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Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Arab News: Optics of the U.S.'s NATO Training Absence Do Not Look Good
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by senior fellow Luke Coffey to Arab News:* * *
Optics of the US's NATO Training Absence Do Not Look Good
The main phase of a large-scale NATO exercise called Steadfast Dart 2026 began last week. This exercise, billed as the alliance's largest for the year, involves more than 10,000 troops from 11 NATO nations. The focus of the military exercise is Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region, an area that ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by senior fellow Luke Coffey to Arab News: * * * Optics of the US's NATO Training Absence Do Not Look Good The main phase of a large-scale NATO exercise called Steadfast Dart 2026 began last week. This exercise, billed as the alliance's largest for the year, involves more than 10,000 troops from 11 NATO nations. The focus of the military exercise is Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region, an area thathas become more contentious since Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance.
The exercise also comes at a time when transatlantic relations have been strained over issues such as trade disputes and American calls to annex Greenland. In light of the geopolitical circumstances, there are three notable observations about this exercise that set it apart from other NATO exercises in recent years.
The first is the limited US participation in the training event. This is the first large-scale NATO training event in which there is no sizable or significant US military presence since President Barack Obama's decision to withhold full American participation in the 2013 Steadfast Jazz exercise. At the time, this was thought to be because Obama was shifting US focus away from Europe as part of the so-called pivot to Asia, meaning he showed little interest in bolstering America's role inside NATO.
Officials say the lack of US participation in this month's exercise is because policymakers want to test Europe's ability to respond to a crisis without the help of Washington. While there is probably some truth in that, it is likely that the lack of an American military role in this year's exercise is part of what has become a repeated pattern by the second Trump administration of reducing America's role in the alliance.
For example, at the last NATO defense ministerial meeting, the US defense secretary, who normally attends, did not show up and instead delegated a more junior official. There is even talk of the US relinquishing the role of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, a position it has held exclusively since the beginning of the Cold War.
The second observation is the outsized role played by Turkiye. It is the second-largest troop-contributing country after Germany, having sent more than 2,000 to the exercise. Notably, the Turkish navy's amphibious assault ship TCG Anadolu is playing a leading role in the maritime component of the exercise and has even sailed into the Baltic Sea, operating off the coast of Latvia. This marks the first time the Turkish navy has operated in the Baltic Sea at this scale.
What is most interesting is how Turkiye's participation is being framed. While Turkiye was an early member of NATO, having joined the organization in 1952, it has often been cautious about highly public participation in major training events during times of geopolitical tension. Ankara prides itself on balancing its relations between both Ukraine and Russia within the framework of its NATO obligations. While it participates in NATO operations and exercises, it often does so quietly. This time, however, even President Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly commented on Turkiye's role in the exercise on social media, signaling a willingness to highlight Ankara's contribution.
The third observation concerns geography and logistics. Many might think that the distances across Europe may not be very far compared to traveling within other continents. However, this is a misconception. Because the focus is on the Baltic Sea, countries such as Turkiye and Spain have had to travel significant distances to participate, serving as a useful test of different European countries' ability to project power in the transatlantic region.
The Turkish navy's deployment to the Baltic represents a power projection of roughly 8,000 km from its home ports, underscoring the scale of the logistical and operational effort required to sustain such a mission. The distances between Spain and the Baltic states are also vast. Going from the Iberian Peninsula to Estonia means flying troops more than 3,300 km. This also requires a significant logistical effort.
NATO's training exercises serve as an important component of the alliance's overall readiness. They offer opportunities to learn lessons and identify shortfalls so that the alliance can be better prepared in the case of war.
For example, NATO this month conducted another training event in Estonia that included a small team of Ukrainian drone operators. In a simulation, in just a matter of hours, 10 Ukrainian drone operators were able to "destroy" so many armored vehicles and troops that two battalions-worth of British and Estonian soldiers were left combat ineffective. The lesson was clear: the character of warfare is evolving rapidly and NATO must adapt. Regular training exercises give the alliance an opportunity to do just that.
Many Americans are frustrated that some European allies have not invested enough in defense. At the same time, the US needs NATO just as much as Europe needs the US. Europe is vital to the US economy, serving as America's largest source of foreign investment and its largest export market. NATO provides the security foundation that makes this economic relationship possible.
So far, the exercise has been successful and it shows that, even if the US chooses not to participate in a major way, the European members of NATO understand that they have obligations, duties and commitments to fulfill.
While the Trump administration's calls for Europe to do more without the US may have been one of the drivers behind the lack of American participation in Steadfast Dart 2026, America's absence also sends political signals, whether intended or not. In the current geopolitical environment, the optics of nonparticipation matter. And at a time when transatlantic unity is needed, the optics of America's absence do not look good.
Read in Arab News (https://www.arabnews.com/node/2634668).
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At A Glance:
Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work analyzes national security and foreign policy, with a focus on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/optics-us-nato-training-absence-do-not-look-good-luke-coffey
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities: SNAP's 'Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility' Supports Working Families and Those Saving for the Future
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following research by Dottie Rosenbaum, senior fellow and director of Federal SNAP Policy, senior director of research Joseph Llobrera, research associate Catlin Nchako, and research analyst Luis Nunez, all of the Food Assistance team:* * *
SNAP's "Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility" Supports Working Families and Those Saving for the Future
The Trump Administration is poised to issue a proposed regulation/[1] essentially eliminating SNAP's "broad-based categorical eligibility" (BBCE) policy, which 46 states have ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following research by Dottie Rosenbaum, senior fellow and director of Federal SNAP Policy, senior director of research Joseph Llobrera, research associate Catlin Nchako, and research analyst Luis Nunez, all of the Food Assistance team: * * * SNAP's "Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility" Supports Working Families and Those Saving for the Future The Trump Administration is poised to issue a proposed regulation/[1] essentially eliminating SNAP's "broad-based categorical eligibility" (BBCE) policy, which 46 states haveadopted to better support low-income working families and others, promote asset-building, minimize benefit cliffs, and improve state administration while lowering administrative costs and payment errors. (See Figure 1.)/[2]
About 6 million people will lose SNAP food assistance if BBCE is eliminated - more than 4 million of them, including 1.8 million children, because their household income exceeds SNAP's restrictive federal limits, the rest because their household assets exceed federal limits
The Administration's exact proposal is not yet public, but it would likely end SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) food assistance for approximately 6 million people, including more than 1.8 million children, based on available estimates, and reduce access to school meals and WIC for many children as a result. (See box, "Eliminating BBCE Would Cut About 6 Million People Off SNAP." See Table 1 at the end of this report for state-by-state estimates.)
BBCE has been available to states for almost 30 years. It enables them to raise their SNAP income eligibility limits somewhat so that many low-income working families who have difficulty making ends meet, such as those facing housing or child care expenses that consume a sizeable share of their income, can receive help affording adequate food. It also provides modest SNAP food assistance to many older adults and people with a disability whose net income after SNAP's deductions are taken into account is slightly above the poverty line, who otherwise would not qualify for SNAP. And it allows states to adopt less restrictive asset tests so that families, older adults, and people with a disability can have modest savings without losing SNAP./[3] (See box, "What Is Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility?")
Cuts to SNAP food assistance from eliminating BBCE would come on the heels of H.R. 1 - the harmful Republican megabill enacted in 2025 - which included the deepest SNAP cuts in history, terminating or substantially cutting food assistance for more than 4 million people, including about 1 million children. H.R. 1 also imposed a major structural change to SNAP: a cost shift to states under which the federal government will no longer ensure that people in need have access to food assistance regardless of the state they live in./[4]
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Figure 1: 46 States Use Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility
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What Is Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility?
Low-income households receiving cash assistance from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or General Assistance have long been considered automatically (or "categorically") eligible for SNAP, which means they do not separately have to pass SNAP's asset or gross income tests.
The 1996 law that replaced AFDC with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) broadened SNAP categorical eligibility because of the flexibility it gave states to offer non-cash benefits funded under the TANF block grant, such as child care assistance or employment-support services. This policy is known as "broad-based categorical eligibility" (BBCE) to distinguish it from traditional categorical eligibility. States using BBCE have elected to offer a TANF-funded benefit or service to a large segment of SNAP applicants as a way to lift SNAP income and/or asset tests and allow more low-income households to qualify for SNAP while simplifying SNAP administration. Other SNAP eligibility and benefit rules continue to apply.a
For categorically eligible households, states still must review fully each household's income and other circumstances to determine its SNAP benefit. (BBCE does not give the state any flexibility on the benefit amounts for which a household is eligible.) And, like all SNAP households, categorically eligible households must complete a SNAP application, have an interview with a state official, document their financial and other circumstances, report changes in their circumstances, and regularly reapply for SNAP.
BBCE does not cause substantial SNAP benefits to go to non-needy families because households can only qualify for a sizable SNAP benefit if they have high expenses that leave them with little income available for food. Only about 1 percent of SNAP benefits went to households with monthly disposable incomes (net income after deducting certain expenses) above the federal poverty line in 2023.
By providing a TANF-funded benefit with a less restrictive asset or income limit to many or all households that apply for SNAP, a state can:
* Raise SNAP's gross and net income limits. Regular federal SNAP rules require families with no elderly or disabled members to have gross income below 130 percent of the poverty line and all households to have net income below the poverty line.b BBCE lets states import a higher gross income limit (up to 200 percent of poverty) and eliminate or raise the net income limit based on the rules for a TANF-funded benefit.
