Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
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Rand Report: State-Level Impacts of Key Medicaid Provisions in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act
SANTA MONICA, California, June 19 (TNSLrpt) -- State-Level Impacts of Key Medicaid Provisions in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act - A report from Rand - June 18, 2026, (119 pages) - Preethi Rao, Lawrence Baker, Federico Girosi, Elaine Li, Rose Kerber, and Christine Eibner
Here are excerpts:
* * *
On July 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed into law the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (Public Law 119-21), a massive budget reconciliation package with implications for many sectors of the U.S. economy. The law contains a series of policy changes that aim to reduce federal spending and improve program ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, June 19 (TNSLrpt) -- State-Level Impacts of Key Medicaid Provisions in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act - A report from Rand - June 18, 2026, (119 pages) - Preethi Rao, Lawrence Baker, Federico Girosi, Elaine Li, Rose Kerber, and Christine Eibner Here are excerpts: * * * On July 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed into law the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (Public Law 119-21), a massive budget reconciliation package with implications for many sectors of the U.S. economy. The law contains a series of policy changes that aim to reduce federal spending and improve programintegrity in Medicaid, the nation's joint state-funded and federally funded health program for people with low incomes and disabilities.
Broadly, these Medicaid changes impose work requirements on non-disabled adults, increase the frequency and stringency of eligibility determinations and redeterminations, limit spending on immigrants, and tighten provisions that have historically enabled states to increase their federal funding. The authors of this report combined publicly available data, published literature, state and federal agency reports, and other sources of information and developed customized approaches to build state-level estimates through 2034 of Medicaid fund impact and enrollment changes associated with several key provisions of the law.
Key Takeaways
* In total, state Medicaid funds will be reduced by $665 billion over the 2025-2034 period. State general funds will be reduced by $86 billion.
* Estimated federal savings amount to $714 billion.
* Medicaid expansion states with substantial use of state-directed payments (SDPs) and provider taxes--Arizona, Iowa, and Nevada--stand to see reductions of more than 15 percent of their Medicaid funds (a combined impact of reduced federal and state spending). California and New York similarly have substantial use of SDPs and provider taxes and see the largest dollar-value reductions to Medicaid funds, on the order of $112 billion and $63 billion, respectively.
* As a non-expansion state without substantial use of SDPs or provider taxes, Florida sees minimal budgetary impacts of the provisions studied (a <0.5-percent change to its Medicaid fund). Some expansion states, such as North Dakota and Nebraska, that similarly do not rely heavily on SDPs and provider taxes will also see minimal budgetary impacts of the provisions studied because expected gains from a rural health program in the law are likely to offset the majority of the losses from other provisions.
* A few states, such as Wyoming and South Dakota, will see increases in Medicaid funds; these states have small populations (and therefore smaller Medicaid funds overall), so they stand to gain substantially in percentage terms from the rural health program and see little to no impact from other provisions.
* Across the provisions examined, the authors estimate a joint impact of 7.6 million fewer Medicaid enrollees in 2034.
* * *
View the full report here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA4000/RRA4098-1-v2/RAND_RRA4098-1-v2.pdf
[Category: ThinkTank]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
On July 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed into law the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (Public Law 119-21), a massive budget reconciliation package with implications for many sectors of the U.S. economy. The law contains a series of policy changes that aim to reduce federal spending and improve program ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, June 19 (TNSLrpt) -- State-Level Impacts of Key Medicaid Provisions in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act - A report from Rand - June 18, 2026, (119 pages) - Preethi Rao, Lawrence Baker, Federico Girosi, Elaine Li, Rose Kerber, and Christine Eibner Here are excerpts: * * * On July 4, 2025, President Donald Trump signed into law the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (Public Law 119-21), a massive budget reconciliation package with implications for many sectors of the U.S. economy. The law contains a series of policy changes that aim to reduce federal spending and improve programintegrity in Medicaid, the nation's joint state-funded and federally funded health program for people with low incomes and disabilities.
Broadly, these Medicaid changes impose work requirements on non-disabled adults, increase the frequency and stringency of eligibility determinations and redeterminations, limit spending on immigrants, and tighten provisions that have historically enabled states to increase their federal funding. The authors of this report combined publicly available data, published literature, state and federal agency reports, and other sources of information and developed customized approaches to build state-level estimates through 2034 of Medicaid fund impact and enrollment changes associated with several key provisions of the law.
Key Takeaways
* In total, state Medicaid funds will be reduced by $665 billion over the 2025-2034 period. State general funds will be reduced by $86 billion.
* Estimated federal savings amount to $714 billion.
* Medicaid expansion states with substantial use of state-directed payments (SDPs) and provider taxes--Arizona, Iowa, and Nevada--stand to see reductions of more than 15 percent of their Medicaid funds (a combined impact of reduced federal and state spending). California and New York similarly have substantial use of SDPs and provider taxes and see the largest dollar-value reductions to Medicaid funds, on the order of $112 billion and $63 billion, respectively.
* As a non-expansion state without substantial use of SDPs or provider taxes, Florida sees minimal budgetary impacts of the provisions studied (a <0.5-percent change to its Medicaid fund). Some expansion states, such as North Dakota and Nebraska, that similarly do not rely heavily on SDPs and provider taxes will also see minimal budgetary impacts of the provisions studied because expected gains from a rural health program in the law are likely to offset the majority of the losses from other provisions.
* A few states, such as Wyoming and South Dakota, will see increases in Medicaid funds; these states have small populations (and therefore smaller Medicaid funds overall), so they stand to gain substantially in percentage terms from the rural health program and see little to no impact from other provisions.
* Across the provisions examined, the authors estimate a joint impact of 7.6 million fewer Medicaid enrollees in 2034.
* * *
View the full report here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA4000/RRA4098-1-v2/RAND_RRA4098-1-v2.pdf
[Category: ThinkTank]
Rand Report: Evaluation of Cohort 3 of Project ImPACT
SANTA MONICA, California, June 19 (TNSLrpt) -- Evaluation of Cohort 3 of Project imPACT - A report from Rand - June 17, 2026, (87 pages) - Stephanie Brooks Holliday, Katya Migacheva, Amy Goldman, Veronica Awan, Nicole Bracy
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Project imPACT was a reentry program for adults with a history of justice system involvement and behavioral health needs in the City of Los Angeles. The principal goals for the final program cohort were to prioritize client-centered holistic programs and approaches; to expand access to culturally congruent, quality mental health and substance use ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, June 19 (TNSLrpt) -- Evaluation of Cohort 3 of Project imPACT - A report from Rand - June 17, 2026, (87 pages) - Stephanie Brooks Holliday, Katya Migacheva, Amy Goldman, Veronica Awan, Nicole Bracy Here are excerpts: * * * Project imPACT was a reentry program for adults with a history of justice system involvement and behavioral health needs in the City of Los Angeles. The principal goals for the final program cohort were to prioritize client-centered holistic programs and approaches; to expand access to culturally congruent, quality mental health and substance usedisorder services; and to reduce recidivism for participants.
This report presents findings related to individuals the program served between December 2022, when Cohort 3 began enrolling Fellows, and February 2026, when the program concluded. The process evaluation focused on the implementation of Project imPACT and examined the number and characteristics of Fellows who received services and completed the program, whether services were delivered with fidelity to program goals, implementation-related facilitators and barriers, and Fellows' satisfaction with the program. The evaluation drew on quantitative data from providers, two rounds of interviews with providers serving each of the program sites, and interviews with 25 program Fellows and 18 program Alumni.
This evaluation found that the program successfully achieved its goals of prioritizing client-centered holistic programming, allowing flexibility in the delivery of services to meet clients where they were. The program successfully expanded access to culturally congruent, quality mental health and substance use disorder services, and the lived experience of the justice system among program leadership and staff was a key facilitator.
Key Takeaways
* Fellows faced high barriers at enrollment, received varied services, and completed the program at high rates.
* Fellows valued the multidisciplinary team approach despite service continuity challenges.
* Housing instability and stigma experienced by Fellows, as well as budget challenges experienced by providers, hindered program delivery.
* Wraparound services and staff with lived experience drove program success.
* Services helped Fellows address reentry barriers.
* Nearly one-half of Fellows gained employment, and many secured stable housing.
* Less than one-third of Fellows were rearrested.
* * *
View the full report here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA4700/RRA4794-1/RAND_RRA4794-1.pdf
[Category: ThinkTank]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Project imPACT was a reentry program for adults with a history of justice system involvement and behavioral health needs in the City of Los Angeles. The principal goals for the final program cohort were to prioritize client-centered holistic programs and approaches; to expand access to culturally congruent, quality mental health and substance use ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, June 19 (TNSLrpt) -- Evaluation of Cohort 3 of Project imPACT - A report from Rand - June 17, 2026, (87 pages) - Stephanie Brooks Holliday, Katya Migacheva, Amy Goldman, Veronica Awan, Nicole Bracy Here are excerpts: * * * Project imPACT was a reentry program for adults with a history of justice system involvement and behavioral health needs in the City of Los Angeles. The principal goals for the final program cohort were to prioritize client-centered holistic programs and approaches; to expand access to culturally congruent, quality mental health and substance usedisorder services; and to reduce recidivism for participants.
This report presents findings related to individuals the program served between December 2022, when Cohort 3 began enrolling Fellows, and February 2026, when the program concluded. The process evaluation focused on the implementation of Project imPACT and examined the number and characteristics of Fellows who received services and completed the program, whether services were delivered with fidelity to program goals, implementation-related facilitators and barriers, and Fellows' satisfaction with the program. The evaluation drew on quantitative data from providers, two rounds of interviews with providers serving each of the program sites, and interviews with 25 program Fellows and 18 program Alumni.
This evaluation found that the program successfully achieved its goals of prioritizing client-centered holistic programming, allowing flexibility in the delivery of services to meet clients where they were. The program successfully expanded access to culturally congruent, quality mental health and substance use disorder services, and the lived experience of the justice system among program leadership and staff was a key facilitator.
Key Takeaways
* Fellows faced high barriers at enrollment, received varied services, and completed the program at high rates.
* Fellows valued the multidisciplinary team approach despite service continuity challenges.
* Housing instability and stigma experienced by Fellows, as well as budget challenges experienced by providers, hindered program delivery.
* Wraparound services and staff with lived experience drove program success.
* Services helped Fellows address reentry barriers.
* Nearly one-half of Fellows gained employment, and many secured stable housing.
* Less than one-third of Fellows were rearrested.
* * *
View the full report here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA4700/RRA4794-1/RAND_RRA4794-1.pdf
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Asia Times: Why Dropping 'Indo-Pacific' Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by senior fellow Ken Moriyasu to Asia Times:
* * *
Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy
On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM).
The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largest ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by senior fellow Ken Moriyasu to Asia Times: * * * Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM). The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largestcombatant command.
This publication reported in June 2018 that the original change "highlights the increasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking and also marks India's re-entry into the American government's 'Asia Nexus.'"
As much as New Delhi may protest, this change signals the opposite: the decreasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking - and its exit from the American government's "Asia Nexus."
There were already hints of this in US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May. "India was mentioned last," an Asian diplomat in attendance recalled.
Hegseth praised the efforts of South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam before finally turning to India.
A strong India, "acting in its own self-interest," advances a shared goal of maintaining a regional balance of power, he said - hardly a description of a core ally in a coordinated strategy.
