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NASA IG: NASA's Management of the Human Landing System Contracts
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. IG-26-004) on March 10, 2026 entitled "NASA's Management of the Human Landing System Contracts."
Here are the results in brief:
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Why We Performed This Audit
NASA's Artemis campaign aims to return astronauts to the Moon for the first time since Apollo 17 and establish the framework for a sustainable lunar presence. The Human Landing System (HLS)--which will enable crew to descend to the lunar surface, temporarily live and work there, and ascend back to lunar orbit--is a key component to that endeavor.
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. IG-26-004) on March 10, 2026 entitled "NASA's Management of the Human Landing System Contracts."
Here are the results in brief:
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Why We Performed This Audit
NASA's Artemis campaign aims to return astronauts to the Moon for the first time since Apollo 17 and establish the framework for a sustainable lunar presence. The Human Landing System (HLS)--which will enable crew to descend to the lunar surface, temporarily live and work there, and ascend back to lunar orbit--is a key component to that endeavor.To this end, NASA awarded firm-fixed-price contracts to SpaceX and Blue Origin for the rapid development and demonstration of each company's unique HLS.
Since the HLS Program's inception in 2019, NASA has obligated $6.9 billion for HLS development and estimates it will spend $18.3 billion through fiscal year 2030. NASA is utilizing a tailored program management approach, giving the HLS providers significant latitude to implement their own project management practices while allowing for a reduced number of Agency-required reviews and data submissions. However, to gain visibility into the providers' development work and ensure they are meeting safety and operational requirements, the HLS Program is employing an insight/ oversight model. Given NASA's significant financial investment and the high stakes of returning astronauts to the Moon's surface, it is essential the Agency maintains sufficient awareness into the risks associated with these new technologies and the authority to require system and operational changes to ensure the safety of the crew.
In this audit, we evaluated (1) the extent to which the HLS providers are meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) the HLS Program's implementation of the insight/oversight model; and (3) the Program's identification and mitigation of risks to astronaut safety. To complete this work, we interviewed HLS Program officials, including program management, contracting officers, contracting officer representatives, safety officials, and systems engineering personnel, among others, as well as officials from SpaceX and Blue Origin. We also examined SpaceX and Blue Origin contract files, data from NASA's financial systems, Agency review milestones and provider deliverables, risk assessments, and technical requirements. Additionally, we reviewed and analyzed HLS Program and provider schedule data.
What We Found
NASA's acquisition approach for the lunar landers has been effective in controlling contract costs, with the SpaceX and Blue Origin contracts having only increased by 6 percent and less than 1 percent, respectively. This was due in part to NASA negotiating mutually beneficial contract changes at no cost to the government. However, both SpaceX and Blue Origin have experienced schedule delays and face technical and integration challenges that have the potential to further impact lander costs and delivery schedules. In particular, SpaceX's lander will not be ready for a June 2027 lunar landing. To accelerate lander development to meet a 2028 lunar landing date, NASA is assessing proposals from both SpaceX and Blue Origin, but it is too early to determine the technical feasibility, financial implications, and schedule impacts of these proposals.
The HLS Program's use of insight and collaborations has shown to be an effective management approach to gain visibility and participatory involvement into lander development and data. However, both insight and collaborations are not without financial costs to the Agency. The HLS Program has insight into more than 1,100 focus areas between SpaceX and Blue Origin, with increased insight into engine development, cryogenic fluid management, and crew training. As the providers continue development and approach critical milestones, increases in insight will likely require additional resources to conduct analyses, reviews, and tests. NASA is also collaborating with SpaceX and Blue Origin by providing requested expertise and knowledge in technical areas such as engineering or safety through the increasing use of NASA personnel and support contractors. While we found the work beneficial to HLS development, it comes at no cost to the providers and is dependent on NASA resources.
Furthermore, while the providers' use of Government Task Agreements (GTA) to access specialized NASA facilities and services has proven to be successful, we found the HLS Program does not have a formal process outlining how to manage GTAs submitted at contract proposal that have since been canceled or unfulfilled, or new GTAs requested after contract award, which are the financial responsibility of the providers. This lack of guidance led to confusion and a pause in GTA work in early 2025. As a result, the HLS Program went through a reconciliation process authorizing NASA to decrement $1.5 million from SpaceX's contract in 2026. The Agency determined a decrement to Blue Origin's contract was not warranted.
