Think Tanks
Think Tanks
Here's a look at documents from think tanks
Featured Stories
Manhattan Institute Issues Commentary to Washington Examiner: Conserving a Revolutionary Tradition
NEW YORK, May 31 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 30, 2025, to the Washington Examiner:* * *
Conserving a Revolutionary Tradition
By James Piereson
Editor's note: The Washington Examiner is honored to publish the unedited remarks of this year's Bradley Prize honorees. The below speech was given by James Piereson.
Friends, we are gathered this evening at the beautiful headquarters of the Daughters of the American
Revolution. Our European friends smile when they learn that one of the most conservative
organizations in America is called the Daughters ... Show Full Article NEW YORK, May 31 -- The Manhattan Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 30, 2025, to the Washington Examiner: * * * Conserving a Revolutionary Tradition By James Piereson Editor's note: The Washington Examiner is honored to publish the unedited remarks of this year's Bradley Prize honorees. The below speech was given by James Piereson. Friends, we are gathered this evening at the beautiful headquarters of the Daughters of the American Revolution. Our European friends smile when they learn that one of the most conservative organizations in America is called the Daughtersof the American Revolution.
It is one of the ironies that goes with being an American, and an American conservative. We inherit a revolutionary tradition.
The historian Clinton Rossiter wrote a book in the 1960s titled, Conservatism in America, but subtitled, "The Thankless Persuasion." The United States is a revolutionary society, he wrote, constantly churning and changing, so that in this country the conservative is doomed to disappointment and defeat.
But, in answer to the historian, the United States is governed by the world's oldest and longest surviving written Constitution. Other advanced countries can make no such claim. All have been through several constitutional systems since our Constitution was ratified.
Continue reading the entire piece here at The Washington Examiner (paywall) (https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/faith-freedom-self-reliance/3425607/james-piereson-conserving-a-revolutionary-tradition)
* * *
James Piereson is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute.
* * *
Original text here: https://manhattan.institute/article/conserving-a-revolutionary-tradition
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Russian Opposition and Russian Resistance - Landscape Before the Battle for Power
WASHINGTON, May 31 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on May 30, 2025, to the Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Russian Opposition and Russian Resistance: The Landscape Before the Battle for Power
By llya Ponomarev
Executive Summary:
* The Russian opposition is currently fractured, dominated by ideologically diverse groups that lack a coherent strategy, shared goals, or political legitimacy. Many function more as protest movements than viable alternatives to Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime.
* Several different organizations lead the opposition, including the ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 31 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on May 30, 2025, to the Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Russian Opposition and Russian Resistance: The Landscape Before the Battle for Power By llya Ponomarev Executive Summary: * The Russian opposition is currently fractured, dominated by ideologically diverse groups that lack a coherent strategy, shared goals, or political legitimacy. Many function more as protest movements than viable alternatives to Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime. * Several different organizations lead the opposition, including theAnti-Corruption Foundation (ACF), the Anti-War Committee (AWC), the Free Russia Forum (FRF), and the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD), as well as moderate urbanist reformers, each pursuing distinct strategies.
* A new resistance movement has emerged, involving over 10,000 people--including fighters on Ukraine's frontlines and guerrillas within Russia--who are actively challenging Putin's regime through direct engagement, offering a new model of sacrifice for change.
* Initiatives, such as the CPD, are proactively crafting constitutional reforms and legislative frameworks to ensure that a democratic, decentralized, and rights-respecting Russia is prepared following a regime change.
* Western powers hesitate to support armed opposition groups, favoring moderate exiles, but embracing the full spectrum of the Russian opposition, especially those risking their lives in active resistance, would facilitate unity and democratic transition.
Many people consider the "Russian opposition" to be impotent, and few believe that it can defeat Russian President Vladimir Putin and ultimately transform the country. It has reached the point where representatives of the armed part of the Russian opposition are beginning to say, "Do not call us the Russian opposition; we now are the Russian resistance." This resistance exists and is growing, and already involves more than ten thousand people who are both on the frontlines of Russia's war against Ukraine and are conducting guerrilla operations on the home front, behind the lines of Putin's army.
The Mainstream Political Landscape
It is useful to examine and define the "Russian opposition." After Boris Yeltsin carried out an unconstitutional coup in October 1993, followed by a highly dubious presidential election in July 1996, all major officially registered opposition parties became representatives of different factions of the ruling elite, becoming essentially their tools in manipulating society./[1] At this point, Russian democracy became "imitational." It was still competitive, but not for voters or policies, but to gain the Kremlin's attention and money for oligarchs./[2] After Putin came to power in 1999, as the elites consolidated under his rule, these parties homogenized to the point of indistinguishability. The result was the creation of the "non-systemic opposition"--poorly structured groups of opposition-minded citizens, typically functioning as fan clubs of individual charismatic leaders./[3] Most of the activities of the "non-systemic opposition" have so far essentially been demonstrations of disagreement with various actions of the authorities. They have never proposed a specific plan to change the situation in the country, were not part of a formulated strategy to fight for power, and did not express the will of particular social groups or classes. They were merely reacting to direct violations of the law and the Constitution by the ruling class, as well as its disregard for morality, ethical norms, and electoral rights.
The "non-systemic opposition" is not really a political opposition. In essence, it is a protest movement, not formalized into political forces with coherent programs of action. Occasionally, it raises the issue of campaigning for one candidate or another during elections, although this is often impossible in the current system. Most of the time, the "non-systemic opposition" acts as the shadow side of the power itself, uncompromisingly criticizing it and making various demands of it, but it cannot imagine itself in power. As the pressure from the authorities on dissenters increased, many of the latter, under the threat of arrest or other repercussions, were forced to leave the country, while few preferred to go to jail, following the example of Soviet-era dissidents. While abroad, they continued to do what they were expelled for--reflecting on the unlawful actions of the Russian authorities, speaking out in the media against the regime, and explaining why Putin was bad to their supporters, sympathetic Russians, and representatives of other countries. In the overwhelming majority of cases, they did not engage in the life of these countries, metaphorically taking Russia with them and continuing to live the life of a homeland that is no longer accessible to them. There has been no transition to meaningful actions that would create an alternative to the regime they despise. These new dissidents increasingly isolated themselves in their separate protest world, created various social clubs and opposition forums, and sometimes held safe public activities or rallies. At the same time, they sharply reject those compatriots who step outside this familiar and comfortable narrative.
Main Tendencies Inside the Russian Opposition
From a political standpoint, the ranks of the opposition are publicly dominated by representatives of right-wing neoliberal views, many of whom lean toward the anti-communist White Movement of the 1918-1920 Civil War./[4] This does not add any optimism for their supporters--as the "Whites" were torn by internal contradictions and were defeated by the Bolsheviks. Many of their descendants now firmly support Putin in his attempts to restore the Russian empire./[5] The political spectrum within the Russian opposition, however, remains diverse. Before the war against Ukraine, it was divided into three large tendencies: leftists, nationalists, and neoliberals. Each of these groups, in turn, could be divided into two. The leftists included both the social-democracy-leaning statists, who were nostalgic for the Soviet Union and wanted to return to the past, and the left-liberals and progressives, who wanted to build a modern decentralized society based on direct democracy and grassroots self-government of citizens.
Among the nationalists, one can distinguish the imperialists from the ethno-nationalists. The imperialists found their perks in the existence of the Soviet Union, but perceived it not as a workers' state but as a continuation of the Russian Empire. It is these people who are now fighting as volunteers in the Russian army in Ukraine. They include such characters as Igor Girkin and Aleksandr Dugin, a well-known representative of modern Russian fascism./[6] /[7] Ethno-nationalists, on the contrary, are supporters of building a nation-state, and their ideal is "Russia for Russians." That is, they usually do not oppose the republics of the Northern Caucasus leaving the Russian Federation, and they tend to support Ukraine under the premise that "Russia is for the Russians, and Ukraine is for the Ukrainians." It is from this milieu that the largest number of fighters emerged to support Ukraine since the very first days of the war in 2014. Many of them fought as part of the Azov Battalion and as part of other units--totaling approximately 5,000 people./[8] About 1,500 of them were granted Ukrainian citizenship by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy./[9]
Neoliberals were also divided into two subgroups. On the one hand, there were the moderates who built their successful careers in the 1990s. For them, under Yeltsin, conditions were not ideal, but it was a system within which they felt comfortable. They perceived Putin as an accident, a deviation, or a mistake and believed that if Russia returned to what Yeltsin or even Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had envisioned, everything would be fine. Some of these neoliberals are still working for Putin, evidently to preserve the market economy, holding positions in the economic agencies of the government and thus providing funding for the war, which they consider to be an unfortunate mistake. These are the "system liberals."/[10]
Another part of this group left the country and set the tone in exile through the main liberal media outlets, including Dozhd TV Channel, Meduza Portal, Novaya Gazeta, and splinter groups of Ekho Moskvy Radio./[11]
Other liberals tend to take a more radical position. They recognize that Putin's regime and Yeltsin's regime are inextricably linked, that a liberal society has never really been built in Russia, with only a brief attempt, which Gorbachev hesitantly began, and the first wave of democrats even more hesitantly continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. All hopes were dashed, however, with the attack on the parliament in 1993, the outbreak of the Russo-Chechen war in 1994, the fraudulent privatization in 1995, and Yeltsin's falsified election in 1996./[12] These people also view liberal democracy and market capitalism as their ideal outcome, but they do not believe that there was any movement in this direction in Russia during the 1990s. Among others, many of the late political activist Alexei Navalny's supporters belong to this tendency.
