Trade Associations
Here's a look at documents from national and international trade associations
Trade Associations
Featured Stories
Managed Funds Association Issues Letter to SEC
WASHINGTON, July 20 (TNSletter) -- The Managed Funds Association issued the following letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission:
* * *
Here is the text of the letter:
July 6, 2026
Vanessa A. Countryman
Secretary
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
110 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549-1090
Re: Semiannual Reporting
Dear Secretary Countryman:
MFA submits this letter to urge the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" or "SEC") to withdraw its proposal to replace the quarterly reporting framework that has existed since 1970 (the "Proposed Amendment") with an ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 20 (TNSletter) -- The Managed Funds Association issued the following letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission: * * * Here is the text of the letter: July 6, 2026 Vanessa A. Countryman Secretary U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 110 F Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20549-1090 Re: Semiannual Reporting Dear Secretary Countryman: MFA submits this letter to urge the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" or "SEC") to withdraw its proposal to replace the quarterly reporting framework that has existed since 1970 (the "Proposed Amendment") with anoptional semiannual reporting regime that would reduce the frequency of public financial disclosure.2 These comments reflect the perspectives of MFA's members, who are significant investors in public companies and invest on behalf of their underlying investors, including public and private pension funds, endowments, and charitable organizations, among other sophisticated investors.
As MFA explained in its April 2026 SEC comment letter regarding Regulation S-K reform, MFA broadly supports the Commission's efforts to refine and modernize the regulatory framework governing public company disclosures.3 In particular, MFA encouraged the Commission to focus disclosure requirements on material information, eliminate duplicative or unnecessary requirements, and streamline disclosure obligations to better support capital formation while preserving the quality and timeliness of information available to investors. Such targeted reforms can reduce issuer costs without diminishing the transparency and integrity of U.S. public markets.
The Proposed Amendment, however, takes a fundamentally different approach. Rather than refining disclosure requirements, it would reduce the frequency of mandatory financial reporting by public companies. MFA urges the Commission to withdraw the Proposed Amendment. Quarterly financial reporting is a core feature of the U.S. disclosure framework that provides investors with critical, timely, decision-useful information about a company's financial performance and evolving business conditions, thus enabling more informed capital allocation and risk assessment. Meanwhile, a shift to semiannual reporting risks significant unintended consequences for investors and capital markets, all for a claimed benefit that the evidence does not support.
At a minimum, the Commission must not proceed with the Proposed Amendment while it considers other, considerably less harmful, content-based reforms to public company disclosure requirements. In fact, within days of publishing the Proposed Amendment, the Commission proposed amendments that would greatly alter filer status and Form S-3 eligibility.4 The Commission must consider the costs and benefits of the Proposed Amendment in tandem with the other two proposals. These reforms would directly affect both issuer compliance costs and the informational value of disclosures, and thus fundamentally shape the context in which any changes to reporting frequency must be evaluated. Absent clarity regarding the ultimate scope and impact of these reforms, if adopted, the Commission cannot satisfy its statutory obligation to assess the costs and benefits of the Proposed Amendment.
Executive Summary
The Proposed Amendment represents a significant departure from the longstanding quarterly reporting framework that has served as a cornerstone of the U.S. disclosure regime. MFA respectfully requests that the Commission consider the following before implementing a change of that magnitude:
(I) A switch to semiannual reporting would harm investors and market integrity by increasing information asymmetries, delaying price discovery, weakening corporate accountability, and impairing the efficient functioning of public markets;
(II) The Commission's contention that changing to semiannual reporting will redress the decline in public offerings lacks evidentiary support; and
(III) The Commission must finalize its consideration of less harmful alternatives to reduce public company reporting burdens before it can accurately assess the costs and benefits of the Proposed Amendment.
I. The Proposed Amendment Risks Serious Foreseeable and Adverse Consequences
Investor access to timely, reliable, and material information about public companies is a core tenet of U.S. capital markets and the regulatory framework governing those markets. The current quarterly financial reporting requirement promotes transparency, market discipline, and investor confidence, and should remain a cornerstone of the U.S. public company disclosure regime. Indeed, investors have relied on the quarterly reporting cadence for decades now, building investment models, risk management frameworks, and capital allocation processes around the predictable flow of reviewed financial information that quarterly Form 10-Q filings provide. MFA's members, in particular, depend on quarterly filings to evaluate companies in which they have invested or are considering investing, and to assess the progress companies have made toward achieving their stated objectives.
Adopting the Proposed Amendment's switch to semiannual reporting would upend that established flow of financial information, risking significant and wide-ranging consequences for the Commission's core statutory objectives of market integrity, investor protection, and capital formation. Those consequences fall into three related categories: impairments to the quality and timeliness of information, market-integrity risks, and weakened governance and capitalmarket outcomes.
* Information Asymmetry and Increased Costs
As discussed in MFA's April 2026 letter, empirical studies and recent experience both confirm that reducing the frequency of required financial reporting would increase disparities in access to information and would disproportionately disadvantage retail investors and smaller market participants that rely heavily on periodic disclosures. Quarterly reporting provides timely, reliable, and material information that is central to informed capital allocation and investor confidence; without it, investors' ability to evaluate performance, monitor risk, and compare issuers would be significantly diminished. Thus, reducing reporting frequency would increase uncertainty and information asymmetry by delaying the release of standardized financial information, allowing material information to accumulate privately, and shifting the market from uniform public disclosure to uneven, resource dependent information access. In response, investors would, at a minimum, demand a higher risk premium, increasing issuers' cost of capital and, in more pronounced cases, may deter the deployment of long term institutional capital. Either outcome would run counter to the Commission's stated objective of promoting capital formation.
* Delayed Market Price Discovery
Reducing the number of mandated reporting intervals would also increase the chance that markets will incorporate outdated financial information, potentially causing delayed or less efficient price adjustments and impairments to overall market efficiency. Those impairments would, in turn, threaten the advantages that have helped make U.S. public markets a global leader in issuance and proceeds, including deeper liquidity, stronger price discovery, and sustained investor confidence. The risk is not farfetched, as research on European markets, cited in MFA's April 2026 letter, shows that markets with less frequent mandatory disclosure experience weaker valuations and thinner trading liquidity, even amid improving global conditions.5 The Commission should not risk replicating these outcomes in U.S. markets.
* Loss of Financial Granularity
A reduction in reporting frequency would also reduce the availability of granular financial data. Companies' quarterly reports provide frequent and detailed insight into issuer performance, including interim trends and developments that are critical to informed capital allocation. Transitioning to semiannual reports would reduce the timeliness and comparability of such financial information, in turn, potentially weakening valuation accuracy and increasing the risk of market mispricing. The result would be less efficient allocation of capital across companies and industry sectors. Additionally, MFA members, as institutional investors, rely on consistent and reliable financial information to compare similar companies and make informed investment decisions; without structured quarterly reporting required by all companies, that ability would be significantly diminished.
* Increased Susceptibility to Rumors, Misinformation, and Elevated Insider Trading Risk
Longer reporting gaps would also create an environment in which unofficial sources, speculation, and incomplete information have a greater influence on market behavior, thereby increasing volatility and the potential for misinformation-driven trading activity. Eliminating mandatory quarterly reporting would also lengthen blackout periods during which material nonpublic information ("MNPI") accumulates. Currently, quarterly Form 10-Q filings provide a regular and predictable mechanism for disclosing MNPI. But if the Proposed Amendment is adopted, MNPI could remain undisclosed for periods of up to six months. While, as the Commission noted in the Proposed Amendment, companies have other means of disclosing MNPI to the markets, many of these are optional, and companies are generally reluctant to disclose financial information without the benefit of having closed their books and completed auditor processes.
An issuer's reporting cadence could itself become a source of speculation. Investors might view less frequent reporting as a sign of weakness or continued quarterly reporting as a sign of strength. Either perception risks fueling rumor-driven trading and adding market noise unrelated to fundamentals. The absence of a regular quarterly reporting cadence would prolong information asymmetry, increase reliance on stale disclosure and social media inferences and rumors, and weaken market liquidity and attractiveness. It would increase the value of non-public information and the potential for its misuse, raising the risk of insider trading.
* Shift from Public Disclosure to Private Corporate Access
Reducing reporting frequency would make information about public companies less available through standardized public disclosures. Rather than reducing the market's demand for timely financial information, the Proposed Amendment would increase the value of obtaining such information through private channels and corporate access. Companies would also continue to provide financial information to lenders and other contractual counterparties through private reporting arrangements. The result would be a market in which investment outcomes increasingly depend on privileged access to information rather than analysis of publicly disseminated financial information, undermining the transparency and fairness that distinguish U.S. public markets.
* Weakened Corporate Accountability and Constrained Legitimate Corporate Activity
Fewer reporting checkpoints would likewise reduce the scrutiny to which management is subject, limiting investors' (and other market participants') ability to monitor a company's performance and strategy execution on a timely basis. The shift to semiannual reporting would cause longer blackout periods, reducing flexibility for management and boards to transact in company stock during open trading windows. The Proposed Amendment would not only remove regular public accountability; it could also constrain legitimate insider activity, which serves important price-discovery and incentive-alignment functions.
* Reduced Attractiveness and Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets
Moving to semiannual reporting could weaken the competitive advantage that U.S. markets enjoy relative to other global markets and private capital alternatives. As MFA explained previously, in Europe, which has moved away from mandatory quarterly reporting requirements, public markets have continued to lag
behind the U.S., with lower deal volumes, weaker valuations, and thinner trading liquidity, even amid improving global conditions.6 Replicating that approach could similarly shift issuance activity away from U.S. public markets, either to jurisdictions offering comparable liquidity with lower regulatory burdens or into private markets where disclosure is limited to sophisticated investors.
II. Optional Quarterly Reporting Would Create Additional Concerns
The Commission's main response to the above concerns seems to be optionality, allowing issuers to choose between quarterly and semiannual reporting. Optionality does not mitigate our concerns but instead adds new ones. The optionality of reporting under the Proposed Amendment would lead to inconsistent disclosure practices, with some companies continuing to report quarterly, others (informally) reporting only particular quarters, and others electing to report semiannually. Such variability would disrupt comparability and the availability of timely, standardized information, undermining the very objectives the disclosure regime is meant to serve. For example, mixed reporting across index and ETFs constituents would disrupt comparability and complicate portfolio construction. Index providers and fund managers would have to deal with inconsistent data, which would add confusion, reduce valuation accuracy and impact how the index is composed and weighted. These inconsistencies would also exacerbate disparities within an issuer's capital structure. As an example, debt investors often receive quarterly financials via covenant reporting regardless of SEC filing requirements, while equity investors would be limited to semiannual disclosures. Such imbalance would heighten information asymmetries between holders of different securities of the same issuer and could distort relative pricing between debt and equity, creating an uneven playing field.
