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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Diverse Russian Responses to U.S.-Israeli Airstrikes on Iran Reveal Elite Split
WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on March 10, 2026, by analyst Kassie Corelli in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Diverse Russian Responses to U.S.-Israeli Airstrikes on Iran Reveal Elite Split
Executive Summary:
* The varied reaction of Russian propaganda to U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against Iran reveals the existence of different elite groups, each with its own interests. Each of these groups' assessments of the airstrikes belies their priorities.
* Narratives about economic benefits for Moscow from the ongoing conflict in and around Iran ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on March 10, 2026, by analyst Kassie Corelli in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Diverse Russian Responses to U.S.-Israeli Airstrikes on Iran Reveal Elite Split Executive Summary: * The varied reaction of Russian propaganda to U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against Iran reveals the existence of different elite groups, each with its own interests. Each of these groups' assessments of the airstrikes belies their priorities. * Narratives about economic benefits for Moscow from the ongoing conflict in and around Iranprevail in the Russian information space. Russian intellectual and military elites advise learning from Iran's experience of maintaining a regime without its leader.
* There are very few articles in the Russian press that portray the death of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as a tragedy. Elite groups in Russia, through their mouthpieces, do not conceal the fact that they are more concerned with their own survival than with their desire to preserve their leader.
The Russian leadership has displayed ambivalence to U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against Iran (see EDM, March 2). Moscow is providing no material help to Tehran because of financial and military constraints caused by its war against Ukraine, an expectation that conflict in the Middle East and rising oil prices will profit Russia, and a desire to preserve the possibility of continuing negotiations with the United States over the Kremlin's war against Ukraine (see EDM, March 9). At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin may uneasily project the fate of Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei on himself, seeing his killing as a threat to any leader of an authoritarian regime (see EDM, March 2).
Russian regime-aligned media show even more contradictory stances on the conflict in and around Iran. The existence of various intra-elite groups may explain these differences. Each of these groups, through its own media outlets, emphasizes the aspects of the fighting in the Middle East that are priorities for it. These priorities and the frequency with which they appear can indicate the group's degree of influence and the attitudes prevailing within it.
Russian media representing financial pragmatists interested in economic gain have widely reported on the conflict in and around Iran, increasing the global price of oil. Independent economists point out that if the fighting continues, Moscow's petroleum and gas income will grow. They opine that this will not have a fundamental effect on the Russian economy in 2026, but could somewhat lessen pressure on government finances (Re: Russia, March 3). These commentators note that "in the initial stages, Russia can profit from the price increase and less competition from Iran" (URA.ru, March 4). They see pro-Western regime change as the main threat to Kremlin profits. Armed conflict in the region jeopardizes shipping routes in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20 percent of the world's oil passes, thereby lowering global oil supply. The most optimistic Russian experts assert that the conflict could push oil prices to $100 per barrel (MK.RU, March 1).
The second prominent elite group is the ideologically charged ultra-patriots who are exclusively pro-Iranian. Their narratives are sometimes directly opposed to those of the financial pragmatists. Commentators associated with this segment see Iran as a bastion of "traditional values," and consider its defense "sacred" (Tsargrad, March 2). They say that the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against Iran are a trap that will be catastrophic for the United States (Tsargrad, March 3). Not only do conservative sites put forward these narratives, but also the country's biggest state-operated news agency, RIA Novosti. Its writers promote a conspiracy theory that Washington attacked Iran in exchange for a payoff from Israel (RIA Novosti, March 4). This demonstrates the growth of "ultra-patriot" influence in the mainstream Russian information space.
A comparatively small segment of the information space publishes stories about how the conflict in Iran will "undermine Ukrainian air defenses" because U.S. and Israeli weapons stores will be diverted to the Middle East. They refer to stocks of air defense missiles, primarily Patriot missiles and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile defense system (Vsglyad, March 3). The group promoting this idea may be described as "military pragmatists." Independent journalists do not share their prognoses and note that Ukraine's military position is more stable than it was a year ago, and that Kyiv has largely adapted to shifting international aid flows (Re: Russia, March 2).
The fourth group of narratives, the most interesting strain, emphasizes the resilience of the Iranian system and the ability of the regime to survive even after the killing of the supreme leader. The program director of the Valdai Discussion Club, Timofey Bordachev, hopes that there is "a low probability for the collapse of state institutions in Iran" and "an absence of prospects for chaos there, regardless of the war's outcome," a fascinating conclusion if applied to Russia's authoritarian regime (Vzglyad, March 1). Russian military analysts are even franker, writing that the ability of the regime to survive without a leader is one of the most important lessons that Russia should take from events in Iran. They even detail the conditions for such survival, describing a structure in which "the entire upper echelon and more than half of the middle echelon of power are believers and true veterans of the Ukraine conflict." Veterans of Russia's war against Ukraine would "have an almost religious status," no "liberal fifth column" would exist, and all Russian elites would "share the idea of the Great Russian Mission" (Topwar.ru, March 1).
Very few commentators focus on the circumstances of the death of Khamenei or on his character (Vzglyad, March 4). Carrying this over to Russia, the picture for Putin is not particularly optimistic. Intellectual and military elites appear most worried about their own survival during conflict and less concerned about their leader. The most radical party of the elite would sooner try to preserve "belief in the mission" than a specific leader. In contrast, others are concerned solely with the financial aspect of the situation. Calls to defend authoritarian leaders following Khamenei's fate are barely visible in Russian propaganda.
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Kassie Corelli is an analyst with The Jamestown Foundation.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/diverse-russian-responses-to-u-s-israeli-airstrikes-on-iran-reveal-elite-split/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Conflict in Iran Creating New Winners and Losers Across Former Soviet Space
WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on March 10, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Conflict in Iran Creating New Winners and Losers Across Former Soviet Space
Executive Summary:
* The military conflict in Iran is having a major impact on the countries of the former Soviet space, creating new winners and losers and thereby transforming the relationships these states have with each other and with the rest of the world.
