Foundations
Foundations
Documents from U.S. foundations.
Featured Stories
What's the Link Between Obesity and Colorectal Cancer?
ALEXANDRIA, Virginia, March 6 -- The Prevent Cancer Foundation issued the following news:* * *
What's the link between obesity and colorectal cancer?
Obesity is a complex disease characterized by an excessive amount of body fat. It's important to understand that obesity is not just about weight--it is a medical condition that can have serious health implications. Obesity is linked to many cancers, including endometrial, liver, kidney, pancreatic and breast cancers (for breast cancer, this is especially in post-menopausal women). Perhaps most notably, research shows a strong link between obesity ... Show Full Article ALEXANDRIA, Virginia, March 6 -- The Prevent Cancer Foundation issued the following news: * * * What's the link between obesity and colorectal cancer? Obesity is a complex disease characterized by an excessive amount of body fat. It's important to understand that obesity is not just about weight--it is a medical condition that can have serious health implications. Obesity is linked to many cancers, including endometrial, liver, kidney, pancreatic and breast cancers (for breast cancer, this is especially in post-menopausal women). Perhaps most notably, research shows a strong link between obesityand colorectal cancer.
Here's what you should know about obesity and colorectal cancer risk--and what you can do about it:
What is obesity?
Obesity is a chronic disease characterized by excessive body fat. It can increase the risk of heart disease, diabetes and some cancers. In the U.S., 1 in 5 children and 2 in 5 adults have obesity.1 Obesity is influenced by many factors ranging from health behaviors and stress to people's genetics and environments.
What is colorectal cancer?
Colorectal cancer is cancer that begins in the colon or rectum (everyone has a colon and rectum unless they have been surgically removed). This cancer can often be prevented with a colonoscopy, where your doctor can find and remove polyps (grape-like growths on the wall of the large intestine, which is part of the colon) before they become cancerous. If the polyps have already become cancer, colonoscopies can also detect colorectal cancer in its early stages. There are also many other screening options available, including at-home tests, that can detect the disease early when the cancer is small and hasn't spread.
How does obesity increase the risk of colorectal cancer?
According to the National Cancer Institute, compared with people without obesity or overweight, colorectal cancer is 1.3x as likely to occur in people who have obesity. There are many possible reasons for this increased risk:
* Carrying excess weight raises the levels of insulin and related hormones in the blood, which can promote cancer growth. Excess weight is also known to promote inflammation, which can contribute to the growth of cancer.2
* Obesity is associated with type 2 diabetes--another risk factor for colorectal cancer. A 2023 study found that people who have diabetes have a 47% higher risk of developing colorectal cancer compared to those without diabetes.
How can I reduce my risk of obesity and colorectal cancer?
There are many steps you can take to reduce your risk of both obesity and colorectal cancer:
* Eat a plant-based diet: Eating a balanced diet rich in fruits, vegetables, whole grains and lean proteins (such as chicken, fish or eggs) can help you maintain a healthy weight and reduce your cancer risk. Limiting red and processed meats is also beneficial--both are strongly linked to colorectal cancer.
* Be physically active: Physical activity is linked to a lower risk of colorectal cancer. Not only can physical activity help in maintaining a healthy weight, but adding exercise to your routine can also reduce stress, increase energy and boost your immune system.
* Avoid tobacco and alcohol: Smoking and excessive alcohol consumption are risk factors for many cancers, including colorectal cancer. It's best to never start using tobacco, but if you do use tobacco products, it's never too late to quit--call 1-800-QUIT-NOW for help. Avoiding alcohol completely is best when it comes to reducing your cancer risk as no amount is considered "safe." For those who do drink alcohol and stop drinking, or those who once overindulged but no longer drink, your cancer risk will decline over time.
* Get screened for colorectal cancer: Routine screenings for colorectal cancer can help find precancerous polyps or detect the disease early when it is in its earliest, most treatable stages. If you are at average risk, screening should begin at age 45. There are many screening options available--including at-home options. Talk to your health care provider about which one is right for you.
By understanding the link between obesity and colorectal cancer and taking proactive steps to check your health, you can reduce your risk and improve your overall well-being. Remember, having a healthy lifestyle is a powerful tool in cancer prevention. Learn more about colorectal cancer prevention and early detection at preventcancer.org/colorectal.
1. https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/risk-factors/risk-factors.html
2. https://www.foxchase.org/blog/diet-obesity-and-colon-cancer-learn-risks
* * *
Original text here: https://preventcancer.org/article/whats-the-link-between-obesity-and-colorectal-cancer/
SCOTUS Ruling Weakens Clean Water Protections
BOSTON, Massachusetts, March 6 -- The Conservation Law Foundation issued the following news release:* * *
SCOTUS Ruling Weakens Clean Water Protections
Decision will slow down water protection efforts
A ruling by the Supreme Court on Tuesday has weakened the ability of federal and state regulators to protect and restore our nation's waters. In San Francisco v. EPA, the Court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exceeded its authority under the Clean Water Act by requiring permit-holders to comply with standards that states and EPA set for waters at the point of discharge. Conservation ... Show Full Article BOSTON, Massachusetts, March 6 -- The Conservation Law Foundation issued the following news release: * * * SCOTUS Ruling Weakens Clean Water Protections Decision will slow down water protection efforts A ruling by the Supreme Court on Tuesday has weakened the ability of federal and state regulators to protect and restore our nation's waters. In San Francisco v. EPA, the Court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exceeded its authority under the Clean Water Act by requiring permit-holders to comply with standards that states and EPA set for waters at the point of discharge. ConservationLaw Foundation (CLF) released the following statement in response to the ruling.
"This Supreme Court has taken away an important tool used by federal and especially state agencies for decades to keep our waters safe from toxic pollution," said Brad Campbell, Conservation Law Foundation President. "This ruling will result in more pollution entering our waters and less power for states to protect the waters they know best. Rather than polluters bearing the expense of avoiding water pollution, the public will bear the costs of cleaning up after them."
