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Commission on International Religious Freedom: Country Brief - Russia
WASHINGTON, Nov. 14 -- U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issued the following fact sheet:
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COUNTRY BRIEF: Russia
The Russian Federation continues to commit or tolerate particularly severe violations of religious freedom. In 2026, the Russian government has used blasphemy laws and charges of extremism to prosecute and imprison peaceful worshipers; arbitrarily detained or prosecuted people of multiple religious backgrounds on unsubstantiated charges, including nonbelievers or nonconforming religious practitioners; violated religious freedom in occupied territory in Crimea,
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WASHINGTON, Nov. 14 -- U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom issued the following fact sheet:
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COUNTRY BRIEF: Russia
The Russian Federation continues to commit or tolerate particularly severe violations of religious freedom. In 2026, the Russian government has used blasphemy laws and charges of extremism to prosecute and imprison peaceful worshipers; arbitrarily detained or prosecuted people of multiple religious backgrounds on unsubstantiated charges, including nonbelievers or nonconforming religious practitioners; violated religious freedom in occupied territory in Crimea,Georgia, and Ukraine; and used transnational repression to intimidate religious communities elsewhere in Europe.
This Country Brief provides an overview of freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) conditions in Russia in 2026 to date, including the government's targeting of particular religious groups within its borders and in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. In its 2026 Annual Report, USCIRF recommended that the U.S. Department of State maintain Russia as a Country of Particular Concern, or CPC.
Background
While recent information on Russia's religious demographics is limited, earlier estimates suggest 72 percent of Russia's population identifies as Orthodox Christian, seven percent as Muslim, and 18 percent as having no religious affiliation--including five percent of the population that identifies as atheist. Several other religious groups together constitute less than one percent of the population. These include Baha'is, Buddhists, Falun Gong practitioners, Hindus, indigenous religious practitioners, members of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews, Latter-day Saints, Protestants, Roman Catholics, Scientologists, and Tengrists.
Legal Restrictions on FoRB
The preface to Russia's 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience defines only Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as "traditional" religions. Independent religious groups that resist the state's political ideologies attract negative attention from Russian authorities, who regard them as "nontraditional" and threats to national security. Russia uses systematic means, including statutes and administrative policies, to restrict the population's freedom of religious expression, methods of worship, and, frequently, liberty.
Blasphemy Laws
The government continues to enforce laws targeting expression it perceives as offensive toward religion, religious leaders, and religious texts. Under a vague provision in Article 148 of Russia's Criminal Code criminalizing "insulting the religious feelings of believers," the government prosecutes the nonviolent expression of people from a variety of religious or secular backgrounds, perceiving them to belittle or mock religion. In February 2026, a district court in Moscow invoked this law, among others, in sentencing standup comedian Artemy Ostanin to five years and nine months in a penal colony in part for telling a joke about Jesus. In April, authorities opened a criminal case against a Moscow bartender who posted a video of herself using a kulich (a traditional Easter cake) as a base for a hookah pipe. Despite deleting the post and apologizing, she faced a fine of up to 300,000 rubles (approximately $3,800) or imprisonment of up to one year.
Bans on Religious Groups
The Russian government's legal designations of religious groups as "extremist" or "undesirable" function as bans on these communities' activities and very existence. Russia has designated several Church of Scientology institutions and evangelical Christian groups as undesirable and has designated other groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, as extremist. Officials continue to wield the extremist designation to justify particularly severe religious freedom violations. For example, in February 2026, the Federal Security Service (FSB) raided four Jehovah's Witness households, detaining a 60-yearold man whom FSB officers reportedly handcuffed, stripped, beat, and electrically shocked. Authorities subsequently charged four Jehovah's Witnesses with organizing or participating in the activities of a banned extremist organization merely for meeting for worship.
Authorities also interfere with the religious activity of groups that do not register with the government. Throughout the year, officials have maintained prior court-ordered bans that prevent at least 10 unregistered Baptist congregations from meeting without state permission. Officials enforce these bans both within Russia proper and in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. For instance, in January 2026, Russian police raided several Baptist worship services in the occupied Luhansk region, with one pastor reporting that authorities told him they would interrupt every service if his congregation did not register.
