrastructure can be adapted for sustained military use. For modern forces like Russia's and Ukraine's, this creates a need to understand and contest the battlefield below ground alongside the surface and the airspace above. Success in a subterranean environment depends upon engineers, specialized reconnaissance teams, communications, and coordination among troops operating in different physical environments. Moreover, control of a narrow underground passage can influence infiltration, logistics, and the security of positions across a much larger area.
3. What to Monitor in the Coming Weeks
Russia's new Filin cruise missile could bring a dangerous new dimension to Moscow's long-range strike deterrent. The missile is a ground-launched weapon with a reported range of roughly 760 miles, and can fly at very low altitudes while carrying a 110- or 220-pound warhead. According to Ukrainian intelligence, the missile combines 3D-printed parts, Chinese-made inertial navigation equipment, and electronics common to other Russian weapons.
The missile's significance lies in its potential for mass production. If the Russian defense technological and industrial base can manufacture the Filin inexpensively and in substantial numbers, it could expand Moscow's strike capacity and, alongside existing missile and drone attacks, further strain Ukraine's beleaguered air defenses. To assess whether Moscow is mass-producing the Filin in the coming weeks, look for larger and more frequent combined salvos, strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure, and evidence that the missile is accurate and resistant to electronic warfare. Wreckage and production data will also help establish whether the Filin is becoming a reliable, scalable weapon--or whether its advertised capabilities exceed its battlefield performance.
* * *
Can Kasapoglu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/ukraine-military-situation-report-october-28-can-kasapoglu
[Category: ThinkTank]
Common Cause: Federal Court Rejects the Federal Government's Unauthorized Attempt to Disenfranchise California Voters Based on Junk Data
WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- Common Cause posted the following news release:
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Federal Court Rejects the Federal Government's Unauthorized Attempt to Disenfranchise California Voters Based on Junk Data
Oct 28, 2026
WASHINGTON - Common Cause issued a statement today after a federal judge in California blocked the Department of Justice's election-eve attempt to pressure local election officials to withhold or discard legitimate ballots without any authority and based on faulty and unreliable date.
This decision reaffirms Common Cause's important victory earlier this month, where a D.C. District ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- Common Cause posted the following news release: * * * Federal Court Rejects the Federal Government's Unauthorized Attempt to Disenfranchise California Voters Based on Junk Data Oct 28, 2026 WASHINGTON - Common Cause issued a statement today after a federal judge in California blocked the Department of Justice's election-eve attempt to pressure local election officials to withhold or discard legitimate ballots without any authority and based on faulty and unreliable date. This decision reaffirms Common Cause's important victory earlier this month, where a D.C. Districtcourt judge ruled that the DOJ's campaign to seize states' unredacted voter registration lists and share them with other government agencies and third parties violates voter privacy and illegally intrudes on states' authority over elections.
Building on that precedent, Common Cause jumped into action to protect California voters by filing an amicus brief in the state's case -- successfully urging the court to uphold states' constitutional authority over elections, protect voter data privacy, and stop last-minute voter disenfranchisement.
Statement from Common Cause President & CEO Virginia Kase Solomon:
"We knew this was a last-ditch attempt by the Trump administration to use faulty, junk data to deprive eligible voters of their rights and manufacture a non-existent crisis.
"Today's decision reinforces what Common Cause already proved in court: the DOJ cannot misuse sensitive, private voter data or hijack local election administration. When federal officials attempted to ignore this ruling and bully California election officials, Common Cause moved immediately to defend Americans' freedom to vote.
"The law is clear, and the courts have reaffirmed it -- states administer our elections. It is time for the administration to stop its desperate overreach and respect the fact that in America, voters choose our leaders."
To ensure every eligible voter can successfully exercise their rights under this ruling, Common Cause's nonpartisan Election Protection volunteers will be on the ground and staffing hotlines (866-OUR-VOTE) nationwide throughout early voting and on Election Day. These trained volunteers can help voters navigate the voting process, so every voice is heard and every vote is counted.
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Original text here: https://www.commoncause.org/press/federal-court-rejects-the-federal-governments-unauthorized-attempt-to-disenfranchise-california-voters-based-on-junk-data/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Federal Court Rejects the Federal Government's Unauthorized Attempt to Disenfranchise California Voters Based on Junk Data
Oct 28, 2026
WASHINGTON - Common Cause issued a statement today after a federal judge in California blocked the Department of Justice's election-eve attempt to pressure local election officials to withhold or discard legitimate ballots without any authority and based on faulty and unreliable date.
This decision reaffirms Common Cause's important victory earlier this month, where a D.C. District ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- Common Cause posted the following news release: * * * Federal Court Rejects the Federal Government's Unauthorized Attempt to Disenfranchise California Voters Based on Junk Data Oct 28, 2026 WASHINGTON - Common Cause issued a statement today after a federal judge in California blocked the Department of Justice's election-eve attempt to pressure local election officials to withhold or discard legitimate ballots without any authority and based on faulty and unreliable date. This decision reaffirms Common Cause's important victory earlier this month, where a D.C. Districtcourt judge ruled that the DOJ's campaign to seize states' unredacted voter registration lists and share them with other government agencies and third parties violates voter privacy and illegally intrudes on states' authority over elections.
Building on that precedent, Common Cause jumped into action to protect California voters by filing an amicus brief in the state's case -- successfully urging the court to uphold states' constitutional authority over elections, protect voter data privacy, and stop last-minute voter disenfranchisement.
Statement from Common Cause President & CEO Virginia Kase Solomon:
"We knew this was a last-ditch attempt by the Trump administration to use faulty, junk data to deprive eligible voters of their rights and manufacture a non-existent crisis.
"Today's decision reinforces what Common Cause already proved in court: the DOJ cannot misuse sensitive, private voter data or hijack local election administration. When federal officials attempted to ignore this ruling and bully California election officials, Common Cause moved immediately to defend Americans' freedom to vote.
"The law is clear, and the courts have reaffirmed it -- states administer our elections. It is time for the administration to stop its desperate overreach and respect the fact that in America, voters choose our leaders."
To ensure every eligible voter can successfully exercise their rights under this ruling, Common Cause's nonpartisan Election Protection volunteers will be on the ground and staffing hotlines (866-OUR-VOTE) nationwide throughout early voting and on Election Day. These trained volunteers can help voters navigate the voting process, so every voice is heard and every vote is counted.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.commoncause.org/press/federal-court-rejects-the-federal-governments-unauthorized-attempt-to-disenfranchise-california-voters-based-on-junk-data/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A Entitled 'Decoding the Right-to-Repair Debate'
WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Oct. 28, 2026, by Director Jerry McGinn, Deputy Director Alek Jovovic and research intern Patrick Armstrong, all of the Center for the Industrial Base.
McGinn and Jovovic are both senior fellows with the CSIS Defense and Security Department.
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Decoding the Right-to-Repair Debate
This is the second article in the CSIS Center for the Industrial Base series on the right to repair. For additional background, see the previous piece.
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The "right to repair" has emerged as ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Oct. 28, 2026, by Director Jerry McGinn, Deputy Director Alek Jovovic and research intern Patrick Armstrong, all of the Center for the Industrial Base. McGinn and Jovovic are both senior fellows with the CSIS Defense and Security Department. * * * Decoding the Right-to-Repair Debate This is the second article in the CSIS Center for the Industrial Base series on the right to repair. For additional background, see the previous piece. - The "right to repair" has emerged asone of the most contentious issues in present-day U.S. defense acquisition policy. At the center of the debate is a simple question: Who should control the technical data and intellectual property needed to maintain and repair U.S. military equipment? As Congress works to achieve consensus on this issue in the FY 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), it is increasingly important for lawmakers, industry, and the public to understand the nuances of the right-to-repair debate and the legal frameworks that underpin it.
Q1: What is the right to repair?
A1: Before the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) signs a contract with an industry contractor for new equipment or weapons systems, both parties must negotiate control over the technical data and software rights associated with these products. When the government funds the development of a system, it generally is entitled to broad intellectual property (IP) rights. Absent that funding, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) typically retain significant control of their product's IP. While this partnership has varied over time, the DOD has relied on OEMs to conduct significant maintenance, repair, and sustainment of its weapons and equipment. However, prominent voices in the DOD and Congress are now calling for greater government control over the technical data necessary to perform maintenance. This push has created growing tension among industry, Congress, and the DOD over the future of IP rights, culminating in a debate over the right to repair.