EPA has delegated its authority to issue the permits at the center of the San Francisco v. EPA case to agencies in most states (with notable exceptions like Massachusetts and New Hampshire).
Media Contact
Mike Naughton
press@clf.org
617/850-1709
* * *
Original text here: https://www.clf.org/newsroom/scotus-ruling-weakens-clean-water-protections/
Georgia Remains Target of Attempted Russian Influence
WASHINGTON, March 6 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following news:* * *
Georgia Remains Target of Attempted Russian Influence
By Zaal Anjaparidze
Executive Summary:
* Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze acknowledged challenges in Georgia-EU relations in early February, citing bureaucratic obstacles, while reaffirming Georgia's pro-European stance despite concerns that the current ruling party is leading the country toward Russia and undermining democratic principles.
* Political turbulence in Georgia following its October 2024 parliamentary elections provides Russia with more ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 6 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following news: * * * Georgia Remains Target of Attempted Russian Influence By Zaal Anjaparidze Executive Summary: * Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze acknowledged challenges in Georgia-EU relations in early February, citing bureaucratic obstacles, while reaffirming Georgia's pro-European stance despite concerns that the current ruling party is leading the country toward Russia and undermining democratic principles. * Political turbulence in Georgia following its October 2024 parliamentary elections provides Russia with moreresources to impede Georgia's integration with the West.
* Moscow is leveraging economic, political, and ideological pressure to expand its influence in Georgia. This includes strengthening economic ties, exploiting Orthodox unity, and supporting pro-Russian narratives.
* Georgia remains economically reliant on Russia in terms of trade, gas imports, and investments. This dependence grants Moscow significant political leverage, creating vulnerabilities to Russian pressure.
* Western sanctions on Georgia risk fueling anti-Western sentiment and pushing the country further into Russia's orbit. Georgia's integration with the West, particularly with the European Union, will remain in jeopardy as long as the political status quo is maintained.
In a February 6 interview with Euronews, Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Kobakhidze admitted to complicated relations between Georgia and the European Union, attributing this to "significant challenges with the European bureaucracy" (Euronews, February 6). Kobakhidze still expressed optimism, however, about Georgia's prospects for EU membership and reaffirmed the unshakable pro-European orientation of Georgia and its government. In the same interview, he vehemently excluded the possibility of restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia until the latter withdrew its recognition of Georgia's secessionist regions Abkhazia, which recently held presidential elections, and South Ossetia as independent states (Euronews, February 6; see EDM, February 12). These statements were a response to reprimands from the West that Georgia is deviating from its former European trajectory. There remains a growing perception in both Georgia and Europe that the former is drifting away from the West and democracy in favor of growing closer to Russia (1tv.ge, January 18; Civil.ge; PACE, January 29; Eeas.europa, February 7).
These concerns have been reinforced by the Georgian leadership's multi-vector foreign policy in recent years, which includes building, as Georgian officials claim, "pragmatic relations with Russia." This, in turn, has been increasingly welcomed by the Kremlin (Civil.ge, April 18, 2024, February 4; Sakartvelos Ambebi, November 28, 2024). Supposedly, Moscow perceives such a policy in Tbilisi as a window of opportunity to restore its influence in Georgia (see EDM, February 6). This poses a challenge for the West as it seeks ways of counteracting Russia's attempts to influence democratic processes abroad (VoxEurop English, July 25, 2024; Congressional Research Service, September 4, 2024; Voice of America, January 18). The results of the 2024 parliamentary elections in Georgia disappointed the West because the ruling Georgian Dream party retained power for a fourth term. Hungary and Slovakia are the only European countries that have recognized the legitimacy of the elections (Jam-News, November 3, 2024; Euractiv, December 17, 2024). Meanwhile, Russian political circles assessed the elections as protecting Georgia's sovereignty, which was supposedly threatened by the West, and accused Western countries of "blatant attempts" to interfere in the elections (TASS, October 15, 2024; Gazeta.ru, October 29, 2024).
Russia reacted calmly to the crushing defeat of the 28-member union of openly pro-Russian parties in the election. Collectively, these groups gained only 2.4 percent of the vote, well below the 5 percent threshold required to win any seats in parliament (Civil.ge, October 27, 2024). The electoral result, however, allowed them to receive budget financing and stay afloat (Sputnik-Georgia, June 24, 2024; Election Administration of Georgia, October 27, 2024). The most proactive local pro-Russian TV channel "Alt-Info" has already resumed broadcasting, which had been suspended after the elections (Civil.ge, October 29, 2024; Alt-Info, accessed March 1).
The periodic allegations about behind-the-scenes communications between Russia and Georgia, as well as suggestions that the founder and now honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, is under pressure from Moscow have yet to be confirmed by reliable data. Ivanishvili, an oligarch who made his fortune in Russia, has been subject to sanctions for his alleged role in making Georgia more susceptible to Russian influence (see EDM, January 23). Officially, the bilateral dialogue between Georgia and Russia known as the Prague Format has been frozen since November 2021 (Civil.ge, December 3, 2024). So far, the parties have not shown readiness for its resumption (Agenda.ge, November 17, 2017).
Russian officials and pro-Kremlin expert circles saturate the Georgian information space with statements about Moscow's desire to restore relations with Tbilisi on Russian terms (TASS, December 4, 2024; Apsny.ge, February 10). When speaking in favor of the further normalization of relations with Georgia, which severed formal diplomatic ties with Moscow following the Russian invasion in 2008, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin reaffirmed that Russia adheres to the same approach as with Ukraine. Galuzin noted that while Russia "intend[s] to continue to promote the normalization of ties with Georgia," Moscow understood that "political demands" in Tbilisi "that conflict with the new realities in the region" (i.e., Russia's recognition of the independence of the two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia) make this all but impossible (TASS, February 10, 2024). Shortly before the Georgian parliamentary elections, Russia officially declared that the recognition of the independence of Georgia's secessionist regions by Moscow "is not subject to revision" (Gazeta.ru September 24, 2024; Interfax October 4, 2024). For some, this refutes the local allegations that Russia attempted to improve Georgian Dream's electoral standing by promising to restore Georgia's territorial integrity. Russia's reluctance to resolve this key problem in bilateral relations significantly weakens the positions of pro-Russian forces when they advocate for a more loyal policy toward Russia and further alienation from the Western orbit.
