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Here's a look at documents from all members of the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate
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Ex-U.S. Ambassador to OAS Trujillo Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere released the following testimony by Carlos Trujillo, former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "Democracy in Peril: the Fight for Free Election in Honduras":* * *
Chairwoman Salazar, Ranking Member Castro, and distinguished members of this Committee, I am deeply grateful for the invitation to appear before you today to offer testimony concerning the critical matter of the upcoming elections in Honduras.
When Xiomara Castro was elected president in 2021, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere released the following testimony by Carlos Trujillo, former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "Democracy in Peril: the Fight for Free Election in Honduras": * * * Chairwoman Salazar, Ranking Member Castro, and distinguished members of this Committee, I am deeply grateful for the invitation to appear before you today to offer testimony concerning the critical matter of the upcoming elections in Honduras. When Xiomara Castro was elected president in 2021,many welcomed her as a voice of change. Unfortunately, the reality was different. She has instituted a government based on far-left political principles and has repeatedly expressed an affinity for Nicolas Maduro and Chavismo, which has destroyed Venezuela.
As the first months of her administration progressed, concerns grew regarding the direction of the new government, particularly following decisions interpreted as a shift toward more radical positions, such as the severing of relations with Taiwan and the establishment of ties with the People's Republic of China. Additionally, there were reports of pressure groups aligned with the administration, compared by some analysts to Venezuela's "colectivos", which allegedly influenced episodes of institutional tension, including the controversial election of the authorities of the National Congress.
Several high-level officials also chose to resign due to internal disagreements or differences of opinion. Among them was Edmundo Orellana, who served as Secretary of Transparency and Anti-Corruption.
In the period leading up to the current elections, civil society organizations, political sectors, and observers have expressed concern over alleged irregularities, particularly regarding delays and obstacles in the contracting of essential services for election day.
Recently the tensions between the Executive Branch and the National Electoral Council (CNE) have intensified. The former president of the CNE, Cossette Lopez-Osorio, has reported receiving threats and judicial pressures, which, according to her, were intended to force her resignation.
Magistrate Ana Paola Hall has similarly conveyed, in a public forum, that she perceives threats to her security, escalating concerns regarding a potential maneuver to replace current electoral authorities with individuals deemed more aligned with the interests of the current administration.
We must not overlook the decision last February when President Castro's government canceled the extradition agreement regarding narcotics trafficking and organized crime.
This action could jeopardize future extradition requests from the U.S., should they become necessary.
Another sensitive point is the role of the Armed Forces. If we look at the historical record, their function in elections has been limited to the custody and transport of ballot boxes across the country. However, recent statements by the high command, particularly General Roosevelt Hernandez, have been interpreted by some sectors as an attempt to involve themselves in areas beyond their constitutional authority, raising concerns about their impartiality. To add on to this, the ongoing security concerns related to the U.S. base at Palmerola include the possibility of risk posed by adversary actors.
I would also like to add that the maneuvers performed within the National Congress under the leadership of Luis Redondo similarly warrant close attention and cannot be disregarded. Redondo refused to continue with ordinary sessions, despite more than 78 of the 128 deputies demanding it and instead opted to create a Permanent Commission composed of nine deputies aligned with the Libre party. Through this structure, it is alleged that interim appointments could be imposed once officials of the National Electoral Council or the Electoral Justice Tribunal are suspended or removed from their positions.
Finally, the performance of the Public Ministry has also been subject to debate. Various opposition parties have alerted that the Attorney General, Johel Zelaya, who has family ties to the Libre party candidate Rixi Moncada, has been making decisions favoring the Executive, including legally contested actions against electoral authorities. Some officials, in this environment, have even temporarily left the country, citing a credible fear of persecution.
For international actors, including the Trump Administration in the United States, strengthening electoral transparency in Honduras is essential. Washington maintains significant influence in the country, largely through security cooperation frameworks and deep bilateral trade ties. The diplomatic and legislative sectors have emphasized that any signs of electoral manipulation should be closely monitored and could have consequences for the bilateral relationship, including the possible imposition of sanctions.
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20251120/118684/HHRG-119-FA07-Wstate-TrujilloC-20251120.pdf
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State McGee Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa released the following testimony by Jake McGee, deputy assistant secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "President Trump's Redesignation of Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern-CPC": a Serious, Well-Founded Wake-Up Call":* * *
Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Jacobs, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to join my colleague, Senior Bureau Official Pratt, to discuss the Trump Administration's decision to redesignate ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa released the following testimony by Jake McGee, deputy assistant secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "President Trump's Redesignation of Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern-CPC": a Serious, Well-Founded Wake-Up Call": * * * Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Jacobs, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to join my colleague, Senior Bureau Official Pratt, to discuss the Trump Administration's decision to redesignateNigeria as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) in accordance with the International Religious Freedom (IRF) Act of 1998.
President Trump's decisive action to designate Nigeria as a CPC made clear that the United States stands ready to champion the rights of Christians and protect them from religious persecution. The religious freedom situation in Nigeria is well-documented in the annual IRF Reports. The IRF Act - designed by Congress nearly three decades ago - establishes religious freedom as a U.S. foreign policy priority and mandates that the President call out religious freedom violators as a reflection of the importance our nation places on America's First Freedom.
As my colleague stated, the levels of violence and atrocities committed against Christians in Nigeria are appalling. Particularly in the Middle Belt, these attacks directly target Christian populations. Ample witness testimonies have confirmed attackers used religious language during their attacks and specifically identified Christians for killing, abduction, and rape. It is clear Nigerians are being attacked and killed because of their faith, and the Nigerian government must uphold its duty to protect them.
The United States stands with the civil society and religious actors brave enough to speak out about the tragic violence and discrimination they face in Nigeria. When Bishop Wilfred Anagbe (Ah-nahg-bay) and Father Remigius Ihyula (Rehm-ee-gee-us Ee-yooh-la) testified before Chairman Smith's hearing last March about religious freedom, these two courageous religious leaders reported they received threats rather than protection from the Nigerian government. But the United States listened, and we will continue to listen and act until the Nigerian government protects religious freedom, strengthens its protections for vulnerable Christians, and holds perpetrators accountable.
In addition to these failures, Nigerian officials also continue to prosecute individuals for alleged "blasphemy," which stands in clear violation of Nigeria's obligation to safeguard free speech. Under the Sharia penal codes enforced in 12 of its states, Nigeria is one of only eight countries in the world that allows for penalties up to execution for blasphemy, along with Iran and Pakistan, which have long been designated CPCs. When authorities detain individuals accused of blasphemy, the judicial process often takes years while they remain in prison, sometimes on death row. Mobs often take the law into their own hands with impunity. For example, in 2022, a mob killed Deborah Samuel Yakubu, a student of Shehu Shagari College of Education Original text here:Sokoto, in a heinous attack after she was accused of blasphemy. This young Christian woman's life was taken too soon, yet her murderers remain free.
With horrifying reports of discrimination, abuse, torture, disappearance, and even the murder of individuals simply trying to practice their faith freely and safely, religious freedom is not an abstraction but an obligation Nigeria must uphold. This Administration has heard the steady, clarion call from civil society and religious actors about the pernicious impact of the violence on religious communities.
The Nigerian government must protect religious freedom, strengthen protections of vulnerable Christians, hold perpetrators accountable, and make measurable progress towards ending this violence against Christians as well as any Nigerians persecuted for their faith.
We greatly appreciate the Committee's dedication to shedding light on the situation in Nigeria and support in advancing religious freedom not just in Nigeria, but around the world. I welcome your questions.
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20251120/118681/HHRG-119-FA16-Wstate-McGeeJ-20251120.pdf
Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow McGuire Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia released the following testimony by Chris McGuire, a senior fellow for China and emerging technologies at the Council on Foreign Relations, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "Export Control Loopholes: Chipmaking Tools and their Subcomponents":* * *
Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Kamlager-Dove, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing. I have had the privilege of working to develop U.S. technology protection and export control ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia released the following testimony by Chris McGuire, a senior fellow for China and emerging technologies at the Council on Foreign Relations, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "Export Control Loopholes: Chipmaking Tools and their Subcomponents": * * * Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Kamlager-Dove, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing. I have had the privilege of working to develop U.S. technology protection and export controlpolicies at the White House, State Department, and the congressionally-established National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. I believe that export controls related to semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) and advanced semiconductors are one of the most powerful tools available to U.S. policymakers in the technological competition with China, and are critical to U.S. efforts to maintain leadership in AI and other emerging technologies. It is no exaggeration to say that the success of these policies could determine if the United States or China leads in the technologies of the future. They deserve sustained, strategic focus at the highest levels of government.
This testimony makes five key arguments:
1. SME export controls are the single most decisive leverage point the United States has in the technology competition with China. Advanced chips are critical to leadership in AI and other emerging technologies, and to military modernization. Because advanced chips cannot be manufactured without U.S. and allied SME, and SME is uniquely hard for China to indigenize, strong SME controls are the foundation of America's ability to shape the global technology landscape and preserve its military advantages.
The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained herein are the sole responsibility of the author.
2. Current controls are working--but not well enough. U.S. SME restrictions have slowed China's progress in advanced chipmaking, yet remaining gaps, loopholes, and inconsistent implementation still allow Beijing to build, maintain, and expand strategically significant semiconductor capacity.
3. Allied controls must be leveled-up to match U.S. controls. Key partner countries, particularly the Netherlands and Japan, have not fully matched U.S. controls on advanced Chinese fabs. This allows advanced Chinese fabs continued access to essential allied tools, components, and servicing, which uplifts Chinese chipmaking capabilities, helps China maintain existing advanced allied tools, and shifts market share away from American firms.
4. Expanded country-wide restrictions on SME--in addition to comprehensive restrictions on all advanced Chinese fabs and toolmakers--are necessary to close all loopholes. Only broad, country-wide restrictions on all SME capable of advanced production can reliably prevent Beijing from advancing its chipmaking capabilities or dominating mature-node manufacturing. The United States must also update the Entity List to include all entities affiliated with China's national champions in chipmaking and SME, but entity-based measures alone cannot keep pace with China's rapid buildout and complex corporate structures.
5. U.S. extraterritorial controls have proven effective and should be expanded to close gaps between U.S. and allied controls. Key allies are currently exempt from these extraterritorial controls; suspending these exemptions until allies adopt fully matching restrictions would seal some of the most significant gaps in the SME control regime.
The Strategic Importance of Strong Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment The semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) industry is one of the most strategically important industries on the planet because it serves as the foundation of U.S. and allied technological supremacy.
SME describes the highly specialized tools needed to operate a facility that can make semiconductors.
SME is by far the most important input into advanced chipmaking, representing 70-80% of the capital expenditure necessary to create an advanced semiconductor fab./1
The most advanced SME are the most complicated machines that humans have ever devised and rely on some of the most complicated supply chains on Earth. They rely on innovations from the bleeding edge of optics, materials science, plasma physics, and mechanical engineering--all working together with nanometer precision to manufacture the chips that power our modern world.
Countries must have access to the most advanced SME to build the semiconductor fabs needed to make the most advanced chips. These chips are the lifeblood of modern data centers and the most advanced AI models, are powering breakthroughs in quantum computing, biotechnology, and robotics. They also have critical military applications in the deployment and development of advanced weapons systems, ranging from autonomous systems to the modeling and simulation of nuclear and hypersonic systems. U.S. technological competitiveness in each of these areas rests on it preserving its leadership position in hardware, specifically in the advanced semiconductors used for each purpose.
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1 Brian Potter, "How to Build a $20 Billion Semiconductor Fab," Construction Physics, May 3, 2024, https://www.constructionphysics.com/p/how-to-build-a-20-billion-semiconductor.
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China lags global leaders in both advanced chip production and SME production, but it has long sought to become a global leader in both areas. Advanced semiconductors are China's single largest strategic dependency on the United States and our allies; in 2024, China's imports of semiconductors totaled $385 billion, more than any other good--including oil. Advanced chips are also the single largest advantage the United States has over China in AI development; the best U.S. AI chips are currently five times better than China's best AI chip, and produced in much greater quantity, granting the United States substantial advantages in access to computing power. The second Trump Administration's AI Action Plan specifically highlighted the need to plug loopholes in semiconductor manufacturing equipment export controls to maintain U.S. leadership in AI./2
If China matches the chipmaking capabilities of the United States and our allies, the damage to U.S. technological competitiveness will be severe. And if China is able to make the world dependent on it for any type of semiconductor manufacturing or tooling, it will gain the ability to disrupt supply chains and potentially hold the global technology industry hostage.
The best way to prevent these outcomes from occurring is by restricting exports of the key inputs into China's semiconductor ecosystem that we control: SME and its subcomponents. SME is the foundation of the entire advanced technology stack, and controls on SME are therefore the foundation of all U.S. technology protection efforts. The U.S. ability to regulate exports of advanced semiconductors to China, to include cutting-edge AI chips, is contingent on China not being able to make those chips itself.