Court Rulings
Judges in Russia remain subject to both internal corruption and pressure from the executive branch and security forces, particularly in high-profile cases, and acquittal rates are extremely low. The judiciary's compromised independence routinely results in court rulings that violate FoRB rights.
For instance, as Russia's illegal offensive against Ukraine entered its fourth year, conscription commissions and courts hearing related appeals continued to deny exemptions to religiously affiliated conscientious objectors--including refusing to grant them alternative civilian service (ACS). At midyear 2026, FoRB advocates described a continuing rise in the number of rulings arbitrarily denying alternative civilian service. As the government has increased its conscription efforts over the course of the conflict, the number of men seeking ACS has grown, while their chances of a successful application have diminished. For example, reportedly, courts recently rejected the administrative suits of three Pentecostal Christian conscientious objectors who had sought to overturn Udmurtiya Conscription Commissions' rejections of their ACS applications. While one of the three has since obtained a medical exemption, as of July 2026 officials reportedly have sent the other two to military units.
Russian courts have also increasingly imposed punitive psychiatric detentions on religious believers or practitioners who pose no apparent threat to themselves or others. After investigators threatened twice to do so, the Ordzhonikidzevskiy District Court of Ufa placed a Jehovah's Witness in a psychiatric hospital in June 2026 after she exercised her right not to answer questions about a criminal prosecution for practicing her faith. In July, a court of appeal deemed the detention justified. Likewise, in June, the Yakutsk City Court further extended the compulsory psychiatric confinement since 2021 of Aleksandr Gabyshev, an indigenous shaman who had organized an "exorcism trek" aimed at President Vladimir Putin. The court also denied Gabyshev's motion for an independent psychiatric examination.
New Legislation
In 2026, the federal legislative organ of the Russian government considered several initiatives to restrict religious freedom. In February, religious leaders raised concern over a bill that a multi-faction set of drafters presented to the State Duma, the lower chamber of Parliament, to ban worship celebrations in the non- residential premises of apartment buildings. The bill would prohibit missionary activity in residential premises entirely, allowing only narrow exceptions for religious ceremonies in the buildings. Because Protestant denominations are often effectively unable to obtain land for the construction of religious sites, thus confining their services to "house churches," the proposed legislation would particularly impede their religious assembly and exercise. Clergy of multiple religious denominations could also potentially face prosecution for illegal missionary work when conducting rites--for example, administering communion to a sick individual at home.
Also in February, a group of Duma deputies submitted a bill to establish administrative liability for people who appear in public in attire that "does not permit identification"--in practice, a proposed ban on Muslim women's niqab. In April, a Duma committee approved a bill establishing administrative fines for violators of a 2025 ban on images of religious buildings and objects without religious symbols. The fines would penalize the use of imagery, for example, featuring churches without crosses. The underlying ban and its proposed fines would reinforce existing blasphemy laws that purport to protect "the feelings of religious believers."
Targeted Communities
Jehovah's Witnesses
Jehovah's Witnesses continue to face severe persecution as a designated extremist organization--a status that the European Court of Human Rights has ruled violates the rights of believers. This year, the Jehovah's Witnesses reported that, since a 2017 ruling affirming the extremist designation, over 530 men and women have spent some time in prison for practicing their faith peacefully. Russian courts continue to sentence elderly or disabled Witnesses to significant sentences. For example, in May 2026, authorities charged an 86-year-old Crimean man with extremism, several months after his 60-year-old son received a six-year prison sentence for the same offense. At the end of July, a court in Moscow seized 123 real estate properties--including 63 residential and commercial properties and 60 plots of land--belonging to Jehovah's Witnesses.
