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US Seizure of Venezuelan Oil Tanker Risks Severe Economic Harm to the General Population
WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Economic and Policy Research issued the following news release:* * *
US Seizure of Venezuelan Oil Tanker Risks Severe Economic Harm to the General Population
The United States' seizure of a Venezuelan oil tanker earlier this week, followed by sanctions on six additional vessels and reports (https://cepr.net/publications/americas-live-updates/#dec11308pm) that further seizures are planned, marks a sharp escalation in US enforcement of its unilateral sanctions on Venezuela. Oil exports make up nearly 90 percent of Venezuela's export revenue, and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 (TNSrep) -- The Center for Economic and Policy Research issued the following news release: * * * US Seizure of Venezuelan Oil Tanker Risks Severe Economic Harm to the General Population The United States' seizure of a Venezuelan oil tanker earlier this week, followed by sanctions on six additional vessels and reports (https://cepr.net/publications/americas-live-updates/#dec11308pm) that further seizures are planned, marks a sharp escalation in US enforcement of its unilateral sanctions on Venezuela. Oil exports make up nearly 90 percent of Venezuela's export revenue, andexperts warn that disrupting this trade will exacerbate the already dire economic situation in Venezuela, with the greatest impact falling on the general population.
CEPR is reviewing details of recent reporting on the role and impact of US intervention there in recent years, including economic sanctions, on our Live Tracker.
"This is vital information that often goes unnoticed about Venezuela's economic collapse, and the impact of broad economic sanctions on the general population. There have been seven episodes of hyperinflation in Latin America since World War II, with a median duration of four months," said Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) Co-Director Mark Weisbrot. "Venezuela's has lasted more than four years, and this was a direct result of US sanctions.
"This was the main cause of the worst depression in the history of this hemisphere -- more than three times as bad as the Great Depression of the United States in the 1930s, as measured by the loss of GDP. Tens of thousands of Venezuelans died in just the first year of the Trump sanctions, and many more in the years that followed. This economic collapse is mainly because the sanctions cut off access to the international financial system and blocked vital foreign exchange earnings from oil exports; and so Venezuela is threatened with another devastating return to hyperinflation.
"This could be the purpose of seizing oil tankers."
The Wall Street Journal reports (https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/seizure-of-venezuelan-oil-strikes-at-the-heart-of-maduros-grip-on-power-2d2352c8?mod=americas_news_article_pos2) that the oil seized so far is valued at roughly $80 million, equal to about 5 percent of Venezuela's monthly import needs. "If you cause a massive decline in oil revenues, that's going to cause another massive recession," said CEPR Senior Research Fellow Francisco Rodriguez.
The Journal also reports (https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/seizure-of-venezuelan-oil-strikes-at-the-heart-of-maduros-grip-on-power-2d2352c8?mod=americas_news_article_pos2) that the threat of further seizures has already disrupted tanker traffic. As of Thursday, about a dozen ships were reportedly idling off Venezuela's main oil port, with none entering to load crude -- a sharp contrast with normal operations, when multiple tankers would be docking or conducting ship-to-ship transfers.
Bloomberg similarly notes that the seizure could cut off one of Venezuela's last functioning revenue channels at a moment when the country is again vulnerable to economic collapse. After sweeping US sanctions in 2019 severed Venezuela's access to foreign currency, the government spent years stabilizing prices, ending hyperinflation, and recovering from one of the "deepest recessions in modern history." Continued seizures could accelerate rising prices and jump-start another deadly period of hyperinflation.
And while these measures are likely to inflict severe suffering to the Venezuelan people, they are unlikely to dislodge Maduro, who has survived far worse economic shocks, including the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic when oil production fell to less than half of today's levels and prices were much lower.
"We could see a complete collapse in Venezuelan oil exports if the US continues seizing tankers, because it would be equivalent to imposing a de facto naval blockade of Venezuela," said Rodriguez.
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Original text here: https://cepr.net/newsroom/us-seizure-of-venezuelan-oil-tanker-risks-severe-economic-harm-to-the-general-population/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Rand Issues Commentary: UK's New Veterans Strategy Wants to Reshape Veterans' Roles in Society-Can It Succeed?
SANTA MONICA, California, Dec. 13 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Dec. 12, 2025:* * *
The UK's New Veterans Strategy Wants to Reshape Veterans' Roles in Society-Can It Succeed?
By Linda Slapakova
We often talk about the importance of "supporting our veterans," but rarely ask what roles veterans have in modern society. Eighty years after the end of the Second World War, that question remains as salient as ever. The United Kingdom's new Veterans Strategy (PDF), released last month, attempts to answer it. It goes beyond improving services, to shift the perception of veterans as vulnerable ... Show Full Article SANTA MONICA, California, Dec. 13 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Dec. 12, 2025: * * * The UK's New Veterans Strategy Wants to Reshape Veterans' Roles in Society-Can It Succeed? By Linda Slapakova We often talk about the importance of "supporting our veterans," but rarely ask what roles veterans have in modern society. Eighty years after the end of the Second World War, that question remains as salient as ever. The United Kingdom's new Veterans Strategy (PDF), released last month, attempts to answer it. It goes beyond improving services, to shift the perception of veterans as vulnerableto being recognised as skilled contributors within national security, resilience, and prosperity. This is a noble aim and reflects the real positive economic and community contributions that most veterans make post-service. But, in a changing society, can the Strategy succeed in this ambition?