If U.S. efforts to control SME are successful at constraining China's advanced chipmaking capabilities, the United States will retain control over all advanced technology supply chains upstream from SME: advanced chips, AI data centers, AI models, quantum computers, advanced robotics, and other emerging areas. If U.S. efforts to control SME fail, China will be able to produce all the advanced chips it needs itself, and the United States will have squandered its single biggest advantage in the technology competition with China. It is imperative that we get this right. Given the stakes, our risk tolerance for failure should be very low.
SME is also uniquely suited to stringent technology controls because: (1) it is a highly concentrated industry in which the United States retains a dominant position and China lags far behind, and (2) SME tools are extremely technically complex and uniquely difficult for China to indigenize. These factors are explained in greater detail below.
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Overview of the Global SME Industry
The United States and our allies dominate the industry for SME, particularly advanced SME. Five companies hold 80-85% of the global SME market: Applied Materials, KLA, and Lam Research in the United States, ASML in the Netherlands, and Tokyo Electron in Japan./3
These firms have an even more dominant market position in the most advanced tools, including a 100% market share in all metrology and inspection tools, and in all advanced tools for lithography, etch, deposition, and photomask production.
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2 The White House, America's AI Action Plan, July 2025, 21, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf.
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Crucially, advanced tools sold by ASML and Tokyo Electron each rely on extremely sophisticated subcomponents and other equipment that are only made by U.S. firms.
The dominant role of U.S. technology in the SME industry is how the United States continues to exert influence over the global semiconductor supply chain. While the United States made the strategic mistake of outsourcing semiconductor manufacturing early this century, its role in the SME industry that underpins manufacturing remains strong. The fact that it is impossible to make chips without U.S. technology is reflective of the fact that the United States is still an irreplaceable element of the semiconductor supply chain, even while it seeks to reshore manufacturing itself.
By contrast, China's SME industry significantly lags industry leaders, although China is seeking to move up the value chain as fast as possible. As of 2023, Chinese SME had a 3.2% global market share and a 14% domestic market share - still small, although its market share had more than doubled since 2020. If China attempted to build a fab with only indigenous equipment, it likely could only produce a chip at the 90nm node - which was first commercialized in 2004, and is nine generations behind the leading-edge./4
ASML's CEO stated that China will not be able to indigenously produce technology at the level of ASML's most advanced machines for 10-15 years./5
Until then, China will remain extremely reliant on U.S. and allied SME to build its semiconductor industry, and on U.S. and allied components to build its SME industry.
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Overview of the Technological Complexity of Advanced SME
The unprecedented technological complexity of the most advanced SME tools makes them uniquely difficult for China to indigenize. China has proven extremely capable at reverse-engineering and scaling technology - but its SME supply chain remains farther behind those of industry leaders than in virtually any other technology area. The reason for this is simple: these are the most complicated machines humans have ever made, the culmination of seventy-five years of cutting-edge engineering and physics and trillions of dollars in investment, and are literally the hardest thing in the world for China to copy and scale.
To give an idea of the immense technical complexity of the most advanced SME tools, it is helpful to explain some of the details of how they work.
An extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) scanner, which is made only by ASML and is used to etch the precise circuit pattern of each chip on to silicon wafers, is basically a controlled lightning storm built inside a vacuum chamber the size of a bus. It fires a high-energy laser 50,000 times per second at tiny molten droplets of tin, each of which is one fourth the width of a human hair and is falling in a vacuum emptier than that found in low-earth orbit--vaporizing them into a micro-plasma that emits extreme ultraviolet light. That light then bounces off a series of mirrors that must be polished so perfectly that if scaled up to the size of Earth, their largest imperfection would be less than two centimeters tall. The light is imprinted on to silicon wafers accelerating faster than a jet fighter during takeoff, at levels of precision that vary by the width of two to three atoms. Each machine contains over 100,000 parts, costs hundreds of millions of dollars, and requires three Boeing 747s to ship. It is, by a wide margin, the most complex machine that humans have ever put into serial production.
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3 U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, Selling the Forges of the Future, 119th Cong., 1st sess., 2025, 9, https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evosubsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/selling-the-forges-of-the-future.pdf.
4 Wency Chen, "Meet AMIES, China's New Hope in Breaking Reliance on ASML's Chipmaking Machines," South China Morning Post, October 19, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-war/article/3329508/meet-amies-chinas-new-hope-breaking-relianceasmls-chipmaking-machines.
5 Ryan Whitwam, "ASML CEO Claims China's Semiconductor Industry is 10 to 15 Years Behind," Yahoo! Tech, December 30, 2024, https://tech.yahoo.com/science/articles/asml-ceo-claims-chinas-semiconductor-120000409.html.
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But deep-ultraviolet lithography (DUV) machines--the second most advanced type of lithography machine, and the workhorses that pattern most layers of every modern chip--are almost equally extraordinary. Instead of creating plasma from tin droplets, they generate intensely pure ultraviolet light inside giant, high-pressure chambers and guide it through a maze of lenses grown from exotic crystals found almost nowhere else on Earth. These lenses must be manufactured so flawlessly that a defect the size of a bacterium would destroy the image. The DUV system must fire light pulses so precisely that their timing cannot deviate by more than a few trillionths of a second--even as the machine is whipping the silicon wafer and the patterning plate beneath the optics at speeds and accelerations that would tear apart almost any other mechanical system, while still keeping their alignment within a few nanometers of the necessary position.
And lithography is only one corner of the semiconductor universe; the other tools are no less astonishing.
The most advanced plasma-etch machines carve three-dimensional structures into silicon using ionized gases hotter than the surface of the Sun--yet must stop at exactly the right atomic layer, across billions of features, without ever cutting too deep. The deposition tools that build up thin films do so literally one atomic layer at a time, requiring chemistry so perfect that adding or missing a single layer can ruin an entire production run. Ion-implantation systems accelerate beams of ions to a significant fraction of the speed of light and then fire them into silicon with the precision of a sharpshooter--dosing each region with exactly the right number of atoms, neither one too many nor one too few, while using magnetic and electrostatic fields worthy of a particle accelerator to steer charged particles to their intended destination.
Even the tools that measure or clean wafers are feats of engineering that border on science fiction. State-of-the-art metrology systems use electron beams, X-rays, and interferometers to inspect structures far smaller than a virus, resolving variations on the scale of atomic orbitals while compensating for vibration, temperature drift, and even subtle gravitational effects from nearby equipment. Advanced cleaning systems must remove contamination measured in individual molecules without scratching or disturbing the delicate, freshly patterned features--using precisely tuned chemical baths, megasonic waves, and fluid-control systems so refined that a ripple or bubble in the wrong place would ruin the production run.
Across lithography, etch, deposition, ion implantation, metrology, and cleaning, every machine in a modern chip fab operates at the edge of what physics allows--stabilizing plasmas, lasers, optics, chemicals, particle beams, and motion systems all at once. The subsystems inside these tools are equally extraordinary: each one is a tightly engineered module--vacuum pumps, RF generators, gas- and chemical-delivery units, multi-layer optics, precision stages--that pushes the limits of materials, control electronics, and manufacturing.
Taken together, SME and the critical subsystems that feed and support it form one of the most complex, precise, and demanding industrial ecosystems ever built. This is why China has struggled to achieve the same success at indigenizing and scaling production of SME, as it has in other high-tech industries such as solar panels and batteries. It is a uniquely difficult nut for China to crack.
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Review of Existing U.S. and Allied Controls on SME
The Trump administration was the first to utilize export controls on SME to slow down China's advanced chipmaking industry. In 2018 it placed the Chinese fab Fujian Jinhua on the Entity List, making it the first Chinese semiconductor manufacturer restricted from purchasing U.S. SME. In 2019 it convinced the Dutch government not to export EUV lithography machines to any entity in China, thereby cutting off all Chinese fabs from the most advanced chipmaking tool. And in 2020 it placed SMIC, China's semiconductor manufacturing national champion, on the Entity List, restricting its access to U.S. equipment. These actions had a significant effect; Fujian Jinhua nearly went out of business, China still cannot make 5nm or more advanced chips without EUV machines, and SMIC's capability buildout and technology level is degraded relative to if it had unrestricted access to SME.
The Biden administration witnessed the impact of the Trump administration's controls on SME, and concluded that expanding SME controls on China was critical to securing long-term U.S. technological advantage. In September 2022, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan declared that the past approach whereby the United States applied export controls only to the latest technologies to stay "a couple of generations ahead" of China was insufficient. Rather, he stated that given the foundational nature of advanced logic and memory chips to U.S. technological supremacy, particularly in AI, "we must maintain as large of a lead as possible" over China in chipmaking capabilities./6
In October 2022, the Biden administration broadened export controls on SME significantly, and further strengthened these controls in 2023 and 2024. The Biden administration's goal was to deny and degrade China's ability to make any advanced chips, which U.S. export control regulations define as logic chips 14nm/16nm or more advanced, DRAM memory chips 18nm half-pitch or more advanced, and NAND memory chips with 144 or more layers.
The Biden administration could have pursued a broad ban on exports of any SME to China that contain any U.S. technology--which would have effectively banned the export of all SME produced anywhere in the world. However, it opted instead to take a relatively targeted, but multi-layered, approach, in conjunction with allies and partners.
To accomplish this, the United States imposed the following controls on exports of SME to China:
* U.S. Country-Wide Controls on SME Exports: Commerce blocked U.S. exports country-wide to China of a set of tools that are necessary for advanced chip production (in addition to EUV lithography tools), as well as any sophisticated components that are specially designed for those tools.
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6 Jake Sullivan, Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Special Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies Summit, White House Archives, transcript, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2022/09/16/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-at-the-special-competitive-studies-project-globalemerging-technologies-summit/.
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* U.S. Additional Controls on Advanced Chinese Fabs: Commerce blocked all shipments of any U.S. tools (including non-advanced tools) to any advanced Chinese fabrication facility, and added sixteen Chinese fabs determined to engage in advanced production to the Entity List.
* U.S. Restrictions on Servicing: Commerce restricted U.S. persons from servicing any equipment at an advanced chipmaking facility in China, which caused all U.S. companies to halt all on-site and virtual maintenance support at those fabs.
* U.S. Restrictions on Exports of Components: Commerce added the vast majority of Chinese SME companies to the Entity List, blocking exports of subcomponents to most of the major Chinese suppliers.
The Biden administration also secured agreement from key allies, namely Japan and the Netherlands, to impose export controls on SME to China. This was critically important, as without allied agreement or U.S. extraterritorial controls on allied equipment, SME firms from allied countries could have backfilled many of the U.S. restrictions.
Allies did impose substantial new controls on SME exports, although these measures were not as comprehensive as U.S. controls. Current allied controls, and their key gaps relative to U.S. controls, are outlined below:
* Allied Country-Wide Controls on SME Exports: Allied country-wide controls on SME are aligned with U.S. controls. However, U.S. and allied controls contain critical gaps, as they permit continued shipment of some tools necessary for advanced production to China--namely certain DUV lithography machines, which are only made by Dutch and Japanese companies and without which China could not make advanced chips.
* Allied Additional Controls on Advanced Chinese Fabs: Allies restrict certain advanced tools to advanced Chinese fabs (in addition to the tools that they restrict country-wide), but do not restrict the export of all non-advanced tools to these facilities like the United States does.
* Allied Restrictions on Servicing: Allies largely do not restrict servicing of controlled tools or tools at advanced Chinese fabs. Allied firms continue to maintain an on-site presence at advanced Chinese fabs (including at SMIC and Huawei facilities), which helps China maintain and upgrade their chipmaking capabilities. Without ASML servicing, China likely could not continue to operate its DUV lithography machines.
* Allied Restrictions on Exports of Components: Allies have not restricted exports to Chinese SME companies. There are no restrictions on exports of allied components to China (other than components specially designed for tools that are controlled country-wide).
The differences between U.S. and allied controls have had three significant negative effects:
First, the most advanced Chinese fabs--to include SMIC South, which is China's most advanced fab and houses China's largest 7nm production line--have continued to benefit from allied tool exports and maintenance, despite being completely cut off from all U.S. technology. This has helped these fabs continue to operate, expand their capacity, and improve yields.
Second, allied firms have backfilled U.S. controls at several advanced facilities, allowing allies to profit and gain market share in China to the detriment of U.S. firms. A recent congressional investigation found that from 2022-2024, ASML and TEL revenue from Chinese entities that U.S. firms were restricted from selling to more than tripled--even while their overall revenue from China grew by only 50%./7
And third, Chinese SME companies have continued to purchase subcomponents from allied companies, significantly blunting the impact of U.S. export controls on the Chinese toolmakers. Japan and the United States are the two largest suppliers of subcomponent systems, and tools are often designed to be able to incorporate competing subcomponents from multiple vendors. The fact that Japanese and other allied vendors are largely unrestricted is a significant loophole.
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Current Extraterritorial U.S. Controls
In 2024, the United States extended its controls extraterritorially by utilizing the foreign-produced direct product rule (FDPR). The Biden Administration decided to implement this extraterritorial restriction when it became aware that U.S. and allied firms were exploiting a critical loophole in U.S. controls, which permitted overseas subsidiaries of U.S. and allied firms to sell certain equipment to certain Chinese fabs on the Entity List without a license, despite the fact that their parent company was restricted from exporting any tools to these fabs. Strengthened extraterritorial measures were needed to fill this gap.