Additionally, optionality also raises important corporate governance questions. First, who within a company decides whether to make the semiannual election (or earnings disclosures), and what process governs that decision? Given that reporting frequency directly affects investor access to information, this is not a matter that should rest solely with management. As proposed, the election mechanism risks being captured by management interests that may not align with the information needs of the investing public. Second, optionality leaves unanswered the consequences of a company's failure to make an election. Because issuers would affirmatively elect, generally on an annual basis, a failure to clearly make such an election could leave investors uncertain whether the issuer will report quarterly or semiannually and create opportunities for issuers to manipulate the timing and signaling of that decision, leaving investors in limbo and with limited visibility into what disclosure information they will receive.
By introducing variability in reporting practices across issuers, the Proposed Amendment would fragment the information landscape, impair comparability, and create new governance risks, all while failing to address the underlying concerns that prompted the proposal. The Commission should not adopt a framework that replaces investor protection with increased investor confusion. For these reasons, MFA urges the Commission to retain the existing uniform quarterly reporting requirement.
III. The Proposed Amendment Will Not Meaningfully Advance the Commission's Key Objectives
The lack of support for the Proposed Amendment's central premise, that a change in reporting frequency will address the decline in public offerings, provides an independent reason for the Commission to reconsider the Proposed Amendment. Notably, the Commission's economic analysis does not identify increased IPO activity as a potential benefit of the Proposed Amendment, nor does it analyze how reducing reporting frequency would encourage companies to go or remain public. Under federal securities laws, the Commission is required to consider the effects of its rulemaking on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. Courts have made it clear that this obligation requires the Commission to engage in a reasoned analysis of the rule's economic consequences, including its effects on capital formation.7 Absent such analysis, the Commission cannot satisfy its statutory duty to evaluate whether the Proposed Amendment would meaningfully advance capital formation.
The absence of such analysis is particularly significant because the available evidence does not support the assumption that reporting frequency is a meaningful driver of IPO activity or company participation. The Commission has framed the Proposed Amendment as a means to encourage companies to go public (or to stay public) by alleviating the burdens associated with public company status. That rational, however, rests on a causal assumption that lacks empirical support. The decline in U.S. IPO activity is driven primarily by structural and market-driven factors, not reporting frequency. Research highlights the increasing appeal of selling to larger firms rather than remaining independent, along with the rapid growth of private capital markets, which allows startups to stay private longer at a larger scale.8 From 2001 to 2016, roughly 90% of successful venture capital-backed exits occurred through trade sales rather than IPOs, compared to just 20% in 1990 to 1991.9 More recent data indicates that this trend has persisted. Only about 4% of U.S. venture capital-backed exits in 2025 were IPOs, with the remaining 96% occurred through acquisitions or other private transactions.10 This trend reflects a rational shift by founders leveraging expanded access to private capital, rather than a failure in public markets.11 In this context, regulatory costs appear to account for only a small share of the overall decline in the number of public companies.12
The timing also undercuts the Commission's premise. The decline in IPOs began well before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, and subsequent legislative efforts to reduce public company burdens (including the JOBS Act of 2012) have not reversed the trend.13 Given that those broader reforms failed to meaningfully increase IPO volumes, there is little reason to conclude that replacing quarterly filings with a single semiannual report will succeed where previous legislative efforts did not. The Commission therefore lacks a sufficient basis to conclude that the Proposed Amendment will generate the capital formation benefits it suggests, while the costs identified above are likely to be realized regardless.
The Commission's related justification, that less frequent reporting will reduce short-termism and encourage companies to focus on long-term value creation, is equally unsupported. The Commission does not commit to this theory; it acknowledges that the academic evidence is mixed on whether quarterly reporting actually drives short-term managerial behavior, that reducing reporting frequency is unlikely to affect genuinely long-horizon decisions, and that other factors, such as executive compensation design and earnings guidance, likely matter far more than the reporting cycle. Such concessions fatally undermine short-termism as a justification for the Proposed Amendment, and the Commission cannot demonstrate that it would meaningfully curb short-termism.
Moreover, even setting the Commission's own concessions aside, there is no reason to believe that changing the reporting cadence from three months to six will alter decision-making over the five-, seven-, or ten-year horizons that drive long-term value. Less frequent disclosure does not make management more long-term oriented; it simply makes investors less informed. The Commission identifies no evidence that withholding material financial information for an additional quarter improves capital allocation or creates shareholder value, and the weight of the research runs in the other direction, more frequent reporting helps managers learn from market signals, improves investment efficiency, and is associated with profitability gains that persist for years.14 The short-termism rationale therefore provides no basis for the Proposed Amendment.
Finally, even if some issuers were to elect semiannual reporting, the Proposed Amendment would not meaningfully reduce the compliance burdens that the Commission claims deter companies from going or staying public. Public companies must maintain robust internal controls, financial reporting infrastructure, and governance processes to ensure the accuracy and reliability of their disclosures (obligations that exist independent of reporting frequency). Reducing the number of required filings from four to two does not eliminate the need to maintain quarter-close processes, internal audit functions, disclosure committees, or the personnel and systems required to produce timely and accurate financial statements. Companies would still need to track and assess material developments on an ongoing basis to comply with their disclosure obligations under federal securities laws. Because the costs associated with public company reporting are largely fixed, the infrastructure required to support those obligations would remain substantially unchanged. As a result, the Proposed Amendment would do little to alter the cost-benefit analysis facing companies considering whether to go public or remain public.
IV. The Commission Does Not Have Enough Information to Accurately Assess the Proposed Amendment's Costs and Benefits
Even if the Commission were to disagree with MFA's substantive concerns, the current record provides an independent reason to pause: the Commission cannot yet conduct the requisite economic analysis.
Courts of appeals have been clear: the Commission has a "statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic implications" of rules like the Proposed Amendment.15 Specifically, the Commission must consider the effect of any new rule upon "efficiency, competition, and capital formation."16 The Commission's "failure to apprise itself -- and hence the public and the Congress -- of the economic consequences of a proposed regulation makes promulgation of the rule arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law."17
The Commission's current analysis of the Proposed Amendment is already flawed. The Commission estimates that the Proposed Amendment will result in net compliance savings of approximately $200,000 in annual savings per issuer. But it makes no attempt to quantify the Proposed Amendment's (far greater) costs. That failure is critical. The costs associated with even a small change to risk premia, spreads, costs of capital, or liquidity are all but guaranteed to wipe out the mere $200,000 in savings the Commission predicts. Plus, the Commission's estimate is far from certain. The predicted adoption rate is nothing but guesswork; the Commission has no idea how many companies will switch to its new Form 10-S. Nor does it consider whether certain types or sizes of companies are more likely to switch than others, much less what that would mean for market quality or investors. Finally, the Commission's calculation likely overstates issuers' savings given that the principal drivers of compliance costs -- internal controls -- will stay the same regardless of reporting cadence.
In any event, the Commission cannot fully conduct the required economic analysis at this juncture. As the Commission itself has explained, "the required economic analysis ... considers the incremental benefits and costs for the specific rule -- that is, the benefits and costs stemming from that rule compared to the baseline."18 The Commission therefore must have an accurate and stable baseline against which a rule's effects can be measured. Without one, the Commission cannot determine whether any identified costs or benefits are attributable to the rule in question, or to something else entirely.
Here, the Commission cannot have a defined economic baseline because it is currently engaged in multiple, concurrent reform initiatives affecting public company disclosure, including substantial revisions to Regulation S K, changes to filer status classifications, and adjustments to Form S 3 eligibility. These reforms will directly affect issuer compliance costs, the production of information, and the value of disclosures to investors, the precise variables that must be understood to assess the effects of altering reporting frequency. Yet the scope and substance of these reforms remain unsettled.
The Commission cannot proceed in the face of that uncertainty. To do so, it would have to choose between speculating as to the contours of the anticipated reforms and the corresponding economic effects, or ignoring the anticipated reforms altogether. The first path is foreclosed by Business Roundtable v. SEC, where the D.C. Circuit held that the Commission "failed ... adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule," in part, because the Commission "neglected to support its predictive judgments."19 "[M]ere speculation," the Court explained, could not suffice.20 And the second path -- ignoring the anticipated reforms and proceeding as though the existing disclosure regime were fixed -- fares no better. In National Association of Private Fund Managers v. SEC, the Fifth Circuit rejected precisely that approach, holding that the Commission cannot rely on an economic baseline that "ignore[d]" "highly interrelated" and contemporaneously adopted rules; the Commission must account for such rules' "collective economic effects."21 The same is true here.
MFA appreciates that developing a complete economic analysis in the face of multiple concurrent reforms might be challenging. But courts have repeatedly held that any "difficulty" in estimating a rule's economic effects "does not excuse the Commission" from its obligation to do so as best it can.22 If anything, the complexity of the task is reason for the Commission to proceed with greater care, not with incomplete information.
To be clear, none of this is to say the Commission should rethink (or delay) reform more broadly. In fact, MFA supports the Commission's ongoing efforts to modernize and streamline disclosure requirements, particularly through content-focused reforms that refocus disclosures on material information, reduce duplicative obligations, and improve data usability. But as MFA noted in its April 2026 letter regarding Regulation S K, changes to narrative and qualitative disclosure requirements should be considered holistically with any proposal to alter reporting frequency, and the Commission should evaluate the aggregated costs and benefits of these interrelated reforms together.23
In short, if the Commission decides to proceed with changes to reporting frequency, such changes should be adopted, if at all, only after these related reforms are finalized. A sound assessment of the Proposed Amendment's costs and benefits is possible only when measured against a settled regulatory baseline -- one that reflects final decisions regarding the content of required disclosures, filer status classifications, and the scope of available relief. The Commission's statutory obligations, its own economic framework, and governing precedent all point to the same conclusion: reforms of this magnitude must be sequenced deliberately, not adopted piecemeal.
