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Rand Issues Commentary: Better Way to Use Criminal Records in Hiring
SANTA MONICA, California, Oct. 17 -- Rand issued the following commentary:
* * *
A Better Way to Use Criminal Records in Hiring
Oct 15, 2026
By Elizabeth Chase and Shawn D. Bushway
Someone in your company just decided to rescind a job offer to a welder, a warehouse supervisor, a medical assistant, or a coder you desperately wanted to hire--not because the person can't do the work, but because a background check turned up a conviction record and your company's rules said, "no hire."
Roughly 90 percent of employers run those checks, and in some surveys as many as 60 percent say they won't hire ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Oct. 17 -- Rand issued the following commentary: * * * A Better Way to Use Criminal Records in Hiring Oct 15, 2026 By Elizabeth Chase and Shawn D. Bushway Someone in your company just decided to rescind a job offer to a welder, a warehouse supervisor, a medical assistant, or a coder you desperately wanted to hire--not because the person can't do the work, but because a background check turned up a conviction record and your company's rules said, "no hire." Roughly 90 percent of employers run those checks, and in some surveys as many as 60 percent say they won't hireanyone with a prior conviction. That's misguided.
What an employer actually wants to know is whether this applicant is likely to commit another crime, possibly on the job. But the screening rules many employers use are often about as accurate as a coin toss, in part because they're based on data that don't represent the population of job seekers with criminal records. A better approach comes from using representative data and careful analysis to answer the question: Which applicants are done committing crimes?
Most of them, it turns out. For a study published last month in the journal Statistics and Public Policy, we traced what happened to nearly 9.5 million people with convictions across seven states. We used court and prison records from 1992 to 2021 to see who among them was convicted again in the next decade and, just as importantly, who wasn't. In five of those states, close to four in five people hadn't been convicted again. In Texas and North Carolina, where reconviction was most common, the figure was still two-thirds.
The risk is low in the aggregate and low for most individuals. More than half of the people in our data set had a five percent or smaller chance of being convicted of anything in the coming year.
Our study found that three simple facts in a criminal record did nearly all the predictive work: How many total prior convictions do they have? How long has it been since their last conviction? And how old is the applicant now? We believe completing a rehabilitative program matters, too, but it wasn't something we could quantify across states for this study.
Now compare that to what employers scrutinize. Asked to rank their concerns about hiring someone with a felony record, employers in a RAND survey put any violent felony conviction first by a wide margin, with more than half calling it their single greatest concern. But the type of crime tells you almost nothing over and above what you can learn from the three simple facts listed above. Criminologists have held for decades that people who break the law tend to be generalists rather than specialists; the correlation between one offense and the next is weak.
On a standard accuracy scale where 0.50 is a coin flip, our model scored 0.70 at predicting a conviction in the year ahead when one year had passed since the last offense, and 0.64 at five years. A decade past the last conviction, no model we tested predicts well. At that point the record has told you what it can, and work history and references are the better evidence. Screening for felony convictions or violent offenses performed substantially worse than our model at every point we measured.
So why do the bright-line felony and violent-offense screens persist? Employers face a lopsided ledger. Hiring someone who causes harm can mean a negligent-hiring suit--rare, but expensive and unpredictable. Declining to hire someone who would have been fine costs the company essentially nothing in a labor market with plenty of workers. It starts to become costly in a tight labor market. It's also unfair. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has an informal test for such job screenings: Does it clear one protected group at less than 80 percent the rate of another protected group? Under a 10-year felony threshold, Black men in our data were 74 percent to 78 percent as likely to be cleared as White women--a failing grade. Under a model built on time, age, and priors, Black men were 98 percent as likely to be cleared as White women.
Because it's more statistically accurate and less discriminatory, this approach is also defensible across a range of regulatory schemes. California employers are feeling this directly right now: The state is in an active enforcement push on fair hiring regulations, and a pending law will further reshape those rules. An approach like the one we outline gives companies a path to compliance and also reduces the time required to evaluate candidates. As states become more prescriptive about the hiring screens that employers need to use, they should also evaluate the quality of their proposed rules. New laws that are not based on good science may actually increase racial disparity and prevent perfectly safe people from being hired.
Our approach fits within the sequence large employers already run: conditional offer, background check, targeted screen, then individualized assessment for anyone flagged. The job of the targeted screening is to clear the low-risk majority quickly so that human judgment is focused on the smaller group that warrants a real conversation.
Finally, a caution: Predicting reconviction risk is not the same as predicting job performance. It does not guarantee your job candidate will show up on time or do good work. That is still the hiring manager's job to find out.
Almost a third of American men have a conviction as an adult. In a labor market with less than 4.5 percent unemployment, where the United States has been for five years, the employer that uses hiring decision tools that are based on high-quality statistical models will find more capable workers that competitors may miss.
* * *
More About This Commentary
Elizabeth Chase is an associate statistician at RAND. Shawn D. Bushway is an adjunct economist and criminologist at RAND and a professor at the University at Albany, SUNY.
Their seven-state study was funded by Arnold Ventures. Bushway is developing a commercial tool, through a company in which he holds a financial interest, that builds on the methods described here; Chase has served as a paid consultant to that company.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/10/a-better-way-to-use-criminal-records-in-hiring.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
A Better Way to Use Criminal Records in Hiring
Oct 15, 2026
By Elizabeth Chase and Shawn D. Bushway
Someone in your company just decided to rescind a job offer to a welder, a warehouse supervisor, a medical assistant, or a coder you desperately wanted to hire--not because the person can't do the work, but because a background check turned up a conviction record and your company's rules said, "no hire."
Roughly 90 percent of employers run those checks, and in some surveys as many as 60 percent say they won't hire ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Oct. 17 -- Rand issued the following commentary: * * * A Better Way to Use Criminal Records in Hiring Oct 15, 2026 By Elizabeth Chase and Shawn D. Bushway Someone in your company just decided to rescind a job offer to a welder, a warehouse supervisor, a medical assistant, or a coder you desperately wanted to hire--not because the person can't do the work, but because a background check turned up a conviction record and your company's rules said, "no hire." Roughly 90 percent of employers run those checks, and in some surveys as many as 60 percent say they won't hireanyone with a prior conviction. That's misguided.
What an employer actually wants to know is whether this applicant is likely to commit another crime, possibly on the job. But the screening rules many employers use are often about as accurate as a coin toss, in part because they're based on data that don't represent the population of job seekers with criminal records. A better approach comes from using representative data and careful analysis to answer the question: Which applicants are done committing crimes?
Most of them, it turns out. For a study published last month in the journal Statistics and Public Policy, we traced what happened to nearly 9.5 million people with convictions across seven states. We used court and prison records from 1992 to 2021 to see who among them was convicted again in the next decade and, just as importantly, who wasn't. In five of those states, close to four in five people hadn't been convicted again. In Texas and North Carolina, where reconviction was most common, the figure was still two-thirds.
The risk is low in the aggregate and low for most individuals. More than half of the people in our data set had a five percent or smaller chance of being convicted of anything in the coming year.
Our study found that three simple facts in a criminal record did nearly all the predictive work: How many total prior convictions do they have? How long has it been since their last conviction? And how old is the applicant now? We believe completing a rehabilitative program matters, too, but it wasn't something we could quantify across states for this study.
Now compare that to what employers scrutinize. Asked to rank their concerns about hiring someone with a felony record, employers in a RAND survey put any violent felony conviction first by a wide margin, with more than half calling it their single greatest concern. But the type of crime tells you almost nothing over and above what you can learn from the three simple facts listed above. Criminologists have held for decades that people who break the law tend to be generalists rather than specialists; the correlation between one offense and the next is weak.
On a standard accuracy scale where 0.50 is a coin flip, our model scored 0.70 at predicting a conviction in the year ahead when one year had passed since the last offense, and 0.64 at five years. A decade past the last conviction, no model we tested predicts well. At that point the record has told you what it can, and work history and references are the better evidence. Screening for felony convictions or violent offenses performed substantially worse than our model at every point we measured.
So why do the bright-line felony and violent-offense screens persist? Employers face a lopsided ledger. Hiring someone who causes harm can mean a negligent-hiring suit--rare, but expensive and unpredictable. Declining to hire someone who would have been fine costs the company essentially nothing in a labor market with plenty of workers. It starts to become costly in a tight labor market. It's also unfair. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has an informal test for such job screenings: Does it clear one protected group at less than 80 percent the rate of another protected group? Under a 10-year felony threshold, Black men in our data were 74 percent to 78 percent as likely to be cleared as White women--a failing grade. Under a model built on time, age, and priors, Black men were 98 percent as likely to be cleared as White women.
Because it's more statistically accurate and less discriminatory, this approach is also defensible across a range of regulatory schemes. California employers are feeling this directly right now: The state is in an active enforcement push on fair hiring regulations, and a pending law will further reshape those rules. An approach like the one we outline gives companies a path to compliance and also reduces the time required to evaluate candidates. As states become more prescriptive about the hiring screens that employers need to use, they should also evaluate the quality of their proposed rules. New laws that are not based on good science may actually increase racial disparity and prevent perfectly safe people from being hired.
Our approach fits within the sequence large employers already run: conditional offer, background check, targeted screen, then individualized assessment for anyone flagged. The job of the targeted screening is to clear the low-risk majority quickly so that human judgment is focused on the smaller group that warrants a real conversation.
Finally, a caution: Predicting reconviction risk is not the same as predicting job performance. It does not guarantee your job candidate will show up on time or do good work. That is still the hiring manager's job to find out.
Almost a third of American men have a conviction as an adult. In a labor market with less than 4.5 percent unemployment, where the United States has been for five years, the employer that uses hiring decision tools that are based on high-quality statistical models will find more capable workers that competitors may miss.
* * *
More About This Commentary
Elizabeth Chase is an associate statistician at RAND. Shawn D. Bushway is an adjunct economist and criminologist at RAND and a professor at the University at Albany, SUNY.
Their seven-state study was funded by Arnold Ventures. Bushway is developing a commercial tool, through a company in which he holds a financial interest, that builds on the methods described here; Chase has served as a paid consultant to that company.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/10/a-better-way-to-use-criminal-records-in-hiring.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Washington Post: In Michigan, Jewish Voters Are Reconsidering Their Allegiances
NEW YORK, Oct. 17 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary:
* * *
In Michigan, Jewish Voters Are Reconsidering Their Allegiances
By Jesse Arm
Washington Post
October 16th, 2026
Communal preservation must accompany universal concern.
-
Amid concerns over rising antisemitism on the left, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel recently told her fellow Jewish Democrats that they may have to "sacrifice the comfort, safety, security and even the very future of our own people in exchange for the opportunity to save the rest of humanity."