The Russian National Research Institute for the Development of Communications (NIIRK), which annually monitors the relationships of the post-Soviet countries, released its observations on the "friendliness of communication of the post-Soviet regimes in 2024." It concluded that fears of the post-Soviet countries coming under Russian influence, which they allege are instigated by the West, are gradually diminishing thanks to a better "understanding by national elites of geopolitical and geo-economic interests of both Western states and their interests in the context of benefits and risks of cooperation with Russia." According to NIIRK's research, in 2024, Georgia's "friendliness" coefficient toward Russia increased from 12 to 15 points on a 100-point scale. Georgia has been included as number eleven in the group of conditionally friendly/unfriendly Post-Soviet countries, whereby South Ossetia is ranked first (not internationally recognized as an independent state), Belarus second, and Ukraine is ranked last (Nicrus.ru, February 26).
Another manifestation of Russian hybrid warfare is a targeted intimidation of Georgian society by proclaiming that the West was trying to support yet another "color revolution.". This task appears to have been primarily assigned to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), probably with the expectation that its information would be perceived as reliable. During July-September 2024, the SVR made several statements accusing the United States of planning "regime change" in Georgia through a "color revolution" with proactive engagement of opposition parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even international organizations such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (SVR, July 9, September 11, 2024). Russian propagandists tried to convince the local population that the West wanted to reshape the results of the Georgian elections (Gazeta.ru June 6, 2024; RIA Novosti, December 10, 2024; TASS, December 30, 2024). According to the SVR, the United States planned to depict the elections as rigged as a pretext to encourage Georgian citizens to protest (SVR, September 11, 2024). These SVR reports, widely disseminated by the Georgian media, appear to have influenced a significant share of the Georgian public. After the elections, the SVR claimed that the Western plans for a "color revolution" in Georgia had failed, and that the United States was losing the initiative in the post-Soviet space (RIA News, December 10, 2024). On February 27, the SVR again accused the West of supporting anti-government rallies in Georgia to maintain its influence there, given the "national-conservative turnaround" taking place in the world (SVR, February 27).
Using a proactive, multifaceted approach to strengthen its influence in Georgia, Russia capitalizes on the critical factor of Orthodox confessional unity with Georgia, using it as an element of "soft power" (Ponars Eurasia, June 6, 2014; MDPI.com, February 17, 2023). The Georgian Orthodox Church advocates the protection of national conservative traditions, which differ from the "alien values of the West." Russia, which has declared itself a worldwide bulwark against "ultra-liberalism," constantly bombards its Georgian audience with messages about the usefulness of "moving away from the ultra-liberal transhumanist agenda imposed from the outside" (Sovanews, December 10, 2024). Such messages held sway over the over one million Georgian Dream supporters in these elections, who represent a traditionalist-conservative segment of Georgian society.
The Russian military presence in Georgia's two separatist regions, hovering like a "sword of Damocles" over the country, represents another powerful factor of Russian influence. This all but ensures Tbilisi's cautious policy toward Moscow. Russia's leadership claims to be concerned that the West would orchestrate a new military conflict near Russia's borders, which would include Georgia's secessionist regions (President of Russia, February 24, 2022). Russian officials and pro-Kremlin opinion-makers praise Georgian Dream's restraint toward providing active assistance to Ukraine and its refusal to impose full-scale sanctions against Russia (Ekhokavkaza, September 6, 2024). This stance, however, does not exclude Georgia from Russia's use of military force. Russia may resort to hostilities against Georgia if Moscow believes that the use of military force guarantees a reduction or elimination of Georgia-borne threats to Russian national interests in the region. Russia is creating new military infrastructure and dual-use facilities in Georgia's secessionist regions, including the Russia-reconstructed Sukhumi airport where the first test flight from Moscow has been conducted (GlobalAffairs.ru, August 13, 2018; see EDM, November 20, 2023; SOVAnews, April 1, 2024; Civil.ge, November 25, 2024).
Against the backdrop of Western sanctions, Russia is searching for alternative transit routes, including those that would pass through Georgia's territory to circumvent Western sanctions (see EDM, September 15, 2022, May 1, 2023, February 27; Civil.ge, February 3). In this regard, a Georgian portion of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), may become the target for various Russia-driven subversive actions (see EDM, April 19, 2022). Ingushetia is discussing the construction of the Caucasus Railway, which will connect the North Caucasus region of Russia with Georgia (JAM-News, December 1, 2024). Entrepreneurs from the Russian-Georgian Business Council--established in 2023--within the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry see new opportunities in this initiative (Civil.ge May 17, 2024). The Georgian government plans to completely modernize the highway--which leads to the border with Russia--and expand existing roads linking Russia and Georgia. The construction of a road that will be 23 kilometers (14 miles) long with five bridges and tunnels funded by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Development Bank is well underway. The project is expected to be completed in 2025 (Kveshetikobiroad.ge, accessed March 3; Imedinews.ge April 23, 2024).
This February, another Georgian-Russian business association was officially registered with the Georgian government. The founding meeting gathered 60 companies, predominantly winemakers. The association's main goal is to help the businessmen engaged in exports to Russia. The association claims that the welfare of at least 700,000 Georgian households heavily depends on Georgia's economic relations with Russia (BM.ge, January 24, February 11). This factor has an influence on the electoral behavior of Georgian citizens.
Moscow is increasingly keen to capitalize on economic factors that strengthen its political footing in Georgia. The 10th International Economic Forum "Southern Gate of Russia 2024" underlined that "[t]oday it is time to revive" previously neglected relations with Georgia, especially through economic and socio-cultural relations, including opening new transit corridors and trans-border cooperation. Additionally, Russia has tried to lure Georgia into regional formats such as a "3+3" format between Turkiye, Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia (Ssoar.info, July 2022). Georgian pundits, however, argue that Georgia cannot and will not receive any benefits from such a platform (see EDM, March 16, 2020, February 6; March 16, 2020; Sputnik-Georgia, June 19, 2024; Jam-news, December 11, 2024, Rezonansi, January 15).