This name change, however, does not represent a toning down of competition with Beijing. On the contrary, it clarifies where competition with China will actually be fought -- and where it will not.
The decision moves the strategy in the right direction. There are three key takeaways.
First, the fact that the Pentagon made this significant move absent any immediate trigger suggests it is sending a deliberate message: the Indian Ocean is not central to dealing with China.
That message is aimed at both allies and Beijing itself. To its allies, it signals that in a potential conflict with China, the United States will concentrate on the Taiwan Strait, operating primarily from Japan and the Philippines.
In all other regions, allies and partners will be expected to take primary responsibility for conventional defense. South Korea will deter North Korea, Europe will confront Russia and the Indian Ocean will largely fall to India to monitor and control.
Symbolically, Hegseth made no mention of "Indo-Pacific" in his Shangri-La speech, nor did he reference Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's efforts to "update" the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept championed by her mentor, the late Shinzo Abe. Japan's region-wide strategic framing may soon require a rethink.
To China, the message is equally clear: the US is laser-focused on the Taiwan Strait.
Second, the shift signals that India is being written out of the core contingency that matters most: Taiwan.
Washington believes Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed the People's Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, by 2027. The Trump administration has little patience for fence-sitters.
It is prioritizing allies such as South Korea and the Philippines - who act like they "live on the front lines," as Hegseth said. India is not aligned, and Washington is no longer hoping that one day it will be.
Third - and most intriguingly - by treating India as a normal partner rather than a strategic centerpiece, Washington gains greater flexibility in dealing with Pakistan, India's archrival.
Trump has turned to Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir as a key backchannel to Tehran, relied on him in defusing the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis and invited him to discussions on expanding the Abraham Accords.
Pakistan matters not because of India, but because of China's westward pivot.
Over the past 15 years, China has steadily reduced its reliance on maritime energy routes through Indian Ocean chokepoints, such as the Malacca and Hormuz straits, shifting instead toward overland pipelines across Central Asia.
In responding to this Chinese pivot to Eurasia, Pakistan - not India - emerges as the more relevant partner.
The return to PACOM reflects these strategic realities. It is a recognition that clarity, not geographic sprawl or vague values-based alignments, will define how the US competes with China. And it is the right move.
Read in Asia Times (https://asiatimes.com/2026/06/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-the-pentagons-china-strategy/).
* * *
At A Glance:
Ken Moriyasu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-pentagons-china-strategy-ken-moriyasu
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy
On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM).
The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largest ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by senior fellow Ken Moriyasu to Asia Times: * * * Why Dropping "Indo-Pacific" Clarifies the Pentagon's China Strategy On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM). The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump's first term to include "Indo" in the name of its largestcombatant command.
This publication reported in June 2018 that the original change "highlights the increasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking and also marks India's re-entry into the American government's 'Asia Nexus.'"
As much as New Delhi may protest, this change signals the opposite: the decreasing significance of India in Washington's strategic thinking - and its exit from the American government's "Asia Nexus."
There were already hints of this in US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May. "India was mentioned last," an Asian diplomat in attendance recalled.
Hegseth praised the efforts of South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam before finally turning to India.
A strong India, "acting in its own self-interest," advances a shared goal of maintaining a regional balance of power, he said - hardly a description of a core ally in a coordinated strategy.
This name change, however, does not represent a toning down of competition with Beijing. On the contrary, it clarifies where competition with China will actually be fought -- and where it will not.
The decision moves the strategy in the right direction. There are three key takeaways.
First, the fact that the Pentagon made this significant move absent any immediate trigger suggests it is sending a deliberate message: the Indian Ocean is not central to dealing with China.
That message is aimed at both allies and Beijing itself. To its allies, it signals that in a potential conflict with China, the United States will concentrate on the Taiwan Strait, operating primarily from Japan and the Philippines.
In all other regions, allies and partners will be expected to take primary responsibility for conventional defense. South Korea will deter North Korea, Europe will confront Russia and the Indian Ocean will largely fall to India to monitor and control.
Symbolically, Hegseth made no mention of "Indo-Pacific" in his Shangri-La speech, nor did he reference Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's efforts to "update" the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept championed by her mentor, the late Shinzo Abe. Japan's region-wide strategic framing may soon require a rethink.
To China, the message is equally clear: the US is laser-focused on the Taiwan Strait.
Second, the shift signals that India is being written out of the core contingency that matters most: Taiwan.
Washington believes Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed the People's Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, by 2027. The Trump administration has little patience for fence-sitters.
It is prioritizing allies such as South Korea and the Philippines - who act like they "live on the front lines," as Hegseth said. India is not aligned, and Washington is no longer hoping that one day it will be.
Third - and most intriguingly - by treating India as a normal partner rather than a strategic centerpiece, Washington gains greater flexibility in dealing with Pakistan, India's archrival.
Trump has turned to Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir as a key backchannel to Tehran, relied on him in defusing the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis and invited him to discussions on expanding the Abraham Accords.
Pakistan matters not because of India, but because of China's westward pivot.
Over the past 15 years, China has steadily reduced its reliance on maritime energy routes through Indian Ocean chokepoints, such as the Malacca and Hormuz straits, shifting instead toward overland pipelines across Central Asia.
In responding to this Chinese pivot to Eurasia, Pakistan - not India - emerges as the more relevant partner.
The return to PACOM reflects these strategic realities. It is a recognition that clarity, not geographic sprawl or vague values-based alignments, will define how the US competes with China. And it is the right move.
Read in Asia Times (https://asiatimes.com/2026/06/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-the-pentagons-china-strategy/).
* * *
At A Glance:
Ken Moriyasu is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/why-dropping-indo-pacific-clarifies-pentagons-china-strategy-ken-moriyasu
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities: Automatic Continuing Resolution Is Not a Good Solution for Government Shutdowns
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following report on June 18, 2026, by senior fellows Richard Kogan and Sam Berger:
* * *
An Automatic Continuing Resolution Is Not a Good Solution for Government Shutdowns
The Senate may soon consider a proposal to provide for an automatic continuing resolution (CR), which would extend funding at the prior year's level whenever the President and Congress fail to enact full-year or temporary funding for a fiscal year. Government shutdowns impose substantial costs on individuals and families in general and federal employees ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following report on June 18, 2026, by senior fellows Richard Kogan and Sam Berger: * * * An Automatic Continuing Resolution Is Not a Good Solution for Government Shutdowns The Senate may soon consider a proposal to provide for an automatic continuing resolution (CR), which would extend funding at the prior year's level whenever the President and Congress fail to enact full-year or temporary funding for a fiscal year. Government shutdowns impose substantial costs on individuals and families in general and federal employeesin particular.[1] And with shutdowns occurring more frequently and lasting longer, there is heightened interest in finding a way to avoid them. But while seeking to prevent shutdowns is a laudable goal, this automatic CR legislation raises significant concerns and is likely to empower some of the very destructive forces it hopes to address, even allowing a president to pick and choose which programs to effectively shut down indefinitely, without any input from Congress. And these concerns are only heightened with the current Administration, which has shown a willingness to exercise executive powers in extreme (and sometimes unlawful) ways.
Here are some of the major problems with this Senate proposal (S. 4632, introduced by Senators James Lankford and Maggie Hassan[2]). It would:
* Significantly reduce pressure to reach agreement on full-year appropriation bills, effectively locking in funding levels that are often inadequate. An automatic CR freezes funding at the prior-year level for every program, with no adjustments for changing circumstances, including inflation. And by allowing the government to keep operating without any action or agreement by the President and Congress, it is likely that an automatic CR would stay in effect for extended periods, possibly the entire fiscal year or longer.
* Greatly strengthen the President's hand in the annual appropriations process. The President could repeatedly and indefinitely veto any appropriations bill that provides more funding than he supports or includes legislative language aimed at ensuring he is complying with congressional intent in funding matters, without concern that it would result in a disruptive shutdown of key government operations.
* Give the President powers when an automatic CR is in effect that allow him to pick and choose which programs he wants to maintain and which he wants to shut down. Provisions in the bill effectively allow the President to operate programs at the prior year's levels or effectively shut them down -- both based only on his choosing -- for the duration of the CRs, which could easily be very late in the fiscal year, the entire year, or even longer.
* Impose new rules on congressional action that create pressure only on Congress, effectively giving President Trump and future presidents the power to hold Congress hostage to achieve their desired outcome.
Shutdowns cause substantial damage. But as painful as shutdowns are, automatic CRs could cause a longer-term unraveling of the annual appropriations process and inflict damage that, while possibly less immediately evident than a shutdown, could have more severe long-term consequences. If automatic CRs become the norm for significant parts of the federal government, they would likely yield funding levels that would become less adequate and less efficiently allocated over time. This in turn would result in critical funding priorities being unmet, less funding for medical research to save lives, and millions of families left without the help they need to afford the growing cost their basic needs.
Automatic Mechanism Could Prolong Disruptive, Inefficient Funding Bills
Congress employs continuing resolutions when it has failed to enact all the regular annual appropriations needed to fund government operations before the fiscal year begins on October 1. CRs provide temporary authority for agencies to continue operating at some specified rate of spending, usually based on the prior year's funding level. CRs have specific expiration dates, typically lasting no more than two to three months and sometimes as little as one day. In addition, they are automatically superseded when regular appropriations are enacted. Often, successive CRs are needed before Congress finishes regular appropriations.
CRs typically include "anomalies": spending increases above the prior year's level to pay for pressing needs in particular programs or spending reductions reflecting reduced funding needs. Even short-term CRs typically include a number of anomalies. When Congress has enacted CRs for a full fiscal year, those measures included many pages of upward and downward adjustments to reflect changes in needs.[3] Indeed, even the temporary CRs enacted by the start of the fiscal year, October 1, have averaged 11 pages over the past decade.[4]
In contrast, automatic CRs would be a mechanical, hard freeze at the prior year's level on a program-by-program basis, with none of the anomalies to adjust funding to address pressing needs. For instance, anomalies have been included to ensure sufficient funding to prevent households from losing their rental assistance, and to maintain participation for all eligible applicants in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) -- neither of which would have been possible at frozen levels due to inflation or other factors. Under the Lankford-Hassan proposal's hard freeze, the most a program would get is current funding, and even that's not a given, since the bill grants the President leeway to reduce or perhaps zero out funding for programs he doesn't like (discussed more below).
The levels set by an automatic CR would be less problematic if they were only in effect for a short period, as is often the case with regular CRs. But once legislation makes CRs automatic, they would likely become the default approach, with an automatic CR remaining in place for extended periods.
Today, long delays in enacting full-year appropriations are already common, given the increasingly contentious nature of appropriation debates, with major disagreements over both funding levels and legislative "riders" that would change underlying laws. And this is the case even though the looming expiration of short-term CRs pressures policymakers to come to agreement and creates definite deadlines for doing so. An automatic CR, with no deadline and no votes needed to create or extend it, would have no such action-forcing event. Further, it would free the President to veto any appropriations that he dislikes, with little repercussions.
The Lankford-Hassan proposal, which would put in place a 14-day CR that renews automatically, attempts to create pressure to finish appropriations bills by restricting members' paid travel and requiring Congress to address only appropriations while an automatic CR is in effect. But all of this pressure is on Congress -- it reduces pressure on the President to negotiate in good faith. Indeed, the main pressure the proposal creates, by preventing a government shutdown, is for Congress to accede to the President's demands.