In a bizarre inversion of ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Oct. 17 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary: * * * In Michigan, Jewish Voters Are Reconsidering Their Allegiances By Jesse Arm Washington Post October 16th, 2026 Communal preservation must accompany universal concern. - Amid concerns over rising antisemitism on the left, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel recently told her fellow Jewish Democrats that they may have to "sacrifice the comfort, safety, security and even the very future of our own people in exchange for the opportunity to save the rest of humanity." In a bizarre inversion ofthe story of Queen Esther, who risked her own life to save the Jews, Nessel invoked the biblical heroine to suggest that Jews should risk their own survival to save everyone else.
I grew up in West Bloomfield, Michigan, a center of Jewish life in the state. Many of the town's residents are declining Nessel's invitation.
It's easy to see why. In March, a Hezbollah-inspired attacker from Dearborn Heights, Michigan, rammed a truck loaded with gasoline, fireworks, guns and ammunition into the preschool of Temple Israel, a Reform synagogue in West Bloomfield, while more than 100 children were inside.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/10/16/abdul-el-sayeds-rise-has-challenged-michigans-jewish-community)
* * *
Jesse Arm is the vice president of external affairs at the Manhattan Institute, where he oversees communications, government relations, and public opinion research.
* * *
Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/in-michigan-jewish-voters-are-reconsidering-their-allegiances
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
In Michigan, Jewish Voters Are Reconsidering Their Allegiances
By Jesse Arm
Washington Post
October 16th, 2026
Communal preservation must accompany universal concern.
-
Amid concerns over rising antisemitism on the left, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel recently told her fellow Jewish Democrats that they may have to "sacrifice the comfort, safety, security and even the very future of our own people in exchange for the opportunity to save the rest of humanity."
In a bizarre inversion of ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Oct. 17 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary: * * * In Michigan, Jewish Voters Are Reconsidering Their Allegiances By Jesse Arm Washington Post October 16th, 2026 Communal preservation must accompany universal concern. - Amid concerns over rising antisemitism on the left, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel recently told her fellow Jewish Democrats that they may have to "sacrifice the comfort, safety, security and even the very future of our own people in exchange for the opportunity to save the rest of humanity." In a bizarre inversion ofthe story of Queen Esther, who risked her own life to save the Jews, Nessel invoked the biblical heroine to suggest that Jews should risk their own survival to save everyone else.
I grew up in West Bloomfield, Michigan, a center of Jewish life in the state. Many of the town's residents are declining Nessel's invitation.
It's easy to see why. In March, a Hezbollah-inspired attacker from Dearborn Heights, Michigan, rammed a truck loaded with gasoline, fireworks, guns and ammunition into the preschool of Temple Israel, a Reform synagogue in West Bloomfield, while more than 100 children were inside.
Continue reading the entire piece here at the Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/10/16/abdul-el-sayeds-rise-has-challenged-michigans-jewish-community)
* * *
Jesse Arm is the vice president of external affairs at the Manhattan Institute, where he oversees communications, government relations, and public opinion research.
* * *
Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/in-michigan-jewish-voters-are-reconsidering-their-allegiances
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Russia Deepens Role in Brazil's Nuclear Fuel Cycle
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 15, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
* * *
Russia Deepens Role in Brazil's Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Sergey Sukhankin
Executive Summary:
* Russia has expanded its nuclear cooperation with Brazil this year, increasing uranium processing contracts by 25 percent and becoming Brazil's largest uranium supplier.
* Moscow is moving beyond uranium exports toward deeper integration into Brazil's nuclear fuel cycle, including conversion, enrichment, and potentially domestic uranium extraction.
* Rosatom--Russia's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 15, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Deepens Role in Brazil's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Sergey Sukhankin Executive Summary: * Russia has expanded its nuclear cooperation with Brazil this year, increasing uranium processing contracts by 25 percent and becoming Brazil's largest uranium supplier. * Moscow is moving beyond uranium exports toward deeper integration into Brazil's nuclear fuel cycle, including conversion, enrichment, and potentially domestic uranium extraction. * Rosatom--Russia'sstate-owned nuclear energy corporation--is seeking to broaden its presence in Brazil through critical mineral projects, small modular reactors, and potential participation in nuclear power plant construction.
* Brazil's plans to expand nuclear generating capacity present new opportunities for Moscow, but financing constraints and Brasilia's pursuit of technological sovereignty could limit Russia's ambitions.
-
Russia and Brazil signed an agreement on July 31, increasing the volume of an existing contract from 2025 for Rosatom to process Brazilian uranium from the Caetite deposit in the state of Bahia (Atomnaia Energiia 2.0, July 31). In July, Brazil's uranium imports from Russia totaled $84.5 million, 172 times more than in July 2025 and the highest monthly level since 1997 (Praim, August 11). This increase makes Russia Brazil's largest uranium supplier (Biznes Zhurnal, August 11). Russia appears poised to secure a greater presence in Brazil's other rapidly developing strategic sectors, potentially including deals on new reactor technologies, regulation of marine nuclear installations, and joint projects in critical mineral extraction. In March, for example, Rosatom's Uranium One Group and Brazil's Nucleo Brasil Energia Participacoes (NBEPar) agreed to establish the Nadina Minerals joint venture to explore, extract, and process mineral resources in Brazil (Atom Media, March 25).
Russian-Brazilian nuclear energy ties are not new. The foundation was laid after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with a 1994 agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and a 2008 accord that expanded that relationship (Mirovaia Politika, January 20, 2025). In 2008, the governments signed another agreement on the peaceful use of atomic energy, but operationalization was slow-moving (TASS, accessed October 13). In 2017, cooperation between the two countries acquired a commercial character when Rosatom-owned Uranium One won an international tender to supply 400 tons of natural uranium to the Brazilian state-owned company Industrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB). At the same time, Rosatom and Eletronuclear--a Brazilian state-linked nuclear power plant (NPP) company--developed a dialogue on NPP construction, including prospects for small and medium-sized reactors. Russian and Brazilian entities also signed a memorandum on innovative nuclear technologies in 2017 (Social and Humanities Sciences, 2024). In 2021, the partnership acquired greater depth when Rosatom and Eletronuclear signed a memorandum on cooperation in the construction and maintenance of large- and small-capacity NPPs, nuclear materials management, personnel training, and nuclear medicine. In June 2021, branches of Rosatom and Brazil's National Nuclear Energy Commission signed a five-year contract for monthly supplies of the medical isotopes Lu-177 and Ac-225. Russian supplies covered around 50 percent of Brazil's demand for medical radioisotopes in 2021 and 2022 (RIA Novosti, October 29, 2022).
December 2022 marked a new shift in the Russian-Brazilian uranium partnership when Rosatom-owned TENEX (Techsnabexport) announced a contract between its subsidiary Internexco GmbH and Brazil's state-owned INB. The contract provided for meeting 100 percent of the Angra NPP's requirements for enriched uranium products in 2023-2027. Rosatom described it as the first long-term contract in its history with Brazil for the supply of enriched uranium products (Atomnaia Energiia 2.0, December 7, 2022). Crucially, the December 2022 contract was not a one-off deal, but the beginning of a series of agreements between the two countries on cooperation in this domain (Interfax, May 4, 2023). In February 2025, Rosatom announced that it won an INB tender to enrich uranium mined in Brazil (Interfax, February 27, 2025).
Russia's engagement with Brazilian nuclear energy is no longer limited to assisting Brazil with processing uranium. Russia has shifted from uranium exports to integration into Brazil's nuclear fuel cycle. Ivan Dybov, director of Rosatom Latin America, said in February 2025 that Rosatom aims to create a model of cooperation with private companies for uranium extraction in Brazil (Rosatom, February 28, 2025). For Russia, the value of such a model is higher than that of conventional exports of raw materials or processing finished products--Russian enterprises could become part of the technological chain of Brazil's nuclear fuel cycle itself. The Nadina Minerals joint venture is a corroboration of such a trajectory. The plan involves more than just trade, including geological exploration, obtaining licenses, and establishing enterprises for the extraction and processing of strategic mineral resources in Brazil (TENEX, March 25, 2026). Rosatom is also discussing lithium projects with Brazilian companies (Rosatom, April 6).
Russia is likely to try to establish a position across the entire life cycle of the Brazilian nuclear industry, and Russian sources are already beginning to link uranium cooperation to Rosatom's broader offerings. Specifically, Rosatom has described the processing of Brazilian uranium as an "important step toward deepening the partnership within Brazil's national nuclear program," while simultaneously presenting Russia's concept of a closed fuel cycle and spent nuclear fuel processing technologies (Rosatom, June 30, 2025). This implies Russia's potential advancement along the chain: extraction, conversion, enrichment, fuel, generation, and, finally, nuclear fuel management. Such advancement would mean that the relationship would cease to depend on a single uranium supply contract. The Russian government is already linking existing cooperation to the possibility of constructing further generating capacity. On May 25, Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov stated the Kremlin sees "prospects in the construction of additional Russian-designed generating units, both large and small" (Interfax, May 25). Russian industry sources have also reported Brazil's interest in Russian-designed small NPPs. In July, this issue was discussed in relation to a potential site in the state of Santa Catarina (Rosatom, July 22).
In the Russian interpretation, the intensification of nuclear cooperation with Brazil after 2025 represents a transition from an export-supply model toward deeper technological integration into Brazil's nuclear fuel cycle. Securing the contract for the conversion and enrichment of Brazilian uranium, its recent expansion, and the establishment of a joint venture for the development of the mineral resource base create the prospect of a long-term Russian presence across several stages of the energy production chain. In turn, the discussion of new large- and small-capacity nuclear power units demonstrates that Russia views uranium cooperation as part of a broader technological partnership.
Brazil's renewed nuclear ambitions create a potentially significant long-term opening for Russian nuclear cooperation. Under the Plano Nacional de Energia (PNE) 2025, Brazil envisages up to roughly 14 gigawatts of additional nuclear capacity while seeking to expand domestic uranium production and strengthen its nuclear fuel cycle (Government of Brazil, February 19). This creates demand for uranium, and for conversion, enrichment, and reactor technologies. Russia's post-2025 involvement in processing Brazilian uranium can therefore be viewed as an entry point into a potentially expanding nuclear value chain. Opportunities, however, remain contingent on Brazil translating long-term planning into financed projects and balancing foreign partnerships with its technological sovereignty.
