Congressional Testimony
Congressional Testimony
Here's a look at documents involving congressional testimony and member statements
Featured Stories
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rogers Issues Opening Remarks at Hearing on Military Posture, National Security Challenges in Europe
WASHINGTON, March 25 -- Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Alabama, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, released the following opening remarks from a March 18, 2025, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in Europe":* * *
Today, we continue our posture hearings with EUCOM.
We meet at a critical moment.
Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine continues.
The U.S. military is actively degrading Iran's military capabilities and preventing the regime from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
And the Department remains laser-focused on defending the homeland and deterring China.
Managing ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 25 -- Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Alabama, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, released the following opening remarks from a March 18, 2025, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in Europe": * * * Today, we continue our posture hearings with EUCOM. We meet at a critical moment. Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine continues. The U.S. military is actively degrading Iran's military capabilities and preventing the regime from acquiring a nuclear weapon. And the Department remains laser-focused on defending the homeland and deterring China. Managingthese threats simultaneously will require a stronger NATO.
Fortunately, thanks to the leadership of President Trump, our Allies are beginning to step up.
And their commitment to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense by 2035 shows they are serious about assuming greater responsibility for their own defense.
But Europe's rearmament will take time.
Fixing manpower shortages and restoring readiness will take time.
Building out the transatlantic defense industrial base will take time.
And developing or purchasing capabilities that today only the United States can provide will take time.
Yet, despite this reality, some within the Department are advocating for a premature and unwise reduction of U.S. forces in Europe and from NATO defense plans.
More troubling still, those same voices have not provided a credible roadmap for how such a transition would occur.
Nor have they defined what "critical but more limited" U.S. support actually means.
That is not a strategy for a stronger, more credible NATO.
It is a risk we should not take.
That is why last year's NDAA mandates consultation with Congress before making any significant reduction in U.S. forces in Europe.
Because the overwhelming bipartisan and bicameral assessment is that a premature drawdown would create a dangerous deterrence gap and invite further Russian aggression.
In particular, as Europe rearms, the two rotational U.S. armored brigades in Poland remain a cornerstone of NATO's conventional defense.
President Trump has been clear about the importance of maintaining that presence, even suggesting the United States could further bolster our posture there.
He's right that those brigades must remain in place.
And I believe it is past time that we seriously consider permanently stationing them in Poland as well.
Moreover, those in the Department advocating for a premature reduction of U.S. forces in Europe are also ignoring that our posture there is about much more than defending Europe.
It helps defend the homeland forward.
And it gives the President more options to project combat power into other theaters, including CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and the Arctic.
Operations like MIDNIGHT HAMMER, and now EPIC FURY, make that clear.
Both are enabled by our presence in Europe and by the access, basing, and overflight permissions provided by our allies.
Just look at Romania.
Romania is allowing the United States to use two of its bases to support operations in the Middle East.
Think about that.
Even after we withdrew a U.S. brigade last year, Romania continues to open its facilities to American forces.
And they are not just providing access.
Romania has invested well over $2 billion to improve those bases and runways for American use.
This is exactly the kind of ally we should be deepening our engagement with, not prematurely stepping away from.
We also should not prematurely step away from Ukraine.
It is in the U.S. interest that a strong, well-armed, and independent Ukraine emerges from this war.
In fact, its innovative and battle-hardened forces are already degrading the threat Russia's military poses to Europe's conventional defense.
Kyiv is also demonstrating that this partnership is not a one-way street.
Ukrainian counter-drone teams and technology are now helping protect U.S. forces and partners in the Middle East from Iranian attacks.
Russia, meanwhile, is doing the exact opposite.
It is helping Iran refine its drone tactics and reportedly providing targeting intelligence to strike American troops.
It's clear Putin is not our friend.
He is an adversary.
The temporary easing of Russian energy sanctions must indeed be temporary, as Secretary Bessent has pledged.
And if Putin continues to refuse to negotiate with President Trump in good faith, pressure on the Russian dictator must increase, including through the additional sanctions now being considered in Congress.
History has taught us this lesson again and again.
Vladimir Putin interprets a lack of American resolve as an opportunity.
We should not give him one--neither in Ukraine, nor in NATO.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=6433
GAO Director Love-Grayer Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, March 25 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Intelligence released the following written testimony by Latesha Love-Grayer, director of international affairs and trade at the Government Accountability Office, from a March 17, 2026, hearing entitled "Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Foreign Assistance: Lessons Learned and Charting a Path Forward":* * *
Chairman Mills, Ranking Member Moskowitz, and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss fraud, waste, and abuse and the work GAO has done regarding fraud risk management in foreign assistance.
Foreign ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 25 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight and Intelligence released the following written testimony by Latesha Love-Grayer, director of international affairs and trade at the Government Accountability Office, from a March 17, 2026, hearing entitled "Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Foreign Assistance: Lessons Learned and Charting a Path Forward": * * * Chairman Mills, Ranking Member Moskowitz, and Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss fraud, waste, and abuse and the work GAO has done regarding fraud risk management in foreign assistance. Foreignassistance supports U.S foreign policy goals by providing resources to countries that policymakers have deemed to be strategically important, countries in conflict, and populations in need. Congress has appropriated approximately $50 billion in 2026 for the Department of State and other foreign affairs agencies and programs, including foreign assistance. Most U.S. foreign assistance prior to 2025 was administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the U.S. Departments of State (State), Agriculture, Health and Human Services, the Treasury, and Defense; and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The current Administration has made changes to the U.S. government entities administering foreign assistance, including ceasing USAID's administration of ongoing foreign aid as of July 1, 2025. State is now poised to be the lead U.S. foreign assistance provider, having assumed certain former USAID functions.
Foreign assistance is often delivered in complex environments with inherent risks, such as fraud, waste, and abuse.1 These risks must be managed effectively to ensure assistance delivery and taxpayer dollars are safeguarded. While most federal spending, including foreign assistance, is not lost to fraud, every dollar or resource that is diverted to fraudsters damages the federal government's ability to achieve its goals.
Direct financial losses from fraud place an increased burden on the government's financial outlook. Additionally, non-financial impacts and losses erode public trust in government and hinder agencies' efforts to execute their missions effectively and efficiently.2
* * *
1 Fraud involves obtaining a thing of value through willful misrepresentation. Willful misrepresentation can be characterized by making material false statements of fact based on actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard of falsity. Fraud risk exists when individuals have an opportunity to engage in fraudulent activity. Waste is squandering money or resources, even if not explicitly illegal, and abuse is behaving improperly or unreasonably or misusing one's position or authority.
* * *
While it is impossible to eliminate fraud completely, agencies can manage the risk more effectively by leveraging our recommendations, guidance, and resources for fraud prevention. And prevention is key. Prosecuting individuals and entities after they have committed fraud addresses only a small fraction of identified fraudulent activity, requires significant time and resources, and often recovers only a portion, if anything, of what was lost.
The tactics of those who commit fraud are constantly evolving and so should the U.S. government's approach to subverting them. To be clear, managing fraud risk is never finished. The goal is to continuously improve anti-fraud efforts to better prevent fraud before it occurs, detect it sooner when it happens, and respond more effectively than we have in the past.
This statement focuses on (1) specific risks and examples of fraud, waste, and abuse associated with foreign assistance and (2) useful practices and weaknesses in fraud risk management in foreign assistance identified through past GAO work.
This statement is based on a body of work of selected reports we published from July 2015 to January 2026 addressing fraud risk management in foreign assistance. More detailed information on the scope and methodology of our prior work can be found within the specific reports on which this statement is based. These reports are listed on the Related GAO Products page at the end of this statement. We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
* * *
2 We have previously reported that the federal government faces an unsustainable longterm fiscal future. GAO, The Nation's Fiscal Health: Strategy Needed as Debt Levels Accelerate, GAO-25-107714 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 5, 2025). Improved efforts to combat fraud, with an emphasis on prevention, can reduce the loss of federal dollars and improve the federal government's fiscal outlook.
* * *
Foreign Assistance Has Heightened Risks for Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
No area of the federal government is immune to fraud, waste, or abuse (see fig. 1). We estimate that the federal government loses between $233 billion and $521 billion annually to fraud, based on 2018-2022 data.3 Fraud can come from within or from outside an organization. For example, an employee, manager or executive within an organization may commit fraud by deceiving their own organization through embezzling funds or accepting bribes. Outside entities may also commit fraud against an organization. For example, vendors may lie about the work they performed, or grantees may claim reimbursement for activities they did not perform.
* * *
Figure 1: Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Definitions and Examples
* * *
Delivering Foreign Assistance Presents Increased Risks
The delivery of foreign assistance can present some specific challenges that increase fraud, waste, and abuse risks.
* * *
3 GAO, Fraud Risk Management: 2018-2022 Data Show Federal Government Loses an Estimated $233 Billion to $521 Billion Annually to Fraud, Based on Various Risk Environments, GAO-24-105833 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2024).
* * *
These include:
Reliance on Implementing Partners for Delivering Assistance. U.S. foreign assistance is often delivered through award agreements with partnering organizations that implement the assistance. These implementing partners may enter into a sub-award agreement that provides funds to sub-partner organizations to carry out the work.4 During the delivery of assistance, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) generally relied on partners' own controls to prevent risks, including fraud. As such, implementing partners and sub-partners play an important role in the delivery and safeguarding of foreign assistance.
Therefore, the potential for fraud and other risks is greater if federal agencies, implementing partners, and sub-partners do not have strong controls. See the text box for examples of inadequate internal controls that could increase vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, or abuse.
Examples of Inadequate Internal Controls that Could Increase the Risk of Fraud, Waste, or Abuse
* Inadequate separation of duties.
* Lack of or limited monitoring visits or inspection requirements.
* Lack of or limited policies and guidance for award selection and management.
* Limited or no requirements for awardees to monitor or report on sub awardee data or information.
* Weak or limited counter fraud or antiterrorism clauses in delivery partner agreements and contracts.
* Limited verification of beneficiary data.
* Limited tracking and oversight of asset management or inventory systems.
* Limited or no antifraud control environment (e.g. limited or no fraud training, fraud reporting mechanism, or regularly communicated antifraud tone at all organizational levels).
* Limited internal or compliance audits.
Source: GAO analysis of prior GAO reports. | GAO-26-108945
Countries Experiencing Conflict. Many factors complicate the delivery of assistance to people living in conflict zones. For example, a dangerous operating environment can limit access to certain geographic areas for U.S. agency personnel and implementing partners, which can result in managing U.S. assistance remotely. Lack of in-person oversight increases the risk that assistance will be misused or diverted through fraud or other means. For example, USAID officials who provided assistance to Syria explained that implementing partners were unable to consistently access project sites due to factors such as ongoing fighting, bombing raids, and border closures. This limited partners' ability to obtain and verify progress.5 Similarly, we found that USAID was often unable to conduct regular site visits in conflict-affected areas, including Ukraine, Nigeria, and Somalia, instead relying at times on other methods to detect risks, such as reviewing partner's financial information in regular reports and additional communication with its partners. However, we also found that partners in these countries also said they were often unable to safely access some of their own implementation sites.6
* * *
4 Implementing partners and sub-partners may be nongovernmental organizations (NGO), government entities, or international organizations, which are typically composed of multiple member states.
