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TechFreedom: Upcoming Webinar - The Future of Federal AI Preemption
WASHINGTON, May 6 -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release on May 6, 2026:* * *
Upcoming Webinar: The Future of Federal AI Preemption
We're excited to announce the eleventh installment of our "Tech in the Courts" webinar series, presented by TechFreedom and Washington Legal Foundation. The event is on Wednesday, May 13, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. ET.
The federal government's approach to AI preemption is undergoing a notable shift, with momentum moving from executive branch actions--such as President Trump's December executive order--to congressional initiatives ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 6 -- TechFreedom, a technology policy think tank, issued the following news release on May 6, 2026: * * * Upcoming Webinar: The Future of Federal AI Preemption We're excited to announce the eleventh installment of our "Tech in the Courts" webinar series, presented by TechFreedom and Washington Legal Foundation. The event is on Wednesday, May 13, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. ET. The federal government's approach to AI preemption is undergoing a notable shift, with momentum moving from executive branch actions--such as President Trump's December executive order--to congressional initiativeslike the National AI Legislative Framework.
Our panel of experts will discuss the potential implications of this transition and the future of AI governance.
* Neil Chilson, Abundance Institute
* Jennifer Huddleston, Cato Institute
* Andy Jung, TechFreedom
Click here (https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_i216TRYqRJ6CJ37Mwak5-w#/registration) for more details and to register
Click here (https://www.wlf.org/programs/from-executive-orders-to-legislation-the-future-of-federal-ai-preemption/) for Washington Legal Foundation's announcement.
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About TechFreedom: TechFreedom is a nonprofit, nonpartisan technology policy think tank. We work to chart a path forward for policymakers towards a bright future where technology enhances freedom, and freedom enhances technology.
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[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Russia Rebuilding Occupied Ukraine for Extraction
WASHINGTON, May 6 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on May 5, 2026, by strategic policy specialist Maksym Beznosiuk in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russia Rebuilding Occupied Ukraine for Extraction
Executive Summary:
* Moscow's latest reconstruction plans for the occupied territories of Ukraine are less about recovery and more about consolidating political and economic control.
* The Kremlin is developing an extractive occupation model focused on seizing property, exporting grain and other products, and exploiting critical minerals to support Russia's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 6 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on May 5, 2026, by strategic policy specialist Maksym Beznosiuk in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Rebuilding Occupied Ukraine for Extraction Executive Summary: * Moscow's latest reconstruction plans for the occupied territories of Ukraine are less about recovery and more about consolidating political and economic control. * The Kremlin is developing an extractive occupation model focused on seizing property, exporting grain and other products, and exploiting critical minerals to support Russia'swartime economy.
* Living conditions in the occupied territories continue to deteriorate, with shortages of electricity, gas, water, medicine, food, and basic municipal services becoming ever more common.
On March 17, Moscow announced new initiatives presented as an ambitious effort to rebuild critical infrastructure in the occupied territories of Ukraine, improve the lives of its residents, and attract nearly 10 million visitors annually (TASS, March 17). The Russian state corporation WebRF and the Unified Institute of Urban Planning announced 25 development projects for the occupied territories of Ukraine (Dan-news, March 17). By 2045, Moscow plans to increase the population in occupied territories by 114,000 Russian residents, construct more than five square miles of property, and develop new railways and healthcare infrastructure, while opening 225,000 jobs for Russians to carry out these projects (RBC Ukraine, March 17).
All these activities are part of the Kremlin's efforts to alter the ethnic composition of occupied territories by increasing the number of Russian residents. The Kremlin has been actively recruiting doctors, teachers, public officials, and military families to the occupied territories by offering them higher pay, housing, and benefits, including access to services (Zmina, March 18). For example, in Mariupol, Donetsk oblast, there are already reportedly over 60,000 Russian residents, with alleged plans to increase the total number of Russians in occupied territories to as many as one million by 2045 (Suspilne, March 22).
These activities are also linked to the occupation authorities' recent efforts to transfer land, property, and mineral development rights to Russians and Russian-owned entities. The Kremlin allegedly allocated $11.8 billion for the development of the occupied territories of Ukraine for 2024-2026--three times the combined financing of 20 Russian regions--but this funding appears to be directed toward integration, logistics, and mineral extraction rather than civilian recovery (24 Channel, March 27). Since 2023, Moscow has allocated $425 million to construct and maintain the railway network in the occupied territories, while also expanding the road network to more than 6,350 kilometers (about 3,946 miles) (President of Russia, September 30, 2025). Russian President Vladimir Putin framed this as part of a large-scale program of socio-economic development and the revival of historical Russian lands (Vedomosti, June 30, 2025; Argumenti i Fakty, March 18). In practice, however, these investments support a methodical process of constructing an extractive occupation model aimed at exporting energy, minerals, wheat, and other products to Russia and other countries via the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk (Suspilne, January 12). In 2025 alone, Russia illegally exported over two million tons of wheat from occupied territories, transporting it to international markets through its shadow fleet at ports in the Black and Azov seas (UATV Freedom, January 17).
Moscow is also actively pursuing large-scale exploitation of subsoil resources in the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The Kremlin sees Ukrainian deposits of strategic and rare metals as a resource base to support its wartime economy and compensate for losses in the energy sector (UATV Freedom, January 17). For instance, in April, Russian geologists completed a detailed study of the Nagolny Ridge in the Rovenkivskyi district, Luhansk oblast, and occupation authorities have intensified preparations for industrial mining of copper and zinc (Korrespondent, April 5). In January, Alchevskpromgroup received licenses to explore and produce copper, zinc, gold, and silver in Luhansk oblast (National Resistance Center, April 5).
