Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
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Center for American Progress: Trump's Latest Executive Order is Another Illegal Attempt to Interfere With Elections
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following statement on March 31, 2026:
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Trump's Latest Executive Order is Another Illegal Attempt to Interfere with Elections
Today, President Donald Trump signed an executive order that would interfere with the legal right of Americans to cast mail-in ballots. In response, Greta Bedekovics, director of Democracy Policy at the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement:
After failing to get Congress to pass the SAVE Act, President Trump has resorted to signing yet another illegal executive order that would
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WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for American Progress issued the following statement on March 31, 2026:
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Trump's Latest Executive Order is Another Illegal Attempt to Interfere with Elections
Today, President Donald Trump signed an executive order that would interfere with the legal right of Americans to cast mail-in ballots. In response, Greta Bedekovics, director of Democracy Policy at the Center for American Progress, issued the following statement:
After failing to get Congress to pass the SAVE Act, President Trump has resorted to signing yet another illegal executive order that woulddictate how states should run their elections. But the courts have already ruled the president doesn't have the authority to set rules for federal elections. This latest order is just as unconstitutional. The 2026 midterm elections are already underway, but this administration has made clear it will stop at nothing to try to manipulate the outcome. Courts must act swiftly to block this order, and election officials in all states must continue to serve the interests of American voters--not the president.
For more information, or to talk to an expert, please contact Sam Hananel at shananel@americanprogress.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanprogress.org/press/statement-trumps-latest-executive-order-is-another-illegal-attempt-to-interfere-with-elections/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Capital Research Center: Conversation With Partisan Policy Networks Author Zachary Albert (Part 2 of 2)
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following recorded conversation on March 31, 2026, involving senior fellow Michael E. Hartmann and Brandeis University professor Zachary Albert:
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A conversation with Partisan Policy Networks author Zachary Albert (Part 2 of 2)
The Brandeis University professor talks to Michael E. Hartmann about differences in the two parties' policy networks, corporate support of both networks, and how to consider improving the research product available to policymakers and the public, including by strengthening parties.
Editorial note: this
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WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Capital Research Center issued the following recorded conversation on March 31, 2026, involving senior fellow Michael E. Hartmann and Brandeis University professor Zachary Albert:
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A conversation with Partisan Policy Networks author Zachary Albert (Part 2 of 2)
The Brandeis University professor talks to Michael E. Hartmann about differences in the two parties' policy networks, corporate support of both networks, and how to consider improving the research product available to policymakers and the public, including by strengthening parties.
Editorial note: thisessay originally appeared at The Giving Review.
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Nonprofit public-policy research organizations--"think tanks," in common parlance--have become much more politicized, partisan even, than when their creation and financial support were first legislatively incentivized by tax-code provisions. The incentivization was to encourage charity in general--including, relevant to this context in particular, furthering scholarly research to better inform policy debates and formulation.
Institutional and individual donors who fund these think tanks, who almost always benefit from the same or related tax-code provisions in the process, have played and continue to play a large role in creating and maintaining tension with, if not outright divergence from, this original legislative intent.
Zachary Albert's first book, Partisan Policy Networks: How Research Organizations Became Party Allies and Political Advocates, sheds much helpfully refulgent light, including in the form of facts and figures, on these phenomena.
Indicative data
Before a prime example, some necessary boilerplate tax-policy background. Policy-research organizations that seek and achieve the status of a public charity under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sec. 501(c)(3), of course, are subject to limits or outright prohibitions on their lobbying or electioneering efforts in order to get and keep that status. They are tax-exempt, and contributions to them are tax-deductible.
A growing number of these (c)(3) think tanks have created an affiliated entity for which they've sought and achieved the status of a social-welfare group under IRC Sec. 501(c)(4). These (c)(4) groups, according to Internal Revenue Service language that Albert quotes, "may engage in some political activities"--including "direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns"--if such efforts are not their "primary activity." They are tax-exempt too, recall, but contributions to them are not tax-deductible.
"The ability to engage in direct advocacy and activism while still retaining the legal and popular patina of a think tank is highly desirable for policy-demanding groups," Albert writes in Partisan Policy Networks, available at a discount from Penn Press by following these instructions. "For this reason, the tendency to form (or transform into) a politically active do-tank is increasingly pervasive ...."