* * *
Urgency of Humanitarian Assistance and Life-saving Aid. Disasters and public emergencies present an additional challenge to combating fraud. The need for urgent assistance can hinder the implementation of effective controls to combat fraud. Agencies may need to develop new programs or significantly expand existing ones, which can involve increased risks. Further, both our work and that of the USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG) have found that crisis environments, such as war zones in Ukraine, Gaza, and Syria, are by their very nature unstable and insecure. Substantial uncertainty and inaccessibility, coupled with the rapid flow of large amounts of money, create prime opportunities for fraud and diversion--risks that have intensified with the growing scale and duration of humanitarian responses.
Use of Local Organizations. USAID set goals to work directly with local partners to implement assistance in some countries. While working with local organizations can improve the effectiveness and sustainability of foreign assistance, it also potentially raises risks, including the risk of fraud. Many local organizations are smaller than traditional development organizations and may not have the capacity to implement large scale programs, oversee and track substantial funding, and may have limited experience in implementing financial controls or reporting requirements Further, fraud risks can be greater in countries with high levels of corruption.
Presence of Terrorists or Other Sanctioned Entities. Various U.S. laws, regulations. and executive orders provide for U.S. sanctions on specified groups, such as drug traffickers and terrorists. The risk of providing assistance to sanctioned entities in violation of these laws, regulations, and executive orders may be higher in conflict zones because of the presence of terrorists or sanctioned entities contributing to the conflict. This type of risk may require increased oversight of assistance provided.
* * *
5 GAO, Syria Humanitarian Assistance: Some Risks of Providing Aid inside Syria Assessed, but U.S. Agencies Could Improve Fraud Oversight. GAO-16-629. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2016.
6 GAO, Foreign Assistance: USAID Should Strengthen Risk Management in Conflict Zones, GAO-24-106192 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2024).
* * *
GAO Work has Highlighted Examples of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
During our work examining foreign assistance programs of multiple agencies, including USAID, State, and U.S. African Development Foundation (USADF), we have identified or reported on various instances of fraud, waste, or abuse or potential fraud under investigation.
U.S. African Development Foundation. We reported in 2025 that USADF has faced allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse originating from former staff.7 These allegations included reports on the misuse of official funds, fraudulent spending, conflicts of interest, and inappropriate, abusive, and discriminatory management practices. According to a Department of Justice press release, on January 30, 2026, the Director of Financial Management of the USADF was charged and agreed to plead guilty to accepting payments from a USADF contractor and lying to federal law enforcement officers about those payments. According to the Department of Justice, the USADF employee directed USADF funds to the contractor for little to no work and arranged for USADF to pay vendors and contractors through a Kenyan-based company that was owned by the USADF contractor. The USADF employee and contractor had allegedly known each other for over 20 years.
Post-Delivery Food Aid Diversion in Somalia. We reported that in July 2023, a United Nations assessment in Somalia found widespread and systemic diversion of food aid, primarily cash assistance.8 For example, internally displaced beneficiaries reported being required or coerced into paying the people managing the camps for the displaced, or other individuals a significant portion--usually in cash--of the aid they had received.
Potential Fraud Under the Merida Initiative. We reported on several potential fraud cases identified by State and USAID under the Merida Initiative, a partnership created to help reduce violence in Mexico and mitigate effects of the drug trade.9 Both State and USAID officials told us about cases of potential fraud involving Merida funds in 2018 that involved grantees overstating labor costs on invoices submitted for repayment. We also reported on another case of potential fraud reported to USAID in 2018 that involved a contractor who had awarded a subcontract to an employee's immediate relative without disclosure, in violation of conflict-of-interest reporting requirements.
* * *
7 GAO, U.S. African Development Foundation: Strategic Approach Needed to Mitigate Fraud Risks, GAO-25-107574 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 15, 2025).
8 GAO-24-106192
* * *
Examples of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Afghanistan. In a 2021 report, we highlighted multiple examples of fraud, waste, and abuse identified in Afghanistan.10
These included:
* In 2009 we reported USAID-funded United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) grants were associated with findings of alleged criminal actions and mismanaged funds, leaving USAID's programs vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. A UN Procurement Task Force in 2008 found instances of fraud, embezzlement, conversion of public funds, conflict of interest, and severe mismanagement of USAIDfunded UNOPS projects in Afghanistan, including a $365.8 million project to rehabilitate secondary roads. According to the allegations, a UNOPS official diverted reconstruction funds for personal use, including hundreds of thousands of dollars in USAID funds for rent, a home renovation, and luxury items. The investigation found that the UNOPS official repeatedly violated rules and regulations by severely misappropriating project funds and by engaging in fraudulent and unlawful acts.
* In 2012, we reported on waste in construction of facilities used by U.S. and Afghan troops. Some contracting officers' representatives did not have the technical expertise necessary to monitor contract performance for the contracts they were assigned to oversee. As a result, some newly constructed buildings had to be repaired or rebuilt before troops could use them, resulting in wasted resources, low morale, and risks to personnel safety.
* In 2009 we reported on alleged fraud involving Afghan government and police personnel. U.S. contractors validated the status of almost 47,400 Afghan Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police personnel but were unable to validate the status of almost 29,400 personnel--who were paid in part by $230 million in U.S. contributions to a UN trust fund--because of a lack of cooperation from some police commanders. During a 2-month period in 2008, U.S. civilian police mentors reported a variety of financial irregularities and alleged fraud.
* * *
9 GAO, U.S. Assistance to Mexico: State and USAID Should Strengthen Risk Management for Programs under the Merida Initiative, GAO-21-335 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2021).
10 GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: GAO Work since 2002 Shows Systematic Internal Control Weaknesses that Increased the Risk of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse, GAO-21-32R (Washington, D.C., Jan. 27, 2021).
* * *
* In 2009 we reported on abuse by the Afghan National Police, including an Afghan Border Police battalion commander in Khost province who allegedly sold weapons to anti-coalition forces. In a March 2008 report, a U.S. contractor working with the Afghan National Police noted that despite repeated requests, the police chief logistical officer for Paktika province would not produce a list of serial numbers for weapons on hand. The contractor suggested that this reluctance to share information could be part of an attempt to conceal inventory discrepancies.
Lessons from Useful Practices and Weaknesses in Managing Fraud Risk
Federal law enacted in 2016 required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish guidelines for agencies to create controls to identify and assess fraud risks and to design and implement antifraud control activities.11 In its 2016 Circular No. A-123 guidelines, OMB directed agencies to adhere to leading practices in our A Framework for Managing Fraud Risk in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework).12 The Fraud Risk Framework's comprehensive leading practices, organized into four components, are designed to help program managers combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based manner. The four components are (1) committing to combat fraud by creating an organizational culture, (2) planning and conducting risk assessments, (3) designing and implementing a strategy with specific control activities, and (4) evaluating and adapting fraud risk management activities (see figure 2).
* * *
11 Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-186, 130 Stat. 546 (2016). The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 was replaced in March 2020 by the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019. Pub. L. No. 116-117, Sec. 2(a), 134 Stat. 113, 131-132 (2020), codified at 31 U.S.C. Sec. 3357.
12 Office of Management and Budget, Management's Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control, OMB Circular No. A-123 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2016) and GAO, A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs, GAO-15-593SP (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2015).
* * *
Figure 2: The Fraud Risk Management Framework
* * *
Our work has found that agencies have some practices and controls in place to manage fraud risks in foreign assistance, consistent with GAO's Fraud Risk Framework. However, we have also identified systematic weaknesses in agencies' efforts to prevent, detect, and properly respond to fraud risks in foreign assistance and made numerous recommendations to address these weaknesses. While agencies have taken some steps to address these weaknesses, the remaining yet to be implemented recommendations can guide agencies seeking to enhance their risk management for foreign assistance. Some of these recommendations are to USAID and USADF, which have respectively ceased administration of aid and reduced functions; however, the practices underlying the recommendations for these agencies may be applicable to the agencies that will continue to administer foreign assistance.
Lessons from Useful Practices and Weakness in Agencies' Efforts
Our prior work identified both useful practices and weaknesses in agencies' fraud risk management related to (1) internal controls, (2) fraud risk assessments, (3) fraud awareness training, (4) oversight of implementing partners, (4) third-party monitoring, (5) use of data analytics to manage fraud risks, and (6) responding and adapting to risks.
Internal Controls
Our prior work has found that agencies have some policies and procedures to mitigate fraud and other risks. For example, in a 2024 review, we found that USAID maintained internal policies and procedures that guided award type decisions and outlined roles and responsibilities for award management.13 However, agencies' policies may be insufficient or not systematically implemented in line with leading practices for managing fraud risks.
For example, we found in a 2025 review that USADF had inadequate policies, procedures, and practices to ensure the appropriate use of federal award funds.14 As one of many systematic internal control weaknesses described in our report, we found that USADF had insufficient internal policies and procedures to guide contract award decisions and management. Treasury officials that supported USADF's contracting process told us that USADF procurement officials engaged in questionable practices when making awards. USADF's Director of Financial Management was later criminally charged by the Department of Justice. We reported concerns with USADF practices such as steering contracts to former USADF contractual employees, cancelling solicitations when desired prior contract employees did not win the contract, and directing Department of Treasury officials on who to hire and what to pay their former contractual employees. Treasury officials noted that these practices all went against Federal Acquisition Regulation provisions related to procurement integrity. We reported that these practices could be a sign of potential procurement fraud and abuse schemes, such as bid rigging and unjustified sole source awards. These practices may have proliferated because of the lack of procedures and oversight controls.
* * *
13 GAO-24-106192.
14 GAO-25-107574.
* * *
Among other things, we recommended that the USADF (1) implement specific effective internal control policies and processes and (2) ensure that it has appropriate personnel in place to establish and update internal control policies, assess and mitigate fraud, ensure appropriate separation of duties, and manage procurements. Our recommendations are not yet implemented.
Fraud Risk Assessments
We noted in a 2024 review of assistance provided in conflict zones that USAID had an Enterprise Risk Management structure that included teams within bureaus and missions to assess and document risks, including fraud.15 Under this structure, USAID bureaus and missions were required to develop annual risk profiles to identify, analyze, and manage risks and communicate these risks to leadership, as outlined in USAID's Enterprise Risk Management guidance and Anti-Fraud Plan.
While these risk assessments have the potential to be useful tools, we found weaknesses in USAID's and State's approach to assessing fraud risks for their programs. Specifically, the agencies' assessments were not tailored to program-specific fraud risks, in accordance with the leading practices identified in the Fraud Risk Framework. For example, in 2021, we found that State and USAID had not fully assessed the potential risks of fraud in their Merida programs.16 In 2024, we again found that USAID's fraud risk assessments for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nigeria, Somalia, and Ukraine did not examine program-specific fraud risks.17 Without completing fraud risk assessments that are tailored to individual programs, State's and USAID's programs were more vulnerable to those risks.
We made one recommendation to State and seven recommendations to USAID to assess fraud risks in their programs. Subsequently, State and USAID completed fraud risk assessments for their Merida programs, and USAID created a requirement for regular fraud risk assessments for its programs agencywide in 2024. As of July 2025, when USAID transferred its remaining programmatic functions to State, USAID had not implemented five of these recommendations.
