Congressional Testimony
Congressional Testimony
Here's a look at documents involving congressional testimony and member statements
Featured Stories
Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security Williams Testifies Before House Armed Services Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces released the following testimony by Brandon M. Williams, under secretary of Energy for nuclear security, and administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, from an April 22, 2026, hearing on the fiscal 2027 budget request:* * *
Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2027 Budget Request for the United States Department of Energy's (DOE)National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
DOE ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces released the following testimony by Brandon M. Williams, under secretary of Energy for nuclear security, and administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, from an April 22, 2026, hearing on the fiscal 2027 budget request: * * * Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2027 Budget Request for the United States Department of Energy's (DOE)National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). DOEand NNSA appreciate the Subcommittee's continued support and partnership.
Today, NNSA's role in America's national security is greater than at any point since the Manhattan Project, while the challenges we face from our adversaries are more intense since the Cuban Missile Crisis. For the first time in our history, we face a threat from two near-peer nuclear adversaries. Russia is developing several exotic, destabilizing weapons. They have lowered the threshold for nuclear use, fired nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles near the borders of NATO allies, and repeatedly threatened nuclear escalation during the conflict in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, China poses an escalating, long-term strategic challenge for the United States. It is rapidly increasing the size of its arsenal, with Department of War (DoW) projections indicating it could exceed one thousand warheads by 2030. In addition, China is advancing a broader and more sophisticated range of strike capabilities while repeatedly refusing to participate in trilateral or multilateral strategic stability talks supported by the President. Finally, reporting from the Department of State indicates China has conducted explosive nuclear tests while attempting to hide their clear violation of nuclear test ban commitments and norms.
The United States must also maintain vigilance against regional threats. North Korea continues to place nuclear weapons at the center of its coercive foreign policy and views its arsenal as a source of regime legitimacy. Meanwhile, the President has taken decisive action through Operations MIDNIGHT HAMMER and EPIC FURY to ensure Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon.
In today's unprecedented security environment, NNSA's foremost priority is to modernize America's strategic deterrent, ensuring a comprehensive suite of capabilities at the President's disposal to address a complex and overlapping range of threats. NNSA is committed to delivering advanced weapon systems to the warfighter that deter adversaries from challenging U.S. resolve while reassuring our allies of America's atomic strength. NNSA is now acting with the urgency this moment demands, advancing initiatives that accelerate delivery timelines, managing cost and schedules across all major projects to maximize taxpayer value, and upholding peace through atomic strength.
NNSA is equally committed to enhancing its nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism capabilities. Too often, these missions are presented as competing with deterrence objectives, but this could not be further from the truth. By reducing stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material around the globe, preventing malicious actors from accessing nuclear and radioactive materials or expertise, and successfully preventing the use of a crude nuclear or radiological device, NNSA directly reinforces deterrence. In an era of growing demand for nuclear power and technology, these capabilities must be strengthened in a way that supports a global civil nuclear renaissance led by American technology, security, and safeguards.
Finally, NNSA's naval nuclear propulsion mission is essential to ensuring the U.S. Navy is an unmatched fighting force capable of projecting American power across the world's oceans; delivering American military might wherever it is needed and safeguarding the assured secondstrike capability of the nuclear triad. NNSA will deliver Columbia-class propulsion plants to the Navy and cultivate the next generation of naval propulsion technology to sustain and strengthen these advantages.
In FY 2027, NNSA is requesting $32.8 billion, an increase of $3.5 billion in total resources (discretionary and Working Families Tax Cut Act funding) from the previous year, or 12%./1
Weapons Activities
NNSA's Weapons Activities portfolio covers stockpile management; production modernization; stockpile research, technology, and engineering; secure transportation; physical security; and information technology and cybersecurity activities. FY 2027 priorities in the Weapons Activities portfolio include urgently rebuilding America's nuclear weapons enterprise with agility and resilience to field a more diverse, flexible, and effective deterrent on a timeline that influences adversaries' decisions. Additionally, NNSA needs to restore reliable, scalable production capacity across the nuclear weapons enterprise to enable sustained delivery of plutonium pits, strategic materials, high explosives, and non-nuclear components at required rates. NNSA recently issued a set of sweeping Transformation Objectives to its enterprise to affect fundamental changes to institutional culture, technical programs, management processes, business practices, fiscal discipline, and systems of accountability. NNSA is requesting $27.4 billion for Weapons Activities to support these efforts.
Stockpile Management
NNSA will no longer be defined solely as a scientific stewardship organization, but an organization focused on weapons production-- on delivering real capabilities, at speed, to meet current and future DoW requirements. NNSA is fully committed to the rapid, simultaneous modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, and NNSA is delivering quickly.
In 2025, NNSA reached multiple milestones that attest to faster weapons delivery, at scale. In May, NNSA achieved the First Production Unit (FPU) for the B61-13 almost a year ahead of schedule. The B61-13 strengthens deterrence and assurance by providing the President with additional options against certain harder and large-area military targets. In September, the W80-4 Life Extension Program achieved FPU for its canned subassembly 18 months ahead of schedule.
* * *
1 Throughout this document, amounts do not reflect the mandated transfer of $96.74 million in FY 2026 from Naval Reactors to the Office of Nuclear Energy for operation of the Advanced Test Reactor.
* * *
Production for the full warhead remains on schedule for FPU in 2027. Finally, NNSA reached the Last Production Unit for the W88 Alt 370 program in December, providing key upgrades to the long-serving W88 onboard the ballistic missile submarine force.
Looking ahead, NNSA is continuing development of the W80-5 for the future nuclear armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile. The W87-1 Modification program remains on track for FPU in the early 2030s, and the W93 is on course for production starting in the mid-2030s. While NNSA aggressively pursues modernization, we will continue maintenance of the current stockpile.
NNSA is requesting $6.5 billion for Stockpile Management. While the accelerated weapons deliveries noted above represent significant progress, NNSA remains committed to accelerating modernization and delivery wherever feasible. Funding in FY 2027 will be used to achieve these objectives with the urgency this mission demands.
Production Modernization
Underpinning NNSA's ability to deliver weapons on time and at scale is NNSA's production enterprise. A clear-eyed honest assessment shows that the current structure of our production enterprise lacks both the capability and capacity to meet expanded mission needs on the timeline required. Decades of underinvestment in production facilities following the Cold War have resulted in the degradation and loss of critical capabilities. Contributing to the current situation, many of NNSA's unique, large-scale projects have suffered embarrassing schedule delays and cost overruns. My highest priority is to restore reliable, and scalable production capacity across the enterprise, enabling sustained delivery of plutonium pits, strategic materials, high explosives, and non-nuclear components. NNSA is requesting $8.8 billion for Production Modernization.
Plutonium Pit Production
Expanded and accelerated plutonium pit production is essential to meet present and future DoW requirements. NNSA is committed to establishing a two-site plutonium pit production capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS). This dual-site approach is vital for national security and strengthening the nuclear industrial base, creating highly skilled American jobs and reducing reliance on single points of failure.
I am pleased to report that significant progress has been made in both the production of pits and equipment installation at LANL over the last year, but more focused and dramatic actions are still necessary to improve production rates and capacity. Efforts are already underway, including expanding LANL's pit production capability to produce at least 100 pits by the end of calendar year 2028, while simultaneously expediting the completion of the Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project to reach 30 pits per year (ppy) rate production and double the target production capacity at LANL to beyond 60ppy. NNSA is also positioning SRS to facilitate this expanded pit production at LANL in the near term, while the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility continues to progress. The funding request for plutonium pit production is $4.9 billion and aims to accelerate construction and full rate production timelines at both LANL and SRS.
Strategic Materials
Alongside pit production, modernizing capabilities to produce or process strategic materials such as uranium, lithium, and tritium is of critical importance for the maintenance of the current stockpile and future modernization efforts.
Current uranium processing is carried out in Building 9212 at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), a Manhattan Project-era facility well past its design life. NNSA is replacing this structure with the modern Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). The construction of UPF is now more than 79% complete. NNSA anticipates construction to be finished in 2027 and now expects an accelerated timeline for full operations at the facility compared to the revised baseline established in 2024. NNSA is working closely with its Management and Operating Contractor partners to enact ways to expedite uranium casting at UPF with validated ability to scale output in response to mission demand on an accelerated timeline. NNSA is requesting $290 million for UPF. This funding level reflects the use of funds made available through the Working Families Tax Cut (WFTC) Act (P.L. 119-21).
NNSA is ensuring that warhead modernization programs have a sound supply chain for depleted uranium alloys and radiation cases with readiness to respond quickly to changing warhead requirements. To meet this need, NNSA is working to re-establish the high-purity depleted uranium supply chain. The request of $655 million supports these efforts while also enabling NNSA to both maintain current production lines in Manhattan-era buildings and continue to mature and ultimately deploy more efficient manufacturing technologies at Y-12.
Y-12 has a long history of successfully delivering quality lithium products for the stockpile each year. However, these processes still occur in Manhattan Project-era facilities that pose operational and worker safety risks. Following unacceptable cost and schedule growth identified in the Lithium Processing Facility (LPF) project in FY 2025, I have directed NNSA to re-design LPF to focus on more cost-effective and timely solutions to meet mission needs. Last month, NNSA issued a Request for Information to a select group of vendors, soliciting industry expertise on the re-design of proposed LPF capabilities as multiple real estate projects on the currently planned LPF footprint at Y-12. The responses will inform NNSA's planned acquisition of the redesigned LPF. This change is key to demonstrating NNSA's ability to deliver big projects affordably to the American taxpayer and to meet the needs of our national security.
In parallel, NNSA is also diversifying lithium production options by partnering with a commercial vendor to reduce reliance on degraded legacy infrastructure and establish redundant capacity to ensure resilience. NNSA will continue to invest in Y-12 as the Lithium Center of Excellence through targeted modernization and new build efforts, lithium technology maturation work, and plans for a new lithium research and development facility. NNSA is expending funds appropriated in FY 2026 and through WFTC funds and is not requesting additional funds in FY 2027 for the LPF line item.
NNSA is also advancing two gas centrifuge technologies for unobligated domestic uranium enrichment to deliver Low Enriched Uranium for stockpile tritium production and Highly Enriched Uranium for Naval Nuclear Propulsion needs in partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory through the Domestic Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge program and with Centrus Energy. In 2025, NNSA awarded a contract to BWXT to develop a pilot plant for future Domestic Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge production. In January 2026, BWXT officially deployed this new production capability, the Centrifuge Manufacturing Development Facility.
Additionally, NNSA released a Notice of Intent in October 2025 announcing a sole source contract to Centrus Energy for project planning, design, licensing, manufacturing demonstrations, and operation services for deployment of the AC100 centrifuge. Continuing to mature and deploy these technologies in parallel provides added resiliency to re-establish the enrichment capability necessary to meet future defense fuel requirements.
Tritium gas decays over time and must be continually replenished in active warheads to maintain stockpile effectiveness. NNSA's tritium mission, principally at SRS, has been a tremendous success, a testament to what our workforce can achieve when production is allowed to continue uninterrupted. NNSA recently completed a record 13 tritium extractions in a 9-month period, significantly beating the previous record of 8 extractions in a 12-month period. As a result of cooperation between NNSA, Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NNSA has increased tritium production from 223 grams in 2007 to 3,300 grams in 2025 and expects the next yield will be higher still. This enhanced production capacity will give NNSA flexibility to field any configuration of the stockpile our security demands.
NNSA is also constructing the Tritium Finishing Facility at SRS to replace key capabilities. Once complete, TFF will support safe, reliable, and operationally efficient capabilities for decades to come. NNSA appreciates the support from Congress and will work towards a realistic schedule for commencing TFF operations while simultaneously managing investments in the current building to meet deliverables. NNSA is requesting $881 million for Tritium and Defense Fuels.
Non-Nuclear Components
NNSA is taking steps to ensure sufficient production capacity for its highly specialized nonnuclear components which make up the overwhelming majority of a nuclear weapon. This work is primarily being carried out at the Pantex Plant (Pantex), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Kansas City National Security Campus (KCNSC).
At Pantex, NNSA is constructing the High Explosives Science and Engineering Facility, which will consolidate 15 aging facilities into three new, more efficient ones to conduct science, technology, engineering, and production activities. NNSA anticipates construction completion in FY 2026, and no additional funding is required for project completion. NNSA is also planning construction of the High Explosives Synthesis, Formulation, and Production (HESFP) Facility, which will replace 11 deteriorating World War Two-era facilities and establish an in-house explosives manufacturing capability. NNSA completed design refresh in FY 2026 and is working to meet congressionally mandated start of operations. NNSA will expend WFTC funds and is not requesting additional funds in FY 2027 for HESFP. I would like recognize the executives and workers of 3M Corporation for providing an abundance of critical materials for our High Explosive (HE) programs to give NNSA margin to complete the buildup of our own HE capability.
At SNL, NNSA is constructing the Power Sources Capability project, which will provide new production, research and development, and office space for the multiple power sources required for weapons systems and replaces an aging 75-year-old warehouse. NNSA anticipates construction completion in 2030 and is requesting $140 million. In addition, NNSA is progressing planning for the Microsystems Engineering, Science and Applications Photolithography Capability project to provide new clean room space and modern photolithography equipment required for the manufacturing of radiation hardened microelectronics that allow weapon systems to operate effectively under adverse conditions while in flight. NNSA is requesting $51 million for this project.
To meet the expanded production, facility, and workforce needs at KCNSC, NNSA is advancing the Kansas City Non-Nuclear Expansion Transformation, which utilizes a phased-in approach to allow for immediate use of completed facilities while construction continues elsewhere. Phase One will be transferred to NNSA on May 19, ahead of schedule. Phase Two began construction near the end of 2025, and agreements are being finalized for Phase Three. NNSA expects to begin construction on a new phase each year through the 2030s.
Stockpile Research, Technology, and Engineering (SRT&E)
The SRT&E program provides the foundation for science-based stockpile decisions; delivers advanced capabilities to support DoW requirements; and innovates across the enterprise to improve productivity, efficiency, and responsiveness. This mission has been a tremendous success and is the modern foundation of our nuclear deterrence. Generations of exceptional scientific talent paired with world-class capabilities have advanced insights into the nuclear stockpile-- including weapons performance, plutonium aging, and component certification -- providing an unmatched understanding that strengthens strategic deterrence. NNSA is requesting $4.6 billion for SRT&E.
To ensure the President has flexible nuclear options in every conceivable conflict scenario, NNSA is designing novel and advanced capabilities on accelerated timelines. SRT&E's Rapid and Advanced Capabilities program is collaborating with the DoW to conduct several Concept Assessments of novel weapon systems through the Nuclear Weapon Council's joint warhead acquisition process, including an effort to improve hard and deeply buried target defeat options.