Russian Opposition During the War Against Ukraine
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 dramatically simplified the political picture. The main issue around which the Russian opposition revolves is its position on the war. While the entire opposition probably has a negative stance toward the war, there are important nuances. Some consider this war to be their own--they believe that they should unambiguously side with Ukraine and fight for its victory, with which the collapse of Putinism will be inextricably linked. Other people have an abstract pacifist attitude and say that they should not oppose their own people. They believe that opposition to the war will harm their future political careers in a liberated Russia, and therefore, they should just wait for the moment when Putin's regime collapses as a result of the struggle with Ukraine or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, or simply under the weight of its own problems. Then it will be possible to return and build a normal country. A large number of people are trying to grasp at every straw, but only to remain in the safer paradigm of waiting for someone else's victory to continue participating in utopian evolutionary change rather than realistic revolutionary change within the country.
Sham presidential elections took place in Russia on March 17, 2024, as if there was no war. Many of the opposition filled out their ballots abroad. People selected candidates who were proposed by the regime and did not intend to change anything within the prevailing system. To be fair, many people came to the polling stations with the sole purpose of demonstrating that in Russia, there is still a significant number of citizens who disagree with the war unleashed by Putin and do not want to see him as president. Such citizens are grasping for any action that gives them hope that they are not entirely cut off from public life and that they can take some safe action to bring about change in the country. Fortunately, there are such people, but unfortunately, an action that could really bring change has not yet been offered to them. More active methods of struggle tend to frighten and repel them, but they will continue to look, and many of those who remain in Russia will be on the streets during future revolutionary events.
Just before the "elections," a tragic event took place. The brightest Russian political activist and journalist, Alexei Navalny, was murdered in a prison camp./[13] A new round of internal struggle within the oppositionists then began. The faction associated with Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) (the same wing that denounced the Yeltsin-Gorbachev legacy) launched an offensive against the "moderates," who are usually associated with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Garry Kasparov, and other representatives of the opposition that rose in the 1990s./[14] There is currently an active fight for which point of view will prevail in the liberal camp. There is no doubt that this acute conflict is directly connected with Navalny's death. The amount of attention from Western leaders to his wife, Yuliya Navalnaya, the main face of Russian liberals at the moment, prompted her team to attempt to enforce her hegemony on the entire liberal flank instead of engaging in negotiations with other opposition members to build a joint coalition./[15] There are great doubts about whether this policy will succeed.
There are several competing centers of the Russian opposition, with leaders around whom political and media activity rotates. First, there is the center built around the ACF, created by Navalny and now led by Navalnaya, Mariya Pevchikh, and Leonid Volkov./[16] Largely because of Navalny's personality, this group has always kept itself separate from others. It expresses radical neoliberal views but is no stranger to left populism stemming from the anticorruption agenda, which is used in attempts to reach beyond its traditional youth constituency. Due to its former media popularity and the attention of Western politicians, this group is not inclined toward any alliances, especially stressing its distance from those members of the opposition who were prominent in the 1990s. Its representatives believe that they are able to come to power completely independently, without entering into agreements with any other political forces. The Navalny group is least inclined to change the current political system and the Russian Constitution, claiming that its failure is primarily the result of treason by corrupted elites.
The other opposition center is the Anti-War Committee (AWC), created by Khodorkovsky and his organization, Open Russia./[17] Once Russia's richest man and its most famous political prisoner, he is a very rational personality with a clear business mindset, which distinguishes him from others. Khodorkovsky does not like to do unnecessary (from his point of view) work to get ahead. A decade in a Russian prison has taught him to wait for the moment when the path of change will be determined: whether Ukraine wins or not, whether Russia will undergo gradual change, or whether the country will be transformed along a revolutionary path. Until this becomes clear to him, he will not take any active steps, let alone any actions that are perceived as controversial by potential supporters. In business parlance, he is a late-stage investor. Khodorkovsky is attempting to establish himself as a figure who dialogues with everyone, almost the "godfather of the opposition," and to promote his central idea--the transformation of Russia from a presidential to a parliamentary republic. In general, he is reasonably successful, except with ACF supporters. He has significant wealth, and with his partner Leonid Nevzlin, his net worth is in the range of $1.5-2 billion, which Khodorkovsky preserved despite the state takeover of his main business asset--the oil giant Yukos. This is an important factor for a large number of Russian emigrants who were suddenly pushed out of Russia and found themselves penniless in the West.
The third opposition center is led by former chess champion Garry Kasparov, who unites people around the Free Russia Forum (FRF). This is the largest and most successful discussion platform for the Russian opposition. For a long time, it has also maintained a reputation as the most radical pro-Western group. Kasparov, who has been living in New York for a long time, prioritizes Russia's integration into the international community over any purely domestic issues. This causes great irritation among other Russian opposition groups, especially the Navalnists, who reproach him for insufficient patriotism. Kasparov has also become one of the most vocal advocates for a Ukrainian victory. Until this happens, however, his priority is to become the main organizer and spokesman for the global Russian diaspora through the project of "virtual Taiwan"--a community of Russians who have been forced to leave the country and build a new state without being tied to any territory./[18] Kasparov calls on all people with opposition views who still reside in Russia to leave it immediately and join him.
The fourth group is the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD), positioning itself as a shadow Russian parliament./[19] This is a unique formation that now includes more than 130 former members of parliament from various periods and levels from 36 regions of Russia, as well as all political parties that have ever been represented in the Russian State Duma. By relying on deputies elected by Russian citizens in internationally recognized elections, this is the only group of the Russian opposition that has a certain degree of verified legitimacy. The total number of votes that the people gathered in the Congress received in their elections reached approximately 8 million. In comparison, the largest elections that the opposition was able to organize were those to the Coordinating Council of the Opposition in 2012, in which about 81,000 people took part./[20]
The CPD, unlike Navalny's, Khodorkovsky's, and Kasparov's organizations, is not engaged in political activism. It is building new legislation for a future Russia, designing a set of laws that will take effect the day after the regime changes, starting with the draft of a new Constitution and ending with basic legislation that regulates the economy, social sphere, education, science, and culture. That is everything that will determine the shape of the country the day after the revolution. Congress deputies are convinced that this should be done in advance because otherwise, there will again be a great risk that everything is done in a hurry and lead to the same discrediting of democratic ideas as happened in the 1990s when various crooks and business lobbyists used loopholes in the legislation to pursue their interests.
The fifth moderate oppositionist group includes former municipal deputies elected during the war against Ukraine and representatives of the urbanist movement. These people focus on "small deeds" of gradual improvements and support an evolutionary process of change. They support constructive dialogue with the authorities and participation in completely fictitious elections. This group includes both municipal deputies who have left Russia and those who remain, formally united in two cooperating structures--the Zemsky Congress, coordinated by Yuliya Galyamina from Moscow, and the Deputies of Peaceful Russia, based in Berlin./[21] In exile, the loudest voice of this group is Maksim Katz, a well-known blogger and political consultant who originated in Navalny's structures but broke with his former colleagues and now actively criticizes them./[22] They are joined by well-known human rights activists Lev Ponomariov, the Memorial movement, and a few others. There is also a sixth notable grouping--the SLOVONOVO community of cultural bohemians, famous writers, artists, musicians, and performers who have been pushed out of the current authoritarian Russian society./[23] They are coordinated, assisted, and developed by gallerist Marat Guelman, a well-known representative of the Russian cultural community, who now lives in Germany./[24]
Emerging Armed Opposition--the Russian Resistance
The six aforementioned groups constitute the Russian political opposition. Three Russian units fighting on the frontlines as official autonomous parts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, however, should be added to this list.[25] First, the largest of them is the Freedom of Russia Legion, followed by the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Siberian Battalion. They were formed in different ways, have different military specialties, and include people of various types, but they are united by one thing--readiness to bear and use arms to defend their values against Putinism. Regarding the Freedom of Russia Legion, which this author had the honor of representing politically in 2022-2024, it includes representatives from the most diverse political tendencies, including former supporters of Navalny, nationalists, leftists, and liberals. The units at the front are complemented by a fairly large internal Russian urban resistance movement, which is currently five to seven times larger than the number of people at the front.