Evangelical Christian Missionaries
Missionary work in Russia continues to face severe legal restrictions and government retaliation. In late April 2026, a court in Kazan fined four Christians 15,000 Russian rubles (approximately $200) each for illegal missionary work. The four preachers are members of an evangelical group that is not registered with the Russian government and had conducted a service inside a private home. Foreigners may also be deported from Russia or Russian-controlled territories for missionary efforts. In March, officials ordered Vladimir Rytikov, a Baptist pastor in Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine, to leave the occupied Luhansk region--where he had resided for decades, facing repeated fines for missionary activity. The order amounted to exile, ostensibly for Rytikov leading an unregistered church. In July, the Russian-controlled Krasnodon Town Court rejected his attempt to overturn the deportation order.
Other FoRB Issues
Deportation and Revocation of Citizenship of Religious Adherents
The Russian government has increasingly wielded immigration and national security policies to remove religious adherents from the country, expelling not only foreigners but also--in a strategy of enforced statelessness--Russians from whom it strips citizenship. In February 2026, international FoRB advocates reported that Russian Interior Ministry officials have revoked the citizenship of at least 12 Jehovah's Witnesses and two Muslims convicted on extremism charges, the latter of whom faced prosecution for meeting to study the writings of Qur'anic scholar Said Nursi. At least five Jehovah's Witnesses have been expelled from the country consequently.
Cross-Border FoRB Violations
Throughout the year, Russia exported its restrictive FoRB policies to territories it occupies, particularly in Ukraine. In two separate cases in May and June, the Khartsyzk Inter-District Court fined Pastor Oleg Stroyev the equivalent of a month's average local salary for illegal missionary activity after authorities raided the Sunday worship meeting of the Council of Churches Baptists in the Russian-occupied Donetsk region. Russian de facto authorities in occupied Crimea continued to harass and restrict the activity of minority religious communities, including Protestants, Catholics, Crimean Tatar Muslims,Jehovah's Witnesses, and members of Orthodox churches not aligned with the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC-MP). Prior to Russia's fullscale invasion of Ukraine, the Kherson region hosted 990 religious organizations across 38 faiths; the number of religious organizations has since fallen to 175. The vast majority of remaining religious organizations in 2026 fall within the ROC-MP, the dominance of which the Russian government continues to facilitate in the occupied territories.
Russia's war against Ukraine also continues to destroy sites of worship, interfering with religious practice and terrorizing communities. In June, Russian strikes hit the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Monastery, part of a UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site, invoking international condemnation. In August, a Russian drone strike left the Holy Presentation Church, a nearly 300-year-old wooden church, and a protected national monument, in ruins. Under international humanitarian law, parties in conflict may not target religious sites for destruction except in rare cases and under strict conditions.
In the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, de facto authorities also reportedly continue to block Georgian Orthodox clergy from entry and forbid them from officiating religious services. In May 2026, religious freedom monitors published the results of an investigation revealing that in the prior year, Russian intelligence services had sponsored attacks on Jewish and Muslim places of worship in France in an apparent attempt to disrupt social cohesion and intimidate religious leaders and worshipers.
FoRB Victims
Russian authorities continue to detain and imprison individuals for their religious identity and for exercising their religion or belief, including religious leaders, members of religious communities, and advocates for religious freedom, steadily increasing the numbers of people it detains on related grounds. USCIRF's Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List documents many of those individuals. For example, in February 2026, authorities sentenced four Jehovah's Witnesses--Oleg Postnikov, Valeriy Tolmazov, Aleksandr Kostyuk, and Maksim Barbazyuk--to multiple years in prison, reportedly on the basis of surreptitious video recordings by spies who infiltrated their prayer sessions.
International Accountability
Amid ongoing international attention to Russia's human rights abuses, international and regional institutions have highlighted the government's continuing violations of religious freedom both within Russia and outside its borders. In May 2026, the UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention condemned the wrongful, ongoing detention of 26 Jehovah's Witnesses in Russia.
In April 2026, U.S. legislators introduced the Countering Russia's War on Faith Act (S. 4379/H.R. 8433), which would require the secretary of state and the secretary of defense to report on efforts by the Russian government to violate religious freedom in Ukraine and mandate that the president impose sanctions on the identified violators.
