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Health Research Scientist Ginexi Testifies Before House Oversight & Government Reform Committee (Part 1 of 3)
WASHINGTON, July 17 -- The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets released the following testimony by Elizabeth Ginexi, health research scientist and former scientific program official at the National Institutes of Health, from a June 30, 2026, hearing entitled "Mind Control and Accountability: Uncovering the Truth of the CIA's MKULTRA Project":
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Chairman Luna, Ranking Member Crockett, and distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
I am a health research scientist. I earned master's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets released the following testimony by Elizabeth Ginexi, health research scientist and former scientific program official at the National Institutes of Health, from a June 30, 2026, hearing entitled "Mind Control and Accountability: Uncovering the Truth of the CIA's MKULTRA Project": * * * Chairman Luna, Ranking Member Crockett, and distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am a health research scientist. I earned master'sand doctoral degrees in psychology from The George Washington University, and completed postdoctoral training at Children's National Hospital and at Vanderbilt University.
I spent 22 years from 2003-2025 as a Scientific Program Official at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), managing a portfolio of more than $132 million in health research grants, coauthoring 18 federal funding programs that generated $778 million across more than 1,000 awards, and working alongside the scientific community that makes this country's biomedical enterprise function. I left NIH in April 2025. Since then, I have been documenting what is happening to the institution I helped build.
I am here to testify that the changes underway at NIH are not reforms. They are a transfer of authority from scientists to political appointees, and the consequences for American health and economic competitiveness are not theoretical.
What federal investment in biomedical research has produced For 80 years, the United States government built the most productive publicly funded biomedical research enterprise in human history. The returns are documented, specific, and large.1
Heart disease is the leading cause of death in the United States. NIH-funded research on blood pressure, cholesterol, and smoking drove a 56 percent decline in heart disease deaths between 1950 and 1996./1
Cancer has been transformed. Treatments for breast, lung, prostate, and childhood cancers, along with immunotherapies that have converted previously fatal diagnoses into manageable conditions, trace directly to NIH-funded investigations into tumor biology, immune function, and genetic mechanisms.1
HIV and AIDS were a death sentence in 1981. Pharmaceutical companies saw no profitable market for treatment. NIH-funded researchers developed AZT and ran the clinical trials no private company would touch. What followed was antiretroviral therapy and pre-exposure prophylaxis. Global AIDS deaths, which peaked near 2 million annually around 2004-2005, have fallen 54 percent since 2010. More than a million people are alive today because of NIH research.1
Polio paralyzed tens of thousands of American children annually in the early 1950s. NIHsupported research produced the vaccines that ended that threat in this country. The same is true for hepatitis B, HPV, and COVID-19. The mRNA platform that produced COVID vaccines in record time was built on decades of NIH-funded basic research during periods when clinical application was far from guaranteed.1
Rare diseases, which affect 25 to 30 million Americans in aggregate, receive research attention from the NIH precisely because no market exists to study them.1 Neurological research with no obvious commercial target produced the understanding of brain chemistry that gave us modern pharmacological treatments for depression.1 NIH-funded research on infant sleep position reduced sudden infant death syndrome deaths by more than 50 percent.1
These outcomes share a pattern: basic research, funded by the public, whose value became visible only years or decades later. Not one of them would have been produced on a market timeline. Every dollar appropriated to NIH generates $2.46 in economic output.1 NIH-supported work contributed to 354 of 356 new drugs the FDA approved between 2010 and 2019./2 The pipeline that produces those approvals begins with basic research that has no immediate commercial application. Cutting the source of funding does not slow the pipeline. It ends it.
What is now at risk
The NIH grants system was designed by the Public Health Service Act of 1944 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.)3 based on a clear principle: scientific judgments should be made by scientists, through accountable deliberative processes, insulated from political direction. That design choice is what produced the outcomes I just described.
The actions of the current administration, and particularly OMB, directly threaten that design.
With this rule, they are trying to dismantle the NIH.
The proposed OMB "Regulation for Federal Financial Assistance" (2 CFR Part 200)4 rule would give political appointees the authority to terminate funded NIH grants at any time, without cause. This means an ongoing clinical trial, one that has already enrolled patients, could be canceled mid-study based on political preference rather than scientific or ethical review.3
That is not a hypothetical risk. NIH has already terminated or frozen thousands of research grants since January 2025.5 The cancellations have been disproportionately concentrated in infectious disease research, vaccine research, and health disparities work. 5 As of April 2026, at least 5,468 NIH grants were terminated or suspended with over $450 million in funds still lost, even as grants were ordered restored by the courts.5 As of late 2025, 383 clinical trials testing treatments for conditions such as cancer, HIV/AIDS, mental or behavioral health conditions, substance abuse, and chronic diseases had lost grant funding with more than 74,000 patients directly impacted.6 The proposed rule would make that authority permanent.
Inside NIH, the Director, Jay Bhattacharya, has overseen the elimination the merit score thresholds that once gave peer review its structural integrity.7,8 Previously, applications scoring above an objective score had a strong likelihood of funding based on scientific merit. That threshold has been removed, with final funding decisions transferred to political appointees who are, right now, overriding peer review outcomes based on whether research aligns with administration priorities in accordance with OMB directives.9 Hundreds of grant applications are being held up at any given time by unprecedented scrutiny after peer review.
The proposed OMB rule would also impose severe restrictions on international research collaboration, severing the partnerships essential to pandemic preparedness and global disease surveillance. The United States is currently managing an H5N1 bird flu outbreak with more than 70 documented human cases.10 A hantavirus outbreak linked to a rare strain from South America required CDC scientists to work alongside Argentine public health officials to trace its origins.11 An Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, now the third-largest on record, is outpacing containment efforts as of this week.12 Each of these required or requires exactly the kind of international scientific cooperation the proposed OMB rule would make structurally harder to maintain. This is the moment the administration has chosen to restrict essential cooperation and funding.
What cannot be rebuilt
Between 2025 and January 2026, federal research agencies lost STEM PhD scientists over new hires at a ratio of 11 to 1, a net loss of more than 4,000 researchers according to a Science analysis of federal workforce data.13 NIH experienced the highest number of PhD losses among all federal agencies, with 1,112 PhD-trained workers leaving their roles. At NIH, 13 of the 27 institutes and centers are operating without permanent scientific leadership.14 The majority of NIH's 25 Advisory Councils, required by statute to provide independent scientific accountability, are operating with less than half their full membership.15 The expertise lost when researchers leave does not return when a budget line is restored. The knowledge infrastructure, once dismantled, does not snap back into place.
What this Committee can do
The fundamental choice before this Congress is between a system where scientists make scientific judgments through accountable deliberative processes or one where political appointees make those calls instead. That choice will determine whether the next generation of breakthroughs in cancer, Alzheimer's, antibiotic resistance, and pandemic defense happens here, or somewhere else, or perhaps not at all.
I urge Congress to pass a joint resolution of disapproval to block the proposed OMB Federal Financial Assistance rule in its entirety.
The proposed rule would replace the peer-review system of federal investment in science with a political approval process. This new political litmus test would extend to all grants issued by any federal agency, including funding for science, public services, infrastructure, and education.
Using OMB's grants management authority as a vehicle for political control over federally funded grants has not been authorized by Congress or the Constitution.16 The United States built the world's preeminent biomedical research enterprise over 80 years.
The speed of the current dismantling of the NIH is breathtaking. Rebuilding what has been lost, if it can be rebuilt at all, will take decades.
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Citations:
1. Dzau, V. J., & Yamamoto, K. R. (2025, August 18). Government-funded health and biomedical research is irreplaceable. National Academy of Medicine. https://nam.edu/perspectives/government-funded-health-and-biomedical-research-isirreplaceable/
2. Cleary, E. G., Jackson, M. J., Zhou, E. W., & Ledley, F. D. (2023). Comparison of research spending on new drug approvals by the National Institutes of Health vs the pharmaceutical industry, 2010-2019. JAMA Health Forum, 4(4), e230511. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamahealthforum.2023.0511
3. Public Health Service Act of 1944, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq. (1944). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1030/pdf/COMPS-1030.pdf
4. Regulation for Federal Financial Assistance, 91 Fed. Reg. 34101 (May 29, 2026). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/29/2026-10817/regulation-forfederal-financial-assistance
5. Kozlov, M., Tollefson, J., & Garisto, D. (2026, January 20). US science after a year of Trump. Nature. https://www.nature.com/immersive
6. Patel, V. R., Liu, M., & Jena, A. B. (2026). Clinical trials affected by research grant terminations at the National Institutes of Health. JAMA Internal Medicine, 186(1), 126-128. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2025.6088
7. Bhattacharya, J. (2025, August). Advancing NIH's mission through a unified strategy. National Institutes of Health. https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/nihdirector/statements/advancing-nihs-mission-through-unified-strategy
8. National Institutes of Health. (2025, November). Implementing a unified NIH funding strategy to guide consistent and clearer award decisions. NIH Extramural Nexus. https://grants.nih.gov/news-events/nih-extramural-nexus-news/2025/11/implementing-aunified-nih-funding-strategy-to-guide-consistent-and-clearer-award-decisions
9. Kozlov, M. (2026, June 26). Inside the new political screening that's stalling NIH grants. Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-026-01924-8
10. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2025, July 7). A(H5) bird flu: Current situation. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situationsummary/index.html
11. Mole, B. (2026, June 24). US ends hantavirus outbreak response with no answers on draconian quarantines. Ars Technica. https://arstechnica.com/science/2026/06/us-endshantavirus-outbreak-response-with-no-answers-on-draconian-quarantines/
12. Bigg, M. M., & Nolen, S. (2026, June 25). Ebola outbreak could become largest ever, Africa's C.D.C. warns. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/25/world/africa/ebola-outbreak-africa-cdc.html
13. Hersher, M., & Mervis, J. (2026, January 26). U.S. government has lost more than 10,000 STEM Ph.D.s since Trump took office. Science. https://www.science.org/content/article/u-sgovernment-has-lost-more-10000-stem-ph-d-s-since-trump-took-office
14. National Institutes of Health. (n.d.). Directors of NIH institutes and centers. https://www.nih.gov/institutes-nih/directors-nih-institutes-centers
15. Kozlov, M. (2026, January 22). Exclusive: key NIH review panels due to lose all members by the end of 2026. Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-026-00183-x
16. Ginexi, E. M. (2026, June 18). My public comment on proposed OMB. Substack. https://elizabethginexi.substack.com/p/my-public-comment-on-proposed-omb
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Appendixes
1. The Editors. (2026, June 15). The OMB and the politicization of science. New England Journal of Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMe260801
2. Politico. (2026, June 12). OMB extension letter. https://www.politico.com/2026/06/12/document/omb-extension-letter
3. 27 UNIHTED. (2026, June). The Bethesda Declaration: One year later, continuing harms to the NIH mission. https://www.27unihted.org/bethesda-declaration-one-year-later
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The New England Journal of Medicine
Editorial
The OMB and the Politicization of Science
The Editors
One of the great joys of working at a journal like ours is seeing the dramatic progress in patient outcomes that research can achieve over time. In the past few years, we've seen breakthroughs in cancer therapy, cures for genetic diseases, and new vaccines that prevent deadly diseases. These advances have been facilitated by the leadership, encouragement, and financial support of governments acting with the help of scientific advice. But such arrangements can go badly wrong.
For decades, the Soviet Union promoted the unorthodox views of Trofim Lysenko, an agronomist who used his close ties to the political leadership to spread misinformation denying Mendelian genetics. What followed was a disaster: many years of poor harvests based on unsupported science and suppression of the teaching and practice of modern genetics throughout the Soviet bloc. A similar threat now hangs over U.S. science.
First, a review of where we are now. Proposals for scientific research are submitted to various federal agencies (we will use the National Institutes of Health [NIH] as an example), where they undergo an initial administrative review (to ensure adherence to all the rules) followed by peer review by a panel of experts in the field.
These experts assess the proposal and assign it a priority score. Priority scores are based on the value of the science and are determined by peer reviewers who are shielded from politics. The appropriate NIH institute determines how many grants can be funded, depending on its budget, and then -- with rare exceptions -- funds strictly by priority score. The NIH leadership and Congress can influence funding by, for example, changing broad budgets or issuing "requests for applications." However, the decisions are almost entirely driven by science. Once funded, the proposed work proceeds, unless the grantee fails to perform it, for the period designated at the time of the funding decision.
The rule changes that the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recently proposed to the Health and Human Services (HHS) grant process would drastically change this process. There are too many objectionable aspects of these proposals to discuss here. But three are particularly striking. Political appointees would be able to make funding decisions and could ignore the advice of independent scientists. They could also stop funding midway through the promised grant period. And they would institute new rules, including rules severely limiting foreign interactions. These changes raise fundamental concerns about the research endeavor, about ethical obligations to participants in clinical studies, about the ability to train the next generation of leaders in biomedical innovation, and about society's ability to address disease threats early, before broader consequences occur.
Giving political appointees ultimate authority to determine federal grant funding, as proposed by the OMB, would politicize and weaken biomedical research. Expert, independent peer review of grant applications is essential for directing NIH dollars to research that has the greatest potential for advancing science and improving health. Selecting the most promising research is an enormously complex and challenging undertaking, but over the past 70 years, scientific advances achieved with rigorous methods in clinical trials have improved quality of life, transformed human health, and extended life expectancies. Substantial investment by the U.S. government built on the foundation of a merit-based review and award process has been central to these advances. A political process for awarding grants, by contrast, will end up harming patients and wasting resources. The OMB proposal indicates that grantees should conduct "Gold Standard Science," a term that has been only vaguely described by the current administration (but, in a seeming contradiction to the OMB proposal, includes peer review). At the Journal, we know that what counts as gold-standard science can be determined only by peer review conducted by experts in the field -- the current system.
The OMB proposal to permit political appointees to discontinue funding of ongoing grants at any time, without cause, would have serious adverse consequences for the research enterprise and for patients. In biomedical research, the gold standard of evidence is the randomized, controlled trial (RCT). The RCT's methods minimize the influence of bias and preconceived notions. However, this type of trial often takes years to conduct and may take even longer for less common diseases. Once RCTs are initiated, alterations in their conduct, other than those made to incorporate new scientific evidence, undermine study integrity, participant safety, and trust in the outcome. For example, a trial to study a new agent to treat cancer may take a year or two to get funded, 3 to 4 years to conduct, and several more years of longer-term follow-up.
If a decision to stop funding the trial occurred at year 4 for political rather than scientific reasons, what would happen to patients who were enrolled in the study at that time? How would longer-term safety and efficacy observations be made? This type of arbitrary midcycle termination of a clinical trial could place participating patients at significant risk of harm. Can physician-investigators ethically enroll a patient in a trial if ongoing funding for the trial is uncertain?
There would be substantial adverse effects on researchers as well as patients. Why would a basic science investigator start a line of investigation that might take years to complete if the funding for it could be cut at any moment, without cause? How could educators train the next generation of clinical investigators if their ability to complete their research were subject to the whims of political appointees? A corrosive consequence of such an arbitrary funding process would be the diminishment of the U.S. workforce of clinical and basic science investigators -- and it would ultimately harm biomedical innovation and cutting-edge patient care.
The proposed rules would also severely limit foreign research partnerships, requiring political approval of international collaborations. For the biomedical enterprise to understand the biology of important diseases, conduct studies of possible treatments for them, and potentially contain them, researchers need to study those diseases where they occur. Broad global collaboration has led to deeper understanding of genetic, environmental, and social factors contributing to disease manifestations and responses to therapy. For example, gastric cancer occurs at much higher rates in southeast Asia than in the United States. With the collaboration of clinical partners in regions with the highest burden of disease, studies can be completed years earlier than they would be otherwise, at a fraction of the cost, bringing earlier and greater benefits to all affected people, including people in the United States. Aren't we better off addressing Ebola, tuberculosis, or screwworm before they spread to additional communities? Disease spread is typically easier to control when cases are fewer in number and contained in a limited geographic area.
A nonscientific, political process for determining what is scientifically sound has not worked in the past and will not work now. Lysenkoism demonstrated that allowing politics to control the scientific process can halt or even reverse a nation's progress. Erratic funding would fundamentally undermine innovation and dramatically impair America's ability to address today's health challenges. The OMB proposal is currently open for public comment, and we urge our readers to express their concerns. When science becomes politicized, everyone loses.
Editor's note: The OMB proposal is available for public comment at https://www.regulations.gov/document/OMB-2026-0034 -0001/comment.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with the full text of this editorial at NEJM.org.
This editorial was published on June 15, 2026, at NEJM.org.
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMe2608017
Copyright Copyright (c) 2026 Massachusetts Medical Society.
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June 12, 2026
Filed electronically via Regulations.gov
Honorable Russell Vought
Director, US Office of Management and Budget The White House
Re: OMB guidance governing federal grants and cooperative agreements Regulation Codifying Policies on Federal Financial Assistance, Revisions to 2 CFR 91 Fed. Reg. 32198 (May 29, 2026)
Extension of Comment Period to August 27 , 2026 Dear Director Vought:
The undersigned organizations across science, research, policy, and education come to you jointly to ask for a 45-day extension to the comment period for the proposed rule by the Office of Management and Budget to revise Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations, published on May 29, 2026. Presently, comments are due July 13, 2026 and we ask that on or before June 30, 2026 a Federal Register Notice is published extending the comment period to August 27, 2026.
The scope and impact of OMB's proposed rule is vast. The proposed rule amends 91 parts of Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations across 456 different sections of the regulations, adding 52 new subsections and fully restating 375 sections. The rule will impact the entirety of government grant-making across the United States. OMB itself says the revisions suggested would relate to over $179 billion of funds to small entities. In addition to these entities, NSF reports that $64 billion was spent in FY2024 at universities on R&D, much of it through grants and cooperative agreements. NIH allocated approximately $36.9 billion in extramural funding that same fiscal year. These are just examples of the small but important components of the approximately $1.2 trillion that the federal government spends via grants and cooperative agreements.1 A 45-day comment period is insufficient to allow completion of the multi-disciplinary analysis needed to provide useful feedback to OMB.
A 90-day period is warranted because this rule is complex and wide-ranging and never appeared on the Unified Agenda as a regulatory action being undertaken by OMB. The fact that no one in the regulated community was aware OMB was pursuing notice and comment rulemaking is evidenced in the fact that not one EO 12866 meeting was requested during the period this rule was under review at OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
Submission of substantive comments is fundamental to the rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act, which at its core is about enhancing public engagement in rulemaking for the purpose of ensuring agencies receive the most comprehensive information possible to solve problems for the American people.2 A fulsome and rational consideration of and response to data and evidence presented in public comments enables agencies to benefit when "situated knowledge" is shared as part of rulemaking efforts; in other words, public officials benefit from having access to knowledge that is widely dispersed among stakeholders.3
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1 Parts of the proposed rule do not apply to the full $1.2 trillion in federal grant spending because there are exceptions for awards such as block grants, awards based on a statutory formula, and disaster-recovery grants, among other types of assistance.
2 84 Fed. Reg. 2139 at 2146-2148 (February 6, 2019).
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"In particular, agencies need information from the industries they regulate, other experts, and citizens with situated knowledge of the field in order to understand the problems they seek to address, the potential regulatory solutions, their attendant costs, and the likelihood of achieving satisfactory compliance."4
Many of us actively take steps as organizations or through our members to ensure the United States has the capacity to engage in ongoing and vital efforts to make progress in critical sectors as well as emerging fields. Many of us have worked with successive administrations and Congress on issues essential to the nation's housing, energy, transportation, infrastructure, research and development, and healthcare systems, among others, that are regularly subject to federal grantmaking and cooperative agreements. Despite differences in approach, sector, and membership, each signatory has found it core to our mission to enhance the American innovation enterprise.
Executive Order 12866 states that agencies should "afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment on any proposed regulation." OMB envisions the proposed revisions of Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations will be a far-reaching reimagining of all forms of federal financial assistance. For a rule with these intended sweeping and comprehensive effects, a period of at least 90 days is needed in order for the comment period to be meaningful.
We value the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking and policy implementation process on the issues framed in the proposed rule, about which we care deeply, and appreciate your consideration of our request.
Respectfully,
ACA: The Structural Science Society
Academic Pediatric Association
Academy for Radiology & Biomedical Imaging Research
Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy
Academy of Physicians in Clinical Research
AcademyHealth
Acoustical Society of America
ACRE
Acterra: Action for a Healthy Planet
ADAP Advocacy Association
Afterschool Alliance
Alliance for Academic Internal Medicine (AAIM) Alliance for Aging Research
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3 M. Sant'Ambrogio and G. Staszewski, Michigan State University, Public Engagement with Agency Rulemaking (Administrative Conference of the United States, November 19, 2018) at p. 3.