The new extraterritorial controls expanded the existing U.S. country-wide controls on advanced equipment, and existing controls on all tool exports to advanced Chinese fabs, to also capture certain foreign tools. Specifically, the extraterritorial controls stipulated that any controlled tool, or any export to an advanced Chinese fab, was captured if the export was a foreign-produced product that either: (a) contains any U.S. content, or (b) contains any item that is the direct product of U.S. technology or equipment (i.e., if it contains a semiconductor made with U.S. tooling). The control includes a carve-out that exempts foreign-produced items from thirty-three allied countries, including the Netherlands and Japan./8
This is an extremely broad control that captures every foreign tool in all impacted countries. It is nearly impossible for a foreign firm to design around, as every tool contains an advanced chip and it is impossible to make an advanced chip without U.S. technology. To create a tool that would not be captured by the control, one would have to design out U.S. technology from the entire semiconductor supply chain--which is effectively impossible, and which no country other than China seeks to accomplish.
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7 U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on the Strategic Competition, Selling the Forges of the Future, 22.
8 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Supplement No. 4 to Part 742, Title 15, https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-742/appendixSupplement%20No.%204%20to%20Part%20742.
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There are indications that this extraterritorial control has been effective. U.S. toolmakers slowed their sales to restricted Chinese fabs in the three months after it was imposed in December 2024./9
This also indicates that extraterritorial controls applied more broadly would be feasible to implement and effective.
The Biden administration decided not to apply this broad extraterritorial control to allied countries, including the Netherlands and Japan, as it continued to urge them to strengthen their own controls to match U.S. restrictions. However, significant gaps remain between U.S. and allied controls, even after many years of negotiations. Ultimately, extraterritorial controls on allied equipment may be necessary to close these gaps.
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Evaluating the Efficacy of U.S. Export Controls on SME
U.S. export controls on SME to China have proven to be the single biggest constraint on the advancement of China's chipmaking capabilities, and have materially widened the gap between China's leading chipmakers and the industry leaders. However, the controls also have significant flaws and gaps, and must be strengthened to be maximally effective.
U.S. export controls on SME have had the following positive impacts:
* The U.S. and allied lead over China in chip fabrication has widened: As recently as 2019, China's advanced logic fabrication capabilities were only two generations behind those of the industryleading firms (Intel, Samsung, and TSMC)./10
However, that lead has since expanded to three generations, and the node at which China is not capacity constrained is five generations behind the leading-edge. This lead could expand further if China's progress continues to stall.
* China's chipmaking capabilities have stalled in sophistication: China still is not able to produce a logic chip better than 7nm at scale. It is not clear if China will be able to produce 5nm or more advanced chips without access to certain advanced chipmaking tools, particularly ASML's EUV tools and advanced U.S. etching and deposition equipment--and if it does, the yields will likely be very low, limiting the number of chips they will be able to produce.
* The gap between the best Chinese and U.S. AI chips is large and rapidly widening: China's best AI chips are currently 20% as powerful as the best U.S. AI chips in terms of processing power. This gap is also slated to widen significantly in the coming years, as China will likely remain reliant on the 7nm node while the most advanced U.S. chips use increasingly advanced production processes: according to Huawei and Nvidia's public chip production roadmaps, by the end of 2027 Huawei's best AI chips is slated to be only 4% as powerful as Nvidia's best AI chip./11
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9 U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on the Strategic Competition, Selling the Forges of the Future, 25.
10 Joel Hruska, "Chinese Foundry SMIC Begins 14nm Production," ExtremeTech, August 19, 2019, https://www.extremetech.com/defense/296802-chinese-foundry-smic-begins-14nm-production.
11 Timothy Prickett Morgan, "Nvidia Draws GPU System Roadmap Out To 2028," Next Platform, March 19, 2025, https://www.nextplatform.com/2025/03/19/nvidia-draws-gpu-system-roadmap-out-to-2028/; Emiko Matsui, "Huawei Reveals 3-Year Ascend AI Chip Roadmap, 950 Coming In 2026," Huawei Central Newsroom, September 18, 2025, https://www.huaweicentral.com/huawei-reveals-3-year-ascend-ai-chip-roadmap-950-coming-in-2026/.
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However, China has exploited the significant loopholes in U.S. controls in ways that pose significant risks to U.S. national security:
* China has become by far the largest purchaser of U.S. and allied tools: In 2024, the three leading U.S. toolmakers sold over $20 billion worth of semiconductor tools to China, ASML's China sales were over $11.5 billion, and TEL's were over $5.5 billion. Exports of SME was the number one or two export from each country to China, and every major equipment maker now derives approximately 40% of its revenue from tool sales to China./12
These tools are being used to help fuel China's expansion of its advanced and legacy chip production capabilities.
* Some of the largest Chinese tool customers are sanctioned entities: A recent report by the Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) discovered that five Chinese fabs that are currently subject to comprehensive U.S. export controls (SMIC Beijing, SwaySure, PST, SiEn, and YMTC) were among the top thirty customers of every major U.S., Dutch, and Japanese toolmaker from 2022-2024./13
* China is stockpiling enormous numbers of DUV lithography machines: China has massively surged orders of ASML's DUV lithography machines, without which it could not produce advanced chips and which remain permitted to export under Dutch restrictions. In 2024 it purchased 90 such machines, representing 70% of ASML's DUV immersion lithography machines globally. This is up from 15-20 such machines per year in 2021 and 2022./14
These machines are again almost certainly going primarily to China's national champions, and will form the core of China's AI chip production capabilities.
* China is using these tools to expand its advanced chip production quantity. China is likely producing some 7nm AI chips domestically, and the number they can make will almost certainly expand in the coming years. Absent strengthened controls that slow its growth and degrade its existing 7nm capabilities, China will be able to manufacture greater numbers of AI chips--and while China will remain compute-constrained due to U.S. export controls on AI chips, this will provide China with the ability to train and operate advanced AI models that it otherwise could not.
* China is also using these tools to dominate the mature chip market. China is rapidly becoming the world leader in mature chip production (defined as chips at 28nm or less advanced nodes), as it seeks to dominate the mature chip market in the same way it dominated the market for other commodity technological goods such as solar panels and batteries. In 2023 China produced 34% of the mature chips, but by 2027 this is projected to surge to 47%, overtaking Taiwan as the world leader. In contrast, the United States produces 4% of mature chips./15
Almost 60% of all mature chip fabs globally that started production between 2023 and 2025 were located in China./16
The only way to stall the growth of China's mature chip production capabilities is to restrict its access to the SME it needs to build mature chip fabs.
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12 U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on the Strategic Competition, Selling the Forges of the Future, 16.
13 Ibid, p. 22
14 Ibid, p. 29-30
15 Sunny Cheung, "Encircling the West: The PRC Gains Ground in Legacy Chips," China Brief 25, no. 10 (May 2025), https://jamestown.org/encircling-the-west-the-prc-gains-ground-in-legacy-chips/.
16 Wen-Yee Lee, "Taiwan's Legacy Chip Industry Contemplates Future as China Eats Into Share," Reuters, February 10, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/technology/taiwans-legacy-chip-industry-contemplates-future-china-eats-into-share-2025-02-10/.
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Recommendations to Close Loopholes in U.S. Export Controls on SME
The United States should take the following steps to close the most significant loopholes in U.S. export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment:
1. Expand the number of tools controlled country-wide to China: The most effective way to close loopholes in export controls is to expand the set of country-wide controls on China to capture all tools capable of advanced production. Country-wide controls are relatively easy to implement and create far fewer opportunities for diversion inside China than entity-based controls. The report of the Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the CCP recently recommended two specific ways to strengthen U.S. controls on SME, which the Department of Commerce should implement with a licensing policy of denial:
a. Control all SME capable of 300mm wafer processing: The Department of Commerce should expand its country-wide export controls on SME to capture all equipment capable of being used to produce advanced chips, defined as all tools capable of processing 300mm wafers.
Advanced chip production exclusively uses 300mm wafers, so this control would ensure no equipment capable of advanced production could be exported to China. 300mm tools are also widely used in most fabs capable of 90nm production or below, which roughly correlates with China's indigenous SME capabilities (the 90nm node debuted over twenty years ago). This action would therefore halt the growth of China's advanced chip production capabilities, and would also substantially slow the growth of its mature chip production capabilities, addressing risks about pending Chinese domination of the mature chip market.
b. Control all node-agnostic SME already identified as chokepoints: The Department of Commerce has already identified a set of tools that are capable of being used for advanced or mature production but are chokepoints for China, which includes all DUV lithography tools. These tools are currently only controlled to certain Chinese fabs, but should be restricted country-wide to China. These tools are identified in Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 3B993 and 3B994 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).
2. Add all parent companies and subsidiaries of China's chipmaking and SME national champions to the Entity List, with a licensing policy of denial: Commerce should add to the Entity List all Chinese fabs known to have an affiliation with China's chipmaking national champions--SMIC, YMTC, CXMT, and Huawei--as well as any other entities of concern, and should apply the strictest possible licensing policy to them. Commerce should also ensure that all Chinese SME companies, and all of their affiliates, are included on the Entity List.
Of the four largest chip fabrication companies in China, three (SMIC, YMTC, and Huawei) are on the Entity List, and one (CXMT) is not. However, even for those companies included on the Entity List, many fabs that are subsidiaries or have a clear affiliation with the parent company remain unlisted.
Additionally, some subsidiaries of these companies that are on the Entity List have more permissive licensing policies than their parent company (namely SMIC Suzhou, SMIC Holdings Limited, SMIC Hong Kong, SMIC Tianjin, and YMTC subsidiary XMC), which allows them to continue to receive equipment. Imposing comprehensive controls on these fabs would substantially degrade their ability to continue their operations, or to facilitate diversion of SME or subcomponents to other fabs within China. Appendix A includes several examples of Chinese fabs that are affiliated with SMIC, YMTC, CXMT, or Huawei, or that otherwise warrant an Entity List designation, but that are not currently listed.
3. Apply the FDPR to all SME controls, suspend existing exemptions for Allies but exempt Allies that match U.S. controls: Commerce should modify the two existing FDPRs that apply to all exports of tools that are restricted country-wide (called the "SME FDPR") and to Chinese advanced fabs (called the "Footnote 5 FDPR"), to suspend the current exemptions for thirty-three allied countries. These controls would therefore apply globally. Commerce should inform allies that once any country imposes controls that are fully equivalent to those of the United States, Commerce will modify U.S. regulations to exempt them from the control.
This is the same general approach that the United States took to building the allied export control coalition against Russia in 2022. This will ensure that allies fully match U.S. controls before U.S. controls are removed, thereby ensuring there are no gaps between U.S. and allied controls. If allies cannot or will not match U.S. controls, the control could be modified to cover any activities captured by allied controls - thereby filling in gaps between U.S. and allied controls. Commerce should also apply the Footnote 5 FDPR to all Chinese SME companies, which would block them from receiving allied components and ensure a level playing field for U.S. component companies.
4. Restrict Allied Servicing of Controlled SME in China: Commerce should implement restrictions on servicing of controlled SME by foreign persons in China, matching existing U.S. restrictions on servicing by U.S. persons. To accomplish this, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) should issue guidance emphasizing that General Prohibition 10 applies to advanced fabs in China. Specifically, the guidance should conclude that any advanced fab in China (identified as a fab on the Entity List and subject to FDPR Footnote 5) has likely acquired SME and related components in violation of export controls, and/or are likely to produce chips in violation of export controls. BIS is therefore permitted, pursuant to General Prohibition 10, to impose a license requirement for any firm to "service" or "use" any SME or components installed in these fabs. Any allies that impose equivalent restrictions could also be exempted from this provision.
Restrictions on servicing would likely cause China's existing advanced chip production capability to degrade. Without these restrictions, China may be able to maintain its existing 7nm production capabilities for the foreseeable future.
5. Restrict use of Chinese SME globally: Commerce should issue a rule pursuant to Executive Order 13873 ("Securing the Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain") that prohibits the sale of any Chinese SME in the United States. Commerce should also stipulate that no fab globally that uses U.S. SME is permitted to also use Chinese SME - effectively forcing companies to choose between using U.S. or Chinese tooling.
There are currently no restrictions on the use of Chinese SME in the United States, or elsewhere in the world. Chinese SME poses unacceptable cybersecurity risks if used in a U.S. or allied fab, as it could be manipulated to disrupt or degrade production. Furthermore, U.S. and allied companies should not provide any technological or financial support to the Chinese SME industry, given its strategic importance.
6. Resource BIS enforcement capabilities: Congress should increase appropriations for BIS enforcement capabilities related to semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
Both the Biden and Trump administrations have sought increased resources for BIS to support these capabilities, which are essential to U.S. technology protection efforts. BIS needs top-tier technical and policy talent, flexible hiring authorities, access to advanced analytical capabilities, and more widespread deployment of classified systems to be able to effectively implement U.S. export controls on dual-use technologies.