Civilian infrastructure and public welfare in the occupied territories continue to deteriorate. Local occupation authorities have completely neglected the development and maintenance of critical infrastructure and have continued systematic oppression and coercion against residents. There have been numerous challenges reported across the healthcare, energy, food, and water sectors, with local authorities often exacerbating rather than resolving them. Residents in occupied Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk oblasts are currently being cut off from water and gas and are experiencing difficulties accessing utilities, especially electricity, with extended power outages lasting up to nine hours (V-Variant, April 23). Since March, there have also been issues with the water supply across many towns in Zaporizhzhia oblast. There is often limited access to water, and the water available is often polluted (Telegraf, April 5). These utilities are furthermore unlikely to become consistently accessible in the near future. Occupation authorities often cut access to these services without warning or clear restoration deadlines, and Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has led to the degradation of vital infrastructure, making any restoration unlikely.
Conditions have reached the level of a humanitarian catastrophe in some areas. For example, the situation in Oleshki, a town of 2,000 in occupied Kherson oblast, reached a particularly dire state in April (Hromadske, April 28). Supplies of food, medicine, animal feed, fuel, gas, and other critical products have substantially worsened since December 2025, while occupation authorities have failed to ensure regular provisions (Glavcom, April 29).
Occupation authorities have also undertaken steps to deliberately shut down internet connectivity in preparation for introducing Russian-controlled networks. This is a deliberate strategy to cut off occupied territories from access to Ukrainian and Western sources with the intention to control and filter information and impose Russian propaganda via television, media, and Russian-controlled messenger applications such as Max. Since March, there have been increasing challenges accessing and using Telegram and WhatsApp, as Moscow prepares for a complete ban. In addition, numerous towns in the occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts lack consistent internet access (Ukrainska Pravda, March 31). Since 2025, Moscow has been forcing residents in the occupied territories to install Max--available only on Russian and Belarusian SIM cards--and restricting their ability to receive and transmit information outside the Russian-controlled digital environment (Texty, August 8, 2025; Zmina, November 27, 2025). Since September 1, 2025, Max has reportedly been pre-installed on all phones sold in the occupied territories, gathering users' personal data and being used by Moscow to control information.
Housing insecurity has also become more prevalent. In April, Moscow issued a new decree requiring real estate registered under Ukrainian law to be re-registered in accordance with Russian law by July 1. This would allow Russia to either force Ukrainians to take up Russian citizenship or seize their property, as the so-called re-registration can only be done in person and requires a Russian passport (Zmina, April 14).
Moscow's policy in the occupied territories of Ukraine is built around coercion, extraction, and demographic change. The Kremlin is actively investing in extractive infrastructure to support resource exports, military logistics, and political control, while neglecting maintenance and modernization of critical energy, heating, and utilities systems. This situation has led to deteriorating living conditions, repeated utility shortages, and growing humanitarian risks. The gap between the Kremlin's reconstruction narrative and the reality on the ground demonstrates Moscow's ultimate objective of exploiting resources, populating the occupied territories with Russian citizens, and making future reintegration with Ukraine virtually impossible.
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Maksym Beznosiuk is a strategic policy specialist whose work focuses on Russia's evolving military strategy, European security, EU-Ukraine cooperation, and Ukraine's reconstruction.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-rebuilding-occupied-ukraine-for-extraction/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Washington Post: Jihadists Are Kicking Russia Out of Mali. The U.S. Should Move In.
WASHINGTON, May 6 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on May 4, 2026, by Zineb Riboua, research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, to the Washington Post:* * *
Jihadists Are Kicking Russia Out of Mali. The US Should Move In.
The decline of Moscow's ambitions in Africa presents a strategic opportunity for Washington.
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Vladimir Putin's ambitions are dying in Africa. As jihadists swept through Mali late last month, they also swept aside the assurances ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 6 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on May 4, 2026, by Zineb Riboua, research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East, to the Washington Post: * * * Jihadists Are Kicking Russia Out of Mali. The US Should Move In. The decline of Moscow's ambitions in Africa presents a strategic opportunity for Washington. * Vladimir Putin's ambitions are dying in Africa. As jihadists swept through Mali late last month, they also swept aside the assurancesthat Moscow had dangled to governments in the Sahel for years. That collapse threatens the region but also offers Washington an opportunity to reassert the control it had foolishly relinquished.
The scale of the terror offensive came into sharp view in a single weekend as the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) -- al-Qaeda's Sahel affiliate -- and nomadic Tuareg rebels seized towns and military installations across the country. On April 25 a JNIM suicide car bomber killed Defense Minister Gen. Sadio Camara at his residence in Kati. Abu Hudhayfa al-Bambari, a local jihadist commander, said that the "entire city" of Bamako, the capital, "is under lockdown."
The Africa Corps, a group of Russian mercenaries that has operated in Mali since 2021, replied by partially retreating. Its abandonment of Kidal, a mineral-rich city in the north, marked the beginning of the end of Moscow's influence on the continent.
That was perhaps a predictable conclusion of Russian overreach. As NATO concentrated on its eastern flank in the early 2020s, the Kremlin built a parallel pressure system along Europe's southern perimeter, running from Libya through Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. By August 2024, close to 2,000 Russian personnel operated across Libyan military sites; Sudan had offered Moscow a 25-year Red Sea naval base; and the juntas of the Sahel's three coup states had cast Russia as their sole security guarantor.
Moscow presented this as liberation from Western dominance, while creating a corridor for migration and weapons transfers to put even more pressure on NATO's southern flank. By granting Niger's junta the political cover to sever ties with the West, Moscow also cleared the path for a $56 million deal in which Tehran acquired 300 tons of yellowcake uranium from Niamey in exchange for drones and missiles.
