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Rand Issues Commentary: Europe Is Betting on Biotech--But Success Depends on Demand
SANTA MONICA, California, Feb. 28 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by Director Nick Fahy, research leader Sarah Parkinson and senior research leader Sana Zakaria:
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Europe Is Betting on Biotech--But Success Depends on Demand
Biotechnology is fast becoming a key tool in building economic power, health security, and geopolitical resilience. The ability to develop, manufacture, and deploy innovations shapes how societies create new therapies for patients, manage chronic and infectious diseases, and withstand global shocks such as pandemics and famines. Against this
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SANTA MONICA, California, Feb. 28 -- Rand issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by Director Nick Fahy, research leader Sarah Parkinson and senior research leader Sana Zakaria:
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Europe Is Betting on Biotech--But Success Depends on Demand
Biotechnology is fast becoming a key tool in building economic power, health security, and geopolitical resilience. The ability to develop, manufacture, and deploy innovations shapes how societies create new therapies for patients, manage chronic and infectious diseases, and withstand global shocks such as pandemics and famines. Against thisbackdrop, the European Commission has proposed "Part One" of a European Biotech Act to strengthen Europe's competitiveness in an increasingly important sector. The ambition is not simply to attract investment and speed up innovation, but to ensure that breakthroughs developed in Europe translate into real-world impact for patients, health systems, and the wider economy.
While Europe is home to world-class biotech expertise, it continues to lag behind the United States and China in attracting private investment, scaling late-stage research and development, and bringing successful products to market quickly. This gap is becoming harder to ignore as technological change accelerates beyond governance frameworks, climate and migration pressures increase the risk of health emergencies, and geopolitical tensions expose vulnerabilities in global supply chains. A stronger European biotech sector would directly support resilience, preparedness, and long-term economic growth. RAND Europe's research portfolio in biotech and health innovation offers insight on what is needed to support a healthy biotech ecosystem in the European Union. Our previous work includes cost-benefit analysis of nucleic acid screening, a study on financial ecosystems for medicines R&D, and a wide range of projects on innovation systems and the adoption of new technologies in health settings. Through these projects, we have developed a deep understanding of the conditions which would allow the European biotech sector to flourish.
The Commission's new proposal aims to provide a wide set of measures to boost competitiveness. These include new public-private investment tools for strategic biotech projects, extended intellectual property protections linked to EU-based activity, and regulatory reforms designed to shorten clinical trial timelines and better accommodate novel technologies. Further provisions focus on strengthening EU manufacturing capacity, supporting biosimilar development, and improving security oversight of sensitive biotech products such as synthetic nucleic acids. Together, these measures reflect growing recognition that biotechnology is not only an industrial policy priority, but a strategic one.
While the Biotech Act responds to many of these challenges, it does so mainly by focusing on the supply side of innovation. This addresses real weaknesses, but it leaves a central issue unresolved: whether Europe offers a reliable and attractive market for biotech products that will reflect the value that they bring once they are approved. Without stronger demand-side conditions, faster innovation alone will not translate into better access for patients or stronger health systems.
Speeding Up Innovation Without Securing the Market
A successful biotech ecosystem depends on both supply and demand. Supply-side measures reduce the cost, risk, and time associated with research, development, and regulation. Demand-side measures determine whether innovations are adopted, reimbursed, and used at scale.
The first part of the Biotech Act proposal concentrates heavily on supply-side reforms. It prioritises shorter time-to-market, funding for research and development, and greater regulatory flexibility for emerging technologies that do not fit neatly into existing categories. For example, regulatory sandboxes and improved foresight for new technologies respond to long-standing concerns about slow and fragmented regulatory processes in Europe that make the journey to the market long and unpredictable.
The focus on supply-side measures is understandable, but it risks overlooking demand-side challenges. Investors do not judge markets solely on the speed of approval. They also assess whether products will be reimbursed, adopted, and scaled across health systems in a predictable way. The EU's inability to attract capital for later stage R&D reflects a lack of confidence that products will enter the market and provide a competitive return in comparison to other investment opportunities. Uncertainty around these factors has been a key reason why later-stage investment often flows elsewhere.
The result is a familiar paradox. Europe supports early innovation and accelerates approvals, yet still struggles to capture the full economic and health benefits if products fail to find a viable market after approval. Without clearer signals on uptake and reimbursement, efforts to mobilise private capital will remain constrained.
Health Systems and the Limits of EU Action
Turning innovation into patient benefit ultimately depends on health systems. Creating an effective market will require systems that can accurately assess the value that innovations represent and that are prepared to pay for that value. In short, much depends on reimbursement and procurement, which remain the primary responsibility of Member States, limiting how far the EU can directly address demand-side barriers.