In general, resistance inside Russia is organized in the form of various loose networks. Some of them have grown at the completely grassroots level, while others have been created in coordination with the three units fighting at the front in Ukraine, thus resembling De Gaulle's movement, which started under the name of Free France and evolved into Fighting France. Their activities can be seen constantly in news reports about acts of sabotage on railroad trains carrying military cargo, attacks on infrastructure facilities inside Russia that have military significance, and even attacks on military bases inside the country. This movement is growing, and its members are real heroes. Paradoxically, it is safer to participate in armed resistance than in nonviolent protest in Russia. Of the current over 1,500 political prisoners in Russia, only about two hundred are people who were associated with the resistance, while the rest were involved in nonviolent actions./[26] This fact is easy to explain: those who engage in armed attacks usually do everything to avoid being caught and remain anonymous, while "ordinary" political activists are in full view of everyone. Thus, the Russian security services come for them quickly and send them to camps.
Finally, there is a growing number of national liberation movements in the regions and republics of the Russian Federation, which the Free Nations League and the Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum primarily coordinate./[27] Discussions about their views and actions in the Russian opposition are probably the toughest. The topic of a possible collapse of the Federation, actively sought by many Ukrainians, remains taboo for most Russians. Some believe that the country must be preserved within its internally recognized borders at all costs, regardless of anything, and quite aggressively attack anyone who disagrees, including physical threats to "deal with the separatists." Others, while sympathetic to the struggle of national republics, believe that this topic is toxic for their relations with the West, which is obviously afraid of the collapse of the Russian Federation and nuclear proliferation, the People's Republic of China's strengthening position in Siberia, and chaos stemming from a possible internal war. Just as the West once did not support the collapse of the Soviet Union, its official circles now do not support even a hint of discussion about the self-determination of the peoples that comprise the Russian Federation.
The CPD, which has adopted a resolution that it will unconditionally respect the right of peoples to self-determination, is a special case in point, which is why Russian regionalists and representatives of national liberation movements regularly attend it. The position of the Congress is simple: there is no need to push anyone to secede from Russia, but it is a crime to hold anyone inside by force. Russia's strength lies in its regions, particularly in grassroots self-government. Any actions aimed at suppressing diverse regional identities, cultures, languages, and overall regional self-determination will play a negative role and may lead not to the strengthening of the future Russian Republic but to its weakening.
Nevertheless, there is quite an active discussion on this topic, and the position of the international community plays an important role. Numerous questions regarding this position remain: What standards will be used to approach the future of Russia? Will it be treated like any other country, and will the rights of its people be treated like the rights of people living in other countries? Or will they encourage anti-democratic, imperialist tendencies in certain Russian opposition groups in the name of important geopolitical concerns, primarily related to Russia's nuclear status, just as Putin was once encouraged to tame the people of Chechnya? At the same time, supporting Ukraine's armed struggle can be considered correct not only from a moral perspective--in times of war, the defender always deserves support--but also from a pragmatic perspective. The likelihood that there will be a very significant number of former state, private, and criminal armed groups left on Russian territory after the collapse of Putin's regime is extremely high. For this reason alone, the new government must have the ability to defend itself independently of the former compromised security apparatus.
Financial Crisis, Political Infighting, and Strategic Paralysis
By 2025, the Russian opposition had plunged into a deep financial crisis triggered by the collapse of USAID-backed funding./[28] The FRF and the ACF were among the hardest hit, launching an aggressive competition for dwindling European funds./[29] The FRF halted its meetings entirely. Many media projects were either downsized or shut down altogether. Only two structures remained financially resilient: the AWC and the CPD, led by Ilya Ponomarev. Unprecedented internal strife was also seen in 2024. ACF accused Nevzlin--Khodorkovsky's lifelong business partner--of orchestrating an assassination attempt on Volkov, following the latter's political attacks against Nevzlin's ally./[30] Volkov himself came under scrutiny for failing to disclose receiving funds from sanctioned oligarch Mikhail Fridman, allegedly in exchange for lobbying efforts to remove him from sanctions lists./[31]
Katz, who received media backing from Khodorkovsky, accused ACF of collaborating with corrupt Russian bankers and providing false testimony in asylum cases.[32] In response, ACF denounced Katz for business dealings with Kremlin-linked tech firms and accused Khodorkovsky of participating in election fraud and suppressing democracy during the 1990s to secure business advantages. Further scandals erupted when Katz accused the Free Russia Foundation, the influential U.S.-based non-governmental organization, of using U.S. State Department funding to run ACF-linked internet troll farms, which allegedly targeted not only the Kremlin but also rival opposition figures. Nevzlin later attempted, unsuccessfully, to seize control of the CPD, igniting additional tension. The cumulative effect of these disputes was devastating for the opposition. Communications and support from the European Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), U.S. officials, Poland, and Ukraine were effectively frozen, as cooperation with the Russian opposition became potentially toxic for mainstream Western politicians.
Most factions of the Russian opposition--excluding the CPD--chose to openly support the Democratic Party's 2024 campaign in the United States, intensifying their criticism of U.S. President Donald Trump. This alignment further complicated formal contacts with U.S. institutions and other allied governments, limiting the opposition's access to decision-makers across the West.
Meanwhile, the looming uncertainty of a potential Russia-Ukraine peace deal cast a paralyzing shadow across opposition planning. Moderates such as Khodorkovsky retreated from public engagement, uncertain of how to proceed if hostilities ended. Radicals such as Kasparov, in contrast, have vocally criticized U.S. efforts at diplomacy, which have triggered accusations that they represent a "party of war." Opposition figures skeptical of the armed resistance and its association with Ukrainian partners seized the opportunity to question the legitimacy of structures such as the CPD and prematurely declared their "political bankruptcy." All opposition groups now confront a common dilemma: none can convincingly offer their followers a coherent and viable future strategy. This is especially detrimental to the CPD, which had positioned itself as a provisional governing body in a post-Putin transition. Without a clear horizon, the Russian opposition movement must pivot from short-term wartime relevance to an indefinite, uncertain long game.
Importance of Consolidated Opposition
It can be argued that if Russian opposition leaders do not value unity above their personal ambitions, then why should anyone else? Should one wait until the Russian elite appoints a successor or wait for a new leader to emerge if the regime collapses, as happened in 1991?
Representatives of the armed wing of the Russian opposition--the Russian resistance--gave their answer to this by acting already. Making strategic decisions, however, is always about a risk-reward calculation. To wait and do nothing means more deaths in Ukraine, a risk of escalating the war beyond Ukraine to the territory of NATO states, and resigning to the idea that somebody from Putin's inner circle will succeed him. Many say that to act means to risk a suicidal nuclear conflict and a bloody civil war inside Russia. Indecisiveness, however, should not be covered by describing such scenarios. Every day, one can already see conflicts in Russia with burning refineries and derailed trains. Putin is not a nuclear jihadist, judging by his long tables in the Kremlin to protect him from an unfiltered disease.
A strong opposition will create internal problems for Putin and help divert him from external escapades. A strong opposition taking over in Moscow can end the war against Ukraine and any wars inside Russia, de-occupy territories, reintegrate Russia with the West, restore trade and foreign investments, and repay the damages of the war, which otherwise would be financed by Western taxpayers. A strong and united opposition, in the sense of a single organization or party, however, is hardly possible because activists often hold divergent views on the future of the country and sometimes different values. Attempts to create a few joint structures in the past demonstrated this. The best example was the left-right coalition The Other Russia, which included both supporters of Kasparov's neoliberal United Civil Front (UCF) and members of Eduard Limonov's National Bolshevik Party (NBP)./[33] As a result, both the UCF and the NBP were annihilated, and most of their networks were lost. The most recent failure was the Coordination Council of the Opposition, established during protests in 2012 and consisting of 45 prominent opposition figures, which failed to adopt even the rules of its own activities in a year of work, and most of whose members simply went home.
A coalition of various forces with different views, which would coordinate activities using various methods of struggle, is quite possible. The creation of a coalition shadow government of the Russian Republic, recognized by the international community, is also possible.