We noted NASA is proactively taking measures to mitigate and prevent hazards associated with the landers, such as requiring lunar ascent tests as part of the providers' uncrewed demonstration missions. However, despite these efforts, and considering the lunar landers carry the highest probability of crew loss, gaps still exist in the Agency's risk reduction methodology. For instance, while HLS Program officials believe the Program is following Agency Test Like You Fly guidance, we found key missed opportunities to apply these principles to the SpaceX and Blue Origin uncrewed demonstration missions. Additionally, NASA and SpaceX disagree on whether the provider is meeting the intent of the Agency's manual control requirement. Incorporating the manual control capability is a key element of HLS's humanrating certification and part of an essential crew survival strategy. Key decisions on Blue Origin's manual control design have yet to be made.
We also observed limitations in the Agency's approach to crew survival analyses--the evaluation of available crew survival capabilities to counter a catastrophic event--due to functional constraints and the availability of resources. Since the analyses typically mature later in the landers' design cycle, the decision packages used to recommend new or enhanced capabilities that improve the likelihood of crew survival are limited to capturing resultant risks rather than preemptively driving risk reduction. Moreover, the analyses do not account for extended crew survival once an immediate threat is over. While NASA is taking steps to prevent catastrophic events from occurring, ultimately, should the astronauts encounter a life-threatening emergency in space or on the lunar surface, NASA does not have the capability to rescue the stranded crew.
What We Recommended
To improve management of government-spent funds and enhance crew safety and survival during the Artemis missions, we recommended NASA officials: (1) ensure an approach for managing GTAs that have been canceled, unfulfilled, modified, or realigned is formalized in HLS Program policy; (2) ensure an approach for decrementing costs for GTAs submitted after contract proposal, including a timeline for recovery, is formalized in HLS Program policy; (3) update the Use of Government Resources clause in both the SpaceX and Blue Origin contracts to reflect GTA policy changes; (4) consult with the Commercial Crew Program to review post-variance acceptance risk assessment findings related to its manual control waiver for lessons that can be applied prior to HLS certification; and (5) update crew survival analyses, including decision packages, to include strategies for extended crew survival.
We provided a draft of this report to NASA management who concurred with Recommendations 1, 2, 4, and 5 and partially concurred with Recommendation 3. We consider management's comments and described planned actions responsive; therefore, the recommendations are resolved and will be closed upon completion and verification of the proposed corrective actions.
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View full report here: https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/nasas-management-of-the-human-landing-system-contracts/
NASA IG: NASA's Management of Programs and Projects After Mission Termination--Canceled or Repurposed Artemis Campaign Systems
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. ML-26-002) June 24, 2026 entitled "NASA's Management of Programs and Projects after Mission Termination--Canceled or Repurposed Artemis Campaign Systems."
Here are excerpts:
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TO: Lori Glaze, Acting Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate
SUBJECT: Interim Memorandum, NASA's Management of Programs and Projects after Mission Termination--Canceled or Repurposed Artemis Campaign Systems (Report No. ML-26-002; Assignment No. A-26-06-00-SARD)
The Office of Inspector
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. ML-26-002) June 24, 2026 entitled "NASA's Management of Programs and Projects after Mission Termination--Canceled or Repurposed Artemis Campaign Systems."
Here are excerpts:
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TO: Lori Glaze, Acting Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate
SUBJECT: Interim Memorandum, NASA's Management of Programs and Projects after Mission Termination--Canceled or Repurposed Artemis Campaign Systems (Report No. ML-26-002; Assignment No. A-26-06-00-SARD)
The Office of InspectorGeneral (OIG) initiated an audit in March 2026 examining NASA's management of developed assets for programs and projects terminated prior to launch or operations. Within the scope of this audit are four Artemis systems--with a combined current contract value of $5.9 billion-- that the Agency recently announced plans to cancel or repurpose: the Space Launch System (SLS) Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), SLS Universal Stage Adapter (USA), Mobile Launcher 2 (ML-2), and Gateway's Habitation and Logistics Outpost (HALO). Collectively, these four systems have experienced billions of dollars in cost increases and years of schedule delays.
In February 2026, NASA announced that it was reformulating the Artemis campaign in accordance with the President's National Space Policy to return American astronauts to the Moon and establish an enduring lunar presence.1 To this end, the Agency intends to increase its cadence of missions by standardizing the SLS two-stage, heavy-lift rocket and adding a new mission to low Earth orbit before sending astronauts to the Moon's surface in 2028. To achieve its goal of one crewed lunar landing mission per year, NASA is no longer planning to upgrade the SLS to a more powerful configuration utilizing the EUS, USA, and ML-2. Further, rather than utilizing the Gateway as a staging location for lunar surface missions, NASA plans to shift its efforts to building a permanent Moon base.