Q2: How do IP rights affect the industrial base?
A2: For OEMs, control over technical data and IP helps preserve their competitive technical edge. It also enables them to generate long-term revenue by performing maintenance and repairs on government-owned systems that they manufactured.
For the DOD, greater IP rights enable the government to pursue repair options independent of the OEM, either through in-house "organic" repairs performed by government personnel in government-owned facilities or through third-party industry providers. These options can be more affordable and efficient than relying on the OEM. As government officials emphasize, a reduced reliance on OEMs can be especially significant when repairs must be executed in the field, far from OEM repair facilities and personnel.
Q3: What is the status of right-to-repair legislation in Congress?
A3: As the right to repair has become an increasingly salient issue, the debate has culminated in a congressional battle over provisions in the annual NDAA for the past two years. For the FY 2026 NDAA, lawmakers enacted Section 805, a measure mandating that the DOD identify deficiencies and gaps in its control of technical data rights for military systems. This was a necessary first step in identifying IP deficiencies and their impact on readiness, but lawmakers are eager to incorporate a more comprehensive solution into the FY 2027 NDAA.
The House and Senate have each created their own version of the FY 2027 NDAA, each featuring a right-to-repair amendment. The House bill shifts the burden of proof onto contractors, requiring industry to justify its right to retain tighter IP control in government contracts. The Senate bill goes a step further by making government IP access a precondition of doing business with the DOD. Reconciling these two bills will require formal negotiation between the two chambers once both distinct bills are finalized.
While the House has passed its version of the NDAA, the Senate has yet to bring its version to the floor, and with both chambers now in recess for the midterm elections, no further action is expected until Congress returns.
Q4: What are government purpose rights, and why do they matter?
A4: Government purpose rights (GPR) are at the center of the current right-to-repair debate and are a core concept in government contracting. Put simply, GPR gives the government the right to use, modify, and share IP freely within the government, and to release it to third parties, provided it is used solely for "government purposes." More restrictive frameworks for IP rights include limited rights and restricted rights, which bar the government from releasing IP to third parties or using it for manufacturing without the contractor's consent. By contrast, an unlimited rights framework grants the government virtually unrestricted ability to use and release commercial IP (it is important to note that GPR typically converts to unlimited rights five years after the initial contract). Finally, specifically negotiated license rights allow negotiators to craft bespoke IP agreements, often threading the needle between GPR and limited rights.
Traditionally, the level of IP control granted to the government in DOD contracts varies from case to case, often depending on the degree of partnership between industry and government in the initial product development.
However, a House amendment, put forth by Representatives Maggie Goodlander (D-NH) and Pat Harrigan (R-NC), would make GPR the default IP rights framework in DOD contracts. This amendment would place the responsibility on industry to demonstrate the need for more restrictive IP rights, paving the way for more government control over equipment maintenance, production, and alternative sources. Importantly, this change would apply only to future contracts, leaving the IP terms negotiated under agreements for existing equipment untouched.
Q5: How would a GPR default change the federal procurement system?
A5: From a government perspective, standardizing the use of GPR could significantly reduce repair costs and improve maintenance efficiency. As cited in previous CSIS analysis, sustainment accounts for roughly 70 percent of the total cost of major weapons systems and platforms. This default would therefore enable the DOD to perform in-house repairs or choose from multiple industry vendors, creating lower-cost repair alternatives to OEMs. To highlight this trade-off, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) recently noted that a helicopter control knob, which cost the Army $47,000 to outsource for repair, could have been manufactured in-house for just $15. It is not clear, however, that GPR would be required for this repair.
It is also important to note that a GPR default would raise contract prices significantly. Contractors would likely charge the government higher up-front prices to offset the loss of control over their IP and the future sustainment revenue they would otherwise earn by performing repairs.
From an industry perspective, the most controversial element of default GPR is the government's ability to share privately developed contractor IP with third parties. Industry stakeholders argue that the Goodlander-Harrigan amendment would prevent contractors from protecting their technical data from potential competitors, creating an uneven playing field across the industrial base.
Q6: What is the distinction between maintenance and manufacturing data?
A6: Much like the different types of IP rights, grasping the distinction between the two forms of technical data--operation, maintenance, installation, and training data (OMIT), and detailed manufacturing and process data (DMPD)--is crucial for understanding the right-to-repair debate. Simply put, OMIT data enables the government to operate and maintain equipment and weapons systems, while DMPD provides instructions necessary for manufacturing and overhauling these assets. Under current U.S. law, industry is required to grant the government unlimited rights to OMIT data in procurement contracts. By contrast, control over DMPD varies with the level of government investment during product development.
However, there is a degree of overlap between OMIT data and DMPD, creating a major source of tension in the right-to-repair debate. DOD guidelines acknowledge that some OMIT data also qualifies as DMPD and state that this data does not automatically fall under unlimited rights like the rest of OMIT. This overlap has led to high-profile disagreements between the government and industry on what technical data the government can access. As a result, a central question in the debate over any right-to-repair legislation will be how it applies to DMPD.
Q7: How does the government manage and track IP rights?
A7: While acquiring IP rights is a fundamental issue behind the right to repair, the government's ability to track the rights it already owns is just as important. Effectively identifying, locating, and accessing existing IP enables the government to determine whether to buy new data or draw on preexisting IP knowledge. A recent Government Accountability Office report found that the DOD has consistently failed to acquire and track the IP and technical data rights necessary to sustain its equipment and weapons systems. The failure to plan for long-term product use and a lack of department-wide coordination were identified as key factors contributing to this issue. This fragmented approach also creates challenges for industry, as inadequate IP records limit the government's ability to clearly define its technical data needs in negotiations, thereby limiting industry's ability to offer an optimal proposal.
Lawmakers added Section 805 to the FY 2026 NDAA to remedy this problem, mandating that the DOD identify and track the technical data and software it needs to maintain the military's major weapons systems and address any gaps in its access to these rights. The DOD's response to Section 805 was to create a database cataloging its existing IP and data access. However, at the time of writing, many industry stakeholders and lawmakers remain frustrated with the DOD's apparent lack of progress on this database. Additionally, some observers have raised concerns in discussion with the authors about the potential security risks posed by a large, centralized database housing U.S. defense IP.
Q8: What is the primary alternative to a GPR default?
A8: Both the current case-by-case IP rights process and the proposed process outlined in the Goodlander-Harrigan amendment use an up-front payment model, in which the government pays for technical data rights at the outset of a contract. Industry, government, and members of Congress have proposed another framework, dubbed data as a service (DaaS). In this process, the government would pay a recurring subscription fee based on its usage of industry IP. Industry stakeholders highlight that this plan would streamline the acquisition process and create a more flexible approach to IP usage. Critics, however, claim that such a plan would unfairly burden taxpayers and create operational risks by denying the government the controls it needs to use IP effectively.
Q9: What solutions could help resolve the right-to-repair debate?
A9: The FY 2026 NDAA compromise did not satisfy anyone, and many lawmakers have made it clear that they are not willing to defer this issue further. Several pathways outlined below may help resolve the right-to-repair debate by addressing the concerns of both industry and government.
One option is to make GPR the default mechanism for government contracts while barring the government from transferring the IP to third parties. This solution would address a key industry concern while allowing the DOD to use IP for organic repair. However, the cost of GPR would remain an issue.
DaaS, explained above, is also a potential solution, allowing the government to gain IP access through recurring fees, much like a subscription. Additionally, some stakeholders have proposed in discussions with the authors a new business model for the DOD where the government would be responsible for switching vendors at various key points in a system's life cycle. The DOD could therefore rely on one vendor for production and another for sustainment, and it would prepare for this switch by securing the appropriate IP rights during contract negotiations.
Another potential solution would be to better delineate the distinction between OMIT data and DMPD. Many industry stakeholders highlight that sensitive software IP, such as source code, should be treated as DMPD and therefore be excluded from the unlimited rights framework for OMIT data. Therefore, the government, which already procures software using a dedicated process, could also develop a separate IP policy for software, distinct from a technical data policy. Similarly, the government could further customize its IP approach to accommodate different types of defense hardware, as munitions and missiles, for example, have significantly different technical data requirements and sustainment needs from ships and vehicles.
Additional IP management frameworks, such as escrow and access agreements, also strike a balance between government and industry goals. In escrow agreements, a neutral third party ensures that IP is handed over to the government if the contractor files for bankruptcy or discontinues product support. Access agreements set specific conditions for government IP access, specifying who can access private technical data and where they can do so, often featuring nondisclosure agreements covering any data the government releases to outside contractors.