* * *
15 GAO-24-106192.
16 GAO-21-335
17 GAO-24-106192. GAO, Central America: USAID Should Strengthen Staffing and Fraud Risk Management for Initiative Addressing Migration to the U.S., GAO-24-106232 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2024).
* * *
Fraud Awareness Training Oversight of Implementing Partners
Fraud risk training also enables agencies to identify and mitigate these risks. In a 2024 review, we found that while USAID offered fraud awareness training, attendance was not always mandated or tracked because USAID did not require these steps agencywide.18 We likewise found in 2021 that State also did not require fraud awareness training.19 Without mandatory training, State and USAID lacked assurance that its staff and partners knew how to identify and mitigate key fraud risks and vulnerabilities for its programs.
We made three recommendations to State and USAID to update their policies and guidance to require fraud awareness training. State and USAID implemented these recommendations.
Agencies employed some useful processes to oversee implementing partners and their sub-partners throughout the award process that can be useful for identifying and assessing fraud risks. For example:
* Reviewing past performance. Our July 2024 review of State's and USAID's use of implementing partners in Ukraine found that State and USAID had standard processes for considering past performance when selecting some prime implementing partners for awards (e.g. contracts or grants), which our review of a sample of 28 awards indicated that they followed. USAID also routinely monitored its NGO implementing partners' screening of their sub-partners for past performance, as of July 2024./20
* Award provisions and due diligence. Our April 2024 review of USAID assistance in conflict zones found that prior to implementing awards, USAID used award provisions (i.e. contractual or legal terms in the award) to outline control requirements related to fiduciary risks, including provisions on fraud disclosure, whistleblower protections, and conflicts of interest.21 Likewise, USAID had policies to conduct due diligence and partner vetting and included provisions in awards to ensure assistance did not benefit terrorists or sanctioned entities.22
* * *
18 GAO-24-106192. GAO-24-106232.
19 GAO-21-335
20 GAO, Ukraine: State and USAID Should Improve Processes for Ensuring Partners Can Perform Required Work, GAO-24-106751 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 31, 2024).
21 GAO-24-106192.
22 GAO-24-106192.
* * *
* Improving internal controls. We found USAID had several strategies to oversee implementing partners' internal controls and address any deficiencies. For example, as of April 2024, USAID's missions in Nigeria and Ukraine conducted financial reviews of awards to oversee and detect fiduciary risks, including fraud. For example, a financial review might look at a partner's accounting and record keeping; internal control procedures; or compliance with the award agreement. The Nigeria mission also required certain local partners to hire a compliance officer to help build an internal compliance system, as local partners may not have had the same level of capacity and controls as international implementing partners.
Our work has also found weaknesses in State's and USAID's oversight of implementing partners and their sub-partners that increased vulnerabilities to financial risks, such as fraud, and the risk of providing assistance to entities or individuals associated with terrorism. In general, we noted additional weaknesses with State and USAID's oversight of awards with international organizations compared to nongovernmental organizations. Specifically,
* Past performance of international organizations. We found weaknesses with State's review of potential partners' past performance during our 2024 review of State and USAID's oversight of partners in Ukraine.23 Specifically, State did not screen for past performance for letters of agreement, a type of award with certain international organizations, as its policy did not require this screening.
Without screening all types of implementing partners, State had a higher risk of selecting implementing partners that may have been excluded from federal awards or may not have performed well. In addition, across all award types, State did not document detailed information about applicants' past performance because its policies did not require it. Detailed documentation would help other State officials understand the risks of using these partners to implement assistance under current and potential future awards.
* Past performance of sub-partners. We also found weaknesses with how State and USAID monitored their partners' screening of their subpartners for past performance, based on the sample of awards we reviewed. While USAID routinely monitored how its NGO implementing partners screened sub-partners for past performance, it did not monitor its international organization partners, such as United Nations agencies. State did not perform this monitoring for either type of partner. Without periodic monitoring, the agencies increased the risk that partners may not have effectively screened sub-partners.
* * *
23 GAO-24-106751
* * *
* Sub-partner vetting and provisions. A March 2021 review of USAID funding to the West Bank and Gaza found that, for fiscal years 2015 through 2019, USAID fully complied with requirements for partner vetting, antiterrorism certificates, and mandatory provisions.24 However, our analysis of a sample of subawards showed that partners were not consistently vetting subawardees and certain mandatory anti-terrorism provisions were not included in contracts, as required. Weaknesses in USAID's subaward monitoring may have increased the risk of providing assistance to entities or individuals associated with terrorism.
In these reports, we made seven recommendations to State and USAID to ensure proper screening of partners and sub-partners. State and USAID implemented six of these recommendations by establishing requirements for officials to document past performance information and periodically monitor partners' screening on sub-partners, among other things. One recommendation to State is yet to be implemented and relates to screening international organizations.
Third-Party Monitoring
Conducting in-person site visits for assistance programs is an important oversight tool. However, the presence of conflict limits agencies' direct oversight of their partners. In these environments, agencies can use thirdparty monitoring to manage this limitation. Specifically, our 2016 review of USAID's humanitarian assistance to Syria and our 2024 review of USAID's assistance in conflict zones found that USAID used third-party monitors to improve oversight and verify progress of its programs.25 However, this third-party monitoring focused on performance management and was not designed explicitly for fraud risk detection. As a result, there were inconsistencies in whether these monitors checked for indications of potential fraud. For example, we reviewed site visit questionnaires for the third-party monitoring contracts in Nigeria, Somalia, and Ukraine and found examples of questions that could be used to detect possible instances of fraud and other risks. Some questionnaires asked beneficiaries whether anyone had demanded payment for assistance, and others had questions on practices to manage fiduciary risk, such as how partners select beneficiaries and whether they maintained distribution registers. However, we did not see similar practices consistently across countries. Improved training and guidance for third-party monitoring would allow these monitors to be used to help assess and identify potential risks.
* * *
24 GAO, West Bank and Gaza Aid: Should Funding Resume, Increased Oversight of Subawardee Compliance with USAID's Antiterrorism Policies and Procedures May Reduce Risks, GAO-21-332 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2021).
25 GAO, Syria Humanitarian Assistance: Some Risks of Providing Aid Inside Syria Assessed, but U.S. Agencies Could Improve Fraud Oversight, GAO-16-629 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 14, 2016). GAO-24-106192.
* * *
We made three recommendations to USAID to enhance the use of thirdparty monitoring to detect potential fraud. One recommendation related to USAID's programs in Syria is implemented, as USAID revised site visit templates for third-party monitors to indicate potential fraud incidents during site visits. As of July 2025, USAID had not implemented two recommendations related to updating agencywide guidance on using third-party monitoring for potential fraud detection.
Data analytics can help agencies prevent and detect potential fraud. For example, our 2024 review of USAID assistance in conflict zones described how USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Affairs maintained a central tracker of all reported allegations, including fraud, across all its awards.26 The bureau used this information to identify trends and support staff in overseeing awards.
We also noted weaknesses in the use of data analytics for fraud risk management. In September 2025, we found that USAID did not regularly verify or use all available data to inform its oversight of direct budget support to Ukraine.27 Specifically, USAID did not review Ukraine's detailed expenditure data received from the World Bank. We analyzed a subset of this data and identified 161 unusual increases out of 5,121 expenditure changes. For example, one large increase was a 2,474 percent increase (equal to $1,067,542) between April and June 2023 for salaries to non-security government employees working at the Ukraine Supreme Court. Although non-security government employees typically receive bonuses in June, this percentage increase was an outlier for June 2023 and merited further examination. Reviewing all available expenditure data would help identify data anomalies, determine the cause, and help ensure Ukraine's use of U.S. direct budget support funding was appropriate.
* * *
26 GAO-24-106192.
27 GAO, Ukraine: State Should Build on USAID's Oversight of Direct Budget Support, GAO-25-107057 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 24, 2025).
* * *
We made one recommendation to State, which assumed oversight responsibility for the direct budget support to Ukraine from USAID in July 2025, to review expenditure data to enhance oversight of direct budget support funding. This recommendation is yet to be implemented.
Responding and Adapting to Risks
Beyond preventing and detecting risks, agencies must also effectively respond and adapt to them. Response can include investigating potential fraud and taking corrective actions. For example, during our 2024 review of assistance in conflict zones we found that USAID required its awardees to report all violations of criminal law involving fraud or other certain prohibited conduct potentially affecting the award to the USAID OIG. We found multiple instances when implementing partners in Ukraine reported instances of conflicts of interest to the OIG for investigation. Our review also found that after a Somalia mission partner reported and confirmed instances of fraudulent invoices, the mission requested that the partner revise its plan for conducting due diligence to address related internal control gaps.
We found that, at times, agencies could improve actions to address fraud and other risks in federal contracts, grants, or other awards. For example, in a 2021 review, we noted that USAID's compliance review process found numerous instances of partners not complying with requirements for vetting and inclusion of mandatory anti-terrorism provisions in subawards for the West Bank Gaza program.28 However, we found this compliance review process did not always occur in time to enforce remedies for awardee's noncompliance before awards ended, such as withholding cash payments pending correction of the deficiency or withholding approval of further awards. We recommended USAID conduct compliance reviews and take appropriate actions before awards end, which USAID implemented.
Even if entities take corrective actions or remedy the harm caused by fraud or other violations, it is essential for agencies to have strong controls to prevent and detect future violations. In particular, reporting award violations and other information related to contractor performance in federal systems used to inform contracting decisions is also essential.
However, we have found that contracting officials sometimes failed to report contractor violations, such as human trafficking violations in federal contracts or terminations of contracts due to the fault of the contractor, in required federal procurement databases. Because other contracting officials rely on these databases to review contractors' performance histories before making new awards, incomplete reporting increases the risk that agencies will unknowingly work with contractors with a history of violating award provisions, thereby putting taxpayer dollars at risk. We are particularly concerned about this incomplete reporting because we are aware of instances when agencies have continued to work with implementing partners or sub-partners on other ongoing or new awards after those partners have entered into settlement agreements with the Department of Justice for fraud or related violations. We recommended that agencies improve their reporting of violations. For example, we made one recommendation to the Secretary of the Army to clarify guidance regarding reporting requirements for human trafficking violations, which it implemented. We also made a recommendation to the Department of Defense on reporting information such as contract terminations in these databases, which is not yet implemented.
* * *
28 GAO-21-332.
* * *
Agencies should also continually adapt their risk management activities by applying lessons learned. However, USAID could not show us how they have used such lessons to develop better prevention and detection controls--a leading practice in fraud risk management. For example, while USAID mission staff in Nigeria, Somalia, and Ukraine reported some sharing of risk related lessons, we found that USAID lacks a dedicated mechanism for its missions to systematically share lessons learned about managing risk in conflict zones. In response, we made a recommendation to USAID to develop a mechanism for systematically sharing lessons learned among conflict-affected missions related to the management of risks that are common across conflict zones, including fraud. As of July 2025, USAID had not implemented this recommendation.
Recommendations to Better Manage Fraud Risks
Over the last ten years, we have made dozens of recommendations to agencies on how they can better manage fraud and other risks in their foreign assistance programs, including those cited above. We have also identified actions Congress can take to improve agencies' efforts.