Given the substantial investment, evolving changes to the Artemis campaign, and urgency of the current fiscal year budget cycle, we are issuing this interim memorandum to document the cost, schedule, and development posture of these systems as well as the projected cost and schedule to complete them if NASA had not reformulated the Artemis campaign. These projections are not intended to serve as comprehensive cost and schedule estimates. Rather, they illustrate potential outcomes based on available historical cost and schedule data provided by NASA. Details about our methodology and associated limitations are outlined in Enclosure I. We believe the timely dissemination of this information will be valuable for the Agency, Administration, Congress, and the public as NASA contemplates the future of Artemis.
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View full report here: https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/nasas-management-of-programs-and-projects-after-mission-termination-canceled-or-repurposed-artemis-campaign-systems/
NASA IG: Desk Review of NASA Exchanges' Fiscal Year 2024 Audit Reports Issued by Various Public Accounting Firms
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. IG-26-007) on April 16, 2026 entitled "Desk Review of NASA Exchanges' Fiscal Year 2024 Audit Reports Issued by Various Public Accounting Firms."
Here are excerpts:
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TO: Sidney Schmidt, Acting Chief Financial Officer
David Mitchell, Associate Administrator for Mission Support Directorate
SUBJECT: Final Memorandum, Desk Review of NASA Exchanges' Fiscal Year 2024 Audit Reports Issued by Various Public Accounting Firms (Report No. IG-26-007; Assignment No. D-25-03-00-FMD)
NASA Exchange and Morale
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. IG-26-007) on April 16, 2026 entitled "Desk Review of NASA Exchanges' Fiscal Year 2024 Audit Reports Issued by Various Public Accounting Firms."
Here are excerpts:
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TO: Sidney Schmidt, Acting Chief Financial Officer
David Mitchell, Associate Administrator for Mission Support Directorate
SUBJECT: Final Memorandum, Desk Review of NASA Exchanges' Fiscal Year 2024 Audit Reports Issued by Various Public Accounting Firms (Report No. IG-26-007; Assignment No. D-25-03-00-FMD)
NASA Exchange and MoraleSupport Activities (Exchanges) are entities under NASA's control that operate businesses, such as cafeterias and gift shops, to contribute to the morale and welfare of NASA employees and their families, retirees, and contractors. Exchange activities are generally supported by non-appropriated funds. Exchanges, by contract or other written agreements, operate activities such as food service, retail stores, and vending machines. Funds generated from these services are used to promote, manage, and oversee morale support activities, including, but not limited to, fitness centers, athletic leagues, social clubs, child development centers, and recreation associations.
NASA policy requires each Exchange to maintain financial records in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States. Each Exchange must also obtain an annual audit of its financial statements conducted by a licensed independent public accounting (IPA) firm in accordance with the Government Accountability Office's generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS).
As part of our oversight of the work performed by the IPA firms, we performed a desk review of the independent auditor's report for each Exchange that received an audit or a review for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2024.2 We performed the desk review to determine whether the audit reports met reporting standards applicable to financial audits contained in GAGAS. See Enclosure I for details of the review's scope and methodology.
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View full report here: https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/desk-review-of-nasa-exchanges-fiscal-year-2024-audit-reports-issued-by-various-public-accounting-firms/
Federal Housing Finance Agency IG: 'FHFA's Controls Over Legal Service Payments Were Generally Effective But Did Not Ensure Compliance With All Contractual Requirements'
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. AUD-2026-001) on Feb. 17, 2026 entitled "FHFA's Controls Over Legal Service Payments Were Generally Effective But Did Not Ensure Compliance With All Contractual Requirements".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA or Agency) procures litigation assistance and consulting services from external law firms on a variety of matters. FHFA paid approximately $15.5 million for contracted legal services from April 2024 through March
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. AUD-2026-001) on Feb. 17, 2026 entitled "FHFA's Controls Over Legal Service Payments Were Generally Effective But Did Not Ensure Compliance With All Contractual Requirements".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA or Agency) procures litigation assistance and consulting services from external law firms on a variety of matters. FHFA paid approximately $15.5 million for contracted legal services from April 2024 through March2025 (scope period of this audit).
We conducted this audit to determine whether FHFA implemented effective controls to ensure that payments for legal services were made in accordance with applicable federal laws and regulations, policies and procedures, and contractual requirements.