Any effective solution to the right-to-repair issue will need to grapple with differing interpretations of the challenges, complex trade-offs, trailing outcomes, and competing interests discussed in this article. A follow-on article will further examine the potential solutions briefly outlined above.
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Jerry McGinn is director of the Center for the Industrial Base and a senior fellow with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Patrick Armstrong is a research intern in the Center for the Industrial Base at CSIS. Alek Jovovic is deputy director for the Center for the Industrial Base and senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/decoding-right-repair-debate
[Category: ThinkTank]
McGinn and Jovovic are both senior fellows with the CSIS Defense and Security Department.
* * *
Decoding the Right-to-Repair Debate
This is the second article in the CSIS Center for the Industrial Base series on the right to repair. For additional background, see the previous piece.
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The "right to repair" has emerged as ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Oct. 28, 2026, by Director Jerry McGinn, Deputy Director Alek Jovovic and research intern Patrick Armstrong, all of the Center for the Industrial Base. McGinn and Jovovic are both senior fellows with the CSIS Defense and Security Department. * * * Decoding the Right-to-Repair Debate This is the second article in the CSIS Center for the Industrial Base series on the right to repair. For additional background, see the previous piece. - The "right to repair" has emerged asone of the most contentious issues in present-day U.S. defense acquisition policy. At the center of the debate is a simple question: Who should control the technical data and intellectual property needed to maintain and repair U.S. military equipment? As Congress works to achieve consensus on this issue in the FY 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), it is increasingly important for lawmakers, industry, and the public to understand the nuances of the right-to-repair debate and the legal frameworks that underpin it.
Q1: What is the right to repair?
A1: Before the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) signs a contract with an industry contractor for new equipment or weapons systems, both parties must negotiate control over the technical data and software rights associated with these products. When the government funds the development of a system, it generally is entitled to broad intellectual property (IP) rights. Absent that funding, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) typically retain significant control of their product's IP. While this partnership has varied over time, the DOD has relied on OEMs to conduct significant maintenance, repair, and sustainment of its weapons and equipment. However, prominent voices in the DOD and Congress are now calling for greater government control over the technical data necessary to perform maintenance. This push has created growing tension among industry, Congress, and the DOD over the future of IP rights, culminating in a debate over the right to repair.
Q2: How do IP rights affect the industrial base?
A2: For OEMs, control over technical data and IP helps preserve their competitive technical edge. It also enables them to generate long-term revenue by performing maintenance and repairs on government-owned systems that they manufactured.
For the DOD, greater IP rights enable the government to pursue repair options independent of the OEM, either through in-house "organic" repairs performed by government personnel in government-owned facilities or through third-party industry providers. These options can be more affordable and efficient than relying on the OEM. As government officials emphasize, a reduced reliance on OEMs can be especially significant when repairs must be executed in the field, far from OEM repair facilities and personnel.
Q3: What is the status of right-to-repair legislation in Congress?
A3: As the right to repair has become an increasingly salient issue, the debate has culminated in a congressional battle over provisions in the annual NDAA for the past two years. For the FY 2026 NDAA, lawmakers enacted Section 805, a measure mandating that the DOD identify deficiencies and gaps in its control of technical data rights for military systems. This was a necessary first step in identifying IP deficiencies and their impact on readiness, but lawmakers are eager to incorporate a more comprehensive solution into the FY 2027 NDAA.
The House and Senate have each created their own version of the FY 2027 NDAA, each featuring a right-to-repair amendment. The House bill shifts the burden of proof onto contractors, requiring industry to justify its right to retain tighter IP control in government contracts. The Senate bill goes a step further by making government IP access a precondition of doing business with the DOD. Reconciling these two bills will require formal negotiation between the two chambers once both distinct bills are finalized.
While the House has passed its version of the NDAA, the Senate has yet to bring its version to the floor, and with both chambers now in recess for the midterm elections, no further action is expected until Congress returns.
Q4: What are government purpose rights, and why do they matter?
A4: Government purpose rights (GPR) are at the center of the current right-to-repair debate and are a core concept in government contracting. Put simply, GPR gives the government the right to use, modify, and share IP freely within the government, and to release it to third parties, provided it is used solely for "government purposes." More restrictive frameworks for IP rights include limited rights and restricted rights, which bar the government from releasing IP to third parties or using it for manufacturing without the contractor's consent. By contrast, an unlimited rights framework grants the government virtually unrestricted ability to use and release commercial IP (it is important to note that GPR typically converts to unlimited rights five years after the initial contract). Finally, specifically negotiated license rights allow negotiators to craft bespoke IP agreements, often threading the needle between GPR and limited rights.
Traditionally, the level of IP control granted to the government in DOD contracts varies from case to case, often depending on the degree of partnership between industry and government in the initial product development.
However, a House amendment, put forth by Representatives Maggie Goodlander (D-NH) and Pat Harrigan (R-NC), would make GPR the default IP rights framework in DOD contracts. This amendment would place the responsibility on industry to demonstrate the need for more restrictive IP rights, paving the way for more government control over equipment maintenance, production, and alternative sources. Importantly, this change would apply only to future contracts, leaving the IP terms negotiated under agreements for existing equipment untouched.
Q5: How would a GPR default change the federal procurement system?
A5: From a government perspective, standardizing the use of GPR could significantly reduce repair costs and improve maintenance efficiency. As cited in previous CSIS analysis, sustainment accounts for roughly 70 percent of the total cost of major weapons systems and platforms. This default would therefore enable the DOD to perform in-house repairs or choose from multiple industry vendors, creating lower-cost repair alternatives to OEMs. To highlight this trade-off, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) recently noted that a helicopter control knob, which cost the Army $47,000 to outsource for repair, could have been manufactured in-house for just $15. It is not clear, however, that GPR would be required for this repair.
It is also important to note that a GPR default would raise contract prices significantly. Contractors would likely charge the government higher up-front prices to offset the loss of control over their IP and the future sustainment revenue they would otherwise earn by performing repairs.
From an industry perspective, the most controversial element of default GPR is the government's ability to share privately developed contractor IP with third parties. Industry stakeholders argue that the Goodlander-Harrigan amendment would prevent contractors from protecting their technical data from potential competitors, creating an uneven playing field across the industrial base.
Q6: What is the distinction between maintenance and manufacturing data?
A6: Much like the different types of IP rights, grasping the distinction between the two forms of technical data--operation, maintenance, installation, and training data (OMIT), and detailed manufacturing and process data (DMPD)--is crucial for understanding the right-to-repair debate. Simply put, OMIT data enables the government to operate and maintain equipment and weapons systems, while DMPD provides instructions necessary for manufacturing and overhauling these assets. Under current U.S. law, industry is required to grant the government unlimited rights to OMIT data in procurement contracts. By contrast, control over DMPD varies with the level of government investment during product development.
However, there is a degree of overlap between OMIT data and DMPD, creating a major source of tension in the right-to-repair debate. DOD guidelines acknowledge that some OMIT data also qualifies as DMPD and state that this data does not automatically fall under unlimited rights like the rest of OMIT. This overlap has led to high-profile disagreements between the government and industry on what technical data the government can access. As a result, a central question in the debate over any right-to-repair legislation will be how it applies to DMPD.
Q7: How does the government manage and track IP rights?
A7: While acquiring IP rights is a fundamental issue behind the right to repair, the government's ability to track the rights it already owns is just as important. Effectively identifying, locating, and accessing existing IP enables the government to determine whether to buy new data or draw on preexisting IP knowledge. A recent Government Accountability Office report found that the DOD has consistently failed to acquire and track the IP and technical data rights necessary to sustain its equipment and weapons systems. The failure to plan for long-term product use and a lack of department-wide coordination were identified as key factors contributing to this issue. This fragmented approach also creates challenges for industry, as inadequate IP records limit the government's ability to clearly define its technical data needs in negotiations, thereby limiting industry's ability to offer an optimal proposal.
Lawmakers added Section 805 to the FY 2026 NDAA to remedy this problem, mandating that the DOD identify and track the technical data and software it needs to maintain the military's major weapons systems and address any gaps in its access to these rights. The DOD's response to Section 805 was to create a database cataloging its existing IP and data access. However, at the time of writing, many industry stakeholders and lawmakers remain frustrated with the DOD's apparent lack of progress on this database. Additionally, some observers have raised concerns in discussion with the authors about the potential security risks posed by a large, centralized database housing U.S. defense IP.