* * *
Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and an Advisor at Gulf State Analytics (Washington, D.C.). He received his PhD in Contemporary Political and Social History from the Autonomous University of Barcelona.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-deepens-role-in-brazils-nuclear-fuel-cycle/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Russia Deepens Role in Brazil's Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Sergey Sukhankin
Executive Summary:
* Russia has expanded its nuclear cooperation with Brazil this year, increasing uranium processing contracts by 25 percent and becoming Brazil's largest uranium supplier.
* Moscow is moving beyond uranium exports toward deeper integration into Brazil's nuclear fuel cycle, including conversion, enrichment, and potentially domestic uranium extraction.
* Rosatom--Russia's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Oct. 15, 2026, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Deepens Role in Brazil's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Sergey Sukhankin Executive Summary: * Russia has expanded its nuclear cooperation with Brazil this year, increasing uranium processing contracts by 25 percent and becoming Brazil's largest uranium supplier. * Moscow is moving beyond uranium exports toward deeper integration into Brazil's nuclear fuel cycle, including conversion, enrichment, and potentially domestic uranium extraction. * Rosatom--Russia'sstate-owned nuclear energy corporation--is seeking to broaden its presence in Brazil through critical mineral projects, small modular reactors, and potential participation in nuclear power plant construction.
* Brazil's plans to expand nuclear generating capacity present new opportunities for Moscow, but financing constraints and Brasilia's pursuit of technological sovereignty could limit Russia's ambitions.
-
Russia and Brazil signed an agreement on July 31, increasing the volume of an existing contract from 2025 for Rosatom to process Brazilian uranium from the Caetite deposit in the state of Bahia (Atomnaia Energiia 2.0, July 31). In July, Brazil's uranium imports from Russia totaled $84.5 million, 172 times more than in July 2025 and the highest monthly level since 1997 (Praim, August 11). This increase makes Russia Brazil's largest uranium supplier (Biznes Zhurnal, August 11). Russia appears poised to secure a greater presence in Brazil's other rapidly developing strategic sectors, potentially including deals on new reactor technologies, regulation of marine nuclear installations, and joint projects in critical mineral extraction. In March, for example, Rosatom's Uranium One Group and Brazil's Nucleo Brasil Energia Participacoes (NBEPar) agreed to establish the Nadina Minerals joint venture to explore, extract, and process mineral resources in Brazil (Atom Media, March 25).
Russian-Brazilian nuclear energy ties are not new. The foundation was laid after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with a 1994 agreement on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and a 2008 accord that expanded that relationship (Mirovaia Politika, January 20, 2025). In 2008, the governments signed another agreement on the peaceful use of atomic energy, but operationalization was slow-moving (TASS, accessed October 13). In 2017, cooperation between the two countries acquired a commercial character when Rosatom-owned Uranium One won an international tender to supply 400 tons of natural uranium to the Brazilian state-owned company Industrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB). At the same time, Rosatom and Eletronuclear--a Brazilian state-linked nuclear power plant (NPP) company--developed a dialogue on NPP construction, including prospects for small and medium-sized reactors. Russian and Brazilian entities also signed a memorandum on innovative nuclear technologies in 2017 (Social and Humanities Sciences, 2024). In 2021, the partnership acquired greater depth when Rosatom and Eletronuclear signed a memorandum on cooperation in the construction and maintenance of large- and small-capacity NPPs, nuclear materials management, personnel training, and nuclear medicine. In June 2021, branches of Rosatom and Brazil's National Nuclear Energy Commission signed a five-year contract for monthly supplies of the medical isotopes Lu-177 and Ac-225. Russian supplies covered around 50 percent of Brazil's demand for medical radioisotopes in 2021 and 2022 (RIA Novosti, October 29, 2022).
December 2022 marked a new shift in the Russian-Brazilian uranium partnership when Rosatom-owned TENEX (Techsnabexport) announced a contract between its subsidiary Internexco GmbH and Brazil's state-owned INB. The contract provided for meeting 100 percent of the Angra NPP's requirements for enriched uranium products in 2023-2027. Rosatom described it as the first long-term contract in its history with Brazil for the supply of enriched uranium products (Atomnaia Energiia 2.0, December 7, 2022). Crucially, the December 2022 contract was not a one-off deal, but the beginning of a series of agreements between the two countries on cooperation in this domain (Interfax, May 4, 2023). In February 2025, Rosatom announced that it won an INB tender to enrich uranium mined in Brazil (Interfax, February 27, 2025).
Russia's engagement with Brazilian nuclear energy is no longer limited to assisting Brazil with processing uranium. Russia has shifted from uranium exports to integration into Brazil's nuclear fuel cycle. Ivan Dybov, director of Rosatom Latin America, said in February 2025 that Rosatom aims to create a model of cooperation with private companies for uranium extraction in Brazil (Rosatom, February 28, 2025). For Russia, the value of such a model is higher than that of conventional exports of raw materials or processing finished products--Russian enterprises could become part of the technological chain of Brazil's nuclear fuel cycle itself. The Nadina Minerals joint venture is a corroboration of such a trajectory. The plan involves more than just trade, including geological exploration, obtaining licenses, and establishing enterprises for the extraction and processing of strategic mineral resources in Brazil (TENEX, March 25, 2026). Rosatom is also discussing lithium projects with Brazilian companies (Rosatom, April 6).
Russia is likely to try to establish a position across the entire life cycle of the Brazilian nuclear industry, and Russian sources are already beginning to link uranium cooperation to Rosatom's broader offerings. Specifically, Rosatom has described the processing of Brazilian uranium as an "important step toward deepening the partnership within Brazil's national nuclear program," while simultaneously presenting Russia's concept of a closed fuel cycle and spent nuclear fuel processing technologies (Rosatom, June 30, 2025). This implies Russia's potential advancement along the chain: extraction, conversion, enrichment, fuel, generation, and, finally, nuclear fuel management. Such advancement would mean that the relationship would cease to depend on a single uranium supply contract. The Russian government is already linking existing cooperation to the possibility of constructing further generating capacity. On May 25, Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov stated the Kremlin sees "prospects in the construction of additional Russian-designed generating units, both large and small" (Interfax, May 25). Russian industry sources have also reported Brazil's interest in Russian-designed small NPPs. In July, this issue was discussed in relation to a potential site in the state of Santa Catarina (Rosatom, July 22).
In the Russian interpretation, the intensification of nuclear cooperation with Brazil after 2025 represents a transition from an export-supply model toward deeper technological integration into Brazil's nuclear fuel cycle. Securing the contract for the conversion and enrichment of Brazilian uranium, its recent expansion, and the establishment of a joint venture for the development of the mineral resource base create the prospect of a long-term Russian presence across several stages of the energy production chain. In turn, the discussion of new large- and small-capacity nuclear power units demonstrates that Russia views uranium cooperation as part of a broader technological partnership.
Brazil's renewed nuclear ambitions create a potentially significant long-term opening for Russian nuclear cooperation. Under the Plano Nacional de Energia (PNE) 2025, Brazil envisages up to roughly 14 gigawatts of additional nuclear capacity while seeking to expand domestic uranium production and strengthen its nuclear fuel cycle (Government of Brazil, February 19). This creates demand for uranium, and for conversion, enrichment, and reactor technologies. Russia's post-2025 involvement in processing Brazilian uranium can therefore be viewed as an entry point into a potentially expanding nuclear value chain. Opportunities, however, remain contingent on Brazil translating long-term planning into financed projects and balancing foreign partnerships with its technological sovereignty.
* * *
Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and an Advisor at Gulf State Analytics (Washington, D.C.). He received his PhD in Contemporary Political and Social History from the Autonomous University of Barcelona.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-deepens-role-in-brazils-nuclear-fuel-cycle/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Rubio Push on Greenland Delivers a Huge Diplomatic Win for U.S. Against China
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary to Fox News:
* * *
Oct 15, 2026
Fox News
Rubio Push on Greenland Delivers a Huge Diplomatic Win for US Against China
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
China seeks to replace the United States as the leading global superpower and key to its strategy is securing critical sea lanes. The country that can control the fate of sea lanes will have leverage over markets and the kind of system on which global trade will rely, access to limited ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary to Fox News: * * * Oct 15, 2026 Fox News Rubio Push on Greenland Delivers a Huge Diplomatic Win for US Against China Rebeccah L. Heinrichs China seeks to replace the United States as the leading global superpower and key to its strategy is securing critical sea lanes. The country that can control the fate of sea lanes will have leverage over markets and the kind of system on which global trade will rely, access to limitednatural resources and a significant ability to project power far from its shores. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has been planning and executing a diplomatic sweep from Panama to Greenland, and now Iceland, to box out China, protect its access and interests and establish an American advantage over the long term.
About 40 years ago, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, Iceland, and initiated the start of the thaw of Cold War tensions. Rubio returned to the site of the meeting where Reagan refused to surrender his vision of a space-based missile shield to the Soviets and reminded the world that the High North still matters for American power and interests.
Standing side by side with Iceland's foreign minister, Rubio noted that the location remains a "critical outpost for monitoring clandestine behavior and deterring our adversaries." When a reporter asked him if the United States may expand its military footprint there, he didn't commit to plans but emphasized that doing so would require Icelandic consent. The negotiations will continue, and, though he didn't mention Russia or China by name, those are the nations now posing acute threats to the United States and its allies.
The Reykjavik visit follows the recently secured landmark deal with the Kingdom of Denmark. This deal ensures that the United States can prevent the Chinese from establishing its habitual scheme in the Arctic. Critics of the deal have said that the negotiations between Washington and Copenhagen were "much ado about nothing," considering that China isn't (yet) in Greenland.
This misses the point. As the ice melts, Arctic shipping routes are becoming increasingly navigable, creating new sea lanes (and thus choke points) that will shape global shipping and military posturing for decades to come. The agreement gives Washington the authority to block non-NATO commercial and military presence in Greenland, a direct role in screening and accelerating foreign investment in critical sectors, overflight, missile defense access and unrestricted undersea access across Greenland's territorial waters.
Critically, the deal honors Greenland's sovereignty, a non-negotiable issue for Denmark, while remaining in force in perpetuity, regardless of if Greenland were to ever become independent. In doing so, the deal clarifies where the 1951 treaty was silent. Dismissing the deal, perhaps due to a desire to deny the Trump administration credit, also shortchanges the Danes' very real concessions and diplomatic skill. Furthermore, the deal came just in time for NATO, whose steadfast solidarity is key as Russia ramps up its campaign of terror attacks across the alliance to collapse support for Ukraine.
For years, both the Chinese and Panamanian governments denied China was taking over the Panama Canal. But the president said that the Chinese had illegally stationed soldiers to operate the canal, and a Chinese-owned company was illegally charging for passage to the disadvantage of the United States, which has paid billions to maintain the canal, of which 72% of all vessels (according to the U.S. government) are transiting to or from an American port.
