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Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to China Brief Notes: Taiwan's Cautious Optimism on U.S. National Security Strategy
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, in its China Brief Notes:* * *
Taiwan's Cautious Optimism on U.S. National Security Strategy
By Dennis Yang
Executive Summary:
* Initial responses in Taiwan to the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) have been divided, largely in line with stakeholders' political persuasions.
* Those in President Lai's administration have welcomed the document's large number of mentions of Taiwan, the removal of language referring to a U.S. "one China Policy" and not supporting Taiwan independence, and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, in its China Brief Notes: * * * Taiwan's Cautious Optimism on U.S. National Security Strategy By Dennis Yang Executive Summary: * Initial responses in Taiwan to the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) have been divided, largely in line with stakeholders' political persuasions. * Those in President Lai's administration have welcomed the document's large number of mentions of Taiwan, the removal of language referring to a U.S. "one China Policy" and not supporting Taiwan independence, andthe commitment to "denying aggression" in the first island chain.
* Opposition Kuomintang voices, as well as some aligned with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have voiced concern about the NSS. They worry that the strategy's focus on the Western Hemisphere, coupled with the administration's apparent softening in tone toward Beijing, could lead to a "strategic retreat" from Taiwan.
U.S. emphasis on burden sharing for a Taiwan contingency puts additional pressure on Taiwan to increase its self-defense capabilities and cooperate more with Indo-Pacific allies.
On December 4, 2025, the White House released the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS). The document mentions Taiwan eight times, the third-most of any country, after the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. It also attaches great importance to the prevention of a Taiwan Strait conflict, saying that "deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority," and calling for the capacity to deny aggression "anywhere" in the first island chain (White House, December 4, 2025). In addition to focusing on Taiwan's strategic value, it also notes Taiwan's economic importance, due to its "dominance of semiconductor production."
The document contains several subtle shifts in language on Taiwan from the Biden administration's 2022 NSS. While the earlier document said that the United States would "oppose" any unilateral changes to the status quo, the new strategy simply says that it "does not support" any changes. The new NSS also drops language from the Biden administration's strategy on not supporting Taiwan independence and on remaining committed to a "one China policy" (White House, October 12, 2022).
Initial Taiwanese reactions to the release of the NSS ranged from cautious optimism to outright skepticism. Some interpreted the language as signaling greater U.S. strategic clarity regarding the Taiwan Strait, while others focused on linguistic shifts in the NSS to argue that it may foreshadow higher expectations for Taiwan and greater uncertainty about Washington's long-term intentions.
Incumbent Administration Optimistic
The day after the NSS was released, President Lai Ching-te remarked on social media that he "greatly appreciate[d]" the prioritization of deterring a conflict over Taiwan and securing the first island chain (X/@ChingteLai, December 5, 2025). Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo described preventing an assault on Taiwan as the strategy's most important objective, saying that "as long as Taiwan is safe, the Indo-Pacific is safe" (SETN, December 6, 2025)./[1]
Cabinet-level officials also reacted positively. Taiwan's foreign minister, Lin Chia-lung, broadened his comments to include reference to Taiwan's role in key supply chains. He said that President Trump's recent signing of the Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act and his approval of arms sale packages to Taiwan demonstrate continued U.S. commitment to Taiwan (Reuters, November 18, 2025; MoFA, December 6, 2025). Taiwan's defense minister, Wellington Koo, remarked that "peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is still the United States's greatest core interest", emphasizing collective deterrence as well as Taiwan's progress in its resolve and self-defense capabilities (LTN, December 6, 2025).
This tone was echoed among Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators and DPP-affiliated experts. Wang Ting-yu, who sits on the Legislative Yuan's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, said that Taiwan "is seen as an important core interest" f the United States, and noted that Taiwan's importance to the United States "is very clearly stated" in the NSS (SETN, December 6, 2025). Su Tzu-yun, director of the Defense Strategy and Resources Division at the government-affiliated think tank Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) said that the NSS affirms U.S. strategic clarity and represents a fourth "period of strategic opportunity") in Taiwan's recent history./[2] Su noted that references in the NSS to "collective defense" and commitments to "denying aggression" in the first island chain should lead to a decrease in "skepticism of the United States" (LTN, December 7, 2025).
The NSS makes clear that the burden of preventing conflict in the Taiwan Strait is not the unilateral responsibility of the United States. It says that U.S. allies "must step up and spend--and more importantly do--much more for collective defense," and that the U.S. will "maintain our determined rhetoric on increased defense spending" in Taiwan.
This has caused some anxiety, even among politicians connected to the DPP administration. General Lee Hsiang-yu), who served as National Security Bureau director under President Ma Ying-jeou and ambassador to Denmark under President Tsai Ing-wen, interpreted the NSS as demanding that Taiwan develop "absolute deterrence" (UDN, December 7, 2025). He also warned that Taiwan must avoid being a victim of great power competition.
On the other side of Taiwan's political spectrum, the Kuomintang (KMT) leadership and local officials have been uncharacteristically quiet, giving no official response on the NSS. One legislator, Lee Yen-hsiu, acknowledged the language in the NSS but criticized delays in U.S. arms deliveries, urging Washington to pressure manufacturers to adhere to delivery timelines (Radio Taiwan International, December 7, 2025).
Some perspectives from the pro-PRC wing of the KMT overlapped with Beijing's response to the NSS, particularly regarding the PRC's interpretation of U.S. intentions in the Western Hemisphere (China Brief, December 17, 2025). Former KMT Legislator and media pundit Tsai Cheng-yuan emphasized the NSS's ambition to "reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere," stating that the NSS represented a "strategic retreat" and that the United States was "hollowing out its Indo-Pacific strategy". This sentiment was reiterated by another former KMT legislator, Joanna Chien Lei, who sees Trump as intending to rely on Taiwan and Japan to contain the PRC. Tsai also argued that the U.S. government is softening its view of the PRC from "enemy number one" to "a friend that they are not on good terms with" (Storm Media Group, December 8, 2025).
Conclusion
Different stakeholders in Taiwan have reacted in different ways to the new U.S. National Security Strategy. Many are reassured of continued U.S. attention and support, especially those in the DPP administration. At the same time, the NSS has sharpened debates over burden sharing and Taiwan's decision-making agency within the overall U.S. strategy. It has not resolved longstanding ambiguities surrounding U.S. commitments to Taiwan, but instead has reframed them in ways that have been interpreted either as opportunities or as challenges. Going forward, Taiwan will likely continue its ongoing military modernization and seek greater cooperation with Japan in recognition that it will not be able to rely solely on the United States in a future Taiwan contingency.
[1] The specific wording is in reference to (Any contingency for Taiwan is a contingency for Japan), first articulated by former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2021 after leaving office. (The original Japanese is Recently, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi referenced the concept in response to a question in parliament that a PRC attack on Taiwan could constitute an "existential crisis" for Japan, allowing for Japan to resort to self-defense.
[2] The other three "periods of strategic opportunity," according to Su, were President George W. Bush's arms sale package to Taiwan in 2001 and his commitment to defend Taiwan; the Taiwan Travel Act, passed under the first Trump administration; and President Biden's four public commitments to defending Taiwan (LTN, December 7, 2025).