Q8: What is the primary alternative to a GPR default?
A8: Both the current case-by-case IP rights process and the proposed process outlined in the Goodlander-Harrigan amendment use an up-front payment model, in which the government pays for technical data rights at the outset of a contract. Industry, government, and members of Congress have proposed another framework, dubbed data as a service (DaaS). In this process, the government would pay a recurring subscription fee based on its usage of industry IP. Industry stakeholders highlight that this plan would streamline the acquisition process and create a more flexible approach to IP usage. Critics, however, claim that such a plan would unfairly burden taxpayers and create operational risks by denying the government the controls it needs to use IP effectively.
Q9: What solutions could help resolve the right-to-repair debate?
A9: The FY 2026 NDAA compromise did not satisfy anyone, and many lawmakers have made it clear that they are not willing to defer this issue further. Several pathways outlined below may help resolve the right-to-repair debate by addressing the concerns of both industry and government.
One option is to make GPR the default mechanism for government contracts while barring the government from transferring the IP to third parties. This solution would address a key industry concern while allowing the DOD to use IP for organic repair. However, the cost of GPR would remain an issue.
DaaS, explained above, is also a potential solution, allowing the government to gain IP access through recurring fees, much like a subscription. Additionally, some stakeholders have proposed in discussions with the authors a new business model for the DOD where the government would be responsible for switching vendors at various key points in a system's life cycle. The DOD could therefore rely on one vendor for production and another for sustainment, and it would prepare for this switch by securing the appropriate IP rights during contract negotiations.
Another potential solution would be to better delineate the distinction between OMIT data and DMPD. Many industry stakeholders highlight that sensitive software IP, such as source code, should be treated as DMPD and therefore be excluded from the unlimited rights framework for OMIT data. Therefore, the government, which already procures software using a dedicated process, could also develop a separate IP policy for software, distinct from a technical data policy. Similarly, the government could further customize its IP approach to accommodate different types of defense hardware, as munitions and missiles, for example, have significantly different technical data requirements and sustainment needs from ships and vehicles.
Additional IP management frameworks, such as escrow and access agreements, also strike a balance between government and industry goals. In escrow agreements, a neutral third party ensures that IP is handed over to the government if the contractor files for bankruptcy or discontinues product support. Access agreements set specific conditions for government IP access, specifying who can access private technical data and where they can do so, often featuring nondisclosure agreements covering any data the government releases to outside contractors.
Any effective solution to the right-to-repair issue will need to grapple with differing interpretations of the challenges, complex trade-offs, trailing outcomes, and competing interests discussed in this article. A follow-on article will further examine the potential solutions briefly outlined above.
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Jerry McGinn is director of the Center for the Industrial Base and a senior fellow with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Patrick Armstrong is a research intern in the Center for the Industrial Base at CSIS. Alek Jovovic is deputy director for the Center for the Industrial Base and senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/decoding-right-repair-debate
[Category: ThinkTank]
CAP's Neera Tanden Honors the Legacy of Dolores Huerta
WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release:
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Oct 28, 2026
CAP's Neera Tanden Honors the Legacy of Dolores Huerta
Washington, D.C. -- Following the death of Dolores Huerta, Neera Tanden, president and CEO of the Center for American Progress released the following statement:
It's hard to overstate the impact that Dolores Huerta had on the rights of workers, immigrants, and women.
As a co-founder and a co-leader of the United Farm Workers, she led a movement that changed the lives of thousands of workers, not just in California's Central Valley, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release: * * * Oct 28, 2026 CAP's Neera Tanden Honors the Legacy of Dolores Huerta Washington, D.C. -- Following the death of Dolores Huerta, Neera Tanden, president and CEO of the Center for American Progress released the following statement: It's hard to overstate the impact that Dolores Huerta had on the rights of workers, immigrants, and women. As a co-founder and a co-leader of the United Farm Workers, she led a movement that changed the lives of thousands of workers, not just in California's Central Valley,but throughout the country and in ways that still resonate more than 60 years after the UFW's founding.
Over the course of her long life, she never let up, continuing to fight for a more just country well into her 90s.
As the originator of the phrase "Si se puede," or "Yes we can," her legacy will inspire future generations to believe in and fight for a stronger, more equitable country.
For more information or to speak to an expert, contact Julia Cusick at jcusick@americanprogress.org.
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Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/statement-caps-neera-tanden-honors-the-legacy-of-dolores-huerta/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Oct 28, 2026
CAP's Neera Tanden Honors the Legacy of Dolores Huerta
Washington, D.C. -- Following the death of Dolores Huerta, Neera Tanden, president and CEO of the Center for American Progress released the following statement:
It's hard to overstate the impact that Dolores Huerta had on the rights of workers, immigrants, and women.
As a co-founder and a co-leader of the United Farm Workers, she led a movement that changed the lives of thousands of workers, not just in California's Central Valley, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following news release: * * * Oct 28, 2026 CAP's Neera Tanden Honors the Legacy of Dolores Huerta Washington, D.C. -- Following the death of Dolores Huerta, Neera Tanden, president and CEO of the Center for American Progress released the following statement: It's hard to overstate the impact that Dolores Huerta had on the rights of workers, immigrants, and women. As a co-founder and a co-leader of the United Farm Workers, she led a movement that changed the lives of thousands of workers, not just in California's Central Valley,but throughout the country and in ways that still resonate more than 60 years after the UFW's founding.
Over the course of her long life, she never let up, continuing to fight for a more just country well into her 90s.
As the originator of the phrase "Si se puede," or "Yes we can," her legacy will inspire future generations to believe in and fight for a stronger, more equitable country.
For more information or to speak to an expert, contact Julia Cusick at jcusick@americanprogress.org.
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Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/statement-caps-neera-tanden-honors-the-legacy-of-dolores-huerta/
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Insight: President Trump's Steel and Aluminum Tariffs - 1.0 vs. 2.0
WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight:
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October 28, 2026
President Trump's Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: 1.0 vs. 2.0
Jacob Jensen, Shuting Pomerleau, Natalie George
Executive Summary
* Over two terms, the Trump Administration has imposed increasingly high steel and aluminum tariffs with the promise of greater domestic employment and production within these industries; in practice, these tariffs have delivered neither a job nor production boom but have delivered higher prices - and foreign retaliation with far wider economic damages.
* Following ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight: * * * October 28, 2026 President Trump's Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: 1.0 vs. 2.0 Jacob Jensen, Shuting Pomerleau, Natalie George Executive Summary * Over two terms, the Trump Administration has imposed increasingly high steel and aluminum tariffs with the promise of greater domestic employment and production within these industries; in practice, these tariffs have delivered neither a job nor production boom but have delivered higher prices - and foreign retaliation with far wider economic damages. * FollowingPresident Trump's comparatively moderate first-term steel and aluminum tariff hikes, his second-term's 50-percent tariff regime has dramatically worsened the impact; these tariffs have resulted in the loss of an estimated 228,000 full-time jobs, driven an estimated 67-percent increase in one bellwether steel price in the last year alone, and increased estimated tariff costs by over 400 percent for steel and 700 percent for aluminum between 2024 and 2025.
* This insight reviews the history of President Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs in his first and second terms, discusses the economic impacts these tariffs have had over time, and looks ahead to what the future may hold.
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Introduction
Over two terms, the Trump Administration has imposed increasingly high steel and aluminum tariffs with the promise of greater domestic employment and production within these industries; in practice, these tariffs have delivered neither a job nor production boom but have delivered higher prices - and foreign retaliation with far wider economic damages.
Following President Trump's comparatively moderate first term steel and aluminum tariff hikes, his second-term's 50-percent tariff regime has dramatically worsened the impact. These tariffs have resulted in the loss of an estimated 228,000 full-time jobs, led to an estimated 67-percent increase in one bellwether steel price in the last year alone. Additionally, they have increased estimated tariff costs by over 400 percent for steel and 700 percent for aluminum between 2024 and 2025.
This insight reviews the history of President Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs in his first and second terms, discusses the economic impacts these tariffs have had over time, and considers prospects for shifts in policy.
Overview of U.S. Steel and Aluminum Industry
The United States is one of the world's largest steel producers, manufacturing about 82 million metric tons of steel products in 2025. In the same year, it consumed roughly 98 million metric tons of steel, of which about 23 million was imported. As the world's largest steel importer, the United States imported steel from 79 countries and territories in 2025, including top producers such as Canada, Brazil, and Mexico. In 2025, it imported 4.4 million metric tons of crude and semi-fabricated aluminum products and produced only 660 thousand metric tons of primary aluminum products.