For years, the U.S. was asleep at the wheel, allowing China's incremental, commercial expansion to dominate the canal. After Rubio's discussions with the Panamanians, a Panamanian court ruled that the contract to operate the container terminals at the canal's Pacific and Atlantic entrances violated the constitution, and it ended the contract.
Some have praised President Donald Trump's "Art of the Deal" for these diplomatic successes. That is, making maximalist demands, including threats of aggression against trusted allies in the hopes of getting a deal somewhere short of the opening threat, but close to it. But that is the wrong lesson to learn here.
Trump's threats to seize Greenland by force did not help the United States achieve this deal with the Danes, who have been good allies. Instead, it created panic across NATO, which undermined the administration's efforts to update and strengthen the alliance. Progress toward the deal only began once Trump stopped making threats in response to the blowback.
On Jan. 21, in the lead-up to the Davos World Economic Forum, Trump's threats contributed to a sharp decline in financial markets. Polling showed 91% of U.S. voters opposed taking Greenland by military force, and Congress was decisively against it, too.
As articulated by Rubio, the Trump administration believes the security of the United States remains linked to Europe's and that the U.S. must make sure that NATO is strong so that it can continue to be a "deterrent against hostility" which makes "our nations and our continents safer from foreign threats and more secure for our people."
The threats were a distraction; foresight and effective diplomacy are the real story. And, on that front, Rubio won for the president and the country with significant gains over the Chinese and the Russians.
Read in Fox News (https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/rubio-push-greenland-delivers-huge-diplomatic-win-us-against-china).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/rubio-push-greenland-delivers-huge-diplomatic-win-us-against-china-rebeccah-heinrichs
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Oct 15, 2026
Fox News
Rubio Push on Greenland Delivers a Huge Diplomatic Win for US Against China
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
China seeks to replace the United States as the leading global superpower and key to its strategy is securing critical sea lanes. The country that can control the fate of sea lanes will have leverage over markets and the kind of system on which global trade will rely, access to limited ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary to Fox News: * * * Oct 15, 2026 Fox News Rubio Push on Greenland Delivers a Huge Diplomatic Win for US Against China Rebeccah L. Heinrichs China seeks to replace the United States as the leading global superpower and key to its strategy is securing critical sea lanes. The country that can control the fate of sea lanes will have leverage over markets and the kind of system on which global trade will rely, access to limitednatural resources and a significant ability to project power far from its shores. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has been planning and executing a diplomatic sweep from Panama to Greenland, and now Iceland, to box out China, protect its access and interests and establish an American advantage over the long term.
About 40 years ago, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, Iceland, and initiated the start of the thaw of Cold War tensions. Rubio returned to the site of the meeting where Reagan refused to surrender his vision of a space-based missile shield to the Soviets and reminded the world that the High North still matters for American power and interests.
Standing side by side with Iceland's foreign minister, Rubio noted that the location remains a "critical outpost for monitoring clandestine behavior and deterring our adversaries." When a reporter asked him if the United States may expand its military footprint there, he didn't commit to plans but emphasized that doing so would require Icelandic consent. The negotiations will continue, and, though he didn't mention Russia or China by name, those are the nations now posing acute threats to the United States and its allies.
The Reykjavik visit follows the recently secured landmark deal with the Kingdom of Denmark. This deal ensures that the United States can prevent the Chinese from establishing its habitual scheme in the Arctic. Critics of the deal have said that the negotiations between Washington and Copenhagen were "much ado about nothing," considering that China isn't (yet) in Greenland.
This misses the point. As the ice melts, Arctic shipping routes are becoming increasingly navigable, creating new sea lanes (and thus choke points) that will shape global shipping and military posturing for decades to come. The agreement gives Washington the authority to block non-NATO commercial and military presence in Greenland, a direct role in screening and accelerating foreign investment in critical sectors, overflight, missile defense access and unrestricted undersea access across Greenland's territorial waters.
Critically, the deal honors Greenland's sovereignty, a non-negotiable issue for Denmark, while remaining in force in perpetuity, regardless of if Greenland were to ever become independent. In doing so, the deal clarifies where the 1951 treaty was silent. Dismissing the deal, perhaps due to a desire to deny the Trump administration credit, also shortchanges the Danes' very real concessions and diplomatic skill. Furthermore, the deal came just in time for NATO, whose steadfast solidarity is key as Russia ramps up its campaign of terror attacks across the alliance to collapse support for Ukraine.
For years, both the Chinese and Panamanian governments denied China was taking over the Panama Canal. But the president said that the Chinese had illegally stationed soldiers to operate the canal, and a Chinese-owned company was illegally charging for passage to the disadvantage of the United States, which has paid billions to maintain the canal, of which 72% of all vessels (according to the U.S. government) are transiting to or from an American port.
For years, the U.S. was asleep at the wheel, allowing China's incremental, commercial expansion to dominate the canal. After Rubio's discussions with the Panamanians, a Panamanian court ruled that the contract to operate the container terminals at the canal's Pacific and Atlantic entrances violated the constitution, and it ended the contract.
Some have praised President Donald Trump's "Art of the Deal" for these diplomatic successes. That is, making maximalist demands, including threats of aggression against trusted allies in the hopes of getting a deal somewhere short of the opening threat, but close to it. But that is the wrong lesson to learn here.
Trump's threats to seize Greenland by force did not help the United States achieve this deal with the Danes, who have been good allies. Instead, it created panic across NATO, which undermined the administration's efforts to update and strengthen the alliance. Progress toward the deal only began once Trump stopped making threats in response to the blowback.
On Jan. 21, in the lead-up to the Davos World Economic Forum, Trump's threats contributed to a sharp decline in financial markets. Polling showed 91% of U.S. voters opposed taking Greenland by military force, and Congress was decisively against it, too.
As articulated by Rubio, the Trump administration believes the security of the United States remains linked to Europe's and that the U.S. must make sure that NATO is strong so that it can continue to be a "deterrent against hostility" which makes "our nations and our continents safer from foreign threats and more secure for our people."
The threats were a distraction; foresight and effective diplomacy are the real story. And, on that front, Rubio won for the president and the country with significant gains over the Chinese and the Russians.
Read in Fox News (https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/rubio-push-greenland-delivers-huge-diplomatic-win-us-against-china).
* * *
Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/rubio-push-greenland-delivers-huge-diplomatic-win-us-against-china-rebeccah-heinrichs
[Category: ThinkTank]
Empire Center: Switching to Electric Home Heating Could Add Thousands to Energy Bills
ALBANY, New York, Oct. 17 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release:
* * *
Switching to Electric Home Heating Could Add Thousands to Energy Bills
October 15, 2026
ALBANY, N.Y. A new Empire Center estimate shows that heating an average home from October to March would cost approximately $790 with natural gas, compared with $1,100 with a heat pump and $3,300 with electric resistance heating. The estimates show that natural gas is significantly less expensive than electricity for residential heating.
"Replacing natural gas with electricity for home heating could ... Show Full Article ALBANY, New York, Oct. 17 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release: * * * Switching to Electric Home Heating Could Add Thousands to Energy Bills October 15, 2026 ALBANY, N.Y. A new Empire Center estimate shows that heating an average home from October to March would cost approximately $790 with natural gas, compared with $1,100 with a heat pump and $3,300 with electric resistance heating. The estimates show that natural gas is significantly less expensive than electricity for residential heating. "Replacing natural gas with electricity for home heating couldadd hundreds or even thousands of dollars to New Yorkers' energy bills," said Zilvinas Silenas, President of the Empire Center for Public Policy.
The Empire Center estimated October-to-March home-heating costs using the previous year's natural-gas and electricity prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration and heating degree days from NYSERDA. The calculation assumes that a residence requires 40 MMBtu of heat energy. It excludes the cost of purchasing and installing heat pumps or other equipment, which can range from thousands to tens of thousands of dollars.
"Ditching cheaper gas for expensive electricity makes no sense. No wonder two-thirds of New Yorkers oppose it," said Silenas. "Lawmakers and candidates need to come clean: Are they going to force home-heating electrification on New Yorkers, or are they going to drop it?"
New data in the Empire Center's Energy Data Bulletin show that New York residential natural-gas prices were 17 percent above the national average and 7 percent higher than the previous year. Earlier data showed that residential electricity prices were 63 percent above the national average and 14 percent higher than the previous year.
* * *
About the Empire Center for Public Policy
The Empire Center is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank located in Albany, New York. Our mission is to make New York a better place to live and work by promoting public policy reforms grounded in free-market principles, personal responsibility, and the ideals of effective and accountable government.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/switching-to-electric-home-heating-could-add-thousands-to-energy-bills/
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Switching to Electric Home Heating Could Add Thousands to Energy Bills
October 15, 2026
ALBANY, N.Y. A new Empire Center estimate shows that heating an average home from October to March would cost approximately $790 with natural gas, compared with $1,100 with a heat pump and $3,300 with electric resistance heating. The estimates show that natural gas is significantly less expensive than electricity for residential heating.
"Replacing natural gas with electricity for home heating could ... Show Full Article ALBANY, New York, Oct. 17 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release: * * * Switching to Electric Home Heating Could Add Thousands to Energy Bills October 15, 2026 ALBANY, N.Y. A new Empire Center estimate shows that heating an average home from October to March would cost approximately $790 with natural gas, compared with $1,100 with a heat pump and $3,300 with electric resistance heating. The estimates show that natural gas is significantly less expensive than electricity for residential heating. "Replacing natural gas with electricity for home heating couldadd hundreds or even thousands of dollars to New Yorkers' energy bills," said Zilvinas Silenas, President of the Empire Center for Public Policy.
The Empire Center estimated October-to-March home-heating costs using the previous year's natural-gas and electricity prices from the U.S. Energy Information Administration and heating degree days from NYSERDA. The calculation assumes that a residence requires 40 MMBtu of heat energy. It excludes the cost of purchasing and installing heat pumps or other equipment, which can range from thousands to tens of thousands of dollars.
"Ditching cheaper gas for expensive electricity makes no sense. No wonder two-thirds of New Yorkers oppose it," said Silenas. "Lawmakers and candidates need to come clean: Are they going to force home-heating electrification on New Yorkers, or are they going to drop it?"
New data in the Empire Center's Energy Data Bulletin show that New York residential natural-gas prices were 17 percent above the national average and 7 percent higher than the previous year. Earlier data showed that residential electricity prices were 63 percent above the national average and 14 percent higher than the previous year.