The below chart, from a sample of 65 influential think tanks he compiled for the book, "shows the share of think tanks founded in each decade that can be considered 'politically active,' meaning they have engaged in lobbying or have an affiliated 501(c)(4)," as described by Albert, an assistant professor of politics at Brandeis University.
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Chart: Politically active think tanks by founding decade
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"The solid line tracks the cumulative percentage of all think tanks considered politically active over time," he continues. "The chart shows that the majority of think tanks founded prior to 1990 did not go on to engage directly in politics, with only two think tanks ... eventually becoming politically active. The vast majority of early think tanks started as and continue to be politically disinterested."
Then, nonprofit "think tanks founded since the 1990s are more likely than not to engage in direct political activism, often but not always through an affiliated advocacy organization," according to Albert.
These organizations are largely ideological and often have partisan policy preferences. There are some notable exceptions ... but in general those that seek to influence the political process in more direct ways also seek to move policy in a specific ideological direction and work through a single political party to do so. The ability to employ advocacy tactics through their affiliated 501(c)(4)s, or just engage in lobbying through their think tanks, allows them to provide direct and indirect subsidies to their preferred party, aid it in their joint policymaking efforts, and act as allies in the partisan policy network.
Later in the work, he also presents and explains data supporting the idea that partisan research organizations "rely far more on ideologically extreme donors, especially individuals."
Albert's next book--Small Donors in the US: Myths & Reality, co-authored with Raymond J. La Raja--will be released later this Spring by The University of Chicago Press.
He was kind enough to join me for a recorded conversation earlier this month. In the first part of our discussion, which is here, we talk about how so many think tanks have become partisan political organizations, including the role of their funding.
The just more than 15-and-a-half-minute video below is the second part, during which we discuss differences in the two parties' policy networks, corporate support of both networks, and how to consider improving the research product available to policymakers and the public, including by strengthening parties.
Asymmetry and avoiding the muck, and massaging and ensuring
The two parties' policy networks "are not symmetrical networks," Albert tells me. "The liberal Democratic-leaning network is more diffuse. It's a bit more scattered." There are "more organizations that fall under that side, and none of them" is "super-dominant. Whereas on the Republican side, the conservative side," there are "fewer organizations, but they have generally more power and more influence. ... There's an asymmetry, even if they're kind of evenly matched in terms of number and to some degree even resources. The nature of these networks looks very different."
On the conservative side, Albert again cites The Heritage Foundation as noteworthily influential, historically and currently. "Generally, I think they've affiliated themselves with the Trump kind of MAGA wing of the party and oriented themselves around that agenda," he says,
so I think I would say their future and their success to some degree hinges on the success of the MAGA movement in the party and how central that faction remains. But on the other hand, we've seen Heritage adapt and pivot before, so I think they are going to remain an important player moving forward regardless.
On corporate support of think tanks, "corporations to some degree are loath to give to some of these organizations that have" political "reputations and get more in the muck" of partisanship, according to Albert. "At the same time, I was also kind of surprised when I looked at the donors to these organizations, the corporate donors" to think tanks,
that they are giving fairly widely, right? So, the Center for American Progress and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities on the left both have a good number of corporate sponsors. The same is true of organizations on the right and in the center. ... There's a good deal of corporate money that's being spread out across the ideological spectrum in a way where individual money is not. It's much more concentrated on one side or the other.
More largely, he says, "I don't want to oversell how intellectually dishonest this process is, because" there are "plenty of organizations, even with ideological viewpoints and partisan viewpoints even, that are doing good research." In Partisan Policy Networks, he continues, he addresses
What does it mean to produce biased research? It's not fabricating the numbers and lying. It's something much less sinister than that. It's agenda-setting; you don't focus on topics, you don't publish research that challenges some of the central goals of your organization. It is also adopting particular assumptions, using particular data, defining concepts in particular ways that are going to support your conclusion, [your] vision.
... I don't want to go too far in saying that these are all liars. By and large, most of these people are doing halfway-decent research, if not better. But it's massaging the research in ways that are going to ensure that they support the general outlook of the organization.