* This transformation is not because of direct attacks ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on March 10, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Conflict in Iran Creating New Winners and Losers Across Former Soviet Space Executive Summary: * The military conflict in Iran is having a major impact on the countries of the former Soviet space, creating new winners and losers and thereby transforming the relationships these states have with each other and with the rest of the world. * This transformation is not because of direct attackson these countries or other military moves but because the conflict has closed Iran as a transit corridor, boosted oil prices, and forced these countries to take sides.
* Some of these consequences will end when the conflict does, and others are likely to continue long into the future. As a result, many of the countries in the former Soviet space are currently discussing how they can continue to benefit from the conflict or mitigate their losses.
The military conflict in and around Iran is creating new winners and losers among the countries of the former Soviet space, transforming their relationships with one another and with the rest of the world (RITM Eurasia, March 3). Iran appears to have launched drone attacks on Azerbaijan's exclave of Nakhchivan (Akcent, March 5; Caliber, March 7). Tehran has also restricted the flow of food northward to some countries in the region (Stan Radar, March 5). Broader transformations stem, however, not from direct effects on these countries, but rather from the conflict closing Iran as a transit corridor, boosting oil prices, and prompting Iran's neighbors to take sides in the conflict (Cronos Central Asia; Stan Radar, March 3; Bugin.info, March 6). Some of these consequences are likely to end when the conflict does, but others may continue long into the future. As a result, many governments in the region are now discussing how to benefit from the fallout if they find themselves on the winning side, or how to reduce their losses if they have suffered from the conflict itself (Stan Radar, March 7).
The effects of the Iranian conflict on the former Soviet space have led to discussions of how the conflict will affect Russia. Discussions have focused on how the conflict is helping Russia in the short term but may have more negative consequences in the long term, and on how it is affecting Ukraine and its resistance to the Russian invasion both now and in the future. In the view of many, Russia has been a major beneficiary in at least three ways. First, the rising price of oil has helped the Kremlin refill its depleted coffers and continue its war against Ukraine (Izvestiya, March 10). Second, violence in Iran and the Straits of Hormuz has increased attention to and interest in using Russia's Northern Sea Route in the Arctic for trade between Europe and Asia (Fontanka.ru, March 1; URA.ru, March 7). Third, the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran have allowed Moscow to play up what its propagandists call the moral equivalency of what the United States and Israel are doing to what Russia is doing in Ukraine (see EDM, March 9; RIA Novosti, March 10). At the same time, other commentators have suggested that the U.S.-Israeli move and its success so far have highlighted Moscow's failure to come to Iran's aid, thus raising questions about its commitments elsewhere. They have also highlighted the West's willingness to act against a Russian partner and thus against Russia itself, as well as the already obvious weaknesses of the Russian army in the field in Ukraine (see EDM, March 2).
As far as Ukraine is concerned, many observers have suggested that the U.S. focus on Iran will lead Washington to be even less supportive of Kyiv. This focus could possibly slow arms deliveries further and leave Ukraine at risk of new and more successful Russian attacks, forcing Kyiv to accept Russian conditions for a peace accord (Svobodnaya Pressa, March 9). Such views may not prove to be true. Ukraine has provided military assistance to the U.S.-Israeli moves against Iran and thus may be in a better position to get more aid and continue to resist the Russian invasion, all the more so because Moscow has verbally and possibly more substantively supported Tehran against the United States and Israel (Novaya Gazeta Baltiya, March 6). That is certainly what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, many Ukrainians, and many of Ukraine's supporters hope for.
In Belarus, some commentators are discussing how the Iranian conflict may undermine longtime dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has bet heavily on developing cooperation with Tehran. The conflict in Iran, similar to the events in Venezuela earlier, has shown how the United States is willing to decapitate the government of a country whose leaders do not cooperate with it (Charter97, March 7). Fear of a similar fate could drive the Belarusian leader even closer into Moscow's embrace, or prompt him to change course and seek a rapprochement with the West for his own protection.
Central Asian countries have been focusing less on the loss of food supplies from Iran than on the implications of the closure of a trade corridor through Iran (Stan Radar, March 5). While some are worried that Tehran may help restart an Islamist threat to their countries, most others, especially in Kazakhstan, see this rerouting as a way to increase their power and influence in the region (Novaya Gazeta Kazakhstan, March 2; Cronos Central Asia; Stan Radar, March 3; The Times of Central Asia; ASIA-Plus, March 5).
The conflict in Iran has reshaped the external relations of all three South Caucasus states, although far less so in Armenia and Georgia than in Azerbaijan (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 1). Armenia's response has been the most restrained of the three. Yerevan has long counted on Iran's support for the maintenance of Armenia's sovereignty over the Syunik region and the Zangezur corridor, but now finds itself at odds with Tehran over the U.S.-supervised Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) (see EDM, July 29, 2025). Recently, its government has become more cautious in sustaining its ties with Iran, lest it antagonize the United States or the West (Armenian Weekly, March 5).
Georgia, where Iranian influence has been growing, has sought to limit perceptions of its associations since the Iran conflict began (see EDM, March 9). Tbilisi is possibly signaling that it may be distancing itself not only from Iran but also from Iran's supporter, Moscow./[1]
Azerbaijan, in contrast to its two South Caucasus neighbors, has been affected by the conflict in Iran far more directly. Relations between Baku and Tehran have long been strained because as much as a third of the population of Iran is Azerbaijani Turkish, and some Azerbaijanis would like to annex the region where their co-ethnics live. Tensions between the two countries have flared, and on occasion, up to and including major military maneuvers, have been a feature of life there for some time. The Azerbaijani government has sought to limit the expression of such views and earlier this year promised that it would not allow Azerbaijan to be the base for any attack on Iran (Anadolu Agency, January 30). Consequently, Baku was outraged by a drone attack on Nakhchivan apparently launched from Iranian territory, pulled its diplomats out of Tehran, and threatened retaliation after pointedly welcoming U.S. support for its hard line in response to the attack, with some Azerbaijanis even saying Baku is ready to go to war against Iran itself (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 5; Svobodanaya Pressa; The Caspian Post; Caliber, March 7 [1], [2], [3], [4]). Tehran has now said it will not attack any country in the region that does not attack Iran and denies that it had any role in the drone attack on Nakhchivan (Anadolu Agency, March 8). That may have reduced tensions, but it has not ended them.