Other Figures Respond With Caution
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Dennis Yang is a Research Assistant at the Jamestown Foundation. He researches Cross-Strait relations, Taiwanese politics, CCP united front efforts, and China-Latin America relations.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/taiwans-cautious-optimism-on-u-s-national-security-strategy/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute: Mercosur Agreement Can Cushion Negative Effects of US Tariff Policy
MUNICH, Germany, Jan. 17 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release:* * *
Mercosur Agreement Can Cushion Negative Effects of US Tariff Policy
The Mercosur Agreement can partially offset losses due to US tariff policy. "The signing of the trade agreement between the EU and the Mercosur states is an important first step. However, additional trade agreements with other trading partners are needed to compensate for the negative consequences of US tariff policy," says Lisandra Flach, Director of the ifo Center for International Economics. "The EU should concentrate on also achieving ... Show Full Article MUNICH, Germany, Jan. 17 (TNSxrep) -- ifo Institute issued the following news release: * * * Mercosur Agreement Can Cushion Negative Effects of US Tariff Policy The Mercosur Agreement can partially offset losses due to US tariff policy. "The signing of the trade agreement between the EU and the Mercosur states is an important first step. However, additional trade agreements with other trading partners are needed to compensate for the negative consequences of US tariff policy," says Lisandra Flach, Director of the ifo Center for International Economics. "The EU should concentrate on also achievingswift results in the currently ongoing free trade negotiations. The trade agreement with Indonesia, for example, has already been negotiated and is on the table."
A study conducted by the ifo Institute on behalf of the New Social Free Market Initiative has shown that new free trade agreements with seven important trading partners would not only offset but even overcompensate the negative effects of US tariff policy. German exports would grow by up to 4.1 percent as a result of this step, despite the US tariffs. German gross domestic product would increase by up to 0.5 percent. Positive value creation effects could be achieved especially in export-oriented industries such as mechanical engineering (2.7 percent), the chemical industry (3.1 percent), and the automotive industry (3.2 percent).
In addition to the EU trade agreement with the Mercosur states (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay), the study is also based on agreements with India, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. Without new trade agreements, US tariffs would reduce German GDP by 0.13 percent and exports by 1.3 percent in the medium term.
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Publication
2025 Monograph (Authorship)
Global Europe 2.0 - Okonomische Potenziale einer neuen europaischen Freihandelsoffensive
Andreas Baur, Lisandra Flach, Isabella Gourevich
ifo Studie
Learn more (https://www.ifo.de/en/publications/2025/monograph-authorship/global-europe-20-okonomische-potenziale-einer-neuen)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-01-16/mercosur-agreement-can-cushion-negative-effects-on-us-tariff-policy
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Posts Commentary to China-US Focus: China-ROK Relations on the Rebound?
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, posted the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, to China-US Focus:* * *
China-ROK Relations on the Rebound?
By Richard Weitz
On January 4, Lee Jae Myung became the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to travel to the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 2019. During his four-day state visit, Lee met with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, Chairman of the National People's Congress Zhao Leji, and other senior PRC leaders. Lee stated ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, posted the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, to China-US Focus: * * * China-ROK Relations on the Rebound? By Richard Weitz On January 4, Lee Jae Myung became the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) to travel to the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 2019. During his four-day state visit, Lee met with President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, Chairman of the National People's Congress Zhao Leji, and other senior PRC leaders. Lee statedthat, "Korea-China relations will advance to an entirely new stage through this visit to China." This will almost certainly not be the case.
The visit did address a wide range of important topics. However, the trip did not resolve any of the main differences between the two countries. The two governments deferred several sensitive questions to future discussions between the PRC and ROK officials. Implementing the economic and commercial agreements will depend on the capacity and willingness of many public and private sector actors to transform memoranda of understanding (MOUs) into concrete business projects. The pledge to "restore strategic dialogue channels in various fields, including between the diplomatic and security authorities of both countries," was also vague.
Lee has termed his approach "pragmatic diplomacy." Upon his return from China, he explained that, "In a ruthless international order where there are no eternal enemies, friends or rules, the fate of the Republic of Korea hinges on pragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests." After winning a snap presidential election and assuming office in early June, Lee initially focused on shoring up relations with the United States. More recently, he has concentrated on improving ties with the PRC and the DPRK.
Lee's visit made some progress on enhancing economic ties. The two governments signed MOUs to expand cooperation in more than a dozen areas, including supply chains, digital technology, business startups, intellectual property, child welfare, and environmental preservation. Lee's delegation included many senior executives, who joined the president at the China-Korea business forum, where Lee called for expanding consumer goods sales and artificial intelligence cooperation. However, concerns about industrial espionage and U.S. export controls will continue to limit Sino-ROK high-tech trade.
Lee secured only a vague promissory note to end China's undeclared "Korean wave ban" on ROK cultural products, which began after the ROK angered the PRC by deploying a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in 2016. The sides reportedly agreed to begin by engaging in sports and games, such as football (soccer) and baduk (Go). They deferred expanding academic, entertainment, media, and youth exchanges to interagency deliberations. Following the trip, though, ROK Presidential Chief of Staff Kang Hoon Sik acknowledged that China was unlikely to halt its informal ban anytime soon.
The governments also deferred their dispute over the Yellow (West) Sea to future vice-ministerial-level talks on maritime and ocean issues. The South Koreans have complained about illegal Chinese fishing in their territorial waters and China's placing various metallic structures in the jointly managed Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ). This is located between each country's coastal territory but inside their overlapping exclusive economic zones. PRC representatives termed these structures fish farms, though some observers view them as the same kind of creeping territorial expansion through artificial islands that Beijing has employed in the South China Sea. Lee unsuccessfully proposed drawing a border line in the middle of the PMZ.
Regarding North Korea, Lee repeated the same appeal to Xi that he made the previous November on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Gyeongju: that Beijing use its influence with Pyongyang to rein in its nuclear program and resume diplomatic engagement with Seoul. Xi responded that patience was needed. His government committed only "to continue exploring creative ways to reduce tensions and build peace on the Korean Peninsula." Official Chinese statements, including during Lee's visit, no longer call for the Peninsula's denuclearization. On the positive side, the Chinese side did not display major public concern about the South's pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines, which ROK officials said they explained in detail to the PRC counterparts.
Xi made an overt effort to pull South Korea away from Japan and possibly the United States. In his meeting with Lee, Xi explicitly referred to both nations' war of liberation against Japan: "Over 80 years ago, China and the ROK made great sacrifices in resisting Japanese militarism and achieved the victory. Today, it is all the more important for the two sides to join hands to defend the victorious outcomes of World War II, and safeguard peace and stability of Northeast Asia." Xi also urged Lee to "firmly stand on the right side of history and make correct strategic choices."
In his own comments, Lee also referenced the two countries' historical partnership and visited a building in Shanghai where the Korean government-in-exile had met during Imperial Japan's occupation of Korea. Lee also distanced himself from the Japanese-U.S. line regarding Taiwan. He helped defuse the issue by telling the PRC media in advance of his trip that he respected the "One China" policy."
Lee understandably wanted to keep South Korea from suffering Japan's fate of heightened PRC denunciations and sanctions, which the ROK also experienced a decade earlier. When he visited Japan the following week, Lee avoided making public comments regarding China or Taiwan even while affirming intent to maintain robust relations with Japan. However, the two governments did discuss strengthening supply chains, an acknowledgement that PRC sanctions on Japan also impose costs on the ROK due to the three countries' economic interdependencies.
Other Asian governments face the same challenge as the Lee administration: how to balance the imperative of dealing with an increasingly assertive and economically preeminent China with their interest in sustaining economic and security ties with the United States and its allies. Lee has thus far adroitly juggled South Korea's diverse interests through pragmatism and multi-vector diplomacy. But the viability of this strategy will be sorely tested if Sino-U.S. relations undergo a renewed downturn over trade, Taiwan, North Korea, or the many other policy differences between Beijing and Washington.