* Lift the asset test. BBCE lets states align their SNAP asset test with their TANF-funded programs to determine the amount of financial resources - and/or what vehicle - a household may own and remain eligible. Under regular federal SNAP rules, countable assets cannot exceed $3,000 for most households and $4,500 for households with members who are elderly or have a disability, and vehicles count toward the asset test to the extent their resale value exceeds $4,650.c
* Improve low-income children's access to free school meals, Summer EBT, and WIC. Children in households that receive SNAP are automatically eligible for free school meals and Summer EBT without having to complete a separate application. Children in households that receive SNAP are also automatically income eligible for WIC. Without BBCE, children whose families lose SNAP when their incomes or assets rise above the federal program thresholds also would lose this automatic link to free school meals and Summer EBT and streamlined access to WIC.
a For more details, see Randy Alison Aussenberg and Gene Falk, "The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Categorical Eligibility," Congressional Research Service, updated February 25, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R42054.
b Gross income is total income before deductions SNAP allows for certain expenses, such as high housing and utility costs and child care and medical expenses. The SNAP benefit formula deducts these costs because these amounts are not available to the household to cover the cost of food. Net income is the income after these expenses are deducted. For detail on the SNAP benefit formula, including deductions, see CBPP, "A Quick Guide to SNAP Eligibility and Benefits," updated October 3, 2025, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/a-quick-guide-to-snap-eligibility-and-benefits.
c Under BBCE, states may lift the asset test for households with gross income up to 200 percent of the federal poverty level. Above that income limit federal asset rules apply. Countable income for SNAP includes unearned income such as interest and dividends.
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Figure 2: Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility Helps SNAP Serve More Working Families and Others, Reduces Red Tape
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The people losing access to food assistance from SNAP, school meals, and WIC would mainly be working families, older adults, and people with disabilities. In other words, the change would primarily harm groups that federal and state policymakers from across the political spectrum have long sought to help: people who work but are living near poverty; older adults and people with disabilities with low, fixed incomes; and people trying to build modest savings in order to become more economically independent. (See Figure 2.)
BBCE is highly effective. It:
* Helps working families by eliminating a "benefit cliff" as their earnings rise. SNAP supports work in part by phasing benefits down gradually - by only 24 to 36 cents for each dollar of increased earnings. But without BBCE, a family can lose substantial SNAP benefits if it has a small earnings increase that raises its gross income over SNAP's federal eligibility threshold (130 percent of the federal poverty line, or $2,888 per month for a family of three in fiscal year 2026)./[5] BBCE allows states to lift this threshold and phase benefits out more gradually, which lets households close to 130 percent of the federal poverty line take modestly higher-paying work and still benefit from SNAP.
About 3.5 million people, or some three-quarters of the individuals helped in 2023 by the higher income limits afforded by BBCE, were in families with earnings - mostly families with children - and 90 percent of the SNAP benefits resulting from the higher income limits went to these families. Their average household SNAP benefit was about $150 per month.
* Allows some older adults and people with disabilities to qualify for a modest SNAP benefit. Under SNAP's regular federal rules, the gross income limit of 130 percent of the federal poverty line does not apply to households with members who are age 60 or older or receive disability benefits such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI). But these households (like all other households) must have net income that is, income after deductions for expenses such as shelter or medical costs - below the poverty line.
Most states that have adopted BBCE allow households that have net income above the poverty line to qualify for a modest SNAP benefit. In 2023, some 1.4 million people in households with older adults or people with a disability qualified for benefits averaging about $35 a month as a result of BBCE.
* Lets low-income households save for the future. Modest assets enable low-income families to avoid debt, weather unexpected financial disruptions, and better prepare to support themselves in retirement. Under regular federal SNAP rules, countable assets cannot exceed $3,000 for most households ($4,500 for households with members who are age 60 or older or have a disability); BBCE lets states increase or eliminate those limits. Low-income households in states that have used the policy to raise asset limits are likelier to have a bank account and have at least $500 in it, an Urban Institute study found./[6]
* Simplifies SNAP administration. BBCE reduces the complexity of the SNAP application process because documenting the modest assets of every SNAP applicant household - few of whom exceed the program's asset limits - is burdensome for both states and households. BBCE also lowers "churn," which occurs when households stop participating in SNAP (for procedural reasons or because they briefly become ineligible) and then reapply within a short period. Churn creates added work for state workers and benefit gaps for SNAP households.
* Lowers SNAP error rates. Though few households that participate in SNAP have significant savings, when states fail to accurately account for a household's assets or when savings rise above the asset limit over time, even by a small amount, that can lead to payment errors under SNAP's Quality Control system. Under H.R. 1, states will soon be required to pay a portion of SNAP food benefit costs based on their error rate, a measure of how much states over- or underpaid households receiving SNAP, primarily due to administrative mistakes. Because the share of benefits a state must pay increases if the state's error rate exceeds certain thresholds, even a small increase in the error rate could trigger a large increase in mandated state costs. Among states that did not use BBCE to lift the asset test in 2023, errors related to the asset test added about 1 percentage point, on average, to the states' error rates enough to push many states to a higher cost-share category./[7]
Moreover, BBCE does not contribute substantially to SNAP costs. In its 2019 proposed rule, the Administration estimated that about 4 percent of SNAP program costs were due to BBCE overall./[8] By 2023 the income-limit component of BBCE accounted for about 3.2 percent of benefit costs. We do not have updated estimates of the impact of the asset-limit component of BBCE.
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Eliminating BBCE Would Cut About 6 Million People Off SNAP
While the exact policy that the Administration will propose is not yet known, we estimate that about 6 million people would likely have their SNAP benefits taken away if the rule is finalized, based on CBPP analysis of available public data and prior U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates.
* The first Trump Administration proposed a similar regulation to limit BBCE in 2019 and estimated, based on SNAP data from 2017, that it would terminate SNAP eligibility for more than 3 million individuals. Slightly more than half of those cut from SNAP would no longer meet eligibility requirements because their income exceeded the program's federal income limits; the rest would be cut because their assets exceeded the program's federal asset limits.a
* More recent data show that because additional states have since adopted the policy (and due to other factors), more than 4 million people, including 1.8 million children, participated in SNAP in 2023 who would not have qualified without BBCE because their household's income exceeded SNAP's gross income limit of 130 percent of the poverty level and/or SNAP's net income limit of 100 percent of poverty, based on SNAP household characteristics data for that year.b Similar data are not available on the number of people who would lose SNAP because their assets exceeded program limits, but in its 2019 proposed rule and subsequent documents, USDA has estimated that figure to be roughly 1.5 to 2 million.c Thus, we estimate about 6 million people would lose SNAP from lower income and asset limits if the forthcoming regulation goes into effect.
* The first Trump Administration estimated that under its proposal, about 1 million children could lose an automatic link to free school meals because they would no longer receive SNAP. (Similarly, our updated analysis finds that 1.3 million children age 5-17 were participating in SNAP in 2023 because of the higher income limits under BBCE.) USDA estimated that 45 percent of the children who lost SNAP would have still qualified for free meals and another 51 percent would have qualified for reduced-price meals, but they would likely have to file an application, which not all would do. As a result, some children would lose free or reduced-price school meals altogether.
Children cut from SNAP would also lose the automatic link to Summer EBT, which provides grocery benefits in the summer when schools are closed to children approved to receive free or reduced-price meals. (The program did not yet exist in 2019.) Children's loss of SNAP benefits also would reduce schools' eligibility for and reimbursements under the Community Eligibility Provision, an option that allows schools that serve large numbers of children in low-income families to provide meals at no charge to all students.d
* Participation in SNAP or Medicaid similarly provides streamlined (or "adjunctive") eligibility for WIC, the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children. Our analysis suggests that about half a million children under age 5 would lose that automatic link under the anticipated proposed rule, though many could qualify for WIC through participation in Medicaid or could apply and document income.
a USDA, "Revision of Categorical Eligibility in SNAP Regulatory Impact Analysis," July 24, 2019, https://www.regulations.gov/document/FNS-2018-0037-0002.
b CBPP analysis of 2023 SNAP Quality Control household characteristics data.
c See, for example, USDA's estimates for 2022: USDA, Food and Nutrition Service, "Trends in Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Participation Rates: Fiscal Year 2020 and Fiscal Year 2022," October 2024, p. 54.
d USDA, "Revision of Categorical Eligibility in SNAP - Informational Analysis," October, 15, 2019, https://www.regulations.gov/document/FNS-2018-0037-16046.
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BBCE Helps Working Families Afford Adequate Food, Eliminates Benefit Cliff
SNAP supports work.[9] The large majority of SNAP participants who can work, do work. Fully 91 percent of households that reported receiving SNAP at some point in 2024, included a non-disabled working-age adult, and included minor children had earnings in that year, based on analysis of 2024 American Community Survey data.[10]
Some policymakers argue that because SNAP benefits fall when participants' earnings rise, workers might be better off financially by avoiding employment gains that could put their benefits at risk. In reality, however, SNAP's benefit structure rewards earnings over unearned income, incentivizing participants to work and to seek greater income through higher wages or more hours. SNAP's earned income deduction disregards 20 percent of participants' earned income when calculating their income. Also, benefits phase out only gradually as income rises: benefits are reduced by 24 to 36 cents per additional dollar of earnings.[11] (See Figure 3.) As a result, the vast majority of SNAP workers will see an increase in their total income - that is, earnings plus SNAP - when their earnings increase.
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FIGURE 3: SNAP Benefits Gradually Phase Out as Earnings Rise
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While one aspect of SNAP can create a benefit cliff, in which a worker may not be better off financially from increasing their earnings, BBCE helps address this problem. The cliff occurs for working families whose income is close to the gross income limit (130 percent of poverty) and who have high expenses - including housing and child care - that absorb a large share of their income. Families with large deductible expenses have less disposable income from other sources with which to purchase food, so they receive higher SNAP benefits. As a result, they have more to lose from becoming ineligible for food assistance if a modest increase in earnings pushes them above the federal gross income limit. If their earnings rise by less than their SNAP benefit falls, working more or at a higher wage leaves them worse off overall.
BBCE allows states to lift the gross income limit and provide SNAP benefits to these working families by smoothing their benefit phase-out. (See Figure 4.) This ensures families' total resources (earnings plus SNAP benefits) don't decrease if their earnings increase.