Note that many of these recommendations were also included in the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the CCP's comprehensive and bipartisan report issued in October 2025. That report should be read in full, and I fully endorse all of its recommendations.
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Appendix A: Examples of Chinese Semiconductor Companies Not on U.S. Entity List
This table lists Chinese semiconductor companies that are not on the U.S. Entity List, but that currently pose a concern due to their close ties to entities already designated on the U.S. Entity List, or their involvement in activities that circumvent existing export controls.
Company/Sites ... Problem with Lack of Entity List Designation
Huawei: subsidiaries and affiliated fabs (e.g., Jing Peng Hi-Tech, Dongguan Guangmao, Wuhan CXT, among others) ... These facilities operate under the umbrella of a designated entity (Huawei), and are often physically located across the street from existing Entity Listed fabs, including Peng Chip and Swaysure. These fabs allow Huawei to continue advancing its semiconductor production capabilities outside direct sanctions.
SMIC: subsidiaries and affiliated fabs (e.g., new fabs in Beijing (Jingcheng), Shanghai (Lingang), Tianjin (Xiqing), among others) ... These sites are publicly characterized as 28nm development, but evidence suggests they are actively pushing technology and production well below the 28nm threshold. SMIC subsidiaries and affiliates not listed on the Entity List also pose a significant risk of diversion to restricted SMIC entities
CXMT: parent company, and subsidiaries and affiliated fabs (Key fab sites in Hefei, Beijing, and Shanghai) ... While CXMT is subject to the U.S. Persons Rule, the lack of a specific Entity List designation for the fab sites makes enforcement of export controls on equipment and technical support significantly more challenging.
YMTC: affiliated cutouts and subsidiaries ... YMTC's network of subsidiaries is designed to aid the parent company in acquiring restricted equipment and technology, effectively bypassing controls aimed at the parent.
GTX Semiconductor ... A known "cut out" company explicitly created to bypass restrictions placed on its parent organization (ICRD, which is on the Entity List). GTX's lack of a designation enables firms to provide continuing support to the restricted entity, and potentially enable advanced capabilities at GTX itself.
Huali Semiconductor: parent company, and subsidiaries and affiliated fabs (e.g., fabs in Shanghai, Chengdu, among others) ... Huali is developing advanced node 7nm FinFET, which would represent a significant capability leap that would likely cause violations of U.S. export controls.
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA19/20251120/118680/HHRG-119-FA19-Wstate-McGuireC-20251120.pdf
Center for Strategic & International Studies Director Onubogu Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa released the following testimony by Oge Onubogu, director and senior fellow of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "President Trump's Redesignation of Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern-CPC": a Serious, Well-Founded Wake-Up Call ":* * *
Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Jacobs, distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to share my views with you on this important topic.
I appeared before this committee in March, and since then, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa released the following testimony by Oge Onubogu, director and senior fellow of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "President Trump's Redesignation of Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern-CPC": a Serious, Well-Founded Wake-Up Call ": * * * Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Jacobs, distinguished Members of the Committee, I am honored to share my views with you on this important topic. I appeared before this committee in March, and since then,so much has changed in our country and around the world. Today, I appear before you as Director and Senior Fellow of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The CSIS Africa program analyzes key trends in security, governance, and development across Africa, with the aim of informing U.S. policy and fostering debate on critical issues affecting the African continent and U.S. relations with African countries. CSIS does not take policy positions, so the views represented in this testimony are my own and not those of my employer.
I have over two decades of experience working on peace, security, and governance issues in Africa, including over 10 years leading projects focused on conflict mitigation, civil-military relations, and community security in Nigeria. In keeping with the nonpartisan, policy-focused work of CSIS, I offer the following comments and recommendations.
In my testimony, I would like to reinforce the recommendations that I made before this committee in March1, as they still hold true today. In addition, I would like to reflect on how this tenuous moment in U.S - Nigeria relations provide an opportunity for both countries to work together to address the critical threats of jihadist violence and insecurity in Nigeria, and to develop a more strategic and comprehensive bilateral partnership.
Consecutive U.S. Administrations have described the U.S. relationship with Nigeria as among the most important in Africa. Nigeria and the U.S. have a complicated bilateral relationship, with shared interests in counterterrorism and economic development, but this relationship is often marked by periods of friction. We are currently experiencing one of these periods of friction due to the U.S. redesignation of Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern for severe violations of religious freedom, accompanied by a U.S. presidential threat of military intervention and aid cuts.
As Africa's largest population and biggest oil producer, and one of the continent's largest economies, Nigeria has regional and continental influence but has long suffered from violent extremism and internal insecurity2. This year marks 26 years of uninterrupted civilian rule in Nigeria, the longest period of constitutional governance since the country's independence from the British in October 1960.
As West Africa's hegemon and anchor of regional security, Nigeria's leadership in the subregion is crucial amid the recent breakaway of three junta-led countries from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), rising terrorism, and other anti-democratic upheavals that have beset the subregion in recent years. But whether and how Nigeria tackles its own governance and security challenges at home will set the pace not only in Nigeria, but also in the broader West Africa region.
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1 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/oge-onubogu-testifies-us-house-representatives-conflict-and-persecution-nigeria-and-case
2 Protests Test Nigeria's Democracy and its Leadership in Africa | United States Institute of Peace
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As Nigeria's internal struggles worsen, what is clear is that the country's instability is rooted in a vital shortcoming: After 64 years of independence, the country still struggles to cultivate a national identity rooted in basic freedoms and dignity for its people3.
In Nigeria today, ethnicity, religion, and language - not nationality - remain the benchmarks of identity for the country's highly diverse population4. While Nigeria has witnessed repeated ethnic and religious clashes over the years, its ethnically and religiously diverse population is not the problem or the cause of these conflicts. According to a 2021 Afrobarometer survey5, 90 percent of Nigerians express willingness to live with people from different ethnicities and religions. The survey also noted low levels of trust among citizens with 92 percent stating they "must be careful" when dealing with others, indicating that while there is a sense of unity among Nigerians, trust issues persist, affecting social interactions. The manipulation of low levels of public trust by Nigeria's political class confirms how ethnicity and religion have become instrumental markers that are used to mobilize and successfully acquire power, resources, and political dominance in the country.
It is important to understand the nature of the violence in Nigeria - and its causes, which extend beyond the religious or ethnic overtones that appear to motivate that animosity. I grew up in Jos, Plateau state in Nigeria's Middle-Belt region, and I visit the region regularly. Having grown up in the Middle Belt, I am deeply aware of the compounding impacts that these protracted conflicts have on once-vibrant communities. I am also from a family that is rooted in Christian missionary work in the Middle Belt, and so I understand the shared faith between Christian communities in the Middle-Belt and some Christian communities in the U.S., which is primarily rooted in the history of American missionary work in Nigeria.
However, a narrow narrative that reduces Nigeria's current security situation to a single story of widespread persecution and mass slaughter of Christians, misses other important considerations and oversimplifies the complexity of violence and inter-faith relations in the country. In actuality, religious and ethnic violence in Nigeria is a symptom, and the hate speech and conspiracy theories6 that often drive it are throwing fuel on a fire long ignited by the frustrations of Nigerians over what essentially are failures of governance7.
Nigeria is facing overlapping security crises across the country, stemming from, among other things, religious extremism, banditry, criminality, resource competition, communal land disputes and separatist agitation. These security threats also tend to be enmeshed in history, tangled in poverty and worsened by political contestation.
The interplay between religion and politics in Nigeria is deep and complex. Nigerian political leaders rhetorically romanticize Nigeria's "unity" but do little to cultivate it. On the contrary, they often stoke ethnic and religious tensions in election campaigns, seemingly to distract from their failure to deliver for the people they are supposed to serve. The divisive political climate of the 2023 elections illustrated this tendency. It deepened rifts among ethnic and religious groups that already existed, largely because they have long been inflamed by political, religious, or other community "leaders." As Nigeria approaches yet another contentious national election in 2027, religion will remain a significant factor, influencing candidate selection, voter behavior, and campaign strategies, just as we saw in 2023.
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3 Punch Newspaper, 2021, It's time to end 'business as usual' with Nigeria, Oge Onubogu https://punchng.com/its-time-to-end-business-as-usual-with-nigeria/
4 AfroBarometer Working Paper, December 2024 "You're not like us! Ethnic discrimination and national belonging in Nigeria WP206-Ethnic-discrimination-and-national-belonging-in-Nigeria-Afrobarometer-30nov24.pdf
5 Afro Barometer, News release, 2021 news_release-tolerance_high_trust_low_in_nigeria-10march21.pdf
6 The New Humanitarian, 2022, The New Humanitarian | The growing appeal of secession in Nigeria's southeast
7 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/oge-onubogu-testifies-house-foreign-affairs-committee-future-freedom-nigeria
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The Trump administration's accusations that Nigeria is allowing targeted killings of Christians distracts from a wider problem of tackling jihadist violence, terrorism and widespread insecurity in the country. In the two decades following Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1999, the country was among the top recipients of U.S. security assistance, which was largely focused on counterterrorism support8. In fact, in August 2025, the Trump administration approved a possible military weapons sale of $346 million to Nigeria9. Despite these large amounts of assistance, the extremist threat has continued to grow expanding beyond the country's North-East where Boko Haram10 and Islamist groups have been waging a fifteen-year insurgency against the Nigerian state, to the North-West, where groups of so-called "bandits" are continually raiding rural villages and terrorising citizens. In both of these regions, the majority religion is Islam, and most of the victims have been Muslims. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index (GTI)11, Nigeria now ranks sixth, moving up from the eighth position in 2023 and 2024, indicating larger ongoing systemic challenges in addressing terrorism.
Since the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009, successive Nigerian administrations, including that of incumbent President Bola Tinubu, have pledged to stamp it out--though they have had little success12. There is wide acknowledgement by Nigerians that the security situation in the country has gotten worse in recent years. Amnesty International13 reported in May that roughly 10,000 people had been killed and many more abducted since the inauguration of President Tinubu in 2023.The Nigerian government disputes14 this figure, but its own National Human Rights Commission15 reports a significant rise in incidents of human rights violations across the country this year.
Therefore, narratives that focus solely on the killing of Christians tend to overlook the broader state of insecurity in the country and ignore the reality that religion is often a secondary factor in Nigeria's internal violence, rather than its primary driver. While there have certainly been many incidents, in recent years, in which religious groups and places of worship have been targeted for atrocities, data suggest that killings motivated explicitly by religious extremism account for only a part of overall fatalities across the country. In 2022, a study conducted by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), found that from January 2020 to June 2022, amid an overall rise in attacks on civilians in Nigeria, "violence in which Christians have been specifically targeted in relation to their religious identity accounted for only 5 percent of reported events targeting civilians16."
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8 Inside the $1.58 billion U.S.-Nigeria security alliance now facing political uncertainty | Business Insider Africa, November 2025
9 US approves potential $346 million weapons sale to Nigeria to bolster security | AP News Nigeria - Munitions, Precision Bombs, and Precision Rockets > Defense Security Cooperation Agency > Article Display | Defense Security Cooperation Agency
10 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-sharia-intersection-islam-and-law
11 Global Terrorism Index, 2025 https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Global-Terrorism-Index-2025.pdf
12 Borno State: Boko Haram kills at least 60 in overnight attack
13 Nigeria: Mounting death toll and looming humanitarian crisis amid unchecked attacks by armed groups - Amnesty International Nigeria
14 Nigerian govt disputes Amnesty International's report on insecurity under Tinubu
15 OCTOBER 2025 HUMAN RIGHTS DASHBOARD - National Human Rights Commission
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In recent years, most victims17 of violence in the Middle Belt have been Christians in farming communities and from various ethnic groups. Most are presumed to have been killed by herders who are predominantly Fulani and Muslim, but they were not killed explicitly because of their faith. Some political and traditional leaders in the Middle-Belt have sometimes described the killings in their region as "genocidal", however, they also often elaborate that the killings are motivated by ethnic or material considerations such as land, rather than religious differences18.
It is also important to consider that in some regions of the country the perpetrators of violence against Christians are also Christians themselves. A good example is in the predominantly Christian South-East region19 of the country, where at least 1,844 people were killed between January 2021 and June 202320. Finally, claims of state-sponsored or targeted anti-Christian violence fail to consider Nigeria's imperfect but still substantial support for the free exercise of religion, as guaranteed by the country's constitution. However, there is no denying that in some parts of the country, both Christians and Muslims complain of constraints to practice their religion freely. In some of the twelve northern states where governments incorporated Sharia law into their legal systems two decades ago, citizens have been killed or imprisoned over charges of blasphemy. But, for the most part, Nigerians of all faiths live together, peacefully, often inter-marrying, with President Tinubu who is a Muslim and married to a Christian, often cited as an example.