Read in China-US Focus (https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-rok-relations-on-the-rebound).
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Richard Weitz is senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as well as US foreign and defense policies.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/china-rok-relations-rebound-richard-weitz
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Mosaic: Century of Rewarding Palestinian Terror
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, to Mosaic:* * *
A Century of Rewarding Palestinian Terror
By Douglas J. Feith
Hamas's October 7 atrocities were innovative--for instance, the attackers livestreamed their actions with Go-Pro cameras--but they also fit an old pattern known to those familiar with the region's history. Hamas said it was defending Jerusalem's al-Aqsa Mosque, and named its attack "al-Aqsa Flood." In the 1929 Hebron massacre ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, to Mosaic: * * * A Century of Rewarding Palestinian Terror By Douglas J. Feith Hamas's October 7 atrocities were innovative--for instance, the attackers livestreamed their actions with Go-Pro cameras--but they also fit an old pattern known to those familiar with the region's history. Hamas said it was defending Jerusalem's al-Aqsa Mosque, and named its attack "al-Aqsa Flood." In the 1929 Hebron massacrein British Mandate Palestine, the Arab rioters, who killed nearly 70 Jews, likewise screamed that they were defending al-Aqsa, which brings to mind Faulkner's aphorism, "The past is never dead. It's not even past."
This parallel is not mere coincidence, and shows something besides the impressive consistency of anti-Zionist propaganda over the past century. Linking the two episodes is the killers' sense that massacres of civilians are politically beneficial. If one fails to acknowledge that political calculation, it is impossible to understand either the terrorists' motivations or how best to counteract them.
In 1929, British officials responded to the bloodbath with pro-Arab policy initiatives, much as present-day governments in Britain and elsewhere have responded to the war launched by Hamas on October 7, 2023 by recognizing a Palestinian state. History shows that those initiatives in 1929 were a huge mistake. They produced ugly, long-lasting effects on Palestinian Arab political culture. Indeed, the 2023 attack can reasonably be seen as a result--a distant but direct reverberation--of the errors those officials made by rushing, in effect, to reward savagery.
In 1929, as in 2023, the Arab attack took the form of torture, rape, murder, arson, and pillage. Raymond Cafferata, the British police superintendent in Hebron, later testified to an investigating commission, "I did all in my power to protect the two Jews by surrounding them with my mounted men but the mob surged round and stoned them to death within two minutes." He continued, "Crowds who had been watching the attack and murder of the two Jews from the road and surroundings then started to attack each Jewish house. They were armed with crowbars, sledgehammers, swords, and knives." Among his many appalling recollections was that he "saw an Arab in the act of cutting off a child's head with a sword; he had already hit him and was having another cut but on seeing me he tried to aim the stroke at me but missed" and "I shot him." Cafferata also told the commission he stopped a rape: there was "a Jewish woman smothered in blood with a man I recognised as a Police constable named Issa Sherrif from Jaffa in [civilian clothes]. He was standing over the woman with a dagger in his hand. He saw me and bolted into a room close by and tried to shut me out--shouting (in Arabic), 'Your Honour, I am a Policeman.' (This man subsequently died.) I got into the room and shot him."
The attackers wrecked a synagogue and a hospital, incinerated homes, and looted shops. They succeeded in obliterating the Jewish community that had lived in and around Hebron for many centuries--according to the Bible, from the time when Abraham and Sarah were entombed there in a cave that the Hebrew patriarch had bought from its Hittite landowner for 400 silver shekels. Arab policemen generally failed in their duty; a number joined the mob. While some courageous Arabs protected their Jewish neighbors, other Jews were hacked to death by people they knew by name and had long lived beside. Anti-Jewish mayhem spread to towns and villages throughout Palestine.
British officials condemned the rioters in 1929 for pitiless murder, and then tried to mollify them. They failed. The consequences of their appeasement effort remain with us today.
When people get rewarded for acting brutally, the world becomes more jungle-like. Palestinian Arabs have been fighting Jews violently in the Holy Land for a little more than a hundred years. The strategy has hardly brought them success, but they have retained it, in part because anti-Jewish mayhem brings them political rewards from important foreign actors. This was true in the 1920s and remains so in 2026.
In light of the events of the past two years, the Hebron riots' history warrants review.
In the late 1920s, Britain governed the Holy Land. The youthful Arab leader, Haj Amin al-Husseini, who served as Jerusalem's mufti and the president of Palestine's Supreme Muslim Council, used religious schools and mosques to promote the accusation that the Jews were plotting to destroy al-Aqsa. Although the accusation was false, it was widely believed in the Arab community.
In 1929, Husseini's campaign of incitement helped bring about two weeks of anti-Jewish atrocities in multiple towns and villages, of which the Hebron massacre was the worst instance. In total, 183 Jews were killed and 339 wounded.
High Commissioner Sir John Chancellor, the British-appointed governor of Palestine, disapproved of Zionism, but was appalled. In his diary, he wrote, "I do not think history records many worse horrors in the last 200 years." A long-serving imperial administrator, Chancellor took office in Jerusalem in 1928, after time in the British army and colonial service, including as governor of Mauritius and then of Southern Rhodesia. He had little experience with Jews, no expertise on Palestine, and scant exposure to the Middle East in general. He was handsome, but that was not enough to make him a popular figure in Jerusalem society, and his grumpy demeanor offset any advantage gained by his looks. Though he displayed neither broad intellectual interests nor personal warmth, he spoke impressively about policy and his opinions won respect.
Chancellor claimed to have brought no political preconceptions to Palestine, but quickly came to champion ideas hostile to the Jewish national cause. This aligned him with most of his subordinates in the Palestine government, but it put him at cross-purposes with Britain's declared policy of support for the creation of a national home for the Jews in their ancient homeland. That policy, originally formulated in the 1917 Balfour Declaration, became a legal obligation when incorporated into the Palestine Mandate, a trust supervised by the League of Nations.
Though Arab leaders for years had insisted that they would never consent to large-scale Jewish immigration, never agree to a Jewish national home, and never join an administration rooted in the Balfour Declaration, and would prefer to fight to the death than to compromise on these positions, British officials generally disregarded these "nevers." They simply assured themselves that the Arabs over time would moderate.
Then came the 1929 riots, which rocked the government. In Britain, they produced moral outrage. They also, however, energized anti-Zionist forces, who interpreted the inhumanity of the bloodletting as a sign of the vehemence of Arab grievances. High Commissioner Chancellor proved far more eager to accommodate than to punish those responsible. He favored radical policy changes to remedy Arab complaints against the Jews and pressed for these changes as necessary to prevent future riots.
Some British opponents of Zionism had long advised Arab leaders to keep the peace, on the assumption that disturbances would hurt the Arab cause. Throughout much of the 1920s, senior figures in the Arab establishment accepted the advice. The riots, however, gave rise to official British initiatives to placate the Arabs, which would permanently alter Arab attitudes toward the use of violence.
Thanks to the British pro-Arab initiatives that followed the 1929 disturbances, the threat of more riots became the mainspring of Palestinian Arab diplomacy. When the British formed a commission to investigate the riots, the once cautious Arab Executive--then the key Arab political organ in Palestine--began issuing threats: its president (an older cousin of the mufti) gave British officials a "warning" of "an armed Arab rising" if the investigating did not lead to cancellation of the Balfour Declaration. A Daily Express correspondent reported on September 2, 1929 that Mufti Husseini said, "Ultimate peace in Palestine and Arabia will never be made while Great Britain continues to pursue the policy of the Balfour declaration." The mufti later described the 1929 riots as a "spontaneous and uncontrollable protest" against "unnatural and unjust Zionist aggression." A British admiral sent London reports of Arabs saying that "next time they will make a more thorough job of it." British intelligence noted that preparations were underway for a "general uprising, well armed and organized for action against the Jews" and that the Arabs would attack the Jews "by all means at their disposal, and at whatever cost."