To some extent, these objectives are a continuation of the government's previous Veterans Strategy Action Plan (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/631f08c38fa8f502013c122e/Veterans-Strategy-Action-Plan-2022-2024.pdf). However, the tone of the 2025 strategy signals a more explicit and ambitious effort to harness the benefits gained from military service and reshape society's relationship with veterans. Delivering this vision will mean confronting longstanding public perceptions, demographic changes, and policy tensions.
In the aftermath of the United Kingdom's military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, public debate, policy, and research have concentrated on the challenges faced by those who served. While well-intentioned, this has driven focus on the negative consequences of military service and the challenges faced by those who served. The public is more likely to see veterans as forgotten, left behind, or ignored (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63bfef60d3bf7f6c2a05bcee/OVA-Public-Perceptions-report-24.11.22-1.pdf), rather than brave or courageous. An overwhelming majority associate veterans with health issues (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63bfef60d3bf7f6c2a05bcee/OVA-Public-Perceptions-report-24.11.22-1.pdf), particularly poor mental health and PTSD.
There have been growing calls for policy, research, and services to take a more nuanced approach that also recognises the positive impacts of military service. Recent research from the Centre for Evidence for the Armed Forces Community (CEAFC), funded by the Forces in Mind Trust, shows that many veterans view their service positively, citing strong bonds, purpose, and upward social mobility, among other benefits.
Changing defence needs have also provided an impetus to make better use of veterans' skills and competencies. This includes actively leveraging them as the United Kingdom's Strategic Reserve (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/683d89f181deb72cce2680a5/The_Strategic_Defence_Review_2025_-_Making_Britain_Safer_-_secure_at_home__strong_abroad.pdf) and easing their re-entry into active military service through "zig-zag" careers.
The new Strategy reflects this shift, but changing ingrained public perceptions is difficult, especially as the civilian-military gap (https://s31949.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/20240116-NHVR-report.pdf) widens. With a shrinking Armed Forces, fewer people have personal ties to the military. Changing this understanding requires coherent messaging and a clearer picture of who today's veterans actually are.
A major challenge lies in reconciling terminology with veterans' own identity. The Veterans Strategy wants to explicitly increase number of ex-serving people who identify as "veterans." However, the veteran community is becoming younger and more diverse in gender and ethnicity, with many no longer self-identifying (PDF) with that term. As a result, many service providers avoid referring to them in that way to appear more inclusive, opting for "former" or "ex-Service personnel" instead. To achieve the Strategy's objectives, policymakers will therefore need to carefully coordinate across the sector to ensure terminology is coherent and not counterproductive.
A second issue concerns how veterans transition to civilian life. This is typically centred on employment support, but research from RAND and CEAFC shows that transition also involves navigating a major identity shift. The military is a unique environment and leaving it can create a sense of "culture shock" that affects veterans' ability to thrive in their post-service career. If the UK government wants to effectively enable veterans to reach their full potential as civilians, it needs to invest in evidence-based interventions that focus not only on practical skills but also on identity, helping individuals understand and adapt to the transition.
A third question is how veterans can and should contribute to national security. The Strategy suggests roles such as "educating the public about the Armed Forces" through community engagement. However, little evidence exists about the extent to which veterans already perform these roles, would be willing to do so, or what support or incentives they would need. Newer initiatives, including "zig-zag careers," also require proper evaluation. Better data and transparency between government, researchers, and the broader sector will be essential to understand the extent to which this is feasible.
Finally, the Strategy's emphasis on celebrating veterans' strengths must be balanced with the core narrative of the Armed Forces Covenant (PDF), which focuses primarily on mitigating disadvantages resulting from military service life. These apparently contrasting perspectives, of service as both an advantage and as a potential source of hardship, can appear in tension--even though it is possible for both to be true across the breadth of the community. As the Covenant's legal duty is set to expand and be fully embedded into law, the government will need to balance these messages carefully so that policy remains coherent and effective.
The 2025 Veterans Strategy signals an ambitious effort to redefine veterans' roles in society in modern times. If policymakers can match ambition with clarity and sustained commitment, the Strategy could mark a turning point that not only reshapes veteran policy, but also redefines society's relationship with the Armed Forces and defence more broadly. But to be successful, the government must confront possible policy tensions, invest in evidence, and rethink how society really views the military and veterans. Otherwise, it risks fading into fragmented initiatives and unfulfilled promise.
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More About This Commentary
Linda Slapakova is a research leader in the Defence, Security & Justice research group at RAND Europe
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/12/the-uks-new-veterans-strategy-wants-to-reshape-veterans.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Bloomberg Opinion: Affordability Isn't a Hoax. It's Not a Crisis for Most, Either
NEW YORK, Dec. 13 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Dec. 11, 2025, to Bloomberg Opinion:* * *
Affordability Isn't a Hoax. It's Not a Crisis for Most, Either
By Allison Schrager
When someone tells you that they are struggling, it is generally a good rule of thumb to take them seriously. So it was not the best political move for President Donald Trump to call the affordability issue a "hoax." Too many Americans are trying to cope with rising food prices and high costs for housing, health care and child care.
At the same time, it is important to note ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, Dec. 13 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on Dec. 11, 2025, to Bloomberg Opinion: * * * Affordability Isn't a Hoax. It's Not a Crisis for Most, Either By Allison Schrager When someone tells you that they are struggling, it is generally a good rule of thumb to take them seriously. So it was not the best political move for President Donald Trump to call the affordability issue a "hoax." Too many Americans are trying to cope with rising food prices and high costs for housing, health care and child care. At the same time, it is important to notethat there is not a widespread "affordability crisis" in the US. Some people are truly unable to keep up with basic necessities. Some have high expectations that their incomes can't meet. And some are doing fine.
