Congressional Testimony
Congressional Testimony
Here's a look at documents involving congressional testimony and member statements
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Impossible Metals CEO Gunasekara Testifies Before House Natural Resources Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resource released the following testimony by Oliver Gunasekara, CEO and co-founder of Impossible Metals Inc., San Jose, California, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Deep Dive: Examining the Regulatory and Statutory Barriers to Deep Sea Mining":* * *
My name is Oliver Gunasekara, and I am the CEO and Co-Founder of Impossible Metals. I came to this country 20 years ago and, as a proud naturalized citizen, have been inspired by the kind of innovation only possible in America. Thank you for the opportunity ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resource released the following testimony by Oliver Gunasekara, CEO and co-founder of Impossible Metals Inc., San Jose, California, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Deep Dive: Examining the Regulatory and Statutory Barriers to Deep Sea Mining": * * * My name is Oliver Gunasekara, and I am the CEO and Co-Founder of Impossible Metals. I came to this country 20 years ago and, as a proud naturalized citizen, have been inspired by the kind of innovation only possible in America. Thank you for the opportunityto testify.
The Trump Administration has taken bold action to unlock America's seabed mineral resources, and deep-sea mining is now inevitable. The only question is whether America will lead, or cede the strategic frontier to China. Beijing has spent over a decade positioning itself to dominate this industry by securing the most exploration licenses, building the world's largest deep-sea research fleet, and maneuvering to control the rules that will govern global seabed mining.
American innovation is our competitive advantage. I am a three-time entrepreneur, with previous successful companies in semiconductors, and now in minerals technology. I co-founded Impossible Metals because I recognized that critical minerals have the same strategic importance as coal in the 19th century and oil in the 20th: these are essential resources that will determine America's prosperity, security, and leadership in this century. At the same time, American advances in AI and robotics have opened up a low cost, clean way of collecting these minerals from a vast, untapped resource: the deep sea.
Impossible Metals is a California-headquartered, Delaware-incorporated "B" Corporation that will responsibly collect nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese from the deep sea./1
Our groundbreaking technology uses advanced underwater robotics and AI-driven selective collecting--our underwater robots hover over the seafloor and use "pick and place" robotic arms to collect nodules individually, minimizing sediment disturbance. We plan to leave approximately 90% of nodules untouched to preserve marine habitat and biodiversity. Impossible Metals could begin providing critical minerals to processing facilities within three years, without relying on foreign adversaries.
President Trump's Executive Order on Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals triggered immediate action by agencies to start the leasing process. For the first time, we can see a path to mineral access in U.S. and international waters. Congress should build on that progress by modernizing our statutory framework, providing pace and certainty to the permitting process, and making the investments needed to anchor a new American export industry that could generate $300 billion in economic output and 100,000 jobs over the next decade.
The technology is ready. The resources are abundant. The Administration has charted the path forward. Congress and industry must both act now to ensure energy abundance, create thousands of quality jobs, and lead a critical global industry of the future before our foreign adversaries.
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1 Impossible Metals, www.impossiblemetals.com; short video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RMt4fu0nGe0.
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America Needs New Sources of Critical Minerals for National Security and Prosperity.
Critical minerals are essential for the future of AI, energy abundance, economic growth, and national defense. They are vital for batteries,2 magnets, submarine sonar, and aircraft engines.
We will need 330,000-420,000 tons of copper by 2030 for data centers3; nickel is used in military plating; and cobalt is used in fighter jets and armor-penetrating munitions.4 And we need large quantities: last week, Amazon purchased the copper output from the first new U.S. source in years, but it will take more than four years to produce enough for one large data center.5 Global demand is rising rapidly. The World Bank projects a 450% increase in demand for critical minerals like cobalt and nickel by 2050./6 Benchmark Minerals Intelligence estimates that without seabed mining, over 300 new land-based mines would need to open by 2035 to meet global demand.7 S&P Global projects a need for 42 million metric tons of copper by 2040, a 50% increase over today, and foresees a shortfall of 10 million tons.8
Today, America relies dangerously on foreign nations for these critical minerals. China dominates global rare earths and significant portions of cobalt, nickel, and copper.9 They have proven they are willing to weaponize their control over these resources -- just as they have with our closest allies like Japan and South Korea, and are now doing with us directly.
We now rely on foreign mines that do not meet American environmental and human rights standards. ~75% of nickel comes from Indonesia, where most collection and processing is controlled by China. Over 240,000 hectares of rainforest were lost to mining in 2024 alone, contributing to floods that killed over 1000 people and massive loss of bio-diversity.10 These rainforests have up to 3000 times greater biomass than the seafloor, where life is scarce and largely microscopic.11 We see similar harms and appalling levels of child labor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where ~70% of cobalt comes from, with the majority of the resource again controlled by China.12
Alternatives to collecting new supplies of these minerals are insufficient. Recycling can be a part of the solution, but the main forecast source of materials--batteries from today's electric vehicles--may not be available for 20 or 30 years because of the vehicles' lifespan and second-life use cases like backing up intermittent renewables.13 Alternative battery chemistries like Chinese-controlled lithium-iron phosphate (LFP) do not work for some personally-owned vehicles or defense systems, because they are too heavy and lack range.14
We cannot forgo minerals without sacrificing economic prosperity, our national security, or the planet.15 To meet rising demand, we need new sources of minerals that are economic, meet our values, fast to production, and free of foreign interference.
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Deep-Sea Nodules are a Critical Component of America's Resource Strategy.
Seabed nodules can advance America's goals of abundant, affordable, and secure mineral supply, and create a large new sector within America's leading mining industry.
Opportunity Size: Most of the world's minerals are in the sea--an estimated $20 trillion reserve.16 There is three times as much cobalt in a single seabed area than in all known land deposits. The United States has an estimated one billion tons of nodules in domestic waters, free of foreign interference.17 The total value of the markets for copper, nickel, manganese, and cobalt is projected to grow from approximately $417 billion in 2024 to $639 billion by 2032.18 Attractive Economics: Deep-sea minerals have four valuable metals with high grades, plus rare earth elements.19 Seabed mining relies primarily on existing ships and ports, and occurs far from population centers. This helps protect against Chinese price manipulation. America's maritime workforce is expected to be able to deploy Impossible Metals' technology, building on U.S. offshore oil and gas operations expertise.
High Environmental Standards: Impossible Metals has designed its technology to responsibly collect nodules, which sit unattached on the seafloor. We also plan to leave approximately 90 percent of the nodules untouched, to maintain the biological ecosystem.
Speed to Extract: Impossible Metals expects to begin production in 2028, subject to regulatory approvals.
History shows the potential for economic transformation from offshore resource development. In 1960, Norway was a fishing nation with a GDP per capita comparable to that of American Samoa today; it is now one of the wealthiest countries in the world, thanks to offshore oil and gas. Its GDP per capita has grown eightfold in that time, and its sovereign wealth fund is the world's largest, valued at more than $300,000 for every Norwegian citizen.20 Marine minerals hold the same potential for the U.S. and its territories.
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China Has Been Moving Decisively for a Decade to Dominate Deep-Sea Mining.
Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in 2016 "the deep sea contains treasures that remain undiscovered and undeveloped. We have to control key technologies in getting into the deep sea and developing the deep sea."21 That same year, China enacted a dedicated seabed mining law--years before most Western nations began serious policy discussions.
Beijing has adopted a comprehensive, state-directed strategy to control seabed mining, the final untapped frontier of critical minerals, that mirrors the playbook they have used to monopolize land-based critical mineral processing. It already controls 78% of refined cobalt, 95% of refined manganese, 35% of refined nickel, and 45% of refined copper.22
International Licensing and Regulation: Today, China holds more exploration contracts at the International Seabed Authority (ISA) than any other nation with five in total, giving it exclusive exploration rights over 238,000 square kilometers of seabed, an area the size of the United Kingdom.23 China is the only country with contracts spanning all three seabed mineral types.
China has also positioned itself to shape the rules that will govern this industry. Since 2001, Beijing has served almost continuously on the ISA Council, the body that approves contracts and sets mining regulations, while the United States remains an observer. China has been the largest financial contributor to the ISA since 2021, funds multiple ISA trust programs, has Chinese nationals embedded across ISA technical and financial committees, and hosts the ISA-China Joint Training and Research Centre in Qingdao, which is the first permanent joint ISA research facility ever created with a member state.24 And it is using these efforts to exercise influence over the global mining code, from blocking areas of discussion to opposing an inspection enforcement regime for environmental compliance.25
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Maritime Investment: At the same time, China has built the largest deep-sea research and oceanographic fleet in the world, expanding from 19 research vessels in 2012 to more than 64 today, and completing 93 ocean-going expeditions across every major ocean basin during its most recent Five-Year Plan.26 Its newest flagship research vessel has the range, crew capacity, and onboard laboratories required for sustained industrial seabed operations.27 At least 40 organizations are part of China's state-backed ecosystem, including PLA-linked organizations.28 China is now one of the only countries to test collectors at depth. In 2024, China's Pioneer II mining vehicle operated beyond 4,000 meters, retrieving hundreds of kilograms of nodules and crusts, and the ISA approved China Minmetals to test mine in their contracted area in 2025.29 Chinese firms are also advancing dual-use autonomous underwater vehicle technologies that have both commercial mining and military applications.30
Global Dealmaking: China is also expanding its geopolitical footprint across the Pacific by signing seabed mineral cooperation agreements with island nations and actively courting emerging economies with Chinese-built vessels, platforms, processing infrastructure, and financial support for their participation at the ISA.31
The question before the United States is therefore not whether deep-sea mining will happen. It is whether America will lead this industry, or once again be forced to buy the foundational materials of its energy, defense, and digital economy from a strategic competitor.
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American Innovation Is Our Competitive Advantage.
Opponents of deep-sea mining ask us to choose between economic growth, preserving our environment, and securing our nation. Impossible Metals shows that American ingenuity is the solution to that impossible choice.
Impossible Metals uses homegrown, groundbreaking, selective collection technology to compete, without compromising environmental standards. Our approach uses an underwater robotics fleet, which hovers over the seafloor without landing, using our patented buoyancy engine innovation,32 and then uses AI-driven "pick and place" robotic arms to collect nodules individually, minimizing sediment disturbance. Image sensing technology identifies visible life on the nodules and we leave those nodules untouched, preserving nodule-dependent fauna. We also plan to leave approximately 90% of total nodules untouched to preserve marine habitat and biodiversity, while maintaining profitability. The robots are retrieved with a revolutionary Launch and Recovery System that can operate even in rough seas, maximizing utilization.
This technology has been tested in the ocean at a depth of over a mile. The final test for regulatory approval will take place next year with the full-scale collector robot.
Impossible Metals' technology promises attractive economics, based on our public economic model.33 That cost structure comes in part from the inherent characteristics of polymetallic nodules--they are high grade, have four metals, and have low infrastructure costs--and in part from our proprietary technology, which operates with significantly less surface infrastructure than other forms of deep-sea mining. No support vessel or ship-to-ship transfers are required, and we can operate in a wide range of sea states, enabling high utilization. Deep-sea mining's competitive cost structure ensures China cannot undercut U.S. industry with unethical labor practices or state subsidies.34
Impossible Metals' technology has been intentionally designed for the lowest environmental impact. We have invested in innovation and designed our system to:
* Preserve unique and ecologically important species through object detection and selective collection.
* Eliminate sediment plumes by avoiding excavation and sediment disturbance, avoiding risk to commercial fishing.
* Minimize acoustic impact that could affect marine mammals by operating low-power robotic systems and reducing the number of vessels.
* Prevent a contamination pathway to commercially important food fish due to the absence of sediment or water column mobilization.
* Maintain deep ocean biomass and carbon storage by leaving surrounding sediments and uncollected polymetallic nodules intact and in a stable pattern.
Over the last 60 years, a significant body of scientific data has been collected on the deep ocean.35 The Ocean Biodiversity System hosts open-access data on marine biodiversity, with more than 125 million observations on nearly 200,000 species. The ISA Deep Seabed and Ocean Database (DeepData, launched in 2019) contains over 10 terabytes of data, cited by more than 160 scientific publications, gathered from dozens of private company cruises. Much of what we know about the deep ocean comes from private investment for deep-sea mining.
Scientific investigations have disproven some preconceptions about the harms of deep-sea mining. For example, MIT researchers found that the sedimentation disturbance of traditional technologies was only 1/3 to 1/6 of the level that critics hypothesized, and concerns of sediment plumes riding hundreds of feet above the seafloor were not borne out in reality.36
Impossible Metals' technology is likely to have even lower environmental impacts. Independent modeling found the expected sediment disturbance of our production-scale device, Eureka III, is expected to be approximately 46 kg/hour.37 For comparison, the GSR Patania II, which was previously deployed in the same area as our planned Eureka III test, produced a sediment discharge rate of 52,500-56,000 kg/hour. Impossible Metals is planning a live test to validate this preliminary modeling.
China is using legacy technology.38 America is innovating--with AI computer vision, cutting edge robotics, and long-lasting batteries. Let the best technology win.
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We Can Access These Resources Quickly And Without Relying On China.
There are multiple paths for American companies like Impossible Metals to secure access to minerals free of adversary control. In the near-term, we are partnering with allied nations that hold exploration licenses in international waters to test our technology in well-explored areas.39 Existing environmental baselining and alternative technology test data makes this the fastest way to demonstrate selective collection's superior environmental impact and effectiveness.
We also requested that the Administration launch a lease sale in U.S. federal waters in the Pacific. The area of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 130-305 miles off the coast of American Samoa is believed to have extraordinarily rich deposits of critical minerals.40 Impossible Metals is committed to engaging with the community of American Samoa. We have voluntarily committed to dedicate one percent of our profits from marine mineral collection to benefit the local community. Beyond this financial commitment, we view community engagement as a vital part of responsible resource development. We have begun engaging with leaders and residents in American Samoa,41 and we plan to continuously ramp up our local engagement as the multi-year lease sale process advances. Deep-sea mining presents valuable employment and investment opportunities for the community,42 but we also recognize that historically, Pacific Island communities have seen opportunities that did not endure or live up to their potential. We are committed to building something lasting, in partnership with the people of American Samoa.
Finally, with the support of the State Department, Impossible Metals's subsidiary was sponsored by the Kingdom of Bahrain, which allowed the company to apply to the ISA for an exploration license in the Clarion Clipperton Zone. The application is for a resource area of 75,000 km2 containing polymetallic nodules with high grades of critical metals. This application will be considered at the next ISA meeting in just over a month.
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The Trump Administration Has Begun Unlocking Access.
The United States already possesses the statutory foundation for deep-sea mining. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) grants the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) authority to offer leases for mineral exploration and development within the U.S. EEZ.
The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980 (DSHMRA) established a licensing regime for American companies operating in international waters, recognizing that the United States need not await international consensus to secure its own mineral future. These laws provide the legal architecture. What has been lacking until now is the political will.
President Trump's Executive Order on Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals has changed that calculus decisively.43 The Executive Order triggered immediate action at BOEM and NOAA on leasing, mapping, and exploration. In response to Impossible Metals' unsolicited request for a lease sale in federal waters near American Samoa, Interior and BOEM have taken important steps this year: updating Interior policies to reduce delay, issuing Requests for Information for three different areas within the U.S. EEZ, and designating a potential lease area in federal waters near American Samoa. NOAA has proposed new regulations that would speed licensing by creating an option for a consolidated exploration and exploitation permit, and accelerated its ocean mapping efforts in areas of strategic mineral interest.
We can now see a path to mineral access in U.S. waters and, through President Trump's direction to begin using DSHMRA for American companies, in international waters. For the first time, deep-sea mining companies can see the light at the end of the licensing tunnel.
With these bold actions, America is standing up to China as they attempt to shape the international licensing system at the ISA to their advantage.
The world is responding. The ISA is accelerating its efforts on the commercial mining code.44 The question is no longer whether deep-sea mining will happen, but which country will lead: setting the technological and environmental standards, building the world's next great export industry, and securing the supply chains to power the industries of the future.
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Congress Must Now Codify This Progress and Address Remaining Statutory Barriers.
While the Administration has taken essential steps, Congress should now strengthen the statutory framework to provide regulatory certainty. A predictable, durable, and efficient permitting process is an absolutely essential step to unleash the billions in private capital that will be required for scientific research, innovation, and manufacturing on these projects.
First, we must solidify the progress made so far. Representative Ezell's legislation, H.R. 4018, would codify President Trump's Executive Order into statute, ensuring that the nation's commitment to seabed minerals endures. Impossible Metals strongly supports this legislation.
Second, Congress should establish predictable statutory timelines for each stage of the leasing process. Under OCSLA, most steps involving BOEM's decision-making and analysis currently lack defined timelines, and there are no clear consequences for missed deadlines. BOEM should also produce a five-year outlook on the Marine Minerals Program, similar to the National OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program, to inform prospecting activities.45
Third, Congress should streamline and clarify the permitting process. BOEM's current regulations involve six comment periods before commercial collection begins: three before a competitive lease sale can commence, with additional comments and approvals for delineation, test mining, and commercial collection plans.46 Unlike the proposed DSHMRA process, where an Environmental Impact Statement is prepared in response to a specific application, BOEM's environmental review first occurs before a collection technology has even been selected or exploration work has begun, when there is substantial uncertainty about impacts. Congress should shorten timelines and agency burden, while retaining ample community engagement.
Fourth, Congress should strengthen the certainty of granted permits. Companies need confidence that the regulatory certainty of a lease will justify the large sums required. The permit certainty provisions of the recent House-passed SPEED Act, championed by Chairman Westerman and Representative Golden, would prevent any administration from interfering with granted permits for political reasons.
Companies pursuing licenses under DSHMRA also need greater confidence that the U.S. government will defend the permits internationally. DSHMRA was enacted before the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and does not anticipate situations where the ISA could grant a conflicting permit for the same area as an American DSHMRA permit. The original rules provided that government officials from the U.S. would use their good offices to assist the American company and the foreign sponsored applicant company to resolve a conflict, but this provision has sunset. Resurrecting a version of this would provide companies vital assurance.
Fifth, Congress should match lease terms under both OCSLA and DSHMRA to international standards. The proposed primary exploitation contract length for ISA licenses will be 30 years, with a possibility of a further 30-year extension. OCSLA and DSHMRA each provide only 20-year exploitation terms. American companies operating in U.S. waters or under DSHMRA permits should not be disadvantaged compared to foreign competitors in international waters.
Sixth, Congress should extend revenue sharing to coastal communities. Under the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006, a portion of royalties from offshore oil and gas leases in federal waters flows to neighboring Gulf Coast states, building public trust and funding coastal resilience projects. The same precedent should be applied to deep-sea mining.
Seventh, Congress should authorize a new public-private partnership to ensure that minerals gathered under DSHMRA and OCSLA permits actually remain in the United States and address our domestic national security needs. Under one vision for this program, participating companies would commit to domestic processing of nodules, provide a portion of offtake to the U.S. government at market prices, and share data with NOAA or BOEM. In return, participating companies would receive expedited permit processing; funding support for exploration, domestic manufacturing of collector technology, and U.S.-flagged ship retrofits; visibility on the Permitting Council dashboard; and designated points of contact at relevant government agencies. This structure would align private incentives with national objectives.
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Beyond Mineral Access, Now Is The Time For Congress to Enable The Industry to Scale.
Securing mineral access is necessary, but not sufficient. With forceful policy action, deep-sea mining could become one of America's most significant export industries, generating $300 billion in U.S. economic output and creating 100,000 domestic jobs over ten years.47 But realizing that vision requires going beyond leasing reform to the policies that will enable scaling.
First, Congress should direct the National Defense Stockpile to include deep-sea nodules procured from American waters and nodule-derived minerals. Unlike direct subsidies, this is a market-making mechanism that the government can recoup or even profit from as metal prices rise. For the industry, a guaranteed buyer provides the demand signal that allows private capital to take the risks of ship retrofits, robot manufacturing, and mineral collection. For the nation, it creates a strategic reserve of metals critical for national security that degrade more slowly than processed metals and incentivizes construction of domestic processing facilities adjacent to the stockpiles.
Second, Congress should support investments in domestic mineral processing facilities and manufacturing. Impossible Metals aims to partner with a domestic processor, but today the United States currently has no processing capability for the critical minerals found in polymetallic nodules. Without domestic facilities, we forfeit jobs, pay higher transport costs, and remain vulnerable to adversary supply restrictions. China directly funds and controls its mineral processing industry; America's approach should be to leverage targeted incentives that attract private capital. Congress can accelerate domestic processing capacity through the Defense Production Act, innovation grants for technologies that can efficiently refine multiple metals from seabed minerals, and trade agreements with allies like Japan that have relevant facilities.
Third, Congress should accelerate government mapping and resource estimation of the U.S. EEZ. As of late 2024, only 52% of U.S. coastal, ocean, and Great Lakes waters have been mapped, and at current pace, the goal of complete mapping will not be met until 2041--eleven years behind schedule.48 Prioritizing areas with potential deep-sea mineral resources for earlier mapping and nodule sampling would provide the foundational data that private investment requires. Rep. Hunt and Vice Chair Begich's CORE Act (H.R. 2556) would require an inventory and analysis of offshore mineral resources, including in the EEZ.
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These actions will de-risk private capital by demonstrating government commitment; catalyze American shipbuilding by creating demand for specialized vessels; create new robotics, manufacturing, and refining jobs across the country; and ensure that deep-sea resources translate into secure American supply chains rather than foreign processing dependence.
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Conclusion
The Trump Administration has taken bold action to unlock America's seabed mineral resources.
Deep-sea mining is now inevitable. The only question is whether America will lead--or cede this strategic frontier to China, which has spent a decade positioning itself to dominate the industry through state-backed investment and influencing the international licensing regime.
America's path to competing with China can only lie in rapid domestic action. By building a commercially viable, technologically superior deep-sea mining industry, we will reshape the global landscape. American companies demonstrating the economic and environmental
superiority of selective collection technology will set a de facto global benchmark, regardless of what rules China writes at the ISA. When Pacific Island nations see that partnering with America means access to superior technology, genuine community investment, and a counterweight to Beijing's influence, it will change the calculus of seabed mineral cooperation agreements.
American innovation is our competitive advantage. We are proving that AI-driven robotics can deliver minerals faster, cheaper, and more responsibly than the legacy dredging technology that China relies upon. Congress should now act to codify this progress, modernize our statutory framework, and make the investments that will build a new American industry.
The race is on. America must win it.
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II06/20260122/118830/HHRG-119-II06-Wstate-GunasekaraO-20260122.pdf
Hawaii Longline Association Executive Director Kingma Testifies Before House Natural Resources Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations released the following testimony by Eric K. Kingma, executive director of the Hawaii Longline Association, Honolulu, from a Jan. 21, 2026, hearing entitled "America First: U.S. Leadership & National Security in International Conservation":* * *
Chairman Gosar, Ranking Member Dexter, distinguished members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for holding this hearing on this important subject. My name is Eric Kingma. I serve as the Executive Director of the Hawaii Longline Association (HLA).
HLA is comprised ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations released the following testimony by Eric K. Kingma, executive director of the Hawaii Longline Association, Honolulu, from a Jan. 21, 2026, hearing entitled "America First: U.S. Leadership & National Security in International Conservation": * * * Chairman Gosar, Ranking Member Dexter, distinguished members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for holding this hearing on this important subject. My name is Eric Kingma. I serve as the Executive Director of the Hawaii Longline Association (HLA). HLA is comprisedof 150 Hawaii-based longline fishing vessels that target tuna and swordfish.
The Hawaii-based longline fleet is a major fishery of the United States and is responsible for over 90 percent of the Nation's landings of bigeye tuna, 60 percent of yellowfin tuna and over 50 percent of the Nation's swordfish landings. The fleet is the largest food producer in the State of Hawaii, with annual landings exceeding 30 million pounds and a dockside value of around $120 million annually. The landed value of Hawaii longline fleet consistently ranks Honolulu Harbor within the Nation's top seven ports in terms of fisheries economic value.
Competition With Foreign Imports: An Unlevel Regulatory and Economic Playing Field Around 80 percent of fishing effort by Hawaii longline vessels occurs on the high seas in international waters amongst foreign competition. Due to Marine National Monument designations, no other fleet nationally has been displaced from U.S. waters to the extent of the Hawaii longline fleet (see Figure 1). Not only are we competing with less regulated foreign fleets in international waters, but we are competing with foreign imports on a daily basis within the U.S. seafood market. A large percentage of imported seafood into the United States comes from subsidized foreign fleets subject to low levels of monitoring and nearly zero enforcement of environmental laws. On the other hand, the Hawaii longline fleet, like other federally managed U.S. fisheries, is subject to stringent regulations and monitoring requirements pursuant to several statutes including but not limited to:
* Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
* Endangered Species Act
* Marine Mammal Protection Act
* Migratory Bird Treaty Act
* Clean Water Act
* Coastal Zone Management Act
* Antiquities Act
* National Marine Sanctuary Act
* Billfish Conservation Act
* Merchant Marine Act
The United States is a global leader in its domestic fisheries management regulations, management processes, and comprehensive environmental laws. It is also a global leader in international marine conservation efforts by setting standards for which international commissions adopt. For example, there are several measures developed within the Hawaii longline fishery that are now established international standards for protected species mitigation for sea turtles, seabirds, and marine mammals.
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U.S. Seafood Market Is Dominated by Cheaper Foreign Imports
U.S. seafood producers are in fierce competition with foreign imports in the U.S. seafood market. Unfortunately, we are losing in most cases. We're seeing devasting impacts from import competition in the Hawaii longline fleet for bigeye and yellowfin tuna and swordfish as well other notable U.S.A fisheries including Gulf shrimp, West Coast albacore tuna, East Coast blue crab, Gulf catfish, Alaska groundfish (pollock/cod), Atlantic lobster, and Gulf/West Coast oysters. Imports are often available for 30 to 50% cheaper or more than U.S. produced seafood.
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), approximately 7085 percent of seafood consumed in the United States is from foreign imported sources./1
The total value of U.S. imported seafood in 2023 was $25.5 billion resulting in an annual seafood trade deficit of approximately $20 billion./2
Over the last 30 years, the inflation adjusted value of foreign imports into the United States has increased by 133% (see Figure 2). The increase in imports has put downward pressure on domestic seafood prices, limiting revenue for American fishermen and domestic seafood processors. Foreign fisheries benefit from lower labor costs, government subsidies, lower regulatory and environmental costs, and cheaper processing operations.
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IUU Fishing: A National Security, Economic, and Conservation Threat
The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates that nearly 15% of wild caught seafood imports into the United States is from Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated foreign fisheries./3
IUU fishing is broadly defined such that it includes transnational crime syndicates involved in the capture and sale of endangered species, human trafficking and forced labor, state-sponsored unregulated fleets, and underreporting from otherwise legally licensed vessels. Impacts from IUU fishing also run the gamut, from overfishing, habitat loss, bycatch of depleted species, to worker welfare, food safety and market distortion. The United States government should do all in its authority to prevent IUU associated seafood from entering the U.S. market.
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Using the Power of the U.S. Market to Drive Conservation Objectives
The United States seafood market is among the world's largest. As such, the United States government has a tremendous ability to level the playing field between domestic fisheries and international fleets through the power of market access. The import provisions of the Marine Commercial Fisheries Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) are a good example. The MMPA requires the National Marine Fisheries Service to make determinations on whether foreign nations have comparable marine mammal protection measures to the United States.
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1 Fisheries of the United States Reports | NOAA Fisheries
2 U.S. Seafood Imports Expand as Domestic Aquaculture Industry Repositions Itself | Economic Research Service
3 Seafood Obtained via Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: U.S. Imports and Economic Impact on U.S.
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After nearly 50 years of the provisions being in the statute, NMFS first issued determinations in September 2025. Out of 2500 assessed fisheries from 46 countries, NMFS found only 9.6 percent (240 foreign fisheries) do not have comparable marine mammal measures as the United States. NMFS gave most industrial foreign fisheries a passing grade including those of China.
This was a major opportunity missed by the U.S. government to level the playing field. NMFS needs to conduct significantly more robust reviews of foreign fisheries in the future and hope this committee exerts oversight of the matter.
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China's Global Fisheries Influence and Linkages to IUU Fisheries
China is the world's largest fishing nation, and its global fisheries reach has been widely documented in recent years. For example, Chinese fishing vessels fish in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of over 90 countries and are responsible for around 30 percent of all fishing effort on the high seas. China's highly subsidized fishing fleets serve as political and economic bridges to other nations.
With respect to the Pacific Islands region, China's fishing influence and tuna fisheries has grown rapidly over the last 15 years. Chinese tuna vessels fish in international waters and in the EEZs of several countries including the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (both former U.S. Trust Territories). With respect to FSM and RMI, Chinese flagged tuna vessels offload to Chinese owned companies fish processing and distribution companies that ship nearly daily fresh and frozen tuna into the United States.
China also has close ties to Kiribati, which is Hawaii's closest foreign neighbor. The proximity of Kiribati's Line Islands to Pearl Harbor (around 1,000 miles) and China's growing influence and development in that country should be monitored closely if not prevented. This is needed not only for U.S. geopolitical concerns but also from an IUU fisheries perspective.
NOAA's 2023 Biennial Report to Congress on IUU fishing lists China as one of 7 countries that has IUU fisheries./4
For example, China does not monitor its distant water tuna fleets to international standards and nowhere close to U.S. levels. China's operational level data reporting as well annual reporting against catch limits within international RFMOs is known to be suspect.
Furthermore, China's distant water fishing fleets have been documented to involve forced labor as well as the harvest of protected species including marine mammals.
China, of course, is not the only country with IUU fisheries. The global seafood supply chain is expansive, involving harvesting nations, processing nations, and diverse markets. For example, it is not uncommon for fish to be landed by a vessel of Country A, caught in the waters of Country B, transshipped at sea on a vessel flagged to Country C, processed in Country D, and imported into the United States.
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4 Other countries identified by NOAA in its 2023 Report to Congress are: Angola, Grenada, Mexico, Taiwan, Gambia, and Vanuatu.
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Leveling the Playing Field and Preventing IUU Seafood from Entering the United States The United State can do more to prevent seafood from IUU fisheries entering the U.S. market as well as leveling the playing field between foreign fisheries and U.S. domestic producers. The following provides a list of actions to support these objectives:
1) Restrict imports: Utilize existing laws to their full extent to prohibit seafood from foreign fisheries that do not meet U.S. environmental standards including monitoring and reporting.
2) International engagement: The United States government needs to continue to participate in international commissions such a Regional Fishery Management Organizations.
* U.S. delegations to these international management organizations should advance measures that are adopted within domestic U.S. fisheries, which by law are based on best available science.
3) Eliminate harmful subsidies in foreign fisheries: Unlike the Nation's farmers, U.S. fishermen do not receive subsidies to reduce operational costs (e.g. fuel); whereas many foreign fleets do receive subsidies from their national government.
* This significantly disadvantages U.S.A fishermen as foreign fleets can operate at much lower costs and sell their seafood into the U.S. market at much lower prices.
4) Implement electronic supply chain tracking for all imports: Country of origin for seafood is often opaque due to where the fish was caught, flag of vessel, and processing country.
The United States should implement a system digital catch and supply chain records that are harmonized across Customs and Boarder Protection and NOAA import requirements.
NOAA's Seafood Import Monitoring Program should be expanded to all species.
5) Seafood country of origin for restaurants: Existing federal law requires country of origin labeling on seafood for retail establishments only and not restaurants. Consumers should be provided information to allow them to make informed choices on the origin of the seafood they eat. This is especially important for seafood, which the overwhelming majority consumed in the United States is from foreign sources and an alarmingly high level from IUU fisheries.
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Conclusion
Imports of poorly monitored, less regulated, subsidized, foreign seafood, including that from foreign IUU fisheries, into the United States perpetuates ocean harm and hurts American fishermen and our associated seafood industry. The United States should use the power of its immense seafood market to prevent imported seafood from foreign fisheries that do not meet U.S. environmental standards, are from subsidized fisheries, and/or from IUU fisheries. Steps should also be taken to improve supply chain tracking as well expanding country of origin labeling to the foodservice sector. Benefits include improving ocean health, supporting the longterm continuity of American fisheries, and protecting American seafood consumers.
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Figure 1: U.S. EEZ Regulated Fishing Ares in the Western Pacific Region
Figure 2: Annual value (inflation adjusted) of U.S.A Seafood Imports, 1995-2023
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Original text and figures here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II15/20260121/118774/HHRG-119-II15-Wstate-KingmaE-20260121.pdf
Chainalysis Cyber Threat Intelligence Head Koven Testifies Before Senate Special Committee on Aging
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The Senate Special Committee on Aging released the following written testimony by Jacqueline Burns Koven, head of cyber threat intelligence at Chainalysis Inc., New York, from a Jan. 14, 2026, hearing entitled "Made in China, Paid by Seniors: Stopping the Surge of International Scams":* * *
Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and distinguished members of the Special Committee: Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the pressing issue of international fraud and scams targeting older Americans, largely perpetrated by Chinese Organized Crime syndicates.
My ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The Senate Special Committee on Aging released the following written testimony by Jacqueline Burns Koven, head of cyber threat intelligence at Chainalysis Inc., New York, from a Jan. 14, 2026, hearing entitled "Made in China, Paid by Seniors: Stopping the Surge of International Scams": * * * Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gillibrand, and distinguished members of the Special Committee: Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the pressing issue of international fraud and scams targeting older Americans, largely perpetrated by Chinese Organized Crime syndicates. Myname is Jacqueline Burns Koven, and I am the Head of Cyber Threat Intelligence for the blockchain data platform Chainalysis, where we harness the transparency of blockchains so that banks, businesses, and governments have the data and investigations, compliance, and security solutions they need for this new digital economy to thrive. We track cryptocurrency use by illicit actors, such as those carrying out investment and impersonation scams, and provide data on their financial activity to private- and publicsector customers, including the federal government.
In my testimony, I provide our assessment of the extent of scam activity and the role that cryptocurrencies play, and recommend how we can best mobilize and fight back against the growing scourge of scams that are putting all Americans, especially the most vulnerable among us, at risk. Once again, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on this important topic and continue to be a helpful partner on initiatives by Congress to better protect Americans - especially the most vulnerable - against scams and fraud.
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Key Takeaways
* Cryptocurrencies are a primary channel for scammers' operations; with the right data, tools, and resources, this should put the government at an advantage.
* AI technology is making scams more effective, but it can also help detect fraud and prevent potential victims from falling victim to scams and sending money.
* Scammers are leveraging a vast, industrialized ecosystem of illicit tools and Chinese-language money laundering networks for their operations.
* Government and industry responses are fragmented and reactive. This crisis requires a unified and technology-enabled response.
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The growing intersection of scams and cryptocurrencies: $17B stolen in 2025
Americans, and especially older Americans, have not been immune to the threat posed by a global, organized, and pernicious scam industrial complex that adeptly leverages technological developments in social media, artificial intelligence, and cryptocurrencies.
Cryptocurrencies are often the financial rails of choice for scammers for the same reasons legitimate users use them - transactions are cross-border and instantaneous. But I am here today to emphasize that fraudsters' use of cryptocurrency should place them at a fundamental disadvantage, given the traceability and freezeability of many of these assets.