However, the EU can still play a meaningful role. It could for instance introduce mechanisms that encourage more consistent engagement with innovators, as well as greater alignment on market authorisation, knowledge sharing, procurement, and health technology assessment. EU-level cooperation on assessing the value of innovative health technologies could also help Member States deal more effectively with therapies whose benefits are realised over time.
From Policy Ambition to Patient Benefit
Industry responses to the Biotech Act have been largely positive, particularly its emphasis on speed and flexibility. These are important, but they are not enough. The Act's success should ultimately be judged on whether it meets health policy goals and whether patients across Europe can access, afford, and benefit from new therapies.
While it addresses important bottlenecks, as it stands the proposal does not fully confront Europe's weakness as a fragmented and uncertain market. This risks repeating a familiar pattern: innovation developed in Europe, commercialised elsewhere, and re-imported at higher cost. Much will depend on implementation of the current proposal, follow-up guidance, and what is included in the second phase of the Act.
Because responsibility is shared between the EU and Member States, progress will require commitment on both sides. Without stronger coordination on adoption, value assessment, and sustainable financing, faster innovation will not deliver its promised public benefit. If these gaps are addressed, the Biotech Act could help ensure that Europe not only innovates faster, but also turns innovation into real outcomes for patients and health systems alike.
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More About This Commentary
Sarah Parkinson is a research leader in the Health and Care research group at RAND Europe. Sana Zakaria is a senior research leader in the Science and Emerging Technology research group. Nick Fahy is director of the Health and Care research group.
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Original text here: https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/02/europe-is-betting-on-biotech-but-success-depends-on.html
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Security Risks of Centralized Satellite Internet in Junta-Led Sahel States
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by researcher and policy analyst Aminah Mustapha in its Terrorism Monitor:
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Security Risks of Centralized Satellite Internet in Junta-Led Sahel States
Executive Summary:
* Commercial low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet is rapidly expanding across the central Sahel, giving civilians and states connectivity beyond fragile terrestrial networks, while also enabling violent extremist groups to coordinate in remote areas with fewer interception constraints.
* Niger, Mali, and Chad are shifting
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by researcher and policy analyst Aminah Mustapha in its Terrorism Monitor:
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Security Risks of Centralized Satellite Internet in Junta-Led Sahel States
Executive Summary:
* Commercial low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet is rapidly expanding across the central Sahel, giving civilians and states connectivity beyond fragile terrestrial networks, while also enabling violent extremist groups to coordinate in remote areas with fewer interception constraints.
* Niger, Mali, and Chad are shiftingfrom bans or informal tolerance to licensing-and-control regimes built around approved distribution channels that can improve traceability but also increase state leverage over connectivity.
* Centralizing satellite connectivity creates chokepoints that increase the payoff of disruption and coercion, ranging from illicit diversion and "ring-fencing" to cyberattack and jamming/spoofing risks. At the same time, bloc-level AES cooperation with Russia may trade one dependency for another.
Throughout 2025, jihadist groups in the Sahel increasingly turned to satellite networks such as Starlink to coordinate activities, taking advantage of policy shifts toward commercial low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet in Niger, Mali, and Chad (African Security Analysis, September 17, 2025). In October 2024, Mali's transitional authorities lifted the six-month suspension on importing and commercializing Starlink kits, while building a regulatory framework and a platform to register and identify users and equipment, explicitly linking legalization to the presence of controllable interlocutors for national services (Koulouba, October 9, 2024). Niger and Chad soon moved in a similar direction through licensing actions that formalize the provision of commercial satellite services, with officials framing LEO connectivity as a solution to coverage gaps in states with sparse and contested terrestrial infrastructure (ARCEP Niger, November 21, 2024; Reuters, November 12, 2024).
This pivot toward "legalize to control" changes the counterinsurgency environment in the Sahel. Control may improve state visibility over licit users, but it does not reliably deny armed actors' access. The legislation, moreover, concentrates critical connectivity within governance and technical chokepoints that are vulnerable to coercion and disruption (GI-TOC, May 2025; ENISA, March 2025).
Commercial LEO satellite broadband has shifted from a marginal connectivity option to a material variable in the security landscape of the central Sahel. Its appeal is straightforward: portable "kits" can provide connectivity without reliance on local telecommunications networks--the networks most prone to gaps, sabotage, or intermittent outages in conflict zones (GI-TOC, May 2025). That same portability, however, makes satellite internet as applicable to armed groups and traffickers as it is to rural communities and state services.