The Kremlin's Sahel proposition rested on three pillars: regime protection, territorial control and military competence. At last May's Africa Day, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov delivered a message from Putin pledging to "broaden the scope of Russia-Africa relations, ... contributing to the emergence of a just and democratic multipolar world order."
The reality on the ground moved in the opposite direction. The Africa Corps concentrated its resources around Bamako and gold-extraction corridors, leaving vast interior territories to the JNIM. The Tuareg, whose demands for autonomy Bamako had long rejected, found in the JNIM a more reliable partner. Since the July 2024 ambush that killed several Russian mercenaries, that convergence eliminated the maneuvering room between factions that Moscow needed to hold the country together.
The deeper irony is that Russia engineered these conditions. The Africa Corps ran a series of anti-French disinformation campaigns in Mali -- the most notorious of which was a staged mass grave that it attributed to the departing French at the Gossi base in April 2022. Russian Houses, cultural and educational centers backed by Moscow, cultivated Pan-Africanist networks that amplified anti-French sentiment across Sahelian public life. The campaign succeeded in expelling France but also removed the only power capable of sustaining large-scale counterinsurgency operations. For all its interest in resources and prestige, Moscow never matched Paris's commitment or capacity on the ground. The JNIM thus inherited the territory and imposed a blockade on Bamako that firepower alone couldn't lift.
The stakes transcend Mali. Burkina Faso and Niger have also tied themselves to Putin's benevolence as members of the Kremlin-backed Alliance of Sahel States. A jihadi-controlled Sahel would sit astride the main overland migration corridors from sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean, giving al-Qaeda its largest sanctuary since Afghanistan. The 2015 migration crisis, which still sows discord among Europeans, originated from a single collapsing state. Bamako's implosion threatens to drag its bloc down with it.
That is, unless the United States takes advantage of at least three opportunities to recover its standing with Mali.
The first is diplomatic. Washington lacks the accumulated resentments of Francafrique -- the post-independence framework that enabled France to maintain ties to its former colonies. The disinformation machinery Moscow deployed against Paris has less purchase against a power without that colonial history. U.S. security and diplomatic channels with Mali's military government are already reopening, with talks advancing toward the resumption of drone and intelligence flights. Washington should keep every such channel open. The Russian-aligned juntas are confronting a jihadist threat that Moscow has failed to suppress. By offering pragmatic security cooperation without heavy political preconditions, the U.S. can help protect vulnerable populations.
The second is economic. Project Vault, the U.S. initiative announced in February to build a strategic private-sector-led critical-minerals reserve, gives Washington a concrete framework to anchor reengagement on terms that Bamako can't afford to refuse. Mali is one of Africa's largest producers of lithium -- an asset the junta needs to monetize. The U.S. project thus offers a commercially driven path without the political conditions Mali has rejected in the past. Resource revenue also funds the security apparatus the junta needs to survive, giving Washington leverage it currently lacks.
The third and most strategically consequential opportunity is deepening the U.S.-Morocco partnership. At the 13th African Land Forces summit in Rome in March, Gen. Christopher Donahue announced the establishment of a drone training center on Moroccan soil. Washington and Rabat signed a 10-year defense road map weeks later. In this sense, Morocco offers what no other transatlantic partner can: an ally with direct counterterrorism reach into the Sahel and decades of institutional knowledge. Delegating regional security to a capable partner would free American resources for the Indo-Pacific, the theater Beijing has worked hardest to keep Washington from focusing on.
African governments have seen what Russian reliability looks like. Moscow abandoned Syria's Bashar al-Assad the moment rebel forces reached Damascus in December 2024, accepting his exile over any serious effort to sustain him. It is now doing the same in Mali. No government on the continent weighing its options can miss the pattern. The U.S. should seek to make that reversal permanent -- knowing, as ever, that a Sahel in free fall won't be contained.
Read more in the Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/05/04/jihadis-kick-russia-out-mali-time-us-move/).
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At A Glance:
Zineb Riboua is a research fellow with Hudson Institute's Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/jihadist-are-kicking-russia-out-mali-us-should-move-zineb-riboua
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to GIS Reports: India's West Asian Dilemma
WASHINGTON, May 6 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on May 5, 2026, by senior fellow Aparna Pande to GIS Reports:* * *
India's West Asian Dilemma
The Iran conflict is disrupting India's energy supplies and remittances, forcing New Delhi to balance ties with Iran, the US, Israel, and Gulf states.
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In a nutshell
* The Middle East conflict is shrinking New Delhi's room for maneuver
* India is diversifying suppliers, raising costs and geopolitical risk
* Prolonged war could ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 6 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on May 5, 2026, by senior fellow Aparna Pande to GIS Reports: * * * India's West Asian Dilemma The Iran conflict is disrupting India's energy supplies and remittances, forcing New Delhi to balance ties with Iran, the US, Israel, and Gulf states. * In a nutshell * The Middle East conflict is shrinking New Delhi's room for maneuver * India is diversifying suppliers, raising costs and geopolitical risk * Prolonged war couldharm remittances, the rupee and growth
The war in Iran is affecting India beyond the global oil shock and trade disruptions. New Delhi has long viewed the Middle East as part of its extended neighborhood and maintains ties with all key actors in the conflict - Iran, the United States, Israel and the Arab Gulf states. As in the Cold War era, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration now faces the classic strategic challenge of balancing relations with contending parties without aligning with any one of them.