* * * * *
MFA appreciates your consideration of our recommendations. We look forward to working with the Commission on content-focused reforms that refocus disclosures on material information, reduce duplicative obligations, and improve data usability. We would welcome the opportunity to discuss our recommendations in greater detail. Please do not hesitate to contact Jeff Himstreet (jhimstreet@mfaalts.org) or the undersigned (jhan@mfaalts.org) with any questions.
Respectfully submitted,
Jennifer W. Han, Chief Legal Officer & Head of Global Regulatory Affairs, MFA
cc: The Hon. Paul S. Atkins, Chairman, SEC
The Hon. Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, SEC
The Hon. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, SEC
James Moloney, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC
* * *
Original text and footnotes here: https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fmfaalts.mmsend.com%2Flink.cfm%3Fr%3DI6akZgr0ZNKKAjrRt9SRLw~~%26pe%3DUIiH41RlVcOgS3K7ELgUlcPwf-lGqTfHZehPDCVL4_aO1Szmy48ZI7onYCrxr0kP99PcQ9rsmnTUjgklATokPA~~%26t%3DMizsaGjI2ziBNlEG3fCZPw~~&data=05%7C02%7Ckgastelum%40mfaalts.org%7Ca3219d290f3545e3041308dedb9b8ff4%7C6daca4ae4f174bdbbbd4fd1f4b08da6b%7C0%7C0%7C639189658360587669%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=p%2FytkfCnGbQ8qygJaO8S3KBsoTJToDnH77DDeE0jFkY%3D&reserved=0
News Release here: https://www.mfaalts.org/press-releases/mfa-urges-sec-to-reconsider-semiannual-reporting-proposal/
[Category: Financial Services]
* * *
Here is the text of the letter:
July 6, 2026
Vanessa A. Countryman
Secretary
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
110 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549-1090
Re: Semiannual Reporting
Dear Secretary Countryman:
MFA submits this letter to urge the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" or "SEC") to withdraw its proposal to replace the quarterly reporting framework that has existed since 1970 (the "Proposed Amendment") with an ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 20 (TNSletter) -- The Managed Funds Association issued the following letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission: * * * Here is the text of the letter: July 6, 2026 Vanessa A. Countryman Secretary U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 110 F Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20549-1090 Re: Semiannual Reporting Dear Secretary Countryman: MFA submits this letter to urge the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" or "SEC") to withdraw its proposal to replace the quarterly reporting framework that has existed since 1970 (the "Proposed Amendment") with anoptional semiannual reporting regime that would reduce the frequency of public financial disclosure.2 These comments reflect the perspectives of MFA's members, who are significant investors in public companies and invest on behalf of their underlying investors, including public and private pension funds, endowments, and charitable organizations, among other sophisticated investors.
As MFA explained in its April 2026 SEC comment letter regarding Regulation S-K reform, MFA broadly supports the Commission's efforts to refine and modernize the regulatory framework governing public company disclosures.3 In particular, MFA encouraged the Commission to focus disclosure requirements on material information, eliminate duplicative or unnecessary requirements, and streamline disclosure obligations to better support capital formation while preserving the quality and timeliness of information available to investors. Such targeted reforms can reduce issuer costs without diminishing the transparency and integrity of U.S. public markets.
The Proposed Amendment, however, takes a fundamentally different approach. Rather than refining disclosure requirements, it would reduce the frequency of mandatory financial reporting by public companies. MFA urges the Commission to withdraw the Proposed Amendment. Quarterly financial reporting is a core feature of the U.S. disclosure framework that provides investors with critical, timely, decision-useful information about a company's financial performance and evolving business conditions, thus enabling more informed capital allocation and risk assessment. Meanwhile, a shift to semiannual reporting risks significant unintended consequences for investors and capital markets, all for a claimed benefit that the evidence does not support.
At a minimum, the Commission must not proceed with the Proposed Amendment while it considers other, considerably less harmful, content-based reforms to public company disclosure requirements. In fact, within days of publishing the Proposed Amendment, the Commission proposed amendments that would greatly alter filer status and Form S-3 eligibility.4 The Commission must consider the costs and benefits of the Proposed Amendment in tandem with the other two proposals. These reforms would directly affect both issuer compliance costs and the informational value of disclosures, and thus fundamentally shape the context in which any changes to reporting frequency must be evaluated. Absent clarity regarding the ultimate scope and impact of these reforms, if adopted, the Commission cannot satisfy its statutory obligation to assess the costs and benefits of the Proposed Amendment.
Executive Summary
The Proposed Amendment represents a significant departure from the longstanding quarterly reporting framework that has served as a cornerstone of the U.S. disclosure regime. MFA respectfully requests that the Commission consider the following before implementing a change of that magnitude:
(I) A switch to semiannual reporting would harm investors and market integrity by increasing information asymmetries, delaying price discovery, weakening corporate accountability, and impairing the efficient functioning of public markets;
(II) The Commission's contention that changing to semiannual reporting will redress the decline in public offerings lacks evidentiary support; and
(III) The Commission must finalize its consideration of less harmful alternatives to reduce public company reporting burdens before it can accurately assess the costs and benefits of the Proposed Amendment.
I. The Proposed Amendment Risks Serious Foreseeable and Adverse Consequences
Investor access to timely, reliable, and material information about public companies is a core tenet of U.S. capital markets and the regulatory framework governing those markets. The current quarterly financial reporting requirement promotes transparency, market discipline, and investor confidence, and should remain a cornerstone of the U.S. public company disclosure regime. Indeed, investors have relied on the quarterly reporting cadence for decades now, building investment models, risk management frameworks, and capital allocation processes around the predictable flow of reviewed financial information that quarterly Form 10-Q filings provide. MFA's members, in particular, depend on quarterly filings to evaluate companies in which they have invested or are considering investing, and to assess the progress companies have made toward achieving their stated objectives.
Adopting the Proposed Amendment's switch to semiannual reporting would upend that established flow of financial information, risking significant and wide-ranging consequences for the Commission's core statutory objectives of market integrity, investor protection, and capital formation. Those consequences fall into three related categories: impairments to the quality and timeliness of information, market-integrity risks, and weakened governance and capitalmarket outcomes.
* Information Asymmetry and Increased Costs
As discussed in MFA's April 2026 letter, empirical studies and recent experience both confirm that reducing the frequency of required financial reporting would increase disparities in access to information and would disproportionately disadvantage retail investors and smaller market participants that rely heavily on periodic disclosures. Quarterly reporting provides timely, reliable, and material information that is central to informed capital allocation and investor confidence; without it, investors' ability to evaluate performance, monitor risk, and compare issuers would be significantly diminished. Thus, reducing reporting frequency would increase uncertainty and information asymmetry by delaying the release of standardized financial information, allowing material information to accumulate privately, and shifting the market from uniform public disclosure to uneven, resource dependent information access. In response, investors would, at a minimum, demand a higher risk premium, increasing issuers' cost of capital and, in more pronounced cases, may deter the deployment of long term institutional capital. Either outcome would run counter to the Commission's stated objective of promoting capital formation.
* Delayed Market Price Discovery
Reducing the number of mandated reporting intervals would also increase the chance that markets will incorporate outdated financial information, potentially causing delayed or less efficient price adjustments and impairments to overall market efficiency. Those impairments would, in turn, threaten the advantages that have helped make U.S. public markets a global leader in issuance and proceeds, including deeper liquidity, stronger price discovery, and sustained investor confidence. The risk is not farfetched, as research on European markets, cited in MFA's April 2026 letter, shows that markets with less frequent mandatory disclosure experience weaker valuations and thinner trading liquidity, even amid improving global conditions.5 The Commission should not risk replicating these outcomes in U.S. markets.
* Loss of Financial Granularity
A reduction in reporting frequency would also reduce the availability of granular financial data. Companies' quarterly reports provide frequent and detailed insight into issuer performance, including interim trends and developments that are critical to informed capital allocation. Transitioning to semiannual reports would reduce the timeliness and comparability of such financial information, in turn, potentially weakening valuation accuracy and increasing the risk of market mispricing. The result would be less efficient allocation of capital across companies and industry sectors. Additionally, MFA members, as institutional investors, rely on consistent and reliable financial information to compare similar companies and make informed investment decisions; without structured quarterly reporting required by all companies, that ability would be significantly diminished.
* Increased Susceptibility to Rumors, Misinformation, and Elevated Insider Trading Risk
Longer reporting gaps would also create an environment in which unofficial sources, speculation, and incomplete information have a greater influence on market behavior, thereby increasing volatility and the potential for misinformation-driven trading activity. Eliminating mandatory quarterly reporting would also lengthen blackout periods during which material nonpublic information ("MNPI") accumulates. Currently, quarterly Form 10-Q filings provide a regular and predictable mechanism for disclosing MNPI. But if the Proposed Amendment is adopted, MNPI could remain undisclosed for periods of up to six months. While, as the Commission noted in the Proposed Amendment, companies have other means of disclosing MNPI to the markets, many of these are optional, and companies are generally reluctant to disclose financial information without the benefit of having closed their books and completed auditor processes.
An issuer's reporting cadence could itself become a source of speculation. Investors might view less frequent reporting as a sign of weakness or continued quarterly reporting as a sign of strength. Either perception risks fueling rumor-driven trading and adding market noise unrelated to fundamentals. The absence of a regular quarterly reporting cadence would prolong information asymmetry, increase reliance on stale disclosure and social media inferences and rumors, and weaken market liquidity and attractiveness. It would increase the value of non-public information and the potential for its misuse, raising the risk of insider trading.
* Shift from Public Disclosure to Private Corporate Access
Reducing reporting frequency would make information about public companies less available through standardized public disclosures. Rather than reducing the market's demand for timely financial information, the Proposed Amendment would increase the value of obtaining such information through private channels and corporate access. Companies would also continue to provide financial information to lenders and other contractual counterparties through private reporting arrangements. The result would be a market in which investment outcomes increasingly depend on privileged access to information rather than analysis of publicly disseminated financial information, undermining the transparency and fairness that distinguish U.S. public markets.
* Weakened Corporate Accountability and Constrained Legitimate Corporate Activity
Fewer reporting checkpoints would likewise reduce the scrutiny to which management is subject, limiting investors' (and other market participants') ability to monitor a company's performance and strategy execution on a timely basis. The shift to semiannual reporting would cause longer blackout periods, reducing flexibility for management and boards to transact in company stock during open trading windows. The Proposed Amendment would not only remove regular public accountability; it could also constrain legitimate insider activity, which serves important price-discovery and incentive-alignment functions.