* * *
About the Empire Center for Public Policy
The Empire Center is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank located in Albany, New York. Our mission is to make New York a better place to live and work by promoting public policy reforms grounded in free-market principles, personal responsibility, and the ideals of effective and accountable government.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/switching-to-electric-home-heating-could-add-thousands-to-energy-bills/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Cambodia's Scam Center Cleanup - Is It Working?
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
Cambodia's Scam Center Cleanup: Is It Working?
Commentary by Japhet Quitzon
October 15, 2026
In the aftermath of the Thailand-Cambodia border skirmishes in July and December 2025, the scale of scam center operations in Cambodia has captured international attention. The fighting revealed major scam operations on the Thailand-Cambodia border. Originally, the Royal Thai Army attacked Cambodian casino complexes, such as the O'Smach Casino and Royal Hill Resort, claiming they housed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Cambodia's Scam Center Cleanup: Is It Working? Commentary by Japhet Quitzon October 15, 2026 In the aftermath of the Thailand-Cambodia border skirmishes in July and December 2025, the scale of scam center operations in Cambodia has captured international attention. The fighting revealed major scam operations on the Thailand-Cambodia border. Originally, the Royal Thai Army attacked Cambodian casino complexes, such as the O'Smach Casino and Royal Hill Resort, claiming they housedmilitary installations. Upon closer investigation by Thai forces, these sites were discovered to be a front for a vast complex of scam center compounds. These compounds housed expansive operations of online scammers, some coerced and some not, who defraud international victims through lucrative investment offers, romance, and even extortion.
In Southeast Asia, investments in telecommunications, IT, and business process management services have produced thousands of jobs throughout the region. However, given global economic headwinds, many college graduates, some of whom are first-generation graduates, find themselves with fewer job opportunities. Many scam centers dress up in professional, corporate trappings--complete with offices, executive structure, titles, and salaries--and paint themselves as the right choice for many emerging college graduates seeking a better life for themselves and for their families. Nonvoluntary, captive scammers, meanwhile, are victims of false promises--an online post for an English teaching, IT, factory, or modeling job could suddenly become a traumatic, captive experience in a scam compound in Cambodia.
After years of denying the existence of scam centers within its borders, Cambodia has made widely publicized efforts to rehabilitate its reputation through new anti-scam legislation, sweeping crackdowns, and international anti-scam coalition building. While these are important steps to rebuilding international reputability, these actions alone are insufficient to dislodge prominent elite networks that continue to sustain Cambodia's scam industry.
Legislative Activity and Law Enforcement
In April 2026, Cambodia passed its first-ever anti-scam legislation, the Law on Combatting Online Scams. The law establishes new criminal penalties on offenders, expands state investigative powers, and creates new mechanisms for scam operation dismantlement. Penalties are harsher if the scam operation involves violence, cruelty, detention, confinement, or human trafficking. The new legislation also criminalizes online scam operation recruitment and training. In addition, it tackles associated issues in money laundering, enabling the Cambodian government to seize property or funds and authorizing Cambodian courts to order the closure of associated bank accounts, online accounts, websites, and social media platforms.
The new legislation bolstered a nationwide law enforcement push that began in late 2025 under international scrutiny. This resulted in high-profile syndicate leaders and seemingly untouchable figures such as Prince Group's Chen Zhi being arrested and extradited. Meanwhile, the Cambodian government has shut down over 200 scam centers throughout the country.
By June 2026, Cambodia had released some 200,000 victims from scam centers. However, it has struggled in helping scam victims return home. This issue is not unique to Cambodia: Scam center survivors from across Africa, Latin America, and Asia are often left stranded without their passports or repatriation assistance. Many countries do not have adequate diplomatic representation within Cambodia that victims can turn to for help; as a result, immigration detention centers in Phnom Penh, where many survivors go to try to get home, have started to overflow. Amnesty International also noted that some of the survivors it had interviewed were not recognized as victims of human trafficking by the Cambodian government, complicating efforts to leave the country. The desperate situation faced by many survivors combined with accruing visa overstay fines from the Cambodian government have led many to return to scam centers as a last resort.
A Lack of Transparency
With large-scale crackdowns complete and thousands of victims freed, Cambodia declared victory in August 2026, claiming that scam centers had been brought under control and had no presence left in the country. Despite the scale of Cambodia's anti-scam operations, concerns remain about the veracity of its efforts. Amnesty International reports that the Cambodian government has not been transparent with its crackdown claims, citing the authorities' lack of detailed information about which sites were investigated and absence of evidence supporting claims of center closures.
It is not clear to what extent Cambodia's extensively broadcasted raids have impacted illicit activity. Outside observers maintain that scam center presence within the country is only expanding. Cyber scams in Cambodia are estimated to produce anywhere between 40 and 60 percent of the country's GDP--and given the importance of illicit industries to the economy, self-interested elites are thought to have hidden their compounds out of public view. This is corroborated by eyewitness statements gathered by Amnesty International alleging that key scam centers were given warning beforehand and relocated to smaller, more subtle locations. Indeed, Amnesty International noted that over 70 percent of the compounds it identified seemed to have been ignored by Cambodia's crackdowns.
Exiled Cambodian opposition politician Mu Sochua stressed that these law enforcement actions are only credible if Cambodia investigates all allegations "regardless of wealth, influence, or official position." The National Democracy Institute's Scam State Architecture report describes the extent to which elite impunity emerges from the country's weak political institutions and strong patronage culture. The lack of accountability faced by the Cambodian elite is made possible through weak civil society, absence of free press, and captured courts and institutions, allowing the key perpetrators of the scam economy to operate without impediment.
There have been no publicly documented Cambodian government investigations into elites that the United States has sanctioned or investigated. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Senator Kok An and 28 other Cambodian elites in April 2026 for connections to scam centers around the country. Chou Bun Eng, Cambodia's permanent vice chairperson of the National Committee for Counter Trafficking, was identified by the NDI report as an "institutional mediator" used to deflect international criticism of the scam center situation. The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs included Chou's name in a September 2026 list of foreign persons affiliated with online scam center operations in the Southeast Asian scam industry, requesting her investigation for potential sanctions. While international investigations and sanctions are not convictions, it is telling that Phnom Penh has so far taken no public action on these accusations of elite complicity in the scam economy.
Crackdowns and legislation can only go so far in repairing Cambodia's reputation, which the international community continues to view as potentially unsafe for both tourism and business. The latest in Cambodia's international image rehabilitation efforts was its two-day International Conference on Combatting Online Scams (ICCOS) 2026, held in Phnom Penh from September 23 to 24. Speaking to a crowd of officials from over 20 countries, Prime Minister Hun Manet vowed that "Cambodia will never become a safe haven for online scams," stressing that the issue is neither uniquely Cambodian nor confined to the country. Ahead of ICCOS, Cambodia touted the scale of its law enforcement operations' abilities with photos from a captured scam compound. The conference yielded an 11-point Phnom Penh Declaration to disrupt scam profits and organizations, deepen anti-scam public-private partnerships, and support trafficked victims. All Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states except Thailand, alongside the United States, China, Japan, and other key partners, committed to the declaration.
Implications for U.S.-Cambodia Cooperation
The United States has a vested interest in ensuring the effective dismantling of Cambodia's scam center industry. In 2025, the United States lost $18.2 billion to Southeast Asia-based scams alone, a number that has likely increased significantly in the last year thanks to the growing capabilities of AI. Cambodia's April 2026 Law on Combatting Online Scams is of key importance to U.S. tech companies, many of which are grappling with the issue of scam recruitment and victimization on their platforms. The law authorizes the Cambodian government to impose significant fines to maintain accountability and deter organizations from participation or facilitation in scam center schemes, and it does not exempt tech companies. "Facilitation" may be a key area of contention: Many scams originating in Cambodia and its neighbors target U.S. citizens on U.S.-owned platforms, placing additional pressure on such companies to ensure compliance. Social media, dating, and financial platforms are primary vectors for cryptocurrency, investment, and romance scams, which globally contributes to the defrauding of around $21 billion from Americans in 2025.
If the Hun Manet government is not internally motivated to push against elite actors within the country, external motivation from the United States and its partners may help move Cambodia to action. Phnom Penh seems interested in finding common ground with the Trump administration: In October 2025, it eliminated tariffs on 100 percent of U.S. products exported to Cambodia, and Hun Manet even nominated U.S. President Donald Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize for his attempted mediation in the Thailand-Cambodia conflict last year. If the Trump administration continues to see scam centers as a national priority, it may be able to take advantage of its leverage over Cambodia to pressure it to take more concrete action against the elite institutions that keep scam centers afloat. Future investment, military cooperation, and development assistance could well hinge on demanding accountability and transparency from Cambodia.
What Comes Next?
Most crucial in countering scams are trust, transparency, information sharing, and cooperation. Trust is still scarce, with the international community deeply skeptical of Cambodia's anti-scam initiatives. Information sharing and cooperation among the most affected countries in the region--Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar--are complicated by ongoing tensions between the first two and the civil war in the last.
Cambodia's attempts to clean up have yielded tangible results: More scam centers are closed and their victims freed. However, reports of underground scam centers continue. In its reforms, Cambodia has not yet addressed the most crucial problem behind the scam center industry: elite impunity. More pressing than the number of shuttered compounds and crackdowns will be Phnom Penh's resolve to dig deeper into the elite networks that sustain the industry. With renewed engagement between Washington and Phnom Penh, cooperation should center around continued transparent investigations, verification of site shutdowns, and accountability demanded from all perpetrators. Large-scale conferences, expansive crackdowns, and widely touted legal reform bear no weight if Cambodia does not look inward to hold scam-affiliated elites accountable.
* * *
Japhet Quitzon is an associate fellow in the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/cambodias-scam-center-cleanup-it-working
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
Cambodia's Scam Center Cleanup: Is It Working?
Commentary by Japhet Quitzon
October 15, 2026
In the aftermath of the Thailand-Cambodia border skirmishes in July and December 2025, the scale of scam center operations in Cambodia has captured international attention. The fighting revealed major scam operations on the Thailand-Cambodia border. Originally, the Royal Thai Army attacked Cambodian casino complexes, such as the O'Smach Casino and Royal Hill Resort, claiming they housed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * Cambodia's Scam Center Cleanup: Is It Working? Commentary by Japhet Quitzon October 15, 2026 In the aftermath of the Thailand-Cambodia border skirmishes in July and December 2025, the scale of scam center operations in Cambodia has captured international attention. The fighting revealed major scam operations on the Thailand-Cambodia border. Originally, the Royal Thai Army attacked Cambodian casino complexes, such as the O'Smach Casino and Royal Hill Resort, claiming they housedmilitary installations. Upon closer investigation by Thai forces, these sites were discovered to be a front for a vast complex of scam center compounds. These compounds housed expansive operations of online scammers, some coerced and some not, who defraud international victims through lucrative investment offers, romance, and even extortion.