Stronger parties, and supply and demand
In terms of what to do about any of this, if anything, "stronger parties would help solve some of the issues we have going on," Albert says. "I would actually turn attention, though, to stronger parties inside of political institutions, so mainly Congress and stronger nonpartisan institutions within there, as well." This would include, for example, "more support for something like the Congressional Research Service and nonpartisan research organizations inside the institution, which would make members less reliant on outside sources of information, which come with all this baggage we've described."
He thinks "stronger political-party organizations, as well, inside Congress"--like "stronger policy committees, stronger committees in general--might help again make members of Congress less reliant on these highly motivated outside sources of information," too.
"A big part of why there's been this increase in partisan and political research organizations is that elected officials have a demand for this," Albert notes, "and these organizations are meeting that. ... It's very much a marketplace dynamic where" what they supply "is just a rational reaction to broader partisan polarization.
"Another, more-punitive approach might be to have more enforcement of these separations" between legal categories, he says, but "I think that's kind of a dead letter," as we talked about in Part 1. "I don't see that being a realistic solution and I really think that raises all sorts of thorny questions. ...
"I like to focus on private think tanks that I think are living up more to the vision of what a think tank is and should be," Albert concludes, citing the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Cato Institute as examples.
They have kind of a principled opposition to that politicization. Even if they have ideological viewpoints, I think it's very valuable to have people researching in ... different areas from particular perspectives, and those perspectives are pretty well-known. What's less well-known a lot of the times is these groups that combine an ideological and even partisan perspective with aggressive political advocacy and doing these interest-group type of things under the guise of a think tank and kind of benefiting from that inherited reputation as just being researchers, when really they're doing far more than that.
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Michael E. Hartmann is CRC's senior fellow and director of the Center for Strategic Giving, providing analysis of and commentary about philanthropy and giving. He also co-edits The Giving Review, a joint project of Philanthropy Daily and the Center for Strategic Giving.
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Original text here: https://capitalresearch.org/article/a-conversation-with-partisan-policy-networks-author-zachary-albert-part-2-of-2/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Why Go Back to the Moon?
WASHINGTON, April 1 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2026, by Clayton Swope, deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department:
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Why Go Back to the Moon?
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
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One of the world's largest rockets waits, probably impatiently, on its launch pad at the Kennedy Space Center, poised
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WASHINGTON, April 1 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2026, by Clayton Swope, deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department:
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Why Go Back to the Moon?
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
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One of the world's largest rockets waits, probably impatiently, on its launch pad at the Kennedy Space Center, poisedto return humans to the Moon for the first time in 50 years. This is NASA's Artemis II mission, which will send four astronauts around the Moon and back, laying the groundwork for a lunar landing in the coming years.
Americans may be asking: Why is the United States going back to the Moon? The answer rests on three main reasons, all of which relate to its strategic value: its location, its natural resources, and the risk of ceding generational preeminence in space to China if the United States fails to take one more giant step for mankind.
During the Cold War, the United States went to the Moon to beat the Soviets. National honor was at stake. The United States won. The Soviets lost. Mission accomplished, NASA shuttered its crewed lunar program after Apollo 17. No human has been to the Moon since 1972. Not even one uncrewed probe visited the Moon during the 1980s. However, it was impossible to ignore indefinitely the key role the Moon would play in the future.
The Artemis program, the United States' return to the Moon, is step one of a long-term vision that envisions humans living beyond Earth orbit. The Moon is the central element of that plan because of its location. All roads to the cosmos naturally lead through the Moon. The Moon is the best place for NASA to test new technologies and figure out how to sustain human life far from Earth, preparing for future missions to Mars and beyond.
Science will be conducted from the Moon, but there are better places in the Solar System to look for scientific discoveries--the Moon will serve as a jumping-off point for many of those expeditions. Possibly within decades, lunar infrastructure will serve as a key waystation and transit hub--like a service plaza on an interstellar toll road--for journeys between the Earth and beyond.
The Moon is also important because of its natural resources. Today, transporting the materials needed to support space activities into orbit, let alone to deep space, is expensive. SpaceX is advertising a price of $220,000 per pound to the Moon--a bargain. Water ice on the Moon can be broken down and used for a variety of purposes, such as manufacturing propellant. Other resources, like oxygen, hydrogen, and metals, are also found there and could be used in situ to sustain human activity at scale.