This government would include representatives of both resistance fighters and the opposition movements supporting them, each of which contains professionally accomplished individuals capable of taking responsibility for the country's fate during the transition period. It can take all necessary steps, coordinated with the states of the Rammstein coalition, to encourage Russians to fight against aggression. It should be stressed, however, that any union that denies cooperation with the armed part of the opposition can never become the real power in Russia.
How the West Can Help Consolidation
Western political circles consistently call for Russian oppositionists to unite before talking about Russia's future. This creates even more intense competition between different political groups. Everyone wants to be in charge, to be the most visible, to be heard by Western politicians, to become the center of unification, and to receive an exclusive mandate. This is especially the case since politicians in emigration are mostly intellectuals, not workers, with a lot of free time, who often direct their energy into a struggle with each other.
On the other hand, the West does not notice or pretends not to see those who are fighting against aggression in Ukraine and on the home front, and who have little time for blogging and political intrigues. Western officials consider such people dangerous and unpredictable and believe any ties with them may backfire. This is why they are not invited to various events and are not called to join coalitions. The part of the opposition that has taken on the heavy burden of organizing real resistance and hastening the end of the war and the fall of Putinism scares traditional politicians due to their desire to completely reset Russian statehood and the methods they employ.
As a result of these factors, there is little assistance, but rather sabotage, in creating truly inclusive opposition alliances. Ultimately, attempts to create such coalitions fail because they lack the core of freedom fighters to make the whole structure meaningful and aimed at political action. The reason for this lies in the lack of understanding of the challenges to global security and human values posed by Putinism and its policies, which is encouraged by the indecisiveness of the free world. The faster this realization comes, the sooner the focus of attention will shift toward the most decisive and capable segments of the Russian opposition--its resistance movement. The most meaningful policy aimed at ending the war and preventing another Putin or someone even worse from emerging in Russia is to create discussion platforms and venues that will be open to all representatives of the Russian opposition without exception. Both the methods of struggle and concrete projects aimed at building a new Russian state must be discussed. Such mechanisms can help ensure that Russia will become part of the Western world and cease to exist as a tyranny, an empire, and a prison for individual citizens and entire nations.
Endnotes
[1] Trudolyubov, Maxim, Evgeny Romanovsky, Izabella Tabarovsky, and Rashad Shirinov. "Opposition Divided over History Leading to Putin." Wilson Center, April 23, 2025. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/opposition-divided-over-history-leading-putin.
[2] Furman, Dmitrii, Keith Gessen, and Tony Wood. 2022. Imitation Democracy: The Development of Russia's Post-Soviet Political System. Translated by Ian Dreiblatt. English language edition. London: Verso. Verso Books. https://www.versobooks.com/products/354-imitation-democracy?srsltid=AfmBOopY15C4nlaKWrp42J1oJaTHPwZTA693gpdQfwP9JH2pFbHW4WyM.
[3] Golosov, Grigorii. "Russian Opposition: Inside or Outside the System?" OpenDemocracy. September 1, 2011. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russian-opposition-inside-or-outside-system/.
[4] Kostenko, Nika, Margarita Zavadskaya, Emil Kamalov and Ivetta Sergeeva. "The Russian Rhizome: A Social Portrait of New Immigrants." Re:Russia. January 11, 2023. https://re-russia.net/en/expertise/045/.
[5] Fishman, Diana. "Compatriots 3. How Descendants of White Russian Emigres Became the Kremlin's Key Agents of Influence in France." The Insider. The Insider. February 21, 2023. https://theins.ru/en/politics/259554.
[6] RFE/RL's Echo of the Caucasus. "Igor Girkin, Imprisoned Russian Nationalist, Plans to Join Troops Invading Ukraine." RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. RFE/RL. April 10, 2024. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-girkin-strelkov-ukraine-invasion-prison/32899197.html.
[7] Ingram, Alan. 2001. "Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia." Political Geography. Volume 20, Issue 8, November 2001, Pages 1029-1051. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629801000439.
[8] Puglisi, Rosaria, Bertrand de Franqueville, Ivan Gomza, Mollie Saltskog, Kacper Rekawek, Taras Tarasiuk, Petro Burkovskiy, and Przemyslaw Witkowski. 2024. In the Eye of the Storm Origins, Ideology, and Controversies of the Azov Brigade, 2014-2023. Edited by Christian Kaunert, Alex MacKenzie, and Adrien Nonjon. 1. Auflage. Hannover: ibidem. https://elibrary.utb.de/doi/book/10.24216/9783838277509; and "U.S. Lifts Ban on Providing Weapons and Training for Ukraine's Controversial Azov Brigade." PBS. Public Broadcasting Service. June 11, 2024. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-lifts-ban-on-providing-weapons-and-training-for-ukraines-controversial-azov-brigade.
[9] "Zelensky Grants Ukrainian Citizenship to Several Foreign Military Volunteers." Information Agency. UNIAN. July 18, 2019. https://www.unian.info/war/10622892-zelensky-grants-ukrainian-citizenship-to-several-foreign-military-volunteers.html; Litnarovych, Vlad. "Ukraine's Azov Brigade Officially Opens Its Ranks to Foreign Volunteers." UNITED24 Media. December 24, 2024. https://united24media.com/latest-news/ukraines-azov-brigade-officially-opens-its-ranks-to-foreign-volunteers-4679.
[10] Matveev, Ilya. "How Russia's Liberal Technocrats Became...Just Technocrats." Jordan Russia Center. Accessed May 25, 2024. https://jordanrussiacenter.org/blog/how-russias-liberal-technocrats-becamejust-technocrats.
[11] TV Rain, Inc. https://tvrain.tv/; 2025. Meduza. https://meduza.io/; https://novayagazeta.eu/; Ekho Moskvy Radio splinter program Live Rain, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCWAIvx2yYLK_xTYD4F2mUNw.
[12] "Russian Forces Enter Chechnya | December 11, 1994." 2025. History.Com. A&E Television Networks. Updated March 2, 2025. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/december-11/yeltsin-orders-russian-forces-into-chechnya; Rosalsky, Greg. "How 'Shock Therapy' Created Russian Oligarchs and Paved the Path for Putin." NPR. NPR. March 22, 2022. https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2022/03/22/1087654279/how-shock-therapy-created-russian-oligarchs-and-paved-the-path-for-putin.
[13] "HRF Condemns the Murder of Russian Dissident Alexei Navalny." Human Rights Foundation. February 16, 2024. https://hrf.org/latest/hrf-condemns-the-murder-of-russian-dissident-alexei-navalny/.
[14] The Bell. "Team Navalny Film about 1990s Oligarchs Divides Russia's Opposition." The Bell. The Bell. April 23, 2024. https://en.thebell.io/team-navalny-film-about-1990s-oligarchs-divides-russias-opposition/.
[15] Deutsche Welle. "Yulia Navalnaya Takes on Leading Role in Russia's Opposition - DW - June 6, 2024." Dw.Com. Deutsche Welle. June 6. https://www.dw.com/en/yulia-navalnaya-takes-on-leading-role-in-russias-opposition/a-69272303.
[16] Anticorruption Foundation, https://acf.international/.
[17] "What Is Open Russia?" Mikhail Khodorkovsky. July 2, 2015. https://khodorkovsky.com/what-is-open-russia/.
[18] Danilova, Maria. "Putin 'Only Understands Force:' Russian Chess Legend." Barrons. Barrons. March 12, 2024. https://www.barrons.com/news/putin-only-understands-force-russian-chess-legend-f5eb7265.
[19] Congress of People's Deputies, https://rosdep.org/.
[20] Wierzbowska-Miazga, Agata. "Russia: The Opposition's Coordinating Council Has Been Chosen." OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. April 19, 2018. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-10-24/russia-oppositions-coordinating-council-has-been-chosen.
[21] Pavlova, Uliana. "Russian Congress Seeking Inspiration from Medieval History Is Quashed by Authorities." The Moscow Times. May 26, 2021. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/05/26/russian-congress-seeking-inspiration-from-medieval-history-is-quashed-by-authorities-a74001; "Deputies of Peaceful Russia." Inoteka.io. https://inoteka.io/en/ino/deputies-peaceful-russia.
[22] "Russian Political Activist Katz Jailed 8 Years in Absentia for Spreading 'War Fakes.'" The Moscow Times. August 24, 2023. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/08/24/russian-political-activist-katz-jailed-8-years-in-absentia-for-spreading-war-fakes-a82237.
[23] "Lev Ponomarev." Rights in Russia. September 10, 2020. https://www.rightsinrussia.org/lev-ponomarev/; "Russia's Supreme Court approves liquidation of International Memorial." Memorial Society. February 28, 2022. https://www.memo.ru/en-us/.