NNSA stood up the Nuclear Deterrence Rapid Capabilities Team in 2025 to meet emerging deterrence needs that require solutions on a faster timescale than traditional warhead acquisition.
Under this model NNSA intends to demonstrate novel systems within two years and to deliver a fieldable capability to DoW within another two years through the Stockpile Management program as authorized by Congress. No one in the world can do this better than America's weapons labs. NNSA is requesting $499 million for Rapid and Advanced Capabilities.
The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program provides unprecedented modeling and simulations that are essential for designing and certifying the nuclear stockpile along with support for NNSA's nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism mission. At the center of the program are the supercomputers, principally El Capitan, NNSA's first exascale supercomputer, which was recertified last year as the world's fastest with a peak performance ability to perform 1.8 quintillion calculations per second. NNSA will use its computing power to take advantage of DOE's world leading Genesis Mission, which unites three things America does better than anyone else: Artificial Intelligence (AI), advanced computing, and innovation, into a collaborative effort across government, industry, and academia to usher in a new golden age of scientific discovery. NNSA will invest in mission-enabling projects that are tailored to solve mission-specific challenges faster and with less power consumption than traditional computers to ultimately speed discovery, optimization, and manufacture of new materials and weapons designs. NNSA is requesting $910 million for ASC.
America's nuclear arsenal is designed to survive the most extreme environments imaginable, and some of those environments are created in our Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) program, which allows experimentation at extreme temperatures and pressures characteristic of nuclear weapons explosions to support the design, certification, and assessment of the nuclear stockpile.
The National Ignition Facility (NIF) remains the only location on earth capable of achieving fusion ignition. Last April, NIF set new records for both energy yield and target gain, achieving 8.6 megajoules of energy from 2.08 megajoules of energy to the target. In FY 2027, ICF will continue to mature technologies to reach higher fusion yields to answer key stockpile questions, including through partnerships with private fusion energy companies when appropriate. ICF will also continue the design and procurement of equipment for the Enhanced Yield Capability project to upgrade NIF to achieve higher fusion yields. NNSA is requesting $914 million for ICF.
As the stockpile evolves, SRT&E's Assessment Science program provides the expertise needed to maintain confidence in the nuclear stockpile. The program performs experiments to support decisions for NNSA's nuclear stockpile. In FY 2027, it will expand its experimental facilities, including construction of two unique test beds in Nevada under the Enhanced Capability for Subcritical Experiments portfolio. NNSA is requesting $1.5 billion for Assessment Science.
Infrastructure and Operations
NNSA's Infrastructure and Operations program maintains, operates, and modernizes infrastructure in a safe, secure, and cost-effective manner to support all NNSA programs. A significant portion of NNSA's critical facilities are operating beyond their 40-year life span while other capabilities must be reestablished. Infrastructure and Operations provide a comprehensive approach to modernizing NNSA infrastructure while maximizing return on investment, enabling program mission sustainment, and reducing enterprise risk. The program also plans, prioritizes, and constructs mission-enabling facilities and infrastructure. These facilities are fundamental to achieving NNSA's plutonium, uranium, tritium, lithium, high explosives, and other mission objectives.
While new facilities are under construction, NNSA must continue to maintain and operate its existing legacy facilities to meet accelerated weapons delivery timelines as well as meet global nuclear security requirements. These efforts include predictive, preventive, and corrective maintenance activities to maintain facilities, property, assets, systems, roads, and vital safety systems. The need to operate legacy facilities while simultaneously constructing new ones places additional financial and workforce strain on NNSA and requires adaptability and flexibility to overcome. The Infrastructure and Operations request reflects the overall need for sustained investment in maintenance and recapitalization. NNSA is requesting $4.8 billion for Infrastructure and Operations.
Securing the Enterprise
NNSA is responsible for a robust array of transportation, physical security, and cybersecurity of the weapons, materials, personnel, and information of the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA is modernizing all three pillars of security to respond to a new threat environment.
In FY 2027, NNSA's Office of Secure Transportation (OST) will continue to prioritize the sustainment and ongoing modernization of operations and equipment, including acquisition of the Mobile Guardian Transporter (MGT). MGT is the next generation secure trailer system designed to safeguard cargos while protecting the public. FPU for MGT is expected in FY 2029.
OST's strength is our people. NNSA also remains focused on recruiting and retaining a highly skilled Federal Agent workforce. NNSA appreciates Congress' ongoing support in sustaining this elite team and ensuring mission readiness. The Secure Transportation Asset (STA) program, which provides this capability, has a record of 100 percent safe and secure shipments without compromise, loss of components, or radiological release. NNSA is requesting $587 million to enhance STA's capability to provide safe and secure mission operations that enable NNSA's nuclear modernization efforts.
As the overall mission set continues to grow, NNSA is acquiring and employing innovative physical security technology to mitigate risk and promote more efficient security operations.
Among the most complex and rapidly evolving security threats NNSA faces are from drones and other uncrewed aircraft systems. NNSA is making substantial investments in next-generation counter-uncrewed aircraft systems (CUAS) and finalized deployment of a CUAS platform at NNSS in August 2025. NNSA anticipates the system will be operational at Pantex, Y-12, and LANL by the end of FY 2026 with the final deployment at SRS completed by the end of FY 2027. The FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) permitted NNSA to integrate KCNSC, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories into the CUAS program. Initial site-configuration discussions have started, and KSNSC is projected to have an operational CUAS platform by early FY 2028. NNSA appreciates Congress' support in the FY 2026 NDAA for expanded CUAS authority at all national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities. NNSA is requesting $50.4 million for CUAS.
In response to escalating cybersecurity challenges, NNSA is fundamentally redesigning its information technology (IT) environments to provide secure, risk-informed solutions across the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA is prioritizing commercial cloud expansion, modernizing classified networks for resilience, enabling connectivity for Digital Transformation and Digital Engineering, and implementing AI. Recent deployments of enterprise-wide, unclassified and classified multi-cloud platforms support information sharing, enhanced collaboration, and streamlined workflows across the nuclear security enterprise. NNSA also recently completed cyber portfolio deployments across more than six million machines to enhance resilience while expanding investment in AI tools and IT infrastructure. NNSA is requesting $935 million for IT and cybersecurity.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) portfolio is America's shield against nuclear and radiological attack. NNSA stops threats before they reach the U.S. Homeland through a multilayered defense, based on denying, detecting, countering, and defeating nuclear and radiological threats. The DNN portfolio works in concert with the rest of NNSA to deter strategic attacks against the United States and achieve peace through atomic strength. In executing this mission, the DNN portfolio also advances American Energy Dominance and helps implement President Trump's May 2025 executive orders on nuclear energy.
Material Management and Minimization
The Office of Material Management and Minimization denies terrorists and adversary state actors the materials needed to produce a nuclear weapon by minimizing the need for and presence of weapons-usable nuclear material around the world. This allows key research and business activities to continue while eliminating proliferation risks. Under this program, NNSA has removed or confirmed the disposition of 7,347kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the equivalent of several hundred nuclear weapons. NNSA has also converted from HEU to high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), or verified as shut down, 111 research reactors and medical isotope production facilities. The most recent conversion was carried out in collaboration with Japan in December 2025.
NNSA is also working with the Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) to unleash energy dominance and implement the President's executive orders on nuclear energy.
Last year, NNSA produced over 300kg of HALEU oxide, which DOE-NE is using to support advanced reactor demonstration projects and the DOE Reactor Pilot Program. Last August, NNSA increased their HALEU commitment to DOE-NE by five metric tons, almost doubling the previous commitment of 6.7 metric tons.
NNSA is requesting $266 million for these activities, with a focus on HALEU production, HEU removals, and implementing executive order and legal requirements related to surplus plutonium management.
Global Material Security
The Office of Global Material Security denies adversary access to nuclear and radioactive materials, protecting U.S. communities and stopping threat long before they reach the homeland.
Through this office, NNSA partners with U.S. industry to advance competitiveness, prosperity, and security. The program currently works with eight domestic advanced reactor vendors on security-by-design to increase the competitiveness and exportability to American nuclear technology.
The program also supports the development of groundbreaking technologies to replace radioactive materials with alternative technologies. This includes a congressional mandate to eliminate all cesium-137 blood irradiators in the United States by the end of 2027. To date, 94% of these irradiators have been removed by NNSA or are under contract for removal. In 2025, NNSA removed the final irradiators from Iowa, Kansas, Nevada, and Oklahoma.
NNSA also engages with foreign partners to enable them to use U.S.-manufactured radiation detection systems to conduct their own counter nuclear smuggling operations. These efforts have resulted in the interdiction of dozens of radioactive sources and hundreds of kilograms of nuclear material. NNSA is requesting $391 million for these vital national security activities.
Nonproliferation and Arms Control
The Nonproliferation and Arms Control program supports the American nuclear industry while advancing U.S. nonproliferation, monitoring and verification, and export objectives. It advances American leadership at the International Atomic Energy Agency, engages with American industry to incorporate safeguards by design, and ensures partner countries implement international safeguards obligations.
NNSA supports the expansion of U.S. nuclear exports by implementing the 10 CFR Part 810 nuclear export control process and by providing technical assistance to the Department of State on the negotiation and implementation of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation (123 Agreements). These agreements open up new markets for American companies while securing commitments from foreign partners to adhere to U.S. nonproliferation standards. Most recently, NNSA played a key role in the negotiation of the 123 Agreement between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. NNSA is ready to lend its expertise in implementing the President's Executive Order requirement for an additional 20 agreements to be in place or under negotiation by the close of the 120th Congress. NNSA is requesting $214 million for these activities.
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development program develops domestic capabilities to detect and characterize global nuclear threats in coordination with mission stakeholders across the nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, and nuclear warfighting mission areas.
Current activities include the production of satellite-based sensors to detect nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and outer space that are crucial for nuclear warfighting, space control, and nuclear test monitoring. NNSA completed two deliveries in May and October 2025 of the latest Global Burst Detector payloads to the Space Force for integration onto GPS satellites for this purpose. NNSA also conducts research to detect foreign nuclear weapons development activities, including uranium enrichment and weaponization, and to improve the U.S. ability to detect evasive nuclear testing by foreign adversaries. NNSA is requesting $819 million for these activities.
Nuclear Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
The CTCP program counters nuclear terrorism and proliferation and responds to any nuclear or radiological threat, incident, or accident worldwide. CTCP serves as the technical foundation of deterrence by attribution and denial and is the Nation's last line of defense against radiological and nuclear emergencies. CTCP is working rapidly to operate effectively in a less stable international security environment with lower barriers to nuclear material and expertise acquisition.
To effectively respond to nuclear emergencies at home and abroad, CTCP is responsible for the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST). NEST maintains a vast array of capabilities to detect, assess, defeat, and attribute the origins of interdicted nuclear materials, improvised nuclear devices, or nuclear device detonations; safely resolve accidents involving a U.S. nuclear weapon; and mitigate any impacts to public health and safety during a radiological or nuclear emergency. NEST executed 80 unclassified emergency response operations in 2025 and safeguarded some of the nation's most important events including the presidential inauguration and Army 250th celebrations in Washington, DC; New Years Eve in New York City; and Super Bowl LX in San Francisco. This summer, NEST will execute its most complex security operation to secure the 104 World Cup games occurring across the United States, Mexico, and Canada.
Finally, CTCP conducts rigorous, objective technical assessments of emergent nuclear weapon challenges, advanced fuel cycles, and applications of AI, to inform planning and operations for the Department of War and other interagency partners. Leveraging unique weapons and response expertise across its portfolio, CTCP engages in extensive training and coordination with local, state, federal, and international partners to prepare them for a potential nuclear or radiological emergency. Last year, CTCP delivered over 250 training events and executed over 40 exercises with domestic and international partners. NNSA is requesting $651 million for CTCP.
Naval Reactors
The Naval Reactors portfolio supports NNSA's close partnership with the U.S. Navy in support of the nuclear fleet. Naval Reactors advances naval nuclear propulsion capabilities for America's attack and ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carriers to keep the Navy on the cutting edge of warfighting and maintain the assured second-strike capability of the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad.
Naval Reactors continues to deliver key reactor and propulsion plant components to support construction of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. The reactor core was certified for use in FY 2025 and will be installed in the submarine this year. Reactor plant components for the next several submarines are in manufacturing and are on pace to support construction timelines. Additionally, progress continues at the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project, including the start of steel erection for the north half of the Main Process Building and delivery of major equipment for transferring spent nuclear fuel into pools. NNSA is requesting $2.39 billion for Naval Reactors.
Federal Salaries and Expenses
NNSA's Federal workforce executes the essential governmental functions that underpin the agency's mission, including programmatic and project execution and contract management, budget development, and rigorous oversight of management and operating contractors. These are the dedicated American men and women whose ingenuity, commitment, and demonstrated merit are the bedrock of our nuclear security. Investing in the workforce and ensuring NNSA attracts and retains the most capable individuals through rigorous, merit-based processes, is investing in the future of American scientific and engineering dominance and peace through atomic strength.
NNSA is requesting $577 million for Federal Salaries and Expenses. NNSA continues to face significant challenges in recruiting and retaining top talent, driven by demographic trends and intense competition from the private sector. At the end of FY 2026, 16.6% of NNSA's federal workforce will be eligible for retirement. NNSA must compete for highly specialized skills that are crucial to meeting current and future mission requirements. These same skills are in high demand across both established and emerging industries. Sustaining a strong, capable workforce is essential to ensuring the success of NNSA's national security mission. At the requested appropriation level, NNSA expects the number of Federal FTEs to be 1,992.
Conclusion
The world is clearly at an inflection point. Great power competition has returned, and the power of the atom poses transformative opportunities alongside significant risks. The hour is late and the need is urgent, to strengthen America's nuclear weapons enterprise. With its unparalleled capabilities, the Department of Energy and NNSA bear a unique and profound responsibility to safeguard the United States and its allies. The FY 2027 budget request underscores the urgency of meeting today's mission requirements while simultaneously preparing the nuclear security enterprise to address future challenges in an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment.
NNSA will embrace urgency and flexibility to be successful because there is no other option.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2026-04-22_williams_testimony.pdf
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rogers Issues Opening Statement at Hearing on National Security Challenges in Indo-Pacific Region
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Alabama, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, released the following opening statement from an April 22, 2026, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region":* * *
Today, we continue our posture hearings with INDOPACOM and U.S. Forces Korea.
As we meet, our adversaries are deepening their cooperation. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are working together to challenge the United States. Recent reports of China and Russia's support for Iran during Operation Epic Fury are just the latest ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Alabama, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, released the following opening statement from an April 22, 2026, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region": * * * Today, we continue our posture hearings with INDOPACOM and U.S. Forces Korea. As we meet, our adversaries are deepening their cooperation. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are working together to challenge the United States. Recent reports of China and Russia's support for Iran during Operation Epic Fury are just the latestexample of this cooperation.