Without the often-painful disruptions caused by government shutdowns, those who oppose the appropriations bills being negotiated -- whether the President or a determined minority in Congress -- would face no pressure to resolve appropriations disputes, leaving funding levels for every program frozen at the prior year level or lower.
Automatic CRs Would Shift Power to the Executive
Enacting an automatic CR would shift power from Congress to the executive branch. In particular, the President would be able to veto appropriations bills he does not support without causing the disruption associated with a government shutdown. For a president looking to cut programs, there is little incentive to agree to any new bills without significant concessions.
Further, the current version of the Lankford-Hassan proposal includes two provisions that were not in previous versions of this bill (or any automatic CR bill) before this Congress. These provisions would allow the President to withhold or limit funding for a program covered by an automatic CR to avoid "impinging on final funding prerogatives."[5] This kind of language is typical in short-term CRs to prevent significant program spending prior to Congress setting final levels in a full-year appropriations bill. But under an ongoing set of rolling 14-day automatic CRs, the President could simply withhold nearly all funds for programs he wants to eliminate, leaving those programs on life support; if he continues to veto bills for the entire fiscal year, he could effectively close down such programs.
All of the pressure created by the Lankford-Hassan proposal would fall on Congress. This bill would essentially allow President Trump and any future president to hold Congress hostage to get the changes they want: the President, by continually vetoing appropriations bills and triggering an automatic CR, could keep Congress stuck in Washington, reduce or zero out funding for targeted programs, and face little or no political pressure to reach an agreement.
These concerns are heightened with the current Administration, which has routinely proposed deep cuts in non-defense appropriations that Congress has largely rejected on a bipartisan basis. In 2026, for instance, the Trump Administration proposed a 21 percent cut relative to the 2025 level for non-defense programs. But the final appropriation bills provided a slight increase (1.1 percent) in overall funding, with some receiving increases and others declining, reflecting updated funding priorities. Notably, the Administration proposed more than a 34 percent cut for the departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development. But Congress' appropriations bill provided them an increase of nearly 7 percent, primarily to accommodate the rising cost of rents so that rental assistance could continue serving the same number of families (even though that is still only 1 in every 4 eligible households).[6]
Further, the President could veto an appropriations bill for reasons beyond just the funding levels. Congress appropriates money often for broad budget accounts (for example, "Aircraft Procurement, Air Force") and then provides more explicit instructions in the accompanying committee and conference reports. During the second Trump Administration, Congress has gone a step further to try to address the Administration's brazen interference with federal funding, placing report language directly in the text of 2026 appropriations bills, as well as including other targeted guardrails to ensure that the Administration follows congressional intent.[7] And it seems that Congress will need to pursue even more robust, government-wide guardrails in 2027 appropriations to contain the Administration's ongoing abuses -- efforts the Administration will surely resist.[8] Indeed, a president could use his power to continually veto appropriations bills and so impose an indefinite automatic CR to pressure Congress to enact legislation he favors that has nothing to do with annual appropriations.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Lankford-Hassan proposal also creates imbalances in the legislative process that give more power to a determined minority. For instance, the proposal would prohibit the Senate from acting on business other than appropriations while an automatic CR is in place unless the prohibition is waived by a two-thirds vote. This two-thirds requirement would apply in the Senate even when the fundamental cause of a lack of appropriations is the failure of the House to act -- or a deliberate choice by the House not to act. And when the two-thirds majority requirement is in effect, a determined minority can effectively grind the entire legislative process to a halt -- on both appropriations and other matters as well. That is particularly true when that minority is of the same party as the President, who can support them by vetoing appropriations.
Automatic CRs Would Make It Easier to Shrink Government
Automatic CRs would give a powerful new tool to those who want to cut funding for programs and services. If a freeze under an automatic CR became the default, policymakers opposed to funding increases for particular agencies or programs could prevail simply by blocking any appropriations bill providing those increases (such as by filibustering it or refusing to bring it to the floor). Similarly, if the President preferred a funding freeze to a regular appropriation bill, a simple veto would do the trick and the bill's opponents would only have to sustain the veto. The longer a freeze is in effect, the larger the reduction in purchasing power (as inflation and a growing population push up the cost of providing federal services and benefits). This fundamental flaw applies even if an automatic CR does not include provisions such as those in the Lankford-Hassan proposal that grant a president additional power to cut below a freeze level.
Currently, appropriation levels are set through the give and take of the legislative process. But with an automatic CR, policymakers could bring about freezes without ever actually voting for them, simply by voting against the alternatives. Opponents of funding increases could take a "hands off" approach to shrinking government, with little incentive to reach agreement on appropriations.
While design changes to an automatic CR might moderate some of the problems with this mechanism,[9] the biggest problems would remain. An automatic CR would make it more difficult to revise program-by-program discretionary funding levels each year to respond to pressing national needs and would diminish Congress' role in establishing national priorities.
* * *
Sam Berger, Senior Fellow
Richard Kogan, Senior Fellow
* * *
End Notes
[1] A "government shutdown" affects only a portion of federal programs -- those funded by annual appropriations and where funding has lapsed because regular appropriations bills or a continuing resolution has not been enacted. Almost three-quarters of federal programs are financed outside the annual appropriations process. For an explanation of government shutdowns, see Center on American Progress, "What Happens During a Government Shutdown?" September 21, 2023, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/what-happens-during-a-government-shutdown/.
[2] Prevent Government Shutdowns Act of 2026, S. 4632, https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/4632.
[3] The full-year continuing appropriation for fiscal year 2011 (P.L. 112-10) contained 94 pages of anomalies and other adjustments and covered all of the government except the Department of Defense. See https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ10/PLAW-112publ10.pdf. The full-year continuing appropriation for fiscal year 2013 (P.L. 113-6) covered seven appropriation bills and included 23 pages of anomalies. See https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ6/PLAW-113publ6.pdf. And the full-year continuing appropriation for fiscal year 2025 (P.L. 119-4) covered the entire government and contained 31 pages of anomalies. See https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ4/PLAW-119publ4.pdf.
[4] Those start-of-year CRs have been the vehicles for other provisions as well, such as extensions of expiring health or transportation provisions or, on occasion, enactment of the full text of regular appropriations for one or a few appropriations subcommittees. This can aid Congress in the enactment of other legislation that might instead have been vetoed -- another reason that an automatic CR might weaken Congress and strengthen a president. Counting the additional material, those start-of-year CRs have averaged 60 pages of text over the last decade.
[5] Section 1311(f) states that "no grants" shall be made "that would impinge on final funding prerogatives." This language is not limited to congressional prerogatives, and could affect education and housing grants, or the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, for example. Section 1311(g) states that "only the most limited funding action ... shall be taken in order to provide for continuation of programs, projects, and activities." This language would allow a president to fund any program below the freeze level while an automatic CR is in effect. See Prevent Government Shutdowns Act of 2026, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119s4632pcs/pdf/BILLS-119s4632pcs.pdf.
[6] Joel Friedman et al., "Tight 2026 Non-Defense Funding Rejects Trump's Proposed Deep Cuts, But Congress Will Need to Continue to Guard Against Administration Abuses," CBPP, revised April 9, 2026, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/tight-2026-non-defense-funding-rejects-trumps-proposed-deep-cuts-but.
[7] Sonali Master, Sam Berger, and Devin O'Connor, "Congress Should Include Robust Government-wide Guardrails in 2027 Appropriations to Halt Unprecedented Interference by Trump Administration," CBPP, May 18, 2026, https://www.cbpp.org/blog/congress-should-include-robust-government-wide-guardrails-in-2027-appropriations-to-halt.
[8] Ibid.
[9] An alternative approach to an automatic CR, for instance, would set funding at the previous year's level adjusted for inflation or economic growth. While this would reduce the problems caused by a funding freeze, it wouldn't solve the other problems that an automatic CR poses. Funding priorities wouldn't adjust to reflect new realities, and opponents of new investments could simply hold out for an automatic CR rather than negotiate new levels and funding priorities.
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Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/an-automatic-continuing-resolution-is-not-a-good-solution-for-government
[Category: ThinkTank]
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An Automatic Continuing Resolution Is Not a Good Solution for Government Shutdowns
The Senate may soon consider a proposal to provide for an automatic continuing resolution (CR), which would extend funding at the prior year's level whenever the President and Congress fail to enact full-year or temporary funding for a fiscal year. Government shutdowns impose substantial costs on individuals and families in general and federal employees ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following report on June 18, 2026, by senior fellows Richard Kogan and Sam Berger: * * * An Automatic Continuing Resolution Is Not a Good Solution for Government Shutdowns The Senate may soon consider a proposal to provide for an automatic continuing resolution (CR), which would extend funding at the prior year's level whenever the President and Congress fail to enact full-year or temporary funding for a fiscal year. Government shutdowns impose substantial costs on individuals and families in general and federal employeesin particular.[1] And with shutdowns occurring more frequently and lasting longer, there is heightened interest in finding a way to avoid them. But while seeking to prevent shutdowns is a laudable goal, this automatic CR legislation raises significant concerns and is likely to empower some of the very destructive forces it hopes to address, even allowing a president to pick and choose which programs to effectively shut down indefinitely, without any input from Congress. And these concerns are only heightened with the current Administration, which has shown a willingness to exercise executive powers in extreme (and sometimes unlawful) ways.
Here are some of the major problems with this Senate proposal (S. 4632, introduced by Senators James Lankford and Maggie Hassan[2]). It would:
* Significantly reduce pressure to reach agreement on full-year appropriation bills, effectively locking in funding levels that are often inadequate. An automatic CR freezes funding at the prior-year level for every program, with no adjustments for changing circumstances, including inflation. And by allowing the government to keep operating without any action or agreement by the President and Congress, it is likely that an automatic CR would stay in effect for extended periods, possibly the entire fiscal year or longer.
* Greatly strengthen the President's hand in the annual appropriations process. The President could repeatedly and indefinitely veto any appropriations bill that provides more funding than he supports or includes legislative language aimed at ensuring he is complying with congressional intent in funding matters, without concern that it would result in a disruptive shutdown of key government operations.
* Give the President powers when an automatic CR is in effect that allow him to pick and choose which programs he wants to maintain and which he wants to shut down. Provisions in the bill effectively allow the President to operate programs at the prior year's levels or effectively shut them down -- both based only on his choosing -- for the duration of the CRs, which could easily be very late in the fiscal year, the entire year, or even longer.
* Impose new rules on congressional action that create pressure only on Congress, effectively giving President Trump and future presidents the power to hold Congress hostage to achieve their desired outcome.
Shutdowns cause substantial damage. But as painful as shutdowns are, automatic CRs could cause a longer-term unraveling of the annual appropriations process and inflict damage that, while possibly less immediately evident than a shutdown, could have more severe long-term consequences. If automatic CRs become the norm for significant parts of the federal government, they would likely yield funding levels that would become less adequate and less efficiently allocated over time. This in turn would result in critical funding priorities being unmet, less funding for medical research to save lives, and millions of families left without the help they need to afford the growing cost their basic needs.