Nevertheless, the high level of insecurity across the country has left many religious communities, including Christians, at risk, due to the shortfalls of political will in the government and operational capacity in the military and other security services. Whether labeled as "banditry" or "terrorism" or "communal clashes" or "ethno-religious conflict," at the root of this violence is a failure of governance to meet the population's most basic needs - not only livelihoods, education, and health care, but also their need for perpetrators21 to be held legitimately accountable22. The failure to hold perpetrators of these violent acts accountable has created both a sense of impunity among those who carry out these attacks and a sense of grievance in the affected communities.
The reaction of Nigerian citizens to the U.S redesignation of Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern" and the subsequent threats regarding the persecution of Christians are mixed. On one hand, Nigerians, Christian groups in particular, welcome the current international spotlight, viewing it as an overdue opportunity to pressure the Nigerian government into taking decisive action against the violence. At the same time, many Nigerians of all faiths, including Christians, worry that President Trump's rhetoric--especially the threat of unilateral military action against the country--will be counterproductive and draw attention away from the specific problem of pervasive insecurity across the country, by inflaming existing political tensions and divisions.
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16 Fact Sheet: Attacks on Christians Spike in Nigeria Alongside Overall Rise in Violence Targeting Civilians | ACLED
17 https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/09/nigeria-conflict-middle-belt-oge-onubogu-testimony
18 https://www.vanguardngr.com/2025/04/genocide-in-plateau-inside-story-of-plot-to-grab-land-wipe-out-natives-gov-mutfwang/
19 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/9363/2025/en/
20 https://www.thecable.ng/christians-killing-christians-in-south-east-its-not-about-religion-says-soludo-on-genocide-claims/
21 https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/03/nigeria-needs-justice-not-payoffs-build-peace
22 The Economist, 2024, Kidnappers are wreaking havoc in Nigeria
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There are also concerns that it would undermine the sovereignty of Nigeria and could create an excuse for a military takeover, which would most certainly cause chaos in the country, and in the broader West Africa and Sahel, as Nigeria is the anchor of security in the region.
Overall, public opinion polls and surveys show a broad consensus among Nigerians about the severity of the security challenges in their country23. The polls also show that Nigerians value diverse communities, identify equally with their ethnicity and nationality, and believe there is more that unites Nigerians as one people than divides them. An Africa Polling Institute survey, the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey 202524, for example, found that, while divisions among Nigerians are growing, Nigerians are still "willing to cooperate" in building unity, and that they are united in their struggle against economic realities, and their collective desire for peace.
So, back to the root causes. Achieving improved governance and accountability that can meet the needs of Nigerians and halt the violent turmoil will require Nigeria's power structures to take the lead and to broaden dialogue with society and summon the utmost political will to tackle the insecurity. The United States can leverage this moment of diplomatic tension with Nigeria to support a more thorough dialogue that advances real change. This will require a dialogue between the United States and counterparts in Nigeria of unprecedented breadth and honesty, engaging not only Nigeria's national leadership but also its state and local political leaders and with civil society.
With that, I offer the following recommendations:
Recommendations for the United States:
Engage deeply and broadly with communities across Nigeria to better understand the nuances driving the conflicts in the country. While it's never wise to dismiss religion as a cause of conflict, it is unproductive to label a conflict as solely driven by religion25, or to single out just one group as a victim when there are so many other factors at play. The root causes of Nigeria's conflicts and insecurity are deeper and more complex than are generally discussed--and that violence is more a symptom than a cause of the real problem. While there is a constructive role for the U.S. to play, it must avoid any policy of selective intervention and make it clear that its concerns incorporate all Nigerians of all religions, in order to avoid deepening sectarian divisions in the country.
Prioritize security governance, to help tackle the violence. The U.S. should take a fresh look at its existing security cooperation with Nigeria, and work with its counterparts in Nigeria to design a security assistance program that prioritizes security governance and conditions future military training and equipment on demonstrated progress on real reforms. The fresh look should emphasize partnership sustained over the long term, looking beyond only support for military training and equipment, but seeking areas across the security sector bureaucracy where cooperation is still possible such as, intelligence sharing, rule of law, and governance. It should also prioritize efforts that are most promising for real change, such as local or non-government initiatives. Security assistance should be shaped with long-term goals that will enable and incentivize specific reforms and benchmarks for accountability. Nigeria's partners must recognize that the country's political and security leaders bear a significant share of responsibility for many of Nigeria's security challenges26.
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23 AD604-Nigerians-say-country-is-unsafe-Afrobarometer-17feb23.pdf
24 https://africapolling.org/2025/07/08/api-releases-2025-social-cohesion-report/
25 Mercy Corps, 2021: 'FEAR OF THE UNKNOWN' Religion, Identity, and Conflict in Northern Nigeria,
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Support local actors that are advancing inclusive peace and conflict resolution: Nigeria's civil society is vibrant, and surveys show that Nigerians view religious leaders as more trustworthy, and less corrupt than public institutions27. Peacebuilding programs that support moderate religious leaders, community networks, and civic actors to develop early warning systems and balanced messaging could help to avert crisis and shift the discussion from the identities and religious backgrounds of those involved in the conflict to focus more on developing sustainable solutions to end the violence. These community-led peacebuilding programs are low-cost and have proven to be highly effective in Nigeria's Middle Belt28, however, the administration's cuts to development assistance have terminated some of these U.S-funded peacebuilding programs29, and recent threats to stop all development assistance to Nigeria risk undermining ongoing peacebuilding efforts.
Work more with Nigeria's disparate states and its growing city centers: The country's 36 states hold significant power in the realpolitik of Nigeria -- and they are distinct enough to warrant specific attention. The U.S. government should decentralize its engagement with Nigeria by strengthening its dialogues with, and support to, receptive government and civic leaders at state and local levels. The states of the Middle Belt, with its population of 45 million, would be a good place to start, given their need for assistance with local-level security to create the safety needed for agriculture and manufacturing that is its base to thrive. This does not mean solely security assistance, but rather a framework that connects economic development with building sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of conflict through economic revitalization, institutional reform, and business-led initiatives.
Rethink reactive quick-win actions that may seem beneficial to Nigerians but could have larger and far-reaching negative impacts. If the Trump administration follows through on its threats of unilateral military action in Nigeria, it risks endangering the Christians that it claims it wants to protect. It could polarize Nigerians along religious divides, undermine local efforts of improving inter-faith relations, exacerbate extremism, and increase insecurity in the country. Even if the U.S. does not follow through with a military operation, its threats have already provided fuel for radical extremists in the country. It has also generated toxic commentary among Nigerians especially on social media which is not conducive for building the unity that many Nigerians crave. Instead of being reactive, the U.S. should focus on proactive long-term engagement in Nigeria that prioritizes institutional support to address the root causes of instability rather than just responding to crisis.
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26 Testimony by Oge Onubogu on the Future of Freedom in Nigeria_0.pdf, Oge Onubogu Testifies Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Future of Freedom in Nigeria | Wilson Center
27 AD900: Nigerians view religious leaders as more trustworthy, less corrupt than public institutions - Afrobarometer
28 PRG_NigeriaImpactEvaluation_R_lo_FINv3_Web.pdf
29 The cuts that bleed: What happens when peace programs go dark | Devex
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Revive the U.S. congressional bipartisan caucus on Nigeria which served as a space to prioritize discussions on issues of U.S.-Nigeria relations. U.S. relationship with Nigeria is among the most important and strategic partnerships in Africa. Nigeria's population is projected to overtake the United States and become the third most populous country in the world by 2050. An active congressional bipartisan caucus will signify the importance of this relationship, elevate discussions, and create a forum to proactively consider wide perspectives to better inform legislative responses to a broad range of issues, including those being discussed here today.
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Recommendations for the Nigerian Government:
Appoint a Nigerian Ambassador to the United States. It has been over two years since Nigeria recalled its Ambassador from Washington, and from other diplomatic missions worldwide. Nigeria needs senior diplomatic representation in Washington to deepen its engagement with the U.S. across all spectrums (including on discussions like these), and to support and engage with Nigeria's dynamic and largely successful diaspora. The Nigerian government needs to improve its engagement with international actors, to clearly communicate Nigeria's security realities and to manage narratives about the country more effectively. In this regard, an urgent priority is for President Tinubu to appoint a competent Nigerian Ambassador to the U.S, as I recommended in my testimony in March30.
Make accountability - of perpetrators and of the authorities -- central to the response. Nigerians need justice. Criminality in the Middle Belt, as elsewhere, has grown in part because of impunity. The trends underlying the violence can be traced and can be anticipated if the appropriate government security agencies have effective early warning and rapid response mechanisms. The narrative of "Christian genocide" has been able to gain traction in part because Nigeria's mass killings have gone on for years with no accountability or clear end in sight, and faith communities feel abandoned. The Nigerian government needs to summon political will, and channel greater resources towards dismantling the extremist and criminal groups operating across Nigeria's Northern and Middle Belt regions.
Get serious about police reform. Nigeria currently has a single federalized police force, which is not effective for the country's diverse and complex security challenges. There is a longstanding active national debate and ongoing legislative process to introduce state-level police. However, police reform should not be about state policing only, but it should consist of a broader conversation that is rooted in the country's present realities and applies lessons learned from past efforts. There has already been a failure of at least three police reform committees under different administrations (in 2006, 2009, and 2012). The Tinubu administration needs to move faster in implementing ongoing initiatives for improving citizens' security, such as quickly recruiting the 30,00031 new police personnel he approved in June. The Nigerian military is overextended and performing duties that should fall under the purview of the police. A fundamental step would be to redirect the large numbers of police who provide personal security services to wealthy elites, assigning those officers to instead address serious crimes.
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30 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/oge-onubogu-testifies-us-house-representatives-conflict-and-persecution-nigeria-and-case
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Coordinate federal and state action and messaging: effective coordination so desperately needed among Nigeria's federal and state governments is too often undermined by finger pointing. That must stop. Since assuming office, President Tinubu has called for better synergy and cooperation among security agencies to address insecurity in the country. However, concrete steps must be taken to move this aspiration into reality.
Lay the groundwork for peaceful elections in 2027: religion in Nigeria is a potent trigger for electoral violence when it is exploited for political gain. The current chairperson of Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) completed his tenure in October 2025. This leadership transition is an opportunity for the Nigerian government to restore public trust in the electoral system by prioritizing electoral reforms to ensure INEC's independence and transparency, fostering responsible political behavior, and strengthening security and judicial processes.
The violence in Nigeria has caused significant loss of life, period! but viewing the country's complex security landscape in narrow religious terms and focusing on one group of victims rather than threats faced by everyone is counterproductive. Clearly, a fresh approach is needed, both for Nigeria and the United States. Nigeria should seize this moment to honestly address the institutional weaknesses in its security, judicial, and conflict prevention systems that have hampered its capacity to end the killings and hold perpetrators accountable. The U.S. should maintain open lines for engagement, dialogue and cooperation with the Nigerian government and the Nigerian people, and its approach should include a better understanding of Nigeria's complexities. Both countries should leverage this moment of diplomatic tension to redefine and strengthen the U.S.-Nigeria bilateral relationship and work together to address the wider threats of jihadist violence in Nigeria, and in the broader West Africa and Sahel region. The vital interests of both countries are at stake.
Thank you for inviting me to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
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31 https://thenationonlineng.net/fg-will-rebuild-police-colleges-ahead-tinubus-30000-personnel-recruitment/
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20251120/118681/HHRG-119-FA16-Wstate-OnuboguO-20251120.pdf
Catholic Diocese of Makurdi Bishop Anagbe Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa released the following testimony by Wilfred C. Anagbe, bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Makurdi in Nigeria, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "President Trump's Redesignation of Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern-CPC": a Serious, Well-Founded Wake-Up Call ":* * *
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the Subcommittee,
Thank you for inviting me back to testify on the escalating crisis of Christian persecution and genocide in Nigeria. Six months ago precisely on 13th March 2025, when I last ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa released the following testimony by Wilfred C. Anagbe, bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Makurdi in Nigeria, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "President Trump's Redesignation of Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern-CPC": a Serious, Well-Founded Wake-Up Call ": * * * Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, Thank you for inviting me back to testify on the escalating crisis of Christian persecution and genocide in Nigeria. Six months ago precisely on 13th March 2025, when I lastappeared before this committee, I warned that the situation was dire and demanded urgent attention.
Tragically, the past half-year has proven those warnings understated the continued attacks on vulnerable Christian villages by the Fulani ethnic millitia and their counterparts, both in the Middle Belt of Nigeria and elsewhere in the country.
Since my testimony in March 2025, credible reports from organizations monitoring religious freedom including Open Doors and our own Justice, development and Peace commission in Makurdi Diocese have documented continuing attacks on Christian villages especially in the Middle Belt States of Benue and Plateau perpetrated by Fulani militia. Thousands more have been displaced, some abducted or subjected with entire villages razed and churches destroyed.
My own village of Aondona in Gwer West LGA, was attacked and several of my relatives killed on May 22, 2025. An entire convent of Reverend Sisters of the Claretians was displaced along with the local Catholic parish. Within the days following that attack, nearby villages like Naka also witnessed attacks. In fact, on the 24th May 2025, one of my priests, Fr. Solomon Atongo was shot and left to die in the pool of his blood, while those travelling with him were abducted.