The Iranian conflict has caused many countries in the former Soviet space to mobilize their focus on its effects, something all those concerned with that region and the place of those countries within it in the broader world need to pay the closest possible attention to.
[1] On the growth of Iranian influence in Georgia, see Hudson Institute, March 3; on the recent investigations over the report, see JAM News, March 9.
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Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/conflict-in-iran-creating-new-winners-and-losers-across-former-soviet-space/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Astana to Host Regional Ecological Summit
WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on March 10, 2026, by independent foreign affairs analyst Fuad Shahbazov in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Astana to Host Regional Ecological Summit
Executive Summary:
* Astana will hold the Regional Ecological Summit (RES) on April 22-24, aiming to reinforce Kazakhstan's regional leadership by promoting coordinated environmental policies and launching a 2026-2030 program addressing shared ecological challenges across Eurasia.
* The summit will focus on urgent regional environmental crises, particularly the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on March 10, 2026, by independent foreign affairs analyst Fuad Shahbazov in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Astana to Host Regional Ecological Summit Executive Summary: * Astana will hold the Regional Ecological Summit (RES) on April 22-24, aiming to reinforce Kazakhstan's regional leadership by promoting coordinated environmental policies and launching a 2026-2030 program addressing shared ecological challenges across Eurasia. * The summit will focus on urgent regional environmental crises, particularly thedeterioration of the Caspian and Aral seas, where declining water levels, biodiversity loss, and desertification threaten ecosystems, fisheries, navigation, and food security across multiple states.
* Kazakhstan seeks to use the RES to strengthen regional cooperation and align environmental protection with geopolitical and economic priorities, including safeguarding the Caspian Sea's role in trade corridors such as the Middle Corridor.
Kazakhstan will host the next Regional Ecological Summit (RES) in Astana, Kazakhstan, between April 22-24 (Kazakhstan Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, December 18, 2025; The Astana Times, January 16). Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced the initiative during the 78th session of the UN General Assembly in 2023 and reaffirmed it at the 80th session in 2025 (President of Kazakhstan, September 20, 2023; The Astana Times, September 24, 2025). Tokayev's initiative to host the upcoming RES aims to consolidate Kazakhstan's regional leadership by addressing environmental challenges across Central Asia and Eurasia.
Hosting such a high-level environmental event requires adopting a tangible program with relevant policy solutions, in addition to conceptual talking points. Kazakh Ecology and Natural Resources Minister Yerlan Nyssanbayev has stated that all Central Asian nations will adopt the 2026/30 program at the RES in Astana to develop joint solutions to the pressing climate and ecology issues facing the region (Qazinform, December 19, 2025).
The upcoming RES will prioritize several critical areas, with particular attention to the Aral and Caspian seas. Discussions are expected to center on joint initiatives to protect ecosystems, preserve biodiversity, manage water resources, and address the pressing environmental challenges facing both the Aral and Caspian basins (RES, accessed March 10).
The adoption of a new strategy amid existing challenges is particularly important for the landlocked Central Asian states, given the loss of the Aral Sea, the declining level of the Caspian Sea, and rapid desertification (UN Chronicle, June 12, 2017). In the last decade, the Caspian Sea has been suffering from falling water levels and biodiversity loss (Euronews, February 15).
Nearly all littoral states face growing challenges that extend well beyond national borders, as the Caspian Sea's rapid decline threatens ecosystems, navigation, fisheries, and food security from the Caucasus to Central Asia (The Times of Central Asia, October 18, 2025). According to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Ecology, since 2006, the sea's surface area has decreased by more than 31,000 square kilometers (nearly 12,000 square miles), and water levels have fallen by about 1.5 to 2 meters (4.9 to 6.5 feet) (Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia, May 26, 2025). Amid a shifting geopolitical landscape in Eurasia and a security vacuum amid Russia's war against Ukraine, the Caspian region today is not just an ecosystem, but a geopolitical nexus where the interests of littoral states and global powers converge. The littoral states agreed to sign the Tehran Convention back in 2018 to end the long-term historical dispute over the Caspian legal status, but not much action has been taken in terms of environmental collaboration (Baku Research Institute, April 6, 2021; Tehran Convention, accessed March 10).
Countries such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan recognize the strategic significance of the Caspian basin not only for its abundant natural resources but also for its role as a vital transit hub in international trade. Over the past decade, Astana has actively advanced the Middle Corridor initiative, a trade route designed to connect the landlocked heart of Eurasia with the Caucasus and onward to Europe via the Caspian Sea. While Kazakhstan stands to gain considerably from developing this multimodal corridor, it has simultaneously placed the preservation and sustainability of the Caspian Sea at the forefront of its agenda (The Astana Times, January 16).
The upcoming RES in Astana has already gained wider international support from major partners. including the Karabakh declaration at the informal Organization of Turkic States (OTS) summit in July 2024, the joint statement of the sixth consultative meeting of Central Asian Heads of State in August 2024, and the Bishkek Declaration of the 21st OTS Summit in November 2024 (OTS, July 6, November 6; RES 2026, accessed March 10). The OTS established the Turkic Green Finance Council at the 11th summit of the OTS in Bishkek in 2024, which held its inaugural meeting on September 4 during the Astana Finance Days 2025 forum. Participants gathered to discuss the development of green and sustainable finance across member states, ultimately producing a joint communique affirming their commitment to sustainable green development, climate change adaptation, and environmental protection, guided by the principles of the Turkic Green Vision, the Turkic World Vision 2040, and the OTS Strategy for 2022-2026 (The Astana Times, February 18, 2025; AIFC, September 4, 2025).
Kazakhstan is willing to mitigate environmental hazards through various strategies, particularly by boosting cross-platform collaboration. Astana knows the cost of environmental disasters, given the Aral Sea tragedy. The upcoming summit's focus on the Caspian Sea is not surprising, as it is a source of life for the natural ecosystem and an important part of interregional connection, both for trade and military means. The establishment of the 2026 RES summit enabled Astana to secure regional cooperation and interest in protecting the Caspian basin and adopt a more comprehensive strategy to address environmental issues.