Moscow's influence in Georgia also benefits from a significant number of Russian citizens who have relocated and settled there since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin considers these individuals as potential leverage that can be used if and when it deems necessary (see EDM, August 10, 2023, February 15, 2024). Russian officials consistently underline that Moscow will defend its citizens worldwide (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2007, March 31, 2023, February 19).
Georgia's economic dependence on Russia remains alarmingly high. This gives Moscow significant influence on local socio-political processes (Jam-News, February 16, 2024; see EDM, January 13). Despite a publicly declared pro-European orientation, many Georgian businesses are closely linked to the Russian market (see EDM, February 15, 2024). Pro-Georgian government TV channel "Imedi" published a list of 30 large- and medium-sized companies that recently, together with 2,300 other firms, signed a petition demanding to keep Georgia's pro-European orientation (Imedi.ge, December 26, 2024; Freebuisness.ge, accessed February 27). The published list shows that these companies conduct lucrative business inside Russia, receiving tens of millions in revenue (Imedinews, December 30, 2024). The income of a significant number of Georgian citizens, including employees of these companies, as well as the welfare of their families, largely depend on positive trade relations with Russia. Russia is likely to attempt to maintain this status quo.
Russia is among Georgia's top five trading partners. According to the National Statistical Service of Georgia, despite a three percent decrease in Georgia-Russia turnover from January to August 2024, Russia remains Georgia's second largest trading partner (RIA Novosti; Sovanews, November 6, 2024). Experts explain that territorial proximity, existing transport routes, long-established economic ties, and other factors facilitate this economic linkage. The experts, however, warn about the Kremlin's unpredictability, implying sudden restrictions on the export of various goods or an increase in excise duty on Georgian wine and spirits could be undertaken. According to the statistics, Russia was the first among the top five export markets for Georgian wine in 2024 (Currenttime.tv, March 17, 2024; BM.ge, September 19, 2024). In 2025, Georgia expects to receive twice as much natural gas from Russia as compared to the figure forecast in 2024. The volume of liquefied gas supplied from Russia to Georgia in September 2024 increased by 77.3 percent compared to 2023 (Parliament's Budget Office, 2024; EkhoKavkaza April 2, 2024; Sputnik Georgia, September 21, 2024; Vestnik Kavkaza, November 6, 2024; TASS December 18, 2024; BM.ge January 8; GPB, January 10, 17; Transparency.ge, February 16). It remains to be seen whether this trend will continue following a new package of Western sanctions on Russian oil and gas. In 2024, the volume of investments made by Russia's Public Joint Stock Company "Inter RAO"-owned electricity distribution company Telasi, effectively one of Russia's strategic assets in Georgia, exceeded GEL 160 million ($57.5 million)--a record high for the enterprise (Telasi.ge, accessed February 27). Additionally, Russia remains the largest grain supplier to Georgia (Commersant.ge, November 14, 2024).
Imposing more sanctions against the Georgian government, which to some extent will also negatively affect Georgian citizens, could be risky despite the prevailing pro-sanction position in the West. Excessive sanctions regimes against Georgia may not yield the expected results, as the negative economic effects may just as likely instill anti-Western sentiment in a significant portion of the Georgian population. Sanctions may also provoke Georgia's leadership to intensify its multi-vector foreign policy at the expense of weakening the nominal pro-European path and increasing Tbilisi's connections with Russia. Ultimately, the current conflict-prone political situation in Georgia and poisoned relations with the West hamper Georgia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Russia will likely do its utmost to maintain this status quo for as long as possible.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/program/georgia-remains-target-of-attempted-russian-influence/
Russia Experiences Reverse Industrialization as Economy Deteriorates
WASHINGTON, March 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following news:* * *
Russia Experiences Reverse Industrialization as Economy Deteriorates
By Hlib Parfonov
Executive Summary:
* The Russian economy appears to be experiencing "reverse industrialization," shifting from the development of high-technology industries to labor-intensive sectors. This trend is negatively impacting Russia's industrial output and economic development.
* Russia's industrial growth is uneven, with the military-industrial complex showing the most growth while civilian sectors stagnate. Russia's ongoing full-scale ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following news: * * * Russia Experiences Reverse Industrialization as Economy Deteriorates By Hlib Parfonov Executive Summary: * The Russian economy appears to be experiencing "reverse industrialization," shifting from the development of high-technology industries to labor-intensive sectors. This trend is negatively impacting Russia's industrial output and economic development. * Russia's industrial growth is uneven, with the military-industrial complex showing the most growth while civilian sectors stagnate. Russia's ongoing full-scaleinvasion of Ukraine is draining the workforce, particularly as conscription is expanded.
* There are more job vacancies than skilled employees in Russia due to the surplus of graduates in subjects such as humanities and social sciences and the shortage of technical and specialist graduates.
* Kremlin reforms that attempt to align the education system with labor market demands are raising concerns from students and families about fairness and quality of training. These changes are reshaping Russia's economic and social landscape in ways that may be difficult to reverse.
On February 6, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that it is necessary to limit student enrollment in unproductive specialties. At a meeting of the Council for Science and Education, Putin argued that the recruitment for specialties that do not fulfill demands in the economy and the labor market must be reduced. Preventing non-specialist educational institutions from teaching specialist courses is also important, according to Putin, in order to avoid low training standards (Kremlin.ru, February 6). This development is the result of "reverse industrialization" (obratnaya industrializatsiya), a trend that has been unfolding in Russia for a few years now. Reverse industrialization refers to economic development that departs from the production of high-technology and reverts instead to the growth of labor-intensive sectors (RIA Novosti, April 21, 2022). This phenomenon is associated with a reduction in the share of high-tech industries and an increase in employment in sectors that demand low-skilled manual labor. According to analysts from the Bank of Russia, after an initial downturn in production and gross value added, a "reverse industrialization" phase may follow, characterized by the development of less advanced technologies and partial import substitution. Such products' technical and economic efficiency, however, may be inferior to that of modern counterparts (RIA Novosti, April 21, 2022).