* Reduced Attractiveness and Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets
Moving to semiannual reporting could weaken the competitive advantage that U.S. markets enjoy relative to other global markets and private capital alternatives. As MFA explained previously, in Europe, which has moved away from mandatory quarterly reporting requirements, public markets have continued to lag
behind the U.S., with lower deal volumes, weaker valuations, and thinner trading liquidity, even amid improving global conditions.6 Replicating that approach could similarly shift issuance activity away from U.S. public markets, either to jurisdictions offering comparable liquidity with lower regulatory burdens or into private markets where disclosure is limited to sophisticated investors.
II. Optional Quarterly Reporting Would Create Additional Concerns
The Commission's main response to the above concerns seems to be optionality, allowing issuers to choose between quarterly and semiannual reporting. Optionality does not mitigate our concerns but instead adds new ones. The optionality of reporting under the Proposed Amendment would lead to inconsistent disclosure practices, with some companies continuing to report quarterly, others (informally) reporting only particular quarters, and others electing to report semiannually. Such variability would disrupt comparability and the availability of timely, standardized information, undermining the very objectives the disclosure regime is meant to serve. For example, mixed reporting across index and ETFs constituents would disrupt comparability and complicate portfolio construction. Index providers and fund managers would have to deal with inconsistent data, which would add confusion, reduce valuation accuracy and impact how the index is composed and weighted. These inconsistencies would also exacerbate disparities within an issuer's capital structure. As an example, debt investors often receive quarterly financials via covenant reporting regardless of SEC filing requirements, while equity investors would be limited to semiannual disclosures. Such imbalance would heighten information asymmetries between holders of different securities of the same issuer and could distort relative pricing between debt and equity, creating an uneven playing field.
Additionally, optionality also raises important corporate governance questions. First, who within a company decides whether to make the semiannual election (or earnings disclosures), and what process governs that decision? Given that reporting frequency directly affects investor access to information, this is not a matter that should rest solely with management. As proposed, the election mechanism risks being captured by management interests that may not align with the information needs of the investing public. Second, optionality leaves unanswered the consequences of a company's failure to make an election. Because issuers would affirmatively elect, generally on an annual basis, a failure to clearly make such an election could leave investors uncertain whether the issuer will report quarterly or semiannually and create opportunities for issuers to manipulate the timing and signaling of that decision, leaving investors in limbo and with limited visibility into what disclosure information they will receive.
By introducing variability in reporting practices across issuers, the Proposed Amendment would fragment the information landscape, impair comparability, and create new governance risks, all while failing to address the underlying concerns that prompted the proposal. The Commission should not adopt a framework that replaces investor protection with increased investor confusion. For these reasons, MFA urges the Commission to retain the existing uniform quarterly reporting requirement.
III. The Proposed Amendment Will Not Meaningfully Advance the Commission's Key Objectives
The lack of support for the Proposed Amendment's central premise, that a change in reporting frequency will address the decline in public offerings, provides an independent reason for the Commission to reconsider the Proposed Amendment. Notably, the Commission's economic analysis does not identify increased IPO activity as a potential benefit of the Proposed Amendment, nor does it analyze how reducing reporting frequency would encourage companies to go or remain public. Under federal securities laws, the Commission is required to consider the effects of its rulemaking on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. Courts have made it clear that this obligation requires the Commission to engage in a reasoned analysis of the rule's economic consequences, including its effects on capital formation.7 Absent such analysis, the Commission cannot satisfy its statutory duty to evaluate whether the Proposed Amendment would meaningfully advance capital formation.
The absence of such analysis is particularly significant because the available evidence does not support the assumption that reporting frequency is a meaningful driver of IPO activity or company participation. The Commission has framed the Proposed Amendment as a means to encourage companies to go public (or to stay public) by alleviating the burdens associated with public company status. That rational, however, rests on a causal assumption that lacks empirical support. The decline in U.S. IPO activity is driven primarily by structural and market-driven factors, not reporting frequency. Research highlights the increasing appeal of selling to larger firms rather than remaining independent, along with the rapid growth of private capital markets, which allows startups to stay private longer at a larger scale.8 From 2001 to 2016, roughly 90% of successful venture capital-backed exits occurred through trade sales rather than IPOs, compared to just 20% in 1990 to 1991.9 More recent data indicates that this trend has persisted. Only about 4% of U.S. venture capital-backed exits in 2025 were IPOs, with the remaining 96% occurred through acquisitions or other private transactions.10 This trend reflects a rational shift by founders leveraging expanded access to private capital, rather than a failure in public markets.11 In this context, regulatory costs appear to account for only a small share of the overall decline in the number of public companies.12
The timing also undercuts the Commission's premise. The decline in IPOs began well before the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, and subsequent legislative efforts to reduce public company burdens (including the JOBS Act of 2012) have not reversed the trend.13 Given that those broader reforms failed to meaningfully increase IPO volumes, there is little reason to conclude that replacing quarterly filings with a single semiannual report will succeed where previous legislative efforts did not. The Commission therefore lacks a sufficient basis to conclude that the Proposed Amendment will generate the capital formation benefits it suggests, while the costs identified above are likely to be realized regardless.
The Commission's related justification, that less frequent reporting will reduce short-termism and encourage companies to focus on long-term value creation, is equally unsupported. The Commission does not commit to this theory; it acknowledges that the academic evidence is mixed on whether quarterly reporting actually drives short-term managerial behavior, that reducing reporting frequency is unlikely to affect genuinely long-horizon decisions, and that other factors, such as executive compensation design and earnings guidance, likely matter far more than the reporting cycle. Such concessions fatally undermine short-termism as a justification for the Proposed Amendment, and the Commission cannot demonstrate that it would meaningfully curb short-termism.
Moreover, even setting the Commission's own concessions aside, there is no reason to believe that changing the reporting cadence from three months to six will alter decision-making over the five-, seven-, or ten-year horizons that drive long-term value. Less frequent disclosure does not make management more long-term oriented; it simply makes investors less informed. The Commission identifies no evidence that withholding material financial information for an additional quarter improves capital allocation or creates shareholder value, and the weight of the research runs in the other direction, more frequent reporting helps managers learn from market signals, improves investment efficiency, and is associated with profitability gains that persist for years.14 The short-termism rationale therefore provides no basis for the Proposed Amendment.
Finally, even if some issuers were to elect semiannual reporting, the Proposed Amendment would not meaningfully reduce the compliance burdens that the Commission claims deter companies from going or staying public. Public companies must maintain robust internal controls, financial reporting infrastructure, and governance processes to ensure the accuracy and reliability of their disclosures (obligations that exist independent of reporting frequency). Reducing the number of required filings from four to two does not eliminate the need to maintain quarter-close processes, internal audit functions, disclosure committees, or the personnel and systems required to produce timely and accurate financial statements. Companies would still need to track and assess material developments on an ongoing basis to comply with their disclosure obligations under federal securities laws. Because the costs associated with public company reporting are largely fixed, the infrastructure required to support those obligations would remain substantially unchanged. As a result, the Proposed Amendment would do little to alter the cost-benefit analysis facing companies considering whether to go public or remain public.
IV. The Commission Does Not Have Enough Information to Accurately Assess the Proposed Amendment's Costs and Benefits
Even if the Commission were to disagree with MFA's substantive concerns, the current record provides an independent reason to pause: the Commission cannot yet conduct the requisite economic analysis.
Courts of appeals have been clear: the Commission has a "statutory obligation to determine as best it can the economic implications" of rules like the Proposed Amendment.15 Specifically, the Commission must consider the effect of any new rule upon "efficiency, competition, and capital formation."16 The Commission's "failure to apprise itself -- and hence the public and the Congress -- of the economic consequences of a proposed regulation makes promulgation of the rule arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law."17
The Commission's current analysis of the Proposed Amendment is already flawed. The Commission estimates that the Proposed Amendment will result in net compliance savings of approximately $200,000 in annual savings per issuer. But it makes no attempt to quantify the Proposed Amendment's (far greater) costs. That failure is critical. The costs associated with even a small change to risk premia, spreads, costs of capital, or liquidity are all but guaranteed to wipe out the mere $200,000 in savings the Commission predicts. Plus, the Commission's estimate is far from certain. The predicted adoption rate is nothing but guesswork; the Commission has no idea how many companies will switch to its new Form 10-S. Nor does it consider whether certain types or sizes of companies are more likely to switch than others, much less what that would mean for market quality or investors. Finally, the Commission's calculation likely overstates issuers' savings given that the principal drivers of compliance costs -- internal controls -- will stay the same regardless of reporting cadence.
In any event, the Commission cannot fully conduct the required economic analysis at this juncture. As the Commission itself has explained, "the required economic analysis ... considers the incremental benefits and costs for the specific rule -- that is, the benefits and costs stemming from that rule compared to the baseline."18 The Commission therefore must have an accurate and stable baseline against which a rule's effects can be measured. Without one, the Commission cannot determine whether any identified costs or benefits are attributable to the rule in question, or to something else entirely.
Here, the Commission cannot have a defined economic baseline because it is currently engaged in multiple, concurrent reform initiatives affecting public company disclosure, including substantial revisions to Regulation S K, changes to filer status classifications, and adjustments to Form S 3 eligibility. These reforms will directly affect issuer compliance costs, the production of information, and the value of disclosures to investors, the precise variables that must be understood to assess the effects of altering reporting frequency. Yet the scope and substance of these reforms remain unsettled.
The Commission cannot proceed in the face of that uncertainty. To do so, it would have to choose between speculating as to the contours of the anticipated reforms and the corresponding economic effects, or ignoring the anticipated reforms altogether. The first path is foreclosed by Business Roundtable v. SEC, where the D.C. Circuit held that the Commission "failed ... adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule," in part, because the Commission "neglected to support its predictive judgments."19 "[M]ere speculation," the Court explained, could not suffice.20 And the second path -- ignoring the anticipated reforms and proceeding as though the existing disclosure regime were fixed -- fares no better. In National Association of Private Fund Managers v. SEC, the Fifth Circuit rejected precisely that approach, holding that the Commission cannot rely on an economic baseline that "ignore[d]" "highly interrelated" and contemporaneously adopted rules; the Commission must account for such rules' "collective economic effects."21 The same is true here.