Recommendations to agencies
From July 2016 through September 2025, we made at least 51 recommendations to improve and support the management of fraud and other risks for agencies delivering foreign assistance. These included 14 recommendations to State, 25 recommendations to USAID, four recommendations to USADF, and eight recommendations to other agencies and offices including Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the Office of Management and Budget.
As of February 2026, these agencies collectively had taken actions to fully implement 22 of these recommendations but had yet to fully implement the remaining 29. Specifically, State had eight implemented recommendations and six not yet implemented; USAID had implemented recommendations and 12 not implemented; USADF had four recommendations not yet implemented; and the remaining agencies had one implemented recommendation and seven not yet implemented.29 With the cessation of USAID's administration of aid and reduction of USADF's functions, the practices underlying the recommendations for these agencies may be applicable to State and other agencies that will continue to administer foreign assistance.
Matters for Congressional Consideration
Congressional action is also part of the solution, and we have identified actions that Congress could take to help agencies combat fraud.30 For example:
* Reinstating the requirement for agencies to report on their antifraud controls and fraud risk management efforts in agency financial reports. In March 2022, GAO recommended that Congress amend the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 to reinstate certain reporting requirements.31 Requiring agencies to report annually on their antifraud controls and fraud risk management efforts would support congressional oversight and focus agency attention on strategic fraud risk management and help align their efforts with leading practices.
In conclusion, combating fraud requires continuous learning, oversight, and improvement. Addressing the weaknesses we have identified and implementing related recommendations and matters will help the federal government to manage fraud risks in foreign assistance. Moreover, as agencies adapt and undertake new programs and challenges, GAO's fraud risk management resources, in addition to the OIGs' and our findings and recommendations, can guide agencies' continued growth in fraud management.32 In particular, to help State transition into its new role as the lead U.S. foreign assistance provider, it can look to incorporate the useful practices into current and future assistance programs and avoid the weaknesses our work has identified.
* * *
29 We follow up on recommendations we have made and update the status at least once per year. Experience has shown that it takes time for some recommendations to be implemented.
30 GAO, Fraud Risk Management: Key Areas for Federal Agency and Congressional Action, GAO-23-106567 (Washington D.C.: Apr. 13, 2023).
31 GAO, Emergency Relief Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Transparency and Accountability for COVID-19 and Beyond, GAO-22-105715 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2022).
* * *
Chairman Mills, Ranking Member Moskowitz, and Members of the Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
* * *
32 For example, USAID OIG published several reports with lessons for the future of foreign assistance. U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Inspector General, Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons for the Future (Washington, D.C.: Jul 16, 2025). U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Inspector General, Public International Organizations: Lessons for the Future (Washington, D.C.: Jul 23, 2025). U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Inspector General, Global Health: Lessons for the Future (Washington, D.C.: Jul 30, 2025).
* * *
Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA17/20260317/118979/HHRG-119-FA17-Wstate-Love-GrayerL-20260317.pdf
Assistant Secretary of War Kadlec Testifies Before House Armed Services Committee
WASHINGTON, March 25 -- The House Armed Services Committee released the following testimony by Robert Kadlec, assistant secretary of War for nuclear deterrence, chemical and biological defense policy and programs, from a March 17, 2026, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture & National Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere":* * *
Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify on our nation's strategic posture.
U.S. strategy is at a critical inflection point, driven by a confluence of stark realities. First and foremost, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 25 -- The House Armed Services Committee released the following testimony by Robert Kadlec, assistant secretary of War for nuclear deterrence, chemical and biological defense policy and programs, from a March 17, 2026, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture & National Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere": * * * Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify on our nation's strategic posture. U.S. strategy is at a critical inflection point, driven by a confluence of stark realities. First and foremost,China's strategic nuclear breakout means we now face the unprecedented challenge of deterring two nuclear peers, China and Russia, simultaneously. This is not a distant problem; it is the central, organizing challenge for our defense strategy today. Compounding this external pressure are two other factors: the immense budgetary, industrial, and programmatic strains of modernizing all three legs of our nuclear triad and its command and control at once, and the expiration of the New START Treaty this past February.
The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) correctly identifies this new, more dangerous environment. My purpose today is to outline how our nuclear posture must be adapted to support that strategy. The reality is that our nuclear forces, while foundational, are not a panacea. They are a necessary but insufficient component of a defense strategy focused on denial. Our primary goal must be to convince adversaries--first and foremost the People's Republic of China (China)--that they cannot succeed in using military force to achieve their objectives. Our nuclear posture must be a credible backstop to that denial strategy, not a substitute for it.
We must be rigorously clear-eyed about the threats we face. China represents the most significant and comprehensive challenge to U.S. national security. China is engaged in the most rapid and opaque nuclear expansion in history. In 2020, the Department assessed China's stockpile of operational nuclear warheads as being in the low 200s. Today it exceeds 600, and is on track to surpass 1,000 by 2030, with capabilities enabling the majority ng to reach the U.S. Homeland.
This nuclear buildup is coupled with a massive investment in theater-range delivery systems, like the DF-26, designed to hold U.S. forces and allies and partners at risk in the Indo-Pacific region.
The purpose of this expansion is clear: to create a strategic shield behind which the People's Liberation Army can conduct regional aggression, particularly against Taiwan. A force of this size and sophistication provides China with a spectrum of nuclear options to try to deter U.S. intervention and coerce a resolution to a conflict on China's terms.
Russia remains a formidable nuclear power with the world's largest arsenal and a doctrine that explicitly integrates nuclear weapons for regional coercion. Its ongoing modernization and development of novel systems, like Poseidon and Burevestnik, underscore its continued reliance on nuclear forces to offset conventional weaknesses. While the primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe must rest with our wealthy and capable European allies, the U.S. nuclear extended deterrence provides a critical backstop. This cannot, however, be the primary solution for European security. A credible deterrent in Europe requires a robust, in-theater conventional denial force, fielded overwhelmingly by the Europeans themselves.
We must now plan for the concrete possibility of coordinated or opportunistic aggression across multiple theaters. An American focus on a crisis in the Indo-Pacific region could be seen by Russia as an opportunity in Europe, just as a crisis in Europe could be seen as an opportunity for China. Our force structure, posture, and nuclear strategy must be robust enough to deter both peers simultaneously, even if we were to be engaged in a major conventional conflict with one.
This does not mean we must match their combined arsenals warhead for warhead. It means we require a nuclear force sufficient to inflict unacceptable costs on both adversaries under any contingency, ensuring neither believes they can exploit a crisis elsewhere for their own gain.
We must never be left vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. It is the Department's responsibility to provide the President with a credible nuclear strategy to defend our vital interests and the forces to support it. This means we require a strong and effective nuclear arsenal adapted to the nation's overall defense strategy. This arsenal must enable a strategy to deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks on the American homeland. This is important not only for deterring aggression but also to provide the President options to favorably manage escalation and achieve other objectives in the event of a conflict across the globe. For too long, America's nuclear strategy has been considered a separate, almost theological, enterprise. Now, our nuclear strategy must be coherently and rigorously integrated into our overall defense strategy.
Our nuclear strategy, therefore, must be subordinate to and supportive of our overall defense strategy. The NDS rightly prioritizes defending the Homeland and deterring China. The most effective way to do so is through a strategy of denial--convincing an adversary that their military aggression will fail to achieve its objectives. In the Indo-Pacific, this means fielding a conventional force, alongside our allies and partners, capable of deterring a conflict in the region, ideally by preserving military overmatch. The role of our nuclear arsenal in this context is not to fight and win a nuclear war, but to deter China from escalating to the nuclear level in the first place, or from believing it can use its nuclear arsenal to coerce us into accepting a fait accompli.
Our nuclear forces must provide the President with credible options to manage escalation, demonstrating that any nuclear use will be met with a response that leaves the adversary worse off. This requires a flexible and modern nuclear posture.
A solvent defense strategy also requires our allies and partners to carry their fair share of the conventional burden. U.S. nuclear extended deterrence is a powerful enabler of this, providing our allies in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region the security backstop they need to invest in their own conventional denial capabilities. But it must be a backstop, not a crutch. In the IndoPacific region, allies like the Republic of Korea and Japan must take the lead in building the conventional forces needed to deny regional aggression. Our nuclear umbrella makes it possible for them to do so without pursuing their own nuclear arsenals, but it does not absolve them of the primary responsibility for their own defense.
President Trump's "Golden Dome for America" initiative is a vital complement to our deterrent posture. It is not a replacement for our offensive nuclear forces. By strengthening our defense against missile attack, we demonstrate that coercion will fail, strengthening the President's hand in a crisis. Deterrence by denial (through missile defense) and deterrence by punishment (through nuclear response) are two sides of the same coin.
To execute our strategy, modernization programs are not optional; they are an urgent necessity.
The transition from our legacy systems to a modernized triad occurs during a period of maximum geopolitical risk. There is no room for error. We must accelerate the Sentinel ICBM, the COLUMBIA-class submarine, and the B-21 bomber with its LRSO cruise missile. Critically, we must also field flexible, theater-range nuclear options. The SLCM-N is essential. It provides a persistent, survivable, and non-strategic nuclear presence in key regions, reducing reliance on land-based assets and providing the President with a credible deterrent against limited nuclear use. It is a vital tool for managing escalation in a conflict with a peer competitor.
We are entering a new, more dangerous era. The luxury of assuming a single major adversary is gone. The NDS provides a sound framework for this new reality, but a strategy is only as good as the will and resources committed to its execution. The cost of modernizing our nuclear deterrent and fielding the conventional forces to support a denial strategy is significant. But the cost of failing to do so is incalculably greater. Congress's continued support is essential to ensuring we have the deterrent we need to protect our nation and its interests.
Thank you.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/aswnd-cbdcongressional_posture_statement_-_kadlec.pdf
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Berkowitz Testifies Before House Armed Services Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, March 25 -- The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces released the following testimony by Marc Berkowitz, assistant secretary of Defense for space policy, from a March 17, 2026, hearing entitled "FY27 Strategic Forces Posture Hearing":* * *
Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Department of War's space and missile defense posture. It is an honor to appear with my colleagues, Assistant Secretary Robert Kadlec, Admiral Richard Correll, General Stephan Whiting, and General ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 25 -- The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces released the following testimony by Marc Berkowitz, assistant secretary of Defense for space policy, from a March 17, 2026, hearing entitled "FY27 Strategic Forces Posture Hearing": * * * Chairman DesJarlais, Ranking Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Department of War's space and missile defense posture. It is an honor to appear with my colleagues, Assistant Secretary Robert Kadlec, Admiral Richard Correll, General Stephan Whiting, and GeneralGregory Guillot.
The United States is facing intensifying strategic competition in the security environment. Competitors have fielded and operate sophisticated space, counterspace, missile, and integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) systems. They view space as a warfighting domain and seek the ability to deny us freedom of access to and use of the domain, jeopardize our military forces, and hold our Homeland at risk.
The pace and scale of the threat is unprecedented. Consequently, fielding and operating the space and missile defense forces necessary to ensure U.S. freedom of action in space, deny adversaries its hostile use, and defend the Homeland and our military forces is a strategic imperative. The Department is therefore focusing investment on maintaining our technological edge and operating modern systems that enhance the capability and survivability of our forces.
Outer space is an increasingly complex and contested warfighting domain.