In Southeast Asia, investments in telecommunications, IT, and business process management services have produced thousands of jobs throughout the region. However, given global economic headwinds, many college graduates, some of whom are first-generation graduates, find themselves with fewer job opportunities. Many scam centers dress up in professional, corporate trappings--complete with offices, executive structure, titles, and salaries--and paint themselves as the right choice for many emerging college graduates seeking a better life for themselves and for their families. Nonvoluntary, captive scammers, meanwhile, are victims of false promises--an online post for an English teaching, IT, factory, or modeling job could suddenly become a traumatic, captive experience in a scam compound in Cambodia.
After years of denying the existence of scam centers within its borders, Cambodia has made widely publicized efforts to rehabilitate its reputation through new anti-scam legislation, sweeping crackdowns, and international anti-scam coalition building. While these are important steps to rebuilding international reputability, these actions alone are insufficient to dislodge prominent elite networks that continue to sustain Cambodia's scam industry.
Legislative Activity and Law Enforcement
In April 2026, Cambodia passed its first-ever anti-scam legislation, the Law on Combatting Online Scams. The law establishes new criminal penalties on offenders, expands state investigative powers, and creates new mechanisms for scam operation dismantlement. Penalties are harsher if the scam operation involves violence, cruelty, detention, confinement, or human trafficking. The new legislation also criminalizes online scam operation recruitment and training. In addition, it tackles associated issues in money laundering, enabling the Cambodian government to seize property or funds and authorizing Cambodian courts to order the closure of associated bank accounts, online accounts, websites, and social media platforms.
The new legislation bolstered a nationwide law enforcement push that began in late 2025 under international scrutiny. This resulted in high-profile syndicate leaders and seemingly untouchable figures such as Prince Group's Chen Zhi being arrested and extradited. Meanwhile, the Cambodian government has shut down over 200 scam centers throughout the country.
By June 2026, Cambodia had released some 200,000 victims from scam centers. However, it has struggled in helping scam victims return home. This issue is not unique to Cambodia: Scam center survivors from across Africa, Latin America, and Asia are often left stranded without their passports or repatriation assistance. Many countries do not have adequate diplomatic representation within Cambodia that victims can turn to for help; as a result, immigration detention centers in Phnom Penh, where many survivors go to try to get home, have started to overflow. Amnesty International also noted that some of the survivors it had interviewed were not recognized as victims of human trafficking by the Cambodian government, complicating efforts to leave the country. The desperate situation faced by many survivors combined with accruing visa overstay fines from the Cambodian government have led many to return to scam centers as a last resort.
A Lack of Transparency
With large-scale crackdowns complete and thousands of victims freed, Cambodia declared victory in August 2026, claiming that scam centers had been brought under control and had no presence left in the country. Despite the scale of Cambodia's anti-scam operations, concerns remain about the veracity of its efforts. Amnesty International reports that the Cambodian government has not been transparent with its crackdown claims, citing the authorities' lack of detailed information about which sites were investigated and absence of evidence supporting claims of center closures.
It is not clear to what extent Cambodia's extensively broadcasted raids have impacted illicit activity. Outside observers maintain that scam center presence within the country is only expanding. Cyber scams in Cambodia are estimated to produce anywhere between 40 and 60 percent of the country's GDP--and given the importance of illicit industries to the economy, self-interested elites are thought to have hidden their compounds out of public view. This is corroborated by eyewitness statements gathered by Amnesty International alleging that key scam centers were given warning beforehand and relocated to smaller, more subtle locations. Indeed, Amnesty International noted that over 70 percent of the compounds it identified seemed to have been ignored by Cambodia's crackdowns.
Exiled Cambodian opposition politician Mu Sochua stressed that these law enforcement actions are only credible if Cambodia investigates all allegations "regardless of wealth, influence, or official position." The National Democracy Institute's Scam State Architecture report describes the extent to which elite impunity emerges from the country's weak political institutions and strong patronage culture. The lack of accountability faced by the Cambodian elite is made possible through weak civil society, absence of free press, and captured courts and institutions, allowing the key perpetrators of the scam economy to operate without impediment.
There have been no publicly documented Cambodian government investigations into elites that the United States has sanctioned or investigated. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Senator Kok An and 28 other Cambodian elites in April 2026 for connections to scam centers around the country. Chou Bun Eng, Cambodia's permanent vice chairperson of the National Committee for Counter Trafficking, was identified by the NDI report as an "institutional mediator" used to deflect international criticism of the scam center situation. The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs included Chou's name in a September 2026 list of foreign persons affiliated with online scam center operations in the Southeast Asian scam industry, requesting her investigation for potential sanctions. While international investigations and sanctions are not convictions, it is telling that Phnom Penh has so far taken no public action on these accusations of elite complicity in the scam economy.
Crackdowns and legislation can only go so far in repairing Cambodia's reputation, which the international community continues to view as potentially unsafe for both tourism and business. The latest in Cambodia's international image rehabilitation efforts was its two-day International Conference on Combatting Online Scams (ICCOS) 2026, held in Phnom Penh from September 23 to 24. Speaking to a crowd of officials from over 20 countries, Prime Minister Hun Manet vowed that "Cambodia will never become a safe haven for online scams," stressing that the issue is neither uniquely Cambodian nor confined to the country. Ahead of ICCOS, Cambodia touted the scale of its law enforcement operations' abilities with photos from a captured scam compound. The conference yielded an 11-point Phnom Penh Declaration to disrupt scam profits and organizations, deepen anti-scam public-private partnerships, and support trafficked victims. All Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states except Thailand, alongside the United States, China, Japan, and other key partners, committed to the declaration.
Implications for U.S.-Cambodia Cooperation
The United States has a vested interest in ensuring the effective dismantling of Cambodia's scam center industry. In 2025, the United States lost $18.2 billion to Southeast Asia-based scams alone, a number that has likely increased significantly in the last year thanks to the growing capabilities of AI. Cambodia's April 2026 Law on Combatting Online Scams is of key importance to U.S. tech companies, many of which are grappling with the issue of scam recruitment and victimization on their platforms. The law authorizes the Cambodian government to impose significant fines to maintain accountability and deter organizations from participation or facilitation in scam center schemes, and it does not exempt tech companies. "Facilitation" may be a key area of contention: Many scams originating in Cambodia and its neighbors target U.S. citizens on U.S.-owned platforms, placing additional pressure on such companies to ensure compliance. Social media, dating, and financial platforms are primary vectors for cryptocurrency, investment, and romance scams, which globally contributes to the defrauding of around $21 billion from Americans in 2025.
If the Hun Manet government is not internally motivated to push against elite actors within the country, external motivation from the United States and its partners may help move Cambodia to action. Phnom Penh seems interested in finding common ground with the Trump administration: In October 2025, it eliminated tariffs on 100 percent of U.S. products exported to Cambodia, and Hun Manet even nominated U.S. President Donald Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize for his attempted mediation in the Thailand-Cambodia conflict last year. If the Trump administration continues to see scam centers as a national priority, it may be able to take advantage of its leverage over Cambodia to pressure it to take more concrete action against the elite institutions that keep scam centers afloat. Future investment, military cooperation, and development assistance could well hinge on demanding accountability and transparency from Cambodia.
What Comes Next?
Most crucial in countering scams are trust, transparency, information sharing, and cooperation. Trust is still scarce, with the international community deeply skeptical of Cambodia's anti-scam initiatives. Information sharing and cooperation among the most affected countries in the region--Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar--are complicated by ongoing tensions between the first two and the civil war in the last.
Cambodia's attempts to clean up have yielded tangible results: More scam centers are closed and their victims freed. However, reports of underground scam centers continue. In its reforms, Cambodia has not yet addressed the most crucial problem behind the scam center industry: elite impunity. More pressing than the number of shuttered compounds and crackdowns will be Phnom Penh's resolve to dig deeper into the elite networks that sustain the industry. With renewed engagement between Washington and Phnom Penh, cooperation should center around continued transparent investigations, verification of site shutdowns, and accountability demanded from all perpetrators. Large-scale conferences, expansive crackdowns, and widely touted legal reform bear no weight if Cambodia does not look inward to hold scam-affiliated elites accountable.
* * *
Japhet Quitzon is an associate fellow in the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/cambodias-scam-center-cleanup-it-working
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: 'Bunker Busters' - Deep Targets, Shallow Stocks
WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary:
* * *
"Bunker Busters": Deep Targets, Shallow Stocks
Commentary by Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park
October 15, 2026
"Bunker busters" is the nickname given to a class of weapons designed to attack what the Department of Defense (DOD) calls "hard and deeply buried targets" (HDBTs). These targets are typically an adversary's most valuable assets. Although such targets have historically been relatively few, their numbers are increasing as countries and nonstate actors seek protection against ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * "Bunker Busters": Deep Targets, Shallow Stocks Commentary by Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park October 15, 2026 "Bunker busters" is the nickname given to a class of weapons designed to attack what the Department of Defense (DOD) calls "hard and deeply buried targets" (HDBTs). These targets are typically an adversary's most valuable assets. Although such targets have historically been relatively few, their numbers are increasing as countries and nonstate actors seek protection againstU.S. precision weaponry. The United States has developed a range of weapons to attack these targets, but their large numbers and increasing hardness will require a greater U.S. effort.
The U.S. bunker buster inventory today contains three types of weapons to cover different situations. All, except the B83-1 and B61-11, can use precision guidance to hit their target. The appendix has details on each of these weapons.
* Bombs: Most currently available bunker busters are air-dropped bombs (bomb live units, or BLUs) that can be fitted with laser or GPS guidance kits to be configured as guided bomb units (GBUs). Compared with regular bombs, bunker busters have a much heavier casing and smaller explosive charges.
* Standoff munitions: Variants of existing systems with enhanced penetrating capability were made during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Only the Navy's system (JSOW-C) remains in the inventory today.
* Nuclear weapons: Because there are targets that even specially designed conventional munitions cannot destroy, nuclear weapons are also an option.
[View table in the link at bottom.]
Weapons to destroy hardened targets have a long history. During World War I, the German Army had "Big Bertha," a 17 in howitzer firing 2,000 lb projectiles and designed to pry open Belgian forts. During World War II, the British developed the Grand Slam bomb to strike underground structures and German U-boat pens in France.