Economic consequences of the Iran war
New Delhi's margin for maneuver has narrowed since U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran triggered Iranian retaliation against Gulf states. This region is crucial for India, providing about 45 percent of its crude oil and condensate, 66 percent of its liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 90 percent of its liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) imports. Over 9 million Indians reside in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, contributing nearly 40 percent of India's annual remittances, which total around $135 billion.
In addition to direct supply disruptions, volatility in the global energy market has increased uncertainty about India's import costs, putting pressure on subsidies and government spending. Energy shortages are affecting all sections of society, including average households, fueling inflationary pressures and limiting spending. A shortage of LPG cylinders has led to the closure of small commercial establishments.
Industries such as automobiles, electronics, ceramics, fertilizers and pharmaceuticals are suffering due to the fuel crunch. Supply chains in the Indian Ocean region have slowed considerably. With India's main agricultural season set to begin in June, the prolonged conflict - which has led to a fertilizer shortage - poses a serious threat to the country's food supply.
Following the Gulf War and the 1991 oil crisis, India began building strategic petroleum reserves. Currently, India has a total reserve coverage of 21 million barrels, far lower than Japan's 263 and China's 1,397 million barrels. The ongoing crisis, which shows little sign of resolution, underscores a key vulnerability: India's strategic reserves, intended to handle short-term disruptions, are not equipped to withstand extended periods of geopolitical instability. As of mid-March, these strategic reserves stood at just two-thirds of total capacity.
New Delhi has responded to the latest crisis by seeking alternative suppliers to address the energy shortfall. While this diversification is necessary, it also exposes India to potential geopolitical risks in these new regions. This highlights the country's lack of a sustainable long-term energy security strategy.
India's options all entail higher costs, prompting it to prioritize securing safe passage for its commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz, under the Indian Navy's protection. The GCC nations are key economic partners for India, and any long-term blockage of shipping routes could heighten the risk of a supply shock to its economy. In fact, safeguarding sea lines of communication has shifted from a mere commercial concern to a crucial element of India's strategic objective of establishing itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean.
The Iran war crisis has exposed some of India's structural vulnerabilities. India's central bank has said that a rise in crude oil and gas prices - resulting in higher capital outflows, trade disruptions, weaker exports, a slowdown in remittances, increased downward pressure on the rupee and a rise in inflation - could decelerate economic growth. This new crisis has hit India at a time when its economy has not yet fully recovered from the tariff and trade pressures imposed by the second Trump administration last year.
Geostrategic challenges
The Modi administration has suffered a setback in its endeavors to keep Muslim-majority Iran and the Gulf Arab states closer to India than to its regional rival, Pakistan. The escalating strategic rivalry between the U.S. and Iran, along with Israel's security concerns, complicates India's ability to maintain strong relationships with all parties involved. New Delhi has sought to internationally isolate Pakistan because of its role in terrorist attacks targeting India. But Islamabad's emergence as a facilitator of talks between Iran and the U.S. now adversely affects India's interests and policies.
India has been a strong partner of Israel and has long supported a two-state solution for Palestine while maintaining functional cooperative relations with Iran. Although New Delhi has not supported Iran's nuclear program, it recognizes Tehran as a regional power. This distinct positioning has been beneficial up until now, but the war reduces the scope for ambiguity that allows for multi-alignment. As a result, India has struggled to clarify its position regarding its various partners currently involved in the conflict.
Long-term instability in the Middle East might prompt a reevaluation of Indian geoeconomic interests. Over the past decade, India has deepened its economic integration with the Middle East. This includes initiatives such as the West Asia Quad or I2U2 (India, Israel, the U.S. and the United Arab Emirates), which focuses on energy and food security and technology. New Delhi has championed the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which includes key partners in the Gulf and Europe.
India has also invested in strategic infrastructure across the Indian Ocean, including key ports like Duqm in Oman, Haifa in Israel and Chabahar in Iran. Its goal with these investments is to achieve a deeper integration of economies across the Indian Ocean region and into global supply chains, ultimately establishing itself as the preferred economic and security partner for countries in the region while mitigating China's influence.
The fate of the Chabahar port is uncertain as the U.S. sanctions waiver granted by the Biden administration nears expiration and is not expected to be renewed by President Donald Trump. Amid recent tensions, Iran targeted Duqm, causing damage to infrastructure in which India had invested. The lines of connectivity and influence that New Delhi has been trying to establish in the Middle East are now being redrawn by more coercive forces.
For over two decades, India has viewed itself as the first responder to humanitarian disasters and the preferred security partner for countries in the Indian Ocean region. But the current environment is far less accommodating of assumed roles. On March 4, 2026, the Iran conflict entered India's maritime neighborhood when an American submarine sank an Iranian warship, IRIS Dena, only 44 nautical miles off the coast of Sri Lanka. Public outrage was heightened by the knowledge that the Iranian ship was returning from a multilateral naval exercise hosted by India and was not involved in any combat activities.
There are significant concerns for the Indian strategic establishment as well. India has historically sought to remain unaffected by conflicts elsewhere, but it has only been partially successful. In recent years, both China and the U.S. have shown their ability and willingness to take actions within India's sphere of influence.
India's strategic dilemma
For three and a half decades, India has sought to balance its ties with the Gulf Arab countries, Israel and Iran, while also trying, as far as possible, to insulate each relationship from the others. But multi-alignment, which has long defined India's foreign policy alongside strategic autonomy, now seems under pressure. The viability of this approach depends on whether the major powers, especially the U.S. under the Trump administration, can accept its strategic ambiguity during periods of crisis or will demand clearer political and military commitments.