RESULTS
We determined that FHFA's controls over payments for legal services were generally effective. That is, payments were made in accordance with applicable federal laws and regulations, policies and procedures. However, we noted instances in which controls did not effectively ensure compliance with contractual requirements. In one instance, we identified a legal services invoice that reflected incorrect billing rates and was paid in an incorrect amount. FHFA identified a second invoice with the same billing rate error. Combined, these two invoices resulted in overpayments in September 2024 of approximately $5,208 for contracted legal services during our audit scope (see Appendix II for Schedule of Questioned Costs). In both instances, the Invoice Approver did not ensure that the billed amount met contract specifications. Furthermore, neither the FHFA's Oversight Procedures for Invoice and Payment Procedures nor the training materials specifically mention or outline procedures for validating billing rates. Accordingly, we question costs related to overpayments of $5,208 that violated the contract's terms governing the expenditure of funds. When the Invoice Approver does not ensure the billed amount meets contract specifications, overpayments may continue to occur, resulting in waste of Agency funds.
We also found two instances in which FHFA did not perform control procedures designed to prevent future late payments. We further determined that FHFA's Oversight Procedures for Invoice and Payment Procedures did not define the timeframes for performing such controls. Delayed follow-up increases the risk of repeated late payments and unnecessary costs.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We made six recommendations to address our two findings. In a written response, FHFA management agreed with our recommendations.
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The report is posted at: https://www.fhfaoig.gov/AuditsAndEvaluations/fhfas-controls-over-legal-service-payments-were-generally-effective-did-not
Federal Housing Finance Agency IG: 'FHFA Did Not Consistently Comply With Policies and Procedures for Paying Employee Reimbursements and Stipends'
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following evaluation report (No. EVL-2026-002) on March 31, 2026 entitled "FHFA Did Not Consistently Comply with Policies and Procedures for Paying Employee Reimbursements and Stipends".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA or Agency) provides reimbursements and stipends to its employees for approved job-related expenses, including professional licensing and certification, professional liability insurance, gym membership, expedited clearance through
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following evaluation report (No. EVL-2026-002) on March 31, 2026 entitled "FHFA Did Not Consistently Comply with Policies and Procedures for Paying Employee Reimbursements and Stipends".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA or Agency) provides reimbursements and stipends to its employees for approved job-related expenses, including professional licensing and certification, professional liability insurance, gym membership, expedited clearance throughairport security, frequent official travel, and home office expenses.
In response to a 2020 FHFA Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit report, the Agency updated its reimbursements and stipends policy and reinforced its policy and procedures with FHFA staff and supervisors.
We initiated this compliance review to assess whether FHFA complied with its reimbursements and stipends policy and procedures from October 1, 2022, to March 31, 2025.
RESULTS
We found that FHFA did not consistently comply with its policies and procedures when issuing employee reimbursements and stipends. In general, we identified instances in which payments were (1) unsupported by required documentation or in violation of policy; (2) made to ineligible employees or those without required, approved agreements; and (3) disbursed without confirmation of accuracy. We also found that FHFA did not consistently comply with records retention and management requirements. As a result, we question costs totaling $65,690 that violated the Agency's policies and procedures governing the expenditure of funds. Of this amount, $9,580 were unsupported costs. See Appendix II for Schedule of Questioned Costs.
Without enforcing adherence to controls over payments of reimbursements and stipends, including records management requirements, FHFA risks making improper payments in the future.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We made nine recommendations to address our findings. In a written response, FHFA management agreed with our recommendations.
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The report is posted at: https://www.fhfaoig.gov/compliance-reviews/fhfa-did-not-consistently-comply-policies-and-procedures-paying-employee
Federal Housing Finance Agency IG: 'FHFA Continues to Monitor and Assess Adequacy of Fannie Mae's Allowance for Loan Losses in Its Multifamily Line of Business'
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following evaluation report (No. EVL-2026-001) on Jan. 6, 2026 entitled "FHFA Continues to Monitor and Assess the Adequacy of Fannie Mae's Allowance for Loan Losses in Its Multifamily Line of Business".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
Fannie Mae provides liquidity to the mortgage market by purchasing and securitizing multifamily mortgage loans. Each quarter, Fannie Mae develops an allowance for loan losses, which is an estimate of loans that Fannie Mae does not expect to collect, and
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following evaluation report (No. EVL-2026-001) on Jan. 6, 2026 entitled "FHFA Continues to Monitor and Assess the Adequacy of Fannie Mae's Allowance for Loan Losses in Its Multifamily Line of Business".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
Fannie Mae provides liquidity to the mortgage market by purchasing and securitizing multifamily mortgage loans. Each quarter, Fannie Mae develops an allowance for loan losses, which is an estimate of loans that Fannie Mae does not expect to collect, andsets aside funds to cover expected losses. In its 2024 annual report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Fannie Mae disclosed that it set aside $752 million to cover such losses. Fannie Mae included potential losses from mortgage fraud in its multifamily business in its allowance for loan losses.
