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Jamestown Foundation Posts Commentary: Wei Hsueh-Kang - United Wa State Army's U.S.-Sanctioned Chinese Warlord in Myanmar
WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan, a lecturer in global studies and governance at the School of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at the Independent University, Bangladesh, in the foundation's Militant Leadership Monitor:
* * *
Wei Hsueh-Kang: United Wa State Army's U.S.-Sanctioned Chinese Warlord in Myanmar
Executive Summary:
* Wei Hsueh-Kang--an ethnic Han Chinese warlord and commander in the United Wa State Army (UWSA)--informally controls the quasi-sovereign Southern Wa State in Myanmar and has transformed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan, a lecturer in global studies and governance at the School of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at the Independent University, Bangladesh, in the foundation's Militant Leadership Monitor: * * * Wei Hsueh-Kang: United Wa State Army's U.S.-Sanctioned Chinese Warlord in Myanmar Executive Summary: * Wei Hsueh-Kang--an ethnic Han Chinese warlord and commander in the United Wa State Army (UWSA)--informally controls the quasi-sovereign Southern Wa State in Myanmar and has transformedit into a major hub for synthetic drugs.
* He acts as the financial mastermind for the UWSA by using vast narcotics profits to fund armed operations, laundering these illicit earnings through large business conglomerates, infrastructure projects, and illegal jade mining.
* Despite facing a $2 million U.S. bounty and strict international sanctions, he remains an elusive and influential figure. He evades capture through his fortified military protection, strategic bribery, and deep political connections with Chinese intelligence.
-
Introduction
Wei Hsueh-Kang is an ethnic Han Chinese warlord and narcotics kingpin in the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Wei is a military commander and informal ruler of the self-proclaimed Southern Wa State enclave in Myanmar, which borders Thailand. He has been described as an architect of the methamphetamine epidemic that has affected Southeast Asia since the 1990s. (Asia Times, April 9, 2019; The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).[1] The UWSA has been linked to transnational criminal activities, including drug production, narcotics trafficking, illegal rare earth mining, illegal resource extraction, and arms trafficking (Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA], January 24, 2005). Wei is widely described as a commercial mastermind of the crime-based political economy that finances UWSA operations and territorial governance (Asia Times, April 9, 2019; The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020). Despite U.S. sanctions and a $2 million bounty on him, he remains one of Southeast Asia's most elusive and influential militant-criminal figures.
Early Life and Criminal Involvement
Wei was likely born in Yunnan Province, People's Republic of China (PRC), on May 29, 1952, although some sources suggest he was born in 1945. His Burmese name is U Sein Win, but he reportedly does not speak Burmese and instead speaks a Yunnan-based Mandarin dialect (Sina, June 29, 2005; U.S. Department of State, April 1, 2017; The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).[2] His father was allegedly a Kuomintang (KMT) officer who accumulated wealth through opium trafficking (Sina, June 29, 2005). His eldest brother, Wei Hsueh-Long, and his youngest brother, Wei Hsueh-Yin, have both reportedly been involved in the drug trade and other illegal ventures in partnership with him. One of Wei's wives is a Thai national, Warin Chaichamrunphan (U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 3, 2005; Asia Times, April 9, 2019).
Wei later became involved with KMT exiles in Myanmar's northeastern borderlands, particularly in Shan State.[3] He was reportedly employed at a signals station linked to where the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collected intelligence on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) activities. After the PRC-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) drove many of these KMT-linked exiles out of their areas, Wei joined the militia of the notorious drug lord Khun Sa in the late 1970s (The Irrawaddy, February 28; March 9, 2020).[4] Through Khun Sa's network, he gained firsthand knowledge of the opium supply chain, from production to distribution through mule-based routes across the dense jungles of the Golden Triangle.[5]
Wei served as Khun Sa's treasurer, but was later detained by Khun Sa after allegedly betraying him. He was subsequently released and parted ways with Khun Sa in 1984, after which he moved to Thailand (Narcotopia, January 30, 2024). In 1985, Wei and his brothers joined forces with a smaller Wa armed group, the Wa National Council (WNC), based along the Thai-Myanmar border (Sina, June 29, 2005). From there, he began establishing heroin laboratories and production facilities across the borderlands and reportedly sponsored targeted assassinations of Khun Sa-affiliated figures. Thai police captured him in 1986, and he was sentenced to death, but he later escaped from prison (The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).
In 1989, the CPB collapsed amid internal revolt and resentment among its non-Bamar members. The UWSA was subsequently formed as one of the four Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that emerged from this fragmentation (ISP-Myanmar, June 17, 2025). Myanmar's then-powerful Military Intelligence (MI) apparatus under Khin Nyunt reached an understanding with the UWSA, granting the group autonomy over Wa State in exchange for a ceasefire. Wei immediately joined the new UWSA and contributed his business and technical expertise to ensure the flow of funds critical to the group's armed operations and territorial governance (The Irrawaddy, June 3, 2019; Narcotopia, January 30, 2024; ISP-Myanmar, June 17, 2025).
Personal Fiefdom in Southern Wa State
Myanmar's Junta accepted the UWSA's quasi-sovereign status in Wa State mainly to prevent the territorial expansion of Khun Sa's powerful Shan nationalist militia, the Mong Tai Army (MTA) (The Irrawaddy, December 4, 2015). The UWSA later launched sweeping military operations against the MTA in southeastern Shan State. Wei led the UWSA offensive and captured large areas controlled by his former boss, Khun Sa. In 1996, Khun Sa surrendered to the Tatmadaw and went into exile in Yangon. Wei's military units thereby consolidated control over southeastern Shan territories previously held by the MTA (Sina, April 2, 2004; The Irrawaddy, April 24, 2019).
This conquered territory effectively became Southern Wa State, locally known as Mong Yawn (The Irrawaddy, October 22, 2013). It is divided into seven districts and includes areas of Tachilek, Mong Hsat, Mongton, Hui Aw district, and Ponparkyin town (The Irrawaddy, April 24, 2019; ISP-Myanmar, June 17, 2025). From 1999 to 2002, Wei--with Khin Nyunt's backing--oversaw the relocation of more than 100,000 Wa from Northern Wa State to this newly conquered fiefdom, in part to colonize territory previously inhabited by other non-Wa ethnic groups (The Irrawaddy, December 4, 2015).
The UWSA welcomed Wei's decades of experience in opium production, and his drug money steadily became a financial backbone of the organization.[6] Wei significantly expanded opium production because poppy was better suited than most other cash crops to the Wa hills (Sina, April 2, 2004). He shifted from poppy cultivation toward large-scale synthetic drug production in the late 1990s.[7] In exchange for a large share of narcotics profits from criminal cartels--mostly from those located in the PRC--he leased land and provided UWSA armed security for the manufacture of synthetic drugs such as yaba in Southern Wa State.[8] By the late 1990s, Wa State had become a major heartland of methamphetamine production, contributing to a widespread drug epidemic across Southeast Asia and beyond. In addition to synthetic drugs and opium, Wei also generates revenue from rubber cultivation for export to the PRC via the Mekong River (Sina, April 2, 2004; Narcotopia, January 30, 2024).
Alongside his Southern Wa State fiefdom, Wei reportedly has a fortified complex at Na Lawt near Panghsang, the capital of Wa State (Asia Times, April 9, 2019). He has maintained good relations with UWSA chief and Wa State President Bao Youxiang, but his relationship with other senior Wa leaders is more complicated. Because of his non-CPB background, his family's Chinese origins, and unilateral control over Southern Wa State, many Northern Wa commanders reportedly dislike him. As a result, Wei spends little time at UWSA headquarters and has consistently avoided being photographed. He even refused to have his photograph included in the book commemorating the UWSA's 30th anniversary, and publicly available images of him remain scarce (The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).
Illicit Business and Investment Ventures
Wei's investments--fueled by narcotics profits--have become one of Southeast Asia's major alleged money-laundering networks. In 1998, he founded the Hong Pang Group (HPG), based in Panghsang, the capital of Wa State. He invested drug proceeds in construction, agriculture, mineral resources, electronics, and telecommunications. HPG opened offices in Yangon, Mandalay, Lashio, Tachilek, and Mawlamyine, and HPG and its subsidiaries became one of Myanmar's largest conglomerates. In 2012, HPG was renamed Thawda Win Co. Ltd and became involved in major construction projects, including the Taunggyi-Meiktila-Tachilek Highway (The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).
Wei has also reportedly made significant investments in the jade sector through firms linked to UWSA mining and export affiliates. These affiliates include Ayeyar Yadanar, Yar Za Htar Ne, Thaw Tar Win, and Apho Tan San Chain Hmi. The companies are reportedly staffed and managed by people previously affiliated with HPG. Through illegal jade mining, Wei's firms officially earned at least $100 million in 2013 and 2014, although the real figure is believed to be significantly higher because much of the jade extracted by his companies is sold to the PRC and Hong Kong through unofficial channels. His front man for the jade venture, Zaw Bo Khant, was also recorded visiting Caterpillar Inc. facilities in Australia, France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom (The Irrawaddy, December 4, 2015; CETRI, February 18, 2016).[9]
Wei also has political and intelligence connections with senior PRC officials. He has reportedly been linked to Zhou Yongkang, the PRC's former Minister of Public Security who also served on the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.[10] The UWSA allegedly received 2,000 truckloads of military hardware from the PRC through Zhou's patronage (The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020). Chinese intelligence officials from the Ministry of State Security (MSS) have also reportedly maintained warm ties and frequent meetings with Wei. As an ethnic Han Chinese, he is also believed to have played a central role in the Sinicization of Wa State (The Irrawaddy, April 24, 2019).[11]
Wei served as the financial czar of the UWSA politburo until 2007 (The Irrawaddy, December 4, 2015). Despite his formal retirement, he is still believed to be the key figure behind economic policy in Wa State. Myanmar government delegates who met UWSA officials in December 2015 reportedly noted his detailed knowledge of Myanmar's fiscal policies and economic situation. At the same meeting, he conveyed an invitation to then-State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi to visit Wa State (The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).