Automatic Mechanism Could Prolong Disruptive, Inefficient Funding Bills
Congress employs continuing resolutions when it has failed to enact all the regular annual appropriations needed to fund government operations before the fiscal year begins on October 1. CRs provide temporary authority for agencies to continue operating at some specified rate of spending, usually based on the prior year's funding level. CRs have specific expiration dates, typically lasting no more than two to three months and sometimes as little as one day. In addition, they are automatically superseded when regular appropriations are enacted. Often, successive CRs are needed before Congress finishes regular appropriations.
CRs typically include "anomalies": spending increases above the prior year's level to pay for pressing needs in particular programs or spending reductions reflecting reduced funding needs. Even short-term CRs typically include a number of anomalies. When Congress has enacted CRs for a full fiscal year, those measures included many pages of upward and downward adjustments to reflect changes in needs.[3] Indeed, even the temporary CRs enacted by the start of the fiscal year, October 1, have averaged 11 pages over the past decade.[4]
In contrast, automatic CRs would be a mechanical, hard freeze at the prior year's level on a program-by-program basis, with none of the anomalies to adjust funding to address pressing needs. For instance, anomalies have been included to ensure sufficient funding to prevent households from losing their rental assistance, and to maintain participation for all eligible applicants in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) -- neither of which would have been possible at frozen levels due to inflation or other factors. Under the Lankford-Hassan proposal's hard freeze, the most a program would get is current funding, and even that's not a given, since the bill grants the President leeway to reduce or perhaps zero out funding for programs he doesn't like (discussed more below).
The levels set by an automatic CR would be less problematic if they were only in effect for a short period, as is often the case with regular CRs. But once legislation makes CRs automatic, they would likely become the default approach, with an automatic CR remaining in place for extended periods.
Today, long delays in enacting full-year appropriations are already common, given the increasingly contentious nature of appropriation debates, with major disagreements over both funding levels and legislative "riders" that would change underlying laws. And this is the case even though the looming expiration of short-term CRs pressures policymakers to come to agreement and creates definite deadlines for doing so. An automatic CR, with no deadline and no votes needed to create or extend it, would have no such action-forcing event. Further, it would free the President to veto any appropriations that he dislikes, with little repercussions.
The Lankford-Hassan proposal, which would put in place a 14-day CR that renews automatically, attempts to create pressure to finish appropriations bills by restricting members' paid travel and requiring Congress to address only appropriations while an automatic CR is in effect. But all of this pressure is on Congress -- it reduces pressure on the President to negotiate in good faith. Indeed, the main pressure the proposal creates, by preventing a government shutdown, is for Congress to accede to the President's demands.
Without the often-painful disruptions caused by government shutdowns, those who oppose the appropriations bills being negotiated -- whether the President or a determined minority in Congress -- would face no pressure to resolve appropriations disputes, leaving funding levels for every program frozen at the prior year level or lower.
Automatic CRs Would Shift Power to the Executive
Enacting an automatic CR would shift power from Congress to the executive branch. In particular, the President would be able to veto appropriations bills he does not support without causing the disruption associated with a government shutdown. For a president looking to cut programs, there is little incentive to agree to any new bills without significant concessions.
Further, the current version of the Lankford-Hassan proposal includes two provisions that were not in previous versions of this bill (or any automatic CR bill) before this Congress. These provisions would allow the President to withhold or limit funding for a program covered by an automatic CR to avoid "impinging on final funding prerogatives."[5] This kind of language is typical in short-term CRs to prevent significant program spending prior to Congress setting final levels in a full-year appropriations bill. But under an ongoing set of rolling 14-day automatic CRs, the President could simply withhold nearly all funds for programs he wants to eliminate, leaving those programs on life support; if he continues to veto bills for the entire fiscal year, he could effectively close down such programs.
All of the pressure created by the Lankford-Hassan proposal would fall on Congress. This bill would essentially allow President Trump and any future president to hold Congress hostage to get the changes they want: the President, by continually vetoing appropriations bills and triggering an automatic CR, could keep Congress stuck in Washington, reduce or zero out funding for targeted programs, and face little or no political pressure to reach an agreement.
These concerns are heightened with the current Administration, which has routinely proposed deep cuts in non-defense appropriations that Congress has largely rejected on a bipartisan basis. In 2026, for instance, the Trump Administration proposed a 21 percent cut relative to the 2025 level for non-defense programs. But the final appropriation bills provided a slight increase (1.1 percent) in overall funding, with some receiving increases and others declining, reflecting updated funding priorities. Notably, the Administration proposed more than a 34 percent cut for the departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development. But Congress' appropriations bill provided them an increase of nearly 7 percent, primarily to accommodate the rising cost of rents so that rental assistance could continue serving the same number of families (even though that is still only 1 in every 4 eligible households).[6]
Further, the President could veto an appropriations bill for reasons beyond just the funding levels. Congress appropriates money often for broad budget accounts (for example, "Aircraft Procurement, Air Force") and then provides more explicit instructions in the accompanying committee and conference reports. During the second Trump Administration, Congress has gone a step further to try to address the Administration's brazen interference with federal funding, placing report language directly in the text of 2026 appropriations bills, as well as including other targeted guardrails to ensure that the Administration follows congressional intent.[7] And it seems that Congress will need to pursue even more robust, government-wide guardrails in 2027 appropriations to contain the Administration's ongoing abuses -- efforts the Administration will surely resist.[8] Indeed, a president could use his power to continually veto appropriations bills and so impose an indefinite automatic CR to pressure Congress to enact legislation he favors that has nothing to do with annual appropriations.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Lankford-Hassan proposal also creates imbalances in the legislative process that give more power to a determined minority. For instance, the proposal would prohibit the Senate from acting on business other than appropriations while an automatic CR is in place unless the prohibition is waived by a two-thirds vote. This two-thirds requirement would apply in the Senate even when the fundamental cause of a lack of appropriations is the failure of the House to act -- or a deliberate choice by the House not to act. And when the two-thirds majority requirement is in effect, a determined minority can effectively grind the entire legislative process to a halt -- on both appropriations and other matters as well. That is particularly true when that minority is of the same party as the President, who can support them by vetoing appropriations.
Automatic CRs Would Make It Easier to Shrink Government
Automatic CRs would give a powerful new tool to those who want to cut funding for programs and services. If a freeze under an automatic CR became the default, policymakers opposed to funding increases for particular agencies or programs could prevail simply by blocking any appropriations bill providing those increases (such as by filibustering it or refusing to bring it to the floor). Similarly, if the President preferred a funding freeze to a regular appropriation bill, a simple veto would do the trick and the bill's opponents would only have to sustain the veto. The longer a freeze is in effect, the larger the reduction in purchasing power (as inflation and a growing population push up the cost of providing federal services and benefits). This fundamental flaw applies even if an automatic CR does not include provisions such as those in the Lankford-Hassan proposal that grant a president additional power to cut below a freeze level.
Currently, appropriation levels are set through the give and take of the legislative process. But with an automatic CR, policymakers could bring about freezes without ever actually voting for them, simply by voting against the alternatives. Opponents of funding increases could take a "hands off" approach to shrinking government, with little incentive to reach agreement on appropriations.
While design changes to an automatic CR might moderate some of the problems with this mechanism,[9] the biggest problems would remain. An automatic CR would make it more difficult to revise program-by-program discretionary funding levels each year to respond to pressing national needs and would diminish Congress' role in establishing national priorities.
* * *
Sam Berger, Senior Fellow
Richard Kogan, Senior Fellow
* * *
End Notes
[1] A "government shutdown" affects only a portion of federal programs -- those funded by annual appropriations and where funding has lapsed because regular appropriations bills or a continuing resolution has not been enacted. Almost three-quarters of federal programs are financed outside the annual appropriations process. For an explanation of government shutdowns, see Center on American Progress, "What Happens During a Government Shutdown?" September 21, 2023, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/what-happens-during-a-government-shutdown/.
[2] Prevent Government Shutdowns Act of 2026, S. 4632, https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/4632.
[3] The full-year continuing appropriation for fiscal year 2011 (P.L. 112-10) contained 94 pages of anomalies and other adjustments and covered all of the government except the Department of Defense. See https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ10/PLAW-112publ10.pdf. The full-year continuing appropriation for fiscal year 2013 (P.L. 113-6) covered seven appropriation bills and included 23 pages of anomalies. See https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ6/PLAW-113publ6.pdf. And the full-year continuing appropriation for fiscal year 2025 (P.L. 119-4) covered the entire government and contained 31 pages of anomalies. See https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ4/PLAW-119publ4.pdf.
[4] Those start-of-year CRs have been the vehicles for other provisions as well, such as extensions of expiring health or transportation provisions or, on occasion, enactment of the full text of regular appropriations for one or a few appropriations subcommittees. This can aid Congress in the enactment of other legislation that might instead have been vetoed -- another reason that an automatic CR might weaken Congress and strengthen a president. Counting the additional material, those start-of-year CRs have averaged 60 pages of text over the last decade.
[5] Section 1311(f) states that "no grants" shall be made "that would impinge on final funding prerogatives." This language is not limited to congressional prerogatives, and could affect education and housing grants, or the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, for example. Section 1311(g) states that "only the most limited funding action ... shall be taken in order to provide for continuation of programs, projects, and activities." This language would allow a president to fund any program below the freeze level while an automatic CR is in effect. See Prevent Government Shutdowns Act of 2026, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119s4632pcs/pdf/BILLS-119s4632pcs.pdf.
[6] Joel Friedman et al., "Tight 2026 Non-Defense Funding Rejects Trump's Proposed Deep Cuts, But Congress Will Need to Continue to Guard Against Administration Abuses," CBPP, revised April 9, 2026, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/tight-2026-non-defense-funding-rejects-trumps-proposed-deep-cuts-but.
[7] Sonali Master, Sam Berger, and Devin O'Connor, "Congress Should Include Robust Government-wide Guardrails in 2027 Appropriations to Halt Unprecedented Interference by Trump Administration," CBPP, May 18, 2026, https://www.cbpp.org/blog/congress-should-include-robust-government-wide-guardrails-in-2027-appropriations-to-halt.
[8] Ibid.
[9] An alternative approach to an automatic CR, for instance, would set funding at the previous year's level adjusted for inflation or economic growth. While this would reduce the problems caused by a funding freeze, it wouldn't solve the other problems that an automatic CR poses. Funding priorities wouldn't adjust to reflect new realities, and opponents of new investments could simply hold out for an automatic CR rather than negotiate new levels and funding priorities.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/an-automatic-continuing-resolution-is-not-a-good-solution-for-government
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A: After the Supermajority - Ethiopia's Trajectory Following the 2026 Election
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on June 18, 2026, involving Aaron Stanley, deputy director and fellow of the Africa Program:
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After the Supermajority: Ethiopia's Trajectory Following the 2026 Election
Ethiopia held its general elections on June 1, and with the majority of votes now finalized, all signs point to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali's Prosperity Party having secured a vast majority. While many analysts confidently predicted these outcomes well in advance, the election results alongside the country's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on June 18, 2026, involving Aaron Stanley, deputy director and fellow of the Africa Program: * * * After the Supermajority: Ethiopia's Trajectory Following the 2026 Election Ethiopia held its general elections on June 1, and with the majority of votes now finalized, all signs point to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali's Prosperity Party having secured a vast majority. While many analysts confidently predicted these outcomes well in advance, the election results alongside the country'seconomic reforms and recent growth, internal conflicts, and regional tensions invite critical analysis of how this supermajority will shape Ethiopia's political, social, and economic trajectory, raising important questions about the broader implications for the nation's future.