4 Id. at p. 10.
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Alliance for Data Science and AI
Alliance for Learning Innovation (ALI)
Alliance of Nurses for Healthy Environments
Alliance to Cure Cavernous Malformation
ALS Association
American Academy of Allergy, Asthma & Immunology
American Academy of Emergency Medicine
American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine
American Academy of Neurology
American Academy of Nursing
American Academy of Pediatrics
American Alliance of Museums
American Anthropological Association
American Association for Anatomy
American Association for Cancer Research
American Association for Dental, Oral, and Craniofacial Research
American Association for Public Opinion Research
American Association for State and Local History
American Association for the Advancement of Science
American Association of Colleges of Nursing
American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy (AACP)
American Association of Geographers
American Association of Immunologists
American Association of Nurse Practitioners
American Association of Physicists in Medicine
American Association of Physics Teachers
American Astronomical Society
American Brain Coalition
American Chemical Society
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists
American College of Physicians
American College of Radiology
American Educational Research Association
American Federation for Aging Research
American Gastroenterological Association
American Geophysical Union (AGU)
American Geriatrics Society
American Heart Association
American Industrial Hygiene Association
American Institute for Medical and Biological Engineering (AIMBE)
American Institute of Biological Sciences
American Institute of Ultrasound in Medicine (AIUM)
American Mathematical Society
American Meteorological Society
American Musicological Society
American Nurses Association
American Occupational Therapy Association
American Oil Chemists' Society (AOCS)
American Ornithological Society
American Pediatric Society (APS)
American Pharmacists Association
American Physical Society
American Physiological Society
American Phytopathological Society
American Political Science Association
American Psychological Association
American Public Gardens Association
American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology
American Society for Bone and Mineral Research
American Society for Cell Biology
American Society for Clinical Investigation
American Society for Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics
American Society for Gravitational and Space Research
American Society for Nutrition
American Society for Pathobiology
American Society for Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics (ASPET) American Society of Agronomy
American Society of Biomechanics
American Society of Civil Engineers
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists
American Society of Hematology
American Society of Nephrology
American Society of Plant Biologists
American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene (ASTMH)
American Speech-Language-Hearing Association (ASHA)
American Statistical Association
American Studies Association
American Thoracic Society
American Vacuum Society (AVS)
Americans for Medical Progress
Animal Behavior Society
Arkansas Immunization Action Coalition (Immunize Arkansas)
Arthritis Foundation
ASCP - Age Friendly Pharmacists and Pharmacies Asian American Scholar Forum
ASM
ASM International
Association for Academic Pathology (AAPath)
Association for Psychological Science
Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology (ARVO)
Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
Association for the Sciences of Limnology and Oceanography
Association for Women in Science
Association of American Cancer Institutes
Association of Art Museum Directors
Association of Biomolecular Resource Facilities (ABRF)
Association of Children's Museums
Association of Environmental Engineering and Science Professors
Association of Family Medicine Residency Directors
Association of Maternal & Child Health Programs
Association of Medical School Pediatric Department Chairs
Association of Population Centers
Association of Public Health Nurses
Association of Research Libraries
Association of Science and Technology Centers
Association of Science Museum Directors
Association of University Presses
Autoimmune Association
Big Cities Health Coalition
Biocom
Biophysical Society
Botanical Society of America
California Botanical Society
California Institute for Regenerative Medicine
California River Watch
California State University
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
Campus Research Computing Consortium
Cancer Nation
Caregiver Action Network
Center for Open Science
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
Cereals & Grains Association
Children's Cancer Cause
Children's Hospital Association
Clean Energy Business Network
Climate Psychiatry Alliance
Coalition for Academic Scientific Computation
Coastal and Estuarine Research Federation
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Computing Research Association
Concord Consortium
Conference of Boston Teaching Hospitals
Council of Medical Specialty Societies
Crohn's & Colitis Foundation
Crop Science Society of America
CSM Advising LLC
CT Public Health Association
Cure Alzheimer's Fund
Cure HHT
Cushman Foundation for Foraminiferal Research, Inc.
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
debra of America
Defend Public Health
DefendResearch
Digital Promise Global
Ecological Society of America
EdTrust
Education Reform Now
Emory University
Endocrine Society
Entomological Society of America
EveryLife Foundation for Rare Diseases
Evidence Advocacy Center
Federation of American Scientists
Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB)
Federation of Associations in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (FABBS)
Fight Colorectal Cancer
Fox Chase Cancer Center -- Temple Health
Friedreich's Ataxia Research Alliance (FARA)
Genetics Society of America
Geological Society of America
George Washington University Cancer Center German Studies Association
Gerontological Society of America
Global Health Technologies Coalition (GHTC)
GreenLatinos
HealthHIV
Heart Failure Society of America
Helminthological Society of Washington
HIV Medicine Association
Huntsman Cancer Institute
IEEE-USA
Illinois Public Health Association
Immune Deficiency Foundation
Infectious Diseases Society of America
INFORMS
Institute for Progress
International Society for Stem Cell Research International
Zebrafish Society (IZFS)
Internet2
Iowa Public Health Association
Lasker Foundation
Latino Caucus for Public Health (APHA)
Lewy Body Dementia Association
Lupus and Allied Diseases Association, Inc.
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MaxRevenue
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MEAction Maryland
MEAction North Carolina
MEAction, California
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Minnesota Public Health Association
Montana Climate and Health
NAPCRG
National Alliance for Caregiving
National Association for Biomedical Research (NABR)
National Association of City Transportation Officials
National Association of School Nurses
National Ataxia Foundation
National Consumers League
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM)
National Council on Public History
National Education Association
National Foundation for Infectious Diseases
National Health Council
National Hispanic Health Foundation
National Humanities Alliance
National Low Income Housing Coalition
National Medical Association
National Organization for Dental Immunizers
National Postdoctoral Association
National School Boards Association
National Women's Law Center
National Women's Studies Association
Natural Resources Defense Council
Natural Science Collections Alliance
NDRI
Nebraska Cures
New America's Future of Work & Innovation Economy Program
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North American Vascular Biology Organization
Oceanography Society
Optica, Advancing Optics and Photonics Worldwide Organization of Biological Field Stations
Partnership for Public Service
Pediatric Nurse Practitioner House Calls
Pediatric Policy Council
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Planetary Society
Plug In America
Population Association of America
Post-Acute and Long-Term Care Medical Association
Prevent Blindness
Psychonomic Society
Pulmonary Fibrosis Foundation
reDesignED
Research!America
RetireSafe
Salem Oaks Consulting
San Diego Natural History Museum
San Jose State University
Sanford Burnham Prebys Medical Discovery Institute
Seismological Society of America
SERP Institute
Shock Society
Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Honor Society
Social Science Research Council
Society for Advancement of Chicanos/Hispanics and Native American in Science
Society for Applied Anthropology
Society For Biomaterials
Society for Birth Defects Research and Prevention
Society for Developmental Biology
Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine
Society for Glycobiology
Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Society for Industrial Microbiology and Biotechnology
Society for Laboratory Automation and Screening
Society for Leukocyte Biology
Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine
Society for Neuroscience
Society for Pediatric Radiology
Society for Pediatric Research (SPR)
Society for Personality and Social Psychology
Society for Range Management
Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD)
Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
Society for the Study of Amphibians and Reptiles
Society for the Study of Evolution
Society for Women's Health Research
Society of Behavioral Medicine
Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry of North America (SETAC North America)
Society of Herbarium Curators
Society of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging
Society of Systematic Biologists
Society of Teachers of Family Medicine
Software & Information Industry Association
Soil Science Society of America
Solve M.E.
SPARC
Speculative Technologies
Spina Bifida Association
St. Jude Children's Research Hospital
Stand Up for Science
STEM Education Coalition
Study Group
T2M Advisors
TERC, Inc.
Texas Behavioral Science and Policy Institute
Third Way
TSC Alliance
UCLA
Union of Concerned Scientists
University of Colorado
University of Colorado Boulder
University of Colorado Anschutz
University of Kentucky Markey Cancer Center
University of Oregon
University of Rochester
Up for Growth Action
Vision Zero Network
West Sonoma County Alliance
Wildlife Society
Wistar Institute
Women's Health Institute
Woodley Park Institute
* * *
The Bethesda Declaration One Year Later
Continuing Harms to the NIH Mission
Developed by 74 concerned current and former NIH staff in their personal capacities, including anonymous contributors and:
1. Kathryn Adams;
2. Cara Anjos Breeden, MLS;
3. Wen-Ying Sylvia Chou, PhD, MPH;
4. Anna Culbertson BS, BA;
5. Susan M. Czajkowski, PhD;
6. Lee E. Eiden, PhD;
7. Marc S. Ernstoff, MD;
8. Hannah Evans, MS;
9. Benjamin Feldman, PhD;
10. Lori Frank, PhD;
11. Nina G. Friedman, BA;
12. Elizabeth Ginexi, MA, PhD;
13. Dave Gutekunst, PhD;
14. Kaitlyn Hajdarovic, PhD;
15. Andrea Horvath Marques, MD, MPH, PhD;
16. Sammy Katta, PhD;
17. Theresa Kim, PhD, MS;
18. Sarah C. Kobrin, PhD, MPH;
19. Rosa Lafer-Sousa, PhD;
20. Amber Lockridge, PhD;
21. Saul Malozowski, MD, PhD, MBA;
22. Mollie Manier, PhD;
23. Matthew Manion, PhD;
24. Vanessa C. McMains, PhD;
25. Ian Morgan, PhD;
26. Jenna M Norton, PhD, MPH;
27. Amy C. Palin, PhD;
28. Vani Pariyadath, PhD;
29. Rui C Pereira de Sa, PhD;
30. Shiv Prasad, PhD;
31. Christa Reynolds, MA;
32. Gina Roussos, PhD;
33. Katrina J. Serrano, PhD;
34. Siddharth Shenoy, PhD
35. Nina Silverberg, PhD;
36. Janine M. Simmons, MD, PhD;
37. Asha Storm, PhD;
38. Joanna Szczepanik, PhD;
39. Jennifer L. Troyer, PhD
Introduction
Founded in 1887, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is still the world's largest funder of biomedical research after more than a century. Currently, NIH has been at the forefront of scientific and technological advances that meaningfully improve the health of Americans and people across the globe: novel medications that prevent transmission of HIV; innovative technologies like CRISPR gene editing, AI-driven drug design, digital health technologies, and tissues on a chip; life-saving therapeutics for cystic fibrosis; a vaccine to prevent cancer; and cutting-edge treatments for diabetes, depression, Alzheimer's disease and obesity, among many others.
For over half a century, these NIH-led scientific advances have been fueled by consistent public funding from Congress, expert input from scientists, and global recruitment of top talent.
Economists estimate that every dollar invested in NIH returns $2.57 in economic activity per year and more than $8.38 in private sector research and development over 8 years.
Last year, NIH Director Dr. Jayanta Bhattacharya released scientific priorities that claim to build on this success. Yet, Director Bhattacharya has repeatedly implemented policies and practices that not only undercut these stated priorities, but endanger the standing of the United States as a global leader in biomedical research.
One year ago, on June 9, 2025, we released the Bethesda Declaration, an open letter of concern to Director Bhattacharya, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., and Congress. Signed by more than 600 NIH staff and 32,000 external scientists, patients, and members of the general public, the Declaration raised concerns about harmful policies that undermine the NIH mission, waste public resources, compromise the ethical imperatives of our profession, and threaten the health of Americans and people across the globe. These concerns include i) the politicization of NIH-funded science; ii) the interruption of global collaboration; iii) the undermining of peer review; iv) capping infrastructure support that is critical to science; and v) cuts in mission-critical personnel.
We hoped our Declaration might engender policy changes to prevent harm, improve public health, and ensure appropriate stewardship of public funds. When Director Bhattacharya held a roundtable with Bethesda Declaration signers on July 21, 2025, we had some optimism that we might together correct some of the most egregious threats to NIH. Ultimately, however, Director Bhattacharya largely ignored the concerns raised in our declaration and discussed during the roundtable.
Today, on June 9, 2026, we provide an update to members of Congress and the public on the current status of NIH, one year after the Bethesda Declaration. The chaos of 2025 has been replaced with coordinated, systematic, institutionalized destruction in 2026. NIH policy directed by HHS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and implemented by Director Bhattacharya continues to flout ethical, statutory, and legal standards, including stipulations in the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S. Code Chapter 6A) for NIH to include diverse populations in research, address health disparities, conduct research related to the health of sexual and gender minority populations, and enhance workforce diversity. Our initial concerns have only deepened as we've seen the consequences of this administration's policies: a 24% decrease in new research funded by NIH in fiscal year (FY) 2025 compared to FY24; project terminations that have discarded investments in multi-year studies and disproportionately impacted early career investigators from minority racial, ethnic and gender groups; extreme staff shortages; and dramatic delays in research awards. A May 29, 2026, proposed rule on the Regulation for Federal Financial Assistance from the OMB promises a return to the chaos of early 2025, codifying into regulation the policies and practices that enabled these harms. Despite the clearly documented negative consequences of such policies, Director Bhattacharya continues to gaslight the scientific community and members of Congress, insisting these challenges are just "political noise."
In this report, we expand on and provide further evidence that the five initial concerns outlined in the Bethesda Declaration remain critically urgent. The concerns include:
* Concern 1: An anti-science agenda is disrupting research for health advances and cures
* Concern 2: Discriminatory policies are worsening disparities
* Concern 3: Ignoring ethical standards has put research participants and the public at risk
* Concern 4: An unstable research environment is undermining scientific advances and public trust
* Concern 5: Lost critical expertise is hindering the NIH mission
* Concern 6: Changing of policies without staff input is creating foreseeable damage
* Concern 7: Cumbersome and shifting processes are wasting resources and harming health
* Concern 8: Disruption of global research is endangering people in the United States and around the world
* Concern 9: A culture of fear and low morale is eroding scientific integrity
We remain committed to the NIH mission, the United States Constitution, and the health and wellbeing of the American public. We sincerely hope that by continuing to shine a light on the harmful policies of current NIH leadership, we can advance meaningful reforms that will enable us to carry out the NIH mission: "to seek and apply fundamental knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability."
Concern 1: An anti-science agenda is disrupting research for health advances and cures
Why It Matters
Health advances require stable, long-term investment across multiple sectors and phases of the scientific process. Good stewardship of this investment demands constant monitoring and mid-course correction. Scientific expertise guides the weight given to innovative ideas - neither overvaluing original concepts in the face of robust evidence to the contrary, nor ignoring them simply because they are novel.
To find this balance, NIH has traditionally relied on two layers of peer review combined with programmatic guidance and oversight:
* First level peer review: a merit-based review process involving external scientific experts. NIH's peer review process occurs at multiple levels. In the first level, external scientists, who have a strong record of scientific accomplishment and are approved by NIH staff in the Center for Scientific Review (CSR), volunteer their time and expertise to judge the scientific merit of proposed research projects based on long-standing, regulatorily defined review criteria (42 C.F.R. Sec. 52h).
* Programmatic review by highly trained, nonpartisan civil servant scientists with expert knowledge in their fields. These knowledgeable and experienced NIH scientific program staff are involved in the development of funding opportunities and funding recommendations. Specifically, program staff identify scientific gap areas where additional research is needed. They take input from external scientific advisory boards with relevant expertise (including patient advocates) as they develop funding opportunities to address identified research needs. They also make funding recommendations regarding applications in their area of expertise, informed substantially by the missions and strategic priorities of their NIH institute or center, scientific merit as judged independently by peer review, and scientific gaps and opportunities that guide NIH investment to improve public health. The funding recommendation process typically involves discussion among scientific program staff at the branch or division level, with Branch or Division Directors arbitrating the process and making final recommendations to the Institute or Center Director.
* Second level peer review: Advisory Council Review by working scientists and patient advocates. Each NIH institute works with a set of external scientific experts and individuals with lived experience, established through the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. Sec. 1009). Advisory Councils of scientific experts and community stakeholders guide programmatic decisions by NIH scientists, including development of funding opportunities and funding recommendations. The roles, requirements and functions of these advisory councils are defined in statute and regulation (42 U.S.C. Sec. 284a, 42 C.F.R. Sec. 52a and 42 C.F.R. Sec. 52h).
Historically, the checks provided by this thorough and considered process have largely curbed the interference of politically appointed non-experts, maintaining the stability and nonpartisan nature of scientific funding across changing political administrations. This stability is what has allowed scientists to do the long-term work required to develop treatments, optimize health, and save lives, positioning the United States as a world leader in biomedical research.
Currently, however, the system needs reinforcement. NIH is implementing policies that devalue scientific expertise in favor of politically motivated decision-making. NIH is circumventing merit-based peer review, expanding the number and power of political personnel in positions of decision-making power at NIH, reducing the civil servant protections that enable a nonpartisan civil service to honestly share their scientific judgement, failing to ensure appropriate leadership across the NIH institutes and centers, with 14 of 27 directorships unfilled, and neglecting or replacing scientific advisory councils.
Devaluing scientific expertise not only breaks the long-established trust that researchers had in the federal science funding structure, but also erodes the American public's trust in science.
Undermining peer review with a partisan, anti-science agenda wastes time and resources, shifts investments toward political allies rather than the most meritorious candidates, and damages the NIH's ability to support science that will improve the health of all Americans.
Examples
Grant terminations and political review undercut evaluations of scientific merit. Every grant funded by the NIH undergoes multiple levels of extensive and rigorous peer review involving external and internal scientists. In recent decades, research applications are typically only funded when they score within the top 20%, with few, unique exceptions. In early 2025, a small team of political appointees undermined this extensive, rigorous and transparent process by abruptly terminating ongoing science. Initially, these terminations were carried out by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). But by April 2025, orders from Director Bhattacharya and Deputy Director Matthew J. Memoli compelled NIH civil servants to terminate existing grants. NIH terminated 5,522 grants, even though they had been deemed meritorious by the rigorous and competitive review process. NIH terminated grants without regard to the content, quality, progress, or potential health impact of the science. Instead, terminations were based on alleged discrimination supposedly committed by the grantee institution or simply the presence of words or concepts that political leaders disliked. While terminations have become far less frequent, the threat of termination persists. All awards now must include a statement that the grant can be terminated based on misalignment with "agency priorities" that actually refer to terms deemed objectionable by the current administration. The context of how those terms are used does not matter. The existence of such terms in an application matters. Thus, grantees are compelled to comply with censorship from the Department of Health and Human Services and NIH, resulting in alteration of studies deemed important, rigorous, and feasible by peer review. Currently, practices controlled by the Office of Extramural Research (OER) within the NIH Office of the Director subject program staff and external investigators to a discriminatory and cumbersome screening and "renegotiation" process. NIH leadership has justified these acts by establishing the ill-defined concept of "Gold Standard Science" and then claiming that any research project that doesn't align with the administration's political priorities does not meet the standard. The process is reminiscent of how the tobacco industry weaponized "sound science" to undermine research linking cigarettes to cancer.
New policies undermine the first level of peer review. Following an Executive Order from President Trump that suggested political appointees could override peer review, Director Bhattacharya issued his "Unified Funding Strategy," instructing NIH institutes to reduce the influence of peer review scores and expert feedback on funding decisions. The recent OMB proposed rule goes further, seeking to codify the minimization of peer review into regulations that carry the weight of law. NIH will soon seek public comment on a proposal to replace numerical peer review scores with a binning system that would cluster applications into three bins: "most competitive" (top 25%), "competitive" (26-50%), and "not discussed" (bottom 50% or unscored). The peer review score would be calculated, but withheld from program staff, Advisory Councils, institute and center leadership, and applicants, making a top-scoring first percentile grant indistinguishable from a grant at the 25th percentile. While data do suggest that scores within tight ranges may not reflect meaningful differences in science quality, binning scores across such broad ranges is not well supported by evidence and has not been piloted inside NIH. This system will remove valuable information from the peer review process, reduce transparency in funding decisions, and enable funneling of resources to NIH decision-makers' more favored pet projects, even if they are not deemed scientifically meritorious by peer review.
Diminished roles of external scientific advisory boards reduce oversight. To ensure NIH funding decisions are scientifically sound, advisory committee members must demonstrate integrity, be free from conflicts of interest, and have appropriate expertise. During the time-intensive process of appointing advisory committee members, NIH staff make every effort to ensure the committee not only has necessary scientific expertise but also is representative of the nation as a whole. Despite the critical importance of these committees, current NIH leadership has allowed the membership of many institute Advisory Boards or Councils to dwindle. Because official concurrence from an Advisory Council legally requires a quorum, this poses a serious threat to the ability of NIH ICs to award grants at all. In addition, Director Bhattacharya completely disbanded the long-running Advisory Council to the Director. The NIH similarly dismissed all 28 members of the National Cancer Institute's Board of Scientific Advisors, which for decades reviewed research and education projects. Other institutes abruptly removed individual members from Boards of Scientific Advisors, with dismissals primarily affecting non-U.S. citizens, women, people from racial and ethnic minority groups, and scientists focusing on topics disliked by the administration. Recent appointments to these Councils, such as Kristine Blanche, wife of Acting Attorney General and former Trump lawyer Todd Blanche, raise concerns about partisan cronyism.
Notices of funding opportunity (NOFOs) are delayed by political review. Notices of funding opportunity are an essential tool for NIH to invite research applications addressing emerging or understudied research areas. Before publication, NOFOs undergo rigorous review by scientific program staff, institute and center leadership, and Advisory Councils. Prior to 2025, NIH typically released more than 700 NOFOs each year. As of March 25, halfway through fiscal year 2026, NIH released just 17. This decrease is due to the insertion of new layers of political review by NIH, HHS, and OMB, as well as OER directives limiting the number of NOFOs allowed. In some cases, notices drafted in January 2025 have yet to be released, because they are still awaiting political approval or political appointees have denied them. Having very few NOFOs delays opportunities to advance cutting-edge science and has forced NIH staff to choose between disrupting long-running programs that provide critical research services to the community or extending these programs without competition to ensure service delivery.
A culture of fear silences scientific input from NIH staff. NIH now suffers from a culture of fear and low morale as a result of threats to and retaliation against civil servant staff, as described in Concern 9. This has constrained the ability of NIH staff to deliver accurate and appropriate scientific feedback or highlight evidence to NIH leadership that conflicts with current Administration priorities. NIH staff fear will only escalate as NIH begins to transition career civil servant staff to career/policy designations that make their employment "at will," as these changes enable politically motivated staff dismissals.