At Chainalysis, we analyze transaction data from blockchain networks in conjunction with open-source intelligence to map the ecosystem of legitimate and illicit flows. Our software provides a clear, visual representation of potential scam networks and laundering activities, a level of transparency that isn't possible for traditional forms of value transfer. Indeed, identifying a single cryptocurrency payment to a scam enterprise can often lead to identifying hundreds of other victim payments, the illicit services they leverage, and, in some cases, the scam compound from which the scammers operate. This visibility also enables us to estimate the amount of crypto funds stolen in fraud and scams over time.
According to Chainalysis data, 2025 was a record year for cryptocurrency scams, totalling an estimated $17 billion worth of cryptocurrency globally. Fraudsters can always be counted on to abuse novel technologies, and scam conglomerates are exceptionally adept at wielding new tools to scale their schemes to defraud Americans. Nobody is better than Chinese organized crime groups. They are the global market leaders in criminal fintech, and the Chinese-language underground ecosystem underpinning them is the most advanced in the world. They provide the entire spectrum of "crimeware" needed to conjure up a scam-- social media profiles, mass calling and text spamming tools, stealer malware, data targeting lists with names and phone numbers of potential targets, AI technologies for deepfakes and voicecloning or fake investment platforms, laundering engines, and critical underground banking infrastructure - leveraging cryptocurrency as a form of payment.
The unique intelligence provided by the blockchain should be considered foundational for understanding the fraud problem at both a strategic and tactical level. The inherent transparency of blockchains, combined with the right data and tools, can illuminate the key components of the scam supply chain that support our national scam crisis. This can empower the U.S. Government to understand the scale of the problem, measure the impact of a counterscam strategy, surface investigative leads for the attribution of threat actors behind these campaigns, and identify opportunities for disruption.
Law enforcement and regulatory bodies can disrupt these networks, cut them off from the global financial system, and make it harder for them to profit by targeting illicit entities and networks on the blockchain with sanctions and asset seizure. Blockchain analytics offers unique opportunities to trace illicit proceeds of crime, identify additional victims, and partner with the private sector to disrupt illicit networks and pursue restitution, rather than relying on one-off criminal investigations.
However, despite this huge potential for disruption, scammers are exploiting the disjointed, siloed nature of how the public and private sectors respond to their schemes. To be truly effective, we must pursue a multifaceted strategy that prioritizes uprooting the enabling scam infrastructure and identifying and bringing to justice the individuals responsible for perpetrating the scams.
Finally, we need to focus on prevention. AI-powered fraud prevention technology can stop victim funds from being stolen by scammers. But financial institutions and cryptocurrency businesses need guidance on when and how to intervene when they suspect their customers may be in the process of being scammed. On one hand, providing some friction may be critical to preventing funds from being sent to scammers. On the other hand, financial institutions may be hesitant to limit what their customers can do with their own money. Part of the solution involves using data to help financial institutions stop their customers from sending to likely scams at the point of transaction, rather than trying to anticipate what their customers are doing based on behavioral red flags alone. But even so, regulatory guidance on what these businesses can and cannot do to protect their customers is needed.
As such, our recommendations include:
1. Mobilize a whole-of-government and industry national anti-scam strategy that prioritizes enhanced reporting and collaborative information sharing that can best disrupt scam conglomerates;
2. Leverage technologies designed for both the prevention and remediation of scams;
3. Ensure financial institutions and crypto businesses are incentivized to assist in the prevention of transactions to scams and have appropriate guidance to enable them to do so;
4. Advocate to close gaps in the implementation of AML/CFT standards by FATF members, especially countries that scammers rely on to launder funds defrauded from Americans.
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Chainalysis data and insights on scam activity
Chainalysis publishes an annual Crypto Crime Report that provides a detailed survey of the various types of illicit activity involving cryptocurrencies. In 2025, we estimate that the total amount of cryptocurrency received by illicit actors will be over $154 billion. This number will inevitably increase as we identify more illicit transactions associated with activity in 2025.
In each of the past five years, scam operators received over $12 billion in cryptocurrency payments, and 2025 is estimated to be a record year for cryptocurrency scam revenue. Our data shows at least $14 billion worth of cryptocurrency scammed globally, and we expect that figure will exceed $17 billion as we retroactively identify more scams, based on historical trends.
Overall scam inflows have also surged, particularly through impersonation tactics that saw a staggering 1400% year-over-year growth. While high-yield investment programs (HYIP) and pig butchering remain dominant categories by volume, we're seeing increasing convergence across scam types as fraudsters leverage AI, sophisticated SMS phishing services, and complex money laundering networks to target victims more effectively than ever before.
These tools and services underpinning all manner of scams are paid for with cryptocurrency, including the mass text phishing scam impersonating E-ZPass that targeted millions of Americans in 2025. To pull this off, the Chinese Smishing Triad leveraged software from "Lighthouse," a Chinese-language vendor on Telegram that accepts cryptocurrency in exchange for "phishing for dummies" with hundreds of templates for fake websites, domain setup tools, and features designed to evade detection. The scale of Lighthouse phishing attacks is staggering. In 20 days, approximately 200,000 fraudulent websites created using Lighthouse were used to attract 'well over 1,000,000 potential victims' in at least 121 countries.
Human trafficking is also behind some of the most pernicious scams. Chainalysis collaborates with NonGovernmental Organizations such as the International Justice Mission, which operates in the world's corruption hotspots, including the Golden Triangle, enabling Chainalysis to identify cryptocurrency wallets belonging to crime syndicates operating within specific compounds. These wallets tell of the horrors not only of the scam victims themselves but of the estimated hundreds of thousands of human trafficking victims behind the scam compounds. Chainalysis has previously detailed how we have traced a single ransom payment in cryptocurrency made by a trafficking victim held captive in the KK Park compound in Myanmar to a centralized wallet commingled with hundreds of millions of dollars in scam proceeds. We've now identified cryptocurrency wallets belonging to compounds across multiple countries and continents.
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The International threat: Scam laundering leverages offshore exchanges and Chinese-language money laundering services, with a strong regional nexus to East and Southeast Asia
We not only track the amount of cryptocurrency funds received by scam operators but also where those funds are directed for purposes of laundering or cashing out to fiat currency. In the last few years, centralized exchanges (CEXs) have been the primary destinations for laundering funds from scams; however, Decentralized Exchanges and Chinese Money Laundering Networks (CMLNs) have seen increased adoption among scammers. The regional connection of the scamming syndicates is evidenced by the off-ramping patterns we observe, with a significant portion of the proceeds from pig butchering scams flowing to CMLNs. It is important to note that scam proceeds are largely laundered through overseas entities, reinforcing the effectiveness of the US anti-money laundering regime domestically.
In recent years, CLMNs have emerged as dominant channels for laundering illicit cryptocurrency, including funds stolen through fraud and scams. Guarantee services operate as one-stop shops for illicit actors needing the technology, infrastructure, and resources to conduct scams. They function primarily as marketing venues and escrow infrastructure for these networks. While they provide trust mechanisms for vendors, they don't control the underlying laundering activity. Huione and Xinbi have dominated the market for the past few years, and many other guarantee services continue to operate freely. Many merchants on these platforms put little effort into masking their illicit activities, advertising the types of services they offer using thinly veiled code words. They openly cater to the scam ecosystem by providing technology for facial recognition or facial alteration, targeted data lists for outreach to potential victims, web hosting services, social media accounts and content creation, orchestration of pig butchering and Ponzi schemes, and global passports, visas, and purportedly assisting with applications, and AI software.
Our on-chain analysis continues to show persistent connections between cryptocurrency scams and operations based in East and Southeast Asia. While the Huione Guarantee platform identified in our 2025 report was effectively shut down following FinCEN's 311 designation -- which severed its access to the U.S. financial system -- we've observed expansion of similar operations across the region.
Our analysis reveals that funds originating at U.S. crypto ATMs frequently flow into wallets associated with Southeast Asia-based CMLNs and guarantee services, which serve as key intermediaries in the broader global scam infrastructure. While not all on-chain flows from scams to CMLNs can be traced directly to ATM on-ramps, crypto ATMs remain a critical input for scammers targeting older adults, who are often instructed to convert cash into cryptocurrency at these kiosks before funds are quickly transferred. In this context, actors leveraging crypto ATMs as both payment conduits and loci of fraud increasingly depend on CMLNs to launder and integrate stolen funds into the wider financial system, illustrating how traditional elder fraud has evolved into a transnational, crypto-enabled ecosystem.
Stronger state protections that require owners and operators of crypto kiosks to set transaction limits, inform users of risks, provide receipts, and refund qualifying payments could help prevent older adults from falling prey to certain scams.
The chart below shows the centrality of Southeast Asia to pig butchering scams by examining the 'holiday effect' associated with the Chinese New Year public holiday (7 days at the start of the 15-day new year celebration). Starting around 2022, roughly when Huione began to play a central role in laundering funds from scam compounds such as KK Park, there was a notable reduction in pig butchering scam activity during the 7-day public holiday associated with the Chinese New Year. After the data have been detrended and seasonally adjusted, average daily pig butchering activity drops notably during these short windows. This pattern suggests that the Chinese holiday is associated with a reduction in inflows to pig butchering scams, indicating that actors in East and Southeast Asia play an important role in this scam ecosystem.
Recent enforcement actions against overseas money laundering facilitation networks, including sanctions designations and advisories, have shed light on the national security threat that impacts victims worldwide. These actions include the designation of the Prince Group by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) by HM Treasury in the UK, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)'s Final Rule designating Huione Group as a primary money laundering concern, and FinCEN's advisory on Chinese money laundering networks.
We applaud these actions, but the threat actors are resilient. As with other genres of illicit on-chain activity, actions against guarantee services can be disruptive, but the core networks persist and migrate to alternative channels when challenged. While Huione's guarantee operations were disrupted after Telegram removed some of their accounts, vendors using Huione have continued to use or advertise on alternative platforms, their operations largely uninterrupted. While these hubs continue to connect vendors and buyers, most vendors promote advertisements across platforms and are not reliant on any specific service. As with legitimate e-commerce platforms, service ratings and reviews create accountability within the illicit ecosystem, and vendors often cultivate their market reputation through public attestations of their reliability and service quality.
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The Local Impact: Elderly US citizens are uniquely vulnerable to the threat of scams, and the role that cryptocurrency can play
Scams targeting older adults represent some of the most financially devastating frauds reported in the US. Recent estimates indicate that Americans aged 60 and older lose billions of dollars annually to financial exploitation and fraud, including nearly $4.9 billion in reported losses in 2024 alone, more than any other age group, according to AARP and FBI data. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) further underscores this trend: in 2024, individuals aged 60 and older reported $2.8 billion in losses from crypto-related scams, reflecting both the scale and the growing role of digital assets in modern fraud.
While elder fraud encompasses a broad range of schemes, cryptocurrency ATMs have emerged as a notable on-ramp for scams. Reported losses from Bitcoin ATM fraud have risen sharply in recent years, and older victims are disproportionately affected by these kiosk-based conversions. The elderly, who often have significant retirement savings yet limited familiarity with irreversible digital payment methods, remain particularly vulnerable to such tactics.
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AI and professional scamming tools increase scam severity
While generative AI can accelerate legitimate innovation, it can also make scams more scalable and affordable for bad actors. We are rapidly moving toward a future in which virtually all scams will incorporate AI into their operations to some degree. While many scams involve buying AI tools through traditional payment channels, a significant subset buys these tools on-chain, making their transactions visible. Exploring the differences between scams with visible on-chain associations to Chinese AI vendors lets us probe the scale and efficiency of AI.
As depicted below, 76% of AI scams are in the time-weighted high-value/high-volume quadrant. This means that a large majority of scams with demonstrable on-chain links to often Telegram-based Chinese AI vendors selling face-swap software, deepfake technologies, and LLMs tend to (1) scale more quickly (i.e., higher incoming transfer rates) and (2) be more severe (i.e., higher daily USD volumes) than scams without these clear on-chain links to AI vendors.
Our analysis reveals that, on average, scams with on-chain links to AI vendors extract $3.2 million per operation compared to $719,000 for those without an on-chain link -- 4.5 times more revenue per scam. These AI-related operations also demonstrate significantly greater time-weighed efficiency:
* Higher daily revenue: $4,838 vs $518 median daily revenue
* Increased transaction volume: 35.1 vs 3.89 average transfers per day (9x more transaction activity)
These metrics suggest both higher operational efficiency and potentially broader victim reach. The increased transaction volume indicates that AI is enabling scammers to reach and manage more victims simultaneously, a trend consistent with the industrialization of fraud. In contrast, the increased scam volume suggests that AI is likewise making the larger scams more persuasive.
The professionalization of scamming tools is also a force multiplier to execute industrial-scale scams.
Many of these campaigns have a social media angle, given that such platforms provide access to millions of users, and are thus prime targets for sending automated messages. In such cases, scammers may buy bulk social media profiles and use SMS and phishing kits to communicate. Scams leveraging these phishing kits are 688 times more effective in dollar terms and four times more effective in average transaction size than regular scams. Scams that buy bulk social media accounts are likewise 238 times more effective in dollar terms and two times more effective in average transaction value than regular scams.
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Chainalysis data and tools as part of the response
The uniquely transparent manner in which blockchains operate opens up powerful opportunities to gain insights into illicit activity occurring on these networks. However, this data is difficult to access without the right tools, training, and data. Over the past ten years, Chainalysis has become indispensable to the workflows of law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the US and globally, as well as to corporate compliance and risk departments.
The most demonstrable result from this work is the support that Chainalysis has provided on hundreds of cryptocurrency cases since its inception, involving seizures and freezing of assets in partnership with government agencies worldwide, helping secure an estimated $34 billion dollars worth of illicit crypto.1 2025 saw unprecedented law enforcement action against scams, including two of the largest-ever crypto-related law enforcement actions directly connected to scam operations.
The following notable scam-related crypto seizures were only possible due to the transparency of the blockchain and the availability of state-of-the-art tools and data like those Chainalysis provides. These actions mark a shift from reactive victim recovery to systematic dismantling, targeting not just front-line scammers, but also the executives, infrastructure, shell companies, and financial rails that sustain them.
Together, they illustrate a new, more integrated phase in scam enforcement: one focused on breaking the economic backbone of crypto-enabled fraud at scale and across borders, rather than treating scams as local, isolated, or purely digital crimes.
* In October 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed charges against a Cambodian national and Prince Group chairman Chen Zhi for allegedly overseeing Cambodian forced-labor scam compounds that powered large-scale cryptocurrency fraud targeting victims worldwide.
According to prosecutors, these compounds operated as vertically integrated fraud factories: trafficked individuals were coerced into running pig butchering investment scams and romance fraud schemes, laundering proceeds through cryptocurrency to obscure attribution and scale operations globally. Critically, U.S. authorities paired these indictments with large-scale financial disruption, including arrests across transnational money laundering networks and actions to seize and forfeit more than $15 billion in illicit proceeds linked to scam activity.
* In November 2025, the UK's Metropolitan Police secured convictions in a landmark crypto money laundering case that led to the world's largest confirmed cryptocurrency seizure, recovering over 61,000 Bitcoin -- currently valued at around pound sterling5 billion -- from Chinese national Zhimin Qian (also known as Yadi Zhang), who orchestrated a multibillion-pound investment fraud in China that victimized more than 128,000 people between 2014 and 2017.
* Also in November 2025, the U.S. Scam Center Strike Force's success in seizing over $401 million in cryptocurrency demonstrates the effectiveness of blockchain intelligence in taking action against transnational scam operations.
* In August 2025, it was revealed that APAC-based law enforcement froze $47 million in pig butchering funds through collaboration with the private sector, following a similarly successful public-private sector collaboration that resulted in the freeze of $225 million in funds.
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1 "Asset Seizure and Cryptocurrency: How Chainalysis Creates Opportunities for Self-Sustaining Law Enforcement," Chainalysis, Mar. 26, 2025, https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/cryptocurrency-assetseizure/.
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AML compliance and the need for prevention
Chainalysis data and tools are not only integral to public sector operations and seizures but also play an important role in the AML programs of financial institutions, crypto businesses, and a broad swath of private sector businesses motivated to stop scam activity. Chainalysis data is leveraged by cryptocurrency businesses and financial institutions for transaction monitoring, enhanced due diligence, and, when appropriate, enhancing SAR filings.
At Chainalysis, we also think it is imperative to move beyond reactive compliance and fraud workflows and to develop processes to prevent Americans from falling prey to scams altogether. Furthermore, in the same way that we observe criminals adapt to and leverage technological developments to their own ends, so too can we harness and encourage the use of AI technology to help financial institutions and crypto platforms prevent their customers from sending funds to likely scams.
Chainalysis Alterya provides real-time proactive fraud protection for payments and enhanced fraud detection during KYC for exchanges, blockchains, and wallet providers. Alterya has already helped top crypto exchanges decrease fraud by up to 60%, reduce scam-related disputes, and improve the efficiency of manual operations. Alterya utilizes artificial intelligence and other advanced techniques to identify scam activities across various online sources, enabling large-scale early "upstream" detection.
We construct a comprehensive scam social graph that interconnects fraudulent activities across multiple platforms, payment systems, and blockchains. Our adversaries are leveraging AI to rob Americans of their life savings, and we must leverage that very technology to beat them at their own game.
Alterya monitors $23B+ in monthly transactions and helps protect hundreds of millions of users across crypto and fiat payment rails, focusing on recipient side risk and money mule detection, critical for stopping authorized push payment (APP) fraud, where victims are socially engineered into authorizing transfers from their own accounts to criminals. Over the past 12 months, Alterya has prevented more than $300 million in losses by supporting customers in proactively reducing fraud. This is what the future of combating scams looks like.
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Recommendations
We are encouraged that this Committee is considering ways to strengthen the U.S. response to scams and fraud involving cryptocurrency that target older victims. We suggest a multi-pronged approach to address this complex problem, consisting of four key recommendations:
1. Mobilize a whole-of-government and industry national anti-scam strategy that prioritizes enhanced reporting and collaborative information sharing that can best disrupt scam conglomerates;
2. Leverage technologies designed for both the prevention and remediation of scams;
3. Ensure financial institutions and crypto businesses are incentivized to assist in the prevention of transactions to scams and have appropriate guidance to enable them to do so;
4. Advocate to close gaps in the implementation of AML/CFT standards by FATF members, especially countries that scammers rely on to launder funds defrauded from Americans.
Taken together and properly implemented, these recommendations will help limit financial flows to scammers, either by preventing victims from sending funds in the first place or by dismantling the scam operations themselves. Further details on each of these are provided below:
1. Create a national anti-scam strategy to orchestrate a comprehensive response which includes centralizing U.S. victim scam reporting, streamlining coordinated action to dismantle scam conglomerates and return funds to victims, and facilitating information sharing between the public and private sectors.
i. Improved reporting mechanisms
Today, scam victims in America have multiple options for reporting their crimes to federal and local law enforcement. This is one factor contributing to a fragmented approach to combating scams and has hindered our response time and visibility into the true scale of the impact on potential victims, both in the US and abroad.
A centralized reporting database that feeds from state, local, and federal sources is critical to enhancing efficiency and actionable intelligence for cases that lead to the recovery of funds, restitution, and the prevention of additional victims. National coordination could streamline the process of connecting a single victim to a larger scheme that has netted thousands of victims and millions of dollars in funds, optimizing opportunities for disruption, the prospect of returning seized assets to victims, and making scammers less profitable overall. Similarly, Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) are filed by financial institutions, but the crucial information contained in these reports about specific scams is not accessible to other financial institutions or to entities supporting scam prevention. This lack of information sharing creates blind spots and delays in response, enabling scammers to continue their illicit activities unabated.
ii. Prioritizing information sharing and collaboration
Addressing the challenge of crypto-integrated laundering networks demands a coordinated publicprivate partnership and a paradigm shift from reactive enforcement against individual platforms to proactive disruption of the underlying networks. By combining law enforcement's legal authorities with the private sector's technical capabilities and blockchain analytics expertise, the industry can more effectively identify and dismantle these services operating across multiple platforms, jurisdictions, and communication channels. On-chain transparency provides unprecedented visibility into these operations, enabling stakeholders to assess the cost and risk of operating large-scale money laundering services. Future intervention strategies must prioritize this collaborative approach to achieve meaningful, lasting disruption of crypto-integrated laundering networks, including Chinese-language money-laundering operations.
Public-private partnerships are already having success. Chainalysis's Operation Spincaster program was designed to disrupt and prevent scams through public-private collaboration by proactively identifying thousands of compromised wallets.2 This actionable intelligence formed the basis for a series of operational sprints across six countries, including 19 public-sector agencies and 18 crypto exchanges.
Over 7,000 leads were disseminated during these sprints relating to approximately USD $187 million of losses. These leads were used to close accounts, seize funds, and build intelligence to prevent future scams.
Further, Chainalysis is a member of the National Elder Fraud Coordination Center, the first-ever national effort that analyzes and assembles private and public sector data and resources into the investigative packages needed by law enforcement to investigate and prosecute criminal fraud rings targeting older Americans. These are examples of how formalized efforts to streamline private-public collaboration can optimize outcomes.
Singapore's Anti-Scam Command (ASCom) serves as a potential model for efficiently combating scams by eliminating silos and working constructively with over 80 private-sector partners. The industry and regulatory bodies must work together to break down these information silos and adopt a more cohesive, collaborative approach to combating cryptocurrency-related scams. This will ensure that the inherent advantages of blockchain technology for tracing and combating financial crime are fully leveraged and that scammers cannot exploit the system due to gaps in communication and information sharing.
The recently announced Scam Center Strike Force and proposed legislation, such as the Scam Compound Accountability and Mobilization Act, will help define and execute an international strategy to take on scam compounds globally. This approach should study the scam supply chain holistically and leverage all levers of government, including law enforcement and regulatory actions, to target the entire scam supply chain, from money launderers to gambling syndicates to compounds to phishing kit developers to data brokers.
2. Encourage the adoption of advanced technologies to combat scammers' growing sophistication and to prevent and remediate scams across fiat and digital asset rails.
i. Broaden access to data, tools, and training
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2 "Introducing Chainalysis Operation Spincaster: An Ecosystem-Wide Initiative To Disrupt and Prevent Billions in Losses to Crypto Scams," Chainalysis, Jul. 18, 2024, https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/operation-spincaster/.
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With the broader adoption of cryptocurrency on the rise, including among illicit actors, it is no longer sufficient to confine knowledge of crypto networks to a small group of technical experts. Rather, government agencies and departments must have the resources to ensure that a broad spectrum of personnel receive the latest training on how crypto networks operate, how blockchain analysis can supplement traditional analytical and operational workflows, and what actions can be taken to quickly disrupt illicit fund movements through crypto networks. Too often, victims are turned away from local authorities who are ill-equipped or even uninformed as to how to take on crypto cases. Other times, an individual complaint might not be prioritized if law enforcement doesn't have the analytic tools it needs to connect a low-value scam payment to a larger scam conglomerate that nets tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. Furthermore, we must acknowledge that a significant number of scams likely go unreported; however, the transparent nature of the blockchain enables investigators to identify all potential victim payments into a scam and can vastly expand their case with assistance from cryptocurrency businesses.
While the proposed Guarding Unprotected Aging Retirees from Deception (GUARD) Act would expressly allow federal law enforcement agencies to assist in these cases, we believe this should not replace providing tools and training to state and local agencies so they can help victims in their jurisdictions.
Particular offices within agencies have invested in integrating blockchain analytics into their workflows and achieved significant success, among them IRS Criminal Investigations and the FBI's Virtual Asset Unit. However, the extensive overlap of crypto across many agencies' missions necessitates a broader cohort of agencies and their staff to understand the underlying technology, have access to the same tools, and receive training to encourage more successful outcomes.
ii. Adoption of cutting-edge technology, systems, and tools that move beyond reactive enforcement While the traditional reactive paradigm of enforcement is important, it is not enough for the speed and scale of scams today. The organized crime groups behind scams move quickly and operate in regions that are difficult to access, making real-time prevention mechanisms a vital line of defense. Given these challenges and the sheer volume of victims, some agencies and investigators across the public and private sectors are now turning to advanced proactive detection techniques.
The future of fraud prevention relies on the deployment of novel technologies such as machine learning and AI. Chainalysis Alterya provides financial institutions with the tools to map the entire lifecycle of fraudulent operations, from initial online scam campaigns and money muling to monetization within financial services and subsequent money laundering and cash-out processes through proactive AI-driven solutions. It identifies scammers before they meet their victims, collecting identifying information about the scammers and the fraudulent scheme. This data is then integrated with customers' transaction monitoring platforms, providing real-time analysis of scam exposure and enabling them to identify and track interactions with scam addresses, assess risk, and take preventive measures.
All relevant agencies and law enforcement should also have this opportunity to move decisively upstream and take the fight directly to scammers. In such a scenario, rather than simply investigating reported crimes, the public and private sectors could best leverage real-time blockchain data, DNS data, and AI technology to identify, disrupt, and potentially prevent illicit activity.
For example, Chainalysis Alterya can help agencies transform scattered victim reports into mapped scam campaigns that connect wallets, domains, social accounts, and other identifiers, giving agencies a single source of truth on how a fraud network actually operates. That same network view becomes the foundation for case triage and victim support--analysts can quickly see which victims are linked, what other identifiers to pursue, and where to prioritize investigative resources. This network view can also power supervisory analytics and market wide disruption, enabling agencies to track typologies over time, measure exposure across institutions and rails, and coordinate targeted interventions against the scamming infrastructure that makes these frauds possible in the first place.
Congress should ensure that relevant federal, state, and local agencies have the tools, resources, and legal authorities necessary to: (1) access, analyze, and act on blockchain and other digital intelligence; (2) collaborate effectively with financial institutions, crypto platforms, and other private sector intermediaries; and (3) integrate AI enabled risk detection into their investigative, supervisory, and consumer protection workflows. This combination of AI driven analytics and blockchain intelligence can materially improve our ability to detect, disrupt, and deter scams at scale, while strengthening restitution outcomes for victims and raising the cost of doing business for organized scam networks.
3. Provide guidance to financial institutions and crypto businesses to help them prevent customers from sending funds to scams and intervene when scam-detection technology identifies risk.
Although the technology exists for cryptocurrency businesses and financial institutions to detect when a customer is trying to send funds to a scam wallet, they lack the legal basis to hold a customer's funds.
Even after a crypto business warns a customer that they are trying to send funds to a scam, more often than not, the customer is so duped by the scammers that they will still opt to release their funds to the scammer. The U.S. Government should establish clear, consistent guidelines for how financial institutions and cryptocurrency businesses may intervene when they suspect customers are being targeted by scams, so that firms are not forced to choose between overreaching into consumers' access to their own funds and passively facilitating payments into organized scam networks.
Today, banks and crypto platforms lack standardized expectations and a legal basis around when and how they can slow, block, or scrutinize suspicious transactions, and what forms of customer outreach and friction are appropriate in these scenarios. With better access to data, typologies, and public private information sharing, these institutions would be far better equipped to strike the right balance between consumer protection and customer autonomy. Congress should therefore direct regulators to issue guidance that encourages the use of advanced fraud prevention technologies, such as Chainalysis Alterya, which enable financial institutions and cryptocurrency businesses to detect and prevent likely scam payments in real time. These tools have already demonstrated that they can significantly reduce authorized push payment (APP) fraud losses, lower the volume of customer disputes, and help institutions retain customers by protecting them from devastating financial harm while preserving safe access to their own money.
One solution could be to implement an optional, scams-specific hold on funds, backed by liability protections, that allows stablecoin issuers, cryptocurrency businesses, and financial institutions to temporarily stop suspicious transactions as soon as they or law enforcement identify red flags.
4. Close gaps in AML/CFT standards implementation for FATF members, especially countries that host scam compounds and the services they rely on to launder funds defrauded from Americans.
More capacity building is needed in jurisdictions with weak AML and CFT policies - particularly across Southeast Asia, where scam compounds operated by Chinese transnational criminal organizations and their local partners have become major hubs for large-scale fraud targeting Americans and other victims worldwide. These same networks increasingly rely on Chinese-language money laundering services as key vehicles for laundering the proceeds of these schemes and cycling them back into the global financial system. In the absence of cooperation, more pressure is needed to disrupt the financial networks and the digital asset services flagrantly abusing laws and regulatory norms. Sanctions have proven to be an effective tool, and sustained enforcement actions targeting every facet of the scam supply chain - especially the offshore institutions that defy international norms and AML/CFT processes and standards - would help cut off scam perpetrators and their facilitators from the global financial system.
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Original text here: https://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/f57529d9-aa4d-34b8-2e16-1c4d42153913/Testimony_Burns%20Koven%2001.14.26.pdf
Blackbeard Biologic CEO Thaler Testifies Before House Natural Resources Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resource released the following testimony by Andrew Thaler, founder and CEO of Blackbeard Biologic - Science and Environmental Advisors, St. Michaels, Maryland, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Deep Dive: Examining the Regulatory and Statutory Barriers to Deep Sea Mining":* * *
Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member, and Members, good afternoon and thank you for inviting me to speak today. My name is Andrew Thaler. I am a deep sea ecologist with more than 15 years of experience researching the environmental ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resource released the following testimony by Andrew Thaler, founder and CEO of Blackbeard Biologic - Science and Environmental Advisors, St. Michaels, Maryland, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Deep Dive: Examining the Regulatory and Statutory Barriers to Deep Sea Mining": * * * Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member, and Members, good afternoon and thank you for inviting me to speak today. My name is Andrew Thaler. I am a deep sea ecologist with more than 15 years of experience researching the environmentalimpacts of deep sea mining. My expertise includes deep sea ecology and marine technology.
My goal today is to give the Committee an objective overview of the reality of deep sea mining.
While I have significant concerns about the long-term environmental harms that can result from mining the deep seafloor, I am not an absolutist against all forms of deep-sea mining.
Polymetallic nodule mining in particular has promise. However, I do think there are significant environmental as well as practical hurdles that need to be addressed before any commercial mining is permitted.
While we frequently talk about deep-sea mining as a single cohesive industry, in reality it is three different industries targeting different ore types with wildly different impacts to the marine environment. Recent executive orders and RFIs take an inclusive approach to deep-sea mining permitting, so I think it is important to keep in mind that policies developed for polymetallic nodule mining will be inappropriate and insufficient for seafloor massive sulphide mining at hydrothermal vents or ferromanganese crust mining on seamounts.
In looking at the viability of a deep-sea mining project, I consider three overarching questions: First, is it urgent? Given the current surpluses in the nickel and cobalt markets, the lack of domestic refining capacity within the United States, and the current pace of technological development, the urgency of deep-sea mining for polymetallic nodules does not exist. Current proposals involve a significant amount of stockpiling of nodules due to lack of refining capacity and the cheapest place to stockpile a nodule is to leave it on the seafloor.
Second, can it be conducted in a manner consistent with environmentally responsible best practices? For hydrothermal vents and seamounts, I do not believe that deep-sea mining is viable. These ecosystems are too small and too fragile. For polymetallic nodules, I remain optimistic that there exists a path forward that respects the ecosystems of the deep sea, but limitations to our knowledge of the long-term impacts and the evolving state of technology means that I am not yet confident that we have reached that point.
While my colleagues in the industry insist that the abyssal plain - the vast, flat areas of the ocean floor that lie 2 to 4 miles beneath the surface - is more akin to a desert than a rainforest, the opposite is true. The deep abyssal plain is more biodiverse than tropical rainforests, with more unique species and genetic novelty than almost any other ecosystem on the planet. High biodiversity coupled with low abundance of individuals makes these species especially vulnerable to extinction. Nodule fields provide unique habitat and species abundance within nodules fields can be two to three times higher than the background abyssal plain.
The direct impact to the seafloor from the mining tool and the benthic plumes which smother the area immediately surrounding extraction leave permanent scars, with species recovery still depressed decades after mining occurred. Nodule fields take millions of years to form and recovery occurs centuries. While I am supportive of the efforts undertaken by Mr. Barron and Mr. Gunasekara to address these impacts, ultimately, the science shows that we should consider any impact to the seafloor environment around a mining site to be permanent.
Beyond the seafloor, there are questions about the impact of mid-water and surface plumes that can spread chemically-polluted waters for hundreds to thousands of miles, impacting marine prey species as well as commercially important fish species. There is the production of marine noise, which persists throughout the lifetime of the mining operation. And there is the physical presence of ships in relatively untrafficked areas, which increase the risk of ship strikes to whales and other marine life.
Third, and, in my view, most important, does the project have local support? Within the US, mining will occur in areas connected to people with strong personal and cultural ties to these waters. Lack of local support has practical logistical impacts. A mining operation off the coast of American Samoa, will depend on American Samoan businesses and services. Without a good faith effort to build inroads in local communities, the realities of overseeing a large offshore operation become exponentially more challenging, expensive, and complex.
The responses to recent RFIs have revealed near-universal, bipartisan community opposition to deep-sea mining in American Samoa, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. A rush towards commercial mining without first building significant relationships within these communities is unlikely to produce a successful venture. One only needs to look to offshore wind development in New Jersey to see how a lack of local support can hinder offshore development.
In international waters, there is an international community to address. Deep-sea mining is, by necessity, an international endeavor, and partner states such as Japan and Korea are party to the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Mining in the CCZ under US permits without the support of the ISA will lead to significant legal challenges, further slowing progress on the international mining code.
The lack of urgency, environmental unknowns, and local opposition does not justify a rush to expedite permitting for deep-sea mining. Deep-sea mining has many issues both environmental and practical that are still unresolved.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee. I look forward to your questions.
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Environmental Impacts of Deep-sea Mining/1
Polymetallic sulphides. The geochemical processes that create these ore deposits provide chemical energy that supports novel ecosystems built on chemosynthetic primary production (Van Dover et al., 2018). The ore cannot be isolated from the ecosystem (Collins et al., 2013).
The direct impact to the hydrothermal vent ecosystem will be catastrophic, resulting in complete defaunation and habitat destruction of the immediate vent environment (Van Dover, 2014). In the only study of the environmental impacts of mining a deep-sea hydrothermal vent, biodiversity collapsed following exploitation and had not recovered after 3 years (Washburn et al., 2023a).
Hydrothermal-vent communities are well-connected and even in limited, controlled mining trials, downstream impacts will impact hydrothermal vent communities beyond the mining area (Thaler et al., 2017, 2014, 2011). At inactive vent sites, mining may still result in comprehensive removal of endemic ecosystems (Erickson et al., 2009). Even at inactive hydrothermal vent systems, abundant successional communities appear dependent on remnant chemosynthetic activity (Mullineaux et al., 2025).
Cobalt-rich crusts. Mining occurs on thick layers of crust coating the rocky tops and upper walls of seamounts and results in the comprehensive removal of ore-bearing material as well as habitat for numerous species, including long-lived, slow growing sessile species like corals from the encrusted rocky tops and upper walls of seamounts (Weaver and Billett, 2019). Seamounts tend to host high biomass ecosystems, providing habitat and supporting nursery grounds for commercially important fisheries (Morato et al., 2010). Though studies on the environmental impacts of mining cobalt-rich crusts are limited, baseline studies have shown that community structure on crusts differs from that of non-crust seamount regions and that recovery from mining disturbance will be slow (Schlacher et al., 2014). In the only, to date, study of the environmental impacts of mining a cobalt-rich crust, mobile epifauna were less abundant following disturbance (Washburn et al., 2023b).