Across Niger, Mali, and Chad, the regulatory trajectory is converging on centralization. Niger formalized a legal basis for operations via a decree granting a five-year license for fixed-satellite internet in low-Earth orbit, open to the public nationwide, reportedly subject to enforceable technical and service conditions (ARCEP Niger, November 21, 2024). Chad announced approval of Starlink licensing in November 2024 following multi-year discussions, presenting satellite broadband as a means to extend access in areas where fiber-optic networks do not reach (Reuters, November 12, 2024). Mali's approach is the most explicit about its intent: an initial drive to dismantle and prohibit terminals was followed by a shift toward feasibility, specifically by creating official interlocutors and enabling a state-run identification and registration platform (Koulouba, October 9, 2024).
The central dilemma for counterterrorism efforts is the dual-use of technology. The same attributes that make satellite broadband attractive to civilians--mobility, rapid deployment, and independence from local infrastructure--also make it appealing to violent extremist organizations operating across porous borderlands. Field-research reporting describes how groups linked to Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) can use satellite connectivity to support dispersed-unit coordination and to rely on mainstream encrypted applications for messaging, voice, and file transfer. This complicates intercept-based approaches that historically benefited from chokepoints in terrestrial networks (GI-TOC, May 2025). Additional analysis underscores that satellite internet can expand the reach of extremists in conflict-prone areas with limited conventional infrastructure, enabling both operational planning and propaganda dissemination. (GNET, December 18, 2024).
Illicit supply chains reinforce this problem. Detailed reporting traces trafficking routes that move kits from Nigeria into southern Niger, via hubs such as Maradi and Zinder, then onward to Niamey and Agadez, into northern Mali corridors, and into Chad through the Lake Chad Basin (GI-TOC, May 2025). Traffickers reportedly break kits into components, mix them with legitimate goods, and use bribery to bypass controls, tactics that exploit uneven enforcement capacity in frontier zones. Mali's own communique acknowledged an enforcement gap, noting that kits already sold and installed continued to function and "can be in bad hands," a rare official admission that prohibition does not equal denial (Koulouba, October 9, 2024).
Centralization, then, is more a reconfiguration of leverage. Licensing approved sellers can make providers legible to regulators and enable end-users to be registered (Koulouba, October 9, 2024; ARCEP Niger, November 21, 2024). Yet these mechanisms also create new internal-security tools in junta-led contexts. Mali's stated purpose--identifying users and equipment and ensuring controllable interlocutors--illustrates how counterinsurgency logics can merge with domestic control incentives (Koulouba, October 9, 2024). Measures such as targeted service denial in specific areas, sometimes described as "ring-fencing," may temporarily inhibit armed-group connectivity but risk civilian backlash if populations lose access to services (GI-TOC, May 2025). Separately, internet shutdown monitoring and coercive restrictions are normalized instruments across parts of Africa; in that environment, centralized satellite governance can complement existing toolkits by making legal satellite access more permissioned (Access Now, 2024).
The technical risk is equally important. Satellite systems depend on interlocking space, ground, and user segments, and threat assessments emphasize that cyberattacks against satellite systems can be executed from the ground and do not require spacefaring capabilities (ENISA, March 2025). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has also highlighted that jamming and spoofing threats to satellite communications signals, as well as cyberattacks against ground infrastructure, are recurring hazards faced by commercial space partners (NATO, October 3, 2024). In Sahel states, where critical connectivity increasingly routes through a limited number of providers and control layers, disruption can produce wide-area effects, whether from hostile interference, cyber compromise, or coercion directed at a small number of institutional nodes (ENISA, March 2025).
Finally, bloc-level centralization is emerging alongside commercial licensing. In September 2024, ministers from Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso met with representatives of Russia's space sector to discuss telecommunications and "surveillance" satellites for border surveillance, national security, secure communications, and disaster monitoring (BBC, September 24, 2024). Related reporting described plans for a joint AES communications satellite enabling multi-service connectivity and secure, encrypted communications (Ecofin Agency, September 2024). While such projects are framed as sovereignty-building, procurement, manufacturing, integration, and training pipelines can embed long-lived dependencies on external providers even as leaders claim greater autonomy (Xinhua, November 2, 2024).
Satellite internet is reshaping the Sahel's security environment by reducing the state advantage historically derived from controlling chokepoints in terrestrial infrastructure, while simultaneously giving regimes new levers to discipline connectivity (Koulouba, October 9, 2024; GI-TOC, May 2025). The result is an action-reaction cycle: armed groups and traffickers adapt quickly, illicit markets persist, and attempts to centralize control create both political risk and operational fragility (GI-TOC, May 2025). For junta-led states, the near-term temptation will be to treat satellite connectivity as permissioned infrastructure. The longer-term danger is that concentrating access into a few technical and governance nodes increases the payoff for disruption by militants, rival states, or criminal intermediaries (NATO, October 3, 2024; Access Now, 2024; ENISA, March 2025).