This intimidation campaign succeeded. Colonial Office experts proposed backing away from the Balfour Declaration. Typical was O.G.R. Williams of the Middle East Department, contemplating the best response "in the face of the increasing threats of violence on the part of the Arabs." In an alarmed and alarming November 13, 1929 memorandum, Williams said Arab leaders were focused on what conclusions would be drawn by the investigating commission. If it fingered the Arabs and linked the violence to "preconcerted action," he warned, then "Arab dissatisfaction" would produce an even worse "explosion."
To head off that explosion, Williams said officials should ascertain "Arab grievances and apprehensions" and "allay them, so far as possible." He recognized that there was danger in any "appearance of weakening," yet the "risk of bloodshed" persuaded him that the high commissioner should reach out to Arab leaders to ease tensions.
At the same time, British intelligence was reporting that Palestinian Arab nationalists had created a "Boycott Committee" for "terrorist purposes with a view to the assassination of [Arab] persons considered to be acting against Arab nationalist interests." The Committee was "formed with knowledge and consent of Supreme Moslem Council and Arab Executive who have subscribed to expense." Its murder campaign, already underway, was organized "quite effectively," and appeared to be "meeting with some success," as evidenced by the drying up of Arab sources of information for the police.
High Commissioner Chancellor warned the Colonial Office that there would be hell to pay if the government did not adopt policies favorable to the Arabs. He cabled that he was "quite certain" that "there will be rebellion," unless the Arabs "obtain some concessions, and the ambitions of the Zionists are curbed." He added, "The Moslem population appear to be approaching a state of desperation on account of government's failure to meet their wishes in any way."
The high commissioner proposed actions to make the anti-Zionists happy. In London, officials debated the proposals and tried to ascertain what exactly the conflict in Palestine was about. Did the Arabs hate Jews or only Zionists? Was the hatred racial and religious, or was it political? Was it widespread or little more than a sentiment and tool of an elite who promoted it for selfish purposes among generally indifferent masses? Was the hatred appeasable?
British officials had long comforted themselves by downplaying the problem of Arab-Jewish enmity. They often denied that the hatred was widespread or so fundamental and intense as to be beyond pacification. The 1929 riots clarified the picture. Hebron's strictly Orthodox Jewish community predated organized Zionism and was known in general to be unconnected to it. So the riots' victims were not specifically Zionists, but simply Jews. The conflict was not mild and manageable, but murderous. It was not narrowly based, but popular. It was not focused on policy issues subject to rational debate and compromise, but rooted in religious and nationalistic passions that scorned accommodation.
The enormities of the rioters that had outraged even anti-Zionist British officials did not produce repudiations, apologies, or goodwill gestures from the Arab community, which evinced no collective shame. Rather, the community rallied to defend rioters facing official punishment, including convicted murderers. It raised money for Arabs who were hurt, but not for Jews. In meetings after the riots, its leaders spoke with officials aggressively and accusatorily, without restraint, let alone remorse. All of this pointed to bloody trouble ahead.
The British investigative commission, in its March 13, 1930 report, adopted High Commissioner Chancellor's perspective. It described the riots as an Arab attack on Jews, yet, contrary to the evidence it collected, it cleared the top Arab leaders of accusations of intentionally fanning racial hatred and organizing the onslaught.
The key finding was that fear, not hatred, drove the Arabs to violence. According to the commission, the Arabs' "fears for the future of their race in Palestine" were based on their belief that the Jews and British intended "to make them landless or to subordinate their interests as a people." Jewish immigration aroused "apprehension in the Arab mind." The Arab mayor of Nablus said the Zionists intended to "dispose of the Arabs" and "replace them with Jews." The commission hammered the theme of the Jewish threat and the awful unease it caused among the Arabs.
Blame is a weapon of war and Zionism's enemies scored an important success when the commission concluded that Jews who spoke provocatively--though they were non-violent--were mainly responsible for the anti-Jewish massacres. "Extreme statements" by Zionists caused the Arabs to see the Jewish immigrant as a "menace to their livelihood" and a "possible overlord." In other words, it was the Jews' fault that Arabs hated them so fiercely. If Zionists had been moderate and generous, the commission wrote, Arab opposition "might never have been fully roused or, if roused, might have been overcome."
The British prime minister Ramsay MacDonald became "much perturbed," according to a well-connected observer, because the report was "far too pro-Arab for the P.M.'s taste." MacDonald, a principal founder of Britain's Labor party, was an admired orator, gifted with a strong intellect and a kindly face decorated with an exuberant mustache. His politics were nimble, without ideological rigidity. Seven years prior, as leader of the Labor opposition, he had visited Palestine as a guest of the Labor Zionist movement. He supported the Jewish national movement in principle, but equivocated. Now he was caught in heavy cross-currents generated by disagreements about Palestine policy.
High Commissioner Chancellor, a determined wavemaker, pressed hard for his anti-Zionist policy proposals. He wanted the home government to gut the Balfour Declaration. His three immediate goals were restricting Jewish immigration, curtailing land sales to Jews, and creating a Legislative Council that would be popularly elected and therefore dominated by Arabs. It bears reiterating: he favored those measures in all events, but he was now able to argue, after the 1929 riots, that they were necessary to prevent future unrest.
The high commissioner's position was adopted by his immediate superior, Lord Passfield, the colonial secretary. Passfield, a short, goateed, and bespectacled academic economist, had helped found the London School of Economics. He was a pacifist, though an admirer of Stalin, and a socialist, but by no means an admirer of the Zionist Labor party. Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist Organization, saw the colonial secretary as "frightened," a man who thought of himself as "patron saint of the Arabs," whose role was "to protect the poor Arabs against the powerful Jews."
In October 1930, Passfield issued a new pronouncement on Palestine, known to history as the Passfield White Paper. The document asserted that no policy in the Holy Land could succeed unless the Arabs as well as the Jews gave it "willing cooperation." This sounded ordinary enough, even banal--a way of encouraging compromise and expressing faith that Arab-Jewish accord was achievable. But these words had the potential to undo the Balfour Declaration. They might just as logically be understood as encouraging Arab resistance, assuring rejectionists that they have the power to kill the Jewish national home by withholding their consent.
The crux of the White Paper was the set of pro-Arab measures championed by High Commissioner Chancellor. First was a promise to move "without further delay" to set up an Legislative Council with elected members. This, the document said, "should be of special benefit to the Arab section of the population." Next, the White Paper expressed negative views of land purchases by Jews. Finally, the government would further limit Jewish immigration.
Throughout the government, officials felt uneasy that Arabs--and Jews too, for that matter--would see these pro-Arab measures as a nervous reaction to the riots. The White Paper's supporters, however, argued that preventing future riots was crucial and the way to do that was to assuage Arab anxiety and resentment. The many British officials who accepted this argument thus risked the obvious danger of rewarding arson, pillage, and murder. The mere appearance of rewarding violence was likely to do the opposite of pacify. It might inflame. In fact, it might send a message to the discontented in Palestine that rioting is the surest path to political success.
The colonial administration was not composed of fools, and officials understood the risks of their preferred policies. They found a simple way to thread the needle: they took action that rewarded violence, but announced that they would never reward violence. Even as it altered policy to try to appease the rioters, the White Paper proclaimed that intimidation would never produce a policy change. To believe otherwise, the text said, was a "false hope," as the government would "not be moved by any pressure or threats." Few found this gambit persuasive.