Conclusion
The United States and Thailand have pursued Wei for nearly four decades, but he continues to operate with impunity. In 1993, the U.S. State Department sanctioned him and placed a $2 million bounty on his head, which remains in effect. He was designated a significant foreign narcotics trafficker pursuant to the Kingpin Act on June 1, 2000, and was subsequently designated as a drug kingpin on May 29, 2003. He is also the subject of a U.S. federal indictment, unsealed in January 2005 by the Eastern District of New York, on narcotics-related charges. In November 2005, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) identified 11 individuals and 16 companies that were allegedly part of the financial and commercial network of Wei and the UWSA (U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 3, 2005; U.S. Department of State, April 1, 2017; The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).
In late May 2002, Thailand planned "Military Exercise 143" to deploy troops along the border with Southern Wa State. Officials were reportedly preparing to use the opportunity to eliminate Wei and his forces. Myanmar's junta objected on sovereignty and national security grounds, and the exercise was ultimately terminated (Sina, April 2, 2004). In March 2024, Thailand and Switzerland reached an unprecedented agreement under which Switzerland would return 1.88 million Swiss francs (about $2.3 million) of laundered money confiscated from Wei's Swiss bank accounts (Bangkok Post, March 3, 2024).
Despite these measures, Wei has repeatedly evaded U.S. sanctions by operating from Wa and PRC territories and by bribing senior security and bureaucratic officials in Thailand. To this day, he remains elusive and largely outside popular discussion, despite a militant-criminal profile that places him among Asia's most consequential and untouchable underworld figures.
* * *
Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan is a Lecturer in Global Studies and Governance (GSG) under the School of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences (SLASS) at the Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB).
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/wei-hsueh-kang-united-wa-state-armys-u-s-sanctioned-chinese-warlord-in-myanmar/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Wei Hsueh-Kang: United Wa State Army's U.S.-Sanctioned Chinese Warlord in Myanmar
Executive Summary:
* Wei Hsueh-Kang--an ethnic Han Chinese warlord and commander in the United Wa State Army (UWSA)--informally controls the quasi-sovereign Southern Wa State in Myanmar and has transformed ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The Jamestown Foundation posted the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan, a lecturer in global studies and governance at the School of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at the Independent University, Bangladesh, in the foundation's Militant Leadership Monitor: * * * Wei Hsueh-Kang: United Wa State Army's U.S.-Sanctioned Chinese Warlord in Myanmar Executive Summary: * Wei Hsueh-Kang--an ethnic Han Chinese warlord and commander in the United Wa State Army (UWSA)--informally controls the quasi-sovereign Southern Wa State in Myanmar and has transformedit into a major hub for synthetic drugs.
* He acts as the financial mastermind for the UWSA by using vast narcotics profits to fund armed operations, laundering these illicit earnings through large business conglomerates, infrastructure projects, and illegal jade mining.
* Despite facing a $2 million U.S. bounty and strict international sanctions, he remains an elusive and influential figure. He evades capture through his fortified military protection, strategic bribery, and deep political connections with Chinese intelligence.
-
Introduction
Wei Hsueh-Kang is an ethnic Han Chinese warlord and narcotics kingpin in the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Wei is a military commander and informal ruler of the self-proclaimed Southern Wa State enclave in Myanmar, which borders Thailand. He has been described as an architect of the methamphetamine epidemic that has affected Southeast Asia since the 1990s. (Asia Times, April 9, 2019; The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).[1] The UWSA has been linked to transnational criminal activities, including drug production, narcotics trafficking, illegal rare earth mining, illegal resource extraction, and arms trafficking (Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA], January 24, 2005). Wei is widely described as a commercial mastermind of the crime-based political economy that finances UWSA operations and territorial governance (Asia Times, April 9, 2019; The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020). Despite U.S. sanctions and a $2 million bounty on him, he remains one of Southeast Asia's most elusive and influential militant-criminal figures.
Early Life and Criminal Involvement
Wei was likely born in Yunnan Province, People's Republic of China (PRC), on May 29, 1952, although some sources suggest he was born in 1945. His Burmese name is U Sein Win, but he reportedly does not speak Burmese and instead speaks a Yunnan-based Mandarin dialect (Sina, June 29, 2005; U.S. Department of State, April 1, 2017; The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).[2] His father was allegedly a Kuomintang (KMT) officer who accumulated wealth through opium trafficking (Sina, June 29, 2005). His eldest brother, Wei Hsueh-Long, and his youngest brother, Wei Hsueh-Yin, have both reportedly been involved in the drug trade and other illegal ventures in partnership with him. One of Wei's wives is a Thai national, Warin Chaichamrunphan (U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 3, 2005; Asia Times, April 9, 2019).
Wei later became involved with KMT exiles in Myanmar's northeastern borderlands, particularly in Shan State.[3] He was reportedly employed at a signals station linked to where the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collected intelligence on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) activities. After the PRC-backed Communist Party of Burma (CPB) drove many of these KMT-linked exiles out of their areas, Wei joined the militia of the notorious drug lord Khun Sa in the late 1970s (The Irrawaddy, February 28; March 9, 2020).[4] Through Khun Sa's network, he gained firsthand knowledge of the opium supply chain, from production to distribution through mule-based routes across the dense jungles of the Golden Triangle.[5]
Wei served as Khun Sa's treasurer, but was later detained by Khun Sa after allegedly betraying him. He was subsequently released and parted ways with Khun Sa in 1984, after which he moved to Thailand (Narcotopia, January 30, 2024). In 1985, Wei and his brothers joined forces with a smaller Wa armed group, the Wa National Council (WNC), based along the Thai-Myanmar border (Sina, June 29, 2005). From there, he began establishing heroin laboratories and production facilities across the borderlands and reportedly sponsored targeted assassinations of Khun Sa-affiliated figures. Thai police captured him in 1986, and he was sentenced to death, but he later escaped from prison (The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).
In 1989, the CPB collapsed amid internal revolt and resentment among its non-Bamar members. The UWSA was subsequently formed as one of the four Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that emerged from this fragmentation (ISP-Myanmar, June 17, 2025). Myanmar's then-powerful Military Intelligence (MI) apparatus under Khin Nyunt reached an understanding with the UWSA, granting the group autonomy over Wa State in exchange for a ceasefire. Wei immediately joined the new UWSA and contributed his business and technical expertise to ensure the flow of funds critical to the group's armed operations and territorial governance (The Irrawaddy, June 3, 2019; Narcotopia, January 30, 2024; ISP-Myanmar, June 17, 2025).
Personal Fiefdom in Southern Wa State
Myanmar's Junta accepted the UWSA's quasi-sovereign status in Wa State mainly to prevent the territorial expansion of Khun Sa's powerful Shan nationalist militia, the Mong Tai Army (MTA) (The Irrawaddy, December 4, 2015). The UWSA later launched sweeping military operations against the MTA in southeastern Shan State. Wei led the UWSA offensive and captured large areas controlled by his former boss, Khun Sa. In 1996, Khun Sa surrendered to the Tatmadaw and went into exile in Yangon. Wei's military units thereby consolidated control over southeastern Shan territories previously held by the MTA (Sina, April 2, 2004; The Irrawaddy, April 24, 2019).
This conquered territory effectively became Southern Wa State, locally known as Mong Yawn (The Irrawaddy, October 22, 2013). It is divided into seven districts and includes areas of Tachilek, Mong Hsat, Mongton, Hui Aw district, and Ponparkyin town (The Irrawaddy, April 24, 2019; ISP-Myanmar, June 17, 2025). From 1999 to 2002, Wei--with Khin Nyunt's backing--oversaw the relocation of more than 100,000 Wa from Northern Wa State to this newly conquered fiefdom, in part to colonize territory previously inhabited by other non-Wa ethnic groups (The Irrawaddy, December 4, 2015).
The UWSA welcomed Wei's decades of experience in opium production, and his drug money steadily became a financial backbone of the organization.[6] Wei significantly expanded opium production because poppy was better suited than most other cash crops to the Wa hills (Sina, April 2, 2004). He shifted from poppy cultivation toward large-scale synthetic drug production in the late 1990s.[7] In exchange for a large share of narcotics profits from criminal cartels--mostly from those located in the PRC--he leased land and provided UWSA armed security for the manufacture of synthetic drugs such as yaba in Southern Wa State.[8] By the late 1990s, Wa State had become a major heartland of methamphetamine production, contributing to a widespread drug epidemic across Southeast Asia and beyond. In addition to synthetic drugs and opium, Wei also generates revenue from rubber cultivation for export to the PRC via the Mekong River (Sina, April 2, 2004; Narcotopia, January 30, 2024).
Alongside his Southern Wa State fiefdom, Wei reportedly has a fortified complex at Na Lawt near Panghsang, the capital of Wa State (Asia Times, April 9, 2019). He has maintained good relations with UWSA chief and Wa State President Bao Youxiang, but his relationship with other senior Wa leaders is more complicated. Because of his non-CPB background, his family's Chinese origins, and unilateral control over Southern Wa State, many Northern Wa commanders reportedly dislike him. As a result, Wei spends little time at UWSA headquarters and has consistently avoided being photographed. He even refused to have his photograph included in the book commemorating the UWSA's 30th anniversary, and publicly available images of him remain scarce (The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).
Illicit Business and Investment Ventures
Wei's investments--fueled by narcotics profits--have become one of Southeast Asia's major alleged money-laundering networks. In 1998, he founded the Hong Pang Group (HPG), based in Panghsang, the capital of Wa State. He invested drug proceeds in construction, agriculture, mineral resources, electronics, and telecommunications. HPG opened offices in Yangon, Mandalay, Lashio, Tachilek, and Mawlamyine, and HPG and its subsidiaries became one of Myanmar's largest conglomerates. In 2012, HPG was renamed Thawda Win Co. Ltd and became involved in major construction projects, including the Taunggyi-Meiktila-Tachilek Highway (The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).