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Aminah Mustapha is a researcher and policy analyst specializing in security governance, emerging technologies, and conflict dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/security-risks-of-centralized-satellite-internet-in-junta-led-sahel-states/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Ifo Institute Dresden Branch Executive Directors Ragnitz, Thum Issue Statement on Business Climate Index in Eastern Germany
MUNICH, Germany, Feb. 28 -- ifo Institute issued the following statement on Feb. 27, 2026, by Joachim Ragnitz and Marcel Thum, executive directors of the Dresden Branch, on Business Climate Index in Eastern Germany:
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ifo Business Climate in Eastern Germany Worsens Slightly (February 2026)
The ifo Business Climate Index in Eastern Germany declined slightly in February compared to the previous month. The barometer of business sentiment for the regional economy in Eastern Germany moved from 89.8 points in January to 89.4 points in February. The eastern German companies surveyed assessed their
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MUNICH, Germany, Feb. 28 -- ifo Institute issued the following statement on Feb. 27, 2026, by Joachim Ragnitz and Marcel Thum, executive directors of the Dresden Branch, on Business Climate Index in Eastern Germany:
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ifo Business Climate in Eastern Germany Worsens Slightly (February 2026)
The ifo Business Climate Index in Eastern Germany declined slightly in February compared to the previous month. The barometer of business sentiment for the regional economy in Eastern Germany moved from 89.8 points in January to 89.4 points in February. The eastern German companies surveyed assessed theirbusiness situation as marginally better than in the previous month, while at the same time slightly lowering their business expectations.
In eastern German manufacturing, the business climate cooled marginally in February. The companies surveyed in Eastern Germany assessed their current business situation as somewhat better than in the previous month but were somewhat more pessimistic about the next three months.
In the eastern German service sector, the business climate brightened slightly in February. The service companies surveyed were somewhat more satisfied with their current business situation than in January. They marginally raised the assessment of their business expectations for the coming months.
In eastern German trade, the business climate was slightly gloomier overall in February. Eastern German wholesalers assessed the current business situation as considerably worse than in the previous month, while retailers assessed their situation as marginally worse than in January. At the same time, companies in wholesale raised their expectations for future business somewhat, while companies in retail lowered their business expectations slightly.
In eastern German construction, the business climate worsened slightly in February. The construction companies surveyed assessed current business as marginally worse than in the previous month but were also somewhat less pessimistic about the coming months.
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ifo Business Climate Eastern Germany (February 2026) (https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-02-27/ifo-business-climate-eastern-germany-worsens-slightly-february-2026)
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Original text here: https://www.ifo.de/en/press-release/2026-02-27/ifo-business-climate-eastern-germany-worsens-slightly-february-2026
[Category: ThinkTank]
Hudson Institute Issues Commentary: Targeting Iran - U.S. Objectives and Priorities
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by senior fellow Joel Rayburn:
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Targeting Iran: US Objectives and Priorities
Below Joel Rayburn assesses the United States' military options for striking Iran and advancing American regional interests.
Objectives
The strategic objectives will determine the targeting. For the United States, strategic objectives appear to be:
* Eliminating the Iranian nuclear program once and for all
* Ending the threat
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28 -- Hudson Institute, a research organization that says it promotes leadership for a secure, free and prosperous future, issued the following commentary on Feb. 27, 2026, by senior fellow Joel Rayburn:
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Targeting Iran: US Objectives and Priorities
Below Joel Rayburn assesses the United States' military options for striking Iran and advancing American regional interests.
Objectives
The strategic objectives will determine the targeting. For the United States, strategic objectives appear to be:
* Eliminating the Iranian nuclear program once and for all
* Ending the threatof Iran's ballistic missile program and arsenal, as well as its drone program
* Compelling the Iranians to stop sponsoring their terrorist proxies abroad
Those are the vital national security interests for the United States. They're also the vital interests that the Israelis, Europeans, and Arab states share.
The Trump administration may decide, or may already have decided, to add another strategic objective, which would be to degrade the Iranian regime's ability to crack down on its own population. If that has been added as a strategic objective for the campaign, then it would dictate an additional set of targets, which would be very different from the ones associated with the objectives above.
As for how to conduct the campaign, the initial priorities will have to be:
1. Disrupt the Iranian regime's command, control, and communications; suppress or destroy its meager remaining air defenses; and defeat any threat that Iran's navy might pose to the US fleet
2. Eliminate the regime's ballistic missile and drone capability, which is the regime's primary means of conducting counterstrikes and imposing costs to coerce the US and Israel.