* * *
(Continues with Part 2 of 3)
* * *
Original text here: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ginexi-Written-Testimony.pdf
* * *
Chairman Luna, Ranking Member Crockett, and distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
I am a health research scientist. I earned master's ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets released the following testimony by Elizabeth Ginexi, health research scientist and former scientific program official at the National Institutes of Health, from a June 30, 2026, hearing entitled "Mind Control and Accountability: Uncovering the Truth of the CIA's MKULTRA Project": * * * Chairman Luna, Ranking Member Crockett, and distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am a health research scientist. I earned master'sand doctoral degrees in psychology from The George Washington University, and completed postdoctoral training at Children's National Hospital and at Vanderbilt University.
I spent 22 years from 2003-2025 as a Scientific Program Official at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), managing a portfolio of more than $132 million in health research grants, coauthoring 18 federal funding programs that generated $778 million across more than 1,000 awards, and working alongside the scientific community that makes this country's biomedical enterprise function. I left NIH in April 2025. Since then, I have been documenting what is happening to the institution I helped build.
I am here to testify that the changes underway at NIH are not reforms. They are a transfer of authority from scientists to political appointees, and the consequences for American health and economic competitiveness are not theoretical.
What federal investment in biomedical research has produced For 80 years, the United States government built the most productive publicly funded biomedical research enterprise in human history. The returns are documented, specific, and large.1
Heart disease is the leading cause of death in the United States. NIH-funded research on blood pressure, cholesterol, and smoking drove a 56 percent decline in heart disease deaths between 1950 and 1996./1
Cancer has been transformed. Treatments for breast, lung, prostate, and childhood cancers, along with immunotherapies that have converted previously fatal diagnoses into manageable conditions, trace directly to NIH-funded investigations into tumor biology, immune function, and genetic mechanisms.1
HIV and AIDS were a death sentence in 1981. Pharmaceutical companies saw no profitable market for treatment. NIH-funded researchers developed AZT and ran the clinical trials no private company would touch. What followed was antiretroviral therapy and pre-exposure prophylaxis. Global AIDS deaths, which peaked near 2 million annually around 2004-2005, have fallen 54 percent since 2010. More than a million people are alive today because of NIH research.1
Polio paralyzed tens of thousands of American children annually in the early 1950s. NIHsupported research produced the vaccines that ended that threat in this country. The same is true for hepatitis B, HPV, and COVID-19. The mRNA platform that produced COVID vaccines in record time was built on decades of NIH-funded basic research during periods when clinical application was far from guaranteed.1
Rare diseases, which affect 25 to 30 million Americans in aggregate, receive research attention from the NIH precisely because no market exists to study them.1 Neurological research with no obvious commercial target produced the understanding of brain chemistry that gave us modern pharmacological treatments for depression.1 NIH-funded research on infant sleep position reduced sudden infant death syndrome deaths by more than 50 percent.1
These outcomes share a pattern: basic research, funded by the public, whose value became visible only years or decades later. Not one of them would have been produced on a market timeline. Every dollar appropriated to NIH generates $2.46 in economic output.1 NIH-supported work contributed to 354 of 356 new drugs the FDA approved between 2010 and 2019./2 The pipeline that produces those approvals begins with basic research that has no immediate commercial application. Cutting the source of funding does not slow the pipeline. It ends it.
What is now at risk
The NIH grants system was designed by the Public Health Service Act of 1944 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.)3 based on a clear principle: scientific judgments should be made by scientists, through accountable deliberative processes, insulated from political direction. That design choice is what produced the outcomes I just described.
The actions of the current administration, and particularly OMB, directly threaten that design.
With this rule, they are trying to dismantle the NIH.
The proposed OMB "Regulation for Federal Financial Assistance" (2 CFR Part 200)4 rule would give political appointees the authority to terminate funded NIH grants at any time, without cause. This means an ongoing clinical trial, one that has already enrolled patients, could be canceled mid-study based on political preference rather than scientific or ethical review.3
That is not a hypothetical risk. NIH has already terminated or frozen thousands of research grants since January 2025.5 The cancellations have been disproportionately concentrated in infectious disease research, vaccine research, and health disparities work. 5 As of April 2026, at least 5,468 NIH grants were terminated or suspended with over $450 million in funds still lost, even as grants were ordered restored by the courts.5 As of late 2025, 383 clinical trials testing treatments for conditions such as cancer, HIV/AIDS, mental or behavioral health conditions, substance abuse, and chronic diseases had lost grant funding with more than 74,000 patients directly impacted.6 The proposed rule would make that authority permanent.
Inside NIH, the Director, Jay Bhattacharya, has overseen the elimination the merit score thresholds that once gave peer review its structural integrity.7,8 Previously, applications scoring above an objective score had a strong likelihood of funding based on scientific merit. That threshold has been removed, with final funding decisions transferred to political appointees who are, right now, overriding peer review outcomes based on whether research aligns with administration priorities in accordance with OMB directives.9 Hundreds of grant applications are being held up at any given time by unprecedented scrutiny after peer review.
The proposed OMB rule would also impose severe restrictions on international research collaboration, severing the partnerships essential to pandemic preparedness and global disease surveillance. The United States is currently managing an H5N1 bird flu outbreak with more than 70 documented human cases.10 A hantavirus outbreak linked to a rare strain from South America required CDC scientists to work alongside Argentine public health officials to trace its origins.11 An Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, now the third-largest on record, is outpacing containment efforts as of this week.12 Each of these required or requires exactly the kind of international scientific cooperation the proposed OMB rule would make structurally harder to maintain. This is the moment the administration has chosen to restrict essential cooperation and funding.
What cannot be rebuilt
Between 2025 and January 2026, federal research agencies lost STEM PhD scientists over new hires at a ratio of 11 to 1, a net loss of more than 4,000 researchers according to a Science analysis of federal workforce data.13 NIH experienced the highest number of PhD losses among all federal agencies, with 1,112 PhD-trained workers leaving their roles. At NIH, 13 of the 27 institutes and centers are operating without permanent scientific leadership.14 The majority of NIH's 25 Advisory Councils, required by statute to provide independent scientific accountability, are operating with less than half their full membership.15 The expertise lost when researchers leave does not return when a budget line is restored. The knowledge infrastructure, once dismantled, does not snap back into place.
What this Committee can do
The fundamental choice before this Congress is between a system where scientists make scientific judgments through accountable deliberative processes or one where political appointees make those calls instead. That choice will determine whether the next generation of breakthroughs in cancer, Alzheimer's, antibiotic resistance, and pandemic defense happens here, or somewhere else, or perhaps not at all.
I urge Congress to pass a joint resolution of disapproval to block the proposed OMB Federal Financial Assistance rule in its entirety.
The proposed rule would replace the peer-review system of federal investment in science with a political approval process. This new political litmus test would extend to all grants issued by any federal agency, including funding for science, public services, infrastructure, and education.
Using OMB's grants management authority as a vehicle for political control over federally funded grants has not been authorized by Congress or the Constitution.16 The United States built the world's preeminent biomedical research enterprise over 80 years.
The speed of the current dismantling of the NIH is breathtaking. Rebuilding what has been lost, if it can be rebuilt at all, will take decades.
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Citations:
1. Dzau, V. J., & Yamamoto, K. R. (2025, August 18). Government-funded health and biomedical research is irreplaceable. National Academy of Medicine. https://nam.edu/perspectives/government-funded-health-and-biomedical-research-isirreplaceable/
2. Cleary, E. G., Jackson, M. J., Zhou, E. W., & Ledley, F. D. (2023). Comparison of research spending on new drug approvals by the National Institutes of Health vs the pharmaceutical industry, 2010-2019. JAMA Health Forum, 4(4), e230511. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamahealthforum.2023.0511
3. Public Health Service Act of 1944, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq. (1944). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-1030/pdf/COMPS-1030.pdf
4. Regulation for Federal Financial Assistance, 91 Fed. Reg. 34101 (May 29, 2026). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/05/29/2026-10817/regulation-forfederal-financial-assistance
5. Kozlov, M., Tollefson, J., & Garisto, D. (2026, January 20). US science after a year of Trump. Nature. https://www.nature.com/immersive
6. Patel, V. R., Liu, M., & Jena, A. B. (2026). Clinical trials affected by research grant terminations at the National Institutes of Health. JAMA Internal Medicine, 186(1), 126-128. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2025.6088
7. Bhattacharya, J. (2025, August). Advancing NIH's mission through a unified strategy. National Institutes of Health. https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/nihdirector/statements/advancing-nihs-mission-through-unified-strategy
8. National Institutes of Health. (2025, November). Implementing a unified NIH funding strategy to guide consistent and clearer award decisions. NIH Extramural Nexus. https://grants.nih.gov/news-events/nih-extramural-nexus-news/2025/11/implementing-aunified-nih-funding-strategy-to-guide-consistent-and-clearer-award-decisions
9. Kozlov, M. (2026, June 26). Inside the new political screening that's stalling NIH grants. Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-026-01924-8
10. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2025, July 7). A(H5) bird flu: Current situation. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situationsummary/index.html
11. Mole, B. (2026, June 24). US ends hantavirus outbreak response with no answers on draconian quarantines. Ars Technica. https://arstechnica.com/science/2026/06/us-endshantavirus-outbreak-response-with-no-answers-on-draconian-quarantines/
12. Bigg, M. M., & Nolen, S. (2026, June 25). Ebola outbreak could become largest ever, Africa's C.D.C. warns. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/25/world/africa/ebola-outbreak-africa-cdc.html
13. Hersher, M., & Mervis, J. (2026, January 26). U.S. government has lost more than 10,000 STEM Ph.D.s since Trump took office. Science. https://www.science.org/content/article/u-sgovernment-has-lost-more-10000-stem-ph-d-s-since-trump-took-office
14. National Institutes of Health. (n.d.). Directors of NIH institutes and centers. https://www.nih.gov/institutes-nih/directors-nih-institutes-centers
15. Kozlov, M. (2026, January 22). Exclusive: key NIH review panels due to lose all members by the end of 2026. Nature. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-026-00183-x
16. Ginexi, E. M. (2026, June 18). My public comment on proposed OMB. Substack. https://elizabethginexi.substack.com/p/my-public-comment-on-proposed-omb
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Appendixes
1. The Editors. (2026, June 15). The OMB and the politicization of science. New England Journal of Medicine. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMe260801
2. Politico. (2026, June 12). OMB extension letter. https://www.politico.com/2026/06/12/document/omb-extension-letter
3. 27 UNIHTED. (2026, June). The Bethesda Declaration: One year later, continuing harms to the NIH mission. https://www.27unihted.org/bethesda-declaration-one-year-later
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The New England Journal of Medicine
Editorial
The OMB and the Politicization of Science
The Editors
One of the great joys of working at a journal like ours is seeing the dramatic progress in patient outcomes that research can achieve over time. In the past few years, we've seen breakthroughs in cancer therapy, cures for genetic diseases, and new vaccines that prevent deadly diseases. These advances have been facilitated by the leadership, encouragement, and financial support of governments acting with the help of scientific advice. But such arrangements can go badly wrong.
For decades, the Soviet Union promoted the unorthodox views of Trofim Lysenko, an agronomist who used his close ties to the political leadership to spread misinformation denying Mendelian genetics. What followed was a disaster: many years of poor harvests based on unsupported science and suppression of the teaching and practice of modern genetics throughout the Soviet bloc. A similar threat now hangs over U.S. science.
First, a review of where we are now. Proposals for scientific research are submitted to various federal agencies (we will use the National Institutes of Health [NIH] as an example), where they undergo an initial administrative review (to ensure adherence to all the rules) followed by peer review by a panel of experts in the field.
These experts assess the proposal and assign it a priority score. Priority scores are based on the value of the science and are determined by peer reviewers who are shielded from politics. The appropriate NIH institute determines how many grants can be funded, depending on its budget, and then -- with rare exceptions -- funds strictly by priority score. The NIH leadership and Congress can influence funding by, for example, changing broad budgets or issuing "requests for applications." However, the decisions are almost entirely driven by science. Once funded, the proposed work proceeds, unless the grantee fails to perform it, for the period designated at the time of the funding decision.
The rule changes that the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recently proposed to the Health and Human Services (HHS) grant process would drastically change this process. There are too many objectionable aspects of these proposals to discuss here. But three are particularly striking. Political appointees would be able to make funding decisions and could ignore the advice of independent scientists. They could also stop funding midway through the promised grant period. And they would institute new rules, including rules severely limiting foreign interactions. These changes raise fundamental concerns about the research endeavor, about ethical obligations to participants in clinical studies, about the ability to train the next generation of leaders in biomedical innovation, and about society's ability to address disease threats early, before broader consequences occur.
Giving political appointees ultimate authority to determine federal grant funding, as proposed by the OMB, would politicize and weaken biomedical research. Expert, independent peer review of grant applications is essential for directing NIH dollars to research that has the greatest potential for advancing science and improving health. Selecting the most promising research is an enormously complex and challenging undertaking, but over the past 70 years, scientific advances achieved with rigorous methods in clinical trials have improved quality of life, transformed human health, and extended life expectancies. Substantial investment by the U.S. government built on the foundation of a merit-based review and award process has been central to these advances. A political process for awarding grants, by contrast, will end up harming patients and wasting resources. The OMB proposal indicates that grantees should conduct "Gold Standard Science," a term that has been only vaguely described by the current administration (but, in a seeming contradiction to the OMB proposal, includes peer review). At the Journal, we know that what counts as gold-standard science can be determined only by peer review conducted by experts in the field -- the current system.
The OMB proposal to permit political appointees to discontinue funding of ongoing grants at any time, without cause, would have serious adverse consequences for the research enterprise and for patients. In biomedical research, the gold standard of evidence is the randomized, controlled trial (RCT). The RCT's methods minimize the influence of bias and preconceived notions. However, this type of trial often takes years to conduct and may take even longer for less common diseases. Once RCTs are initiated, alterations in their conduct, other than those made to incorporate new scientific evidence, undermine study integrity, participant safety, and trust in the outcome. For example, a trial to study a new agent to treat cancer may take a year or two to get funded, 3 to 4 years to conduct, and several more years of longer-term follow-up.
If a decision to stop funding the trial occurred at year 4 for political rather than scientific reasons, what would happen to patients who were enrolled in the study at that time? How would longer-term safety and efficacy observations be made? This type of arbitrary midcycle termination of a clinical trial could place participating patients at significant risk of harm. Can physician-investigators ethically enroll a patient in a trial if ongoing funding for the trial is uncertain?
There would be substantial adverse effects on researchers as well as patients. Why would a basic science investigator start a line of investigation that might take years to complete if the funding for it could be cut at any moment, without cause? How could educators train the next generation of clinical investigators if their ability to complete their research were subject to the whims of political appointees? A corrosive consequence of such an arbitrary funding process would be the diminishment of the U.S. workforce of clinical and basic science investigators -- and it would ultimately harm biomedical innovation and cutting-edge patient care.
The proposed rules would also severely limit foreign research partnerships, requiring political approval of international collaborations. For the biomedical enterprise to understand the biology of important diseases, conduct studies of possible treatments for them, and potentially contain them, researchers need to study those diseases where they occur. Broad global collaboration has led to deeper understanding of genetic, environmental, and social factors contributing to disease manifestations and responses to therapy. For example, gastric cancer occurs at much higher rates in southeast Asia than in the United States. With the collaboration of clinical partners in regions with the highest burden of disease, studies can be completed years earlier than they would be otherwise, at a fraction of the cost, bringing earlier and greater benefits to all affected people, including people in the United States. Aren't we better off addressing Ebola, tuberculosis, or screwworm before they spread to additional communities? Disease spread is typically easier to control when cases are fewer in number and contained in a limited geographic area.
A nonscientific, political process for determining what is scientifically sound has not worked in the past and will not work now. Lysenkoism demonstrated that allowing politics to control the scientific process can halt or even reverse a nation's progress. Erratic funding would fundamentally undermine innovation and dramatically impair America's ability to address today's health challenges. The OMB proposal is currently open for public comment, and we urge our readers to express their concerns. When science becomes politicized, everyone loses.
Editor's note: The OMB proposal is available for public comment at https://www.regulations.gov/document/OMB-2026-0034 -0001/comment.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with the full text of this editorial at NEJM.org.
This editorial was published on June 15, 2026, at NEJM.org.
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMe2608017
Copyright Copyright (c) 2026 Massachusetts Medical Society.
* * *
June 12, 2026
Filed electronically via Regulations.gov
Honorable Russell Vought
Director, US Office of Management and Budget The White House
Re: OMB guidance governing federal grants and cooperative agreements Regulation Codifying Policies on Federal Financial Assistance, Revisions to 2 CFR 91 Fed. Reg. 32198 (May 29, 2026)
Extension of Comment Period to August 27 , 2026 Dear Director Vought:
The undersigned organizations across science, research, policy, and education come to you jointly to ask for a 45-day extension to the comment period for the proposed rule by the Office of Management and Budget to revise Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations, published on May 29, 2026. Presently, comments are due July 13, 2026 and we ask that on or before June 30, 2026 a Federal Register Notice is published extending the comment period to August 27, 2026.
The scope and impact of OMB's proposed rule is vast. The proposed rule amends 91 parts of Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations across 456 different sections of the regulations, adding 52 new subsections and fully restating 375 sections. The rule will impact the entirety of government grant-making across the United States. OMB itself says the revisions suggested would relate to over $179 billion of funds to small entities. In addition to these entities, NSF reports that $64 billion was spent in FY2024 at universities on R&D, much of it through grants and cooperative agreements. NIH allocated approximately $36.9 billion in extramural funding that same fiscal year. These are just examples of the small but important components of the approximately $1.2 trillion that the federal government spends via grants and cooperative agreements.1 A 45-day comment period is insufficient to allow completion of the multi-disciplinary analysis needed to provide useful feedback to OMB.
A 90-day period is warranted because this rule is complex and wide-ranging and never appeared on the Unified Agenda as a regulatory action being undertaken by OMB. The fact that no one in the regulated community was aware OMB was pursuing notice and comment rulemaking is evidenced in the fact that not one EO 12866 meeting was requested during the period this rule was under review at OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
Submission of substantive comments is fundamental to the rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act, which at its core is about enhancing public engagement in rulemaking for the purpose of ensuring agencies receive the most comprehensive information possible to solve problems for the American people.2 A fulsome and rational consideration of and response to data and evidence presented in public comments enables agencies to benefit when "situated knowledge" is shared as part of rulemaking efforts; in other words, public officials benefit from having access to knowledge that is widely dispersed among stakeholders.3
* * *
1 Parts of the proposed rule do not apply to the full $1.2 trillion in federal grant spending because there are exceptions for awards such as block grants, awards based on a statutory formula, and disaster-recovery grants, among other types of assistance.
2 84 Fed. Reg. 2139 at 2146-2148 (February 6, 2019).
* * *
"In particular, agencies need information from the industries they regulate, other experts, and citizens with situated knowledge of the field in order to understand the problems they seek to address, the potential regulatory solutions, their attendant costs, and the likelihood of achieving satisfactory compliance."4
Many of us actively take steps as organizations or through our members to ensure the United States has the capacity to engage in ongoing and vital efforts to make progress in critical sectors as well as emerging fields. Many of us have worked with successive administrations and Congress on issues essential to the nation's housing, energy, transportation, infrastructure, research and development, and healthcare systems, among others, that are regularly subject to federal grantmaking and cooperative agreements. Despite differences in approach, sector, and membership, each signatory has found it core to our mission to enhance the American innovation enterprise.
Executive Order 12866 states that agencies should "afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment on any proposed regulation." OMB envisions the proposed revisions of Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations will be a far-reaching reimagining of all forms of federal financial assistance. For a rule with these intended sweeping and comprehensive effects, a period of at least 90 days is needed in order for the comment period to be meaningful.
We value the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking and policy implementation process on the issues framed in the proposed rule, about which we care deeply, and appreciate your consideration of our request.
Respectfully,
ACA: The Structural Science Society
Academic Pediatric Association
Academy for Radiology & Biomedical Imaging Research
Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy
Academy of Physicians in Clinical Research
AcademyHealth
Acoustical Society of America
ACRE
Acterra: Action for a Healthy Planet
ADAP Advocacy Association
Afterschool Alliance
Alliance for Academic Internal Medicine (AAIM) Alliance for Aging Research
* * *
3 M. Sant'Ambrogio and G. Staszewski, Michigan State University, Public Engagement with Agency Rulemaking (Administrative Conference of the United States, November 19, 2018) at p. 3.