Affordability has been an issue for years, but it became an acute problem when inflation spiked after the pandemic and there was a drop in real income. Inflation is still high, about 3%. But real income growth is still positive for most Americans, suggesting that income is rising to cover many of the goods and services that are increasing in price.
Continue reading the entire piece here at Bloomberg Opinion (https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-12-11/affordability-isn-t-a-hoax-it-s-not-a-crisis-for-most-either?srnd=undefined)
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Allison Schrager is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and a contributing editor of City Journal.
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Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/affordability-isnt-a-hoax-its-not-a-crisis-for-most-either
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Russia Grapples With Western Hydrocarbon Sanctions
WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Dec. 12, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russia Grapples with Western Hydrocarbon Sanctions
By Sergey Sukhankin
Executive Summary:
* In late October, the United States and the European Union introduced tougher sanctions targeting Russia's hydrocarbon sector, aiming to curb energy revenues that fund Moscow's war against Ukraine.
* The new U.S. measures feature secondary sanctions--which penalize companies for dealings with sanctioned Russian entities--and added Russian energy giants LUKOIL and Rosneft ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Dec. 12, 2025, in its Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russia Grapples with Western Hydrocarbon Sanctions By Sergey Sukhankin Executive Summary: * In late October, the United States and the European Union introduced tougher sanctions targeting Russia's hydrocarbon sector, aiming to curb energy revenues that fund Moscow's war against Ukraine. * The new U.S. measures feature secondary sanctions--which penalize companies for dealings with sanctioned Russian entities--and added Russian energy giants LUKOIL and Rosneftto the list.
* The European Union's 19th sanctions package targets Russian LNG, shadow-fleet operations, and third-country facilitators of sanction circumvention, though Moscow intends to continue rerouting its supply chain to mitigate the impact of the updated EU measures.
* Most Russian experts assert that the new sanctions will cause damage but not eliminate Russia's oil and LNG exports, which will rely on middlemen, alternative currencies, and an expanded shadow fleet to avoid debilitation.
* The United States and European Union must persuade buyers of Russian goods to comply with sanctions to avoid repeating the pattern observed between 2014 and 2024, when international sanctions initially appeared highly threatening but ultimately had limited effects on the Russian economy.
In late October, the United States and the European Union introduced a new set of economic sanctions targeting the Russian Federation. The fuel and energy sectors emerged as the primary focus of these measures (see EDM, October 27). Western governments justified this approach because the sector--which is estimated to account for approximately 30 percent of total revenues in the Russian state budget--remains a crucial financial pillar sustaining Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime and enabling its ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine (see EDM, March 24; Freedom, October 26; see EDM, February 27, November 4). There are numerous measures Russia may employ to circumvent these measures and mitigate their economic effects (see EDM, January 27, April 28). These include defensive and countermeasures that the Russian government could implement to reduce the intended harm of the sanctions and impose reciprocal costs on the principal architects of these policies.
Washington Hits Russian Oil Sector
On October 22, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed further sanctions "as a result of Russia's lack of serious commitment to a peace process to end the war in Ukraine" (U.S. Treasury Department, October 22). Washington added two Russian corporate energy giants, LUKOIL and Rosneft, to the specially designated national sanctions list, along with a broad range of Russia's energy-related entities. The United States sanctioned both corporations in 2014, but the new sanctions feature a greater scope and reach. These sanctions have a "secondary effect," meaning that foreign companies may also face sanctions if they deal with sanctioned Russian entities. Russia's key buyers of oil include India and the People's Republic of China (PRC), which jointly purchases around 90 percent of Russia's seaborne oil (3 million barrels per day); Turkiye, which purchases 300,000 barrels; Syria, which purchases 70,000 barrels; and Slovakia and Hungary, which continue to purchase Russia's pipeline oil (The Moscow Times, October 23).
According to Kremlin-affiliated media, Russia exports around 47 percent of its extracted oil--240 million tons out of 516 million tons went for export in 2024 (Kommersant, October 23). LUKOIL and Rosneft jointly produce around 50 percent of Russia's oil. Since January 2025, when Washington sanctioned Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegaz, Russia's entire oil-exporting industry has become toxic. Working with these sanctioned companies could expose third parties to U.S. sanctions (U.S. Treasury Department, January 10).
The response of Russian officials and subject experts to this development was quite reserved and lacked pessimism. Igor Yushkov from the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, for instance, stated that new sanctions against LUKOIL and Rosneft will likely result in new expenses and shrinking profit margins due to the restrictions. Russian firms would have to extend the chain of middlemen involved in transportation and export, but, according to Yushkov, the new sanctions are unlikely to have a devastating effect on the companies or Russia's oil exports.
Kirill Bakhtin from BCS Company LLC shares Yushkov's view, adding that Russian firms expected this scenario and "had plenty of time to get ready" (Kommersant, October 23). Deputy Russian Prime Minister Alexander Novak also expressed confidence in Russia's ability to withstand any oil-related sanctions, noting that Russia has managed to successfully reorient the export of its oil to so-called friendly countries of the Indo-Pacific region, which buy 81 percent of Russia's oil exports (TASS, October 14).