Disrupting the Regime
In the very first wave of attacks, the US would want to blind the regime and ensure Tehran cannot communicate internally or maintain situational awareness. The US should prevent regime leaders from being able to understand what is happening to them so they cannot effectively deploy whatever meager defensive capabilities they might have left after last June.
Targets in this initial phase would be:
* Senior regime leadership facilities
* Critical communications hubs
* Critical transportation infrastructure, such as military aircraft and air bases or airports that Iran would use for military purposes
* Broadcast and information sharing infrastructure
* Integrated air defense systems, in the following order:
1. Communication infrastructure that allows integration between systems
2. Radars that these systems use to detect incoming aircraft
3. The air defense missile systems themselves
Iran does not have much air defense infrastructure left after last year, though they have been trying to reconstitute their air defense capabilities in the interim.
Eliminating the Missile Threat
The next priority would be the Iranian missile strike capability. The key here is to locate and destroy Iranian missile launchers, both short- and medium-range. The launchers are vital because while the Iranians may have considerable missile stockpiles, they cannot use them if they lose their launchers. After last June's confrontation with Israel, the Iranians had an estimated 95 medium-range missile launchers left. They probably reconstituted some of their capability and could have upward of 200 (one estimate from the Jewish Institute for National Security of America puts it at about 260).1 Whatever the case, the Iranians will have far fewer than the 480 medium-range launchers with which they began the 12-day war. This means their ability to overwhelm Israel's missile defenses with their medium-range missiles is diminished compared to last year's salvos.
More dangerous in the immediate term will be Iran's short-range ballistic missile arsenal, which can reach US bases in the Gulf, Iraq, and Syria, as well as targets in the Strait of Hormuz. It is unknown how many of these missiles (though likely thousands) or launchers (likely about 100) are in Iran's arsenal.2 The US will have to prioritize destroying these stocks in the first hours and days of a confrontation to protect US and Gulf allied forces. Luckily for US targeters, the vast majority of these short-range missiles are clustered in western Iran, allowing them to more easily reach Gulf and American targets. So finding them should be a fairly straightforward matter. And of course, as soon as a launcher deploys a missile, its location is detected and it can be struck, provided the US and its allies have the forces on station or missiles ready to counterstrike.
The Israelis were able to reduce the missile threat to a manageable level within the first four or five days of the 12-day war. US forces could likely reduce the missile problem to a manageable level even faster. Essentially, the US targeters will have to find and destroy about 300 short- and medium-range missile launchers as quickly as possible while blinding the regime and eliminating its air defenses.
Follow-on Target Priorities: Nuclear Sites and Sponsorship of Terrorism
Once the US has air supremacy and the Iranians cannot respond with missiles, Washington can strike the remaining targets--including fixed nuclear sites--with less urgency. The only potential exception would be if the Iranians are in the process of recovering highly enriched uranium, usable centrifuges, or other vital equipment that Operation Midnight Hammer buried last summer.
Beyond eliminating nuclear, ballistic missile, and drone sites, the US should also diminish the regime's ability to support terrorist proxies. Achieving this strategic objective would be a matter of coercing the regime into discontinuing support for--or even taking direct action against--the proxies themselves in Lebanon, Yemen, and possibly Iraq.
An alternate path to this objective would be for Washington to convince and empower Jerusalem to eliminate these proxies. It may be that the Israelis already have a war plan that involves destroying more of Hezbollah while the United States (maybe with Israel's backing) attacks Iran proper. Otherwise, ending Iran's support for its terrorist proxies would be a matter of forcing an Iranian capitulation through overwhelming military pressure.
In the broader picture, if the US is going to force the Iranians to surrender or capitulate, it should do so while the military operation is still going on. Alternatively, the White House should negotiate directly with either the regime leadership or the rump regime leadership, if some of the key figures are eliminated. The drawback of the operation last June came when the US-Israeli military operation ended before the Iranian regime was forced to capitulate. The time to negotiate with an adversary like Iran is when warplanes are still flying, not after. The United States should bear that in mind this time around.
If, as part of this targeting campaign, the US eliminates or foments the overthrow of top Iranian leadership--as the Israelis did to the IRGC leadership last summer--the White House will hopefully be prepared to identify which remaining Iranian regime leaders have the power to make a lasting capitulation deal.
Degrading the Regime's Crackdown Ability
It is unlikely that the US will be able to completely eliminate Iran's ability to crack down on its population without escalating further. But to degrade the regime's crackdown ability, the US would have to strike the major regional Basij that the regime uses to control the population, as well as Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) bases that support Basij operations in those areas. The US is largely aware of the location and nature of these bases, especially after the regime deployed its forces against the Iranian population in January.