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Fuad Shahbazov is an independent foreign affairs analyst. He is mainly focused on Russian foreign and military policy, and the South Caucasus.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/astana-to-host-regional-ecological-summit/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Operation Epic Fury Situation Report
WASHINGTON, March 11 (TNSxrep) -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on March 10, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Can Kasapoglu:* * *
Operation Epic Fury Situation Report | Battlefield Effects and Early Strategic Signals
Battlefield Assessment
The United States began Operation Epic Fury alongside Israel's Operation Roaring Lion on February 28. By the end of the first week, the two allies had systematically dismantled the Islamic Republic's military infrastructure and put serious ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 11 (TNSxrep) -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on March 10, 2026, by nonresident senior fellow Can Kasapoglu: * * * Operation Epic Fury Situation Report | Battlefield Effects and Early Strategic Signals Battlefield Assessment The United States began Operation Epic Fury alongside Israel's Operation Roaring Lion on February 28. By the end of the first week, the two allies had systematically dismantled the Islamic Republic's military infrastructure and put seriouspressure on Iran's long-range strike salvos. Nonetheless, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is tightening its grip on the country's political system. Gulf Arab states--and global energy markets--remain under growing stress. A systematic Iranian campaign targeting the region's desalination plants looms as the most dangerous wildcard.
Over those first seven days alone, the US military reportedly struck more than 3,000 targets across Iran. As of the tenth day of the campaign, American forces have engaged some 5,000 targets, marking a hike in operational tempo. The US military has also hit more than 50 warships overall. Washington's target set prioritized the elimination of the country's missile launch capabilities and military facilities, as well as the command nodes tied to the Revolutionary Guards' strategic weapons.
In parallel, the Israeli Air Force concentrated on degrading the Islamic Republic's air deterrent. Israeli strikes targeted 10 of Iran's 18 air bases, and cratered runways, destroyed hardened aircraft shelters, and reportedly damaged or eliminated several heavy-lift and combat aircraft.
The US military has reportedly shifted from a reliance on long-range, standoff weapons to stand-in precision-strike methods against Iranian targets. Rather than employing expensive cruise missiles and other standoff munitions with high price tags, American aircraft are now increasingly using Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), which convert unguided bombs into precision weapons guided by inertial navigation and Global Positioning System (GPS) kits.
This transition likely reflects two operational dynamics. First, earlier phases of the US and Israeli campaigns capitalized on the 12-Day War's success and heavily degraded what was left of Iran's integrated air-defense network, allowing coalition aircraft to operate closer to their targets with reduced risk. Second, the shift in weaponry reflects cost considerations. Expert writings suggest that even the first 100 hours of Operation Epic Fury cost Washington $3.7 billion. High-end standoff weapons carry substantial unit costs, while JDAM kits provide a far cheaper precision-strike option that can be used once enemy air defenses have been sufficiently suppressed. In practical terms, the US campaign appears to be moving from its initial phase of standoff attacks to a more systematic destruction of Iran's remaining critical military capabilities and defense technological and industrial base. This phase allows Washington to employ less expensive weapons while also maintaining the depth of its offensive magazine.
Israeli air operations reportedly targeted Tehran's Mehrabad Airport, a key asset long associated with logistics networks supporting the IRGC and its regional proxies. According to Israeli military statements, the strike package targeting Mehrabad focused on aircraft that the IRGC Quds Force allegedly used to transport weapons to Hezbollah and other proxy militias across the region. Satellite imagery data appears to show extensive damage across the airfield. Visual analysis also indicates that at least 17 aircraft sustained damage there, while several platforms were reportedly destroyed.
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) indicated that their air campaign also targeted facilities that supported Iran's missile production capacity in the Parchin and Shahrud areas, long associated with elements of the Islamic Republic's strategic weapons manufacturing. Israel's campaign increasingly targeted the regime's security apparatus as well. In Isfahan, the IDF's strikes hit installations charged with maintaining internal security and facilities operated by the Basij, a paramilitary militia branch within the IRGC. Facilities that Israel targeted included the headquarters of a regional corps command, an IRGC base, and a police command facility tied to the Revolutionary Guards. In other parts of Iran, Israeli forces targeted missile launch sites and rocket-engine production facilities.
In a notable escalation, the joint US-Israeli campaign began striking elements of Iran's oil infrastructure, including several fuel storage facilities and depots. This move suggests that the military-strategic planning behind the joint campaign has widened the pre-determined target sets in an effort to impose economic pressure on the Islamic Republic, while further constraining its war-sustaining capacity.
For its part, Iran continued to conduct missile and drone salvos, though at a declining combat-operations tempo. As of March 9, Iran had launched approximately 174 waves of missile and drone strikes against Israel since the outbreak of hostilities. Tehran directed most of these attacks toward central Israel, with the Tel Aviv metropolitan area absorbing more than half of incoming salvos.
Notably, the operational tempo of Iran's long-range strike campaign has declined drastically. Between February 28 and March 9, the number of Iranian strike waves targeting Israel dropped roughly fourfold. Nonetheless, open-source intelligence suggests that the IRGC is employing ballistic missiles with "shotgun-type" warhead configurations in its strikes against Israel. These munitions, which carry payloads that disperse multiple fragments or sub-munitions during the terminal phase of flight, are designed to complicate interception efforts and stress air and missile defenses.
The systems involved likely derive from the family of Khorramshahr missiles, a core component of Iran's long-range missile deterrent. The Khorramshahr lineage carries the same design philosophy as North Korea's Musudan missile, reflecting decades of technical exchange between the Iranian and North Korean weapons development programs.
Among the Gulf Arab states, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has absorbed the bulk of Iran's missile and drone strikes. As of March 9, Tehran had targeted the UAE with 1,440 drones, eight cruise missiles, and 253 ballistic missiles. As of that same date, the UAE boasts a 90 percent interception rate against Iranian drones and missiles. The UAE Ministry of Defense has uploaded videos showcasing AH-64E Apache gunships preying on Shahed drones launched by Iran, mimicking a frequent concept of employment that Ukraine uses in its counter-drone operations.