U.S. sanctions against Russia's oil sector raise a critical question about how Russia's major buyers will respond. This particularly pertains to India, Russia's second-largest oil importer. India imports between 1.6 to 1.9 million barrels of oil daily, with Rosneft and LUKOIL supplying up to two-thirds of Russian oil imported by India (The Moscow Times, October 23). New Delhi's purchase of Russian oil has been a key factor in mitigating the effects of economic sanctions imposed on Russia's energy sector since 2022. Following the October 22 U.S. sanctions, India's largest oil companies and refineries--such as Indian Oil Corp, Bharat Petroleum Corp, Hindustan Petroleum Corp, and Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals--have reportedly declared their interest in revising contracts with Russian companies or have already reduced purchases of Russian oil (Vkpress.ru, October 23; MK.ru, November 7).
The opinions of some in the Russian expert community and anonymous Indian oil-related officials regarding scenarios in which India continues to import Russian oil have diverged. Indian experts noted that U.S. sanctions could jeopardize oil imports from Russia, and admitted that such operations could become impossible altogether in the future. Russian experts, however, refused to believe that India would discontinue imports of Russian oil, calling such a scenario "unrealistic." Energy and commodities expert Vladimir Demidov said:
Even if India were ever to decide to refuse to buy Russian oil, it will continue doing so still, it is just that those operations would be conducted through other countries ... The only outcome would be that India would have to pay a higher price for the same oil (Lenta.ru, October 23).
Some Indian experts agree with this. They assert that, though New Delhi is likely to ostensibly reduce or stop direct imports of Russian oil, imports will continue through an extended chain of middlemen. According to one source, "For now the main task for Indian importers is to find such middlemen that would hide the origins of Russian oil," so no secondary sanctions are applied (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, October 23).
Russian experts generally acknowledge that India's resolve to openly challenge U.S.-imposed sanctions is lower than the PRC's. In India, where the role of the state is less pronounced and private firms have more power to act on their fear of secondary sanctions, at least partial rejection of Russian oil is possible. Moscow hopes that over time, Indian oil companies will demonstrate greater elasticity and find ways to evade U.S. sanctions. Some Russian experts have argued that already sanctioned Indian operators--such as Nayara Energy, where Rosneft owns a stake--will continue buying Russian oil since they "have nothing to lose anyway" (Vzglyad, October 24).
The effectiveness of U.S. sanctions--and Russia's real economic losses--will depend significantly on whether Washington can convince its allies and strategic partners outside the so-called "Big Seven," such as India, to join and abide by its restrictions. Otherwise, Russia's financial and logistical isolation will remain incomplete (Focus.ua, October 24).
There are at least three confirmed results of the new U.S. sanctions. First, Finnish media have reported that Teboil (Oy Teboil Ab)--a LUKOIL-affiliated Finnish oil and fuel retail company engaged in the marketing, sale, and distribution of petroleum products and the operation of filling stations and service stations across Finland--has started to wrap up its activities in the country under the influence of U.S. sanctions (Hs.fi, November 7).
Second, Gunvor Group--a multinational energy commodities trading company registered in Cyprus--withdrew its offer to buy LUKOIL's foreign assets. The Gunvor Group was founded by Russian oligarch Gennady Timchenko and his Swedish partner Torbjorn Tornqvist in 1997. While Russian experts argue that the deal cannot be pronounced completely dead, the development could further complicate LUKOIL's ability to manage its foreign activities (Forbes.ru, November 7).
Third, Saudi Arabia has reduced the price of its oil for customers in India and the PRC (The Economic Times, November 7). Russian experts do not believe that this price reduction will cause the PRC to reject Russian oil imports, but "there are questions" about India's response, according to Alexey Gromov, the principal director for Energy Studies at the Institute for Energy and Finance (Hoviye Izvestiya, October 28; The Moscow Times, November 7).
European LNG Sanctions
In late October, the European Commission also announced a broad spectrum of anti-Russian restrictions in the European Union's 19th sanctions package. The European Union's main energy-related measures include the following sanctions and restrictions (European Commission, October 23):
* Ban on imports of Russian LNG under short-term contracts within six months of the new sanctions package entering into force, and as of January 1, 2027, for long-term contracts.
* Full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, eliminating Rosneft's and Gazprom Neft's exemption from sanctions on Russian oil and gas imports into the European Union. Oil from third countries, such as Kazakhstan, and the transport of oil compliant with the Oil Price Cap are exempt from sanctions.
* Sanctions against important third-country operators enabling Russia's revenue streams, including PRC entities--two refineries and an oil trader--that are significant buyers of Russian crude oil.
* An import ban on a variant of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), which has been used to bypass existing LPG restrictions.
* The addition of 117 vessels on the list of Russia's so-called "shadow fleet" that now totals 557 vessels. New sanctions across the shadow fleet value chain, including on Litasco Middle East DMCC, Lukoil's prominent shadow fleet, as well as on maritime registries providing false flags to shadow fleet vessels. Two oil trading companies in Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates have also been added to the transaction ban.
As stated by Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Margus Tsahkna, the European Union is already working on the 20th sanctions package. He said, "We [the European Union] will not settle for half-measures. Each new package reinforces our message: Ukraine is not alone, and Russia will not go unpunished." The next EU sanctions package reportedly will include measures targeting Russia's largest energy companies and focus on third countries that assist Russia in circumventing sanctions (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 23). Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria--countries that are usually quite vocal about anti-Russian economic restrictions--did not block the European Union's 19th sanctions package (Novaya Gazeta, October 23).
Russian public figures and representatives of the expert community reacted to the new EU sanctions package. Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Energy of the State Duma, Yuri Stankevich, noted:
The structure of the global hydrocarbons industry has been forming for decades, and it does not indicate drastic changes--all major players are known. Sanctions will not change the balance of supply and demand. What is likely to happen is the inclusion of new middlemen in supply chains between the seller and the end user. No one is surprised by the increasing exports of oil and oil products from India or Singapore [given that they are not crude oil producers]. The same thing will happen with LNG (TASS, October 23).
