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GAO Issues Report: VA Health Care Facilities - Leveraging Partnerships to Address Capital Investment Needs
WASHINGTON, May 15 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-106017) entitled "VA Health Care Facilities - Leveraging Partnerships to Address Capital Investment Needs".Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report.
What GAO Found: "The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offers health care services to about 9 million veterans at its 171 medical centers and more than 1,100 outpatient facilities. VA has long faced challenges addressing its pressing infrastructure demands. As part of a partnership pilot program, VA is authorized to accept up to five donations ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 15 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-106017) entitled "VA Health Care Facilities - Leveraging Partnerships to Address Capital Investment Needs". Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report. What GAO Found: "The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offers health care services to about 9 million veterans at its 171 medical centers and more than 1,100 outpatient facilities. VA has long faced challenges addressing its pressing infrastructure demands. As part of a partnership pilot program, VA is authorized to accept up to five donationsof real property--such as buildings, facility construction, or facility improvements--from non-federal entities before the end of 2026. It is also authorized to use certain appropriated funds to help the donating entity finance, design, or construct a facility in connection with its donation. Through this program, VA has received one real property donation--an ambulatory care center in Omaha, NE--and a second--an inpatient hospital in Tulsa, OK--is planned. The Omaha project has provided lessons learned regarding efficiencies of this approach--such as the use of an electronic design-review process--that could benefit future VA construction projects. We identified several considerations that are relevant in seeking additional donation partnerships, such as challenges related to restrictions on which projects are eligible and the sizeable donation required.
In 2010, VA and the Department of Defense (DOD) integrated two medical facilities in North Chicago, IL into the Captain James A. Lovell Federal Health Care Center as a 5-year demonstration project. The Lovell Center was intended to create a national model for the joint delivery of health care. It was also expected to inform decision makers about whether this model of care would be effective if replicated at other VA and DOD locations. However, the departments determined that evaluations of the Lovell Center integration did not find that sharing facilities provided benefits over a "joint venture" approach. In a joint venture, the departments share space but manage their operations separately. In part because of the challenges of converting the Lovell Center to a joint venture, in 2016 VA and DOD jointly recommended continuing the Lovell Center's operation as an integrated facility with periodic reviews and implementation of the recommended improvements."
Why GAO Did This Study: "VA administers one of the largest health care systems in the nation. VA estimates that fulfilling all of its priority infrastructure projects would cost approximately $63-$76 billion as of fiscal year 2021. GAO has reported that VA has struggled with instances of cost overruns and time delays in constructing some facilities. VA has leveraged partnerships to address its capital needs, including a donation partnership with the private sector (known as CHIP-IN) and an integrated health care facility with DOD.
This statement discusses (1) VA's donation partnership pilot program, efficiencies identified, and considerations relevant to seeking additional donation partnerships, and (2) VA's and DOD's integration of their health care facilities in North Chicago, IL and the agencies' observations on the integration. This statement is based on GAO's prior work."
What GAO Recommends: "GAO has made recommendations to VA regarding the use of leading practices for pilot programs (GAO - 19 - 117) and a lessons-learned process for the donation partnership projects (GAO-21-133). VA concurred with and implemented these recommendations.
GAO also recommended that VA and DOD collaborate to update a cost- effectiveness analysis for the Lovell Center (GAO-17-197). VA and DOD concurred with and implemented this recommendation."
The report was sent to Rep. Julia Brownley, D-California, chairman, and Rep. Jack Bergman, R-Michigan, ranking member of the House Veterans' Affairs subcommittee on Health, on May 12, 2022.
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Chairwoman Brownley, Ranking Member Bergman, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on partnerships for capital investments in VA health care facilities. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers one of the largest health care systems in the nation. VA offers health care services to about 9 million veterans at its 171 VA medical centers and more than 1,100 outpatient facilities as of September 2021. VA has pressing infrastructure demands and estimates that fulfilling all of its priority infrastructure projects would cost approximately $63-$76 billion as of fiscal year 2021. We have reported that VA has struggled with instances of cost overruns and time delays in constructing some facilities. VA has also struggled to lease health care facilities; no major leases have been authorized in nearly 5 years.
In recent years, VA has leveraged two partnership approaches to address its capital investment needs: (1) a donation partnership with non-federal entities (known as CHIP-IN) authorized by the Communities Helping Invest through Property and Improvements Needed for Veterans Act of 2016;/1 and (2) integration of a health care facility with the Department of Defense (DOD) in North Chicago, IL. VA may seek additional partnerships, which VA refers to as strategic collaborations, with other entities to help meet capacity in its medical centers and facilities.
My testimony today focuses on our prior work on these two partnership approaches. Specifically, my testimony discusses (1) VA's CHIP-IN pilot program, efficiencies identified, and considerations relevant to seeking additional donation partnerships, and (2) VA's and DOD's integration of their health care facilities in North Chicago, IL and the agencies' observations on the integration. For this statement, we primarily relied on four reports we issued from January 2017 to February 2022./2 Information on our objectives, scope, and methodology for that work can be found in each of the reports./3
We conducted the work on which this statement was based in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
See footnotes here: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-106017.pdf
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The text of the GAO report is available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-106017
GAO Issues Report: COVID-19 - FDA Took Steps to Help Make Tests Available
WASHINGTON, May 15 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-104266) entitled "COVID-19 - FDA Took Steps to Help Make Tests Available; Policy for Future Public Health Emergencies Needed".Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report.
What GAO Found: "The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) took several actions aimed at increasing the availability of COVID-19 tests in the United States. This included granting emergency use authorizations (EUA) for more than 400 COVID-19 tests and sample collection devices by the end of 2021 (see figure https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104266). ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 15 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-104266) entitled "COVID-19 - FDA Took Steps to Help Make Tests Available; Policy for Future Public Health Emergencies Needed". Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report. What GAO Found: "The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) took several actions aimed at increasing the availability of COVID-19 tests in the United States. This included granting emergency use authorizations (EUA) for more than 400 COVID-19 tests and sample collection devices by the end of 2021 (see figure https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104266).In a public health emergency, FDA may grant EUAs to temporarily allow the use of unapproved medical products, provided there is evidence that the product may be effective and that the known and potential benefits outweigh known and potential risks. FDA also exercised enforcement discretion for certain COVID-19 tests --that is, it did not object to laboratories' use of these COVID-19 tests before FDA had authorized them; this did not apply to tests that could be used at home. FDA's use of enforcement discretion helped increase test availability early in the pandemic.
As of September 30, 2021, FDA had exercised its enforcement discretion for 370 tests. Test developers had submitted EUA requests for these tests, but FDA had not yet reviewed them. FDA officials told GAO they had concerns about the lack of review for these unauthorized tests, and as the number grew, the risks of this policy began to outweigh the benefits. Nevertheless, it was not until November 2021 that FDA updated its COVID-19 test policy with the intention of phasing out the agency's use of enforcement discretion and reducing the number of unauthorized tests. However, FDA has no policy for when it would begin and end exercising enforcement discretion for the use of unauthorized tests in a future public health emergency. Without such a policy, if FDA were to exercise similar enforcement discretion in the future, the agency could face the risk that tests with uncertain accuracy and reliability could be available for use for an extended period of time, even when a sufficient number of authorized tests are available. This could hamper an effective response and recovery during a crisis.
FDA monitors the performance of all COVID-19 tests--whether granted an EUA or not--through reports of performance problems submitted to FDA by test developers, health care providers, and consumers. According to FDA, this includes reports of false positive or false negative test results. By December 31, 2021, FDA had received more than 18,000 such reports for COVID-19 tests and took action to address identified problems. For example, FDA issued 10 letters to clinical laboratory staff and health care providers to inform them of safety concerns about COVID-19 tests."
Why GAO Did This Study: "Diagnostic testing for COVID-19 is critical to tracking the virus, informing treatment, and suppressing transmission. However, because COVID-19 is caused by a novel virus, no test existed at the beginning of the pandemic. Typically, medical devices, such as diagnostic tests, must be approved or cleared by FDA before they can be offered. However, FDA's EUA authority requires a lower level of evidence than the effectiveness standard normally required for FDA product approval; therefore, it can help tests become available in a shorter amount of time. Test developers submit EUA requests to FDA that include data on a test's performance, and FDA reviews the data to determine whether to grant an EUA.
GAO was asked to review FDA's oversight of tests for COVID-19. This report examines, among other things, 1) the actions FDA took to help make COVID-19 tests available for use, 2) the number of tests FDA authorized and those for which it exercised enforcement discretion, and 3) FDA's monitoring of these tests after they were available for use. GAO reviewed agency documentation, and interviewed FDA and associations that represent test developers."
What GAO Recommends: "GAO recommends that FDA develop a policy for the use of enforcement discretion regarding unauthorized tests in future public health emergencies. This policy should include the conditions under which FDA would begin and end the use of such discretion. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with our recommendation."