Polymetallic nodules. Polymetallic-nodule extraction involves collecting nodules directly from the seafloor. The nodules themselves are habitat for many species found exclusively within nodule fields, including sponges, corals, tube-building worms, barnacles, and other species (Amon et al., 2016; De Smet et al., 2021). Nodule fields play a key role in abyssal plain communities, driving biodiversity, abundance, and community composition, and may be critical for maintaining the integrity of deep food webs (Amon et al., 2016; Durden et al., 2021; SimonLledo et al., 2023, 2020; Stratmann et al., 2021; Uhlenkott et al., 2023; Vanreusel et al., 2016).
Removal of nodules may also reshape the microbial ecosystem beneath the nodules (Wear et al., 2021).
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1 This section has been adapted and expanded from Thaler, Andrew D., 2025. Impacts of Deep-sea Mining on Migratory Species: Review and Knowledge Gaps. CMS Secretariat, Bonn, Germany. [https://www.cms.int/sites/default/files/document/202511/cms cop15 doc.25.2.3 annex1 dsm-report e.pdf]
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Nodule-mining experiments were conducted in the 1970s and 1980s to assess the long-term impacts of deep-sea nodule mining, including at the DIS-turbance and re-COL-onization experiment (DISCOL) site in the Peru Basin, which is among the best studied experimental mining sites (Thiel et al., 2001). Twenty-six years after the disturbance, there has been no sign of recovery of benthic filter feeders and mobile scavengers have a quantitatively different community composition compared with the original community (Jones et al., 2017; Simon-Lledo et al., 2019). Microbial communities and ecosystem function may have also failed to recover (Molari et al., 2020; Volz et al., 2020; Vonnahme et al., 2020). Recent surveys have shown that biological impacts of polymetallic nodule mining persist for at least 44 years, though some mobile species have begun to re-establish (Jones et al., 2025). The direct impacts to the ecosystem of the immediate mining site will likely persist for at least several decades beyond the lifetime of the mine and may never recover to its pre-mining condition, given many of the fauna live directly on the nodules, which take millions of years to form.
Plumes. The extent, and thus environmental impact, from sediment plumes depends on the mining technology used in collecting and processing the ore (Peacock and Ouillon, 2023), the characteristics of the underlying sediment (Gillard et al., 2019), and the current regime and biodiversity present in these specific areas.
Collection plume. All forms of deep-sea mining generate a sediment plume at the seabed, where the activities of the mining tool mobilize sediment. This sediment plume could extend several kilometers across the deep seafloor (Gillard et al., 2019). Though historically spread of up to 100km was suggested, recent studies suggest that the extent of the plume may be much more limited, with the majority of sediment deposited within a few meters of the disturbance site with lower concentration buoyant and passive-transport phases (Peacock and Ouillon, 2023). A recent independent assessment of an experimental nodule collector observed plumes dispersing up to at least 4.5 km (the limit of the monitoring area), with suspended particle concentration of four orders of magnitude greater than background observed 50 m from mining tracks and redeposited sediment adjacent to the mining tracks of approximately 3 cm (Gazis et al., 2025).
While some nodule collector designs may mobilize the top 5 to 15 cm of sediment (Peacock and Ouillon, 2023), others are being designed to operate with a presumptively less aggressive removal process./2
The duration and propagation of the collection plume will be dependent on the specific design and operation of the collection vehicle. The plume may propagate beyond the immediate mining area, with heavy sedimentation occurring within 100 meters from the nodule collector (Burns, 1980). Observations of an experimental tracked mining vehicle in the ClarionClipperton Zone documented a plume that rose 3 meters above the seafloor and propagated for more than 100 meters beyond the immediate mining site (Munoz-Royo et al., 2022), with 2% to 8% of the mobilized sediment detected more than 2 meters above the seafloor and did not settle out over several hours of observation. As the ultimate evolution of the plume can be mediated by environmental conditions, such as site-specific tidal influence, benthic currents, and seafloor topography, as well as the specific design of the nodule collector, models predicting the total extent of the broadly dispersed, dilute passive-transport phase of the collection plume may be off by orders of magnitude and precise prediction of plume propagation depends on accurate in-situ observations using operation-specific measurement of plume evolution (Peacock and Ouillon, 2023).
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2 Collingwood team creating friendlier robot for deep sea mining - https://www.collingwoodtoday.ca/local-news/collingwood-teamcreating-friendlier-robot-for-deep-sea-mining-10773843
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Collection plumes can smother the surrounding ecosystem, resulting in loss of marine habitat and biodiversity (Miller et al., 2018). Ore from deep-sea deposits may be enriched in heavy metals such as lead and arsenic which can be mobilized into the ecosystem during mining (Hauton et al., 2017; Price et al., 2016). One study indicated that deep-sea marine mammals interact with the seafloor in the area around the Clarion-Clipperton Zone and that plume generation may disrupt feeding patterns (Marsh et al., 2018). Recent studies detected minimal residual effects from the sedimentation plume 44 years after a small-scale test nodule mine (Jones et al., 2025), but at the DISCOL site 26 years post-disturbance, megafauna and fish communities still showed impacts in plume-effected seafloor (Drazen et al., 2021; Simon-Lledo et al., 2019).
Return plume. Nodules recovered to the surface carry with them a fraction of benthic sediment.
Depending on the method of extraction, this return plume can consist of ore-enriched sediments (including both particulate and dissolved metals produced when recovered ore is dewatered (Spearman et al., 2020). In the majority of proposed mining scenarios, this plume occurs in the midwater, though proposals to discharge the return plume closer to the seafloor have also been presented. As yet, there are no regulations to mandate the depth of the return plume. Midwater plumes can persist for weeks to more than 4 months before finally settling out on the seafloor, allowing these plumes to disperse over hundreds to thousands of kilometers (Peacock and Ouillon, 2023). Midwater plumes have the potential to significantly disrupt marine food webs (Dowd et al., 2025) and heavy-metals from plumes may bioaccumulate in higher trophic levels including migratory and commercially important fish species (Amon et al., 2023).
The epipelagic and mesopelagic, in particular, has received relatively little consideration compared to the deep benthos where mining occurs (Drazen et al., 2020). Dewatering plumes, if released in the photic zone, may disrupt the nutrient flow in otherwise nutrient-limited waters, triggering algal blooms which can ultimately starve a region and smother seafloor communities once the algae begin to die off. Dewatering plumes will discharge large volumes of inorganic mud and ore particles into midwaters (~50,000m3 d-1; Drazen et al., 2020) that could dilute the organic detrital particles that deep-midwater filter feeders rely upon. In one study, deep-sea corals exposed to suspend particles from polymetallic sulphides resulted in tissue loss, necrosis, and the bioaccumulation of copper in coral specimens (Carreiro-Silva et al., 2022). A recent investigation into the potential effects of dewatering plumes on a deep-pelagic jellyfish indicated that deep-sea mining would negatively impact biodiversity and ecosystem function in the midwater zone (Stenvers et al., 2023).
Surface plume. Surface plumes can be produced by the dewatering process but will more likely be the result of accidental or emergency discharge. These discharges can alter the neuston directly surrounding the mining vessel (Helm, 2021) and interfere with migration and feeding behavior of pelagic species, including marine mammals and migratory seabirds, as well as the pelagic communities they are dependent on. As no current deep-sea mining contractor proposes releasing surface plumes as part of their operations, studies on the promulgation of deep-sea mining-derived surface plumes are limited. Mining contractors recognize that intentional surface discharge of nodule waste is "too environmentally challenging to be viable" (Peacock and Ouillon, 2023). At least one case of accidental surface plume discharge has already been reported from a deep-sea mining vessel conducting experimental trials in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone./3
That unintentional discharge covered and area significant enough to be tracked from space (Yin et al., 2024).
Noise. With the exception of the hydrothermal vents associated with polymetallic sulphides, the soundscape of the deep sea is relatively quiet and poorly studied (Chen et al., 2021). One nodule field soundscape within Japan's EEZ was observed to be quieter even than Challenger Deep in the Mariana Trench (Chen et al., 2021). Deep-sea mining will introduce multiple new sources of marine noise pollution into regions that are historically lightly trafficked and exposed to limited anthropogenic noise. Mining operations involving robotic vehicles are expected to operate around the clock, with ore pumped continuously from the seafloor to the surface via a riser and lift system. A surface vessel, on site for months at a time, also contributes to altering the acoustic environment. Noise from deep-sea mining operations can span vast areas, with acute impacts focused in the area immediately around the mining site and surface vessel (Williams et al., 2022). The cumulative impacts of chronic noise exposure from mining systems will likely have far greater impact than the short-term, acute sound exposure most often assessed in noise exposure studies (Williams et al., 2025).
Habitat-specific soundscapes can serve as cue for settlement and significant alterations to the deep soundscape could mask the acoustic signals that larvae use to locate appropriate habitats (Chen et al., 2021). The noise generated by a commercial nodule operation could produce a cylinder of sound of up to a 6 km radius which exceeds standard thresholds for impacting the behavior of marine mammals (Southall et al., 2019; Williams et al., 2022). Even relatively shortduration scientific research cruises using submersible assets have been shown to significantly alter the immediate soundscape (Chen et al., 2021).
For marine mammals, sea turtles, and other migratory species, anthropogenic noise can cause behavioral changes, including interrupting feeding behaviors, altering vocalizations, and triggering flight response from high noise areas. Behavioral changes associated with anthropogenic noise are often unpredictable and not necessarily correlated with the volume of the noise source, but a multitude of factors (Williams et al., 2025). In the most extreme cases, sound can lead to direct damage to ear structures, which can be lethal (Gomez et al., 2016).
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3 Leaked video footage of ocean pollution shines light on deep-sea mining: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/feb/06/leaked-video-footage-of-ocean-pollution-shines-light-on-deep-sea-mining high-intensity
At least one study suggests that deep-diving beaked whales may interact with the seafloor in the Clarion Clipperton Zone (Marsh et al., 2018). Many deep-sea mining contract areas are not only located where cetaceans are active, but in regions that are otherwise rarely disturbed by human activities. The noise produced by mining operations are known to overlap with the frequency at which many cetaceans communicate, which may lead to permanent alteration in the behavior of populations still in recovery from two centuries of commercial whaling (Thompson et al., 2023).
Commercially Important Fisheries. Bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin tuna populations are present within the CCZ, and fall under the aegis of two regional fisheries management organizations in that part of the oceans (van der Grient and Drazen, 2021). The populations fished in the CCZ represent some of the most valuable commercial fisheries in the world. There is significant spatial overlap between deep-sea mining contract areas and fishing grounds (van der Grient and Drazen, 2021), which will likely lead to direct conflict between these two industrial activities, especially as climate change drives increasing overlaps between the two activities (Amon et al., 2023). Metal-enriched discharge plumes may also cause heavy metals to enter the food web, resulting in bioaccumulation within apex predators and spoiling the value of the fishery, much the same as mercury bioaccumulation in swordfish resulted in devaluing of the fishery (Amon et al., 2023). The bioaccumulation of heavy metals can result in significant adverse health effects for high-trophic-level predators (Ray and Vashishth, 2024).
Underwater Cultural Heritage. Relatively little consideration has been given to the social and cultural impacts of deep-sea mining. Lack of stakeholder engagement with the peoples that may be most immediately affected by deep-sea mining is a frequent point of contention among ISA delegations (Jaeckel et al., 2023). Deep-sea mining comes in direct conflict with, in particular, the cultural heritage of Pacific Islanders./4
Deep-sea mining leases fall within both the Micronesian and Polynesian Voyaging Triangles - areas where traditional navigators established and maintained millennium-spanning connections between remote islands, as well as recent proposals within the EEZs associated with American Samoa and Papua New Guinea. Further, many culturally significant migratory species occur in proposed mining areas in the Pacific (Tilot et al., 2021).
Deep-sea hydrothermal vents have significant cultural and scientific value. The first deep-sea marine protected areas were established around historically important hydrothermal vent fields within the Marine Park of the Azores and the Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents Marine Protected Area in Canada (Menini and Van Dover, 2019). The Middle Passage, a region of the Mid-Atlantic, encompasses the historic route through which millions of enslaved people were transported from West Africa to the Americas and Caribbean and serves as a maritime graveyard for up to 2 million people (Turner et al., 2020). Several ISA-issued deep-sea mining leases fall within the historic seaways of the Middle Passage. At least one campaign to declare the seafloor of the Middle Passage as a maritime cemetery is underway./5
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4 Connecting Conservation and Culture in Oceania - https://www.angelovillagomez.com/2022/09/connecting-conservation-andculture-in.html
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Comment on Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands/6
The area proposed by BOEM in the CNMI is inadequate for deep-sea polymetallic nodule mining. There is almost no environmental baseline data for this area. There are no known commercially viable nodule field within the area. The area is topographically complex, with numerous seamounts that make deep-sea mining based on current established best practices nearly impossible. There are roughly 125 seamounts and 22 knolls consolidated into 38 major seamount and guyot structures in the BOEM RFI representing some of the oldest seafloor and seamounts in the world. Analyses of seamounts elsewhere in the Pacific Ocean have resulted in a recommendation for an Ecologically of Biologically Significant Marine Area buffer of at least 30 km around existing seamounts. Approximately 99.9% of the lease area is within 100 km of a seamount, and 92% of the lease area is within 30 km of a seamount.
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Biodiversity in the CCZ7
The Clarion-Clipperton Zone harbors immense species richness. Conservative estimates indicate that the CCZ is highly biodiverse and that current undersampling underrepresents the full extent of biodiversity. Studies confirm trends of both high biodiversity and low abundance. A third of species (37%) are represented by a single individual. 436 named species had been catalogued, of which 185 were new to science (Rabone et al., 2023). This likely represents a small fraction of true biodiversity. There is an estimated 6,200 and 7,600 species in the region. Macrofauna like brittle stars show high site-to-site turnover, with 44% of species known from just a single site (Macheriotou et al., 2025), while meiofaunal like nematodes are widespread. 12 of the 19 most abundant species occurring at all sampling locations but still account for a small fraction of the estimated 360 species identified in this group (Macheriotou et al., 2025). Polychaetes are highly diverse, with over 1,600 species estimated across the CCZ but fewer than 3% formally described (Bonifacio et al., 2024).
Ninety percent recovery of by-products from existing domestic metal mining operations could meet nearly all US critical mineral needs
In terms of defense and national security, where we're really losing ground is in discovery.
Scientific discovery. For the last 50 years, every major discovery in the deep-sea has happened aboard an American ship or with the major contribution of US researchers. And these are real, economically tangible discoveries. Discovering hydrothermal vents fundamentally changed how we think about biology and revolutionized the medical industry to the tune of trillions of dollars.
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5 Group urges Atlantic seafloor be labeled a memorial to slave trading - https://today.duke.edu/2020/11/group-urges-atlanticseafloor-be-labeled-memorial-slave-trading
6 These comments compiled from Comment from Deep-sea subject matter experts in response to the BOEM RFI https://www.regulations.gov/comment/BOEM-2025-0351-0694
7 Adapted from a paper in prep by Thaler, Betters, and McClain
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And we keep discovering new and totally novel ecosystems in the deep sea about once a decade.
This year, for the first time, a Chinese research team discovered the deepest know complex ecosystem at 10,000 meters. So by pulling back on research in favor of mineral extraction, we are ceding American research dominance, and that can have real, long-lasting impacts that vastly exceed any economic benefits from mining the deep.
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Works Cited:
* Amon, D.J., Gollner, S., Morato, T., Smith, C.R., Chen, C., Christiansen, S., Currie, B., Drazen, J.C., Fukushima, T., Gianni, M., Gjerde, K.M., Gooday, A.J., Grillo, G.G., Haeckel, M., Joyini, T., Ju, S.-J., Levin, L.A., Metaxas, A., Mianowicz, K., Molodtsova, T.N., Narberhaus, I., Orcutt, B.N., Swaddling, A., Tuhumwire, J., Palacio, P.U., Walker, M., Weaver, P., Xu, X.-W., Mulalap, C.Y., Edwards, P.E.T., Pickens, C., 2022. Assessment of scientific gaps related to the effective environmental management of deep-seabed mining. Mar. Policy 138, 105006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2022.105006
* Amon, D.J., Palacios-Abrantes, J., Drazen, J.C., Lily, H., Nathan, N., van der Grient, J.M.A., McCauley, D., 2023. Climate change to drive increasing overlap between Pacific tuna fisheries and emerging deep-sea mining industry. Npj Ocean Sustain. 2, 1-8. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44183-023-00016-8
* Amon, D.J., Ziegler, A.F., Dahlgren, T.G., Glover, A.G., Goineau, A., Gooday, A.J., Wiklund, H., Smith, C.R., 2016. Insights into the abundance and diversity of abyssal megafauna in a polymetallic-nodule region in the eastern Clarion-Clipperton Zone. Sci. Rep. 6, 30492. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep30492
* Burns, R.E., 1980. Assessment of environmental effects of deep ocean mining of manganese nodules. Helgolander Meeresunters. 33, 433-442. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02414768
* Carreiro-Silva, M., Martins, I., Riou, V., Raimundo, J., Caetano, M., Bettencourt, R., Rakka, M., Cerqueira, T., Godinho, A., Morato, T., Colaco, A., 2022. Mechanical and toxicological effects of deep-sea mining sediment plumes on a habitat-forming cold-water octocoral. Front. Mar. Sci. 9.
* Chen, C., Lin, T.-H., Watanabe, H.K., Akamatsu, T., Kawagucci, S., 2021. Baseline soundscapes of deep-sea habitats reveal heterogeneity among ecosystems and sensitivity to anthropogenic impacts. Limnol. Oceanogr. 66, 3714-3727. https://doi.org/10.1002/lno.11911
* Collins, P., Kennedy, B., Copley, J., Boschen, R., Fleming, N., Forde, J., Ju, S.-J., Lindsay, D., Marsh, L., Nye, V., Patterson, A., Watanabe, H., Yamamoto, H., Carlsson, J., David Thaler, A., 2013. VentBase: Developing a consensus among stakeholders in the deep-sea regarding environmental impact assessment for deep-sea mining-A workshop report. Mar. Policy 42, 334-336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j marpol.2013.03.002 De Smet, B., Simon-Lledo, E., Mevenkamp, L., Pape, E., Pasotti, F., Jones, D.O.B., Vanreusel, A., 2021. The megafauna community from an abyssal area of interest for mining of polymetallic nodules. Deep Sea Res. Part Oceanogr. Res. Pap. 172, 103530. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dsr.2021.103530
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II06/20260122/118830/HHRG-119-II06-Wstate-ThalerA-20260122.pdf
The Metals Co. Chairman Barron Testifies Before House Natural Resources Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resource released the following testimony by Gerard Barron, chairman and CEO of The Metals Co. USA, Raleigh, North Carolina, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Deep Dive: Examining the Regulatory and Statutory Barriers to Deep Sea Mining":* * *
1. Introduction
Chairman Stauber, Ranking Member Ansari, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on regulatory and statutory barriers to deep seabed mining (DSM), an emerging industry that has the potential ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resource released the following testimony by Gerard Barron, chairman and CEO of The Metals Co. USA, Raleigh, North Carolina, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Deep Dive: Examining the Regulatory and Statutory Barriers to Deep Sea Mining": * * * 1. Introduction Chairman Stauber, Ranking Member Ansari, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on regulatory and statutory barriers to deep seabed mining (DSM), an emerging industry that has the potentialto transform America's critical mineral dependence into dominance that can last for centuries.
On land, China has established control over the global strategic minerals supply chain for its geopolitical and commercial advantage. Offshore, however, the United States has two advantages over its adversaries:
(1) an established regulatory regime to govern the industry, and
(2) an American DSM industry including companies like TMC USA that are ready to start commercial production during this Administration.
This lead should be cemented and accelerated through increased regulatory certainty and U.S. government support. China is not standing still--it has identified deep seabed minerals as a strategic priority and is pouring resources into dominating this new industry.
I would like to begin by commending the current Administration for its clear-eyed recognition that establishing a domestic supply chain of critical minerals is a matter of national security and that offshore minerals hold the potential to be a big part of the solution. Prior to this Administration, the American development of offshore minerals in the high seas under U.S. law was frozen in time for almost half a century. While Lockheed Martin continues to hold two exploration licenses, no at-sea activity has taken place in decades. The Administration's decisive action to unleash offshore minerals through the April 24, 2025 Executive Order (EO) 14285 and the subsequent engagement by all agencies tasked in the EO, have provided a clear and much needed signal. The response from the industry has been remarkable. We estimate that in the nine months following the EO, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has received over a dozen applications for exploration licenses and one application for a commercial recovery permit. We believe that the total area now under U.S. exploration licenses and license applications supersedes the total exploration area held by China and may exceed the total exploration contract area under the International Seabed Authority (ISA).
Following the EO, The Metals Company USA submitted two exploration license applications and the first ever commercial recovery permit application to NOAA. In my role as CEO, I have closely monitored the permitting process over the last nine months, and I would like to commend NOAA for its ability to mobilize resources and expertise to deal with an unprecedented volume of applications and recognizing early on that delivering on the EO directive to accelerate permitting required changes in existing regulations. Within two months, NOAA developed a new consolidated application process and proposed a rule amendment titled "Deep Seabed: Revisions to Regulations for Exploration License and Commercial Recovery Permit Applications" published as a proposed rule in the Federal Register on July 7, 2025. As stated by NOAA, 'this approach is consistent with DSHMRA [The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act], which does not require sequential licensing and permitting, and is in keeping with the Act's finding that "the present and future national interest of the United States requires the availability of hard mineral resources which is independent of the export policies of foreign nations." Once the final rule is adopted, TMC believes the amendment will address the single most urgent regulatory barrier to DSM in the U.S.--accelerating permitting timelines for qualified applicants who have conducted the required exploration, environmental data gathering and technology development to proceed to commercial recovery. The amendment by NOAA will not allow every applicant to proceed immediately to recovery, preserving the need for applicants to conduct comprehensive exploration work programs. We have completed the required work and TMC USA will apply under this new consolidated process. While DSHMRA envisioned the possibility of a consolidated process, its implementing regulations focused on the sequential process where an exploration license application would first need to be secured before applying for a commercial recovery permit. In cases where exploration work has already been completed and an applicant has already acquired all information required for a commercial recovery permit, a sequential process would lead to a situation where NOAA would be duplicating many of the application review steps and prolonging the permitting timeline. The consolidated application process solves these issues.
With this new rule in place and permitting timelines addressed, please allow me to look ahead and focus my testimony entirely on the next set of statutory and regulatory changes that could address remaining uncertainties, further increase investor confidence and accelerate the development of this new industry.
2. Modernizing DSHMRA
The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act was adopted by Congress in 1980 and NOAA published final implementing regulations for exploration licenses in 1981 and for commercial recovery permits in 1989. DSHMRA was enacted after years of bipartisan work and extensive consultation with scientists, industry, and environmental experts. It predates the international regime and, in fact, served as the basis for national seabed mining legislation put in place by the UK, Germany, France, Belgium, Japan and others in the 1980s as well as the exploration regulations put in place by the International Seabed Authority. Importantly, it was designed to be fully consistent with U.S. environmental law, including NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
DSHMRA provides U.S. companies with a clear legal basis to explore and recover deep sea minerals in the high seas. Under authority granted by DSHMRA, NOAA issued four exploration licenses to U.S.-based consortia (two have since been relinquished); under its Deep Ocean Mining Environmental Studies (DOMES) program running from 1975 to 1981, in partnership with various agencies, NOAA developed a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for the DOMES area that included the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone (CCZ), issued Technical Guidance on environmental data collection and went on to develop the total of five site specific EISs as part of its process to grant exploration licenses.
Based on a detailed audit of DSHRMA, its associated regulations and regulatory history we conducted in 2024, TMC concluded that it provides a comprehensive regulatory framework that offers regulatory certainty for this emerging industry. The current regulatory regime, particularly with the recent addition of the consolidated permitting process, contains no showstoppers or insurmountable barriers for American DSM industry.
At the same time, both the Unites States and the industry have evolved since the 1980s and DSHMRA could benefit from modernization and updates to better reflect the current state of affairs.
2.1. Consolidated Application Process
While DSHMRA does not exclude the possibility of the NOAA Administrator running a consolidated process, explicit statutory language about this process would further reinforce NOAA's amended regulations on the consolidated application process. Since DSHMRA was adopted, significant technological progress has been made and a significant amount of research on the deep-seabed ecosystem and impacts of nodule mining have taken place.
Over the past fifteen years, TMC has invested over $750M into resource estimation, dozens of environmental cruises, honed mining technology culminating in a 2022 test mining program that demonstrated readiness to advance to commercial operations, and processed nodules into highgrade critical minerals. As a result, the industry is at a critical transition point. Deep seabed mining is now positioned to move from exploration to responsible commercial operations.
Codifying the consolidated permitting will enable TMC USA and other advanced American companies who have done the necessary exploration to more efficiently move to commercial operations. This expedited permitting pathway will encourage further investment and support America's goal to develop a more robust domestic critical minerals supply. While the International Seabed Authority remains gridlocked, the United States has a window of opportunity to attract companies who have already completed valuable exploration work and provide them an expedited pathway to commercial recovery, bringing more critical minerals to the United States.
2.2. Statutory Time Caps on Administrative Process
Exploration license, commercial recovery permit and consolidated applications are expected to go through a sequence of administrative steps. Establishing statutory time limits for each step -- and clear recourse for applicants if the Administrator fails to deliver an outcome within prescribed timeframes --would further improve process predictability.
2.3. Environmental Provisions
When DSHMRA was adopted, only a few years of mining tests and environmental research cruises had been conducted and NEPA was a relatively new statute with less than a decade of implementation practice. As a result, DSHMRA was prescriptive in several areas, for example, requiring an environmental impact statement (EIS) not just for commercial recovery but for all exploration work plans, even if they involved no at-sea activity. Over the last forty years, deep seabed mineral exploration work and NEPA implementation practice have evolved in leaps and bounds.
At the time DSHMRA was adopted, only a dozen environmental and resource-definition research cruises had been conducted in the CCZ. Since that time, hundreds of environmental research cruises have been completed in the high seas alongside the development of standardized operating procedures for a wide range of baseline and impact monitoring activities. Most of these activities are now routine and do not require NEPA EIS in the U.S. EEZ or in the high seas. We believe DSHMRA needs to be amended to refer to NEPA standards and processes for all matters related to environmental impact assessments, instead of maintaining now outdated and inflexible industry-specific requirements. Similarly, DSHMRA could benefit from removing a requirement that in addition to a comprehensive NEPA EIS, a separate permit for vessel discharges should be sought from the EPA under the Clean Water Act--a single NEPA EIS process under NOAA would be a welcomed simplification of the process without compromising on the scope and depth of the impact assessment.
2.4. Regulatory Stability
Capital-intensive offshore industries require confidence that permits will endure across administrations. Recent experiences in other offshore industries have created considerable uncertainty and tangible investor concern. As we get closer to commercial production, the question we get from our investors more and more often is, "How can you guarantee that a permit given by one administration through due process won't just be stopped or revoked by the next administration that does not support your industry?" Stabilization clauses either in the statute or in the Terms, Conditions & Restrictions of licenses and permits would be one way to address this concern.
2.5. Tariff treatment
Specifying clearly in DSHMRA (or amendments to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States and U.S. Customs regulations) that deep seabed minerals recovered in the highseas by American companies under U.S.-issued permits are "domestic materials" for the purpose of tariff treatment would remove a further uncertainty. The best analog is the fishing industry: fish caught in the high seas by American companies operating under U.S. permits are deemed a "product of American fisheries" and are not subject to import tariffs or duties. A clear statutory and regulatory confirmation for deep seabed minerals would be very helpful.
2.6. Disruptions of Licensed and Permitted At-Sea Activities
In addition to the civil penalties considered in DSHMRA today, criminal penalties should be put in place to deter bad actors. As evidenced by the illegal boarding of a TMC USA affiliate's vessel by Greenpeace in December 2023, activist groups must be deterred from endangering American vessels, crews and operations. Any amendments to DSHMRA should serve to encourage long-term private investment while preserving agency discretion, environmental safeguards, security and safety at sea.
2.7. Revenue from Commercial Recovery
Any financial obligations of American companies to the federal government need to be in line with the maturity of the industry. As with other extractive industries, differentiation between early-stage and mature commercial operations is essential. Consideration should also be given to corporate structure, vertical integration, and the point at which marketable products are realized when assessing any relevant fees. All the interest and progress over the last nine months could be undone by imposing unreasonable fees before the industry is up and running.
2.8. Manipulation by adversarial nations
DSHMRA and other statutory, regulatory and executive actions need to protect the American deep seabed mineral industry from market manipulation by adversarial nations. As China has demonstrated with land-based critical minerals and processing, they can manipulate markets to make ex-China investment next to impossible on commercial grounds. Given increasing export and technology sharing restrictions imposed upon the United States by China in recent years, it should be assumed that China will use the same tactics against the emerging American DSM industry. China could use its considerable influence and capabilities in shipbuilding, off- and onshore equipment, and their significant market share in deep seabed mineral-derived metal products to block American companies from accessing relevant supply chains and markets in an attempt to slow America's lead and preserve its dominance over critical mineral supply chains.
3. Conclusion
The scale of the opportunity cannot be overstated. Polymetallic nodules found on the abyssal seafloor contain nickel, cobalt, manganese, and copper in concentrations that can rival China's dominance in critical mineral mining and processing, while re-industrializing America. Even a fraction of known deep seabed resources could supply the United States with hundreds of years of these critical minerals.
The same leadership that built America's offshore energy sector, its oceanographic institutions, and its maritime industries is now being applied to deep seabed minerals. By providing regulatory clarity and predictable permitting pathways, the United States can secure a first mover's advantage in anchoring deep seabed mineral production, transport, international trade, and value-added processing here at home.
The United States stands at a rare convergence of offshore mineral resource availability, technological readiness, and regulatory capability. With a proven statutory framework in DSHMRA and its implementing regulations, an Administrator acting on the designation of deep seabed minerals as a matter of national priority working to streamline and improve the permitting process, and clear leadership from the Administration, America is well positioned to lead the world in deep seabed mining.
I thank the Subcommittee for its time, its attention to this important issue, and its continued commitment to policies that strengthen American industry, security, and leadership offshore.
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II06/20260122/118830/HHRG-119-II06-Bio-BarronG-20260122.pdf
National Ocean Industries Association President Milito Testifies Before House Natural Resources Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resource released the following testimony by Erik Milito, president of the National Ocean Industries Association, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Deep Dive: Examining the Regulatory and Statutory Barriers to Deep Sea Mining":* * *
Thank you, Chairman Stauber, Ranking Member Ansari, and members of the subcommittee. We appreciate the opportunity to testify about the importance of critical minerals, ocean mineral exploration, and the role of the U.S. government in forging a leadership position for the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 31 -- The House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resource released the following testimony by Erik Milito, president of the National Ocean Industries Association, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Deep Dive: Examining the Regulatory and Statutory Barriers to Deep Sea Mining": * * * Thank you, Chairman Stauber, Ranking Member Ansari, and members of the subcommittee. We appreciate the opportunity to testify about the importance of critical minerals, ocean mineral exploration, and the role of the U.S. government in forging a leadership position for thecountry.
Ocean mineral exploration, development, and processing presents a substantial opportunity for countries worldwide to secure vital supplies of critical minerals. Ocean minerals include shallow-water deposits, such as phosphorites and heavy mineral sands (containing titanium, zirconium, REEs), and deep-sea deposits, primarily consisting of sulfides, cobalt-rich crusts, metalliferous muds, and, perhaps of greatest present interest to industry, polymetallic nodules, with high concentrations of cobalt, lithium, manganese, nickel, tellurium, titanium, and rare-earth elements. The Cook Islands, Japan, Norway, Brazil, Sweden, Tonga, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and other nations have already taken steps to explore for and/or develop critical minerals in their national waters. With no active exploration licenses in its national waters, the U.S. is at risk of falling behind. Simultaneously, China has firmly established itself as the dominant producer and processor of critical minerals. Ocean mineral exploration presents a very real opportunity for U.S. leadership in this space.
For more than 50 years, the National Ocean Industries Association ("NOIA") has represented the interests of all segments of the offshore energy industry. Our membership includes energy project developers and the entire supply chain of companies that make up an innovative energy system contributing to the safe and responsible exploration, development, and production of energy and resources for the American people. Our member companies are leading efforts in the U.S. and around the globe related to offshore oil and gas, offshore wind, offshore carbon capture and storage, and ocean mineral projects. The offshore energy industry has unique expertise in engineering projects at scale in the marine environment, economically producing massive quantities of energy and resources for the benefit of the American public, with safety and environmental responsibility as core values. Given the economic and national security interests at stake, it is extremely important that we work together to advance policies that enable long-term U.S. leadership in ocean mineral exploration, development, and processing. We encourage Congress and the Administration to continue to take the steps necessary to enable research, exploration, and production of critical minerals in areas of the U.S. outer continental shelf and beyond. The advancement of the U.S. ocean mineral exploration industry will advance American prosperity through capital investment, job creation, manufacturing, technology leadership, and national security. NOIA and its members stand ready to work with policymakers to advance policies that ensure Americans can rely on an affordable and reliable energy and mineral resources system built on strong pillars of energy, economic, national, and environmental security.
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Demand for Critical Minerals Is Rapidly Rising
With energy demand skyrocketing, driven by everyday needs and the rise of AI and data centers, the global economy will need a corresponding surge in production of critical minerals to support growing demand for electricity and other strategic uses. By 2030, U.S. data centers could consume over 11 percent of our electricity--quadruple today's share. In its Short-Term Energy Outlook released this month, the U.S. Energy Information Administration forecasts "electricity consumption will grow by 1% in 2026 and 3% in 2027, marking the first four years of consecutive growth since 2005-07, and the strongest four-year period of growth since the turn of the century."/1
The National Electrical Manufacturers Association predicts that U.S. electricity demand will increase by 2% annually and by more than 50% by 2050./2
And it's not just AI and data centers. The surge in demand for electricity is also driven by consumer electrification of products like electric vehicles and heat pumps, by the reshoring of manufacturing, and by crypto mining.
As described by Daniel Yergin, Peter Orzag, and Atul Arya in the March/April volume of Foreign Affairs, the global economy is making a move toward "big shovels," precipitated by vastly more mining and processing of critical minerals that are needed to support the oncoming growth in electrical power generation and new technologies.
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1 https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/
2 https://www.makeitelectric.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/grid-reliability-study-nema-deck.pdf
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Yergin sums up the issue extremely well:
The International Energy Agency has projected that global demand for minerals needed for "clean energy technologies" will quadruple by 2040. At the top of the list are such critical minerals as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and graphite, as well as copper. Between 2017 and 2023 alone, demand for lithium increased by 266 percent; demand for cobalt rose by 83 percent; and demand for nickel jumped by 46 percent. Between 2023 and 2035, S&P expects demand for lithium to increase by another 286 percent; cobalt, by 96 percent; and nickel, by 91 percent.... S&P's analysis of future copper demand found that global copper supply will have to double by the middle of the 2030s to meet current policy ambitions for net-zero emissions by 2050./3
The Center of the American Experiment has published a report entitled "Mission Impossible: Mineral Shortages and the Broken Permitting Process Put Net Zero Goals Out of Reach." In this report, the Center emphasizes that "modern life requires mining," noting that every person in the U.S. uses "more than 40,000 pounds of materials, minerals, metals, and fuels annually and over three million pounds during their lifetime."/4
The report highlights how there will very likely be a substantial shortfall in key critical minerals in the decades to come. The report also discusses the U.S. federal government's role in hindering the discovery and development of crucial minerals under U.S. jurisdiction. Fortunately, the U.S. has an opportunity to adjust its policies to elevate our stature and emerge as a safe, environmentally responsible, and leading producer of critical minerals, particularly through offshore mineral exploration, development, and processing.