Q1: What does a Prosperity Party supermajority mean for the trajectory of Ethiopia's economic reform agenda?
A1: Launched in 2019, Ethiopia's Homegrown Economic Reform (HGER) program has driven a deliberate transition toward a more market-oriented, private sector-friendly economy. Efforts to open the banking sector to foreign institutions, along with reforms such as easing foreign exchange controls and floating Ethiopia's currency, have been accompanied by sector-specific liberalization, most notably in telecoms with Safaricom's entry.
Economic reforms initially led to high inflation, which diminished household purchasing power. Inflation remains relatively high but has fallen sharply from its peak and stabilized around 12 percent. Additionally, recently released government data shows substantial increases in foreign exchange reserves, a stronger balance of payments, and rising exports. Yet these gains accrue unevenly. If the data is accurate, those benefits are felt more by exporters, banks, and capital-intensive firms than by the majority of Ethiopians navigating cost-of-living pressures.
The supermajority presents a tradeoff. On one hand, it removes any legislative impediment to the next phase of economic reform, offering policy predictability for investors and international financial institutions. On the other, the absence of meaningful legislative opposition creates an accountability deficit.
Despite reduced formal political friction, several tensions endure. First, even with economic liberalization and reform, the Prosperity Party is essentially statist. The state, and increasingly the party, retain decisive leverage over land, strategic enterprises, and financial flows. Partial divestitures of Ethio Telecom through the securities exchange illustrate how limited liberalization is used to attract capital without ceding strategic control. Whether this reflects prudent industrial policy or rent-preserving restraint is difficult to observe from the outside.
Second, cost-of-living pressures are a major concern. High inflation and strained household spending power are being compounded by global crises. Since the launch of the HGER program, Covid-19, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the recent U.S.-Israel war with Iran have all created external shocks to the Ethiopian--and global--economy. Alongside the short-term implications of the national economic reforms, average Ethiopians have struggled with increased day-to-day cost-of-living pressures.
A third source of friction concerns the country's internal security and conflict. Military and police spending, conflict-induced displacement, and the impact of internal insecurity on investor risk perception ultimately limit the extent to which macroeconomic reform can achieve its objectives. Similarly to how these elections were only held in certain areas of the country, if economic reform is selectively implemented, there is a risk that regional and urban-rural inequality could grow significantly, further exacerbating tensions between the federal government, regional entities, and organizations representing different constituencies.
The post-election moment provides a politically convenient window to release an updated version of HGER, even if the general expectation is continuity of economic reforms. In a new iteration of HGER, one can expect accelerated execution where the government has already made commitments, little movement where reform would threaten political control, and a widening gap between the formal liberalization narrative and the governance environment surrounding it.
Q2: What are the implications of the elections for Ethiopia's system of ethnic federalism?
A2: One of the election's most consequential long-range implications concerns not who governs, but rather the architecture of government. Ethiopia's federal system is unusually robust in the formal powers it grants to ethnic groups. The Prosperity Party was conceived in part as a response to this, merging ethnically based parties into a single national entity that claims to pursue a more unified identity.
Commentators remark that the Prosperity Party holds little regard for the 1995 settlement that marked the beginning of the current Ethiopian constitution and the country's ethnic federalism framework. The National Dialogue Commission, which launched in 2022, is expected by some to recommend changes leading to greater executive power and reducing subnational autonomy. By this reading, reduced legislative friction creates an enabling environment for the administration to move forward with these changes.
The difficulty is that centralization does not dissolve ethnic mobilization. The Tigray war began when a regional government asserted electoral autonomy against federal timelines. Similarly, the ongoing regional insurgencies led by the Fano in Amhara and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Oromia are, at root, contests over the terms of the federal arrangement. Efforts to undermine the federalist model are therefore likely to exacerbate ethnic tension rather than transcend it.
One nuance complicates a purely centralizing reading. A July 2025 revision adjusted the threshold for parliamentary participation, resulting in 48 opposition parties for the 2026 elections, suggesting the government seeks the appearance of pluralist enfranchisement even as it consolidates. Another interpretation is that the lower party participation threshold dilutes competition. The likely trajectory is a hybrid with a formal federal architecture retained on paper while substantive authority migrates to the center. Whether that produces stability or fracture depends on whether centralization is paired with genuine accommodation. On current evidence, it is not.
Q3: Does a renewed Prosperity Party mandate improve or worsen Ethiopia's internal security outlook?
A3: A renewed mandate is likely to worsen the structural security outlook while marginally stabilizing the short-term operational picture. Generally speaking, when parliament is dominated by the ruling party, holding the executive to account becomes structurally difficult, and dissent migrates outside formal institutions. Given multiple ongoing internal conflicts, these trends are already playing out.
The insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia continue to produce considerable instability. Even so, both Fano and the OLA have fallen short of holding sizeable and strategic territory. Additionally, the success of the economic reform package provides the government with useful capital to fund salaries and weapons needed to sustain its military and policing efforts in these regions.
Although they have not achieved large strategic gains, the OLA and Fano have maintained their presence and organization. These conflicts persist because they are fueled by the federal system's contested legitimacy. A supermajority that resolves elite competition through electoral dominance forces the opposition to seek other outlets, often armed ones. In March 2026, Fano warned that any entity assisting the voting process would be "considered enemies of the Amhara people." An election conducted under such conditions confirms rather than dissolves the marginalization narrative driving the insurgency.
Tigray is a grave flashpoint, and the election is directly implicated in its deterioration. The 2022 Pretoria Agreement, ending the previous two years of hostilities between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government, held for nearly three years, even though implementation faltered. However, in early 2025, analysts began warning of the potential for renewed violence in Tigray. In early 2026, several actions escalated tensions. In February, the federal House of Federation stripped multiple constituencies from the Tigrayan administration and postponed regional elections until "ownership claims" were addressed. Additionally, the TPLF, already deregistered after holding its congress against federal wishes, moved in April 2026 to restore the regional government. In the end, no vote was held in Tigray, which continues to see ongoing displacement and threats of fighting.
The decisive risk is that the supermajority mandate removes the incentive to accommodate precisely where it is most needed. Abiy publicly warned that the TPLF congress could lead to open conflict in similar language to what he used before fighting broke out in 2020.
Q4: How do the elections shape Ethiopia's foreign relations in the Horn of Africa?
A4: Ethiopia's internal and external security are intertwined. Fragile relations with Eritrea and mounting tensions with Sudan, both characterized by mutual accusations of proxy support, mean that a regime insulated from domestic accountability faces fewer constraints on its assertive regional behavior. The mandate does not alter Ethiopia's foreign policy goals; it merely lowers the internal cost of pursuing them aggressively.
Reelection clears the way for Abiy's Red Sea ambitions, which he frames as an existential imperative for a state of more than 130 million people. The clearest illustration of Ethiopia's pursuit of sea access is the January 2024 memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, in which Somaliland would lease a stretch of Gulf of Aden coastline to Ethiopia in exchange for eventual recognition of Somaliland's independence. Through Turkish mediation, Ethiopia walked back on the agreement but has not confirmed its cancellation. The push for sea access has already catalyzed an opposing, if loose, alignment among Eritrea, Somalia, and Egypt. The aggressive approach is altering the region's geopolitical and security alliances.
A newer and more dangerous entanglement is Sudan. Since December 2025, Sudanese officials have accused Ethiopia of training Rapid Support Forces (RSF) fighters and allied militias. The allegations increased in 2026. In March, a Sudanese Armed Forces-aligned governor accused Ethiopia of backing an RSF offensive on the border town of Kurmuk. Satellite imagery analyzed by Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab documented activity at an Ethiopian National Defense Force base near Asosa in western Ethiopia consistent with military support operations. However, this evidence is contested rather than conclusive, showing the genuine uncertainty around the developing engagement.
The sharpest near-term flashpoint lies with Eritrea, as a centralized government attempt to resolve Tigray by force risks direct confrontation with Asmara. Eritrea-Ethiopia relations have deteriorated, reversing the rapprochement that earned Abiy the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. Eritrea has treated the question of sea access and the identification of the Eritrean coastal port city of Assab as a potential access location as a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Another tension has been in Tigray, where the previous coalition between Ethiopia and Eritrea has fully collapsed. Ethiopia maintains that Eritrea's support for the TPLF is increasing and that Eritrea is supporting armed groups in Amhara. This includes claims that Eritrean troops are in Tigray, which Eritrea has denied. Many observers believe that off-ramps from conflict are narrowing and that the 2026 election and the unresolved situation in Tigray could be a tipping point.
Ethiopia's internal stability can serve as a "system-level variable" for the region, meaning that changes within Ethiopia have large-scale repercussions in the Horn of Africa. This has played out in the regional repercussions generated by Ethiopia's calls for sea access, and an electoral mandate reduces the friction for Abiy to pursue sea access more assertively. Yet, this dynamic raises important questions regarding the broader impact of Ethiopia's actions. If assertive moves fuel countercoalitions and increase the risk of escalation, the government's gains may be offset by heightened regional instability. Reflecting on this pattern suggests that Ethiopia's domestic political consolidation could paradoxically undermine both its regional ambitions and the wider stability of the Horn.
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Aaron Stanley is deputy director and fellow of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/after-supermajority-ethiopias-trajectory-following-2026-election
[Category: ThinkTank]
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After the Supermajority: Ethiopia's Trajectory Following the 2026 Election
Ethiopia held its general elections on June 1, and with the majority of votes now finalized, all signs point to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali's Prosperity Party having secured a vast majority. While many analysts confidently predicted these outcomes well in advance, the election results alongside the country's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on June 18, 2026, involving Aaron Stanley, deputy director and fellow of the Africa Program: * * * After the Supermajority: Ethiopia's Trajectory Following the 2026 Election Ethiopia held its general elections on June 1, and with the majority of votes now finalized, all signs point to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali's Prosperity Party having secured a vast majority. While many analysts confidently predicted these outcomes well in advance, the election results alongside the country'seconomic reforms and recent growth, internal conflicts, and regional tensions invite critical analysis of how this supermajority will shape Ethiopia's political, social, and economic trajectory, raising important questions about the broader implications for the nation's future.
Q1: What does a Prosperity Party supermajority mean for the trajectory of Ethiopia's economic reform agenda?
A1: Launched in 2019, Ethiopia's Homegrown Economic Reform (HGER) program has driven a deliberate transition toward a more market-oriented, private sector-friendly economy. Efforts to open the banking sector to foreign institutions, along with reforms such as easing foreign exchange controls and floating Ethiopia's currency, have been accompanied by sector-specific liberalization, most notably in telecoms with Safaricom's entry.
Economic reforms initially led to high inflation, which diminished household purchasing power. Inflation remains relatively high but has fallen sharply from its peak and stabilized around 12 percent. Additionally, recently released government data shows substantial increases in foreign exchange reserves, a stronger balance of payments, and rising exports. Yet these gains accrue unevenly. If the data is accurate, those benefits are felt more by exporters, banks, and capital-intensive firms than by the majority of Ethiopians navigating cost-of-living pressures.