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Figure 4: SNAP's Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility Smooths Benefit Phase-Out
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Consider, for example, a single mother with two children working full time at $16 an hour; her income is about 125 percent of the poverty level and she receives about $302 a month from SNAP, making up about 11 percent of her total monthly income./[12] If her hourly wage rises by just 70 cents (or $121 a month), lifting her slightly above 130 percent of poverty, she loses her $302 a month in SNAP benefits, leaving her family about $180 a month worse off. But with BBCE, a 70-cent raise would reduce her SNAP benefit by only $44 per month (to about $258), leaving the family $78 per month better off due to her wage increase. (See Figure 5.)
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FIGURE 5: SNAP's Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility Encourages Work
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Thus, BBCE helps households close to the income threshold accept modestly higher-paying work while staying connected to SNAP.
Thirty-eight states currently use BBCE to provide SNAP to working families with income exceeding federal income limits. In an average month in 2023, approximately 3.5 million low-income individuals in families with earnings received food assistance as a result of the flexibility under BBCE to ease SNAP's income limits. The average household with earnings helped by BBCE received about $150 a month in SNAP benefits, or about $60 per person.
The SNAP benefits made available through the higher income limits primarily go to:
* Working families. More than 90 percent of the benefits provided to low-income households that qualify for SNAP because their state uses a higher income limit go to working families; 80 percent of the resulting benefits go to working families with children./[13]
* Households with high expenses. Three-quarters of the resulting benefits go to households whose rent or mortgage and utility costs exceed half of their net income.
* Households only modestly above the poverty line. Nearly 60 percent of the benefits go to households with gross income between 131 percent and 150 percent of the poverty line; more than 80 percent go to households with gross income below 170 percent of poverty./[14]
Improving Children's Access to Other Food Assistance
BBCE has an important additional benefit. Children in households that receive SNAP because of BBCE also can receive free lunches and breakfasts at school and summer grocery benefits without completing an additional application, because children in SNAP households are directly certified to receive free school meals and Summer EBT.
About 1.3 million children ages 5-17 participated in SNAP in 2023 because of the higher income limits under BBCE and would likely lose automatic eligibility for free school meals and Summer EBT under the Trump Administration's anticipated proposed rule.[15] While USDA estimated in 2019 that 45 percent of children losing automatic SNAP eligibility under the first Trump Administration proposal would still have qualified for free meals and another 51 percent would have qualified for reduced-price meals, they would likely have to file an application, which not all would do. As a result, some children would lose free or reduced-price school meals and Summer EBT altogether./[16]
Children's loss of access to SNAP also negatively impacts schools' eligibility for and reimbursement under the Community Eligibility Provision, an option that allows schools that serve large numbers of children in low-income families to provide meals at no charge to all students. Community eligibility has health and educational benefits for students, reduces their families' spending on groceries, and simplifies administration of the school meal programs./[17]
Participation in SNAP or Medicaid similarly provides streamlined (or "adjunctive") eligibility for WIC. Our analysis suggests that about half a million children under age 5 would lose that automatic link if BBCE were limited. Though many could qualify for WIC through participation in Medicaid or could apply and document income, not all would do so.
BBCE Helps Some Older Adults and People with Disabilities Qualify for a Modest SNAP Benefit
Under SNAP's regular federal rules, the gross income limit of 130 percent of the federal poverty line does not apply to households with members who are age 60 or older or receive disability benefits such as SSI. But these households (like all other households) must have net income - that is, income after deductions for expenses such as shelter or medical costs - below the poverty line.
However, most states that have adopted BBCE allow households, including those with older adults or people with a disability, who have net income above the poverty line to qualify for a modest SNAP benefit. In 2023 some 1.4 million people in households with older adults or people with a disability qualified for benefits averaging about $35 a month as a result of BBCE. Households with income over the net income limit generally qualify for very low benefits because benefits phase down as net income rises; many of the households helped by lifting the net income limit have one or two members and qualify for SNAP's minimum benefit, currently $24 a month in most states./[18]
About 30 percent of the people receiving SNAP because of the income component of BBCE, and about 15 percent of the total amount of benefits from that aspect of BBCE, go to households with older adults or people with disabilities. About two-thirds of such households with net income over 100 percent of the poverty level have net income between 100 and 130 percent of poverty.
As noted, such households must undergo the same certification process as all other SNAP households (though most states do not require them to reapply as often). They must submit an application, participate in an eligibility interview in person or over the telephone, and provide documentation of their income and other circumstances all for a SNAP benefit of sometimes less than $1 a day.
BBCE Lets Families, Seniors, People With Disabilities Save for the Future
BBCE also lets states lift SNAP's very low asset test, which disqualifies families from food assistance if they manage to save as little as $3,000 ($4,500 for households with older adults or disabled members, who are very unlikely to be able to replenish any assets they spend down)./[19] Building assets can help low-income families and individuals invest in their future, avert a financial crisis that could push them deeper into poverty or into homelessness, and avoid accumulating debt that can impede economic mobility. Savings also help people prepare for retirement or potential disability for themselves or a family member. Policies that support asset-building are particularly important for people of color, who have historically been disadvantaged in accumulating wealth due to discrimination.
Forty-six states have used BBCE to raise or eliminate their SNAP asset limits, thereby reducing or eliminating the program's savings disincentive and encouraging savings as a means to support greater opportunity./[20] In these states, low-income households that otherwise would be denied SNAP can receive food assistance in at least three situations:
* Participating SNAP households can begin building modest savings without losing food assistance. This may help them weather financial emergencies and invest in their future, for example by obtaining a vehicle that lets them find and keep a job, buying a home, or saving for their children's education.
* Families that lose their jobs or experience another short-term financial crisis (such as a divorce or unexpected temporary disability) do not have to liquidate their savings before they can receive help affording groceries from SNAP.
* Households with elderly people or people with disabilities, who may have limited ability to save because they no longer work, can receive SNAP benefits to purchase groceries while they maintain a cushion that can help them weather future financial emergencies.
Most Low-Income Households Have Few Savings
Many Americans have difficulty saving enough to withstand a financial disruption, research shows. A survey of adults across the income spectrum found that 37 percent would borrow or sell something to cover an emergency expense of $400 (rather than pay for it completely using cash or its equivalent), while 45 percent said they did not have emergency savings set aside for three months of expenses if they lost their primary income source. The rates for people of color are higher: 59 percent of Black respondents and 56 percent of Hispanic respondents report lacking three months of emergency savings. Separately, 30 percent of adults report that they could not cover three months of expenses by any means./[21]
Households eligible for SNAP have even lower assets. One analysis found that the median value of liquid assets among those income-eligible for SNAP was only $141 in 2023 dollars./[22] An earlier study using data from 2011 found that only 48 percent of SNAP households had any liquid assets, and the median value among those who did have assets was just $450. (The median value was even lower - $250 - if retirement accounts were excluded, as is the case under SNAP rules.) Just over half of SNAP households had a bank account, and the median amount in the account was just $150./[23]
Savings Help Low-Income Households Weather Emergencies
Unexpected life events and unplanned expenses affect all households, but for households with low income that may have trouble meeting routine costs each month, a financial shock such as a job loss, unanticipated car repair, or medical expense can cascade into a major problem and lead to severe hardship./[24] Even modest assets can help a family or individual with fixed income (such as an elderly person) weather such shocks, research shows.
One study found that households with even minimal liquid savings (up to $2,000, the SNAP asset limit at the time of the study) are significantly less likely than otherwise-similar households with no liquid assets to experience multiple hardships, such as food insecurity (inadequate access to food at some point during the year) or a utility shutoff, and that "progressively larger effects are found with larger asset holdings."/[25] Another study found that households without a bank account are 15 percent likelier to be food insecure and 34 percent likelier to experience very low food security, a more severe form of food insecurity./[26]
Thus, policies that support saving and asset-building may protect low-income families against hardship./[27] Savings also can help low-income families avoid the spiraling costs associated with predatory financial products, such as payday loans./[28]
BBCE May Encourage Modest Savings, Research Suggests
SNAP households in states that have raised the asset limit using BBCE are likelier to have at least $500 in assets and to have a bank account, compared to similar households in states that maintain the federal asset limit, an Urban Institute study found. The authors concluded that "changes to reinstate federal SNAP asset limits [such as by eliminating BBCE] will harm family financial stability and security."/[29] Another study found that BBCE increased asset holdings among SNAP households and that removing the asset limit through BBCE increased the amount that SNAP households have in liquid accounts by about 20 percent./[30]
Other research has looked at asset limits in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or its predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). A study in the mid-2000s found that in states with higher TANF asset limits, families receiving TANF were likelier to have a bank account, and they had higher liquid assets overall. These positive effects grew with the length of time since a state raised its asset limits, suggesting there is a learning period for participants to understand and respond to rule changes./[31] An earlier study found that higher AFDC asset limits were strongly associated with higher savings among current and potential AFDC recipients: each $1 increase in asset limits raised savings among female household heads by $0.25./[32]
BBCE Pushes Back Against Nation's Large Racial Disparities in Wealth
People of color have historically faced barriers to accumulating wealth by buying homes or building other assets. These barriers, deeply rooted in discriminatory public policies and private actions, have led to vast disparities in income and wealth. The average household wealth for white households is about four times that of Black households and five times that of Hispanic households./[33]
The federal and state tax codes include many incentives for asset building, such as special treatment of retirement and education savings and mortgage interest, as well as tax breaks on capital gains and other income from wealth. Low-income families, who are disproportionately people of color, historically could not take advantage of these asset-building opportunities, largely because the economic barriers they face mean they have much less discretionary income.
Policies that help support asset building among low-income families, like BBCE, can begin addressing some of these disparities. Without BBCE, adults age 60 or older - including those who are people of color - need to spend all but $4,500 of their savings before they can receive any help from SNAP in affording groceries.
BBCE Improves Administrative Efficiency, Lowers Error Rates
States have embraced BBCE not only because it helps them better serve working families, older adults, and those saving for the future, as described above, but also because it helps them streamline their operations.