4 Id. at p. 10.
* * *
Alliance for Data Science and AI
Alliance for Learning Innovation (ALI)
Alliance of Nurses for Healthy Environments
Alliance to Cure Cavernous Malformation
ALS Association
American Academy of Allergy, Asthma & Immunology
American Academy of Emergency Medicine
American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine
American Academy of Neurology
American Academy of Nursing
American Academy of Pediatrics
American Alliance of Museums
American Anthropological Association
American Association for Anatomy
American Association for Cancer Research
American Association for Dental, Oral, and Craniofacial Research
American Association for Public Opinion Research
American Association for State and Local History
American Association for the Advancement of Science
American Association of Colleges of Nursing
American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy (AACP)
American Association of Geographers
American Association of Immunologists
American Association of Nurse Practitioners
American Association of Physicists in Medicine
American Association of Physics Teachers
American Astronomical Society
American Brain Coalition
American Chemical Society
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists
American College of Physicians
American College of Radiology
American Educational Research Association
American Federation for Aging Research
American Gastroenterological Association
American Geophysical Union (AGU)
American Geriatrics Society
American Heart Association
American Industrial Hygiene Association
American Institute for Medical and Biological Engineering (AIMBE)
American Institute of Biological Sciences
American Institute of Ultrasound in Medicine (AIUM)
American Mathematical Society
American Meteorological Society
American Musicological Society
American Nurses Association
American Occupational Therapy Association
American Oil Chemists' Society (AOCS)
American Ornithological Society
American Pediatric Society (APS)
American Pharmacists Association
American Physical Society
American Physiological Society
American Phytopathological Society
American Political Science Association
American Psychological Association
American Public Gardens Association
American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology
American Society for Bone and Mineral Research
American Society for Cell Biology
American Society for Clinical Investigation
American Society for Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics
American Society for Gravitational and Space Research
American Society for Nutrition
American Society for Pathobiology
American Society for Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics (ASPET) American Society of Agronomy
American Society of Biomechanics
American Society of Civil Engineers
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists
American Society of Hematology
American Society of Nephrology
American Society of Plant Biologists
American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene (ASTMH)
American Speech-Language-Hearing Association (ASHA)
American Statistical Association
American Studies Association
American Thoracic Society
American Vacuum Society (AVS)
Americans for Medical Progress
Animal Behavior Society
Arkansas Immunization Action Coalition (Immunize Arkansas)
Arthritis Foundation
ASCP - Age Friendly Pharmacists and Pharmacies Asian American Scholar Forum
ASM
ASM International
Association for Academic Pathology (AAPath)
Association for Psychological Science
Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology (ARVO)
Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
Association for the Sciences of Limnology and Oceanography
Association for Women in Science
Association of American Cancer Institutes
Association of Art Museum Directors
Association of Biomolecular Resource Facilities (ABRF)
Association of Children's Museums
Association of Environmental Engineering and Science Professors
Association of Family Medicine Residency Directors
Association of Maternal & Child Health Programs
Association of Medical School Pediatric Department Chairs
Association of Population Centers
Association of Public Health Nurses
Association of Research Libraries
Association of Science and Technology Centers
Association of Science Museum Directors
Association of University Presses
Autoimmune Association
Big Cities Health Coalition
Biocom
Biophysical Society
Botanical Society of America
California Botanical Society
California Institute for Regenerative Medicine
California River Watch
California State University
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids
Campus Research Computing Consortium
Cancer Nation
Caregiver Action Network
Center for Open Science
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
Cereals & Grains Association
Children's Cancer Cause
Children's Hospital Association
Clean Energy Business Network
Climate Psychiatry Alliance
Coalition for Academic Scientific Computation
Coastal and Estuarine Research Federation
College for Creative Studies
Computing Research Association
Concord Consortium
Conference of Boston Teaching Hospitals
Council of Medical Specialty Societies
Crohn's & Colitis Foundation
Crop Science Society of America
CSM Advising LLC
CT Public Health Association
Cure Alzheimer's Fund
Cure HHT
Cushman Foundation for Foraminiferal Research, Inc.
Dana-Farber Cancer Institute
debra of America
Defend Public Health
DefendResearch
Digital Promise Global
Ecological Society of America
EdTrust
Education Reform Now
Emory University
Endocrine Society
Entomological Society of America
EveryLife Foundation for Rare Diseases
Evidence Advocacy Center
Federation of American Scientists
Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology (FASEB)
Federation of Associations in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (FABBS)
Fight Colorectal Cancer
Fox Chase Cancer Center -- Temple Health
Friedreich's Ataxia Research Alliance (FARA)
Genetics Society of America
Geological Society of America
George Washington University Cancer Center German Studies Association
Gerontological Society of America
Global Health Technologies Coalition (GHTC)
GreenLatinos
HealthHIV
Heart Failure Society of America
Helminthological Society of Washington
HIV Medicine Association
Huntsman Cancer Institute
IEEE-USA
Illinois Public Health Association
Immune Deficiency Foundation
Infectious Diseases Society of America
INFORMS
Institute for Progress
International Society for Stem Cell Research International
Zebrafish Society (IZFS)
Internet2
Iowa Public Health Association
Lasker Foundation
Latino Caucus for Public Health (APHA)
Lewy Body Dementia Association
Lupus and Allied Diseases Association, Inc.
Massachusetts Public Health Alliance
Materials Research Society
Mathematical Association of America
MaxRevenue
ME/CFS San Diego
MEAction Maryland
MEAction North Carolina
MEAction, California
Minerals, Metals & Materials Society
Minnesota Public Health Association
Montana Climate and Health
NAPCRG
National Alliance for Caregiving
National Association for Biomedical Research (NABR)
National Association of City Transportation Officials
National Association of School Nurses
National Ataxia Foundation
National Consumers League
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM)
National Council on Public History
National Education Association
National Foundation for Infectious Diseases
National Health Council
National Hispanic Health Foundation
National Humanities Alliance
National Low Income Housing Coalition
National Medical Association
National Organization for Dental Immunizers
National Postdoctoral Association
National School Boards Association
National Women's Law Center
National Women's Studies Association
Natural Resources Defense Council
Natural Science Collections Alliance
NDRI
Nebraska Cures
New America's Future of Work & Innovation Economy Program
NJME/CFS Association
North American Vascular Biology Organization
Oceanography Society
Optica, Advancing Optics and Photonics Worldwide Organization of Biological Field Stations
Partnership for Public Service
Pediatric Nurse Practitioner House Calls
Pediatric Policy Council
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Planetary Society
Plug In America
Population Association of America
Post-Acute and Long-Term Care Medical Association
Prevent Blindness
Psychonomic Society
Pulmonary Fibrosis Foundation
reDesignED
Research!America
RetireSafe
Salem Oaks Consulting
San Diego Natural History Museum
San Jose State University
Sanford Burnham Prebys Medical Discovery Institute
Seismological Society of America
SERP Institute
Shock Society
Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Honor Society
Social Science Research Council
Society for Advancement of Chicanos/Hispanics and Native American in Science
Society for Applied Anthropology
Society For Biomaterials
Society for Birth Defects Research and Prevention
Society for Developmental Biology
Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine
Society for Glycobiology
Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
Society for Industrial Microbiology and Biotechnology
Society for Laboratory Automation and Screening
Society for Leukocyte Biology
Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine
Society for Neuroscience
Society for Pediatric Radiology
Society for Pediatric Research (SPR)
Society for Personality and Social Psychology
Society for Range Management
Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD)
Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues
Society for the Study of Amphibians and Reptiles
Society for the Study of Evolution
Society for Women's Health Research
Society of Behavioral Medicine
Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry of North America (SETAC North America)
Society of Herbarium Curators
Society of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging
Society of Systematic Biologists
Society of Teachers of Family Medicine
Software & Information Industry Association
Soil Science Society of America
Solve M.E.
SPARC
Speculative Technologies
Spina Bifida Association
St. Jude Children's Research Hospital
Stand Up for Science
STEM Education Coalition
Study Group
T2M Advisors
TERC, Inc.
Texas Behavioral Science and Policy Institute
Third Way
TSC Alliance
UCLA
Union of Concerned Scientists
University of Colorado
University of Colorado Boulder
University of Colorado Anschutz
University of Kentucky Markey Cancer Center
University of Oregon
University of Rochester
Up for Growth Action
Vision Zero Network
West Sonoma County Alliance
Wildlife Society
Wistar Institute
Women's Health Institute
Woodley Park Institute
* * *
The Bethesda Declaration One Year Later
Continuing Harms to the NIH Mission
Developed by 74 concerned current and former NIH staff in their personal capacities, including anonymous contributors and:
1. Kathryn Adams;
2. Cara Anjos Breeden, MLS;
3. Wen-Ying Sylvia Chou, PhD, MPH;
4. Anna Culbertson BS, BA;
5. Susan M. Czajkowski, PhD;
6. Lee E. Eiden, PhD;
7. Marc S. Ernstoff, MD;
8. Hannah Evans, MS;
9. Benjamin Feldman, PhD;
10. Lori Frank, PhD;
11. Nina G. Friedman, BA;
12. Elizabeth Ginexi, MA, PhD;
13. Dave Gutekunst, PhD;
14. Kaitlyn Hajdarovic, PhD;
15. Andrea Horvath Marques, MD, MPH, PhD;
16. Sammy Katta, PhD;
17. Theresa Kim, PhD, MS;
18. Sarah C. Kobrin, PhD, MPH;
19. Rosa Lafer-Sousa, PhD;
20. Amber Lockridge, PhD;
21. Saul Malozowski, MD, PhD, MBA;
22. Mollie Manier, PhD;
23. Matthew Manion, PhD;
24. Vanessa C. McMains, PhD;
25. Ian Morgan, PhD;
26. Jenna M Norton, PhD, MPH;
27. Amy C. Palin, PhD;
28. Vani Pariyadath, PhD;
29. Rui C Pereira de Sa, PhD;
30. Shiv Prasad, PhD;
31. Christa Reynolds, MA;
32. Gina Roussos, PhD;
33. Katrina J. Serrano, PhD;
34. Siddharth Shenoy, PhD
35. Nina Silverberg, PhD;
36. Janine M. Simmons, MD, PhD;
37. Asha Storm, PhD;
38. Joanna Szczepanik, PhD;
39. Jennifer L. Troyer, PhD
Introduction
Founded in 1887, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is still the world's largest funder of biomedical research after more than a century. Currently, NIH has been at the forefront of scientific and technological advances that meaningfully improve the health of Americans and people across the globe: novel medications that prevent transmission of HIV; innovative technologies like CRISPR gene editing, AI-driven drug design, digital health technologies, and tissues on a chip; life-saving therapeutics for cystic fibrosis; a vaccine to prevent cancer; and cutting-edge treatments for diabetes, depression, Alzheimer's disease and obesity, among many others.
For over half a century, these NIH-led scientific advances have been fueled by consistent public funding from Congress, expert input from scientists, and global recruitment of top talent.
Economists estimate that every dollar invested in NIH returns $2.57 in economic activity per year and more than $8.38 in private sector research and development over 8 years.
Last year, NIH Director Dr. Jayanta Bhattacharya released scientific priorities that claim to build on this success. Yet, Director Bhattacharya has repeatedly implemented policies and practices that not only undercut these stated priorities, but endanger the standing of the United States as a global leader in biomedical research.
One year ago, on June 9, 2025, we released the Bethesda Declaration, an open letter of concern to Director Bhattacharya, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., and Congress. Signed by more than 600 NIH staff and 32,000 external scientists, patients, and members of the general public, the Declaration raised concerns about harmful policies that undermine the NIH mission, waste public resources, compromise the ethical imperatives of our profession, and threaten the health of Americans and people across the globe. These concerns include i) the politicization of NIH-funded science; ii) the interruption of global collaboration; iii) the undermining of peer review; iv) capping infrastructure support that is critical to science; and v) cuts in mission-critical personnel.
We hoped our Declaration might engender policy changes to prevent harm, improve public health, and ensure appropriate stewardship of public funds. When Director Bhattacharya held a roundtable with Bethesda Declaration signers on July 21, 2025, we had some optimism that we might together correct some of the most egregious threats to NIH. Ultimately, however, Director Bhattacharya largely ignored the concerns raised in our declaration and discussed during the roundtable.
Today, on June 9, 2026, we provide an update to members of Congress and the public on the current status of NIH, one year after the Bethesda Declaration. The chaos of 2025 has been replaced with coordinated, systematic, institutionalized destruction in 2026. NIH policy directed by HHS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and implemented by Director Bhattacharya continues to flout ethical, statutory, and legal standards, including stipulations in the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S. Code Chapter 6A) for NIH to include diverse populations in research, address health disparities, conduct research related to the health of sexual and gender minority populations, and enhance workforce diversity. Our initial concerns have only deepened as we've seen the consequences of this administration's policies: a 24% decrease in new research funded by NIH in fiscal year (FY) 2025 compared to FY24; project terminations that have discarded investments in multi-year studies and disproportionately impacted early career investigators from minority racial, ethnic and gender groups; extreme staff shortages; and dramatic delays in research awards. A May 29, 2026, proposed rule on the Regulation for Federal Financial Assistance from the OMB promises a return to the chaos of early 2025, codifying into regulation the policies and practices that enabled these harms. Despite the clearly documented negative consequences of such policies, Director Bhattacharya continues to gaslight the scientific community and members of Congress, insisting these challenges are just "political noise."
In this report, we expand on and provide further evidence that the five initial concerns outlined in the Bethesda Declaration remain critically urgent. The concerns include:
* Concern 1: An anti-science agenda is disrupting research for health advances and cures
* Concern 2: Discriminatory policies are worsening disparities
* Concern 3: Ignoring ethical standards has put research participants and the public at risk
* Concern 4: An unstable research environment is undermining scientific advances and public trust
* Concern 5: Lost critical expertise is hindering the NIH mission
* Concern 6: Changing of policies without staff input is creating foreseeable damage
* Concern 7: Cumbersome and shifting processes are wasting resources and harming health
* Concern 8: Disruption of global research is endangering people in the United States and around the world
* Concern 9: A culture of fear and low morale is eroding scientific integrity
We remain committed to the NIH mission, the United States Constitution, and the health and wellbeing of the American public. We sincerely hope that by continuing to shine a light on the harmful policies of current NIH leadership, we can advance meaningful reforms that will enable us to carry out the NIH mission: "to seek and apply fundamental knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability."
Concern 1: An anti-science agenda is disrupting research for health advances and cures
Why It Matters
Health advances require stable, long-term investment across multiple sectors and phases of the scientific process. Good stewardship of this investment demands constant monitoring and mid-course correction. Scientific expertise guides the weight given to innovative ideas - neither overvaluing original concepts in the face of robust evidence to the contrary, nor ignoring them simply because they are novel.
To find this balance, NIH has traditionally relied on two layers of peer review combined with programmatic guidance and oversight:
* First level peer review: a merit-based review process involving external scientific experts. NIH's peer review process occurs at multiple levels. In the first level, external scientists, who have a strong record of scientific accomplishment and are approved by NIH staff in the Center for Scientific Review (CSR), volunteer their time and expertise to judge the scientific merit of proposed research projects based on long-standing, regulatorily defined review criteria (42 C.F.R. Sec. 52h).
* Programmatic review by highly trained, nonpartisan civil servant scientists with expert knowledge in their fields. These knowledgeable and experienced NIH scientific program staff are involved in the development of funding opportunities and funding recommendations. Specifically, program staff identify scientific gap areas where additional research is needed. They take input from external scientific advisory boards with relevant expertise (including patient advocates) as they develop funding opportunities to address identified research needs. They also make funding recommendations regarding applications in their area of expertise, informed substantially by the missions and strategic priorities of their NIH institute or center, scientific merit as judged independently by peer review, and scientific gaps and opportunities that guide NIH investment to improve public health. The funding recommendation process typically involves discussion among scientific program staff at the branch or division level, with Branch or Division Directors arbitrating the process and making final recommendations to the Institute or Center Director.
* Second level peer review: Advisory Council Review by working scientists and patient advocates. Each NIH institute works with a set of external scientific experts and individuals with lived experience, established through the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. Sec. 1009). Advisory Councils of scientific experts and community stakeholders guide programmatic decisions by NIH scientists, including development of funding opportunities and funding recommendations. The roles, requirements and functions of these advisory councils are defined in statute and regulation (42 U.S.C. Sec. 284a, 42 C.F.R. Sec. 52a and 42 C.F.R. Sec. 52h).
Historically, the checks provided by this thorough and considered process have largely curbed the interference of politically appointed non-experts, maintaining the stability and nonpartisan nature of scientific funding across changing political administrations. This stability is what has allowed scientists to do the long-term work required to develop treatments, optimize health, and save lives, positioning the United States as a world leader in biomedical research.
Currently, however, the system needs reinforcement. NIH is implementing policies that devalue scientific expertise in favor of politically motivated decision-making. NIH is circumventing merit-based peer review, expanding the number and power of political personnel in positions of decision-making power at NIH, reducing the civil servant protections that enable a nonpartisan civil service to honestly share their scientific judgement, failing to ensure appropriate leadership across the NIH institutes and centers, with 14 of 27 directorships unfilled, and neglecting or replacing scientific advisory councils.
Devaluing scientific expertise not only breaks the long-established trust that researchers had in the federal science funding structure, but also erodes the American public's trust in science.
Undermining peer review with a partisan, anti-science agenda wastes time and resources, shifts investments toward political allies rather than the most meritorious candidates, and damages the NIH's ability to support science that will improve the health of all Americans.
Examples
Grant terminations and political review undercut evaluations of scientific merit. Every grant funded by the NIH undergoes multiple levels of extensive and rigorous peer review involving external and internal scientists. In recent decades, research applications are typically only funded when they score within the top 20%, with few, unique exceptions. In early 2025, a small team of political appointees undermined this extensive, rigorous and transparent process by abruptly terminating ongoing science. Initially, these terminations were carried out by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). But by April 2025, orders from Director Bhattacharya and Deputy Director Matthew J. Memoli compelled NIH civil servants to terminate existing grants. NIH terminated 5,522 grants, even though they had been deemed meritorious by the rigorous and competitive review process. NIH terminated grants without regard to the content, quality, progress, or potential health impact of the science. Instead, terminations were based on alleged discrimination supposedly committed by the grantee institution or simply the presence of words or concepts that political leaders disliked. While terminations have become far less frequent, the threat of termination persists. All awards now must include a statement that the grant can be terminated based on misalignment with "agency priorities" that actually refer to terms deemed objectionable by the current administration. The context of how those terms are used does not matter. The existence of such terms in an application matters. Thus, grantees are compelled to comply with censorship from the Department of Health and Human Services and NIH, resulting in alteration of studies deemed important, rigorous, and feasible by peer review. Currently, practices controlled by the Office of Extramural Research (OER) within the NIH Office of the Director subject program staff and external investigators to a discriminatory and cumbersome screening and "renegotiation" process. NIH leadership has justified these acts by establishing the ill-defined concept of "Gold Standard Science" and then claiming that any research project that doesn't align with the administration's political priorities does not meet the standard. The process is reminiscent of how the tobacco industry weaponized "sound science" to undermine research linking cigarettes to cancer.
New policies undermine the first level of peer review. Following an Executive Order from President Trump that suggested political appointees could override peer review, Director Bhattacharya issued his "Unified Funding Strategy," instructing NIH institutes to reduce the influence of peer review scores and expert feedback on funding decisions. The recent OMB proposed rule goes further, seeking to codify the minimization of peer review into regulations that carry the weight of law. NIH will soon seek public comment on a proposal to replace numerical peer review scores with a binning system that would cluster applications into three bins: "most competitive" (top 25%), "competitive" (26-50%), and "not discussed" (bottom 50% or unscored). The peer review score would be calculated, but withheld from program staff, Advisory Councils, institute and center leadership, and applicants, making a top-scoring first percentile grant indistinguishable from a grant at the 25th percentile. While data do suggest that scores within tight ranges may not reflect meaningful differences in science quality, binning scores across such broad ranges is not well supported by evidence and has not been piloted inside NIH. This system will remove valuable information from the peer review process, reduce transparency in funding decisions, and enable funneling of resources to NIH decision-makers' more favored pet projects, even if they are not deemed scientifically meritorious by peer review.
Diminished roles of external scientific advisory boards reduce oversight. To ensure NIH funding decisions are scientifically sound, advisory committee members must demonstrate integrity, be free from conflicts of interest, and have appropriate expertise. During the time-intensive process of appointing advisory committee members, NIH staff make every effort to ensure the committee not only has necessary scientific expertise but also is representative of the nation as a whole. Despite the critical importance of these committees, current NIH leadership has allowed the membership of many institute Advisory Boards or Councils to dwindle. Because official concurrence from an Advisory Council legally requires a quorum, this poses a serious threat to the ability of NIH ICs to award grants at all. In addition, Director Bhattacharya completely disbanded the long-running Advisory Council to the Director. The NIH similarly dismissed all 28 members of the National Cancer Institute's Board of Scientific Advisors, which for decades reviewed research and education projects. Other institutes abruptly removed individual members from Boards of Scientific Advisors, with dismissals primarily affecting non-U.S. citizens, women, people from racial and ethnic minority groups, and scientists focusing on topics disliked by the administration. Recent appointments to these Councils, such as Kristine Blanche, wife of Acting Attorney General and former Trump lawyer Todd Blanche, raise concerns about partisan cronyism.
Notices of funding opportunity (NOFOs) are delayed by political review. Notices of funding opportunity are an essential tool for NIH to invite research applications addressing emerging or understudied research areas. Before publication, NOFOs undergo rigorous review by scientific program staff, institute and center leadership, and Advisory Councils. Prior to 2025, NIH typically released more than 700 NOFOs each year. As of March 25, halfway through fiscal year 2026, NIH released just 17. This decrease is due to the insertion of new layers of political review by NIH, HHS, and OMB, as well as OER directives limiting the number of NOFOs allowed. In some cases, notices drafted in January 2025 have yet to be released, because they are still awaiting political approval or political appointees have denied them. Having very few NOFOs delays opportunities to advance cutting-edge science and has forced NIH staff to choose between disrupting long-running programs that provide critical research services to the community or extending these programs without competition to ensure service delivery.