Though he survived the attack, he is unable to walk freely.
A few weeks before, on Palm Sunday, April 13, 2025 with the attack occurring late that night into the early hours of April 14, Fulani militants launched a coordinated assault on Christian communities in Plateau State, Nigeria, primarily targeting the village of Zikke in the Bassa Local Government Area, near Jos. This incident was part of a broader wave of violence in the region during Holy Week targeting Christians as they prepared to celebrate one of the most important feasts in our Church.
In my own diocese of Makurdi, you are all familiar with the massacres of Saturday 13th June in Yelwata, where 278 persons, men, women and children were killed in a manner too gory to describe here by people shouting "Allahu akbar" while slaughtering their victims. It took the prayer of the Holy Father, the Pope, on Sunday 14th June, for the Government in Nigeria to even acknowledge this evil. Even so, the federal government still seeks to downplay the numbers and has yet to properly care for the survivors, even as I speak.
Abductions of clergy and laity remain rampant; priests and pastors are prime targets for elimination. on 17th November 2025, another priest from Kaduna diocese was kidnap while his brother was shot dead and others taken into captivity. On the same day a school was attacked in Kebbi State with many kidnapped. Reports are also rife of the capture of a Major General of the Nigerian Army by the Islamists.
This is the daily experience of many Christians in Nigeria. Violence is spreading southward, displacing millions and destroying farmland, creating a humanitarian crisis compounded by food insecurity. Attacks by Fulani militants, Boko Haram, and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have intensified not only in the Middle Belt and northern states but spreading southward and targeting Christian communities with impunity. We hoped the CPC designation by President Trump at the end of October might stabilize the situation but instead it is deteriorating into one of the most lethal periods for Nigerian Christians in recent memory.
Like it is now commonly acknowledged, Nigeria remains the deadliest place on earth to be a Christian more believers are killed there annually than in the rest of the world combined. Yet perpetrators face little accountability, and the Nigerian government's response since the CPC designation is to unleash vain glory speakers and willing tools to spin the narrative and make false equivalencies about Muslim deaths. But I will like to ask the question here, who is killing the Muslims? Is there any Christian militia displacing millions and occupying lands in Nigeria?
The government of Nigeria's silence and refusal to engage in the face of continued killings and displacements has deepened feelings of abandonment among the people. The National leadership appears disengaged, treating the Christian genocide reports as a non issue instead of considering it a national emergency. This lack of political will undermines trust in government institutions and fuels perceptions of complicity or indifference.
Mr. Chairman, Honorable members, allow me to briefly mention another point so close to my heart: the humanitarian and social impact of this genocide.
In the Middle Belt alone, millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain in camps, unable to return to their ancestral lands, this threatens cultural continuity, religious and economic survival. The psychological trauma of survivors of these attacks is immense with little access to counseling or rehabilitation. Widows, orphans, and survivors face ongoing threats, girls and women endure sexual violence as a weapon. So many others resort to unsafe coping mechanism for daily sustenance. Destroying families guarantees that no more Christians will be born from so many traumatized women. This is one of the elements of genocide, securing the disappearance of a group by longer term measures other than murder.
Without quick intervention, Christianity risks elimination in parts of northern and Middle Belt Nigeria within a very short time.
Let me put it on record here that on behalf of millions of Christians in Nigeria and in the diaspora, we want to thank President Donald J Trump for his bold leadership in denominating Nigeria a CPC. I commend you Mr. Chris Smith and this subcommittee's ongoing leadership and the recent U.S. denomination of Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern. CPC designation is a vital step, but must be backed by serious action:
I. Using the Magnitsky Act for targeted sanctions on Nigeria government officials and others tolerating or condoning Islamic violence in the country.
II. Tie security and other development or humanitarian aid to measurable protection improvements; expand humanitarian support for IDPs.
III. The IDPs must be returned to their ancestral homes and lands with security guarantees by the Nigerian government. They must also be supported to rebuild their economic livelihoods and enjoy basic services such as education and sanitation.
IV. Support bills like the Nigeria Religious Freedom Accountability Act to hold perpetrators accountable. This point cannot be overemphasized because it is impunity that fuels the violence we suffer.
V. International advocacy: Work with allies to press Nigeria at the UN and ensure discriminatory laws and blasphemy laws are eradicated or expunged.
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Closing Call to Action
The CPC designation has brought immense joy, hope, and spiritual resilience to communities under siege in Nigeria. The Christian Faith-based organizations remain among the few sources of relief and encouragement, filling the vacuum left by government inaction. However, the Church alone cannot stop the killings; it requires coordinated political, military, and humanitarian intervention.
Mr. Chairman and Members, the blood of Nigerian Christians cries out to you. We cannot afford to wait any longer. Renew hearings, pass binding legislation, and use every tool of U.S. influence to demand change. America remains the only country in the world with an International Religious Freedom Act, America has a unique role in defending religious freedom globally, please enact concrete actions according to the CPC denomination. We all know that inaction emboldens the extremists even more.
Thank you for listening, I welcome your questions.
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20251120/118681/HHRG-119-FA16-Wstate-AnagbeB-20251120.pdf
Atlantic Council's Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Non-Resident Senior Fellow Currie Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees
WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific released the following testimony by Kelley E. Currie, a non-resident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council's Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, from a Nov. 19, 2025 joint hearing with the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia entitled "No Exit Strategy: Burma's Endless Crisis and America's Limited Options":* * *
Thank you Chairwoman Kim, Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Members Bera and Kamlager-Dove, and other members of the Committee, for convening this hearing at a time when the world largely ignores Burma's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific released the following testimony by Kelley E. Currie, a non-resident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council's Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, from a Nov. 19, 2025 joint hearing with the Subcommittee on South and Central Asia entitled "No Exit Strategy: Burma's Endless Crisis and America's Limited Options": * * * Thank you Chairwoman Kim, Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Members Bera and Kamlager-Dove, and other members of the Committee, for convening this hearing at a time when the world largely ignores Burma'sspiraling poly-crisis. As someone who has worked in support of democracy and human rights in Burma for three decades, I deeply appreciate the opportunity to testify today. My remarks solely represent my personal views and not those of any of the institutions with which I am affiliated.
Since Min Aung Hlaing and the Burma army launched their illegal coup in February 2021, the country has descended into state failure, economic collapse, widespread criminality, and unspeakable violence. Burma's neighbors have either profited off this disaster or hidden their heads in the sand, even when their citizens bear the negative consequences of the junta's misrule.
As the regime moves ahead with sham elections in a bid to institutionalize its illegitimate rule, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) continues to stand by inertly. Russia and China keep the junta flush with weapons at a cost that includes mortgaging the country's resources and its future. India has attempted to follow China's strategy of playing all sides but lacks the leverage and moral flexibility to do it effectively. Bangladesh and other Muslimmajority countries in the region push the UN and international community to address the ongoing Rohingya crisis with unrealistic solutions, even as they ratchet up pressure on refugees within their borders.
Since the coup, U.S. policy on Burma has also been adrift. The Biden administration largely deferred to ASEAN's failed "Five Point Consensus" while refusing to implement the Burma Act passed by Congress in 2022. The Trump administration has been "reviewing" Burma policy since coming into office. This 'review' seems to have consisted primarily of loose talk about Burma's critical minerals, some half-measures to address the scam center epidemic, and dramatically cutting funding to programs for civil society, media, and vulnerable communities.
Recent pledges to support Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are welcome but do not replace the failure of leadership overall. That humanitarian assistance is also undercut by termination of support for and engagement with the Independent Investigative Mission on Myanmar (IIMM) and the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar, despite strong support for these efforts during the previous Trump administration.
Despite this international apathy and predation, Burma's "Spring Revolution" has continued its unprecedented fight against the military regime. The revolutionary forces have been scrappy and largely self-sufficient. The flexible tactics of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) keep frustrating the junta's ability to retain effective control of the country, and likely will play a major role in disrupting the planned sham elections. While the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) and ethnic revolutionary forces have lost ground recently as China expands its role as the regime's decisive enabler, these under-resourced forces continue to innovate and build their own capacity. Despite decades of mistrust and broken promises--and continued use of divide and rule tactics by the military regime--the Bamar majority and ethnic nationalities continue fighting together on the frontlines while working to protect civilians and develop grassroots federalism in areas liberated from military rule. They struggle with the downstream consequences of genocide and geopolitics, framed by decades of military-dominated misrule, chauvinism, and autarky.
None of it is easy but they keep working at it. Their DIY revolution keeps going.
As this conflict shows no sign of abating, the Burmese people continue to suffer. Meanwhile, from the scam centers of Myawaddy to the dirty rare earths mines of Chipwe to the drug dens of Tachilek to the refugee camps of Kutapalong--Burma's extractive neighbor keeps finding a way to prosper from its crises. I will leave the last of these issues to my co-panelists and focus on the other three.
1. Scam centers: The scam centers that operate out of Burma are a major node in an estimated $35 billion a year business enterprise. Chinese transnational criminal organizations provide the backbone for this network, working with the junta and allied ethnic border guard forces. In addition to defrauding innocent victims of their life savings, these scam centers are a major source of an extremely abusive form of human trafficking and facilitate global money laundering networks used by Mexican drug cartels and other bad actors. These scam centers rely on energy and telecommunications resources that are vulnerable to cut offs by Thai authorities, and the operators continue to use Thai and Singaporean banking services.
2. Critical minerals: China sources nearly all of the terbium and dysprosium it processes from mines in Kachin state, in upper Burma. The extraction at these sites is carried out in the most environmentally damaging way possible, destroying fragile ecosystems and poisoning waterways that communities depend on for their survival. Since the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) seized control of key mining areas earlier this year, they have attempted to end some of the most destructive practices and bring the largely unregulated Chinese mining under control, with limited success. In return, the Chinese government has increased its pressure on the KIA, cutting them and Kachin state off from fuel, food and other critical supplies, and expanding support to the regime's efforts to retake territory the KIA had controlled together with People's Defense Forces, especially in the Bhamo area.
3. Methamphetamines: As documented in an exhaustively reported story in the Washington Post last week, the drug trade out of Burma has exploded since the coup, fueled by a massive influx of cheap Chinese industrial chemicals. These precursor chemicals are used to produce to make highly addictive methamphetamine compounds that are sold across Asia. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), the largest and most well-armed non-state military in Burma, is the primary manufacturer and trafficker of these illicit drugs. The UWSA grew out of the Chinese-backed wing of the old Burmese Communist Party, and its leaders maintain close ties to the CCP. These ties have facilitated their connections to the web of Chinese chemical manufacturers and exporters--some of whom are state owned enterprises--that are driving the crystal meth epidemic in Asia. Many of these same chemical companies provide precursors to Mexican cartels that produce synthetic opiates such as fentanyl, and the Post reports growing signs of cooperation and learning across these criminal syndicates.
The Chinese leadership has made it clear that they do not wish to see a victory by the democratic forces in Burma. At key moments over the past two years, Beijing has put its thumb on the scale to ensure its interests are served by events inside Burma. Whether providing diplomatic and economic lifelines to the junta, or cutting off resources for key ethnic armed groups, Beijing has set itself up as the decisive enabler of the junta's war on its own people, much as it serves the same purpose in Russia's war on Ukraine. But because of the complicated and obscure nature of what is happening in Burma, and the fecklessness and apathy of other countries, China has paid little cost for its complicity in the junta's ruinous coup and subsequent war on the Burmese people or its enablement of the ecosystem of harmful illicit activities that support that war.
It is not too late for the United States to have a positive impact on the situation in Burma, but it would require a degree of subtlety and willingness to confront vested interests in the region that has not been evident up to now. Because Burma is a "seam" issue that cuts across not only two regional bureaus at the State Department, but also involves a complex matrix of technical, law enforcement, and financial issues, it is ripe for the appointment of a presidential special envoy who is equipped to understand these challenges and empowered to act on them. The BRAVE Act recognizes the need for a higher-level coordination function, and recommends the creation of such a position.
In addition, the US and its allies should:
* Designate terbium, dysprosium, and other minerals mined by the junta and its proxies as conflict minerals and enforce sanctions on exporters and processors until a more transparent and accountable system of developing these resources is in place. This was done with cobalt mining in Congo, and there are models from other regions where resource extraction has exacerbated conflict and/or severely harmed local communities.
Any proceeds from subsequent mining should be placed into a trust fund to remediate the impacts of past destructive mining practices and support communities that have suffered harm.
* Expand cooperation and co-investigation with Thailand and Singapore to more quickly identify and prosecute (1) scam center operators and beneficiaries; (2) groups and individuals involved with human trafficking, the transport of precursor chemicals into Burma, and the drug traffic in the region; and (3) money laundering networks related to these crimes. Restore U.S. funding to projects that track financial networks connected to the junta, its proxy armed groups, and external actors in order to provide actionable financial intelligence to the Treasury Department and allied governments.
* Work with partners to cut off scam centers' access to banking services, Starlink, and other critical operational systems.