The U.S. steel manufacturing process is more advanced those of most developing countries. Approximately 70 percent of U.S. steel production uses electric arc furnace technology, as opposed to the traditional blast oxygen furnaces--which is less efficient and much more carbon-intensive.
New U.S. construction projects account for about 40 percent of annual steel consumption. Key industries that consume steel and aluminum products are construction, packaging, autos, appliances, and aviation. Recently, data center construction has become the main driver boosting the demand for steel in the country.
Trump 1.0 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs and the World's Responses
In March 2018, President Trump imposed a 25-percent tariff on imported steel and a 10-percent tariff on imported aluminum. These tariffs initially covered close to $16 billion in steel imports and roughly $9 billion in aluminum imports, including various "derivative" products made from either metal. The administration later expanded the tariffs in January 2020 by applying the same 25 percent steel and 10 percent aluminum rates to 13 additional categories of derivative products, including certain nails, wires, automobile stampings, and other manufactured articles containing steel or aluminum.
President Trump imposed tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the president to restrict imports deemed a threat to national security. Supporters argued that foreign governments subsidized production, creating overcapacity that threatened the U.S. industrial base; these measures would protect industries vital to national security.
The administration initially granted exemptions to Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, South Korea, and the European Union while negotiations continued. Argentina, Australia, and Brazil later reached alternative arrangements with the United States and received long-term exemptions. South Korea secured a permanent exemption from the steel tariff in exchange for an absolute quota equal to 70 percent of its average steel exports to the United States from 2015-2017, although its aluminum exports remained subject to the tariff. The administration granted exemptions to Canada and Mexico in May 2019 as part of negotiations surrounding the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
As shown in Table 1, major U.S. trade partners responded with a combination of retaliatory tariffs, World Trade Organization (WTO) challenges, and appeals for exemptions or quotas. Overall, the international response to Section 232 tariffs did not remain confined to the metals sector, leading to damaging retaliation against U.S. agriculture, consumer, and manufacturing markets.
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Table 1. Major Trade Partners' Responses to Trump 1.0 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs
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Trump 2.0 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs and the World's Responses
Soon after President Trump took office in 2025, he revived and expanded the steel and aluminum tariffs first imposed in 2018. In February 2025, the administration raised the aluminum tariff from 10-25 percent and eliminated all country exemptions, tariff-rate quotas, and product exclusions. The revised tariffs were expanded to include additional derivative products and took effect on March 12, 2025.
In June 2025, the administration doubled the steel and aluminum tariff rates to 50 percent. The United Kingdom (UK) was able to maintain a 25-percent rate under its bilateral agreement, while tariffs on most derivatives applied solely to foreign metal content. In August 2025, the administration launched the Section 232 "inclusions process," adding over 400 additional Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) classifications and expanding the number of downstream manufactured products subject to the tariffs. After widespread concerns over affordability began to rise, the administration altered the structure of its metal tariffs to simplify compliance by creating "buckets" of products based on their metal content.
Most recently, on July 20, 2026, President Trump announced an investment incentive program to boost domestic aluminum production. Companies making approved onshoring plans and domestic investments in U.S. primary aluminum facilities can import specified aluminum volumes at a reduced 25-percent tariff, rather than the standard 50-percent rate, provided meaningful construction begins by January 20, 2029.
As shown in Table 2, U.S. trade partners responded to the second Trump Administration's tariffs with immediate retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports, unlike the negotiation strategy deployed by most partners during the first term.
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Table 2. Major Trade Partners' Responses to Trump 2.0 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs
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Impact of the Tariffs
The United States imports tens of billions of dollars' worth of steel, aluminum, and derivative products annually. Imports of steel mill products have generally declined over the past decade, rising substantially during the Covid-19 pandemic due to bottled up demand, import price inflation, and higher global steel prices. In 2025, U.S. imports of steel totaled roughly $25 billion, a 21-percent decrease compared to 2024 (See Figure 1). In the first half of 2026, the value of steel imports is down 30 percent compared to the same period in 2025, and nearly 40 percent compared to 2024. Looking solely at the weight of imported steel in kilograms, the picture remains the same, as imports are down 23 percent in the first half of 2026 (See Figure 3).
As also shown in Figure 1, the estimated impact of tariffs on steel imports greatly increased under both Trump Administrations. In 2025, estimated tariff costs rose over 400 percent compared to 2024, with the average effective tariff rate rising from 3.6 to a little more than 24 percent. In the first half of 2026, the average effective tariff rate is right around 40 percent. This is a significant uptick even compared to President Trump's first wave of tariffs during his first term as the average effective tariff rate sat around 11 percent in 2019 and slowly fell as more carveouts were made with trade partners.
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Figure 1: U.S. Imports of Steel and Estimated Tariffs
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In 2025, aluminum imports fell to $16.5 billion from $17.7 billion in 2024, a 6-percent decline (see Figure 2). In the first half of 2026, the value of aluminum imports rose by 15 percent compared to the same time in 2025, and 23 percent compared to 2024. Looking at the weight of imports in kilograms, however, imported aluminum is down roughly 2 percent in the first half of 2026.
As displayed in Figure 2, the total aluminum tariff bill has risen sharply during the second Trump Administration. In 2025, estimated tariff costs rose over 700 percent compared to 2024, with the average effective tariff rate rising from 3.3 percent to a little more than 29 percent. In the first half of 2026, the average effective tariff rate hit 49.9 percent; it has declined slightly in July and August. This marks a drastic increase in tariff rates for imported aluminum as the average effective rate was between 5.8-6.5 percent from 2018 to 2019, falling as agreements were struck with trade partners.
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Figure 2: U.S. Imports of Aluminum and Estimated Tariffs
Figure 3: U.S. Imports of Steel and Aluminum (Kilograms)
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The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs implemented in 2018 sought to strengthen domestic metal production by reducing reliance on imports and encouraging domestic investment. In reality, economists found that the tariffs produced mixed economic outcomes. While they provided some protection for domestic producers, they also raised input costs for downstream manufacturers and generated only modest gains in U.S. production.
As shown in Figure 4, the Tax Foundation estimated that the Section 232 tariffs from 2018 to 2021 increased imported steel prices by 22.7 percent and aluminum prices by 8.0 percent, contributing to modest increases in domestic prices and passing most of the tariff cost onto U.S. importers. As a result, steel imports declined by 24.0 percent and aluminum imports by 31.1 percent. Although the tariffs provided some protection for domestic producers, their impact on domestic output was relatively modest, increasing steel production by 1.9 percent and aluminum production by 3.6 percent annually.
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Figure 4: Estimates of the Section 232 Tariffs' Effects From 2018 to 2021
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Despite these industry-level gains, the broader economic effects were negative. Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs are estimated to have reduced long-run U.S. GDP by 0.2 percent, reduced the capital stock by 0.2 percent, and eliminated the equivalent of approximately 228,000 full-time jobs (according to the data as of July 2026), while having little measurable effect on pre-tax wages.
As steel and aluminum prices increased, those metals became less competitive against potential alternatives, offsetting many of the gains realized by domestic metal producers. Higher metal prices affected downstream industries that rely on steel and aluminum as production inputs, contributing to an estimated $3.4 billion annual reduction in output across the economy between 2018 and 2021, with the construction and automotive sectors experiencing the largest impacts.
The second Trump Administration largely reversed the negotiated framework established after the original Section 232 tariffs. The 2025 expansion removed many country-specific exemptions and limited the use of tariff-rate quotas by restoring broader application of Section 232 duties across trading partners. The administration also expanded Section 232 coverage to hundreds of derivative steel and aluminum products and initiated a Section 232 investigation into copper imports, signaling a broader use of national security authorities to protect domestic metals industries. While the administration claims these measures will further encourage domestic manufacturing and investment in steel, aluminum, and copper production, the higher tariffs are also expected to increase production costs for downstream manufacturers that rely heavily on these metals as production inputs.
These changes reflect a shift away from negotiated quota arrangements toward a more uniform tariff regime in President Trump's second term, increasing compliance requirements for importers while reducing the flexibility previously afforded under bilateral agreements.