MFA appreciates that developing a complete economic analysis in the face of multiple concurrent reforms might be challenging. But courts have repeatedly held that any "difficulty" in estimating a rule's economic effects "does not excuse the Commission" from its obligation to do so as best it can.22 If anything, the complexity of the task is reason for the Commission to proceed with greater care, not with incomplete information.
To be clear, none of this is to say the Commission should rethink (or delay) reform more broadly. In fact, MFA supports the Commission's ongoing efforts to modernize and streamline disclosure requirements, particularly through content-focused reforms that refocus disclosures on material information, reduce duplicative obligations, and improve data usability. But as MFA noted in its April 2026 letter regarding Regulation S K, changes to narrative and qualitative disclosure requirements should be considered holistically with any proposal to alter reporting frequency, and the Commission should evaluate the aggregated costs and benefits of these interrelated reforms together.23
In short, if the Commission decides to proceed with changes to reporting frequency, such changes should be adopted, if at all, only after these related reforms are finalized. A sound assessment of the Proposed Amendment's costs and benefits is possible only when measured against a settled regulatory baseline -- one that reflects final decisions regarding the content of required disclosures, filer status classifications, and the scope of available relief. The Commission's statutory obligations, its own economic framework, and governing precedent all point to the same conclusion: reforms of this magnitude must be sequenced deliberately, not adopted piecemeal.
* * * * *
MFA appreciates your consideration of our recommendations. We look forward to working with the Commission on content-focused reforms that refocus disclosures on material information, reduce duplicative obligations, and improve data usability. We would welcome the opportunity to discuss our recommendations in greater detail. Please do not hesitate to contact Jeff Himstreet (jhimstreet@mfaalts.org) or the undersigned (jhan@mfaalts.org) with any questions.
Respectfully submitted,
Jennifer W. Han, Chief Legal Officer & Head of Global Regulatory Affairs, MFA
cc: The Hon. Paul S. Atkins, Chairman, SEC
The Hon. Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, SEC
The Hon. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, SEC
James Moloney, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC
* * *
Original text and footnotes here: https://nam12.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fmfaalts.mmsend.com%2Flink.cfm%3Fr%3DI6akZgr0ZNKKAjrRt9SRLw~~%26pe%3DUIiH41RlVcOgS3K7ELgUlcPwf-lGqTfHZehPDCVL4_aO1Szmy48ZI7onYCrxr0kP99PcQ9rsmnTUjgklATokPA~~%26t%3DMizsaGjI2ziBNlEG3fCZPw~~&data=05%7C02%7Ckgastelum%40mfaalts.org%7Ca3219d290f3545e3041308dedb9b8ff4%7C6daca4ae4f174bdbbbd4fd1f4b08da6b%7C0%7C0%7C639189658360587669%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=p%2FytkfCnGbQ8qygJaO8S3KBsoTJToDnH77DDeE0jFkY%3D&reserved=0
News Release here: https://www.mfaalts.org/press-releases/mfa-urges-sec-to-reconsider-semiannual-reporting-proposal/
[Category: Financial Services]
NAR Pending Home Sales Report Shows 5.4% Decrease in June
WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The National Association of Realtors issued the following news release:
* * *
NAR Pending Home Sales Report Shows 5.4% Decrease in June
Month-Over-Month
5.4% decrease in pending home sales
Declines in the Northeast, Midwest, South and West
Year-Over-Year
* 0.3% decrease in pending home sales
* Gains in the Northeast and Midwest; Declines in the South and West
-
Pending home sales in June decreased by 5.4% month-over-month and 0.3% year-over-year, according to the National Association of REALTORS(R) Pending Home Sales report. The report provides the real estate ecosystem--including ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The National Association of Realtors issued the following news release: * * * NAR Pending Home Sales Report Shows 5.4% Decrease in June Month-Over-Month 5.4% decrease in pending home sales Declines in the Northeast, Midwest, South and West Year-Over-Year * 0.3% decrease in pending home sales * Gains in the Northeast and Midwest; Declines in the South and West - Pending home sales in June decreased by 5.4% month-over-month and 0.3% year-over-year, according to the National Association of REALTORS(R) Pending Home Sales report. The report provides the real estate ecosystem--includingagents, homebuyers and sellers--with data on the level of home sales under contract.
Month-over-month pending home sales declined in all four major U.S. regions. Year-over-year pending home sales increased in the Northeast and Midwest but declined in the South and West.
"The highest mortgage rates in nearly a year and the record-high national median home price together are contributing to a tepid housing market that is especially difficult for first-time homebuyers," said NAR Chief Economist Dr. Lawrence Yun. "However, job gains can help support housing demand."
"It is worth emphasizing that it is closing activity, not contract signings, that generates economic impact. Pending contracts are only suggestive of upcoming closed deals and do not align perfectly, due to fallout rates and contract contingencies."
June 2026 National Pending Home Sales
* 5.4% decrease month-over-month
* 0.3% decrease year-over-year
June 2026 Regional Pending Home Sales
Northeast
* 3.0% decrease month-over-month
* 2.2% increase year-over-year
Midwest
* 8.9% decrease month-over-month
* 0.3% increase year-over-year
South
* 4.1% decrease month-over-month
* 0.9% decrease year-over-year
West
4.7% decrease month-over-month
1.1% decrease year-over-year
At the local level, several markets posted notable year-over-year gains in pending home sales. Among the 50 largest metro areas, the following 10 markets posted the biggest annual increases in pending home sales, according to data from Realtor.com(R) Economics:
1. Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC (+15.4%)
2. Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA (+15.2%)
3. Kansas City, MO-KS (+14.4%)
4. Richmond, VA (+14.0%)
5. Buffalo-Cheektowaga, NY (+12.1%)
6. Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX (+11.1%)
7. San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA (+10.7%)
8. Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA (+9.6%)
9. Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL (+9.5%)
10. St. Louis, MO-IL (+9.1%)
* * *
About the National Association of REALTORS(R)
The National Association of REALTORS(R) is involved in all aspects of residential and commercial real estate. The term REALTOR(R) is a registered collective membership mark that identifies a real estate professional who is a member of the National Association of REALTORS(R) and subscribes to its strict Code of Ethics. For free consumer guides about navigating the homebuying and selling transaction processes--from written buyer agreements to negotiating compensation--visit facts.realtor.
* * *
*The Pending Home Sales Index is a leading indicator for the housing sector, based on pending sales of existing homes. A sale is listed as pending when the contract has been signed but the transaction has not closed, though the sale usually is finalized within one or two months of signing.
Pending contracts are good early indicators of upcoming sales closings. However, the amount of time between pending contracts and completed sales is not identical for all home sales. Variations in the length of the process from pending contract to closed sale can be caused by issues such as buyer difficulties with obtaining mortgage financing, home inspection problems, or appraisal issues.
The index is based on a sample that covers about 40% of multiple listing service data each month. In developing the model for the index, it was demonstrated that the level of monthly sales-contract activity parallels the level of closed existing-home sales in the following two months.
An index of 100 is equal to the average level of contract activity during 2001, which was the first year to be examined. By coincidence, the volume of existing-home sales in 2001 fell within the range of 5.0 to 5.5 million, which is considered normal for the current U.S. population.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.nar.realtor/newsroom/nar-pending-home-sales-report-shows-5-4-decrease-in-june
[Category: Real Estate]
* * *
NAR Pending Home Sales Report Shows 5.4% Decrease in June
Month-Over-Month
5.4% decrease in pending home sales
Declines in the Northeast, Midwest, South and West
Year-Over-Year
* 0.3% decrease in pending home sales
* Gains in the Northeast and Midwest; Declines in the South and West
-
Pending home sales in June decreased by 5.4% month-over-month and 0.3% year-over-year, according to the National Association of REALTORS(R) Pending Home Sales report. The report provides the real estate ecosystem--including ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The National Association of Realtors issued the following news release: * * * NAR Pending Home Sales Report Shows 5.4% Decrease in June Month-Over-Month 5.4% decrease in pending home sales Declines in the Northeast, Midwest, South and West Year-Over-Year * 0.3% decrease in pending home sales * Gains in the Northeast and Midwest; Declines in the South and West - Pending home sales in June decreased by 5.4% month-over-month and 0.3% year-over-year, according to the National Association of REALTORS(R) Pending Home Sales report. The report provides the real estate ecosystem--includingagents, homebuyers and sellers--with data on the level of home sales under contract.
Month-over-month pending home sales declined in all four major U.S. regions. Year-over-year pending home sales increased in the Northeast and Midwest but declined in the South and West.
"The highest mortgage rates in nearly a year and the record-high national median home price together are contributing to a tepid housing market that is especially difficult for first-time homebuyers," said NAR Chief Economist Dr. Lawrence Yun. "However, job gains can help support housing demand."
"It is worth emphasizing that it is closing activity, not contract signings, that generates economic impact. Pending contracts are only suggestive of upcoming closed deals and do not align perfectly, due to fallout rates and contract contingencies."
June 2026 National Pending Home Sales
* 5.4% decrease month-over-month
* 0.3% decrease year-over-year
June 2026 Regional Pending Home Sales
Northeast
* 3.0% decrease month-over-month
* 2.2% increase year-over-year
Midwest
* 8.9% decrease month-over-month
* 0.3% increase year-over-year
South
* 4.1% decrease month-over-month
* 0.9% decrease year-over-year
West
4.7% decrease month-over-month
1.1% decrease year-over-year
At the local level, several markets posted notable year-over-year gains in pending home sales. Among the 50 largest metro areas, the following 10 markets posted the biggest annual increases in pending home sales, according to data from Realtor.com(R) Economics:
1. Virginia Beach-Chesapeake-Norfolk, VA-NC (+15.4%)
2. Sacramento-Roseville-Folsom, CA (+15.2%)
3. Kansas City, MO-KS (+14.4%)
4. Richmond, VA (+14.0%)
5. Buffalo-Cheektowaga, NY (+12.1%)
6. Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX (+11.1%)
7. San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA (+10.7%)
8. Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA (+9.6%)
9. Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL (+9.5%)
10. St. Louis, MO-IL (+9.1%)
* * *
About the National Association of REALTORS(R)
The National Association of REALTORS(R) is involved in all aspects of residential and commercial real estate. The term REALTOR(R) is a registered collective membership mark that identifies a real estate professional who is a member of the National Association of REALTORS(R) and subscribes to its strict Code of Ethics. For free consumer guides about navigating the homebuying and selling transaction processes--from written buyer agreements to negotiating compensation--visit facts.realtor.