In his threat environment, President Trump was right to commit to a historic $1.5 trillion defense budget. This investment is essential to rebuild our military and ensure peace through strength. I look forward to working with President Trump and Secretary Hegseth to get it enacted.
In particular, this investment is critical to addressing our most pressing challenge: deterring China in the Indo-Pacific.
Under Xi Jinping, China is pursuing a historic military buildup. It now fields the world's leading hypersonic missile arsenal. The PLA is on track to exceed 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.
China is the world's preeminent shipbuilding nation. And its growing arsenal of conventional long-range strike, cyber, and space capabilities increasingly puts not only U.S. interests in the region at risk, but also the U.S. homeland.
And China is not just building capability, it is demonstrating intent. In a December exercise, the PLA encircled Taiwan and rehearsed operations to isolate and seize the island.
To ensure the Department can deter China through strength, we must: improve integrated air and missile defenses, including the Guam Defense System; scale production of innovative, low-cost munitions and attritable unmanned systems; replenish our munitions stockpiles, especially long-range fires; and rebuild and modernize U.S. shipbuilding.
Moreover, we need a strong network of alliances and partnerships.
Fortunately, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia are increasing their defense spending and providing critical access and basing that enable our forces to operate throughout the region.
Taiwan, too, has made strides in strengthening its self-defense capabilities and is already spending about 3% of GDP on defense. And like President Trump, the Taiwanese President is also proposing a special budget to bring their defense spending closer to 5% of GDP. I encourage their legislature to pass it as soon as possible.
The stakes are clear for not only Taiwan, but also the United States: a cross-Strait invasion would disrupt the global economy and enable China to dominate the Pacific and its key sea lanes to America's detriment.
The time is now to strengthen Taiwan's defenses. I urge the Department to move quickly to execute congressionally-appropriated funds for the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative. The recently announced $11 billion U.S. arms sale is a positive step, but we must make use of every available authority to arm Taiwan.That is consistent with the 2026 National Defense Strategy's call to build a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain.
While China is our pacing challenge, North Korea remains a persistent threat that cannot be ignored. North Korean forces are gaining real-world combat experience fighting for Vladimir Putin against Ukraine. In return, Putin is giving Kim advanced technologies to greatly enhance his military capabilities. North Korea's advancing cyber, nuclear, and missile arsenals threaten both South Korea and the U.S. homeland.
Therefore, I am encouraged that South Korea is demonstrating a clear commitment to taking on significantly greater responsibility for its own defense. But that progress must not be undermined by a premature reduction of U.S. forces from the Peninsula or a premature transition of wartime operational control.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here and for their service to our nation.
I look forward to hearing how we can work together to ensure our warfighters have what they need to maintain stability and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=6544
Assistant Secretary of War for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Noh Testifies Before House Armed Services Committee
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The House Armed Services Committee released the following testimony by John Noh, Assistant Secretary of War for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, from an April 22, 2026, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region":* * *
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity today to discuss how the Department of War is preserving a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and implementing President Trump's common-sense peace through strength agenda in this vital region. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The House Armed Services Committee released the following testimony by John Noh, Assistant Secretary of War for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, from an April 22, 2026, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region": * * * Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity today to discuss how the Department of War is preserving a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and implementing President Trump's common-sense peace through strength agenda in this vital region.I am pleased to testify alongside Admiral Paparo from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and General Brunson from U.S. Forces Korea.
The 2026 National Defense Strategy directs the Department of War to deter China through strength, not confrontation. It seeks to focus the U.S. military's effort on ensuring the preservation of a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, in which no country, including China, can become a regional hegemon. This is to defend our nation's scoped and reasonable vital interests in the Indo-Pacific: to ensure that neither China nor anyone else can dominate the region or our allies.
We are clear-eyed about the People's Liberation Army's rapid and sustained buildup, which has strengthened its ability to project military power. Recognizing this, it is our essential responsibility at the Department of War to ensure that President Trump is always able to negotiate from a position of unquestionable military strength to sustain peace in the Indo-Pacific.
The Department is therefore moving with the utmost urgency and focus to erect a strong denial defense in the Indo-Pacific, with a focus on the First Island Chain, while simultaneously defending the U.S. Homeland. This requires strengthening U.S. force posture across the theater, including through resilient basing and logistics networks, and accelerating the fielding and production of the capabilities required to deny aggression and, if necessary, prevail. This also requires expanding the contributions of U.S. allies and partners through greater burden sharing. We will enable and incentivize our allies and partners to do more for our collective defense, including by bolstering their readiness, increasing operational cooperation, and revitalizing our defense industrial bases.
These efforts are central to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific and to achieving the President's objective of peace through strength.
Building, Posturing, and Sustaining a Strong Denial Defense Along the First Island Chain Consistent with the Secretary's direction to reestablish deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, the Department is focused on strengthening its force posture across the theater to increase the Joint Force's lethality and optionality to deny aggression along the First Island Chain.
Strengthening our presence and posture in Japan is a top priority for the Department. As the Secretary announced during his visit to Tokyo in October 2025, we are making significant progress modernizing U.S. command-and-control in Japan. We have started Phase II of the upgrade of U.S. Forces Japan into a joint force headquarters, growing its ability to respond to regional contingencies and work closely with Japan's Joint Operations Command (JJOC). We also continue to forward deploy to Japan our most capable platforms and formations, such as the F-35s arriving at Misawa Air Base as part of the Department's tactical aircraft modernization plan for Japan. Additionally, we are improving our training and exercise programs with Japan, including at new and operationally relevant locations, such as in Japan's Southwest Islands.
The Department of War is rapidly expanding force posture in Australia. This includes increasing rotational deployments of U.S. bombers, fighters, and advanced air capabilities. We are also advancing important infrastructure projects at Australian airbases to support these rotations, with plans to expand infrastructure enhancements at additional locations. The Department is building on longstanding initiatives, such as Marine Rotational Force-Darwin, by further developing infrastructure and logistics capacity, as well as prepositioning U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft in Australia. As directed by President Trump, the Department is also moving "full steam ahead" to implement AUKUS - the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. AUKUS enhances our combat-credible forward posture by increasing submarine interoperability, expanding access and sustainment infrastructure, and ensuring that U.S. and Australian forces can operate seamlessly together in crisis. In December 2025, Secretary Hegseth and Secretary Rubio, alongside their Australian counterparts, reaffirmed the plan under AUKUS to establish Submarine Rotational Force-West as early as 2027, which will mark an important expansion of our maintenance options and sustainment infrastructure to support a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain.
We continue to deploy more forces and advanced capabilities across the Philippines for longer, including High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) - an anti-ship missile system used by the Marine Littoral Regiment - and the Typhon missile system. We are also investing in resilient infrastructure and storage facilities at contingency-relevant locations to preposition key equipment and munitions, while improving alliance cooperation through streamlined U.S. access to Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) locations. With the allocation of an additional $144M for Fiscal Year 2026, the Department of War has committed over $300M in infrastructure investments at EDCA locations to date. Across Southeast Asia, we are engaging our partners to expand and streamline U.S. access, basing, and overflight permissions so that we are prepared to deny aggression and respond if necessary.
Our posture across the Pacific Islands also remains critical for U.S. military logistics, sustainment, and homeland defense. We continue to enhance infrastructure in the Freely Associated States (FAS), particularly in Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). The Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) between the United States and Palau, FSM, and the Republic of the Marhsall Islands grant the United States assured military access, in addition to permissions to execute important posture projects, as part of the United States' exclusive responsibility for the COFAs' national defense. In FSM's Yap State, we are making considerable progress on construction projects at the airport and seaport, which enhances the resiliency of our military infrastructure in the Second Island Chain. In Palau, we are continuing construction on the Tactical Multi-Mission Over-the-Horizon (TACMOR) capability to improve the Joint Force's domain awareness across the Indo-Pacific. Also in Palau, our work to establish a defense site in Peleliu will provide additional logistics support to the Joint Force.
Increasing Burden Sharing with Allies and Partners
The 2026 National Defense Strategy recognizes that the U.S. military cannot and should not sustain a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific alone. The Department has called upon wealthy and capable allies and partners to share the burden of restoring and sustaining deterrence by increasing defense spending, meeting the new global standard of spending 3.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on core defense, and taking greater responsibility for their conventional defense.
This is particularly critical for Taiwan. President Lai has publicly committed to reach 5% of GDP in core defense spending by 2030. This includes an unprecedented special defense budget that addresses many of Taiwan's most critical defense gaps. The Department worked closely with Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense in the development of its historic defense special budget and is encouraging Taiwan's political parties to work together to fund these requirements. Still, Taiwan must do more, and faster, to build on this positive momentum and ensure it has the selfdefense capability to meet the scale of the threat it faces.
Following his visit to the Republic of Korea (ROK) in October 2025, President Trump and President Lee announced the ROK's plan to increase its defense spending to 3.5% of GDP as soon as possible and the ROK's commitment to spend $25 billion on U.S. military equipment purchases by 2030. Supported by high defense spending and its powerful military, the ROK has committed to take primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited support from U.S. forces and is developing capabilities to support this goal. By shifting the balance of responsibility with the ROK and enhancing U.S. conventional deterrence posture on the peninsula against all threats, we are modernizing the U.S.-ROK Alliance to better align with the Department's priorities. We are working closely with the ROK as it acquires the requisite capabilities for its conventional defense.
We are optimistic about Prime Minister Takaichi's commitment to increase Japan's defense capabilities, especially following her party's landslide victory in Japan's election in February 2026.
As the Fact Sheet from her official visit to the White House last month states, Japan is committed to rapidly strengthen its own defense capabilities and increase its defense budget. Japan also affirmed the importance of credible deterrence and denial capabilities and of deploying advanced capabilities in Japan, building on the successful U.S. deployment of the Typhon missile system to mainland Japan last year. These commitments and monetary investments are important steps, but there is still more work to do.
As part of AUKUS, Australia has contributed $2 billion to the U.S. submarine industrial base over the last year, which will support U.S. efforts to uplift submarine production. Although Australia is making significant investments in AUKUS-related submarines and infrastructure, it must continue to invest in key capabilities, including integrated air and missile defense, long-range strike, and logistics. We appreciate Australia's release of its updated National Defense Strategy and Integrated Investment Plan last week. It is vital that Australia work to increase its defense spending commensurate with its critical capability requirements.
Developing the Capability and Capacity of Allies and Partners to Contribute to Collective Defense
Through security cooperation, defense industrial collaboration, and enhanced military operations and exercises, the Department will empower U.S. allies and partners to leverage their latent military potential - creating a formidable network of highly capable armed forces that would convince any adversary that peace and restraint are the better course.
We are continuing to work closely with Japan to increase U.S.-Japan Alliance readiness, build military capabilities, and address defense industrial base issues to increase production for the United States and our allies. We are working diligently to expand realistic training and exercises in Japan, including in the Southwest Islands, which directly improve alliance readiness. Fires are a key focus area. Last year, we deployed the NMESIS system to Okinawa, conducted a live fire exercise of HIMARS at Camp Fuji, and temporarily deployed the Typhon missile system to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. We are also working closely with Japan to address industrial base issues through the Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment (DICAS) initiative. This work includes efforts to dramatically expand production of air defense missiles, including the Standard Missile-3 Block IIA, and partnering on AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) co-production.
In line with the changing security environment, we are strengthening readiness and interoperability with the ROK through combined, joint, all-domain exercises. This includes annual bilateral, combined exercises like FREEDOM SHIELD and ULCHI FREEDOM SHIELD that strengthen alliance readiness against a range of threats. We are also deepening defense industrial cooperation with the ROK by expanding co-sustainment efforts to repair critical U.S. military assets in theater, reducing cost, duration, and operational impacts to the Joint Force. In November 2025, Secretary Hegseth announced that the U.S. Navy will repair a warship in the ROK for the first time - a clear demonstration of the ROK's advanced maintenance capability. We are also adding to the list of projects under the Regional Sustainment Framework, including partnering with Korean industry to repair U.S. Air Force fixed wing platforms and U.S. Army watercraft and helicopters. We are beginning to explore opportunities for co-production of critical platforms with the ROK to leverage Korean manufacturing capacity and fortify global supply chains.
The Department continues to increase operational cooperation with Australia, including through Exercise TALISMAN SABRE--the largest bilateral combined training activity between our two countries. This last iteration demonstrated enhanced interoperability and employment of exquisite weapons systems, including the first ever live-fire of the Typhon missile system in the Indo-Pacific and the use of the Precision Strike Missile. The Department is also continuing to increase defense industrial base collaboration with Australia through initiatives like the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise. In December 2025, Secretaries Hegseth and Rubio, together with their Australian counterparts, endorsed a two-year pathway for GWEO that will support Australian co-production of the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile, sustainment of critical munitions such as AMRAAMs, and cooperation on maritime strike and interceptor capabilities.
We continue to expand our exercises and training with key allies and partners across Southeast Asia. This year's Exercise BALIKATAN, currently underway with the Philippines, is our largest and most complex ever, testing multi-domain warfighting concepts in strategic locations like the Batanes Islands and Northern Luzon. We recently concluded Exercise COBRA GOLD with Thailand, where we demonstrated new multidomain fires and incorporated unmanned systems for the first time. With Singapore, we have increasing opportunities to expand our interoperability following Singapore's recent announcement of its intent to purchase P-8 aircraft in addition to its fleet of F-16s, F-15s, and F-35s. We are also supporting the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through the Philippines Security Sector Assistance Roadmap (P-SSAR), which prioritizes combat-credible capabilities like long-range fires, integrated air and missile defense, and cyber systems, to ensure that our joint investments contribute to our collective defense.
Finally, we are expanding our defense cooperation with India. In October, Secretary Hegseth and Defense Minister Singh signed the Framework for the U.S.-India Major Defense Partnership, which charts a course for increasing operational coordination, information sharing, and growing our defense industrial, science, and technology cooperation. Our defense industrial collaboration has expanded significantly, with commitments to co-produce and co-develop advanced technologies, increase U.S. Navy ship repair in India under the Master Shipyard Repair Agreements, and pursue the maintenance, repair, and overhaul of commonly operated platforms such as C-130s, P-8s, and C-17s.
Conclusion
The Department will move with focus and determination to execute the 2026 National Defense Strategy's clear direction to preserve a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, with an emphasis on erecting a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain while simultaneously defending the U.S. Homeland. We will do so by strengthening our force posture across the region, increasing burden sharing among highly capable allies and partners, and enabling them to increase their self-defense capability and capacity. Much work remains to be done to sustain lasting peace in the Indo-Pacific. But I am confident that with the support of Congress, we will meet this challenge.
Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to your questions.
* * *
Editor's note: President Trump, by executive order on Sept. 5, 2025, said he wanted to call the Department of Defense the Department of War. However, only an act of Congress can change the name of the agency, and Congress has not acted. Targeted News Service will use the designations presented on the agency website going forward.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2026-04-22_indopacom_noh_testimony.pdf
U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Programs Director Wolfe Testifies Before House Armed Services Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces released the following testimony by Navy Vice Adm. Johnny Wolfe Jr., director of strategic systems programs at the U.S. Navy, from an April 22, 2026, hearing on the fiscal 2027 budget request:* * *
Strategic Systems Programs' (SSP) mission is to deter strategic attack by providing credible and affordable nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to the Warfighter to underwrite the security of our Nation. As the Navy command that provides cost-effective, safe, and secure sea-based strategic deterrence solutions, the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces released the following testimony by Navy Vice Adm. Johnny Wolfe Jr., director of strategic systems programs at the U.S. Navy, from an April 22, 2026, hearing on the fiscal 2027 budget request: * * * Strategic Systems Programs' (SSP) mission is to deter strategic attack by providing credible and affordable nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to the Warfighter to underwrite the security of our Nation. As the Navy command that provides cost-effective, safe, and secure sea-based strategic deterrence solutions, theSSP team is entrusted to provide cradle-to-grave lifecycle support to three critical programs: the TRIDENT II D5 Strategic Weapon System (SWS), Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonics, and the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) programs.
The U.S. nuclear triad's most survivable leg is provided by the sea-based strategic deterrent (SBSD). The TRIDENT II D5 represents over two-thirds of our Nation's deployed nuclear warheads, providing an unyielding foundation for assured response against any adversary. The SBSD encompasses a formidable network of assets: the strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force, the TRIDENT II D5 and its associated nuclear warheads, the Navy Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications systems, and the crucial shore-based maintenance and security infrastructure.
SLCM-N is intended to expand the President's options for responding to limited nuclear use and strategic non-nuclear attacks with a theater-level option. SLCM-N enables a persistent, survivable, regional, nuclear presence without dependence on allied host nations, giving the President more options in a conflict. The capability also provides a valuable regional deterrent.
Underpinning these capabilities is a wide-ranging industrial base, ensuring the sustainment and modernization of this vital deterrent for decades to come.
Maintaining Unmatched Strength and Lethality
A key component of an effective deterrent is an assured second-strike capability, which is exactly what the Navy's submarine-launched nuclear weapons provide. SSP's core mission supporting the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad comprises two fundamental lines of effort: the safety and security of our Nation's strategic assets entrusted to the Navy; and the design, development, production, sustainment, and disposal of the Navy's SWS. We strive to maintain a culture of excellence, underpinned by rigorous self-assessment, to achieve the highest standards of performance and integrity for personnel supporting the strategic deterrent mission. We focus unrelentingly on our tremendous responsibility for the custody and accountability of our Nation's nuclear assets. The men and women of SSP, our Sailors, our Marines, our Coast Guardsmen, and our industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the strategic deterrence mission, ready to respond to the emerging needs of our Warfighter, and committed to protecting and safeguarding our Nation's assets with which we are entrusted. We are grateful to congressional defense committees for their unwavering support for our critical mission.
SSP Priorities: Lethality, Warfighting, Homeland Defense
SSP approaches our mission through the lens of our three main priorities:
* Lethality: SSP ensures the highest levels of readiness for our systems, providing critical support to the U.S. national strategy to deter any adversary who threatens the United States, our allies, or our interests.
* Warfighting: Our unwavering focus on designing, developing, and deploying the most advanced SLBM, SLCM-N, and hypersonic technologies ensures the U.S. Navy maintains its competitive edge in an increasingly contested maritime domain.
* Homeland Defense: As the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad, the SBSD, under SSP's stewardship, stands constant, providing an unshakeable deterrent against attack on our homeland.
State of the Program
Today's nuclear triad is built upon the foresight and decisions of those who have come before us.
Deliberate investment into a nuclear weapons support infrastructure promoted both the safety and reliability of the SWS as well as the high levels of security required for weapons of such importance. After seven decades of use, the Navy must revitalize and build the capacity that will allow this infrastructure to continue to meet Warfighter requirements in the face of evolving threats. In addition to revitalizing legacy infrastructure to sustain SWS shore operations, the Nuclear Enterprise, and SSP in particular, must prioritize both expanded and new infrastructure to promote the safety, security, efficacy, and credibility of the SWS through 2084. These investments must be made in weapon design and development capacity, transportation and storage infrastructure, technical operations, and security facilities.
The safety, security, and reliability of the Navy's nuclear weapons is SSP's highest priority. The SSP flight test program measures performance and reliability of the SWS in order to ensure operational effectiveness. SSP has accomplished 197 successful flight tests of the TRIDENT II missile - the most recent of which occurred in April 2025. Furthermore, the Navy strictly complies with the Nuclear Weapons Surety Standards for all nuclear weapons in its custody and regularly evaluates itself to ensure we are meeting those standards. The TRIDENT II program is safe, secure, and highly reliable.
A minimum of 12 COLUMBIA-class SSBNs will replace the current fleet of 14 OHIO-class SSBNs. The continued demonstrated high performance of the SWS will ensure the COLUMBIA-class meets U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) direction to meet requirements derived from Presidential guidance, which establish the minimum force necessary to deter adversary attack against the homeland and to provide the President with an assured survivable second-strike capability. For this reason, the Navy must maintain a robust OHIO-class SSBN age management program to avoid a degradation in mission capabilities as the COLUMBIA-class SSBN prepares to enter service.
The SBSD stands at a critical juncture. Decades of strategic foresight have delivered an unparalleled capability. But, to maintain our advantage in the face of evolving threats, we must build on these decisions and prioritize the modernization of our nuclear infrastructure and industrial base. SSP will continue to balance the following priorities as we move into a new era of sustainment and new programs:
* Prioritizing Modernization: With its advanced capabilities, the COLUMBIA-class SSBN combined with its TRIDENT II D5 represents a generational leap forward in our undersea deterrent. With improvements in the SSBN platform come upgrades to the SWS - both the TRIDENT II D5 missile and its warhead. SSP is fully committed to ensuring a seamless transition from the OHIO-class SSBN, leveraging existing infrastructure while modernizing the SWS to meet the demands of the future.
* Revitalizing the Industrial Base: A strong and resilient domestic industrial base is the bedrock of a credible deterrent. SSP is actively working to revitalize this vital national asset, ensuring the timely production and delivery of critical SWS components while fostering American jobs and technological superiority.
* Confronting Emerging Threats: In light of the ever-evolving threat landscape, SSP is fully committed to investing in necessary deterrence technologies, including SLCM-N and conventional hypersonics, and in strategies to protect our strategic assets from those who seek to undermine our national security.
* Systems Integration: SSP is the system of systems integrator for the SWS, SLCM-N, and CPS, meaning we have technical cognizance of, and integrate, the subsystems that make the entire weapons systems work. We also own cradle-to-grave responsibilities.
This requires our civilian workforce to have the requisite expertise and critical knowledge of the design development through sustainment and disposal to support nuclear modernization in collaboration with our industry partners.
SWS Sustainment on OHIO-Class SSBN and Procurement for COLUMBIA-Class SSBN
The 14 ship OHIO-class fleet remains the backbone of U.S. strategic deterrence, carrying approximately 70 percent of the United States' deployed nuclear warheads in the form of the W76/Mk4 and W88/Mk5 families of reentry systems. Originally designed for a 30-year service life, the OHIO-class submarines were called upon to extend this service to 42 years, supporting a delay in investment in the next generation of SSBNs.
To account for this extension in service life, SSP embarked on a life extension program for the TRIDENT II D5 missile to update critical, aging missile electronics systems. SSP introduced the first TRIDENT II D5 Life Extension (D5LE) missile to the fleet in 2017 and the missile will remain an effective and credible SWS into the 2040s - supporting the OHIO-class submarine through end of service life and serving as the initial SWS for the COLUMBIA- and UK DREADNOUGHT-class SSBNs.
SSP's program efforts and collaboration with the UK through the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, as amended (PSA) and 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, as amended (MDA) support the UK's Continuous At Sea Deterrent through VANGUARD-class SSBN end of service life and the transition to a DREADNOUGHT-class SSBN fleet.
To meet these critical program responsibilities, SSP maintains the security of not just the systems themselves, but for the processes surrounding them. We will sustain our deployed systems and modernize for our new ones, ensuring that we continue to keep the Navy's nuclear weapons safe and secure. We also will develop and protect our logistics supply chain. Through these measures, SSP will continue to unlock new capabilities that the Warfighter can leverage to enhance strategic deterrence and act decisively should deterrence fail.
TRIDENT II D5 Life Extension and Life Extension 2
The TRIDENT II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) subprogram is essential to maintaining a credible strategic deterrent through the life of the COLUMBIA-class SSBN. In mid-2025, D5LE2 was instantiated as a major subprogram having successfully completed Milestone B, with an Acquisition Program Baseline approved by the Navy. The D5LE2 program will:
* Extend Service Life: D5LE2 will replace the D5LE missiles to align with the COLUMBIA-class planned service life, ensuring a credible at-sea deterrent for decades to come.
* Enhance Capabilities: Using a hybrid approach of leveraging existing reliable technology and integrating cutting-edge advancements, D5LE2 will have the adaptability to counter emerging threats throughout its service life.
* Strengthen the Industrial Base: D5LE2 is a critical driver in revitalizing our domestic industrial base, ensuring the availability of critical components and supporting American jobs.
As the Navy carefully manages the approach to end of life of our OHIO-class SSBNs, we have assessed how we can ensure the SWS is available throughout the life of the COLUMBIA-class SSBNs. A minimum of 12 COLUMBIA-class SSBNs will replace today's 14 OHIO-class
SSBNs; and, beginning in FY30, we will load current D5LE missiles on Hulls 1 through 8 of COLUMBIA-class SSBNs. Production of additional D5LE missiles is not practical due to obsolete parts and the current lack of a robust industrial base, though investments made in FY26 have enabled increases to processing capacity at our facilities.
To meet inventory requirements and maintain a credible strategic deterrent in the face of evolving threats, we are designing, engineering, producing, and deploying D5LE2 in time for strategic outload of COLUMBIA-class hulls starting in 2039. All future COLUMBIA-class hulls will also be fielded with D5LE2 for their initial outload. D5LE2 will be backfitted into initial COLUMBIA-class hulls during their Extended Refit Period from FY39-49. D5LE2's architecture will ensure the weapon system maintains demonstrated performance and survivability while facing a dynamic threat environment driven by multiple near-peer adversaries until COLUMBIA-class end of life.
Supporting the modernization transition, D5LE2 is also focused on recapitalizing required infrastructure across the Navy's Nuclear Enterprise. The Strategic Weapons Facilities (SWFs) at Kings Bay, GA and Bangor, WA, and the Naval Ordinance Test Unit at Cape Canaveral, FL, are required to support SSBN operations in addition to their missions to develop, produce and support operational testing throughout the service life of D5LE2. Constant support is required to maintain our continuous presence at sea in accordance with U.S. Strategic Command requirements.
D5LE2 is a hybrid of existing, cost-effective technology (e.g., solid rocket motors, ignitors) and redesigned and updated components (e.g., avionics, guidance, system architecture). It is structured to maintain today's unmatched reliability and demonstrated performance while unlocking untapped system potential to efficiently respond to emerging needs and to maintain a credible strategic deterrent. Maintaining full support of D5LE2 is vital to achieving 2039 Initial Fleet Introduction and to embarking on a path that maintains an SLBM deterrent capability through the service life of the COLUMBIA Class SSBNs.
Industrial Base and Infrastructure
The Nation requires a modernized nuclear force and supporting infrastructure to execute our national strategy. Years of heavy focus on sustainment, vice focusing on both sustainment and development, as the program had in the past, has led to D5LE2 being unable to rely on a healthy defense industrial base built on simultaneously maintaining production and continuous development. Our modernization needs cannot succeed without investing in research and development, critical skills in the workforce, and the facilities needed to produce, sustain, and certify our nuclear systems. Ensuring robust defense and aerospace industrial base capabilities-- such as radiation-hardened electronics, strategic inertial instrumentation, and solid rocket motors (SRMs)--remains an important priority in conjunction with sustainment of deployed flight and shipboard systems and research and development investment. Due to these realities, we are actively engaging with industry partners and across Military Services to proactively identify and assess known and unknown risks and opportunities for investment.
SSP has placed particular emphasis on the SRM industry and its sub-tier suppliers. We appreciate Congress' support for the continuous production of these vital components. Over the past 15 years, the SRM industrial base waned following the completion of the Space Shuttle missions, Minuteman III re-graining, and disruption of the space launch market by new Liquid Rocket Engine entrants. However, SRM demand is increasing due to competing programs (CPS, Sentinel, Next Generation Interceptor) and production rate increases for TRIDENT II. In addition, the TRIDENT II SRM production line is aging and requires modernization in order to ensure production can continue well into the 2060s.
In short, full support of D5LE2 today is vital to achieving Initial Fleet Introduction in 2039 and to embarking on a path that maintains an SLBM deterrent capability through the service life of the COLUMBIA-class SSBNs. If the Nation does not continue to address these concerns, no amount of money will be able to mitigate the realized risk of an inadequately prepared industrial base.
In addition to SRMs, we also need a national capability to build aeroshells, which protect the payload upon re-entry to the atmosphere. The Navy has not delivered an integrated aeroshell since the 1980s and needs to reinvigorate a production capability that only resides in a small cadre of highly skilled experts in an exceptionally niche industry. Aeroshell investment supports the Navy but will also be cost-effectively leveraged by our colleagues in the Air Force and our strategic partners in the United Kingdom as they pursue their sovereign warhead program endeavors.
Strategic radiation-hardened microelectronics and inertial instrumentation are foundational to mission success, but in recent decades, the industrial base has aged and become sole source. SSP, in partnership both with other government agencies and with industry, is attempting to stabilize the industrial base; however, vulnerabilities persist, as we remain dependent on sole-source suppliers for critical components of the system. The entire base is challenged by aging infrastructure, intermittent demand, and a workforce losing vital skills. For both strategic microelectronics and inertial instrumentation, we depend on small teams reliant on niche labor types and processes. Their resiliency, skilled workforce, and supply chain depend entirely on consistent and predictable demand signals from programs such as ours. Our deliberate engagement and investment are essential to sustain these critical suppliers for decades to come.