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Figure 5: Price of Hot-rolled Coil Steel (Steel Product Benchmark)
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As shown in Figure 5, U.S. steel prices recently reached a four-year high at $1,357 per short ton for hot-rolled coil steel in October 2026 (a widely used steel product benchmark), a 67-percent year-over-year jump. This was largely driven by President Trump's significant second-term steel and aluminum tariffs. The last time U.S. steel prices spiked to similar levels was between 2021 and 2022. This previous spike was under different circumstances, however, as it was a result of pandemic-era inflation and a surge in demand while supply continued to remain constrained.
Looking Ahead
While steel and aluminum tariffs have changed in scale and scope since President Trump's first term in office, it appears they are here to stay for the foreseeable future. The administration has offered few exemptions or lower rates for allied nations, even closely integrated trade partners such as Canada and Mexico. The most plausible scenario is that steel and aluminum tariffs see added exemptions and slightly lower rates attached to USMCA negotiations - as long as both Canada and Mexico agree to maintain a high tariff wall of their own against foreign metals. (There is speculation that recent U.S.-Canada negotiations may result in a tariff rate as low as 15 percent for Canadian steel.)
Furthermore, just as the Biden Administration lowered the average effective tariff rates for each metal via a tariff-free quota system, a future administration may follow a similar trajectory. The most likely trade partners to receive a quota would be South Korea, Japan, the UK, Australia, and Argentina due to the historic precedent of past quotas. The EU and Brazil also previously held tariff-rate quotas, although they are currently less likely to receive any relief due to fraught relations.
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Jacob Jensen is the Director of Trade Policy at the American Action Forum.
Shuting Pomerleau is the Director of Energy and Environmental Policy at the American Action Forum
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/president-trumps-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-1-0-vs-2-0/
[Category: Think Tank]
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October 28, 2026
President Trump's Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: 1.0 vs. 2.0
Jacob Jensen, Shuting Pomerleau, Natalie George
Executive Summary
* Over two terms, the Trump Administration has imposed increasingly high steel and aluminum tariffs with the promise of greater domestic employment and production within these industries; in practice, these tariffs have delivered neither a job nor production boom but have delivered higher prices - and foreign retaliation with far wider economic damages.
* Following ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 -- The American Action Forum issued the following insight: * * * October 28, 2026 President Trump's Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: 1.0 vs. 2.0 Jacob Jensen, Shuting Pomerleau, Natalie George Executive Summary * Over two terms, the Trump Administration has imposed increasingly high steel and aluminum tariffs with the promise of greater domestic employment and production within these industries; in practice, these tariffs have delivered neither a job nor production boom but have delivered higher prices - and foreign retaliation with far wider economic damages. * FollowingPresident Trump's comparatively moderate first-term steel and aluminum tariff hikes, his second-term's 50-percent tariff regime has dramatically worsened the impact; these tariffs have resulted in the loss of an estimated 228,000 full-time jobs, driven an estimated 67-percent increase in one bellwether steel price in the last year alone, and increased estimated tariff costs by over 400 percent for steel and 700 percent for aluminum between 2024 and 2025.
* This insight reviews the history of President Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs in his first and second terms, discusses the economic impacts these tariffs have had over time, and looks ahead to what the future may hold.
-
Introduction
Over two terms, the Trump Administration has imposed increasingly high steel and aluminum tariffs with the promise of greater domestic employment and production within these industries; in practice, these tariffs have delivered neither a job nor production boom but have delivered higher prices - and foreign retaliation with far wider economic damages.
Following President Trump's comparatively moderate first term steel and aluminum tariff hikes, his second-term's 50-percent tariff regime has dramatically worsened the impact. These tariffs have resulted in the loss of an estimated 228,000 full-time jobs, led to an estimated 67-percent increase in one bellwether steel price in the last year alone. Additionally, they have increased estimated tariff costs by over 400 percent for steel and 700 percent for aluminum between 2024 and 2025.
This insight reviews the history of President Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs in his first and second terms, discusses the economic impacts these tariffs have had over time, and considers prospects for shifts in policy.
Overview of U.S. Steel and Aluminum Industry
The United States is one of the world's largest steel producers, manufacturing about 82 million metric tons of steel products in 2025. In the same year, it consumed roughly 98 million metric tons of steel, of which about 23 million was imported. As the world's largest steel importer, the United States imported steel from 79 countries and territories in 2025, including top producers such as Canada, Brazil, and Mexico. In 2025, it imported 4.4 million metric tons of crude and semi-fabricated aluminum products and produced only 660 thousand metric tons of primary aluminum products.
The U.S. steel manufacturing process is more advanced those of most developing countries. Approximately 70 percent of U.S. steel production uses electric arc furnace technology, as opposed to the traditional blast oxygen furnaces--which is less efficient and much more carbon-intensive.
New U.S. construction projects account for about 40 percent of annual steel consumption. Key industries that consume steel and aluminum products are construction, packaging, autos, appliances, and aviation. Recently, data center construction has become the main driver boosting the demand for steel in the country.
Trump 1.0 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs and the World's Responses
In March 2018, President Trump imposed a 25-percent tariff on imported steel and a 10-percent tariff on imported aluminum. These tariffs initially covered close to $16 billion in steel imports and roughly $9 billion in aluminum imports, including various "derivative" products made from either metal. The administration later expanded the tariffs in January 2020 by applying the same 25 percent steel and 10 percent aluminum rates to 13 additional categories of derivative products, including certain nails, wires, automobile stampings, and other manufactured articles containing steel or aluminum.
President Trump imposed tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the president to restrict imports deemed a threat to national security. Supporters argued that foreign governments subsidized production, creating overcapacity that threatened the U.S. industrial base; these measures would protect industries vital to national security.
The administration initially granted exemptions to Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, South Korea, and the European Union while negotiations continued. Argentina, Australia, and Brazil later reached alternative arrangements with the United States and received long-term exemptions. South Korea secured a permanent exemption from the steel tariff in exchange for an absolute quota equal to 70 percent of its average steel exports to the United States from 2015-2017, although its aluminum exports remained subject to the tariff. The administration granted exemptions to Canada and Mexico in May 2019 as part of negotiations surrounding the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
As shown in Table 1, major U.S. trade partners responded with a combination of retaliatory tariffs, World Trade Organization (WTO) challenges, and appeals for exemptions or quotas. Overall, the international response to Section 232 tariffs did not remain confined to the metals sector, leading to damaging retaliation against U.S. agriculture, consumer, and manufacturing markets.
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Table 1. Major Trade Partners' Responses to Trump 1.0 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs
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Trump 2.0 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs and the World's Responses
Soon after President Trump took office in 2025, he revived and expanded the steel and aluminum tariffs first imposed in 2018. In February 2025, the administration raised the aluminum tariff from 10-25 percent and eliminated all country exemptions, tariff-rate quotas, and product exclusions. The revised tariffs were expanded to include additional derivative products and took effect on March 12, 2025.
In June 2025, the administration doubled the steel and aluminum tariff rates to 50 percent. The United Kingdom (UK) was able to maintain a 25-percent rate under its bilateral agreement, while tariffs on most derivatives applied solely to foreign metal content. In August 2025, the administration launched the Section 232 "inclusions process," adding over 400 additional Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) classifications and expanding the number of downstream manufactured products subject to the tariffs. After widespread concerns over affordability began to rise, the administration altered the structure of its metal tariffs to simplify compliance by creating "buckets" of products based on their metal content.
Most recently, on July 20, 2026, President Trump announced an investment incentive program to boost domestic aluminum production. Companies making approved onshoring plans and domestic investments in U.S. primary aluminum facilities can import specified aluminum volumes at a reduced 25-percent tariff, rather than the standard 50-percent rate, provided meaningful construction begins by January 20, 2029.
As shown in Table 2, U.S. trade partners responded to the second Trump Administration's tariffs with immediate retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports, unlike the negotiation strategy deployed by most partners during the first term.
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Table 2. Major Trade Partners' Responses to Trump 2.0 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs
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Impact of the Tariffs
The United States imports tens of billions of dollars' worth of steel, aluminum, and derivative products annually. Imports of steel mill products have generally declined over the past decade, rising substantially during the Covid-19 pandemic due to bottled up demand, import price inflation, and higher global steel prices. In 2025, U.S. imports of steel totaled roughly $25 billion, a 21-percent decrease compared to 2024 (See Figure 1). In the first half of 2026, the value of steel imports is down 30 percent compared to the same period in 2025, and nearly 40 percent compared to 2024. Looking solely at the weight of imported steel in kilograms, the picture remains the same, as imports are down 23 percent in the first half of 2026 (See Figure 3).