The current conflict, however, has the potential to reshape the region in ways that Indian leaders and strategists may not have anticipated. If the conflict expands into the Indian Ocean region, it could force India to shift its stance from neutrality to selective alignment, particularly regarding maritime security and the defense of vital infrastructure.
India's ability to act is limited by its reluctance to build economic and military hard power, which would enable it to project power in its geographical neighborhood.
Instead of focusing on building hard power, Prime Minister Modi has aimed to project India through the lens of moral authority, positioning the country as a Vishwa Guru ("world leader") for both the developed world and the Global Majority. This is easier during times of relative peace but tougher during conflicts.
During Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India faced criticism from many partners for its refusal to condemn Russian aggression. As India gets ready to chair BRICS+ - a coalition of 11 emerging economies that includes Iran - later this year, it is once again under scrutiny. The country is facing pressure to take a clear stance and voice its opinions, something its leaders have largely avoided so far.
Scenarios
Most likely: India continues its current strategy
The most likely scenario is a continuation of India's current policy of working with Iran to allow Indian tankers to pass while seeking oil and gas from other suppliers to ease short-term distress. However, India's domestic challenges are growing. Indian households are hurting, as are small and medium-sized enterprises, which are vital to manufacturing. Factory closures are resulting in laborers returning home to their villages, a reminder of what happened during the Covid-19 shutdown.
The drawn-out war in the Middle East could also disrupt remittances, causing short-term financial instability for smaller Indian households. In the run-up to the April 2026 assembly elections in five states, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led central government adopted a cautious approach on fuel prices and subsidies. Unlike some of its neighbors, such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka, India has so far refrained from imposing shorter work weeks or raising oil and gas prices. This political caution highlights how internal electoral dynamics can sometimes influence economic policymaking, potentially delaying difficult but necessary decisions.
If, however, the war continues for months rather than weeks, the Indian government has limited maneuverability. For example, the government has sought to limit airfare hikes by private airlines, but that cannot be sustained. Similarly, the government is prioritizing the supply of LPG cylinders to households over commercial establishments, but that too can only last for weeks, not months. Eventually, this may compel India to reevaluate its subsidy policy, its energy pricing scheme and even its sector priorities for resource allocation.
Less likely: A prolonged war seriously challenges New Delhi
The worst-case scenario for India would be a war that lasts years, diverts the U.S. focus from the Indo-Pacific and China, and drains American resources and bandwidth. Such a war would affect oil and gas supplies, disrupt Gulf economies leading to the return of Indian workers and a drop in remittances, and further harm the Indian economy.
Furthermore, if Washington turns its gaze away from the Indo-Pacific region for an extended period, it will certainly embolden Beijing to assert its influence in the Indian Ocean - a strategic nightmare for New Delhi.
In the past two decades, India has developed strong security ties with Gulf Arab countries, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, in the last year, Pakistan has deepened its defense and military cooperation with both Saudi Arabia and Turkiye. The Iran war has also helped Islamabad portray itself to the U.S. as a mediator and to the Gulf Arab states as a security partner. This follows the reopening of Pakistan's channels with Washington over the past year, while India-U.S. relations were on a downward trajectory.
A post-war Middle East in which Pakistan is positioned across multiple axes of influence and enjoys closer relations with the U.S., Gulf Arab states, Turkiye and Iran will be less accommodating to New Delhi's assumptions. In this changed regional dynamic, India will need both diplomatic finesse and economic and military credibility to hold onto strategic space.
Read in GIS Reports (https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/india-west-asia/).
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At A Glance:
Aparna Pande is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute where her work focuses on India and South Asia.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/indias-west-asian-dilemma-aparna-pande
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Celebrating Excellent Educators Across All Learning Settings
MINNETONKA, Minnesota, May 6 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on May 5, 2026, by policy fellow Catrin Wigfall:* * *
Celebrating excellent educators across all learning settings
National Teacher Appreciation Week kicked off yesterday, with today recognized as National Teacher Day. It was first celebrated in 1953 after Eleanor Roosevelt persuaded Congress to set aside a day to honor educators. It was officially recognized as a national day in 1980, and four years later the ... Show Full Article MINNETONKA, Minnesota, May 6 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on May 5, 2026, by policy fellow Catrin Wigfall: * * * Celebrating excellent educators across all learning settings National Teacher Appreciation Week kicked off yesterday, with today recognized as National Teacher Day. It was first celebrated in 1953 after Eleanor Roosevelt persuaded Congress to set aside a day to honor educators. It was officially recognized as a national day in 1980, and four years later thefirst full week of May each year became Teacher Appreciation Week. Since 1985, the Tuesday of every Teacher Appreciation Week is observed as National Teacher Day.
On this day, students, parents, and communities around the country get to celebrate teachers and appreciate all they do. And while showing our gratitude shouldn't be limited to just this week and day, it's a wonderful opportunity to reflect on how teachers go above to help students go beyond.
As a former elementary and middle school teacher, I know firsthand how incredibly rewarding it is to ignite curiosity and spark a lifelong love of learning in students. But I also know how challenging it can be as well. We ask a lot of our teachers, and this is why we must remember the importance of a great teacher and not take that for granted.
Great teachers can be found across all learning environments -- from my sister in a traditional public school setting and my best friend in a private school setting to Rebecca in a microschool setting, Michelle in a home education setting, and Amy in a hybrid homeschool setting.
Thank you, educators, for the many ways you help our next generation of leaders grow and flourish!
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Who was your favorite teacher? And why? Share your thoughts below!
I will always remember my third-grade teacher Mrs. H. and my fifth-grade teacher Mr. H. (not related). Outside of helping me grow academically, both reminded me in their own ways of my value and potential.