Militaries with nuclear weapons built underground facilities during the Cold War to conceal and protect their operations from a nuclear attack. A major change came with the advent of precision-guided conventional munitions and their subsequent widespread adoption in U.S. warfighting, as shown in Table 2. This made many more targets vulnerable, spurring the rapid growth of HDBTs as countries and nonstate actors sought to protect key military assets. The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, for example, built networks of tunnels--referred to as the "Underground Great Wall"--to protect its, until recently, limited arsenal of nuclear weapons and ensure second strike capability against other nuclear powers. Many of North Korea's nuclear and missile facilities were built underground. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other adversaries during the counterterrorism campaign also took to hiding in underground bunkers or caves.
* * *
Table 2: Precision-Guided Munitions Used in U.S. and Coalition Military Operations
* * *
As the Trump administration considers its next steps in the Iran campaign, many hardened military targets remain. Continuing Iranian missile launches appear to confirm reports that some underground missile and drone storage facilities have survived, particularly in the reported 33 underground missile bases adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.
The United States has used large numbers of 2,000 lb and 5,000 lb bunker busters to attack Iran's extensive underground nuclear facilities and other protected military infrastructure. Israel, too, has used large numbers of these U.S.-made munitions in its wars since Hamas's October 7 attack. Hamas's estimated 310 miles of tunnels--about six times the underground length of the Washington Metro--enabled its surprise attack on October 7, 2023, and helped the group survive Israeli air and ground attacks. Nevertheless, the United States retains a large inventory of 2,000 lb bunker buster munitions. Inventory stress may occur with the largest munitions (5,000 lb), which would be needed for the surviving and likely most hardened targets.
Further, existing U.S. weapons may be insufficient to reach the most hardened and deeply buried facilities. Among Iranian nuclear sites, analysts have identified Pickaxe Mountain to be even deeper underground and likely beyond the reach of even the most powerful conventional munitions, compared to other facilities at Isfahan and Natanz. Construction at Pickaxe Mountain is ongoing, so the facility may not be ready. It is nevertheless a part of Iran's nuclear program, and eliminating it would be necessary to fully meet President Trump's goal of preventing the regime from ever having a nuclear weapon.
Out of the Shadows, Into the Mainstream
What were once niche weapons for use against a limited set of targets are now in great demand. The proposed FY 2027 defense budget reflects the demand for weapons against HDBTs, requesting $429 million for conventional bunker buster weapons--up from an average of $123 million (in FY 2027 dollars) in the previous 10 fiscal years. The previous spike in FY 2019 reflects the high demand to defeat the Islamic State.
* * *
Figure 1: Procurement Spending for Conventional Bunker Busters
* * *
A limitation is that current bunker busters are nearly all bombs because of the weight needed for heavy casings and explosive power. Delivery aircraft must fly over the target, requiring at least local air superiority. That has been feasible in recent conflicts, but it will not always be achievable, for example, in a potential conflict with China. A standoff munition would be highly desirable to reduce risk to the aircraft and expand the number of targets that could be reached.
The demand for weapons against HDBTs will continue to grow because, as colleague Eliot Cohen put it, there has been a "revolution in tunneling affairs." U.S. adversaries are digging deeper and more extensively to protect themselves from U.S. precision weapons. These military facilities will be both more numerous and harder to reach than in the recent past. Thus, the United States needs bunker busters that can address two target sets. One is the large number of tunnels and other moderately difficult targets, which require volume. The other is a much smaller but more difficult target set of facilities inside mountains. Here, numbers matter less; the key capability is depth of penetration.
Appendix: Types of Bunker Busters
This appendix describes each of the munitions listed in Table 1, dividing them into three categories: bombs, standoff munitions, and nuclear weapons. It provides a broad view of U.S. capabilities and limitations.
Bombs
Bomb live units (BLUs) are free-fall ordnance that can be fitted with guidance kits to become Guided bomb units (GBUs). They are listed here by size and date of production. It is important to note the size differences. The GBU-43B, "Mother of all Bombs," is 60 times the size of the BLU-140.
* BLU-140: This 500 lb bomb retains the shape of the Mk 82 500 lb general purpose bomb but has an external casing designed for penetration. The bomb's relatively small size allows more to be loaded on aircraft, and thus more targets can be struck per sortie. It can be fitted with the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guidance system.
* BLU-109: This 2,000 lb bomb can be precisely delivered when fitted with the Paveway laser-guided system or JDAM and reportedly can break through six feet of reinforced concrete. It . Compared with the standard 2,000 lb bomb used by U.S. forces, the Mk 84, it has a thicker steel case and a smaller explosive charge (approximately 500 lb versus 945 lb). The bomb has been widely used since its introduction in the 1980s. Recent operational uses include the Israeli Air Force strike against Hassan Nasrallah's compound in Lebanon and U.S. operations during Operation Epic Fury. Nevertheless, a sizable inventory remains due to large procurement over decades.
* BLU-116/BLU-121: During the counterterrorism campaigns, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency procured variants of 2,000 lb bombs. BLU-116 had more than twice the penetration capability of the BLU-109. The Navy received 580 of them in 2005, but likely none remain in the inventory today. Also procured, though in limited numbers, was the BLU-121. It had a thermobaric warhead that could penetrate Taliban tunnels, not just collapse the entrances.
* BLU-137: Also referred to as the Advanced 2,000 lb Penetrator, or A2K, this is the latest variant of the 2,000 lb hard target penetrator bomb. It has "increased reliability and survivability" over the BLU-109 as the United States faced "increasingly hardened targets." Procurement began in FY 2018.
* BLU-113: This 5,000 lb bomb has a 650 lb explosive package and the ability to penetrate over 20 feet of concrete or 100 feet of earth. It was fitted with the Paveway laser-guided system (GBU-27), with later variants adding GPS/INS guidance (GBU-28). In planning for an air campaign against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait, deeply buried Iraqi command bunkers raised questions of whether the existing BLU-109s would be sufficient. The Air Force crash developed the GBU-28 ahead of Operation Desert Storm--the bomb body, for example, was made from an Army artillery barrel. Only two were used during the First Gulf War due to the limited inventory and rapid conclusion of the war. The BLU-122 improved the bomb's performance.
* BLU-138: Also known as Advanced 5,000 lb Penetrator, or A5K, this bomb has been procured since FY 2023. Compatible with the JDAM guidance kit, it will replace the BLU-113/122 bombs.
* GBU-57/BLU-127: Also known as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), this is a 30,000 lb bomb with a 5,700 lb explosive charge. The munition reportedly can penetrate up to 200 ft of unspecified material. Budget documents record a procurement quantity of only 8, but public reports indicate the Air Force took delivery of at least 20. MOPs have had a series of upgrades, driven in part by concerns over their effectiveness against increasingly deep and fortified targets. 14 MOPs were used in the attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz during Operation Midnight Hammer. The Trump administration subsequently reprogrammed $123 million to replenish the inventory, but it will take several years for the bombs to be delivered. The number of MOPs remaining in the U.S. inventory is estimated to be in the low single digits.
* GBU-43/B: This 21,000 lb munition bears the moniker "The Mother of all Bombs" (MOAB). The picture below shows its massive size. The bomb casing is not designed to penetrate; rather, the casing is thin, and the bomb contains a maximum amount of explosive. That explosive creates massive overpressure that can reach inside caves or, potentially, blow open doors to underground facilities. The bomb is so large that it must be dropped by a cargo plane, usually a C-130. Because of the large effects and potential for collateral damage, the MOAB has been used only once: in 2017, when President Trump ordered a strike against a Taliban cave complex in Afghanistan. The United States built about a dozen of these huge weapons. With one used operationally and perhaps two in testing, around 10 should remain.
Standoff Munitions
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, each military service developed bunker busters with standoff range by modifying existing missiles to carry penetrating warheads. The Air Force's Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) with a BLU-116-based warhead retired with other CALCMs in 2019. An Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile with a Navy reentry and penetrator system was canceled during development.
The Joint Standoff Weapon version C (JSOW-C) is the only standoff munition still in the U.S. inventory designed for use against hardened targets. It has a 500 lb British-developed penetrating warhead with two charges: an initial shaped charge to cut a passage and a following warhead to explode inside the target. It is not a missile, but rather glides, unpowered, 12-70 miles to the target. Range depends on the release altitude--more altitude provides a longer range. The inventory goal was initially set at 7,000. In FY 2015, the Navy reported a low inventory of the missile but ended procurement the following year based on "ongoing investment in related weapons." Several hundred are estimated to remain in U.S. inventory.
Nuclear Weapons
Some targets are too well fortified or deeply buried for conventional munitions to destroy. The United States developed "earth-penetrating weapons"--nuclear variants of bunker buster munitions--for particularly difficult HDBTs. Nuclear blasts generate large ground shock and overpressure effects that can more readily defeat adversary hardening than conventional munitions. The United States has three nuclear bombs, all air-delivered, available for this purpose:
B83-1 is an unguided nuclear bomb developed as a nuclear bunker buster. With a yield of 1.2 MT, it is the most powerful nuclear warhead in the current U.S. stockpile. Hundreds were manufactured, but only a handful remain. The Biden administration planned to retire the B83-1 as the B61-13 was deployed. The Trump administration has not yet stated its policy.
B61 is a family of air-dropped gravity bombs that has become the main element of the U.S. tactical nuclear stockpile. One variant, the B61-11, has earth-penetrating capability but is unguided. A later variant, the B61-13, was designed against "large area and some harder targets" with precision guidance, a hardened nose cone, and steel casing. Air Force budget materials suggest a new nuclear bunker buster may be in development.
* * *
Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Chris H. Park is a research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/bunker-busters-deep-targets-shallow-stocks
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
"Bunker Busters": Deep Targets, Shallow Stocks
Commentary by Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park
October 15, 2026
"Bunker busters" is the nickname given to a class of weapons designed to attack what the Department of Defense (DOD) calls "hard and deeply buried targets" (HDBTs). These targets are typically an adversary's most valuable assets. Although such targets have historically been relatively few, their numbers are increasing as countries and nonstate actors seek protection against ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Oct. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary: * * * "Bunker Busters": Deep Targets, Shallow Stocks Commentary by Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park October 15, 2026 "Bunker busters" is the nickname given to a class of weapons designed to attack what the Department of Defense (DOD) calls "hard and deeply buried targets" (HDBTs). These targets are typically an adversary's most valuable assets. Although such targets have historically been relatively few, their numbers are increasing as countries and nonstate actors seek protection againstU.S. precision weaponry. The United States has developed a range of weapons to attack these targets, but their large numbers and increasing hardness will require a greater U.S. effort.
The U.S. bunker buster inventory today contains three types of weapons to cover different situations. All, except the B83-1 and B61-11, can use precision guidance to hit their target. The appendix has details on each of these weapons.