As also shown in Figure 1, the estimated impact of tariffs on steel imports greatly increased under both Trump Administrations. In 2025, estimated tariff costs rose over 400 percent compared to 2024, with the average effective tariff rate rising from 3.6 to a little more than 24 percent. In the first half of 2026, the average effective tariff rate is right around 40 percent. This is a significant uptick even compared to President Trump's first wave of tariffs during his first term as the average effective tariff rate sat around 11 percent in 2019 and slowly fell as more carveouts were made with trade partners.
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Figure 1: U.S. Imports of Steel and Estimated Tariffs
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In 2025, aluminum imports fell to $16.5 billion from $17.7 billion in 2024, a 6-percent decline (see Figure 2). In the first half of 2026, the value of aluminum imports rose by 15 percent compared to the same time in 2025, and 23 percent compared to 2024. Looking at the weight of imports in kilograms, however, imported aluminum is down roughly 2 percent in the first half of 2026.
As displayed in Figure 2, the total aluminum tariff bill has risen sharply during the second Trump Administration. In 2025, estimated tariff costs rose over 700 percent compared to 2024, with the average effective tariff rate rising from 3.3 percent to a little more than 29 percent. In the first half of 2026, the average effective tariff rate hit 49.9 percent; it has declined slightly in July and August. This marks a drastic increase in tariff rates for imported aluminum as the average effective rate was between 5.8-6.5 percent from 2018 to 2019, falling as agreements were struck with trade partners.
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Figure 2: U.S. Imports of Aluminum and Estimated Tariffs
Figure 3: U.S. Imports of Steel and Aluminum (Kilograms)
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The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs implemented in 2018 sought to strengthen domestic metal production by reducing reliance on imports and encouraging domestic investment. In reality, economists found that the tariffs produced mixed economic outcomes. While they provided some protection for domestic producers, they also raised input costs for downstream manufacturers and generated only modest gains in U.S. production.
As shown in Figure 4, the Tax Foundation estimated that the Section 232 tariffs from 2018 to 2021 increased imported steel prices by 22.7 percent and aluminum prices by 8.0 percent, contributing to modest increases in domestic prices and passing most of the tariff cost onto U.S. importers. As a result, steel imports declined by 24.0 percent and aluminum imports by 31.1 percent. Although the tariffs provided some protection for domestic producers, their impact on domestic output was relatively modest, increasing steel production by 1.9 percent and aluminum production by 3.6 percent annually.
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Figure 4: Estimates of the Section 232 Tariffs' Effects From 2018 to 2021
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Despite these industry-level gains, the broader economic effects were negative. Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs are estimated to have reduced long-run U.S. GDP by 0.2 percent, reduced the capital stock by 0.2 percent, and eliminated the equivalent of approximately 228,000 full-time jobs (according to the data as of July 2026), while having little measurable effect on pre-tax wages.
As steel and aluminum prices increased, those metals became less competitive against potential alternatives, offsetting many of the gains realized by domestic metal producers. Higher metal prices affected downstream industries that rely on steel and aluminum as production inputs, contributing to an estimated $3.4 billion annual reduction in output across the economy between 2018 and 2021, with the construction and automotive sectors experiencing the largest impacts.
The second Trump Administration largely reversed the negotiated framework established after the original Section 232 tariffs. The 2025 expansion removed many country-specific exemptions and limited the use of tariff-rate quotas by restoring broader application of Section 232 duties across trading partners. The administration also expanded Section 232 coverage to hundreds of derivative steel and aluminum products and initiated a Section 232 investigation into copper imports, signaling a broader use of national security authorities to protect domestic metals industries. While the administration claims these measures will further encourage domestic manufacturing and investment in steel, aluminum, and copper production, the higher tariffs are also expected to increase production costs for downstream manufacturers that rely heavily on these metals as production inputs.
These changes reflect a shift away from negotiated quota arrangements toward a more uniform tariff regime in President Trump's second term, increasing compliance requirements for importers while reducing the flexibility previously afforded under bilateral agreements.
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Figure 5: Price of Hot-rolled Coil Steel (Steel Product Benchmark)
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As shown in Figure 5, U.S. steel prices recently reached a four-year high at $1,357 per short ton for hot-rolled coil steel in October 2026 (a widely used steel product benchmark), a 67-percent year-over-year jump. This was largely driven by President Trump's significant second-term steel and aluminum tariffs. The last time U.S. steel prices spiked to similar levels was between 2021 and 2022. This previous spike was under different circumstances, however, as it was a result of pandemic-era inflation and a surge in demand while supply continued to remain constrained.
Looking Ahead
While steel and aluminum tariffs have changed in scale and scope since President Trump's first term in office, it appears they are here to stay for the foreseeable future. The administration has offered few exemptions or lower rates for allied nations, even closely integrated trade partners such as Canada and Mexico. The most plausible scenario is that steel and aluminum tariffs see added exemptions and slightly lower rates attached to USMCA negotiations - as long as both Canada and Mexico agree to maintain a high tariff wall of their own against foreign metals. (There is speculation that recent U.S.-Canada negotiations may result in a tariff rate as low as 15 percent for Canadian steel.)
Furthermore, just as the Biden Administration lowered the average effective tariff rates for each metal via a tariff-free quota system, a future administration may follow a similar trajectory. The most likely trade partners to receive a quota would be South Korea, Japan, the UK, Australia, and Argentina due to the historic precedent of past quotas. The EU and Brazil also previously held tariff-rate quotas, although they are currently less likely to receive any relief due to fraught relations.
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Jacob Jensen is the Director of Trade Policy at the American Action Forum.
Shuting Pomerleau is the Director of Energy and Environmental Policy at the American Action Forum
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/president-trumps-steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-1-0-vs-2-0/
[Category: Think Tank]
America First Policy Institute: Unchecked Siege - How Two Firms Hijacked U.S. Public Companies
WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 (TNSLrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following research report on Oct. 13, 2026, by Jeff Schlagenhauf, Ethan Antonelli and Kenzo Takeda, entitled "An Unchecked Siege: How Two Firms Hijacked U.S. Public Companies."
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Topline Points
* Current rules and regulations enable two proxy advisory firms to impose their politically motivated agendas on U.S. public companies which results in the companies pursuing political goals like ESG and DEI instead of maximizing returns for shareholders who are primarily working Americans saving for ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 (TNSLrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following research report on Oct. 13, 2026, by Jeff Schlagenhauf, Ethan Antonelli and Kenzo Takeda, entitled "An Unchecked Siege: How Two Firms Hijacked U.S. Public Companies." Here are excerpts: * * * Topline Points * Current rules and regulations enable two proxy advisory firms to impose their politically motivated agendas on U.S. public companies which results in the companies pursuing political goals like ESG and DEI instead of maximizing returns for shareholders who are primarily working Americans saving fortheir retirements.
* These two proxy advisory firms, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, control 97% of the market and are owned by a German stock exchange and a Canadian private equity fund respectively.
* ISS and Glass Lewis have obtained an outsized amount of influence, to the point that their recommendations can swing shareholder votes at U.S. public companies by up to 30%.
* * *
View full report at: file:///Users/abcd/Downloads/An-Unchecked-Siege-How-Two-Firms-Hijacked-U.S.-Public-Companies.pdf
[Category: ThinkTank]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Topline Points
* Current rules and regulations enable two proxy advisory firms to impose their politically motivated agendas on U.S. public companies which results in the companies pursuing political goals like ESG and DEI instead of maximizing returns for shareholders who are primarily working Americans saving for ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 (TNSLrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following research report on Oct. 13, 2026, by Jeff Schlagenhauf, Ethan Antonelli and Kenzo Takeda, entitled "An Unchecked Siege: How Two Firms Hijacked U.S. Public Companies." Here are excerpts: * * * Topline Points * Current rules and regulations enable two proxy advisory firms to impose their politically motivated agendas on U.S. public companies which results in the companies pursuing political goals like ESG and DEI instead of maximizing returns for shareholders who are primarily working Americans saving fortheir retirements.
* These two proxy advisory firms, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, control 97% of the market and are owned by a German stock exchange and a Canadian private equity fund respectively.
* ISS and Glass Lewis have obtained an outsized amount of influence, to the point that their recommendations can swing shareholder votes at U.S. public companies by up to 30%.