Dmitry Suslov, the deputy director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics and deputy director of Research Programs at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, highlighted the "simultaneous" nature of U.S. and EU sanctions. He argued that European sanctions are concerned with convincing the United States to take a tougher stance on Russia, and Brussels' desire to demonstrate its commitment to end energy reliance on Russia to Washington. Suslov believes that the European Union's principal interest is to avoid Russia's victory at any cost, which "is viewed in Europe as a by far a much more existential threat to European elites rather than any economic damage sustained by Europe itself from its sanctions" (Expert.ru, October 23).
Sergey Shein, associate professor at the Faculty of World Economy and World Politics at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, assumes that the European Union's decision to reject imports of Russian LNG has primarily "internal purposes." In his view, this is "a kind of a kick directed at Hungary and Slovakia" and an attempt to "overcome internal [EU] differences" (Expert.ru, October 23). Shein wrote that Hungary and Slovakia may be able to "buy" more favorable conditions within the European Union by rejecting Russian natural gas. He also argued that the European Union "is less interested in concrete results; rather, it is the process itself that matters." Shein, who does not believe in the serious gravity of EU sanctions, asserts that the European Union has neither the mechanisms nor the political will for effective sanctions. As evidence, he referenced that the EU did not include the confiscation of Russia's frozen assets in the 19th sanctions package and, based on publicly available information, will not add it to the 20th package (Expert.ru, October 23).
Russia's Potential Response
Russian sources argue that over time, Russia will overcome and evade sanctions because of the inelasticity of global supply and demand of oil and LNG. These commentators believe that Russia has acquired immunity to sanctions since it has been adapting to them since 2014 (Nn.ru, October 24). In the worst-case scenario, pro-regime Russian experts--such as Igor Yushkov from the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation--say that Russian firms would bear additional expenses and reduced profit margins, but that Russian hydrocarbons will not disappear from the global market (OIL.Expert, October 24).
These experts cite the examples of Surgutneftegaz and Gazprom Neft, which survived the same sanctions as Rosneft and LUKOIL, as demonstrations of how to evade new sanctions. Similarly, Russian experts are skeptical of public statements by foreign importers that claim they will stop importing Russian oil. The outcome of these sanctions and the extent to which the United States will be willing and able to execute them remain to be seen. Russian experts are particularly hopeful that India, given its weaker economy and lack of alternatives--unlike the PRC, which has a well-balanced energy mix with a rapidly growing green energy component--will try to assist Russia in evading sanctions. Russian commentators, such as economic reviewer Kirill Rodionov, however, also acknowledge that the most recent sanctions could produce a growing sense of frustration and a "feeling of hopelessness" (chuwstvo tupika) among the Russian elite (Telegram/@kirillrodionov, October 25). Despite Russia's official bragging about the "uselessness of sanctions," U.S.-introduced sanctions have hindered the development of Russia's LNG industry, with Arctic LNG-2 remaining the only large-scale success of the entire industry (see EDM, July 26). Some Russian experts argue that the Kremlin should take the European Union's LNG-related sanctions seriously. Furthermore, Western refusal to supply critical equipment for Russian oil refineries--given the damage they have sustained in Ukrainian strikes--could have a significant negative impact on Russia's export capabilities and its domestic petroleum production market (see EDM, May 15; Noviye Izvestiya, October 26).
Russia is likely to try to use loopholes to mitigate the effect of sanctions and avoid detrimental consequences for its economy and ability to wage war against Ukraine. With Moscow's war against Ukraine continuing, however, the room for maneuver is gradually shrinking, but several options for sanctions evasion remain. First, Moscow may seek political support from the Kremlin's Western partners, where Hungary and Serbia could be seen as the key actors. For example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban recently stated that Budapest was working on how to evade these sanctions (24tv.ua, October 24). Furthermore, during the recent meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, Orban complained that due to its geographic position, Hungary has no other alternative but to continue purchasing Russian oil. Following the meeting, Trump granted Hungary a one-year exemption from the U.S. secondary sanctions, allowing Hungary to continue its purchases of Russian oil (RIA Novosti, November 7).
Russia sees Serbia as another partner in the West. The situation, however, may be changing. For example, the European Union has drastically increased pressure on Belgrade, demanding that it fully harmonize its foreign policy with the European Union's norms and standards, which primarily means joining European sanctions against Russia. According to Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, sanctions are the only remaining point of contention holding Serbia back from becoming an EU member state (RBC, October 15). Depending on its trade-off measures, Serbia is likely to eventually have to join EU sanctions against Russia. Russian commentators have expressed grave concern over U.S. pressure--through energy sanctions on Serbia--to join the West in its sanctions campaign against Russia. In early October, for example, the United States imposed sanctions on Serbian NIS (Naftna Industrija Srbije), where Gazprom Neft is reported to hold a 44.85 percent stake. Russian experts have argued that by doing this, the West is reducing Serbia's ability to export oil and related products and purposefully puts Serbia's domestic energy security in jeopardy. Unstable energy security, a backbone of the local economy, could result in mass protests and political turbulence in Serbia (Svobodnaya pressa, October 21). While Russia could theoretically rely on its "Western assets" to evade sanctions, its options are being curtailed.