Wei has also reportedly made significant investments in the jade sector through firms linked to UWSA mining and export affiliates. These affiliates include Ayeyar Yadanar, Yar Za Htar Ne, Thaw Tar Win, and Apho Tan San Chain Hmi. The companies are reportedly staffed and managed by people previously affiliated with HPG. Through illegal jade mining, Wei's firms officially earned at least $100 million in 2013 and 2014, although the real figure is believed to be significantly higher because much of the jade extracted by his companies is sold to the PRC and Hong Kong through unofficial channels. His front man for the jade venture, Zaw Bo Khant, was also recorded visiting Caterpillar Inc. facilities in Australia, France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom (The Irrawaddy, December 4, 2015; CETRI, February 18, 2016).[9]
Wei also has political and intelligence connections with senior PRC officials. He has reportedly been linked to Zhou Yongkang, the PRC's former Minister of Public Security who also served on the CCP Politburo Standing Committee.[10] The UWSA allegedly received 2,000 truckloads of military hardware from the PRC through Zhou's patronage (The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020). Chinese intelligence officials from the Ministry of State Security (MSS) have also reportedly maintained warm ties and frequent meetings with Wei. As an ethnic Han Chinese, he is also believed to have played a central role in the Sinicization of Wa State (The Irrawaddy, April 24, 2019).[11]
Wei served as the financial czar of the UWSA politburo until 2007 (The Irrawaddy, December 4, 2015). Despite his formal retirement, he is still believed to be the key figure behind economic policy in Wa State. Myanmar government delegates who met UWSA officials in December 2015 reportedly noted his detailed knowledge of Myanmar's fiscal policies and economic situation. At the same meeting, he conveyed an invitation to then-State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi to visit Wa State (The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).
Conclusion
The United States and Thailand have pursued Wei for nearly four decades, but he continues to operate with impunity. In 1993, the U.S. State Department sanctioned him and placed a $2 million bounty on his head, which remains in effect. He was designated a significant foreign narcotics trafficker pursuant to the Kingpin Act on June 1, 2000, and was subsequently designated as a drug kingpin on May 29, 2003. He is also the subject of a U.S. federal indictment, unsealed in January 2005 by the Eastern District of New York, on narcotics-related charges. In November 2005, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) identified 11 individuals and 16 companies that were allegedly part of the financial and commercial network of Wei and the UWSA (U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 3, 2005; U.S. Department of State, April 1, 2017; The Irrawaddy, March 9, 2020).
In late May 2002, Thailand planned "Military Exercise 143" to deploy troops along the border with Southern Wa State. Officials were reportedly preparing to use the opportunity to eliminate Wei and his forces. Myanmar's junta objected on sovereignty and national security grounds, and the exercise was ultimately terminated (Sina, April 2, 2004). In March 2024, Thailand and Switzerland reached an unprecedented agreement under which Switzerland would return 1.88 million Swiss francs (about $2.3 million) of laundered money confiscated from Wei's Swiss bank accounts (Bangkok Post, March 3, 2024).
Despite these measures, Wei has repeatedly evaded U.S. sanctions by operating from Wa and PRC territories and by bribing senior security and bureaucratic officials in Thailand. To this day, he remains elusive and largely outside popular discussion, despite a militant-criminal profile that places him among Asia's most consequential and untouchable underworld figures.
* * *
Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan is a Lecturer in Global Studies and Governance (GSG) under the School of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences (SLASS) at the Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB).
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/wei-hsueh-kang-united-wa-state-armys-u-s-sanctioned-chinese-warlord-in-myanmar/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary: Ukrainian Drone Attacks Lead Moscow to Revive Idea of Buffer Zone in Border Areas
WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor:
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Ukrainian Drone Attacks Lead Moscow to Revive Idea of Buffer Zone in Border Areas
Executive Summary:
* Ukrainian drone strikes into the Russian Federation have prompted the Kremlin to revive the idea of creating a buffer zone in western Russian regions and in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine to prevent or at least limit such strikes.
* The Russian government has not released ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Ukrainian Drone Attacks Lead Moscow to Revive Idea of Buffer Zone in Border Areas Executive Summary: * Ukrainian drone strikes into the Russian Federation have prompted the Kremlin to revive the idea of creating a buffer zone in western Russian regions and in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine to prevent or at least limit such strikes. * The Russian government has not releaseddetails on what such a zone would entail, and there is much disagreement in Moscow over its potential size, the number of additional troops required, and whether its creation would involve the forced removal of people living there.
* Creating such a zone has Russian President Vladimir Putin's public backing, though the increasing range of Ukrainian drones has led some Russians to express doubts, with some calling the idea "stupid" unless the Ukrainian state were destroyed and its entire territory absorbed into the zone.
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In response to Ukrainian drone strikes targeting infrastructure ever deeper into the Russian Federation, Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov revived the idea of creating a buffer zone in Russian regions lying along the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine on the other side (Interfax, July 9). This idea was first enshrined in the Minsk Accords after Moscow seized Ukraine's Crimea and parts of other Ukrainian regions, and it resurfaced after Ukraine seized Russia's Kursk oblast (RBC, May 12, 2025). In the past month, it has returned to Russian discussions with new force following Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian infrastructure deep within the country and a Kyiv proposal for limiting such long-range strikes in both directions, a proposal Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected out of hand (RIA Novosti, June 28). To date, the Russian government has not released details on what such a zone might look like, how large it would be, how many additional troops would be needed to create it, and whether its creation would require the expulsion of people living there (Nakanune.ru, July 15). While the idea of such a buffer zone enjoys Putin's support, a growing number of Russian politicians and commentators are skeptical, with some describing the idea as useless or even "stupid" (RIA Novosti, June 28). Their skepticism centers on three factors--the increasing range of Ukrainian drone strikes, the massive troop numbers the policy would require, including a likely general mobilization, and how forced expulsions, reminiscent of Stalin-era policies, would play with the Russian population (Nakanune.ru, July 15, 22; Vot Tak, July 22; Novaya Gazeta, July 23).
The fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces has created a broad zone of displacement that extends well beyond the front line itself, and Kyiv and Moscow have responded to it in starkly different ways. Most reporting on the war speaks only of a front line, though the fighting affects people at considerable distances from where troops are positioned. Since Putin seized Ukraine's Crimea and parts of several other Ukrainian regions in 2014, and especially since the Kremlin leader launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022, people living in places near the fighting have fled, and the two governments have taken a variety of steps to help them. These efforts have expanded alongside a rising civilian death toll, which reached a record last month. That trend has created enormous challenges for both governments, according to Nikolay Mitrokhin, a Russian sociologist now at the University of Bremen (Vot Tak, July 22). Tens of thousands of people are involved, though exact numbers remain unavailable given the confusion surrounding these movements. Kyiv has consistently adopted a proactive approach, according to Mitrokhin, warning populations well in advance of Russian attacks and helping them relocate voluntarily. Moscow, in contrast, has been less consistent, neither warning local populations nor providing the assistance it has promised. The Russian government has instead responded to the problem almost exclusively during crises, such as the Ukrainian seizure of Kursk in 2024 and the current wave of Ukrainian drones striking targets deep within the Russian Federation (Vot Tak, July 22).
Moscow's renewed interest in a buffer zone appears driven more by Ukrainian drone attacks on the Russian interior than by any shift at the front, suggesting the idea functions as a public relations effort to calm the population rather than a plan the Kremlin intends to carry out. Putin and his spokesman admitted as much when they suggested that the deeper Ukrainian drones strike targets in Russia, the larger such a buffer zone would need to be (Interfax, July 9). Russian commentators have been reluctant to specify how deep such a zone would need to be, though the few who have offered figures suggest roughly 300 kilometers (186 miles) would be required (Nakanune.ru, July 15). Ukraine already strikes targets more than 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) inside Russia with drones and has announced plans to develop drones with a range of 10,000 kilometers (6,200 miles). Any buffer zone large enough to stop such strikes would have to encompass all Ukrainian territory, rendering the concept meaningless unless it did exactly that (Vot Tak, July 22).
The lack of specificity surrounding the buffer zone, including its size, the number of troops required, and whether current residents could remain, has pushed the debate from closed Kremlin discussions into the public sphere, where the Kremlin is losing control of the narrative. The most dramatic example of this shift, one that may kill off the buffer-zone idea altogether, came in a recent broadcast by outspoken Russian television host Vladimir Solovyev, who argued that Moscow must be ready to move 200,000 to 300,000 people from Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts away from "the line of the front" and resettle them in the Middle Volga, the Urals, and the Russian Far East (RIA Pivden, July 23). Several Russian military analysts called the idea reasonable for wartime planning, arguing that governments must prepare for worst-case scenarios precisely to avoid them, and suggested that Moscow might relocate people to regions near the North Caucasus rather than east of the Urals, as some feared (Nakanune.ru, July 22).
The prospect of mass deportations reminiscent of Stalin-era policies has provoked public outrage in Russia, undermining political support for the buffer-zone concept. Many Russians reacted with alarm at the prospect that Moscow might again deport large numbers of people, and whole nationalities, into the interior of the country (Novaya Gazeta, July 23). Some Russians may not draw this parallel or might even welcome it. Prominent commentators and even senior Duma figures now argue that a depopulated buffer zone along the Russian-Ukrainian border will not stop the drone attacks in the way the Kremlin suggests, calling the latest Putin proposal simply "stupid" (Vot Tak; Nakanune.ru, July 22).
The most likely outcome is that Moscow will not build a buffer zone anytime soon, and the idea will fade from the Russian media. The discussion itself, however, will carry lasting political consequences. Putin's talk of a buffer zone appears to be backfiring, with more people questioning his judgment, even if not yet prepared to act against him. This corrosion of authority matters, since it suggests a growing number of Russian elites may conclude that challenging Putin is no longer the fool's errand many have long assumed.