The program's infrastructure is also at an inflection point, as existing facilities are reaching their 30-year recapitalization windows as we enter into a once-in-a-generation transition of both the weapons system and platform. The Navy relies on a limited footprint in Kings Bay, Georgia; Bangor, Washington; and Florida's Space Coast to process missiles and outfit the SSBNs.
Maintaining and sustaining facilities is critical to meeting U.S. Strategic Command and Fleet mission requirements, as well as providing new capabilities through military construction. We must make smart investments to address capability gaps, throughput constraints, and design for surge capacity to address requirements presented by new and emerging threats. Our Nation and the Navy must continue to prioritize and resource the sustainment and modernization of its nuclear infrastructure enterprise to provide an effective and flexible deterrent now and into the future.
As the Navy executes the modernization and replacement of the SSBN and associated SLBM leg of the nuclear triad, the Department of War (DoW) and the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) infrastructure must be prepared to respond in tandem to the evolving needs of the Nation. We must have an effective, resilient, and responsive plutonium pit production capability. This capability can address age-related risks, support planned refurbishments, as well as prepare for future uncertainty. Additionally, tritium, lithium, and uranium, and high explosives and energetics, among other strategic materials, are vital to ensuring the Navy can continue to meet its strategic deterrent requirements.
The Navy is developing the SLCM-N airframe and launcher through a competitive strategy using Other Transaction Authority (OTA) to quickly award multiple missile concept design and prototype contracts. This process allows for a full and open competition among both traditional and non-traditional defense contractors during the Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase in order to meet an aggressive timeline. By competing the development of the SLCM-N flight system, SSP is able to find where capacity exists within an already burdened cruise missile industrial base.
Efforts to sustain and modernize the deterrent industrial base and infrastructure must be addressed with a sense of urgency. Our strategic forces underpin every military operation around the world, and we cannot afford to delay investments given the increasing threats facing our Nation.
Warhead and Reentry Body Activities
The Navy is also working in partnership with NNSA to refurbish our existing reentry systems and develop new reentry systems in response to U.S. Strategic Command requirements. As the threat environment faced by the nuclear enterprise continues to evolve, it is critical that the Navy designs, develops, and deploys programs that meet the needs of the Warfighter.
Today, the TRIDENT II D5 missile is capable of carrying two types of warhead families, the W76/Mk4 and the W88/Mk5. SSP is designing and developing a new reentry system: the W93/Mk7. It will be designed for use on both the D5LE and D5LE2 missiles and, through support to the United Kingdom, and the Mk7 reentry body will support the UK's sovereign Replacement Warhead program as well.
W93/Mk7 will provide flexibility and adaptability to meet future Warfighter needs. The W93/Mk7 will ensure an uninterrupted at sea deterrent for the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad.
In March 2025, the W93/Mk7 program entered Phase 2A, with plans to enter Phase 3 in FY2027.
The W93/Mk7 will not increase the size of the deployed stockpile and will not require underground nuclear explosive testing. The Navy will work in close coordination with the DoW, NNSA, Nuclear Weapons Council, and Congress as this effort matures.
SSP is working closely with NNSA on adapting a W80 family warhead for use on the SLCM-N.
Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) and Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA): Support to the United Kingdom
Fundamental to U.S. strategic and extended deterrence policies is the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom through the 1958 MDA and the 1963 PSA.
Under the PSA, the United States sells the TRIDENT II SWS, minus warheads, to the UK along with associated support, testing and training equipment, and defense services. This sales agreement allows the United States to procure for the UK on U.S. contracts under the same terms and conditions as those for the United States, allowing for increased economies of scale and sharing certain costs and liabilities.
Under the MDA, the United States cooperates with the UK on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. The PSA and MDA agreements are complementary, and together enable the U.S. Navy to sell SWS delivery system and reentry body equipment to the UK, as well as to exchange controlled unclassified and classified information, including atomic information, with the UK. This decades-old framework facilitates U.S. support for the UK's strategic capabilities and ensures the UK continues to field a robust, sovereign nuclear deterrent.
SSP's key responsibility associated with the COLUMBIA-class program is the integration of the SWS onto the new SSBNs. A critical aspect is the Common Missile Compartment (CMC) that will support TRIDENT II SWS deployment on COLUMBIA-class SSBNs and the UK DREADNOUGHT-class SSBNs. The CMC represents the most recent example of the PSA partnership, in which our nations established a cost-sharing arrangement to design, develop, and produce common shipboard infrastructure that improves comingling of TRIDENT II D5 missile inventory and sets the stage to improve maintenance system consistency across the two fleets.
SSP also supports the SSBN Program Executive Office as it oversees U.S. industry's delivery of CMC components to both U.S. and UK Navies for installation into their new SSBNs. Full lead ship construction is in progress along with delivery of SWS equipment to the UK in support of construction and outfitting efforts under the authorities of the 1963 PSA.
As with the COLUMBIA-class SSBNs, the UK DREADNOUGHT-class SSBNs will initially carry the TRIDENT II D5LE missile. The development of the Mk7 reentry system to support the U.S. W93 warhead program is also critical to the UK's development of a next generation nuclear warhead and reentry system. Our nations are working separate and sovereign nuclear warhead programs that will leverage the Mk7 reentry system. SSP will continue to nurture and safeguard this special relationship with the UK, supporting the UK's Continuous At Sea Deterrent (CASD) while modernizing and building flexibility, adaptability, and resiliency into the UK's future CASD.
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, Nuclear
Over the past year, Navy has made incredible progress moving forward with development of the SLCM-N as the program moves at an extremely aggressive pace to deliver an initial operational capability by 30 September 2034. The program is on track to meet this requirement. Our nation's adversaries have a theater nuclear capability for which the United States has limited response options. SLCM-N will provide a flexible, credible, and survivable sea-based regional deterrent capability designed to complement existing capabilities and to expand Presidential options.
SLCM-N development includes the missile flight system, fire control, launcher system, platform integration, warhead integration, ashore infrastructure, and enablers for SLCM-N deployment.
SSP is the SLCM-N weapon system integrator and we are working with government and industry partners to develop the constituent subsystems. Given the program's highly compressed schedule, the program is taking a novel approach to early risk reduction through the use of a limited operational capability to drive early learning and risk mitigation across the weapon system, including warhead integration, warhead interface unit development, fire control prototyping, SWF handling and processing, system life-cycle supportability, and VIRGINIA-class submarine integration.
In early 2025, the SLCM-N program concluded assessments of potential flight system materiel solutions and determined the program would take a competitive approach to SLCM-N flight system development. The program has awarded multiple OTA task areas for initial concept design and prototyping. The use of OTAs enabled the program to rapidly get industry partners on project agreements and provides the program the flexibility to carry forward multiple vendors and to select the most promising partners, including both traditional and non-traditional defense contractors, while maximizing contracting flexibility. Phase I issued design project agreements to four missile vendors, one missile technology vendor, and two launcher design vendors. The SLCM-N program continues to work with our NNSA partners to integrate the SLCM-N warhead into candidate flight system designs.
The program continues to focus on integrating SLCM-N into the VIRGINIA-class submarine.
Navy is developing a nuclear fire control solution that fully meets nuclear surety requirements, and the program is working closely with other undersea warfare program offices to integrate SLCM-N while minimizing impact to VIRGINIA-class readiness and operations. The program is continuing to work to integrate SLCM-N into the existing infrastructure at Navy's SWFs where SLCM-N will be stored and loaded. The program will leverage a combination of existing, modified, and new facilities at the SWFs.
In November 2025, Navy provided an initial, service-level validation of the SLCM-N program's requirements, and in December 2025, the SLCM-N program achieved Milestone A - four months ahead of schedule. This significant event marks the program's entry into the TMRR phase where the program will continue to develop and mature the SLCM-N weapon system.
In accordance with the FY26 NDAA's requirement for a SLCM-N limited operational capability by 30 September 2032, the program is working to plan and execute an accelerated capability development process within SLCM-N's already highly compressed schedule. The program is on track to deliver a limited number of assets to meet the NDAA's intent. Consistent funding resources are critical to the program's ability to deliver a system for both this limited operational capability and to meet the initial operational capability by FY34.
As the SLCM-N program executes the TMRR phase, our planned activities over the next fiscal year will advance development across all weapon subsystems, infrastructure, and operational enablers in accordance with the Department's acquisition best practices. We are maintaining robust vendor competition, with multiple contractors advancing SLCM-N missile designs and refining prototypes. This competitive approach ensures we mature critical technologies while managing cost and schedule risk. Our platform integration and nuclear fire control development efforts are focused on seamless integration into the submarine force architecture, minimizing operational impacts and leveraging existing infrastructure where possible. System integration across the non-materiel critical enablers - including doctrine, training, and policy - will ensure all elements are in place to make Navy and the Joint Force prepared to receive and operationalize SLCM-N when it is deployed. The SLCM-N program remains on track to deliver limited operational capability by FY32 and to meet its initial operational capability by FY34.
Workforce
SSP's mission - strategic deterrence - is critical to this Nation. It is the foundation of the National Security Strategy and is the top priority of the Secretary of War. Based on the success of the TRIDENT program, SSP has also been tasked with rapidly developing and producing the Navy's first hypersonic weapon system, CPS, which is also the Army's first long range hypersonic weapons system. At the same time, SSP is currently developing the SLCM-N. This is a new capability that required the organization to establish a new program office, along with corresponding staff. Finally, I have Echelon I command responsibilities for the personnel that execute regulatory oversight of the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission and technical authority on Department of the Navy Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons systems, an effort that provides a holistic Navy view of the no-fail mission.
But systems do not design, test, and build themselves - people do, which makes our people our greatest asset. SSP's workforce size has been growing and requires continued growth to execute these programs. SSP must recruit, train, and retain some of the most sought-after skills in the U.S. job market to support the breadth and complexity of SSP's strategic deterrence mission.
SSP requires a workforce comprised of highly specialized, technical experts. Failing to appropriately staff this command would be catastrophic to TRIDENT II D5 SWS, CPS, and SLCM-N programs.
History reminds us that the swift, successful creation and execution of the Fleet Ballistic Missile program in the 1950s was truly a result of national commitment, congressional support, and a cadre of hand-selected scientists, engineers, and inspirational leaders. Though process will always underpin our efforts, our dedicated predecessors--civilians, military, and industry partners alike--responded to the national need with focused determination and propelled the program forward with a vision. People are as fundamental to our nuclear deterrent as the SWS itself. Today, SSP and its industry partners are focused on inspiring, growing, and retaining a generation of workforce that did not live through the darkest days of the Cold War. Connecting a new workforce to this fundamental global security mission remains an important task shared among the entire nuclear enterprise.
Our mission has grown significantly, while our workforce size has not grown in the same proportion. Additionally, as the global threat environment has changed and the operational tempo has increased, the workforce is challenged to manage the increased strain on an already aging deployed weapons system. In order to accomplish SSP's sustainment and development missions, SSP must have trained, skilled employees on-board and able to work independently. SSP has gone to significant lengths to optimize the size of the workforce for efficiencies, and the answer is clear: We must grow our workforce to meet the needs of the nation.
The next decade is a time of great importance to successfully accomplish concurrent development efforts, on top of the sustainment of the aging D5/D5LE weapon system. SSP has spent the past several years posturing its workforce, organizational structure, infrastructure, culture, and technical capabilities to ensure optimal success for the impending bow wave of critical development, testing, deployment, and sustainment efforts.
Conclusion
Since the 1950s, our Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent has been a critical component of our national security and must continue to assure our allies and partners and deter potential adversaries well into the future. SSP ensures a safe, secure, effective, flexible, and strategic deterrent, with a steadfast focus on the proper stewardship, custody, and accountability of the nuclear assets entrusted to the Navy. Sustaining and modernizing the sea-based strategic deterrent capability is a vital national security requirement.
As the fourteenth Director of SSP, I have absolute faith and confidence in the safety, security, effectiveness, and credibility of our Navy's strategic deterrent due to the proficiency and professionalism of the dedicated service members and civilians committed to our mission. I am leaving the fifteenth Director a legacy of proven success that will allow the command to grow and take on challenges we have not yet begun to imagine. With continued Congressional support and stable, on-time funding, the Navy will continue to effectively defend our Nation and preserve peace for future generations. I am proud of the work I have overseen in the last eight years as the Director of SSP and in my 38 years in the Navy; it has been my honor to lead this organization and its people.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2026-04-22_wolfe_testimony.pdf
U.N. Commander Brunson Testifies Before House Armed Services Committee
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The House Armed Services Committee released the following testimony by Army Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea, from an April 22, 2026, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region":* * *
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and Distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide a written statement on the security environment in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Northeast Asia. The Korean Peninsula is key strategic ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The House Armed Services Committee released the following testimony by Army Gen. Xavier Brunson, commander of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea, from an April 22, 2026, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific Region": * * * Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and Distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide a written statement on the security environment in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Northeast Asia. The Korean Peninsula is key strategicterrain vital to defending the American homeland and advancing American interests in the region. The ROK and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) exist in a state of Armistice, not peace. Our forces in Korea advanced U.S. goals since I took command in 2024.
We have observed significant changes in the operating environment including Allied strategic leader transitions and the DPRK's deepening relations with Russia and China, and have modified our lines of effort accordingly to ensure stability in a region vital to American security.
Since taking command in December 2024, the Tri-Command made significant progress to advance security in Northeast Asia. We have committed to a path of holistic modernization that refocuses all three commands on the region's evolving strategic dilemmas. A year and a half ago, I spoke with this body about the importance of maneuvering in the information environment. As we have watched adversaries weaponize disinformation to erode trust between Allies in the region, I believe that proactive maneuver is more critical now, than ever. We are countering these narratives by actively communicating the centrality of Korea to a region essential for American security and prosperity. We have instituted "interagency teaming" to match interagency capabilities against regional challenges. FBI Director Patel's visit to Korea stands out as a prominent example where we improved partnership against a modernizing threat nexus in the region. Additionally, we are engaged in a campaign of learning that integrates lessons learned from global events to better posture our theater for success. I am grateful to our ROK Allies who enable innovative theater concepts such as the Regional Sustainment Hub and seek to take a leading role in the conventional deterrence of the DPRK. During my second year of command, we will exploit the gains we have made to increase our readiness, lethality, and expand partnerships to meet the missions assigned in support of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Department of War (DOW).
As our nation's Senior United States Officer Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK), Commander of the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC), U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC), and United States Forces Korea (USFK), I am committed to deterring wouldbe adversaries in the region. It is an honor and privilege to lead those under my Command and to do so in lockstep with our Department, State, the Interagency, and our Allies and Partners.
The strategic environment in Northeast Asia has changed in ways that have significant impacts on American national security interests in the region. The most consequential and strategic changes are the leadership transitions of the United States, the ROK, and Japan. 2025 marked a consequential shift in national priorities for all ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral governments.