The report was sent to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vermont, chairman, Sen. Richard C. Shelby, R-Alabama, vice chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Oregon, chairman, Sen. Mike Crapo, R-Idaho, ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, Sen. Patty Murray, D-Washington, chairman, Sen. Richard Burr, R-North Carolina, ranking member of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, Sen. Gary Peters, D-Michigan, chairman, Sen. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Sen. Kyrsten Sinema, D-Arizona, chairman, Sen. James Lankford, R-Oklahoma, ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee on Government Operations and Border Management, Rep. Rosa L. DeLauro, D-Connecticut, chairman, Rep. Kay Granger, R-Texas, ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee, Rep. Frank Pallone Jr., D-New Jersey, chairman, Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, R-Washington, Republican leader of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, D-Mississippi, chairman, Rep. John Katko, R-New York, ranking member of the House Homeland Security Committee, Rep. Carolyn Maloney, D-New York, chairwoman, Rep. James Comer, R-Kentucky, ranking member of the House Oversight and Reform Committee, Rep. Richard E. Neal, D-Massachusetts, chairman, Rep. Kevin Brady, R-Texas, Republican leader of the House Ways and Means Committee, and Rep. Abigail Spanberger, D-Virginia, on May 12, 2022.
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May 12, 2022
To: Congressional Addressees
The COVID-19 pandemic has had devastating effects on public health and the economy. As of May 4, 2022, more than 81 million cases of COVID-19 have been reported in the U.S. since COVID-19 was first identified in January 2020, and as of the week ending April 30, 2022, over 997,000 deaths associated with COVID-19 have been reported./1 Testing for COVID-19 is critical to diagnosing cases and tracking the virus, informing treatment, and suppressing transmission. Because COVID-19 was caused by a novel virus, no diagnostic test existed at the beginning of the pandemic. CDC data show that as of May 1, 2022, more than 870 million COVID-19 tests have been performed in the United States./2 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for ensuring that medical devices sold in the United States, including diagnostic tests, provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. As such, one of FDA's roles, according to FDA officials, includes determining whether these tests provide sufficiently accurate and reliable results, and helping to provide timely access to such tests. Typically, before a medical device can be marketed in the U.S., it must be approved or cleared by FDA./3 However, during a public health emergency like the COVID-19 pandemic, the Secretary of HHS may declare that circumstances justify the emergency use of unapproved medical products./4 On February 4, 2020, the Secretary of HHS declared that circumstances justified FDA's issuance of emergency use authorizations (EUA) for tests to detect or diagnose SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, until the public health emergency declaration is terminated.
FDA's EUA authority allows the agency to authorize tests that it reasonably believes may be effective to be made available for use. This authority generally allows for products to be available in a shorter time frame than typically would be necessary for full approval because it requires a lower level of evidence than the "effectiveness" standard that is normally required for FDA product approvals./5 Additionally, during the COVID-19 public health emergency, FDA exercised enforcement discretion for certain COVID-19 tests -that is, FDA did not object to laboratories' use of these tests before authorizing them. As part of its mission to ensure that medical devices are safe and effective, FDA monitors COVID-19 tests after they reach the market to detect performance problems or other potential safety issues.
We placed HHS's leadership and coordination of public health emergencies on GAO's High Risk list in January 2022, in part due to concerns related to HHS' handling of COVID-19, including testing. HHS's response to the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted longstanding concerns we raised about the department's ability to execute its role leading federal public health and medical preparedness for, and response to, such public health emergencies.
You asked us to review issues related to FDA's oversight of COVID-19 tests. In this report, we examine
1. FDA's actions to help make COVID-19 tests available for use and stakeholders' views on those actions;
2. the number of tests FDA authorized and the number for which it exercised enforcement discretion; and
3. how FDA monitors COVID-19 tests after they are available for use.
In addition, this report is part of our body of COVID-19 work in response to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act./6 The CARES Act included a provision for us to report on our ongoing monitoring and oversight efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic./7 To address all three objectives, we reviewed relevant agency documentation related to EUAs and COVID-19 tests and interviewed agency officials from FDA's Center for Devices and Radiological Health to understand FDA's policies and processes applicable to COVID-19 tests.
For example, we reviewed multiple iterations of FDA's Policy for Coronavirus Disease-2019 Tests During the Public Health Emergency./8 We reviewed publicly available information on FDA's website about COVID-19 tests, such as information about tests FDA has authorized and not authorized and FDA's responses to frequently asked questions. The scope of our review did not include an examination of the appropriateness of FDA's EUA decisions for COVID-19 tests. Throughout this report, when we discuss "COVID-19 tests," we are referring broadly to diagnostic and antibody tests, unless otherwise specified.
To examine FDA's actions to help make COVID-19 tests available for use, stakeholders' views on those actions, and the extent to which FDA exercised enforcement discretion for COVID-19 tests, we also reviewed FDA data and interviewed a selection of associations that represent test developers. We reviewed FDA data from February 2020 through December 2021 on the number of EUA requests for tests FDA received, authorized, and revoked, and on FDA's EUA review times. In some cases, we present data in this report as of September 30, 2021 because it was the end fiscal year 2021 and because it fell in the period prior to FDA's issuance of revised guidance in November 2021, which sought to reduce the number of unauthorized tests that could be used. We assessed the reliability of these data by asking agency officials about how FDA stores and maintains the information, and any known reliability issues. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes. To examine stakeholders' views on FDA's actions, we conducted interviews with or received written responses from a nongeneralizable selection of laboratory and device manufacturer associations./9 We selected these associations because their members included COVID-19 test developers. We asked them about their perspectives on FDA's policies and processes for reviewing and authorizing COVID-19 tests.
To keep apprised of FDA's updates and information FDA shares with test developers, we listened to FDA's public Town Hall conference calls for COVID-19 test developers between February 2021 and January 2022, which FDA generally held weekly or biweekly. We also reviewed FDA's standard operating procedure for COVID-19 test authorization and publications authored by FDA officials that described FDA's challenges in making COVID-19 tests available for use and lessons learned for future public health emergencies./10 We also collected information in April 2021 using an email-based questionnaire from the eight states and one territory that chose to authorize laboratories within their state or territory to develop COVID-19 tests for emergency use and that perform testing; in addition, we interviewed officials from one of the states to collect more in-depth illustrative information about their test review process and standards./11 We reviewed the websites of a non-generalizable sample of 25 COVID-19 test developers to determine if their tests appeared to be available for purchase before FDA had authorized them. In evaluating FDA's actions, we considered recommendations in FDA's 2021 COVID19 Pandemic Recovery and Preparedness Plan and FDA's stated mission of ensuring access to safe and effective medical devices.
To examine how FDA monitors COVID-19 tests after they are available for use, we examined FDA documentation and interviewed FDA officials.
We summarized FDA's use of its enforcement tools for post-market monitoring of COVID-19 tests. We gathered data on FDA's use of enforcement tools from its public website. We interviewed FDA officials about the process of conducting post-market monitoring for COVID-19 tests, FDA's use of enforcement tools, and any challenges the agency has faced in doing so.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2020 to May 2022 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
See footnotes here: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104266.pdf
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Conclusions
Testing is a critical tool in our nation's fight against COVID-19 and FDA took steps to increase the availability of tests early in the pandemic when there was an urgent need for tests. This included issuing policies that enabled certain types of tests to be used prior to FDA review of their accuracy and reliability. However, once hundreds of tests were reviewed and authorized for emergency use, the risks of unauthorized tests being used outweighed the benefits. FDA eventually took action to mitigate this risk in the current pandemic. However, until FDA develops a policy for the use of enforcement discretion regarding unauthorized tests in a future public health emergency--including the conditions under which FDA would begin and end such discretion--the agency could face the risk that unauthorized tests could be used for an extended period of time, even when a sufficient number of authorized tests are available. This could hamper an effective response and recovery during a future crisis.
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Recommendations for Executive Action
The Commissioner of FDA should develop a policy for the use of enforcement discretion regarding unauthorized tests in future public health emergencies. This policy should include the conditions under which FDA would begin and end the use of such discretion. (Recommendation 1)
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Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for review. In its comments, reproduced in appendix IV, HHS concurred with our recommendation and also stated that FDA did not permit the use of unauthorized tests but instead exercised enforcement discretion to not object to their use. HHS also described some lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic that it said could enable faster authorization of tests during a future public health emergency. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
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The text of the GAO report is available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104266
GAO Issues Report: Border Security - CBP Could Improve How It Categorizes Drug Seizure Data and Evaluates Training
WASHINGTON, May 12 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-104725) entitled "Border Security - CBP Could Improve How It Categorizes Drug Seizure Data and Evaluates Training".Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report.