The second strategy Russia may use to evade sanctions is the maintenance and expansion of its highly effective "shadow fleet." Russia could acquire new vessels and use them under different flags, rapidly changing their registration (TASS, October 23). Russia could also resell and change the registration of some previously sanctioned vessels to nominally remove them from the sanctions list. For example, several vessels that the European Union previously sanctioned--such as Audax (IMO 9763837), Pugnax (IMO 9763849), Pier (IMO 9273442), and Page/Blage (IMO 9275763)--have been excluded from the list of sanctioned vessels, which, according to Russian sources, is because they changed their formal owners and registration (Neftegaz.ru, October 23). Aside from sanctions-related considerations, the quality of the vessels Russia uses for the seaborne transportation of its oil is very poor. The vessels' condition poses multiple security and environmental risks to all areas traversed by Russia's "shadow fleet."
The Kremlin considers using Western collaborators or its "shadow fleet" to circumvent sanctions to be "defensive" in nature because these strategies are primarily designed to mitigate the impact of existing sanctions on Russia's hydrocarbon industry and its state budget. Members of Russia's more radical expert community encourage a more "offensive" approach designed to discourage Western countries from increasing pressure on Russia's economy and its energy pillar. First, Russia could intensify the use of currencies outside of U.S. or EU regulation--such as the yuan, dirham, and rupee--in international trade as part of its broader strategy to accelerate the de-dollarization of the global economy. While the macroeconomic feasibility of this approach remains open to debate, Russia has already succeeded in concealing a portion of the monetary flows associated with its foreign trade transactions. At present, more than half of Russia's external trade is conducted in rubles, a currency that falls outside the regulatory oversight of financial authorities in both the United States and the European Union (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, October 23).
Second, Russia could implement a price-suppression strategy. Under conditions of significant external pressure, the Russian state might reduce the selling price of its crude oil to--or even below--the production break-even point, challenging the market position of U.S. shale producers. This approach would, however, most likely result in direct competition not just with the United States, but with Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+) member states and other oil-exporting countries, such as Angola, for whom export revenues are critical to macroeconomic stability. Such dynamics could precipitate a regional price adjustment and have inadvertent effects stemming from the complex interdependencies of the global oil market.
Third, some of the most radical Russian commentators suggest cyberattacks on Western critical infrastructure or the reduction of palladium and titanium supplies to paralyze Western hi-tech industries (Bloknot.ru, October 24; see EDM, December 5). Another extremist suggestion from the authors of the telegram channel RIA Katyosha included ideas to launch a "special operation [spetsoperatsiya] under someone else's flag on the territory of one of the [North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)] countries or unleash supplies of missiles for [Russia's] foreign allies" (Telegram/@riakatysha, October 23; Dzen.ru, October 24).
Fringe ideas about the need to conduct a "special operation" on the territory of a NATO member are not new. In 2023, a prominent conservative military expert, Alexander Perendzhiev, suggested using private military companies or other similar groups in Alaska to distract Western attention from Ukraine (Ukraina.ru, May 17, 2023).
At present, these ideas remain largely marginal and detached from official policy. If Russia's leadership were to perceive its survival as existentially threatened, however, more reckless or aggressive actions are possible under zero-sum strategic logic. This aggressive rhetoric requires close monitoring, distinguishing between fringe commentary and proposals with actual institutional backing, and considering the potential geopolitical and legal consequences should such ideas gain traction.
Conclusion
Analysis of Russian expert commentary and broader responses indicates that Moscow is significantly more concerned with U.S. restrictions targeting its oil sector--including secondary sanctions--than with European measures. While European sanctions carry political weight, they are widely perceived as less immediately threatening to Russia's core energy revenues. Many Russian analysts, as well as several foreign experts, argue that a sanctions-hardened Russian economy could, over time, develop mechanisms to circumvent international restrictions through alternative payment systems, re-routing exports, and leveraging partnerships with non-Western markets (Inosmi.ru, October 24). In the short term, Russian experts assert that sanctions are likely to produce a temporary reduction in revenue, creating visible economic strain without causing systemic damage to the Russian economy.
To avoid repeating the pattern observed between 2014 and 2024--when international sanctions initially appeared highly threatening but ultimately had only a limited effect on the Russian economy--a more comprehensive and strategic approach is required. Beyond closing the legal and regulatory loopholes that have allowed Russia to evade restrictions within Europe, engaging key partners, such as India, whose continued energy purchases have significantly bolstered Russia's resilience to sanctions since 2022, would be productive. Encouraging India to align, even partially, with Western objectives could further constrain Russia's capacity to mitigate the effects of international restrictions and enhance the overall effectiveness of sanctions.
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Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and an Advisor at Gulf State Analytics (Washington, D.C.).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/russia-grapples-with-western-hydrocarbon-sanctions/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Breaking the Debt Trap - Why Spending Smarter Beats Spending More
WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Dec. 12, 2025:* * *
Breaking the Debt Trap: Why Spending Smarter Beats Spending More
By Philip Luck and Michael H. Gary
Economies around the world are facing increasingly challenging fiscal landscapes. Rising debt burdens and slowing growth threaten to constrain fiscal policy for years to come. The trajectory of these economies will hinge on the policies they adopt--but amid the challenges, there are valuable lessons from recent success stories.
As debt piles up and global growth moderates ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on Dec. 12, 2025: * * * Breaking the Debt Trap: Why Spending Smarter Beats Spending More By Philip Luck and Michael H. Gary Economies around the world are facing increasingly challenging fiscal landscapes. Rising debt burdens and slowing growth threaten to constrain fiscal policy for years to come. The trajectory of these economies will hinge on the policies they adopt--but amid the challenges, there are valuable lessons from recent success stories. As debt piles up and global growth moderatesunder the weight of tariffs, geopolitical fragmentation, and demographic decline, policymakers find themselves operating in an increasingly challenging fiscal environment.