As the last edition of this report detailed, US radar architecture in the region remained a high-priority target of the Iranian campaign. Visuals circulating across social media appear to indicate the suspected locations of AN/TPY-2 radar units, the principal sensor components supporting the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defense batteries the United States has deployed throughout the region.
These reports suggest that Washington had positioned its THAAD systems in the UAE and Jordan. Imagery emerging from the UAE, which is known to operate two THAAD batteries, shows visible structural damage and scorched equipment at locations previously associated with the radar installations. This evidence indicates that Iranian salvos may have struck the deployment site. Whether the radar arrays were destroyed or only damaged, however, remains unclear at this stage.
These strikes are notable, as the AN/TPY-2 radar is a particularly high-end sensor. Operating in the X-band frequency range commonly used for missile defense, it provides extremely high-resolution tracking that allows the system to distinguish between objects traveling along ballistic trajectories and differentiate actual warheads from debris or decoys.
The radar is particularly important because it combines precision with long-range surveillance capabilities enabled by its large phased-array antenna, high transmission ability, and advanced beam-steering technology. A deployed AN/TPY-2 installation includes a large antenna array together with supporting elements such as power generators, cooling equipment, and control electronics. Although technically transportable, it is difficult to conceal. Moreover, an operating radar emits signals that an adversary's electronic sensors can detect and geolocate.
While the exact circumstances surrounding Iran's strikes against the AN/TPY-2 remain unclear, there are several plausible explanations for them. The Iranian strikes notably coincide with indications that Russia has been providing Tehran with critical data transfers regarding American force deployments across the Middle East.
The precise scale of Moscow's support for Tehran remains unclear. However, Iran's own ability to monitor American military movements appears to have been weakened following recent US and Israeli strikes against Iranian command and control architecture. In this context, targeting information from Moscow could help restore some of the Revolutionary Guard's operational capabilities.
Iran Intensifies Its Missile and Drone Campaign as Hardliners Shore Up Power
Iran's missile and drone campaign has entered a more dangerous phase as the Islamic Republic expands the scope of its CONOPS (concept of operations) to target critical infrastructure across the Gulf.
Recent Iranian strikes have reportedly targeted Kuwait International Airport, locations across Riyadh, hydrocarbon-related infrastructure in Saudi Arabia's Shaybah oil field, and high-value sites in the UAE and Bahrain. Beyond their immediate operational impact, these attacks--combined with simultaneous political developments inside Iran--suggest that the IRGC and other hardline factions are consolidating power.
Iran's strikes contradicted earlier pledges by Masoud Pezeshkian, the country's elected president, that Tehran would avoid attacking neighboring states. Prominent hawkish clerical and political figures inside Iran publicly criticized Pezeshkian for this statement. The decision to proceed with the salvos, therefore, highlights the state of play inside the Islamic Republic and underscores the dominant role the Revolutionary Guard holds in wartime decision-making.
Meanwhile, Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, the former supreme leader killed in the early stages of Operation Epic Fury, was elevated to succeed his father. The election of the younger Khamenei appears to have been a hasty decision that bypassed deliberation among many Iranian elites. Mojtaba, widely regarded as closely aligned with the IRGC and other radical factions inside the country's security apparatus, now occupies the most powerful office in the Islamic Republic's political system.
After Mojtaba Khamenei's selection as supreme leader, Iran's security establishment quickly signaled its loyalty to the new cleric. The IRGC, the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Council, the IRGC Quds Force, and other services issued statements pledging their allegiance to Mojtaba. President Pezeshkian also promptly released a statement pledging his loyalty to the Islamic Republic's leader.
Mojtaba's elevation under wartime conditions signals that the Iranian regime is oriented toward confrontation and survival rather than compromise. His rise carries a personal dimension too, as several members of Mojtaba's immediate family were reportedly killed in the US-Israeli strikes that eliminated his father.
In political systems shaped by patronage circles and personal loyalties, vendettas can reinforce extremist instincts rather than political moderation. Mojtaba's combination of personal grievance and deep institutional ties with the Revolutionary Guard will likely harden Tehran's decision-making in the coming phases of the conflict. This trend aligns with assessments in earlier editions of this report that Iran could end up a military dictatorship when current military operations cease.
Energy Markets Become a Battlespace
The economic and military logic of Iran's long-range strike strategy became clearer this week.
IRGC leaders asserted that the energy infrastructure and hydrocarbon exporting capabilities of the Islamic Republic's Gulf Arab neighbors are now key strike targets. Iranian General Ebrahim Jabari specified that regional energy sites are within Iran's operational range. Many of these facilities do not possess hardened defenses and therefore remain vulnerable to Iran's low-cost Shahed drones. Sustained attacks on these facilities would not require large missile salvos, and even limited disruption of the region's energy infrastructure could have a major strategic impact on global energy markets.
Maritime data illuminate the potential consequences of Iran's pressure strategy. Ship tracking shows a severe drop in tanker movements through the Strait of Hormuz since hostilities began. Lloyd's List Intelligence data indicates that no tankers weighing over 10,000 deadweight tons have entered the Gulf westbound since March 3.
Energy markets have reacted sharply to this new reality. On March 9, oil prices briefly exceeded $119 a barrel, levels not seen since mid-2022. (The historical peak is about $147 a barrel, reached in 2008.)
The Strait of Hormuz, the only sea passage from the Gulf to the open ocean, is central to Iran's strategy in the ongoing conflict. Roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day--one-fifth of global oil consumption--normally pass through the strait. Any attempts to bypass the strait via pipelines offer only limited relief. Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline can reroute up to 5 million barrels daily, while the UAE's line to the Gulf of Oman typically carries 1.5 million and could reach 2 million in an emergency. Together, these routes make up for only part of the normal traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. If the current disruptions to global shipping stretch into weeks, the pressure on global markets will intensify.