Industrial Production
Russia's industrial production was uneven throughout the course of 2024. According to the Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (CMACF), after growth in production in the first quarter of 2024 and a sharp surge in May, a negative trend emerged in the second half of the year. Production volume fell by 1.5 percent in June as compared with the previous month, and in July it declined further by 0.8 percent (Forecast.ru, October 10, 2024, February 6).
The primary contribution to Russia's growth in production comes from the military-industrial complex, while civilian sectors are showing signs of stagnation (see EDM, July 10, 25, 2024). Oil refining, metallurgy, and the production of manufactured goods is growing in spurts rather than as a sustained trend (see EDM, April 29, 2024). In December 2024, industrial output showed significant growth, primarily driven by the military-industrial complex and the pharmaceutical sector, whereas other sectors developed more slowly (Forecast.ru, February 6).
Russia's industrial sector faces numerous challenges in the year ahead. The main challenges include limited growth rates outside the military industrial complex, a decline in domestic consumer demand, problems with the import of equipment and technologies, and a shortage of skilled personnel, which constrains future expansion of production. One key factor limiting the growth of industrial production is the acute shortage of qualified workers and technical specialists (see EDM, June 27, 2024). According to CMACF, in 2024, 40 percent of enterprises identified a personnel shortage as the primary problem in the industry (Forecast.ru, October 10, 2024, February 6).
The Russian labor market is not in a position conducive to growing productivity. It is experiencing historically low unemployment at 2.5 percent. The tightness ratio (the number of unemployed individuals per job vacancy) of the labor market has fallen to about 0.2 or 0.3 as of June 2024, meaning that there are fewer than one applicant for every vacancy. The most acute shortage of personnel is observed in the industrial manufacturing, construction, transport, and IT sectors (Forecast.ru, October 10, 2024; see EDM, February 27).
Education Fairness vs Needs of the Economy
Meanwhile, a structural imbalance persists between graduates of educational institutions and the needs of the economy. There is a shortage of workers with technical education (engineers, welders, computer numerical control (CNC) operators, technologists) and an oversupply of humanities specialists, including economists, lawyers, managers, and other professionals (Forecast.ru, October 10, 2024, February 6). The Russian industrial sector faces a double challenge consisting of a shortage of skilled personnel--which in turn constrains the expansion of production--and an imbalance in the labor market that exacerbates said problem.
The fall in unemployment correlates with recruitment into the Russian Armed Forces on a contract basis (see EDM, April 29, June 27, September 9, 2024). By the end of 2024, approximately 450,000 people had signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense, and another 40,000 had joined volunteer formations (RBC, January 24). This means that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine may be having a directly negative effect on unemployment rates in Russia.
The lack of skilled professionals in Russia's workforce also correlates to challenges in Russia's education system. The issue of Russian students' progression from years 9 to 10, lower secondary education to upper secondary education (typically ages 16-18), has become particularly acute. Parents across the country complain that due to the introduction of new standards and intensified competitive selection, many children are forced to leave school and attend colleges (institutions that focus on vocational and technical education), which often entails additional financial costs (Izvestiya, August 15, 2024). According to Russian news outlet RBC, in Chelyabinsk oblast, refusals to enroll pupils in year 10 have become commonplace; this is likely representative of the state of other regions as well (RBC, August 26, 2024). In some cases, experts note that even when free spots are available, schools actively turn down pupils by offering them alternative options to study in colleges. This creates additional pressure on family budgets and raises concerns regarding equal access to free secondary education (Mel.fm, August 1, 2024). Posts in the Telegram channel "Parents of Moscow," demonstrate how parents are forced to approach education departments or even lodge complaints with the prosecutor's office to secure their children's right to free secondary education when admittance to year 10 is denied (Mel.fm, August 1, 2024; Telegram/@roditelimoskvynews, accessed February 28).
The reforms also affect higher education. Changes to the status of the Basic State Exam (OGE; ocnovnoi gosudarstvennyy ekzamen)--which is to be transformed from a graduation exam into an entrance test administered alongside the Unified State Exam (EGE,; yedinyy gosudarstvenyy ekzamen)--have raised concerns about the potential transfer of negative examination procedures into secondary schools. Experts note that whereas attendance in university was once considered an end in itself, the question remains of whether all students should advance to year 10 if their exam results do not guarantee future professional suitability, especially as the selection system becomes increasingly stringent. Statistics indicate a decline in the proportion of pupils advancing to year 10--from approximately 67 percent in 2000 to 48 percent in 2022--and further reductions are predicted, which does not correlate with the needs of the labor market, at least with regard to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics-related degrees (Vogazeta, April 22, 2019; Kommersant, May 15; Silkbox, May 21; Mel.fm, August 2, 2024).
Reforms in the education sector reflect the Russian state's desire to meet the demands of the modern economy. Namely, this means reducing the number of specialists with outdated skills and steering young people toward more in-demand professions. Extreme measures in education raise questions about the balance between protecting students' rights and fulfilling state obligations. These measures demonstrate how difficult it is to implement profound reforms in a system where economic realities and educational principles are in constant conflict (RBC, August 26, 2024, February 7).
The educational changes in Russia are not merely an attempt to modernize the system but constitute a complete strategic restructuring in which the state aims to align educational standards with the market's needs. In practice, however, numerous problems arise, including difficulties with enrollment in year 10 and severe sanctions imposed on graduates who refuse to work in hazardous regions, such as Mariupol in occupied Ukraine (The Insider, February 7). These developments underscore that reforms are inevitably accompanied by conflicts of interest, with some parties insisting on strict measures while others demanding the protection of citizens' rights and safety (RBC, August 26, 2024; The Insider, February 7).