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Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/ukrainian-drone-attacks-lead-moscow-to-revive-idea-of-buffer-zone-in-border-areas/
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Ukrainian Drone Attacks Lead Moscow to Revive Idea of Buffer Zone in Border Areas
Executive Summary:
* Ukrainian drone strikes into the Russian Federation have prompted the Kremlin to revive the idea of creating a buffer zone in western Russian regions and in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine to prevent or at least limit such strikes.
* The Russian government has not released ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Paul Goble, specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in the foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Ukrainian Drone Attacks Lead Moscow to Revive Idea of Buffer Zone in Border Areas Executive Summary: * Ukrainian drone strikes into the Russian Federation have prompted the Kremlin to revive the idea of creating a buffer zone in western Russian regions and in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine to prevent or at least limit such strikes. * The Russian government has not releaseddetails on what such a zone would entail, and there is much disagreement in Moscow over its potential size, the number of additional troops required, and whether its creation would involve the forced removal of people living there.
* Creating such a zone has Russian President Vladimir Putin's public backing, though the increasing range of Ukrainian drones has led some Russians to express doubts, with some calling the idea "stupid" unless the Ukrainian state were destroyed and its entire territory absorbed into the zone.
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In response to Ukrainian drone strikes targeting infrastructure ever deeper into the Russian Federation, Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov revived the idea of creating a buffer zone in Russian regions lying along the Ukrainian border and in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine on the other side (Interfax, July 9). This idea was first enshrined in the Minsk Accords after Moscow seized Ukraine's Crimea and parts of other Ukrainian regions, and it resurfaced after Ukraine seized Russia's Kursk oblast (RBC, May 12, 2025). In the past month, it has returned to Russian discussions with new force following Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian infrastructure deep within the country and a Kyiv proposal for limiting such long-range strikes in both directions, a proposal Russian President Vladimir Putin has rejected out of hand (RIA Novosti, June 28). To date, the Russian government has not released details on what such a zone might look like, how large it would be, how many additional troops would be needed to create it, and whether its creation would require the expulsion of people living there (Nakanune.ru, July 15). While the idea of such a buffer zone enjoys Putin's support, a growing number of Russian politicians and commentators are skeptical, with some describing the idea as useless or even "stupid" (RIA Novosti, June 28). Their skepticism centers on three factors--the increasing range of Ukrainian drone strikes, the massive troop numbers the policy would require, including a likely general mobilization, and how forced expulsions, reminiscent of Stalin-era policies, would play with the Russian population (Nakanune.ru, July 15, 22; Vot Tak, July 22; Novaya Gazeta, July 23).
The fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces has created a broad zone of displacement that extends well beyond the front line itself, and Kyiv and Moscow have responded to it in starkly different ways. Most reporting on the war speaks only of a front line, though the fighting affects people at considerable distances from where troops are positioned. Since Putin seized Ukraine's Crimea and parts of several other Ukrainian regions in 2014, and especially since the Kremlin leader launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine in 2022, people living in places near the fighting have fled, and the two governments have taken a variety of steps to help them. These efforts have expanded alongside a rising civilian death toll, which reached a record last month. That trend has created enormous challenges for both governments, according to Nikolay Mitrokhin, a Russian sociologist now at the University of Bremen (Vot Tak, July 22). Tens of thousands of people are involved, though exact numbers remain unavailable given the confusion surrounding these movements. Kyiv has consistently adopted a proactive approach, according to Mitrokhin, warning populations well in advance of Russian attacks and helping them relocate voluntarily. Moscow, in contrast, has been less consistent, neither warning local populations nor providing the assistance it has promised. The Russian government has instead responded to the problem almost exclusively during crises, such as the Ukrainian seizure of Kursk in 2024 and the current wave of Ukrainian drones striking targets deep within the Russian Federation (Vot Tak, July 22).
Moscow's renewed interest in a buffer zone appears driven more by Ukrainian drone attacks on the Russian interior than by any shift at the front, suggesting the idea functions as a public relations effort to calm the population rather than a plan the Kremlin intends to carry out. Putin and his spokesman admitted as much when they suggested that the deeper Ukrainian drones strike targets in Russia, the larger such a buffer zone would need to be (Interfax, July 9). Russian commentators have been reluctant to specify how deep such a zone would need to be, though the few who have offered figures suggest roughly 300 kilometers (186 miles) would be required (Nakanune.ru, July 15). Ukraine already strikes targets more than 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) inside Russia with drones and has announced plans to develop drones with a range of 10,000 kilometers (6,200 miles). Any buffer zone large enough to stop such strikes would have to encompass all Ukrainian territory, rendering the concept meaningless unless it did exactly that (Vot Tak, July 22).
The lack of specificity surrounding the buffer zone, including its size, the number of troops required, and whether current residents could remain, has pushed the debate from closed Kremlin discussions into the public sphere, where the Kremlin is losing control of the narrative. The most dramatic example of this shift, one that may kill off the buffer-zone idea altogether, came in a recent broadcast by outspoken Russian television host Vladimir Solovyev, who argued that Moscow must be ready to move 200,000 to 300,000 people from Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts away from "the line of the front" and resettle them in the Middle Volga, the Urals, and the Russian Far East (RIA Pivden, July 23). Several Russian military analysts called the idea reasonable for wartime planning, arguing that governments must prepare for worst-case scenarios precisely to avoid them, and suggested that Moscow might relocate people to regions near the North Caucasus rather than east of the Urals, as some feared (Nakanune.ru, July 22).
The prospect of mass deportations reminiscent of Stalin-era policies has provoked public outrage in Russia, undermining political support for the buffer-zone concept. Many Russians reacted with alarm at the prospect that Moscow might again deport large numbers of people, and whole nationalities, into the interior of the country (Novaya Gazeta, July 23). Some Russians may not draw this parallel or might even welcome it. Prominent commentators and even senior Duma figures now argue that a depopulated buffer zone along the Russian-Ukrainian border will not stop the drone attacks in the way the Kremlin suggests, calling the latest Putin proposal simply "stupid" (Vot Tak; Nakanune.ru, July 22).
The most likely outcome is that Moscow will not build a buffer zone anytime soon, and the idea will fade from the Russian media. The discussion itself, however, will carry lasting political consequences. Putin's talk of a buffer zone appears to be backfiring, with more people questioning his judgment, even if not yet prepared to act against him. This corrosion of authority matters, since it suggests a growing number of Russian elites may conclude that challenging Putin is no longer the fool's errand many have long assumed.
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Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia.
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Original text here: https://jamestown.org/ukrainian-drone-attacks-lead-moscow-to-revive-idea-of-buffer-zone-in-border-areas/
[Category: ThinkTank]
CSIS Issues Commentary: Japan's Defense Industry Charts an Uncertain Global Path
WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Deputy Director Alek Jovovic and research intern Awais Hanif, both with the Center for the Industrial Base.
Jovovic is also a senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department.
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Japan's Defense Industry Charts an Uncertain Global Path
Following decades of self-imposed constraints, Japan's defense industrial base is poised to expand its international presence as legal restrictions are lifted and business culture evolves. Historically limited to serving only ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Deputy Director Alek Jovovic and research intern Awais Hanif, both with the Center for the Industrial Base. Jovovic is also a senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department. * * * Japan's Defense Industry Charts an Uncertain Global Path Following decades of self-imposed constraints, Japan's defense industrial base is poised to expand its international presence as legal restrictions are lifted and business culture evolves. Historically limited to serving onlythe Japanese Self-Defense Forces--a single domestic customer with historically modest spending--the sector has been defined by specialized, Japan-specific solutions delivered by firms deeply rooted in civilian industries, as well as limited economies of scale. Nevertheless, these long-standing conventions may be on the cusp of major upheaval thanks to the sale of Mogami-class frigates to Australia and revision of defense export rules. This inflection point carries significant consequences for Tokyo's partners and allies, as Japanese firms emerge in the global market as both new partners and potential rivals.
Japan's Defense Industrial Base in Context
Before disarmament and the U.S. occupation, Japan's defense industrial base was formidable--world-class in aviation and shipbuilding, and broadly able to keep pace with the other great powers of the day. The occupation dismantled this sector, and in the years immediately after World War II, Japanese firms played only a modest defense role, repairing equipment and supplying U.S. operations during the Korean War. That war proved a turning point: U.S. "special procurement" revived Japan's flattened heavy industries, and the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement allowed firms to license-produce U.S. designs such as the F-86 Sabre jet, launching a decades-long pursuit of indigenous production known as kokusanka. Importantly, that pursuit was aimed at technological autonomy and spillover into the civilian economy, not at selling weapons abroad.
The constraints that locked the industry inward arrived in two steps. In 1967, the Sato Eisaku government's Three Principles barred arms exports to communist states, countries under UN embargo, and nations involved in or likely to face conflict. It was the Miki Takeo cabinet that effectively sealed the door in 1976, declaring that Japan would also refrain from exporting arms to all other countries and extending controls to cover weapons production equipment. From then on, for the better part of half a century, Japan's defense firms would serve a single customer: their own Self-Defense Forces.
The door that Miki shut began to reopen in 2014. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's cabinet scrapped the blanket ban and replaced it with the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfers, which permitted exports that served Japan's security or international peace, subject to National Security Council review. The following year Japan consolidated its scattered procurement and export functions into a single Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency.
The pace then accelerated: The December 2022 National Security Strategy committed Japan to raising defense spending toward 2 percent of GDP, and in December 2023 the rules were loosened again to allow the export of licensed-produced systems--Patriot interceptors among them--back to their U.S. licensor, and lethal systems to partners with whom Japan codevelops. By 2024 Japan had cleared the way to export the next-generation fighter being developed with Britain and Italy under the Global Combat Air Programme. The last wall fell in April 2026, when the Takaichi Sanae cabinet abolished the five categories that had confined finished exports to non-lethal roles--rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping--and reclassified defense equipment simply as weapons or non-weapons. Warships, missiles, and fighters can now be sold outright to the seventeen countries with which Japan holds defense equipment and technology transfer agreements.