Few low-income households applying for SNAP have assets above the federal limits, but states that have not used BBCE to raise the asset limit must ask all households about assets during the application process and eligibility interview. In many cases, households and state workers will need to gather documents about households' assets, even when such assets are too small to disqualify the household from SNAP. These activities increase states' administrative workload and costs. Adopting BBCE thus can make state operations more efficient.
In addition, because reducing paperwork simplifies SNAP's recertification process, BBCE has been found to reduce administrative churn, which creates unnecessary administrative burdens and costs for states as well as for SNAP households. In states that have adopted BBCE, households are 26 percent less likely to experience churn over the course of a year than similar households in other states, an Urban Institute study found./[34]
Federal changes to BBCE would require states to alter their SNAP eligibility rules, modify their computer systems, retrain staff, and revise applications and program manuals. Such changes also would make SNAP rules considerably more complicated.
Reinstating asset tests would also increase SNAP payment error rates and, as a result, likely increase some states' costs under the state cost-shift mandates imposed by H.R. 1. When states fail to accurately account for a household's assets, or when savings rise above the asset limit over time, that can lead to payment errors under SNAP's Quality Control system, even if the households' assets exceed the limit by only a small amount.
Under H.R. 1, the share of SNAP benefit costs a state is required to pay is based on its error rate: 5 percent of benefit costs for states with error rates of 6-7.99 percent, 10 percent of costs for states with error rates of 8-9.99 percent, and 15 percent of costs for states with error rates 10 percent or higher./[35] Even a small increase in the error rate could trigger a large increase in mandated state costs if it pushed the state into a higher cost-share category, such as from below 10 percent to over 10 percent. Among states that did not use BBCE to lift the asset test in 2023, errors related to the asset limits added about 1 percentage point, on average, to the states' error rates enough to push many states to a higher cost-share category under H.R. 1./[36]
Moreover the extra time it takes for eligibility workers to track down information about households' assets would take resources away from other activities states are undertaking to improve their payment accuracy. And H.R. 1 also cut the federal match for state administrative costs in SNAP in half, from 50 percent to 25 percent, further stretching state resources to maintain or improve payment accuracy and program access.
BBCE Has Not Substantially Increased SNAP Caseloads or Costs
In its 2019 proposed rule, the first Trump Administration estimated that states' use of BBCE to lift their income and asset limits accounted for about 4 percent of SNAP program costs./[37] By 2023 the income-limit component of BBCE accounted for 3.2 percent of program costs.
As noted, we do not have updated estimates of the impact of BBCE's asset-limit component. Many states implemented the policy during the Great Recession, partly to lower their workloads at a time when caseloads were rising rapidly due to the severe downturn. However, research shows that only about 10 percent of the caseload increase during the recession was due to BBCE./[38]
And SNAP benefits under BBCE continue to go to very low-income households: only about 1 percent of SNAP benefits in 2023 went to households with monthly disposable income (net income after deducting certain expenses) above the federal poverty line.
Conclusion
Nearly every state has used BBCE to extend SNAP's reach to low-income households, including working families, older adults, and people with disabilities who struggle to afford food but might not otherwise meet SNAP's rigid income and asset tests. Congress, on a bipartisan basis, has repeatedly rejected proposals to cut SNAP by cutting BBCE. Rolling back BBCE would cause about 6 million low-income individuals to lose their SNAP benefits entirely and undermine the program's ability to promote opportunity for people who are working and seeking to save for the future.
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TABLE 1: Estimated Number of Individuals Who Received SNAP Due to BBCE Option to Raise Income Limits, Fiscal Year 2023
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End Notes
[1] See regulation pending review at the Office of Management and Budget, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202504&RIN=0584-AF10. The first Trump Administration issued a similar proposed rule, which was not finalized and later withdrawn by the Biden Administration: "Revision of Categorical Eligibility in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program," Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 142, July 24, 2019, 35570-35581, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/24/2019-15670/revision-of-categorical-eligibility-in-the-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap.
[2] The District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands are considered states under SNAP law. Puerto Rico does not participate in SNAP but instead receives a block grant for Nutrition Assistance.
[3] The Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, which authorizes SNAP, requires households that receive a TANF-funded benefit to be categorically eligible for SNAP. Broad-based categorical eligibility is commonly referred as an "option" because states have the option whether to provide households with the TANF-funded benefits that trigger categorical eligibility. For details, see box, "What Is Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility?"
[4] CBPP, "By the Numbers: Harmful Republican Megabill Takes Food Assistance Away From Millions of People," updated August 14, 2025, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/by-the-numbers-harmful-republican-megabill-takes-food-assistance-away-from.
[5] Households that contain individuals with disabilities or seniors do not face a gross income test under federal rules. BBCE allows states to create parity across all households with respect to this rule.
[6] Caroline Ratcliffe et al., "The Unintended Consequences of SNAP Asset Limits," Urban Institute, July 2016, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/82886/2000872-The-Unintended-Consequences-of-SNAP-Asset-Limits.pdf.
[7] These figures are based on information from USDA, Food and Nutrition Service, "Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Quality Control Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2023," September 2025, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Quality Control Annual Report Fiscal Year 2023.
[8] The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that BBCE accounts for only about 2 percent of SNAP costs and about 5 percent of SNAP participation. These estimates are based on CBO's re-estimate of President Trump's 2020 budget proposal to restrict SNAP categorical eligibility to only households receiving cash assistance under TANF. (CBO's re-estimate of this policy is available at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-05/55215-snap.pdf.) The CBO estimate of the number of participants eligible because of BBCE is based on 2016 SNAP household characteristics data and earlier CBO estimates of the number of people who would be affected by eliminating BBCE.
[9] Joseph Llobrera and Lauren Hall, "SNAP Provides Critical Benefits to Workers and Their Families," CBPP, April 28, 2025, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-provides-critical-benefits-to-workers-and-their-families; and Elizabeth Wolkomir and Lexin Cai, "The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Includes Earnings Incentives," CBPP, June 5, 2019, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/the-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-includes-earnings-incentives.
[10] CBPP Analysis of 2024 American Community Survey data.
[11] Kenneth Hanson and Margaret Andrews, "State Variations in the Food Stamp Benefit Reduction Rate for Earnings: Cross-Program Effects from TANF and SSI Cash Assistance," USDA, Economic Research Service, March 2009, https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/publications/44317/9663_eib46.pdf.
[12] The calculation assumes the family has only earned income, claims the $209 standard deduction and 20 percent earned income deduction, and has $1,404 in monthly shelter costs (the median value for working households of three with children that have incomes at or above 125 percent of poverty, based on fiscal year 2023 SNAP household characteristics data adjusted to 2026 dollars).
[13] Based on a CBPP analysis of fiscal year 2023 SNAP household characteristics data. These figures are for an average month of the fiscal year for households that would be ineligible if the component of BBCE that allows states to raise their income limits were eliminated; they do not include the effect of the component that allows states to lift their asset tests.
[14] Ibid.
[15] USDA estimated 1 million children would lose the automatic link to free and reduced-price meals under its 2019 proposed rule. USDA, "Revision of Categorical Eligibility in SNAP - Informational Analysis," October 15, 2019, https://www.regulations.gov/document/FNS-2018-0037-16046.
[16] Families with income at or below 130 percent of the federal poverty line qualify for free school meals. Children in households that receive SNAP are considered categorically eligible for free school meals, and states use a data match to certify them based on their SNAP participation (this is known as "direct certification"). Children in households at or below 185 percent of poverty qualify for reduced-price meals, capped at a price of 30 cents for breakfast and 40 cents for lunch.
[17] See "Benefits of CEP" section of Federal Register, Vol. 88, No. 56, March 23, 2023, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-03-23/pdf/2023-05624.pdf.
[18] The minimum benefit is higher in Alaska, Hawai'i, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
[19] Under federal SNAP rules, resources that could be available to the household to purchase food, such as amounts in bank accounts, count as assets. Resources that are not accessible, such as the household's home, personal property, and retirement savings, do not count. The rules count the market value of most vehicles above $4,650 toward the asset limit. In the absence of BBCE, states would retain flexibility to apply less restrictive vehicle asset rules under another state option, but they would have to modify state policy to do so.
[20] Five states (Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Nebraska, and Texas) use BBCE to raise their SNAP asset limits. The other 41 states use BBCE to eliminate the SNAP asset limits, though income from assets continues to count toward SNAP eligibility.
[21] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2024," May 2025, https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2024-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202505.pdf.
[22] Elizabeth Cox, Chloe East, and Isabelle Pula, "Beyond Hunger: The Role of SNAP in Alleviating Financial Strain For Low-Income Households," Brookings Institution, June 20, 2024, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/beyond-hunger-the-role-of-snap-in-alleviating-financial-strain-for-low-income-households/.
[23] Caroline Ratcliffe et al., "Asset Limits, SNAP Participation, and Financial Stability," Urban Institute, June 2016, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/81966/2000843-Asset-Limits-SNAP-Participation-and-Financial-Stability.pdf.
[24] Signe-Mary McKernan, Caroline Ratcliffe, and Katie Vinopal, "Do Assets Help Families Cope with Adverse Events?" Urban Institute, December 14, 2009, https://www.urban.org/research/publication/do-assets-help-families-cope-adverse-events.
[25] Gregory Mills and Joe Amick, "Can Savings Help Overcome Income Instability?" Urban Institute, December 2010, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32771/412290-Can-Savings-Help-Overcome-Income-Instability-.PDF.
[26] Katie Fitzpatrick, "Bank Accounts, Nonbank Financial Transaction Products, and Food Insecurity among Households with Children," Journal of Consumer Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 3, Fall 2017, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/joca.12158.
[27] Signe-Mary McKernan et al., "Building savings, ownership, and financial well-being," Urban Institute, April 2020, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101992/building-savings-ownership-and-financial-well-being_0_1.pdf.
[28] "Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where they Borrow, and Why," Pew Charitable Trusts, July 2012, https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewpaydaylendingreportpdf.pdf.
[29] The study found that living in a state that adopted BBCE increases the likelihood that a low-income household has savings of at least $500 (by 8 percent) and has a bank account (by 5 percent). Ratcliffe et al., "Unintended Consequences," op. cit.