Enforcing Student Success
Data from Russian news outlet RIA Novosti indicate that the percentage of pupils successfully passing the OGE has increased significantly in recent years (RIA Novosti, February 4). On the one hand, this rise may reflect an improvement in the quality of student preparation. On the other hand, it raises questions regarding the exam's difficulty level. A high pass rate may suggest that the current testing system is not always capable of adequately assessing a pupil's knowledge, which could negatively impact the training of future specialists (RIA Novosti, February 4).
Materials from Russian outlet Interfax provide further details of the new control mechanisms that have been introduced as part of the reform of the OGE procedures (Interfax, February 6). These measures entail stricter supervision over the process of checking exam results, as well as increasing the accountability of examiners for the accuracy and objectivity of their assessments. The changes are aimed at eliminating possible errors in the calculation of scores, which should enhance the reliability and fairness of the final results (Interfax, February 6).
An explanatory note published on the Public Committee for Family Protection (OUZS) Educational Department's website provides an explanation of the procedure for conducting final state examinations and the processes for admitting pupils to educational institutions. The document contains recommendations on recording exam results and the methods for calculating scores, which helps schools adhere to uniform assessment standards and allocate places in year 10 fairly (Ouzs.ru, January 22). These clarifications are especially pertinent in light of the current reforms, as they provide a legal basis for the transition to the new assessment system.
The changes in the OGE system and the procedures for admission to year 10 are part of a large-scale strategy to modernize Russia's educational system. While the reforms aim to increase the objectivity and quality of assessing pupils' knowledge, they also give rise to new challenges, such as the tightening of competitive criteria and the risk of restricting access to free education. All of these measures reflect the state's attempt to synchronize educational standards with the needs of the modern economy. The reform process, however, is fueling debates among educators, parents, and experts, highlighting the difficulty of balancing an efficient educational system and protecting citizens' rights.
Conclusion
As the Kremlin attempts to resolve conscription and recruiting problems for the military in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine by expanding eligibility for service, this comes at the cost of further draining Russia's workforce (see EDM, November 19, 2024). At the same time, efforts to increase the number of specialized professionals by reforming the education system are presenting their own adverse effects on perceived fairness toward students. The ongoing reverse industrialization that is exacerbated by these changes is altering Russian society and the economy in such a way that may prove irreversible.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/program/russia-experiences-reverse-industrialization-as-economy-deteriorates/
Rising Arctic Temperatures Threaten Russian Cities and Military Facilities in Far North
WASHINGTON, March 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following news:* * *
Rising Arctic Temperatures Threaten Russian Cities and Military Facilities in Far North
By Paul Goble
Executive Summary:
* The Russian North is negatively impacted by climate change at a rate that is three times faster than in the south. The thawing permafrost, faltering infrastructure, and isolation of the population centers and military bases in Russia's North place additional requirements on Moscow as it attempts to sustain Northern Sea Route activities and its own Arctic ambitions.
* This problem has grown ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, March 5 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following news: * * * Rising Arctic Temperatures Threaten Russian Cities and Military Facilities in Far North By Paul Goble Executive Summary: * The Russian North is negatively impacted by climate change at a rate that is three times faster than in the south. The thawing permafrost, faltering infrastructure, and isolation of the population centers and military bases in Russia's North place additional requirements on Moscow as it attempts to sustain Northern Sea Route activities and its own Arctic ambitions. * This problem has grownworse since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has forced Moscow to delay or cancel plans to repair and build more road and rail infrastructure in the North at a time when rivers in many parts of the region no longer freeze hard or long enough to serve as ice roads.
* These developments, in turn, have been exacerbated by the "Atlantification" of the Arctic, meaning Russia now faces greater competition, as the Arctic Ocean itself is ice-free longer each year, allowing foreign vessels to transit without relying on Russian icebreakers.
Temperatures in the Russian North are rising three times as fast as in other parts of the country, a development with enormous but as of yet not fully appreciated geoeconomic and geopolitical consequences. These changes are increasing the ability of other countries to transit the Northern Sea Route (NSR) without relying on Russian icebreakers. Critically, rising temperatures are thawing the permafrost underlying the whole region, in turn undermining and destroying the integrity of local infrastructure, including pipelines and airfields. Rising temperatures are also further isolating population centers and military bases, making it far more difficult for Moscow to exploit natural resources and sustain Russian dominance of the NSR and the country's claims in the Arctic (see EDM, November 15, 2022, February 22, 2023; The Barents Observer, May 18, 2022; To Be Precise, September 22, 2023; TASS; RIA Novosti, September 11, 2024; The Moscow Times, September 12, 2024). While Moscow celebrates what it has achieved--and often even what it has not--the situation in the North is a quickly escalating problem for the Russian government (Window on Eurasia, January 10).
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has forced Moscow to cut back and even cancel plans to build railways and highways in the Russian North (see EDM, February 22, 2023). At present, the region severely lacks sufficient road and rail infrastructure. Communities living in the North have instead traditionally relied on "ice roads," which are formed when rivers freeze, for delivery of supplies and to transport ores of various kinds. Ice roads, however, can no longer be relied on because the surface of many waterways is not remaining frozen long enough or becoming thick enough to carry heavy trucks (see EDM, March 12, 2024; Nakanune, January 28, February 20; The Barents Observer, February 25). This issue is exacerbated by what some scholars are now calling the "Atlantification" of the Arctic. This refers to the influx of warm water from the Atlantic Ocean into the Arctic Ocean, which is itself caused by the increasing amount of sea ice melting in the Arctic from Scandinavia to the Bering Strait (Igor V. Polyakov et al., "Atlantification advances into the Amerasian Basin of the Arctic Ocean," Science Advances. Vol 11, No. 8 (2025); The Barents Observer, February 25). This trend affects not only the ocean and global weather patterns but also the life of population centers and military bases in northern Russia's littoral regions.