Prominent members of Parliament lambasted the government for its pro-Arab turn. The White Paper was "almost universally regarded as a revocation" of the Palestine Mandate, the former prime minister David Lloyd George argued on November 17, 1930 in the House of Commons. "Not merely the Jews, but the Arabs take this view. The Jews regret; the Arabs rejoice."
Toward Jewish activities, Lloyd George said, the White Paper "breathes distrust and even antagonism," which was understandable only as the product of an "anti-Semitic" author. The White Paper complained of Jews who immigrated without permission, but it merely assumed they were Jews and said not a word about "the thousands of Arabs who have been doing the same thing."
In this House of Commons debate, the Liberal Lloyd George received cross-party support. The Conservative Leopold Amery, a former colonial secretary, bolstered the case for upholding the Balfour Declaration. As a member of the War Cabinet secretariat in 1917, Amery had helped write the Declaration. He denied that it ignored the Arabs. The authors considered the Arabs' position, Amery explained, but decided a Jewish national home was a matter of right and "that right should not be left to the discretion of conflicting Arab nationalism."
Herbert Samuel also took to the floor. He was the Liberal party's number-two parliamentarian and joined its leader, Lloyd George, in panning the White Paper. As Palestine's first high commissioner (1920-1925), Samuel had had authority over all of Palestine, on both sides of the Jordan River. Believing the White Paper was wrong in claiming that Arab farmers lacked cultivable land, Samuel focused attention on eastern Palestine, known then as Transjordan. It had ample rich farmland, he said, available for Arabs from western Palestine who wanted or needed to relocate. He elaborated, "there is a constant movement to and fro" across the Jordan River and Transjordan urgently needs more population.
There were other problems with the White Paper, Samuel commented, including its promotion of the false idea that "any Jewish gain must be an Arab loss." The worst flaw, however, was that it was changing policy "after massacre," which could lead people in Palestine and elsewhere to think that "massacre is the road to obtain concessions."
Among Palestinian Arab leaders, the riots and their aftermath caused the relative moderates to lose ground to the radicals--especially to Mufti Husseini. Husseini had been the loudest voice accusing the Jews of plotting to destroy al-Aqsa, fueling the country-wide anti-Jewish frenzy that brought about the riots and the astonishing subsequent British concessions.
Arab Executive members debated how to respond to the White Paper. Its pro-Arab qualities were noted, but detractors dominated the discussion. Rather than praise the decision to limit Jewish immigration, the Arab Executive ultimately issued a critical statement, knocking Britain for refusing to give the Arabs more power in the proposed Legislative Council. This was a sign that younger, more radical men--supporters of the mufti--were taking over leadership.
The high commissioner had crafted his pro-Arab agenda to induce the Arabs to moderate. But the Arab Executive's response showed that it had the opposite effects, as could be expected of a policy based on appeasing violence. The radicals emerged stronger, and even the more moderate Arab leaders grew less inclined to cooperate with the government. If the White Paper had elicited the desired Arab response, perhaps the prime minister would have simply taken in stride the flak directed against the document from pro-Zionists in Parliament, as well as both Jews and Arabs in Palestine. It quickly grew apparent, however, that the change in policy was an unmitigated fiasco.
Husseini had ignited the violence that triggered the official British spasm of pro-Arab appeasement. He won credit among his own people for this, making the old guard, embodied in the Arab Executive, appear weak and overly cautious. He capitalized on his accomplishment to fulfill his long-term aspiration to political as well as religious preeminence. With its non-radical approach discredited, the Arab Executive soon ceased to function. The mufti, never a member of the Executive, emerged as the dominant force in his community and the leader of its wars against the Jews and the British. But he was not able to win those wars. Palestine's Arabs to this day have not recovered from his failures--or even learned from them.
Four months after its publication, Prime Minister MacDonald effectively admitted that the White Paper was a bad mistake. He cancelled its main provisions in a February 13, 1931 letter he sent to the Zionist Organization. Lasting damage, however, was already done, for important Arab leaders had already become convinced that murderous riots made senior British officials eager to accommodate them.
As their internal memoranda showed, British officials knew what they had to do to accomplish Britain's declared goals in Palestine--principally, to fulfil the Mandate by upholding the Balfour Declaration and to prevent a resurgence of Arab rioting. They needed to show strength of purpose, moral confidence, and willingness to use force to preserve law and order. Also, they needed to discourage bloody disorder rather than incentivize it.
Yet they failed.
They vacillated. They diluted their commitment to the Jewish national home. They deployed inadequate force and communicated reluctance to use it. They denounced brutal behavior but then rewarded it. They teetered, making themselves look irresolute, fearful, and vulnerable to pressure.
For Palestine's Arabs, the lessons of British action in 1929 were that rioting pays and, when London is wobbly, the Arabs should be unyielding. British officials groused about Arab intransigence, but over time they gave in. The results militated against Britain's official goals. The government was empowering Husseini and the Arab radicals. It was encouraging extremism, not moderation, let alone compromise with the Jews. It was ensuring future political violence. And the violence soon came.
Why did British leaders make so many poor decisions?
Part of the problem was that some officials, opposed to their country's endorsement of Zionism, undermined rather than facilitated the Jewish national cause. Part was excessive faith in appeasement--the belief that Britain could make concessions that would satisfy the Arabs even while upholding Britain's commitment to the Jews. This was a refusal to take seriously the declared determination by Arab leaders to oppose any kind of Jewish national home anywhere in Palestine.
Part of the problem was an unwillingness among British officials to use force to uphold their policy against enemies that were willing to resort to violence. Whether this hesitance reflected pragmatic calculations, pacifist principles, cowardice, or something else, it had unintended effects. It encouraged Arab anti-Zionists to use violent threats, riots, and terrorism to oppose the Jews.
The parallels to the current war in Gaza are obvious. Under the leadership of Yahya Sinwar, Hamas in Gaza designed a catastrophe in the form of a one-two punch. First, it launched the savage October 7 attack. Then, having constructed its tunnel system for terrorist operations, it ensured that Israeli self-defense would harm civilians and cause gross destruction of Gaza's infrastructure. When the resulting condemnations of the IDF and calls for Palestinian statehood came, Hamas leaders could congratulate themselves. Even now, they celebrate their strategy, not despite the human suffering it causes, but because the suffering has so amply advanced their cause.
People around the world did express horror at the murders, rapes, mutilations, and kidnappings of ordinary men, women, and children by Hamas on October 7. Yet very little time passed before many of these same people, like High Commissioner Chancellor in 1929, argued that the key to preventing future terrorism of this kind is to placate the Zionists' enemies--for example, by recognizing Palestine as a state, endorsing untrue reports of famine in Gaza, accusing Israel falsely of "genocide," and otherwise delegitimating its actions to defend itself.
As in the aftermath of the 1929 riots, rewards for savagery will increase, not decrease, the likelihood of future terrorist violence. The responses of Western heads of state, journalists, professors, and human-rights institutions incentivize violence against ordinary Jews, while capitalizing on the misery of ordinary Palestinians. Intentionally or not, this lays a foundation for another century of self-defeating Arab anti-Zionist belligerence.
Such violence has never succeeded in blocking Israel's progress. The rewards can be expected, however, to empower the more hateful and oppressive elements in Palestinian Arab politics, making peace with Israel harder to achieve. Ordinary Palestinians will suffer as a result of the wrongheadedness of their ostensible supporters, as they have for more than a century.
The above is adapted from the author's book-in-progress on the pre-1948 history of the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine.