Conclusion
The Russian Federation continues to perpetrate systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, banning entire religions on arbitrary bases; arresting, detaining, or expelling individuals on the basis of their religious belief; and cultivating less overt methods of repression, such as punitive psychiatric sentences, for religious adherents or FoRB advocates.
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Original text here: https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2026-11/2026%20Russia%20Country%20Brief.pdf
Inter-American Development Bank: Joint MDB Statement for COP31
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following news release:
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Joint MDB Statement for COP31
November 12, 2026
Focused on Implementation: Supporting Our Clients in Delivering Climate-Smart Development
As Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), we welcome the COP31 Climate Action Agenda and its focus on implementation.
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We are committed to working with Turkiye's COP31 Presidency, Australia's President of Negotiations, and partners to accelerate climate-smart development.
Led by client demand and country development priorities, our focus is to help countries
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following news release:
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Joint MDB Statement for COP31
November 12, 2026
Focused on Implementation: Supporting Our Clients in Delivering Climate-Smart Development
As Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), we welcome the COP31 Climate Action Agenda and its focus on implementation.
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We are committed to working with Turkiye's COP31 Presidency, Australia's President of Negotiations, and partners to accelerate climate-smart development.
Led by client demand and country development priorities, our focus is to help countriesand private sector clients translate their development goals and their climate ambitions and commitments into action, including those set out in their Nationally Determined Contributions. As essential implementation partners, we bring together financing, knowledge, policy support, and capacity to deliver tangible results - strengthening resilience, supporting low-carbon economic growth, expanding opportunities, creating jobs, and improving the lives of people and communities.
We welcome the priorities the Presidency has set for Antalya, including electrification, green industrialization, and adaptation and resilience, as well as its emphasis on access to finance, reflected in the declarations and initiatives being launched at COP31. These priorities align closely with areas where we are increasingly investing at scale, responding to growing demand across the regions and sectors in which we operate.
Our focus is on the development outcomes and impact our finance enables for people, economies, and ecosystems. This includes strengthening the resilience of vulnerable communities, supporting jobs and food security, expanding access to energy, health, and education, and improving access to affordable, climate-smart infrastructure, housing, and essential services.
Responding to client demand, we are advancing this implementation agenda through continued progress in climate finance delivery. In 2025, MDBs provided $103 billion in climate finance to low- and middle-income economies, including $35 billion for adaptation, and mobilized an additional $35 billion in private climate finance for these economies1. The 21% increase in climate finance over the prior year compares well to our collective 2030 climate finance estimates announced at COP29, of delivering $120 billion per year to low- and middle-income economies and mobilizing a further $65 billion in private capital.
We work together as a system to maximize impact, accelerate market transformation that mobilizes sustainable capital and strengthens competitiveness, and build long-term economic resilience. One example is the Joint MDB Long-Term Strategies Program, now moving into implementation in more than 30 countries. In several countries, multiple MDBs are working in a coordinated way to help translate climate plans and strategies into investment pipelines and finance. We also use common tools and shared approaches, including common principles to track climate finance and report on it jointly, and we are working on common metrics to measure climate-smart development results and on mutual reliance in co-financed operations.
This is particularly important for clients in small island developing states and fragile and conflict-affected settings, where easier access to finance and delivery support can help increase the leverage of concessional resources for climate-smart development outcomes, including by deepening our collaboration with the multilateral climate funds.
Looking ahead, we will continue to direct our support toward areas where client demand for climate finance is growing. Adaptation, resilience, and disaster preparation are clear priorities. The MDB Partnership for Adaptation and Resilience Investment, which we are presenting at COP31, aims to deepen client engagement, expand MDB investment in response to strong client demand, and mobilize more public and private finance for adaptation.
We thank Turkiye and Australia for their climate leadership in bringing the world together at COP31, and we look forward to engaging with countries, the private sector, and other partners throughout the conference and beyond.
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1. Figures are rounded. Detailed 2025 figures for all countries of operation are published in the 2025 Joint Summary Report on Multilateral Development Banks' Climate Finance and on the MDB Climate Finance Dashboard.