The supermajority presents a tradeoff. On one hand, it removes any legislative impediment to the next phase of economic reform, offering policy predictability for investors and international financial institutions. On the other, the absence of meaningful legislative opposition creates an accountability deficit.
Despite reduced formal political friction, several tensions endure. First, even with economic liberalization and reform, the Prosperity Party is essentially statist. The state, and increasingly the party, retain decisive leverage over land, strategic enterprises, and financial flows. Partial divestitures of Ethio Telecom through the securities exchange illustrate how limited liberalization is used to attract capital without ceding strategic control. Whether this reflects prudent industrial policy or rent-preserving restraint is difficult to observe from the outside.
Second, cost-of-living pressures are a major concern. High inflation and strained household spending power are being compounded by global crises. Since the launch of the HGER program, Covid-19, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the recent U.S.-Israel war with Iran have all created external shocks to the Ethiopian--and global--economy. Alongside the short-term implications of the national economic reforms, average Ethiopians have struggled with increased day-to-day cost-of-living pressures.
A third source of friction concerns the country's internal security and conflict. Military and police spending, conflict-induced displacement, and the impact of internal insecurity on investor risk perception ultimately limit the extent to which macroeconomic reform can achieve its objectives. Similarly to how these elections were only held in certain areas of the country, if economic reform is selectively implemented, there is a risk that regional and urban-rural inequality could grow significantly, further exacerbating tensions between the federal government, regional entities, and organizations representing different constituencies.
The post-election moment provides a politically convenient window to release an updated version of HGER, even if the general expectation is continuity of economic reforms. In a new iteration of HGER, one can expect accelerated execution where the government has already made commitments, little movement where reform would threaten political control, and a widening gap between the formal liberalization narrative and the governance environment surrounding it.
Q2: What are the implications of the elections for Ethiopia's system of ethnic federalism?
A2: One of the election's most consequential long-range implications concerns not who governs, but rather the architecture of government. Ethiopia's federal system is unusually robust in the formal powers it grants to ethnic groups. The Prosperity Party was conceived in part as a response to this, merging ethnically based parties into a single national entity that claims to pursue a more unified identity.
Commentators remark that the Prosperity Party holds little regard for the 1995 settlement that marked the beginning of the current Ethiopian constitution and the country's ethnic federalism framework. The National Dialogue Commission, which launched in 2022, is expected by some to recommend changes leading to greater executive power and reducing subnational autonomy. By this reading, reduced legislative friction creates an enabling environment for the administration to move forward with these changes.
The difficulty is that centralization does not dissolve ethnic mobilization. The Tigray war began when a regional government asserted electoral autonomy against federal timelines. Similarly, the ongoing regional insurgencies led by the Fano in Amhara and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Oromia are, at root, contests over the terms of the federal arrangement. Efforts to undermine the federalist model are therefore likely to exacerbate ethnic tension rather than transcend it.
One nuance complicates a purely centralizing reading. A July 2025 revision adjusted the threshold for parliamentary participation, resulting in 48 opposition parties for the 2026 elections, suggesting the government seeks the appearance of pluralist enfranchisement even as it consolidates. Another interpretation is that the lower party participation threshold dilutes competition. The likely trajectory is a hybrid with a formal federal architecture retained on paper while substantive authority migrates to the center. Whether that produces stability or fracture depends on whether centralization is paired with genuine accommodation. On current evidence, it is not.
Q3: Does a renewed Prosperity Party mandate improve or worsen Ethiopia's internal security outlook?
A3: A renewed mandate is likely to worsen the structural security outlook while marginally stabilizing the short-term operational picture. Generally speaking, when parliament is dominated by the ruling party, holding the executive to account becomes structurally difficult, and dissent migrates outside formal institutions. Given multiple ongoing internal conflicts, these trends are already playing out.
The insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia continue to produce considerable instability. Even so, both Fano and the OLA have fallen short of holding sizeable and strategic territory. Additionally, the success of the economic reform package provides the government with useful capital to fund salaries and weapons needed to sustain its military and policing efforts in these regions.
Although they have not achieved large strategic gains, the OLA and Fano have maintained their presence and organization. These conflicts persist because they are fueled by the federal system's contested legitimacy. A supermajority that resolves elite competition through electoral dominance forces the opposition to seek other outlets, often armed ones. In March 2026, Fano warned that any entity assisting the voting process would be "considered enemies of the Amhara people." An election conducted under such conditions confirms rather than dissolves the marginalization narrative driving the insurgency.
Tigray is a grave flashpoint, and the election is directly implicated in its deterioration. The 2022 Pretoria Agreement, ending the previous two years of hostilities between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government, held for nearly three years, even though implementation faltered. However, in early 2025, analysts began warning of the potential for renewed violence in Tigray. In early 2026, several actions escalated tensions. In February, the federal House of Federation stripped multiple constituencies from the Tigrayan administration and postponed regional elections until "ownership claims" were addressed. Additionally, the TPLF, already deregistered after holding its congress against federal wishes, moved in April 2026 to restore the regional government. In the end, no vote was held in Tigray, which continues to see ongoing displacement and threats of fighting.
The decisive risk is that the supermajority mandate removes the incentive to accommodate precisely where it is most needed. Abiy publicly warned that the TPLF congress could lead to open conflict in similar language to what he used before fighting broke out in 2020.
Q4: How do the elections shape Ethiopia's foreign relations in the Horn of Africa?
A4: Ethiopia's internal and external security are intertwined. Fragile relations with Eritrea and mounting tensions with Sudan, both characterized by mutual accusations of proxy support, mean that a regime insulated from domestic accountability faces fewer constraints on its assertive regional behavior. The mandate does not alter Ethiopia's foreign policy goals; it merely lowers the internal cost of pursuing them aggressively.
Reelection clears the way for Abiy's Red Sea ambitions, which he frames as an existential imperative for a state of more than 130 million people. The clearest illustration of Ethiopia's pursuit of sea access is the January 2024 memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, in which Somaliland would lease a stretch of Gulf of Aden coastline to Ethiopia in exchange for eventual recognition of Somaliland's independence. Through Turkish mediation, Ethiopia walked back on the agreement but has not confirmed its cancellation. The push for sea access has already catalyzed an opposing, if loose, alignment among Eritrea, Somalia, and Egypt. The aggressive approach is altering the region's geopolitical and security alliances.
A newer and more dangerous entanglement is Sudan. Since December 2025, Sudanese officials have accused Ethiopia of training Rapid Support Forces (RSF) fighters and allied militias. The allegations increased in 2026. In March, a Sudanese Armed Forces-aligned governor accused Ethiopia of backing an RSF offensive on the border town of Kurmuk. Satellite imagery analyzed by Yale's Humanitarian Research Lab documented activity at an Ethiopian National Defense Force base near Asosa in western Ethiopia consistent with military support operations. However, this evidence is contested rather than conclusive, showing the genuine uncertainty around the developing engagement.
The sharpest near-term flashpoint lies with Eritrea, as a centralized government attempt to resolve Tigray by force risks direct confrontation with Asmara. Eritrea-Ethiopia relations have deteriorated, reversing the rapprochement that earned Abiy the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. Eritrea has treated the question of sea access and the identification of the Eritrean coastal port city of Assab as a potential access location as a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Another tension has been in Tigray, where the previous coalition between Ethiopia and Eritrea has fully collapsed. Ethiopia maintains that Eritrea's support for the TPLF is increasing and that Eritrea is supporting armed groups in Amhara. This includes claims that Eritrean troops are in Tigray, which Eritrea has denied. Many observers believe that off-ramps from conflict are narrowing and that the 2026 election and the unresolved situation in Tigray could be a tipping point.
Ethiopia's internal stability can serve as a "system-level variable" for the region, meaning that changes within Ethiopia have large-scale repercussions in the Horn of Africa. This has played out in the regional repercussions generated by Ethiopia's calls for sea access, and an electoral mandate reduces the friction for Abiy to pursue sea access more assertively. Yet, this dynamic raises important questions regarding the broader impact of Ethiopia's actions. If assertive moves fuel countercoalitions and increase the risk of escalation, the government's gains may be offset by heightened regional instability. Reflecting on this pattern suggests that Ethiopia's domestic political consolidation could paradoxically undermine both its regional ambitions and the wider stability of the Horn.
* * *
Aaron Stanley is deputy director and fellow of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/after-supermajority-ethiopias-trajectory-following-2026-election
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: FERC Data Center Orders Accelerate Grid Connection
WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Energy and Environmental Policy Director Shuting Pomerleau:
* * *
FERC Data Center Orders Accelerate Grid Connection
Executive Summary
* On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued six tailored orders aimed at drastically accelerating grid interconnection for artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and other large-load energy users; this action, taken under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, fulfills a 2025 request by Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright.
* ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Energy and Environmental Policy Director Shuting Pomerleau: * * * FERC Data Center Orders Accelerate Grid Connection Executive Summary * On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued six tailored orders aimed at drastically accelerating grid interconnection for artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and other large-load energy users; this action, taken under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, fulfills a 2025 request by Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright. *The orders compel regional grid operators to: 1) justify within 60 days why their existing utility pricing structures can accommodate massive data centers, or immediately reform them, and 2) submit a mandatory reliability report within 30 days detailing how they will secure sufficient generation capacity to support large loads; additionally, FERC recommends five categories of potential future reform areas, including prevention of cost shifting.
* FERC's aggressive timelines will likely reshape the AI data center landscape by significantly shortening the multi-year interconnection queue backlog and leading to new retail large-load rate categories in more states; furthermore, by deploying targeted, region-specific orders restricted to FERC's jurisdiction rather than a broad national rulemaking, FERC strategically maximizes its actions' legal durability against potential challenges from state-level stakeholders.
-
Introduction
On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an agency that "regulates the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, and electricity," issued tailored orders under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act to each U.S. regional grid operator. This historic action directly fulfills a 2025 request submitted by Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Chris Wright that aimed to drastically accelerate grid interconnection for large-load energy users--specifically AI data centers--amid unprecedented energy demand.
The FERC orders compel regional grid operators to: 1) justify within 60 days why their existing utility pricing structures can accommodate massive data centers, or they must immediately reform them, and 2) submit a mandatory reliability report within 30 days detailing how they will secure sufficient generation capacity to support large loads; additionally, FERC recommends five categories of potential future reform areas.
FERC's aggressive timelines will likely reshape the AI data center landscape by significantly shortening the multi-year interconnection queue backlog and leading to new retail large-load rate categories in more states; furthermore, by deploying targeted, region-specific orders restricted to FERC's jurisdiction rather than a broad national rulemaking, FERC strategically maximizes its actions' legal durability against potential challenges from state-level stakeholders.
FERC's New Orders to the Six Regional Grid Operators
Overview
FERC has launched "aggressive targeted action" to speed up large load interconnection to the grid following its June 18, 2026, open meeting. The action addresses how large-load energy users, including AI data centers and manufacturing facilities, are connected to the grid. This action is a direct response to DOE's request filed last year (discussion in the background section below).
To many experts' surprise, instead of issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) that typically takes a long time to finalize, FERC has issued customized show cause orders via Section 206 of the Federal Power Act to each of the six regional grid operators. FERC's press release states that these orders are aimed at "moving to ensure that Americans have reliable, affordable power--even as electricity demand and technology accelerates."