The US could strike those bases and any assembled forces there, as well as their communications capabilities and their weapons storage. Striking targets like that, along with blinding the regime and degrading the regime's ability to move its own forces from place to place within the country, would most likely open a large window of opportunity for popular uprisings, especially in peripheral areas where the population is already inclined to rise, such as Iranian Kurdistan.
The US might also want to disrupt any reinforcing elements coming from Iranian proxies, especially in Iraq. In January, thousands of Iraqi militiamen reportedly crossed the border to quell protests in several Iranian cities under IRGC command. Large convoy movements of these kinds of militia forces would be detectable at or near border crossing points, and the US could disrupt those movements with airstrikes or drone strikes. The Israelis demonstrated this tactic against Hezbollah reinforcements when Bashar al-Assad's forces were in the process of falling back in December 2024. North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces also conducted similar operations against Muammar Gaddafi's forces as they approached Benghazi during the Libyan Civil War.
It is unlikely the Iranian regime can handle simultaneous external and internal pressure. Uprisings would likely result in the Iranian opposition taking control of significant parts of the country if the regime is paralyzed.
Economic Pressure and a Tanker War
Whether the US campaign ends up being an extended one, Washington should stop Iran's oil exports to disrupt Tehran's cash flow until the Iranian regime has fully capitulated. That means hindering Iranian oil tankers from exiting the Gulf and interdicting those that are already on the high seas, if they can be pinpointed. In other words, the US should institute a blockade on Iranian vessels.
Military planners can expect the Iranians to try to rerun a tanker war in the Gulf, focused on the Strait of Hormuz. This means, in addition to the operations outlined above, US and allied naval forces will have to fight and win against the IRGC Navy and its shore batteries in the earliest phases of war to limit the duration of any disruptions of commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf itself.
It is unlikely that the Iranians will be able to put up a lengthy fight on this front. They did not hold out for long in 1988, and US capabilities have advanced considerably in the intervening decades while Iran's have remained frozen in amber. The IRGC Navy can mount suicide-type attacks, but not for very long. Iran's shore batteries and their anti-ship cruise missile launchers would probably not survive very long either. But this is another front of the war that the US will have to contend with in the early stages.
Iranian Attacks Against Soft Targets
Finally, the White House should consider what the Iranians might do beyond the near theater.
They can strike American and Israeli targets using whatever sleeper networks they might have in place, and they can hit soft targets both near and far. But this will not be enough to deter Washington and Jerusalem, and the further from Iran these soft targets are, the less capable the Iranians are of striking them. US and allied targets in places like Iraq will be more vulnerable, and the Iranians have numerous strike options.
Iran will be able to do some damage in Lebanon as well, via Hezbollah, though that will be subject to the pressure the Israelis may be putting on the terror group. And while Tehran has shown that it can do some damage in one-off attacks in Europe and Latin America, it has not demonstrated any meaningful ability to threaten the United States itself.
The Iranians will also likely try to launch an uprising in the West Bank. But they failed to do that for the entirety of the post-October 7 war, so it is unlikely they would be able to sustain such an operation under these circumstances.
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At A Glance:
Joel Rayburn is a senior fellow in Hudson Institute's Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East.
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Original text here: https://www.hudson.org/missile-defense/targeting-iran-us-objectives-priorities-joel-rayburn
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Should We Worry About Foreign Money in Minnesota Colleges?
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Feb. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Feb. 26, 2026, by policy fellow Catrin Wigfall:
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Should we worry about foreign money in Minnesota colleges?
A new federal tracking platform is making it easier to examine the reported foreign dollars flowing into Minnesota's higher education institutions and distinguish legitimate academic partnerships from those that warrant closer scrutiny.
Concern over foreign financial influence in American universities
... Show Full Article
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Feb. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on Feb. 26, 2026, by policy fellow Catrin Wigfall:
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Should we worry about foreign money in Minnesota colleges?
A new federal tracking platform is making it easier to examine the reported foreign dollars flowing into Minnesota's higher education institutions and distinguish legitimate academic partnerships from those that warrant closer scrutiny.
Concern over foreign financial influence in American universitieshas grown steadily in recent years. One high-profile flashpoint was the spread of Chinese government-funded Confucius Institutes on American campuses, which attracted close scrutiny for potential national security risks and curtailing of academic freedom.
The controversial programming became symbolic of a broader problem: large foreign gifts from authoritarian governments flowing into American colleges and universities with limited transparency and inconsistent reporting. This led policymakers across the political spectrum to call for the enforcement of existing federal disclosure laws after discovering billions of dollars in foreign funding that colleges and universities had failed to report.