[24] "Marat Guelman." Guelman Und Unbekannt. https://guelmanundunbekannt.com/guelman.
[25] Kyiv Post. "'Irpin Declaration' on the Cooperation of the Russian Opposition against Putin's Regime." Kyiv Post. September 1, 2022. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/5321.
[26] Gozman, Leonid. "Russia's Political Prisoners Must Not Be Forgotten." Atlantic Council. October 1, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-political-prisoners-must-not-be-forgotten/.
[27] Free Nations League. https://freenationsleague.org/en/; Free Nations of Post-Russia Forum. https://www.freenationsrf.org/en.
[28] Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-estimates-usaid-cuts.
[29] Free Russia Foundation. https://www.4freerussia.org/.
[30] "Poland Detains Two Men Suspected of Attack on Russian Opposition Figure in Lithuania." Notes From Poland. April 19, 2024. https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/04/19/poland-detains-two-men-suspected-of-attack-on-russian-opposition-figure-in-lithuania/.
[31] "Mikhail Fridman - Putin's Oligarchs." Coda Story. February 5, 2024. https://www.codastory.com/instagarchs/mikhail-fridman/.
[32] The Bell. "Reputation Whitewashing' Scandal Rocks Russian Opposition." The Bell. October 9, 2024. https://en.thebell.io/reputation-whitewashing-scandal-rocks-russian-opposition/.
[33] The Other Russia. Accessed May 25. http://www.theotherrussia.org/; Manifesto of the United Civil Front, Wayback Machine. Accessed May 25, 2025. https://web.archive.org/web/20050610022403/http:/www.rufront.ru/; Yasmann, Victor. "Russia: National Bolsheviks, The Party of 'Direct Action." RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. RFE/RL. April 29, 2008. https://www.rferl.org/a/1058689.html.
* * *
llya Ponomarev is a politician and technology entrepreneur, in 2007-2016 - member of Russian Parliament (Social-Democrat - Novosibirsk, "A Just Russia" political party), Chairman of Innovations and Venture Capital Subcommittee, one of the founders of the Skolkovo Foundation and SkolTech University. Former vice-president for technologies of Yukos Oil Company.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/program/russian-opposition-and-russian-resistance-the-landscape-before-the-battle-for-power/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Jamestown Foundation Issues Commentary to Eurasia Daily Monitor: Poland Responds to Russian Sabotage Campaign With Consulate Closure
WASHINGTON, May 31 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on May 29, 2025, to the Eurasia Daily Monitor:* * *
Poland Responds to Russian Sabotage Campaign with Consulate Closure
By Alexander Neuman
Executive Summary:
* Poland announced on May 12 that it will close Russia's consulate in Krakow after attributing the May 2024 Warsaw shopping center fire to Russian security services, as one of only seven North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries to shut down Russian consulates.
* Moscow and its proxies continue staging covert operations in Poland, with at least ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 31 -- The Jamestown Foundation issued the following commentary on May 29, 2025, to the Eurasia Daily Monitor: * * * Poland Responds to Russian Sabotage Campaign with Consulate Closure By Alexander Neuman Executive Summary: * Poland announced on May 12 that it will close Russia's consulate in Krakow after attributing the May 2024 Warsaw shopping center fire to Russian security services, as one of only seven North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries to shut down Russian consulates. * Moscow and its proxies continue staging covert operations in Poland, with at leasttwo apparent abductions in recent months, despite Poland's extensive diplomatic and civilian restrictions on Russia and Belarus.
* Russian hybrid warfare increasingly utilizes local criminals in influence operations designed to tarnish the Ukrainian image in the West, even when physical outcomes are limited.
On May 12, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski announced that Poland would close Russia's consulate in Krakow within 30 days and expel three Russian diplomats. These decisions followed the Polish government's attribution of a May 2024 arson attack in Warsaw's Marywilska 44 shopping center to Russian security organizations (X/@sikorskiradek; TASS, May 12). The previous day, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated, "The activities were coordinated by a person residing in Russia. Some of the perpetrators are already in custody, the rest have been identified and are wanted" (X/@donaldtusk, May 11).
A joint statement by the Polish Minister of Justice-Prosecutor General, Adam Bodnar, and Minister Coordinator of Secret Services, Tomasz Siemoniak, credited the Mazovian Branch of the National Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime and Corruption, the Warsaw Police Headquarters, the Internal Security Agency (ABW, Agencja Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego), and their Lithuanian counterparts with an investigation that interviewed over 70 witnesses and 530 victims of the attack (Website of the Republic of Poland, May 11). The attack closed more than 1,400 businesses.
The shuttering of the Russian consulate in Krakow leaves only its consulate in Gdansk and embassy in Warsaw. Poland recently shut down the Russian consulate in Poznan, citing cyberattacks, intelligence activities, and attempted acts of sabotage in Wroclaw (Notes from Poland, October 22, 2024). Russia responded by closing Poland's consulate in Saint Petersburg and is threatening to close Poland's remaining consular missions in Irkutsk and Kaliningrad (X/@tassagency_en, May 12). Poland's countermeasure is one of Europe's most significant responses to Russian covert actions on the continent. Among North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (all in 2022), Germany (in 2023), and the United States (in 2017 and 2018) have shut down Russian consulates, while the United Kingdom and Netherlands closed other diplomatic properties. Poland has also barred Russian citizens from entry for economic, sporting, tourist, or cultural purposes since September 2022, even if entering with a Schengen visa (Straz Graniczna, July 19, 2024).
The Polish government's decisive response demonstrates a Europe-wide trend of directly attributing physical and cyber acts of sabotage to Russia over the last year. In April 2024, Czechia's Security Information Service (BIS) confirmed that Unit 29155 of Russia's Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU) military intelligence agency attacked two ammunition depots in 2014 (Bezpecnostni Informacni Sluzba, April 29, 2024). In April, French authorities publicly condemned the GRU for the first time, citing a 2015 cyberattack on the TV5 Monde television channel, the hacking of French President Emmanuel Macron supporters' emails during his 2017 campaign, and cyberattacks on sporting bodies involved in the 2024 Paris Olympic Games (Le Monde, April 29). The French government, however, has not attributed the 2024 sabotage of French National Railways (SNCF) during the Games to Russia (Le Journal du Dimanche, July 26, 2024). Director General Ken McCallum of the United Kingdom's MI5 described the GRU as being "on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets" (Security Service MI5, October 8, 2024). In April, British police arrested a Romanian man in Birmingham, allegedly involved in setting a fire at a DHL warehouse on behalf of Russia (The Guardian, April 9).
Russia and Belarus have continued covert actions against Poland despite their lowered diplomatic footprint since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which resulted in a wave of diplomatic expulsions across the West. Russian and Belarusian intelligence services have facilitated an artificial migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border since July 2021 (see EDM, August 15, 2023). This manufactured crisis spiked again in 2024, which saw 30,090 attempted border crossings from Belarus (Notes from Poland, January 10). In 2024, Tusk described the situation, saying, "What we're dealing with there isn't a spontaneous or accidental arrival of refugees or escapees, but rather an organized, large-scale Russian-Belarusian operation, transporting thousands of people," sourced from countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria, where Poland does not have cooperation agreements (The Eastern Frontier Initiative, October 17, 2024). May 28 marked the anniversary of the death of a Polish soldier who was stabbed by a migrant while trying to prevent a group from illegally crossing the border from Belarus (Notes from Poland, June 6, 2024).
The recent disappearance of Belarusian dissidents from Poland has further raised the profile of Russian and Belarusian covert operations within Polish borders. Exiled Belarusian activist Anzhalika Melnikaua and her two daughters disappeared from Krakow in March, and former Belarusian prisoner Pavel Belyutin vanished from Poland in April (Polskie Radio, March 29; Belsat, April 24). Belarusian state media triumphantly announced Belyutin and another dissident's "repatriation" on May 6 (Belsat, May 6). Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka's regime crushing mass pro-democracy protests in 2020 spurred a wave of emigration, establishing Poland and Lithuania as major hubs for the Belarusian opposition in exile (see EDM, April 23, October 2, 2024, February 3). Warsaw, for example, hosts the headquarters of the Association of Security Forces of Belarus (BYPOL), an association of former Belarusian law enforcement and security officers with underground ties to the country, and NEXTA, a Telegram channel that played a major role in the 2020 protests (The Record, June 19, 2024; Telegram/nexta_tv, accessed May 29). Vilnius hosts Sviatlana Tskikhanouskaya's Office, the Belarusian opposition leader and 2020 president-elect (The Record, June 19, 2024).