These regional transmission organizations (RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs) are PJM, Interconnection, LLC, Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP), California Independent System Operator Corporation, ISO New England Inc., and New York Independent System Operator, Inc..
Specifically, these tailored orders direct the regional grid operators to:
* Justify or reform--FERC has ordered the operators to either justify why their existing tariffs (utility fees/pricing structures) remain "just and reasonable without provisions tailored to large loads," within a 60-day period or to "to file tariff changes that address the issues the Commission identified."
* Address five categories of reform--FERC has requested they address several reform areas, including 1) developing efficient transmission services, 2) preventing cost shifting and requiring transparency into transmission costs, 3) accommodating co-location agreements (building a power plant next to an AI data center) and behind-the-meter generation (off-grid operation), 4) providing new transmission services for flexible large loads, and 5) developing a process to study generation plants that power large load users.
* Submit informational reports--Within 30 days, FERC ordered that each grid operator and its transmission owners must submit a report "describing how the grid operator intends to ensure that adequate generation will be available to serve existing and new large loads."
Background
On October 23, 2025, DOE Secretary Wright requested that FERC consider an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANOPR) regarding the connection of large electrical loads--specifically those exceeding 20 megawatts (MW), such as the energy demanded by AI data centers--to the interstate transmission system.
Although FERC is an independent agency, Secretary Wright invoked a rarely deployed legal authority via Section 403 of the Department of Energy Organization Act to make the request to the agency.
The request asked FERC to assert its jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of electricity at wholesale in interstate commerce." DOE also recommended FERC consider a set of principles to ensure "large loads, including AI data centers, served by public utilities must be able to connect to the transmission system in a timely, orderly, and non-discriminatory manner."
Potential Implications
FERC's actions have significant implications for stakeholders including utilities, state utility regulators, data center developers, transmission providers, and other large industrial or commercial energy users.
Much-shorter regulatory timelines for large load interconnection
If FERC had issued a NOPR rather than targeted orders, it would likely take the agency 2-5 years to draft, review public comments, and finalize the rule. Instead, FERC has issued six different tailored orders to the regional grid operators requiring them to move relatively quickly to connect large loads to their grid. The 30-day and 60-day deadlines in the orders demonstrate the agency's acknowledgement of the importance of the issue and recognition of the need for swift solutions.
Notably, FERC highlights in its factsheet that SPP, the RTO that manages states in the Central and Western United States, "stands out with its High Impact Large Load and High Impact Large Load Generation Assessment processes," highlighting it as a potential model for other regional grid operators.
Currently, it typically takes at least 5 years for large-scale energy users (200+ MW load) to be connected to the grid from initial submission of the interconnection request to the energy user connecting to the grid and beginning commercial operation. This means that under the existing framework and processes, it would take AI data centers at least 5 years to gain access to power from the grid to begin commercial operation.
FERC's orders today will likely lead to highly compressed regulatory timelines for AI data centers to be connected to the grid after regional grid operators and state regulators reform the existing processes and requirements.
New rate classes for AI data centers likely ahead
The "justify or reform" order from FERC will likely lead more states to create a new utility rate class for large-load customers, especially AI data centers, to prevent utility rate spikes in the residential sector.
For example, Virginia's state corporation commission (SCC)--a regulator of utilities--has approved a new electricity rate for large-scale customers including AI data centers that will start in January 2027. Under this new framework, affected customers must pay for at least 85 percent of contracted distribution and transmission demand and 60 percent of generation demand. American Action Forum (AAF)'s previous insight provides a detailed analysis of this new rate class. Under FERC's new orders, it's likely some states will follow Virginia's lead to create a sperate rate class for large-load customers.
Bulletproofing potential legal challenges from state and local entities
FERC has taken a strategic preemption approach to avoid legal challenges and pushbacks from state-level stakeholders.
Before this meeting, legal experts had regarded anticipating federal versus state jurisdiction as the key point of contention for FERC's pending action. The Federal Power Act gives FERC authority over the management of interstate transmission and the wholesale market, and leaves the matters of retail sales, local distribution, and siting to the states. Historically, FERC standardized how generators connect to the grid, while leaving the rules for end-use load interconnections to be managed by states through retail tariffs (pricing related to the transmission and distribution of electricity) and local distribution planning.
Legal experts believed that a uniform national standardization of processes issued by FERC would be subject to litigation from state and local stakeholders on the grounds of federal overreach on state authority. In fact, state-level stakeholders such as the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC)--an organization representing state utility regulators, and the Virginia SCC filed official comments with FERC highlighting the problems of a national standardization of large-load interconnection.
On April 13, 2026, NARUC filed a public comment with FERC to urge the agency not to encroach upon state jurisdiction to regulate the local electricity market. Specifically, the document stated
Federal regulation of large load interconnections will impede states' abilities to (i) adapt quickly to industry changes or region-specific challenges as they emerge, and (ii) adequately protect the affordability of service to other retail customers.
FERC's orders appear to reshape the landscape with regard to AI energy load while avoiding any questions or challenges on the basis of jurisdiction. Taking into account the comments and concerns from state-level stakeholders, FERC explicitly stated that it respects states' jurisdiction in today's orders:
Importantly, nothing in today's orders intrudes either on the authority of states to select, site, and permit generating resources or on the authority of state public utility commissions to set the rates, terms, and conditions of retail sales of electricity. The orders also make clear that the Commission acts today to guard against cost shifting among transmission customers but leaves to the states the responsibility to ensure that there is no cost shifting among retail customers.
In addition, today's orders are not intended to disrupt existing agreements that large loads have negotiated, or are in the process of negotiating, for the provision of transmission service. These orders provide that the RTOs/ISOs should allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize agreements that are nearing completion when any tariff revisions are filed with the Commission.
Other Major Federal Energy Policy Response to AI Data Center Boom
These FERC orders represent a significant reform of federal policy affecting the AI data center buildout, but they are far from the only such measures. The Trump Administration has adopted several measures aimed at promoting AI data center development in the country:
* In July 2025, the administration released a document titled "Winning the Race, America's AI Action Plan" outlining the U.S. strategy of boosting AI and AI data center development in the United States. The action plan includes steps to support innovation, infrastructure, security, and other items. AAF's insight provided an overview of the action plan.
* In January 2026, the administration reached an agreement with a bipartisan group of governors to direct PJM to hold an emergency electricity auction to make tech companies pay for the construction of new power plants, which aims to ensure the rapid expansion of AI data centers does not increase electricity costs for residential customers.
Looking Forward
As the 30-day and 60-day deadlines in FERC's orders approach, it will be critical to monitor how the six regional grid operators structurally reshape their transmission pricing structures to strike a balance between meeting AI data centers' demand and protecting residential customers' utility bills from spiking.
At the same time, state utility commissions are likely to use this compliance period to accelerate their own local distribution and retail rate reforms, potentially using Virginia's landmark 2027 rate structure as a blueprint.
It remains to be seen whether FERC's orders will allow the U.S. grid to successfully accommodate the AI boom without sacrificing long-term reliability and affordability for residential ratepayers.
* * *
Shuting Pomerleau is the Director of Energy and Environmental Policy at the American Action Forum
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/ferc-data-center-orders-accelerate-grid-connection/
[Category: Think Tank]
* * *
FERC Data Center Orders Accelerate Grid Connection
Executive Summary
* On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued six tailored orders aimed at drastically accelerating grid interconnection for artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and other large-load energy users; this action, taken under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, fulfills a 2025 request by Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright.
* ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on June 18, 2026, by Energy and Environmental Policy Director Shuting Pomerleau: * * * FERC Data Center Orders Accelerate Grid Connection Executive Summary * On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued six tailored orders aimed at drastically accelerating grid interconnection for artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and other large-load energy users; this action, taken under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, fulfills a 2025 request by Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright. *The orders compel regional grid operators to: 1) justify within 60 days why their existing utility pricing structures can accommodate massive data centers, or immediately reform them, and 2) submit a mandatory reliability report within 30 days detailing how they will secure sufficient generation capacity to support large loads; additionally, FERC recommends five categories of potential future reform areas, including prevention of cost shifting.
* FERC's aggressive timelines will likely reshape the AI data center landscape by significantly shortening the multi-year interconnection queue backlog and leading to new retail large-load rate categories in more states; furthermore, by deploying targeted, region-specific orders restricted to FERC's jurisdiction rather than a broad national rulemaking, FERC strategically maximizes its actions' legal durability against potential challenges from state-level stakeholders.
-
Introduction
On June 18, 2026, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an agency that "regulates the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, and electricity," issued tailored orders under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act to each U.S. regional grid operator. This historic action directly fulfills a 2025 request submitted by Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Chris Wright that aimed to drastically accelerate grid interconnection for large-load energy users--specifically AI data centers--amid unprecedented energy demand.
The FERC orders compel regional grid operators to: 1) justify within 60 days why their existing utility pricing structures can accommodate massive data centers, or they must immediately reform them, and 2) submit a mandatory reliability report within 30 days detailing how they will secure sufficient generation capacity to support large loads; additionally, FERC recommends five categories of potential future reform areas.
FERC's aggressive timelines will likely reshape the AI data center landscape by significantly shortening the multi-year interconnection queue backlog and leading to new retail large-load rate categories in more states; furthermore, by deploying targeted, region-specific orders restricted to FERC's jurisdiction rather than a broad national rulemaking, FERC strategically maximizes its actions' legal durability against potential challenges from state-level stakeholders.
FERC's New Orders to the Six Regional Grid Operators
Overview
FERC has launched "aggressive targeted action" to speed up large load interconnection to the grid following its June 18, 2026, open meeting. The action addresses how large-load energy users, including AI data centers and manufacturing facilities, are connected to the grid. This action is a direct response to DOE's request filed last year (discussion in the background section below).
To many experts' surprise, instead of issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) that typically takes a long time to finalize, FERC has issued customized show cause orders via Section 206 of the Federal Power Act to each of the six regional grid operators. FERC's press release states that these orders are aimed at "moving to ensure that Americans have reliable, affordable power--even as electricity demand and technology accelerates."
These regional transmission organizations (RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs) are PJM, Interconnection, LLC, Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (SPP), California Independent System Operator Corporation, ISO New England Inc., and New York Independent System Operator, Inc..
Specifically, these tailored orders direct the regional grid operators to:
* Justify or reform--FERC has ordered the operators to either justify why their existing tariffs (utility fees/pricing structures) remain "just and reasonable without provisions tailored to large loads," within a 60-day period or to "to file tariff changes that address the issues the Commission identified."
* Address five categories of reform--FERC has requested they address several reform areas, including 1) developing efficient transmission services, 2) preventing cost shifting and requiring transparency into transmission costs, 3) accommodating co-location agreements (building a power plant next to an AI data center) and behind-the-meter generation (off-grid operation), 4) providing new transmission services for flexible large loads, and 5) developing a process to study generation plants that power large load users.
* Submit informational reports--Within 30 days, FERC ordered that each grid operator and its transmission owners must submit a report "describing how the grid operator intends to ensure that adequate generation will be available to serve existing and new large loads."
Background
On October 23, 2025, DOE Secretary Wright requested that FERC consider an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANOPR) regarding the connection of large electrical loads--specifically those exceeding 20 megawatts (MW), such as the energy demanded by AI data centers--to the interstate transmission system.
Although FERC is an independent agency, Secretary Wright invoked a rarely deployed legal authority via Section 403 of the Department of Energy Organization Act to make the request to the agency.