Adversaries are employing space systems for command and control, targeting, and precision strike while simultaneously developing and operating a variety of space control capabilities--from cyber and electronic warfare to kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles and orbital weapons--to counter U.S. advantages.
Concurrently, rivals are expanding their arsenals of ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles, and other advanced aerial threats. They are integrating offensive strike capabilities and IAMD systems into joint operations to strengthen their ability to deny access and impose costs. The risk is compounded by the prospect of simultaneous conflicts, where adversaries could act in coordination or opportunistically across multiple theaters.
China is our pacing competitor. Its military modernization is rapid and comprehensive, spanning space, counterspace, cyber, nuclear, and conventional strike capabilities. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) sees space as vital for future conflicts, essential for denying our ability to sense and communicate, targeting U.S. forces, and enabling long-range strikes. China's satellite constellations have expanded significantly, and their networked systems are designed to track and engage our mobile forces in the Indo-Pacific region. It is fielding a broad range of kinetic and non-kinetic space control weapons to hold U.S. space assets at risk.
Furthermore, China is expanding its nuclear and missile forces, developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with nuclear and conventional payloads, hypersonic glide vehicles, and other advanced systems that can threaten the U.S. Homeland from multiple vectors. This offensive buildup is paired with a sophisticated, layered IAMD system to protect critical targets. The PLA is diligently applying lessons from modern conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, to improve its warfighting concepts.
Russia possesses significant space, counterspace, missile, and IAMD capabilities. Russia's space program has faced setbacks, but it continues to invest in an array of weapons designed to counter space capabilities. This includes cyber and electronic warfare against satellite systems as seen in Ukraine. Russia's primary strategic threat remains its large and diverse nuclear arsenal which is central to its military strategy. Russia's use of advanced conventional missiles in Ukraine provides a real-world testbed for its capabilities.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea poses a direct and growing threat to our Homeland, forces, and allies with its expanding nuclear missile and electromagnetic warfare capabilities. Its arsenal of theater-range missiles holds U.S., South Korean, and Japanese territory at risk, and its ICBMs are capable of striking America.
Iran's development and proliferation of missiles and unmanned aerial systems to its proxies and state actors like Russia underscore its threat to regional stability. Its air and missile attacks against U.S. forces, allies, and partners demonstrate this threat. The decisive military actions conducted under President Trump through Operations MIDNIGHT HAMMER and EPIC FURY are necessary to address the threat from Iran's nuclear ambitions and its malign activities.
As articulated in the 2025 National Security Strategy, our approach is to restore American strength to secure peace. The President directed the Department to secure our vital interests by ensuring American space superiority as well as defend the Homeland with the Golden Dome for America (GDA). The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) builds on this principle, prioritizing a commonsense, America-First approach to peace through strength. Space and missile defense forces are central to U.S. strategy.
The Department's highest priority, as directed by the President and the NDS, is the defense of the U.S. Homeland. Access to and use of space is a vital national interest because of its overriding importance to our security and economic prosperity. U.S. space systems enable nuclear deterrence. They enhance domain awareness, including access to denied and hostile territory, and provide strategic and tactical indications and warning, launch detection, nuclear detonation detection, attack assessment, and nuclear command, control, and communications.
Consistent with the President's direction to ensure space superiority, the Department is focused on normalizing space as a warfighting domain. Space systems contribute to all elements of America's national power. We will secure and defend our interests to, in, and from space.
The President's GDA initiative is the cornerstone of our Homeland defense posture. It is an essential and pragmatic response to the growing threat posed by ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missile and other next-generation aerial weapons. Combined with the prospect of U.S. retaliation, GDA will strengthen deterrence by denying adversaries the ability to achieve their objectives through coercion or aggression. Our competitors have been modernizing their offensive and defensive forces for years. A comprehensive Homeland missile defense will contribute to deterrence by protecting our nation, citizens, critical infrastructure, and retaliatory capabilities against the most catastrophic threats while reducing the utility of opponents' air and missile arsenals as well as an incentive for an adversary to strike first in a crisis or escalate during a conflict.
At present, our Homeland missile defense is limited, and its effectiveness is eroding against increasingly advanced threats. It offers no defense against hypersonic weapons, advanced cruise missiles, or major ballistic missile attacks.
GDA aims to rectify this by creating a comprehensive, layered defense-in-depth of the United States. It will perform multiple missions including ballistic missile defense, hypersonic missile defense, and cruise missile defense. GDA will leverage both existing technologies and next-generation systems such as spacebased sensors and interceptors. It will integrate sensors and effectors across multiple domains, managed by an artificial intelligence-enabled battle management and command and control system. By providing multiple engagement
opportunities across a wider range of threats, GDA will be more effective than our current limited system. The cost of GDA, while significant, is a necessary investment to protect assets of incalculable value--the lives of our citizens and the territorial integrity of our nation. The cost of failing to defend the Homeland would be infinitely greater.
In the Indo-Pacific region, a denial defense along the First Island Chain is critical. Space capabilities are essential to this effort, enabling the intelligence, command and control, and other warfighting functions needed to project power effectively across the vast distances of the region. U.S. Space Command and U.S. Space Forces-Indo-Pacific are integrating space capabilities into joint and combined operations to maintain a credible deterrent. Our regional missile defense posture, centered on Aegis destroyers, as well as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot systems, provides a forward-deployed, layered network to defend our forces and allies.
Our global alliances will remain a strategic advantage if our allies and partners invest properly in defense. We require capable allies with the military strength and political will to take primary responsibility for their own regional security. This allows the United States to focus its finite resources on the most pressing challenges.
The Department is pursuing robust space and missile defense cooperation with key allies and partners. We have agreements in place with numerous countries for a variety of such cooperative activities. In addition, the Combined Space Operations initiative and Multi-National Force Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER enable the protection of common U.S. and allied interests in space.
The Department also has agreements with numerous countries for missile defense.
We are working with allies and partners across the world to transform disparate IAMD systems into cohesive regional defense networks.
The final pillar of the NDS is supercharging our Defense Industrial Base. To maintain our military edge, we must move faster than our rivals. This requires cutting bureaucratic red tape, empowering program leaders to take risks, and embracing a "commercial-first" mindset where appropriate to leverage private sector innovation. We must accelerate the development, acquisition, and fielding of critical space and missile defense capabilities at scale.
Our investments in space and missile defense are aligned with these strategic priorities. These investment priorities are focused on resilient satellite control, advanced tracking of aerial threats, secure data networks, space domain surveillance, and modernizing command and control to operate at the speed of conflict. We are also acquiring the necessary warfighting capabilities to protect and defend U.S. interests in space.
We are building GDA to provide a comprehensive, layered, and defense-indepth of the United States. Key investments include the Next Generation Interceptor; the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor; the Glide Phase Interceptor, and Space-Based Interceptors.
We are also expanding and enhancing regional missile defenses by delivering additional THAAD batteries, significantly increasing production of PAC-3 interceptors, expanding inventories of other key interceptors, and continuing development of a comprehensive IAMD system for Guam.
In closing, the Department of War is posturing its space and missile defense forces to achieve peace through strength. With the continued support of Congress, we will field the modern space and missile defense forces required to deter aggression, defend the Homeland, and protect U.S. national interests.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/aswsp_hon_berkowitz_march_17_hasc_posture_statement.pdf
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Zimmerman Testifies Before House Armed Services Committee
WASHINGTON, March 25 -- The House Armed Services Committee released the following testimony by Daniel Zimmerman, assistant secretary of Defense for international security affairs, from a March 18, 2025, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in Europe":* * *
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on our defense policy in the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility in my capacity as Assistant Secretary of War for International Security Affairs. It is ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 25 -- The House Armed Services Committee released the following testimony by Daniel Zimmerman, assistant secretary of Defense for international security affairs, from a March 18, 2025, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture and National Security Challenges in Europe": * * * Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on our defense policy in the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility in my capacity as Assistant Secretary of War for International Security Affairs. It ismy honor to appear alongside USEUCOM Commander, General Alexus Grynkewich.
In today's testimony, I will highlight how our approach to Europe nests within the recently released National Defense Strategy, particularly in the areas of homeland defense, burden sharing with our European allies and partners, and super-charging the defense industrial base.
Our Approach to Europe
In line with the National Security Strategy, the Department's National Defense Strategy calls for a courageous realignment of our resources and priorities in line with the interests of everyday citizens of the United States of America - an "America First" approach. The world that shaped our habits, assumptions, and force posture in Europe post-Cold War no longer exists. The National Defense Strategy is based on a clear-eyed, flexible realism - a pragmatic approach focused on peace through strength that we have been advancing since President Trump took office last January, in four succinct lines of effort. First, we will defend the U.S. Homeland in line with our national interest. Second, we will deter China in the Indo-Pacific; third, we must increase burden-sharing with our allies and partners. Finally, to achieve all of this, we must supercharge the U.S. defense industrial base, which will operationalize that burden-sharing and help field combat-credible capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic. My testimony will focus on our commonsense approach in Europe across the first, third, and fourth NDS lines of effort.
Relevant to today's hearing, the National Defense Strategy recognizes the threats that Russia poses to the U.S. Homeland and, most acutely, to eastern Europe. Under Secretary of War for Policy, Elbridge Colby, underscored to NATO Defense Ministers on February 12, 2026, that we must be prepared for the possibility of potential opponents across theaters to act simultaneously.
We do not consider this inevitable, but as a Department, we must plan for the worst-case scenario, and ensure our allies and partners are planning for this as well. Operation EPIC FURY in Iran has underscored the importance of prudent planning across adjacent theaters, and only reinforces the need for a reformed NATO, a defensive military alliance focused on the European continent, what Under Secretary Colby has called "NATO 3.0."
This requires being honest and clear with our allies and partners that they must do more, rapidly, not as a favor to us, but for their own interests. These realities compel us to think clearly, soberly, and realistically about how we defend ourselves--and how we do so together sustainably, sensibly, and credibly.
The core strategic reality is this: while the United States remains committed to NATO - via our extended nuclear deterrent and other, critical, but more limited, operational support - Europe must step up to assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense.
We have worked hard to communicate this necessity to our allies. We have and we will continue to engage in an open, forthright dialogue as befits allies.
To underscore a simple but essential point: the Department remains committed to NATO and our common defense. We hold this commitment with the conviction that fundamental to having a strong alliance is that all members do their part. Experience teaches us that alliances are strongest when responsibilities are appropriately shared among allies to reflect comparative advantages in underlying capabilities and interests. This is not an abandonment of NATO, nor a strategy of isolation. Rather, we are looking to our allies and partners to stand on equal footing in true partnership, rather than enabling dependence. We fundamentally believe this is in both their interest and ours - because when a burden-sharing balance among allies becomes misaligned or spread too thin, the alliance will weaken, not from ill will, but from structural strain.
Defend the U.S. Homeland--Mitigating Threats from the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility
The United States must and will prioritize those theaters and challenges with the greatest consequence for American interests and where only American power can play a decisive role-- most notably, in the Western Hemisphere as we defend the U.S. Homeland. By leveraging our respective strengths and specializing in areas we are best positioned to act, our alliances will be more balanced, effective, and resilient.