The President of the ROK, Lee Jae-Myung's inauguration occurred in June 2025. President Lee espouses a platform of "pragmatic" foreign policy that includes goals for increased interaction between the ROK and DPRK. Prime Minister Sanae Taikaichi's ascension in Japan is another significant change among Allied leadership in the region that remains critical for trilateral cooperation. Enabled by the strategic clarity offered by the United States National Security and Defense Strategies, my commands strive daily to improve the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral partnership that is vital to deterrence and defending the homelands for years to come.
While our Allied leaders in Northeast Asia transitioned, three developments across our adversaries stand out: continuity of leadership, Chinese military build-up, and active DPRKRussian relations. Kim Jong-Un (KJU), Vladmir Putin, and Xi Xinping, still lead DPRK, Russia, and China, respectively. Strategic continuity among adversary leadership has enabled several outcomes counter to United States objectives in the region. These challenges include an on-going build-up of Chinese military power in the region, that threatens to deny American access to vital global markets. Furthermore, cooperation between Russia and DPRK provides the Korean People's Army (KPA) valuable combat experience and technological support to enhance DPRK industrial modernization. These outcomes, when considered in relation to improvements to DPRK's military, including its WMD and ballistic missile threats, demands increased vigilance in defense of the United States homeland.
DPRK's pursuit of advanced military technology, improved international relations with Russia and China, military support to Russia's war effort in Ukraine, and sanctions evasion efforts pose risks to the United States' interests in the region. Kim Jong-Un's presence alongside President Xi Xinping and Vladmir Putin during the 2025 Chinese Victory Day Parade is a stark reminder that KJU's relationships with Russia and China are vital for the Kim Regime's survival.
DPRK's commitment of munitions and military units to the war in Ukraine demonstrates Kim's continued collusion with Russia against American interests. DPRK's 2025 record breaking theft of cryptocurrencies represents one of several illicit methods DPRK employs to evade sanctions and achieve Kim's objectives.
The Tri-Command supports American national interests across three inextricably linked UNC, CFC, and USFK missions. The U.S.-led UNC enforces the terms of the 1953 Armistice Agreement and supports peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. CFC deters aggression by any adversary to maintain regional security in Northeast Asia. USFK embodies the American commitment to the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The centrality of our position within the region offers unique strategic military advantages during Armistice and conflict, while also preventing adversaries from denying American access to the region. Maintaining our position within adversary anti-access/area denial corridors enables our nation to negotiate from positions of strength. Our posture on the Korean Peninsula sends a clear message in support of deterrence: "Ignore us at your own risk."
Our new national security and defense strategies demand application of practical and flexible realism to maintain a favorable balance of power in the region. Our strategic approach applies these concepts across four lines of effort: Maneuver in the Information Environment, Defend the Homelands, Stand by Allies and Partners, and Set the Theater. Our forces implement this approach while recognizing that "People are Our Platform."
Maneuver in the Information Environment
Maneuvering in the information environment is critical for deterrence against adversaries in the region. Through all levels of war, our teams work hand in hand with Allies and Partners in the CFC and UNC to establish trust and confidence in our commitment to the region. As stated by Secretary Hegseth during his visit to Camp Humphreys: our warfighters and their families (including the ROK and UNC Member States in attendance) "are the face of deterrence." Our information maneuver emphasizes the following elements to support deterrence: advancing Alliance narratives through contest in the information environment, employing the "east-up" approach to contextualize the theater, and amplifying UNC's role and successes to enforce the Armistice.
The Tri-Command contests actors in the information environment who seek to undermine the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Our efforts leverage U.S., ROK, and international media opportunities to inform, educate, and engage disparate cohorts of the significance of our Alliance. U.S. interests in the region are bolstered by dialogue, fora, and media. These efforts combat disinformation in our operating environment. Routine Security Consultative and Military Committee Meetings (SCM/MCM) guide our national command authority dialogues. Regional defense forums, cultural exchanges, and everyday interaction between ROK citizens and members of the TriCommand weave a tapestry of human and organizational relationships. This strategic system encompasses the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and 18 United Nations Command Member States (UNCMS) who stand ready to defeat aggression in the region.
Throughout 2025, we employed an "east-up" approach to contextually communicate the significance of our Alliance. We advanced the level of understanding for our theater among ROK media outlets, international media outlets, academics, and policymakers. The strategic narratives regarding Korea, DPRK, trilateral cooperation, the role of UNC, and the intrusions on ROK sovereignty by regional actors are all communicable through the "east-up" approach to the environment. The approach has proven successful in demonstrating to military counterparts across the region of the centrality of Korea to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
2025 also marked the 75th commemoration of the start of the 1950-53 Korean War. UNC invoked the spirit, will, and emotions of 1950 in its approach to public engagements and outreach. These emotions are critical today because the United States response to communist aggression sparked collective action from eventual UNC sending states. As more of our Allies and Partners take on greater roles in their defense, UNC remains a vehicle where U.S. Allies and Partners can deter regional aggression and nuclear coercion in a region vital to global economic interests. UNC serves as a symbol of collective action and U.S. leadership in a region vital to American interests.
Recently, attempts have been made to restore the ROK-DPRK Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula. However, UNC continues to support stability and reduce tensions daily. UNC's enforcement of the Armistice through impartial investigations of Armistice violations provide ROK and DPRK an alternative to conflict and escalation. Coordination through UNC with the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee (NNSC) involves non-aligned state supervision of Alliance compliance with the Armistice. UNC observation of the ROK-DPRK Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), daily communication with the KPA, and administration of the Joint Security Area (JSA) provide the necessary stability mechanisms in Armistice. We actively communicate all of the above to counter disinformation in the information environment.
Defend the Homelands
DPRK is in the midst a multi-year force modernization program to establish capabilities that threaten the ROK and U.S. homelands. DPRK's technological advancement, aided by Russia, continues despite highly punitive and restrictive sanctions. I implore our military leaders in Korea to consider posture from the perspective of: "capabilities over numbers." Defending the homeland is only possible when the capabilities match threats. We are making significant progress to match capabilities to threats by employing the "Three Kings" modernization framework, advocating for advanced information sharing and passive defense measures to mitigate DPRK long-range fires, and improving Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) planning and coordination.
To this end, we have made steady progress across what I refer to as the "Three Kings of Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific:" Posture, Protection, and Sustainment. Modernizing our posture to defend the U.S. Homeland employs an all-domain capabilities-based approach to the theater.
Our vision to employ capabilities in Korea requires U.S. and ROK authorities to support military competition in the region, while empowering the ROK to lead conventional deterrence against DPRK. Our modernized posture must include sustainment capabilities that provide staying power in the region. Modernizing Tri-Command capabilities within the "Three Kings" framework supports a more lethal and capable U.S. presence able to defeat threats to our homelands.
The number one threat in the theater remains DPRK's steadily advancing long range fires capability. DPRK's long-range fires complex includes a multitude of launchers, delivery vehicles, and payloads that hold the U.S. homeland, the ROK, and UNC Member State homelands at risk. To mitigate this risk, we support increased information sharing among trilateral partners. We are pursuing several opportunities and investments across our joint warfighting functions that improve our ability to find, fix, track, and destroy missile threats before they reach their targets. While we strive to maintain pace with adversary munitions build ups, we also employ passive and economically efficient defense measures to erode DPRK's confidence in its arsenal.
One of the most critical aspects of extended deterrence is America's top tier nuclear forces commanded by United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). During 2025, USFK established a Strategic Integration Element/Joint Directorate-10 to facilitate coordination between the ROK and U.S. Strategic Command. Our J10 is one of our newest organizational solutions designed to re-establish deterrence in the region. Developed as an outcome of the 2023 Washington Declaration, the J10 represents USFK in American policy dialogue with the ROK through participation in Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) activities. The NCG is an important symbol of U.S. extended deterrence and a critical vehicle for understanding ROK policy objectives related to deterring nuclear strikes on the ROK-U.S. homelands. The NCG principals met in December 2025 to set forth an updated NCG agenda for 2026. Of the six different NCG planning priorities, USFK's most significant priority is support to refining CNI concepts in response to an adversary nuclear strike. Our J10 professionals embody the reality that our operations, activities, and investments involving U.S. nuclear forces are American planned, led, and executed in support of theater requirements.
Stand by Allies and Partners
Our Allies and Partners are vital to the success of the Tri-Command. Without the support of the ROK, Japan, and the 18 UNCMS, our mission would be more costly to the American people, our troops would face greater dangers, and risks to our national interests would be higher.
Conversely, changes in the strategic environment are driving our adversaries closer thereby increasing their capability to compete with the United States' network of Alliances. Our Allies and Partners contribute extensively to prevent our adversaries from gaining advantages. First, the U.S.-ROK Alliance is modernizing in ways that result in transfer of wartime operational control for forces, second, USFK in coordination with the ROK is optimizing its posture to support ROK-led conventional deterrence of the DPRK with critical but more limited capabilities, and third, UNC remains engaged with the ROK to maximize multinational contributions to support stability in the region.
The United States' network of Alliances has served as a springboard for military power projection since the end of World War II. Our Allies and Partners remain critical for assuring a favorable balance of military power in Northeast Asia. The ROK-U.S. Alliance is modernizing to meet this moment. Militarily, the ROK is increasing its investments in military spending and seeks to assume wartime operational control per our bi-laterally agreed Conditions-based OPCON Transition Plan (COTP). The ROK is pursuing conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines and the U.S. will work closely with the ROK to advance the requirements for that project, including avenues to source fuel. These commitments are indicative of the ROK's investment in security as a model ally.
Alliance Modernization faces substantial challenges. One of these challenges is the simultaneity problem outlined in our National Defense Strategy. While the U.S. is committed to the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty our joint forces must remain flexible to meet global challenges.
Alliance Modernization will result in enhanced trust, expectations, and processes that enable the U.S. to support the ROK with critical but more limited capabilities.
Accelerated COTP is a feature of the modernized ROK-U.S. Alliance. Accelerated COTP is not time-based. As the bilaterally agreed-to framework dictates, the ROK military must possess specific capabilities to meet conditions for COTP. I continue to engage our ROK Allies on COTP capabilities requirements as they decide their investments in defense. Even though the ROK is significantly increasing its defense spending as a model ally, it is imperative that the ROK government achieve the capabilities necessary prior to transfer.
While Alliance Modernization is an inflection point in the history of U.S.-ROK relations, the U.S. maintains other relationships vital to security in the region. 2025 UNC efforts included UNC Ambassador Day and Ambassador Round Table events where I personally engaged senior representatives from the UNC member states in the ROK (monthly) and Japan (quarterly).
During these events, we discuss the security situation and enhance coordination for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). Evacuation operations are critical to the safety of our citizens abroad and are more complex when conducted under the specter of nuclear, chemical, and ballistic missile threats. Continued multinational coordination among the UNC member states today saves lives should deterrence fail. I am grateful for the continued support from our fellow UNC member states: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
Set the Theater
Setting the theater for competition, crisis, or conflict is essential. Lessons learned from COVID, wars in Ukraine and Gaza, and technological innovations render supply lines more susceptible to disruption and interdiction. USFK, supported by partners from Department of State, our military services, and industry is establishing a regional sustainment hub in support of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Our efforts to set the theater maximize our position in the ROK by: leveraging the ROK industrial base to support maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO), leveraging support from DOS teammates to inform ROK acquisitions, expanding special authorities for maintenance, requesting additional assigned multi-domain forces, maintaining investments by the ROK through Special Measures Agreement (SMA) funding, and integrating more UNC Member State capabilities into the theater. These efforts mitigate the "tyranny of distance" across our theater significantly when implemented.
The ROK defense industrial base has developed into one of the finest military production capabilities in the world. The ROK has maintained the ability to conduct depot level maintenance on common platforms since 1978. These platforms include fighter aircraft (F-16, F-15), cargo aircraft (C-130), and rotary wing aircraft (UH-60, CH-47, CH-53). More recently, the ROK industrial base has expanded its service to U.S. maritime assets including four U.S. Naval Ships (USNS): Charles Drew, Carl Brashear, Wally Shira, and the Yukon. The ROK government is also pursuing agreements with the United States regarding co-sustainment for other systems like the PATRIOT and repair for T-55 aircraft engines.
Partnering with ROK military industrial firms requires lock-step coordination between our Department of State and Department of War leaders. As an example of this cooperation, we hosted the Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for Product Support, Ms. Lisa Smith, in July 2025.
Coordination with the U.S. Embassy in Seoul through the Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group (Korea) (JUSMAG-K) also ensures that we speak with one voice to our ROK Allies about desired acquisitions outcomes. Outside of the interagency, we hosted several Congressional and Staff Delegations to communicate the vision for leveraging our positional advantage to improve our ability to sustain the "fight."
In addition to establishing interagency permissions and agreements with ROK firms, special repair authority from Congress is necessary to enable ROK repairs on select U.S. platforms. While these investments cannot replace the industrial capacity of the U.S. homeland, they enable setting the theater while also providing the benefits of strategic redundancy.
In addition to sustainment and medical capacity, we are requesting an increase in multidomain forces over the next five years. As our services continue to modernize, resulting in leaner, but more capable formations, our military staffs coordinate these requests with USINDOPACOM and the Secretary's staff to bring all domain capabilities to Korea to reestablish deterrence. Since these capabilities are in limited supply, I will also pursue episodic and enduring operations and activities in support of USINDOPACOM in competition.
Resourcing the Tri-Command is a collaborative process between the U.S. and the ROK as well as between USFK, USINDOPACOM, the Department of War, and the United States Congress. United States Forces Korea receives substantial funding by the ROK in accordance with their Special Measures Agreement commitments. Our ROK-funded construction efforts provide our forces with some of the newest facilities in the DOW. Likewise, our host nation employees, who support the fight with minimal cost to the U.S. taxpayer, are critical to our success. I am grateful to the DOS negotiators and national leadership on both sides of the Pacific for providing our forces with this support.
USFK continues to work with the services, USINDOPACOM, the Office of the Secretary, and our ROK Allies to increase capability on the peninsula. As we improve our posture on the Korean Peninsula, the Tri-Command accounts for U.S., ROK, and UNC Member State contributions that provide the strategic depth necessary to deter adversaries in the region.
People Are Our Platform
The Tri-Command's success is the result of the efforts of our talented service members, government civilians, and their families. Our human talent provides strategic advantage. We exploit this advantage to ensure a ready and lethal presence in Northeast Asia. Our most prominent effort to cultivate human talent across the peninsula is implementing the "3-2-1 Tour Normalization" policy and expanding capacity for the three pillars of Command Sponsorship: housing, medical care, and family education.