The request asked FERC to assert its jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of electricity at wholesale in interstate commerce." DOE also recommended FERC consider a set of principles to ensure "large loads, including AI data centers, served by public utilities must be able to connect to the transmission system in a timely, orderly, and non-discriminatory manner."
Potential Implications
FERC's actions have significant implications for stakeholders including utilities, state utility regulators, data center developers, transmission providers, and other large industrial or commercial energy users.
Much-shorter regulatory timelines for large load interconnection
If FERC had issued a NOPR rather than targeted orders, it would likely take the agency 2-5 years to draft, review public comments, and finalize the rule. Instead, FERC has issued six different tailored orders to the regional grid operators requiring them to move relatively quickly to connect large loads to their grid. The 30-day and 60-day deadlines in the orders demonstrate the agency's acknowledgement of the importance of the issue and recognition of the need for swift solutions.
Notably, FERC highlights in its factsheet that SPP, the RTO that manages states in the Central and Western United States, "stands out with its High Impact Large Load and High Impact Large Load Generation Assessment processes," highlighting it as a potential model for other regional grid operators.
Currently, it typically takes at least 5 years for large-scale energy users (200+ MW load) to be connected to the grid from initial submission of the interconnection request to the energy user connecting to the grid and beginning commercial operation. This means that under the existing framework and processes, it would take AI data centers at least 5 years to gain access to power from the grid to begin commercial operation.
FERC's orders today will likely lead to highly compressed regulatory timelines for AI data centers to be connected to the grid after regional grid operators and state regulators reform the existing processes and requirements.
New rate classes for AI data centers likely ahead
The "justify or reform" order from FERC will likely lead more states to create a new utility rate class for large-load customers, especially AI data centers, to prevent utility rate spikes in the residential sector.
For example, Virginia's state corporation commission (SCC)--a regulator of utilities--has approved a new electricity rate for large-scale customers including AI data centers that will start in January 2027. Under this new framework, affected customers must pay for at least 85 percent of contracted distribution and transmission demand and 60 percent of generation demand. American Action Forum (AAF)'s previous insight provides a detailed analysis of this new rate class. Under FERC's new orders, it's likely some states will follow Virginia's lead to create a sperate rate class for large-load customers.
Bulletproofing potential legal challenges from state and local entities
FERC has taken a strategic preemption approach to avoid legal challenges and pushbacks from state-level stakeholders.
Before this meeting, legal experts had regarded anticipating federal versus state jurisdiction as the key point of contention for FERC's pending action. The Federal Power Act gives FERC authority over the management of interstate transmission and the wholesale market, and leaves the matters of retail sales, local distribution, and siting to the states. Historically, FERC standardized how generators connect to the grid, while leaving the rules for end-use load interconnections to be managed by states through retail tariffs (pricing related to the transmission and distribution of electricity) and local distribution planning.
Legal experts believed that a uniform national standardization of processes issued by FERC would be subject to litigation from state and local stakeholders on the grounds of federal overreach on state authority. In fact, state-level stakeholders such as the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC)--an organization representing state utility regulators, and the Virginia SCC filed official comments with FERC highlighting the problems of a national standardization of large-load interconnection.
On April 13, 2026, NARUC filed a public comment with FERC to urge the agency not to encroach upon state jurisdiction to regulate the local electricity market. Specifically, the document stated
Federal regulation of large load interconnections will impede states' abilities to (i) adapt quickly to industry changes or region-specific challenges as they emerge, and (ii) adequately protect the affordability of service to other retail customers.
FERC's orders appear to reshape the landscape with regard to AI energy load while avoiding any questions or challenges on the basis of jurisdiction. Taking into account the comments and concerns from state-level stakeholders, FERC explicitly stated that it respects states' jurisdiction in today's orders:
Importantly, nothing in today's orders intrudes either on the authority of states to select, site, and permit generating resources or on the authority of state public utility commissions to set the rates, terms, and conditions of retail sales of electricity. The orders also make clear that the Commission acts today to guard against cost shifting among transmission customers but leaves to the states the responsibility to ensure that there is no cost shifting among retail customers.
In addition, today's orders are not intended to disrupt existing agreements that large loads have negotiated, or are in the process of negotiating, for the provision of transmission service. These orders provide that the RTOs/ISOs should allow a reasonable amount of time to finalize agreements that are nearing completion when any tariff revisions are filed with the Commission.
Other Major Federal Energy Policy Response to AI Data Center Boom
These FERC orders represent a significant reform of federal policy affecting the AI data center buildout, but they are far from the only such measures. The Trump Administration has adopted several measures aimed at promoting AI data center development in the country:
* In July 2025, the administration released a document titled "Winning the Race, America's AI Action Plan" outlining the U.S. strategy of boosting AI and AI data center development in the United States. The action plan includes steps to support innovation, infrastructure, security, and other items. AAF's insight provided an overview of the action plan.
* In January 2026, the administration reached an agreement with a bipartisan group of governors to direct PJM to hold an emergency electricity auction to make tech companies pay for the construction of new power plants, which aims to ensure the rapid expansion of AI data centers does not increase electricity costs for residential customers.
Looking Forward
As the 30-day and 60-day deadlines in FERC's orders approach, it will be critical to monitor how the six regional grid operators structurally reshape their transmission pricing structures to strike a balance between meeting AI data centers' demand and protecting residential customers' utility bills from spiking.
At the same time, state utility commissions are likely to use this compliance period to accelerate their own local distribution and retail rate reforms, potentially using Virginia's landmark 2027 rate structure as a blueprint.
It remains to be seen whether FERC's orders will allow the U.S. grid to successfully accommodate the AI boom without sacrificing long-term reliability and affordability for residential ratepayers.
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Shuting Pomerleau is the Director of Energy and Environmental Policy at the American Action Forum
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/ferc-data-center-orders-accelerate-grid-connection/
[Category: Think Tank]
AFPI Report: Iran Was China's 'Counter-Pivot' - And Operation Epic Fury Just Dismantled It
WASHINGTON, June 19 (TNSrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on June 18, 2026:
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New AFPI Report: Iran Was China's "Counter-Pivot" -- And Operation Epic Fury Just Dismantled It
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released a new report contending that China spent two decades using Iran as a tool to keep the United States distracted from the Pacific -- and that Operation Epic Fury has now broken that architecture, handing Washington a lasting strategic advantage over Beijing.
The report, "Iran as China's 'Counter-Pivot': The Strategic Implications ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 (TNSrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on June 18, 2026: * * * New AFPI Report: Iran Was China's "Counter-Pivot" -- And Operation Epic Fury Just Dismantled It The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released a new report contending that China spent two decades using Iran as a tool to keep the United States distracted from the Pacific -- and that Operation Epic Fury has now broken that architecture, handing Washington a lasting strategic advantage over Beijing. The report, "Iran as China's 'Counter-Pivot': The Strategic Implicationsof Operation Epic Fury for America's Competition with China," was authored by Piero A. Tozzi, Senior Director for China Policy at AFPI, and Adam Savit, Director for China Policy at AFPI.
It finds that discounted Iranian oil, dual-use tech transfers, and tacit support for Tehran's proxy network let China extract outsized strategic value at minimal cost -- and that Epic Fury has disrupted that model, with Beijing now having failed to defend two partners, Venezuela and Iran, in two months.
"Operation Epic Fury broke the tool Beijing relied on for twenty years," said Tozzi. "China couldn't protect Iran, just like it couldn't protect Venezuela. That's a strategic opening for the United States, allowing us to finally pivot to Asia."
The report urges the U.S. to consolidate allies' shift toward U.S. LNG, press its informational advantage against CCP and PLA leadership, and accelerate domestic critical minerals production.
Tozzi will lead a related discussion on Tuesday, June 23, at AFPI's fireside chat with Frederick H. Fleitz, "Confronting the North Korean Nuclear Threat & Stability in the Indo-Pacific," featuring Fleitz's newest book, North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship, and the Oval Office. Interested members of the press can register here (https://forms.cloud.microsoft/pages/responsepage.aspx?id=56dYYP9PjEWO08DmFPeOezvqpWvm4iJBoBFIdeZPo-RUMk1ZT1RIWVc4MTNSVVpHVENXTjJTNVo4RC4u&route=shorturl).
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REPORT: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/assets/uploads/files/Iran_as_China_s_%E2%80%9CCounter-Pivot%E2%80%9D-_The_Strategic_Implications_of_Operation_Epic_Fury_for_America%E2%80%99s_Competition_with_China.pdf
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/new-afpi-report-iran-was-chinas-counter-pivot-and-operation-epic-fury-just-dismantled-it
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
New AFPI Report: Iran Was China's "Counter-Pivot" -- And Operation Epic Fury Just Dismantled It
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released a new report contending that China spent two decades using Iran as a tool to keep the United States distracted from the Pacific -- and that Operation Epic Fury has now broken that architecture, handing Washington a lasting strategic advantage over Beijing.
The report, "Iran as China's 'Counter-Pivot': The Strategic Implications ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, June 19 (TNSrpt) -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on June 18, 2026: * * * New AFPI Report: Iran Was China's "Counter-Pivot" -- And Operation Epic Fury Just Dismantled It The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) today released a new report contending that China spent two decades using Iran as a tool to keep the United States distracted from the Pacific -- and that Operation Epic Fury has now broken that architecture, handing Washington a lasting strategic advantage over Beijing. The report, "Iran as China's 'Counter-Pivot': The Strategic Implicationsof Operation Epic Fury for America's Competition with China," was authored by Piero A. Tozzi, Senior Director for China Policy at AFPI, and Adam Savit, Director for China Policy at AFPI.
It finds that discounted Iranian oil, dual-use tech transfers, and tacit support for Tehran's proxy network let China extract outsized strategic value at minimal cost -- and that Epic Fury has disrupted that model, with Beijing now having failed to defend two partners, Venezuela and Iran, in two months.
"Operation Epic Fury broke the tool Beijing relied on for twenty years," said Tozzi. "China couldn't protect Iran, just like it couldn't protect Venezuela. That's a strategic opening for the United States, allowing us to finally pivot to Asia."
The report urges the U.S. to consolidate allies' shift toward U.S. LNG, press its informational advantage against CCP and PLA leadership, and accelerate domestic critical minerals production.
Tozzi will lead a related discussion on Tuesday, June 23, at AFPI's fireside chat with Frederick H. Fleitz, "Confronting the North Korean Nuclear Threat & Stability in the Indo-Pacific," featuring Fleitz's newest book, North Korea, Nuclear Brinkmanship, and the Oval Office. Interested members of the press can register here (https://forms.cloud.microsoft/pages/responsepage.aspx?id=56dYYP9PjEWO08DmFPeOezvqpWvm4iJBoBFIdeZPo-RUMk1ZT1RIWVc4MTNSVVpHVENXTjJTNVo4RC4u&route=shorturl).
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REPORT: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/assets/uploads/files/Iran_as_China_s_%E2%80%9CCounter-Pivot%E2%80%9D-_The_Strategic_Implications_of_Operation_Epic_Fury_for_America%E2%80%99s_Competition_with_China.pdf
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/new-afpi-report-iran-was-chinas-counter-pivot-and-operation-epic-fury-just-dismantled-it
[Category: ThinkTank]