Japan as a Competimate
Japan's defense sector was never a walled-off industry on the U.S. model; it grew inside civilian heavy industry, drawing on what Richard Samuels calls "spin-on"--the flow of commercial process and product technology into military systems--with diversified primes including Mitsubishi and Kawasaki carrying world-class shipbuilding, materials, and electronics into their defense lines. That heritage is what now makes Japan, all at once, a partner and a rival--what the defense industry calls a "competimate." For allies, the partnership is real: A capable, exporting Japan deepens the allied industrial base, widens codevelopment, and spreads the burden of deterrence in a region fixed on China. But the same capability also makes it a competitor. In winning the Australia contract, Japan displaced an established European supplier, and it will increasingly compete with U.S., French, German, and a fast-rising South Korean industry for the same export opportunities. This potential friction can reach inside the alliance, as it did between Japan and the United States during the FS-X fighter fight of the late 1980s, which turned a technical program into a bruising dispute over who would control technology and workshare.
None of this is guaranteed. Japanese systems are advanced but expensive, and Japanese firms still lack the marketing reach, sustainment networks, and financing that established exporters use to close and service deals abroad. The Australia deal is a commercial contract with Mitsubishi rather than a government-to-government sale, and its "zero-change" design promise will be tested as Australian weapons and systems are integrated. That kind of rework has driven cost and delay on Canberra's own programs before, such as the Hunter-class frigates, adapted from a British design. Japan's international sales inexperience was evident a decade ago when its Soryu-class submarine failed to win in Australia. Whether Japan can turn these lessons and a handful of landmark wins into a durable export industry remains in question.
The United States and its allies will now have to see Japan as two things at once: a partner whose industrial weight relieves strained supply chains and shores up deterrence, and a competitor bidding against their own national champions. The strategic case for welcoming the first is strong; the commercial cost of the second falls on specific set of global defense firms. Reconciling the two has become an allied problem, not merely a Japanese opportunity. How this tension is managed will determine whether Japan's reemergence adds to allied strength or just redistributes it.
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Aleksandar (Alek) Jovovic is deputy director of the Center for the Industrial Base and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Awais Hanif is a research intern in the Center for the Industrial Base at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/index%2ephp/analysis/japans-defense-industry-charts-uncertain-global-path
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jovovic is also a senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department.
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Japan's Defense Industry Charts an Uncertain Global Path
Following decades of self-imposed constraints, Japan's defense industrial base is poised to expand its international presence as legal restrictions are lifted and business culture evolves. Historically limited to serving only ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Deputy Director Alek Jovovic and research intern Awais Hanif, both with the Center for the Industrial Base. Jovovic is also a senior fellow in the CSIS Defense and Security Department. * * * Japan's Defense Industry Charts an Uncertain Global Path Following decades of self-imposed constraints, Japan's defense industrial base is poised to expand its international presence as legal restrictions are lifted and business culture evolves. Historically limited to serving onlythe Japanese Self-Defense Forces--a single domestic customer with historically modest spending--the sector has been defined by specialized, Japan-specific solutions delivered by firms deeply rooted in civilian industries, as well as limited economies of scale. Nevertheless, these long-standing conventions may be on the cusp of major upheaval thanks to the sale of Mogami-class frigates to Australia and revision of defense export rules. This inflection point carries significant consequences for Tokyo's partners and allies, as Japanese firms emerge in the global market as both new partners and potential rivals.
Japan's Defense Industrial Base in Context
Before disarmament and the U.S. occupation, Japan's defense industrial base was formidable--world-class in aviation and shipbuilding, and broadly able to keep pace with the other great powers of the day. The occupation dismantled this sector, and in the years immediately after World War II, Japanese firms played only a modest defense role, repairing equipment and supplying U.S. operations during the Korean War. That war proved a turning point: U.S. "special procurement" revived Japan's flattened heavy industries, and the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement allowed firms to license-produce U.S. designs such as the F-86 Sabre jet, launching a decades-long pursuit of indigenous production known as kokusanka. Importantly, that pursuit was aimed at technological autonomy and spillover into the civilian economy, not at selling weapons abroad.
The constraints that locked the industry inward arrived in two steps. In 1967, the Sato Eisaku government's Three Principles barred arms exports to communist states, countries under UN embargo, and nations involved in or likely to face conflict. It was the Miki Takeo cabinet that effectively sealed the door in 1976, declaring that Japan would also refrain from exporting arms to all other countries and extending controls to cover weapons production equipment. From then on, for the better part of half a century, Japan's defense firms would serve a single customer: their own Self-Defense Forces.
The door that Miki shut began to reopen in 2014. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's cabinet scrapped the blanket ban and replaced it with the Three Principles on Defense Equipment Transfers, which permitted exports that served Japan's security or international peace, subject to National Security Council review. The following year Japan consolidated its scattered procurement and export functions into a single Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency.
The pace then accelerated: The December 2022 National Security Strategy committed Japan to raising defense spending toward 2 percent of GDP, and in December 2023 the rules were loosened again to allow the export of licensed-produced systems--Patriot interceptors among them--back to their U.S. licensor, and lethal systems to partners with whom Japan codevelops. By 2024 Japan had cleared the way to export the next-generation fighter being developed with Britain and Italy under the Global Combat Air Programme. The last wall fell in April 2026, when the Takaichi Sanae cabinet abolished the five categories that had confined finished exports to non-lethal roles--rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping--and reclassified defense equipment simply as weapons or non-weapons. Warships, missiles, and fighters can now be sold outright to the seventeen countries with which Japan holds defense equipment and technology transfer agreements.
Japan as a Competimate
Japan's defense sector was never a walled-off industry on the U.S. model; it grew inside civilian heavy industry, drawing on what Richard Samuels calls "spin-on"--the flow of commercial process and product technology into military systems--with diversified primes including Mitsubishi and Kawasaki carrying world-class shipbuilding, materials, and electronics into their defense lines. That heritage is what now makes Japan, all at once, a partner and a rival--what the defense industry calls a "competimate." For allies, the partnership is real: A capable, exporting Japan deepens the allied industrial base, widens codevelopment, and spreads the burden of deterrence in a region fixed on China. But the same capability also makes it a competitor. In winning the Australia contract, Japan displaced an established European supplier, and it will increasingly compete with U.S., French, German, and a fast-rising South Korean industry for the same export opportunities. This potential friction can reach inside the alliance, as it did between Japan and the United States during the FS-X fighter fight of the late 1980s, which turned a technical program into a bruising dispute over who would control technology and workshare.
None of this is guaranteed. Japanese systems are advanced but expensive, and Japanese firms still lack the marketing reach, sustainment networks, and financing that established exporters use to close and service deals abroad. The Australia deal is a commercial contract with Mitsubishi rather than a government-to-government sale, and its "zero-change" design promise will be tested as Australian weapons and systems are integrated. That kind of rework has driven cost and delay on Canberra's own programs before, such as the Hunter-class frigates, adapted from a British design. Japan's international sales inexperience was evident a decade ago when its Soryu-class submarine failed to win in Australia. Whether Japan can turn these lessons and a handful of landmark wins into a durable export industry remains in question.
The United States and its allies will now have to see Japan as two things at once: a partner whose industrial weight relieves strained supply chains and shores up deterrence, and a competitor bidding against their own national champions. The strategic case for welcoming the first is strong; the commercial cost of the second falls on specific set of global defense firms. Reconciling the two has become an allied problem, not merely a Japanese opportunity. How this tension is managed will determine whether Japan's reemergence adds to allied strength or just redistributes it.
* * *
Aleksandar (Alek) Jovovic is deputy director of the Center for the Industrial Base and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Awais Hanif is a research intern in the Center for the Industrial Base at CSIS.
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Original text here: https://www.csis.org/index%2ephp/analysis/japans-defense-industry-charts-uncertain-global-path
[Category: ThinkTank]
American Action Forum Issues Commentary: Two Approaches to Social Security Reform - Changing the Process, Not the Policy
WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Fiscal Policy Director Jordan Haring:
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Two Approaches to Social Security Reform: Changing the Process, Not the Policy
Executive Summary
* Despite decades of warnings regarding Social Security's looming insolvency, Congress has failed to enact comprehensive reform, largely due to political concerns; yet amid urgent warnings, leaders in Congress have introduced two bipartisan bills - one in the House, and one in the Senate - to change the process through which Social Security reform would ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Fiscal Policy Director Jordan Haring: * * * Two Approaches to Social Security Reform: Changing the Process, Not the Policy Executive Summary * Despite decades of warnings regarding Social Security's looming insolvency, Congress has failed to enact comprehensive reform, largely due to political concerns; yet amid urgent warnings, leaders in Congress have introduced two bipartisan bills - one in the House, and one in the Senate - to change the process through which Social Security reform wouldbe developed and considered.
* The two bills represent different approaches to congressional delegation; the Senate's Protecting Retirement Opportunities and Maintaining Income Security for Everyone Act would rely on the existing Social Security Advisory Board and preserve Congress' ability to amend legislation, while the House's Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would establish a temporary commission whose recommendations would receive expedited legislative consideration with no opportunity for congressional amendments.
* While procedural reforms could encourage bipartisan negotiations and reduce legislative barriers, they cannot eliminate the difficult policy tradeoffs inherent in Social Security reform; Congress and the White House must be willing to both accept a political compromise and to endorse a combination of tax increases and benefit cuts that may be highly unpopular with voters.
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Introduction
For decades, the Social Security Trustees have warned that Social Security is approaching insolvency. Their latest projections estimate the combined Social Security trust funds (Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (SSDI)) will be insolvent by the end of calendar year 2034 - just eight years from now. Despite these urgent warnings, Congress has failed to reform the program since 1983, nearly a half-century ago. While lawmakers have put forth numerous proposals over the years to improve Social Security's finances, political concerns have proven a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to adopting program changes. This decades-long delay has, regrettably, left the reform options both abrupt and relatively sharp.