Political developments inside Iran are also reinforcing market anxiety. The elevation of Mojtaba Khamenei to succeed his father as supreme leader signals that radical factions remain firmly in control in the country. Overall, the conflict, and the associated risks to global energy flows, may endure rather than quickly de-escalate.
The Hydro-strategic Dimensions of the Gulf Conflict
The current conflict is exposing a critical but often ignored vulnerability that many states in the region face: water security. As Operation Epic Fury continues into its second week, Iranian drones have revealed the fragility of the region's desalination infrastructure.
Desalination plants are the backbone of efforts to supply water to the Gulf, one of the world's most arid regions. About 90 percent of Kuwait's drinking water comes from desalination, as does 86 percent of Oman's and around 70 percent of Saudi Arabia's. These critical plants convert seawater, primarily via reverse osmosis, to water that can be used for drinking, industry, tourism, and agriculture.
The region's desalination infrastructure is extensive but concentrated. Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) possess nearly half of the world's desalination capacity, yet their supply network remains highly centralized. Declassified intelligence assessments note that although hundreds of desalination plants exist across the region, more than 90 percent of the Gulf's desalinated water output comes from only a few dozen major facilities at a small number of coastal sites. Such concentration marks a geopolitical vulnerability: damage to even a few of these plants could interrupt water production for millions of people.
Operationally, these facilities are also difficult to defend. Many components essential to their functioning--pumping stations, intake systems, and filtration units--are exposed and susceptible to drone or missile strikes. Disruption of key elements within the system could halt production entirely. Moreover, if major equipment is destroyed, restoring the plants could take months, while fully reconstructing them might require years in the absence of improved contingency planning.
On March 8, Bahraini officials reported that an Iranian drone had struck a desalination plant, sparking concern that the attack might be merely the beginning of a highly attritional trend. The strike also occurred in a sensitive area near Bahrain's capital, Manama, where many US military personnel and their families reside. This area has seen repeated attacks since US and Israeli strikes on Iran began on February 28. Bahrain's Interior Ministry accused Tehran of attacking civilian facilities.
In a prolonged conflict in the Gulf, water infrastructure, not oil, may emerge as the region's most strategically sensitive resource.
Potential Exposure for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
In a notable geographic escalation of the conflict, Iran launched another ballistic missile toward Turkiye, marking the second attempt to strike the territory of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member state since the war began. The projectile was intercepted by NATO-integrated air- and missile-defense systems before it reached its intended target.
The incident highlights the Revolutionary Guards' apparent willingness to widen the battle space beyond the traditional area of operations for which US Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible. The attempted strike also indicates Iran's willingness to test the alliance's defensive architecture on its southeast flank.
Although the interception of the Iranian projectile prevented it from causing any damage, the episode underscores a growing risk that the conflict could acquire a direct NATO dimension if further attacks on Turkish territory occur.
What to Monitor?
Over the next 72 hours, policymakers should monitor the following:
* Additional Iranian strikes on desalination infrastructure across the Gulf. The recent Iranian drone attack on a Bahraini desalination plant highlights the vulnerability of water systems that sustain millions of people in the region. Repeated attacks on similar facilities would signal that the Revolutionary Guards are deliberately shifting toward targeting the hydro-strategic backbone of the Gulf Arab states.
* Renewed Iranian attempts to strike Turkiye. Any further missile activity against NATO territory would add a direct alliance dimension to the conflict and risk expanding the war beyond the CENTCOM theater into the Euro-Atlantic security space.
* The operational status of the Strait of Hormuz and the persistence of tanker disruptions. Oil prices may fluctuate in response to any prolonged disruption in Gulf shipping. But sustained prices above recent thresholds would signal that Iranian pressure on energy markets is translating into structural shocks rather than temporary volatility.
* Further consolidation of power by the Revolutionary Guards. Indicators of this development could include the marginalization of civilian leadership, the expansion of IRGC wartime authority, and continued hardline policy decisions under the new supreme leadership. In the meantime, Israel and the US may also target Iran's new supreme leader.
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At A Glance:
Can Kasapoglu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson focuses on political-military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and former Soviet regions.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/operation-epic-fury-situation-report-battlefield-effects-strategic-outcomes-can-kasapoglu
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center for Economic & Policy Research: Ecuador Suspends the Country's Largest Opposition Party
WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The Center for Economic and Policy Research issued the following news release on March 10, 2026:* * *
Ecuador Suspends the Country's Largest Opposition Party
Increased political repression takes place alongside illegal joint military strikes by US and Ecuadorian military forces, and Donald Trump's "Shield of the Americas" summit
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Acting on the request of the government-aligned Prosecutor General, an electoral judge in Ecuador on Friday ordered the nine-month suspension of the country's largest opposition party, the Citizens' Revolution (RC). The Center for Economic ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The Center for Economic and Policy Research issued the following news release on March 10, 2026: * * * Ecuador Suspends the Country's Largest Opposition Party Increased political repression takes place alongside illegal joint military strikes by US and Ecuadorian military forces, and Donald Trump's "Shield of the Americas" summit * Acting on the request of the government-aligned Prosecutor General, an electoral judge in Ecuador on Friday ordered the nine-month suspension of the country's largest opposition party, the Citizens' Revolution (RC). The Center for Economicand Policy Research (CEPR) condemns the ban, which coincides exactly with the registration timeline for candidates in the 2027 local elections -- effectively preventing the party from participating in the electoral process.
"The government of President Daniel Noboa, who is strongly backed by President Trump, is trying to accelerate the destruction of what is left of democracy in Ecuador," said CEPR Co-Director Mark Weisbrot.
In recent weeks, a series of judicial and administrative measures have been launched against the RC. Led by former president Rafael Correa, the RC is widely considered the principal opposition force in Ecuador, with the country's largest member base and territorial presence.
"Democracy has been under attack since the presidency of Lenin Moreno (2017-2021), with not only the exclusion of political parties, but with persecution by lawfare, the imprisonment or forced exile of political opponents, and Noboa's repeated assumption of 'emergency' powers and other abuses that have gutted civil liberties," CEPR Director of International Policy Alex Main said.