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Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/celebrating-excellent-educators-across-all-learning-settings/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Lessons for the United States in the Militant Attacks That Killed Mali's Defense Minister
WASHINGTON, May 6 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on May 5, 2026, by Oge Onubogu, director and senior fellow of the Africa Program:* * *
Lessons for the United States in the Militant Attacks that Killed Mali's Defense Minister
The security crisis in Africa's western Sahel region has entered a dangerous new phase with the recent unprecedented and coordinated attacks in military-controlled areas and urban centers of Mali by al Qaeda-linked militant groups and Tuareg separatist forces. The Sahel already accounted for more than half of all terrorism-related ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 6 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on May 5, 2026, by Oge Onubogu, director and senior fellow of the Africa Program: * * * Lessons for the United States in the Militant Attacks that Killed Mali's Defense Minister The security crisis in Africa's western Sahel region has entered a dangerous new phase with the recent unprecedented and coordinated attacks in military-controlled areas and urban centers of Mali by al Qaeda-linked militant groups and Tuareg separatist forces. The Sahel already accounted for more than half of all terrorism-relateddeaths globally in 2024 and continued to dominate in 2025 among the 10 countries most affected by terrorism. But the attacks in Mali on April 25 and 26--the largest joint insurgent-separatist offensive in the country since 2012--were particularly shocking, killing the country's defense minister and forcing the withdrawal of Russia's Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) from key territory.
The developments reflect a precipitous and fundamental decline in the security situation in Mali and the western Sahel, and they highlight the weakness of the region's governing military juntas and their Russian partners. The volatile trajectory holds important lessons for the United States as it seeks to reengage in the Sahel to pursue its economic and counterterrorism interests through a model that appears to trade security for resources--one that may risk ignoring the region's underlying dynamics.
A String of Military Coups
The junta in Mali, like its counterparts in neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger, seized power in a string of military coups in the Sahel region between 2020 and 2023. These coups, while instigated by military officers, were largely driven by public frustration with escalating violence as well as widespread corruption and a powerful surge of anticolonial sentiment, mostly directed toward the former colonial power, France, which had been their key security partner and also had struggled to contain the violence.
As ties with France and the West soured, the elected governments and, more so, the military regimes that took over in the wake of the coups increasingly turned to Russia--specifically the Wagner Group and then the Africa Corps--for security assistance. Russia took advantage of internal discontent to position itself as an external champion of the juntas' nationalist posturing on sovereignty and "pragmatic" security. The military regimes of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger officially withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had relations with the United States and Europe, and established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), essentially fracturing a once unified--if weak--regional front against the growing jihadist movements in the region.
The military juntas promised improved security but have mostly failed at that. Instead, they have busied themselves with maneuvering to delay political transitions to civilian rule and fending off various domestic, social, and economic pressures. What the military juntas initially touted as a pivot away from Western dependence to restore sovereignty has instead produced a state weakened even more by a fragmented security landscape. Insurgent groups have expanded, and the juntas' newly chosen external partner, Russia, has clearly reached the limit of its operational model, judging by Africa Corps forced retreat from Kidal during the recent fighting.
The Trump Administration's Reengagement
Following years of suspended U.S. cooperation due to the coups, the Trump administration is trying to reengage the United States in the region, though on a platform that it says will be fundamentally different from that of previous U.S. approaches. Nick Checker, the senior bureau official for the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, visited Mali in February and told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy in April in his written statement:
We will pursue a disciplined, interest-driven strategy rooted in flexible realism.... Going forward we will prioritize enabling and cooperating with African nations with demonstrated commitment and capacity to take the lead in addressing their security gaps while advancing core U.S. national interests.
Before the recent attacks in Mali, the administration had lifted sanctions on Wagner-linked officials of the ruling junta, including the late Defense Minister General Sadio Camara, who was the government's key liaison with Russia. The United States also was nearing a deal with the junta to resume intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance flights over Mali to help battle expanding jihadist activity, and in part to help locate an American missionary pilot kidnapped in Niger in October and believed to be held in Mali by the al Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
The Trump administration's focus on counterterrorism reflects its 2025 National Security Strategy, which outlines plans to address "resurgent Islamist terrorist activity in parts of Africa while avoiding any long-term American presence or commitments." However, the convergence between al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups and Tuareg separatist forces in the recent attacks in Mali reveals a complicated security landscape that links territorial disputes with broader insurgent campaigns. The main adversaries of the Malian state are not a single terrorist insurgency but a layered network of armed groups. The most prominent include JNIM (itself an amalgam of militant groups aligned with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and the separatist Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front. These groups have increasingly synchronized their operations, combining jihadist ideology with local grievances and separatist aspirations.
The Risks of Divorcing Counterterrorism from Governance and Local Dynamics
This dynamic raises an important question about the limits of external counterterrorism efforts in the region when the approaches are detached from issues of governing legitimacy and local dynamics. Russia's recent failure in Mali is a case in point: The security arrangement between Mali and Russia is purely transactional. Mali's junta gained regime protection and counterinsurgency support in return for Russian access to strategic resources and gained geopolitical leverage across the Sahel.
The U.S. approach to reengaging with Mali appears to be taking a similar tack, and it should beware of Russia's failures in that respect. While Russia had several tactical successes in its security operations in Mali--Wagner Group mercenaries, in cooperation with the Malian army, actually captured Kidal in 2023 before losing it this April--the Kremlin and its paramilitaries had limited strategic control, which allowed insurgents to regroup and reemerge in new areas. In addition, the heavy-handedness of Russia's military operations and the Malian junta's repression, including banning political parties and delaying political transitions, alienated important segments of the population and eroded the junta's legitimacy, allowing insurgents to present themselves as an alternative to a failing state. The recent success of the insurgents in taking back the major northern Malian city of Kidal, a pro-independence stronghold controlled for years by rebel groups before being captured by the Wagner Group in November 2023, is partly due to their ability to exploit localized grievances and distrust of the central government.