Some resources on the Moon are valuable enough to justify extraction and return to Earth. Lunar rocks from the Apollo program contained rare earth elements, which are used in a wide range of modern electronics. Other compounds, like helium-3, which is uncommon on Earth but found in large amounts on the Moon, could play a key role in advancing quantum technologies.
Although China had only recently sent its first astronaut into space when President George W. Bush in 2004 announced U.S. plans--the predecessor to the Artemis program--to return to the Moon, China is now a space power impossible to ignore. It is also the United States' main geopolitical competitor. China plans to land astronauts on the Moon by 2030, build a base, and establish a network of lunar infrastructure. For China, the Moon is the keystone in its ambitions to extend and strengthen its influence in space.
Geopolitical dynamics shape the urgency of the United States' return to the Moon, but the primary rationale lies in the Moon's intrinsic strategic value. Whether it be in 10 years or 50 years, humans will travel from Earth to populate other places in space. The Moon holds inestimable value to humankind as part of that journey, a value that will become most clear in time. The Moon is a step to Mars and beyond.
In his famous 1962 speech, President John F. Kennedy laid out to the nation why we were going to the Moon. He asked: "Why climb the highest mountain? Why . . . fly the Atlantic? . . . We choose [to do these things] not because they are easy, but because they are hard." Going to the Moon was a manifestation of the "best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one we intend to win." The United States is going back to the Moon--and staying--for the same reasons today.
As a nation, the United States plays a key role in how the story of humanity's journey in the cosmos unfolds, as it has since the 1950s. It has played the same role in world events over the last 250 years. As President Theodore Roosevelt once observed: "We have no choice, we people of the United States, as to whether or not we shall play a great part in the world. That has been determined for us by fate. . . . All that we can decide is whether we shall play it well or ill." The United States' role in humanity's next chapter in space starts on the Moon and begins with Artemis.
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Clayton Swope is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-go-back-moon
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: We Are Going Back to the Moon to Stay
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2026, by Audrey M. Schaffer, senior associate (non-resident) at the Aerospace Security Project:
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We Are Going Back to the Moon to Stay
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
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Landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely was a clear and compelling demonstration of U.S. technological prowess and might in an era of strategic
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WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2026, by Audrey M. Schaffer, senior associate (non-resident) at the Aerospace Security Project:
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We Are Going Back to the Moon to Stay
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
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Landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely was a clear and compelling demonstration of U.S. technological prowess and might in an era of strategiccompetition with the Soviet Union. The United States went to the Moon during the Cold War precisely for that reason--to demonstrate to the world the supremacy of capitalism over communism and democracy over autocracy. President John F. Kennedy chose this goal in 1961 because it was the one NASA was most confident it could achieve before the Soviets, and before the decade was out. The United States went to the Moon to win.
And the United States did win. People around the world were captivated by the Moon landing. An estimated one in five people across the planet watched live when Neil Armstrong took his one small step on July 20, 1969. It was a turning point in the Cold War.
Unfortunately, it was also a turning point in the U.S. space program. Instead of building on the United States' giant leap for all mankind, winning was the end. Apollo missions 18, 19, and 20 were canceled due to declining public interest and shifting political priorities--and no human (let alone American)--has traveled further than low Earth orbit since.
The Artemis program offers an opportunity to change that--beginning with Artemis II, when NASA sends the first humans to lunar orbit since 1972. But the Artemis program is notable not for its repetition of Apollo-era missions, but for its explicit goal of establishing a sustained human presence on another celestial body.
Rather than chasing flags and footprints, NASA is planning to build a Moon base, a feat that will again demonstrate the technological might of the United States--but this time in an enduring way. Establishing a permanent presence on the Moon will push the space economy into cislunar space, creating business opportunities for a new generation of American dreamers and entrepreneurs. It will provide experience in long-duration surface missions, laying the groundwork for humanity's next giant leap-to Mars. And most importantly, it will extend Western values and democracy to a new foothold in the solar system.
Today, the United States is again in an era of strategic competition, not with the Soviets but with the People's Republic of China. There is a strong bipartisan consensus in Washington that the United States must return to the Moon before China lands its first taikonauts on the lunar surface. This element of competition helps create the urgency and drive that energizes the nation's space program and excites the American people with demonstrations of new and novel feats.