Read in Mosaic (https://ideas.tikvah.org/mosaic/observations/one-hundred-years-of-appeasement-the-history-of-getting-what-you-paid-for-in-the).
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Douglas J. Feith is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. He works on a range of foreign and defense issues, writing and lecturing on such topics as terrorism, arms control, alliance relations, national security policy making and the relationship of policy and intelligence.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/century-rewarding-palestinian-terror-douglas-feith
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary to Arab News: Geopolitical Consequences of Iran Protests for South Caucasus
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, to Arab News:* * *
The Geopolitical Consequences of Iran Protests for South Caucasus
By Luke Coffey
The ongoing mass demonstrations in Iran are the largest protests the country has seen in about half a decade. Although this current round of nationwide demonstrations began as a response to the economic crisis affecting market traders in the bazaars, it rapidly spread across the country as long-standing grievances ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026, to Arab News: * * * The Geopolitical Consequences of Iran Protests for South Caucasus By Luke Coffey The ongoing mass demonstrations in Iran are the largest protests the country has seen in about half a decade. Although this current round of nationwide demonstrations began as a response to the economic crisis affecting market traders in the bazaars, it rapidly spread across the country as long-standing grievancesover the lack of political reform and economic growth boiled over.
It is too early to tell what the outcome of these protests will be. The regime has proved resilient in the past and, although the situation does appear messy, it does not appear close to a total collapse. However, if the protests continue and outside intervention takes place, a wide range of outcomes is possible, from a rapid regime collapse as seen in Libya in 2011 to a gradual erosion of centralized control and de facto partition as seen in Syria.
While many policymakers view Iran primarily through the lens of the Middle East, the country's northern flank cannot be ignored. The three South Caucasus countries -- Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan -- will be watching events closely with nervousness and anxiety. Iran has historically viewed the South Caucasus as an area of influence in competition with Turkiye and Russia. The region is geopolitically important, as some of the world's most critical oil and gas transit pipelines run through it. Any spillover from Iran's internal turmoil could therefore have broader geopolitical consequences for the South Caucasus.
Although none of the three countries has made public statements regarding the demonstrations, off-the-record conversations with regional officials suggest clear concern. While the three states maintain varying degrees of relations with Tehran, two shared issues stand out.
The first is the economic impact of sustained unrest inside Iran. As neighbors, all three countries engage in trade and economic activity with Iran, albeit to different degrees. Azerbaijan, as the only country that borders both Russia and Iran, plays a role as a transit country between the two allies and generates revenue from this arrangement.
Armenia has often viewed Iran as an economic lifeline since trade with its neighbors Turkiye and Azerbaijan was frozen following the Nagorno-Karabakh War in the 1990s. This remains the case today, with Armenia's land borders with both Turkiye and Azerbaijan still closed. As a result, Iran continues to serve as one of Yerevan's most important economic outlets.
Georgia's trade with Iran is smaller than that of Armenia and Azerbaijan but it has been growing in recent years. As the Georgian government has grown more politically aligned with Moscow and more distant from its traditional European partners, it has increasingly sought economic opportunities elsewhere, including with Tehran. Trade between Georgia and Iran has risen year on year.
Notably, Georgia has faced criticism for allowing Russian cargo aircraft to transit its airspace en route to Iran, despite the fact that Russia continues to occupy portions of Georgian territory. This underscores how economic considerations are increasingly overriding long-standing political sensitivities.
Another economic factor shaping regional thinking is US President Donald Trump's threat to impose a 25 percent tariff on any country doing business with Iran. While such a measure may not have a dramatic immediate impact on the economies of the South Caucasus, it would still create economic fallout that governments in the region would prefer to avoid, particularly at a time of broader regional uncertainty.
The second shared concern among the South Caucasus states is the humanitarian impact of a potential refugee crisis. If conditions in Iran deteriorate to levels seen in Libya or Syria in 2011, the countries of the South Caucasus could experience an influx of refugees fleeing instability and violence. Such a development would place serious strain on already-fragile economies and public services, and it is a scenario regional governments are keen to prevent.
For Armenia and Azerbaijan, the two South Caucasus countries that share a land border with Iran, additional concerns are at play. One major issue is the well-being of ethnic minority communities inside Iran. For Armenia, which has historically maintained close relations with Tehran, there is concern that a shift in the internal balance of power could undermine the status of Iran's ethnic Armenian community.
For Azerbaijan, the issue is both more sensitive and more consequential. Since the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 divided ethnic Azerbaijani lands between the Russian Empire and Persia, a latent grievance has existed in Azerbaijan regarding the treatment of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran. Some estimates place the number of ethnic Azerbaijanis living in northern Iran in the range of 15 million to 25 million. They continue to speak their own language and maintain cultural traditions more closely aligned with modern-day Azerbaijan than with Persian identity. Any major unrest in northern Iran could increase domestic pressure on authorities in Baku to respond, particularly if ethnic Azerbaijani communities are affected.
Another shared concern for Armenia and Azerbaijan is the potential impact of instability in Iran on the fragile peace process between the two countries. Although leaders in Yerevan and Baku pledged last August to ratify a peace agreement in the coming months, progress has been limited. A major crisis in Iran could easily divert political attention and diplomatic momentum away from completing this process.
Overall, the countries of the South Caucasus would strongly prefer stability and security over chaos and uncertainty. Yet recent history has shown that mass protests and sudden political shifts can rapidly reshape the region. Only a few weeks into 2026, the year is already shaping up to be one of significant geopolitical consequence. How events in Iran ultimately affect the South Caucasus and the wider region remains to be seen but, at present, the outlook is far from reassuring.
Read in Arab News (https://www.arabnews.com/node/2629548).
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Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson analyzes national security and foreign policy, with a focus on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/geopolitical-consequences-iran-protests-south-caucasus-luke-coffey
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center Posts Commentary: Maduro's Friends in America - The Alliance for Global Justice
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Capital Research Center posted the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026:* * *
Maduro's friends in America: the Alliance for Global Justice
The Alliance supports collectivist dictatorships across Latin America, and Nicolas Maduro was no exception.
By Robert Stilson
Erstwhile Venezuelan dictator-president Nicolas Maduro is in federal custody after having been captured in a cross-border raid by U.S. forces. This has predictably touched off a firestorm among his most ardent nonprofit supporters in America, and few groups have been more vocal or consistent in their ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Capital Research Center posted the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026: * * * Maduro's friends in America: the Alliance for Global Justice The Alliance supports collectivist dictatorships across Latin America, and Nicolas Maduro was no exception. By Robert Stilson Erstwhile Venezuelan dictator-president Nicolas Maduro is in federal custody after having been captured in a cross-border raid by U.S. forces. This has predictably touched off a firestorm among his most ardent nonprofit supporters in America, and few groups have been more vocal or consistent in theiradmiration for Maduro's repressive and boundlessly corrupt regime than the Alliance for Global Justice.
Background
A mainstay of the internationally oriented far-left in the United States, the Alliance for Global Justice is a 501(c)(3) public charity that principally serves as a fiscal sponsor for ideologically-aligned activist groups that do not have their own tax-exempt status from the IRS. The Alliance has described itself as "the accounting department for the movement for social change," and takes pride in "continuing to sponsor the groups that no other fiscal sponsor will take on." In its fiscal year ending March 2024 it reported $6.7 million in total revenue against $8.8 million in expenses.