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The Role of Critical Minerals
Critical minerals are strategically significant for our economic and national security.
Critical minerals are essential for military hardware, including fighter jets and submarines, and they are embedded in the technology and electronics we use every day. The Energy Act of 2020 has defined critical minerals as those that are (1) essential to the economic or national security of the United States; (2) have a supply chain that is vulnerable to disruption; or (3) serve an essential function in the manufacturing of a product, the absence of which would have significant consequences for the economic or national security of the U.S. The Act grants the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior the authority to maintain a list of critical minerals based upon the above definition. Once a mineral is determined to be a critical mineral, it kickstarts research by the Department of Energy to better understand the use of and alternatives to the critical mineral, as well as analysis of policies to "inform future actions that may be taken to avoid supply shortages, mitigate price volatility, and prepare for demand growth and other market shifts."
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3 Yergin, Orzag, and Atul, "The Trouble Energy Transition," Foreign Affairs, March/April 2025, at 115.
4 https://files.americanexperiment.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Mission-Impossible-report2024.pdf?v=1728416598& gl=1*oe5j5s*gcl au*NDAzMjY0MjMyLjE3NDQ4MDg2ODU at page 2.
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The Secretary of the Interior generally works through the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) in the implementation of these responsibilities. The USGS has analyzed key supply chains to develop the list of critical minerals. The list, most recently revised in November 2025, currently includes sixty minerals whose supply must be assured to avoid significant consequences to the United States economy and national security:
Significant demand growth is expected for critical minerals because of their importance in everyday life. Cobalt is used in batteries, magnets, pigments, superalloys, catalysts, and medical devices. Manganese is used in steel applications, batteries, pigments, glass, aluminum applications, fertilizer, and in water treatment. Nickel is used in batteries, magnets, stainless steel, desalination plants, armor plating, and medical applications.
The current list also includes what are known as "rare earth elements," which is a collection of elements critical for advanced technologies. These elements are abundant but hard to find in mineable concentrations. China, Vietnam, Russia, and India are well recognized as dominating the global rare-earth supply. Rare earths are generally used in magnetics, lighting, metal alloys, catalysts, ceramics, glass, and military defense. Rare earths are understood to be found in hydrothermal vents, metal-rich crusts of the earth, and polymetallic nodules often located in deep-sea regions.
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U.S. Policy Must Open Doors to Offshore Critical Mineral Development
The Trump Administration has maintained a laser focus on promoting U.S. leadership in the procurement of critical minerals, including through offshore mineral exploration. On December 20, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13817, "A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals," with the goal of reducing the nation's vulnerability to disruptions in the supply of critical minerals. On September 30, 2020, President Trump signed Executive Order 13953, "Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain From Reliance on Critical Minerals From Foreign Adversaries and Supporting the Domestic Mining and Processing Industries," which makes it the policy of the U.S. to "prioritize the expansion and protection of the domestic supply chain for minerals and the establishment of secure critical minerals supply chains." This Executive Order further directs federal agencies to allocate their resources to fulfill these purposes. On January 20, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14156, "Declaring a National Energy Emergency," directing federal agencies to "facilitate the identification, leasing, siting, production, transportation, refining, and generation of domestic energy resources," including critical minerals. Finally, on April 24, 2025, President Trump took action specific to offshore mineral exploration, issuing Executive Order 14285, "Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources," framing offshore and seabed critical minerals as vital to U.S. national security, economic strength, and supply chain resilience.
This E.O. emphasizes the critical importance of reducing dependence on foreign adversaries -particularly China -- for strategic minerals used in defense, technology, and clean energy.
On February 3, 2025, Secretary Burgum, U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), signed two orders that help advance the President's objectives for U.S. leadership in critical minerals.
Secretarial Order 3417 formally instructs recovery and regulatory staff to find authorities that could facilitate offshore critical minerals development (including through permit and lease processes) as part of an emergency energy orientation. Secretarial Order 3418 reinforces DOIwide support for expanding minerals supply chains, including offshore sources, by removing regulatory barriers, speeding permitting, and updating geological data. Both orders support the implementation of Executive Order 14285, "Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources," which further directs the DOI, through the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), to establish expedited processes for prospecting, leasing, and permitting offshore mineral activities under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The offshore mineral exploration industry has responded positively to the Administration's steps to enable investment and development of critical minerals. BOEM has received requests for lease sales for critical mineral development offshore American Samoa and for heavy mineral sands and phosphorites offshore Virginia.
The U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS) is a promising region for the development of critical mineral resources to benefit U.S. consumers. The U.S. OCS includes not only those submerged lands adjacent to U.S. states, but also offshore areas adjacent to U.S. territories. This was made possible pursuant to provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act, which amended the definition of "state" in the OCSLA to include the U.S. territories. The following map is provided by the Congressional Research Service in its December 11, 2024 report, "Critical Minerals on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf: The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management's Role and Issues for Congress," on page 2:
According to BOEM, many of the critical minerals and all the rare earth elements occur in the U.S. outer continental shelf:
However, according to the U.S. Geological Service (USGS), "as of June 2024, only 26.1% of the global seafloor has been mapped at high resolution." There remains an extreme lack of information on the commercial availability of critical minerals located in the U.S. OCS. BOEM had identified five categories of deposits on the U.S. OCS that may contain critical minerals, including heavy mineral sands, phosphorites, hydrothermal vents, ferromanganese crusts, and polymetallic nodules.
The DOI, through BOEM, has the authority to evaluate the U.S. OCS for mineral development potential and to lease offshore acreage for critical mineral development. BOEM has also issued regulations allowing leasing of non-oil and gas minerals, including critical minerals.
BOEM's regulations cover pre-leasing activities, such as prospecting through geological and geophysical surveys, as well as leasing offshore acreage for the right to explore for and develop offshore minerals. BOEM is developing a National Offshore Critical Mineral Inventory (NOCMI) initiative to locate, identify, and understand potential critical minerals on the OCS.
The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), also within DOI, has authority over safety and environmental requirements, including compliance with BSEE regulations and BOEM-approved plans. BOEM has not yet held any lease sales for critical minerals but has taken steps forward for lease sales offshore American Samoa and the Mariana Islands and most recently by initiating the process for a potential mineral lease sale offshore Virginia.
Concurrently, international waters, located beyond any one nation's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or 200 nautical miles from coastlines, has been the focus of extensive mineral exploration over many decades. Polymetallic nodules, which contain nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese, found in the Clarion Clipperton Zone (CCZ) in the Pacific Ocean, are the primary focus for current-day exploration and commercial recovery efforts. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) at the U.S. Department of Commerce has authority for ocean mineral exploration from the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction by U.S. citizens and entities pursuant to the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA), enacted in 1980 in response to growing interest in mining valuable minerals on the deep ocean floor, particularly polymetallic nodules. NOAA delivered implementing regulations for exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits in 1981 and 1989, respectively, issuing four exploration licenses, delivering one programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS) across the CCZ and four regional EISs subsequently. DSHMRA covers exploration (surveying, sampling, testing), commercial recovery (mining and extraction), transportation, and processing related to seabed minerals, and applies only to hard mineral resources, not oil, gas, or living resources. NOAA implements DSHMRA primarily through its Office of Coastal Management and ensures compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act through its processes. Once a license is issued, NOAA monitors compliance with license conditions, requires regular reporting, can modify, suspend, or revoke licenses, and coordinates with other federal agencies as needed.
Currently, there are two active exploration licenses held by Lockheed Martin. The Metals Company and Deep Sea Rare Minerals have both confirmed they have applications under review by NOAA, and there are believed to be many more active applications under the agency's review.
On September 5, 2025, public comment concluded on a proposed rule from NOAA that would expressly allow for a consolidated license and permit review process [Revisions to Regulations for Exploration License and Commercial Recovery Permit Applications] in response to Executive Order 14285. NOAA found that, "over the past decades there has been a vast improvement in the technological capability for deep seabed mining, and the industry has obtained a substantial amount of information from deep seabed exploration activities and expressed a readiness for commercial recovery." NOIA commends the federal government for enabling applicants who have completed the requirements to move to commercial operations in a more streamlined manner.
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America's Offshore Energy Industry is Poised to Advance U.S. Leadership in Offshore Mineral Exploration, Development, and Processing
America's offshore energy industry has decades of experience working in the marine environment, in deep water conditions, to safely and responsibly produce the energy required to fuel America and our allies. Our industry is made up of leading innovators, focusing on cuttingedge technologies, including artificial intelligence, data analytics, subsea robotics, modern geophysical mapping, and the advancement of incredible technologies to solve the greatest energy, and now mineral, challenges. From our experience, offshore safety has been enhanced through modern geosciences, leading-edge engineering design, improved subsea and remote technologies, shared best practices, and innovative safety systems. We continuously improve the safety and environmental performance of our operations so that our workers and communities are protected and that our environmental footprint continues to decrease. Our offshore industry is well-suited for the challenges of deep-sea mining so that the U.S. can better achieve its goals of reducing dependency on China and other adversaries for supplies of critical minerals.
America's offshore energy industry has decades of experience operating in the marine environment, in both deep and shallow water, to safely and responsibly produce the energy required to fuel America and our allies. Our industry is made up of leading innovators focused on cutting-edge technologies, including artificial intelligence, data analytics, subsea robotics, and modern geophysical mapping, advancing incredible technologies to solve the greatest energy challenges. From our experience, offshore safety has been enhanced through modern geosciences, leading-edge engineering design, improved subsea and remote technologies, shared best practices, and innovative safety systems. We continuously improve the safety and environmental performance of our operations so that our workers and communities are protected and heard, and our environmental footprint is continually minimized.. An emerging and durable U.S. offshore mineral exploration industry will drive capital investment, job growth, STEM education, and technology development for the benefit of all Americans. Our industry will also be central to our strategic efforts to compete with China in the global race for securing critical mineral resources.
As well-stated by Yergin, Orzag, and Arya, "China already has a dominant position in mining and predominant position in processing of minerals into metals essential for renewable energy infrastructure. It accounts for over 60 percent of the world's rare-earth mining production (compare with nine percent for the United States) and more than 90 percent of the processing and refining of rare earths. It produces 77 percent of the world's graphite, processes 98 percent of it, and processes over 70 percent of the world's lithium and cobalt and almost half of the copper."/5
While China's lead in the land-based mining and processing is clear - it does not lead in deep sea mineral development - this is the opportunity that exists for the US today through the encouragement and support for this emerging industry and our own American companies. The President has made clear the urgency of addressing this increasingly dire situation. In addition to U.S. onshore mining regions, the U.S. OCS and the high seas provide major opportunities for our country to prospect for and develop the critical minerals that we will need for decades to come.
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5 Yergin, Orzag, and Atul, "The Troubled Energy Transition," Foreign Affairs, March/April 2025, at 116.
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Regulatory Certainty is Requisite for Advancing U.S. Leadership in Ocean Mineral Exploration, Development, and Processing
Public policy will play a central role in the ability of the U.S. to establish a leadership role in global ocean mineral exploration, development, and processing. We urge Congress to continue working with the Administration to advance a regulatory framework for domestic waters that is predictable and science-based, including leasing and time-bound permitting pathways that provide open access to exploration, regulatory certainty, and security of tenure for companies satisfactorily executing permitted activities. This further includes: clearly defined lease terms, conditions, and timelines; transparent lease sale processes; and revisions to overly broad protected designations applied to unmapped or unexplored areas of the OCS that unnecessarily restrict access. In international waters, this includes: increased clarity in application review and issuance processes, supporting developers as this emerging industry transitions to commercial production, and modernizing DSHMRA to the present day.
NOIA is a big supporter of permitting reform to boost confidence for investing in U.S.managed and approved projects. We support the SPEED Act, and its provisions for streamlined permitting, judicial reform, and permit certainty. Whether through the legislative or regulatory process, the ocean mineral exploration industry similarly needs the certainty of a swift, clearly defined permitting, oversight, and approval process to build the confidence to invest.
In the global economy, regulatory uncertainty across any business sector can inevitably push investment to other regions of the world. This is particularly true for an emerging industry like ocean mineral exploration. U.S. companies, already developing world class mapping, robotics, and environmental technologies, are encouraged by the Administration's steps to advance ocean exploration opportunities. We need to work together to build a durable framework for sanctioning projects so we can avoid losing that investment to other regions, thereby risking the permanent offshoring of intellectual property and high value jobs.
We urge the federal family to construct a framework that streamlines permitting and eliminates inconsistencies and duplicative requirements. We have the opportunity to become the global technology leader in ocean mineral exploration, development, and processing. It will thus be vital to ensure that the regulatory framework provides companies with the flexibility to research, develop, demonstrate, and deploy new and advanced technologies. In summary, we encourage Congress, DOI, and the DOC to work together to establish appropriate policies and ensure that sufficient resources are available to the American offshore minerals industry.
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Conclusion
We appreciate the subcommittee's efforts to assess our country's growing needs for offshore critical minerals and the government's role in meeting that demand. We encourage Congress and the Administration to continue to take the steps necessary to enable research, exploration, development, and processing of critical minerals in areas of the U.S. outer continental shelf and the high seas. NOIA and its members stand ready to work with policymakers to advance policies that ensure Americans can rely on an affordable and reliable energy and mineral resources system built on strong pillars of energy, economic, national, and environmental security.
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/II/II06/20260122/118830/HHRG-119-II06-Wstate-MilitoE-20260122.pdf
Customs & Border Protection Office of Field Operations Acting Executive Assistant Commissioner Sabatino Testifies Before House Homeland Security Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 -- The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement released the following testimony by Diane J. Sabatino, acting executive assistant commissioner for the Office of Field Operations at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Smarter Borders, Safer Nation: Expanding the Use of Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology":* * *
Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about U.S. Customs and Border ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 -- The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement released the following testimony by Diane J. Sabatino, acting executive assistant commissioner for the Office of Field Operations at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Smarter Borders, Safer Nation: Expanding the Use of Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology": * * * Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about U.S. Customs and BorderProtection's (CBP) use of non-intrusive inspection technology. This critical capability strengthens our ability to continue securing our Nation's borders while facilitating the flow of lawful trade and travel.
Under President Trump and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Noem's leadership, the CBP Office of Field Operations plays a central, critical role in securing our nation's borders. With nearly 34,000 highly trained personnel, the Office of Field Operations is CBP's largest component and oversees 328 ports of entry and 15 preclearance locations domestically and abroad, performing complex customs, immigration, agriculture, and trade activities. Every day,/1 the Office of Field Operations processes more than 1 million passengers and pedestrians, facilitates the importation of nearly $10 billion in goods, and collects nearly $600 million in duties and taxes. At the same time, on average, we prevent the entry of nearly 1,200 inadmissible persons, seize more than 1,300 pounds of drugs, confiscate $165,000 in illicit currency, and intercept 3 counterfeit documents.
CBP's Office of Field Operations employs a dynamic, intelligence-driven, law enforcement strategy that integrates advanced data analysis, information sharing, and coordination with federal, state, and international partners to identify and disrupt threats. By leveraging cuttingedge technologies such as non-intrusive inspection systems, artificial intelligence, and facial biometrics, the Office of Field Operations enhances its ability to detect contraband, verify identities, and streamline inspections, all while maintaining the flow of lawful trade and travel.
Today, I will provide an overview of CBP's non-intrusive inspection technology, its role within CBP's broader security strategy, and the progress made in deploying these critical assets. I will also discuss the deployment and operational challenges we face and outline our plans to address them as we continue to enhance our border security capabilities and protect our communities from transnational threats.
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Border Security Threats at U.S. Ports of Entry
As CBP reasserts control of our borders in accordance with President Trump's directives, transnational criminal organizations and foreign terrorist organizations continue their efforts to smuggle people, contraband, and other potentially harmful materials into the United States.
These organizations possess immense resources and sophisticated capabilities and can adjust their concealment tactics to evade detection by law enforcement.
Most illicit drugs seized by CBP, including fentanyl, are seized during smuggling attempts at Southwest Border land ports of entry. In fact, last fiscal year, approximately 75 percent of the total weight of illicit drugs seized by CBP at the Southwest Border were seized at ports of entry./2
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1 Average daily enforcement actions based on preliminary Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 data.
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Drug cartels and other transnational criminal organizations conceal these drugs in passenger vehicles, commercial vehicles, mail, and even on pedestrians.
To counter these threats, CBP's Office of Field Operations continues to integrate law enforcement intelligence, data analysis, and advanced detection technologies to enhance its ability to intercept contraband and other potential threats. Among these capabilities, CBP's nonintrusive inspection technology remains one of CBP's most effective tools for detecting radiological materials as well as anomalies that may indicate concealed contraband.
Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology as Part of CBP's Multi-Layered Strategy
CBP employs a diverse range of non-intrusive inspection systems tailored to the unique needs of our operational environments. Large-scale systems are used at sea and land ports of entry to scan passenger vehicles, commercial trucks, railcars, and cargo containers. Small-scale systems are used to scan baggage, mail, and parcels. Together, these technologies provide a versatile and effective detection capability across all operational environments.
Simply put, non-intrusive inspection allows CBP to "see" inside vehicles, packages, cargo containers, and other conveyances without physically opening or unloading them. Using advanced imaging technologies, such as X-ray and gamma-ray, these systems detect anomalies that may indicate the presence of illicit drugs, contraband, or other threats.
The key advantage of non-intrusive inspection technology is its ability to conduct thorough inspections quickly, efficiently, and safely. This enables CBP to detect and interdict suspected dangerous materials without causing unnecessary delays to lawful trade and travel that physical inspections would cause.
Most of CBP's large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems are deployed in secondary inspection operations at ports of entry, where they are used to examine targeted or referred vehicles or shipments. CBP leverages advance electronic shipping information, actionable law enforcement intelligence, and CBP's Automated Targeting System to identify high-risk shipments for inspection before they arrive at ports of entry. This proactive approach allows CBP to allocate resources efficiently and focus on the highest-priority threats, while facilitating the critical flow of lawful goods into the United States.
To further advance the efficiency of our operations, CBP prioritizes the implementation of drivethrough operational concepts. New non-intrusive inspection systems are positioned in preprimary inspection areas, allowing for a greater capacity of vehicles to be scanned without interrupting traffic flows. The scans are transmitted to remote command centers, where officers review the images in real time for anomalies and flag those requiring secondary inspection. This approach streamlines the vehicle inspection process and allows more vehicles to be scanned.
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2 Of the 255,243 pounds of drugs CBP seized at the Southwest Border in FY 2025, 192,701 pounds were seized at land ports of entry. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics.
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The effectiveness of CBP's non-intrusive inspection systems is clear. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2025, CBP officers used large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems to scan over 17 million sea containers, rail cars, and vehicles, resulting in the interdiction of 110,000 pounds of narcotics, approximately $2.2 million in unreported U.S. currency, and the apprehension of 66 undeclared passengers. Just this past November, CBP officers at the Laredo-Colombia Solidarity International Bridge in Laredo, Texas intercepted nearly 2,000 pounds of methamphetamine with a street value of $16 million concealed in a commercial truck hauling decorative items.3 These enforcement results underscore the critical role of non-intrusive inspection technology in combating the smuggling of illicit drugs.
While non-intrusive inspection technology is a powerful tool, it is just one component of CBP's broader multi-layered enforcement strategy. This strategy provides our skilled personnel with advanced technology, law enforcement intelligence, and partnerships to create a comprehensive approach to border security.
A key example of this integrated approach is the work of CBP's National Targeting Center, which integrates law enforcement intelligence and data analysis to identify potential high-risk shipments for inspection. Skilled trade specialists and CBP officers, trained to operate and interpret non-intrusive inspection systems, play a critical role in identifying suspect shipments. In addition, CBP canine teams further enhance our detection capabilities and often work alongside officers conducting inspection activities. These specially trained dogs can detect undeclared passengers, narcotics, unreported currency, prohibited agricultural items, and other contraband.
Together, these resources form a multi-layered approach that ensures that no single tool or capability is relied upon exclusively. By combining technology, intelligence, and specialized personnel, CBP adapts to emerging threats while maintaining the balance between security and the facilitation of lawful trade and travel.
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Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology Investments and Deployment Plans
Congressional funding is instrumental in advancing CBP's non-intrusive inspection system program. As of December 2, 2025, CBP has deployed 405 large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems at air, sea, and land ports of entry, including 67 fixed systems added during FY 2024, FY 2025, and FY 2026 to date. By the end of FY 2026, CBP plans to deploy 38 additional systems currently under construction or in an active construction planning phase. These drivethrough non-intrusive inspection system deployments are part of a multi-year effort to close the vehicle scanning capacity gap and address high-priority threats.
Looking ahead, CBP has allocated more than $1 billion from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act for the procurement and integration of new non-intrusive inspection systems, artificial intelligence, and other mission support capabilities./4
The President's FY 2026 Budget also requests $137 million to procure more systems and to enhance non-intrusive inspection capabilities. These investments will enable CBP to expand pre-primary non-intrusive inspection operations, integrate systems, and implement artificial intelligence to reduce manual image analysis to further increase security and enhance the flow of legitimate trade and travel through ports of entry.
* * *
3 https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-officers-seize-more-16-million-methamphetamine-colombia-solidarity
4 Public Law 119-21
* * *
CBP's non-intrusive inspection system program represents a tremendous investment in our border security capabilities, and we are committed to maximizing the impact of these systems.
CBP has ambitious plans to expand the use of non-intrusive inspection technology and increase scanning rates at our ports of entry. With current deployment plans, CBP aims to scan 40 percent of passenger vehicles and 70 percent of commercial vehicles at Southwest Border land ports of entry by the end of FY 2026.
CBP also has a recapitalization plan to replace aging non-intrusive inspection systems, ensuring the continued functionality and availability of this critical technology to support port of entry operations. Replacing this equipment with the latest cutting-edge technology is expected to increase our scanning capacity and improve our ability to detect anomalies.
Despite its benefits, non-intrusive inspection technology faces deployment challenges, including limited real estate at some ports of entry and placement constraints to avoid interference with radiation detection systems. CBP addresses these challenges by evaluating facilities and infrastructure at ports of entry and exploring innovative solutions to increase and improve scanning at these locations.
* * *
Conclusion
Non-intrusive inspection technology is an essential component of CBP's layered enforcement strategy. It enables our frontline personnel to focus on their critical border security mission, facilitate lawful trade and travel, and protect American communities by disrupting transnational criminal organizations that attempt to smuggle contraband through ports of entry.
CBP will continue to implement President Trump's policies to enforce the law, prevent criminals from entering our country, and strengthen border security.
I want to take this opportunity to thank Congress for its unwavering support of CBP's mission.
Specifically, your commitment to funding advanced technologies, such as non-intrusive inspection systems, is instrumental in addressing the complex challenges we face at our Nation's ports of entry. With your support, CBP will further expand its non-intrusive inspection capabilities, enhance and modernize data systems, and address infrastructure and technology challenges. These advancements will enhance our ability to detect and interdict threats, disrupt criminal and terrorist networks, and safeguard the American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.
* * *
Original text here: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-01-22-BSE-HRG-Testimony.pdf
Center for Immigration Studies Senior Researcher Rush Testifies Before Senate Judiciary Subcommittees
WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 -- The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration released the following written testimony by Nayla Rush, a senior researcher at the Center for Immigration Studies, from a Jan. 14, 2026, joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Crime and Counterterrorism entitled "Biden's Afghan Parolee Program - A Trojan Horse With Flawed Vetting and Deadly Consequences":* * *
Summary
The Biden-Harris administration evacuated over 80,000 Afghans during the summer of 2021 as U.S. forces withdrew from Afghanistan. Rahmanullah Lakanwal, the individual charged in the recent ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 -- The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration released the following written testimony by Nayla Rush, a senior researcher at the Center for Immigration Studies, from a Jan. 14, 2026, joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Crime and Counterterrorism entitled "Biden's Afghan Parolee Program - A Trojan Horse With Flawed Vetting and Deadly Consequences": * * * Summary The Biden-Harris administration evacuated over 80,000 Afghans during the summer of 2021 as U.S. forces withdrew from Afghanistan. Rahmanullah Lakanwal, the individual charged in the recentambush attack that killed one National Guard member and critically injured another, was on one of them. The administration did not stop there: it created additional pathways for Afghans to enter the United States - ultimately bringing in more than 200,000 individuals.
Contrary to popular narratives, most Afghans admitted during and after the evacuation had nothing to do with the U.S. government or any of its contractors or subcontractors. They were not U.S. "allies" eligible for Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) nor were they "persecuted" individuals in need of refugee resettlement. Lacking immigrant visas, they were granted "parole", a temporary permission to enter and remain in the United States.
These arrivals were provided federal benefits, health insurance, work authorization, Social Security numbers, English-language instruction, mental-health support, and more. The associated costs reached into the billions of dollars, borne by American taxpayers.
Furthermore, the Biden-Harris administration contracted resettlement agencies not only to provide the standard Reception and Placement (R&P) assistance - normally limited to refugees - but also to help Afghan parolees pursue long-term immigration pathways, including adjustment of status through qualifying family relationships, SIV applications, or asylum claims.
This raises a fundamental question: Why did the prior administration choose to open the door (and keep it wide open) to hundreds of thousands of Afghans who were not at risk, despite the clear limitations of our vetting capacity of these individuals? And how many more Rahmanullah Lakanwals are there, time-bombs waiting to turn against the country that welcomed them?
* * *
EVACUATION: OPERATION ALLIES REFUGE
Following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, some 80,000 Afghans1 were evacuated by the Biden-Harris administration as part of "Operation Allies Refuge"2 in JulyAugust 2021. Despite the program's name, the majority of those airlifted were not our "Allies" - i.e. Afghan nationals who had supported the U.S. forces, government personnel, contractors or subcontractors, and faced a serious threat as a result of that employment. Amid the chaos and the urgency of the evacuation, U.S. officials allowed virtually anyone who could reach the airport and board a flight to do so.
On September 3, 2021, former Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, explained the evacuation process to the press. Bottom line, the first priority was to get people out of there, and figure out later on exactly who's who:
And given the premium that we put on getting people out as quickly and as safely as possible... then really digging into exactly which categories they may fit into. Were they locally employed staff? Were they SIVs, Afghans at risk, potential P-1 or P-2 [refugees], parolees, et cetera? All of that work now is what we're doing.3
Most Afghan evacuees (including Lakanwal) did not have a visa to be admitted into the United States. They did not have Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs)4 - visas specifically granted to Afghan "allies" - nor were they "persecuted" Afghans looking to be resettled as refugees under the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP)5. Hence, the use of "parole" to admit them into the United States.
"Allies" are those who worked as translators, interpreters, or other professionals employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan and face a serious threat as a result of that employment. They have access to SIVs to come to the United States. Upon admission, SIV holders are granted Lawful Permanent Residence (LPR), also known as green cards. They receive the same benefits and federal services as refugees under the USRAP.
* * *
1 "Operation Allies Welcome Announces Departure of All Afghan Nationals from the National Conference Center Safe Haven in Leesburg, VA", Department of Homeland Security, News Archive, September 27, 2022.
2 "Statement of President Joe Biden on the Arrival of the First Flight of Operation Allies Refuge", Biden White House Archive, July 30, 2021.
3 "Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks on Afghanistan at a Press Availability", The U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Italy website, September 3, 2021.
4 Bruno Andorra, "Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs", CRS report, January 15, 2025.
5 "The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Consultation and Worldwide Processing Priorities", U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website, September 17, 2025.
* * *
"Refugees"6 are those who are "unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion". Refugees are resettled into the United States through the USRAP and must apply for a green card one year after arrival. Refugees, like SIVs, have access to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) assistance and federal benefits.
"Immigration Parole"7 is an "official permission to enter and remain temporarily in the United States. It does not constitute formal admission under the U.S. immigration system." The parole provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) gives the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) discretionary authority to "parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States"8 [Emphasis added].
Parolees can stay in the United States for the duration of the grant of parole (typically one year, two for Afghans as requested by former DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas9) and can also apply for re-parole. Re-parole was made available to Afghan parolees in 202310.
Parole was made available not only to Afghan evacuees but also to those who followed. The legality of the Biden-Harris administration's expansive use of parole has been widely questioned11. What was equally, if not especially puzzling, was the transfer of power to parolees (who, supposedly, are here on a provisional, short-term basis) by allowing them to sponsor new parolees to join them in the United States, to live and work here, under that same illusory, "temporary", and highly ambiguous status. Parole is supposed to be granted on a case-by-case basis - not to thousands of individuals at once - and most parolees will never leave when their parole expires.
Both SIVs and refugees are authorized to live permanently in the United States (SIVs are granted green cards upon admission, while refugees must apply for a green card one year after arrival), whereas parolees are only granted periods of authorized stay.
* * *
6 "What is a refugee?", UNHCR US website, undated.
7 "Immigration Parole", Congressional Research Service report, October 15, 2020.
8 Ibid.
9 "Operation Allies Welcome", U.S. Department of Homeland Security, archived content, last updated January 22, 2025.
10 "DHS Announces Re-parole Process for Afghan Nationals in the United States", Department of Homeland Security, News Archive, June 8, 2023.
11 Andrew R. Arthur, "So Many Errors in CBS News' Report on Illegal Biden Parole Programs", Center for Immigration Studies blogpost, July 26, 2023. Georges Fishman, "The Pernicious Perversion of Parole", Center for Immigration Studies report, February 16, 2022. Elizabeth Jacobs, "DHS to Return Venezuelan Border-Crossers to Mexico, but Will Allow Thousands in with Parole", Center for Immigration Studies blogpost, October 14, 2022.
* * *
Afghan parolees can apply to adjust their status based, for example, on a qualifying relationship to a family member or apply for either an SIV status or asylum.
Of the over 80,000 Afghan evacuees, 77,000 were paroled into the United States12. Eighteen months into their stay, fewer than 5,000 were approved for asylum or SIV status13.
* * *
PROCESSING AND RELOCATION INTO AMERICAN COMMUNITIES: OPERATION ALLIES WELCOME
Once the evacuation effort (Operation Allies Refuge) ended, former President Biden directed Mayorkas to coordinate efforts across the federal government to support all evacuated Afghans: "Operation Allies Welcome" was underway14.
To coordinate these efforts, Biden appointed former Delaware Governor, Jack Markell, as the White House Coordinator for Operation Allies Welcome15.
Afghan evacuees were transported to designated temporary overseas transit centers, known as "lily pads16," and to military bases within the United States, referred to as "safe havens17". Eight such safe haven installations were provided by United States Department of Defense (DOD) - now referred to as the Department of War - to house Afghan evacuees: Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Fort Lee, Virginia; Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Bliss, Texas; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; and Camp Atterbury, Indiana.
This came at a significant cost to American taxpayers. For instance, housing 3,755 Afghan evacuees at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia for four months (August-December 2021) cost $226.7 million.18
Evacuees were provided with a wide array of services on U.S.-bases, including food, shelter and worship tents; medical, dental and psychological care; Afghan-led English classes as well as classes on American culture; hygiene, and women's health; internet and recreational movie nights, and more. Afghan nationals were also able to apply for work authorization documents (EADs, or work permits) with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) personnel and were connected to resettlement services.19
* * *
12 "DHS Has a Fragmented Process for Identifying and Resolving Derogatory Information for Operation Allies Welcome Parolees", U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, May 6, 2024.
13 Camilo Montoya-Galvez, "Tens of thousands of Afghans in U.S. could lose deportation protections unless Congress acts", CBS News, February 16, 2023.
14 "Operation Allies Welcome", U.S. Department of Homeland Security, archived content, last updated January 22, 2025.
15 Dave Lucas, "White House's refugee resettlement czar Jack Markell comes to Albany, already home to strong Afghan community", WAMC Northeast Public Radio, December 7, 2021.
16 "DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis (REDACTED)", U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, September 6, 2022.
17 Ibid.
18 "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia", U.S. Department of Defense, Inspector General, January 5, 2022.
* * *
USCIS personnel were adjudicating applications for employment authorization (EADs) and providing administrative support and translation services, "to expedite the processing of applications for immigrant status and work authorization20." The U.S. Department of State and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services were working to provide "initial relocation support to Afghans granted parole and to ensure that those Afghans arriving in American communities have initial support, including health insurance." Top relocation states of Afghan parolees were Texas, California and Virginia21.
The "Sponsor Circle Program for Afghans"22 was also launched in October 2021 to encourage private individuals to form "sponsor circles" to help with initial relocation, "complementing the work of the State Department's non-profit resettlement agency partners."
Through the "Afghan Placement and Assistance Program (APA)"23 that was created in 2021, individuals were placed in communities across the country. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) signed new cooperative agreements with nine resettlement agencies to implement the APA Program. Usually, resettlement agencies are only responsible for the Reception and Placement (R&P)24 assistance but under the APA program, they were also required to help Afghan parolees with accessing immigration legal services to apply for asylum or another legal status to remain in the United States following the termination of their parole.
* * *
19 Ibid.
20 "Operation Allies Welcome", U.S. Department of Homeland Security, archived content, last updated January 22, 2025.
21 Camilo Montoya-Galvez, "Here's where Afghan evacuees have resettled in the U.S.", CBS News, February 24, 2022.
22 "Launch of the Sponsor Circle Program for Afghans", U.S. Department of State Press Statement, October 25, 2021.
23 "Review of Challenges in the Afghan Placement and Assistance Program", U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, March 2023.
24 "Reception and Placement", U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Archived Content, undated,
* * *
BRINGING IN MORE AFGHANS THROUGH A ROUTE TO CITIZENSHIP
On September 27, 2022, the last of the Afghan evacuees departed from the safe haven facility at the National Conference Center (NCC) in Northern Virginia outside Washington to settle in cities across the United States25.
Despite the completion of these relocation operations, the Biden-Harris administration declared it remained "fully committed to continuing the work of welcoming and resettling Afghan nationals"26:
Our commitment to our Afghan allies is enduring and, as part of the U.S. government's efforts to continue welcoming our Afghan allies, we are adopting a new model whereby Afghan nationals arriving will travel directly to their new communities without a safe haven stop-over in the United States.
The U.S. government also remains committed to supporting and continues to develop processes for family reunification for Afghans. [Emphasis added.]
Accordingly, the prior administration pivoted towards "welcoming Afghan nationals through programs that have long-term durable status27." Its pledge to resettle Afghans carried no "end date", "doubling down on existing immigrant pathways" to help those interested in coming to the United States28.
"Operation Allies Welcome" transitioned into "Enduring Welcome"29 as part of a longer-term strategy to bring certain Afghan nationals and their family members who remained abroad through "durable immigration pathways"30. The idea was to move away from the "temporary" parole system and ensure that future Afghan arrivals had a direct pathway to permanent legal status in the United States. The U.S. government focused on three categories of Afghans: immediate family members of U.S. citizens, permanent residents and evacuees; those who qualify for SIVs; and potential refugees.
In August 2021, the Biden-Harris administration announced a Pre-defined Group Access P-2 (Priority 2 - Group Referrals) to USRAP for certain Afghan nationals and their eligible family members31. Priority 2 refers to groups of special concern designated by the Department of State as having access to USRAP by virtue of their circumstances and apparent need for resettlement; whereas Priority 1 relates to individual cases referred by designated entities to USRAP by virtue of their circumstances and apparent need for resettlement.32
* * *
25 "Operation Allies Welcome Announces Departure of All Afghan Nationals from the National Conference Center Safe Haven in Leesburg, VA", Department of Homeland Security, News Archive, September 27, 2022.