But the United States should not recreate a competition it has already won. China almost certainly has a long-term plan to establish a permanent presence on the Moon--one that is oriented around its priorities, its economy, and its values. So yes, the United States should compete with China as a key strategic rationale for the U.S. space program. But the United States should not mistake the sprint to be first with the marathon to stay.
It is time to return to the Moon, and this time, the United States needs to be in it for the long game.
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Audrey M. Schaffer is a senior associate (non-resident) at the Aerospace Security Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. She is a space policy expert with experience across the civil, commercial, and national security space sectors. She previously served in the U.S. government for over 15 years, including on the National Security Council staff, at the Departments of Defense and State, and at NASA.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/we-are-going-back-moon-stay
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Beyond Artemis - Why the Moon Matters for the Future of Space Operations
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2026, by Astroscale U.S. Policy Director Tahara Dawkins:
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Beyond Artemis: Why the Moon Matters for the Future of Space Operations
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
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The United States is preparing to return astronauts to the Moon through the Artemis program. More than 50 years after the Apollo era, the question naturally arises:
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WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2026, by Astroscale U.S. Policy Director Tahara Dawkins:
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Beyond Artemis: Why the Moon Matters for the Future of Space Operations
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
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The United States is preparing to return astronauts to the Moon through the Artemis program. More than 50 years after the Apollo era, the question naturally arises:Why go back? The answer is not limited to exploration alone.
Returning to the Moon advances three strategic objectives: It enables new scientific discovery, supports international cooperation in lunar exploration, and begins building the infrastructure necessary for sustained human activity beyond Earth orbit. Taken together, these goals make a return to the Moon a logical next step in the evolution of the space domain.
The Moon remains an extraordinary platform for scientific discovery. Lunar geology preserves a record of the early solar system that has remained largely unchanged for billions of years, and studying that record can deepen our understanding of planetary formation, the evolution of the Earth-Moon system, and the broader history of our solar neighborhood. The lunar surface also offers unique opportunities for astronomy and other scientific research that cannot easily be conducted elsewhere.
Lunar exploration provides an opportunity to strengthen international cooperation in space. The Artemis Accords are built around peaceful purposes, transparency, and cooperation. As more nations and commercial providers prepare lunar missions, coordination and shared expectations for responsible behavior will become increasingly important.
But perhaps the most consequential reason to return to the Moon is that such an effort would begin to extend the operational footprint of human activity beyond Earth orbit. For most of the space age, space operations have been concentrated around Earth. Over time, that region has evolved from a place of experimentation into a vital layer of global infrastructure supporting a wide range of activities, including communications, navigation, weather forecasting, and national security missions. These functions are now enabled by a mix of government and commercial capabilities, with private sector participation expanding rapidly and contributing to an increasingly dynamic environment involving governments, private companies, and international partners.
The next phase of space development will likely extend that activity outward into the cislunar region between Earth and the Moon. Operating in that environment will require more than just launch capability and exploration systems--sustained activity will require operational capabilities that allow missions to function reliably over long periods. As activity expands, the space community will need to address issues such as coordination among multiple operators, responsible proximity operations, logistical support, and the long-term sustainability of space environments. Many of the operational techniques relevant to these activities, such as rendezvous, inspection, and other forms of in-space servicing and logistics, are already being developed and demonstrated in Earth orbit today. Significant private and public investment in the aerospace sector has accelerated this progress, helping to transition capabilities that were once largely experimental into operational realities.
As these capabilities mature, policymakers and operators are increasingly focused on how to manage a more complex space environment. Governments and industry are working to improve space situational awareness, develop norms of responsible behavior, and ensure that space operations remain safe and predictable over time. As activity expands toward the Moon, these same governance and coordination challenges will extend into a new region of space.
All of these factors make returning to the Moon strategically important beyond the exploration missions themselves. Early activity in the lunar domain provides an opportunity to develop the operational practices, partnerships, and governance approaches needed to support a more complex space environment in the decades ahead. The choices made today about how missions operate and interact in the lunar environment will help shape the norms and standards that govern future activity throughout cislunar space.