* * *
*The Pending Home Sales Index is a leading indicator for the housing sector, based on pending sales of existing homes. A sale is listed as pending when the contract has been signed but the transaction has not closed, though the sale usually is finalized within one or two months of signing.
Pending contracts are good early indicators of upcoming sales closings. However, the amount of time between pending contracts and completed sales is not identical for all home sales. Variations in the length of the process from pending contract to closed sale can be caused by issues such as buyer difficulties with obtaining mortgage financing, home inspection problems, or appraisal issues.
The index is based on a sample that covers about 40% of multiple listing service data each month. In developing the model for the index, it was demonstrated that the level of monthly sales-contract activity parallels the level of closed existing-home sales in the following two months.
An index of 100 is equal to the average level of contract activity during 2001, which was the first year to be examined. By coincidence, the volume of existing-home sales in 2001 fell within the range of 5.0 to 5.5 million, which is considered normal for the current U.S. population.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.nar.realtor/newsroom/nar-pending-home-sales-report-shows-5-4-decrease-in-june
[Category: Real Estate]
Mychal Walker Begins Term as President of the National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals
WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals (formerly the National Association of Health Underwriters) issued the following news release:
* * *
Mychal Walker Begins Term as President of the National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals
The National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals (NABIP) recently announced that Mychal Walker, Managing Director of The Walker Agency in Duluth, Georgia, has officially begun his one-year term as President of the association.
Walker assumes the presidency following nearly two decades ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals (formerly the National Association of Health Underwriters) issued the following news release: * * * Mychal Walker Begins Term as President of the National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals The National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals (NABIP) recently announced that Mychal Walker, Managing Director of The Walker Agency in Duluth, Georgia, has officially begun his one-year term as President of the association. Walker assumes the presidency following nearly two decadesof leadership within NABIP at the local, state, regional, and national levels. Throughout his career, he has been a leading advocate for licensed insurance professionals and consumer access to affordable, high-quality healthcare coverage through education, advocacy, and professional development.
"Serving as NABIP President is one of the greatest honors of my professional career," said Walker. "Our members play an essential role in helping individuals, families, employers, and Medicare beneficiaries navigate an increasingly complex healthcare system. Together, we will continue to strengthen our profession, advocate for consumers, embrace innovation, and ensure licensed agents and brokers remain trusted advisors in every community."
In addition to leading The Walker Agency, Walker serves as Chair of the Georgia Leadership Council for the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), Secretary of the Georgia Board of Public Health following his appointment by Governor Brian Kemp, and a member of the Dean's Advisory Board for Auburn University's College of Liberal Arts. He has also contributed significantly to the Georgia Department of Insurance and the First Commission Task Force established by Governor Brian Kemp. Most notably, Walker played a key role in the creation of Georgia Access, the state's health insurance marketplace, helping shape one of Georgia's most significant healthcare policy initiatives. Walker has also served NABIP in numerous leadership roles, including Georgia Chapter President, Region V Vice President, National Secretary, National Treasurer, National Vice President, and President-Elect.
During his presidency, Walker will focus on strengthening member engagement, expanding NABIP's voice in healthcare policy, increasing public awareness of the value licensed insurance professionals provide, and preparing members for emerging issues such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity.
Walker's presidential theme, "Forward Together," reflects his commitment to collaboration, innovation, and empowering leaders throughout the association.
"As we approach NABIP's 100th anniversary, we have an incredible opportunity to honor our legacy while building an even stronger future for our members, the consumers they serve, and our profession."
The 2026-27 Board of Trustees began its term on July 1 and will lead the association's efforts to advance advocacy, professional development, member engagement, while continuing to champion the value of licensed health insurance and employee benefits professionals and the consumers they serve.
* * *
NABIP is the preeminent organization for health insurance and employee benefits professionals, working diligently to ensure all Americans have access to high-quality, affordable healthcare and related benefits. NABIP represents and provides professional development opportunities for more than 100,000 licensed health insurance agents, brokers, general agents, consultants and benefit professionals through more than 150 chapters across America.
* * *
Original text here: https://nabip.org/media/11136/mychal-walker-press-release_nabip-president.pdf
[Category: Insurance]
* * *
Mychal Walker Begins Term as President of the National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals
The National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals (NABIP) recently announced that Mychal Walker, Managing Director of The Walker Agency in Duluth, Georgia, has officially begun his one-year term as President of the association.
Walker assumes the presidency following nearly two decades ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 18 -- The National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals (formerly the National Association of Health Underwriters) issued the following news release: * * * Mychal Walker Begins Term as President of the National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals The National Association of Benefits and Insurance Professionals (NABIP) recently announced that Mychal Walker, Managing Director of The Walker Agency in Duluth, Georgia, has officially begun his one-year term as President of the association. Walker assumes the presidency following nearly two decadesof leadership within NABIP at the local, state, regional, and national levels. Throughout his career, he has been a leading advocate for licensed insurance professionals and consumer access to affordable, high-quality healthcare coverage through education, advocacy, and professional development.
"Serving as NABIP President is one of the greatest honors of my professional career," said Walker. "Our members play an essential role in helping individuals, families, employers, and Medicare beneficiaries navigate an increasingly complex healthcare system. Together, we will continue to strengthen our profession, advocate for consumers, embrace innovation, and ensure licensed agents and brokers remain trusted advisors in every community."
In addition to leading The Walker Agency, Walker serves as Chair of the Georgia Leadership Council for the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), Secretary of the Georgia Board of Public Health following his appointment by Governor Brian Kemp, and a member of the Dean's Advisory Board for Auburn University's College of Liberal Arts. He has also contributed significantly to the Georgia Department of Insurance and the First Commission Task Force established by Governor Brian Kemp. Most notably, Walker played a key role in the creation of Georgia Access, the state's health insurance marketplace, helping shape one of Georgia's most significant healthcare policy initiatives. Walker has also served NABIP in numerous leadership roles, including Georgia Chapter President, Region V Vice President, National Secretary, National Treasurer, National Vice President, and President-Elect.
During his presidency, Walker will focus on strengthening member engagement, expanding NABIP's voice in healthcare policy, increasing public awareness of the value licensed insurance professionals provide, and preparing members for emerging issues such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity.
Walker's presidential theme, "Forward Together," reflects his commitment to collaboration, innovation, and empowering leaders throughout the association.
"As we approach NABIP's 100th anniversary, we have an incredible opportunity to honor our legacy while building an even stronger future for our members, the consumers they serve, and our profession."
The 2026-27 Board of Trustees began its term on July 1 and will lead the association's efforts to advance advocacy, professional development, member engagement, while continuing to champion the value of licensed health insurance and employee benefits professionals and the consumers they serve.
* * *
NABIP is the preeminent organization for health insurance and employee benefits professionals, working diligently to ensure all Americans have access to high-quality, affordable healthcare and related benefits. NABIP represents and provides professional development opportunities for more than 100,000 licensed health insurance agents, brokers, general agents, consultants and benefit professionals through more than 150 chapters across America.
* * *
Original text here: https://nabip.org/media/11136/mychal-walker-press-release_nabip-president.pdf
[Category: Insurance]
IIB Statement: Federal Banking Agencies Coordinated Appproach to Handling Highly Sensitive Info
NEW YORK, July 18 -- The Institute of International Bankers issued the following statement on July 17, 2026:
* * *
IIB Statement: Federal Banking Agencies Coordinated Appproach to Handling Highly Sensitive Info
Statement from the Institute of International Bankers on the Federal Banking Agencies Coordinated Approach to Handling Highly Sensitive Information
"The Institute of International Bankers (IIB) welcomes the recent announcement by the federal banking agencies establishing a coordinated approach for handling highly sensitive information during examinations.
"We appreciate the agencies' ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, July 18 -- The Institute of International Bankers issued the following statement on July 17, 2026: * * * IIB Statement: Federal Banking Agencies Coordinated Appproach to Handling Highly Sensitive Info Statement from the Institute of International Bankers on the Federal Banking Agencies Coordinated Approach to Handling Highly Sensitive Information "The Institute of International Bankers (IIB) welcomes the recent announcement by the federal banking agencies establishing a coordinated approach for handling highly sensitive information during examinations. "We appreciate the agencies'adoption of a flexible, risk-based approach that strengthens the protection of highly sensitive information while supporting effective supervision.
"The ability to review information through a range of methods including on-site review, direct digital access, and appropriately tailored alternatives, recognizes that institutions may maintain sensitive information in different ways.
"We look forward to continued engagement with the agencies as this framework is implemented."
* * *
The Institute of International Bankers (IIB) represents the U.S. operations of internationally headquartered financial institutions from more than 35 countries around the world. The membership consists of international banks that operate branches, agencies, bank subsidiaries, and broker-dealer subsidiaries in the United States. The IIB works to ensure a level playing field for these institutions, which supported $5.4 trillion in foreign direct investment by underwriting more than 70% of debt issuance in the United States by internationally headquartered companies between 2020 and 2024. These institutions also underwrote more than 40% of U.S. financing raised during this same time period and comprise the majority of U.S. primary dealers.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.iib.org/news/731412/IIB-Statement-Federal-Banking-Agencies-Coordinated-Appproach-to-Handling-Highly-Sensitive-Info-.htm
[Category: Financial Services]
* * *
IIB Statement: Federal Banking Agencies Coordinated Appproach to Handling Highly Sensitive Info
Statement from the Institute of International Bankers on the Federal Banking Agencies Coordinated Approach to Handling Highly Sensitive Information
"The Institute of International Bankers (IIB) welcomes the recent announcement by the federal banking agencies establishing a coordinated approach for handling highly sensitive information during examinations.
"We appreciate the agencies' ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, July 18 -- The Institute of International Bankers issued the following statement on July 17, 2026: * * * IIB Statement: Federal Banking Agencies Coordinated Appproach to Handling Highly Sensitive Info Statement from the Institute of International Bankers on the Federal Banking Agencies Coordinated Approach to Handling Highly Sensitive Information "The Institute of International Bankers (IIB) welcomes the recent announcement by the federal banking agencies establishing a coordinated approach for handling highly sensitive information during examinations. "We appreciate the agencies'adoption of a flexible, risk-based approach that strengthens the protection of highly sensitive information while supporting effective supervision.