26 "Operation Allies Welcome Announces Departure of All Afghan Nationals from the National Conference Center Safe Haven in Leesburg, VA", U.S. Department of Homeland Security, News Archive, September 27, 2022.
27 Ibid.
28 Pricilla Alvaraz, "Biden administration pivoting to long-term strategy to assist Afghans", CNN Politics website, September 1, 2021.
29 "Enduring Welcome Program", Military One Source, An Official Defense Department website, undated.
30 "Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2025", U.S. Department of State, Archived Content, September 4, 2024.
31 "U.S. Refugee Admissions Program Priority 2 Designation for Afghan Nationals", U.S. Department of State Factsheet, Archived Content, August 2, 2021.
* * *
P-2 was made available to Afghans who are not SIVs or SIV applicants but worked for a project in Afghanistan supported by a U.S. government grant or cooperative agreement or to those who worked for a U.S.-based media or NGO as a freelancer.
Afghans who were not "Allies" but were made eligible for this P-2 resettlement by the BidenHarris administration included the following33:
* Afghans who do not meet the minimum time-in-service for an SIV but who work/worked as employees of contractors, locally employed staff, interpreters or translators for the U.S. government, including United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), or Resolute Support.
* Afghans who work/worked for a U.S. government-funded program or project in Afghanistan supported through a U.S. government grant or cooperative agreement.
* Afghans who are or were employed in Afghanistan by a U.S.-based media organization or NGO. U.S.-based media organizations may also refer Afghan nationals who worked for them under stringer, freelance, and comparable arrangements.
Afghans who work/worked for sub-contractors and sub-grantees do not qualify for the P-2 designation but can qualify for P-1 referrals.
That said, exceptionally34, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) can accept P-2 referrals "for third-party contractors, particularly from U.S.-based media organizations, and for staff of U.S. NGO wholly- or majority-owned subsidiaries in Afghanistan."
The Biden-Harris administration continued to process refugee cases for Afghans in third countries across the world. PRM and USCIS began processing applications of Afghan refugees in Pakistan35 in July 2023 and had "significantly increased processing capacity" as of January 2024. As of early July 2024, PRM accepted 28,000 P-1 (individual) and P-2 (group) referrals for Afghan principal applicants.
Moreover, under the Welcome Corps for Afghans36, a new program introduced by the BidenHarris administration within USRAP, U.S.-based sponsors (including Afghan newcomers) could select and welcome Afghan refugees and SIVs to the United States, including those they know.
* * *
32 "The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Consultation and Worldwide Processing Priorities", U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, last updated September 17, 2025.
33 "Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2025", U.S. Department of State, Archived Content, September 4, 2024.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 "Welcome Corps for Afghans", The Welcome Corps website, undated.
* * *
The program allowed for the preferential selection of "refugees"37 by their friends/family already here. Sponsor groups could support one family of up to 10 people at a time. The sponsor group had to wait 90 days, beginning when the individual or family arrived in the United States, before submitting another sponsorship application.
And, in early 2023, the same administration introduced a "Family Reunification for Afghans"38 program that allowed Afghan parolees who are here supposedly temporarily to sponsor their family members to come to the United States as refugees (i.e. as potential future American citizens)39. The program fell under Biden's policy direction, providing a path toward a "longterm, permanent residence"40 to Afghans.
In April 2023, the Office of the Special Coordinator for Afghanistan (OSCA) was created. Daniel Schneiderman was appointed as Senior Coordinator.41
The Office of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE)42 was established in 2021 as a "whole-of-society operation to continue to relocate and resettle eligible Afghans." Led by career diplomat Mara Tekach, CARE was the U.S. government's centralized coordinator for identifying, relocating, processing and admitting Afghans through various pathways including SIV, Refugee status (P-1, P-2, or P-4 (the Welcome Corps)) or parole - from their departure from Afghanistan through their arrival and relocation into American communities. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)43 was updated and signed in 2023 between the State Department and AfghanEvac44 (a "coalition of more than 200 organizations working alongside the U.S.
Government to support Afghan relocation efforts") that advocates for the admission of Afghans and a "pathway to permanent residency" for Afghan evacuees already here. The MOU institutionalized "the innovative public-private partnership established in August 2021."45
* * *
37 Nayla Rush, "How the New Biden-Harris 'Welcome Corps' for Refugees Works", Center for Immigration Studies report, October 10, 2024.
38 "Family Reunification for Afghans", U.S. Department of State, undated.
39 Nayla Rush, "Family Reunification: A Path to Permanent Residence for 'Temporary' Afghan Parolees", Center for Immigration Studies blogpost, January 13, 2023.
40 "Operation Allies Welcome Announces Departure of All Afghan Nationals from the National Conference Center Safe Haven in Leesburg, VA", U.S. Department of Homeland Security, News Archive, September 27, 2022.
41 "Daniel Schneiderman", Center for a New American Security website, undated.
42 Alexanderia Haidara, "Office of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts", State Magazine, August 2024.
43 "Secretary Blinken Renews Partnership with #AfghanEvac to Continue Supporting, Resettling Afghan Allies", AfghanEvac website, June 12, 2023.
44 "AfghanEvac", Website.
45 "Secretary Blinken Renews Partnership with #AfghanEvac to Continue Supporting, Resettling Afghan Allies", AfghanEvac website, June 12, 2023.
* * *
MOST AFGHANS WHO CAME AND WANT TO COME TO THE U.S. ARE NOT "ALLIES"
Under the Biden-Harris administration, U.S. communities (mainly in Texas, California, Virginia, Washington, and Pennsylvania)46 welcomed close to 200,000 "Afghan newcomers" following the withdrawal of U.S. troops in August 2021. They were, for the most part, not our "allies"47 and were only granted parole (not SIVs).
SIV spots are numerically capped. There are two SIV programs designed for certain Afghan nationals.
The first is a permanent program authorizing SIVs for certain Afghan nationals who worked directly with U.S. Armed Forces or under Chief of Mission authority as translators or interpreters (the Translators program). The "Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for Afghan Translators/Interpreters"48 offers visas to up to 50 persons a year (the cap excludes family members such as spouses and children) and remains active.
The second one, the "Special Immigrant Visas program for Afghans who were employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government"49 is temporary. According to Current statutory authority50 no more than 50,500 SIVs can be issued to principal applicants under this program and of those, only 10,012 spots are remaining. In other words, the program ends when all visas have been issued unless additional spots are added.
The Special Immigrant Visas program for Afghans who were employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government was capped at 1,500 principal applicants per year for FY 2009 through FY 2013.51 Any unused numbers could be carried forward from one fiscal year to the next. Congress kept adding to these numbers throughout the years. In March 2024, Congress, through the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 202452, increased the total number of visas available for issuance after December 19, 2014, to 50,500 (from 38,500) and extended both the employment termination date and application deadline to December 31, 2025. As of March 21, 2025, there were only 10,012 remaining SIVs for Afghan Principal Applicants.53 There are 130,000 principal applicants with pending SIV applications (complete and incomplete).54 That said, the program continues to accept new applications; its application deadline is December 31, 2025.
* * *
46 "Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2025", U.S. Department of State, Archived Content, September 4, 2024.
47 Nayla Rush, "Most Evacuated Afghans Were Not 'Allies'", Center for Immigration Studies blogpost, March 4, 2025.
48 "Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for Iraqi and Afghan Translators/Interpreters", U.S. Department of State, Travel.State.Gov website, undated.
49 "Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans - Who Were Employed by/on Behalf of the U.S. Government", U.S. Department of State, Trasvel.State.Gov website, undated.
50 Bruno Andorra, "Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs", CRS report, January 15, 2025.
51 Ibid.
52 "H.R.2882 - Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024", Congressional Record, March 23, 2024.
* * *
About 143,000 SIVs have been issued to principal applicants and their dependents under this program through March 202455. Demand for these visas spiked following the 2021 U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan. As of June 30, 2024, more than 130,000 principal applicants have pending applications (complete and incomplete) for this program56.
Only 28,145 Afghans57 were admitted here as refugees through USRAP (from the beginning of FY 2022 through the first three months of FY 2025) and only 68,654 Afghans were granted SIVs58 (this includes principal applicants and eligible family members - spouses and children of any age, whether married or unmarried). Knowing that Afghan derivative applicants are usually at least four times that of principal applicants59, only about 17,000 SIVs have been granted to principal applicants - i.e., actual Afghan "allies."
* * *
BENEFITS AND SERVICES
In principle, parolees, unlike SIV holders and resettled refugees, have only limited access to federal benefits and services. Afghan (and Ukrainian) parolees, however, were exempted from this rule.
The Biden-Harris administration extended the benefits and beneficiaries of ORR60 to include non-refugees on U.S. soil; hundreds of thousands of Afghan (and Ukrainian) parolees were added to ORR's list of beneficiaries61. In FY 2025, in addition to refugee arrivals through USRAP (capped at 125,000), ORR was projecting to serve 531,500 other arrivals62.
* * *
53 Bruno Andorra, "Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs", CRS report, January 15, 2025.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 "Admissions and Arrivals", U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Archives.
58 Ibid.
59 "Afghan SIV References: Quarterly Reports on Status of Afghan Program", U.S. Department of State, Travel.State.Gov website, undated.
60 "Extending Refugee Cash Assistance and Refugee Medical Assistance From 8 Months to 12 Months", National Archives, Federal Register Notice, March 28, 2022.
* * *
Under the prior administration, State and ORR were working to provide "initial relocation support to Afghans granted parole and to ensure that those Afghans arriving in American communities have initial support, including health insurance."63
Congress later passed legislation (the Afghanistan Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, and the Additional Afghanistan Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022) making Afghan parolees eligible for the same resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and other federal benefits provided to refugees.
The U.S. Department of State has contracts with religious or community-based organizations called resettlement agencies to assist refugees (and other eligible newcomers such as Afghan parolees) upon arrival and provide them with services and assistance here. These agencies maintain nationwide networks of local affiliates to assist with the reception and placement (R&P)64 of these populations.
The Biden-Harris administration expanded the domestic resettlement system; it added a tenth resettlement agency (Bethany Christian Services) to the existing nine. Moreover, more than 150 local resettlement offices were opened or reopened, bringing the total of local affiliates in 226 communities to more than 350.65
In March 2022, one of the ten resettlement agencies, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), in partnership with PRM, launched a new virtual case management program, the Virtual Afghan Placement and Assistance (VAPA).66 This initiative was to provide remote program support, including direct assistance, to Afghan parolees who independently departed Safe Havens and had not yet been able to access resettlement support services.
In March 2024, PRM approved six of the national resettlement agencies to offer "Virtual Reception and Placement (VR&P)" services as an alternative to the traditional, in-person R&P services to certain populations, including Afghan SIV holders, refugees and parolees.67 VR&P was set to alleviate "capacity constraints on local affiliates and expand USRAP's ability to resettle refugees"68. Instead of working through local affiliate offices, VR&P delivered services remotely through case managers.
* * *
61 "Status and Documentation Requirements for the ORR Refugee Resettlement Program", U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, October 16, 2024.
62 "Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2025", U.S. Department of State, Archived Content, September 4, 2024.
63 "Operation Allies Welcome", U.S. Department of Homeland Security, archived content, last updated January 22, 2025.
64 "Reception and Placement", U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, Archived Content, undated,
65 "Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2025", U.S. Department of State, Archived Content, September 4, 2024.
66 "IRC launches groundbreaking Virtual Reception and Placement program to support SIVs", International Rescue Committee press release, March 26, 2024.
* * *
The benefits Afghan parolees received were numerous; they included employment training, English-language training, job placement, cash, support with housing, community orientation, health services, enrollment in various benefits and welfare programs, etc. They also had access to Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) and Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) upon arrival. Those two programs (RCA and RMA) were extended from eight to 12 months by the Biden-Harris administration69.
Afghan parolees are also allowed to apply70 for a driver's license or identification card under section 202 of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (division B of Public Law 109-13; 49 U.S.C. 30301 note), notwithstanding subsection (c)(2)(B) of that law71, which limits access to certain categories of aliens.
Those numerous benefits were not just made available for the 80,000 individuals who were hastily evacuated out of Afghanistan during Operation Allies Refuge. Those paroled into the United States afterward, throughout fiscal year 2022 (which ended September 30, 2022), were also eligible for the same benefits. Moreover, spouses and children of those Afghan parolees arriving at any time after the end of FY 2022 (no time limit beyond that date was specified) will have access to those benefits as well.
Additional advantages were also added to that list. Contrary to SIVs and refugees, parolees are not provided with a pathway to citizenship and are expected to leave when their period of parole expires. They could, however, apply for work authorization and seek employment during their stay here. Unlike refugees who are authorized for employment incident to status (meaning they are authorized to work indefinitely upon admission to the United States because their immigration status does not expire -- and are not charged a fee for applying), parolees are not employment-authorized incident to status and must pay a fee for their work permits - unless the fee is waived or exempted, which is exactly what the Biden-Harris administration did.
The prior administration provided the "benefits of employment authorization incident to status normally accorded to refugees and a no-fee initial" (and replacement of an initial) EAD to Afghan (and Ukrainian) parolees in order for them to receive the same treatment as refugees.
* * *
67 "Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2025", U.S. Department of State, Archived Content, September 4, 2024.
68 "IRC launches groundbreaking Virtual Reception and Placement program to support SIVs", International Rescue Committee press release, March 26, 2024.
69 "Extending Refugee Cash Assistance and Refugee Medical Assistance From 8 Months to 12 Months", National Archives, Federal Register Notice, March 28, 2022.
70 "Extending Government Funding and Delivering Emergency Assistance Act", Public Law, July 17, 2025.
71 "H.R.418 - REAL ID Act of 2005", Congressional Record, February 17, 2005.
* * *
Effective November 21, 2022, Afghan parolees and their qualifying family members were considered72 "employment authorized incident to parole, which means that they do not need to wait for USCIS to approve their Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization, before they can work in the United States". They were not to be charged any fee for these filings.
Afghan parolees had access to other ORR benefits73. ORR funded the Immigration Legal Services for Afghan Arrivals (ILSAA) project74, which provided free (i.e., taxpayer-funded) legal services to Afghans in the United States. ILSAA supported "pathways to permanent residence"75, such as obtaining asylum, Special Immigrant Visa status, or family reunification.
Moreover, services to Afghan Survivors Impacted by Combat (SASIC)76 were launched by ORR in February 2023 to support eligible Afghans and their families77 to overcome long-lasting trauma. Through congressional funding provided to ORR, and through a one-time competitive application process, 24 SASIC grants were awarded across the United States. Services through SASIC were to be available through February 15, 2026.
All these benefits and services come with a high cost to U.S. taxpayers. For FY 2025 alone, Biden proposed spending $5.1 billion78 on refugee processing and resettlement (that provides assistance to Afghan parolees, SIVs and refugees), five times more than the average cost before he took office. Under the prior administration, the cost kept increasing79: from $967 million in FY 2021, $1.4 billion in FY 2022, $2.2 billion in FY 2023, to $2.8 billion in FY 2024.
For comparison, the cost was around $1 billion whether under Trump or Obama80:
$892 million in FY 2020, $1 billion FY 2019, $1 billion FY 2018, $1.5 billion FY 2017, $1.2 billion FY 2016, $1 billion 2015, $1 billion 2014, and $1 billion FY2013.
* * *
72 "Certain Afghan and Ukrainian Parolees Are Employment Authorized Incident to Parole", U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Archive, November 21, 2022.
73 "Afghan Re-Parole FAQs", U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, last updated April 23, 2025.
74 "Immigration Legal Services for Afghan Arrivals (ILSAA)", U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, undated.
75 "Afghan Re-Parole FAQs", U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, last updated April 23, 2025.
76 "Services to Afghan Survivors Impacted by Combat", U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, undated.
77 "Afghan Humanitarian Parolees and Unaccompanied Afghan Minors Eligible for ORR Benefits and Services; ASA-Eligible Afghan Populations", U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Policy Letter, Revised January 05, 2023.
78 Ibid.
79 "Admissions and Arrivals", U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Archives.
80 Ibid.
* * *
A 2021 congressional appropriations bill provided about $6.3 billion for Afghan efforts81 including both immediate evacuation and long-term support which covered housing and care on U.S. military bases as well as resettlement services. Moreover, according to some reporting82, the U.S. government (i.e. taxpayers) spent from 2021-2024 more than $14 billion on Afghan efforts, including on both immediate evacuation and long-term support.
* * *
VETTING: WHERE AND HOW?
We can't talk about the admission of Afghan nationals without addressing the problem of efficient vetting. Some claim that Afghans are rigorously vetted83, but, as many have explained84, the screening and vetting of Afghan nationals is at best misleadingly reassuring. We know there are no dependable screening measures for nationals from conflict zones85, such as Afghans and Syrians, and of the impossible task of crosschecking backgrounds.
Furthermore, while vetting is essential, it only gives us a glimpse of the past and present; it doesn't secure the future. Shared values and successful integration are the best shields against radicalization.
The case of Alif Jan Adil, a young Afghan (21 at the time) who was evacuated by the BidenHarris administration to Camp Upshur at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia in 2021 is quite telling.86
Adil was arrested less than two months into his stay in the United States for engaging in a prohibited sexual conduct with minor and possessing child pornography images. A federal judge convicted Adil of "abusive sexual contact, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2244(a)(3); coercion or enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2422(b); and possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2252(a)(4)(A), (b)(2)."87
* * *
81 "The DHS Unified Coordination Group for Operation Allies Welcome Coordinated Afghan Resettlement but Faced Challenges in Funding and Authority", U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, September 29, 2022.
82 Stephen Dinian, "U.S. has spent $14 billion on Afghan evacuees", The Washington Times, November 10, 2024.
83 "Letter to Secretaries Rubio, Hegseth, and Noem", AfghanEvac website, February 8, 2025.
84 Mark Krikorian, "Op-ed: Vetting in All the Wrong Places", National Review, December 2, 2025. Andrew R. Arthur, "Assimilation or Removal Afghan vetting and the D.C. Metro shooting", Center for Immigration Studies blogpost, December 1, 2025.
85 "Threats to the Homeland", Homeland Security Government Affairs, Full Committee Hearing, October 8, 2015.
86 "Is Cultural Leniency in Order for Afghan Sexual Offenders?" Center for Immigration blogpost, September 20, 2023.
87 "US v. Alif Adil, No. 22-4740 (4th Cir. 2023)", JUSTIA U.S. Law website.
* * *
Most of the mitigating circumstances88 presented by the defense to get leniency at sentencing touched on his cultural difference: some sexual conduct that is deemed criminal in the United States is considered normal in Afghanistan. Even if he was indeed "rigorously screened" and all the documents pertaining to his judicial history in Afghanistan were available, he would still have been cleared to enter the United States. In this young man's case, nothing was missed because there was probably nothing to find. His village in rural Afghanistan does not have a regularized criminal justice system; disputes there are resolved through inter-family mediation.
Following Adil's conviction, his lawyer filed a "Defendant's Position on Sentencing"89, pleading with the court to impose a "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" sentence of no longer than ten years imprisonment. Most of the mitigating circumstances presented by the defense to get leniency at sentencing touch on Adil's cultural difference: Adil had no time to adapt to American culture.
Afghan evacuees in military bases (including Adil) did receive some cultural orientation.
Personnel in Quantico, in coordination with NGO staff, hosted Afghan-led classes open to the entire Afghan evacuee population90. These included classes on American culture.
Dar Al-Hijrah91 is one of the NGOs who worked alongside refugee resettlement agencies to provide Afghan evacuees with numerous services, including cultural orientation. As a result of its work with Afghan evacuees, Dar Al-Hijrah became the only Muslim agency in Northern Virginia92 to be officially partnering with the U.S. Department of State to assist refugees and parolees upon arrival to the United States.
Adil, as his lawyer explained93, had been on U.S. soil for less than two months at the time of his arrest, confined to a military camp with other Afghans, which meant "he was still steeped in his home culture and had had little time to assimilate into the U.S." Adil "may have viewed his relationship with F.J. [the victim, age 14 at the time of the offense] through the lens of his own upbringing." That said, his lawyer argues: "This is not to diminish the rationale for the laws that protect minors in this country, but it provides context for Mr. Adil's actions given his origin in a culture so distinctive and remote from our own."94
* * *
88 "Is Cultural Leniency in Order for Afghan Sexual Offenders?" Center for Immigration blogpost, September 20, 2023.
89 United States v. Adil, No. 1:21-cr-277, Defendant's Position on Sentencing (E.D. Va. filed December 7, 2022).
90 "Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia", U.S. Department of Defense, Inspector General, January 5, 2022.
91 "Dar El Hijrah Islamic Center", Website, undated.
92 "Refugee Services", Dar Al-Hijrah Islamic Center website, undated.
93 "Is Cultural Leniency in Order for Afghan Sexual Offenders?" Center for Immigration blogpost, September 20, 2023.
94 Ibid.
* * *
Teenagers in Afghanistan do become engaged and get married.95 Adil himself was engaged when he was 15 to a 14-year-old girl in Afghanistan, and they married two years later. In fact, the first instinct of the father of the victim was to demand that Adil marry his daughter.
It is indeed naive to think that newcomers are necessarily going to leave their beliefs and biases behind.96
* * *
95 "Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan", UNICEF website, November 12, 2021.
96 Nayla Rush, "Resettled Refugees Do Not Necessarily Leave Their Beliefs and Biases Behind", Center for Immigration Studies blogpost, November 6, 2023.
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Original text here: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fecf0474-ff5a-c9f7-7af8-b1dfd901a825/2026-01-14_Testimony_Rush.pdf
Homeland Security Deputy IG for Audits Adelman Testifies Before Senate Judiciary Subcommittees
WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 -- The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration released the following testimony by Craigg Adelman, deputy inspector general for audits at the Homeland Security Department, from a Jan. 14, 2026, joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Crime and Counterterrorism entitled "Biden's Afghan Parolee Program - A Trojan Horse With Flawed Vetting and Deadly Consequences":* * *
Chairman Cornyn, Chairman Hawley, Ranking Member Padilla, Ranking Member Durbin, and Members of the Subcommittees:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department of Homeland ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 -- The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration released the following testimony by Craigg Adelman, deputy inspector general for audits at the Homeland Security Department, from a Jan. 14, 2026, joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Crime and Counterterrorism entitled "Biden's Afghan Parolee Program - A Trojan Horse With Flawed Vetting and Deadly Consequences": * * * Chairman Cornyn, Chairman Hawley, Ranking Member Padilla, Ranking Member Durbin, and Members of the Subcommittees: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) Office of Inspector General's (OIG) critical oversight work of the Federal Government's efforts to resettle persons from Afghanistan under Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). Since 2021, DHS OIG has identified serious and systemic problems with the Department's ability to execute one of its most fundamental responsibilities: ensuring that individuals who are granted entry into or afforded temporary protection in the United States are properly vetted, accurately tracked, and effectively monitored.
The November 2025 shooting of two National Guard Members in Washington, D.C., allegedly committed by an Afghan national who arrived under OAW, has brought renewed attention to the importance of rigorous screening, vetting, and monitoring of individuals admitted under emergency or humanitarian authorities. It has also heightened public concern about whether the U.S. Government's systems, processes, and information are adequate and as effective as possible to identify and address risks within these populations.
Our body of work makes it clear that since OAW began, DHS was challenged to build reliable, end-to-end processes to resolve derogatory information, track parole expirations, and maintain accurate, current data across DHS components. In several cases, DHS could not demonstrate that it accurately knew who individuals were, where they were located, whether parole conditions were being met, or whether individuals had unresolved risk indicators.
Taken together, our work shows the Department struggling to manage information, coordinate component activities, and build sustainable operational controls capable of functioning effectively--all while experiencing surge conditions at the Southwest Border, emergency authorities, and humanitarian crises.
These deficiencies are not simply bureaucratic shortcomings or about degrees of efficiency; they represent serious gaps that have direct bearing on public safety, national security, and the public trust in our immigration system.
* * *
Background
In the summer of 2021, the United States withdrew its military and diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan. The White House launched Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) with the Department of State (DOS) as the lead to help relocate potentially eligible Afghan nationals and their immediate family members in the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) application pipeline./1
On August 29, 2021, President Biden directed Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas to lead the coordination across the Federal Government to resettle vulnerable Afghans, known as Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). Secretary Mayorkas established a Unified Coordination Group (UCG)/2 to ensure Federal resources, authorities, and expertise were used in a unified and synchronized manner to support the goals of OAW. The U.S. military and diplomatic withdrawal and evacuation operation concluded on August 30, 2021.
* * *
1 For our reviews, we used the definition of an Afghan evacuee from Public Law 117-43 as a person whose evacuation from Afghanistan to the United States, or a U.S.-controlled location overseas, was facilitated by the United States as part of OAR.
* * *
Between July 2021 and January 2022, DHS paroled approximately 77,000 evacuees from Afghanistan into the United States as part of OAR/OAW. Parole is a discretionary immigration mechanism that grants foreign nationals, who are otherwise inadmissible, entry to the United States and permission to remain for a designated period, during which they are eligible to apply for immigration benefits, including employment authorization./3
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security/4 to temporarily parole individuals applying for admission into the United States for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit on a case-by-case basis./5
* * *
Oversight of OAW/OAR Activities
Since 2022, DHS OIG has published seven reports examining DHS's performance across OAW/OAR, five/6 of which have implications for screening and vetting. Our work is part of a broader body of OAW/OAR oversight work produced by fellow OIGs./7
DHS OIG has examined a range of OAW/OAR activities, from the initial deployment of resources and personnel to frontline screening and vetting, and through the ongoing process for re-vetting, monitoring, and tracking individuals over time. Our comprehensive reports, which have been recognized for their excellence by the OIG community, reveal systemic and recurring weaknesses in DHS's ability to manage large-scale humanitarian operations while simultaneously maintaining strong national security controls.
* * *
2 According to DHS's National Response Framework, a UCG is made up of senior leaders representing various interests including state, tribal, territorial, and Federal, and in some instances local jurisdictions, private sector, and non-governmental organizations. UCG responsibilities include coordinating staff based on incident requirements, operations, planning, and logistics to integrate personnel for unity of government effort.
* * *
3 INA Sec. 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(d)(5); see also 8 C.F.R. Sec. 274a.12(c)(11).
4 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296 (codified as 6 U.S.C. Sec. 251), transferred authority from the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the DHS Secretary.
5 There is no statutory or regulatory definition of "urgent humanitarian reasons" or "significant public benefit." However, "urgent humanitarian reasons" call for immediate or other time-sensitive action, such as critical medical treatment. "Significant public benefit" parole includes, but is not limited to, law enforcement and national security reasons or foreign or domestic policy considerations.
6 The other two OAW/OAR reports from DHS OIG cover funding and authority for the UCG and whether U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services met asylum timeframe requirements.
7 Given the many Federal departments involved in the evacuation and resettlement efforts, DHS Inspector General Cuffari initiated a working group with other OIGs to deconflict and coordinate efforts, and to ensure efficiency of effort within the inspector general community. The working group included participation from the OIGs of the Department of War, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence Community, Social Security Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, United States Agency for International Development, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
* * *
DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis (OIG-22-64)
Perhaps our most significant work on OAW/OAR was our examination of DHS's ability to screen, vet, and inspect evacuees - the functions most closely linked with risks to national security and public safety. To assess DHS's ability to protect the Nation when permitting entry to a large number of evacuees, we:
* Interviewed more than 130 personnel across DHS, the Department of War (DoW), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to understand their roles in OAW/OAR;
* Conducted site visits and met with officials at the Philadelphia International Airport and the safe havens at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and Fort McCoy;
* Reviewed biographic and biometric enrollment results at lily pads/8 --temporary transit points at international locations around the world--from CBP's system to determine how many Afghan evacuees did not have a "green status"/9 as of March 2022; and
* Reviewed a CBP report on evacuees who did not have a complete "green status" prior to flying to the United States and compared these evacuees against CBP primary inspection and secondary inspection data to determine what happened to these individuals at a U.S. Port of Entry.
We determined that DHS encountered obstacles to screen, vet, and inspect all evacuees arriving as part of OAR/OAW which resulted in CBP not always having access to critical data to properly screen, vet, or inspect OAR/OAW evacuees. At the lily pads, DHS and DoW had very limited time to conduct complex screening and vetting of the evacuees. For example, over 40,000 evacuees were sent to a U.S. military base in Germany where DHS and DoW had only 10 days to complete screening and vetting of each evacuee. We also found that some fundamental biographic information used to vet evacuees through U.S. Government databases, such as name, date of birth, identification number, and travel document data, was inaccurate, incomplete, or missing.
These failures resulted in CBP paroling at least two evacuees who posed a risk to national security and the safety of local communities/10 and may have admitted or paroled other individuals of concern. CBP also allowed 35 evacuees to board a flight to the United States although they had not received a "green status" clearing them to travel. CBP also did not collect biometric data (fingerprints) from nearly 1,300 evacuees prior to their travel to the United States.
* * *
8 The lily pads served as transit points to screen and vet evacuees prior to their arrival into the United States. DoW provided temporary housing, sustainment, and other support at the lily pads.
9 According to CBP's vetting process, evacuees who passed both biometric and biographic vetting processes would receive a "green status" clearing them to travel to the United States from a lily pad.
10 Both evacuees were later apprehended and removed from the United States.
* * *
DHS OIG attributed the Department's challenges to their lack of:
* a list of evacuees who were unable to provide sufficient evacuation documents; x a contingency plan to support similar emergency situations; and
* standardized policies.
We made two recommendations in our report to improve the Department's screening and vetting of evacuees and coordination and planning efforts for future similar emergency situations; however, the Department did not concur with either. Our first recommendation, related to screening and vetting of the evacuees, is closed. Our second recommendation related to developing a comprehensive contingency plan to support future emergency situations remains open and unresolved, which means that the Department has not given OIG a credible, clear plan to address the matter.
* * *
The UCG Struggled to Track Afghan Evacuees Independently Departing US Military Bases (OIG-22-79)
DHS OIG also examined the Department's ability to track evacuees from Afghanistan who independently departed U.S. military bases, meaning they left the site without notice and in some cases without processing by the U.S. Government. During OAW, DHS temporarily housed evacuees on military bases in the United States known as "safe havens," until they could be resettled in U.S. communities. DHS eventually determined that approximately 11,700 of the evacuees departed the safe havens without resettlement assistance.
We found that the UCG struggled to document and track these evacuees who independently departed safe havens. DHS was missing contact information for some who departed, and the case tracking system used by UCG officials was not designed to track independent departures. In some instances, officials noted that evacuees recorded as present at safe havens had already left. We also identified approximately 600 evacuees who independently departed had not completed required health requirements, such as receiving vaccinations.
DHS Has a Fragmented Process for Identifying and Resolving Derogatory Information for Operation Allies Welcome Parolees (OIG-24-24)
We examined DHS's processes--led by CBP, USCIS, and ICE--for identifying and resolving derogatory information for individuals evacuated from Afghanistan and paroled into the United States under OAW. We determined that DHS had a fragmented process for identifying and resolving issues for OAW parolees with derogatory information. This siloed approach created potential gaps in DHS components' responsibility for terminating parole, initiating removal proceedings, or monitoring parole expiration.
Most significantly, we found:
* USCIS would not initiate removal proceedings or terminate parole when it denied a benefit application due to derogatory information. As a result, an OAW parolee whose parole had expired and who had already been denied a benefit may not have faced enforcement consequences for remaining in the United States without legal status.
* DHS did not have a process for monitoring parole expiration for individual parolees and had not designated a component to monitor this parole expiration, potentially resulting in OAW parolees remaining unlawfully in the United States after parole expiration.
* ICE had a complex process--dependent on third-party countries--for removing OAW parolees to Afghanistan.
These issues were further complicated by litigation surrounding DHS's immigration law enforcement policies and factors such as consideration of derogatory information during the re-parole and parole extension processes. DHS still must consider how to address the vulnerabilities in the USCIS and ICE processes for resolving derogatory information and establish processes for managing the end of parole and ensuring data integrity.
We made a total of five recommendations to address vulnerabilities in the derogatory information and resolution processes. DHS concurred with all five recommendations and as of today, all are resolved and open.DHS Needs to Improve Oversight of Parole Expiration for Select Humanitarian Parole Processes (OIG-25-30)
Based on our findings regarding the resolution of derogatory information for OAW parolees, we examined DHS's processes, procedures, and resources to monitor the end of immigration parole and determine what enforcement exists for parolees who stay in the United States after parole expiration or revocation.
For our review, we examined three parole processes: OAR/OAW; Uniting for Ukraine (U4U); and processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans (CHNV). Under these processes, DHS paroled aliens into the United States from Afghanistan, Ukraine, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as well as immediate family members of Ukrainians, Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans for up to 2-year periods. Since 2021, DHS has granted humanitarian parole to more than 800,000 aliens under these programs.
We found that none of the three DHS components responsible for end of parole activities-- CBP, USCIS, and ICE--were designated as having primary responsibly for or required to monitor parole expiration. DHS did not have a well-defined process to address parole expiration for aliens paroled into the United States through OAW/OAR or any of the other select parole processes we reviewed.
We also found that DHS did not initiate enforcement actions for parolees whose parole expired. As a result, DHS did not have assurance that former parolees were lawfully present in the United States after parole expiration.
We made three recommendations to improve DHS's oversight of humanitarian parole expiration. The Department concurred with two of our recommendations and did not concur with one recommendation, which called for DHS to designate a component or office to oversee parole expiration.DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies Welcome (OIG-22-54)
As the lead Federal agency for OAW, DHS had a responsibility not only to coordinate Federal efforts to resettle individuals evacuated from Afghanistan, but also to provide staff support for the operation. Part of DHS's responsibility was staffing DHS personnel at safe havens at U.S. military installations to carry out specific leadership and support roles.
DHS advertised detail opportunities to its employees but did not direct components to commit all necessary staff. DHS recruited employee volunteers through the DHS Volunteer Force. However, DHS could not reimburse components for the costs of travel and overtime, making some components reluctant to fund the volunteer deployments from their own budget, which further limited the number of DHS employees at state-side safe havens.
Consequently, DHS did not provide adequate manpower for these positions.
Throughout OAW, the UCG did not fully staff the detail positions, and the Volunteer Force never met its staffing goal. In fact, the Volunteer Force only met 38 percent of the goal at the peak of its deployments. Between September 14, 2021, and January 25, 2022, DHS employees accounted for only 3 percent of the staff at safe havens. Partners such as DoW, which supplied nearly 87 percent of staff, assumed most of the staffing responsibility. The shortage of DHS employees affected the safe havens' ability to provide services to the evacuees.
To avoid potential staffing shortages in future operations, DHS OIG recommended that DHS develop a framework for directing DHS components to deploy staff to support missions, including non-centrally funded, unplanned, and emergency operations. We also
recommended developing a volunteer deployment strategy that included provisions for supporting and training volunteers, regardless of the deployment funding source. DHS concurred with all three of our recommendations; one is closed and two are resolved and open.
* * *
Ongoing OAW-Related Work
We have several ongoing reviews relevant to today's hearing. We are conducting an evaluation of the adjudication of asylum applications for the OAW population in response to the
Ahmed v DHS settlement in April 2023. This review is based on complaints from USCIS employees who believe the settlement agreement has contributed to errors in the asylum adjudication process due to a court-mandated shorter timeframe for adjudication.