A culture of fear silences scientific input from NIH staff. NIH now suffers from a culture of fear and low morale as a result of threats to and retaliation against civil servant staff, as described in Concern 9. This has constrained the ability of NIH staff to deliver accurate and appropriate scientific feedback or highlight evidence to NIH leadership that conflicts with current Administration priorities. NIH staff fear will only escalate as NIH begins to transition career civil servant staff to career/policy designations that make their employment "at will," as these changes enable politically motivated staff dismissals.
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(Continues with Part 2 of 3)
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Original text here: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ginexi-Written-Testimony.pdf
Health Research Scientist Ginexi Testifies Before House Oversight & Government Reform Committee (Part 2 of 3)
WASHINGTON, July 17 -- The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets released the following testimony by Elizabeth Ginexi, health research scientist and former scientific program official at the National Institutes of Health, from a June 30, 2026, hearing entitled "Mind Control and Accountability: Uncovering the Truth of the CIA's MKULTRA Project":
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(Continued from Part 1 of 3)
Recommendations
* Restore and bolster the outputs of first-level peer review at NIH wherein expert panels impartially deliberate on the scientific merits ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets released the following testimony by Elizabeth Ginexi, health research scientist and former scientific program official at the National Institutes of Health, from a June 30, 2026, hearing entitled "Mind Control and Accountability: Uncovering the Truth of the CIA's MKULTRA Project": * * * (Continued from Part 1 of 3) Recommendations * Restore and bolster the outputs of first-level peer review at NIH wherein expert panels impartially deliberate on the scientific meritsof grant applications by 1) maintaining the availability of numeric scores, 2) ensuring that any binning systems provide sufficient levels of granularity and are piloted prior to broadscale implementation, and 3) ensuring funding decisions reflect input from peer review.
* Safeguard the input of NIH scientific staff with expertise in relevant research areas on funding decisions, ensuring that those who are charged with carrying out disbursement of public funds do so in a transparent, legal, and efficient manner. This will require an environment where staff can safely speak honestly. Sound funding decisions cannot realistically come from a few political appointees, even if they had relevant scientific expertise, as no individual alone can have the depth and breadth of expertise to cover all areas of health research within the NIH mission.
* Support academic freedom at NIH for both intramural and extramural research staff. Support the agency and authority of institute and center leadership and insulate these leaders from political winds. For individual intramural labs, support high-quality, curiosity-driven inquiries as reviewed by peer scientists. Deepening our understanding of biological processes through excellent fundamental research consistently leads to medical advances that arise from unexpected areas of inquiry. For extramural staff, ensure staff feel safe sharing their honest scientific judgement and aren't penalized for raising scientific concerns.
* Reconstitute and fully staff NIH Institutes' Scientific Advisory Councils and Boards. Such boards should include scientists and patient advocates from relevant fields who have been well vetted for potential conflicts of interest, which include close connections with members of the administration or related financial stakes.
* Restart and deepen collaboration with patients and other affected communities, such as people living with or at risk for relevant health conditions and their caregivers, to ensure NIH research supports patient-centered outcomes. This should include continued participation of relevant community members on advisory boards serving institute Advisory Councils, as well as community advisory boards to NIH-funded clinical studies.
* Ensure future grant terminations only occur when justified by scientific or ethical concerns, such as study futility, early determinations of efficacy, irreparably poor progress, unexpected participant harm, or investigator misconduct. Study terminations should not be allowed based on lack of alignment with politicized agency censoring set by any administration, as these will inevitably change every 4 to 8 years, creating whiplash in the scientific community and allowing completion of very few studies.
Concern 2: Discriminatory policies are worsening disparities Why It Matters
As the nation's premier health research institution, the NIH must remain accessible to the best scientists of every demographic group and address the health of all people in our country. This approach is supported by both U.S. law and scientific evidence.
* The law. Discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or another protected characteristic (including gender identity) remains unlawful in the United States under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Public Health Service Act, the foundational statute for the NIH, requires the NIH director to: encourage grantees to "utilize diverse study populations," develop a strategic plan that considers "biological, social, and other determinants of health that contribute to health disparities" and "encourage efforts to improve research related to the health of sexual and gender minority populations" (42 U.S.C. Sec. 6A). The 21st Century Cures Act further mandates that the NIH Director shall "develop, modify, or prioritize policies, as needed, within the National Institutes of Health to promote opportunities for new researchers and earlier research independence, such as policies to increase opportunities for new researchers to receive funding, enhance training and mentorship programs for researchers, and enhance workforce diversity" (Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, 2016).
* The evidence. Variation is central to health research, providing the necessary differences to create knowledge through comparison and ensure that research findings are generalizable. Excluding diversity along any axis (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, ability, geography) removes the opportunity to learn from differences and makes findings less relevant and applicable in the real world. People from racial and ethnic minority groups, rural populations, LGBTQIA+ people, under-resourced communities, and people with
disabilities often experience social and structural barriers, such as transportation challenges, inflexible work hours, lack of childcare, and mistrust driven by historical and present-day traumas. These barriers contribute to poor health outcomes and limit participation in research to improve those outcomes. Including diverse populations in research requires intentional and focused recruitment, particularly of small populations, to study and overcome these barriers. Similarly, addressing health disparities requires research that both explicitly focuses on populations that experience worse health outcomes and considers the contribution of social and structural challenges. Finally, peer-reviewed research shows that diverse teams of people with different backgrounds outperform uniform teams, as they are more likely to question assumptions, reveal blindspots, and generate innovation. This perhaps explains why diverse teams publish more frequently and receive more citations. Prior to 2025, NIH policies supported broadening the NIH workforce by encouraging the mentorship, participation, and inclusion of people from diverse backgrounds, but never by determining funding based on any individual characteristic.
Despite the evidence in support of diverse study populations and researchers, under Director Bhattacharya, NIH has implemented policies that weaponize a poorly defined "DEI" (diversity, equity, and inclusion) label to eliminate a broad range of science-related efforts the administration finds convenient to target: inclusive study participation, minority health and health disparities research, and scientific workforce diversity.
Examples
A discriminatory screening tool is censoring NIH-funded research. Despite his oft-repeated assertion that "there are no banned words," NIH Director Jay Bhattacharya has mandated a screening and "renegotiation" process across NIH that is applied to every grant or application prior to receiving its first or subsequent installment of NIH funding. This screening process is being applied retroactively to grants that have already gone through a rigorous multi-level peer and programmatic review process in which they were evaluated as being innovative, scientifically meritorious, relevant to the health of the public, and worthy of funding. There are several hundreds of words being screened in this process. Funded projects affected by "renegotiation" have often been producing results for several years. The "renegotiation" process involves a "computational text analysis tool" that screens grants for "terms that may potentially be associated with misalignment with the agency's priorities." Any grants containing "misaligned" terms must undergo manual review by NIH program staff who must provide written justification for inclusion of the terms or engage in "renegotiation" with investigators and grantee institutions to remove the terms prior to initial or continued funding. On June 16, 2025, Reagan-appointed U.S. District Judge William G. Young issued a ruling on earlier, similar keyword-based screening processes at NIH, calling them an "effort to rubber stamp an ideological purge" and declaring: "I am hesitant to draw this conclusion, but I have an unflinching obligation to draw it - that this represents racial discrimination. And discrimination against America's LGBTQ community," "I've sat on this bench now for 40 years. I've never seen government racial discrimination like this," and "My duty is to call it out."
Notably, the set of "misaligned" terms is not provided to the scientific community, nor is it provided to the majority of scientific program staff (including Program Officers and Grants Management Officials) within NIH. The set of terms has also evolved over time. NIH staff have compiled every "misaligned" term flagged by the tool between fall 2025 and early 2026 across four NIH institutes and provided the list to Congress. Terms the administration considered to "potentially be associated with misalignment with the agency's priorities" during that period included "African American," "Hispanic American," and "Asian American." (Notably, no grants were flagged for including "white American" or "European American.") Grants are also flagged for terms such as "gender," "health disparities," "diverse," "racial/ethnic minority," and "Latinx." These terms directly contradict the framework for federal public health programs and services set for NIH by Congress. In some cases, NIH scientific program officers are able to successfully justify these terms, but often their expert opinions are rejected. In addition, the heightened scrutiny introduces delays that disproportionately affect health disparities research and workforce diversity programs, each of which is required in NIH's foundational statute. The screening process and threat of award termination or delay often pushes the scientific community to self-censor their research for fear of being caught up in this discriminatory and cumbersome process. Concern about getting flagged in this screening process has caused some scientists to avoid health disparities research and programs designed to train the diverse workforce needed for excellent science and required by law.
Civil rights law is weaponized against research on racial and ethnic minority populations.
On February 10, 2025, a memo from then Acting Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services Dorothy Fink stated: "The Department of Health and Human Services has an obligation to ensure that taxpayer dollars are used to advance the best interests of the government. This includes avoiding the expenditure of federal funds on programs, or with contractors or vendors, that promote or take part in diversity, equity, or inclusion ('DEI') initiatives or any other initiatives that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or another protected characteristic." As a direct result of this memo, and in the absence of repeatedly requested clarification on policy from HHS, the NIH Director, and OER, some institutes and centers systematically delayed funding for any grants that focused on racial and ethnic minority populations, regardless of the scientific justification. To receive funding, grants were required to expand their study populations, even if the associated costs could not be justified by the scientific question or health concern. These delays lasted throughout fiscal year 2025, extending into 2026. While this hold has been lifted in some institutes, it continues in others, and a year of confusion and misguided policies has impeded or interfered with the scope of studies focused on health conditions specific to people of color.
Termination of research addressing health disparities and health equity. In 2025, NIH terminated more than 2,700 grants addressing health disparities and/or the health of racial, ethnic, and gender minority populations. The U.S. District Court found the processes that led to these terminations illegal, a decision that the Supreme Court declined to overturn. While terminations in 2026 are infrequent, more than 1,000 grants terminated in 2025 have not been reinstated. The threat of terminations remains present, driving compliance with the discriminatory grant screening and censorship processes that disproportionately exclude racial, ethnic and gender minority populations from research (described in the prior section), and largely mirrors the processes the courts already found unlawful.
Termination of research conducted internationally. As discussed in Concern 8, the NIH suddenly and retroactively changed policies regarding foreign research collaboration in 2025, leading to the unexpected termination or disruption of ongoing clinical trials conducted abroad.
Research participants, who had generously participated in science to help the health of others around the globe, were abruptly removed from medical protocols or in some cases left with unmonitored devices in their bodies in complete disregard for their safety. When studies were conducted in regions lacking robust public health infrastructure, these participants were left with little recourse. This was a gross violation of ethical research standards (as discussed in Concern 3), often minimized simply because it happened beyond our borders.
Termination of research training programs designed to broaden the research workforce.
Based on compelling evidence demonstrating the advantages of a diverse research workforce, and as directed by Congress in the 21st Century Cures Act (Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, 2016), NIH developed multiple training programs to attract meritorious scientists from a variety of backgrounds. These included programs such as the Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award (NRSA) Individual Predoctoral Fellowship to Promote Diversity in Health-Related Research, which supported individualized, mentored research training of predoctoral students, and the Maximizing Opportunities for Scientific and Academic Independent Careers (MOSAIC) program, which provided 5-year awards to support postdoctoral scientists transitioning into independent faculty roles. Importantly, both programs awarded grants to highly qualified applicants identified through rigorous competition. Neither program limited participation based on any protected characteristic (e.g., race, ethnicity, sex, gender). In 2025, NIH not only ended these programs but also terminated all active grants funded under these programs, regardless of the merit, progress, or scope of the science. In the case of many NRSA awardees, NIH terminated awards to scientists from underrepresented backgrounds whose applications had received better scores than those of retained awardees who had applied via the standard pathway. In doing so, NIH cut off active health research, leaving trainees without a clear path forward in science and increasing the likelihood of these talented individuals leaving science.
Recommendations
* Ensure no groups, regardless of background or identity, are excluded from the benefits of NIH research. NIH research is funded by taxpayer dollars, and thus it should benefit all Americans, including those from racial, ethnic, sexual, and gender minority backgrounds. In addition, Green Card holders (lawful permanent residents), immigrants in the United States on work visas, and the majority of undocumented immigrants all pay taxes and should be included in federally funded research. Yet, the policies and practices of this administration have systematically excluded these groups from NIH-funded research. As contributing members of the American public, these groups deserve to participate in, and benefit from, NIH research.
* Stop the discriminatory censorship of NIH grants. The internal "alignment" screening process must be stopped. In addition, the NIH Director must publicly acknowledge the harm caused by these discriminatory practices, apologize to those who have been excluded from research, and confirm that research will no longer be screened and censored based on discriminatory keywords. Absent a clear apology and commitment, the research community may continue to self-censor their own research.
* Ensure all research participants, regardless of demographic background, identity or location, receive the respect, safety, and dignity they deserve for generously donating their time and bodies to research, as also noted in Concerns 3 and 8.
* Ensure NIH meets its statutory obligation to broaden participation in the research workforce.
* External research suggests a disproportionate impact of these terminations on groups already underrepresented in science. NIH should assess how grant terminations have affected the demographic makeup of NIH-funded researchers, especially early career investigators. These data should then be shared with the public.
* NIH should reinstate prior programs and develop new programs to address persistent racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, regional, sexual orientation, and gender disparities in the research workforce, as mandated by Congress. Congress should enact measures to ensure these programs are not targeted again by future politically motivated actions.
* Ensure NIH meets its statutory obligation to address health disparities and the health of sexual and gender minority populations, including consideration of social determinants of health, as mandated by Congress. NIH should ensure that new agency priorities do not undermine those established and maintained by Congress for NIH.
Concern 3: Ignoring ethical standards has put research participants and the public at risk
Why It Matters
The early history of science was fraught with ethical violations and abuses of research participants. For example, beginning in 1932, the U.S. Public Health Service launched an observational study of untreated syphilis in Black men in Tuskegee, Alabama, without providing informed consent or disclosing diagnoses. They continued the study through 1972, well after treatment was available, causing participants to needlessly suffer neurological consequences and death, their wives to become infected, and their children to be born with congenital syphilis.
This history demands that scientists remain constantly vigilant for such violations.
Motivated by these atrocities, the U.S. National Research Act commissioned the Belmont Report in 1974, which provides the foundational ethical principles and guidelines for research with human participants still used today. Adherence to the principles of the Belmont Report is codified for HHS and NIH research under 45 C.F.R. 46, also known as the Common Rule.
These principles include:
* Respect for persons, which requires researchers to treat individuals as autonomous agents capable of self determination and to protect people with diminished autonomy,
* Beneficence, the obligation to avoid harm while maximizing potential benefits and minimizing possible risks, and
* Justice, to ensure fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research.
Director Bhattacharya's NIH has violated these fundamental ethical standards, undermining the credibility of science and breaching trust with research participants and the public. Repairing this trust could take decades.
Examples
Abrupt clinical study disruptions created ethical issues of unprecedented scope.
Beginning in February 2025, the Trump administration began terminating NIH research studies without warning. While termination of clinical trials is sometimes necessary, ethically justifiable reasons are typically limited to situations when preliminary study data reveal unexpected risks to participant safety, efficacy of the intervention, or futility of the study. Such terminations are also typically planned in advance, based on predetermined analyses, with clear expectations for safely closing down the study. Rather than adhering to these ethical standards, NIH prioritized political ideology by terminating 383 trials affecting more than 74,000 participants in 2025. The initial spate of terminations are widely attributed to DOGE, but the terminations continued under the leadership of NIH Director Dr. Bhattacharya, often at the explicit direction of Deputy Director Dr. Memoli, despite objections from NIH scientific and clinical staff. While some trials were reinstated under court order, they experienced lengthy disruptions. Many were not covered by the court ruling and remain canceled. Beyond terminations, many clinical studies were delayed for months due to uncertainty regarding "alignment with agency priorities" such as the presence of censored words or studies being conducted internationally, creating study disruptions. These terminations and delays compromised the principles of the Belmont report and, therefore, violated federal research regulations. Terminated studies, including clinical trials, were initially allowed no time or funding to ethically close out, safely disenroll participants, or follow through on commitments to participants. After months of harm, NIH finally changed policy to allow terminated studies to request costs to support an orderly study closeout. However, the damage caused by abrupt trial discontinuation and disruption was entirely foreseen by NIH staff and should never have occurred. These thoughtless terminations and delays created significant ethical violations, including:
* Research participants and the public were put at unnecessary risk. When studies were abruptly terminated or held for months, research teams were left without funding to provide continued care required by participants, such as tapering patients off medicines or monitoring implanted devices. Terminated or delayed studies were often based in countries that lacked the public health infrastructure to absorb the care of these study participants without NIH collaborations and funding. In at least one case, the indefinite delay of a study on multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (TB) put the study team's ability to continue antibiotic treatment at risk, potentially triggering further antibiotic resistance.
* Altered risk-benefit balance, as social value decreased and risk increased. A reasonable risk-benefit ratio is central to ethical and regulatory approval of research.
This consideration may also be a primary factor for participants when they decide to join a study. Study disruptions cause incomplete data collection, making it impossible to fully answer the original research question(s) or fully realize the benefit of the research. Thus, the clinical trial disruptions decreased the social value of the study, while simultaneously placing participants at greater risk.
* Informed consent undermined. Study disruptions also conflict with commitments made to participants during the informed consent process, violating the respect for persons central to the ethical paradigms of science. Informed consent documents explain to participants how they can expect to be treated in the study. The informed consent guides their decision making process for joining the study. These unnecessary study disruptions forced research teams to shirk the commitments made to participants in informed consent documents, breaching participant trust.
* Forced destruction of patient samples. As a result of study terminations, institutions were left without funding to support the storage of human tissue samples. When a participant donates tissue for research, they expect their contribution will advance scientific knowledge and benefit fellow patients. Causing the premature destruction of tissue samples donated for research through study termination undermines the participant's altruistic intent and stymies scientific progress.
* Erosion of trust. Decisions to terminate studies were made without consulting study teams, undermining ethical principles of collaborative partnership and affecting the research community's trust in NIH. Many NIH clinical studies are conducted in collaboration with members of the relevant patient community, who may serve on study advisory boards or act as members of the study team. In these cases, the erosion of trust in NIH may extend to community partners. Indeed, a group of community research partners described their reaction to a termination letter stating that research programs like theirs "are antithetical to scientific inquiry, do nothing to expand our knowledge of living systems, provide low returns on investment and do not enhance or lengthen life or reduce illness." The community partners said: "The majority of the patients on our [community advisory] board interpreted this message to mean: 'Your life does not matter to us.'"
Termination of clinical center staff continues to disrupt patient care and research. Known as "the House of Hope," the NIH Clinical Center is the nation's largest hospital devoted only to research, previously attracting top research talent from around the globe. The Clinical Center focuses on trailblazing clinical research, including developing treatments where none exist, and diagnosing and treating rare or previously unknown diseases and conditions. The Clinical Center requires top-tier clinicians to support such unique and complex care needs. As a result of research interference (see Concern 1) and demoralizing working conditions (see Concern 9), world-class clinical research investigators, enormously talented staff, and patient care leaders are fleeing in droves. Many other staff, including essential nursing staff, were lost to reductions in force (RIF), probationary terminations, and mandated 35% contract cuts across NIH. The losses have become critical and threaten the hospital's ability to operate and provide high-quality care. Tests and results are delayed due to a lack of staff. These breaches in care represent significant ethical concerns, putting patients at risk of adverse outcomes.
Recommendations
* Ensure all current and future NIH policy changes prioritize the health and safety of research participants and the public over political considerations and/or speed of implementation. Prior to initiating policy changes that will affect the conduct of studies that include human participants, NIH should carry out and publish a thorough ethics review that considers the policy's impact on respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.
* Address Clinical Center staff shortages to ensure patient wellbeing and continuity of research. To appropriately staff the Clinical Center, the NIH must: 1) remove contract cost limits to enable the hiring of trained nursing staff, 2) boost staff morale by acknowledging the chaos of the past 18 months and taking steps to repair the resulting harm, 3) reverse RIFs and probationary terminations.
* Rebuild trust with research and patient communities by acknowledging, taking ownership of, and apologizing for the harms to participants and patients caused by rapid implementation of policy changes without regard to participant safety and other central ethical considerations.
* Ensure all research participants, regardless of demographic background, identity or location, receive the respect, safety, and dignity they deserve for generously donating their time and bodies to research, as also noted in Concerns 2 and 8.
Concern 4: An unstable research environment is undermining scientific advances and public trust
Why It Matters
Instability and uncertainty are rampant across the NIH and the broader scientific ecosystem under Director Bhattacharya and Deputy Director Memoli. They have implemented radical, abrupt, and careless changes in policies related to funding opportunities, funding decisions, grant terminations, contracting, peer review, and staffing across every institute, position, and level in both intramural and extramural programs. Reduced funding, shifting policies, and political pressure hamper NIH and NIH-funded researchers. The United States faces dire consequences:
* Reduced trust in NIH and scientific institutions. To change policies abruptly and retroactively undermines the legitimacy of NIH. As discussed in Concern 3, this uncertainty has introduced risk to research participants, thereby damaging the public's trust in NIH. Terminating clinical studies without cause harms NIH's credibility as a steward of our nation's successful research enterprise, especially among vulnerable populations already underrepresented in research. This loss of goodwill further jeopardizes future participation in health research. Operating in a shifting landscape and under threats to their employment, NIH staff cannot effectively advise scientists on navigating NIH policies, breaking trusted relationships between program staff and the scientific community. Despite his stated desire to increase trust in science, Director Bhattacharya's actions (and inactions) have accomplished the opposite. Since Director Bhattacharya assumed his role, the public's trust in NIH has declined.