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About the IDB Group
The Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB Group) is the leading source of financing and knowledge for improving lives in Latin America and the Caribbean. It comprises the IDB, which works with the region's public sector and enables the private sector; IDB Invest, which directly supports private companies and projects; and IDB Lab, which spurs entrepreneurial innovation.
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Original text here: https://www.iadb.org/en/news/joint-mdb-statement-cop31
Inter-American Development Bank: 'When Is the Sovereign Greenium a Scarcity Price? Green Supply, Market Depth, and Cross-Country Evidence'
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on Nov. 13, 2026, entitled "When Is the Sovereign Greenium a Scarcity Price? Green Supply, Market Depth, and Cross-Country Evidence."
Here are excerpts:
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We study how the sovereign greenium, the yield discount on green relative to conventional sovereign bonds, varies with green-bond supply and sovereign-market depth across countries. Using daily bond observations with week fixed effects on 104 sovereign green bonds in 29 countries over 2019-2025, we construct a bond-level synthetic greenium
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on Nov. 13, 2026, entitled "When Is the Sovereign Greenium a Scarcity Price? Green Supply, Market Depth, and Cross-Country Evidence."
Here are excerpts:
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We study how the sovereign greenium, the yield discount on green relative to conventional sovereign bonds, varies with green-bond supply and sovereign-market depth across countries. Using daily bond observations with week fixed effects on 104 sovereign green bonds in 29 countries over 2019-2025, we construct a bond-level synthetic greeniumand document facts consistent with a relative-scarcity channel. A parsimonious multi-country framework shows how segmented demand for green assets, arising from investment mandates or investor preferences, can interact with limited and endogenous certified supply to generate a scarcity premium. Because certified supply responds to the greenium, the frameworks negative supply prediction applies to observational regressions when variation is supply-driven. Lower sovereign green supply relative to the debt market is associated with higher greeniums: one percentage point of relative green supply is associated with a 2.5 basis point lower greenium. The negative association persists when relative supply is computed using a time-invariant, country-specific measure of market size. The relation is one between slow-moving market structures rather than a response to individual issues. Under the baseline time controls it is concentrated in emerging markets; the advanced-economy difference is sensitive to the treatment of common time shocks. Across countries, greeniums are higher in riskier sovereigns, and within countries the greenium compresses in acute sovereign stress, though both patterns rest almost entirely on Egypt. The highest-greenium sovereigns in the issue-sizes sample lack large green issues, a descriptive pattern consistent with thin green-market segments.
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View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/when-sovereign-greenium-scarcity-price-green-supply-market-depth-and-cross-country-evidence
[Category: IADB]
Inter-American Development Bank: 'Rethinking Agricultural Support - The Role of Public Policies in Productivity Growth'
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on Nov. 13, 2026, entitled "Rethinking Agricultural Support: The Role of Public Policies in Productivity Growth."
Here are excerpts:
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This paper examines whether the composition of agricultural support matters for productivity growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. We use an annual panel of 17 countries over 1995 to 2023. The analysis links agricultural total factor productivity to policy support measures constructed under the OECD Producer Support Estimate framework and extended to
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on Nov. 13, 2026, entitled "Rethinking Agricultural Support: The Role of Public Policies in Productivity Growth."
Here are excerpts:
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This paper examines whether the composition of agricultural support matters for productivity growth in Latin America and the Caribbean. We use an annual panel of 17 countries over 1995 to 2023. The analysis links agricultural total factor productivity to policy support measures constructed under the OECD Producer Support Estimate framework and extended tothe region through the IDB Agrimonitor initiative. The paper distinguishes between market price support, direct transfers to producers, and general services support, and estimates dynamic panel models using System GMM. To address the potential endogeneity of support, the analysis combines internal instruments with an external instrument based on rural voter turnout. The results show that aggregate support is not positively associated with agricultural productivity. However, this relationship masks substantial heterogeneity across instruments. Market price support is negatively related to TFP under USDA and FarePrimont indices, and significantly so under the FarePrimont index, while direct transfers display a positive, though less robust, association. Contemporaneous general services support is not significantly associated with current productivity, consistent with the delayed nature of public goods investments. When public research and development is modeled as a long-lived stock of agricultural knowledge, its association with TFP becomes positive under both productivity indices and statistically significant under the USDA index. These findings suggest that the productivity effects of agricultural policy depend less on the total level of support than on its composition and timing. For LAC, where producer support remains heavily tilted toward price-based interventions, the findings underscore the importance of reducing reliance on distortionary market price support, improving the design of budgetary transfers, and strengthening sustained investment in agricultural public goods, particularly R&D.