Another ongoing OIG review focuses on DHS' recurrent vetting of the OAW population, which follows up on a recommendation in a prior audit for which the Department did not concur.
Our current project is evaluating how DHS vets OAW parolees remaining in the country on a reoccurring basis, how derogatory information is shared with DHS components, and if DHS conducted enforcement actions. This is a critical and timely project as National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Joseph Kent testified on December 11 th that the NCTC has identified 2,000 Afghans who entered the country as part of OAW and have ties to terrorist organizations.
Beyond projects linked to OAW/OAR, DHS OIG has other work examining DHS's programs and activities related to screening and vetting of foreign nationals entering the United States, which is a major area of focus for us.
* * *
Recommendations & Conclusion
In sum, our body of oversight work revealed several root causes of DHS's inability to carry out its core mission responsibilities during OAW. These include:
* Fragmented leadership and lack of centralized control;
* Disjointed and inconsistent vetting and derogatory resolution processes;
* Incomplete, poor quality, and siloed data that hindered screening and case resolution; and
* Lack of parole expiration monitoring and enforcement.
Across our body of work on OAW/OAR, DHS OIG has issued 17 targeted, operationally focused recommendations that provide a roadmap for improving the Department's ability to manage large scale crises. These recommendations consistently call for DHS to centralize ownership of vetting and derogatory information resolution, modernize and integrate data systems, clearly define unity of command and lines of authority during surge operations, establish reliable mechanisms to track parole status and expiration in real time, and institutionalize contingency planning for large-scale humanitarian crises.
DHS did not concur with three of the recommendations, two of which remain unresolved.
The recommendations DHS did not agree to are: (1) ensuring a recurrent vetting process was established for all OAW evacuees for the duration of their parole, (2) a contingency plan to support similar emergency situations in the future, and (3) designating a DHS component to track the expiration of parole. We judge that, if these recommendations were fully implemented, it would enable the Department to replace its ad hoc, reactive model with a more disciplined, crisis-ready framework capable of quickly and effectively reacting to large scale events while ensuring security, accountability, and public trust.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I am grateful for the bipartisan attention to this issue and your support of the important work of DHS OIG. I look forward to answering your questions.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fecf0474-ff5a-c9f7-7af8-b1dfd901a825/2026-01-14_Testimony_Adelman.pdf
Heritage Foundation Senior Fellow Hankinson Testifies Before Senate Judiciary Subcommittees
WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 -- The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration released the following written testimony by Simon R. Hankinson, a senior research fellow in the Center for Border Security and Immigration at the Heritage Foundation, from a Jan. 14, 2026, joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Crime and Counterterrorism entitled "Biden's Afghan Parolee Program - A Trojan Horse With Flawed Vetting and Deadly Consequences":* * *
My name is Simon Hankinson. I am the Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Border Security and Immigration at The Heritage Foundation. The ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 -- The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration released the following written testimony by Simon R. Hankinson, a senior research fellow in the Center for Border Security and Immigration at the Heritage Foundation, from a Jan. 14, 2026, joint hearing with the Subcommittee on Crime and Counterterrorism entitled "Biden's Afghan Parolee Program - A Trojan Horse With Flawed Vetting and Deadly Consequences": * * * My name is Simon Hankinson. I am the Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Border Security and Immigration at The Heritage Foundation. Theviews I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.
I. Summary
The Afghan government collapsed in the summer of 2021, after nearly 20 years of U.S. efforts to sustain a democracy in a soil where it could not flourish. Amid the chaos, the U.S. evacuated around 80,000 Afghans to staging areas outside Afghanistan in Operation Allies Refuge (OAR).
The second stage, bringing Afghans into the U.S., was known as Operation Allies Welcome (OAW). The Biden Administration then transitioned the effort to a permanent program to bring in Afghans called Enduring Welcome and created an office at the State Department to run it, the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE).
Starting with the initial 80,000 evacuees, the Biden Administration ultimately brought in more than 200,000 putative Afghan "allies" and their claimed family members. Unlike legal or illegal immigrants from most other countries, the Afghans were given work authorization, legal assistance, health insurance, and a range of other benefits that cost billions of U.S. tax dollars.1 In a recent report, Nayla Rush of the Center for Immigration Studies wrote:
Contrary to popular narratives, most Afghans admitted during and after the evacuation had nothing to do with the U.S. government or any of its contractors. They were not U.S. "allies," nor were they "persecuted" individuals in need of refugee resettlement. Lacking immigrant visas, they were granted "parole", a temporary permission to enter and remain in the United States.2
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1 Nayla Rush, "How did 'Operation Allies Welcome' work, and how did he benefit?" Center for Immigration Studies, December 5, 2025, https://cis.org/Rush/Rahmanullah-Lakanwal-One-200000-Afghans-Brought-Here2021
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It is probable, as some American activists claim, that there remain some Afghans in Afghanistan or elsewhere outside the U.S. who have legitimate claims to protection after both providing loyal service to the United States and due to current fear of the Taliban. AfghanEvac, a "nonprofit working to resettle Afghan nationals," told the Wall Street Journal that "[s]ome 265,000 Afghans are still being processed abroad, including about 180,000 in the Special Immigrant Visa pipeline" as SIVs, refugees, or to join relatives already here under various programs.3 Meanwhile, we have likely imported thousands of others with no such valid claims, because the Biden Administration deliberately lowered the bar for Afghans to qualify for Special Immigrant Visas or paroled them into the United States by blatant abuse of a limited discretionary power.
At present, the U.S. has no people or means to vet anyone inside Afghanistan. We have no diplomatic, security, or overt official presence in the country. Until the Trump Administration paused all entry for Afghans in 2025, the State Department was still allowing them to apply for SIVs in other countries they could reach. Their applications were processed by local staff with no knowledge of Afghanistan. They were interviewed by junior consular officers with no experience of Afghanistan. There were no penalties for submitting false applications, or for applying more than once under a false identity. It would be foolhardy to resume processing of Afghan SIVs as long as these conditions persist.
II. Afghan Evacuation - OAR and OAW
As the Afghan government crumbled in July-August 2021, the Biden Administration believed the United States had a duty to remove so-called "Afghan allies" from Afghanistan, where they and their families might be at risk of retribution from the Taliban regime. Unfortunately, the OAR evacuation was so chaotic and indiscriminate that those evacuated were a mix of some "allies" along with random Afghans who made it to the airport and were let on a plane.4
OAR was created in an emergency, in haste, and without adequate planning. The deliberate decision was taken to evacuate tens of thousands of Afghan nationals and their immediate relatives on the premise that the principal applicants had rendered significant service to the U.S. government effort in Afghanistan. However, the U.S. had insufficient time and means to determine with accuracy (a) which Afghans seeking evacuation and then entry to the U.S. had really served the U.S. as "allies," (b) who their family members were, (c) whether they had criminal records or for other reasons were ineligible from entering the U.S. under our immigration law, (d) whether they had any connections with the Taliban or terrorist organizations, and (e) even the true identity of the Afghans in question.
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2 Rush, Ibid.
3 Sune Engel Rasmussen, "Trump's Immigration Crackdown Targets Even Closest Wartime Allies," December 6, 2025, Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trumps-immigration-crackdowntargets-even-closest-wartime-allies-f2b62074?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqexoFOXBclUGYSmBv25tbAGJqTmPk4bs8f_DPyBkrNCEvcuLXhkymk0JnU3bE%3D&gaa_ts=693c4383&gaa_sig=-zmKlH97eTTdN59GZhHAhzzbi43q40ai_xq-XuYrDtM_VKZW3Z_BodUuKvaMZlcKfBOjmrKsLzYshEr1q8Tc7g%3D%3D
4 Nayla Rush, "Operation Allies Refuge: Who Exactly Was on Those Planes?" Center for Immigration Studies, September 14, 2021, https://cis.org/Rush/Operation-Allies-Refuge-Who-Exactly-Was-Those-Planes
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To make OAR possible in a rush, the U.S. government improvised a complex web of "vetting" through which every Afghan coming to the U.S. was intended to be properly identified and then screened for any derogatory information that would render them ineligible from entering - or otherwise unsafe to admit to - the U.S.
The presumption at the time was that once removed from Afghanistan, most of the "allies" and their relatives would be brought to the U.S. where they would eventually be able to apply for permanent residency through various means. Permanent residency is the final stage before U.S. citizenship.
OAR brought Afghans to locations outside Afghanistan known as "lily pads" where they were processed for later entry into the United States, mostly using immigration parole. Other evacuated Afghans were brought directly to what grew to be eight "Safe Havens," areas on U.S. military bases where they were housed and processed for onward resettlement in the U.S.5
III. Abuse of Parole
Parole is supposed to be temporary, used on a case-by-case basis for individuals based on humanitarian reasons or public benefit to the United States for aliens who don't have time to pursue a U.S. visa. The typical examples are emergency surgery and testifying in a criminal case. When that temporary activity is over, parole is supposed to terminate and the alien departs. Given the purpose and temporary nature of parole, Congress logically did not provide work authorization for parolees.
It is important to note that Congress amended the parole statute to expressly state that refugees should not be paroled into the U.S. In violation of many of these statutory provisions, the Biden Administration used parole as a mass migration program to bring a million and a half aliens from, inter alia, Afghanistan, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Ukraine, and Venezuela and gave them work authorization.6
Of the 80,000 initial OAR Afghan evacuees, 72,550 were paroled into the U.S. under OAW.7 Once they were here on parole, DHS had insufficient processes and means to monitor their status and to deport them if they were found to be in violation of immigration status or otherwise ineligible to remain. A DHS Office of the Inspector General report in 2024 found that "DHS does not have a process for monitoring parole expiration."8 Therefore, at least between August 2023 and May 2024, Afghans who had not applied for a further immigration benefit before their initial two-year parole expired could have remained in the country with no legal status.
The Biden Administration's aim was that all the Afghans on parole would apply to remain in the United States by applying for asylum, immigrant visas based on family petitions, or Special Immigrant Visas. However, if U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied those petitions because the applicant was ineligible or committed fraud, "USCIS would also not initiate removal proceedings for a parolee whose application it had denied and whose parole later expired."9 In other words, Afghans who were paroled into the U.S. using questionable authority for two years and whose parole had expired would simply remain unlawfully, until something brought them back to the attention of U.S. immigration or law enforcement agencies.
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5 USCRI Policy Brief, "Allies Welcome Phase I & II Analysis - Domestic & International Intermediary Sites," June 14, 2022, https://refugees.org/allies-welcome-conference-safe-havens-and-lily-pads-initiative/
6 Simon Hankinson, "Liberal Judge Tries To Block Trump Over Bogus Biden-Era Parole for Countless Illegals," April 29, 2025, https://www.heritage.org/border-security/commentary/liberal-judge-tries-block-trump-overbogus-biden-era-parole-countless
7 Rush, Ibid.
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, "DHS Has a Fragmented Process for Identifying and Resolving Derogatory Information for Operation Allies Welcome Parolees," OIG-24-24, May 6, 2024.
9 OIG-24-24, Ibid.
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IV. Failures of Vetting
"Vetting" means checking an applicant's background to determine whether they have past criminal, terrorist, or other records that indicate they are a national security risk or show an ineligibility to enter the U.S. It requires U.S. agencies to gather and rely on biographic information (name, date of birth, place of birth, etc.) and biometric information (photo, fingerprints, and DNA). This can then be compared to all data held in U.S. official military, intelligence, and law enforcement databases.
"Hits" or matches to derogatory information must be cleared as not applicable, waived, or addressed by administrative measures or law enforcement.
The vetting of Afghans in OAR was a coordinated U.S. interagency effort including but not limited to the Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and FBI.
According to a DHS inspector general report in September 2022, "DHS officials said screening and vetting requirements were decided on an ad hoc basis."10 For OAR, DoD, State, or DHS collected biometric and biographic data on Afghans while they were out of Afghanistan at "lily pads" in other countries awaiting entry to the U.S. DHS coordinated the vetting of that information. Afghans who were cleared were again screened at the port of entry when they arrived in the U.S.
The FBI "served a critical support function in OAR and OAW by providing the lead partner agencies with timely information to help them determine whether Afghan evacuees, including individuals who may pose a risk to national security, entered or remained in the United States."11 According to an internal FBI audit: "the need to immediately evacuate Afghans overtook the normal processes required to determine whether individuals attempting to enter the United States pose a threat to national security, which increased the risk that bad actors could try to exploit the expedited evacuation."12
Even the best vetting can only find information that is available. The saying in computing goes: "garbage in, garbage out." For vetting, the corollary would be "nothing in, nothing out." Any criminal convictions, terrorist links, Taliban connections, or actions in Afghanistan applicable to a given Afghan individual but which were unrecorded or are unavailable to U.S. agencies does not count as derogatory information. Given the number of Afghans - regardless of whether they had qualifying U.S. service - who were hastily evacuated under U.S. auspices, there were inevitably some who presented security concerns of various kinds.
Regarding the OAR evacuees, the 2022 DHS/OIG report found that "some information used to vet evacuees... such as name, date of birth, identification number, and travel document data was inaccurate, incomplete, or missing." The report found that 11,110 records among the roughly 80,000 Afghans they looked at had the birthday, January 1. Some applicants used only one name, not always the same one, and not always spelled the same by those entering their data. According to the DHS/OIG report, "CBP admitted or paroled evacuees who had questionable names and dates of birth partly due to cultural differences."13 DHS/OIG found that CBP guidance was to admit or parole Afghan evacuees into the U.S. even if they had improper identification documents, as long as they had no derogatory information. The result: CBP "admitted or paroled evacuees who were not fully vetted into the United States."14
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10 Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, "DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis," September 6, 2022
11 U.S. Department of Justice, "Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Participation in the Handling of Afghan Evacuees During Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome," Audit Division 25-056, June 2025.
12 Ibid.
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Sex Crimes Ignored
Unrevealed connections to the Taliban and terrorist groups are only one of the risks of admitting tens of thousands of Afghans with limited background information. Afghan men were reportedly evacuated by the U.S. and even admitted to the U.S. accompanied by underage girls they claimed as wives.15 Some girls alleged they were forced into marriage or raped as the price of getting out of Afghanistan with the older men. In 2010, a PBS documentary revealed the practice of powerful Afghan men using boys for sex and "documenting how the Afghan authorities responsible for stopping these crimes are sometimes themselves complicit in the practice."16 In 2015, the New York Times reported that the U.S. military had instructed soldiers to ignore sexual abuse of children by Afghan allies.17 The State Department's Afghanistan Task Force noted cases of probable child marriage and polygamy when processing Afghans at a "safe haven" U.S. military base. These concerns do not appear to have resulted in any Afghans being denied benefits or deported.
Whatever is customary or tolerated in Afghanistan, adults having sex with children is statutory rape in the United States. Here, polygamy and child marriage are also illegal. All of these activities would render any Afghan ineligible from receiving a visa of any kind to enter the United States and render them deportable after admission. Even if State and DHS did check for such criminal records, they would only have existed if the crimes had been committed in the U.S. For the most part, U.S. authorities would have no way to know, before admitting them, if any of the Afghans brought to the U.S. since 2021 had committed sex crimes in Afghanistan. Members of the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other armed Afghan forces were eligible for evacuation and parole under OAR. However, the U.S. military reportedly did not share all the derogatory information it possessed about members of these forces with the State Department and DHS. Therefore, any such information would not have been revealed in vetting of these individuals.
Several studies from Europe have shown that Afghan refugees and immigrants (along with those of some other countries) commit violent crime at much higher rates than native-born people. For example, Afghans were more than ten times as likely to be arrested for violent crime in Germany than Germans.18 In the United Kingdom, Afghans "were more than 20 times more likely to account for sexual offence convictions than British citizens."19 It is naive to expect that with a much larger population of recent Afghan migrants than most European countries, the experience of the United States should be radically different. Properly screening the Afghans evacuated and paroled into the United States during OAR and successor programs would at least have reduced that risk.
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13 Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, "DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis," September 6, 2022
14 Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, "DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis," September 6, 2022
15 Mathew Lee, "Afghan evacuation raises concerns about child trafficking," AP, September 3, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-child-trafficking-27d93a340c4834d497eb36e22bb72f42
16 PBS Frontline, "The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan," April 20, 2010, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/documentary/dancingboys/
17 Jeff Goldstein, "U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies," New York Times, September 20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/world/asia/us-soldiers-told-to-ignore-afghan-allies-abuse-ofboys.html
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Removing Ineligible Afghans
Once in the U.S., each time an Afghan applied to adjust status, extend parole, or for some other immigration benefit, their information should have been again compared to U.S. information holdings and any derogatory match addressed before granting the benefit desired. Addressing a match would mean either dismissing it as not applicable to the applicant concerned or waiving it; or denying the benefit and, if so warranted, beginning deportation proceedings based on a discovered ineligibility. However, a subsequent report from DHS/OIG in 2024 concluded that DHS suffered from "a complex ICE process for removing OAW parolees to Afghanistan that depends on a thirdparty country," and that "DHS does not have a process for monitoring parole expiration."20 Perhaps these deficiencies also applied to the Afghans let into the U.S. on parole after OAW.
V. Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts (CARE)
From the U.S. withdrawal in 2021 until the end of the Biden presidency, CARE brought to America more than 200,000 Afghans, mostly using parole but also with SIVs and refugee status via USRAP.
The Biden State Department used SIVs where feasible. In cases where an SIV was not possible or would take too long, DHS used parole to bring Afghans into the U.S. for two years, and then in 2023, allowed them to apply to renew their parole for another two years. Once the Afghans were in the U.S., the government provided legal assistance and encouraged them to use the USRAP, apply for SIVs, or apply for immigrant visas under family reunification as "pathways" to the ultimate end - making them permanent residents and then citizens.
From 2021 to 2025, CARE spent around $5 billion ostensibly to "assist Afghans who cooperated with the US mission in that country."/i
The State Department official closed the CARE office in the summer of 2025 but transferred its responsibilities to the South and Central Asia Bureau's Afghanistan Desk, where it is still operating with a few dozen contract (not direct hire federal) staff.
CARE was reportedly still bringing in Afghans until a few days before the terrorist attack on the National Guard soldiers in Washington, D.C. in November 2025. The CARE offices in Washington and Doha remain open to deal with the remaining 1,200 Afghans at refugee Camp Al Sayliyah in Doha. At least 300 Afghans from that camp have voluntarily returned to Afghanistan without reports of retribution against them, which belies their initial claims to protection. Ethnic and religious minority groups such as Christians and Hazaras are much more likely to face persecution from the Taliban than ethnic Pashtuns. However, most of the remaining families in Doha are Pashtuns. The Taliban is dominated by Pashtuns.
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18 "German Police: Afghan, Syrian Newcomers Linked To Higher Violent Crime Rates In Germany," December 9, 2025, https://www.afintl.com/en/202512090838
19 Charles Hymas, "Foreigners convicted of up to 23pc of sex crimes," The Daily Telegraph, March 10, 2025, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/03/10/foreigners-commit-up-to-quarter-of-sex-crimes/#:~:text=Source:%20Freedom%20of%20infromation%20request,population%20in%20England%20and %20Wales
20 20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, "DHS Has a Fragmented Process for Identifying and Resolving Derogatory Information for Operation Allies Welcome Parolees," OIG-24-24, May 6, 2024.
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According to several whistleblowers and others familiar with Afghan case work, CARE permitted the entry of thousands of Afghans with no legitimate experience working for the United States, nor any credible fear of the Taliban regime that would qualify them for asylum or refugee status. Case workers and whistleblowers have identified systematic fraud in the program, including forged recommendation letters from U.S. officials and fraud in identity and personal documents. In addition, they allege, CARE employed contractors, around 200 of them from Afghanistan, with insufficient vetting and oversight. Some contractors reportedly facilitated the approval of cases for family and other reasons rather than connection to the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. Whistleblowers and other Americans familiar with case processing have said that CARE supervisors had no ability to verify applicants' claims and documents, and that "CARE has no capacity to or real interest in trying to expose fraudulent claims."21
Corruption is endemic in Afghanistan. A report from the State Department's Inspector General on U.S. Embassy Kabul in 2010 said, in a section on fraud prevention in consular operations, that "it is widely acknowledged that Afghan documents are unreliable and that corruption is rampant in both government and social sectors," adding that "so many of the applicants are found to be intending immigrants and therefore ineligible for NIVs [non-immigrant visas] regardless of the veracity of their supporting documentation." Further, the report noted that even then - halfway through the U.S. two-decade presence - "[t]he high number of travelers absconding from government-sponsored training programs, youth exchanges, and official travel, with many of those absconders requesting asylum in Canada, suggests that there may be organized smuggling rings operating both in Afghanistan and the United States."22
When processing SIVs, State Department consular officers reportedly "overcame" significant "hits," or records in the U.S. consular database indicating criminal, terrorist, or Taliban ties, in various cases, allowing these cases to proceed despite not confirming whether the "hits" were indicative of national security threats. According to officers who worked in or with CARE, some Afghan recipients of SIVs who claimed a fear of persecution by the Taliban returned to Afghanistan after they became legal permanent residents of the United States. Some of these Afghans worked for the CARE office, so American supervisors would have been aware of their travel home. Their return to Afghanistan after claiming fear of persecution indicates that these individuals committed immigration fraud when applying for their SIVs and later for their green cards. This should normally result in the termination of their status in the U.S. and render them removable under U.S. immigration law.
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21 Phillip Linderman, "The Afghan Refugee Program Is an Unfixable Mess--and May Bring the Next Terrorist Attack," The American Conservative, March 13, 2025, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-afghanrefugee-program-is-an-unfixable-mess-and-may-bring-the-next-terrorist-attack/
22 United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection, Embassy Kabul, Afghanistan, Report Number ISP-I-10-32A, February 2010, https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/isp-i-10-32a_1.pdf
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As Philip Linderman writes, whistleblowers within CARE alleged that the process for approving SIV applications was "riddled with payoffs and other Afghan-to-Afghan reward kickbacks about which the American CARE supervisors know little and, apparently, care even less."23
VI. Special Immigrant Visas (SIV)
SIVs are granted annually to long-serving or meritorious foreign employees of U.S. missions abroad, long known as Foreign Service Nationals and now as Locally-Employed Staff (LES). Normally, to qualify for an SIV, LES have to show they've worked at least 15 years for the U.S. government (at the State Department or other agency present at the U.S. mission) with outstanding service, or 20 years with good service. With the massive scale-up of U.S. personnel and LES in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2001, Congress lowered the qualification requirements for SIVs to one year (later raised to two) of service, and raised numerical limits to accommodate a large increase in applications from Iraqi nationals.24
(i) Pre-2021 SIVs at Embassy Kabul:
The Kabul SIV process was similar to that of any other U.S. embassy, with some exceptions. The Principal Applicant (PA) for an SIV had to have an employment letter from the U.S. government, plus a letter of recommendation from his American supervisor. Each case needed a final Chief of Mission (COM) approval, in a memorandum, which was based on those letters and a review of the employee's personnel records.
After COM approval, the applicant had an SIV interview with a consular officer. Because of the high fraud and corruption levels in Afghanistan, Embassy Kabul subjected every SIV application to an automatic fraud interview with the Assistant Regional Security Officer/Investigator (A/RSO/I), an officer from Diplomatic Security agent assigned to the consular section to fight visa fraud. The A/RSO/I was assisted by Afghan LES investigators and staff with experience in local languages, traditions, and other information helpful to discovering fraud.
After that interview, the State Department submitted a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) cable to the State Department, which triggered a standard inter-agency review for security concerns. Only after that process was complete - with COM approval and SAO clearance - did the consular section issue the SIV, allowing the PA and his family to fly to the U.S.
After the initial evacuation of the 80,000 Afghans and total takeover of the country by the Taliban government, the U.S. State Department lowered the standards and eased the process for Afghans to apply for SIVs.
(ii) Post-OAW SIVs for Afghans
Since the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. Embassy Kabul is now the Afghan Affairs Unit (AAU) in Doha, Qatar. Within U.S. Embassy Doha, the AAU has six consular officers, four of whom are Entry Level Officers who do the adjudicating of visas, including SIVs from Afghans. The AAU has an SIV Council which reports to the Chief of Mission, who signs the COM Approval memorandum required for all SIVs.
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23 Linderman, Ibid.
24 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Policy Manual, Chapter 10 - Certain Afghan and Iraqi Nationals," https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-7-part-f-chapter-10, (accessed December 12, 2025).
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After OAR, the State Department reportedly made a number of procedural changes to the processing of SIVs for Afghans that weakened an already fraud-prone program with many vulnerabilities.
Starting in late 2022, Afghans who had not worked for the U.S. government could be considered for the USRAP.25 In addition, Afghans who did not formerly qualify for an SIV because they did not work for the U.S. government directly could be eligible if they had worked for a U.S. -funded contractor, project, or program, or even if they worked for a U.S.-based media or non-profit organization. A letter from an American employer was not required - an Afghan citizen employer could recommend another Afghan.26 Verifying this recommendation and the alleged relationship between the Afghan SIV applicant and any American presence in Afghanistan presented serious, perhaps insurmountable obstacles. Data on Afghans - criminal, military, terrorist, biographic, and any other information gathered by U.S. agencies when they were present in Afghanistan - has not been gathered or properly updated since the summer of 2021 because the DoD, State Department, and other agencies responsible for entering information are no longer there.
This gives consular officers outside Afghanistan less and less to go on every year. Afghanistan is a high-fraud country with poor document integrity and legendary corruption. Consular officers in Doha and other countries that process Afghan SIVs have, with rare exceptions, never served in Afghanistan and do not speak any of its languages.
When American citizens, veterans, and politicians speak of "Afghan allies," they most likely think of soldiers, translators, and others who risked their lives beside our forces in the field or in crucial national security, combat, and intelligence roles. They are not thinking of casual laborers working for sub-contractors, or for foreign media organizations, or for NGOs tangentially connected to the U.S. effort. One Foreign Service officer interviewed several Afghans for SIVs when he was working as a consular officer in a nearby country.27 One of these Afghans had worked in a warehouse allegedly affiliated with a U.S. contractor. Another had worked for a sub-contractor to build latrines on a military base used by American forces. Neither had been interviewed in Kabul by the A/RSO/I and fraud unit, so therefore neither had a case file which could be cross-referenced with information presented in their SIV application.
Case notes from previous applications filed in Kabul are very useful. In another case, the aforementioned consular officer found case notes from a fraud interview showing that the applicant had never worked for the U.S. government. The applicant had, presumably, hoped that applying in a country outside Afghanistan would avoid revelation of his previous fraud. Normal SIVs for U.S. embassy employees are accompanied by the personnel file going back at least 15, and normally 20 years. Afghan SIV applicants who actually worked for the U.S. government have files going back only one or two years. Those who claim to have worked for NGOs and contractors may have no records at all. They can also submit fraudulent documents to back their claims.
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25 Rush, Ibid.
26 Person interviewed by author on background ("FSO-1")
27 FSO1, ibid.
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Afghan applicants for SIVs have submitted fraudulent employment letters, letters of recommendation, and even Chief of Mission approvals. In May 2025, Dilbar Gul Dilbar was arrested and charged with visa fraud in the United States, after his application for an SIV was found to have a counterfeit Chief of Mission approval from U.S. Embassy Kabul, a fraudulent letter of employment, and a fraudulent Letter of Recommendation. Despite all these fake documents, Dilbar's SIV was approved on March 20, 2024. He was then admitted into the U.S. in April and granted legal permanent resident status in July 2024. No experienced consular officer would imagine that Dilbar's case is unique./ii
Fraudulent documents are easy to obtain on the local market in many countries - and are available even in the United States. In 2024, U.S. Navy reserve officer Jeromy Pittman of Florida was sentenced to two years for accepting bribes from Afghans for "drafting, submitting and verifying fraudulent letters of recommendation for Afghan citizens who applied for SIVs with the State Department."28
On June 4, 2025, President Trump issued a Proclamation which "fully restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 12 countries found to be deficient with regards to screening and vetting and determined to pose a very high risk to the United States."29 The first country on the list is Afghanistan.
VII. Afghan Adjustment Act
In 2022, the Afghan Adjustment Act (AAA) was proposed in Congress.30 This would have expedited adjustment to Legal Permanent Resident for Afghans present in the U.S. who:
* Were anywhere in the SIV process, as long as they had Chief of Mission approval; or
* Were referred (usually by the U.N. refugee agency) to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program; or
* Had filed an SIV before July 31, 2018; or
* Merely were physically present in the U.S. for the past two years.
The AAA would have lowered already low standards for approving Afghan SIVs, and introduced additional fraud risks into a program already vulnerable to malfeasance. The bill did not pass. The umbrella group AfghanEvac lobbied for the AAA and later legislation to fast-track Afghans to U.S. residency and citizenship. Provisions that would have facilitated rapid entry and residency for Afghans pushed by AfghanEvac and others were in draft versions of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act but were removed before it passed.
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28 Louis Casiano, "Naval officer sentenced in Afghan SIV bribery scheme amid scrutiny of visa program after terror plot exposed," Fox News, October 28, 2024, https://www.foxnews.com/us/naval-officer-sentenced-afghan-sivbribery-scheme-scrutiny-visa-program-terror-plot-exposed
29 The White House, "Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restricts the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats," June 4, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/06/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-restricts-the-entry-offoreign-nationals-to-protect-the-united-states-from-foreign-terrorists-and-other-national-security-and-publicsafety-threats/#:~:text=Pursuant%20to%20President%20Trump's%20Executive,entry%20serves%20U.S.%20national %20interests.
30 Simon Hankinson, "The Afghan Adjustment Act Would Not Facilitate Safe or Orderly U.S. Entry of Afghan Allies," Heritage Foundation, December 2, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/homeland-security/report/the-afghanadjustment-act-would-not-facilitate-safe-or-orderly-us-entry
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VIII. Refugee Programs for Afghans
Parole is temporary and can be revoked as easily as it can be granted - letting Afghans (and other aliens) in this way was merely a means to allow them physical presence while they pursued other means of remaining in the U.S. such as asylum or, for qualified Afghans, SIVs. Because not that many Afghans qualified for SIVs, even with the significantly lower bar discussed above, the Biden administration tried to process them as refugees through the USRAP. The administration created a program (Welcome Corps) by which groups of at least five American citizens or legal permanent residents could "sponsor Afghan refugees who are outside of Afghanistan, do not already have a case with the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program or Special Immigrant Visa program, and meet all of the program's eligibility requirements."31 In brief, the requirements were that the Afghan was 18, not in the US or Afghanistan, and hadn't previously been denied under the USRAP.32 The sponsors had to commit to "providing a set of core services," but the refugees they sponsored (families of up to 10 people) would automatically be eligible for work authorization and resettlement benefits paid for by taxpayers, and there was no apparent mechanism - let alone intent - to compel sponsors to fulfil their commitments.
Allowing private individuals, including non-citizens, the power to declare Afghans to be refugees raised serious risks of fraud and corruption. In 2023, the Biden administration went further, by allowing Afghans in the U.S. on parole to bring their spouses and unmarried children up to 21 in as refugees (if the parolee was over 18) or their parents, legal guardians, and unmarried siblings under 21 (if the parolee was under 18).33 That means that Afghans here on parole, and thus not technically "admitted" to the U.S., with no guaranteed ability to remain beyond two years, let alone pathway to permanent residence, were able to essentially bypass the normal programs and bring their relatives into the USRAP.
Foreigners here on parole are not supposed to be able to access federal welfare benefits. Cubans and Haitians are an exception to this due to a quirk in immigration law, so they can tap into welfare immediately on arrival. Refugees are also able to access a wide range of federal welfare benefits immediately on arrival in the U.S.34 Therefore, Afghan refugees can be eligible with no waiting period for certain federal public benefits, including Medicaid, Refugee Cash and Medical Assistance, Refugee Social Services, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Federal Student Aid.
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31 Welcome Corps, "Welcome Corps for Afghans," https://welcomecorps.org/become-a-sponsor/help-afghanrefugees/ (accessed December 12, 2025).
32 A requirement that they also be registered with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees could be waived.
33 U.S> Department of State, "Family Reunification for Afghans," https://www.state.gov/afghanistan-familyreunification/ (accessed December 12, 2025).
34 The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was passed to prevent legal (and illegal) immigrants from getting federal welfare benefits for their first five years in the U.S. However, the PRWORA exempted "qualified aliens," which includes refugees.
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IX. Post-2021 Criminal and Terrorist Activity in the U.S. by Afghans
Even successful vetting cannot predict future radicalization or action. As Nayla Rush writes, "shared values and successful integration are the best shields against radicalization."35 Admitting aliens, however vetted, has inherent risk that varies with the country of origin, the age and sex of the aliens, and other factors. The higher the crime rate in the country of origin of those brought in, the higher the risk to the host country. The more people brought in, the more likely there will be offences committed in the future.
In 2022, there were reports of various crimes by Afghans - including four sexual assaults - on or near U.S. military bases. Some were not prosecuted and others were downgraded from felonies to misdemeanors. Below are a few recent cases involving Afghan perpetrators, most of whom came to the U.S. after 2021.
* 03 DEC 2025 - ICE arrested Afghan Jaan Shah Safi in Waynesboro, VA. DHS said he was linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K). ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the AUG 2021 bombing at Kabul airport which killed 13 US servicemen.
Safi came to the U.S. under Operation Allies Welcome.36
* 02 DEC 2025 - Afghan Mohammad Dawood Alokozay was arrested in Texas on charges of making terroristic threats after he allegedly posted a video to social media threatening to carry out a suicide bombing attack against Americans. In a DoJ press release, Attorney General Pam Bondi said that "This Afghan national came into America during the Biden administration," but she was not specific as to how./iii
* On 26 NOV 2025, Rahmanullah Lakhanwal allegedly shot two national guard members in Washington, DC, killing one. He came in 2021 on parole under Operation Allies Welcome.
Reportedly, he applied for asylum and his case was approved in 2024./iv
* In June 2025, Nasir Ahmad Tawhedi pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiring and attempting to provide material support and resources to ISIS. He and another Afghan had been arrested in November 2024 for plotting to kill Americans at polling stations in Oklahoma City on Election Day./v
Tawhedi reportedly came to the U.S. in 2021 under Operation Allies Welcome.37
* In April 2025, Jamal Wali was pulled over by Fairfax, VA, police officers for speeding.
After ranting at the officers, Wali pulled a gun and was shot by the police. Wali, a former translator for the military in Afghanistan, came to the U.S. in 2014./vi
X. Conclusion
The U.S. presence in Afghanistan did not achieve its desired objective, after two decades, thousands of lives lost, and billions of tax dollars spent. Our exit was rushed and ignominious. Our efforts to extract a theoretically limited number of Afghan "allies" were poorly targeted and feckless, satisfying no one. The vetting standards initially were inadequate for the purposes of determining the identity, biography, and hence national security risk for many Afghans who were allowed into the United States under parole, SIVs, or as refugees. Efforts to bring in as many Afghans as possible resulted in standards being dropped far below the level plausible to bring actual "allies" to safety while preventing dangerous, unstable, or otherwise undesirable individuals to enter and/or remain in the United States.