What GAO Found: "U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers and agents follow a multi-step process when seizing drugs. This process includes collecting seizure data such as the drug type and concealment method in CBP data systems. CBP officials have several mechanisms to perform quality assurance efforts on drug seizure records. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 12 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-104725) entitled "Border Security - CBP Could Improve How It Categorizes Drug Seizure Data and Evaluates Training". Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report. What GAO Found: "U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers and agents follow a multi-step process when seizing drugs. This process includes collecting seizure data such as the drug type and concealment method in CBP data systems. CBP officials have several mechanisms to perform quality assurance efforts on drug seizure records.For example, they conduct supervisory reviews of the records for accuracy before they are finalized. CBP intelligence entities--such as field targeting and intelligence units--review seizure data in CBP data systems on a daily basis to inform their drug interdiction efforts, target drug smugglers, and monitor drug seizure trends. GAO found that the number of CBP drug seizures increased from about 65,000 in fiscal year 2016 to 99,000 in fiscal year 2021.
While CBP has various fields in its data systems for recording, analyzing, and using data on drug seizures, it has not assessed its categories for drug type to determine if they adequately reflect the drug smuggling scenarios encountered by CBP officers and agents and if they are useful for targeting and intelligence. For example, GAO found that 23 percent of total drug seizures from fiscal years 2016 through 2021 were classified in a catchall drug type category-- Other drugs, prescriptions, and chemicals. CBP intelligence officials GAO spoke with who use and analyze drug seizure data stated that they have some concerns with the drug type categories available--particularly this catchall category--because the lack of specificity requires additional research, such as text searches. Assessing the drug type categories available in its data systems could strengthen the quality of CBP's drug seizure data and reduce the work for CBP intelligence officials who analyze the data.
While CBP officers and agents are trained on the process for recording drug seizures during their academy and post-academy programs, CBP has not evaluated its post-academy drug seizure training. Specifically, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) and U.S. Border Patrol have not evaluated them since they implemented them in 2011 and 2006, respectively. Finalizing and implementing a plan to regularly evaluate their post-academy drug seizure training would provide OFO and Border Patrol with the data and information needed to determine if the training is helping achieve CBP's goals related to drug seizures."
Why GAO Did This Study: "Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CBP is responsible for securing the nation's borders and preventing the illegal flow of people, contraband, and drugs from entering the U.S. CBP has an important role in national efforts to prevent the use of illicit drugs and the misuse of prescription drugs. Specifically, CBP is responsible for interdicting drugs and working with other federal agencies to prevent their importation.
GAO was asked to review issues related to CBP's drug seizure data and training. This report examines (1) how CBP collects and categorizes drug seizure data in its systems and monitors trends in drug seizures, and (2) to what extent CBP trains its officers and agents on the process for recording drug seizures and evaluates its training.
GAO analyzed CBP drug seizure data from fiscal years 2016 through 2021, which were the most recent data available; and reviewed related policies and procedures. GAO also interviewed officials at CBP headquarters and 11 selected field locations, including officers and agents at those locations. GAO selected these locations to include varying levels of drug seizures and variety in geographic location, among other factors."
What GAO Recommends: "GAO is making three recommendations, that CBP assess the drug type categories available in its data systems, and that OFO and Border Patrol each finalize and implement a plan to regularly evaluate their post-academy drug seizure training. DHS concurred with the recommendations."
The report was sent to Rep. John Katko, R-New York, ranking member of the House Homeland Security Committee, Rep. Clay Higgins, R-Louisiana, ranking member of the House Homeland Security subcommittee on Border Security, Facilitation, and Operations, Rep. Carlos Gimenez, R-Florida, ranking member of the House Homeland Security subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, and Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Alabama, on May 11, 2022.
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May 11, 2022
To: Congressional Requesters
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for securing the nation's borders and preventing the illegal flow of people, contraband, and drugs from entering the U.S./1 CBP has an important role in national efforts to prevent drug misuse--the use of illicit drugs and the misuse of prescription drugs.
Specifically, CBP is responsible for interdicting drugs and working with other federal agencies to prevent their importation./2 Members of Congress and other federal agency stakeholders have raised concerns about drugs that are concealed in legitimate goods--specifically, produce shipments--and smuggled into the country. CBP has reported on such instances in recent years. For example, in February 2021, CBP reported seizing $11.5 million worth of methamphetamine hidden with a commercial shipment of mixed produce from Mexico at the PharrReynosa International Bridge in Texas.
In addition, the DHS Office of Inspector General has raised questions about the timeliness and accuracy of CBP's process for recording drug seizures in its data systems. For example, in 2021, the DHS Office of Inspector General found that drug seizures from international mail inspected at the John F. Kennedy International Airport were not recorded in CBP's system of record within the required time frame./3
You asked us to review issues related to CBP's drug seizure data and training. This report addresses (1) how CBP collects and categorizes drug seizure data in its systems, and monitors trends in drug seizures; and (2) to what extent CBP trains its officers and agents on the process for recording drug seizures and evaluates its training.
To address both objectives, we interviewed officials via teleconference at a nongeneralizable sample of 11 CBP field locations--seven Office of Field Operations (OFO) ports of entry, two U.S. Border Patrol stations, and two Air and Marine Operations (AMO) branches. For the ports of entry and Border Patrol stations, we selected locations based on a mix of factors. One factor we considered was locations with the greatest number of drug seizures recorded in SEACATS--the official CBP system of record for tracking seized property, including drugs, and processing seizures--from fiscal years 2016 through 2020./4 In selecting ports of entry, the other factors we considered were variety in port type and geographic location, as well as ports of entry with the greatest value of imported goods and the greatest number of land border crossings. In selecting Border Patrol stations, we also considered stations that varied in geographic location and that have immigration checkpoints./5 For the AMO branches, we selected locations from among those with the greatest number of drug seizures from fiscal year 2016 through March 2021 using summary data from AMO's Tasking, Operations, and Management Information System; and variety in geographic location. For each location, we conducted two teleconferences: one with management, supervisors, and data specialists and a second with available officers and agents who are responsible for initial drug seizure recordation and who would have participated in drug seizure training./6
To address our first objective, we identified and analyzed CBP's policies, procedures, and other documentation that outline the drug seizure and recordation process. We also interviewed CBP officials in headquarters and in the 11 field locations. These officials provided us with perspectives on when and how CBP developed and updated the policies and procedures, requirements in these documents specifically related to seizing drugs and recording seizures in CBP data systems, and any challenges they faced when seizing drugs and recording data. We assessed CBP's policies and procedures for the drug seizure and recordation process against the control activities component of the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government./7
Furthermore, we assessed the mechanisms CBP headquarters and field officials use to ensure the quality of drug seizure records. To describe how CBP monitors drug seizure trends, we reviewed drug seizure-related products intelligence entities prepare to assist with their targeting efforts.
We also interviewed knowledgeable officials from OFO's National Targeting Center and CBP's Office of Intelligence, as well as the CBP field targeting and intelligence units at all 11 field locations we selected.
We also analyzed data on drug seizure cases and drug seizures recorded in SEACATS from fiscal years 2016 through 2021, the most recent data available at the time of our review./8 Specifically, we analyzed the number of CBP drug seizure cases and drug seizures by CBP component (OFO, Border Patrol, and AMO) when the component was listed as the discovering agency. We also analyzed data for this same time period on the following data fields: drug type, conveyance type, concealment method, and whether drugs were concealed in commodities. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed related documentation (such as data dictionaries and user manuals); interviewed agency officials responsible for managing the systems; interviewed end users of the drug seizure data; and performed electronic testing to identify any errors or omissions. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting overall trends in drug seizure cases and drug seizures.
We also drew four random generalizable samples of drug seizure records from fiscal years 2019 and 2020 to examine how CBP officers and agents categorize certain drug types using the drug type categories available in SEACATS and Border Patrol's e3--an application that Border Patrol uses to collect and transmit data related to its law enforcement activities, including drug seizures./9 We selected these samples from two specific drug type categories in SEACATS and e3--namely Marijuana and Other drugs, prescriptions, and chemicals--because they were the top two drug types seized during the time frame of our review./10 All estimates are presented in the report along with their margins of error at the 95 percent confidence level. We assessed CBP's categorization of drug seizure data against federal internal control standards for information and communication and DHS Directive 139-02 on information quality to review what steps CBP took to incorporate information quality criteria into its dissemination of drug seizure data./11
To address our second objective, we reviewed agency documentation, such as training course guides, related to CBP's academy and post-academy drug seizure training efforts. We also reviewed CBP and component-specific policies and plans related to training evaluation. We interviewed CBP training officials to identify actions they have taken related to the drug seizure training design, development, implementation, and evaluation process. We also interviewed CBP officials at the 11 field locations to obtain their perspectives on the benefits and challenges of drug seizure training. We assessed CBP's training efforts against the control activities and control environment components of federal internal control standards./12 Further, we assessed CBP's training evaluation efforts against our guide for assessing federal training programs, as well as federal internal control standards for monitoring to review what steps CBP took to systematically plan for and evaluate the effectiveness of its training efforts./13 We also assessed CBP's efforts against relevant federal laws and CBP standard operating procedures for administering post-academy training programs.14 For more details on our scope and methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2021 through May 2022 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
See footnotes here: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104725.pdf
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Conclusions
CBP has an important role in preventing illicit drugs from entering the U.S.--having recorded about 99,000 drug seizures in fiscal year 2021-- and working with other federal agencies to prevent drug importation. CBP has policies and processes that outline how its officers and agents target, seize, and record drugs in CBP data systems. In addition, CBP has various categories for recording, analyzing, and using drug seizure data, including for targeting and intelligence activities. However, CBP has not assessed if the drug type categories available in its systems adequately reflect the drug smuggling scenarios encountered by CBP officers and agents, and if they are useful for targeting and intelligence. Assessing the drug type categories available in CBP's data systems could strengthen the quality of its drug seizure data and could yield other benefits, such as helping CBP better target illicit drugs and monitor trends.