These cases demonstrate the evolution of Russia and Belarus's covert war against the West. Russia and Belarus are aggressively and successfully targeting dissidents in Poland, one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) governments most hostile to Russia, despite limited diplomatic presence and near-blanket bans on Russian citizens. These limitations have drawn Russian security services toward co-opting local and third-country nationals, especially Ukrainians and Belarusians, to conduct less professionalized covert actions at a lower cost. This pattern is seen in the string of 2024 arson attacks in Poland and Lithuania (LRT, March 17; Notes from Poland, May 12; see EDM, May 10; see Jamestown Perspectives, May 27)./[1] Other cases that point to Russian security forces hiring non-Russian citizens include a DHL bombing plot in Germany and an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned business in London (BBC, October 25, 2024; ZDF Heute, November 26, 2024).
The United Kingdom is investigating the possibility of Russian involvement in the case of one Romanian and two Ukrainian men arrested in May for three counts of arson in locations tied to Prime Minister Keir Starmer (Financial Times, May 23). On the same week of one arrest, Germany and Switzerland arrested three Ukrainian nationals suspected of preparing explosive packages destined for Ukraine "on behalf of Russian state agencies" (Deutsche Welle, May 14). Even though these attempts have limited tangible effects, they have propaganda value for Russia when portrayed as "Ukrainian" attacks without acknowledging Russia's role (Vesti.ru, May 14; StopFake, May 18). The expansive "hired criminal" phase of Russian hybrid warfare allows Moscow to sow discord regardless of the mission's physical outcome, with criminals likely to remain attractive partners for the West's strategic adversaries.
Note:
[1] See Poland on the Frontlines Against Russia's Shadow War by Anjou Kang Stryker and Janusz Bugajski for a comprehensive public data set of Russia's espionage operations in Poland.
* * *
Alexander Neuman has an MA in International Security and a BA in Russian and Eurasian Studies from George Mason University.
* * *
Original text here: https://jamestown.org/program/poland-responds-to-russian-sabotage-campaign-with-consulate-closure/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Empire Center Digs Through Albany's Pork Barrel
ALBANY, New York, May 31 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release:* * *
Empire Center Digs Through Albany's Pork Barrel
Albany steered over $226 million in grant awards to 581 local projects between June 2024 and April 2025 through the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York (DASNY), according to data the Empire Center recently received under a Freedom of Information Law request.
The governor and state legislators hand-picked the grantees for more than $110 million, under a program that allows them to direct DASNY dollars to state and local projects. ... Show Full Article ALBANY, New York, May 31 -- Empire Center, a non-profit think tank, issued the following news release: * * * Empire Center Digs Through Albany's Pork Barrel Albany steered over $226 million in grant awards to 581 local projects between June 2024 and April 2025 through the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York (DASNY), according to data the Empire Center recently received under a Freedom of Information Law request. The governor and state legislators hand-picked the grantees for more than $110 million, under a program that allows them to direct DASNY dollars to state and local projects.Authority for the grants comes from the State and Municipal Facilities Program (SAM), a slush fund created in 2013 that lets state lawmakers and the governor name the recipients.
Another $50.5 million went to child care providers under a program announced by Governor Hochul last fall.
The largest grant was a $7.7 million award to a Village of Baxter Estates coastal erosion and flooding mitigation project, including elevated overlook walkways, upper shoreline landscaping, benches, and energy efficient lighting. The second largest grant was $5 million to The Humane Society of Rochester and Monroe County for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc. for improvements to its Lollypop Farm Facility animal shelter and adoption center.
Other SAM-funded projects include:
* $2,500,000 for beach restoration at Montauk and $500,000 to renovate the water infrastructure system at the Hamptons' exclusive Georgica Pond;
* $2,000,000 to construct a spray park in Tonawanda in Western New York;
* $750,000 to for the creation of a splash pad for Middletown in Orange County;
* $500,000 to create a cafeteria and wellness lounge for a school in Dobbs Ferry in Westchester County;
* $125,000 to purchase a street sweeper for Kings Point, aka Jay Gatsby's West Egg, on Long Island; and
* $125,000 to purchase a UTV and related equipment for Bedford Hills Fire District in Westchester County.
More than $62 million was channeled to local entities state-wide, including $18.3 million to 37 villages; $15 million to 61 towns; $8.4 million to 29 New York City public schools; $6.2 million to 15 cities outside the Big Apple; $2.3 million to 14 counties; $4.3 million to 19 elementary/secondary schools outside New York City; $6.3 million to colleges and universities and $1.4 million to public libraries.
The grants are not awarded on a competitive or transparent basis, and most get disbursed outside the normal budget process, meaning state lawmakers never vote on the individual recipients.
"These are projects that local taxpayers could be funding, but instead they get charged to the state outside public view," said Empire Center president & CEO Zilvinas Silenas. "Even if these projects warranted support from state taxpayers, they should be funded in the state budget, not through Albany's secret credit card."
The funds are being dished out through ten separate programs using borrowed funds, meaning state taxpayers will pay not only the cost, but also the interest on DASNY-issued bonds.
The Empire Center, based in Albany, is an independent, not-for-profit, non-partisan think tank dedicated to promoting policies that can make New York a better place to live, work and raise a family.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/empire-center-digs-through-albanys-pork-barrel/
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center on Budget & Policy Priorities: House Republican Reconciliation Bill Takes Away Health Coverage, Food Assistance, Tax Credits From Millions of Immigrants and Their Families
WASHINGTON, May 31 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following research:* * *
House Republican Reconciliation Bill Takes Away Health Coverage, Food Assistance, Tax Credits From Millions of Immigrants and Their Families
By Margot Dankner, Shelby Gonzales, Elizabeth Lower-Basch and Kiran Rachamallu
The House Republican reconciliation bill would impose massive cuts in food assistance, health care coverage, and other supports for people with low incomes/[1] and singles out immigrants with lawful status and their families for particularly cruel restrictions on assistance. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 31 -- The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities issued the following research: * * * House Republican Reconciliation Bill Takes Away Health Coverage, Food Assistance, Tax Credits From Millions of Immigrants and Their Families By Margot Dankner, Shelby Gonzales, Elizabeth Lower-Basch and Kiran Rachamallu The House Republican reconciliation bill would impose massive cuts in food assistance, health care coverage, and other supports for people with low incomes/[1] and singles out immigrants with lawful status and their families for particularly cruel restrictions on assistance.These measures would partially pay for the bill's trillions of dollars in tax cuts heavily weighted to the wealthy,/[2] as well as its $50 billion for border wall construction and around $150 billion for a large detention and deportation apparatus/[3] that threatens family separation and unjust treatment of immigrants and others who get swept up by the deportation dragnet.
Although congressional Republicans have falsely claimed that the cuts targeting immigrants are aimed at people without a documented immigration status, the reality is that people who lack documentation already do not qualify for these benefits. Instead, the cuts would primarily impact immigrants who lawfully live and work in the U.S. and U.S. citizen children in immigrant families.
At the same time, the Trump Administration is taking steps to terminate lawful status for hundreds of thousands of people granted humanitarian parole, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) holders, and others who have sought refuge in this country. The combination of these changes and the new restrictive policies would leave people more hungry, less healthy, less able to buy food for their children (who are often U.S. citizens), and less able to contribute to their communities.
House Bill Targets People Granted Humanitarian Protections
In 1996, Congress enacted a set of very restrictive rules that took away food assistance and health coverage from many people lawfully living in the U.S. Among those whose eligibility the legislation protected, however, were people whose immigration status was granted out of humanitarian concern for their (and their family's) well-being and safety.
This group includes refugees who are fleeing persecution and have been vetted and adjudicated as needing protection before they come to this country. It also includes people who have been granted asylum after proving, while in the U.S., that they would face persecution in their home country. And it includes people who have been granted humanitarian parole (such as Afghans who assisted the U.S. during wartime and would be harmed if they remained in Afghanistan), certain victims of sex or labor trafficking who help law enforcement bring the perpetrators to justice, and certain victims of domestic violence.
The House Republican reconciliation bill pointedly seeks to turn the nation against people who have received humanitarian protection -- many of whom have no resources -- and deny them the often temporary help they need to get established in the U.S. and provide for their families.
Taking Away Health Coverage
The House reconciliation bill, passed in the early hours of the morning of May 22 by a one-vote Republican majority, would take away health coverage that millions of immigrants who are living and working lawfully in the U.S. now receive through various sources, including the Affordable Care Act (ACA) marketplaces, Medicare, and Medicaid.