"The ability to review information through a range of methods including on-site review, direct digital access, and appropriately tailored alternatives, recognizes that institutions may maintain sensitive information in different ways.
"We look forward to continued engagement with the agencies as this framework is implemented."
* * *
The Institute of International Bankers (IIB) represents the U.S. operations of internationally headquartered financial institutions from more than 35 countries around the world. The membership consists of international banks that operate branches, agencies, bank subsidiaries, and broker-dealer subsidiaries in the United States. The IIB works to ensure a level playing field for these institutions, which supported $5.4 trillion in foreign direct investment by underwriting more than 70% of debt issuance in the United States by internationally headquartered companies between 2020 and 2024. These institutions also underwrote more than 40% of U.S. financing raised during this same time period and comprise the majority of U.S. primary dealers.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.iib.org/news/731412/IIB-Statement-Federal-Banking-Agencies-Coordinated-Appproach-to-Handling-Highly-Sensitive-Info-.htm
[Category: Financial Services]
Conference Board: LEI for the Euro Area fell in June
NEW YORK, July 18 -- The Conference Board issued the following news release:
* * *
The LEI for the Euro Area fell in June
Using the Composite Indexes: The Leading Economic Index (LEI) provides an early indication of significant turning points in the business cycle and where the economy is heading in the near term. The Coincident Economic Index (CEI) provides an indication of the current state of the economy. Additional details are below.
This month's release of the composite economic indexes incorporates annual benchmark revisions which bring them up-to-date with revisions in the source data. ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, July 18 -- The Conference Board issued the following news release: * * * The LEI for the Euro Area fell in June Using the Composite Indexes: The Leading Economic Index (LEI) provides an early indication of significant turning points in the business cycle and where the economy is heading in the near term. The Coincident Economic Index (CEI) provides an indication of the current state of the economy. Additional details are below. This month's release of the composite economic indexes incorporates annual benchmark revisions which bring them up-to-date with revisions in the source data.These revisions do not change the cyclical properties of the indexes. The indexes are updated throughout the year, but only for the previous six months. Data revisions that fall outside of the moving six-month window are not incorporated until the benchmark revision is made and the entire histories of the indexes are recomputed. As a result, the revised indexes, in levels and month-on-month changes, will not be directly comparable to those issued prior to the benchmark revision.
For more information, please visit conference-board.org/topics/business-cycle-indicators/ or contact us at indicators@tcb.org.
The Conference Board Leading Economic Index (r) (LEI) for the Euro Area decreased by 0.3% in June 2026 to 102.9 (2016=100), after also falling by 0.3% in May. Due to recent monthly declines, the LEI contracted by 1.1% over the first half of 2026. This is a slightly faster rate than the 0.9% drop experienced over the second half of 2025.
The Conference Board Coincident Economic Index (r) (CEI) for the Euro Area ticked up by 0.1% in June 2026 to 110.4 (2016=100), after being unchanged in April and May. The CEI increased by 0.1% over the first half of 2026, a slower pace than the 0.5% increase experienced over the second half of 2025.
"The Euro Area LEI fell for the fourth consecutive month in June," said Timothy Brennan, Economic Research Associate, at The Conference Board. "As in previous months, the consumer expectations component was the main drag on the Index. Lower expectations from businesses in the service sector and industrial producers also contributed to the monthly drop. However, positive contributions from financial components helped mitigate the decline."
"The 6-month growth rate of the Euro Area LEI remained negative, signaling pressure on economic activity ahead," continued Brennan. "Expectations among consumers, industrial producers, and services businesses remain well below their historical averages. Renewed tensions between the US and Iran are likely to place further strain on these components in the coming months by intensifying inflationary pressures and global uncertainty. These headwinds are expected to subdue Euro Area growth in H2 of 2026. The Conference Board forecasts real GDP growth in the Euro Area at only 1.0% for 2026, down from 2025."
The next release is scheduled for Tuesday, August 18, 2026, at 9:30 A.M. ET.
* * *
Chart: The Euro Area LEI fell for the fourth consecutive month in June
Chart: Low expectations from consumers, services businesses, and industrial producers drove the June contraction
Chart: The 6-month growth rate of the Euro Area LEI was more negative in June, but remained above the recession signal threshold
* * *
NOTE: The chart illustrates the so-called 3Ds - duration, depth, and diffusion- for interpreting a downward movement in the LEI. Duration refers to how long the decline has lasted. Depth denotes the size of decline. Duration and depth are measured by the rate of change of the index over the most recent six months at an annualized rate. Diffusion is a measure of how widespread the decline is among the LEI's component indicators-on a scale of 0 to 100, a diffusion index reading below 50 indicates most components are weakening.
The 3Ds rule signals an impending recession when: 1) the six-month diffusion index lies at or below 50, shown by the black warning signal lines in the chart; and 2) the LEI's six-month growth rate (annualized) falls below the threshold of -5.6%. The red recession signal lines indicate months when both criteria are met simultaneously-and thus that a recession is likely imminent or underway.
About The Conference Board Leading Economic Index(r) (LEI) and Coincident Economic Index(r) (CEI) for the Euro Area
The composite economic indexes are key elements in an analytic system designed to signal peaks and troughs in the business cycle. Comprised of multiple independent indicators, the indexes are constructed to summarize and reveal common turning points in the economy in a clearer and more convincing manner than any individual component.
The CEI reflects current economic conditions and is highly correlated with real GDP. The LEI is a predictive tool that anticipates-or "leads"-turning points in the business cycle by around seven months.
The eight components of Leading Economic Index(r) for the Euro Area are:
* ECB Minimum Bid Yield Spread
* Consumer Expectations of the General Economic Situation
* EURO STOXX(r) Price Index
* Industry Production Expectations
* Services Expected Demand
* Volume of Order Books
* Index of Residential Building Permits
* Systemic Stress Composite Indicator
The four components of the Coincident Economic Index(r) for the Euro Area are:
* Industrial Production
* Employment
* Retail Sales
* Manufacturing Sales
To access data, please visit: https://data-central.conference-board.org
* * *
About The Conference Board
The Conference Board is the Member-driven think tank that delivers Trusted Insights for What's Ahead (r) (r). Founded in 1916, we are a nonpartisan, not-for-profit organization holding 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt status in the United States. TCB.org l Learn about Membership
***
Original text here: https://www.conference-board.org/topics/business-cycle-indicators/euro-area
* * *
The LEI for the Euro Area fell in June
Using the Composite Indexes: The Leading Economic Index (LEI) provides an early indication of significant turning points in the business cycle and where the economy is heading in the near term. The Coincident Economic Index (CEI) provides an indication of the current state of the economy. Additional details are below.
This month's release of the composite economic indexes incorporates annual benchmark revisions which bring them up-to-date with revisions in the source data. ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, July 18 -- The Conference Board issued the following news release: * * * The LEI for the Euro Area fell in June Using the Composite Indexes: The Leading Economic Index (LEI) provides an early indication of significant turning points in the business cycle and where the economy is heading in the near term. The Coincident Economic Index (CEI) provides an indication of the current state of the economy. Additional details are below. This month's release of the composite economic indexes incorporates annual benchmark revisions which bring them up-to-date with revisions in the source data.These revisions do not change the cyclical properties of the indexes. The indexes are updated throughout the year, but only for the previous six months. Data revisions that fall outside of the moving six-month window are not incorporated until the benchmark revision is made and the entire histories of the indexes are recomputed. As a result, the revised indexes, in levels and month-on-month changes, will not be directly comparable to those issued prior to the benchmark revision.
For more information, please visit conference-board.org/topics/business-cycle-indicators/ or contact us at indicators@tcb.org.
The Conference Board Leading Economic Index (r) (LEI) for the Euro Area decreased by 0.3% in June 2026 to 102.9 (2016=100), after also falling by 0.3% in May. Due to recent monthly declines, the LEI contracted by 1.1% over the first half of 2026. This is a slightly faster rate than the 0.9% drop experienced over the second half of 2025.
The Conference Board Coincident Economic Index (r) (CEI) for the Euro Area ticked up by 0.1% in June 2026 to 110.4 (2016=100), after being unchanged in April and May. The CEI increased by 0.1% over the first half of 2026, a slower pace than the 0.5% increase experienced over the second half of 2025.
"The Euro Area LEI fell for the fourth consecutive month in June," said Timothy Brennan, Economic Research Associate, at The Conference Board. "As in previous months, the consumer expectations component was the main drag on the Index. Lower expectations from businesses in the service sector and industrial producers also contributed to the monthly drop. However, positive contributions from financial components helped mitigate the decline."
"The 6-month growth rate of the Euro Area LEI remained negative, signaling pressure on economic activity ahead," continued Brennan. "Expectations among consumers, industrial producers, and services businesses remain well below their historical averages. Renewed tensions between the US and Iran are likely to place further strain on these components in the coming months by intensifying inflationary pressures and global uncertainty. These headwinds are expected to subdue Euro Area growth in H2 of 2026. The Conference Board forecasts real GDP growth in the Euro Area at only 1.0% for 2026, down from 2025."
The next release is scheduled for Tuesday, August 18, 2026, at 9:30 A.M. ET.
* * *
Chart: The Euro Area LEI fell for the fourth consecutive month in June
Chart: Low expectations from consumers, services businesses, and industrial producers drove the June contraction
Chart: The 6-month growth rate of the Euro Area LEI was more negative in June, but remained above the recession signal threshold
* * *
NOTE: The chart illustrates the so-called 3Ds - duration, depth, and diffusion- for interpreting a downward movement in the LEI. Duration refers to how long the decline has lasted. Depth denotes the size of decline. Duration and depth are measured by the rate of change of the index over the most recent six months at an annualized rate. Diffusion is a measure of how widespread the decline is among the LEI's component indicators-on a scale of 0 to 100, a diffusion index reading below 50 indicates most components are weakening.
The 3Ds rule signals an impending recession when: 1) the six-month diffusion index lies at or below 50, shown by the black warning signal lines in the chart; and 2) the LEI's six-month growth rate (annualized) falls below the threshold of -5.6%. The red recession signal lines indicate months when both criteria are met simultaneously-and thus that a recession is likely imminent or underway.