* * *
View full report at: file:///Users/abcd/Downloads/An-Unchecked-Siege-How-Two-Firms-Hijacked-U.S.-Public-Companies.pdf
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: Protecting Americans From Overprescription
WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 (TNSLrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following research report on Oct. 20, 2026, by Jennifer Bauwens, Sara Rogers, entitled "Protecting Americans from Overprescription."
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Topline Points
* Antidepressants are widely used, but current prescribing systems do not consistently ensure that patients receive standardized information about potential risks, expected benefits, treatment alternatives, monitoring needs, or discontinuation considerations before starting therapy.
* Mental health symptoms are complex and may be influenced by ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 (TNSLrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following research report on Oct. 20, 2026, by Jennifer Bauwens, Sara Rogers, entitled "Protecting Americans from Overprescription." Here are excerpts: * * * Topline Points * Antidepressants are widely used, but current prescribing systems do not consistently ensure that patients receive standardized information about potential risks, expected benefits, treatment alternatives, monitoring needs, or discontinuation considerations before starting therapy. * Mental health symptoms are complex and may be influenced bybiological, psychological, social, and medication-related factors.
* Psychiatric polypharmacy is increasing, yet medication combinations are not always systematically reviewed for cumulative risks, drug interactions, or therapeutic value.
* Drug interactions and genetic variability can influence antidepressant response and safety, but these factors are not consistently incorporated into medication decisions.
* Some adverse effects from antidepressants and other psychotropic medications may be misinterpreted as new or worsening psychiatric symptoms, contributing to prescribing cascades.
* Modern healthcare technology creates opportunities to improve informed consent without restricting access to care.
Introduction
Antidepressants are among the most commonly prescribed medications in the United States and represent an important treatment option for millions of individuals experiencing depression, anxiety, and other mental health conditions (Perlis et al., 2026). For many patients, these medications can reduce symptoms, improve quality of life, and support recovery. At the same time, the increasing prevalence, duration, and quantity of antidepressant use highlights the need to ensure that prescribing practices are supported by robust patient education, shared decision-making, and ongoing medication safety monitoring.
Over the past several decades, the role of antidepressants has evolved substantially. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and related medications are now commonly prescribed across a wide range of clinical settings, including primary care, where most antidepressant treatment is initiated. Many patients remain on therapy for years, and an increasing number receive multiple medications that affect mood, cognition, or behavior. These trends have created a need to examine whether existing systems adequately support patients throughout the full medication lifecycle, from treatment initiation to long-term monitoring and, when appropriate, discontinuation.
The therapeutic scope of antidepressants has also expanded well beyond major depressive disorders. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), and other psychotropic medications are now routinely prescribed for a wide range of both FDA-approved and off-label indications (Jannini et al., 2022). These include generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, chronic pain syndromes, migraine prevention, irritable bowel syndrome, vasomotor symptoms of menopause, insomnia, and other conditions. In many cases, these medications are prescribed by primary care clinicians and specialists outside of psychiatry, often for symptoms that patients may not associate with a psychiatric diagnosis.
Medication safety concerns are particularly important as treatment regimens become more complex. Differences in medication response, drug interactions, genetic variability, and concurrent use of multiple psychotropic medications can influence both treatment effectiveness and the risk of adverse effects. Additionally, some medication-related effects may resemble symptoms of underlying mental health conditions, creating challenges in distinguishing disease progression from adverse drug reactions or prescribing cascades. Routine reassessment and medication review are therefore essential components of high-quality mental healthcare.
A comprehensive approach to mental health treatment also recognizes that symptoms such as depression, anxiety, fatigue, cognitive changes, and mood instability may arise from multiple contributing factors. While pharmacotherapy remains an important treatment option, patients benefit from understanding when additional evaluation, lifestyle interventions, counseling, or other therapeutic approaches may be appropriate as part of individualized care. Modern tools, including electronic health records, patient portals, telehealth platforms, and clinical decision support, provide new opportunities to deliver consistent medication information and support ongoing monitoring without creating unnecessary barriers to care.
This research report examines opportunities to modernize informed consent and medication safety practices for antidepressant therapy, including comprehensive patient education, consideration of contributing medical factors, proactive monitoring, medication reassessment, and review of psychiatric polypharmacy. These principles align with emerging efforts to ensure that patients receive meaningful information and remain active partners in decisions about their mental health treatment.
* * *
View full report at: americafirstpolicy.com/issues/protecting-americans-from-overprescription/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Topline Points
* Antidepressants are widely used, but current prescribing systems do not consistently ensure that patients receive standardized information about potential risks, expected benefits, treatment alternatives, monitoring needs, or discontinuation considerations before starting therapy.
* Mental health symptoms are complex and may be influenced by ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 (TNSLrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following research report on Oct. 20, 2026, by Jennifer Bauwens, Sara Rogers, entitled "Protecting Americans from Overprescription." Here are excerpts: * * * Topline Points * Antidepressants are widely used, but current prescribing systems do not consistently ensure that patients receive standardized information about potential risks, expected benefits, treatment alternatives, monitoring needs, or discontinuation considerations before starting therapy. * Mental health symptoms are complex and may be influenced bybiological, psychological, social, and medication-related factors.
* Psychiatric polypharmacy is increasing, yet medication combinations are not always systematically reviewed for cumulative risks, drug interactions, or therapeutic value.
* Drug interactions and genetic variability can influence antidepressant response and safety, but these factors are not consistently incorporated into medication decisions.
* Some adverse effects from antidepressants and other psychotropic medications may be misinterpreted as new or worsening psychiatric symptoms, contributing to prescribing cascades.
* Modern healthcare technology creates opportunities to improve informed consent without restricting access to care.
Introduction
Antidepressants are among the most commonly prescribed medications in the United States and represent an important treatment option for millions of individuals experiencing depression, anxiety, and other mental health conditions (Perlis et al., 2026). For many patients, these medications can reduce symptoms, improve quality of life, and support recovery. At the same time, the increasing prevalence, duration, and quantity of antidepressant use highlights the need to ensure that prescribing practices are supported by robust patient education, shared decision-making, and ongoing medication safety monitoring.
Over the past several decades, the role of antidepressants has evolved substantially. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and related medications are now commonly prescribed across a wide range of clinical settings, including primary care, where most antidepressant treatment is initiated. Many patients remain on therapy for years, and an increasing number receive multiple medications that affect mood, cognition, or behavior. These trends have created a need to examine whether existing systems adequately support patients throughout the full medication lifecycle, from treatment initiation to long-term monitoring and, when appropriate, discontinuation.
The therapeutic scope of antidepressants has also expanded well beyond major depressive disorders. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), serotonin-norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), and other psychotropic medications are now routinely prescribed for a wide range of both FDA-approved and off-label indications (Jannini et al., 2022). These include generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, chronic pain syndromes, migraine prevention, irritable bowel syndrome, vasomotor symptoms of menopause, insomnia, and other conditions. In many cases, these medications are prescribed by primary care clinicians and specialists outside of psychiatry, often for symptoms that patients may not associate with a psychiatric diagnosis.
Medication safety concerns are particularly important as treatment regimens become more complex. Differences in medication response, drug interactions, genetic variability, and concurrent use of multiple psychotropic medications can influence both treatment effectiveness and the risk of adverse effects. Additionally, some medication-related effects may resemble symptoms of underlying mental health conditions, creating challenges in distinguishing disease progression from adverse drug reactions or prescribing cascades. Routine reassessment and medication review are therefore essential components of high-quality mental healthcare.
A comprehensive approach to mental health treatment also recognizes that symptoms such as depression, anxiety, fatigue, cognitive changes, and mood instability may arise from multiple contributing factors. While pharmacotherapy remains an important treatment option, patients benefit from understanding when additional evaluation, lifestyle interventions, counseling, or other therapeutic approaches may be appropriate as part of individualized care. Modern tools, including electronic health records, patient portals, telehealth platforms, and clinical decision support, provide new opportunities to deliver consistent medication information and support ongoing monitoring without creating unnecessary barriers to care.
This research report examines opportunities to modernize informed consent and medication safety practices for antidepressant therapy, including comprehensive patient education, consideration of contributing medical factors, proactive monitoring, medication reassessment, and review of psychiatric polypharmacy. These principles align with emerging efforts to ensure that patients receive meaningful information and remain active partners in decisions about their mental health treatment.
* * *
View full report at: americafirstpolicy.com/issues/protecting-americans-from-overprescription/
[Category: ThinkTank]