Russia's engagement in Mali is also shaped by broader geopolitical priorities, including the war in Ukraine, which has significantly limited its ability to commit resources elsewhere. This is also an important lesson for the United States to consider, as it is engaged in its own war with Iran.
What Now for the U.S. Reset?
To succeed where Russia has failed, the United States must avoid becoming trapped in the same security-for-resources approach in the Sahel. Trading security guarantees for critical minerals access risks repeating the Russian error of backing authoritarian leaders without demanding accountability. In a conflict defined by a hybrid insurgency that combines conventional and irregular warfare, local grievances, and fluid adversaries, a transactional approach is inherently insufficient because the problem is not only tactical but structural.
The paradox of the junta security strategy across the western Sahel has been the rejection of Western-aligned and more democratically oriented regional and international partners in the face of escalating militant threats. Russia's narrow focus on protecting junta leaders has accelerated regional fragmentation. ECOWAS, however significant its weaknesses, has been signaling for months its willingness to help address the jihadist threat. The AES is young and weak, and while the group has purchased sophisticated equipment and boasts of a newly formed joint task force, its operational reality is one of severe limitations.
The geographic scope of the recent attacks in Mali, the direct targeting of senior regime officials, and the coordination between jihadist and separatist forces reflect a change in the operational capability of the insurgents that has been building for years and spreading across the western Sahel. U.S. policymakers were caught off guard by the events in Mali, but they can still help shape outcomes moving forward.
The quest for sovereignty in the Sahel is a profound, legitimate, and widely supported goal among local populations. So, even when military juntas use it as a ploy to consolidate power, expel Western forces, and avoid democratic accountability, it remains a critical factor for the United States to take into account and to address. Senior Bureau Official Checker gave a nod to that in his Senate testimony when he said, "there are regional and cultural dynamics that must be accounted for to address the underlying conditions that fuel conflict--weak governance, lack of economic opportunity, and unresolved regional disputes." But then the rest of his sentence called them "challenges that the U.S. cannot unilaterally address." Perhaps not unilaterally, but in conjunction with legitimate representatives in Mali, they could be surmountable.
Rather than simply using the same talking points about sovereignty as the Russians, the Trump administration should pursue a multidimensional strategy in the Sahel that focuses on genuine partnership with regional states, addresses economic needs in a principled way that could eventually curb corruption, and honestly confronts anti-Western sentiments.
Certainly, Malian and wider West African public opinion is increasingly sensitive to anything that might be perceived as external interference. That means the United States must strike a fine balance between the pragmatism required to engage with the subregion's military regimes and an insistence on fundamental democratic values and principles. Only then can Mali--and/or its regional neighbors--prevent the further political and diplomatic isolation of the Sahel states and embrace a renewed collaboration on more equitable terms.
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Oge Onubogu is director and senior fellow of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/lessons-united-states-militant-attacks-killed-malis-defense-minister
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: How to Lose an Information War in 10 Days
WASHINGTON, May 6 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on May 5, 2026, by Director Benjamin Jensen, associate fellow Jose M. Macias, and intern Nico Vacca, all of the Futures Lab:* * *
How to Lose an Information War in 10 Days
We live in a surreal world in which battlefield success does not necessarily translate into an information advantage. Belief is suspended from reality largely because most of us spend hours of our waking lives bombarded by images, memes, and ephemeral social media content that is both tailored and increasingly augmented ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 6 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on May 5, 2026, by Director Benjamin Jensen, associate fellow Jose M. Macias, and intern Nico Vacca, all of the Futures Lab: * * * How to Lose an Information War in 10 Days We live in a surreal world in which battlefield success does not necessarily translate into an information advantage. Belief is suspended from reality largely because most of us spend hours of our waking lives bombarded by images, memes, and ephemeral social media content that is both tailored and increasingly augmentedby AI. For every official press conference, no matter how masterful or awkward, viral pop culture pastiches blitz the senses. Homo economicus succumbs to giggles, fear, dopamine, and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).
Look no further than the war with Iran. The United States and Israel achieved unparalleled success on the battlefield, sinking large portions of Iranian naval capability and setting back its ballistic missile and nuclear program by years, if not decades. Yet, Iran counterattacked as much online as it did with salvos of ballistic missiles and drones. While U.S. leaders struggled to make a compelling case for the war, Iranian-linked accounts flooded social media with deepfakes, false claims of battlefield success, and narratives painting the conflict as a costly war driven by corrupt elite interests at the expense of ordinary Americans. The war shows that it is increasingly difficult to separate information warfare from conventional military campaigns. Killing your way to victory is only half the battle.
This is a notion that old thinkers would understand. From Sun Tzu to Kautilya, there is a long history of seeing coercion as more than brute force. What has changed is the terrain of perception. Adversaries now can counterattack with ideas online, not just through rumors and battlefield feints, creating a compounding effect that elevates fiction over fact. The result is a new form of cyber-enabled political warfare.
As a result, the United States--along with other free societies--must adapt and align the resources and authorities required to wage a modern war for hearts and minds with the same level of technical acumen with which it conducts joint all-domain operations.
How Iran Clapped Back
Iran's information war starts at the top with Iranian state media. Iranian embassies and state-media figures have amplified content from coordinated pro-Iran networks, while the regime has treated internet access as a political tool during the war, reserving it for users who "carry its voice further." This is consistent with Iran's use of internet shutdowns and tightly controlled media at times of domestic unrest, such as the recent protests in early 2026.