* Loss of current and future biomedical scientists. World-class scientists are leaving the country, no longer confident in the future of U.S. science. For investigators, reduced and delayed NIH spending has created a hypercompetitive funding environment that threatens the viability of their labs, impacting employment as well as scientific progress.
Funding constraints have also reduced the solvency of academic institutions, and universities have been forced to rescind offers of admission to graduate programs.
Funding instability disproportionately affects early career scientists as they grapple with reduced opportunities for training and few job openings. In a 2025 National Postdoctoral Association survey, more than 50% of 378 respondents reported their funding has been cut, 44% reported threats to their positions, 11% reported they had lost their jobs, and 11% reported salary or stipend freezes. Uncertainty in research funding has reached the private sector as well, with biotech and pharma losing federal grants and private investments.
* Future therapies that won't materialize. Funding uncertainty and reductions undermine long-term planning and momentum of successful research programs. Lack of support has forced U.S. scientists to reduce or close productive and promising research programs. In a 2026 survey of nearly 1,000 U.S. scientists, more than 40% reported canceling planned research. Although we will never know the scientific advances that could have occurred had research funding remained stable, projections suggest funding cuts could reduce development of treatments.
* A less-safe country. NIH science contributes to the Nation's safety. By undermining its scientific enterprise, the United States voluntarily and incomprehensibly cedes its national security, pandemic preparedness, biodefense, and ability to respond to public health emergencies.
Examples
Reduced spending of NIH appropriations heightens funding uncertainty. Director Bhattacharya and Deputy Director Memoli, with direction from OMB Director Russell Vought, have systematically implemented processes that undermine NIH's ability to disburse congressionally appropriated funds for health research, including the following:
* New layers of justification and political approval for awarding NIH grants are required by NIH's Office of Extramural Research. Director Bhattacharya's Unified Funding Strategy forces NIH institutes to abandon transparent funding processes based on peer review and requires staff to continue debating the merit of already-funded outstanding grant applications.
* Disruption of grant payment systems. The administration infamously held hostage NIH grants and contracts that were already awarded at Columbia, Harvard, and other universities to coerce these institutions into adopting policies sharply restricting free speech and academic freedom. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) associates prevented these institutions from withdrawing funds for active grants by blocking disbursement in the government's Payment Management System.
* NIH mandated multiyear funding (MYF) for 50% of all new research dollars beginning in July 2025. Most NIH grant applications are submitted with two- to five-year budgets, which are typically paid on an annual basis pending programmatic review and approval.
With MYF, the entire cost of the two- to five-year award is paid in year 1. Because MYF obligates a larger portion of the annual budget to a single study, this rapid transition to MYF effectively shrank the NIH budget, contributing to a 24% decline in new research funded by NIH in 2025 compared to 2024 (as further discussed in Concern 6). This introduced crippling opportunity costs for new research and sowed chaos and uncertainty in the U.S. scientific workforce. While the fiscal year 2026 NIH appropriations bill constrains the use of MYF, the bill anchors MYF to fiscal year 2025 levels (about 39% of new research dollars), thus allowing comparable contraction of new research in fiscal year 2026 as we previously saw in fiscal year 2025.
* NIH cut 35% of all contract spending in response to Executive Order 14210 in February 2025. Small biotech businesses across the United States saw their congressionally mandated research and development contracts abruptly terminated.
NIH's intramural labs found themselves with insufficient staff to care for research animals or procure routine supplies. The 35% cut has introduced staffing shortages at the Clinical Center (as discussed in Concern 3), impeded critical scientific workshops, and interrupted access to critical resources for NIH laboratories.
The threat of research terminations impedes scientific progress. In 2025, NIH terminated 5,843 research grants, many for containing words or concepts the administration finds objectionable. These actions were justified post-hoc by new language in the Code of Federal Regulations (2 C.F.R. 200.340) that went into effect after many of the terminations occurred.
Subsequent NIH terms of award force individuals and grantee institutions to agree to termination if "an award no longer effectuates program goals or agency priorities." Previously, grant termination required evidence of ethical violations, scientific misconduct, or scientific justifications based on efficacy, futility or participant safety. Most fully funded NIH grants now remain vulnerable to full or partial termination on vague "administration priority" grounds. The threat of termination looms over all NIH grant recipients. Scientists concerned about potential termination struggle to effectively manage complex studies. This challenge is particularly acute in clinical trials, where the threat of termination introduces quandaries about the ethics of recruiting participants into a study that could be terminated on a whim (as discussed in Concern 3).
Inexperienced, unqualified and dishonest leadership breaks public trust. Historically, NIH leaders are selected for their scientific expertise, with only the Directors of the NIH and NCI nominated by the President. Director Bhattacharya, Deputy Director Memoli, and HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., have purged respected and experienced leaders across NIH, in some cases offering demotions disguised as "reassignments" or "details" and forcing leaders into retirement. Since January 2025, the brain drain has included Ms. Julie Berko and Drs. Monica Bertagnolli, Diana Bianchi, John Burklow, Francis Collins, Gary Gibbons, Eric Green, Amy Kelley, Walter Koroshetz, Clifford Lane, Michael Lauer, Jeanne Marrazo, Kathy Neuzil, Eliseo Perez-Stables, Tara Schwetz, Larry Tabak, Shannon Zenk, and many other trusted, respected, and eminent scientists and administrators.
None of them have been replaced with people of equivalent stature. Replacements such as Seanna Cranston, Rachel Riley, and James McElroy have arrived with minimal-to-no experience in science, health care, or health administration. Some NIH institutes installed politically aligned individuals in newly invented positions, such as Chief Operating Officer (COO) or Chief Science Advisor (CSA). In October 2025, during the government shutdown when hiring processes are normally on hold, NIH removed the Director of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences and replaced him with Kyle Walsh, the former roommate and friend of Vice President Vance. In at least one case, this directly increased waste, fraud, and abuse at NIH, at least temporarily. Within 3 months of his appointment, Eric Schnabel, NIH's COO plucked from the defense industry, was investigated and fired after NIH awarded a contract to an entity that employed his wife.
Newly appointed HHS and NIH leadership have actively eroded trust in NIH and American science and risked the well-being of the American public. HHS Secretary Kennedy has spread dangerous misinformation on public health, which has not been refuted by Dr. Bhattacharya in his roles as either the NIH Director nor Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Acting Director. In his first NIH staff town hall, while trying to rationalize major shifts in agency policy and practice, Director Bhattacharya accused NIH of causing the COVID-19 pandemic. He has continued to promote one-sided COVID-related conspiracy theories through the so-called Scientific Freedom Lecture Series, ironically described as promoting "the principles of gold standard science." Despite ample evidence on the impact that structural racism has on minority health and health disparities and validated approaches to measure the phenomenon, Director Bhattacharya continues to insist that structural racism is not a legitimate line of research.
Director Bhattacharya has also repeatedly obfuscated the state of NIH operations, providing dishonest representations to Congress and the public. In short, positions of authority and accountability at NIH are increasingly filled by people who lack the technical knowledge or integrity to make sound decisions about the future of health research in the United States.
Recommendations
* Ensure NIH staff are able to maximize the benefit of congressionally approved appropriations. NIH must lift mandates that have impeded the ability of its staff to ensure funding is spent in the best interests of the American taxpayer. NIH, HHS, and OMB should reduce layers of political oversight that undermine peer review standards and drastically slow down processes. NIH should rescind the multiyear funding mandate that reduces the power of the NIH budget. NIH should ensure that all of its operating divisions can individually justify contracts based on needs rather than an arbitrary cap. If NIH, HHS, and OMB fail to address these issues, Congress should enact meaningful guardrails to ensure the Article 1 Branch maintains the power of the purse, as directed by the U.S. Constitution.
* Ensure future grant terminations only occur when justified by scientific or ethical concerns, such as study futility, early determinations of efficacy, unexpected participant harm, or investigator misconduct, as noted in Concern 1. The threat of study terminations creates substantial uncertainty that impedes the ability of scientists to conduct their research.
* Introduce new policies with clarity, transparency and reasonable implementation time frames. Allow broad scientific input before proclaiming NIH priorities. Adhere to the Administrative Procedures Act and resume best practices of incorporating input from NIH scientists and the scientific community regarding research priorities, established through workshops, working groups, scientific conferences, requests for information (RFIs), and other methods. Thoughtfully examine existing mechanisms and processes before implementing new policies. Introduce new policies to NIH staff before public dissemination. Provide clear and rational guidance and processes to inform NIH staff and the public. Consult scientific experts and individuals with lived experience regarding: a) health disparities research, b) workforce diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility, c) COVID-19, long-COVID and immunizations, d) climate change, e) gender and intersex populations, f) foreign collaborations, and g) animal research. Recognize that specialists at NIH and elsewhere can bring their experience, not to discourage, but to enhance the success of, new initiatives.
* Develop and restore funding mechanisms that support training to counteract brain drain. NIH must act urgently to counteract the substantial reduction in opportunity for early career scientists. Allow program staff to develop and strengthen funding opportunities to support training of clinical and basic scientists. New programs must accomplish the goals and adequately replace previously successful training programs that were terminated. This will require flexibility in the development of funding opportunities, without arbitrary limitation in the number of opportunities. In addition, Congress must establish clear, meaningful, and binding protections against the disruption of these critical programs in the future.
Concern 5: Lost critical expertise is hindering the NIH mission
Why It Matters
As of April 2026, NIH lost over 4,400 employees since January 2025 through probationary firings, reductions in force (RIF), incentivized retirements, staff resigning in protest or under pressure, alongside usual departures, representing a reduction of roughly 20% to 25% of its total workforce. Contract terminations and non-renewals have further reduced capacity. In many cases, cuts were made arbitrarily and without consideration of how key job functions could still be accomplished by remaining staff. Cuts targeted critical areas such as workforce management, legislative affairs, communication, and ethics, among many others. NIH's expert workforce management staff identified, trained, and managed the scientific leaders of our nation. Communications staff helped share NIH research findings with the public. Ethics staff ensured adherence to ethical guidelines. Policy staff enabled effective communication with Congress. The reductions in mission-critical personnel has significantly impeded NIH's ability to achieve its stated priorities. The mission of NIH, to seek fundamental knowledge and apply that knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability, cannot be achieved without the foundation of the individuals who sustain it.
Specifically, the planned and actualized staff reductions led to losses in:
* Irreplaceable knowledge and institutional memory. RIFs removed entire offices and divisions from NIH, leaving little or no staff in certain mission areas. With almost no one remaining in these areas, certain areas of expertise and knowledge of past practices are no longer available to the agency
* Novel perspectives, emerging scientific expertise, and future leaders. The termination of probationary employees categorized as new hires or recently promoted personnel deprived NIH of scientists and related professionals capable of advancing both the agency and the wider scientific community. These dismissals effectively suppressed the introduction of novel ideas and innovative scientific methodologies.
Since recently promoted staff constituted some of NIH's most exceptional talent, these actions severely impacted the cultivation of future agency leadership.
* Undermining relationships with scientists and community partners. These professional relationships were formed through years of outreach and collaboration. The sudden nature of the terminations left no time for proper communication and orderly transition, jeopardizing any future partnerships.
* Ability to carry out NIH's most basic functions. Personnel reductions among critical grants management staff have compromised the capacity of NIH institutes struggling to evaluate research proposals, manage funding allocations to external research institutions, and issue research grant awards. As discussed in Concern 3, termination of Clinical Center staff continues to endanger patients and disrupt research.
* Transparency and trust. RIFs removed roles related to information sharing with the public and Congress, including communications and legislative affairs offices as well as staff who processed Freedom of Information Act requests, a primary tool for the public to understand government actions.
These losses will be exacerbated by the OMB Schedule Policy/Career rule, which was designed to strip career civil servants of their employment protections by making positions "at will" and enabling the executive branch to fire staff for political reasons and without performance-related cause. The new category classifies positions that "help shape or carry out Presidential policies, or involve a high level of confidentiality or policy influence" and was intended "to enhance accountability in these policy-influencing positions." However, the White House's list of NIH job classes to be designated Schedule Policy/Career includes frontline staff and managers (e.g., Health Scientist Administrators, Branch Chiefs) involved in regular scientific administrative work.
Civil service protections were designed to stop the "spoils system," wherein the elected party rewarded its supporters with government jobs. Removing civil service protections will increase political pressure on government career professionals, exacerbating the ongoing brain drain, increasing grant funding barriers, and furthering the discriminatory practices described in Concern 2.
Examples
Firing staff responsible for public and congressional communications undermines stated goals to rebuild public trust in NIH. Through dismissals and reorganization, individual institutes and centers have been left without dedicated communication teams. A consolidated central communications office cannot have all the information needed to provide accurate and up-to-date information about advances in every health area in the NIH mission. This limits NIH's ability to inform the public about taxpayer-funded research outcomes and counter false information about NIH and the science it funds. The same winnowing and reorganization has negatively impacted policy and legislative functions; staff with critical institute-specific expertise are no longer available to answer urgent legal and congressional inquiries.
Widespread vacancies in institute and center directors and senior staff. With the change in administration, NIH lost 17 of 27 Institute and Center Directors, and 14 directorships remain vacant. In some institutes and centers, gaps in permanent leadership extend to the division level. Reassignment of senior staff as detailees to other institutes adds further concerns about the functional stability of NIH. As a result, the ability to develop institutional goals, plan long-term priorities and provide guidance to a highly concerned research community has been crippled.
RIFs were executed without understanding of staffing needs. RIFs were based on broad position codes, without evaluation of component roles. Entire human resources (HR) branches were let go based on alphabetical order (e.g., Branches A-E) without regard to responsibilities.
As a result, the RIFs eliminated all HR for some institutes and centers, as well as the entire NIH-wide retirement office, leaving some parts of NIH without HR staff to support ongoing incentivized retirement programs and other staffing changes. Moreover, the lack of transparent communication and the targeting of specific sectors, like HR and administrative officers (AO), impeded staff from carrying out basic job functions that led to widespread confusion about roles, responsibilities, and who remained to do the work. Demonstrating clear continuing need for some RIFed positions, Contracting and Acquisitions staff, who provided for the purchase of office and research supplies, research and development contracts, information technology contracts, and other needs, were asked to continue to work while on administrative leave after receiving RIF notices. Despite their continued service and demonstrated need, most were separated from federal service and let go on Monday, July 14, 2025.
Regulation-driven, statutory, time-limited and essential activities are stalled. Absent staff with the necessary training and skills to complete them, NIH functions required by law, such as review of contract deliverables and invoices, Paperwork Reduction Act clearances, pre- and post-award administration of grants, and timely responses to congressional inquiries, are being conducted without appropriate expertise. For example, probationary terminations and incentivized retirements substantially reduced grants management staff at many institutes, impeding NIH's ability to award grants. The shortage of grants management staff has become so severe that one institute estimates that under current staffing levels, they could issue only about 5% of its typical new awards, potentially leaving $500 million unspent. At another institute, property management staff were RIFed, and the upper managers who have assumed responsibility for oversight of government property are unfamiliar with how the electronic systems work. As a result, staff whose laptops were broken could not obtain new ones. The fulfillment of Freedom of Information Act requests has been distributed across staff, taking time away from science, grants management, and other critical activities.
Insufficient oversight of high-risk studies and clinical trials. Lack of staff with clinical knowledge and expertise can lead to safety and productivity risks. Over the last 18 months, NIH has lost dozens of clinically-trained scientists responsible for the oversight of high-risk projects, such as drug and device-based interventions in children and patients with advanced or rare diseases. This reduction in clinical staff presents ethical challenges including endangering research participants, as discussed in Concern 3.
The talent pool for NIH staff has been curtailed. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) fellowship program, Presidential Management Fellows (PMF), and other fellowship and internship opportunities have been discontinued. This disrupts long-standing pathways to NIH employment and blocks NIH from the benefits of working with creative young scientists (and non-scientists) who represent the future of the U.S. health research enterprise. In addition, reporting suggests that the dismissals of NIH employees, which targeted workforce management, scientific administration, financial management, and communications, likely disproportionately impacted people from racial and ethnic minority groups. The OMB has removed race and ethnicity from their published workforce data, undermining the ability to monitor disparate effects. This reduction in diversity diminishes the ability of NIH to serve all Americans.
Recommendations
* Bring NIH staffing back to appropriate levels to enable mission-critical work, including communications, workforce management, human resources, legislative affairs, and other domains targeted by RIFs. Hiring excellent and needed staff will require restoring the reputation of the NIH working environment, which is widely recognized as hostile, as discussed in Concern 9. Rehire RIFed employees and probationary employees, where possible. Conduct a careful review of institute- and center-specific staffing needs, and restore staff with specific expertise in acquisitions, communications, legislative affairs, planning and evaluation, and other staff areas that were targeted by consolidations. Restore staff support for NIH's internal laboratories, including administrative operations, purchasing of laboratory supplies, hiring of needed personnel, and management of lab facilities, so that labs run efficiently and scientists can pursue science rather than paperwork.
* Protect the NIH mission by ensuring career civil servants retain employment protections and cannot be fired for political reasons, as would be enabled by the recent implementation of the Schedule Policy/Career designation. Congress must ensure that NIH staff have access to the full benefit of civil employee protections, so they continue to be hired and retained based on merit and not political views.
* Fill vacant institute and center directorships with qualified scientists selected through the search process typical at NIH prior to 2025. Congress should establish binding requirements to ensure rigorous search processes for these directorships, such as mandating search committees composed of both internal civil servant staff and independent external scientists and requiring a minimum time period for posting job announcements.
* Address Clinical Center staff shortages to ensure patient wellbeing and continuity of research, as recommended in Concern 3.
* Reinstate fellowship and training programs that provide a pipeline of excellent NIH staff, such as the AAAS fellowship program and PMF program.
Concern 6: Changing policies without staff input is creating foreseeable damage
Why It Matters
Institutional expertise is an essential component of organizational success. It is an asset that any competent management team must deploy for effective and prudent stewardship of available resources. This is particularly true at NIH, because the consequences of ignoring institutional expertise can endanger lives. In addition, the ecosystem of NIH grant funding is large and complex because it must address a wide variety of needs for the health research enterprise. These include filling research gaps with specific funding opportunities and projects, supporting shared research resources and infrastructure, training the research workforce, and supporting entrepreneurship through the small business programs. As such, developing and implementing effective policies at NIH depends on institutional knowledge that cannot be improvised. The staff who implement, administer, and oversee this ecosystem carry decades of scientific and administrative experience.
Since January 2025, Director Bhattacharya, HHS, DOGE, and OMB have in multiple instances envisioned, developed, and implemented changes without staff input, forcing staff to execute flawed and often conflicting policies that cause harm. These instances involve political disruption of peer and programmatic review without staff consultation, even though peer review is mandated by the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 6A). This has led to extensive delays, termination or non-awarding of grants for health research, disrupting taxpayer investments intended to benefit the American public. The cost of the mismanagement of NIH's best asset--its trained and experienced staff and consultants--is uninformed decisions, foreseeable error, and inconsistent or inappropriate implementation of policies. Such exclusion of institutional knowledge inevitably results in foreseeable harm as well as wasted time, effort and resources. The ultimate impact of this mismanagement falls disproportionately on those least able to weather it, such as patients and participants in abruptly terminated studies (as discussed in Concern 3) and early career scientists losing funding just as their work begins to bear fruit (as discussed in Concern 4). In biomedical science, technology development and human health, the consequences of these process failures are catastrophic.
Examples
Termination appeals denied without (or against) Scientific Program Officer consultation.
When grants were terminated under new policies and practices beginning in 2025, grantees were able to submit an appeal to justify the merit and appropriateness of their science. These appeals were seldom successful, and were often denied without input from relevant scientific staff. When input from relevant staff was sought, it was often disregarded. Disregarding the scientific judgement of scientific staff with appropriate expertise has been a common practice under Director Bhattacharya, as discussed in Concern 1.
Ill-considered changes to the management of peer review. Over the last 18 months, a number of changes have been imposed on the peer review process at NIH, without the input of knowledgeable peer review staff. These changes include consolidation of institute and center peer review branches into CSR, which impedes nuanced review of specific funding opportunities tailored to address the unique needs of the research communities supported by individual institutes and centers. In addition, NIH no longer requires study sections to reflect "diversity with respect to the geographic distribution, gender, race, and ethnicity of the membership," despite statutory requirements that such committees be balanced with respect to the U.S. population. Changes to the Early Career Reviewer program eliminating smaller workloads designed to enable junior investigators to more easily transition to full-scale review may impede participation in peer review by this next generation. The termination or reduction of benefits to scientists who volunteer on advisory committees and study sections, including the elimination of continuous submission and the narrowing of the window of qualifying service for late submission, undermines service in peer review and impedes the recruitment of reviewers.
In addition to these policies being implemented without staff input, these changes occurred without expert input from the Center for Scientific Review Advisory Council that would typically offer guidance to the director of CSR, because the council was recently disbanded. The cumulative effect of these changes undermine rigorous and fair peer review of research applications submitted to NIH.
NIH mandated a 50% rate of multiyear funding (MYF) without staff input. As discussed in Concern 4, MYF pays the full cost of a grant award upfront, reducing the impact of the NIH budget. In addition, MYF reduces the ability for NIH staff to effectively oversee awards, as further funds cannot be withheld should studies fail to achieve study objectives or reach critical milestones such as adequate participant recruitment. The MYF mandate has also been particularly damaging to clinical trials. NIH is not considering clinical trials for MYF because they involve human study participants and require annual oversight for safety and productivity.