CBP also provides a variety of drug seizure training to its officers and agents, including during basic training at the academy, during post-academy programs, and on an as-needed basis. However, OFO and Border Patrol have not evaluated their post-academy drug seizure training. Finalizing and implementing a plan to regularly evaluate their post-academy drug seizure training would provide OFO and Border Patrol with the insights to determine if their training is helping to achieve agency goals related to drug seizures.
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Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following three recommendations, one to CBP, one to OFO, and one to Border Patrol:
* The Commissioner of CBP should assess the drug type categories available in its data systems to determine if they adequately reflect the drug smuggling scenarios encountered by CBP officers and agents. (Recommendation 1)
* The Executive Assistant Commissioner of OFO should finalize and implement a plan to regularly evaluate the drug seizures portion of the Post-Academy Program. (Recommendation 2)
* The Chief of Border Patrol should finalize and implement a plan to regularly evaluate the drug seizures portion of the National Field Training Program. (Recommendation 3)
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Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this product to DHS for review and comment. DHS provided comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix II and discussed below. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
In its comments, DHS concurred with our three recommendations and described actions planned to address them.
In response to our first recommendation that the Commissioner of CBP assess the drug type categories available in its data systems, DHS stated that OFO plans to review and assess those categories to ensure that they adequately reflect the drug smuggling scenarios encountered by CBP officers and agents. Further, DHS stated the CBP Office of Information Technology will plan to update the data systems, as appropriate.
With regard to our second recommendation that the Executive Assistant Commissioner of OFO finalize and implement a plan to regularly evaluate the drug seizures portion of the Post-Academy Program, DHS stated that the CBP Field Operations Academy is in the process of revising the CBP Officer Post-Academy Training Program. This revision will include a plan to regularly evaluate the drug seizures portions of the program.
With regard to our third recommendation that the Chief of Border Patrol finalize and implement a plan to regularly evaluate the drug seizures portion of the National Field Training Program, during the agency comment period, Border Patrol provided its finalized Internal Operating Procedure related to the National Field Training Program, which includes language about evaluating the program, and requested that the recommendation be closed as implemented. While issuing the Internal Operating Procedure is an important first step, it does not fully address our recommendation, as Border Patrol has not yet implemented the procedure. We will monitor Border Patrol's efforts to determine if they fully address our recommendation.
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The text of the GAO report is available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104725
GAO Issues Report: 2022 Annual Report - Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Billions of Dollars in Financial Benefits
WASHINGTON, May 12 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-105301) entitled "2022 Annual Report - Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Billions of Dollars in Financial Benefits".Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report.
What GAO Found: "GAO identified 94 new actions in 21 new and nine existing areas for Congress or executive branch agencies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government. For example:
* The Department of Energy could pursue less expensive disposal options of nuclear and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 12 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-105301) entitled "2022 Annual Report - Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Billions of Dollars in Financial Benefits". Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report. What GAO Found: "GAO identified 94 new actions in 21 new and nine existing areas for Congress or executive branch agencies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government. For example: * The Department of Energy could pursue less expensive disposal options of nuclear andhazardous waste, such as immobilizing waste in grout, which could help save tens of billions of dollars.
* Contracting leaders at federal agencies should use metrics measuring cost reduction or avoidance to improve the performance of their procurement organizations and potentially save billions of dollars annually.
* Congress should consider directing the Department of Health and Human Services to implement additional payment reductions for Skilled Nursing Facilities with high rates of potentially preventable hospital readmissions and emergency room visits, potentially saving hundreds of millions of dollars in Medicare costs.
* The Internal Revenue Service could improve taxpayer service and better manage refund interest payments, potentially saving $20 million or more annually, by establishing a mechanism to identify, monitor, and mitigate issues contributing to refund interest payments.
* The Social Security Administration could potentially save millions of dollars by identifying and addressing the causes for overpayments to disability beneficiaries in its Ticket to Work program.
* The Department of Defense could improve various administrative services, such as by better managing fragmentation in its food program and strengthening ongoing initiatives to reduce improper defense travel payments, potentially saving millions of dollars in those programs.
Congress and executive branch agencies have made significant progress in addressing many of the 1,299 actions that GAO identified from 2011 to 2022 to reduce costs, increase revenues, and improve agencies' operating effectiveness, although work remains to fully address them. As shown in the figure below, these efforts have resulted in approximately $552 billion in financial benefits, an increase of $35 billion from GAO's last duplication report. These are rough estimates based on a variety of sources that considered different time periods and used different data sources, assumptions, and methodologies.
To achieve these benefits, as of March 2022, Congress and executive branch agencies have fully addressed 724 (about 56 percent) of the 1,299 actions GAO identified from 2011 to 2022 and partially addressed 240 (about 18 percent). Examples of actions taken that led to significant financial benefits include:
* The Department of Health and Human Services changed processes to curtail some problematic methods of determining budget neutrality and restricted the amount of unspent funds states can accrue and carry forward to expand Medicaid demonstrations, which resulted in more than $140 billion in federal savings.
* In support of the Office of Management and Budget's Data Center Optimization Initiative, 22 federal agencies have been consolidating their data centers to improve government efficiency with related cost savings of approximately $5.7 billion.
Further steps are needed to fully address the actions GAO identified from 2011 to 2022. While GAO is no longer tracking 106 actions due to changing circumstances, GAO estimates that fully addressing the remaining 469 open actions could result in savings of tens of billions of dollars and improved government services, among other benefits. For example:
See table here: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105301"
Why GAO Did This Study: "GAO issues annual reports on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives--either within departments or government-wide--that have duplicative goals or activities. As part of this work, GAO also identifies additional opportunities for greater efficiency and effectiveness that result in cost savings or enhanced revenue collection
This report discusses new opportunities for achieving billions of dollars in financial savings and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of a wide range of federal programs. It also evaluates progress in addressing actions identified in GAO's previous 11 annual reports.
In addition, the report provides examples of open actions where further steps by Congress and executive branch agencies could yield significant financial and non-financial benefits."
The report was sent to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vermont, chairman, Sen. Richard C. Shelby, R-Alabama, vice chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Sen. Bernie Sanders, I-Vermont, chairman, Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-South Carolina, ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee, Sen. Gary Peters, D-Michigan, chairman, Sen. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, ranking member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Rep. Rosa L. DeLauro, D-Connecticut, chairman, Rep. Kay Granger, R-Texas, ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee, Rep. John A. Yarmuth, D-Kentucky, chairman, Rep. Jason Smith, R-Missouri, Republican leader of the House Budget Committee, Rep. Carolyn Maloney, D-New York, chairwoman, Rep. James Comer, R-Kentucky, ranking member of the House Oversight and Reform Committee, and Sen. Mark Warner, D-Virginia, on May 11, 2022.
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May 11, 2022
To: Congressional Addressees
We issue annual reports on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives--either within departments or government-wide--that have duplicative goals or activities./1 As part of this work, we also identify additional opportunities for greater efficiency and effectiveness that result in cost savings or enhanced revenue collection.
Since 2011, we have introduced more than 400 areas and 1,299 actions for Congress or executive branch agencies to reduce, eliminate, or better manage fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; achieve cost savings; or enhance revenues./2 Congress and executive branch agencies have partially or fully addressed 964 (about 74 percent) of the actions we identified from 2011 to 2022. Actions from Congress and executive branch agencies to address many of these actions had resulted in about $552 billion in financial benefits, including $531 billion that accrued through 2021 and $21 billion that are projected to accrue in future years.
We also estimate tens of billions more dollars could be saved by fully implementing all of our remaining open actions./3
See footnotes here: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105301.pdf
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The text of the GAO report is available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105301
GAO Issues Report: Missile Defense - Acquisition Processes Are Improving, But Further Actions Are Needed to Address Standing Issues
WASHINGTON, May 12 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-105925) entitled "Missile Defense - Acquisition Processes Are Improving, but Further Actions Are Needed to Address Standing Issues".Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report.