In a growing number of places in the region, the only reliable means of transport is by air. This, however, is a serious limiting factor given the carrying capacity of planes, closing of airports in the region, and inadequate roads and rail lines connecting to them. As Sergey Sulyma, a Russia historian who specializes in transportation issues, points out, Russian officials like to brag that jet planes have reduced the time it takes to get from Moscow to Chukotka, located in the extreme northeast of the Russian Federation, to only eight hours (REX Information Agency, February 10). This claim omits the fact that it takes days or even weeks for passengers and cargo to travel to and from the airport in Chukotka because of the absence of year-round roads (REX Information Agency, February 10). These delays mean that the region is not reliably supplied with goods, which has unsurprisingly led to a slow but steady emigration out of Chukotka (see EDM, July 6, 2021; Nakanune, January 28, February 20). This trend, broadly mirrored across the Russian North, makes it almost impossible to maintain the development of natural resources, the maintenance of NSR-related search and rescue institutions or guidance facilities, or the support of military facilities Moscow needs to project power further into the Arctic.
Insufficient highways and rail lines represent only one example of the failure of the Russian government to support regional infrastructure in the North. Another problem involves pipelines. The shifting ground with the melting of permafrost has caused pipelines to fail, spilling their contents and even leading to their abandonment on occasion, as continuous repairs are too expensive. This means oil and gas recovered in the Russian North often does not reach the central areas of Russia where they can be used or exported. In turn, population centers and military bases in the Russian North do not receive a steady supply of the petroleum products they need. Russian officials have long been worried by this fact and in 2017 prepared a 900-page report detailing just how dire the situation had become (Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment of the Russian Federation via Web Archive, 2018; The Barents Observer, October 2, 2018; Window on Eurasia, October 2, 2018). There is no reason to think that the situation has improved since then, and every reason to believe that it has gotten worse as the topic appears to have become politically sensitive in Moscow.
The impact of global warming on the Arctic Ocean and Russian littoral is especially great with regard to Russian military facilities in the region. Putin has an expansive plan to develop the Arctic seabed and has made claims to portions of the Arctic that are contested by other Arctic states. These claims remain under consideration at the United Nations vis-a-vis its Law of the Sea-mandated process (Window on Eurasia, August 25, 2022, December 27, 2023). Putin's efforts to develop Russia's military bases in the North in accordance with his Arctic aspirations have been largely constrained. This is due to the high costs and difficulties of transporting supplies to such facilities, on top of the problems which Russia is experiencing in shipbuilding for its Arctic Fleet (Window on Eurasia, January 19, 2022). Moscow has, as a result, cut back and sought cheaper means of projecting power by building low-cost drone bases and potentially exploring options to purchase ships from elsewhere (see EDM, July 6, 2021, April 18, 2024; , October 15, 2023, October 26, 2024).
As Russia's Arctic territory continues to warm, the combination of its impact on the ocean and the littoral will only intensify. With less ice on the Arctic Ocean, more ships from other countries will likely make use of the NSR or regions adjoining it, creating a situation in which Moscow will feel even more threatened and prepare to be in a position to respond militarily (Window on Eurasia, August 6, 2024). With higher temperatures on land in the Russian Far North, however, Moscow will find it increasingly difficult to implement such a policy, given the unlikelihood of having either the necessary population or military bases in the region. Moscow will thus likely be inclined to adopt a more aggressive approach to any new international presence in the region, potentially by employing forces further from the Arctic itself (see EDM, May 30, 2024). Such a shift in Russian strategy and tactics will require corresponding shifts by others as the Arctic heats up--both literally and figuratively.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/program/rising-arctic-temperatures-threaten-russian-cities-and-military-facilities-in-far-north/
Presbyterian Health Foundation awards $1 million in grants to OMRF
OKLAHOMA CITY, Oklahoma, March 5 -- The Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation posted the following news:* * *
Presbyterian Health Foundation awards $1 million in grants to OMRF
The Presbyterian Health Foundation has awarded 10 grants totaling $1 million to the Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation.
These grants will support the purchase of critical scientific equipment and studies at OMRF in areas such as Alzheimer's, multiple sclerosis, lupus, sickle cell anemia and ovarian aging.
Timing of the PHF awards is fortunate, as the National Institutes of Health recently announced it would cut ... Show Full Article OKLAHOMA CITY, Oklahoma, March 5 -- The Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation posted the following news: * * * Presbyterian Health Foundation awards $1 million in grants to OMRF The Presbyterian Health Foundation has awarded 10 grants totaling $1 million to the Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation. These grants will support the purchase of critical scientific equipment and studies at OMRF in areas such as Alzheimer's, multiple sclerosis, lupus, sickle cell anemia and ovarian aging. Timing of the PHF awards is fortunate, as the National Institutes of Health recently announced it would cutthe amount it pays to biomedical institutions like OMRF for research grants. A federal judge in Washington, D.C., has halted implementation of the rate cut pending further review.
"The uncertainty of future NIH grant funding levels means alternative forms of support now have greater importance than ever," said PHF President Rick McCune. "We're proud of the role we play in filling that gap, assuring that future scientific discoveries continue to be made in Oklahoma."
PHF primarily supports the state's biotechnology, medical research and education organizations, with an emphasis on research and innovation taking place within the Oklahoma Health Center campus in Oklahoma City. Its awards support the early research results needed to compete for larger grants.
For instance, with a new $65,000 PHF grant, OMRF physician-scientist Hal Scofield, M.D., hopes to uncover why women are far more prone than men to developing lupus.
Scofield suspects the absence of a particular gene protects men against lupus. With the PHF grant, he'll perform experiments testing this theory.
The $100,000 PHF grant awarded to OMRF scientists Michael Stout, Ph.D., and Xin Geng, Ph.D., will provide early study results involving the lymphatic system, which helps drain toxic substances from tissues. The researchers hypothesize that in women, malfunctioning lymphatic vessels lead to premature ovarian aging.
"This study will allow us to get some critical answers that otherwise would have been delayed, perhaps indefinitely," Stout said. "PHF's support gets us ahead of the curve."