Arctic Security & Greenland
The Department is addressing the President's top priority of defense of the homeland. In the past year, the President approved a change to move Greenland from the USEUCOM area of responsibility to U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), in recognition of the importance of Greenland to U.S. homeland defense. Greenland is strategically significant for the security and defense of the U.S. Homeland and interests in the Arctic region. However, there remains tremendous equity for USEUCOM around Greenland and the broader Arctic region. Greenland constitutes one border of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom, or GIUK, Gap, which is a strategic corridor for Russia's naval operations between the Arctic and North Atlantic. As we work to ensure guaranteed U.S. military and commercial access to Greenland, the Department fully supports the diplomatic trilateral talks led by Vice President Vance and Secretary Rubio with Greenland and Denmark. Separately, General Grynkewich, in his Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) capacity, recently initiated an enhanced Vigilance Activity (eVA) Arctic Sentry to enhance broader Arctic security efforts and align NATO and select allied national activities in the Arctic.
Russia
Russia still retains deep reservoirs of military and industrial power, and the national resolve required to sustain a protracted war, as the ongoing war in Ukraine shows. Moreover, Russia possesses the world's largest nuclear arsenal and continues to modify and diversify its nuclear forces and equipment. Russia invests in undersea, space, and cyber capabilities that it could employ against the U.S. Homeland, or which could be used in a coercive manner short of nuclear confrontation. The Department assesses that Russia will remain a persistent but manageable threat to NATO's eastern front for the foreseeable future. Conventional, nuclear and cyber capabilities and threats are understood through our defense intelligence and national intelligence enterprises, which are in turn enabled by the use of FISA Section 702, an invaluable source of intelligence collection.
The threat is real, complex, and growing. Adversaries are actively developing and fielding a new generation of advanced weapons. We face a spectrum of dangers, from sophisticated ballistic and hypersonic missiles to advanced cruise missiles to other aerial systems, that put the U.S. Homeland at risk, which underscores the President's push for a Golden Dome for America to protect the American people from such threats.
Given these realities, the National Defense Strategy notes we will ensure U.S. forces are prepared to defend against these threats to the U.S. Homeland, while also making clear that our European allies and partners will take primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe against a potential Russian threat. European NATO dwarfs Russia in economic scale, population, and potential military power. However, we cannot take our deterrence posture for granted; allies must move urgently to meet NATO defense spending commitments and capability targets.
The Department is open to fostering mil-mil dialogues with the Russian Federation, including in support of State Department-led talks in the wake of New START's expiration and the high-level mil-mil dialogue announced last month by General Grynkewich. In any case, our goal will remain ensuring that America's interests are upheld and defended, especially as we consider the future of nuclear arms control. Additionally, the United States remains interested in strategic stability and maintaining channels for military deconfliction and de-escalation with Russia, which have for decades reduced the chances of miscalculation between our militaries.
Increase Burden-Sharing
America's alliances have an essential role to play, and our strategy is one of focused, realistic, interests-based engagement. As such, a burden-sharing approach with NATO allies and nonNATO partners is essential, especially to address persistent threats to our allies and partners but are less severe for the United States.
NATO
The Department is committed to NATO. We believe that the best way to meet that commitment is an approach that validates and returns to NATO's founding purpose.
NATO was established to provide strong, credible, and equitable defense of the North Atlantic area. Since its founding, the alliance has adapted to meet the security challenges it faced. NATO 1.0, from 1949 through 1989, was focused on deterring an attack on NATO territory and was fully ready to fight and win if deterrence failed. This era was defined by a hard-nosed, realistic, clear-eyed approach to deterrence and defense in which all allies were expected to pull their weight. This model deterred the USSR in part by persuading the Soviet Union that military action was not a viable strategy.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and dismantlement of the USSR and Iron Curtain, NATO transformed into "NATO 2.0". This version of the Alliance was typified by a shift of effort and focus away from Europe's defense toward "out of area" operations and substantial disarmament on the continent, as well as a change in frame from the hard-nosed, flexible realism of the Cold War "NATO 1.0" to much more of a liberal internationalist mindset of the "rules-based international order." It is clear, however, that this approach of "NATO 2.0" is no longer fit for purpose, neither for the United States nor our allies. The times are changing, and we must adapt - in terms of how we think about the world and the Alliance's role in it and how we posture to meet it in practical terms.
The Department is calling for NATO 3.0: something closer to NATO 1.0 than the approach of the last thirty-five years. We want the Alliance refocused on its original purpose as a defensive military alliance focused on the European continent. "NATO 3.0" will require much greater effort by our allies to step up and assume primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe. To President Trump's great credit and to the great credit of the allies, the alliance took historic, momentous steps to chart a new course in line with this needed shift, most notably committing to 5% defense spending, with 3.5% on core defense - the new global standard for our allies around the world. We are beginning to see a promising start in meeting 5% spending, and reforming procurement and readiness systems that have long been neglected. The past year was a year to reframe and reorient - the turning of the tide has happened. We must now, in collaboration with our allies, deliver balanced, credible, and durable results.
We will continue to provide critical capabilities that underpin NATO's deterrence. We will continue to train, exercise, and plan alongside our allies. We are committed to Article 5. Yet we believe Europe can and must do more. Increasingly, Europe believes this too. We will all be stronger and safer as a result.
Last year, I briefed both professional staff members and members from the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the Department's decision to redeploy a brigade combat team (BCT) stationed in Romania. Following consultations with General Grynkewich and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Hegseth opted not to backfill this BCT, which had been forward deployed to Europe since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I want to highlight this decision was rooted in the progress our European NATO allies have made to improve their military capabilities and take on greater responsibility for their defense. Since 2022, our allies have taken on increased responsibility on NATO's eastern flank, including through the NATO Forward Land Forces battlegroups stationed in these countries. These increased capabilities enabled the United States to graduate its BCT, not as a disengagement from Europe, but as a demonstration of allied progress.
Ultimately, this progress and Europe's resources must result in ready forces and capabilities, so the United States is seeking allied progress on the issue of military readiness. Readiness is a culture, involving personnel, doctrine, training, logistics, budgeting, and several other things and we will be encouraging a holistic look at readiness within allied militaries, to ensure forces are effectively ready to fight and defend European NATO. Given Europe's wealth, industrial capacity and technological advances, and proximity to Russia, it stands to reason that Europe can and must field the preponderance of the conventional forces required to deter and, if necessary, defeat, aggression against Europe. In doing so, our allies can ensure NATO's ability to provide for the effective defense of the continent, even in a scenario of simultaneous contingencies worldwide.
As we work with NATO to accelerate the transition to a Europe-led NATO, we have pledged to be as transparent as possible in our approach, working through NATO processes wherever possible to meet the Secretary's commitment to "no surprises" to the allies. Through the use of these processes, we will continue to make clear our expectation that allies must do more, focusing on real war-fighting requirements.
In these ways, this approach will allow us - working closely with our allies - to ensure that NATO remains strong, relevant, sustainable, and positioned to succeed for decades to come.
"Model Allies"
Following The Hague NATO summit last year, some of our allies and partners have stepped up in a special way to meet the moment and set the example for others. These model allies are spending at levels that resource and prioritize their national defense and the defense of Europe.
Poland, for example, is a preeminent example of a model ally, spending 4.5% for 2025 and has pledged 5% for 2026. Others are increasingly stepping up. Germany, at our request but also in its own interest, has accelerated investments in its defense industrial base to become the powerhouse that drives Europe toward meeting its Article 3 obligations. Finland, after NATO accession in 2023, continually hones its capabilities through development of its air defenses and investment in whole of society military capabilities, representing a significant contribution to the alliance. These model allies are partners, not dependents, and the Department will prioritize cooperation, engagement, arms sales, defense industry collaboration, and intelligence sharing with those countries who share our sense of urgency to step up on defense.
We recognize threat perceptions can differ across the alliance depending on history, geography, and politics - we will work with countries where they are and encourage our allies and partners to focus on where their resolve is. Nevertheless, we will urge our allies toward progress on meeting spending commitments, delivering on NATO Capability Targets, enhancing their readiness, and increasing commitments to NATO missions and the NATO force model from all our allies - east and west, north and south, and new and old.
Ukraine
Turning to Ukraine, President Trump has stated, the war in Ukraine must come to an end. It is in the interest of the United States, Europe, and Ukraine to secure a lasting and durable peace. A durable, sustainable peace in Ukraine can only be achieved and maintained through strength: a strong Europe, and a strong Ukraine. As Ukraine defends its territory, it is important that allies act with urgency to provide the necessary resources for Ukraine's defense. While negotiations play out, the National Defense Strategy plainly underscores the need for Europe to take the lead in supporting Ukraine's defense, as well as the role it would have to sustain a future peace deal through reconstruction.
Credible deterrence and defense measures are essential prerequisites for any enduring settlement, but equally critical is ensuring that Ukraine's Armed Forces are sufficiently capable to serve as the foundation of deterrence. To that end, on July 14, 2025, President Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte publicly announced the United States would continue to provide critical materiel to Ukraine funded with financial contributions from NATO allies. This has culminated into the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative. The PURL initiative has become one of the alliance's most effective mechanisms for coordinating support and aligning allies behind a common understanding of validated Ukrainian battlefield requirements. Over 20 European nations have pledged more than $4.3 billion to this effort, and the United States will continue to encourage our allies and partners to sustain their contributions to the PURL initiative to meet Ukraine's validated battlefield requirements. The PURL initiative is enhancing Ukraine's defense capabilities, supporting peace efforts, and enabling Europe to take the lead in its own defense.
On negotiations, the Department continues to be regularly engaged with the U.S. negotiating team as it seeks to secure peace in Ukraine. Though negotiations are ongoing, the United States and Coalition of the Willing (CoTW) have made substantial progress on both security protocols and a post-conflict deterrence framework, including ceasefire monitoring.
At the same time, the Department is paying attention to lessons learned from the battlefield and delivering those insights to U.S. warfighters. This is especially true regarding the role of drones, along with the expertise and cutting-edge technology to deploy them. Beyond technology, the Department is changing its own ecosystem by incorporating adaptable, modular, and rapidimprovement processes to stay relevant in future fights in other theaters.
Other Non-NATO Partners
We also recognize that keeping our European allies laser-focused on strengthening our deterrence through burden-sharing means mitigating any new or resurgent conflicts on the continent that could distract from our core NATO 3.0 priority. Toward that end, we remain engaged, with European allies and partners increasingly in the lead, in preventing any resurgence of conflict in the Western Balkans.
Last year, President Trump facilitated a historic agreement to cease hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, creating new opportunities to collaborate with our two partners in the Caucasus.
Our priority remains focused on resolving the conflict, finalizing the peace process, and ensuring that enduring peace is maintained between the two nations.
We are collaborating with both nations to expand cooperation with their respective State Partners--the Kansas and Oklahoma National Guards. Our efforts include modernizing our partners' armed forces through foreign military sales and enhancing their exercise programs to improve interoperability with U.S. Armed Forces.
Supercharging the Defense Industrial Base on Both Sides of the Atlantic
Expanding transatlantic defense industrial capacity is the most important step NATO allies can take to operationalize the 5% defense spending commitment and invest in real, combat-credible forces and capabilities. We need to get the defense industrial base healthy on both sides of the Atlantic.