* * *
35 Rush, Ibid.
36 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Press Release, "Miles from Nation's Capital, ICE Arrests ISIS-K Afghan Terrorist Who Was Released into the U.S. Under Biden's Operation Allies Welcome," December 3, 2025, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/12/03/miles-nations-capital-ice-arrests-isis-k-afghan-terrorist-who-wasreleased-us-under
37 Todd Bensman, "Afghan Evacuee Added to CIS National Security Vetting Failures Database," Center for Immigration Studies, December 10, 2024, https://cis.org/Bensman/Afghan-Evacuee-Added-CIS-NationalSecurity-Vetting-Failures-Database
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Henceforth, U.S. efforts should concentrate on re-examining all Afghans brought to the U.S. by the government or who entered on their own since 2021. Those unqualified to remain should be removed to Afghanistan or third countries. In future, further treatment of "allies" should concentrate on protection efforts in the countries surrounding Afghanistan or other places where Afghans in fear of the Taliban could more easily, cheaply, and safely be relocated.
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The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization recognized as exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives no funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work.
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Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are their own and do not reflect an institutional position of The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.
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i Phillip Linderman, "Afghan refugee office is a corrupt failure -- Trump is right to shut it down," New York Post, June 10, 2025, https://nypost.com/2025/06/10/opinion/afghan-refugee-office-a-corrupt-failure-best-to-shutterit/?utm_campaign=iphone_nyp&utm_source=mail_app (last accessed June 23, 2025).
ii U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, "Afghan citizen charged with visa fraud," May 1, 2025, https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/afghan-citizen-charged-visa-fraud (last accessed June 23, 2025).
iii https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/afghan-citizen-federally-charged-posting-threats-build-bomb-and-kill-americans
iv Jack Morphet, "Who Is D.C. Shooting Suspect Rahmanullah Lakanwal?" Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/who-is-d-c-shooting-suspect-rahmanullah-lakanwalc44ef1cd?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqe8KGDsNLcO-ZkQllMllzQ89SYW4x-fddgUavvPGOIbVyNBezZIeghV&gaa_ts=692f447d&gaa_sig=MtWFUSt-ociYo-4IroOVDEy4WPYeILE7SGWgZiNxscRLjzuCDx2QV12_li17IbKbe9pQw5iwdkJFU7lX8e62-g%3D%3D
v U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, "Afghan National Pleads Guilty to Plotting Election Day Terror Attack in the United States," June 13, 2025, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/afghan-national-pleads-guilty-plotting-election-dayterror-attack-united-states (last accessed June 23, 2025).
vi Shane Galvin, "Driver exclaims 'I should have served with f-king Taliban' moments before fatal traffic-stop shootout with police: bodycam footage," New York Post, May 25, 2025, https://nypost.com/2025/05/25/us-news/virginia-policeshooting-driver-jamal-wali-declared-he-should-have-served-with-the-taliban-before-fatal-traffic-stop-shootout/ (last accessed June 23, 2025).
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Original text here: httTestifies Before Senate Judiciary Subcommitteesps://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fecf0474-ff5a-c9f7-7af8-b1dfd901a825/2026-01-14_Testimony_Hankinson.pdf
GAO Director Benedict Testifies Before House Homeland Security Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 -- The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement released the following written testimony by Hilary Benedict, director of science, technology assessments and analytics at the Government Accountability Office, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Smarter Borders, Safer Nation: Expanding the Use of Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology":* * *
Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 29 -- The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement released the following written testimony by Hilary Benedict, director of science, technology assessments and analytics at the Government Accountability Office, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Smarter Borders, Safer Nation: Expanding the Use of Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology": * * * Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) non-intrusive inspection (NII) systems.Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CBP is the lead federal agency charged with a dual mission of facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade at U.S. borders while also keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and inadmissible people out of the country. As part of its responsibilities, CBP coordinates the inspection and processing of pedestrians, passengers, and cargo at land, air, and sea ports of entry (POE)./1
Land POEs are a key drug smuggling route for transnational criminal organizations. According to CBP, most illicit drugs, including fentanyl, enter the United States through southwest border POEs hidden in passenger vehicles or belongings, concealed in commercial vehicles, and carried by pedestrians./2
To help detect illegal drugs and other contraband, CBP uses large- and small-scale NII systems, like X-ray machines, at land POEs to enable officers to inspect travelers and their belongings, and vehicles and their contents, without the need for unloading or disassembly./3
Since 2019, CBP's NII program has received over $2 billion for NII systems, which it has used to enhance inspections of commercial and passenger vehicles and trains, and to increase the number of vehicles that are scanned using large-scale NII systems as they enter the United States. In 2021, the Securing America's Ports Act required CBP to develop a plan to achieve 100 percent scanning of commercial and passenger vehicles and freight rail entering the United States at land POEs by 2027 using large-scale NII systems./4
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1 POEs are facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the United States. Specifically, a POE is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, or land border location) where CBP officers or employees are assigned to clear passengers, merchandise, and other items, collect duties, and enforce customs laws; and where CBP officers inspect persons seeking to enter or depart, or apply for admission into the United States, pursuant to U.S. immigration and travel controls. A single land POE may be composed of one or more crossings.
2 James Mandryck, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Protecting the U.S. Homeland: Fighting the Flow of Fentanyl from the Southwest Border, testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2023).
3 CBP officers use large-scale NII systems to scan entire vehicles. The process produces an image that CBP officers review to identify anomalies that may be an indication of contraband or hidden people. CBP officers use small-scale NII systems to localize those anomalies, among other things.
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My statement today discusses (1) how CBP assesses large-scale NII system performance, (2) the status of large-scale NII system deployment, and (3) CBP's plans for future large-scale NII system deployments. This statement is based primarily on a report we published in September 2025 in response to a request to review the implementation and effectiveness of CBP's NII program./5
To inform that report, GAO analyzed NII program documentation, including inspection procedures, performance data, and deployment plans, and interviewed program officials. GAO also interviewed and observed CBP officers conducting inspections at land POEs where largescale NII systems had been deployed in preprimary inspection areas.
More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology for that work can be found in the report. Our work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
CBP began using large-scale NII systems to scan vehicles in 1996 and has generally deployed them in secondary inspection areas at land POEs. When deployed in secondary inspection areas, they are only used to scan vehicles that were referred by CBP officers in primary inspection.
In 2020, CBP began deploying new large-scale NII systems in preprimary inspection areas--before a traveler is interviewed by a CBP officer, where vehicles are scanned before they reach the primary inspection booth (see fig. 1). Previously, NII systems were generally used only when an officer determined that further inspection was required after the interview.
Placing NII systems in preprimary inspection areas significantly increases the number of vehicles scanned because all vehicles approaching a primary inspection booth that do not choose to go through an opt-out lane are scanned, rather than only those referred for secondary inspection./6
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4 Securing America's Ports Act, Pub. L. 116-299, 134 Stat. 4906 (2021), codified at 6 U.S.C. Sec. 211 note.
5 GAO, Land Port Inspections: CBP Should Improve Performance Data and Deployment Plans for Scanning Systems, GAO-25-107379 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 15, 2025).
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As part of its overall inspection process, CBP uses large-scale NII systems to scan vehicles. These scans produce images that are reviewed by officers to identify any anomalies that might be contraband or hidden people. If officers identify any anomalies, the vehicles undergo further inspection, which can include the use of detection canines; small-scale NII systems such as videoscopes to look into hard-to-reach areas of vehicles or baggage scanners to scan vehicle contents to localize the anomalies; and manual inspection procedures.
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6 According to CBP officials, travelers may opt out of undergoing a scan by an NII system in preprimary inspection by using an opt-out lane to drive to the primary inspection booth, and officials at the POEs have discretion as to how vehicle inspections are handled when drivers choose to opt out.
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CBP Assesses Large-Scale NII Performance, but Has Not Clearly Defined All Key Performance Parameters
CBP collects and uses performance data to help ensure that its largescale NII systems are operational and available for use to scan vehicles.
For example, these data include a daily list of system outages, and operational availability, which is the percentage of time systems are available for use.
CBP uses performance data to inform actions it takes to improve NII system performance. For example, CBP's fiscal year 2024 target for system performance was for individual large-scale NII systems, and for the average across all large-scale NII systems, to have an operational availability of 95 percent or greater. However, in fiscal year 2024 just over half of individual large-scale systems met this target, while the average across all large-scale NII systems was 90 percent. CBP officials told us that CBP included penalty clauses in its new maintenance contracts in September 2024, which are intended to improve contractors' accountability for maintaining the targeted level of operational availability.
In 2015, CBP established three key performance parameters for NII systems. These include (1) meeting an average NII imaging system operational availability of 95 percent, (2) inspecting 100 percent of all designated high-risk commercial vehicles and containerized cargo, and (3) maintaining 100 percent inspection of targeted containers, cargo, and international mail. According to DHS guidance, key performance parameters reflect the most important and nonnegotiable requirements that NII systems must meet to fulfill their purpose.
CBP collects data for operational availability and reports the results in its annual operational analysis reports. However, as we found in our September 2025 report, CBP has not clearly defined its other two key performance parameters or reported their results in operational analysis reports. Specifically, CBP has not clearly defined what "high-risk" means for the inspection rate key performance parameter or what maintaining 100 percent inspection of targeted containers, cargo, and international mail means for the examination key performance parameter. CBP officials said that because they are unclear how CBP intended to define or measure these key performance parameters, they have not reported data related to them.
Clearly defining its key performance parameters and using them for reporting would enable CBP to determine whether large-scale NII systems are working as intended. Doing so would also help CBP identify any system deficiencies or possible cost savings, achieve its objectives more efficiently and effectively, and help inform future procurement decisions. In our September 2025 report, we recommended that CBP should clearly define all NII key performance parameters and report performance using them. The agency concurred with the recommendation and said that its NII program will capture and clearly define system-level key performance indicators and reporting requirements for NII systems within new contract statements of work.
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CBP Has Made Progress Deploying Large-Scale NII Systems, but Has Encountered Increased Costs and Schedule Delays
As part of its efforts to increase vehicle scanning at land POEs, CBP is deploying additional large-scale NII systems in preprimary inspection areas. Specifically, CBP is deploying low-energy portals (LEP) in passenger vehicle preprimary inspection areas and multi-energy portals (MEP) in commercial vehicle preprimary inspection areas. These systems will allow CBP to scan vehicles prior to primary inspection to identify potential anomalies and assist in determining whether to refer vehicles for secondary inspection, rather than only scanning vehicles referred for secondary inspection.
Beginning in fiscal year 2020, CBP awarded contracts to procure and deploy 153 large-scale NII systems to land POEs. As of February 2025, 52 of these 153 systems CBP planned to deploy were fully operational, nearly all located at preprimary inspection areas. An additional 101 systems were in preplanning, design, or construction phases (see table 1). These systems include 12 high-energy NII rail systems that CBP plans to deploy to replace existing gamma-ray systems that they are retiring.
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Table 1: Deployment Status of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Large-Scale Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Systems at Land Ports of Entry, as of February 2025
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As a result of the deployment and use of LEPs and MEPs, CBP has increased its scanning of passenger vehicles from 2 percent in fiscal year 2020 to 8 percent in fiscal year 2024, and scanning of commercial vehicles from 16 percent to 27 percent during this same timeframe. Some factors have limited the use of the systems, such as limited staff and system outages. For example, when these systems are deployed in preprimary inspection areas at land POEs, they require additional staff to operate them and to review the images from the vehicle scans. CBP officials we met with at all four field offices with land POEs where largescale NII systems had been deployed in preprimary inspection areas told us they did not always have sufficient staff to fully use the systems. CBP headquarters officials said they are discussing ways to mitigate staffing challenges, such as reviewing images at regional command centers rather than at the POEs, which could improve efficiency. Additionally, CBP officials at these POEs said that system outages, which were sometimes frequent or lengthy, have affected their operations.
In our September 2025 report we found that, although CBP has made progress deploying large-scale NII systems, it has encountered significant challenges that have led to deployments costing more and taking longer than expected.
CBP has developed and updated cost estimates for deploying MEP, LEP, and high-energy NII rail systems, but costs have exceeded those estimates. One reason for higher costs than anticipated are substantial increases in the costs for civil works and construction. For example, the estimated costs to install each MEP increased from $1.3 million in fiscal year 2020 to $4.1 million in fiscal year 2023. Further, in October 2024 CBP estimated the cost to complete installation of each remaining planned MEP system would range from $4.2 million to $9.7 million.
As a result, CBP has requested and received additional funding to deploy its large-scale NII systems and to meet its initial goals to increase vehicle scanning rates. According to CBP officials, in fiscal years 2019 through 2024, CBP received over $2.1 billion for the NII program (see table 2)./7
Most of these funds were intended for the deployment of large-scale NII systems in preprimary inspection areas. In October 2024, CBP reported that it had sufficient funds to finish deploying most of the large-scale NII systems but needed an additional approximately $173 million to complete deployment for 31 of the systems.
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7 In July 2025, Congress passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which included an appropriation of funds available to CBP for, among other things, NII. See Pub. L. 119-21 Title IV, Subtitle A, Sec. 90004, 139 Stat. 72, 359.
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Table 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Reported Funding for Non-Intrusive Inspection Program Fiscal Years 2019 Through 2024 (dollars in millions)
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Large-scale NII system deployments have also taken longer than originally planned. The Securing America's Ports Act required CBP to develop a plan to achieve 100 percent scanning of commercial and passenger vehicles and freight rail entering the United States at land POEs by 2027 using large-scale NII systems. As of February 2025, CBP did not expect to complete all of its planned large-scale NII deployments until December 2029. CBP's original timelines to complete system deployments ranged from 12 to 24 months. However, some installations have taken longer than expected.
CBP officials identified various factors that have contributed to system deployments taking longer than expected. For example, some POEs require major site upgrades to enable NII systems to be installed in preprimary inspection, including the construction of command centers or installation of power and data connections to the new systems. In other instances, vendors have taken longer than expected to resolve issues encountered during system deployment, such as during site acceptance testing. CBP said they are aware of these issues and are taking actions to address them, such as considering future NII system installation needs when making infrastructure improvements at POEs along the northern border.
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CBP's Deployment Plans Do Not Include All Ports of Entry Along the Southwest Border, Including Three of its Highest-Traffic Locations
In response to the Securing America's Ports Act, in January 2022 CBP submitted its plan to Congress to increase vehicle scanning with these large-scale NII systems at land POEs./8
In its January 2022 scanning plan, CBP estimated that it would need 434 large-scale NII systems to achieve 100 percent scanning of vehicles and rail containers along the southwest and northern borders (see table 3). While the plan described how CBP intended to deploy large-scale NII systems to both the southwest and northern borders, CBP has focused its initial efforts on the southwest border because most CBP contraband seizures have occurred there.
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Table 3 : Numbers of Additional Large-Scale Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Systems Needed for 100 Percent Scanning, Based on U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fiscal Year 2021 Scanning Plan
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CBP made these estimates in its Large Scale Non-Intrusive Inspection Scanning Plan, Fiscal Year 2021 Report to Congress. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Large Scale Non-Intrusive Inspection Scanning Plan, Fiscal Year 2021 Report to Congress (January 18, 2022).
CBP submitted its fiscal year 2022 update in March 2023 including the steps it had taken to increase scanning./9
Specifically, in its March 2023 scanning plan update, CBP reported procuring 129 large-scale NII systems for scanning passenger and commercial vehicles to be deployed at POEs along the southwest border, which, once fully deployed, would give CBP the capacity to scan up to 40 percent of passenger vehicles and 70 percent of commercial vehicles.
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8 Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Large Scale Non-Intrusive Inspection Scanning Plan Fiscal Year 2021 Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2022).
9 Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Large Scale Non-Intrusive Inspection Scanning Plan - Annual Update Fiscal Year 2022 Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2023). In November 2025, CBP issued its fiscal year 2024 update to its scanning plan.
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As we stated in our September 2025 report, however, the CBP scanning plan does not include NII system deployments needed to scan passenger vehicles at nine POEs along the southwest border. This includes three of its highest-traffic locations that together accounted for almost 24 percent of passenger vehicle crossings at all land border POEs in fiscal year 2024 (see table 4). Combined, these nine POEs comprised about 30 percent of total passenger vehicle traffic entering the United States and almost 40 percent of passenger vehicle traffic entering the United States at the southwest border in fiscal year 2024.
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Table 4: Southwest Border Passenger Vehicle Crossings Not Included in U.S. Customs and Border Protection Deployment Plans, as of March 2023
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CBP officials told us they have not included the three high-traffic crossings because there is not enough space to install the large-scale NII systems in preprimary inspection areas (see fig. 2). While CBP has not determined how it will overcome the lack of space at these POEs, they are considering some possible solutions, including working with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to develop LEPs that could be installed where space constraints and interference with radiation detectors make deployment of large-scale NII systems difficult. Other solutions they are considering include deploying the systems after the primary inspection booth, which they have done at other POEs; redeveloping the border crossings so there is enough space in preprimary; or installing the equipment across the international border, as they have done on the northern border, although this may not be possible on the southwest border.
While CBP's scanning plan states its intent to scan 100 percent of passenger and commercial vehicles and rail containers entering the United States at land POEs, the plan does not include the deployment of large-scale NII systems to some of CBP's highest passenger traffic POEs along the southwest border. Without these crossings in its plan, CBP risks entry of many unscanned passenger vehicles, hampering its ability to prevent illegal drugs and other contraband from entering the United States.
In our September 2025 report, we recommended that CBP determine how to include deployment of large-scale NII systems to all southwest border land POEs in updates to its deployment plans. CBP concurred with GAO's recommendation and said it is collaborating with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to address the radiation interference between the large-scale NII systems and the radiation detection equipment, which could allow for placement of NII large-scale systems within limited real estate constraints.
We will continue to monitor CBP's efforts to address our recommendations. Addressing our recommendations would strengthen CBP's management of the NII program and its interdiction efforts to help it achieve its mission.
Chairman Guest, Ranking Member Correa, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
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Original text, tables and figures here: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-01-22-BSE-HRG-Testimony.pdf
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science & Technology Allende Testifies Before House Homeland Security Committee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The House Homeland Security Committee released the following testimony by Pedro M. Allende, under secretary of Homeland Security for science and technology, from a Jan. 21, 2026, hearing entitled "Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: CISA, TSA, S&T." CISA is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency while TSA is the Transportation Security Administration.* * *
Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to have the confidence of President ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The House Homeland Security Committee released the following testimony by Pedro M. Allende, under secretary of Homeland Security for science and technology, from a Jan. 21, 2026, hearing entitled "Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: CISA, TSA, S&T." CISA is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency while TSA is the Transportation Security Administration. * * * Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am honored to have the confidence of PresidentTrump and Secretary Noem to serve as the Under Secretary for Science and Technology (S&T) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I look forward to executing the Trump Administration priorities to make the nation safer through advancement and application of science and technology.
I appreciate the Committee's continued engagement with the DHS S&T Directorate, and I look forward to our work together during my tenure as Under Secretary.
The S&T Directorate plays a unique role within DHS. We are responsible for understanding emerging threats and opportunities, and for ensuring the Department has access to timely, effective, and responsible technology solutions to meet its evolving mission needs. As threats to the homeland become more complex, adaptive, and technology-enabled, S&T's mission is to help DHS stay ahead of those challenges.
S&T works closely with DHS operational components, the private sector, academia, international and interagency partners to deliver solutions that enhance security, improve efficiency, and strengthen operational effectiveness. Our success is measured not by research alone, but by outcomes delivered to operators and the American people.
In my short time in this role, I have been energized by seeing S&T in action and witnessing firsthand the critical role technology plays in keeping our nation safe.
Just last week, I had the opportunity to meet with our partners at operational sites on the West Coast, including our DHS colleagues in the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as our local law enforcement partners. At Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), I observed TSA security operations and gained valuable insight into how emerging technologies can create new opportunities for enhanced safety and security. At SoFi Stadium, I engaged with security teams to discuss how innovative solutions can strengthen our defenses as we prepare to host the FIFA World Cup in the summer of 2026.
I toured the complex operations and technology required for cargo operations and screening by CBP as they ensure the safety of two of the largest U.S. seaports in Los Angeles and Long Beach, California, to cargo operations and screening. At the Air and Marine Operations Center, I met with partners to discuss collaborative activities, such as the Kestrel system which enhances their ability to determine highest-priority threats and make real-time operational decisions and explore enhancements to achieve full domain awareness across our borders and airspace.
My experiences this past week have crystalized for me the importance of advancing the Administration's priorities and my commitment to ensuring S&T remains focused on the needs of our operational components while staying ahead of our adversaries. Our organization is also taking on broader challenges, including leading efforts in areas such as Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Secretary Noem recently announced the establishment of the Program Executive Office for Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems, investing to rapidly procure and deploy advanced counter-drone technologies. As Secretary Noem noted, these are critical investments to protect our borders and to keep Americans safe and secure during America 250 celebrations and at 2026 FIFA World Cup venues.
My recent trip also enabled me to engage with private sector partners, which will be a key theme of my service as Under Secretary. Not only does the private sector operate much of the critical infrastructure upon which our nation relies, but they are a major source of technological innovation necessary to protect the homeland. One of my guiding principles will be to seek out and adopt private sector solutions whenever possible. Leveraging existing or adaptable technologies will allow DHS to accelerate delivery to the field.
I look forward to working with Congress on key legislative priorities including the restoration of Other Transaction Authority (OTA). OTA is a critical tool used to partner with nontraditional small- and medium-sized businesses and organizations on innovations that enhance our national security. The expiration of the authority on September 30, 2024, brought to a halt various efforts at S&T to develop solutions across several mission areas.
Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the Committee, S&T is committed to delivering innovative, responsible, and operationally relevant solutions that strengthen the security of the homeland.
We look forward to continuing our close collaboration with Congress, across DHS components and partner agencies, and our external partners as we work to execute Administration priorities, understand emerging threats, and leverage private sector innovation to make the nation safer.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.
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Original text here: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-01-21-HRG-Testimony.pdf
TSA Acting Administrator McNeill Testifies Before House Homeland Security Committee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The House Homeland Security Committee released the following testimony by Ha McNeill, senior official performing the duties of the administrator at the Transportation Security Administration, from a Jan. 21, 2026, hearing entitled "Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: CISA, TSA, S&T." CISA is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency while S&T is the Science and Technology Directorate.* * *
Good morning, Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify before you today ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The House Homeland Security Committee released the following testimony by Ha McNeill, senior official performing the duties of the administrator at the Transportation Security Administration, from a Jan. 21, 2026, hearing entitled "Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: CISA, TSA, S&T." CISA is the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency while S&T is the Science and Technology Directorate. * * * Good morning, Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify before you todayon behalf of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). I am honored to be here and grateful for the longstanding and productive partnership TSA shares with this Committee.
I would like to start by thanking TSA's employees for their unrelenting efforts day in and day out to secure the Nation's transportation systems. TSA is an agile security agency, embodied by a dedicated and professional workforce that works tirelessly to outmatch an increasingly sophisticated and dynamic threat.
Under the Trump Administration and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kristi Noem, TSA is laser-focused on delivering for the American people, fortifying travel security, renewing its commitment to the traveler experience, and serving as a responsible steward of the American tax dollar. This starts with deploying upgraded, state-of-the-art technology to airports nationwide, renewing our commitment to the American taxpayer, returning to our core mission, leveraging public-private partnerships, and enhancing hospitality and the passenger experience.
* * *
TSA Priorities
With the transportation sector remaining a top target for malign actors, and passenger volumes at airports reaching record highs in 2025--including eight out of the top ten busiest travel days on record--it is more critical than ever to have a technologically advanced, seamless, and secure aviation security system. In 2025 alone, TSA screened 906.7 million passengers, 480 million checked bags, and 2.1 billion carry-on bags.
The upcoming 2026 World Cup, America250 events, and 2028 Summer Olympics present an enormous opportunity to boldly transform transportation security in the United States. Through new policies, legislation, and private-sector partnerships that support technological innovation and modernizing the screening process, we can usher in President Trump's vision for a new Golden Age of American travel.
* * *
Leveraging Public-Private Partnerships to Advance the Mission
TSA's mission is supported by critical public-private partnerships, and the Trump Administration, DHS, and TSA are strongly committed to working more collaboratively with industry stakeholders than ever before, utilizing their expertise and efficiency, to strengthen aviation security and improve the passenger experience. On that note, I would like to thank this Committee for ensuring TSA and our critical interagency, state, local, and private sector partners have the resources needed to mitigate the evolving threat landscape, which includes the proliferating cybersecurity and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) threats.
* * *
Screening Partnership Program
Under the Screening Partnership Program (SPP), TSA contracts with qualified private companies to provide personnel to perform security screening operations at commercial airports. TSA is working closely with Congressional and industry partners to modernize SPP to incentivize airports and industry to invest in more tailored and innovative solutions faster, to optimize security operations, while maintaining the Agency's rigorous regulatory oversight and outcomebased security standards.
* * *
One-Stop Security
In close partnership with the Department of State, industry, and international partners, TSA is advancing the One-Stop Security (OSS) pilot program. OSS improves international aviation security, streamlines the transfer process for passengers inbound to the United States with connecting flights, and eliminates the need for passengers and their bags to go through screening again. Last summer, TSA launched its first OSS pilot location at London-Heathrow Airport (LHR), demonstrating an immediate success for all stakeholders. Currently, there are seven OSS flights per day from LHR into Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (ATL) and Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), saving each OSS passenger up to two hours that he or she can now use to relax, shop, and dine at the airport.
* * *
Reimbursable Screening Services Program
Another critical pilot program that Congress has afforded us to explore with industry partners is the Reimbursable Screening Services Program (RSSP). RSSP enables TSA to work with industry to screen passengers in a location separate from the checkpoint, such as an off-airport cruise or VIP terminal. RSSP is an innovative public-private partnership to alleviate congestion at the checkpoint and offset TSA costs. Permanently authorizing RSSP, which is set to expire on January 30 of this year, will provide certainty and unlock innovation, further increasing industry interest and participation.
* * *
Investing in Modernizing Security Technology
Starting in 2004, Congress authorized the first $250 million in revenue collected each year from the Passenger Security Fee to go to the Aviation Security Capital Fund (ASCF), to be used for checked baggage technology. Along with amounts provided in annual appropriations, amounts in the ASCF were meant to recapitalize and modernize TSA screening technology, but unfortunately this level of investment has not kept pace with changing technology and the evolution of the threat landscape.
Over the past several years, Congress has diverted approximately $1.6 billion in TSA Passenger Security Fee revenue each year for deficit reduction purposes. The President's FY 2026 Budget proposes to eliminate the deficit reduction contributions and instead direct Passenger Security Fee amounts to their intended purpose of bolstering TSA aviation screening operations. The FY 2026 Budget also includes proposed additional investments in aviation screening technology, such as Computed Tomography (CT) technology, that can supplement ASCF amounts to make improvements to both security and the passenger experience at the checkpoints. TSA encourages Congress to act on the President's FY 2026 Budget request so that the ASCF is not the only source of funding for modernizing TSA security technology.
* * *
Renewing Focus on Core Mission and Serving the American Taxpayer
REAL ID
Under the leadership of Secretary Noem, since May 2025, TSA is fully enforcing its statutory requirements under the REAL ID Act of 2005. The legislation was enacted in response to the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations aimed at combatting fraudulent identity documents (IDs) and ensuring passengers are who they say they are. As the 9/11 Commission Report stated, "For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons." This Administration acted swiftly to enforce the law to ensure TSA maintains the highest standards of aviation security for the American taxpayer and traveler.
Currently, most travelers (about 94 percent) present either a REAL ID-compliant or another acceptable form of ID. However, we must ensure that everyone who flies is who they say they are. TSA ConfirmID is a new modernized alternative identity verification system to enhance and streamline identity verification for travelers that do not have an acceptable form of ID.
Starting February 1, 2026, travelers who do not present an acceptable form of ID at TSA checkpoints and still want to fly, have the option of paying a $45 fee and undergoing the TSA ConfirmID process. The fee ensures that the cost to cover verification of an unacceptable ID will be borne by the non-compliant traveler, not the American taxpayer, and prevents malign actors from getting on a plane. TSA will continue working closely with all states to increase adoption of REAL IDs and urges all travelers to obtain a REAL ID, or other acceptable form of ID, as soon as possible to avoid delays and potentially missing flights.
* * *
Improving the Travel Experience for Our Military and American Families
TSA is committed to making the airport experience as smooth and stress free for active-duty military personnel and their families, and American families traveling with children. To honor those who protect our Nation and to recognize their service and sacrifices, TSA has established the "Serve with Honor, Travel with Ease" program, which provides dedicated screening lanes for active-duty military personnel and their families at airports near the Nation's largest military bases. Similarly, the Agency is actively working to create a welcoming environment for families with children. TSA's new "Families on the Fly" program provides dedicated lanes for families at select airports to create a welcoming environment and ease stress for families traveling with children.
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Conclusion
Today, TSA is at a strategic crossroads. With continued support from Congress and industry partners, a screening process that is more efficient, technologically integrated, secure, and affordable to the American taxpayer, is within our grasp. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished members of the Committee, it is a privilege to testify before you today.
I thank you for your support of TSA and look forward to your questions.
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Original text here: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-01-21-HRG-Testimony.pdf
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency Acting Director Gottumukkala Testifies Before House Homeland Security Committee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The House Homeland Security Committee released the following testimony by Madhu Gottumukkala, acting director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, from a Jan. 21, 2026, hearing entitled "Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: CISA, TSA, S&T." TSA is the Transportation Security Administration while S&T is the Science and Technology Directorate.* * *
Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and for the opportunity to discuss the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 28 -- The House Homeland Security Committee released the following testimony by Madhu Gottumukkala, acting director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, from a Jan. 21, 2026, hearing entitled "Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: CISA, TSA, S&T." TSA is the Transportation Security Administration while S&T is the Science and Technology Directorate. * * * Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and for the opportunity to discuss the Cybersecurity and InfrastructureSecurity Agency's priorities to protect the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber and physical threats.
I appreciate the Committee's continued support for the critical mission that CISA carries out on behalf of the American people. Since President Trump took office last year, and with strong support and guidance from Secretary Noem, CISA has been laser-focused on fulfilling the mission Congress' gave us when the agency was first established by President Trump in 2018: to support, strengthen, and secure our nation's critical infrastructure. Our work today is squarely aligned with the agency's original statutory purpose. That means working with government and private sector partners to protect our financial systems, safeguard our pipelines, and ensure the digital and physical systems our nation depends on to remain resilient against disruption from possible cyberattacks.
To do this, over the past year, CISA has focused its work on efforts aligned to the agency's statutory priorities, including:
* Reinforcing federal civilian network defense.
* Supporting critical infrastructure nationwide in defending against physical and cyber threats.
* Delivering security directly to state and local governments by offering an array of no-cost resources and tools, such as technical assistance, exercises, and cybersecurity assessments.
* Continuing to share threat information and mitigation guidance in a faster, more integrated way.
Through these efforts, we remain deeply committed to working side by side with organizations of every size, across every critical sector. Because no single entity -- not even the Federal Government -- can manage these risks alone.
Thanks to the leadership of President Trump and Secretary Noem, CISA is leading the fight against malign actors. We strengthened our operational capabilities to detect and to respond to cyber threats, deepened collaboration across government and industry, and continued to provide guidance to the critical infrastructure community to reduce vulnerabilities and systemic risk across our nation's most critical systems and functions as malign actors seek to exploit our Nation's vulnerabilities.
CISA has continued to provide practical services and guidance to critical infrastructure owners and operators, helping them to improve their resilience, limit disruptions, and recover more quickly when incidents do occur.
Under the Trump Administration, CISA is focused on our number one priority: protecting and defending the American people. CISA's work has reduced the impact of cyber incidents and helped to ensure that Americans could continue to use the critical infrastructure functions they rely on. The agency also continues to share threat and incident reports, coordinate intelligence across the Federal Government, and partner through structured meetings and threat briefings to strengthen resilience nationwide.
As the operational lead for federal cybersecurity, and as part of our mission to protect and defend federal civilian networks, CISA strengthened its work with each department and agency to promote the adoption of risk-based common policies and best practices to effectively respond to the ever-evolving threat landscape.
Secretary Noem recognizes that cybersecurity is national security and in 2025, under her leadership, CISA issued three emergency directives to protect federal networks from critical vulnerabilities and cyber threats. CISA also scaled its Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Technology, giving analysts near real-time visibility to detect and stop advanced threats.
The Trump Administration recognizes that the Federal Government cannot fight our Nation's adversaries alone - we must empower our local partners. That is why CISA has worked alongside our state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments to deliver security to our local partners. With a nationwide presence in 10 regions across the country, CISA delivered tailored resources, training, and technical assistance to help our partners anticipate, withstand, and recover from threats. We also recognize that many SLTT governments across the country are constrained by smaller, more limited operating budgets, and fewer IT staff than a similarly sized business. Secretary Noem and I recognize this challenge, and so to help support our SLTT partners last year, the Department of Homeland Security released Notice of Funding Opportunities for the State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program (SLCGP) and the Tribal Cybersecurity Grant Program (TCGP) -$91.7 million to states and territories and $12.1 million to Tribal Governments to address cybersecurity risks.
CISA remains dedicated to supporting critical infrastructure owners and operators.
Physical security, defending against physical threats, remains a no-fail mission for the agency. In FY 2025, CISA continued to train public and private sector stakeholders on counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) and risk mitigation practices, enhancing threat awareness, preparedness, and capabilities across the critical infrastructure community.
We also continue to look ahead to preparing for major events in 2026 and beyond, including the FIFA World Cup, America 250, and the 2028 Olympics in Los Angeles. To give you just one example of this work, in April, CISA convened participants from more than 40 agencies at Lincoln Financial Field in Philadelphia, one of the 11 American Host cities, for a full-scale exercise ahead of the FIFA World Cup. The exercise produced areas for improvement and action recommendations to enhance coordination, communication, and public safety.
Continuing to look ahead as we begin 2026, CISA will reinvigorate its mission first approach. We will be launching targeted initiatives designed to close the most pressing risk gaps facing critical infrastructure - particularly where cyber threats intersect with real world consequences. These efforts are intentionally scoped, operationally focused, and aligned with the Trump Administration's broader goals and priorities of efficiency, accountability and impact. We are prioritizing what works from previous lessons learned, eliminating duplication, and ensuring every new service or product we release directly advances CISA's statutory mission and responsibilities.
For example, CISA is currently reviewing public comments on the proposed rule for the Cyber Incident Reporting and Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022, or CIRCIA. CISA appreciates the input it received from Congress and the public about aligning with Congressional intent and streamlining the CIRCIA requirements. CISA is also cognizant of the concerns raised regarding the scope and burden of the rule and improving harmonization of CIRCIA with other federal cyber incident reporting requirements. CISA is considering this feedback as it works to issue a final rule. I look forward to continuing to engage with Congress on these efforts and providing updates as the final rule process nears its completion.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment to thank Congress, and particularly this Committee under your leadership, for their work on reauthorizing CISA 2015, which is mission-critical for CISA's work and information sharing with the private sector. The Secretary and I have been very clear that we fully support the reauthorization of this vital piece of legislation.
CISA remains steadfast on the agency's statutory intent, we also recognize that a disciplined mission requires the right workforce - not a larger one, but a more capable and technically skilled one. In 2026, CISA will continue to right-size and rebalance its workforce by prioritizing highly technical professionals in mission critical roles, including cybersecurity operators and infrastructure security experts. These targeted positions will support frontline critical infrastructure owners and operators across every region in the United States in reducing their long-term risks. We will execute our hiring authorities while remaining consistent with the Administration's efforts to streamline the government workforce, control cost, and maximize return.
Under President Trump's leadership and Secretary Noem's guidance, CISA remains committed to being a focused, efficient, and accountable agency - one that executes the mission Congress assigned, supports the Administration's priorities, and delivers real security outcomes for the American people. We look forward to continuing to work with this Committee to ensure that CISA has the tools and capabilities necessary to protect the nation's critical infrastructure.