ACA Marketplaces
The House bill would bar many lawfully present immigrants from qualifying for premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions that help people afford health insurance in the ACA marketplaces. It would also bar the same group from qualifying for health coverage from the Basic Health Program, which Oregon and Minnesota use to provide coverage to people with low incomes rather than through the ACA marketplace. (People without a documented immigration status are already barred from purchasing coverage in the ACA marketplaces, contrary to House Republicans' claims.)/[4]
Under current law, only individuals who are lawfully present in the U.S. may receive financial assistance to buy marketplace coverage./[5] But the bill radically narrows which categories of immigrants would qualify, taking away assistance from numerous groups of immigrants who all have lawful immigration statuses: people granted asylum; refugees; special immigrant juveniles who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected by a parent; TPS holders; those granted humanitarian parole (based on a determination that their urgent humanitarian needs cannot be met in their home countries); and certain victims of domestic violence, labor or sex trafficking, and other serious crimes, among others.
The only groups eligible for assistance to afford marketplace coverage would be U.S. citizens, people with lawful permanent resident status (LPRs, also known as green card holders), certain Cubans paroled into the U.S. under a specific family reunification program, and people from the Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau who live and work in the United States under Compacts of Free Association (COFA).
The bill would also take away premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions that help low-income people who are lawfully present but ineligible for Medicaid due to their immigration status buy marketplace coverage. The ACA included a provision that allows people in these groups to qualify for premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions even if their incomes are below the poverty line.
Medicare
The bill would also take Medicare away from people with lawful immigration status. Medicare is an earned benefit, meaning that only people who themselves (or whose spouses) have worked in the U.S. for at least 40 quarters -- ten years -- qualify. Currently, lawfully present immigrants who meet this work history test as well as other program requirements are eligible for Medicare. The House bill would restrict access so that only citizens, LPRs, certain Cuban parolees, and people residing in the U.S. from COFA nations would be eligible. As a result, people with TPS as well as refugees, those granted asylum, and certain survivors of domestic violence, labor or sex trafficking, and other serious crimes, among others, would be stripped of Medicare eligibility.
While many refugees and asylees ultimately convert to LPR status, some are unable to due to health or other limitations. People with TPS, a long-standing form of immigration relief that administrations from both parties have used to enable people in humanitarian need to live and work lawfully in the U.S., generally have no pathway to LPR status. They may therefore pay Medicare payroll taxes for years into a system they will never benefit from, subsidizing U.S. citizens and LPRs while being left with no health coverage when they need it.
Penalizing States That Provide Health Coverage to Certain Immigrants
The House bill would levy severe penalties on states that have adopted the Medicaid expansion under the ACA if the state provides certain categories of immigrants (including many who have lawful immigration statuses) with access to comprehensive health coverage, regardless of the source of funding for that coverage.
Medicaid has strict, long-standing eligibility requirements that prohibit anyone who is undocumented from enrolling and also bar many people with lawful immigration statuses from accessing coverage. A 1996 law created the "qualified alien" immigration standard to be used in determining eligibility for Medicaid; a narrow list of immigration statuses are defined as "qualified," and many people with "qualified alien" status are only eligible for Medicaid after they have had that status for five years.
The House bill would impose a penalty on states that provide comprehensive health coverage to people who are not U.S. citizens or "qualified aliens," even if the state solely uses its own funds or private funds to provide this coverage or the state provides coverage permitted under the federal Medicaid or CHIP programs.
States that operate programs with the following criteria would trigger a sizable penalty:
* Programs funded solely by state funds in 16 states and the District of Columbia that provide comprehensive health coverage to people who are not citizens and do not have a "qualified alien" status.
* Any comprehensive coverage (including Medicaid) to people granted humanitarian parole (and that status is granted for at least one year). This group would otherwise meet the federal immigration-related eligibility requirement for federally funded Medicaid after a five-year waiting period, but for the purposes of this penalty, the House bill excludes them from the "qualified alien" standard, meaning that states would trigger the penalty if they continued to cover this group in Medicaid.
* Potentially, Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) coverage to children and pregnant adults who are "lawfully residing" in the U.S., a more generous eligibility standard than the strict "qualified alien" standard. The House-passed bill exempts states that have taken up this "lawfully residing" option (created by 2009 legislation) to provide coverage through Medicaid, but the bill language is unclear as to whether the penalty could still be levied on states that have taken up this option under CHIP.
Any state that provides comprehensive coverage to individuals described above would be penalized with a cut in its federal matching rate for covering the ACA Medicaid expansion population -- an entirely different group of people -- from 90 to 80 percent. This would double its state cost for the Medicaid expansion group. (See Table 1.) (For states that have not expanded Medicaid but that cover one or more of these groups, no penalty would apply.)
This policy is a direct affront to state sovereignty, placing enormous pressure on states to reduce or terminate coverage programs that their lawmakers have adopted and that they have a legal right to provide or face devastating cuts to Medicaid expansion funding. It goes beyond coercion by imposing a direct, virtually unavoidable penalty on some states. New York, for example, is required under its state constitution to provide health coverage to certain individuals who do not have a "qualified alien" status./[6]
The bill would also result in unequal treatment among the states. For example, states that have not taken up the Medicaid expansion, including Florida and Georgia, would not be penalized for taking up the CHIP "lawfully residing" coverage option, while states that have expanded Medicaid, such as Pennsylvania and Virginia, would lose significant federal funding for continuing their CHIP "lawfully residing" options.
* * *
TABLE 1: Increase in State Portion of Medicaid Expansion Spending to Maintain Current State Policies, FY 2028-2034
* * *
Taking Away the Child Tax Credit
The bill would strip 4.5 million children who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents of eligibility for the Child Tax Credit if even one of their parents files taxes without a Social Security number (SSN), according to estimates by the Center for Migration Studies./[7] (In married-couple families, both parents would need an SSN; in single-parent families, just the parent claiming the child would need an SSN.) While these children would be eligible for the $500 Credit for Other Dependents, which the 2017 tax law created for certain dependents who don't qualify for the Child Tax Credit, families with low incomes who do not have tax liability don't receive it. Research shows that children in low-income families that receive income supports like the Child Tax Credit have better health and educational outcomes during childhood, as well as higher earnings as adults./[8]
Around 1 million children are already denied eligibility for the Child Tax Credit under current law because they do not have an SSN. The bill would go much further by denying the credit to children who are U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who live in immigrant families./[9] Note that the bill even takes the credit away from a child who has one U.S. citizen parent, even if the other parent is lawfully residing in the U.S. but does not have an SSN. (This would happen if the second parent had a student visa, for example.)
The bill also contains a number of other anti-immigrant tax provisions. It imposes a 3.5 percent tax on remittances sent abroad by immigrants, while exempting citizens who undertake the same activity; it requires an SSN to claim new tax incentives in the bill, such as the "no tax on tips"; and it denies the American Opportunity Tax Credit and Lifelong Learning Credit to people without an SSN. These unprecedented restrictions on tax code benefits based solely on a person's immigration status create a higher effective tax rate for people who are following the law and filing their taxes using an ITIN.
Taking Away Food Assistance
The bill would take away food assistance under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) from refugees, people approved for asylum, and other people living in the U.S. lawfully, including certain immigrants who are victims of domestic violence (as well as their children and/or parents) and certain survivors of labor or sex trafficking.
People without a documented immigration status have never been eligible for SNAP, and many people with lawful immigration statuses are already ineligible for SNAP due to program restrictions enacted in 1996. The House bill would go much further, leaving only citizens, lawful permanent residents (after a five-year waiting period for adults), certain Cuban parolees, and COFA migrants eligible for SNAP. All other "qualified aliens" would be denied access to SNAP.
The people who would be cut off SNAP by this provision are primarily refugees and individuals who have been granted asylum -- people who have fled their homes seeking safety from persecution and violence and have been heavily vetted by the U.S. government in order to be granted this humanitarian relief. Congress has previously exempted these immigrants from the five-year bar. In 2023, according to program data, 434,000 refugees and people granted asylum received SNAP. More than 100,000 were children./[10]
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the House bill provision would take food assistance away from between 120,000 and 250,000 people over the next ten years.[11] The losses would likely be greatest in the early years, since people in these statuses have a path to become LPRs, and the U.S. is currently admitting fewer refugees and making it harder for people to apply for asylum.
* * *
End Notes
[1] CBPP, "By the Numbers: House Bill Takes Health Coverage Away From Millions of People and Raises Families' Health Care Costs," updated May 23, 2025, https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/by-the-numbers-house-bill-takes-health-coverage-away-from-millions-of-people-and; CBPP, "By the Numbers: House Republican Reconciliation Bill Takes Food Assistance Away From Millions of People," May 23, 2025, https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/by-the-numbers-house-republican-reconciliation-bill-takes-food-assistance.