What GAO Found: "The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was established 20 years ago to develop a system to defend the U.S. and its allies against ballistic missile attacks. Since then, MDA has made progress developing and testing the Missile Defense System. MDA has taken steps to improve how it develops missile defense assets ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 12 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-105925) entitled "Missile Defense - Acquisition Processes Are Improving, but Further Actions Are Needed to Address Standing Issues". Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report. What GAO Found: "The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was established 20 years ago to develop a system to defend the U.S. and its allies against ballistic missile attacks. Since then, MDA has made progress developing and testing the Missile Defense System. MDA has taken steps to improve how it develops missile defense assetsand capabilities, but problems with its acquisition policy and practices persist. For example:
* Limited stakeholder input in requirements-setting. In 2020, the Department of Defense (DOD) made changes to MDA's acquisition processes to more closely align with leading practices, such as working closely with stakeholders throughout program development. In November 2021, GAO found opportunities for DOD to better incorporate the warfighter's needs by establishing processes to better align MDA programs in early development with warfighter-approved requirements.
* Problematic cost estimates and underreported costs. In 2013 and 2017, GAO found shortfalls in MDA's cost estimates and reporting. In February 2022, GAO found that MDA continues to omit key costs from program life-cycle cost estimates and lingering accuracy issues with flight test cost estimates. These deficiencies limit decision-makers' insight into the financial commitments necessary for making funding and other determinations.
Since 2010, GAO has made 61 recommendations to improve missile defense acquisitions. While MDA has generally agreed with most of these recommendations, 23 still require additional actions (see figure https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105925). Addressing the open recommendations would help reduce acquisition risk. For example, early alignment of MDA programs to warfighter-approved requirements helps ensure delivery of needed capabilities while minimizing the risk of late-cycle design changes--which has proven to raise cost and create schedule delays--or delivering capabilities that do not fully meet warfighter's needs."
Why GAO Did This Study: "Since MDA was established in 2002, DOD has spent over $174 billion to develop a network of sensors, interceptors, and command and control capabilities collectively called the Missile Defense System. GAO has previously reported on MDA's process to acquire assets and capabilities for this system.
This statement highlights key findings from GAO's work on missile defense acquisitions. Specifically, this testimony provides information on (1) changes to MDA's acquisition processes; (2) program and flight test cost estimates and reporting; and (3) MDA's implementation of GAO's prior recommendations relevant to missile defense acquisitions. This statement is primarily based on GAO reports issued since 2020 on MDA's requirements and cost estimating process. In addition, the statement draws upon GAO's body of work issued since 2010."
The report was sent to Rep. Jim Cooper, D-Tennessee, chairman, and Rep. Doug Lamborn, R-Colorado, ranking member of the House Armed Services subcommittee on Strategic Forces, on May 11, 2022.
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Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Lamborn, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work assessing the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) acquisition practices. The Department of Defense (DOD) has charged MDA with developing and fielding the Missile Defense System (MDS) to defend the United States, deployed troops, and allies against ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile attacks.
The MDS architecture includes (1) space-based sensors as well as ground- and sea- based radars; (2) ground- and sea- based interceptor missiles; and (3) command and control, battle management, and communications systems to enable a coordinated response from the warfighter. Since MDA was established in 2002, the agency has spent over $174 billion developing and fielding missile defense capabilities. The agency is requesting an additional $9.6 billion for fiscal year 2023 to continue its efforts.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 and subsequent Acts have included provisions for us to prepare annual assessments of MDA's progress toward its acquisition goals and objectives. We have carried out those assessments since our first report in 2004./1 We have also reported on other important areas within MDA, such as collaboration with the intelligence community, the contracting strategy for MDS elements, and the acquisition risks in developing and delivering targets to support flight testing.
GAO's body of work on MDA's acquisitions has shown that MDA has taken important steps to
* increase transparency in its documentation;
* improve its outreach to stakeholders, including the intelligence community and other DOD stakeholders; and
* reduce concurrency (broadly defined as the overlap between product development, testing, and production).
However, MDA continuously struggles to meet its annual acquisition goals and has canceled a number of critical efforts due to cost and technical challenges--a trend the department indicated must not continue given the importance of these systems.
This testimony statement focuses on two of our recent reports: one evaluating changes to MDA's acquisition flexibilities that we issued in November 2021, and another assessing MDA's cost estimating and reporting that we issued in February 2022./2 This statement will also highlight MDA's progress implementing GAO's recommendations relevant to missile defense that we have made over the past decade. More information on our objectives, scope, and methodology is available in the reports cited.
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
See footnotes here: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105925.pdf
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The text of the GAO report is available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105925
GAO Issues Report: Higher Education - Education Needs to Strengthen Its Approach to Monitoring Colleges' Arrangements With Online Program Managers
WASHINGTON, May 6 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-104463) entitled "Higher Education - Education Needs to Strengthen Its Approach to Monitoring Colleges' Arrangements with Online Program Managers".Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report.
What GAO Found: "At least 550 colleges worked with an online program manager (OPM) to support at least 2,900 education programs (e.g., certificate and degree programs) as of July 2021, according to the most recently available market research data. However, the exact number of OPM arrangements is unknown, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 6 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-104463) entitled "Higher Education - Education Needs to Strengthen Its Approach to Monitoring Colleges' Arrangements with Online Program Managers". Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report. What GAO Found: "At least 550 colleges worked with an online program manager (OPM) to support at least 2,900 education programs (e.g., certificate and degree programs) as of July 2021, according to the most recently available market research data. However, the exact number of OPM arrangements is unknown,due to a lack of comprehensive data, and there could be more of these OPM arrangements. Available market research data show that the number of new arrangements between colleges and OPMs is growing. There were at least 20 new arrangements between colleges and OPMs in 2010, and by 2020 the number had grown to at least 165. About 90 percent of the colleges with OPM arrangements are public or nonprofit colleges. GAO found that OPMs commonly recruit students for colleges, making these arrangements subject to the Department of Education's oversight and the Higher Education Act's ban on incentive compensation--which was designed to prevent abusive recruiting practices.
Education's monitoring instructions for annual audits and agency reviews do not ensure it obtains information about colleges' OPM arrangements to fully assess compliance with the ban on incentive compensation.
* Education relies on independent auditors to collect information on OPM arrangements to identify potential violations of the incentive compensation ban; however, auditor instructions lack some key details. For example, the instructions do not specifically reference OPMs or a key piece of guidance that Education released in 2011. As a result, compliance audits may not assess relevant OPM arrangements.
* Education depends on colleges to provide information about their OPM arrangements during audits and agency reviews. However, Education's instructions to colleges also lack key details about identifying OPM arrangements subject to agency oversight and consequently colleges do not always report such arrangements, according to agency officials.
Without clearer instructions to auditors and colleges about the information on OPM arrangements that must be assessed during compliance audits and agency reviews, there is a risk that Education will not have the information it needs to detect incentive compensation violations."
Why GAO Did This Study: "Almost three-quarters of the nation's college students were enrolled in an education program offered at least partially online in 2020. Some colleges have contracted with third parties, known as OPMs, to help them deliver programs online and recruit students for these programs.
GAO was asked to review Education's role in overseeing colleges' use of OPMs. This report examines (1) colleges' use of OPMs and (2) the extent to which Education's monitoring instructions ensure that it obtains the information needed to assess whether OPM arrangements comply with the incentive compensation ban. GAO analyzed data and information from a market research firm, a higher education research firm, and seven OPM companies with the largest number of arrangements with colleges. GAO reviewed relevant regulations and agency guidance on Education's monitoring policies and procedures. GAO interviewed Education officials as well as officials from selected colleges, three audit firms, and a state audit office that were identified through research and referrals."
What GAO Recommends: "GAO is making two recommendations to Education to improve instructions for auditors and colleges to help Education obtain the information needed to assess OPM arrangements for incentive compensation violations. Education agreed with GAO's recommendations and described plans to address them."
The report was sent to Sen. Patty Murray, D-Washington, chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, Rep. Robert C. Scott, D-Virginia, chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, Sen. Tina Flint Smith, D-Minnesota, and Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Massachusetts, on May 5, 2022.
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April 5, 2022
To: The Honorable Patty Murray, Chair, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, United States Senate
The Honorable Robert "Bobby" Scott, Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives
The Honorable Sherrod Brown, United States Senate
The Honorable Tina Smith, United States Senate
The Honorable Elizabeth Warren, United States Senate
While overall enrollment in college has declined in recent years, enrollment in online education has increased, and the number of college students enrolling in online education has grown considerably during the COVID-19 pandemic./1 According to Department of Education (Education) data, the percent of college students enrolled in education programs offered entirely or partially online increased from about 26 percent of total enrollment in 2013 to 73 percent in 2020./2 The number of students enrolled in exclusively online programs increased 150 percent from 2019 to 2020./3 According to a survey recently published by a higher education organization, 85 percent of responding colleges reported moving courses online to provide emergency remote learning in the fall of 2020 because of the pandemic. Almost 60 percent of responding colleges said they plan to continue some or all of their remote learning online after the pandemic./4
Colleges can contract with third parties, commonly known as online program managers (OPM), for services that enable colleges to offer their programs online./5 In addition to providing services such as instructional design and technology support, OPMs can provide colleges with marketing and student recruitment. The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, prohibits colleges from providing incentive payments to either individuals or contracted third parties engaged in student recruiting based on their success in enrolling students./6 This incentive compensation ban was created to eliminate financial incentives that could lead to abusive recruiting practices. Education is responsible for enforcing the ban on incentive compensation. You asked us to review colleges' use of OPMs and Education's role in ensuring colleges' compliance with the ban on incentive compensation.