The warning's growing urgency, has, however, spurred leaders in Congress to introduce two bipartisan bills - one in the House, and one in the Senate - to change the process through which Social Security reform would be developed and considered.
In the House, Representatives Tom Cole (R-OK) and Tom Suozzi (D-NY) have introduced the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act of 2026 (HR 9187). In the Senate, Senators Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Tim Kaine (D-VA), John Cornyn (R-TX), Angus King (I-ME), and Alan Armstrong (R-OK) have introduced the Protecting Retirement Opportunities and Maintaining Income Security for Everyone (PROMISE) Act of 2026 (S 4979). Each bill would establish a process to develop recommendations for Congress, with the goal of encouraging bipartisan negotiations and creating a structured path toward legislative action on Social Security reform legislation. The bills differ in design, yet both rest on the idea that institutional and process reforms can help overcome the political barriers that have long impeded action on Social Security.
Whether changing the legislative process increases the likelihood of reforms is an open question. While commissions may facilitate bipartisan negotiations and reduce some political issues, they cannot eliminate the difficult policy tradeoffs inherent in restoring Social Security solvency.
Why Change the Process?
Most lawmakers inherently understand that Social Security reform is inevitable, yet there is no consensus on when Congress should act or how the costs of restoring long-term solvency should be distributed. Although Congress has successfully enacted major Social Security reforms before, doing so requires a bipartisan process. The National Commission on Social Security Reform (the Greenspan Commission) helped forge the bipartisan compromise that became the Social Security Amendments of 1983. The success of the Greenspan Commission demonstrates that institutional mechanisms can facilitate bipartisan agreement on politically difficult issues.
Social Security's financial challenge has been anticipated for decades. Since 1985, the Social Security Trustees have consistently warned that absent legislative action, the trust funds would eventually be depleted. Although the projected depletion date has shifted over time as economic and demographic assumptions changed, for much of the past four decades the trustees have projected depletion in the early-to-mid 2030s. These recurring warnings demonstrate that Social Security's financial challenge has been well understood for decades and has long required congressional action.
Despite these longstanding warnings, the traditional legislative process is not well-suited for producing a comprehensive Social Security reform package. Members often have incentives to support individual policies while opposing the broader compromise needed to restore solvency. Moreover, Social Security reform cannot be done through budget reconciliation, which allows legislation to pass the Senate by a simple majority vote. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 prohibits any budget reconciliation legislation from changing Social Security's benefit structure, trust funds, or dedicated funding mechanisms, requiring any comprehensive reform to proceed through the regular legislative process and overcome the Senate's 60-vote cloture threshold.
These institutional barriers are compounded by decades of legislative inaction. Since lawmakers have repeatedly delayed reforms while Social Security's financial imbalance has grown, restoring long-term solvency will almost certainly require both revenue and benefit changes. Earlier action would have allowed Congress to phase in smaller, more gradual changes. Now, the options are more limited, and any viable reform package will likely impose costs on both current and future workers and beneficiaries. The central political challenge is therefore not whether difficult choices must be made, but how those unavoidable costs should be distributed.
The challenge is further compounded by the complexity of Social Security reform. The program's financing and benefit structures are highly interconnected, meaning changes to one component will inevitably affect others. As a result, comprehensive reform cannot be achieved by considering individual proposals in isolation. Lawmakers must negotiate a comprehensive package of benefit and revenue changes.
Institutional reforms could address this challenge by changing the way Social Security reform would be developed and considered. Such changes could create a clear and structured process to evaluate policy options, establish deadlines for congressional action, and combine multiple reforms into a single legislative package. While changing the process cannot eliminate the difficult tradeoffs inherent in Social Security reform, it could improve Congress' ability to negotiate and act on comprehensive legislation.
Two Different Institutional Approaches
The PROMISE Act and the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act both aim to facilitate Social Security reform by changing the legislative process by which reform could be enacted, albeit in different ways.
The PROMISE Act: Building on an Existing Institution
The PROMISE Act would direct the bipartisan Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB) to develop a comprehensive proposal to restore solvency to the OASI and SSDI trust funds for at least 50 years, certified by the Social Security Trustees. The proposal would then be submitted to Congress as a "base bill" for legislative consideration.
To ensure Congress acts on SSAB's proposal, the PROMISE Act would establish expedited procedures for legislative consideration. It would direct the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader to introduce the base bill, though any Member of Congress could do so if leadership declines. The legislation would then be referred to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, which would have the chance to hold hearings and amend the base bill. They would have a set timeframe to report the bill (as potentially amended). If either committee fails to act within that period, the bill would be automatically discharged and placed on the House and Senate legislative calendars.
The Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader would move to proceed to the base bill, though any member could make a motion to proceed if leadership declines. Debate on the base bill would be limited to 100 hours in each chamber, divided equally between the majority and the minority. During floor consideration, members would have the opportunity to offer substitute amendments to the base bill. Any amendment would need to ensure that the OASI and SSDI trust funds are solvent for at least the next 50 years, and the adoption of an amendment would require a simple majority in the House and a three-fifths majority in the Senate. Once the 100 hours of debate concludes, Congress would vote on final passage of the bill (as potentially amended). A simple majority vote in the House and a three-fifths vote in the Senate would be required for passage.
The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act: Creating a Temporary Negotiating Body
The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would establish a Commission on Long-Term Social Security Solvency to develop bipartisan recommendations and legislation to restore solvency to the OASI and SSDI trust funds for at least the next 75 years. The commission would be comprised of 13 members. One member would be appointed by the President of the United States, two by each of the Speaker of the House, the House Minority Leader, the Senate Majority Leader, and the Senate Minority Leader. One member would also be appointed by each of the House Ways and Means Committee Chairman and Ranking Member, and Senate Finance Committee Chairman and Ranking Member. Of the 12 members appointed by Congress, at least one appointed by each political party must be an expert. The appointed by the President would serve as the chair of the commission while one of the Speaker of the House's appointees would serve as the co-chair. Within one year of its first meeting, the commission would be required to approve its recommendations - by an affirmative vote of at least nine of its members - before submitting them to Congress.
Once the recommendations are received, Congress would be able to consider them under expedited procedures. Within three legislative days of receiving the commission's report, the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader would be required to introduce an "approval bill" consisting of the commission's recommendations. The bill would then be referred to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, which would have three legislative days to report the bill (no amendments would be allowed). If either committee fails to act within that period, the bill would be automatically discharged and placed on the House and Senate legislative calendars.
The Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader would move to proceed with the approval bill. Debate on the bill would be limited to four hours in the House and 30 hours in the Senate, split evenly between the majority and the minority. Once the specified hours of debate conclude, Congress would vote on final passage of the approval bill. A simple majority vote in the House and a three-fifths vote in the Senate would be required for passage.
Comparing Two Proposals for Delegation
While both the PROMISE Act and the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act aim to facilitate Social Security reform through procedural changes, they represent different forms of congressional delegation.
The PROMISE Act would delegate the development of a legislative package to an existing advisory entity but preserve Congress' ability to amend the bill. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee would have a period to review, amend, and report the legislation and each chamber would have ample time to debate and amend the bill on the floor. The PROMISE Act therefore represents an attempt to balance expedited legislative consideration with congressional ownership of the policy outcome.
In contrast, the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would delegate the development of recommendations to a temporary bipartisan commission and prohibit congressional amendments to the recommendations. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee would have a very short window to review - not debate or amend - and report the legislation and each chamber would have limited time to debate the bill on the floor. This expedited, amendment-free process is similar to the procedures used by the Base Realignment and Closure process - which was used in 1988,1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005 to dispose of excess military infrastructure - that submitted recommendations to Congress for an up-or-down vote without amendment. The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act therefore places greater emphasis on reaching bipartisan consensus before legislation reaches Congress.
The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act's expedited procedures are considerably more restrictive than the PROMISE Act's. The former would prohibit amendments, give committees a short window to report the bill, and limit floor debate to while the latter would permit amendments in committee and on the floor and allow 100 hours of floor debate in each chamber. The bills also differ in their solvency objectives. The PROMISE Act would require a legislative package that restores solvency for at least 50 years, while the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would require a 75-year solvency package.
Can Process Reform Overcome Political Incentives?
The PROMISE Act and the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act both rest on the idea that institutional reforms can help overcome the political barriers that have long impeded Social Security reform. Their structured negotiations, mandatory deadlines, and expedited procedures would reduce legislative delays and force lawmakers to consider comprehensive Social Security reform packages rather than isolated policy changes.
Whether process reforms are sufficient is an open question. Neither bill would eliminate the difficult choices associated with Social Security reform. The same debate over taxes, benefits, retirement age, and program design would remain regardless of whether recommendations come from the SSAB or a temporary bipartisan commission.
Commissions can facilitate negotiation, not consensus. Their success is contingent on lawmakers' willingness to accept the tradeoffs necessary to enact comprehensive reform.
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Jordan Haring is the Director of Fiscal Policy at the American Action Forum
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/two-approaches-to-social-security-reform-changing-the-process-not-the-policy/
[Category: Think Tank]
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Two Approaches to Social Security Reform: Changing the Process, Not the Policy
Executive Summary
* Despite decades of warnings regarding Social Security's looming insolvency, Congress has failed to enact comprehensive reform, largely due to political concerns; yet amid urgent warnings, leaders in Congress have introduced two bipartisan bills - one in the House, and one in the Senate - to change the process through which Social Security reform would ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The American Action Forum issued the following commentary on July 28, 2026, by Fiscal Policy Director Jordan Haring: * * * Two Approaches to Social Security Reform: Changing the Process, Not the Policy Executive Summary * Despite decades of warnings regarding Social Security's looming insolvency, Congress has failed to enact comprehensive reform, largely due to political concerns; yet amid urgent warnings, leaders in Congress have introduced two bipartisan bills - one in the House, and one in the Senate - to change the process through which Social Security reform wouldbe developed and considered.