Per our National Defense Strategy, the Department will partner broadly to restore our industrial capacity and reinvigorate our nation's ingenuity, because our fighting force's readiness, lethality, and military options depend on it. This effort is a "call to industrial arms," and putting American industry on a wartime footing, a national mobilization rivaling those that powered America--and our allies--to victory in the World Wars and the Cold War.
We issue the same call to our European allies and partners to make a parallel effort. This will require a commonsense, non-exclusionary approach to defense industrial base expansion that focuses on building capacity, aggregating demand to sustain that additional capacity, expanding multinational procurement, utilizing NATO standardization agreements, and addressing supply chain vulnerabilities.
We recognize this approach should allow Europeans the flexibility to invest in their industries and build comparative advantages, while still enabling U.S. firms to compete. Protectionist measures that exclude U.S. industry and isolate our respective industrial bases only serve to deprive the alliance from meetings its goals without delay. The need for rapidly increased defense industrial production is too acute for us to toy with exclusions.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Department of War is clear-eyed about the threats associated with the USEUCOM AOR and, as always, will address them from a peace-through-strength position that prioritizes the interests and security of American citizens. We are committed to NATO and seek to strengthen it even further - in a way that is balanced, credible, sustainable, and positions the alliance to succeed for the long term. I am honored to be working with this committee, General Grynkewich and his team at U.S. European Command, and our valued allies and partners on this inspired vision from the President.
Thank you.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/eucom_posture_hearing_testimony_as_amended_v2.pdf
Acting Assistant Secretary of War for Homeland Defense & Americas Security Affairs Humire Testifies Before House Armed Services Committee
WASHINGTON, March 25 -- The House Armed Services Committee released the following testimony by Joseph Humire, performing the duties of the assistant secretary of War for homeland defense and Americas security affairs, from a March 17, 2026, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture & National Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere":* * *
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of War for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs (HD&ASA).
I ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 25 -- The House Armed Services Committee released the following testimony by Joseph Humire, performing the duties of the assistant secretary of War for homeland defense and Americas security affairs, from a March 17, 2026, hearing entitled "U.S. Military Posture & National Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere": * * * Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of War for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs (HD&ASA). Iam here to outline the Department of War's (DoW) strategy and policy for defending the U.S. Homeland and securing American interests in the Western Hemisphere. Our efforts are a cornerstone of President Trump's 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which mandates that we prioritize the nation's security by putting the American homeland and hemisphere first.
The 2026 NDS structurally redefines U.S. defense priorities around the security of American territory and people. To that end, the Department has made several major achievements over the last year in support of this objective, including: sealing the U.S. southern border to stop illegal mass migration and drug trafficking; repelling drone incursions on the homeland; deterring designated terrorist organizations and cartels from trafficking deadly drugs into America through the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific; and advancing U.S. interests in key hemispheric terrain, to include the Panama Canal, the Gulf of America, and the Arctic. These achievements are detailed in this written statement, and I look forward to discussing DoW's vital mission with the Committee.
Sealing the U.S. Southern Border
The United States faces a persistent and complex threat along its southern border, characterized by the unprecedented flow of unlawful migration, sophisticated narcotics and human trafficking operations, and the corrosive influence of transnational criminal organizations. These activities not only undermine U.S. sovereignty but also fuel a humanitarian crisis and risks public safety while also straining national resources and directly endangering American communities. As directed in the 2026 NDS the Department has prioritized sealing U.S. borders and repel any form of invasion.
Transnational criminal organizations exploit specific, high-traffic corridors along the border where rugged terrain and vast distances stretch civilian law enforcement assets to their limits. To secure our borders, DoW has established targeted and effective tools for securing the most vulnerable sectors of our border, permitting our troops to apprehend trespassers on our military installations. These trespassers are then handed over to appropriate law enforcement personnel for potential prosecution, adding another layer of consequence for those who violate our borders.
The Department maintains Service members postured along the southern land border to provide critical support, guard static observation posts, conduct ground and aerial patrols, and perform real-time detection and monitoring analysis. This presence furthers DoW's mission to ensure territorial integrity, while also enabling our partners at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to interdict threats to border security more effectively. In addition, the Department supports DHS operations using DoW's unique surveillance and patrol capabilities to ensure DHS maintains full awareness of activities along the border. Such support has helped DHS disrupt established trafficking routes and funnel illicit activity into areas where law enforcement can more effectively interdict it.
January 2026 marked the fourth consecutive month of decline in Border Patrol apprehensions, with figures 93% below the historic average. Critically, this also marks the ninth straight month with zero administrative releases of apprehended individuals into the country's interior.
Furthermore, the DoW is actively hardening our physical defenses through the construction of 15 miles of border barrier at the Barry M. Goldwater Range in Arizona.
However, it is not just about DoW personnel patrolling the borders. DoW modernizing the border security mission rapidly. DoW is investing more than $150M in affordable and effective test beds to evaluate means to transform how we secure the border. DoW is investing in several cutting-edge technologies to extend and augment the reach of manned waterborne patrols, counter-unmanned aerial systems to deny cartels the ability to threaten Service members on patrol, and airborne platforms to understand cartel and illegal alien habits to increase the likelihood of detection. Each of these missions offers powerful lessons for DoW in other theaters.
Sealing the U.S. southwest border is a critical mission to defend the U.S. Homeland. As President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have stated, "border security is national security." Under their leadership, the Department leaned into our mission and, in concert with our federal law enforcement partners, have achieved unprecedented success. As the U.S. southern land border has become increasingly secure, the Department added an additional focus on the maritime environment and the flow of illicit narcotics from South America to the United States through the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America.
Making America's Cities Safer Through Support to Law Enforcement
The Department's success in securing the U.S. Homeland by minimizing threats originating in the Western Hemisphere is coupled with significant reduction in violent crime in America's major cities by supporting federal law enforcement partners.
Violent crime and the proliferation of organized criminal networks in major U.S. cities represent a significant threat to domestic stability and the safety of the American people. Local and federal law enforcement agencies often lack the personnel and logistical capacity to effectively track and apprehend the sheer volume of violent fugitives, gang members, and arms traffickers operating within their jurisdictions. This resource gap allows criminal elements to flourish, eroding public safety.
The 2026 NDS emphasizes the imperative to build a resilient and ready Joint Force capable of responding to crises both abroad and at home. The National Guard is the cornerstone of domestic operations, providing a flexible and scalable force that can surge to support civilian authorities. By ensuring National Guard capabilities are available when needed to support law enforcement, the Department provides an enduring advantage that underwrites domestic security and reinforces stability.
The DoW's model is one of support, not supplementation. Local and federal law enforcement partners handle all traditional policing functions: they conduct the patrols, they make the arrests, and they engage with the community. DoW and National Guard forces enable law enforcement to do their job by establishing joint command posts and providing critical analytical, logistical, and personnel support. The success of this force-multiplier effect is quantifiable: the deployments of National Guard members and U.S. Marshals to major U.S. cities in support of law enforcement has resulted in the arrest of 37 known gang members and more than 6,150 violent fugitives, including 16 for homicide, 958 for narcotics, 461 for weapons offenses, and 28 for sex offenses, and the seizure of 600 illegally possessed firearms. Credit for the success of this model is also due to U.S. Northern Command, which has adapted to this mission in a professional and efficient manner. The ability to rapidly mobilize and integrate these highly disciplined units provides a critical backstop for our law enforcement partners that cannot be replicated.
Degrading Narco-terrorists through Decisive Action
Building on successes on the U.S. southern border, Secretary Hegseth announced Operation Southern Spear (OSS) in November 2025 as a key DoW effort to defend the homeland from within the Western Hemisphere. The primary focus of OSS is to restore deterrence against the narco-terrorist cartels that profit from poisoning Americans and destabilizing our neighbors.
OSS's maritime interdiction operations, conducted with interagency partners, send a clear message that the Western Hemisphere is not a permissive environment for illicit actors. This posture was solidified in September 2025 when, at the President's direction, the Department conducted its first lethal kinetic strike in international waters against a narco-trafficking vessel tied to the Designated Terrorist Organization, Tren de Aragua. As of March 10, 2026, the Department has carried out 45 total kinetic strikes, which killed 157 members or affiliates of those narco-terrorist organizations, destroying 47 narco-trafficking vessels and placing all narcoterrorists in the Western Hemisphere on notice.
The effects have been significant and profound. Since the first September strike, there has been a 20% reduction of movements of drug vessels in the Caribbean and an additional 25% reduction in the Eastern Pacific. These two maritime corridors are the origin source for follow-on flow into the U.S. Homeland. In January 2026, DoW went 23 days without a significant strike against a narco-trafficking vessel in the Eastern Caribbean, primarily because movements shifted eastward through Venezuela and Guyana into Suriname. The balloon effect has raised the costs to narco-terrorist organizations in the Eastern Caribbean, in both blood and treasure.
The success of OSS combined with our National Defense Areas on the U.S. southern border has diminished the flow of fentanyl--a weapon of mass destruction--down 56% since the same period last year. As early as September 2025, the Administration had also achieved a nearly 20% drop in deadly drug overdoses in the United States compared to the previous year. We have successfully deterred cartels from exploiting key maritime routes, leading to a more than 20 percent reduction in cocaine flow. This proactive and aggressive stance under OSS has degraded adversary capabilities and created new opportunities for decisive action by partner nations throughout the Americas.
Bolstering Partnerships to Secure the Americas
In early March 2026, Secretary Hegseth hosted the inaugural Americas Counter-Cartel Conference at U.S. Southern Command Headquarters in Doral, Florida. During and after the conference, 17 partner-nations from the Western Hemisphere signed a Joint Security Declaration signaling their intent to combine efforts to deter, degrade, and destroy cartel operations while strengthening border security. Select partner nations pledged to enhance their defense posture toward partner-led, deterrence-focused bi-lateral and multi-lateral operations against cartels and terrorist organizations in the region. This commitment marks the establishment of a first-of-itskind hemispheric counter-cartel coalition and will increase partner burden sharing in this hemisphere.
President Trump formally announced this coalition at the Shield of the Americas Summit on March 7, 2026, launching the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition, a combined military and law enforcement approach to deter, degrade, and ultimately destroy narcotics and terrorist-related threats in the hemisphere, including those that threaten the U.S. Homeland. On March 3, the DoW supported, at the request of Ecuador, bilateral kinetic actions against cartel targets along the Colombia-Ecuador border. The joint effort, named "Operation Total Extermination," is the start of a military offensive by Ecuador against transnational criminal organizations with the support of the U.S., setting the pace for regional, deterrence-focused operations against cartel infrastructure throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
As these conferences and Ecuador's leadership in land-based strikes against cartels demonstrate, our partners across Latin America are inspired by the bold and decisive action by President Trump and Secretary Hegseth, who have renewed use of military and law enforcement action to complement interdiction as a prominent counternarcotics tool. This new focus translates into strengthening security cooperation partnerships, increasing engagements and intelligence sharing, and enhancing maritime and border security, all of which deepen defense ties and increase U.S. influence throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Operation Absolute Resolve: Resetting the Region
The United States' strategic pressure, enhanced access and placement in the Caribbean, and intelligence dominance established under OSS paved the way for the January 2026 Operation Absolute Resolve (OAR) in Venezuela. In support of the Department of Justice's indictment of Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, the DoW conducted OAR to support the Department of Justice secure the arrest of these indicted individuals and fugitives of U.S. law. A culmination of months of planning, OAR was a discreet and precise law enforcement support operation conducted by the DoW during the darkest hours on January 3, 2026, with significant aerial superiority and support from the intelligence community. Thanks to our brave warfighters and precise military planners of the Joint Force, OAR was a resounding success that sent a strong signal of America's military superiority around the world.