This evaluation assessed the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA or Agency) oversight of Fannie Mae's multifamily allowance for loan losses, including the amounts set aside for expected losses due to fraud for the 2022, 2023, and 2024 examination cycles.
RESULTS
We determined that Fannie Mae adjusted its allowance for loan losses to address suspected fraud found in its multifamily book of business. We also concluded that FHFA has taken supervisory action to examine and assess Fannie Mae's multifamily allowance for loan losses, including fraud risk in its multifamily book of business. FHFA's Division of Enterprise Regulation (DER) reviewed and assessed the allowance each quarter and did not question the adequacy of the allowance. DER also determined that Fannie Mae's earnings were
Fannie Mae is taking actions to address an increase in suspected multifamily fraud detected in 2023 and 2024. Those actions include enhancing mechanisms for reporting potential fraud, addressing property condition issues, conducting additional training, clarifying guidelines, and exercising its contractual remedies with lenders.
Lastly, we identified an issue that did not rise to the level of a finding but deserves FHFA's consideration. We noted that DER determined that certain Fannie Mae practices . Although DER addressed those practices through examination findings, and management is currently implementing a remediation plan, DER did not communicate to Fannie Mae that the practices . Given that a could result in an enforcement action, DER should consider taking appropriate steps to ensure it puts Fannie Mae (or Freddie Mac) on notice of any such failure in the future.
We made no recommendations in this report.
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The report is posted at: https://www.fhfaoig.gov/sites/default/files/EVL-2026-001_redacted.pdf
Federal Housing Finance Agency IG: 'DBR's Quality Control Program Did Not Detect a Documentation Deficiency in Its Oversight of FHLBank System's Information Security and Cybersecurity Risk Management'
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. AUD-2026-003) on May 13, 2026 entitled "DBR's Quality Control Program Did Not Detect a Documentation Deficiency in Its Oversight of the FHLBank System's Information Security and Cybersecurity Risk Management".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
Each Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) and the Office of Finance (collectively, the FHLBank System) relies heavily on information systems and other technology to conduct and manage business. The FHLBank System needs to
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. AUD-2026-003) on May 13, 2026 entitled "DBR's Quality Control Program Did Not Detect a Documentation Deficiency in Its Oversight of the FHLBank System's Information Security and Cybersecurity Risk Management".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
Each Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) and the Office of Finance (collectively, the FHLBank System) relies heavily on information systems and other technology to conduct and manage business. The FHLBank System needs toprotect the information technology assets and data under its control and manage cybersecurity risks - intentional and unintentional acts that may jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information technology assets and data.
As part of our ongoing oversight of the Division of Federal Home Loan Bank Regulation's (DBR) supervision of the FHLBank System, we performed this audit to assess whether DBR provided sufficient oversight of the FHLBank System's information security and cybersecurity risk management.
RESULTS
We determined that DBR provided sufficient oversight of the FHLBank System's information security and cybersecurity risk management. Specifically, we concluded that DBR designed examination guidance that provided examiners with the worksteps needed to provide such oversight. DBR examiners performed risk-based examinations of information security and cybersecurity risk management for the four examinations in our sample and generally documented their supervisory conclusions in accordance with DBR's workpaper standards. DBR also issued information security and cybersecurity-related Matters Requiring Attention (MRA); monitored the FHLBanks' progress to resolve deficiencies indentified in the MRAs; and closed MRAs, as appropriate, in accordance with its guidance. Overall, we found that DBR examiners were qualified and had the relevant experience to perform the Information Security Management workprogram examinations.
Although DBR provided sufficient oversight of the FHLBank System's information security and cybersecurity risk management, we found that DBR's quality control program did not detect and correct an instance in which the examiner analysis supporting a supervisory conclusion was not documented in the examination workpapers. The risk of incorrect supervisory conclusions increases when DBR's quality control program does not detect and correct examination workpaper deficiencies.
RECOMMENDATION
We made one recommendation to address our finding. In a written response, FHFA management agreed with our recommendation.
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The report is posted at: https://www.fhfaoig.gov/AuditsAndEvaluations/dbrs-quality-control-program-did-not-detect-documentation-deficiency-its