About The Conference Board Leading Economic Index(r) (LEI) and Coincident Economic Index(r) (CEI) for the Euro Area
The composite economic indexes are key elements in an analytic system designed to signal peaks and troughs in the business cycle. Comprised of multiple independent indicators, the indexes are constructed to summarize and reveal common turning points in the economy in a clearer and more convincing manner than any individual component.
The CEI reflects current economic conditions and is highly correlated with real GDP. The LEI is a predictive tool that anticipates-or "leads"-turning points in the business cycle by around seven months.
The eight components of Leading Economic Index(r) for the Euro Area are:
* ECB Minimum Bid Yield Spread
* Consumer Expectations of the General Economic Situation
* EURO STOXX(r) Price Index
* Industry Production Expectations
* Services Expected Demand
* Volume of Order Books
* Index of Residential Building Permits
* Systemic Stress Composite Indicator
The four components of the Coincident Economic Index(r) for the Euro Area are:
* Industrial Production
* Employment
* Retail Sales
* Manufacturing Sales
To access data, please visit: https://data-central.conference-board.org
* * *
About The Conference Board
The Conference Board is the Member-driven think tank that delivers Trusted Insights for What's Ahead (r) (r). Founded in 1916, we are a nonpartisan, not-for-profit organization holding 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt status in the United States. TCB.org l Learn about Membership
***
Original text here: https://www.conference-board.org/topics/business-cycle-indicators/euro-area
American Soybean Association Welcomes Withdrawal of Glyphosate Petition
ST. LOUIS, Missouri, July 18 -- The American Soybean Association issued the following news release:
* * *
ASA Welcomes Withdrawal of Glyphosate Petition
The American Soybean Association welcomes Ruveon's decision to withdraw its petitions filed with the International Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce seeking antidumping and countervailing duties on glyphosate imports from China.
"We appreciate Ruveon's decision to withdraw the antidumping and countervailing duty petitions after listening to the concerns about affordability and access raised by ASA, soybean farmers, and other ... Show Full Article ST. LOUIS, Missouri, July 18 -- The American Soybean Association issued the following news release: * * * ASA Welcomes Withdrawal of Glyphosate Petition The American Soybean Association welcomes Ruveon's decision to withdraw its petitions filed with the International Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce seeking antidumping and countervailing duties on glyphosate imports from China. "We appreciate Ruveon's decision to withdraw the antidumping and countervailing duty petitions after listening to the concerns about affordability and access raised by ASA, soybean farmers, and otheragricultural organizations," said Scott Metzger, ASA President and soybean farmer from Ohio. "ASA provided extensive feedback to Ruveon following the filing of the petitions and again this week during our Board of Directors meeting. Ruveon's decision reflects the value they place on farmer customers who rely on access to affordable crop protection tools to remain productive and globally competitive. We appreciate Ruveon's willingness to engage with growers and respond to their concerns, and ASA looks forward to continuing this important dialogue."
ASA remains committed to working with stakeholders and policymakers to ensure soybean farmers have access to the crop protection tools they need to remain productive, profitable, and sustainable for generations to come.
Ruveon, LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bayer. On June 30, 2026, Monsanto Company and Ruveon, LLC filed antidumping and countervailing petitions on glyphosate imported from China with the International Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce. Ruveon produces about 60% of glyphosate sold in the U.S.
* * *
Original text here: https://soygrowers.com/news-releases/asa-welcomes-withdrawal-of-glyphosate-petition/
[Category: Agriculture]
* * *
ASA Welcomes Withdrawal of Glyphosate Petition
The American Soybean Association welcomes Ruveon's decision to withdraw its petitions filed with the International Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce seeking antidumping and countervailing duties on glyphosate imports from China.
"We appreciate Ruveon's decision to withdraw the antidumping and countervailing duty petitions after listening to the concerns about affordability and access raised by ASA, soybean farmers, and other ... Show Full Article ST. LOUIS, Missouri, July 18 -- The American Soybean Association issued the following news release: * * * ASA Welcomes Withdrawal of Glyphosate Petition The American Soybean Association welcomes Ruveon's decision to withdraw its petitions filed with the International Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce seeking antidumping and countervailing duties on glyphosate imports from China. "We appreciate Ruveon's decision to withdraw the antidumping and countervailing duty petitions after listening to the concerns about affordability and access raised by ASA, soybean farmers, and otheragricultural organizations," said Scott Metzger, ASA President and soybean farmer from Ohio. "ASA provided extensive feedback to Ruveon following the filing of the petitions and again this week during our Board of Directors meeting. Ruveon's decision reflects the value they place on farmer customers who rely on access to affordable crop protection tools to remain productive and globally competitive. We appreciate Ruveon's willingness to engage with growers and respond to their concerns, and ASA looks forward to continuing this important dialogue."
ASA remains committed to working with stakeholders and policymakers to ensure soybean farmers have access to the crop protection tools they need to remain productive, profitable, and sustainable for generations to come.
Ruveon, LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bayer. On June 30, 2026, Monsanto Company and Ruveon, LLC filed antidumping and countervailing petitions on glyphosate imported from China with the International Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce. Ruveon produces about 60% of glyphosate sold in the U.S.
* * *
Original text here: https://soygrowers.com/news-releases/asa-welcomes-withdrawal-of-glyphosate-petition/
[Category: Agriculture]
Advocacy Alert: Hawaii Adopts New E-Bike Law
IRVINE, California, July 18 -- The National Bicycle Dealers Association, a non-profit supported by the membership of participating retailers and industry sponsorship, issued the following news:
* * *
Advocacy Alert: Hawaii Adopts New E-Bike Law
Hawaii has enacted significant new legislation that updates how electric bicycles and e-mobility devices are regulated across the state. The new law adopts the three-class e-bike system, creates a legal definition for "e-motos," and establishes new operating rules for both vehicle categories.
Key Highlights
* Adopts the three-class e-bike system, aligning ... Show Full Article IRVINE, California, July 18 -- The National Bicycle Dealers Association, a non-profit supported by the membership of participating retailers and industry sponsorship, issued the following news: * * * Advocacy Alert: Hawaii Adopts New E-Bike Law Hawaii has enacted significant new legislation that updates how electric bicycles and e-mobility devices are regulated across the state. The new law adopts the three-class e-bike system, creates a legal definition for "e-motos," and establishes new operating rules for both vehicle categories. Key Highlights * Adopts the three-class e-bike system, aligningHawaii with the framework used in many other states.
* Creates a legal definition for e-motos, separating them from traditional low-speed electric bicycles.
* Prohibits e-motos from operating on public roads, bike lanes, shared-use paths, and sidewalks intended for bicycles.
* Continues regulation of low-speed e-bikes as bicycles, allowing riders to follow the same rules that apply to traditional bicycles.
* Maintains Hawaii's one-time $30 e-bike registration fee, with funds supporting bicycle infrastructure and education.
* Requires helmets for riders under 18 years of age.
* Adds enforcement for unsafe riding behaviors, including prohibiting wheelies and other dangerous stunts on public roadways.
Why This Matters
This legislation reflects a growing trend across North America to clearly distinguish low-speed electric bicycles from higher-powered electric motorcycles, often marketed as "e-motos." As more states update their laws, retailers should expect continued conversations around vehicle classifications, rider education, registration requirements, and safe operation.
The NBDA will continue monitoring state and federal legislation affecting specialty bicycle retailers and will keep members informed of important regulatory changes.
You can read more about Hawaii's new law here: Hawaii Passes E-Bike Law Defining E-Motos (Bicycle Retailer & Industry News) (https://www.bicycleretailer.com/industry-news/2026/07/16/hawaii-passes-e-bike-law-defining-e-motos?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
As always, if you have questions about e-bike regulations or advocacy issues affecting your business, please don't hesitate to reach out.
* * *
Original text here: https://nbda.com/advocacy-alert-hawaii-adopts-new-e-bike-law/
[Category: Business]
* * *
Advocacy Alert: Hawaii Adopts New E-Bike Law
Hawaii has enacted significant new legislation that updates how electric bicycles and e-mobility devices are regulated across the state. The new law adopts the three-class e-bike system, creates a legal definition for "e-motos," and establishes new operating rules for both vehicle categories.
Key Highlights
* Adopts the three-class e-bike system, aligning ... Show Full Article IRVINE, California, July 18 -- The National Bicycle Dealers Association, a non-profit supported by the membership of participating retailers and industry sponsorship, issued the following news: * * * Advocacy Alert: Hawaii Adopts New E-Bike Law Hawaii has enacted significant new legislation that updates how electric bicycles and e-mobility devices are regulated across the state. The new law adopts the three-class e-bike system, creates a legal definition for "e-motos," and establishes new operating rules for both vehicle categories. Key Highlights * Adopts the three-class e-bike system, aligningHawaii with the framework used in many other states.
* Creates a legal definition for e-motos, separating them from traditional low-speed electric bicycles.
* Prohibits e-motos from operating on public roads, bike lanes, shared-use paths, and sidewalks intended for bicycles.
* Continues regulation of low-speed e-bikes as bicycles, allowing riders to follow the same rules that apply to traditional bicycles.
* Maintains Hawaii's one-time $30 e-bike registration fee, with funds supporting bicycle infrastructure and education.
* Requires helmets for riders under 18 years of age.
* Adds enforcement for unsafe riding behaviors, including prohibiting wheelies and other dangerous stunts on public roadways.
Why This Matters
This legislation reflects a growing trend across North America to clearly distinguish low-speed electric bicycles from higher-powered electric motorcycles, often marketed as "e-motos." As more states update their laws, retailers should expect continued conversations around vehicle classifications, rider education, registration requirements, and safe operation.
The NBDA will continue monitoring state and federal legislation affecting specialty bicycle retailers and will keep members informed of important regulatory changes.
You can read more about Hawaii's new law here: Hawaii Passes E-Bike Law Defining E-Motos (Bicycle Retailer & Industry News) (https://www.bicycleretailer.com/industry-news/2026/07/16/hawaii-passes-e-bike-law-defining-e-motos?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
As always, if you have questions about e-bike regulations or advocacy issues affecting your business, please don't hesitate to reach out.
* * *
Original text here: https://nbda.com/advocacy-alert-hawaii-adopts-new-e-bike-law/
[Category: Business]