* Bombs: Most currently available bunker busters are air-dropped bombs (bomb live units, or BLUs) that can be fitted with laser or GPS guidance kits to be configured as guided bomb units (GBUs). Compared with regular bombs, bunker busters have a much heavier casing and smaller explosive charges.
* Standoff munitions: Variants of existing systems with enhanced penetrating capability were made during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Only the Navy's system (JSOW-C) remains in the inventory today.
* Nuclear weapons: Because there are targets that even specially designed conventional munitions cannot destroy, nuclear weapons are also an option.
[View table in the link at bottom.]
Weapons to destroy hardened targets have a long history. During World War I, the German Army had "Big Bertha," a 17 in howitzer firing 2,000 lb projectiles and designed to pry open Belgian forts. During World War II, the British developed the Grand Slam bomb to strike underground structures and German U-boat pens in France.
Militaries with nuclear weapons built underground facilities during the Cold War to conceal and protect their operations from a nuclear attack. A major change came with the advent of precision-guided conventional munitions and their subsequent widespread adoption in U.S. warfighting, as shown in Table 2. This made many more targets vulnerable, spurring the rapid growth of HDBTs as countries and nonstate actors sought to protect key military assets. The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, for example, built networks of tunnels--referred to as the "Underground Great Wall"--to protect its, until recently, limited arsenal of nuclear weapons and ensure second strike capability against other nuclear powers. Many of North Korea's nuclear and missile facilities were built underground. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other adversaries during the counterterrorism campaign also took to hiding in underground bunkers or caves.
* * *
Table 2: Precision-Guided Munitions Used in U.S. and Coalition Military Operations
* * *
As the Trump administration considers its next steps in the Iran campaign, many hardened military targets remain. Continuing Iranian missile launches appear to confirm reports that some underground missile and drone storage facilities have survived, particularly in the reported 33 underground missile bases adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz.
The United States has used large numbers of 2,000 lb and 5,000 lb bunker busters to attack Iran's extensive underground nuclear facilities and other protected military infrastructure. Israel, too, has used large numbers of these U.S.-made munitions in its wars since Hamas's October 7 attack. Hamas's estimated 310 miles of tunnels--about six times the underground length of the Washington Metro--enabled its surprise attack on October 7, 2023, and helped the group survive Israeli air and ground attacks. Nevertheless, the United States retains a large inventory of 2,000 lb bunker buster munitions. Inventory stress may occur with the largest munitions (5,000 lb), which would be needed for the surviving and likely most hardened targets.
Further, existing U.S. weapons may be insufficient to reach the most hardened and deeply buried facilities. Among Iranian nuclear sites, analysts have identified Pickaxe Mountain to be even deeper underground and likely beyond the reach of even the most powerful conventional munitions, compared to other facilities at Isfahan and Natanz. Construction at Pickaxe Mountain is ongoing, so the facility may not be ready. It is nevertheless a part of Iran's nuclear program, and eliminating it would be necessary to fully meet President Trump's goal of preventing the regime from ever having a nuclear weapon.
Out of the Shadows, Into the Mainstream
What were once niche weapons for use against a limited set of targets are now in great demand. The proposed FY 2027 defense budget reflects the demand for weapons against HDBTs, requesting $429 million for conventional bunker buster weapons--up from an average of $123 million (in FY 2027 dollars) in the previous 10 fiscal years. The previous spike in FY 2019 reflects the high demand to defeat the Islamic State.
* * *
Figure 1: Procurement Spending for Conventional Bunker Busters
* * *
A limitation is that current bunker busters are nearly all bombs because of the weight needed for heavy casings and explosive power. Delivery aircraft must fly over the target, requiring at least local air superiority. That has been feasible in recent conflicts, but it will not always be achievable, for example, in a potential conflict with China. A standoff munition would be highly desirable to reduce risk to the aircraft and expand the number of targets that could be reached.
The demand for weapons against HDBTs will continue to grow because, as colleague Eliot Cohen put it, there has been a "revolution in tunneling affairs." U.S. adversaries are digging deeper and more extensively to protect themselves from U.S. precision weapons. These military facilities will be both more numerous and harder to reach than in the recent past. Thus, the United States needs bunker busters that can address two target sets. One is the large number of tunnels and other moderately difficult targets, which require volume. The other is a much smaller but more difficult target set of facilities inside mountains. Here, numbers matter less; the key capability is depth of penetration.
Appendix: Types of Bunker Busters
This appendix describes each of the munitions listed in Table 1, dividing them into three categories: bombs, standoff munitions, and nuclear weapons. It provides a broad view of U.S. capabilities and limitations.
Bombs
Bomb live units (BLUs) are free-fall ordnance that can be fitted with guidance kits to become Guided bomb units (GBUs). They are listed here by size and date of production. It is important to note the size differences. The GBU-43B, "Mother of all Bombs," is 60 times the size of the BLU-140.
* BLU-140: This 500 lb bomb retains the shape of the Mk 82 500 lb general purpose bomb but has an external casing designed for penetration. The bomb's relatively small size allows more to be loaded on aircraft, and thus more targets can be struck per sortie. It can be fitted with the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guidance system.
* BLU-109: This 2,000 lb bomb can be precisely delivered when fitted with the Paveway laser-guided system or JDAM and reportedly can break through six feet of reinforced concrete. It . Compared with the standard 2,000 lb bomb used by U.S. forces, the Mk 84, it has a thicker steel case and a smaller explosive charge (approximately 500 lb versus 945 lb). The bomb has been widely used since its introduction in the 1980s. Recent operational uses include the Israeli Air Force strike against Hassan Nasrallah's compound in Lebanon and U.S. operations during Operation Epic Fury. Nevertheless, a sizable inventory remains due to large procurement over decades.
* BLU-116/BLU-121: During the counterterrorism campaigns, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency procured variants of 2,000 lb bombs. BLU-116 had more than twice the penetration capability of the BLU-109. The Navy received 580 of them in 2005, but likely none remain in the inventory today. Also procured, though in limited numbers, was the BLU-121. It had a thermobaric warhead that could penetrate Taliban tunnels, not just collapse the entrances.
* BLU-137: Also referred to as the Advanced 2,000 lb Penetrator, or A2K, this is the latest variant of the 2,000 lb hard target penetrator bomb. It has "increased reliability and survivability" over the BLU-109 as the United States faced "increasingly hardened targets." Procurement began in FY 2018.
* BLU-113: This 5,000 lb bomb has a 650 lb explosive package and the ability to penetrate over 20 feet of concrete or 100 feet of earth. It was fitted with the Paveway laser-guided system (GBU-27), with later variants adding GPS/INS guidance (GBU-28). In planning for an air campaign against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait, deeply buried Iraqi command bunkers raised questions of whether the existing BLU-109s would be sufficient. The Air Force crash developed the GBU-28 ahead of Operation Desert Storm--the bomb body, for example, was made from an Army artillery barrel. Only two were used during the First Gulf War due to the limited inventory and rapid conclusion of the war. The BLU-122 improved the bomb's performance.
* BLU-138: Also known as Advanced 5,000 lb Penetrator, or A5K, this bomb has been procured since FY 2023. Compatible with the JDAM guidance kit, it will replace the BLU-113/122 bombs.
* GBU-57/BLU-127: Also known as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), this is a 30,000 lb bomb with a 5,700 lb explosive charge. The munition reportedly can penetrate up to 200 ft of unspecified material. Budget documents record a procurement quantity of only 8, but public reports indicate the Air Force took delivery of at least 20. MOPs have had a series of upgrades, driven in part by concerns over their effectiveness against increasingly deep and fortified targets. 14 MOPs were used in the attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz during Operation Midnight Hammer. The Trump administration subsequently reprogrammed $123 million to replenish the inventory, but it will take several years for the bombs to be delivered. The number of MOPs remaining in the U.S. inventory is estimated to be in the low single digits.
* GBU-43/B: This 21,000 lb munition bears the moniker "The Mother of all Bombs" (MOAB). The picture below shows its massive size. The bomb casing is not designed to penetrate; rather, the casing is thin, and the bomb contains a maximum amount of explosive. That explosive creates massive overpressure that can reach inside caves or, potentially, blow open doors to underground facilities. The bomb is so large that it must be dropped by a cargo plane, usually a C-130. Because of the large effects and potential for collateral damage, the MOAB has been used only once: in 2017, when President Trump ordered a strike against a Taliban cave complex in Afghanistan. The United States built about a dozen of these huge weapons. With one used operationally and perhaps two in testing, around 10 should remain.
Standoff Munitions
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, each military service developed bunker busters with standoff range by modifying existing missiles to carry penetrating warheads. The Air Force's Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) with a BLU-116-based warhead retired with other CALCMs in 2019. An Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile with a Navy reentry and penetrator system was canceled during development.
The Joint Standoff Weapon version C (JSOW-C) is the only standoff munition still in the U.S. inventory designed for use against hardened targets. It has a 500 lb British-developed penetrating warhead with two charges: an initial shaped charge to cut a passage and a following warhead to explode inside the target. It is not a missile, but rather glides, unpowered, 12-70 miles to the target. Range depends on the release altitude--more altitude provides a longer range. The inventory goal was initially set at 7,000. In FY 2015, the Navy reported a low inventory of the missile but ended procurement the following year based on "ongoing investment in related weapons." Several hundred are estimated to remain in U.S. inventory.
Nuclear Weapons
Some targets are too well fortified or deeply buried for conventional munitions to destroy. The United States developed "earth-penetrating weapons"--nuclear variants of bunker buster munitions--for particularly difficult HDBTs. Nuclear blasts generate large ground shock and overpressure effects that can more readily defeat adversary hardening than conventional munitions. The United States has three nuclear bombs, all air-delivered, available for this purpose:
B83-1 is an unguided nuclear bomb developed as a nuclear bunker buster. With a yield of 1.2 MT, it is the most powerful nuclear warhead in the current U.S. stockpile. Hundreds were manufactured, but only a handful remain. The Biden administration planned to retire the B83-1 as the B61-13 was deployed. The Trump administration has not yet stated its policy.
B61 is a family of air-dropped gravity bombs that has become the main element of the U.S. tactical nuclear stockpile. One variant, the B61-11, has earth-penetrating capability but is unguided. A later variant, the B61-13, was designed against "large area and some harder targets" with precision guidance, a hardened nose cone, and steel casing. Air Force budget materials suggest a new nuclear bunker buster may be in development.
* * *
Mark F. Cancian (Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, ret.) is a senior adviser with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Chris H. Park is a research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/bunker-busters-deep-targets-shallow-stocks
[Category: ThinkTank]