Following OAR, DoW is supporting the State Department-led three phase approach in Venezuela: Stabilization, Recovery, and Transition, with a DoW focus on the first phase.
Stabilization is centered on not allowing an economic or societal collapse of Venezuela, while ensuring there are still pressure mechanisms in place and providing augmented security to the Department of State as it considers how best to resurrect the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. DoW supports the U.S. Government policy on Venezuela to leverage the private sector, which minimizes risk to U.S. forces, while DoW is establishing persistent military-to-military engagement to improve security and stability.
OAR's success has had multiple reciprocal effects in the region, including U.S. high-level talks with Cuba, gaining compliance from Nicaragua, and shifting the Caribbean in a favorable direction toward U.S. interests.
Advancing Enduring Presence on the Panama Canal
President Trump has rightly identified the United States' immediate security perimeter and a new strategic map, from Greenland to the Gulf of America to the Panama Canal and surrounding countries. Our hemispheric approach will reflect that geographic prioritization to secure key hemispheric terrain and infrastructure, which are critical for the security, sovereignty, and prosperity of all Americans.
As outlined in the 2025 NSS and 2026 NDS, ensuring unrestricted U.S. access to the Panama Canal is vital for protecting the homeland against actors who seek to do us harm. Previous administrations neglected this critical chokepoint, allowing it to become a playground for U.S. competitors, particularly China. President Trump and Secretary Hegseth have been clear-eyed in the U.S. government's pursuit of curbing Chinese influence from the Canal Area.
Enabled by a Memorandum of Understanding concerning Cooperative Security Activities in Panama, signed by Secretary Hegseth last April, the United States is working by, with, and through the Government of Panama to enhance U.S. military presence and harden the Canal's security against the most likely threats. On the Pacific side, the Department has established a Joint Security Cooperation Group (JSCG) to improve interoperability with Panamanian security forces to combat shared threats. On the Atlantic side, the Department established a Jungle Operations Training Course (JOTC), bringing together U.S. Service members and Panamanian forces to train side-by-side in jungle environments. These initiatives, like others in Panama, aim to accomplish one goal: to fully secure the Canal and guarantee U.S. access to this strategic chokepoint and vital national asset.
In addition to advancing these security initiatives, Secretary Hegseth secured priority access to the Panama Canal through the Joint Declaration Concerning Security and Operation of the Panama Canal, which provides cost-neutral transit for U.S. war and auxiliary vessels.
Over the last year, Panama has withdrawn from China's Belt and Road Initiative, diversified away from Chinese contractors, and expelled the China-based CK Hutchison from the ports at the Pacific and Atlantic openings of the Canal. Today, U.S. subsidiaries operate these ports, representing a major victory for unfettered U.S. commerce and a strategic win for the United States.
Hardening U.S. Homeland Defense Through the Arctic
In the same way the Panama Canal enables U.S. power projection and Naval force flows to the Indo-Pacific region, use of Greenland and Alaska are essential for U.S. power projection through the Arctic. U.S. adversaries are increasingly active in the Arctic to signal their ability to hold the U.S. Homeland at risk. Receding ice and technological innovations are enabling greater maritime access to the region, which provides increasing commercial opportunities but also poses significant risks, threats, and challenges to U.S. trade and national security interests.
Alaska makes the United States an Arctic nation. The 2026 NDS directs the Department to ensure access to key terrain, and Alaska is critical to homeland defense. Additionally, the state is vital for ensuring the flow of forces to the Indo-Pacific and other regions in times of crisis and conflict. The Department has placed and invested considerable resources in Alaska, including infrastructure, fifth-generation fighters, and the 11th Airborne "Arctic Angels." Going forward, DoW will continue to ensure we have the force posture, infrastructure, and readiness in Alaska to carry out NDS objectives.
Similarly, Greenland is key terrain for the defense of our nation and hemisphere. The island's location on the eastern side of the North American continent is strategically vital for air defense, strategic waterways, domain awareness, and power projection, particularly as it hosts our Pituffik Space Base. Overall, Greenland's strategic geography is critical to fulfilling the homeland missile defense mission and securing northern approaches to the United States. DoW is working with the Kingdom of Denmark and the other NATO Allies to ensure that our interests are protected and that they step up in terms of defense contributions.
Aerospace Missile Defense and Counter-UAS Advancements
Potential U.S. adversaries are pouring resources into rapidly advancing their long-range military capabilities and delivery platforms. Simultaneously, they increase their own air and missile defense capabilities. Their intent is clear, to hold the U.S. Homeland increasingly at risk while advancing their own security agenda at the expense of American interests.
Aerospace and maritime early warning and control against all manner of threats remain critical elements of safeguarding the homeland. The first critical element of safeguarding the American people is the ability to detect threats by land, sea, and air from traditional and emerging approaches. In this vein, NORAD remains a critical facet of North American defense. DoW must continue driving modernization of the assets tasked with the defense of our skies.
Relatedly, the 2026 NDS emphasizes that "the Department will prioritize efforts to develop President Trump's Golden Dome for America, with a specific focus on options to costeffectively defeat large missile barrages and other advanced aerial attacks." DoW is moving swiftly to bolster our missile defenses and ensure the safety and security of the American people from missile threats. The Department continues to refine the array of sensors, command and control systems, and effectors that we will deploy as key elements of Golden Dome for America.
Missile defense is a necessary component of deterrence as it complicates our adversaries' attack planning by increasing uncertainty as to whether a missile attack will achieve the intended effects. Effective, layered and defense-in-depth missile defenses complement the Joint Force by maintaining the burden of escalation on our adversaries so that if deterrence fails, the Joint Force can sufficiently safeguard the American people while providing leadership time and capability to respond appropriately.
DoW is acting decisively, as the 2026 NDS states, "defend our nation's skies through a renewed focus on countering unmanned aerial threats." We have repeatedly seen how these systems threaten our security and degrade the safety of the American people. As these technologies proliferate among foreign terrorist organizations and transnational criminal organizations that attempt to bring illicit material into the Homeland, the DoW continues to act decisively to counter this threat. In response to the Administration's actions to secure our land borders, unmanned aerial systems have increasingly become a critical vector for these organizations to bring illicit goods across our borders. Furthermore, the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrates how UAS have revolutionized the modern battlefield. We can ill afford to leave ourselves vulnerable to something like Operation SpiderWeb occurring on American Soil.
As a result, the Department has driven significant investments in capabilities and systems to defend against unmanned aerial threats, especially along the Southern land border. The Department has also implemented policy and process changes to make full use of the authorities we have. The Secretary is prioritizing counter-UAS (C-UAS), particularly in the U.S. homeland.
Mid-last year, we streamlined the process for obtaining the coordination required under section 130i of title 10 of the U.S. Code ("section 130i"), reducing the administrative burden to the Department by over 80%. Recently, the Department consolidated and updated guidance for CUAS detection and mitigation in the Homeland. The Department is actively implementing this guidance to ensure the Department, and most importantly commanders, understand their authority and ability to act.
DoW has taken steps to extend section 130i coverage to the NDAs along the southern border, and we have extended coverage to cover nearly 100 additional critical sites across the U.S. homeland in just the last year. We have established a first of its kind C-UAS Joint Task Force in JIATF-401 and are also implementing the designation of USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM as the C-UAS operations synchronizers in the Homeland. In parallel, the Department is leveraging all agencies and agile acquisition authorities at our disposal, to include efforts from the Defense Innovation Unit, to develop and deploy effective, low-cost C-UAS systems. Following implementation and education, we still face capability gaps. While we have dedicated more money than ever before to C-UAS critical site defense, we need Congress' continued support to ensure the development and deployment of capable systems across the U.S. homeland and to meet the policy goals of this Administration.
President Trump and Secretary Hegseth understand and recognize today's threats and the need to protect the Homeland while balancing the need to defend our ability to project forward. Golden Dome for America is a next-generation defensive shield that will afford America with that protection. Its purpose, paired with Departments historical investments in C-UAS capabilities and NORAD's modernization efforts, will deter attacks and defend the American people against the full spectrum of modern missile threats, to include aerial systems. As we move with urgency to build this, the threat demands we move quicker.
Improving Burden Sharing Throughout the Americas
As touched upon earlier regarding partner-led efforts to counter cartels in Latin America, effective burden-sharing is a crucial element of the NDS for safeguarding the U.S. Homeland and the Western Hemisphere. When allies and partners invest properly in their own defense, they create a strong defensive perimeter in key geographic regions. This forward-deployed strength deters potential adversaries from initiating conflicts that could otherwise escalate and threaten the United States directly. By having capable partners manage regional security, the United States can better preserve its own military resources and strategic focus for the direct defense of the Homeland and U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere, our neighborhood.
Canada and NATO: The United States has achieved significant success in encouraging Canada to shoulder its fair share as a security provider in the Western Hemisphere and Euro-Atlantic theaters. In June 2025, Canada announced that it would reach 2% of GDP in defense spending that fiscal year, a dramatic shift after lagging behind most NATO allies. Canada subsequently committed to reach President Trump's proposal at the NATO Hague summit to spend 5% of GDP on defense and security, including 3.5% on core defense spending. If fulfilled, these pledges will begin to address decades of underinvestment and create new opportunities for defense partnership in the alliance on NORAD modernization and Arctic security.
Argentina: Our success in fostering security partnerships extends far beyond the Arctic, reaching deep into South America as well. For instance, Argentina's acquisition of 24 F-16 aircraft, with Department of State approval of a third party-transfer from Denmark, not only signals Buenos Aires's close defense policy alignment with the United States but enhances burden-sharing in the defense of the Southern Cone. By generating greater interoperability with U.S. forces and enhancing its own training, maintenance, and doctrine, Argentina can improve its air domain awareness and border security. We have also been working closely with Peru on its potential acquisition of F-16s, which would replace its aged fixed-wing fleet and demonstrate its strong commitment to partnering with the United States.
Increasing Regional Access in Latin America and the Caribbean: Underpinning these strategic partnerships is a broader effort to formalize and expand our security cooperation with our partners throughout the Western Hemisphere. Since November 2025, the Department of War has obtained bilateral commitments from Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago expressing our shared intent to cooperate regarding border security, countering narco-terrorism, and securing critical infrastructure and assets from malign control. Consistent with these efforts, the Department signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Paraguay in December 2025 (that's recently been ratified by Paraguay's Congress), and DoW is actively engaging these and other regional partners to identify opportunities to expand our access, basing, and overflight.
Conclusion
From the Arctic to the southernmost tip of the Americas, the defense of the U.S. Homeland and the security of the Western Hemisphere are one and the same. In every domain, the DoW stands ready to ensure our nation is defended, operating on the principle of peace through strength. Our actions demonstrate a clear resolve to protect American interests and enforce the modern application of the NSS "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished Members of the Committee:
Thank you for your continued support and leadership and for the opportunity to testify before you today.
* * *
Original text here: https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ptdo_asw_hdasa_writen_posture_statement.pdf