[30] Jessica Todd, Young Jo, and James Richard Boohaker, "The Impact of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Policies on Asset Holdings," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, Vol. 41, No. 2, June 2019, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1093/aepp/ppy014.
[31] Yunju Nam, "Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: Asset Limit Changes, Financial Assets, and Vehicle Ownership," Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 1, March 2008.
[32] Elizabeth T. Powers, "Does means-testing welfare discourage saving? Evidence from a Change in AFDC Policy in the United States," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 68, 1998. Other studies, however, have found no statistically significant relationship between asset limits and households' liquid assets. The inconclusive research literature likely reflects the fact that most low-income families hold very few assets, so the SNAP asset limits are not binding for the vast majority of households that apply for (or consider applying for) SNAP. Lifting the asset limits thus has little impact on most households.
[33] Ana Hernandez Kent, "The State of U.S. Household Wealth," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, June 2025, https://www.stlouisfed.org/open-vault/2025/june/the-state-of-us-household-wealth.
[34] Ratcliffe et al., "Asset Limits," op. cit.
[35]Paradoxically, H.R. 1 provides an exception for states with the highest error rates. If a state's error rate multiplied by 1.5 is at or above 20 percent (meaning the error rate is above 13.33 percent) for fiscal year 2025, the state will not be required to pay a cost share in fiscal year 2028. If the error rate is above this threshold for 2026, the state will not be required to pay a cost share in fiscal year 2028 or 2029.
[36] See note 7.
[37] See note 8.
[38] For example, Ganong and Liebman found that this option accounted for about 8 percent of the caseload increase between 2007 and 2011, and Dickert-Conlin et al., found that BBCE "only explains up to 12 percent of the recent caseload increase." Peter Ganong and Jeffrey B. Liebman, "The Decline, Rebound, and Further Rise in SNAP Enrollment: Disentangling Business Cycle Fluctuations and Policy Changes," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 10, No. 4, November 2018, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20140016&&from=f; Stacy Dickert-Conlin et al., "The Downs and Ups of the SNAP Caseload: What Matters?" SSRN, December 1, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3052570.
* * *
Dottie Rosenbaum is the Senior Fellow and Director of Federal SNAP Policy on the Food Assistance team.
Joseph Llobrera is the Senior Director of Research for the Food Assistance team, where his work highlights the positive impacts of federal nutrition assistance programs on people's health, food security, and economic well-being.
Catlin Nchako joined the Food Assistance Division as a Research Associate in November of 2013. His work focuses on data analysis and research for the food stamp, school meals, and WIC programs.
Luis Nunez is a Research Analyst on the Food Assistance team.
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Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snaps-broad-based-categorical-eligibility-supports-working-families-and-0
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Hopkins School Board Chair Reportedly in Violation of State Statute
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Feb. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary by policy fellow Catrin Wigfall:* * *
Hopkins school board chair reportedly in violation of state statute
A community member in the Hopkins school district used the public comment period during a recent school board meeting to bring forth evidence that the chair of the school board has violated state statute.
Board chair Shannon Andreson is an employee of the district, and while being on the payroll of ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Feb. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary by policy fellow Catrin Wigfall: * * * Hopkins school board chair reportedly in violation of state statute A community member in the Hopkins school district used the public comment period during a recent school board meeting to bring forth evidence that the chair of the school board has violated state statute. Board chair Shannon Andreson is an employee of the district, and while being on the payroll ofHopkins Public Schools does not automatically disqualify her from serving as chair, conflict-of-interest safeguards appear to have been violated.
Under Minnesota Statute 123B.195, a school board member may be employed by a school district only if "there is a reasonable expectation at the beginning of the fiscal year or at the time the contract is entered into or extended that the amount to be earned by that officer under that contract or employment relationship will not exceed $20,000 in that fiscal year."
A public data request submitted to the school district by a community member reportedly shows that Chair Andreson's salary for her non-board position as a paraprofessional in the district exceeded the $20,000 statutory limits in both FY 2024 and FY 2025.
"This is not a one-time oversight. It is a knowing repeat violation for a second consecutive year suggesting a belief that the rules do not fully apply in this case or that any excesses can be overlooked," testified the community member.
"I respectfully urge the board to acknowledge these repeated violations, investigate the circumstances, including any lack of proper approval from the board ahead of time, as dictated by law, and take immediate steps to comply fully with 123B.195. The statute is clear on corrective action needed to fix this problem."
The $20,000 limit established in state statute is "a strict ceiling designed to prevent conflicts of interest, ensuring board members do not have direct financial stake in the district operations that could influence their decisions," noted the community member.
The board has not yet publicly responded to the allegation and will hopefully address it at its next meeting on March 17. If public institutions expect trust, they must demonstrate that no officeholder stands above the statutes that govern them.
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Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/hopkins-school-board-chair-reportedly-in-violation-of-state-statute/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Got Milk? Whole Milk on the Horizon for School Lunchrooms
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Feb. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary by policy fellow Josiah Padley:* * *
Got Milk? Whole milk on the horizon for school lunchrooms
Minnesota students hoping to load up on protein at lunch might soon rejoice.
After last month's bipartisan Whole Milk for Healthy Kids Act was signed into law by President Trump, Minnesota lawmakers, headed by Sen. Torrey Westrom, are now attempting to update Minnesota state statute to codify the ability for ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Feb. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary by policy fellow Josiah Padley: * * * Got Milk? Whole milk on the horizon for school lunchrooms Minnesota students hoping to load up on protein at lunch might soon rejoice. After last month's bipartisan Whole Milk for Healthy Kids Act was signed into law by President Trump, Minnesota lawmakers, headed by Sen. Torrey Westrom, are now attempting to update Minnesota state statute to codify the ability forstudents to access whole milk in their school meals.
Previously, Obama-era school lunch policies limited milk choices to skim or low fat only. Following the FDA's flipping of the food pyramid in the most recent edition of their Dietary Guidelines for Americans, the Whole Milk for Healthy Kids Act updated federal guidance for the National School Lunch Program's school lunches to include whole milk -- now considered widely to be essential for healthy childhood development. Social media updates from the office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services that attempt to be humorous suggest that whole milk will continue to be a priority for the administration.
Minnesota's proposed new pro-bovine milk policies would go further than the federal act, expanding the option for whole milk to both breakfast and lunch.
Following the 2023 Free School Meals Law, Minnesota now provides free breakfasts and lunches for all students within schools that qualify to participate in the National School Lunch Program. Every student at a participating school receives a free breakfast and lunch, regardless of if the individual student qualifies for free food under federal income guidelines. Minnesota reimburses schools for the cost of any meals that are not paid for by the federal government. As of 2024, every public school district in Minnesota and 167 charter schools participates in Minnesota's Free School Meals program.
In a press release, Senator Westrom wrote:
Senate File 3687 would update Minnesota Statutes to conform to the new federal standards and formally restore those options in Minnesota school lunch programs. The bill also ensures parents may request a non-dairy alternative for their child without needing a doctor's note.
"This bill is about giving families more choice, ensuring kids have access to the nutrition milk provides for those who choose it, and supporting our state's dairy farmers at the same time. That's a win for students and a win for our dairy farmers."
At this time, it is unclear what the financial impact of this bill may be. The bill also does not explicitly state that all schools who participate in the Free School Meals program must offer whole milk, instead connecting the dairy requirement to participation in national school lunch programs. As the bill moves through committee, it will be interesting to see its trajectory.
The bill will now moo-ve to the Senate Education Policy Committee.
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Josiah Padley is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
josiah.padley@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/got-milk-whole-milk-on-the-horizon-for-school-lunchrooms/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Critical Questions Q&A: Why Did Pakistan Announce 'Open War' Against the Taliban?
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Feb. 27, 2026, involving fellow Alexander Palmer and intern Alexander Margolis of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program:* * *
Why Did Pakistan Announce "Open War" Against the Taliban?
Early in the morning of February 27, Pakistan's defense minister announced "open war" between Pakistan and the Taliban, a group that Islamabad frequently backed in its 30-year quest to rule Afghanistan. The conflict will probably remain contained to border skirmishes and occasional ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following Critical Questions Q&A on Feb. 27, 2026, involving fellow Alexander Palmer and intern Alexander Margolis of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program: * * * Why Did Pakistan Announce "Open War" Against the Taliban? Early in the morning of February 27, Pakistan's defense minister announced "open war" between Pakistan and the Taliban, a group that Islamabad frequently backed in its 30-year quest to rule Afghanistan. The conflict will probably remain contained to border skirmishes and occasionalair strikes but could also escalate further as the region faces heightened tensions due to the U.S.-Iran crisis.
Q1: What is happening?
A1: The announcement of "open war" follows a week of escalating conflict. On February 22, 2026, Pakistan carried out multiple air strikes against several alleged camps used by militant groups, including the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan claimed it conducted these attacks in response to terrorist attacks within the country over the last few weeks, including a high-profile attack against a Shia mosque in Islamabad in early February. The Taliban promised retribution for these attacks, which it claimed hit civilian targets, including a religious school.
On the night of February 26, the Taliban announced an offensive against Pakistani positions along the Durand Line, as the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is widely known. The attacks apparently prompted the Pakistani defense minister's announcement on February 27, which was accompanied by strikes against the cities of Kabul and Kandahar as well as in Paktia, a province on the Durand Line. The choice to target Kabul and Kandahar is significant because the two cities are the major Afghan political centers. While Kabul is Afghanistan's formal capital and houses much of its administrative bureaucracy, the Taliban's emir lives in Kandahar and has steadily accumulated power in the city.
The strikes follow more than a year of tension and conflict between the two states. Although most of this fighting has consisted of TTP attacks followed by Pakistani reprisals, the recent escalation is not unprecedented: In October 2025, Pakistan and the Taliban fought a brief conflict that killed at least 17 civilians.
Q2: Why is Pakistan bombing Afghanistan?