This report examines (1) colleges' use of OPMs and how commonly OPM arrangements include services that are subject to the ban on incentive compensation and (2) the extent to which Education's monitoring instructions ensure that it obtains the information it needs to assess whether OPM arrangements comply with the incentive compensation ban.
To describe what is known about colleges' use of OPMs, we obtained data from the market research firm LISTedTECH./7 This included summary information on the number of colleges working with OPMs and characteristics of these colleges and education programs, as of July 2021. We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing information about the company's data collection and quality assurance methods, and conducted manual checks for errors. Because there are no public data sources relating to colleges' arrangements with OPMs, we cannot confirm that LISTedTECH's data capture every OPM arrangement. However, we found the data to be reliable for the purpose of estimating the prevalence of OPM arrangements and OPM-supported education programs, as well as providing general descriptive characteristics of colleges that work with OPMs.
To describe what is known about how commonly OPMs provide services subject to the ban on incentive compensation, we conducted interviews or requested written responses from eight of the largest OPM companies and received responses from seven./8 We also obtained summarized results from a 2019 survey of 145 college leaders conducted by Eduventures Research./9 We assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing information about the survey design and quality assurance methods. We determined the data were reliable for describing the characteristics of the OPM arrangements at the survey respondents' colleges. The Eduventures Research survey results and information collected from the seven OPMs included details on the services that OPMs provide to colleges, how colleges pay OPMs, and the types of programs OPMs support. We also interviewed selected individuals knowledgeable about this industry that we identified through research and referrals, as well as officials from three colleges that have OPM arrangements./10
To examine Education's instructions for monitoring compliance with the incentive compensation ban, we reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, including the Higher Education Act, and documentation on Education's monitoring policies and procedures. Specifically, we reviewed monitoring documentation related to compliance audits and the agency's program reviews. We identified any explicit instructions directed to auditors or college officials regarding how they are to assess compliance with the incentive compensation ban for colleges that contract with OPMs for student recruiting. We also analyzed Education's final audit determination and final program review determination reports that Education identified as containing incentive compensation violations from fiscal years 2012 through 2020./11 Education identified reports with incentive compensation violations using its Postsecondary Education Participants System, and we assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing the underlying reports associated with each finding and interviewing knowledgeable Education officials about data input and quality assurance methods./12 We found the data to be reliable to report the number of identified incentive compensation violations.
Further, in coordination with representatives from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, a national association representing accountants, we selected and interviewed three audit firms and one state auditing office (which we refer to as audit organizations) that audited at least one college that contracted with an OPM./13 In addition, we interviewed Education officials about compliance audit and program review practices and any challenges auditors and agency officials encounter obtaining information to assess whether colleges' OPM arrangements comply with the incentive compensation ban. We assessed Education's communications with auditors and colleges about its monitoring policies and procedures against requirements in the Higher Education Act, federal regulations for updating compliance requirements for auditors, and federal internal control standards for designing control activities to achieve objectives and sharing quality information with external parties to help the agency achieve its objectives./14
We conducted this performance audit from August 2020 to April 2022 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
See footnotes here: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104463.pdf
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Conclusions
As enrollment in online education continues to grow, colleges are increasingly looking to OPM providers to help them develop and deliver their online programs. Available information suggests that a significant share of OPMs recruit students for enrollment in the online education programs they support, and that many OPMs are paid with a share of tuition revenue generated by these online programs. Education's 2011 Dear Colleague Letter contains important agency guidance for evaluating such arrangements to prevent prohibited incentive compensation payments and to safeguard against abusive recruiting practices.
Determining whether colleges' arrangements with OPMs comply with the ban on incentive compensation requires independent auditors and Education's program review staff to ensure that these safeguards are in place and that OPM-employed recruiting staff are not receiving incentive payments. To protect students from predatory recruiting practices, it is important for Education to ensure that OPMs that provide recruiting services for colleges, as well as OPM recruiting staff, do not receive incentives based on their success enrolling students. Without clearer instructions to auditors and colleges about the information on OPM arrangements that must be assessed during compliance audits and program reviews, there is a risk that Education will not have the information it needs to detect incentive compensation violations.
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Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following two recommendations to Education: The Secretary of Education should provide additional instructions for inclusion in the Compliance Supplement to help auditors better identify and assess potential incentive compensation ban violations when a college contracts with an OPM. Additional instructions should prompt auditors to ask specifically about OPMs, direct auditors to obtain and assess compensation information for OPM staff who provide recruiting services, and reference relevant guidance including the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter. (Recommendation 1)
The Secretary of Education should provide additional instructions to colleges regarding the information they must provide about their OPM arrangements during compliance audits and program reviews. Additional instructions should explain that colleges are responsible for both identifying all OPM contracts that include recruiting, and then providing auditors and Education's program review staff with copies of those contracts and information on how covered OPM staff are compensated. (Recommendation 2)
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Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Education for review and comment. In its comments, reproduced in appendix I,
Education agreed with both recommendations. We also provided relevant sections of the report to LISTedTECH for review and comment, and LISTedTECH agreed that GAO accurately presented its information and had no technical comments.
In its formal comments, Education agreed that colleges are increasingly seeking out OPMs to help administer their online education programs and that this development presents challenges for the agency's oversight of the ban on incentive compensation. Education noted that colleges that contract with OPMs and auditors of those contracts should be aware of their responsibilities regarding the ban on incentive compensation.
In response to the first recommendation, Education agreed that the Compliance Supplement's treatment of the ban on incentive compensation can be strengthened and stated that it plans to propose revisions to the Compliance Supplement to OMB. Education noted that its proposed revisions will provide relevant guidance, including the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter. According to Education, proposed revisions will also suggest procedures for auditors to obtain and assess information about college or third party staff performing any functions covered under the ban, including student recruitment.
In response to the second recommendation, Education stated that it will revise its instructions to colleges about program reviews and audits to improve the agency's enforcement of the ban on incentive compensation.
According to Education, the agency's revised instructions will identify the types of information that colleges must provide about contracts with third parties--including contracts with OPMs for student recruiting services.
Education also stated that it would reinforce for colleges that the ban on incentive compensation applies to all educational programs they offer.
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The text of the GAO report is available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104463
GAO Issues Report: Earthquakes - Opportunities Exist to Further Assess Risk, Build Resilience, and Communicate Research
WASHINGTON, May 5 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-105016) entitled "Earthquakes - Opportunities Exist to Further Assess Risk, Build Resilience, and Communicate Research".Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report.
What GAO Found: "The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) has goals outlined in its most recent Strategic Plan for fiscal years (FY) 2009-2013 for the improvement of earthquake resilience in communities nationwide. However, officials from the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) said that a national ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 5 -- The Government Accountability Office has issued a report (GAO-22-105016) entitled "Earthquakes - Opportunities Exist to Further Assess Risk, Build Resilience, and Communicate Research". Here are excerpts of summaries associated with the report. What GAO Found: "The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) has goals outlined in its most recent Strategic Plan for fiscal years (FY) 2009-2013 for the improvement of earthquake resilience in communities nationwide. However, officials from the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) said that a nationalrisk assessment has not been done to identify improvements and remaining gaps in resilience. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) initiated some efforts to identify improvements by collecting data on the adoption of building codes. The NEHRP agencies are currently working to update the Strategic Plan FY 2022-2029. By conducting a national risk assessment, NEHRP would gain greater awareness of earthquake resilience improvements and be better positioned in planning long-term goals and objectives toward closing remaining gaps.
Accomplishing NEHRP's strategic objectives requires developing and applying research in the geological, engineering, and social sciences areas. NEHRP identifies research priorities, and many of the NEHRP agencies award grants to entities such as universities or state and local agencies, to conduct research. While the communication mechanisms used by the National Science Foundation (NSF) include program solicitations, program descriptions, and letters issued to research entities, they do not communicate NEHRP's strategic research priorities. By developing strategies to better communicate its research priorities, NEHRP can help ensure that they are met.
NEHRP's Program Coordination Working Group is responsible for coordinating the implementation of NEHRP's strategic research priorities and has followed leading practices for leadership and outcomes. However, the working group did not follow two leading practices for accountability and resources. For example, the working group did not track and monitor progress, and did not identify and leverage resources needed to achieve outcomes for research priorities. Identifying resources would enable the interagency group to leverage all relevant resources across the NEHRP agencies, and better align them with research priorities. Further, the identification of resources would provide an opportunity for the working group to build programmatic partnerships aimed at strengthening earthquake resilience."