* The two bills represent different approaches to congressional delegation; the Senate's Protecting Retirement Opportunities and Maintaining Income Security for Everyone Act would rely on the existing Social Security Advisory Board and preserve Congress' ability to amend legislation, while the House's Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would establish a temporary commission whose recommendations would receive expedited legislative consideration with no opportunity for congressional amendments.
* While procedural reforms could encourage bipartisan negotiations and reduce legislative barriers, they cannot eliminate the difficult policy tradeoffs inherent in Social Security reform; Congress and the White House must be willing to both accept a political compromise and to endorse a combination of tax increases and benefit cuts that may be highly unpopular with voters.
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Introduction
For decades, the Social Security Trustees have warned that Social Security is approaching insolvency. Their latest projections estimate the combined Social Security trust funds (Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (SSDI)) will be insolvent by the end of calendar year 2034 - just eight years from now. Despite these urgent warnings, Congress has failed to reform the program since 1983, nearly a half-century ago. While lawmakers have put forth numerous proposals over the years to improve Social Security's finances, political concerns have proven a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to adopting program changes. This decades-long delay has, regrettably, left the reform options both abrupt and relatively sharp.
The warning's growing urgency, has, however, spurred leaders in Congress to introduce two bipartisan bills - one in the House, and one in the Senate - to change the process through which Social Security reform would be developed and considered.
In the House, Representatives Tom Cole (R-OK) and Tom Suozzi (D-NY) have introduced the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act of 2026 (HR 9187). In the Senate, Senators Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Tim Kaine (D-VA), John Cornyn (R-TX), Angus King (I-ME), and Alan Armstrong (R-OK) have introduced the Protecting Retirement Opportunities and Maintaining Income Security for Everyone (PROMISE) Act of 2026 (S 4979). Each bill would establish a process to develop recommendations for Congress, with the goal of encouraging bipartisan negotiations and creating a structured path toward legislative action on Social Security reform legislation. The bills differ in design, yet both rest on the idea that institutional and process reforms can help overcome the political barriers that have long impeded action on Social Security.
Whether changing the legislative process increases the likelihood of reforms is an open question. While commissions may facilitate bipartisan negotiations and reduce some political issues, they cannot eliminate the difficult policy tradeoffs inherent in restoring Social Security solvency.
Why Change the Process?
Most lawmakers inherently understand that Social Security reform is inevitable, yet there is no consensus on when Congress should act or how the costs of restoring long-term solvency should be distributed. Although Congress has successfully enacted major Social Security reforms before, doing so requires a bipartisan process. The National Commission on Social Security Reform (the Greenspan Commission) helped forge the bipartisan compromise that became the Social Security Amendments of 1983. The success of the Greenspan Commission demonstrates that institutional mechanisms can facilitate bipartisan agreement on politically difficult issues.
Social Security's financial challenge has been anticipated for decades. Since 1985, the Social Security Trustees have consistently warned that absent legislative action, the trust funds would eventually be depleted. Although the projected depletion date has shifted over time as economic and demographic assumptions changed, for much of the past four decades the trustees have projected depletion in the early-to-mid 2030s. These recurring warnings demonstrate that Social Security's financial challenge has been well understood for decades and has long required congressional action.
Despite these longstanding warnings, the traditional legislative process is not well-suited for producing a comprehensive Social Security reform package. Members often have incentives to support individual policies while opposing the broader compromise needed to restore solvency. Moreover, Social Security reform cannot be done through budget reconciliation, which allows legislation to pass the Senate by a simple majority vote. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 prohibits any budget reconciliation legislation from changing Social Security's benefit structure, trust funds, or dedicated funding mechanisms, requiring any comprehensive reform to proceed through the regular legislative process and overcome the Senate's 60-vote cloture threshold.
These institutional barriers are compounded by decades of legislative inaction. Since lawmakers have repeatedly delayed reforms while Social Security's financial imbalance has grown, restoring long-term solvency will almost certainly require both revenue and benefit changes. Earlier action would have allowed Congress to phase in smaller, more gradual changes. Now, the options are more limited, and any viable reform package will likely impose costs on both current and future workers and beneficiaries. The central political challenge is therefore not whether difficult choices must be made, but how those unavoidable costs should be distributed.
The challenge is further compounded by the complexity of Social Security reform. The program's financing and benefit structures are highly interconnected, meaning changes to one component will inevitably affect others. As a result, comprehensive reform cannot be achieved by considering individual proposals in isolation. Lawmakers must negotiate a comprehensive package of benefit and revenue changes.
Institutional reforms could address this challenge by changing the way Social Security reform would be developed and considered. Such changes could create a clear and structured process to evaluate policy options, establish deadlines for congressional action, and combine multiple reforms into a single legislative package. While changing the process cannot eliminate the difficult tradeoffs inherent in Social Security reform, it could improve Congress' ability to negotiate and act on comprehensive legislation.
Two Different Institutional Approaches
The PROMISE Act and the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act both aim to facilitate Social Security reform by changing the legislative process by which reform could be enacted, albeit in different ways.
The PROMISE Act: Building on an Existing Institution
The PROMISE Act would direct the bipartisan Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB) to develop a comprehensive proposal to restore solvency to the OASI and SSDI trust funds for at least 50 years, certified by the Social Security Trustees. The proposal would then be submitted to Congress as a "base bill" for legislative consideration.
To ensure Congress acts on SSAB's proposal, the PROMISE Act would establish expedited procedures for legislative consideration. It would direct the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader to introduce the base bill, though any Member of Congress could do so if leadership declines. The legislation would then be referred to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, which would have the chance to hold hearings and amend the base bill. They would have a set timeframe to report the bill (as potentially amended). If either committee fails to act within that period, the bill would be automatically discharged and placed on the House and Senate legislative calendars.
The Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader would move to proceed to the base bill, though any member could make a motion to proceed if leadership declines. Debate on the base bill would be limited to 100 hours in each chamber, divided equally between the majority and the minority. During floor consideration, members would have the opportunity to offer substitute amendments to the base bill. Any amendment would need to ensure that the OASI and SSDI trust funds are solvent for at least the next 50 years, and the adoption of an amendment would require a simple majority in the House and a three-fifths majority in the Senate. Once the 100 hours of debate concludes, Congress would vote on final passage of the bill (as potentially amended). A simple majority vote in the House and a three-fifths vote in the Senate would be required for passage.
The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act: Creating a Temporary Negotiating Body
The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would establish a Commission on Long-Term Social Security Solvency to develop bipartisan recommendations and legislation to restore solvency to the OASI and SSDI trust funds for at least the next 75 years. The commission would be comprised of 13 members. One member would be appointed by the President of the United States, two by each of the Speaker of the House, the House Minority Leader, the Senate Majority Leader, and the Senate Minority Leader. One member would also be appointed by each of the House Ways and Means Committee Chairman and Ranking Member, and Senate Finance Committee Chairman and Ranking Member. Of the 12 members appointed by Congress, at least one appointed by each political party must be an expert. The appointed by the President would serve as the chair of the commission while one of the Speaker of the House's appointees would serve as the co-chair. Within one year of its first meeting, the commission would be required to approve its recommendations - by an affirmative vote of at least nine of its members - before submitting them to Congress.
Once the recommendations are received, Congress would be able to consider them under expedited procedures. Within three legislative days of receiving the commission's report, the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader would be required to introduce an "approval bill" consisting of the commission's recommendations. The bill would then be referred to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, which would have three legislative days to report the bill (no amendments would be allowed). If either committee fails to act within that period, the bill would be automatically discharged and placed on the House and Senate legislative calendars.
The Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader would move to proceed with the approval bill. Debate on the bill would be limited to four hours in the House and 30 hours in the Senate, split evenly between the majority and the minority. Once the specified hours of debate conclude, Congress would vote on final passage of the approval bill. A simple majority vote in the House and a three-fifths vote in the Senate would be required for passage.
Comparing Two Proposals for Delegation
While both the PROMISE Act and the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act aim to facilitate Social Security reform through procedural changes, they represent different forms of congressional delegation.
The PROMISE Act would delegate the development of a legislative package to an existing advisory entity but preserve Congress' ability to amend the bill. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee would have a period to review, amend, and report the legislation and each chamber would have ample time to debate and amend the bill on the floor. The PROMISE Act therefore represents an attempt to balance expedited legislative consideration with congressional ownership of the policy outcome.
In contrast, the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would delegate the development of recommendations to a temporary bipartisan commission and prohibit congressional amendments to the recommendations. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee would have a very short window to review - not debate or amend - and report the legislation and each chamber would have limited time to debate the bill on the floor. This expedited, amendment-free process is similar to the procedures used by the Base Realignment and Closure process - which was used in 1988,1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005 to dispose of excess military infrastructure - that submitted recommendations to Congress for an up-or-down vote without amendment. The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act therefore places greater emphasis on reaching bipartisan consensus before legislation reaches Congress.
The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act's expedited procedures are considerably more restrictive than the PROMISE Act's. The former would prohibit amendments, give committees a short window to report the bill, and limit floor debate to while the latter would permit amendments in committee and on the floor and allow 100 hours of floor debate in each chamber. The bills also differ in their solvency objectives. The PROMISE Act would require a legislative package that restores solvency for at least 50 years, while the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would require a 75-year solvency package.
Can Process Reform Overcome Political Incentives?
The PROMISE Act and the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act both rest on the idea that institutional reforms can help overcome the political barriers that have long impeded Social Security reform. Their structured negotiations, mandatory deadlines, and expedited procedures would reduce legislative delays and force lawmakers to consider comprehensive Social Security reform packages rather than isolated policy changes.
Whether process reforms are sufficient is an open question. Neither bill would eliminate the difficult choices associated with Social Security reform. The same debate over taxes, benefits, retirement age, and program design would remain regardless of whether recommendations come from the SSAB or a temporary bipartisan commission.