* Refuse to recognize any elections organized by the illegal military junta, and block agrement for any new junta-appointed diplomats. Expel and declare persona non grata Burmese military attaches who are acting as junta enforcers within embassies and committing transnational repression, including those operating out of the Burmese embassy in Washington and the permanent mission to the UN in New York.
* Work bilaterally and through UN agencies and international financial institutions (IFIs) to expand parallel mechanisms for humanitarian assistance to conflict affected communities inside Burma, including by working with civil society, existing ethnic nationalities systems, and other cross-border pathways.
* Consider placing frozen Burmese foreign exchange funds into a managed account and using the interest to support humanitarian and governance assistance. Require countries that receive humanitarian assistance for Burmese refugees to permit them to be registered with UNHCR, have minimum legal protections to deter exploitation, and be given opportunities to work, access education and other services.
Burma is again at a crossroads. Its people are fighting hard for a peaceful, prosperous and democratic future, while the regime is fighting to protect its self-declared prerogative to continue its brutal and extractive rule. The United States has remained largely aloof from this fight, while our adversaries in Beijing have become major beneficiaries of the chaos and instability it has generated. There are relatively low-cost ways the United States can engage that will improve our own security, while also backstopping our partners in the region who are suffering the downstream consequences of Burma's lawlessness and state failure. Burma may not be a frontline state for the United States, but we cannot afford to let it become a Chinese cat's paw in a critical region. Beijing has already weaponized Burma's chaos against Thailand, our oldest treaty ally in the region and the pillar of U.S. security infrastructure in southeast Asia. The path out of this current morass will not be found in a race to the bottom with Beijing, but rather in working with partners to bring about a sovereign, stable and democratic Burma that is at peace with itself and contributing positively to its neighborhood. Stability and prosperity are the best bulwarks against a Chinese takeover of Burma, but they will not be achieved under a military dominated regime forced on an unwilling populace. We should help Burma to realize a different future, and with consistent, smart policy we can do this in ways that make sense against the broader backdrop of our national security priorities in the region.
I look forward to your questions and am again grateful for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing.
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20251119/118674/HHRG-119-FA05-Wstate-CurrieK-20251119.pdf
Foundation for American Innovation Senior Fellow Ball Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia released the following testimony by Dean Ball, a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "Export Control Loopholes: Chipmaking Tools and Their Subcomponents":* * *
Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Kamlager-Dove, and distinguished members of the subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee today on this vitally important topic. My name is Dean Ball. I am a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation and ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia released the following testimony by Dean Ball, a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "Export Control Loopholes: Chipmaking Tools and Their Subcomponents": * * * Chairman Huizenga, Ranking Member Kamlager-Dove, and distinguished members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee today on this vitally important topic. My name is Dean Ball. I am a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation andauthor of the AI-focused newsletter Hyperdimensional, where I focus on AI, emerging technologies, public policy, and geostrategy. The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as representing the official position of the Foundation for American Innovation or any other organization with whom I have a current or prior affiliation.
In July 2019, during his first term, President Trump successfully persuaded the Dutch government to block sales of extreme-ultraviolet lithography machines to Chinese semiconductor companies. These machines are the result of a tremendous range of scientific breakthroughs and technological miracles--employing lasers, for example, whose prevision is akin to hitting a hole-in-one on the Moon from Earth, to paint sub-microscopic electrical circuits with light onto razor-thin wafers made of processed sand.
At the time, these lithography machines--made exclusively by the Dutch company ASML-- were not widely known outside of the semiconductor industry and its close observers. But President Trump's decision would prove wise and forward-looking: within a few short years, ASML and their advanced lithography technology became widely known the world over as key inputs in the manufacturing of advanced semiconductors. Today, it is widely believed that these controls represent the single most important technological chokepoint preventing China from manufacturing leading-edge semiconductors.
Since 2019, the significance of advanced semiconductors has risen dramatically. In particular, advanced semiconductors are at the heart of the revolution in artificial intelligence (AI) that is currently transforming science, software engineering, and many other areas of business. This revolution is the seed of one of the largest infrastructure development efforts in American history.
Advanced semiconductors are the most complex objects humans have ever assembled-- the product of generations of compounding scientific inquiry, human ingenuity, and untold billions of invested capital. A great deal of that inquiry, ingenuity, and investment has originated in American labs, corporations, and factories. But without doubt, it has been a collective effort as well, most notably in key U.S. allies such as Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Taiwan, and elsewhere.
Of course, since 2022 the United States has imposed export controls on the advanced semiconductors most relevant to AI. The wisdom and prudence of these controls has been the subject of vigorous debate in recent months, but that is not my focus today. Instead, I want to focus on the issue President Trump identified in 2019: semiconductor manufacturing equipment. And the reality I wish to convey to you is stark: there are large gaps in current semiconductor manufacturing export controls today, and these gaps have meaningfully enabled China's rapid progress in advanced semiconductor manufacturing in recent years.
We have set on the path of denying China access to the most advanced machines in the world-- advanced AI compute. But we have failed to deny access to something perhaps even more important: the machines that make the machines. It should be no surprise, then, that China has managed to significantly advance its semiconductor manufacturing industry considerably even in light of our export controls. We are not comprehensively denying them access to the specialized equipment they need to build their own chips. Make no mistake: China's goal is to catch up in advanced chips within the next several years, and once they do that, they will not only match the West in AI capabilities, but also seek to drive U.S. semiconductor firms out of business through the sale of heavily subsidized chips across the world.
The U.S. has constructed a sound export control regime for semiconductor manufacturing equipment made by domestic companies. Our major shortcoming, instead, is that we have struggled to harmonize those controls with allies who compete with our domestic companies, and sometimes hold near-monopolies over the production of certain equipment.
Sometimes, this lack of international harmonization results in insufficient controls on equipment that is short of the cutting edge, but still advanced. Perhaps the best example of this is deep ultraviolet immersion lithography machines, the predecessor to extreme ultraviolet lithography. Like EUV machines, these are made almost exclusively by the Dutch company ASML. These machines can be used to manufacture both legacy chips, such as those at the 28-nanometer node, and near-cutting-edge chips that fall within U.S. export controls, such as those on the 7-nanometer node.
While the Dutch government does impose export controls on many immersion DUV machines, they allow exports of some equipment, such as the NXT:1980i model, to certain Chinese firms for legacy semiconductor production. Once the machines are within the country, it is either stockpiled or diverted to more advanced production lines.
Two observations merit mention: first, China is dependent upon this equipment for all its advanced AI compute production. Every chip made by companies like Huawei, and every unit of the high-bandwidth memory that is also essential for AI, is made with ASML immersion DUV machines. Senior Trump Administration officials, including U.S. Crypto and AI Czar David Sacks, have recognized the threat these products pose to the long-term leadership of U.S. firms in AI chips.
Second, it is at least worth questioning whether the U.S. and its allies should enable China to develop a foothold even in legacy chip production. Legacy chips are commodity goods, sold at low margins, yet essential for a huge range of quotidian consumer and industrial goods.
The semiconductor supply chain problems that led to shortages of automobiles, appliances, and much else during the COVID pandemic were largely the result of difficulty in accessing legacy, rather than leading-edge, chips.
A country with control over large fractions of legacy chip production could readily grind any advanced economy to a halt. China's recent export controls on refined rare earths and rare earth magnets demonstrate their willingness to use chokepoint control over low-margin, ubiquitous commodities as leverage over the rest of the world. Whether we should allow China to develop a similar chokehold over legacy-node semiconductors is a prudential question I will leave to the distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Our lack of international harmonization on export controls creates additional problems as well. In many cases, for example, U.S. firms are tightly export controlled even when there foreign competitors are not. American companies like Applied Materials, Lam Researchers, and KLA make complex tools for etching, deposition, cleaning, and metrology--all important parts of the semiconductor manufacturing process. Export of these tools to Chinese firms is largely forbidden by U.S. export controls. Yet the export of tools that are functionally the same from companies like Tokyo Electron--a Japanese company--is permitted.
Unsurprisingly, the result is that the China sales of foreign competitors has jumped after U.S. export controls, suggesting that American firms are being denied revenue while critical technology flows into China nonetheless. This is the worst of both worlds: our firms bear the cost of the policy, but the policy itself fails because our allies do not coordinate with us.
Finally, it is important to remember that many of the systems described above rely on components which are themselves highly specialized and the fruit of substantial R&D investment. Often these goods are not controlled either, allowing Chinese companies to re-build advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment for themselves. Some subcomponents even of EUV lithography machines, for example, are permitted to be sold to China by U.S. and allied country firms.
The Trump Administration's AI Action Plan, which I helped to draft when I served as a Senior Policy Advisor at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, clearly recognizes this challenge:
Semiconductors are among the most complex inventions ever conceived by man.
America and its close allies hold near-monopolies on many critical components and processes in the semiconductor manufacturing pipeline. We must continue to lead the world with pathbreaking research and new inventions in semiconductor manufacturing, but the United States must also prevent our adversaries from using our innovations to their own ends in ways that undermine our national security. This requires new measures to address gaps in semiconductor manufacturing export controls, coupled with enhanced enforcement.
Two policy tools are at our disposal: one is diplomacy. Diplomatic efforts have been ongoing since the 2022 imposition of export controls during the Biden Administration, and continue under the Trump Administration. If these efforts do not succeed in the near term, it is essential that policymakers employ the second tool: the Foreign Direct Product Rule. This allows the U.S. to impose export controls on foreign-made goods if they contain or are directly made with U.S. technology. Both options should be on the table, with an aim toward resolving these gaps in the near term.
Export controls, like all public policy, come with tradeoffs. Controls on advanced AI chips threaten to deny American firms like Nvidia and AMD the global software and developer ecosystem advantages that are the basis for their technology leadership today. And unilateral controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment can harm domestic firms while giving foreign competitors an advantage. Right now, in semiconductor manufacturing equipment export controls, the United States gets the worst of both worlds: bearing substantial costs to domestic firms while gaining little of the benefit in terms of restraining Chinese advancement in the field.
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA19/20251120/118680/HHRG-119-FA19-Wstate-BallD-20251120.pdf
Hudson Institute Center for Religious Freedom Director Shea Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa released the following testimony by Nina Shea, senior fellow and director of the Center for Religious Freedom at Hudson Institute, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "President Trump's Redesignation of Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern-CPC": a Serious, Well-Founded Wake-Up Call":* * *
Thank you, Chairman Smith, and Members of this Subcommittee for holding these important hearings. I am honored to be a witness at them.
On October 31, President Trump redesignated Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern" ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Nov. 30 -- The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa released the following testimony by Nina Shea, senior fellow and director of the Center for Religious Freedom at Hudson Institute, from a Nov. 20, 2025, hearing entitled "President Trump's Redesignation of Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern-CPC": a Serious, Well-Founded Wake-Up Call": * * * Thank you, Chairman Smith, and Members of this Subcommittee for holding these important hearings. I am honored to be a witness at them. On October 31, President Trump redesignated Nigeria as a "Country of Particular Concern"for the persecution of Christians by groups of violent Islamists. A White House statement announced that the United States will "stand ready, willing and able" to defend them. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who had urged CPC status for Nigeria, cited specifically the actions of "Fulani ethnic militias." President Trump made this designation in accordance with the International Religious Freedom Act (IRF Act) of 1998. This law requires the president to evaluate annually every foreign country's record on religious freedom and designate as a CPC those with "severe violations of religious freedom," which its government actively "engages in" or "tolerates." "Severe" is defined as "egregious, ongoing and systematic." The law does not address other terms that are frequently used loosely and interchangeably in social discourse, such as "genocide," which American law defines with a high bar, and "persecution," which has no legal definition.
The debate about Nigeria's status regarding whether it should be designated as a CPC began in earnest in Washington last spring. After House African Subcommittee Chairman Chris Smith introduced a resolution that urged CPC designation for Nigeria, as he had also done in 2022, the Subcommittee held a pivotal hearing on the case for Nigeria's CPC designation on March 12, 2025. Thankfully, President Trump listened and acted.
Nigeria's multi-faceted terror problem has devasted northern Muslim and Christian communities alike and is well known. The persecution of Nigeria's Middle Belt Christians by Fulani jihadi militias, however, was long overlooked and finally got Washington's attention when Nigerian Catholic Bishop Wilfred Anagbe testified at the March hearing. The bishop gave startling, first-hand testimony that described frequent raids on the farmlands of his Makurdi diocese by armed Fulani Muslim herders, who kill, rape, or kidnap residents, all the while shouting the jihadi battle cry, "Allahu Akbar." Bishop Anagbe, who is testifying also today, related that these attacks have shut down 20 parishes in his Makurdi diocese.
Moreover, Bishop Anagbe said, Nigeria's government was doing nothing to stop this. I was also a witness at the March hearing and agreed that Nigeria should be designated a CPC precisely because the relentless and systematic Fulani attacks targeting Middle Belt Christians are carried out with complete government impunity. By contrast, the government is actively fighting against the terror groups in the north, whose victims include many Muslims. This disparity in the government's policy response to the terror groups and its non-response to the Fulani militias is often missed. In other words, the government is "tolerating" the Fulani militias and that is key to the CPC designation of Nigeria, under the Act.