Why GAO Did This Study: "Established in 1977, NEHRP aims to help reduce the risks to life and property from earthquakes. NEHRP's initiatives include strengthening community resilience through improved design and construction methods, conducting research to better understand the impacts from earthquakes, and providing outreach and education. NEHRP is comprised of four federal agencies (FEMA, NIST, NSF, and the U.S. Geological Survey) that promote and support NEHRP's initiatives for strengthening earthquake resilience.
The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act of 2018 includes a provision for GAO to assess the program's efforts. This report examines, among other things, NEHRP's progress in identifying gaps and strengthening resilience to earthquakes, and its activities to identify and communicate about research priorities. GAO reviewed NEHRP's strategic plans, agency guidance, and external communications; compared procedures to leading practices for interagency collaboration; and interviewed federal and state officials, among others."
What GAO Recommends: "GAO is making seven recommendations, including that NEHRP agencies conduct a national assessment to identify progress and remaining gaps in earthquake resilience; develop strategies to better communicate research priorities; and follow leading practices to identify and leverage resources. NIST, NSF, and FEMA concurred with our recommendations."
The report was sent to NAMESANDTITLES on May 4, 2022.
SENNAME, chairman, SENNAME, ranking member of the Senate Committee
REPNAME, chairman, REPNAME, ranking member of the House Committee
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May 4, 2022
To: Congressional Committees
Almost half of the U.S. population--150 million people--reside in areas that are at risk of experiencing a damaging earthquake within the next 50 years. In 2017, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) estimated that the total average annual loss from earthquakes in the U.S. is $6.1 billion, with California, Oregon, and Washington accounting for 73 percent of such losses ($4.5 billion)./1 Large earthquakes are not just a risk on the west coast. For example, according to a FEMA and MidAmerican Earthquake Center scenario, a magnitude 7.7 earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone would be expected to produce severe ground shaking in Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas, causing widespread impacts to the population and economic losses approaching $300 billion./2 According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), 16 states are at very high risk of a seismic event, and their metropolitan regions could face unprecedented life loss and catastrophic damage to buildings, and lifelines (e.g. electrical power lines, water, and sanitary sewer system).
Established in 1977, the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) includes four federal agencies: (1) the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); (2) FEMA; (3) the National Science Foundation (NSF); and (4) USGS./3 Further, the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act of 2004 (NEHRP Reauthorization Act of 2004) established the Interagency Coordinating Committee (ICC) to oversee planning, management, and coordination of the program./4
Under the program, the federal government supports efforts to assess and monitor seismic activity in the U.S., and reduce the risks to life and property from future earthquakes. In particular, NEHRP promotes the adoption of earthquake risk reduction measures through the development of standards, guidelines, and seismic building codes aimed at reducing the damaging effects of earthquakes. NEHRP also promotes improved design and construction methods, coordinated emergency preparedness plans, and public education and involvement programs.
The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act of 2018 (NEHRP Reauthorization Act of 2018) placed further emphasis on earthquake early warning systems, earthquake-resistant design and construction practices, and community resilience./5 The law defined community resilience as the ability of a community to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse seismic events./6 The NEHRP Reauthorization Act of 2018 also included a provision that we review the program, including assessing the progress of NEHRP agencies in advancing the plans and goals of the program, to include its strategic planning efforts, collaboration to meet strategic priorities, and efforts to strengthen resilience./7
Also in response to this provision, we reported in March 2021 that USGS, through its Earthquake Hazards Program, made several efforts to identify the dangers from earthquakes, such as ground shaking, tsunamis, and landslides, to inform the public and help decision-makers ensure public safety and mitigate losses./8 For example, USGS updated the national seismic hazard maps used to strengthen building codes throughout the nation, and made progress implementing (ShakeAlert), the earthquake early warning system. USGS implemented cost-cutting actions to meet the program's mission, but not all actions were consistent with leading practices for strategic planning, performance measurement, and human capital planning. In addition, USGS had not followed best practices in establishing schedules, milestones, and timeframes for its ShakeAlert implementation, and has not completed its plan for coordinating outreach with stakeholders.
We made nine recommendations (seven to the Director of USGS, and one each to the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior). As of April 2022, the Director of USGS and Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior have not implemented the recommendations, though they generally concurred and are taking steps to implement them.
This report addresses:
1. The extent to which NIST and the ICC updated the NEHRP strategic plan and developed a management plan.
2. The extent to which NEHRP assessed earthquake resilience nationwide since 2015, and informed tribal governments about how to strengthen earthquake resilience.
3. The extent to which NEHRP collaborated with stakeholders to prioritize earthquake research and communicate these priorities to research entities.
4. The extent to which NEHRP disseminates earthquake research findings to federal, state, local, and tribal governments.
To address our first objective, we interviewed officials from NIST, FEMA, NSF, and USGS to determine progress being made updating NEHRP's Strategic Plan for fiscal years for fiscal years 2022 - 2029 (Strategic Plan FY 2022 - 2029) and developing a management plan. We discussed the long-term goals and timelines for releasing NEHRP's Strategic Plan FY 2022 - 2029, and what steps, if any, they took to develop the management plan. We also interviewed the Advisory Committee for Earthquake Hazards Reduction (Advisory Committee) to discuss recommendations that the ICC and NIST establish strategic plans and identify resources towards achieving the strategic plan's goals and objectives./9
To address our second objective, we reviewed NEHRP's Strategic Plan for FY 2009 - 2013, reports, assessments, and planning documents relevant to NEHRP's efforts to plan and assess improvements in earthquake resilience in communities nationwide, since 2015./10 We also reviewed the Advisory Committee's 2015 and 2017 biennial reports to identify recommendations made to NIST, the ICC, and to the member agencies addressing progress in strengthening resilience in communities nationwide, and identifying gaps with respect to seismic vulnerability of buildings, critical infrastructure, and lifeline systems./11 We met with the Advisory Committee to discuss their recommendations and to determine whether the NEHRP agencies took steps to address them. Further, we interviewed NIST, FEMA, NSF, and USGS officials to determine whether they conducted any plans or assessments to assess improvements in earthquake resilience in communities since 2015. We also selected and interviewed officials from 19 stakeholder groups to discuss their perspectives on earthquake resilience in communities, and any assessments to identify improvements in resilience in communities nationwide, since 2015./12
To identify FEMA's efforts toward identifying progress in earthquake risk reduction, we reviewed NEHRP's annual and biennial reports provided to Congress from fiscal years 2015 to 2019, as well as other reports and documents./13 We also reviewed FEMA's NEHRP State Assistance Grant Program guidance and related documents to identify how FEMA uses performance measurement data submitted by states to assess progress made on activities intended to improve seismic safety and earthquake risk reduction. Further, we interviewed FEMA officials to obtain information on their initiatives used to identify progress in earthquake risk reduction, such as tracking the status of building code adoption by jurisdictions.
To determine the extent to which FEMA conducts outreach and education to inform tribal governments about earthquake risk reduction, we reviewed FEMA's tribal policy, which addresses collaboration with tribal governments to further develop education and training opportunities in areas related to disaster preparedness. Although FEMA's National Tribal Strategy was not released as of February 2022, we interviewed FEMA to determine whether any plans were being developed on the approaches for conducting outreach and training with tribes. We also asked FEMA officials what actions, if any, have been taken to help tribes understand earthquake risk reduction. Further, we interviewed representatives from nine tribes and one tribal association to obtain their perspectives on the extent to which FEMA conducted outreach and training with them on earthquake risk reduction./14
To address our third objective, we reviewed NEHRP's Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2009 - 2013 (Strategic Plan FY 2009 - 2013) and related documents to identify strategic research priorities, and the extent stakeholders were involved in the development of the NEHRP's Strategic Plan FY 2022 - 2029./15 Further, we interviewed officials from NIST, FEMA, NSF and USGS to discuss their perspectives on the extent to which stakeholders were included in the process of identifying strategic research priorities. We also interviewed officials from 19 selected stakeholder groups to discuss their perspectives on the strategic research priorities, and whether they were included in the process of identifying the priorities./16
To determine the extent to which NSF and NIST communicated the strategic research priorities to research entities, we reviewed NSF's mechanisms to communicate research opportunities, such as program solicitations, program descriptions, and Dear Colleague Letters./17 We also assessed NSF's Dear Colleague Letters provided to research entities from 2016 to 2021 to determine whether the letters identified NEHRP's research priorities. Further, we interviewed officials from NIST and NSF to discuss how, if at all, NEHRP's strategic research priorities are identified in the mechanisms used to communicate with research entities. Also, to help provide an understanding about the number of research entities conducting research on topics related to NEHRP, we reviewed research grants awarded in NSF's award database.