Total factor productivity has stagnated globally, and some emerging economies have experienced remarkable growth, while others are less productive than they were decades prior.
High debt amplifies growth challenges: It raises borrowing costs, heightens vulnerability to investor sentiment swings, and--when denominated in foreign currency--exposes countries to exchange rate volatility that can turn manageable obligations into full-blown crises. The result is a dangerous feedback loop in which high debt suppresses growth, and low growth makes debt ever harder to manage.
What is often missing from fiscal strategies is attention to an unsung driver of fiscal and development success: public spending efficiency. When governments cannot spend more, they must spend smarter. As highlighted in the 2025 IMF Fiscal Monitor, recently launched at CSIS, public spending efficiency is critical in today's constrained fiscal environment. Efficiency can take two forms: extracting more from each dollar spent--for example, better health outcomes per health dollar--and optimizing the portfolio of spending itself: for instance, balancing education investment against public wage bills.
Yet many economies struggle to reach optimal efficiency due to fiscal rigidity--the inability to reallocate existing finances toward higher-priority areas due to political and legal constraints. This rigidity limits discretionary spending and undermines both growth and efficiency. Research shows that countries with lower corruption, robust rule of law, and less political polarization can adjust budgets more flexibly, meaning fiscal agility is derived from institutional quality.
Some may argue that efficiency is secondary to the absolute level of investment in critical sectors. Even if one accepts this, recent success stories suggest efficiency gains can unlock growth even in severely constrained environments.
Rwanda's Education Reforms
The country expanded access to primary and secondary schooling while introducing a laptop program which provided 200,000 devices to Rwandan primary school students. By pairing accessibility with technology, Rwanda increased enrollment rates, digital literacy, and educational outcomes. These reforms were followed by an 8 percentage point increase in public spending efficiency on education. In a sector as pivotal as education, efficient spending can generate powerful spillover effects--raising productivity, improving health outcomes, and boosting domestic consumption. In this way, efficiency itself becomes a form of pro-growth investment, amplifying the fiscal multipliers embedded in high-impact sectors.
Croatia's Healthcare Reforms
Croatia's government increased revenue by broadening the tax base, removing exemptions, and adding public-health-promoting taxes, such as cigarette levies and mandatory car insurance. Croatia also incentivized cost control by transitioning from a payment per therapeutic procedure model (i.e., fee-for-service) to outcome-based diagnosis-related groups where the payer--in this case, the Croatian Health Insurance Fund--pays for a package of treatments and resources based on a patient's diagnoses and other factors. Implementing digitization also improved operational efficiency and oversight. Croatia's reforms are an exemplar for how to make difficult choices while satisfying constituents: While increasing revenue puts strain on taxpayers, realigning incentives to prioritize patient outcomes and improving operational efficiency matches expenditure with value. This is particularly crucial in politically sensitive sectors like healthcare.
Jamaica's Debt Sustainability Reforms
Perhaps the most impressive example in recent years comes from Jamaica. The country reduced its debt-to-GDP ratio from 144 percent in 2012 to 72 percent in 2023, a remarkable achievement given average annual real growth below 0.75 percent and repeated natural disasters, including hurricanes, floods, droughts, and earthquakes, along with the Covid-19 pandemic. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts the ratio will fall below 60 percent this year and approach 50 percent by 2030.
Jamaica achieved this through fiscal spending rules with carefully designed escape clauses that balanced rigidity with flexibility, allowing debt reduction even during crises without harsh austerity. Strict austerity measures including spending reductions, higher taxes, and reduced public sector wages can be extremely unpopular and inflict severe economic distress upon communities as seen in Greece's post Euro crisis recovery. Efforts to reduce political polarization and engage stakeholders through the National Partnership Council--composed of government officials, parliamentary opposition, and social partners--also ensured policy continuity across administrations, enabling sustained progress and collective buy-in.
Public Spending Efficiency Applies to the Biggest Spenders Too
Lessons on public spending efficiency in developing countries are highly relevant for the world's largest economy. The United States spends nearly twice as much on healthcare as other advanced economies yet delivers worse life expectancy, chronic disease management, and preventable mortality outcomes. High spending and poor health outcomes are a disappointing pair; getting more health per dollar has become a fiscal and policy imperative.
Recent reforms in the U.S. target two major efficiency gaps: excessive prices and poor value allocation. The Inflation Reduction Act empowers Medicare to negotiate prices for high-cost drugs, limits annual price hikes, and requires inflation rebates--all designed to curb pharmaceutical spending growth. While still modest in scope, these steps are projected to generate substantial savings and establish a precedent for broader price discipline.
At the same time, new federal price transparency rules will require hospitals and insurers to disclose negotiated rates, allowing employers to compare costs when selecting plans for their employees. Some evidence suggests transparency can lower prices and foster competition, particularly when paired with usable data tools and enforcement. Meanwhile, hospitals and insurers are increasingly turning to artificial intelligence to identify administrative inefficiencies, streamline billing, and optimize patient scheduling--producing measurable cost reductions without sacrificing quality of care.
Shifting payment from fee-for-service toward value-based and preventive care also poses an opportunity for progress. The common fee-for-service model rewards volume over value, encouraging more procedures rather than better outcomes. Expanding alternative payment arrangements--such as accountable care organizations, bundled payments, and shared-savings models--can better align incentives with long-term wellness.