Because these studies still count against the 50% directive, clinical trial applications face the dual obstacles of funding decreases and de-prioritization of non-MYF awards. This may lead to a decrease in federal investment in clinical trials, which seek to bring new therapies and treatment approaches to patients with chronic and life-threatening diseases.
Recommendations
* Solicit input from staff with relevant experience and knowledge before adopting any new policy or processes. NIH staff understand the consequences of process change and can identify foreseeable harms before implementation. Routine incorporation of staff input, through working groups, pilot testing and structured review, would prevent many of the avoidable disruptions documented in this report (Concerns 4, 6 and 7).
* Ensure new policies are deployed with appropriate support, training, and mechanisms of adequate implementation. Policies implemented on extremely rapid timelines, without staff consultation or preparation, are bound to produce unnecessary disruption and harm.
Concern 7: Cumbersome and shifting processes are wasting resources and harming health
Why It Matters
Some who have reached government via Silicon Valley suggest that moving fast and breaking things enables innovation, but the approach can have serious adverse consequences, especially when applied to clinical research where human health, safety, and lives are at stake.
NIH is not a startup; its mission represents a compounding investment where the returns depend on stability. Effective scientific administration benefits from stable, predictable, and proportionate processes.
Yet, under HHS Secretary Kennedy and Director Bhattacharya, NIH has imposed arbitrary, ill-conceived, and cumbersome administrative burdens. These have often been launched abruptly without preparation, support, training, or mechanisms for adequate implementation. In some cases, policies are reversed, revised, and altered multiple times within mere weeks, creating uncertainty, instability, and waste. When administrative requirements are poorly thought through, implemented without adequate preparation or expert input (as discussed in Concern 6), or changed repeatedly without adequate notice or guidance, unnecessary costs fall on the shoulders of NIH staff, scientists, and the public. Derailing the careers and research pathways built with NIH funding represents an enormous self-inflicted waste of technological and scientific capacity, all to the detriment of American innovation and health.
Examples
Escalating administrative burden on program officers and principal investigators. Many of the administrative policies being implemented suffer from flaws, inconsistencies, and contradictions, requiring continual changes in methods and processes. The increased burden from these shifting policies undermines NIH staff's ability to carry out mission critical activities.
Every hour a grants manager, program officer, review officer, or scientist spends navigating the shifting and erratic changes in policy and bureaucracy is an hour not spent advising investigators, identifying scientific gaps, enabling peer review, or advancing research.
Cumulatively, the time and effort lost to implementing and correcting flawed policies delays discoveries and wastes taxpayer investment. In addition, increased burden without benefit drives staff attrition and lowers the attractiveness of the federal government as an employer, exacerbating staffing problems (as discussed in Concern 5). Examples include:
* A cumbersome screening process for ideological alignment has slowed the pace of grant awards. As discussed in Concern 2, the screening process uses a "computational text analysis tool" to scan for a discriminatory set of terms, flag grants as "misaligned" with new administration priorities, and launch scientifically unnecessary cycles of "renegotiation." The time required to manage active NIH grants has increased significantly, forcing staff, grantees, and institutions to focus on paperwork rather than fostering good science. Moreover, this lengthy process risks NIH's ability to obligate its Congressionally appropriated funds before the end of the fiscal year, as required by law.
* Barriers to supply procurement interrupts access to critical lab resources, impeding cutting edge and unique intramural NIH research. All purchasing orders above $15,000 now must go through a lengthy, centralized process that takes so long it effectively functions as an arbitrary limit on essential laboratory tools and resources.
Backlogs and arbitrary deadlines being imposed for purchase orders further impede obtaining needed equipment and resources, including inability to purchase new instruments and a lack of instrument service contracts to maintain and/or repair current instruments.
* Idiosyncratic travel policies interrupted critical work. These shifting policies prevented scientific staff from exchanging knowledge at conferences and program staff from overseeing NIH scientific investments. In early 2025, travel was almost entirely banned. Travel policies were changed multiple times in a year, with seemingly arbitrary approval or disapproval from political appointees, changes in advance notice, and procedures.
* Changes to performance evaluations, an annual regulatory requirement for NIH staff (5 CFR 430.201-430.210), were implemented off cycle, temporarily halting the entire process. These changes doubled the time required by supervisors and employees to complete the appraisal process, while restricting the range of evaluation outcomes.
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Original text here: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ginexi-Written-Testimony.pdf
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(Continued from Part 1 of 3)
Recommendations
* Restore and bolster the outputs of first-level peer review at NIH wherein expert panels impartially deliberate on the scientific merits ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets released the following testimony by Elizabeth Ginexi, health research scientist and former scientific program official at the National Institutes of Health, from a June 30, 2026, hearing entitled "Mind Control and Accountability: Uncovering the Truth of the CIA's MKULTRA Project": * * * (Continued from Part 1 of 3) Recommendations * Restore and bolster the outputs of first-level peer review at NIH wherein expert panels impartially deliberate on the scientific meritsof grant applications by 1) maintaining the availability of numeric scores, 2) ensuring that any binning systems provide sufficient levels of granularity and are piloted prior to broadscale implementation, and 3) ensuring funding decisions reflect input from peer review.
* Safeguard the input of NIH scientific staff with expertise in relevant research areas on funding decisions, ensuring that those who are charged with carrying out disbursement of public funds do so in a transparent, legal, and efficient manner. This will require an environment where staff can safely speak honestly. Sound funding decisions cannot realistically come from a few political appointees, even if they had relevant scientific expertise, as no individual alone can have the depth and breadth of expertise to cover all areas of health research within the NIH mission.
* Support academic freedom at NIH for both intramural and extramural research staff. Support the agency and authority of institute and center leadership and insulate these leaders from political winds. For individual intramural labs, support high-quality, curiosity-driven inquiries as reviewed by peer scientists. Deepening our understanding of biological processes through excellent fundamental research consistently leads to medical advances that arise from unexpected areas of inquiry. For extramural staff, ensure staff feel safe sharing their honest scientific judgement and aren't penalized for raising scientific concerns.
* Reconstitute and fully staff NIH Institutes' Scientific Advisory Councils and Boards. Such boards should include scientists and patient advocates from relevant fields who have been well vetted for potential conflicts of interest, which include close connections with members of the administration or related financial stakes.
* Restart and deepen collaboration with patients and other affected communities, such as people living with or at risk for relevant health conditions and their caregivers, to ensure NIH research supports patient-centered outcomes. This should include continued participation of relevant community members on advisory boards serving institute Advisory Councils, as well as community advisory boards to NIH-funded clinical studies.
* Ensure future grant terminations only occur when justified by scientific or ethical concerns, such as study futility, early determinations of efficacy, irreparably poor progress, unexpected participant harm, or investigator misconduct. Study terminations should not be allowed based on lack of alignment with politicized agency censoring set by any administration, as these will inevitably change every 4 to 8 years, creating whiplash in the scientific community and allowing completion of very few studies.
Concern 2: Discriminatory policies are worsening disparities Why It Matters
As the nation's premier health research institution, the NIH must remain accessible to the best scientists of every demographic group and address the health of all people in our country. This approach is supported by both U.S. law and scientific evidence.
* The law. Discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or another protected characteristic (including gender identity) remains unlawful in the United States under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Public Health Service Act, the foundational statute for the NIH, requires the NIH director to: encourage grantees to "utilize diverse study populations," develop a strategic plan that considers "biological, social, and other determinants of health that contribute to health disparities" and "encourage efforts to improve research related to the health of sexual and gender minority populations" (42 U.S.C. Sec. 6A). The 21st Century Cures Act further mandates that the NIH Director shall "develop, modify, or prioritize policies, as needed, within the National Institutes of Health to promote opportunities for new researchers and earlier research independence, such as policies to increase opportunities for new researchers to receive funding, enhance training and mentorship programs for researchers, and enhance workforce diversity" (Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, 2016).
* The evidence. Variation is central to health research, providing the necessary differences to create knowledge through comparison and ensure that research findings are generalizable. Excluding diversity along any axis (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, ability, geography) removes the opportunity to learn from differences and makes findings less relevant and applicable in the real world. People from racial and ethnic minority groups, rural populations, LGBTQIA+ people, under-resourced communities, and people with
disabilities often experience social and structural barriers, such as transportation challenges, inflexible work hours, lack of childcare, and mistrust driven by historical and present-day traumas. These barriers contribute to poor health outcomes and limit participation in research to improve those outcomes. Including diverse populations in research requires intentional and focused recruitment, particularly of small populations, to study and overcome these barriers. Similarly, addressing health disparities requires research that both explicitly focuses on populations that experience worse health outcomes and considers the contribution of social and structural challenges. Finally, peer-reviewed research shows that diverse teams of people with different backgrounds outperform uniform teams, as they are more likely to question assumptions, reveal blindspots, and generate innovation. This perhaps explains why diverse teams publish more frequently and receive more citations. Prior to 2025, NIH policies supported broadening the NIH workforce by encouraging the mentorship, participation, and inclusion of people from diverse backgrounds, but never by determining funding based on any individual characteristic.
Despite the evidence in support of diverse study populations and researchers, under Director Bhattacharya, NIH has implemented policies that weaponize a poorly defined "DEI" (diversity, equity, and inclusion) label to eliminate a broad range of science-related efforts the administration finds convenient to target: inclusive study participation, minority health and health disparities research, and scientific workforce diversity.
Examples
A discriminatory screening tool is censoring NIH-funded research. Despite his oft-repeated assertion that "there are no banned words," NIH Director Jay Bhattacharya has mandated a screening and "renegotiation" process across NIH that is applied to every grant or application prior to receiving its first or subsequent installment of NIH funding. This screening process is being applied retroactively to grants that have already gone through a rigorous multi-level peer and programmatic review process in which they were evaluated as being innovative, scientifically meritorious, relevant to the health of the public, and worthy of funding. There are several hundreds of words being screened in this process. Funded projects affected by "renegotiation" have often been producing results for several years. The "renegotiation" process involves a "computational text analysis tool" that screens grants for "terms that may potentially be associated with misalignment with the agency's priorities." Any grants containing "misaligned" terms must undergo manual review by NIH program staff who must provide written justification for inclusion of the terms or engage in "renegotiation" with investigators and grantee institutions to remove the terms prior to initial or continued funding. On June 16, 2025, Reagan-appointed U.S. District Judge William G. Young issued a ruling on earlier, similar keyword-based screening processes at NIH, calling them an "effort to rubber stamp an ideological purge" and declaring: "I am hesitant to draw this conclusion, but I have an unflinching obligation to draw it - that this represents racial discrimination. And discrimination against America's LGBTQ community," "I've sat on this bench now for 40 years. I've never seen government racial discrimination like this," and "My duty is to call it out."
Notably, the set of "misaligned" terms is not provided to the scientific community, nor is it provided to the majority of scientific program staff (including Program Officers and Grants Management Officials) within NIH. The set of terms has also evolved over time. NIH staff have compiled every "misaligned" term flagged by the tool between fall 2025 and early 2026 across four NIH institutes and provided the list to Congress. Terms the administration considered to "potentially be associated with misalignment with the agency's priorities" during that period included "African American," "Hispanic American," and "Asian American." (Notably, no grants were flagged for including "white American" or "European American.") Grants are also flagged for terms such as "gender," "health disparities," "diverse," "racial/ethnic minority," and "Latinx." These terms directly contradict the framework for federal public health programs and services set for NIH by Congress. In some cases, NIH scientific program officers are able to successfully justify these terms, but often their expert opinions are rejected. In addition, the heightened scrutiny introduces delays that disproportionately affect health disparities research and workforce diversity programs, each of which is required in NIH's foundational statute. The screening process and threat of award termination or delay often pushes the scientific community to self-censor their research for fear of being caught up in this discriminatory and cumbersome process. Concern about getting flagged in this screening process has caused some scientists to avoid health disparities research and programs designed to train the diverse workforce needed for excellent science and required by law.
Civil rights law is weaponized against research on racial and ethnic minority populations.
On February 10, 2025, a memo from then Acting Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services Dorothy Fink stated: "The Department of Health and Human Services has an obligation to ensure that taxpayer dollars are used to advance the best interests of the government. This includes avoiding the expenditure of federal funds on programs, or with contractors or vendors, that promote or take part in diversity, equity, or inclusion ('DEI') initiatives or any other initiatives that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or another protected characteristic." As a direct result of this memo, and in the absence of repeatedly requested clarification on policy from HHS, the NIH Director, and OER, some institutes and centers systematically delayed funding for any grants that focused on racial and ethnic minority populations, regardless of the scientific justification. To receive funding, grants were required to expand their study populations, even if the associated costs could not be justified by the scientific question or health concern. These delays lasted throughout fiscal year 2025, extending into 2026. While this hold has been lifted in some institutes, it continues in others, and a year of confusion and misguided policies has impeded or interfered with the scope of studies focused on health conditions specific to people of color.
Termination of research addressing health disparities and health equity. In 2025, NIH terminated more than 2,700 grants addressing health disparities and/or the health of racial, ethnic, and gender minority populations. The U.S. District Court found the processes that led to these terminations illegal, a decision that the Supreme Court declined to overturn. While terminations in 2026 are infrequent, more than 1,000 grants terminated in 2025 have not been reinstated. The threat of terminations remains present, driving compliance with the discriminatory grant screening and censorship processes that disproportionately exclude racial, ethnic and gender minority populations from research (described in the prior section), and largely mirrors the processes the courts already found unlawful.
Termination of research conducted internationally. As discussed in Concern 8, the NIH suddenly and retroactively changed policies regarding foreign research collaboration in 2025, leading to the unexpected termination or disruption of ongoing clinical trials conducted abroad.
Research participants, who had generously participated in science to help the health of others around the globe, were abruptly removed from medical protocols or in some cases left with unmonitored devices in their bodies in complete disregard for their safety. When studies were conducted in regions lacking robust public health infrastructure, these participants were left with little recourse. This was a gross violation of ethical research standards (as discussed in Concern 3), often minimized simply because it happened beyond our borders.
Termination of research training programs designed to broaden the research workforce.
Based on compelling evidence demonstrating the advantages of a diverse research workforce, and as directed by Congress in the 21st Century Cures Act (Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, 2016), NIH developed multiple training programs to attract meritorious scientists from a variety of backgrounds. These included programs such as the Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award (NRSA) Individual Predoctoral Fellowship to Promote Diversity in Health-Related Research, which supported individualized, mentored research training of predoctoral students, and the Maximizing Opportunities for Scientific and Academic Independent Careers (MOSAIC) program, which provided 5-year awards to support postdoctoral scientists transitioning into independent faculty roles. Importantly, both programs awarded grants to highly qualified applicants identified through rigorous competition. Neither program limited participation based on any protected characteristic (e.g., race, ethnicity, sex, gender). In 2025, NIH not only ended these programs but also terminated all active grants funded under these programs, regardless of the merit, progress, or scope of the science. In the case of many NRSA awardees, NIH terminated awards to scientists from underrepresented backgrounds whose applications had received better scores than those of retained awardees who had applied via the standard pathway. In doing so, NIH cut off active health research, leaving trainees without a clear path forward in science and increasing the likelihood of these talented individuals leaving science.
Recommendations
* Ensure no groups, regardless of background or identity, are excluded from the benefits of NIH research. NIH research is funded by taxpayer dollars, and thus it should benefit all Americans, including those from racial, ethnic, sexual, and gender minority backgrounds. In addition, Green Card holders (lawful permanent residents), immigrants in the United States on work visas, and the majority of undocumented immigrants all pay taxes and should be included in federally funded research. Yet, the policies and practices of this administration have systematically excluded these groups from NIH-funded research. As contributing members of the American public, these groups deserve to participate in, and benefit from, NIH research.
* Stop the discriminatory censorship of NIH grants. The internal "alignment" screening process must be stopped. In addition, the NIH Director must publicly acknowledge the harm caused by these discriminatory practices, apologize to those who have been excluded from research, and confirm that research will no longer be screened and censored based on discriminatory keywords. Absent a clear apology and commitment, the research community may continue to self-censor their own research.
* Ensure all research participants, regardless of demographic background, identity or location, receive the respect, safety, and dignity they deserve for generously donating their time and bodies to research, as also noted in Concerns 3 and 8.
* Ensure NIH meets its statutory obligation to broaden participation in the research workforce.
* External research suggests a disproportionate impact of these terminations on groups already underrepresented in science. NIH should assess how grant terminations have affected the demographic makeup of NIH-funded researchers, especially early career investigators. These data should then be shared with the public.
* NIH should reinstate prior programs and develop new programs to address persistent racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, regional, sexual orientation, and gender disparities in the research workforce, as mandated by Congress. Congress should enact measures to ensure these programs are not targeted again by future politically motivated actions.
* Ensure NIH meets its statutory obligation to address health disparities and the health of sexual and gender minority populations, including consideration of social determinants of health, as mandated by Congress. NIH should ensure that new agency priorities do not undermine those established and maintained by Congress for NIH.
Concern 3: Ignoring ethical standards has put research participants and the public at risk
Why It Matters
The early history of science was fraught with ethical violations and abuses of research participants. For example, beginning in 1932, the U.S. Public Health Service launched an observational study of untreated syphilis in Black men in Tuskegee, Alabama, without providing informed consent or disclosing diagnoses. They continued the study through 1972, well after treatment was available, causing participants to needlessly suffer neurological consequences and death, their wives to become infected, and their children to be born with congenital syphilis.
This history demands that scientists remain constantly vigilant for such violations.
Motivated by these atrocities, the U.S. National Research Act commissioned the Belmont Report in 1974, which provides the foundational ethical principles and guidelines for research with human participants still used today. Adherence to the principles of the Belmont Report is codified for HHS and NIH research under 45 C.F.R. 46, also known as the Common Rule.
These principles include:
* Respect for persons, which requires researchers to treat individuals as autonomous agents capable of self determination and to protect people with diminished autonomy,
* Beneficence, the obligation to avoid harm while maximizing potential benefits and minimizing possible risks, and
* Justice, to ensure fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research.
Director Bhattacharya's NIH has violated these fundamental ethical standards, undermining the credibility of science and breaching trust with research participants and the public. Repairing this trust could take decades.
Examples
Abrupt clinical study disruptions created ethical issues of unprecedented scope.
Beginning in February 2025, the Trump administration began terminating NIH research studies without warning. While termination of clinical trials is sometimes necessary, ethically justifiable reasons are typically limited to situations when preliminary study data reveal unexpected risks to participant safety, efficacy of the intervention, or futility of the study. Such terminations are also typically planned in advance, based on predetermined analyses, with clear expectations for safely closing down the study. Rather than adhering to these ethical standards, NIH prioritized political ideology by terminating 383 trials affecting more than 74,000 participants in 2025. The initial spate of terminations are widely attributed to DOGE, but the terminations continued under the leadership of NIH Director Dr. Bhattacharya, often at the explicit direction of Deputy Director Dr. Memoli, despite objections from NIH scientific and clinical staff. While some trials were reinstated under court order, they experienced lengthy disruptions. Many were not covered by the court ruling and remain canceled. Beyond terminations, many clinical studies were delayed for months due to uncertainty regarding "alignment with agency priorities" such as the presence of censored words or studies being conducted internationally, creating study disruptions. These terminations and delays compromised the principles of the Belmont report and, therefore, violated federal research regulations. Terminated studies, including clinical trials, were initially allowed no time or funding to ethically close out, safely disenroll participants, or follow through on commitments to participants. After months of harm, NIH finally changed policy to allow terminated studies to request costs to support an orderly study closeout. However, the damage caused by abrupt trial discontinuation and disruption was entirely foreseen by NIH staff and should never have occurred. These thoughtless terminations and delays created significant ethical violations, including:
* Research participants and the public were put at unnecessary risk. When studies were abruptly terminated or held for months, research teams were left without funding to provide continued care required by participants, such as tapering patients off medicines or monitoring implanted devices. Terminated or delayed studies were often based in countries that lacked the public health infrastructure to absorb the care of these study participants without NIH collaborations and funding. In at least one case, the indefinite delay of a study on multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (TB) put the study team's ability to continue antibiotic treatment at risk, potentially triggering further antibiotic resistance.
* Altered risk-benefit balance, as social value decreased and risk increased. A reasonable risk-benefit ratio is central to ethical and regulatory approval of research.
This consideration may also be a primary factor for participants when they decide to join a study. Study disruptions cause incomplete data collection, making it impossible to fully answer the original research question(s) or fully realize the benefit of the research. Thus, the clinical trial disruptions decreased the social value of the study, while simultaneously placing participants at greater risk.
* Informed consent undermined. Study disruptions also conflict with commitments made to participants during the informed consent process, violating the respect for persons central to the ethical paradigms of science. Informed consent documents explain to participants how they can expect to be treated in the study. The informed consent guides their decision making process for joining the study. These unnecessary study disruptions forced research teams to shirk the commitments made to participants in informed consent documents, breaching participant trust.
* Forced destruction of patient samples. As a result of study terminations, institutions were left without funding to support the storage of human tissue samples. When a participant donates tissue for research, they expect their contribution will advance scientific knowledge and benefit fellow patients. Causing the premature destruction of tissue samples donated for research through study termination undermines the participant's altruistic intent and stymies scientific progress.