Noboa has expanded the use of extraordinary measures in response to the country's escalating security crisis. Nevertheless, the homicide rate has continued to rise, from 5.8 per 100,000 at the end of Correa's presidency in May 2017, to 50.6. Prolonged states of emergency, curfews, and increased military deployment have been implemented nationwide.
On the same day as the ban on the RC, the Ecuadorian and US militaries conducted joint airstrikes near the Colombian border targeting an alleged FARC dissident site. These "lethal kinetic operations," as SOUTHCOM called them, represent the culmination of Noboa's efforts since his 2023 election to deepen ties with Washington -- including attempts to reestablish a US military base in the country.
The Noboa government's current attack on electoral democracy and its violations of human rights coincides with the Trump administration's launching of an alliance of right-wing Latin American presidents who are seen as sharing his "MAGA" ideology and values. Joining Trump at this "Shield of the Americas" summit in Doral, Florida were Presidents Javier Milei of Argentina, Rodrigo Paz of Bolivia, Rodrigo Chaves of Costa Rica, Luis Abinader of the Dominican Republic, Daniel Noboa of Ecuador, Nayib Bukele of El Salvador, Irfaan Ali of Guyana, Nasry Asfura of Honduras, Jose Raul Mulino of Panama, and Santiago Pena of Paraguay. Also attending were President-Elect of Chile Jose Antonio Kast and Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar of Trinidad and Tobago.
"Although Trump has now recruited, and in some cases helped bring to power, some 13 governments in the region, 60 percent of the population of Latin America -- a solid majority -- still lives in countries governed by people who seek to preserve and expand democracy and raise the living standards of the majority and the poor," Weisbrot said. "These are Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, who combined also have 64 percent of the region's GDP.
"Trump's right-wing coalition has just 22 percent of the region's population and 25 percent of its GDP."
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A note on the current lawfare in Ecuador
Friday's decision to ban the RC stems from a case initiated by Prosecutor General Carlos Alarcon, whose appointment has been challenged as illegal. In late January, Alarcon launched a money laundering investigation alleging that the RC received campaign funds "from Venezuela" during the 2023 snap elections, but the case hinges largely on testimony from a key witness who is himself about to stand trial on child sexual abuse charges and who has reportedly received preferential treatment within the penitentiary system.
On March 4, Alarcon filed a complaint against the RC with Ecuador's Electoral Dispute Tribunal (TCE) based on the investigation. Just two days later, an electoral judge ordered the party's suspension for nine months, without giving the RC an opportunity to present a defense. In issuing the suspension, the judge did not rule on the merits of Alarcon's complaint, stating instead that the move constituted a set of "provisional" measures against the party while the money laundering case proceeds in criminal courts.
In addition, the RC mayor of Ecuador's largest city, Guayaquil, was arrested in February in a separate case initiated by Alarcon. The mayor, an outspoken critic of President Noboa, was recently transferred to a high-security prison under brutal conditions, a move that underscores the redoubled campaign of political persecution underway in Ecuador.
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Original text here: https://cepr.net/newsroom/ecuador-suspends-the-countrys-largest-opposition-party/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Issues Commentary: Political Vise - An Incomplete Model
WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The Capital Research Center posted the following commentary on March 10, 2026, by Michael Watson, research director and managing editor for InfluenceWatch:* * *
The Political Vise: An incomplete model
Longtime conservative activist John Tillman's model of the "political vise" explains part of the story of why politics and advocacy behave as they do. But what the model misses matters almost as much as what it explains.
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John Tillman has made an advocacy career as a libertarian-conservative in one of the most socialist states in the union: Illinois. He brings the experiences ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The Capital Research Center posted the following commentary on March 10, 2026, by Michael Watson, research director and managing editor for InfluenceWatch: * * * The Political Vise: An incomplete model Longtime conservative activist John Tillman's model of the "political vise" explains part of the story of why politics and advocacy behave as they do. But what the model misses matters almost as much as what it explains. * John Tillman has made an advocacy career as a libertarian-conservative in one of the most socialist states in the union: Illinois. He brings the experiencesof constant battle in that state to his new book, which is something of a memoir of his advocacy career (at least through about 2021) and a promotion for his current projects: The Political Vise: How the Radical Left Controls America and the Path to Regaining Our Liberty.
The eponymous "vise" is Tillman's model of how public policy is made and cultural change occurs. As the subtitle's inconsistency with the present federal administration and the cultural changes it has carried out suggests, the model is missing something.
The political vises
Tillman proposes the existence of three forms of political pressure, which he analogizes to a carpenter's vise. In the "traditional political vise," which Tillman argues prevailed from the founding era until the 1980s, politicians who make decisions based on expediency, fear, and principle (in that order of precedence) are squeezed by the press and the people and driven to policy outputs that shape culture and norms by organized interest groups and other "influencers." Tillman argues that since the 1980s, the dominant "vise" has been the progressive form, in which the public has been squeezed by the press and liberal politicians while influencers drive the public to conform to progressive norms or else.
Tillman also argues that a "liberty political vise" might also exist, with the media and influencers squeezing politicians who are driven by the people to make policies based on personal aspiration, opportunity, and fulfillment. One is allowed to have dreams, even after two decades in public policy work.
As a simple model of public policy development, the "traditional" vise reasonably explains (even today) why legislator X might be inclined to vote for policy Y, but it doesn't explain the playing field on which liberals and conservatives contend. The "progressive" vise is a reasonable model of "cancel culture," but here it runs into its own deficiency: Cancel culture doesn't work like it used to, suggesting the vise can break down.
When the people aren't for freedom
In the introduction to the book, Tillman asserts, "A people fully engaged will protect their freedom." It's a noble folk-libertarian sentiment.
But I fear this is wish-casting. As the Tommy Lee Jones character (Agent Kay) says in the film Men in Black, "A person is smart. People are dumb, panicky dangerous animals and you know it." Tillman writes extensively on the early COVID lockdown period, characterizing it as a case of "manufactured consensus" and the Progressive Political Vise at work.