Under Section 117 of the Higher Education Act, universities receiving federal financial assistance must annually disclose foreign-source gifts and contracts valued at $250,000 or more to the U.S. Department of Education. The new foreign funding reporting portal, which the Department launched earlier this year, now makes those disclosures publicly available and is part of a "broader transparency push by the Trump administration aimed at strengthening oversight of foreign financial ties in higher education," according to The Center Square.
A closer look at Minnesota-specific data illustrates what these dollars look like at the state level. Since 2015, 11 Minnesota institutions have reported receiving funding from foreign sources totaling nearly $700 million, as first reported by The Center Square. The majority of the funding has flowed to the University of Minnesota - Twin Cities, which disclosed roughly $457 million in foreign gifts and contracts over the past decade. Another major recipient is Mayo Clinic College of Medicine and Science, with over $212 million in foreign contributions.
Is this level of foreign funding a cause for concern?
Not all of Minnesota's millions of dollars raise red flags, but some do. The tracking platform designates certain dollars as "countries of concern funding" based on United States Code, which includes governments whose strategic interests do not consistently align with ours.
For example, the University of Minnesota - Twin Cities has received $26.9 million from China, one such identified country of concern. The dollars represent about 17 percent of the U's total reported foreign funding, making China's contributions its fifth-largest foreign funding source. Its top reported sources include the United Kingdom ($88.1 million), Ireland ($74.9 million), England ($56.5 million), and Switzerland ($53 million). The U of M closed its Confucius Institute in 2019, citing a "shift" in institutional priorities and compliance with federal policy, amid heightened national scrutiny of concerns about academic freedom and foreign government influence.
St. Cloud State University, another institution that previously operated a Confucius Institute on campus, has reportedly received $1.7 million from China, which represents 67 percent of its total funding from foreign sources. Mayo Clinic College of Medicine and Science has received $8.7 million from China, accounting for about 4 percent of its foreign funding. Carleton College reported receiving its entire $1 million in foreign funding from China.
International collaboration has long been part of the university model, but the dramatic expansion of foreign money in higher education nationwide continues to demand transparency and oversight.
When funding originates (directly or indirectly) from governments with different priorities than the U.S., the risk is not always immediate. Foreign funding in higher education can have soft power influence, subtly shaping research, public messaging, or a college's priorities in ways that are not transparent to students, parents, or taxpayers. The controversy surrounding Confucius Institutes offers a cautionary tale.
While most Confucius Institutes have closed, a report (https://www.nas.org/reports/after-confucius-institutes/full-report) from the National Association of Scholars indicates that this "has not deterred the Chinese government from seeking alternative means of influencing American colleges and universities," including persuading higher education institutions to reopen and "rebrand Confucius Institute-like programs under other names."
This isn't to say that every foreign partnership is nefarious, nor is it a case against foreign students or scholars. Consider the advances in research and scientific collaboration that have come from international academic exchange. But institutions that receive taxpayer dollars also carry a responsibility to ensure that financial relationships, particularly those involving governments of concern, do not compromise academic independence or public trust. The new transparency dashboard is a useful step toward that accountability.
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Catrin Wigfall is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
catrin.wigfall@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/should-we-care-about-foreign-money-in-minnesota-colleges/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Got Milk? Whole Milk on the Horizon for School Lunchrooms
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Feb. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary by policy fellow Josiah Padley:
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Got Milk? Whole milk on the horizon for school lunchrooms
Minnesota students hoping to load up on protein at lunch might soon rejoice.
After last month's bipartisan Whole Milk for Healthy Kids Act was signed into law by President Trump, Minnesota lawmakers, headed by Sen. Torrey Westrom, are now attempting to update Minnesota state statute to codify the ability for
... Show Full Article
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Feb. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary by policy fellow Josiah Padley:
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Got Milk? Whole milk on the horizon for school lunchrooms
Minnesota students hoping to load up on protein at lunch might soon rejoice.
After last month's bipartisan Whole Milk for Healthy Kids Act was signed into law by President Trump, Minnesota lawmakers, headed by Sen. Torrey Westrom, are now attempting to update Minnesota state statute to codify the ability forstudents to access whole milk in their school meals.
Previously, Obama-era school lunch policies limited milk choices to skim or low fat only. Following the FDA's flipping of the food pyramid in the most recent edition of their Dietary Guidelines for Americans, the Whole Milk for Healthy Kids Act updated federal guidance for the National School Lunch Program's school lunches to include whole milk -- now considered widely to be essential for healthy childhood development. Social media updates from the office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services that attempt to be humorous suggest that whole milk will continue to be a priority for the administration.
Minnesota's proposed new pro-bovine milk policies would go further than the federal act, expanding the option for whole milk to both breakfast and lunch.