Within hours of the first strikes, coordinated networks saturated social media platforms with AI-generated footage of Iranian missiles destroying U.S. and Israeli assets abroad, including embassies, military bases, aircraft carriers, and cities. In the coming days, fabricated claims appeared across pro-Iran networks, including that a U.S. B-2 bomber had been downed and its crew captured, and Iranian state-linked outlets amplified other falsehoods: the shootdown of an F-15, American casualties surpassing over 650 U.S. soldiers killed or wounded, and the death of Benjamin Netanyahu. The fabrications do not need to be believed outright to be effective. Their purpose is to amplify a contested information environment by making U.S. and Israeli battlefield dominance feel disputed and exploiting audiences skeptical of the war. Manufactured Iranian success sets the stage for a more potent line of attack: exploiting Western publics' distrust of leadership to portray the war as corrupt, costly, and against the public interest.
Iran's information war has also targeted pre-existing grievances in the American public. Framing the war as a costly conflict with no end in sight is not a hard sell. Americans are skeptical of sustained conflicts abroad, and unforeseen and unpredictable economic consequences are likely to make such conflicts unpopular. For example, an estimated 69 percent of Americans are concerned about higher gas prices from the war. Iran has exploited this vulnerability by casting the conflict as the project of a detached ruling class. In one instance, Iranian accounts paired fabricated claims of President Trump's family purchasing oil futures before the initial strikes with messages that ordinary Americans would pay more for energy, bear the human costs of escalation, and sacrifice domestic programs (e.g., healthcare, SNAP food assistance) for another Middle East war. A separate thread framed the war as a distraction from the Epstein files, while deepfakes depicted U.S. soldiers expressing regret and suffering the consequences of a conflict they did not choose. In a recent CSIS Futures Lab white paper, narratives in this category generated the strongest engagement, outperforming both posts touting Iranian battlefield success and posts driving anti-Israel content.
The campaign's reach is the product of deliberate infrastructure. Accounts operate in tightly coordinated networks, concentrating amplification within closed communities. Research has shown this taking place on X and Bluesky. On X, accounts purchased Premium verification badges to gain algorithmic and audience credibility, posted at high volume, and relied on accounts within their community to amplify their posts to a larger community. Some X posts were reposted by verified Iranian and Russian diplomatic accounts, extending the reach to broader audiences. Two such networks identified on X had posts generate over 1 billion views in the war's first month. Similarly, on Bluesky, CSIS research identified 19 user accounts that were embedded across 15 communities to spread Iranian disinformation. Russia and China further amplified compatible narratives pushing U.S. weakness and elite corruption.
How the United States Can Regain the Initiative
The United States cannot answer an authoritarian information campaign by trying to imitate an authoritarian state. It has to compete where free societies are strongest, capitalizing on speed, credibility, transparency, and coordination. In the next crisis, the goal should not be to rebut every lie after it spreads. It should be to establish the dominant account early, expose hostile networks quickly, and sustain public trust long enough for battlefield reality to matter.
Before the next crisis, Washington needs to rebuild the institutions that make rapid, credible communication possible. That means restoring public diplomacy and international broadcasting capacity, modernizing platforms such as Voice of America for the social media age, empowering embassy digital teams, and establishing standing information coordination cells across the interagency and every combatant command. The point is to have the people, authorities, and relationships in place before the shooting starts, not to improvise them after the first wave of disinformation has already gone viral.
There is a need to formalize standing information warfare task forces across each combatant command. Often, information operations, psychological operations, and public affairs are separated in U.S. and NATO military headquarters. This is a mistake. Commanders need to combine information effects to include both messaging as well as ways of amplifying and measuring effectiveness in cyberspace. This new operational approach--whether called cognitive warfare, reflexive control, or morale operations--becomes a key aspect of modern campaigning. In the ideal case, these standing information warfare task forces become joint interagency task forces, complete with representatives from the Department of State and other agencies to help create unity of effort based on pooling key authorities.
These interagency task forces need to have sufficient depth and resources to counterattack in real time. Just like the United States maintains a global response force and regional crisis response forces, it needs to adopt the same posture in the information domain. Perception changes fast on social media, and waiting for authorities and consistent messaging can lead to outright defeat online.
In the first 24 hours of a conflict, speed matters more than polish. The United States and its allies should be prepared to release verified imagery, selectively declassify intelligence, expose coordinated foreign influence networks, and explain the political purpose of military action in plain language to domestic and foreign audiences alike. A press conference is necessary, but it is not enough. The message has to move in platform-native formats through credible voices at the same speed as the falsehoods it is trying to beat.
In the first week, the task shifts from rebuttal to sustained competition. Commanders and civilian leaders need one common operating picture of the information environment, one team measuring which narratives are gaining traction, and one process for adjusting in real time. That team should synchronize public affairs, cyber, intelligence, and military information support functions while respecting their distinct legal authorities. The goal is not to mirror the lie. It is to make the truth travel farther, faster, and with enough consistency that battlefield success, political purpose, and public understanding reinforce one another.
Free societies will never control information as tightly as Iran, and they should not try to do so. Their advantage lies elsewhere--in credibility, alliances, and the ability to expose coercion rather than conceal it. In modern war, credibility is combat power.
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Benjamin Jensen, Director, Futures Lab and Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department
Nico Vacca, Intern, Futures Lab
Jose M. Macias III, Associate Fellow, Futures Lab, Defense and Security Department
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-lose-information-war-10-days
[Category: ThinkTank]