A2: Pakistan justified its actions on Friday in part by citing the Taliban's sheltering of "terrorists." Despite the Taliban's repeated denials, international terrorist groups--most notably Al Qaeda and the TTP--receive at least safe haven from the Taliban. Violence in Pakistan has dramatically increased since the Taliban seized power in Kabul in August 2021.
The TTP is at the heart of the Pakistan-Taliban conflict. It has steadily escalated its war against the Pakistani government since 2022, increasing the tempo of its attacks and expanding what it considers to be legitimate targets. A TTP offshoot also conducted a major attack in Islamabad in November 2025, although TTP leadership denied involvement.
Although the Taliban has mediated between Pakistan and the TTP in the past, it has proven to be more closely aligned with the TTP than its former backers in Islamabad. The TTP has pledged allegiance to the Taliban, fought alongside the Taliban during the conflict with the United States, and shares ideological and familial ties with the Taliban. Clamping down on TTP activity would probably threaten the Taliban's internal cohesion, including via TTP defection to the terrorist group Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP). The Taliban have consistently prioritized internal cohesion above other interests and show no sign of stopping.
In addition, the Taliban have never recognized the Durand Line. The line was drawn in 1893 as part of Great Britain's efforts to shield the British Raj from the Russian empire. The British did not appear to give much thought to how the line divided the Pashtun communities that live in the region. The Taliban remain a Pashtun-dominated movement, and its nationalist tendencies would likely drive it toward conflict with Pakistan even if the TTP had never arisen as an organization.
Finally, Pakistan has accused the Taliban of being "a proxy for India." However, most analysis suggests that India's engagement has primarily consisted of diplomatic contacts and the provision of humanitarian aid, and India was primarily aligned with the Northern Alliance and later the United States against the Taliban before August 2021. Whether the Pakistani government genuinely believes that India is using the Taliban or TTP as a proxy or whether such statements are mere rhetoric is an open question.
Q3: What will happen next?
A3: The most likely outcome is that the conflict will soon de-escalate. Previous periods of escalation have been limited to stand-off strikes and border skirmishes. The 2025 conflict began with a Pakistani strike in Kabul but took place mostly along the border and ended with a ceasefire.
However, Pakistan's rhetoric of "open war" suggests that more significant military options are on the table.
One option would be a larger-scale bombing campaign against targets in Afghanistan. Such a campaign would represent a continuation of Friday's strikes aimed at coercing the Taliban into restraining the TTP or degrading the TTP's ability to conduct attacks in Pakistan. Border skirmishes would almost certainly continue as long as such a campaign continued.
The Pakistani military might also conduct large-scale ground operations against the TTP in Pakistan. Rumors of an impending operation in the Tirah Valley, a long-standing hotbed of TTP activity, have swirled for weeks due to large-scale displacements in the area. Such an offensive would be destabilizing and could unleash unpredictable effects: Similar operations helped drive the creation of IS-KP during the early 2010s.
Finally, Pakistan could attempt a major ground incursion into Afghanistan itself. Islamabad has historically sought to manage the threat from its border regions and Afghanistan through nonstate proxies. However, its main nonstate partner in these efforts has been the Taliban. With the group increasingly at odds with Islamabad and the Taliban's main rivals either militarily inconsequential or also violently opposed to Pakistan, its options for indirect involvement in the country have largely disappeared. Such an effort would be unprecedented for Pakistan, and success is therefore highly uncertain.
In addition, the Taliban or TTP could escalate attacks in Pakistani cities. The Taliban said that it would attack Pakistan's "key centers and important cities" in retaliation for any attacks against major Afghan cities.
Q4: How does the Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict affect U.S. interests?
A4: The main U.S. interest in Afghanistan and western Pakistan is counterterrorism. The region is still home to a variety of terrorist groups hostile to the United States--most notably IS-KP and the Al Qaeda core. War between Pakistan and the Taliban would probably increase the threat both groups pose to the United States, although the effect on the threat from Al Qaeda is less certain.
War between Pakistan and the Taliban would almost certainly affect IS-KP and the Al Qaeda core in different ways. IS-KP is waging an insurgency against the Taliban and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan while plotting mass-casualty attacks abroad. Conflict between its two main regional enemies would probably reduce the counterterrorist pressure it faces and allow it to resurge.
The Al Qaeda core, in contrast, is sheltered by the Taliban government and appears concentrated primarily on rebuilding after 20 years of intense pressure from the United States and its allies. The effect of a potential war on the group is more uncertain. On the one hand, any weakening of the Taliban could also weaken the Al Qaeda core, decreasing the threat it poses and increasing the independence of its regional affiliates. On the other, Al Qaeda has acted as a force multiplier for Afghan insurgents before--providing training and money--which could increase its utility to the Taliban and lead them to weaken any restrictions the group has placed on Al Qaeda's international activities.
The United States is also on the verge of conflict with Iran, which borders both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Depending on the extent of the escalation, a Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict could affect U.S. planning and policy toward Iran.
Finally, China is interested in the state of Pakistan-Afghanistan escalation. China has significant counterterrorism interests in the region. Afghanistan borders China's Xinjiang Province, and Beijing has framed its activities in the region as counterterrorism. Chinese nationals have also been repeatedly targeted by terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Terrorist propaganda is increasingly focused on China as well. Meanwhile, its security relationship with Pakistan has deepened. Beijing will push for a ceasefire, and success could further increase its regional influence, although de-escalation is otherwise consistent with U.S. interests.
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Alexander Palmer is a fellow in the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism (WITT) Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Alexander Margolis is an intern with the WITT Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-did-pakistan-announce-open-war-against-taliban
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: USMCA 2026 and Economic Security - The Convergence of Technology, Trade, and National Security
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by Jake Jennings, adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Americas Program:* * *
USMCA 2026 and Economic Security: The Convergence of Technology, Trade, and National Security
The USMCA Review Is Becoming a Test of North American Technology Security
Initially, the 2026 review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement was initially framed as a routine, if politically sensitive, "check-in" trade exercise. In practice, it is becoming something far more consequential: a ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by Jake Jennings, adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Americas Program: * * * USMCA 2026 and Economic Security: The Convergence of Technology, Trade, and National Security The USMCA Review Is Becoming a Test of North American Technology Security Initially, the 2026 review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement was initially framed as a routine, if politically sensitive, "check-in" trade exercise. In practice, it is becoming something far more consequential: astress test of whether North America can function as a coherent technology and economic-security platform in an era of intensified strategic competition globally.
Unlike earlier trade negotiations that focused on tariff schedules or sectoral market access, the coming USMCA process is unfolding against a backdrop of accelerating rivalry with China, heightened concern over supply-chain resilience, and a growing willingness by governments to use trade tools to shape trade outcomes. The result is a review process that increasingly resembles a negotiation over security architecture rather than a traditional trade update. Recent U.S. agreements with El Salvador and Guatemala, alongside the opening of USMCA reform talks on rules of origin, critical minerals, and external trade alignment, underscore that U.S. trade policy in the Western Hemisphere is now being operationalized as economic security policy, with market access used to enforce supply-chain discipline and geopolitical alignment rather than tariff reciprocity alone.
Why This Review Is Different
Several forces have converged to make the 2026 review distinct from past USMCA moments. The White House has focused on "onshoring" by leveraging market access to "investment commitments," particularly in technology sectors such as semiconductors, advanced computing, and AI-enabled infrastructure. These "strategic" sectors are now viewed primarily through a national security lens rather than a simple trade issue. In other words, U.S. trade policy has shifted decisively toward selective, conditional engagement that ties market access to alignment on technology, energy, and security priorities.
Taken together, these dynamics reposition USMCA review as a vehicle to operationalize North American security integration. Developments across Central America already point toward a tiered Western Hemisphere model, with a core group of "trusted" partners moving into deeper U.S.-aligned production and technology ecosystems and others facing pressure to choose between closer ties with China and privileged access to the U.S. market.
From Tariff Management to Strategic Leverage
Recent U.S. trade actions offer a window into how this approach is evolving. Ongoing Section 232 activity related to semiconductors and advanced technologies illustrates a broader shift away from across-the-board protectionism toward targeted leverage. Rather than relying solely on tariffs as blunt instruments, the emerging model uses the prospect of trade restrictions to drive investment, supply-chain relocation, and policy alignment among close partners.
Increasingly, U.S. officials view prolonged compliance processes and formal dispute settlement as ill-suited to the pace of economic-security challenges. In this context, enforcement is becoming less about legal proceduralism and more about behavioral outcomes--whether trade rules are actually changing investment decisions, supply-chain composition, and technology exposure in practice.
The significance of this approach lies less in the specific measures under consideration than in the signal it sends. In particular, the United States is leveraging trade policy through tariffs as a mechanism to shape where sensitive technologies are designed, produced, and deployed, and by whom. For USMCA partners, this means that preferential access to the U.S. market will be increasingly conditioned on demonstrable alignment with U.S. technology, industrial, and security objectives.
Recent cases reinforce this shift from static trade rules to behavioral enforcement. Tariff relief for India has been explicitly tied to energy sourcing decisions, while Japan and South Korea have faced tariff escalation threats to compel delivery on investment and technology commitments. Moreover, the recent U.S.-Taiwan semiconductor arrangement takes this a step further: tariff relief is not only tied to up to $500 billion in United States semiconductor ecosystem investment, it also comes with requirements to follow United States export controls and keep Chinese linked technology out of subsea cables and next generation 5G and 6G networks.
Trilateral Rules, Bilateral Enforcement
Formally, USMCA remains a trilateral agreement. Functionally, however, the review process is likely to be driven by increasingly differentiated bilateral tracks.
Canada enters the review with deep institutional alignment with the United States on export controls, investment screening, and technology governance. While disputes over market access and industrial policy persist, these disagreements generally unfold within a shared framework of regulatory trust and security cooperation. As a result, U.S.-Canada trade frictions are more likely to be managed through negotiated adjustments and targeted enforcement rather than fundamental recalibration.