History suggests that the development of new frontiers follows a familiar pattern: Exploration demonstrates what is possible. Over time, infrastructure, logistics, and operational services evolve to support sustained activity. Space has followed this trajectory in Earth orbit, and it is likely to follow a similar path as human activity expands farther from Earth.
In that sense, the importance of returning to the Moon depends not only on reaching the surface again but on taking the next step in the long-term expansion of human activity in space.
The Moon is both a destination and a proving ground. By returning there now, the United States and its partners can help shape the next phase of space development while establishing the foundation for a future in which exploration, science, and economic activity increasingly extend into the beyond.
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Tahara Dawkins is the director of policy at Astroscale U.S. She previously served as the chief of staff for the National Space Council.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-artemis-why-moon-matters-future-space-operations
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Artemis and the Economics of a Permanent Moonbase
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2026, by Alexander MacDonald, senior associate (non-resident) with the Aerospace Security Project:
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Artemis and the Economics of a Permanent Moonbase
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
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For space economists, few problems are more compelling than how to build and sustain a long-term human presence on the lunar surface. For one,
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WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on March 31, 2026, by Alexander MacDonald, senior associate (non-resident) with the Aerospace Security Project:
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Artemis and the Economics of a Permanent Moonbase
This piece is part of a commentary series called Why Go to the Moon? that analyzes the strategic, economic, scientific, and geopolitical drivers of renewed U.S. lunar exploration.
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For space economists, few problems are more compelling than how to build and sustain a long-term human presence on the lunar surface. For one,it is a demonstrably hard problem. Not only is there no breathable air, no farmable soil, nor anyone there to trade with, but human missions to the Moon have thus far been very expensive.
The Apollo Program included six missions to the lunar surface with a cumulative total of around 25 days of experience amongst the twelve astronauts to walk on its surface. At around $250-$300 billion total in today's terms for the overall Apollo efforts, the average cost per astronaut day on the lunar surface was around $10-$12 billion. The marginal cost per mission by the end was much better at around $3.5-$4.0 billion per mission in today's dollars, cutting the marginal cost down to a still pricey $580-$670 million per day for the Apollo 17 crew's roughly six cumulative days on the lunar surface.
For all of the Apollo program's incredible achievements, it was ultimately cancelled by President Richard Nixon in part because those footing the bill for the effort--the American taxpayers--had signaled that they did not believe that the benefits of continuing the process of lunar exploration and development at that time were worth the cost.
The Artemis program is the third attempt to return to the Moon to stay since the end of the Apollo Program. The first attempt was the Space Exploration Initiative, announced by President George H.W. Bush in 1989, and then cancelled around 1993 when the NASA cost estimate ($500 billion in 1989, which is over $1 trillion in today's dollars) for that particular Moon and Mars endeavor was submitted to Congress and deemed unaffordable. The second attempt was the Vision for Space Exploration, announced by President George W. Bush in 2004, which was later cancelled by the Obama administration, also for reasons of affordability, although some of its core elements--notably the Orion spacecraft and the Space Launch System (SLS)--were reinstated through the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and later became part of the Artemis Program.
I was serving in NASA's office of the administrator at the start of the first Trump administration, and as it became clear that lunar return and permanence there were going to be prioritized once again, my constant refrain around the office was, "Great, let's at least make a different mistake this time around." In other words, given that previous NASA efforts to return to the Moon and build the infrastructure for a permanent human presence had been crippled by architectures and strategies that were both financially and politically unsustainable, the United States clearly needed to try a new approach. Thankfully, it did.
The Artemis program--and its lunar surface infrastructure development strategy, originally known as Artemis Base Camp--made two core strategic changes from what had come before: Artemis relies on commercial capabilities for critical path elements, and it also relies on international partners for critical path elements. Last week, NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman recommitted NASA and the nation to the development of a moonbase and laid out new plans for its acceleration and expansion. The United States and its partners, both in the private sector and internationally, should make sure that this effort is both successful and sustainable.
Part of that will be speed and architecture affordability, both of which motivated the most recent Artemis architecture changes from NASA and the Human Landing System (HLS) contractors. Incentivizing continued private investment and maintaining commercial competition will be another vital element. This will have to be balanced, however, with ensuring that the American public--who are still going to be underwriting the vast majority of the costs of this endeavor--continues to support the initiative and feels that it is in the service of the nation.