But was it? Sure, Deborah Birx, one of the first Trump administration's COVID-lockdown advisers, essentially lied about "fifteen days to slow the spread," admitting in her memoir that she effectively immediately went about getting the lockdowns extended. But in that she didn't have to do much manipulation of anything other than the "traditional" political vise.
The people, being subject to Agent Kay's Law, wanted to be protected by the state. The press amplified that desire, and influencers like Dr. Birx and Dr. Anthony Fauci drove politicians--first and foremost President Donald Trump, as Tillman concedes--to act from expediency and fear to give the traditional political vise what it wanted.
When your people aren't for freedom
I could not help ruefully laughing when Tillman wrote this, about red-state Democratic senators who voted to oppose Brett Kavanaugh's nomination to the Supreme Court: "When the November 2018 midterms came, [Joe] Donnelly, [Heidi] Heitkamp, and [Claire] McCaskill were all ousted by Republican challengers [...] GOP activists [...] put three pro-liberty Republicans into office."
The records of now-former Sen. Mike Braun (R-IN) and Sen. Kevin Cramer (R-ND) are debatable, but the third successor Tillman suggests was "pro-liberty," statist Teamsters union stooge Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO), most assuredly is not. This illustrates another problem with Tillman's model.
Since President Trump's second term began, the right -- even the "MAGA" or populist right -- has splintered, and along lines Tillman thought divided the right from the left. He contends that "victimhood versus fulfillment" is a key split, with the left playing on victimhood to convince the public to "give the government enough power [so] it will right the wrongs that have hurt you."
But victimhood-dwelling is not a uniquely progressive-left fault. Right-wing victimhood culture likely underlies the curious rise of what some call the "woke right," especially following the horrific assassination of Turning Point USA leader Charlie Kirk in September. This faction essentially flips the classical woke "pyramid of grievances"--under which "intersectional" identities prevail over the straight white Christian male--upside-down, seeking to privilege the group wokeism sought to overthrow.
To be clear, Tillman is not one of these people. He's the exact opposite: A committed individualist and libertarian. (He asserts at multiple points that the income tax is theft if not tantamount to enslavement, which is about as libertarian as you can get without leaving this plane of existence.) But that makes it very tempting to believe that the wish that a "people fully engaged will protect their freedom" is a fact, or at least that everyone who asserts he is on one's own side is aligned with the cause of liberty. Unfortunately, that is not the case.
What are the other guys actually selling?
What ultimately causes the "political vise" model to be incomplete is its failure to reckon with the sale the progressive-liberal movement has been making to American public opinion since Teddy Roosevelt ran under its banner. From its earliest days as an electoral movement, the progressive has offered the American voter a standard product: With the voter's support, the progressive will deliver a stable, ever-improving, middle-class standard of living, and will raise the status of the voter's relevant demographic "communities" (even if the supposed communities are actually heterogeneous and divided; see the division between New York City Puerto Rican and Miami Cuban "Hispanics" for a glaring example of such heterogeneity).
This is a fundamentally appealing offer, which explains why progressive-liberals win presidential general elections roughly half the time and control major states like Big Labor's golden California, Zohran Mamdani's New York, and Tillman's Illinois. Conservatives and libertarians win when progressive-liberals fail to deliver the stable, ever-improving, middle-class standard of living. See the presidential elections of 1952, 1980, and 2024 for examples of this. They also win when the pace of social change to raise the status of certain demographic communities exceeds the public's tolerance for change or the communities themselves fracture; this explains the elections of 1968 and 2016.
Using Tillman's model, these dynamics contribute to the resolute strength of the traditional political vise and illustrate the fundamental weakness of the progressive vise, which has been effectively neutered by progressives' loss of federal power since 2025. (It also illustrates how the liberty-movement vise is a pipe-dream.)
Politics is hard, and governing is harder, as Tillman knows and acknowledges in the memoir-ish portions of the story. Sometimes you win--Tillman rightly claims his share of credit for his organizations' work supporting the Janus v. AFSCME challenge to mandatory union dues for government workers. Sometimes you lose--the left got much of what it wanted, at least for a time, out of the COVID-19 relief legislation. But both sides are ultimately playing the same game, and there's no magic approach to ensure either wins forever.
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Michael Watson
Michael is Research Director for Capital Research Center and serves as the managing editor for InfluenceWatch.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/the-political-vise-an-incomplete-model/
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to Daily Signal: No One Should Fear Violence in a House of Worship.
WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 9, 2026, by American Values Vice Chair Richard Rogers to the Daily Signal:* * *
No One Should Fear Violence in a House of Worship. Ohio Is Leading the Way.
Across the country, churches are becoming targets. When people disrupt worship and nothing happens, when there are no meaningful changes or follow through, it tells the next group of agitators they can do it again. Ohio can change that by treating intimidation inside a sanctuary like what it is: unacceptable.
"It takes an act ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 11 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on March 9, 2026, by American Values Vice Chair Richard Rogers to the Daily Signal: * * * No One Should Fear Violence in a House of Worship. Ohio Is Leading the Way. Across the country, churches are becoming targets. When people disrupt worship and nothing happens, when there are no meaningful changes or follow through, it tells the next group of agitators they can do it again. Ohio can change that by treating intimidation inside a sanctuary like what it is: unacceptable. "It takes an actof Congress" is an old American saying used when something feels nearly impossible. Unfortunately, that phrase is starting to apply to something that should never be difficult at all: ensuring peace and security inside houses of worship.
Ohio State Reps. Tex Fischer and Jonathan Newman recently introduced House Bill 662, a proposal aimed at deterring intentional disruptions of religious worship. The goal is sound and urgent. Every American should be able to worship without fear, whether in a church, synagogue, mosque, or temple.
Read full op-ed in The Daily Signal (https://www.dailysignal.com/2026/03/09/no-one-should-fear-violence-in-a-house-of-worship-ohio-is-leading-the-way/)
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Dr. Richard Rogers is from Flowery Branch, Georgia and serves AFPI as Vice Chair of American Values.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/no-one-should-fear-violence-in-a-house-of-worship-ohio-is-leading-the-way
[Category: ThinkTank]