Mexico presents a more complex challenge. Mexico has become the United States' largest trading partner by value, underscoring the centrality of the bilateral relationship. At the same time, developments related to judicial reform, tax administration, and energy policy have raised concerns in Washington about legal predictability, regulatory independence, and investor protections. These concerns do not negate Mexico's strategic importance, but they do shape how U.S. policymakers assess risk and leverage.
In this framework, Mexico is not simply a USMCA partner but a central enforcement hinge. U.S. concerns increasingly focus on whether Chinese capital, components, and technology are being routed through Mexico in ways that undermine the agreement's economic-security objectives. Mexican policy decisions on tariffs, investment, energy, and technology governance are therefore read in Washington as signals of whether Mexico is helping to seal the North American perimeter--or leaving exploitable gaps.
This divergence suggests the USMCA review will operate less as a single trilateral negotiation and more as a framework within which the United States pursues distinct bilateral enforcement and alignment strategies. In practice, USMCA is increasingly functioning as the anchor of a tiered regional system, with differentiated access based on compliance, technology governance, and geopolitical behavior rather than uniform application of shared rules.
Technology Issues Moving to the Center
Several technology-linked issue areas are likely to dominate the review process.
* Digital Trade and Data Governance: Cross-border data flows, cloud services, and digital taxation are no longer peripheral trade issues. They are central to the competitiveness of North American firms and to the governance of AI-enabled services. The review is likely to focus not only on formal commitments, but on how digital rules are implemented in practice.
* Export Controls and Re-Export Risk: As U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors and AI-related technologies become more complex, enforcement increasingly depends on partner cooperation. The review is likely to scrutinize how effectively USMCA partners prevent circumvention, transshipment, and unauthorized access through affiliates or third-country intermediaries.
* Next-Generation Telecommunications: While 5G remains a reference point, attention is shifting toward 6G and other advanced network architectures. Vendor security, trusted supplier frameworks, and research collaboration will increasingly intersect with trade commitments.
* Critical Minerals and Advanced Manufacturing Inputs: Rather than focusing solely on extraction, policymakers are increasingly interested in processing, refining, and downstream integration. The review may explore mechanisms to treat North America as a platform for trusted sourcing, including eligibility criteria tied to security and governance standards. The emerging U.S.-Mexico critical minerals framework offers a preview of how this approach may be operationalized: bilateral coordination embedded within the USMCA ecosystem, focused on processing, downstream integration, and exclusion of non-trusted inputs rather than on formal treaty renegotiation. Similar architectures could emerge in other sensitive sectors.
At the same time, technology governance is becoming inseparable from infrastructure realities. The Department of Commerce's move to embed export-control officials closer to AI hubs, alongside growing constraints around power availability, permitting, and self-financed generation, signals that access to advanced technology markets will increasingly depend on firms' ability to align infrastructure investment with federal and state priorities. USMCA is therefore not just shaping rules for technology flows but influencing where industrial and digital capacity is permitted to scale.
What the Review Is Likely to Produce
The most consequential outcomes of the USMCA review are unlikely to take the form of sweeping treaty amendments. Instead, they are more likely to emerge through a series of targeted instruments, including side letters, annexes, and enforcement memoranda that clarify expectations and create leverage without reopening the core agreement.
These mechanisms may be used to reinforce verification and enforcement around rules of origin, formalize cooperation on export controls and investment screening, and establish principles for digital and technology governance backed by bilateral enforcement pathways. In effect, the review may produce a layered architecture: shared trilateral commitments paired with more intensive bilateral implementation.
Privately, many in Washington expect the review process to extend beyond the July 1 timeline without producing a clean renewal or a definitive package of outcomes. This should not be read as a signal that USMCA itself is at risk. Rather, the agreement is likely to remain legally intact while enforcement, interpretation, and implementation become more assertive over time.
Implications for Business
For many firms, the central question is no longer whether USMCA will endure, but whether their sector and operating model will be viewed by Washington as advancing--or undermining--the agreement's economic-security objectives.
In the near term, firms should map exposure to rules-of-origin verification and enforcement risk, particularly for products with complex or opaque input chains; assess data, cloud, and digital service operations for sensitivity to evolving digital trade and localization pressures; and review affiliate, reseller, and distribution relationships for export-control and re-export risk.
Looking through 2026, companies should watch for signals that preferential market access is being tied to investment commitments or technology-security alignment, increased use of bilateral enforcement tools within the USMCA framework, and the emergence of sector-specific side agreements that set de facto standards for participation in North American supply chains.
A Review That Will Define the Next Phase
The 2026 USMCA review is unlikely to produce a single headline-grabbing outcome. Its significance lies instead in how it redefines the role of trade policy in shaping North America's technology and security posture. USMCA is increasingly serving as the enforcement spine of a broader hemispheric economic-security strategy, integrating market access, technology governance, critical minerals, energy, and compliance into a single operating framework.
If successful, the review will help transform USMCA from a market-access agreement into a platform for coordinated technological resilience. If it fails, it risks accelerating fragmentation and uncertainty at precisely the moment when integration is most needed. Either way, the review will be a defining test not only of the agreement itself, but of North America's ability to act as a coherent economic and strategic actor in a rapidly evolving global landscape.
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Jake Jennings is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/usmca-2026-and-economic-security-convergence-technology-trade-and-national-security
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Northwood Declaration - The Future of European Deterrence?
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by visiting fellows Astrid Chevreuil and Jonathan Burchell of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program:* * *
Northwood Declaration: The Future of European Deterrence?
Introduction
At the Munich Security Conference two weeks ago, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron underscored a deepening strategic alignment between their countries. Starmer emphasized "enhancing nuclear cooperation with France," reflecting commitments under the Northwood ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by visiting fellows Astrid Chevreuil and Jonathan Burchell of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program: * * * Northwood Declaration: The Future of European Deterrence? Introduction At the Munich Security Conference two weeks ago, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron underscored a deepening strategic alignment between their countries. Starmer emphasized "enhancing nuclear cooperation with France," reflecting commitments under the NorthwoodDeclaration signed last summer. Macron, meanwhile, argued that "this is the right time for audacity" in strengthening Europe's security posture and support for Ukraine, reflecting a broader push for a strategically autonomous Europe. Together, these statements highlight the political context underpinning Northwood and its implication for the future of European deterrence.
The Northwood Declaration is an updated bilateral framework for nuclear coordination and introduces two major developments to reflect evolving strategic thinking in both Paris and London. On the one hand, the United Kingdom, whose nuclear deterrent has traditionally been closely aligned to the United States and declared to NATO, has emphasized a strengthened British contribution to the security of the European continent while remaining firmly embedded within the NATO alliance framework. On the other hand, France has moved beyond limited cooperation with the United Kingdom to establish a formal "coordination" on nuclear policy, capabilities, and operations. This is an unprecedented move from Paris, which has historically guarded its independence against any perceived encroachment.
While UK and French nuclear forces remain operationally independent, Northwood strengthens Euro-Atlantic security. With growing U.S. pressure for European burden-sharing, this declaration signals a stronger European pillar of deterrence that complements, not replaces, U.S. extended deterrence. Its dual approach--maintaining independence, whilst enabling coordination--represents a significant evolution in strategic thinking. This shift strengthens coordination between two sovereign nuclear forces without compromising their independence, framing deterrence as a shared response to extreme threats against the continent.
Ultimately, Northwood is politically significant because it enhances the credibility of a genuinely European contribution to nuclear deterrence and deepens Franco-British burden sharing. It serves to both reassure European allies and signal to Washington that London and Paris are stepping up as independent contributors to transatlantic security.
The real credibility of this shift, however, depends on translating these high-level commitments into concrete, practical measures. If realized, the declaration could catalyze a new European approach to nuclear deterrence more broadly, establishing a foundation for collective security while preserving national sovereignty.
A Heightened Franco-British Nuclear Cooperation
Franco-British nuclear cooperation has developed incrementally over the past three decades, driven by converging threat perceptions and a pragmatic recognition of each country's role in European security. During the Cold War, nuclear relations between Paris and London were limited, reflecting divergent doctrines and contrasting alliance choices after the Suez Crisis. The United Kingdom embedded its nuclear deterrent within the U.S.-led NATO framework, whereas France pursued a strictly independent path outside of the alliance's nuclear structures.
The mid-1990s marked the first meaningful convergence in Franco-British nuclear relations. The 1995 Chequers Declaration, negotiated after the U.S. cancellation of a planned British nuclear test in Nevada, marked the start of bilateral nuclear cooperation, focusing on information exchange, technical support, and reciprocal consideration of vital interests. Chequers remains a keystone of the partnership and has provided the foundation for later agreements.
The 2010 Lancaster House Treaties further deepened this cooperation, formalizing scientific collaboration through the Teutates program on warhead stewardship. These agreements built the necessary trust and interoperability for closer alignment while maintaining full national control over nuclear forces.
Building on this foundation, the United Kingdom and France refreshed their defense partnership in 2025 through the Lancaster House 2.0 agenda, which expanded cooperation into conventional mass, munitions, air and missile defense, and industrial resilience. This broader agenda reinforced the strategic context in which nuclear coordination under Northwood would occur, highlighting a comprehensive Franco-British approach to European and transatlantic security.
The 2025 Northwood Declaration represents the next stage in this 30-year arc of nuclear convergence, fitting a recurring 15-year cycle of renewal. Northwood sets out "three buckets" for formal coordination: nuclear policy, operational planning, and capability development. Central to this shift is the establishment of the Franco-British Nuclear Steering Group. Its inaugural meeting in December 2025, held alongside the unprecedented British observation of France's Operation POKER, signals a willingness on both sides to invest political and bureaucratic capital in a long-term nuclear partnership. Beyond the symbolic gesture, the unprecedented presence of British observers at France's sensitive Operation POKER was hailed by senior officials as a profound sign of confidence, signaling a shift toward genuine strategic intimacy.