This year, we implemented tour normalization, sometimes referred to as "3-2-1 Tour Normalization." This change is a significant shift to the USFK personnel and talent management paradigm. Over the next several years, we will see returns on this implementation across all commands. Tour normalization ensures that our warfighters at tactical, operational, and strategic levels serve in roles along similar timelines as forces stationed in other theaters. This enables improved continuity among American staffs while supporting our national strategic objectives, higher levels of battlefield integration across our joint components, and more avenues to build readiness and lethality at the tactical level among our combined-joint forces in Korea.
Throughout implementation, we ensure that our entire joint military community has access to the three pillars of the Command Sponsorship Program (CSP) necessary to implement this policy: Housing, Medical Support, and Education. Our service members implement this approach deliberately in close coordination with the Department of War and the United States Congress.
Tour normalization must maintain pace with available housing. One benefit of tour normalization is that by increasing the length of currently supported command sponsorship billets from two to three years, we expect to achieve greater readiness outcomes prior to increasing the number of CSP billets. The flexible nature of two-year and one-year options also enables us to fill critical shortages while preserving CSP resources to support servicemembers and their families.
Similarly, the Tri-Command improved access to the Medical Support pillar. For example, this year, leaders within our medical services community opened a walk-in clinic and implemented unit level changes to improve support to the community. These efforts reduced wait-times for medical appointments from several weeks to days. In addition to improved access, we hired more Korean local national employees across provider, nursing, and medical administration disciplines to make healthcare more accessible across our community.
The Department of War Education Activity (DoWEA) remains an excellent partner and leading advocate for our youth in Korea. Their professionalism and commitment to educating our children continues uninterrupted and remains essential for drawing talent from not only the United States, but also from UNCMS who deploy servicemembers to Korea in support of the U.S.-led UNC. DoWEA in Korea has capacity to increase enrollment. As capacity grows, Camp Humphreys stands to benefit from a third elementary school that will open, as well as additional staff hiring windows during the 2026-2027 calendar year.
Conclusion
The Tri-Command stands ready and capable to support a favorable balance of power across the region that deters aggression and supports American prosperity and security. Our presence in the region is a driving force that has evolved our Alliances over decades from dependencies to true partnerships. We are vigilant and committed to maintaining the Armistice and deterring large scale conflict through our readiness, cooperation, and commitment to the region. Together, with the Department, our interagency teammates, the United States Congress, and our multinational Allies and Partners, we demonstrate American strength in the region so that a peace favorable to American interests prevails.
Under One Flag!
"Katchi-Kapshida" We Go Together!
Fight Tonight!
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2026-04-22_indopacom_brunson_testimony.pdf
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Associate Professor Socal Testifies Before House Education & Workforce Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The House Education and Workforce Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions released the following testimony by Mariana P. Socal, associate professor of health policy and management at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, from an April 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Profits Over Patients: The PBM Business Model Under Scrutiny." PBM stands for pharmacy benefit manager.* * *
Chairman Allen, Ranking Member DeSaulnier, and members of the Subcommittee, good morning. It is a great honor to be speaking with you today. I am Prof. Mariana Socal, an Associate ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The House Education and Workforce Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions released the following testimony by Mariana P. Socal, associate professor of health policy and management at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, from an April 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Profits Over Patients: The PBM Business Model Under Scrutiny." PBM stands for pharmacy benefit manager. * * * Chairman Allen, Ranking Member DeSaulnier, and members of the Subcommittee, good morning. It is a great honor to be speaking with you today. I am Prof. Mariana Socal, an AssociateProfessor of Health Policy and Management at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health based in Baltimore, Maryland. I am a medical doctor with a specialization in neurology. I have a Ph.D. in Health Systems from Johns Hopkins University and a master's in Public Policy from Princeton University. My research focuses on improving access and affordability for Americans who need prescription drugs to improve their health and quality of life.
For several years, I have been working with large employer organizations that are attempting to control prescription drug spending. These include ERIC-The ERISA Industry Committee, PBGH, the Purchaser Business Group on Health, and others. I have done extensive research examining the pharmacy benefits that self-insured employers - from school districts to America's largest corporations - offer to their workers.
I am speaking today on my own behalf. The opinions expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Johns Hopkins University or Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. I would like to provide commentary on how high drug prices impact American commercial insurers and their beneficiaries, including self-insured employers, workers, and retirees.
1. HIGH COST OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS WEIGHS HEAVILY ON COMMERCIAL INSURERS AND SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS
Over half of all Americans obtain health coverage through their employer.1 One third of all Americans are covered by employer self-sponsored health insurance plans.2 This means that the prescription drug costs of most American workers are paid by employers and the workforce.3 Commercial health insurance including employer-sponsored and individual plans accounts for about 45% of all national prescription drug spending, exceeding Medicare (about 30%) and Medicaid (about 10%).4 On average, prescription drug costs consume over 15% of every dollar in private health insurance premiums.5
Commercial insurers bear most of the financial burden from prescription drugs, with higher spending growth among mid-sized employers
* * *
1 US Census Bureau - Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2018 https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-267.pdf
2 Kaiser Family Foundation Employer Health Survey 2018 https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2018-employer-health-benefits-survey/
3 Self-insured employers may purchase stoploss insurance, which may cover varying portions of the risk. (reference: Kaiser Family Foundation survey)
4 PMC, prescription drug spending by payer (MEPS 2017-2019 data) -- https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10835280/
5 Peterson-KFF Health System Tracker, drug spending trends -- https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chartcollection/recent-forecasted-trends-prescription-drug-spending/
* * *
A National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans found that pharmacy spending jumped 8.4% in 2023, following a 6.4% increase in 2022, making prescription drugs the fastest-growing component of employer health benefit costs. The average per-employee cost of employer-sponsored health insurance rose 5.2% in 2023 to reach $15,797./6 Importantly, the highest cost increases were among smaller and mid-sized employers (50-499 employees), averaging 7.8%./7 In 2023, overall pharmaceutical spending grew 13.6% to $722.5 billion/year.
Specialty drugs including blockbuster drugs like Ozempic and Wegovy drove much of this increase.8 Three in four employers reported their benefit costs went up in 2023 due in part to increased pharmaceutical spending. Specialty drugs now account for over 50% of employers' total prescription spending.9
It is imperative to keep prescription drug spending under control in the commercial market
* * *
6 Source: Mercer, 2023 National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans -- https://www.mercer.com/enus/about/newsroom/mercer-survey-finds-health-benefit-costs-up-5-2-percent-in-2023-due-to-inflation-andhigher-spending-on-prescription-drugs/
7 Source: Mercer, 2023 National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans -- https://www.mercer.com/enus/about/newsroom/mercer-survey-finds-health-benefit-costs-up-5-2-percent-in-2023-due-to-inflation-andhigher-spending-on-prescription-drugs/
8 National Trends in Prescription Drug Expenditures and Projections for 2024 -- https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38656319/
9 Marsh McLennan, The Impact of Rising Prescription Drug Costs on Employers -- https://www.marshmma.com/us/insights/details/health-care-economics.html Department of Health Policy and Management
* * *
The increasing cost of prescription drugs has been driving trends in plans restricting access to prescription drugs through formulary exclusions and prior authorization requirements, and plans shifting more of the costs of prescription drugs onto beneficiaries. Today, many Americans cannot afford the drugs they need, even if they have health insurance, because of the high out-of-pocket costs that are associated with many drugs.
Reforms implemented by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA) have helped lower drug prices in Medicare, bringing much-needed relief to Medicare plans and beneficiaries. However, the commercial market was left out of such policies, and the high price of prescription drugs remains a big burden for both plans and patients in this sector.
2. PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS PLAY A CRITICAL ROLE IN DETERMINING HEALTH PLANS' DRUG COVERAGE AND SPENDING
Commercial plans and self-insured employers typically hire a pharmacy benefit manager - PBM - to manage their drug benefit. The PBM negotiates prices with drug manufacturers and, based on these negotiations, designs the drug formulary that determines the drug benefit that the insurer will offer. Because the PBM determines which drugs are excluded and which ones are included in the formulary - and at which cost-sharing requirements for beneficiaries - the PBM plays a critical role in determining plans' pharmacy spending as well as beneficiaries' covered therapeutic options and associated out-of-pocket costs.
Vertical integration and lack of transparency challenge plans' ability to understand how PBMs impact pharmacy spending and beneficiary access Today, 3 large PBMs collectively control 80 percent of the US market. These PBMs are: CVS Caremark, Express Scripts, and OptumRx.10 This enormous market concentration means that there is no real competition across PBMs. All the 3 large PBMs are vertically integrated with insurance plans, pharmacies, and health care providers.10 Some argue that those arrangements may increase efficiency and reduce costs. However, there is growing concern that the increasing vertical integration between PBMs, insurers, pharmacies, and providers in fact contributes to anti-competitive practices. This is one of the reasons why PBMs have been the focus of multiple investigations, including from Congress (such as the House of Representatives' Committee on Oversight and Government Reform11) and government agencies (such as the Federal Trade Commission).12 PBMs also have "no skin in the game" - they do not get penalized if patients cannot afford the drugs they need and need to use more medical care, increasing costs to insurers as a result.
* * *
10 https://www.drugchannels.net/2025/04/mapping-vertical-integration-of.html
11 https://oversight.house.gov/release/hearing-wrap-up-oversight-committee-exposes-how-pbms-underminepatient-health-and-increase-drug-costs/#:~:text=The%20Oversight%20Committee%20obtained%20over%20140%2C000%20documents,patent%20c are%20for%20their%20own%20financial%20benefit.
12 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-releases-second-interim-staff-reportprescription-drug-middlemen
* * *
For commercial payers not integrated with a PBM, it is difficult to understand how PBM choices impact plan spending and patients' experience. PBMs characteristically limit the information that they share with plans. In my studies with self-insured employers, I've witnessed first-hand how employers were unable to obtain information from the PBMs with whom they contracted. One example was a software company that had developed the software that their PBM used to manage drug claims. This software company wanted to know how much they were spending on a certain drug. After initially declining to provide the information, the PBM proposed to provide this information for a $5,000 fee.
My research on self-insured employers identified that the mix of drugs included in the formulary by PBMs often included "wasteful" drugs, i.e., drugs that cost more but provided the same benefit than lower-cost therapeutic options.13 One example of a wasteful drug is when a more expensive branded product is covered in the formulary instead of its cheaper generic. Although branded products have the same therapeutic benefit than generics, the more expensive branded product can offer greater rebates, which can in turn provide a greater opportunity for the PBM to keep a portion of the rebate as profit. We examined information from two large, self-insured employers and identified that removing wasteful drugs from the formulary and substituting them for lower-cost options with similar therapeutic value resulted in 15% net savings without beneficiary dissatisfaction.14
* * *
13 Removing Waste from Drug Formularies. https://www.pbgh.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/PBGH-WastefulDrugs-Guidebook-FINAL.pdf
14 Socal MP, Bai G, Cordeiro T, Anderson GF. Association Between Waste-Free Formularies and Prescription Drug Spending Among Self-insured Employers. JAMA Netw Open. 2021 Oct 1;4(10):e2131486.
* * *
Without information, plans turn to brokers and consultants for help selecting a PBM - however, brokers and consultants often have conflicts of interest Without sufficient information and with PBMs vertically integrated with insurers, it is difficult for health plans to select the right PBM. For non-integrated plans, it has become increasing difficult to be able to select a PBM that does not choose drugs that will maximize their own profits and is transparent. For employers it is also difficult to select an insurer that is not tied to a specific PBM.
This is why plans usually hire consultants and brokers to help them select a PBM.
A study published in the American Journal of Managed Care in 2024 surveyed 110 self-insured employer drug benefit decision-makers and found that benefit consultants were the most influential entity in PBM decisions: 37.3% of employers named a consultant as the primary driver. Benefits brokers were named by 21.8%, meaning consultants and brokers combined drive approximately 59% of PBM selection. HR/benefits leaders within the company accounted for 29.1% of the decisions according to this survey.15
The problem is that, in addition to being paid by the plan, consultants and brokers are often paid by the PBM that the plan ultimately selects. Investigations have documented that the 3 largest PBMs obtain much of their employer business through the major consulting houses, all of which earn over $1.5 billion/year from benefits consulting and operate drug purchasing coalitions that channel employers into contracts with the Big 3 PBMs.16 Ultimately, this can create an incentive for some brokers and consultants to prefer the PBM or insurer the pays them the most. Congress should not allow brokers to be paid by PBMs and insurers to avoid this conflict of interest.
* * *
15 Henderson, Patterson, O'Brien. "Prescription Rebate Guarantees: Employer Insights." Am J Manag Care. 2024;30(11):574-580. PMID: 39546759
* * *
3. IMPROVED PBM REGULATION IS NEEDED BUT NOT ENOUGH FOR COMMERCIAL INSURERS AND SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS
Recent reforms have tried to reign in some PBM practices and incentives that contribute to lower accountability to payors and higher prescription drug spending. Signed into law on February 3, 2026, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2026 included provisions to make PBMs more transparent - requiring PBMs to allow self-insured employer plans to audit PBM rebate records, including rebate contracts, and requiring PBMs to provide large, self-insured employer plans with detailed reports, among others.17 It also included provisions to reduce the incentives for PBMs to favor more expensive drugs instead of cheaper options - requiring PBMs to pass through all rebates to the plan sponsor in Medicare Part D and commercial markets, for example, and disconnecting PBM compensation from prices of drugs included in Medicare Part D formularies.
* * *
16 Axios -- Bob Herman, September 2018 "How Big Consulting Firms and PBMs Work the Drug Pricing System"
17 H.R. 7148, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, 119th Congress, Pub. L. 119-75, signed Feb. 3, 2026 -- https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/7148
* * *
Proposed regulation by the Department of Labor in January 2026 also aimed to expand transparency in self-insured employer markets, including by requiring the PBM to provide disclosure to a self-insured employer health plan of a series of expected compensation amounts before signing a contract.18
An important gap in recent PBM reform policies is that they do not modify the high prices that manufacturers charge for drugs
With the new regulations, employers will have more visibility into what they are paying -- but the law does not compel lower drug prices. The current PBM business model incentivizes the use of big rebates, to which manufacturers have responded by raising list prices. For many patients, higher list prices mean higher out-of-pocket spending. Patients pay based on drug list prices when they are paying cash, are in the deductible phase, or are required by their insurer to pay a percentage of the drug cost (coinsurance) to get their drug.
A concern is that persistently high drug prices may incentivize PBMs to shift lost rebate revenue into higher flat administrative fees charged to plan sponsors, particularly since the legislation lacks a clear definition of "bona fide service fees" and "fair market value" in the commercial sector. This could increase not only patient cost-sharing but also health insurance premiums.