Despite its relatively modest size, the Alliance for Global Justice has occasionally made headlines for its fiscal sponsorship activities. During its 2020-2021 fiscal year, the Alliance brought in $56.4 million (an eightfold increase from the year before) largely due to its sponsorship of the Movement for Black Lives and a number of other Black Lives Matter-related groups. It was also revealed to have served as fiscal sponsor for Samidoun, a group which was sanctioned by the governments of the United States and Canada as "a sham charity that serves as an international fundraiser for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorist organization." Today, the "donate" page on the Alliance's website blames what the group calls its "right-wing Zionist adversaries" for its resulting inability to accept credit card payments.
Support for Venezuela
Since the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the activists occupying America's leftmost fringes have regularly turned toward Latin America in search of a geopolitical lodestar. The Alliance for Global Justice is no exception. Its origins can be traced back to 1979 and a pro-Sandinista group called the Nicaragua Network. Until 2024, the Alliance served as fiscal sponsor for the Venceremos Brigade, which has dispatched thousands of sympathetic American radicals to Cuba to labor in solidarity with its communist government since 1969.
It is no different with Venezuela, which alongside Nicaragua tends to account for an outsized portion of the Alliance for Global Justice's public commentary. The group has been a staunch supporter of Venezuela's socialist "Bolivarian Revolution" since Hugo Chavez became president in 1999. It attributes the country's myriad socioeconomic problems not to profound domestic corruption and mismanagement, but to sanctions and other foreign interference from the United States.
It can be difficult to distinguish material published on the Alliance's website from Venezuelan government propaganda. In 2024, after Maduro claimed to have secured another six-year term as president in an election widely considered to have been outright stolen, the Alliance dutifully promoted the regime's official results. In a statement, it declared:
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Alliance for Global Justice congratulates Venezuela for a clear, transparent, consistent and peaceful electoral process implemented on July 28. We also congratulate President Nicolas Maduro on his re-election and the Venezuelan National Electoral Council (CNE) for administering a free and fair election.
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The Alliance has also been aggressively critical of the decision to award the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize to Venezuelan pro-democracy opposition figure Maria Corina Machado, publishing a doctored photograph of her with the flags of the United States and Israel superimposed across her face and clothing. Earlier in 2025, the Alliance's weekly newsletter spotlighted Iran's violent theocratic autocracy for standing with Venezuela "against US aggressions," alongside a quote from Maduro declaring that "the State of Israel was created to colonize the Middle East and Central Asia, to plunder the wealth of those regions and subjugate their peoples."
The Alliance's affinity for Maduro's dictatorship evidently extends to a willingness to encourage domestic lawbreaking. In conjunction with several other activist groups (including Code Pink), it had previously asked supporters to pledge to rapidly "perform direct action and risk arrest if the US invades or otherwise overthrows the democratically elected government of Venezuela."
It made good on this pledge after Maduro was captured in January 2026, joining with dozens of other activist groups in calling for "coordinated and organized resistance" across the United States in order to "defend Venezuela's sovereignty and right to resist" and to "shut down the supply chains of imperialism." To the Alliance for Global Justice, Maduro's capture was part of an effort "to thwart the autonomy and success of the Venezuelan people" and "an attack on socialism, in all its forms, in order to advance a new fascism across the Americas."
Major Funders
All of this makes the question of who currently funds the Alliance for Global Justice an interesting one. At least thirty-one nonprofit grantmakers reported giving at least $20,000 to the Alliance in their respective fiscal years ending in 2024, which is the most recent available. These are listed below in descending order, along with links to their corresponding profiles on InfluenceWatch:
* Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program: $392,100
* Fidelity Investments Charitable Gift Fund: $303,908
* Colorado Health Foundation: $300,150
* William Penn Foundation: $250,000
* Groundswell Fund: $220,170
* Morgan Stanley Global Impact Funding Trust: $180,000
* Common Counsel Foundation: $130,000
* Marin Community Foundation: $125,000
* New York Foundation: $102,500
* Michael Reese Health Trust: $100,000
* Park Foundation: $90,000
* Eugene and Agnes E. Meyer Foundation: $89,000
* Borealis Philanthropy: $80,000
* Race Forward: $80,000
* 128 Collective Foundation: $75,000
* North Star Fund: $60,000
* Solutions Project: $60,000
* Claneil Foundation: $55,000
* SisterSong: $50,200
* Krupp Family Foundation: $43,478
* Amalgamated Charitable Foundation: $38,250
* Community Food Bank of Southern Arizona: $37,090
* Destination Tomorrow: $30,000
* Field Foundation of Illinois: $30,000
* Key Lime Foundation: $30,000
* Manzanita Foundation: $30,000
* San Diego Foundation: $25,000
* Tides Center: $25,000
* Institute for Local Self-Reliance: $23,000
* Brown University: $22,200
* American Online Giving Foundation: $20,382
Combined, these thirty-one funders gave $3,097,428 to the Alliance for Global Justice in 2024, which would represent somewhat less than half of the group's total revenue that year. Of course, such a calculation cannot precisely be made, because many of these grantmakers operate on different fiscal years than the Alliance (and from one another).
Thoughts and questions
A few additional comments may be worth noting.
First, functionally-anonymous grants from donor-advised fund providers such as Vanguard, Fidelity, and Morgan Stanley account for a significant portion of the Alliance for Global Justice's revenue. This is consistent with modern philanthropic giving trends, but also may reflect the particularly controversial nature of the Alliance's advocacy and a desire among donors to conceal their support for the group. That, of course, is speculation.
Second, while some grants were made simply to support the Alliance's general operations, many others were earmarked for specific fiscally sponsored projects. The Common Counsel Foundation noted that its funding was designated for the Reale Justice Network and Assata's Daughters (named in honor of the recently-deceased fugitive murderer Assata Shakur), while Borealis Philanthropy's grant was for the purpose of supporting Black Trans Media.
Finally, it would be interesting to hear what these grantmakers think of the Alliance's strident pro-Maduro advocacy--to say nothing of its other noxious activism. Do they agree with it? If not, why do they continue their financial support? This is especially true for those funders that made general support grants--such as the Park Foundation--since they cannot claim that they merely intended to support one of the Alliance's sponsored projects. Such an argument would nevertheless be specious, however, as the Alliance's board only accepts projects for sponsorship if they align with its own mission and vision. The bottom line is that these funders are willingly underwriting a group that openly favors a rotten authoritarian kleptocracy over the United States of America.
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Robert Stilson
Robert runs several of CRC's specialized projects. Originally from Indiana, he has a B.A. from Hanover College and a J.D. from University of Richmond School of Law, where he graduated magna cum laude.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/maduros-friends-in-america-the-alliance-for-global-justice/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Exploring the New Math Puzzle of a PJM Intervention
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026:* * *
Exploring the New Math Puzzle of a PJM Intervention
By Arushi Sharma Frank
Earlier today, the White House National Energy Dominance Council and partnering agencies released a "Statement of Principles Regarding PJM." These principles come out of "an agreement with governors across the Mid-Atlantic region to urge PJM to make electricity more affordable for residential customers and strengthen grid reliability by building more than $15 billion of reliable baseload power ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Jan. 16, 2026: * * * Exploring the New Math Puzzle of a PJM Intervention By Arushi Sharma Frank Earlier today, the White House National Energy Dominance Council and partnering agencies released a "Statement of Principles Regarding PJM." These principles come out of "an agreement with governors across the Mid-Atlantic region to urge PJM to make electricity more affordable for residential customers and strengthen grid reliability by building more than $15 billion of reliable baseload powergeneration."
The Statement of Principles outlines a radical departure from market norms as follows:
* A new reliability backstop auction that will guarantee 15-year price certainty, a stark contrast to the market's traditional short-term signals.
* To protect ratepayers, the plan extends the existing price cap on existing generation for two more auctions, effectively freezing scarcity revenues for the legacy fleet.