The updated declaratory policy, stating that "there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations," explicitly anchors both deterrents in a European dimension while reaffirming their contribution to NATO's collective security. Under Northwood, the United Kingdom and France emphasize that their "nuclear forces are independent, but can be coordinated and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance, and to the peace and stability of Euro-Atlantic area." In France, President Macron will announce a new doctrinal discourse on nuclear issues in March 2026 which is expected to cover the "European dimension" of French deterrence. In the United Kingdom, a decision to acquire F-35As to support NATO's nuclear mission signals a desire for greater operational flexibility. UK efforts to deepen cooperation with France through Northwood as well as joining the NATO mission--and initiating both almost simultaneously--could be interpreted as a dual strategy of strengthening both U.S. and French relations on deterrence.
More broadly, Northwood is also a direct response of the two countries to a deteriorating European security environment. Both the United Kingdom and France explicitly identified Russia as a direct threat in their 2025 strategic defense reviews, a shift that--combined with growing U.S. pressure for European burden sharing--forms the strategic backdrop to the renewed cooperation. Though under-recognized in Washington, Northwood demonstrates an unprecedented willingness to advance a European approach to deterrence. With Northwood, London and Paris are setting the stage for a more substantive, coordinated role in transatlantic security.
Milestone for Substantive Work Ahead
As Washington explicitly calls for Europe to assume more responsibility for its own defense, especially in the conventional domain, Northwood and Lancaster House 2.0 offer a blueprint for credible European deterrence, not only between France and the United Kingdom but with other European partners as well. Integrating the nuclear and conventional tracks in this way signals that London understands Washington's burden-sharing message across domains and is investing in both the strategic and conventional foundations of European defense.
This is not a move toward isolation but an urgent necessity as European capitals weigh the long-term consistency of U.S. strategic priorities. Indeed, the language in the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy that a threat to a person halfway around the world is not "the same as to an American" has underscored the need for a more self-reliant European deterrent architecture. Crucially, operationalizing Northwood will require diplomatic finesse to ensure that this bilateral strategic cooperation reinforces, rather than undermines, the P3 (the United States, United Kingdom, and France) as well as European security. While Washington likely welcomes such tangible proof of burden sharing, U.S. officials will remain attentive to how this enhanced European deterrent pillar aligns with the broader NATO framework.
As previously mentioned, Northwood identifies three "buckets" for future Franco-British work: policy, capabilities, and operations. When accounting for their respective doctrinal red lines and the specific technical constraints of their arsenals, the scope for practical cooperation is naturally circumscribed to a few options.
Policy
First, Paris and London could move beyond traditional bilateral dialogue by systematically coordinating their positions in international disarmament and nonproliferation forums, building on Northwood's commitment to uphold and reinforce international and nonproliferation architecture. This represents "low-hanging fruit" at a moment of perceived U.S. retreat from multilateralism, providing a way to uphold vital norms--such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty--in an increasingly competitive global environment. Furthermore, France and the United Kingdom could initiate in-depth doctrinal reviews as a first step toward defining the "European dimension" of the Northwood Declaration. Subsequently, they could convene strategic dialogues with interested partners, such as Sweden. Reaffirming that French and British deterrence are inextricably linked to, and not a replacement for, U.S. extended deterrence would serve to reassure both Washington and anxious allies alike.
Second, France and the United Kingdom could elaborate on their new declaratory policy with European allies through its reference to "extreme threats to Europe." By adding this shared category to their sovereign definition of vital interests, the two governments create a broader, collective escalatory band that signals to Moscow that large-scale aggression against Europe could trigger a coordinated response. This layered approach strengthens deterrence by complicating an adversary's calculations and widening crisis management options. Yet, expanded ambiguity is a double-edged sword: While advantageous against adversaries, it can create friction among allies if left unexplained. France and the United Kingdom will therefore need to reassure NATO partners that: (1) this language reinforces, rather than substitutes for, U.S. extended deterrence; and (2) their independent, coordinated deterrents continue to contribute meaningfully to the alliance's collective security as well as peace and stability across the Euro-Atlantic area.
Capabilities
Deepening scientific synergy through the Teutates program would allow both nations to build a structurally resilient alliance capable of sustaining high-end deterrence independently. In particular, Paris and London could further standardize their diagnostic protocols through a "rapprochement" of their high-performance computing environment or quantum diagnostic tools. By aligning these underlying architectures, both nations can accelerate technical breakthroughs without compromising national warhead design secrecy.
Strategic cooperation should also continue in the non-nuclear domains with strategic weight, specifically Deep Precision Strike and Integrated Air and Missile Defense. These areas bypass a primary friction point in the nuclear domain: the difficulty of separating U.S.-sourced components from UK-origin elements in British nuclear architecture. From a French perspective, fostering such high-end capabilities could operationalize the doctrine of "mutual support" (epaulement) between nuclear and conventional domains, thereby providing European capabilities that strengthen the European collective posture. Building on the success of the SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow, Paris and London should continue pursuing joint development for next-generation strategic non-nuclear systems to reinforce NATO deterrence and defense as well as the broader European security dimension. While the primary objective is not the creation of a common nuclear weapon, such cooperation would provide a robust industrial foundation should the United Kingdom choose to pursue a future air-launched nuclear capability.
Any cooperation that touches UK systems with U.S. origin components will, however, require careful coordination with Washington. This is particularly relevant as the United Kingdom prepares to field the F35A for NATO's nuclear mission, which aligns London more closely with established NATO nuclear architecture and contributes to alliance burden sharing, a priority for both Washington and the United Kingdom. Yet this step does not constrain longer-term options. It does not preclude a distinct Franco-British airborne pathway, which would require deeper integration between the United Kingdom's Atomic Weapons Establishment and France's Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission, as well as potentially a "convertible" warhead design independent of U.S. components. Any such development would need to be positioned as complementary to NATO's Dual-Capable Aircraft mission, reinforcing allied capabilities rather than duplicating or competing with them.
Operations
Finally, several concrete steps could be taken to give substance to the operational cooperation envisioned in the Northwood Declaration, beginning with peacetime operational synergy. Following the inclusion of UK officials in France's Operation POKER, the next logical step would be the active participation of British conventional aircraft in an escort role or airspace-control missions during future iterations. Conducting these maneuvers outside French territory would amplify the European dimension of this cooperation and strengthen its deterrent signaling to adversaries.
Though less visible by nature, cooperation within the naval leg of the nuclear posture could be enhanced through coordinated submarine escorts prior to long-range patrols or synchronized port calls. These actions improve survivability by reducing predictability, sharing intelligence, and allowing limited mutual support--such as protective escorts or tracking of potential adversary antisubmarine activity--before the submarines enter deep patrol areas. They also provide a platform for deliberate strategic messaging.
As bilateral trust matures, this relationship could evolve to include joint training for nuclear command staff and complementary strategic signaling via coordinated sea patrols. Given that operational planning is a traditionally guarded sovereign domain, success will require a high degree of mutual confidence.
To ensure the long-term viability of these initiatives, both nations should focus on institutionalizing these workstreams. By embedding "Northwood" objectives into the career paths of senior military and civil-service personnel, the alliance can maintain strategic continuity and "weather-proof" the partnership against shifting domestic political climates in either capital.
From Declaration to Delivery
To provide substance to the Northwood Declaration, Paris and London must prioritize "quick wins" that signal tangible operational synergy. This should involve formalizing a structured sequence for 2026-27 POKER-type exercises, alongside reassurance flights and enabler events for ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To maintain strategic ambiguity, these commitments need not be date-specific; however, formalizing the sequence itself would demonstrate a meaningful shift toward deepened integration.
Politically, both capitals must further harmonize their definitions of "vital interests" and "extreme threats." This is particularly timely if President Macron's forthcoming doctrine speech further emphasizes the "European dimension" of French deterrence. However, this harmonization should be pursued through discreet strategic dialogues with allies rather than public codification, so that Paris and London can reassure European partners of a shared understanding of vital interests and extreme threats without revealing sensitive thresholds or operational intentions to potential adversaries. The articulation between these joint dialogues involving France and the United Kingdom, and the bilateral dialogues that France convenes on the "European dimension" of its deterrence (e.g., with Germany and Sweden) will have to be thought through as well.
While some analysts argue that France should join the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), a smaller, dedicated European forum could allow more candid discussions on "vital interests" and conventional capabilities underpinning a "Europeanized" nuclear posture. This approach complements NATO, reflecting that the United Kingdom's nuclear commitment remains firmly anchored in the NATO alliance, and offers a model for other European states to strengthen security without diverting focus or resources away from NATO. This does not preclude France from articulating how its policy aligns with NATO; rather, it provides a flexible architecture for those most directly affected by European security shifts. If Paris remains outside the NPG, the United Kingdom is uniquely positioned to bridge coordination between any European initiative and the broader NATO structure.
As the continent's only two nuclear-armed states, the United Kingdom and France have a unique role to underpin the continent's strategic stability. Yet nuclear forces are one part of a broader deterrence ecosystem that increasingly depends on credible conventional mass. Europe needs to develop interoperable strike, air defense, and enabling capabilities to ensure the overall European deterrence architecture is credible and flexible. This will allow the United Kingdom and France to anchor their nuclear dimension with conventional mass so that Europe can impose cost and manage escalation through non-nuclear means.
Finally, these advancements depend on proactive management of the U.S. relationship. For the United Kingdom, maintaining its nuclear partnership with the United States--anchored in the Mutual Defense Agreement--remains indispensable. To secure Washington's endorsement and avoid miscalculation, France and the United Kingdom must maintain transparency regarding their deepened cooperation. Strategically, this cohesion is a necessity; Paris and London must avoid any vulnerability to Russian opportunism, which is often fueled by a perceived decoupling of transatlantic ties. This reassurance is vital for European allies and aligns with the Franco-British tradition of transparency within disarmament fora, demonstrating how the Northwood Declaration ultimately supports global nonproliferation goals and a stronger, more autonomous European pillar within NATO.
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Astrid Chevreuil is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Jonathan Burchell is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/northwood-declaration-future-european-deterrence
[Category: ThinkTank]