To determine the extent to which NEHRP's Program Coordination Working Group followed leading practices for interagency collaboration in implementing NEHRP's strategic research priorities, we compared the working group's collaboration practices against four leading practices identified in our past work./18 We determined that four leading practices in our report on interagency collaboration were most relevant to this engagement and include practices related to (1) defining shared outcomes and goals, (2) ensuring accountability by developing performance measures and tracking progress, (3) establishing leadership, and (4) identifying resources, such as funding, staffing, and technology.
We assessed the extent to which NEHRP's working group followed these leading collaboration practices by assessing them as (1) generally followed, (2) partially followed, or (3) not followed./19
To address our fourth objective, we reviewed NEHRP's Strategic Plan FY 2009 - 2013 to determine how, if at all, goals and objectives identified linkage to the dissemination of materials and research. We also reviewed NIST and NSF policies and supporting documents addressing how NIST and NSF are to disseminate research findings related to NEHRP. In addition, we interviewed NIST and NSF officials to discuss the mechanisms and practices used to disseminate research findings related to NEHRP. Further, we selected and interviewed officials from 19 stakeholder groups to discuss their awareness and perspectives concerning how NIST and NSF disseminate research findings related to NEHRP. Lastly, we reviewed the Advisory Committee's biennial reports in 2015 and 2017 to identify any challenges reported on NEHRP's practices in disseminating research findings./20 For more details on our stakeholder selection methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2021 to May 2022 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
See footnotes here: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105016.pdf
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Conclusions
NEHRP has helped communities strengthen earthquake resilience by identifying dangers from earthquakes and taking measures to reduce their damaging effects. For example, FEMA has initiated efforts to identify progress states and localities have made strengthening earthquake risk reduction nationwide by tracking the status of building code adoption.
However, opportunities exist to improve stakeholder involvement and better share information to help entities understand risk and how best to undertake resilience initiatives. Specifically, conducting a national risk assessment could help NEHRP gain greater awareness of earthquake resilience improvements and identify remaining gaps. Additionally, a national risk assessment could help NEHRP be in a better position to strategically plan long-term goals and objectives towards reducing remaining gaps and prioritize future research to address known vulnerabilities.
Determining if additional actions are needed to obtain input from stakeholders may help align research priorities with community and stakeholder needs. Also, developing approaches to communicate NEHRP's research priorities to research entities (e.g. person(s), institutions, businesses, universities, or institutions) can ensure research priorities are being met. Lastly, developing a documented plan will ensure all stakeholders are informed about the mechanisms and practices used to disseminate research findings.
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Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making a total of seven recommendations, including three recommendations to NIST, one to NSF, one to FEMA, and two to
NEHRP. Specifically:
The Director of NIST should, in collaboration with FEMA, NSF, and USGS and in coordination with federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and stakeholders, conduct a national risk assessment to identify the progress made by communities to strengthen earthquake resilience since 2015, and the gaps in resilience that remain. (Recommendation 1)
The Administrator of FEMA should develop and implement a plan to increase awareness among tribes about earthquake risk reduction initiatives. (Recommendation 2)
The Director of NIST should, in collaboration with FEMA, NSF, and USGS, assess and determine if additional actions are needed to obtain input from state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and stakeholders on research priorities that align with community and stakeholder needs. (Recommendation 3)
The Director of NSF should, in collaboration with NIST, develop strategies to better communicate NEHRP's priorities to research entities. (Recommendation 4)
The Director of NEHRP should, in collaboration with FEMA, NIST, NSF, and USGS, follow leading practices to develop performance measures linked to priority research outcomes, and to track and monitor research to ensure research priorities are being met. (Recommendation 5)
The Director of NEHRP should, in collaboration with FEMA, NIST, NSF, and USGS, follow leading practices to identify and leverage the program's resources needed to achieve research priority outcomes. (Recommendation 6)
The Director of NIST should, in collaboration with NSF, document and implement a comprehensive plan to better ensure that all state, local, territorial and tribal governments and stakeholders are aware of the mechanisms and practices used by NSF and NIST for disseminating research. (Recommendation 7)
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Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Commerce (Commerce), Department of Interior (DOI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). Commerce, DHS, and NSF provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix III, IV, and V. In its comments, all three departments generally concurred with our recommendations. Additionally, DOI, DHS, and NSF provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
With regard to our first recommendation, Commerce concurred that the Director of NIST should in collaboration with stakeholders, conduct a national risk assessment to identify the progress made by communities to strengthen earthquake resilience since 2015, and the gaps in resilience that remain. Commerce stated that if resources are provided, NIST will lead a collaboration effort to conduct assessments to identify the progress made by communities to strengthen earthquake resilience and the gaps in resilience that remain. In addition, Commerce stated that the updated NEHRP Strategic Plan will prioritize future activities that can help communities strengthen their earthquake resilience.
With regard to our second recommendation, DHS concurred that the Administrator of FEMA should develop and implement a plan to increase awareness among tribes about earthquake risk reduction initiatives.
According to DHS, the Director of FEMA's Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) Planning and Safety Division, as well as FIMA's Earthquake and Wind Programs Branch, will collaborate with FEMA's National Tribal Affairs Advisor to develop culturally sensitive and relevant products to communicate earthquake risk effectively. DHS stated that once complete, a strategic communications plan will also support the distribution of these products.
With regard to our third recommendation, Commerce concurred that the Director of NIST should, in collaboration with FEMA, NSF, and USGS, assess and determine if additional actions are needed to obtain input from state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and stakeholders on research priorities that align with community and stakeholder needs.
Commerce stated that NSIT has many mechanisms include grant programs, hosted workshops, program reviews by leading research councils, experience of the NIST workforce, strategic planning studies, collaboration with other NEHRP agencies and the Advisory Committee, and proactive participation with building code and standards development organizations. We reviewed the efforts by NIST to obtain input from external entities, however, our work shows that 19 selected stakeholders we interviewed were not involved in the process of identifying updates to the strategic plan's research priorities. Commerce added that the NEHRP agencies will collectively evaluate additional outreach opportunities to obtain input from stakeholders and will continue to review the Advisory Committee membership to ensure a diverse representation of stakeholders.
With regard to our fourth recommendation, NSF concurred that the Director of NSF should, in collaboration with NIST, develop strategies to better communicate NEHRP's priorities to research entities. According to NSF, the agency has already begun conversations within the Foundation about this aim. NSF added that existing mechanisms will be enhanced, and new mechanisms may be created to improve research communities' awareness.
With regard to our fifth recommendation, Commerce concurred that the Director of NEHRP should, in collaboration with FEMA, NIST, NSF, and USGS, follow leading practices to develop performance measures linked to priority research outcomes, and to track and monitor research to ensure research priorities are being met. According to Commerce, NEHRP submits a biennial report to Congress that highlights milestones achieved from programmatic efforts during the reporting period that supports the NEHRP mission. The reports are written to align with the goals and priorities identified in the NEHRP Strategic Plan. We reviewed NEHRP's biennial report to Congress, however our work shows NEHRP's working group has not tracked and monitored progress with research priorities. Commerce stated that the NEHRP agencies will collectively evaluate other practices for tracking and monitoring progress.
With regard to our sixth recommendation, Commerce concurred that the Director of NEHRP should, in collaboration with FEMA, NIST, NSF, and USGS, follow leading practices to identify and leverage the program's resources needed to achieve research priority outcomes. Commerce stated that the NEHRP agencies collaborate at the programmatic level to ensure individual agency activities are unique and mutually supportive to a shared outcome established in the NEHRP Strategic Plan. Commerce also stated that although the NEHRP agencies do not share funding responsibilities for an external, multi-agency collaborative subject, the agencies do coordinate topical responsibilities, based on agency mission.
We reviewed NEHRP's efforts to collaborate at the programmatic level, however our work shows that NEHRP's working group does not collectively identify and leverage the program's resources needed to achieve research priority outcomes defined in the strategic plan.
Commerce added that the program will collectively explore what other best practices can further maximize the collective efforts of the NEHRP agencies toward supporting a research priority.
With regard to our seventh recommendation, Commerce concurred that the Director of NIST should, in collaboration with NSF, document and implement a comprehensive plan to better ensure that all state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and stakeholders are aware of the mechanisms and practices used by NSF and NIST for disseminating research. According to Commerce, open access to research results is a fundamental mission of NIST. For example, NIST uses presentations and information booths at earthquake-focused conferences, active participation on, and collaboration with building code and design standards development committees, publications in peer-reviewed journals, and relevant postings on NIST supported website for disseminating research results that support NEHRP. However, our work shows that 17 of the 19 selected stakeholder groups we interviewed were generally not aware of research findings related to NEHRP. Commerce stated that NIST will continue to seek other opportunities to increase accessibility of research results to stakeholders. Commerce added that NEHRP will work to promote diverse representation on the Advisory Committee to enhance two-way communication with key state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and stakeholders.
We believe the actions discussed above, if implemented effectively, should address the intent of the recommendations. Additionally, once the agencies implement our recommendations, they will be better positioned to improve stakeholder involvement and better share information to help communities understand risk and how best to undertake resilience initiatives.
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The text of the GAO report is available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105016