Commissions can facilitate negotiation, not consensus. Their success is contingent on lawmakers' willingness to accept the tradeoffs necessary to enact comprehensive reform.
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Jordan Haring is the Director of Fiscal Policy at the American Action Forum
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Original text here: https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/two-approaches-to-social-security-reform-changing-the-process-not-the-policy/
[Category: Think Tank]
America First Policy Institute: Crime Data Confirms America First Policies Make Communities Safer
WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 28, 2026:
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New Crime Data Confirms America First Policies Make Communities Safer
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement in response to new crime data that shows violent crime continued to decline during the first half of 2026.
Compared to the first half of 2025, homicides fell 18%, robberies dropped 17%, carjackings declined 47%, gun assaults decreased 6%, and residential burglaries fell 13%.
"Americans want to feel safe where they live, work, and raise ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 28, 2026: * * * New Crime Data Confirms America First Policies Make Communities Safer The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement in response to new crime data that shows violent crime continued to decline during the first half of 2026. Compared to the first half of 2025, homicides fell 18%, robberies dropped 17%, carjackings declined 47%, gun assaults decreased 6%, and residential burglaries fell 13%. "Americans want to feel safe where they live, work, and raisetheir families. These new numbers show that strong leadership and common-sense public safety policies are making a real difference," said Brett Tolman, chair for American Justice at AFPI. "President Trump is delivering on his promise to make America safe again by standing with law enforcement, holding criminals accountable, and putting the safety of the American people first.
After years of rising crime and failed policies, our communities are moving in the right direction. We cannot go back to the policies that made our neighborhoods less safe.
Every American deserves the security and peace of mind that comes with safe streets, and we must continue building on this progress."
AFPI will continue advancing policies that support law enforcement, protect communities, and put the safety of the American people first.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/new-crime-data-confirms-america-first-policies-make-communities-safer
[Category: ThinkTank]
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New Crime Data Confirms America First Policies Make Communities Safer
The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement in response to new crime data that shows violent crime continued to decline during the first half of 2026.
Compared to the first half of 2025, homicides fell 18%, robberies dropped 17%, carjackings declined 47%, gun assaults decreased 6%, and residential burglaries fell 13%.
"Americans want to feel safe where they live, work, and raise ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following statement on July 28, 2026: * * * New Crime Data Confirms America First Policies Make Communities Safer The America First Policy Institute (AFPI) released the following statement in response to new crime data that shows violent crime continued to decline during the first half of 2026. Compared to the first half of 2025, homicides fell 18%, robberies dropped 17%, carjackings declined 47%, gun assaults decreased 6%, and residential burglaries fell 13%. "Americans want to feel safe where they live, work, and raisetheir families. These new numbers show that strong leadership and common-sense public safety policies are making a real difference," said Brett Tolman, chair for American Justice at AFPI. "President Trump is delivering on his promise to make America safe again by standing with law enforcement, holding criminals accountable, and putting the safety of the American people first.
After years of rising crime and failed policies, our communities are moving in the right direction. We cannot go back to the policies that made our neighborhoods less safe.
Every American deserves the security and peace of mind that comes with safe streets, and we must continue building on this progress."
AFPI will continue advancing policies that support law enforcement, protect communities, and put the safety of the American people first.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/new-crime-data-confirms-america-first-policies-make-communities-safer
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to Washington Reporter: Does Your State Protect Your Family From Sexual Predators?
WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 28, 2026, by Kayleigh Kozak, senior manager for the America Combats Child Exploitation Initiative, to the Washington Reporter:
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Does your state protect your family from sexual predators?
Most Americans believe the sex offender registry tells them exactly what potential threats live in their neighborhood. Parents use it before buying a home, choosing a school, or letting their children play outside, trusting that it provides a complete picture of potential danger.
It doesn't.
In ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 28, 2026, by Kayleigh Kozak, senior manager for the America Combats Child Exploitation Initiative, to the Washington Reporter: * * * Does your state protect your family from sexual predators? Most Americans believe the sex offender registry tells them exactly what potential threats live in their neighborhood. Parents use it before buying a home, choosing a school, or letting their children play outside, trusting that it provides a complete picture of potential danger. It doesn't. Inmany states, offenders convicted of sexual crimes too often do not show up on the public registry at all. Others are classified as "low risk" despite crimes involving children. Whether your family receives transparent and accurate information depends on the state you call home.
To read the full article, click here (https://washingtonreporter.news/op-ed-kayleigh-kozak-does-your-state-protect-your-family-from-sexual-predators/).
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Kayleigh Kozak serves as the Senior Manager for the America Combats Child Exploitation Initiative at the America First Policy Institute, where she is committed to developing and advances policy with the goal of ending the scourge of trafficking and child exploitation and ensuring harsh penalties and accountability for those who cause harm.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/does-your-state-protect-your-family-from-sexual-predators
[Category: ThinkTank]
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Does your state protect your family from sexual predators?
Most Americans believe the sex offender registry tells them exactly what potential threats live in their neighborhood. Parents use it before buying a home, choosing a school, or letting their children play outside, trusting that it provides a complete picture of potential danger.
It doesn't.
In ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on July 28, 2026, by Kayleigh Kozak, senior manager for the America Combats Child Exploitation Initiative, to the Washington Reporter: * * * Does your state protect your family from sexual predators? Most Americans believe the sex offender registry tells them exactly what potential threats live in their neighborhood. Parents use it before buying a home, choosing a school, or letting their children play outside, trusting that it provides a complete picture of potential danger. It doesn't. Inmany states, offenders convicted of sexual crimes too often do not show up on the public registry at all. Others are classified as "low risk" despite crimes involving children. Whether your family receives transparent and accurate information depends on the state you call home.
To read the full article, click here (https://washingtonreporter.news/op-ed-kayleigh-kozak-does-your-state-protect-your-family-from-sexual-predators/).
* * *
Kayleigh Kozak serves as the Senior Manager for the America Combats Child Exploitation Initiative at the America First Policy Institute, where she is committed to developing and advances policy with the goal of ending the scourge of trafficking and child exploitation and ensuring harsh penalties and accountability for those who cause harm.
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/does-your-state-protect-your-family-from-sexual-predators
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Governors' Council to Treasury: Don't Leave Homeschoolers Behind
WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 28, 2026:
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America First Governors' Council to Treasury: Don't Leave Homeschoolers Behind
Today, the America First Policy Institute's (AFPI) Governors' Council sent a letter to the Department of the Treasury, urging the department to clarify that American students in innovative learning models will be eligible for Education Freedom Tax Credit (EFTC) scholarships.
The Governors' Council celebrates Treasury's swift implementation of the EFTC. However, they express concern that children in ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 28, 2026: * * * America First Governors' Council to Treasury: Don't Leave Homeschoolers Behind Today, the America First Policy Institute's (AFPI) Governors' Council sent a letter to the Department of the Treasury, urging the department to clarify that American students in innovative learning models will be eligible for Education Freedom Tax Credit (EFTC) scholarships. The Governors' Council celebrates Treasury's swift implementation of the EFTC. However, they express concern that children innon-traditional settings could be shut out if eligibility relies on whether state law treats these alternative education options as "schools." Many states do not currently give this status to homeschools, microschools, hybrid programs, and other innovative learning models. AFPI's Governors' Council notes that conditions imposed by Congress only require a student to be eligible to enroll in a public school.
"The public education system is designed to be one-size-fits-all, but that approach does not work for every child," said Erika Donalds, Chair of Education Opportunity at AFPI. "A family shouldn't lose access to the Education Freedom Tax Credit simply because the best learning environment for their child doesn't look like a traditional classroom. Congress wrote this credit for students, not for systems or buildings."
As of today, 30 states have formally opted in to the EFTC. Earlier this year, AFPI released an interactive calculator which shows how much funding and how many scholarships will be forfeited by the remaining states that are not yet participating.
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INFODOC: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/assets/uploads/files/Governors_Council_Letter_to_Treasury.pdf
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-first-governors-council-to-treasury-dont-leave-homeschoolers-behind
[Category: ThinkTank]
* * *
America First Governors' Council to Treasury: Don't Leave Homeschoolers Behind
Today, the America First Policy Institute's (AFPI) Governors' Council sent a letter to the Department of the Treasury, urging the department to clarify that American students in innovative learning models will be eligible for Education Freedom Tax Credit (EFTC) scholarships.
The Governors' Council celebrates Treasury's swift implementation of the EFTC. However, they express concern that children in ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 29 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following news release on July 28, 2026: * * * America First Governors' Council to Treasury: Don't Leave Homeschoolers Behind Today, the America First Policy Institute's (AFPI) Governors' Council sent a letter to the Department of the Treasury, urging the department to clarify that American students in innovative learning models will be eligible for Education Freedom Tax Credit (EFTC) scholarships. The Governors' Council celebrates Treasury's swift implementation of the EFTC. However, they express concern that children innon-traditional settings could be shut out if eligibility relies on whether state law treats these alternative education options as "schools." Many states do not currently give this status to homeschools, microschools, hybrid programs, and other innovative learning models. AFPI's Governors' Council notes that conditions imposed by Congress only require a student to be eligible to enroll in a public school.
"The public education system is designed to be one-size-fits-all, but that approach does not work for every child," said Erika Donalds, Chair of Education Opportunity at AFPI. "A family shouldn't lose access to the Education Freedom Tax Credit simply because the best learning environment for their child doesn't look like a traditional classroom. Congress wrote this credit for students, not for systems or buildings."
As of today, 30 states have formally opted in to the EFTC. Earlier this year, AFPI released an interactive calculator which shows how much funding and how many scholarships will be forfeited by the remaining states that are not yet participating.
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INFODOC: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/assets/uploads/files/Governors_Council_Letter_to_Treasury.pdf
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Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-first-governors-council-to-treasury-dont-leave-homeschoolers-behind
[Category: ThinkTank]