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View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/rethinking-agricultural-support-role-public-policies-productivity-growth
[Category: IADB]
Inter-American Development Bank: 'Impact of Agricultural Technical Assistance: Evidence From Guyana'
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on Nov. 13, 2026, entitled "The Impact of Agricultural Technical Assistance: Evidence from Guyana."
Here are excerpts:
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This paper provides one of the first quasi-experimental evaluations of a climate-resilient agricultural intervention in Guyana and the wider Caribbean. We isolate and examine the empirical impact of the targeted technical assistance (TA) component delivered under the Sustainable Agricultural Development Program (SADP) on smallholder productivity and resource management.
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on Nov. 13, 2026, entitled "The Impact of Agricultural Technical Assistance: Evidence from Guyana."
Here are excerpts:
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This paper provides one of the first quasi-experimental evaluations of a climate-resilient agricultural intervention in Guyana and the wider Caribbean. We isolate and examine the empirical impact of the targeted technical assistance (TA) component delivered under the Sustainable Agricultural Development Program (SADP) on smallholder productivity and resource management.Using a balanced panel of 802 agricultural households surveyed in 2022 and 2025 and employing a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) approach combined with Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW), the study estimates the programs effects on agricultural outcomes and sustainable practices. The results show no measurable effect on the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices or environmental sustainability indicators, nor on the gross value of overall crop or livestock production during the evaluation period. We find some evidence of higher cassava yields, although this result is based on a small subsample and is not reflected in increased production values. Overall, the evidence suggests limited program impacts during the evaluation period. These findings contribute to the limited evidence base on agricultural technology adoption and rural extension services in the Caribbean. The study highlights the distinction between crop-specific productivity gains and broader changes in production systems and resource management, which may require longer time horizons to become observable.
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View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/impact-agricultural-technical-assistance-evidence-guyana
[Category: IADB]
Inter-American Development Bank: 'Education and Crime Prevention - Impacts, Mechanisms, and Policy Implications for Latin America and the Caribbean'
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on Nov. 13, 2026, entitled "Education and Crime Prevention: Impacts, Mechanisms, and Policy Implications for Latin America and the Caribbean."
Here are excerpts:
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Drawing on evidence from a broad range of policies and interventions including compulsory schooling reforms, improvements in school quality, early childhood education, extended school days, extracurricular programs, summer employment programs, and conditional cash transfers this paper systematically reviews the causal evidence
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on Nov. 13, 2026, entitled "Education and Crime Prevention: Impacts, Mechanisms, and Policy Implications for Latin America and the Caribbean."
Here are excerpts:
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Drawing on evidence from a broad range of policies and interventions including compulsory schooling reforms, improvements in school quality, early childhood education, extended school days, extracurricular programs, summer employment programs, and conditional cash transfers this paper systematically reviews the causal evidenceon the relationship between education and crime to inform policy design in Latin America and the Caribbean. The review covers 81 studies and organizes the evidence into nine categories of educational policies and programs. It compares effects across crime outcomes, examines the mechanisms through which the interventions operate, and, when possible, summarizes their costs and cost-effectiveness. Overall, educational interventions tend to reduce criminal involvement, although their effectiveness varies substantially across policies and outcomes. The literature points to multiple mechanisms beyond the traditional channels of higher opportunity costs of crime and incapacitation, including socio-emotional skill development, peer effects, and household dynamics. However, relatively few studies examine the economic returns to educational interventions or incorporate crime-reduction benefits into cost-benefit analyses, which may lead to an underestimation of their social value. Finally, the evidence base is heavily concentrated in the United States, highlighting the need for more rigorous research in underrepresented regions and greater attention to contextual factors that may influence policy effectiveness. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for the region, emphasizing implementation conditions, targeting criteria, and priorities for future research.