* Costs for the new plants will be allocated 100 percent to new data centers--"whether they show up and use the power or not"--unless they can prove they have self-procured capacity or have agreed to be curtailable.
* The Trump administration explicitly directs PJM to bypass its own stakeholder process ("no further CIFP processes are necessary") and mandates that interconnection studies be completed in "150 days or less."
A proposal to auction 15-year generation contracts will do more than just fund new power plants. It will fundamentally alter who bears the risk of building out the American grid and keeping current power plants (thermal and non-thermal) open, creating a new, paradoxical reality for the technology sector: Participants are potentially "short" on power today, but "long" on liability tomorrow.
This shift moves regional transmission organizations (RTOs) into uncharted territory. RTO markets were designed to facilitate bilateral contracting and unitary pricing, not to host separate government-mandated procurements for a specific asset class. Whether that is the intent of the proposal, and what PJM files, is yet to be seen.
The policy implication is clear though: By carving out a dedicated market for certain loads while leaving the rest of the grid in the legacy auction, this proposal breaks the unitary market structure. On first read, the reality appears to be a hybrid: financially segregated but physically integrated. The data center might pay the mortgage (the 15-year contract), but the electrons flow into the shared grid. This distinction will be vital to understand the merits of the rules to come from PJM; it determines whether this intervention actually lowers prices for consumers--via a "denominator effect," discussed below.
Scenarios for PJM Money Problems Versus Physical Problems
As this issue unfurls in new or modified PJM rules, a few distinct futures could emerge.
In one scenario, the definition of "eligibility" could dictate: By explicitly listing self-procured capacity and curtailment as the only off-ramps, these principles create an immediate, existential financial incentive for large loads to engineer their way out of the auction. Building your own plants could be a path out of the cost allocation; an exemption for "curtailable" load puts pressure on PJM to enact pathways to validate and count on that behavior for economics and reliability.
Critically, a 15-year contract could solve the money problem, but it does not fix the physical problem. While the principles mandate that interconnection studies be completed in "150 days or less," industry insiders note that a memo cannot manufacture a transformer or staff a power study team overnight. This is a path for creating a financial instrument to pay for infrastructure that may still take years to physically connect.
Further, a structural risk looms in either scenario. Whether this commissioned generation is "siphoned" for large loads or allocated into the shared PJM loads pool, the influx of mandated supply--without a guaranteed match in net demand--creates a signal of artificial oversupply. Paradoxically, this could depress prices enough to motivate the retirement of the very baseload power the policy intends to preserve.
Denominator Effects for Consumer Electricity Rates
If the intent of the policy comes into being--the potential to protect residential retail ratepayers from steep increases due to data center demand--the proposed auction could operate like a capital injection: It forces data centers to cover the capital cost of these new plants upfront. When that generation eventually turns on, it bids into the PJM market with its construction costs already covered. It only needs to recover its fuel and operations. The result would be to inject massive amounts of supply that can bid at marginal cost. Assuming all other factors remain equal, this suppresses the wholesale price of energy for everyone.
Rates are assessed based on the costs of building, maintaining, and operating the grid. If some of those costs are already being absorbed by data center developers, then there is more power for everyone without increased costs, and rates can fall. This isn't magic--it's simply the math of the denominator effect (more energy hours to pay for a relatively fixed or new expense-insulated delivery infrastructure cost = lower rates for all impacted classes who can benefit).
This will not, however, fully insulate ratepayers. Increasing rates are not usually driven by the cost of adding generation. It's the wires. If a utility builds a $50 million substation for a data center and spreads that cost to the legacy rate base, residential bills can rise despite low-cost generation. This is where state regulators must hold the line, with tariffs that require large data centers to pay demand charges covering specific infrastructure costs (including substations). Regulators can look to models like the Rappahannock Electric Cooperative's Large Power-Dedicated Facilities tariff, which bills based on the installed capacity of the delivery infrastructure, and incentivize loads to build private firming solutions that bring flexibility to the utility. The incentive has an effect of derisking overbuild of the utility infrastructure The policy announcement today from the White House seems similar in intent: Pay for the power plant capital costs, whether the energy hours are used or not.
Considerations for Large Loads Asset Class Fracturing
Even if the new math of PJM protects the residential consumer, the pain within the technology sector is expected to be uneven, as will the pain to be distributed between legacy generation assets (thermal and renewable) and new construction under contract. This is largely true of existing proposals in PJM's stakeholder processes: at least one such proposal posits market-oriented reforms consisting of a reliability backstop mechanism with multiyear price certainty (from Amazon, Calpine, Constellation, Google, Microsoft, Talen).
Early reactions to the announcements portend that this approach--a contract-specific auction--effectively has the economic impact of fracturing the electricity ratepayer asset class into at least three tiers while at least solving some of the problems of bringing enough capacity into the market to support gigawatts of load. Impacts on these classes, at least from the principles released today, also depend on the work that states will do to effectuate load-serving entity cost allocation.
Residential customers could remain shielded, provided state regulators enforce the strict tariffs described above and other theoretical wins become reality, including distributed energy and grid utilization programs that support lowering the average cost of utility operations. They get the increased reliability of a robust grid without the increased costs. Tech giants like Microsoft, Google, and Amazon are the "long capital" class. They are the most likely candidates who could possess the balance sheets to absorb a 15-year infrastructure liability, and if the rules of such a program or other PJM programs going forward allow it, the engineering depth to execute complex private firm delivery strategies needed to opt out (they can hedge the risk or pass it downstream).
The likely casualties of this new regime may include specialized infrastructure providers, co-location firms, and conventional industrial loads that lack the balance sheet of a hyperscaler. The administration's Statement of Principles explicitly demands that new loads provide "credit/collateral support" to be counted, a hurdle that favors the giants. Often locked into fixed-price contracts with tenants, these "middle-class" providers lack the credit depth to absorb a 15-year liability and the physical footprint to execute the "self-procure or curtail" opt-outs envisioned by the new rules. For them, the choice between a massive balance sheet liability and a regulatory blockade represents an existential margin squeeze.
The other likely casualty to insure against, is price signals for existing PJM generators, and their contracted status with loads that cannot benefit from the new policy. The principles document extends the existing price collar for two more auctions, effectively capping scarcity revenues for the legacy fleet just as reliability value is rising. Perhaps most concerning to existing resources is a future where existing generators face a "dumping" risk. If the 7.5 GW of new mandated capacity is built but not fully utilized by data centers, that excess power flows onto the grid at zero marginal cost. This artificial oversupply creates a price-suppressive signal that could ironically force the retirement of the very baseload units the policy claims to value. As is usually the case in PJM, when a major market intervention suppresses price signals for existing thermal assets, it drags existing renewables down with it. By capping capacity revenues and potentially flooding the energy market with subsidized "must-run" baseload, the policy erodes the investment case for all legacy generation, not just the coal and gas plants it aims to protect.
Ultimately, this intervention privatizes the cost of reliability, a move that stands in sharp contrast to the unitary market design PJM has administered to date. While the principles document calls for a future "Return to Market Fundamentals" by 2027, the precedent from the proposed approach is one in which reliability procurement is no longer for and from a shared pool of buyers and sellers; PJM's work over the next several months will be to develop a segmented product that is effectively procured by multi-state mandate and billed to specific asset classes. Market stakeholders invested in future-proofing retail and wholesale power deliverability solutions should find themselves even more invested than before in innovating solutions for their large and small customers.
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Arushi Sharma Frank is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/exploring-new-math-puzzle-pjm-intervention
[Category: ThinkTank]