[2] Sharon Parrott, "House Republicans' Shockingly Harmful Agenda Is Now Crystal Clear -- the Country Deserves Better," CBPP, May 16, 2025, https://www.cbpp.org/press/statements/house-republicans-shockingly-harmful-agenda-is-now-crystal-clear-the-country.
[3] American Immigration Council, "Rapid Response Analysis: U.S. House of Representatives 2025 'Reconciliation' Spending Provisions Related to Immigration and the Border," May 14, 2025, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/rapid-analysis-2025-recon.
[4] See floor statement by Rep. Brad Schneider, House Ways and Means Committee markup of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal year 2025, H. Con. Res. 14, May 13, 2025.
[5] National Immigration Law Center, "'Lawfully Present' Individuals Eligible Under the Affordable Care Act," updated May 2024, https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Lawfully-Present-Individuals-Eligible-Under-ACA-2024.pdf.
[6] New York Health Access, "Medicaid for Immigrants who are Not Permanent Residents (Do Not have 'Green Cards') -- PRUCOL and Temporary Non-Immigrant Eligibility," updated March 12, 2025, http://health.wnylc.com/health/entry/33/#state%20directives.
[7] Matthew Lisiecki et al., "New Estimates of the Number of United States Citizen and Legal Permanent Resident Children Who May Lose Eligibility for the Child Tax Credit," Center for Migration Studies, April 24, 2025, https://cmsny.org/publications/number-of-children-who-may-lose-eligibility-for-the-child-tax-credit/.
[8] Marianne E. Page, "New Advances on an Old Question: Does Money Matter for Children's Outcomes?" Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 62, No. 3, September 2024, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.20231553&page=301.
[9] Marco Guzman, "Inclusive Child Tax Credit Reform Would Restore Benefit to 1 Million Young 'Dreamers,'" Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, April 27, 2021, https://itep.org/inclusive-child-tax-credit-reform-would-restore-benefit-to-1-million-young-dreamers/.
[10] Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Characteristics of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Households, FY 2023," Table A-23, April 2025, https://fns-prod.azureedge.us/sites/default/files/resource-files/snap-FY23-Characteristics-Report.pdf. The number of children is from unpublished CBPP analysis of 2023 SNAP quality control public use data.
[11] Phillip L. Swagel, Letter to Sens. Klobuchar and Craig Re: Potential Effects on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program of Reconciliation Recommendations Pursuant to H. Con. Res. 14, as Ordered Reported by the House Committee on Agriculture on May 12, 2025, Congressional Budget Office, May 22, 2025. https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-05/Klobuchar-Craig-Letter-SNAP_5-22-25.pdf.
* * *
Margot Dankner is a Senior Policy Analyst on the Immigration Policy team.
Shelby Gonzales is the Vice President for Immigration Policy. She focuses primarily on leading the Center's work related to access to public benefit and other supports for immigrants and their families.
Kiran Rachamallu is a Research Assistant on the Federal Fiscal Policy and Immigration policy teams.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.cbpp.org/research/immigration/house-republican-reconciliation-bill-takes-away-health-coverage-food
[Category: ThinkTank]
Center of the American Experiment Issues Commentary: Walz Needs to Drop the Comedy Routine and Make Minnesota Competitive Again
GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, May 31 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on May 29, 2025:* * *
Walz needs to drop the comedy routine and make Minnesota competitive again
By Matt Dean
This week, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz needled the Texas legislature's attempt to rein in their marijuana laws. "Texans, flee the nanny state and come up north to enjoy the land of the free." Walz's post on X suggested that the traditionally conservative and independent Texans might prefer Minnesota's ... Show Full Article GOLDEN VALLEY, Minnesota, May 31 -- The Center of the American Experiment, a civic and educational organization that says it creates and advocates policies, issued the following commentary on May 29, 2025: * * * Walz needs to drop the comedy routine and make Minnesota competitive again By Matt Dean This week, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz needled the Texas legislature's attempt to rein in their marijuana laws. "Texans, flee the nanny state and come up north to enjoy the land of the free." Walz's post on X suggested that the traditionally conservative and independent Texans might prefer Minnesota's"wild west" pot laws as Lone Star State attempts to tap the brakes on full legalization. Unsurprisingly, the reaction was immediate and unkind to Gov. Walz for his lack of situational awareness.
In 1973, Governor Wendy Anderson hoisted a northern pike on the cover of Time Magazine featuring "The Good Life in Minnesota." It's not uncommon for our governors to brag about our clean air and lakes, great schools and friendly people. Now we are recruiting Texas pot smokers. So much for the clean air.
Governors often engage in a little fun to take a shot (particularly across the political aisle) at a competing state. Self-deprecating humor can be even more effective. Unfortunately for Walz, he wasn't joking about Texas. Gov. Walz's predecessor, Mark Dayton, used self-deprecating humor to his great advantage. Dayton is a very funny guy who is (often painfully) self-aware.
Last month, Walz joked, "Some of you know this. On the iPhone, they've got that little stock app. I added Tesla to it to give me a little boost during the day -- $225 and dropping!" Investor Kevin Oleary (aka Mr. Wonderful) lamented "That poor guy didn't check his portfolio and his own pension plan for the state" noting that Minnesota's State Board of Investment (Chaired by Walz) owns 1.6 million shares Tesla.
In 2021, Tesla moved its headquarters from Palo Alto, California to Austin, Texas, citing California's high taxes and loony regulatory environment. Minnesota has also lost jobs to Texas for the past 25 years. The warmer climate and access to cheaper land and lower labor costs are understandable, if not comforting to policymakers in Minnesota. But the ultimate battle is for the future homeowner.
John Phelan, an economist at Center of the American Experiment, showed that Minnesotans want to flee to Texas more than any other non-contiguous state. Phelan has been studying the trend of losing middle and high income earners to other states for years, noting "Younger Minnesotans, on balance, are leaving to make their lives elsewhere. So, too, are middle class Minnesotans. This is unfortunate on a personal level, but it is also bad news for the state's economic future."
When he was running for Vice President, Governor Walz presented Minnesota as a test case for progressive social policies. He scolded republican governors for their stances on abortion, men in women's sports and spaces, taxpayer-funded healthcare for illegal immigrants, and pot legalization.
Minnesota's governor should be our biggest cheerleader and recruiter. Those who left because they could get a job and an affordable house in a safe neighborhood (in Texas) are not going to return unless they can find them here. Stern lectures about eccentric social policies don't seem to be moving things too far in the right direction.
* * *
Matt Dean is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americanexperiment.org/walz-needs-to-drop-the-comedy-routine-and-make-minnesota-competitive-again/
[Category: ThinkTank]
America First Policy Institute Issues Commentary to Townhall: Education Belongs to Parents Again
WASHINGTON, May 31 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 27, 2025, to Townhall:* * *
Education Belongs to Parents Again
By Erika Donalds and Jorge Martinez
In schools across America, a quiet revolution is underway -- and it's being led by President Donald J. Trump and Education Secretary Linda McMahon. After years of bureaucratic overreach, ideological indoctrination, and declining academic standards, educational freedom has returned to the hands of those who know best: parents.
From day one, President Trump and Vice President JD Vance ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 31 -- The America First Policy Institute issued the following excerpts of a commentary on May 27, 2025, to Townhall: * * * Education Belongs to Parents Again By Erika Donalds and Jorge Martinez In schools across America, a quiet revolution is underway -- and it's being led by President Donald J. Trump and Education Secretary Linda McMahon. After years of bureaucratic overreach, ideological indoctrination, and declining academic standards, educational freedom has returned to the hands of those who know best: parents. From day one, President Trump and Vice President JD Vancemade it clear that their priority was putting students first, not teachers' unions, not activist administrators, and not Washington elites. Under their leadership, America is witnessing the most sweeping restoration of parental rights and school choice in modern history. The results are profound.
This administration's national initiative to expand educational freedom under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and enhanced guidance for Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) programs redirects federal education dollars toward approved private, charter, religious, homeschooling, and technical education options.
To read the full article, click here (https://townhall.com/columnists/erikadonalds/2025/05/27/education-belongs-to-parents-again-n2657691).
* * *
Erika Donalds is the Chair of America First Policy Institute's Center for Education Opportunity. Erika is known as a national expert on education policy and school choice and is a frequent media commentator and speaker.
Jorge Martinez is from San Juan, Puerto Rico, and serves as National Director of Hispanic Outreach & Director of Special Projects at AFPI.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.americafirstpolicy.com/issues/education-belongs-to-parents-again
[Category: ThinkTank]