* * *
18 Federal Register, 91 Fed. Reg. 4348 (Jan. 30, 2026) -- https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/30/2026-01907/improving-transparency-into-pharmacybenefit-manager-fee-disclosure
* * *
4. RECENT DRUG PRICING REFORMS HAVE BENEFITTED THE MEDICARE PROGRAM BUT NOT COMMERCIAL INSURERS AND SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS
Different than the commercial insurance market, the Medicare program was the focus of a series of reforms to directly address high drug prices through the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022. During 2022-2023, Medicare beneficiaries began receiving IRA protections -- inflation rebates (Oct. 2022), $35 out-of-pocket cap for insulin (Jan. 2023), and the first 10 drugs selected for price negotiation (Aug. 2023). Employers received none of these protections while their prescription drug costs surged 6.4% in 2022 and 8.4% in 2023./19
In Medicare, the drug price negotiation program achieved reductions of 38%-79% off list price for the 10 drugs selected in its first cycle (initial price applicability year 2026), with estimated savings to Medicare of about $6 billion/year from these 10 drugs alone.20 Medicare-negotiated Maximum Fair Prices (MFPs) are disclosed to the public, reducing the need for confidential rebates on these drugs.
These transparent lower prices can now also serve as benchmarks for patient cost-sharing calculations, allowing Medicare beneficiaries to pay based on the lower negotiated price as opposed to the higher list price inflated by confidential rebates.
* * *
19 Mercer, 2023 employer survey -- https://www.mercer.com/en-us/about/newsroom/mercer-survey-findshealth-benefit-costs-up-5-2-percent-in-2023-due-to-inflation-and-higher-spending-on-prescription-drugs/
20 https://www.cms.gov/files/document/fact-sheet-negotiated-prices-initial-price-applicability-year-2026.pdf Department of Health Policy and Management
* * *
Maximum Fair Prices negotiated in Medicare should be available for commercial insurers and self-insured employers
Two drugs that have been driving much of the growth in pharmacy spending for commercial insurers in recent years - Ozempic and Wegovy - have had their prices negotiated in the second cycle of the Medicare drug price negotiation program (initial price applicability year 2027), with the negotiated MFP representing a 71% discount off the drugs' list price.21 However, as one analysis put it: "A drug negotiated to a lower price for Medicare patients can still be sold at full commercial price to commercially insured patients. The vast majority of commercially insured patients remain in a pre-IRA pricing environment."22 In the commercial market, therefore, insurers pay significantly higher prices than Medicare, and beneficiaries do not have access to the transparent, lower MFP prices on which to base cost-share calculations. For a privately insured patient in a high-deductible health plan, not having access to the Medicare-negotiated MFPs would mean spending over $900 every month for a 30-day supply of Ozempic when they could spend $274 for this same drug under the MFP (starting 2027).
Medicare inflation rebate penalties should include commercial plans
* * *
21 https://www.cms.gov/files/document/fact-sheet-negotiated-prices-ipay-2027.pdf
22 DrugPatentWatch, IRA Price Reset analysis (2026) -- https://www.drugpatentwatch.com/blog/the-ira-pricereset-what-it-actually-does-to-pharma-pricing-and-what-comes-next/ Department of Health Policy and Management
* * *
The Medicare inflation rebate penalties implemented by the IRA target drugs with price increases faster than inflation. This provision penalizes drug manufacturers increasing list prices faster than inflation by charging them a rebate, calculated as the difference between the actual price and an inflation-adjusted benchmark, multiplied by the total number of units sold in Medicare.23
The inflation rebate penalty is not only intended to penalize, but also to deter drug list price increases. The US pays on average 3-4 higher prices for the same prescription drugs than other industrialized countries.24 Older drugs that had been in the US market for several years had the largest price differentials. While list prices tend to go down in other countries over time, in the US list prices tend to only increase, even in the absence of modifications or innovations on the drug.
Given that commercial payors account for the largest share of pharmaceutical spending in the US, and that growing drug list prices contribute to higher costs in the commercial market, the inflation rebate penalty should also apply to the commercial market. This would mean, mainly, that the number of units of a drug that are sold in the commercial market should be included in the rebate penalty calculation together with the units sold in Medicare and that the price changes in commercial markets should be part of this calculation as well. Higher penalties from including commercial insurers in the Medicare inflation rebate penalty would serve as a larger deterrent to discourage drug list price increases.
* * *
23 https://www.cms.gov/files/document/rebate-report-frequently-asked-questions-mar2026.pdf
24 Kang SY, DiStefano M, Socal MP, Anderson GF. Using External Reference Pricing In Medicare Part D To Reduce Drug Price Differentials With Other Countries. Health Aff (Millwood). 2019 May;38(5):804-811.
* * *
In addition, it would provide savings in the commercial market. The Council on Informed Drug Spending Analysis (CIDSA) of the West Health Policy Center conducted an analysis in 2022 estimating that spillover from the IRA's Medicare inflation rebate penalties would reduce employer-sponsored insurance costs by $31 billion by 2031, of which $24B in lower employer premiums, and $8B in lower employee out-of-pocket costs.25
Patient out-of-pocket protections should be expanded to commercial market While the IRA has protected Medicare beneficiaries by implementing copay caps for insulin (maximum of $35 out-of-pocket per 30-day supply) and an out-ofpocket maximum ($2,000 per year), research by the Drug Channels Institute identified that nearly 1/3 of commercial plans lacked these maximum out of pocket caps, and a fifth of the plans had out-of-pocket maximums in excess of $6,000 annually.26 Congress should consider extending these protections out-ofpocket caps and out-of-pocket maximum protections to the commercial market.
The table below illustrates the difference between the drug price reduction measures implemented in Medicare and the gap that persists for the commercial market.
* * *
25 https://www.cidsa.org/publications/commercial-savings-generated-by-spillover-from-medicare-inflationpenalties-under-the-inflation-reduction-act-of-2022
26 https://www.drugchannels.net/2023/01/the-state-of-employers-pharmacy.html#:~:text=Coinsurance%20amounts%20are%20typically%20based%20on%20the,had%20an%20OOP %20max%20greater%20than%20$6%2C000
* * *
Table: Drug Pricing Reforms in Medicare vs. the Persisting Gaps in the Commercial Market
Metric ... Medicare (IRA enacted) ... Commercial / Self-Insured (excluded)
Price reduction achieved on negotiated drugs ... 38%-79% off list price (first cycle, initial price applicability year 2026) ... No negotiated prices. Full commercial market price continues.
Estimated annual program savings ... $6 billion/year to Medicare (first cycle) ... $195B to employers + $98B to workers by 2030 (H.R. 3 est., never enacted)
Inflation price cap protection ... In effect from Oct. 2022 (Part D) & Jan. 2023 (Part B) ... No equivalent protection. Employer drug costs grew 6.4% (2022) and 8.4% (2023).
Insulin cost cap ... $35/month for Medicare enrollees (Jan. 2023) ... No federal cap. Commercial insulin prices remained unrestricted.
Out-of-pocket cap ... $2,000/year cap for Medicare Part D (effective 2025) ... No federal out-of-pocket cap for employer plan enrollees.
10-year federal savings estimate ... $237 billion deficit reduction (CBO) ... CMS Actuary estimated $43B to businesses + $120B to households under H.R. 3 -- never enacted.
Who benefits ... 65+ million Medicare enrollees ... 160+ million Americans in employer plans -- excluded by reconciliation ruling.
* * *
Initiatives such as H.R.6166, the Lowering Drug Costs for American Families Act could provide much-needed relief in the commercial market for both plans and beneficiaries
H.R.6166, the Lowering Drug Costs for American Families Act (2025-2026), would reduce prescription drug prices in the commercial market by expanding the Medicare drug negotiation program to include the commercial market and by applying inflation rebates to the commercial market. It proposes capping annual out-of-pocket prescription drug costs at $2,000 for individuals and $4,000 for families in private insurance, in addition to establishing a copay cap for insulin.27 This legislation would extend the drug pricing reforms that have brought relief to the Medicare program to the commercial market. It would directly address the problem of high drug prices through price negotiations and the deterrent effect on rising drug prices from inflation rebates. The legislation would also benefit patients, who are directly harmed by high drug prices, through out-of-pocket maximums and copay caps.
CONCLUSION
The current PBM business model incentivizes the use of big rebates, to which drug manufacturers have responded by raising list prices. For many patients, higher list prices mean higher out-of-pocket spending. While the IRA has protected Medicare beneficiaries with out-of-pocket maximums and copay caps, nearly 1/3 of commercial plans lack out of pocket maximums.28 Congress should consider extending out-of-pocket cap protections to the commercial market.
* * *
27 https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/6166/text 28 https://www.drugchannels.net/2023/01/the-state-of-employers-pharmacy.html#:~:text=Coinsurance%20amounts%20are%20typically%20based%20on%20the,had%20an%20OOP %20max%20greater%20than%20$6%2C000
* * *
Another way to counter the current PBM business model would be to provide transparent drug prices. Expanding the Medicare-negotiated MFP prices to the commercial market would allow commercial insurers and self-insured employers to access transparent, lower prices. This can reduce the contribution of rebates in coverage decisions, increase transparency, and lower overall costs. Lastly, to mitigate the increasing trend of drug companies raising list prices to maximize rebates when negotiating with PBMs, Congress could consider extending inflation rebates to commercial markets.
PBM reform is urgently needed throughout our health care system but in isolation it is not sufficient to provide the needed relief for commercial insurers and selfinsured employers. High drug prices strain American employers, workers, and retirees. Because most Americans obtain health insurance through their employers, lowering prescription drug prices in the commercial market is imperative. This would not only help bring down premiums and out-of-pocket payments. Lower health care costs can also contribute to making American workers and American companies more competitive in the global market.
Thank you so much. I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.
* * *
Original text here: https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/socal_testimony.pdf
House Armed Services Subcommittee Chairman Kelly Issues Opening Statement at Hearing on Maritime Industrial Base
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- Rep. Trent Kelly, R-Mississippi, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, released the following opening statement from an April 22, 2026, joint hearing with the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation entitled "Revitalizing Shipbuilding and the Maritime Industrial Base":* * *
Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for being here for today's hearing on Revitalizing Shipbuilding and the Maritime Industrial Base.
We are joined today by our colleagues from the Transportation ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- Rep. Trent Kelly, R-Mississippi, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, released the following opening statement from an April 22, 2026, joint hearing with the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation entitled "Revitalizing Shipbuilding and the Maritime Industrial Base": * * * Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for being here for today's hearing on Revitalizing Shipbuilding and the Maritime Industrial Base. We are joined today by our colleagues from the Transportationand Infrastructure Committee's Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, and I want to give a special thank you to heir chairman, my good friend and fellow Mississippian Mike Ezell, and Ranking Member Carbajal for being such great partners for Seapower Ranking Member Joe Courtney and myself.
The collaboration between our two subcommittees is more important than ever, given the dire straits in which we find our maritime industrial base.
Years of inconsistent demand from the government and the commercial maritime industry have wreaked havoc on production schedules for government shipbuilding and the domestic supply chain, exactly the kind of structural challenge the SHIPS Act is designed to address through more stable demand signals and long-term investment. Because of that we have seen costs continue to increase.
That is why I am leading the SHIPS Act with my good friend, Congressman Garamendi; I greatly appreciate his collaboration.
Now, as we reorient ourselves back to great power competition, we need the ability to project American power and influence across the farthest reaches of the globe, and we cannot achieve that capability without a thriving shipbuilding and maritime industry.
We can no longer afford to be complacent; we are far behind our near peer competitors when it comes to the pace of getting hulls in the water.
We are far and away better from a qualitative standpoint, but quantity has a value on its own.
There are currently just eighty U.S.-crewed and U.S.-flagged vessels in international commerce, and our military shipbuilding programs are slower and more hampered than those of our near peer competitors and even our allies. We need to take an honest account of what we see in the mirror, and more importantly, put forward a serious, actionable plan to close that gap, which is what the SHIPS Act is intended to do.
Fostering shipbuilding and commercial maritime industry will take action by all parts of government. Along those lines, I want to reiterate the importance of a new sealift program for the Department of the Navy. Procuring used vessels just is not going to cut it. A new construction program for militarily useful sealift can support close follow construction efforts for commercial industry vessels, reinforcing the SHIPS Act's approach of aligning commercial shipbuilding capacity with national defense requirements.
These committees have also been critical to support for commercial industry through stipend programs that assure access for military needs. But that is not enough.
Critical reforms to defense acquisitions were passed as part of last year's NDAA, and I was also pleased to see the White House encouraging investment in shipyards, ship building, and ship repair in the Maritime Action Plan that was released in February. But there is still more work to be done to reinvigorate our seagoing sectors, not only in government and industry, but in communities and among the younger generations.
Reviving our commercial and military shipbuilding is a complex challenge, one that we must attack from multiple different angles.
We are also lucky to have a range of perspectives from our witnesses. I know I speak for everyone on the subcommittees when I say that we are eager to hear your suggestions and recommendations and appreciate y'all being here today.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=6547
House Armed Services Subcommittee Chairman Bacon Issues Opening Statement at Hearing on Cyber Posture of DOD
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- Rep. Don Bacon, R-Nebraska, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies and Innovation, released the following opening statement from an April 21, 2026, hearing entitled "Cyber Posture of the Department of Defense":* * *
Good afternoon, and welcome to today's hearing on the cyber posture of the Department of Defense.
Today's hearing comes at a time of increased cyber activity targeting U.S. infrastructure, including recent campaigns against telecommunications and critical infrastructure networks.
It also comes at a time when ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- Rep. Don Bacon, R-Nebraska, chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies and Innovation, released the following opening statement from an April 21, 2026, hearing entitled "Cyber Posture of the Department of Defense": * * * Good afternoon, and welcome to today's hearing on the cyber posture of the Department of Defense. Today's hearing comes at a time of increased cyber activity targeting U.S. infrastructure, including recent campaigns against telecommunications and critical infrastructure networks. It also comes at a time whencyber operations are being integrated into military operations more than ever before. U.S. Cyber Command has supported recent operations, including Operation Midnight Hammer in Iran and Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela.
The Department, with the support of Congress, has continued to develop its cyber forces. Over the past several years: the Cyber Mission Force has grown and matured; Cyber Command has received enhanced budget control; the role of the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Policy has been established and filled; and the Department has stood up the Department of Defense Cyber Defense Command--DCDC--as a sub-unified command.
This maturation is continuing. Cyber Command has initiated an organizational and force generation reform effort known as "CYBERCOM 2.0", focused on improving workforce management, training, readiness, and operational effectiveness. This effort is intended to create more defined career paths, enable greater specialization, and improve the Department's ability to respond to emerging threats.
We look forward to hearing about how these efforts are improving the Department's cyber posture and where challenges remain.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=6527