The Bishop's frank testimony required heroic courage. He soon received death threats. A few weeks later, Fulani militants attacked the bishop's home village of Aondoana and its surrounding area, massacring twelve of his relatives and scores of others. The priest directing his Justice, Development and Peace office, who took the body counts and came to the aid of survivors in such attacks, has been forced to take a temporary leave after credible threats to his life.
Washington's political leaders, such as Chairman Smith and White House officials, were "appalled" when they learned of this. This attack was part of the brutal pattern the Bishop described in hard-it Benue and other Middle Belt states. Moreover, it also raised the concern that the attack was in reprisal for his testimony to Congress - one organized not simply by nomadic herders but by those in Nigeria who are close observers of Washington.
Two weeks after the Aondoana incident, Yelewata, a town less than five miles from Benue's state capital of Makurdi, was hit by a Fulani raid. Over 270 Christians were murdered so brutally it move Pope Leo to publicly pray for them in Rome. The victims included some who had been displaced from their hometowns by prior Fulani raids and had sought refuge in Yelewata because it's a military garrison town. The Nigerian troops there did not put up a fight against the couple dozen Fulani attackers who swarmed in on motorcycles and on foot wielding assault rifles and machetes. Other attacks on Benue's Christian villages, including ones earlier this month, have followed. This has been going on for years - again with government impunity.
Similar attacks are relentlessly taking place in Kaduna, Plateau and Taraba and other Middle Belt states, as well as Benue. To give one recent example, a cleric told the outlet TruthNigeria (directed by former State Department official Douglas Burton) that, between November 9 and 11, Fulani militants stormed through Taraba's Wukari Local Government Area, indiscriminately killing 20 people and burning and damaging homes and churches. A survivor, a 33-year-old farmer from Amadu village, told TruthNigeria that, as she prepared to go to early morning Mass a Fulani militia arrived on motorcycles and shot into her house. She is quoted, stating: "They fired for about five minutes, shouting Allahu Akbar. When the gunfire stopped, I went inside and found my husband of 14 years, John Joseph, already dead." A survivor from a neighboring village also related that attackers on motorcycles with AK assault rifles strafed his community. He said, "my neighbors, David Bawa and Titus Gregory, lost five family members between them. My house was riddled with bullets."
TruthNigeria reports on this Taraba attack: "The Fulani militants that attacked are led by warlord Alhaji Tukur, according to [the] community leader." Wakuri diocese called the crisis "overwhelming" and said that 335 pf ots Catholic churches have been destroyed and more than 300,000 Catholics there have been displaced, beginning in 2015, reported TruthNigeria. According to the head of a local security consultancy, Fulani militants plan and stage their attacks from an abandoned resort now overgrown with vegetation called Danjuma Farm. The private security consultant further related that the Fulani "use it as a cover for cattle grazing, but that's just a smokescreen," and commented, that if "the government wants to stop the attacks ... they must clear out the terrorists from Danjuma Farms." In a Daily Post Nigeria article, a local priest described the situation as "'devastating,' revealing that many rural parishes have been abandoned following sustained assaults that have claimed multiple lives and destroyed entire villages." The Bishop told ACI Africa last year that if "peace is restored, the region's rich agricultural landscape could provide a 'prosperous future for its residents,'" instead, he said, there is food scarcity because of these constant attacks.
There are countless reports like this across the Middle Belt. I mention this one because it shows that Abuja has failed to act even when the Fulani aggressors are identified and their base from which they launch repeated attacks is known. This represents not only a horrifying pattern of severe persecution by Fulanis targeting largely Christian areas but also a shocking pattern of government "tolerance" of this persecution.
I'd like to give one last example from Plateau state that occurred a month ago. In Plateau, a pastor with the Church of Christ in Nations told journalists in Jos, on October 24, that Islamic extremists have threatened to murder him for calling on the Nigerian and U.S. governments to help protect Christians against genocide. He told the Christian outlet Morning Star News: "My life is in grave danger. Even as I speak, I am on the lookout for attacks," he reportedly said. "I no longer sleep with my eyes closed. I have been attacked before but escaped." The threats came after he appeared in a video on October 15, standing in a mass grave containing the remains of a dozen slain church members, reportedly killed by Fulani herders.
As the Nigeria government issues denials and watches passively -- with no Fulanis prosecuted, with no Nigerian forces prepared to defend the vulnerable -- the Christian death toll from Fulani militia attacks alone (leaving aside attacks by the designated terror groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP) is in the thousands and Christian survivors in displacement camps number in the millions. The respected research group Open Doors cites Nigeria as now the world's most dangerous country for Christians because of their religion. Again, at this time most Nigerian Christians are being murdered by the Fulani militias and Christians are these militias special target. Aid to the Church in Need reported last month: "Nigerian Christians in the Middle Belt are bearing the brunt of violent attacks" from those identified as "Fulani militants."
For years the State Department's Foreign Service and the United Nations have insisted that the violent aggression by Nigeria's Fulani herders against Christian farmers on their own land is the unavoidable result of climate change. The State Department religious-freedom reports have annually described these indiscriminate mass killings as "clashes" between two socio-economic groups, who fight over scarce resources brought on by climate change. Religion has nothing to do with it, they claimed. This justification of Fulani violence has recently shifted. Now, it is generally acknowledged that Christians are being murdered in cold blood but it is being argued that more Muslims are killed in the violence, and this proves it has nothing to do with religion. This argument is not factual and is irrelevant for CPC. The premise that more Muslims than Christians are killed is debatable, as the scholarly Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa documents. In any case, most Nigerian Muslims live in the north where Boko Haram and a plethora of ISIS- and al-Qaeda-linked Islamist terror groups attack them and non-Muslims alike and this violence too is religiously based. However, significant for CPC criteria, the Nigerian military is actively fighting those terror groups in the north. By contrast, in the Middle Belt, where most of the Christians are being killed in recent years and where Christians are the special target of Fulani herder militias, the government isn't lifting a finger against the Fulani militants. Instead, it is "tolerating" these militias and some high level Nigerian officials continue denying that the attacks are taking place. I have also heard about sporadic Christian attacks on Muslim villages. To the extent that the government is not taking action in those cases, that is a further reason for CPC designation.
The Fulani tribe is among West Africa's largest ethnic groups and its millions of members, most of whom are Muslim, consist of hundreds of clans. In the early 19th century, Fulani Islamic scholar Usman dan Fodio established a caliphate in Sokoto with himself as caliph that extended throughout most of northern Nigeria and other areas of West Africa and existed until Nigeria's British colonization. Today, a portion of the Fulani nomadic herder community are radicalized, well-armed, and carrying out jihad in a loosely organized network against the Middle Belt Christians. Some long for the reestablishment of the Fulani caliphate. They may be influenced by but are distinct from some Fulanis elsewhere in West Africa who have been recruited by various terror groups, including the al Qaeda-linked JNIM and its offshoot, Lakurawa, which wages jihad in Nigeria's northwest. This is where 25 school girls were kidnapped this week. Nor should they be conflated, as some scholars have, with those known as "bandits," Nigeria's various criminal gangs. The cattle barons in the powerful Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association and similar groups in Nigeria are the Fulani herders' biggest supporters. The Association's secretary Ibrahim Galma pushes the narrative internationally that the Fulani are the real victims -- of climate change.
Political momentum to list Nigeria among the world's worst persecutors gained throughout October as the annual CPC review neared the year-end deadline and reports of massacres kept coming. Celebrity Bill Maher, who is not a Christian, denounced the persecution of Nigerian Christians on an episode of Real Time in late September that went viral.
On October 21, the pontifical foundation Aid to the Church in Need issued its World survey that reported, "The number and ferocity of the attacks on Christian villages [in the Middle Belt] have led some experts to conclude that these incursions are a deliberate land grab to remove Christians and Islamise the region."
Various high level White House officials and the State Department were also hearing from groups of religious freedom activists on Nigeria. Myself and dozens of other American religious freedom advocates sent an appeal to President Trump specifically asking him to designate Nigeria as a CPC on October 24.
Later that week, President Trump made the CPC designation announcement. For the first time, the issue of the Fulani militias targeting Christians for mass murder received official U.S. acknowledgement.
This, in turn, got the attention of Nigeria's President Tinubu, who said he is willing to work with the U.S.
Until now he has not shown the political will to stop this Fulani violence.
The next step after designation in the CPC process requires the President to adopt a policy response.
There are several actions the U.S. should immediately take to end the impunity afforded to the Fulani militias attacking Christians.
1. Disarm Fulani herders. The Fulani herder militias are loosely organized, don't have explosives, or drones, don't use tunnels, suicide vests or propaganda films. They are an unsophisticated but nevertheless lethal force because they come armed with AK-47s and 49s while their targets have only home-made pipe guns with which to defend themselves. Assault rifles, such as those used by the Fulani, are heavily regulated by Nigeria's Firearms Act, and illegal for the targeted Christian farming villages. The Firearms Act prohibits "military rifles namely those of calibers 7.62 mm, 9 mm, .300 inches and .303 inches," and "revolvers and pistols whether rifled or unrifled." It specifically allows only shotguns, sporting rifles, and muzzle loading air guns, daneguns (homemade guns), flintlocks, and cap-guns for personal use. The Act, thus, outlaws the firearms that would match the assault-rifle firepower of Fulani militias, and leaves the peaceful Christian communities essentially defenseless. President Tinubu should order the removal of Fulani heavy weapons, raiding their encampments at Danjuma Farm in Taraba, and other places, in the process. He should direct cattle breeders' associations to cooperate in doing this.
2. Fortify Target Areas: U.S. foreign aid to Nigeria has in recent years amounted to about $1 billion annually to Nigeria. Areas targeted by the Fulani should receive some of this aid to securely return home and reclaim their properties, rebuild and defend themselves. For example, this aid could go toward communication systems, intelligence sharing and the training and equipping of local or private security guards, as well as other measures to strengthen security. The Fulani militias are not the formidable foe seen in ISIS and al Qaeda and their attacks could be prevented and defended against by taking these basic measures.
3. Humanitarian Aid: U.S. humanitarian aid and American charity for the victims of Fulani herder militia attacks should be distributed through trusted local providers, including through the churches on the ground that are currently one of the main aid providers to the survivors of Fulani militia attacks. Millions of these survivors are in need of humanitarian assistance for physical and psychological trauma. Formerly productive farmers, they now need food aid since they have been driven from their Middle Belt farms.
4. Sanction those aiding, abetting and granting impunity to the Fulani herder militias, including high-level officials in the criminal justice system and military: The U.S. should gather intelligence regarding official responses to the Fulani herder militias and review possible visa and Magnitsky sanctions for those aiding and abetting them and for those officials failing to act to stop their atrocities. The names of Fulani warlords and supporters are known or knowable.
Some police, military, legal and other officials who fail to perform their responsibilities and deny justice have been identified and should be investigated for possible U.S. visa and Magnitsky sanctions, as well. Out of all the violent attacks by Fulani herder militias there have been only a few arrests. One involved the prosecution of a Fulani herder who was convicted of destroying melons at a melon company, who received a ten-year prison sentence. Two high-profile legal cases of violent attacks on Christians have seen movement in recent months. One concerns the Catholic Church of St Francis in Ondo where terrorists killed some 40 worshippers on Pentecost Sunday in 2022. Depositions are being taken in that case, Ondo's Bishop recently told me, and the trial hasn't yet started. The five suspects being held are said to be part of the East African Shabaab terror group and not members of a Fulani herder militia. The other case involves the Yelewata massacre from last June, where charges were filed against five Fulani herders in September, in an extremely rare example of prosecution that might be attributable to the pressure raised by the CPC debate in Washington.
5. Binding agreement with Nigeria to prevent Fulani herder violence & restore stolen Christian farmlands and property: The IRF Act suggests as a possible policy response to CPC designation a binding agreement between our two countries to stop severe violations of religious freedom.
Stopping the Fulani herder militia attacks and atrocities could be done relatively easily since they are not of the caliber of Boko Haram, and the ISIS- and al-Qaeda linked groups. So far, President Tinubu has not demonstrated the political will to direct the police and military action within his power to stop Fulani militias. He argues that because the police force is centralized under the constitution, he is overwhelmed. He says that a constitutional amendment is required to give back policing power to the governors of the states and that could take years.
However, right now there exist legal ways President Tinubu can shore up defenses within the targeted Christian areas, for example by letting state governors issue lawful directions to police acting within their states, decentralizing police commands internally, empowering local guards, deploying more mobile police units to states and prioritizing referrals of State governor police orders for presidential review. The U.S. should enter into a binding agreement with Nigeria to ensure needed protection against the Fulani militias and should consider working with state governors who seek American help. Since President Trump's CPC designation, some Nigerian officials, including generals of a force in the southern state of Ondo, citing worries about securing Nigeria's open border, already asked for U.S. partnership in an effort to "help flush out Fulani Ethnic Militia terrorists from the Southwest."
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Original text here: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20251120/118681/HHRG-119-FA16-Wstate-SheaN-20251120-U1.pdf