PHF has contributed $20 million in research grants to OMRF over the past decade. Since its inception in 1985, PHF has invested $225 million in biomedical research, discovery, and health initiatives in Oklahoma.
"For three decades, PHF has helped us purchase essential lab equipment and supported the testing of new ideas," said Courtney Griffin, Ph.D., OMRF's vice president of research. "Many of these ideas might have remained unexplored without PHF's help. We're grateful for their continued trust in our scientists' expertise and creativity."
***
Original text here: https://omrf.org/2025/03/05/presbyterian-health-foundation-awards-1-million-in-grants-to-omrf/
LAWSUIT: LGBTQ student group sues to overturn Texas A&M's unconstitutional drag ban
PHILADELPHIA, Pennsylvania, March 5 -- The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression posted the following news release:* * *
LAWSUIT: LGBTQ student group sues to overturn Texas A&M's unconstitutional drag ban
HOUSTON, Texas, March 5, 2025 -- The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of an LGBTQ+ student organization to block a new policy from the Texas A&M University System that bans drag performances on its 11 public campuses -- a clear violation of the First Amendment.
FIRE is asking a court in the Southern District of Texas to halt Texas ... Show Full Article PHILADELPHIA, Pennsylvania, March 5 -- The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression posted the following news release: * * * LAWSUIT: LGBTQ student group sues to overturn Texas A&M's unconstitutional drag ban HOUSTON, Texas, March 5, 2025 -- The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of an LGBTQ+ student organization to block a new policy from the Texas A&M University System that bans drag performances on its 11 public campuses -- a clear violation of the First Amendment. FIRE is asking a court in the Southern District of Texas to halt TexasA&M officials from enforcing the drag ban, abruptly adopted on Friday afternoon. The lawsuit is on behalf of the Queer Empowerment Council, a coalition of student organizations at Texas A&M University-College Station and the organizers of the fifth annual "Draggieland" event that was scheduled to be held on campus on March 27.
"We refuse to let Texas A&M dictate which voices belong on campus," said the Queer Empowerment Council. "Drag is self-expression, drag is discovery, drag is empowerment, and no amount of censorship will silence us."
Texas A&M students first held "Draggieland" (a portmanteau of "Drag" and "Aggieland," a nickname for Texas A&M) at the campus theatre complex in 2020, and the event has been held on campus annually ever since. But last Friday, the Board of Regents suddenly voted to ban drag events entirely across all 11 Texas A&M campuses.
"The board finds that it is inconsistent with the system's mission and core values of its universities, including the value of respect for others, to allow special event venues of the universities to be used for drag shows," the board's resolution reads. The regents also claimed that drag performances are "offensive" and "likely to create or contribute to a hostile environment for women."
"Public universities can't shut down student expression simply because the administration doesn't like the 'ideology' or finds the expression 'demeaning,'" said FIRE attorney Adam Steinbaugh. "That's true not only of drag performances, but also religion, COVID, race, politics, and countless other topics where campus officials are too often eager to silence dissent."
The regents' attempts to justify the drag ban as anything other than illegal viewpoint discrimination are feeble. The board admits they want to ban drag on campus because they find it "demeans women," "promotes gender ideology," or runs contrary to their "values"--- but the First Amendment squarely protects speech that offends and even angers others. And in all cases, it prevents campus officials from silencing speech because they disagree with the "ideology." As a taxpayer-funded university system, Texas A&M campuses cannot treat some student events differently simply because they dislike the view being expressed.
"Even putting on an on-campus production of Shakespeare or Mrs. Doubtfire, or taking part in powderpuff, could be banned at A&M if some hostile administrator thinks they 'promote gender ideology,'" said FIRE senior attorney JT Morris. "But if the First Amendment means anything, it's that the government can't silence ideologies they don't like -- real or perceived."
Title IX's prohibition on creating a "hostile environment" also does not give public universities the ability to run around the First Amendment. FIRE has long seen efforts to suppress speech on the basis that it might contribute to a "hostile environment" because someone finds it offensive, but if speech can be suppressed because someone believes it is offensive, no speech is safe. The First Amendment does not permit public universities to suppress speech because someone thinks it is inappropriate.
In order to fit the definition of harassment the Supreme Court has established, speech must be "objectively offensive" AND "severe" AND "pervasive." A once-a-year drag show in an enclosed theatre that requires a ticket to enter doesn't even come close to satisfying those strict conditions.
"If other students dislike or disagree with Draggieland, the solution is simple: don't go," said FIRE attorney Jeff Zeman. "Or they could organize a protest, as students opposing drag have in the past. The First Amendment protects drag and the ability to criticize drag -- and it forbids the government silencing the side it disagrees with."
Finally, the regents' motion notes that "there are alternative locations for such events off-campus." But that violates the First Amendment, too. The government cannot censor speech in places the First Amendment protects it, just because a speaker might express themselves elsewhere. "Draggieland" highlights why that principle is so vital: if a student group can't reach their campus community with their message, then their message can't fulfill its purpose.
In the face of unconstitutional censorship, Draggieland organizers have remained unbowed. They have announced to supporters that they will hold an on-campus "Day of Drag" protest on Thursday and that they are committed to holding the event even if forced off-campus.
"We are committed to ensuring that our voices are heard, and that Draggieland will go on, no matter the obstacles we face," the Queer Empowerment Council announced.
* * *
The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to defending and sustaining the individual rights of all Americans to free speech and free thought--the most essential qualities of liberty. FIRE recognizes that colleges and universities play a vital role in preserving free thought within a free society. To this end, we place a special emphasis on defending the individual rights of students and faculty members on our nation's campuses, including freedom of speech, freedom of association, due process, legal equality, religious liberty, and sanctity of conscience.
CONTACT:
Alex Griswold, Communications Campaign Manager, FIRE: 215-717-3473; media@thefire.org
***
Original text here: https://www.thefire.org/news/lawsuit-lgbtq-student-group-sues-overturn-texas-ams-unconstitutional-drag-ban