Following the 2023 Free School Meals Law, Minnesota now provides free breakfasts and lunches for all students within schools that qualify to participate in the National School Lunch Program. Every student at a participating school receives a free breakfast and lunch, regardless of if the individual student qualifies for free food under federal income guidelines. Minnesota reimburses schools for the cost of any meals that are not paid for by the federal government. As of 2024, every public school district in Minnesota and 167 charter schools participates in Minnesota's Free School Meals program.
In a press release, Senator Westrom wrote:
Senate File 3687 would update Minnesota Statutes to conform to the new federal standards and formally restore those options in Minnesota school lunch programs. The bill also ensures parents may request a non-dairy alternative for their child without needing a doctor's note.
"This bill is about giving families more choice, ensuring kids have access to the nutrition milk provides for those who choose it, and supporting our state's dairy farmers at the same time. That's a win for students and a win for our dairy farmers."
At this time, it is unclear what the financial impact of this bill may be. The bill also does not explicitly state that all schools who participate in the Free School Meals program must offer whole milk, instead connecting the dairy requirement to participation in national school lunch programs. As the bill moves through committee, it will be interesting to see its trajectory.
The bill will now moo-ve to the Senate Education Policy Committee.
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Josiah Padley is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
josiah.padley@americanexperiment.org
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/got-milk-whole-milk-on-the-horizon-for-school-lunchrooms/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Feds Will Halt MN Payments Until Fraud Mess is Cleaned Up
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Feb. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment Comment Policy issued the following statement on Feb. 26, 2026::
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Feds will halt MN payments until fraud mess is cleaned up
Minnesota Governor Tim Walz today fired back at the Trump administration for halting approximately $259.5 million in federal Medicaid funding to the state's fraud-plagued public health programs.
The governor's announcement of new anti-fraud measures came one day after a press conference featuring Vice President JD Vance, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Administrator Mehmet Oz, and
... Show Full Article
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, Feb. 28 -- The Center of the American Experiment Comment Policy issued the following statement on Feb. 26, 2026::
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Feds will halt MN payments until fraud mess is cleaned up
Minnesota Governor Tim Walz today fired back at the Trump administration for halting approximately $259.5 million in federal Medicaid funding to the state's fraud-plagued public health programs.
The governor's announcement of new anti-fraud measures came one day after a press conference featuring Vice President JD Vance, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Administrator Mehmet Oz, andHHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. who laid out the problem.
According to CMS: "Minnesota's Medicaid spending for the fourth quarter of FY 2025 resulted in a deferral of $259,505,491 in federal matching funds. This includes state expenditures of $243.8 million for unsupported or potentially fraudulent Medicaid claims and $15.4 million related to claims involving individuals lacking satisfactory immigration status." The agency used traditional financial management tools and new program integrity strategies to flag unusually high spending and rapid growth in areas such as:
* Personal care services
* Home and community-based services
* Other practitioner services
Governor Walz dismissed the Trump administration's quarter-billion-dollar payment delay as pure political retribution. "This has nothing to do with fraud," he said. "The agents Trump sent to investigate are shooting protesters and arresting children. His DOJ is gutting the U.S. Attorney's Office and crippling their ability to prosecute fraud."
In reality, both taxpayers and patients deserve protection. Medicaid is funded through a state-federal partnership--often roughly 50-50--and the federal government has every right to ensure its dollars are spent legally and for the benefit of eligible patients. Taxpayers in Alabama (or any state) have needy residents too; their money shouldn't end up in the pockets of criminals in Minnesota or smuggled abroad. These fraud schemes don't just steal tax dollars--they deprive sick, injured, and disabled people of the health care they need.
This isn't new. The Walz administration has long prioritized pushing funds out the door to favored interest groups, treating leakage as a "cost of doing business." In the first year of Walz's tenure, while probing improper payments to nonprofits serving tribes, the Minnesota Star Tribune revealed that the Department of Human Services violated the law 200 times with improper contracts. That same year, federal CMS fined Minnesota $150 million for improper Medicaid enrollment.
The federal government is a partner in funding and overseeing these programs. Vulnerable Minnesotans rely on Medicaid to survive and have federally protected rights to that care. If the feds don't withhold funds until the mess is cleaned up, reform will never happen. Programs like MinnesotaCare and MNSure operate under state-federal agreements, and if they are being violated, the sweetheart deals that shovel disproportionate amounts of federal dollars here could be cancelled.
After seven years, the Walz administration has finally released an action plan to address fraud.
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Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/feds-will-halt-mn-payments-until-fraud-mess-is-cleaned-up/
[Category: ThinkTank]