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View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/education-and-crime-prevention-impacts-mechanisms-and-policy-implications-latin-america-and
[Category: IADB]
EPA Proposes Approving Alaska's Request to Separate Fairbanks and North Pole Air Quality Areas After Years of Air Quality Progress
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 -- The Environmental Protection Agency issued the following news release:
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EPA Proposes Approving Alaska's Request to Separate Fairbanks and North Pole Air Quality Areas After Years of Air Quality Progress
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FAIRBANKS, Alaska (November 13, 2026) - Today, based on recent air monitoring data and years of progress to improve air quality, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed approving Alaska's request to divide the Fairbanks North Star Borough nonattainment area into two separate areas for implementing the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for
... Show Full Article
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 -- The Environmental Protection Agency issued the following news release:
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EPA Proposes Approving Alaska's Request to Separate Fairbanks and North Pole Air Quality Areas After Years of Air Quality Progress
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FAIRBANKS, Alaska (November 13, 2026) - Today, based on recent air monitoring data and years of progress to improve air quality, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed approving Alaska's request to divide the Fairbanks North Star Borough nonattainment area into two separate areas for implementing the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) forfine particulate matter (PM2.5). If finalized, the change would not alter the federal air quality standards for PM2.5 but would instead establish separate areas for Fairbanks and North Pole, each with their own air quality designations. By doing so, EPA and Alaska are acknowledging the distinct factors contributing to PM2.5 levels in these two areas.
Simultaneously, EPA is proposing to find that the Fairbanks area, once split from the North Pole area, has the data needed to designate that area as meeting air quality standards. If finalized, the proposal would give four power plants in the region flexibility to continue providing reliable, affordable electricity to residents while maintaining stringent clean air standards. This would prevent increases in energy costs and also ensure that our military has the reliable power needed to protect our national security.
"This proposed action recognizes the improvements in air quality and will help stabilize the cost of energy, ensuring the area is able to thrive environmentally and economically," said EPA Region 10 Administrator Emma Pokon. "This is a win for cooperative federalism and the environment even as we look to supporting North Pole into attainment next so they too can reap the benefits of clean air."
"This proposal reflects a simple principle: air quality planning should address local conditions," said Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation Division of Air Quality Director Jason Olds. "It would help us focus resources where the challenges are greatest, while continuing our commitment to cleaner air for residents throughout the Fairbanks North Star Borough."
If today's proposal is finalized, Alaska will need to submit a formal redesignation request and maintenance plan for Fairbanks before EPA can officially redesignate the area as meeting federal PM2.5 air quality standards. Today's proposal lays out the necessary foundation for that next step. Importantly, the Fairbanks area would continue implementing measures that have already improved air quality.
The Trump EPA remains committed to working with the State of Alaska and the people of North Pole to progress through Clean Air Act requirements, while respecting community needs and way of life. The agency continues to demonstrate that protecting human health and the environment can go hand in hand with economic growth.
EPA will hold a 30-day public comment period once it has been published in the Federal Register.
Background
On October 17, 2006, EPA set the 24-hour PM2.5 NAAQS at 35 micrograms per cubic meter. Since 2009, portions of the Fairbanks North Star Borough have been designated as nonattainment for the 2006 24-hour PM2.5 NAAQS. In November 2025, EPA approved Alaska's Fairbanks PM2.5 plan to achieve attainment, allowing the state to manage the unique air quality challenges in Interior Alaska. According to the plan, the state is expected to meet these standards by the end of 2027.
The Fairbanks PM2.5 State Implementation Plan can be found at EPA's Fairbanks Air Quality Plan website.
For additional information and background, visit EPA's website on Health and Environmental Impacts of Particulate Matter.
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Original text here: https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-approving-alaskas-request-separate-fairbanks-and-north-pole-air-quality