Taken together, drug price reform, transparency, and payment reform represent not austerity but optimization. By extracting more health from every dollar spent, the United States can expand fiscal space and deploy efficiency to achieve policy objectives.
Policy Recommendations
Public spending efficiency is critical to the challenges facing economies worldwide, but success stories like Rwanda, Croatia, and Jamaica's are products of specific institutional and political conditions. The United States and international financial institutions have long supported fiscal reforms in developing countries, but translating success from one context to another requires addressing three fundamental challenges:
1. Institutions: Rule of law and checks and balances support the implementation of fiscal rules with escape clauses. Without strong institutions, even well-designed rules can be ignored or politicized.
2. Political will and polarization: Jamaica's success relied on reducing polarization and engaging stakeholders in dialogues aimed at solving collective challenges. In more polarized environments, policymakers and the public may not buy into challenging fiscal reforms, and leadership transitions may reverse progress.
3. Transparency: As countries broaden revenue sources, accountability becomes more important. Croatia's success relied on taxpayers believing that efficiency reforms provided a net benefit to society.
Debates in development economics have long centered on whether countries need more resources or better use of existing ones. In the absence of fiscal space, the choice has already been made. The success of public spending efficiency in countries like Rwanda, Croatia, and Jamaica is built on smart institutional investments. To replicate these outcomes across the developing world, countries should prioritize institution-building, depolarization, and transparency-enhancing policies while avoiding onerous measures that increase spending rigidity. Inflexible wage bills, blanket subsidies, and politically motivated transfers may appear expedient in the moment, but they carry long-term costs. Just as the benefits of wise policies compound over time, so do the penalties of fiscal inefficiency. Ultimately, the ability to spend smarter--not just spend more--will determine which emerging markets escape the debt trap, and which remain caught in it.
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Philip A. Luck is director of the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Michael H. Gary is a research intern with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/analysis/breaking-debt-trap-why-spending-smarter-beats-spending-more
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: Civilization Erasure, Christmas Markets, and Hungary
WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following commentary on Dec. 12, 2025, to American Greatness:* * *
Civilization Erasure, Christmas Markets, and Hungary
By The Honorable Fred Fleitz
Not surprisingly, a controversial prediction in the new Trump administration's National Security Strategy that Europe is facing "civilization erasure" because of out-of-control mass migration infuriated European elites. The Economist attacked this reference as "shocking." The Independent, a UK newspaper, referred to it as a "sinister conspiracy theory."
I want to set this aside ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following commentary on Dec. 12, 2025, to American Greatness: * * * Civilization Erasure, Christmas Markets, and Hungary By The Honorable Fred Fleitz Not surprisingly, a controversial prediction in the new Trump administration's National Security Strategy that Europe is facing "civilization erasure" because of out-of-control mass migration infuriated European elites. The Economist attacked this reference as "shocking." The Independent, a UK newspaper, referred to it as a "sinister conspiracy theory." I want to set this asidefor a moment and talk about European Christmas markets, especially in Hungary.
These markets are an old tradition where people gather to shop and socialize in the four weeks of Advent before Christmas at outdoor stalls, often in city squares, to purchase handmade goods, eat sweet treats and sausages, and drink mulled wine, a spiced wine cocktail served hot. The markets usually include Nativity scenes. Some have small performances and people singing Christmas carols.
To read the full article, click here (https://amgreatness.com/2025/12/12/civilization-erasure-christmas-markets-and-hungary/).
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Fred Fleitz is originally from Lansdowne, Pennsylvania, and serves as Vice Chair of AFPI's American Security.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/civilization-erasure-christmas-markets-and-hungary
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute: 'America First' Starts in Our Own Hemisphere
WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following commentary on Dec. 12, 2025, to the Hill:* * *
'America First' Starts in our Own Hemisphere
By Melissa Ford Maldonado
There's a reason American airmen, sailors, and Marines are putting themselves into harm's way in the southern Caribbean. It's not because Washington suddenly returned to neoconservative adventurism. It is because a narco-state ruled by a corrupt leftist dictator has become the latest frontline in defending the American people.
That might surprise some who still believe President Trump's "America ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following commentary on Dec. 12, 2025, to the Hill: * * * 'America First' Starts in our Own Hemisphere By Melissa Ford Maldonado There's a reason American airmen, sailors, and Marines are putting themselves into harm's way in the southern Caribbean. It's not because Washington suddenly returned to neoconservative adventurism. It is because a narco-state ruled by a corrupt leftist dictator has become the latest frontline in defending the American people. That might surprise some who still believe President Trump's "AmericaFirst" ideal means "America only." But what's happening off the coast of Venezuela tells a different story. The fight against Nicolas Maduro's criminal regime isn't about foreign crusades, but about keeping poison off our streets and chaos off our shores.
For a generation, U.S. national security policy wandered the earth, guarding oil fields in Syria while leaving American towns in Texas undefended. We policed deserts halfway around the world but let narco-fleets cruise the Caribbean, ferrying the chemicals that kill tens of thousands of Americans every year. Something had gone badly wrong.
Trump came back to fix it.
To read the full article, click here (https://thehill.com/opinion/international/5644877-america-first-starts-in-our-own-hemisphere/).
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Melissa Ford Maldonado is the Director of the Western Hemisphere Initiative at the America First Policy Institute (AFPI), where she leads efforts to strengthen U.S. leadership and influence throughout Latin America.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-first-starts-in-our-own-hemisphere
[Category: ThinkTank]