This is where issues such as whether different elements of the Artemis moonbase will be owned by the government or by private companies will come to the fore. Although there is a significant increase in private investment in space, there have yet to be significant nongovernmental revenues for lunar activities, and economic assessments suggest we should not be expecting this to change anytime too soon either. Maintaining U.S. governmental ownership of core Artemis moonbase elements--such as potentially some power systems and core habitation modules--and allowing for private ownership of others, such as additional power systems and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) and mining hardware, might ultimately be an enabling mix for long-term sustainability given the expected revenue sources.
In addition to private investments in commercial capabilities, the most significant material contributions to Artemis come from international partners. Maintaining and growing this partnership will be vital but also potentially challenging with NASA planning to pause its lunar orbiting Gateway Project, which has thus far served as a core focus for Artemis contributions from Europe, Japan, Canada, and the United Arab Emirates. If Gateway is no longer on the critical path, then another critical path element for overall sustainability will be to figure out how to migrate the Gateway partnership from lunar orbit down to the lunar surface. Having an international Gateway Station on the Moon within a broader U.S.-led Artemis moonbase has a certain logic to it.
As Artemis begins crewed operations around the Moon, the United States stands at the start of a campaign to develop our first phase of infrastructure development on the lunar surface. As Administrator Isaacman recently stated, "We are going to plus-up for moonbase construction in a huge way." Sustaining an Artemis moonbase will require improving on the marginal cost per crewed mission, balancing the overall cost to the American taxpayer with public and national benefits, and leveraging international and commercial partnerships to the maximum extent practicable. If this can be achieved, then the legacy of Artemis might well be the realization of that long-held dream of a permanent home on the Moon. Or, to paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, Artemis is a commitment to humanity's first moonbase--if you can keep it.
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Alexander MacDonald is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/artemis-and-economics-permanent-moonbase
[Category: ThinkTank]
AFPI-Georgia Highlights Impact of Military Spouse Licensing Act Following DOJ Settlement With Georgia Licensing Boards
WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on March 31, 2026:
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AFPI-Georgia Highlights Impact of Military Spouse Licensing Act Following DOJ Settlement with Georgia Licensing Boards
Rebecca Yardley, Chair of the America First Policy Institute's (AFPI) Georgia Chapter, released the following statement on the Department of Justice's settlement with Georgia professional licensing boards for violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act:
"The Department of Justice's $3 million settlement with Georgia's professional licensing boards underscores
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WASHINGTON, April 1 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on March 31, 2026:
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AFPI-Georgia Highlights Impact of Military Spouse Licensing Act Following DOJ Settlement with Georgia Licensing Boards
Rebecca Yardley, Chair of the America First Policy Institute's (AFPI) Georgia Chapter, released the following statement on the Department of Justice's settlement with Georgia professional licensing boards for violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act:
"The Department of Justice's $3 million settlement with Georgia's professional licensing boards underscoresa serious failure that placed unnecessary burdens on our nation's servicemembers and their families. As the DOJ found, military spouses were denied or delayed the ability to work due to licensing barriers, limiting their economic opportunity and financial stability.
In 2024, AFPI-Georgia researched policy solutions and had discussions with lawmakers to address precisely these kinds of injustices. This legislation drafted by Rep. Bethany Ballard and signed into law by Governor Kemp became effective in January 2025. The Military Spouse Licensing Act ensures that military spouses with valid, out-of-state licenses can get to work quickly without navigating unnecessary red tape for Georgia's roughly 42,000 military spouses. This kind of America First policy sets a national standard for reducing barriers to work.
Georgia is now leading the policy debate. The success of the Military Spouse Licensing Act has already informed a model policy being advanced across the country, demonstrating how strong state leadership can drive meaningful policies at both the state and federal levels. AFPI will continue to champion policies that honor the sacrifices of our servicemembers by ensuring their families have the opportunity to work, thrive, and succeed."
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/afpi-georgia-highlights-impact-of-military-spouse-licensing-act-following-doj-settlement-with-georgia-licensing-boards
[Category: ThinkTank]