Thank you again for your support and I look forward to your questions.
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Original text here: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-01-21-HRG-Testimony.pdf
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Troutman Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa released the following testimony by Sarah Troutman, deputy assistant secretary of State for African affairs, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Advancing Peace in DRC and Rwanda Through President Trump's Washington Accords." DRC is the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* * *
Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Jacobs, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the United States' efforts to advance peace between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, culminating ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa released the following testimony by Sarah Troutman, deputy assistant secretary of State for African affairs, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Advancing Peace in DRC and Rwanda Through President Trump's Washington Accords." DRC is the Democratic Republic of the Congo. * * * Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Jacobs, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the United States' efforts to advance peace between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, culminatingin the signing of the Washington Accords on December 4, 2025.
For more than three decades, the eastern DRC has been plagued by conflict, instability, and human suffering. The region's challenges have defied easy solutions, with cycles of violence undermining development and threatening the security of millions. The United States has long recognized the strategic importance of the Great Lakes region, both for our own interests and for the wellbeing of the region's people.
On December 4, at the Donald J Trump Institute for Peace, President Tshisekedi and President Kagame signed the Washington Accords--a historic step forward that marks the most meaningful advance toward resolving this conflict in decades.
This achievement is a testament to the power of sustained, high-level diplomacy and the importance of American leadership on the world stage.
President Trump is the Peace President, and the landmark breakthrough achieved by the Washington Accords would not have been possible without his leadership.
His direct engagement, vision, and determination to see this conflict resolved were instrumental in bringing the parties to the table and sustaining momentum throughout the process. I also recognize the leadership of Secretary Rubio and Senior Advisor Massad Boulos, whose tireless efforts were critical in forging consensus and guiding the negotiations to a successful conclusion.
The benefits of the Washington Accords are profound. For the people of the DRC and of Rwanda, the Accords offer a pathway for lasting peace, improved security, and the opportunity to rebuild communities devastated by decades of violence. For the United States, President Trump designed the Accords to advance American interests in regional stability and promote economic growth that benefits both Americans and the region.
As a key component of the America First Foreign Policy objectives of this administration, the Accords deliver direct, concrete benefits to the American people. By stabilizing a region that is a major source of critical minerals-- including cobalt and coltan, which are essential for the U.S. manufacturing and defense sectors--the Accords help secure American supply chains and reduce our reliance on competitors like China. The Strategic Partnership Agreement with the DRC is a first of its kind legally binding agreement that creates the conditions for significant U.S. investment into the DRC - in critical minerals and key strategic infrastructure - and lays out the path forward for U.S.-DRC cooperation on the Sakania-Lobito Corridor. A more stable Great Lakes region means less need for costly U.S. humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping missions, allowing us to focus taxpayer resources on priorities at home, while upholding U.S. global leadership and securing supply chains.
For the region, the Washington Accords represent a new chapter. The Accords establish clear commitments from both sides to respect territorial integrity, cease support for armed groups, and cooperate on border security and economic development. It also envisions a robust framework for monitoring and implementation, with the United States, Qatar, and the African Union working together to play a central role in future mediation and oversight.
We know that peace is fragile and our work does not end with the signing of the Accords. As we move forward, our focus remains on the difficult work of implementation. We are working closely with our partners in the African Union, the United Nations, Qatar, and other regional and international stakeholders to ensure that commitments are translated into concrete action on the ground. This includes supporting the Qatari-led talks between the DRC and the M23 armed group, strengthening the AU's mediation architecture, and mobilizing resources for post-conflict recovery while burden sharing with partners.
We will ensure that the promises made in Washington are kept, that the peace process delivers real results so that the people of the region see tangible improvements in their lives, and that the conditions for increased U.S. investment are realized. Transparency and accountability are central at every stage, and those who threaten peace will be held responsible. As Secretary Rubio said, we will "take action to ensure promises made to the President are kept."
In closing, I want to thank the Subcommittee for its attention to this critical issue and for its support of our efforts in the Great Lakes region. The Washington Accords are an historic achievement, but they are also a call to action. With continued leadership and partnership, we can help build a future of peace and prosperity for the DRC, Rwanda, and the United States.
Thank you. I welcome your questions.
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20260122/118868/HHRG-119-FA16-Wstate-TroutmanS-20260122.pdf
De Nicola Center for Ethics & Culture Senior Fellow Wubbenhorst Testifies Before Senate Health Committee (Part 2 of 2)
WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 -- The Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee released the following written testimony by Monique Chireau Wubbenhorst, a senior fellow with De Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame, from a Jan. 14, 2026, hearing entitled "Protecting Women: Exposing the Dangers of Chemical Abortion Drugs":* * *
(Continued from Part 1 of 2)
Physicians in pro-abortion states must follow the laws of the states where women fill their prescriptions, including where abortion is restricted. Physician practice is regulated by state boards of medicine. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 -- The Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee released the following written testimony by Monique Chireau Wubbenhorst, a senior fellow with De Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame, from a Jan. 14, 2026, hearing entitled "Protecting Women: Exposing the Dangers of Chemical Abortion Drugs": * * * (Continued from Part 1 of 2) Physicians in pro-abortion states must follow the laws of the states where women fill their prescriptions, including where abortion is restricted. Physician practice is regulated by state boards of medicine.State boards of medicine oversee the licensure, behavior and practice of physicians and require them to adhere to state law. In order to prescribe a medication in a state, a physician must have a license to practice medicine within that state (interstate compacts allow physicians licensed in one state to hold licenses in other states). If a physician is not licensed to practice in a state, they are not allowed to prescribe medications in that state (see for example https://legalclarity.org/canan-out-of-state-doctor-prescribe-medication for an explanation). While prescribing in a state, the physician is bound by the laws of that state. Prescribing abortion pills in states where it is not legal, thereby violating the laws of that state, is inconsistent with the ethical practice of medicine. It also violates the standard of care, because where a physicianpatient relationship has been established, that physician has a responsibility to oversee the care of that patient. This situation is analogous to cross-border prescribing of narcotics, which in the past contributed to the opioid epidemic. In those cases, state and federal regulators had to step in to enact strict laws to address the opioid crisis.
"Telemedicine" abortion, mail-order abortion, and self-administered abortion, as noted, are unsafe and endanger women. In fact, licensed physicians do not prescribe medications to individuals without specific requirements including verifying a patient's identity, medical history and making a diagnosis.
The practice of telemedicine is highly regulated, and therefore the prescribing of abortifacient drugs virtually should not be legitimized by calling it telemedicine. This is more properly termed remote abortion. Safeguards which are a part of standard telemedicine are absent in remote abortion services. For example, strict physician licensure requirements are essential to verify that medical professionals providing abortion services in-person possess the necessary qualifications, training, and ongoing competency to do so. Remote abortion services cannot ensure that the person dispensing the abortion pill is even a physician, or that patients receive the same standard of care and safety oversight as in-person procedures. The latter ensures adherence to medical standards and protects patient safety. These requirements are particularly important in reproductive health, where the complexity of abortion services and potential for complications demand a high level of clinical oversight and professional accountability. This also includes critical safeguards such as ultrasound to rule out ectopic pregnancy, Rh testing, and physical exams. These safeguards are essential to prevent misdiagnosis, delayed care, or failure to detect life-threatening conditions such as ectopic pregnancy and cannot be done with remote abortion.
There are additional reasons why remote abortion is unsafe and endangers women:
* Abortionists providing remote abortion cannot assess a patient for ectopic pregnancy. It is mandatory that providers assess for ectopic pregnancy prior to abortion, to reduce the risk of this potentially fatal complication. In fact, ectopic pregnancy is a contraindication to chemical abortion according to mifepristone's prescribing information. Ectopic pregnancy occurs in 1 in 50 pregnancies. It cannot be diagnosed virtually. It is one of the leading causes of maternal death in 1st trimester, often due to delays in care. 50% of women diagnosed with ectopic pregnancy will not have any known risk factors.
* Abortionists providing remote abortion cannot confirm the identity of the woman or assess for coercion, trafficking or abuse. As noted above, these issues may be associated with abortion because traffickers and abusers desire to hide the evidence (pregnancy in their victims) of their crimes.
* Abortionists providing remote abortion cannot assess the gestational age of the unborn child, or if the mother is even pregnant. ACOG (Committee Opinion 700) states "Accurate dating of pregnancy is important to improve outcomes and is a research and public health imperative...A pregnancy without an ultrasound examination...should be considered to be suboptimally dated." Because some of the signs of pregnancy are subtle or not easily distinguishable from normal physical signs (constipation, fatigue), it is common for women to not have an accurate idea of how far along they are in pregnancy. For example, a patient for whom I cared recently came to the hospital unaware that she was at 23 weeks' gestation. The use of chemical abortion at advanced gestational ages is associated with severe and potentially fatal outcomes.
* Remote abortion increases the risk of complications because of a lack of clinical assessment.
* Abortionists providing remote abortion cannot assess a patient's Rh status and administer Rhogam, a blocking antibody. Women who are Rh negative and who have an Rh positive fetus can develop antibodies which will attack and injure or kill a future Rh positive fetus in utero, if they do not receive injections of Rhogam at the time of abortion, miscarriage, vaginal bleeding in pregnancy, and birth, all situations where the mother may be exposed to the embryo's or fetus' blood, and become sensitized. Despite abortionists' attempts to change this longstanding medical precedent, these injections remain the standard of care. Women who become Rh sensitized may suffer repeated early miscarriages, and their unborn children may develop severe disease or die in utero or soon after birth, as noted.
* Informed consent is a cornerstone of medical care, and it is essential to protecting patients and allowing them to make a fully informed decision prior to them undergoing a proposed intervention. Full informed consent for an intervention such as chemical abortion that has many associated risks, cannot be safely or appropriately given virtually. Remote abortion therefore negates true informed consent
* Abortionists providing remote abortion cannot supervise safe administration of the drugs, nor provide adequate follow up.
* Abortionists providing remote abortion have no idea who is in the room, whether a woman is being threatened, and who is actually receiving the pills (disgruntled boyfriend or husband, pimp, trafficker).
AAPLOG notes that "A study on obtaining abortion pills from international distributors found that no prescription or clinical information was required, the pills averaged two weeks to arrive, analysis of the medications obtained demonstrated that some misoprostol pills contained only 15% of the advertised amount of medication, the packages often arrived damaged, and no instructions were contained in any of the packages.
In a 2019 survey of abortion providers by University of Iowa researchers, published in Contraception, "Thirty-five percent of respondents had witnessed complications following self-managed abortion with misoprostol and/or mifepristone...The most frequently observed complication was incomplete abortion and retained products of conception, which comprised 34.7% of the reported types of complication, with hemorrhage following at 25.8%". (Courtney A Kerestes, Colleen K Stockdale, M Bridget Zimmerman, Abbey J Hardy-Fairbanks. Abortion Providers' Experiences and Views on Self-Managed Medication Abortion, an Exploratory Study. Contraception. 2019 August ; 100(2): 160-164.doi:10.1016/j.contraception.2019.04.006).
Other complications noted in this study included ongoing pregnancy, sepsis, preterm birth, undiagnosed ectopic pregnancy, and uterine rupture. Rates of these complications were reported in graph form, as opposed to exact numbers. Two findings stand out in this study.
The first is that clinician estimates of adverse outcomes associated with mifepristonemisoprostol abortion were much higher than the numbers reported in the literature.
The second is that 46.7% of abortion providers - nearly half - felt that the use of misoprostol with or without mifepristone for self-administered abortion was not safe.
It is a telling admission regarding the lack of safety of self-administered, or "telemedicine abortion" when a significant proportion of abortionists, who might be most likely to advocate for its use, express in writing that they feel it is unsafe.
Multiple cases of coerced abortion are associated with mail-order abortion, for example:
* In 2025...Emerson Evans was arrested and charged with two counts of intentional homicide of an unborn child. He allegedly put abortion pills in his girlfriend's vagina without her knowledge or consent. His girlfriend was approximately 7 weeks pregnant at the time. Evans claimed he bought mifepristone pills for $50 "from a girl on campus." Evans reportedly told police that he "made the decision for her."
* Also in 2025, "Justin Anthony Banta was taken into custody to be charged with capital murder and tampering with evidence. Upon learning she was pregnant...
Banta allegedly ordered abortion pills online and crushed the pills into her coffee later that day without her knowledge. Several days later she went to an emergency room after experiencing heavy bleeding, discovering that her unborn child was dead. The county sheriff's office also alleges that Banta remotely reset his phone, which had been seized as evidence, "deleting crucial evidence related to the case."
* In early 2025, Christopher Cooprider's girlfriend became pregnant with a baby girl...Cooprider obtained pills from AidAccess--a website operated by a Dutch doctor, Rebecca Gomperts, who illegally ships pills into the United States from international sources. Eventually Cooprider...laced her hot chocolate with the abortion pills he purchased from AidAccess. According to the complaint, she started cramping and hemorrhaging withing 30 minutes...When his girlfriend finally made her way to the ER, it was too late for her baby.
* In 2022, Mason Herring was charged with assaulting a pregnant woman and assaultforced induction after repeatedly slipping an abortion drug into his wife's beverages to forcibly abort their unborn child. She went to the hospital with severe cramping and bleeding. She eventually gave birth to her baby prematurely. The forced induction charge was downgraded to injury to a child. In 2024 Herring was sentenced to 180 days in prison and 10 years probation.
- Wisconsin 2022...Jeffrey Smith was sentenced to five years in prison for attempted first degree homicide of an unborn child. He crushed up an abortion pill and put it in his girlfriend's water bottle. She was about 20 weeks pregnant at the time.
* Virginia 2018...Doctor Sikander Imran, a doctor, was sentenced to three years in prison for fetal homicide. He spiked his girlfriend's tea with an abortion pill. She was 17 weeks pregnant at the time.
* Kansas 2015...Scott Bollig was sentenced to nearly 10 years in prison for conspiracy to commit intentional first degree murder for crushing an abortion pill into his girlfriend's pancakes. She was about 8-10 weeks pregnant when she lost her child.
* Wisconsin 2007...Manishkumar Patel was sentenced to 22 years in prison for firstdegree intentional homicide after trying to trick his girlfriend into drinking a smoothie spiked with a crushed abortion pill.
* Massachusetts 2024...Robert Kawada "was charged with poisoning, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon on a pregnant person and assault and battery on a household or family member." Kawada allegedly gave his girlfriend iron and vitamin pills, however at least one pill was actually misoprostol. The victim lost the pregnancy after ingesting the drugs.
* Florida 2014...John Weldon was sentenced to 14 years in prison after tricking his girlfriend into taking an abortion pill. She was about 7 weeks pregnant at the time.
He forged the signature of his father - a fertility doctor - on a prescription and swapped the abortion pills into a bottled labeled as an antibiotic.
* Dr. Hassan Abbas allegedly wanted his girlfriend to get an abortion, but she refused.
According to a state medical board document, he ordered mifepristone and misoprostol from an online abortion provider using his estranged wife's information, without her knowledge. The pills were shipped to his house from out of state.
Roughly a week later in the middle of the night he held his girlfriend down and forced crushed powder in her mouth. She tried to call 911 but he took her phone. She drove to an ER herself. Abbas admits to these events but claims his girlfriend agreed to take the pills. She currently has a protective order against him. Abbas is currently under investigation by the State Medical Board of Ohio and his license is suspended. WTOL 11 Investigates confirmed with the sheriff that "at this time, no charges have been filed in the case."
* Washington 2024...David Coots, a nurse practitioner, was charged with assault, third degree rape, and witness tampering after allegedly forcing a misoprostol pill into a woman's vagina during sexual intercourse. Coots claimed that he prescribed the misoprostol for himself...After days of bleeding and stomach pain, she was no longer pregnant. In summer 2025 Coots pleaded guilty to both second and fourthdegree assault as well as tampering with a witness. He was sentenced to one year and one day in prison and may not contact the victim for 10 years.
* Louisiana 2024...New York abortionist Dr. Margaret Carpenter, along with a Louisiana woman, were indicted by a Louisiana grand jury for violating the state's law prohibiting abortion pills. According to the district attorney, the Louisiana woman obtained the pills via Dr. Carpenter and told her pregnant daughter, a minor, that "she had to take the pill or else." The young girl reportedly ended up in the emergency room after suffering significant bleeding....allegedly [having been] coerced to take have an abortion she didn't want with pills...prescribed by a doctor who had reportedly never even evaluated her or spoken with her.
* Florida 2023: Haley Raborn was charged with solicitation and attempted murder on an unborn child by injury to the mother, and tampering with/fabricating physical evidence. Raborn allegedly attempted to have the ex-fiance of the victim kill his 11week old unborn child with an abortion pill. Instead, the ex-fiance turned the pill over to law enforcement. Raborn claimed that she got the pill from an online telemedicine doctor, which is illegal under Florida law.
* Louisiana 2023: Rosalie Markezich found out she was pregnant and wanted to keep her child. Her boyfriend, originally supportive, decided he did not want her to have their child and coerced her to have an abortion...In a sworn declaration, Rosalie described how her boyfriend's sister advised him how to order drugs from an online pharmacy. He filled out a form online using her information; the only interaction Rosalie had with a medical provider was to send payment for the drugs, which were shipped from California via USPS [Ms. Markezich lost her child].
* California 2022...Jagmeet Sandhu was sentenced to a year in jail for involuntary manslaughter. He had held his girlfriend at gunpoint after entering her home while she slept and forced her to take abortion pills, killing her child. She was about 12 weeks pregnant at the time.
* Nebraska 2021...Ronald Powell, a high school security guard, was accused of sexually abusing a 15-year old student over the course of several years. And a result, the student became pregnant. According to court records he posed as her father at Planned Parenthood, where she had a chemical abortion.
* Connecticut 2016...Sage Lanza, an adult male, had a sexual relationship with a 14year old victim who became pregnant. He pressured her to have an abortion and made an appointment for her at Planned Parenthood. When she was about two months pregnant, he and his father took her to Planned Parenthood for a chemical abortion. Connecticut does not have parental notification or consent laws for minors seeking an abortion.
* New York 2015...Joshua Woodward was sentenced to nine years in prison for attempted murder after giving a woman abortion drugs without her knowledge during a sexual encounter. She had previously refused his request that she have an abortion. The woman was 13 weeks pregnant at the time; Woodward had tried to slip her the drug twice before his third attempt was successful ( see https://www.heritage.org/life/commentary/abortion-pills-coercion-and-abuse)
Abortion pill websites provide bulk shipping, also known as "pills in advance" https://aidaccess.org/en/page/2880027/advance-provision). There is no clear reason for bulk amounts of chemical abortion drugs to be provided for direct-to-consumer sales, other than for trafficking, illegal abortion where abortion is occurring outside of a set of clinical encounters, or women planning to self-manage abortion with no clinical guidance whatsoever.
To summarize, AAPLOG notes (ibid) that "There are many potential negative consequences to these recommendations...For example, underestimation of gestational age may result in higher likelihood of failed abortion. Undetected ectopic pregnancies may rupture leading to life-threatening hemorrhages. Rh negative women may not receive prophylactic Rhogam resulting in isoimmunization in future pregnancies. Potential for misuse and coercion is high when there is no way to verify who is consuming the medication and whether they are doing so willingly. Sex traffickers, incestuous abusers and coercive boyfriends will all welcome more easily available medication abortion. Catastrophic complications can occur, and emergency care may not be readily available in remote areas".
As with the opioid epidemic, state and regulatory authorities should continue to enact efforts to help decrease the medical and social risks to women from mifepristonemisoprostol. FDA should strengthen the REMS by restoring the original safeguards. An understanding of mifepristone's approval provides a foundation for understanding why chemical abortion must be dispensed in person. Per AAPLOG (https://aaplog.org/wpcontent/uploads/2023/01/PG-8-Medication-Abortion.pdf), "The FDA failed to follow its own rules on numerous occasions to approve this drug. A new drug must have at least two randomized, blinded placebo-controlled trials documenting its safety and efficacy, but the submitted trials had no placebo groups... Mifepristone was approved under a special category, "Subpart H: Accelerated Approval Regulations" which are intended for serious/life-threatening illnesses such as advanced cancer and HIV...Also, the FDA based approval on the combined action of the mifepristone with misoprostol...over the objections of its [misoprostol's] manufacturer, Searle.
The FDA is required to test a drug in a pediatric population but waived this requirement without explanation despite adolescent women comprising 1/4-1/3 of its users...Finally, the approved regimen does not mimic clinical trial conditions as it lacked a required ultrasound, experienced surgeon dispensing, and nearby hospital admitting privileges. The FDA approved Mifepristone for U.S distribution in 2000 under SubPart H, which was the only mechanism at the time which allowed FDA to require post-marketing restrictions of drugs considered at high risk for complications if not used in accordance with the FDA label.
In 2006, the FDA instituted a Risk Evaluation Mitigation Strategy (REMS). This is a safety strategy applied to medications that have a known or potential serious risk associated with them...Under this strategy, the risk of complications such as ruptured ectopic pregnancies, hemorrhage, infection and retained pregnancy tissue, which require surgery in as many as one in 20 women...might be minimized. To decrease the likelihood of these negative effects, Mifepristone was initially only approved up to 49 days gestational age, the provider was registered after specific training, it was only to be dispensed in certain healthcare settings and the patients were to be informed of the risk of serious side effects. Mifepristone abortion providers were required to be able to accurately determine the gestational age, confirm an intrauterine location of the pregnancy, and intervene surgically if the abortion was unsuccessful or a complication resulted (or alternatively the abortionist could have an agreement with another doctor and facility capable of providing this care). Complication reporting was mandated, as was a 14day follow-up visit for the woman...Finally, a black box warning was assigned. "If mifepristone/misoprostol results in incomplete abortion, surgical intervention may be necessary. Prescribers should determine in advance and give clear instructions whom to call and what to do in case of emergency. Medication abortion is contraindicated if there is no access to medical facilities for emergency services."
The REMS have been progressively weakened over the last few decades. In 2000, rapid approval of mifepristone occurred. It was to be used up to 49 days (7 weeks), with 3 office visits required, physician only dispensing, and was to be dispensed in a health care facility (https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2000/12/mifepristone-rollout-begins-fda-okays-newcontraceptive-shot). Reporting was required for all serious adverse events.
In 2016, changes were made to the REMS. The abortion pill could be now used up to 70 days (10 weeks) and only 1 office visit was required. Any health care provider could prescribe it; reporting was only required for deaths (https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/020687s020lbl.pdf).
In 2021, further changes were made. No office visit was required and the abortion pill could be delivered via mail (https://www.sba-list.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/govdoc20210412-226601.pdf).
In 2023, it could be dispensed at a local pharmacy https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/rems/Mifepristone_2023_03_23_REMS_ Full.pdf) .
The Comstock Act, which prohibits the mailing of abortifacient drugs through USPS, should be enforced. Self-administered and telemedicine abortion, as noted above, are associated with serious medical and social risks to women and girls. Similar to the mailing of illicit narcotics, the mailing of abortifacient drugs should be restricted in order to protect the health of women and children and prevent coercion, trafficking, abuse and forced abortion.
To conclude, abortion in the majority of cases constitutes intentional feticide. As discussed above, there are significant risks associated with abortion at any gestational age and with any method. A number of studies show consistent associations between chemical abortion and adverse outcomes, many of which are serious. Because of this, laws regulating the practice of abortion, and mandating abortion reporting, serve to protect the health of women and children. In addition, coercion, domestic violence, abuse and sex trafficking have been associated with abortion as a means for abusers and traffickers to hide their crimes. The prevention and prosecution of coercion and abuse should be a priority, with a focus on helping vulnerable women obtain the help they need.
A high percentage of unborn children who have disabilities undergo abortion. This is eugenic by intention. Abortion is carried out disproportionately in black women. This is eugenic by outcome. Both are destructive because the unborn child, the embryo or fetus, is a human being and has human dignity. It is a fact, based on scientific consensus, that life begins at conception; and a physician caring for a pregnant woman has 2 patients, because the fetus is the patient within the patient. Eugenic abortion ignores these facts and violates human dignity. Such abortions are often carried out at or near fetal viability, when the risks of maternal complications and death are greater than in the first trimester.
Arguments have been advanced that mifepristone-misoprostol should be less regulated, not more, because of access to abortion. But access to any intervention must never come at the expense of safety.
Finally, the Dobbs decision, as noted, returned legislative decisions about abortion to the people of the United States and their elected representatives. We have seen that it has resulted in vigorous, often difficult, debates about abortion. But debate is positive. In medicine, we do not see debate as necessarily adversarial, because our enemies are sickness and untimely death. The health and safety of the patient - or in the case of the mother and child, the 2 patients - and the fetus, the patient within the patient - are our concern and the focus for care. This debate and discussion, and our actions, should be informed by our values as they relate to inherent human dignity, compassion, justice, and scientific and clinical data. Stronger regulatory frameworks are necessary to protect the health of women and children and to promote human flourishing.
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Reference List for Monique Chireau Wubbenhorst, M.D., M.P.H., FACOG, FAHA
Protecting Women: Exposing the Dangers of Chemical Abortion Drugs - January 14, 2026
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* Auger N, Healy-Profitos J, Ayoub A, Lewin A, Low N. Induced abortion and implications for longterm mental health: a cohort study of 1.2 million pregnancies. Journal of psychiatric research. 2025;187:304-310. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/40408979/
* Induced Abortions in Ohio 2024 Report. Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Statistics; 2025. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://odh.ohio.gov/wps/wcm/connect/gov/f7a6dd80-fc41-4a7595c5-9858e8f7ac93/Induced+Abortions+in+Ohio+2024+draft+09162025.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVE RT_TO=url&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE.Z18_JQGCH4S04P41206HNUKVF31000-f7a6dd80-fc414a75-95c5-9858e8f7ac93-pCx9FQl
* Gissler M, Berg C, Bouvier-Colle MH, Buekens P. Injury deaths, suicides and homicides associated with pregnancy, Finland 1987-2000. European journal of public health. 2005;15(5):459-463. doi:10.1093/eurpub/cki042
* Investigator Report. Clark County Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner; 2022. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://abortiondocs.org/wp-content/uploads/AlyonaDixonAutopsysearchable.pdf
* Moore A, Frohwirth L, Miller E. Male reproductive control of women who have experienced intimate partner violence in the United States. Social science & medicine. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20359808/
* Ranbaxy. Medabon- Combipack of Mifepristone 200 mg tablet and Misoprostol 4 x 0.2 mg vaginal tablets. Electronic Medicines Compendium. July 9, 2024. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://www.medicines.org.uk/emc/product/3380/smpc
* New M. Media Mislead on Tragic Death of Amber Thurman. National Review. September 19, 2024. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/media-mislead-ontragic-death-of-amber-thurman/
* Duffy K. Medical Abortion Fails 1-in-17 Women. Medical Abortion Fails 1-in-17 Women. October 28, 2021. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://percuity.blog/2021/10/28/medical-abortion-fails1-in-17-women/
* Maloney P. Medical Abortion is fatal for 19 year old woman. Run With Life. January 27, 2023. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://run-with-life.blogspot.com/2023/01/medical-abortion-isfatal-for-19-year.html
* Ireland L, Gatter M, Chen A. Medical Compared With Surgical Abortion for Effective Pregnancy Termination in the First Trimester. Obstetrics and gynecology. 2015;126(1):22-28.doi:10.1097/AOG.0000000000000910
* Medication Abortion. 2020. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://aaplog.org/wpcontent/uploads/2023/01/PG-8-Medication-Abortion.pdf
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* MIFEPREX. Published online March 2016. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/020687s020lbl.pdf
* Cirucci C, Aultman K, Harrison D. Mifepristone Adverse Events Identified by Planned Parenthood in 2009 and 2010 Compared to Those in the FDA Adverse Event Reporting System and Those Obtained Through the Freedom of Information Act. Health services research and managerial epidemiology. 2021;21(8). doi:10.1177/23333928211068919
* Mifepristone Rollout Begins; FDA Okays New Contraceptive Shot. Guttmacher Institute; 2000. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2000/12/mifepristone-rolloutbegins-fda-okays-new-contraceptive-shot
* Duffy K. Non-negligible Risk of Failure. Percuity. October 12, 2021. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://percuity.blog/2021/10/12/non-negligible-risk-of-failure/
* Pornography, Sex Trafficking, and Abortion. 2019. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://aaplog.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/2025.10.14-CO-05-Pornography-SexTrafficking-and-Abortion-WEBSITE.pdf
* ACOG. Prediction and Prevention of Spontaneous Preterm Birth: ACOG Practice Bulletin, Number 234. Obstetrics and gynecology. 2021;138(2):65-90. https://www.acog.org/clinical/clinical-guidance/practice-bulletin/articles/2021/08/predictionand-prevention-of-spontaneous-preterm-birth
* Pregnancy-Associated Mortality Review. Ohio Department of Children & Youth. Accessed January 11, 2026. https://childrenandyouth.ohio.gov/for-providers/maternal-infant-clinicalinitiatives/pregnancy-associated-mortality-review/pregnancy-associated-mortality-review
* Gissler M, Kauppila R, Merilainen J, Tuokomaa H, Hemminki E. Pregnancy-associated deaths in Finland 1987-1994 - definition problems and benefits of record linkage. Acta obstetricia et gynecologica Scandinavica. 1997;76(7):651-657. doi:10.3109/00016349709024605
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Original text here: https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/f9cd01e5-fca1-2029-3e9a-398e30ae8200/Wubbernhorst%20FINAL%20Testimony.pdf
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety & Health Palmer Testifies Before House Education & Workforce Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 -- The House Education and Workforce Subcommittee on Workforce Protections released the following testimony by Wayne Palmer, assistant secretary of Labor for mine safety and health, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Examining the Policies and Priorities of the Mine Safety and Health Administration":* * *
Good morning/afternoon, Chairman Mackenzie, Ranking Member Omar, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify here today. It is an honor to appear before this subcommittee and to represent President Trump, Secretary of Labor Chavez-DeRemer, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 -- The House Education and Workforce Subcommittee on Workforce Protections released the following testimony by Wayne Palmer, assistant secretary of Labor for mine safety and health, from a Jan. 22, 2026, hearing entitled "Examining the Policies and Priorities of the Mine Safety and Health Administration": * * * Good morning/afternoon, Chairman Mackenzie, Ranking Member Omar, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify here today. It is an honor to appear before this subcommittee and to represent President Trump, Secretary of Labor Chavez-DeRemer,and the Mine Safety and Health Administration. As a descendant of both coal and metal/nonmetal miners, it is a privilege to serve as the twelfth Assistant Secretary for MSHA, and I can think of no mission more vital than ensuring the day-to-day safety and long-term health of our nation's 325,000 miners.
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Vision for Mine Safety and Health
Being called to appear this early in my tenure as Assistant Secretary, I thought it would be helpful to share with you my initial vision for how I believe MSHA should fulfill its mission of preventing death, illness, and injuries from mining and promoting safe and healthful workplaces for the Nation's miners.
In accordance with Executive Order 14219, which directs agencies to focus limited enforcement resources on regulations squarely authorized by statute, MSHA will prioritize statutorily mandated mine inspections under the Mine Act--at least two full inspections each year at surface mines and at least four at underground mines annually, our twos and fours as we call them-- along with accident investigations and mine rescue operations. I am pleased to report that in 2025, MSHA completed its mandatory inspections, conducting 20,054 such inspections at 12,289 mines. While inspecting those mines, this administration will call balls and strikes, and when mine operators commit errors, we will cite and penalize according to the Mine Act's strict liability standard, evenhandedly, without fear or favor.
We also will seek to modernize the agency, in two ways. The first is through technological advancements. When I served as MSHA's Deputy Assistant Secretary during the first Trump administration, we launched an aerial drone program for inspecting high-hazard impoundments using 3-D imaging, enabling our inspectors to identify structural deficiencies in tailings dams from a safer distance. We also pioneered an artificial intelligence platform capable of predicting real-world mine safety risks based on decades of inspection and investigation data. As I sit here today, we are further refining this AI platform and will integrate its predictive data into inspectorworn smart helmets that we soon will pilot across six mines. When implemented, these technologies will guide MSHA field staff to focus on the most likely risks and hazards when inspecting mines, and for mine operators to identify and mitigate safety and health risks during day-to-day operations between MSHA inspections. Second, wherever possible we will modernize agency regulations. During the first Trump administration, for example, we updated existing rules to accommodate advancements in electronic detonators, which minimize accidental misuse during blasting in a mine. Last June and July, as a part of the President's robust deregulatory agenda, MSHA published 19 Notices of Proposed Rulemaking intended to remove outdated or inconsistent requirements; reduce regulatory burdens without compromising miner health and safety; facilitate compliance; and modernize safety and health practices. Additionally, the administration is committed to safeguarding miners' health and is working on a limited rulemaking to reconsider and seek comments on portions of the 2024 final Silica Rule.
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Responding to Trends in the Mining Industry
I take the helm at an especially important, dynamic moment for America's mining industry, as the Trump administration implements policies to improve American competitiveness and address downstream affordability for consumers of finished goods and energy. Through decades of complacency, we as a nation grew dependent on nondomestic mineral supply chains, including from countries hostile to our economic and security interests.
This administration is vigorously pursuing policies aimed at reshoring those supply chains and making America dominant again. Where the previous administration granted FAST-41 expedited permitting status for the coordinated federal environmental review of infrastructure projects under title 41 of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act to only a single new mining project, the Trump administration has granted such status to 13 additional projects focused on critical minerals already during its first year. Where the outgoing administration imposed a moratorium on coal lease sales, the Trump administration is moving to increase them.
A recent Congressional Review Act resolution formally nullified the moratorium, ensuring that a future administration cannot create a permanent moratorium through the rulemaking process.
These are just two examples of actions that will lead to new mines and increased production at existing mines, with the International Energy Agency reporting that strong policy support already boosted domestic demand for coal in 2025. What does this mean for MSHA as an agency?
Last July, MSHA developed the Compliance Assistance in Safety and Health (CASH) Program to provide compliance assistance primarily to new mine operators and inexperienced miners.
During 2025, our Educational Field and Small Mine Services (EFSMS) provided nearly 32,000 hours of compliance assistance to mine operators. Such assistance is especially helpful to new mines when they enter their exploration and development phase, and MSHA already has established contact with 22 mining startups assigned FAST-41 status, and others that have not received such status. As of the New Year, MSHA has assisted 93 new or reopening mines with regulatory compliance, helping them avoid thousands in fines and more swiftly commence operations. How better to ensure safety than to help a new mine prepare for regulatory compliance before MSHA shows up unannounced for that mine's first statutorily-mandated inspection? From an organizational efficiency perspective, it means situating our resources strategically to accommodate future growth. The vast majority of mines in development fall west of the Mississippi, and MSHA needs to be resourced accordingly, into the future.
Again, the Trump administration's chief goal, in the spirit of America First, is to reshore mineral production and eliminate our vulnerability to global supply chain disruptions. But it is also important to recognize that such policies will generate stable, well-paying jobs. Mining, of course, occurs mostly in rural areas, oftentimes in communities that rely on a much smaller host of employers and opportunities than urban areas can offer. Wherever new mines arise, or expanded production at existing mines occurs, as an agency MSHA will strive to ensure safe and healthful workplaces for all of America's miners.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering any questions that members of this subcommittee may have.
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Original text here: https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/palmer_testimony.pdf