* Erosion of trust. Decisions to terminate studies were made without consulting study teams, undermining ethical principles of collaborative partnership and affecting the research community's trust in NIH. Many NIH clinical studies are conducted in collaboration with members of the relevant patient community, who may serve on study advisory boards or act as members of the study team. In these cases, the erosion of trust in NIH may extend to community partners. Indeed, a group of community research partners described their reaction to a termination letter stating that research programs like theirs "are antithetical to scientific inquiry, do nothing to expand our knowledge of living systems, provide low returns on investment and do not enhance or lengthen life or reduce illness." The community partners said: "The majority of the patients on our [community advisory] board interpreted this message to mean: 'Your life does not matter to us.'"
Termination of clinical center staff continues to disrupt patient care and research. Known as "the House of Hope," the NIH Clinical Center is the nation's largest hospital devoted only to research, previously attracting top research talent from around the globe. The Clinical Center focuses on trailblazing clinical research, including developing treatments where none exist, and diagnosing and treating rare or previously unknown diseases and conditions. The Clinical Center requires top-tier clinicians to support such unique and complex care needs. As a result of research interference (see Concern 1) and demoralizing working conditions (see Concern 9), world-class clinical research investigators, enormously talented staff, and patient care leaders are fleeing in droves. Many other staff, including essential nursing staff, were lost to reductions in force (RIF), probationary terminations, and mandated 35% contract cuts across NIH. The losses have become critical and threaten the hospital's ability to operate and provide high-quality care. Tests and results are delayed due to a lack of staff. These breaches in care represent significant ethical concerns, putting patients at risk of adverse outcomes.
Recommendations
* Ensure all current and future NIH policy changes prioritize the health and safety of research participants and the public over political considerations and/or speed of implementation. Prior to initiating policy changes that will affect the conduct of studies that include human participants, NIH should carry out and publish a thorough ethics review that considers the policy's impact on respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.
* Address Clinical Center staff shortages to ensure patient wellbeing and continuity of research. To appropriately staff the Clinical Center, the NIH must: 1) remove contract cost limits to enable the hiring of trained nursing staff, 2) boost staff morale by acknowledging the chaos of the past 18 months and taking steps to repair the resulting harm, 3) reverse RIFs and probationary terminations.
* Rebuild trust with research and patient communities by acknowledging, taking ownership of, and apologizing for the harms to participants and patients caused by rapid implementation of policy changes without regard to participant safety and other central ethical considerations.
* Ensure all research participants, regardless of demographic background, identity or location, receive the respect, safety, and dignity they deserve for generously donating their time and bodies to research, as also noted in Concerns 2 and 8.
Concern 4: An unstable research environment is undermining scientific advances and public trust
Why It Matters
Instability and uncertainty are rampant across the NIH and the broader scientific ecosystem under Director Bhattacharya and Deputy Director Memoli. They have implemented radical, abrupt, and careless changes in policies related to funding opportunities, funding decisions, grant terminations, contracting, peer review, and staffing across every institute, position, and level in both intramural and extramural programs. Reduced funding, shifting policies, and political pressure hamper NIH and NIH-funded researchers. The United States faces dire consequences:
* Reduced trust in NIH and scientific institutions. To change policies abruptly and retroactively undermines the legitimacy of NIH. As discussed in Concern 3, this uncertainty has introduced risk to research participants, thereby damaging the public's trust in NIH. Terminating clinical studies without cause harms NIH's credibility as a steward of our nation's successful research enterprise, especially among vulnerable populations already underrepresented in research. This loss of goodwill further jeopardizes future participation in health research. Operating in a shifting landscape and under threats to their employment, NIH staff cannot effectively advise scientists on navigating NIH policies, breaking trusted relationships between program staff and the scientific community. Despite his stated desire to increase trust in science, Director Bhattacharya's actions (and inactions) have accomplished the opposite. Since Director Bhattacharya assumed his role, the public's trust in NIH has declined.
* Loss of current and future biomedical scientists. World-class scientists are leaving the country, no longer confident in the future of U.S. science. For investigators, reduced and delayed NIH spending has created a hypercompetitive funding environment that threatens the viability of their labs, impacting employment as well as scientific progress.
Funding constraints have also reduced the solvency of academic institutions, and universities have been forced to rescind offers of admission to graduate programs.
Funding instability disproportionately affects early career scientists as they grapple with reduced opportunities for training and few job openings. In a 2025 National Postdoctoral Association survey, more than 50% of 378 respondents reported their funding has been cut, 44% reported threats to their positions, 11% reported they had lost their jobs, and 11% reported salary or stipend freezes. Uncertainty in research funding has reached the private sector as well, with biotech and pharma losing federal grants and private investments.
* Future therapies that won't materialize. Funding uncertainty and reductions undermine long-term planning and momentum of successful research programs. Lack of support has forced U.S. scientists to reduce or close productive and promising research programs. In a 2026 survey of nearly 1,000 U.S. scientists, more than 40% reported canceling planned research. Although we will never know the scientific advances that could have occurred had research funding remained stable, projections suggest funding cuts could reduce development of treatments.
* A less-safe country. NIH science contributes to the Nation's safety. By undermining its scientific enterprise, the United States voluntarily and incomprehensibly cedes its national security, pandemic preparedness, biodefense, and ability to respond to public health emergencies.
Examples
Reduced spending of NIH appropriations heightens funding uncertainty. Director Bhattacharya and Deputy Director Memoli, with direction from OMB Director Russell Vought, have systematically implemented processes that undermine NIH's ability to disburse congressionally appropriated funds for health research, including the following:
* New layers of justification and political approval for awarding NIH grants are required by NIH's Office of Extramural Research. Director Bhattacharya's Unified Funding Strategy forces NIH institutes to abandon transparent funding processes based on peer review and requires staff to continue debating the merit of already-funded outstanding grant applications.
* Disruption of grant payment systems. The administration infamously held hostage NIH grants and contracts that were already awarded at Columbia, Harvard, and other universities to coerce these institutions into adopting policies sharply restricting free speech and academic freedom. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) associates prevented these institutions from withdrawing funds for active grants by blocking disbursement in the government's Payment Management System.
* NIH mandated multiyear funding (MYF) for 50% of all new research dollars beginning in July 2025. Most NIH grant applications are submitted with two- to five-year budgets, which are typically paid on an annual basis pending programmatic review and approval.
With MYF, the entire cost of the two- to five-year award is paid in year 1. Because MYF obligates a larger portion of the annual budget to a single study, this rapid transition to MYF effectively shrank the NIH budget, contributing to a 24% decline in new research funded by NIH in 2025 compared to 2024 (as further discussed in Concern 6). This introduced crippling opportunity costs for new research and sowed chaos and uncertainty in the U.S. scientific workforce. While the fiscal year 2026 NIH appropriations bill constrains the use of MYF, the bill anchors MYF to fiscal year 2025 levels (about 39% of new research dollars), thus allowing comparable contraction of new research in fiscal year 2026 as we previously saw in fiscal year 2025.
* NIH cut 35% of all contract spending in response to Executive Order 14210 in February 2025. Small biotech businesses across the United States saw their congressionally mandated research and development contracts abruptly terminated.
NIH's intramural labs found themselves with insufficient staff to care for research animals or procure routine supplies. The 35% cut has introduced staffing shortages at the Clinical Center (as discussed in Concern 3), impeded critical scientific workshops, and interrupted access to critical resources for NIH laboratories.
The threat of research terminations impedes scientific progress. In 2025, NIH terminated 5,843 research grants, many for containing words or concepts the administration finds objectionable. These actions were justified post-hoc by new language in the Code of Federal Regulations (2 C.F.R. 200.340) that went into effect after many of the terminations occurred.
Subsequent NIH terms of award force individuals and grantee institutions to agree to termination if "an award no longer effectuates program goals or agency priorities." Previously, grant termination required evidence of ethical violations, scientific misconduct, or scientific justifications based on efficacy, futility or participant safety. Most fully funded NIH grants now remain vulnerable to full or partial termination on vague "administration priority" grounds. The threat of termination looms over all NIH grant recipients. Scientists concerned about potential termination struggle to effectively manage complex studies. This challenge is particularly acute in clinical trials, where the threat of termination introduces quandaries about the ethics of recruiting participants into a study that could be terminated on a whim (as discussed in Concern 3).
Inexperienced, unqualified and dishonest leadership breaks public trust. Historically, NIH leaders are selected for their scientific expertise, with only the Directors of the NIH and NCI nominated by the President. Director Bhattacharya, Deputy Director Memoli, and HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., have purged respected and experienced leaders across NIH, in some cases offering demotions disguised as "reassignments" or "details" and forcing leaders into retirement. Since January 2025, the brain drain has included Ms. Julie Berko and Drs. Monica Bertagnolli, Diana Bianchi, John Burklow, Francis Collins, Gary Gibbons, Eric Green, Amy Kelley, Walter Koroshetz, Clifford Lane, Michael Lauer, Jeanne Marrazo, Kathy Neuzil, Eliseo Perez-Stables, Tara Schwetz, Larry Tabak, Shannon Zenk, and many other trusted, respected, and eminent scientists and administrators.
None of them have been replaced with people of equivalent stature. Replacements such as Seanna Cranston, Rachel Riley, and James McElroy have arrived with minimal-to-no experience in science, health care, or health administration. Some NIH institutes installed politically aligned individuals in newly invented positions, such as Chief Operating Officer (COO) or Chief Science Advisor (CSA). In October 2025, during the government shutdown when hiring processes are normally on hold, NIH removed the Director of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences and replaced him with Kyle Walsh, the former roommate and friend of Vice President Vance. In at least one case, this directly increased waste, fraud, and abuse at NIH, at least temporarily. Within 3 months of his appointment, Eric Schnabel, NIH's COO plucked from the defense industry, was investigated and fired after NIH awarded a contract to an entity that employed his wife.
Newly appointed HHS and NIH leadership have actively eroded trust in NIH and American science and risked the well-being of the American public. HHS Secretary Kennedy has spread dangerous misinformation on public health, which has not been refuted by Dr. Bhattacharya in his roles as either the NIH Director nor Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Acting Director. In his first NIH staff town hall, while trying to rationalize major shifts in agency policy and practice, Director Bhattacharya accused NIH of causing the COVID-19 pandemic. He has continued to promote one-sided COVID-related conspiracy theories through the so-called Scientific Freedom Lecture Series, ironically described as promoting "the principles of gold standard science." Despite ample evidence on the impact that structural racism has on minority health and health disparities and validated approaches to measure the phenomenon, Director Bhattacharya continues to insist that structural racism is not a legitimate line of research.
Director Bhattacharya has also repeatedly obfuscated the state of NIH operations, providing dishonest representations to Congress and the public. In short, positions of authority and accountability at NIH are increasingly filled by people who lack the technical knowledge or integrity to make sound decisions about the future of health research in the United States.
Recommendations
* Ensure NIH staff are able to maximize the benefit of congressionally approved appropriations. NIH must lift mandates that have impeded the ability of its staff to ensure funding is spent in the best interests of the American taxpayer. NIH, HHS, and OMB should reduce layers of political oversight that undermine peer review standards and drastically slow down processes. NIH should rescind the multiyear funding mandate that reduces the power of the NIH budget. NIH should ensure that all of its operating divisions can individually justify contracts based on needs rather than an arbitrary cap. If NIH, HHS, and OMB fail to address these issues, Congress should enact meaningful guardrails to ensure the Article 1 Branch maintains the power of the purse, as directed by the U.S. Constitution.
* Ensure future grant terminations only occur when justified by scientific or ethical concerns, such as study futility, early determinations of efficacy, unexpected participant harm, or investigator misconduct, as noted in Concern 1. The threat of study terminations creates substantial uncertainty that impedes the ability of scientists to conduct their research.
* Introduce new policies with clarity, transparency and reasonable implementation time frames. Allow broad scientific input before proclaiming NIH priorities. Adhere to the Administrative Procedures Act and resume best practices of incorporating input from NIH scientists and the scientific community regarding research priorities, established through workshops, working groups, scientific conferences, requests for information (RFIs), and other methods. Thoughtfully examine existing mechanisms and processes before implementing new policies. Introduce new policies to NIH staff before public dissemination. Provide clear and rational guidance and processes to inform NIH staff and the public. Consult scientific experts and individuals with lived experience regarding: a) health disparities research, b) workforce diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility, c) COVID-19, long-COVID and immunizations, d) climate change, e) gender and intersex populations, f) foreign collaborations, and g) animal research. Recognize that specialists at NIH and elsewhere can bring their experience, not to discourage, but to enhance the success of, new initiatives.
* Develop and restore funding mechanisms that support training to counteract brain drain. NIH must act urgently to counteract the substantial reduction in opportunity for early career scientists. Allow program staff to develop and strengthen funding opportunities to support training of clinical and basic scientists. New programs must accomplish the goals and adequately replace previously successful training programs that were terminated. This will require flexibility in the development of funding opportunities, without arbitrary limitation in the number of opportunities. In addition, Congress must establish clear, meaningful, and binding protections against the disruption of these critical programs in the future.
Concern 5: Lost critical expertise is hindering the NIH mission
Why It Matters
As of April 2026, NIH lost over 4,400 employees since January 2025 through probationary firings, reductions in force (RIF), incentivized retirements, staff resigning in protest or under pressure, alongside usual departures, representing a reduction of roughly 20% to 25% of its total workforce. Contract terminations and non-renewals have further reduced capacity. In many cases, cuts were made arbitrarily and without consideration of how key job functions could still be accomplished by remaining staff. Cuts targeted critical areas such as workforce management, legislative affairs, communication, and ethics, among many others. NIH's expert workforce management staff identified, trained, and managed the scientific leaders of our nation. Communications staff helped share NIH research findings with the public. Ethics staff ensured adherence to ethical guidelines. Policy staff enabled effective communication with Congress. The reductions in mission-critical personnel has significantly impeded NIH's ability to achieve its stated priorities. The mission of NIH, to seek fundamental knowledge and apply that knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability, cannot be achieved without the foundation of the individuals who sustain it.
Specifically, the planned and actualized staff reductions led to losses in:
* Irreplaceable knowledge and institutional memory. RIFs removed entire offices and divisions from NIH, leaving little or no staff in certain mission areas. With almost no one remaining in these areas, certain areas of expertise and knowledge of past practices are no longer available to the agency
* Novel perspectives, emerging scientific expertise, and future leaders. The termination of probationary employees categorized as new hires or recently promoted personnel deprived NIH of scientists and related professionals capable of advancing both the agency and the wider scientific community. These dismissals effectively suppressed the introduction of novel ideas and innovative scientific methodologies.
Since recently promoted staff constituted some of NIH's most exceptional talent, these actions severely impacted the cultivation of future agency leadership.
* Undermining relationships with scientists and community partners. These professional relationships were formed through years of outreach and collaboration. The sudden nature of the terminations left no time for proper communication and orderly transition, jeopardizing any future partnerships.
* Ability to carry out NIH's most basic functions. Personnel reductions among critical grants management staff have compromised the capacity of NIH institutes struggling to evaluate research proposals, manage funding allocations to external research institutions, and issue research grant awards. As discussed in Concern 3, termination of Clinical Center staff continues to endanger patients and disrupt research.
* Transparency and trust. RIFs removed roles related to information sharing with the public and Congress, including communications and legislative affairs offices as well as staff who processed Freedom of Information Act requests, a primary tool for the public to understand government actions.
These losses will be exacerbated by the OMB Schedule Policy/Career rule, which was designed to strip career civil servants of their employment protections by making positions "at will" and enabling the executive branch to fire staff for political reasons and without performance-related cause. The new category classifies positions that "help shape or carry out Presidential policies, or involve a high level of confidentiality or policy influence" and was intended "to enhance accountability in these policy-influencing positions." However, the White House's list of NIH job classes to be designated Schedule Policy/Career includes frontline staff and managers (e.g., Health Scientist Administrators, Branch Chiefs) involved in regular scientific administrative work.
Civil service protections were designed to stop the "spoils system," wherein the elected party rewarded its supporters with government jobs. Removing civil service protections will increase political pressure on government career professionals, exacerbating the ongoing brain drain, increasing grant funding barriers, and furthering the discriminatory practices described in Concern 2.
Examples
Firing staff responsible for public and congressional communications undermines stated goals to rebuild public trust in NIH. Through dismissals and reorganization, individual institutes and centers have been left without dedicated communication teams. A consolidated central communications office cannot have all the information needed to provide accurate and up-to-date information about advances in every health area in the NIH mission. This limits NIH's ability to inform the public about taxpayer-funded research outcomes and counter false information about NIH and the science it funds. The same winnowing and reorganization has negatively impacted policy and legislative functions; staff with critical institute-specific expertise are no longer available to answer urgent legal and congressional inquiries.
Widespread vacancies in institute and center directors and senior staff. With the change in administration, NIH lost 17 of 27 Institute and Center Directors, and 14 directorships remain vacant. In some institutes and centers, gaps in permanent leadership extend to the division level. Reassignment of senior staff as detailees to other institutes adds further concerns about the functional stability of NIH. As a result, the ability to develop institutional goals, plan long-term priorities and provide guidance to a highly concerned research community has been crippled.
RIFs were executed without understanding of staffing needs. RIFs were based on broad position codes, without evaluation of component roles. Entire human resources (HR) branches were let go based on alphabetical order (e.g., Branches A-E) without regard to responsibilities.
As a result, the RIFs eliminated all HR for some institutes and centers, as well as the entire NIH-wide retirement office, leaving some parts of NIH without HR staff to support ongoing incentivized retirement programs and other staffing changes. Moreover, the lack of transparent communication and the targeting of specific sectors, like HR and administrative officers (AO), impeded staff from carrying out basic job functions that led to widespread confusion about roles, responsibilities, and who remained to do the work. Demonstrating clear continuing need for some RIFed positions, Contracting and Acquisitions staff, who provided for the purchase of office and research supplies, research and development contracts, information technology contracts, and other needs, were asked to continue to work while on administrative leave after receiving RIF notices. Despite their continued service and demonstrated need, most were separated from federal service and let go on Monday, July 14, 2025.
Regulation-driven, statutory, time-limited and essential activities are stalled. Absent staff with the necessary training and skills to complete them, NIH functions required by law, such as review of contract deliverables and invoices, Paperwork Reduction Act clearances, pre- and post-award administration of grants, and timely responses to congressional inquiries, are being conducted without appropriate expertise. For example, probationary terminations and incentivized retirements substantially reduced grants management staff at many institutes, impeding NIH's ability to award grants. The shortage of grants management staff has become so severe that one institute estimates that under current staffing levels, they could issue only about 5% of its typical new awards, potentially leaving $500 million unspent. At another institute, property management staff were RIFed, and the upper managers who have assumed responsibility for oversight of government property are unfamiliar with how the electronic systems work. As a result, staff whose laptops were broken could not obtain new ones. The fulfillment of Freedom of Information Act requests has been distributed across staff, taking time away from science, grants management, and other critical activities.
Insufficient oversight of high-risk studies and clinical trials. Lack of staff with clinical knowledge and expertise can lead to safety and productivity risks. Over the last 18 months, NIH has lost dozens of clinically-trained scientists responsible for the oversight of high-risk projects, such as drug and device-based interventions in children and patients with advanced or rare diseases. This reduction in clinical staff presents ethical challenges including endangering research participants, as discussed in Concern 3.
The talent pool for NIH staff has been curtailed. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) fellowship program, Presidential Management Fellows (PMF), and other fellowship and internship opportunities have been discontinued. This disrupts long-standing pathways to NIH employment and blocks NIH from the benefits of working with creative young scientists (and non-scientists) who represent the future of the U.S. health research enterprise. In addition, reporting suggests that the dismissals of NIH employees, which targeted workforce management, scientific administration, financial management, and communications, likely disproportionately impacted people from racial and ethnic minority groups. The OMB has removed race and ethnicity from their published workforce data, undermining the ability to monitor disparate effects. This reduction in diversity diminishes the ability of NIH to serve all Americans.
Recommendations
* Bring NIH staffing back to appropriate levels to enable mission-critical work, including communications, workforce management, human resources, legislative affairs, and other domains targeted by RIFs. Hiring excellent and needed staff will require restoring the reputation of the NIH working environment, which is widely recognized as hostile, as discussed in Concern 9. Rehire RIFed employees and probationary employees, where possible. Conduct a careful review of institute- and center-specific staffing needs, and restore staff with specific expertise in acquisitions, communications, legislative affairs, planning and evaluation, and other staff areas that were targeted by consolidations. Restore staff support for NIH's internal laboratories, including administrative operations, purchasing of laboratory supplies, hiring of needed personnel, and management of lab facilities, so that labs run efficiently and scientists can pursue science rather than paperwork.
* Protect the NIH mission by ensuring career civil servants retain employment protections and cannot be fired for political reasons, as would be enabled by the recent implementation of the Schedule Policy/Career designation. Congress must ensure that NIH staff have access to the full benefit of civil employee protections, so they continue to be hired and retained based on merit and not political views.
* Fill vacant institute and center directorships with qualified scientists selected through the search process typical at NIH prior to 2025. Congress should establish binding requirements to ensure rigorous search processes for these directorships, such as mandating search committees composed of both internal civil servant staff and independent external scientists and requiring a minimum time period for posting job announcements.
* Address Clinical Center staff shortages to ensure patient wellbeing and continuity of research, as recommended in Concern 3.
* Reinstate fellowship and training programs that provide a pipeline of excellent NIH staff, such as the AAAS fellowship program and PMF program.
Concern 6: Changing policies without staff input is creating foreseeable damage
Why It Matters
Institutional expertise is an essential component of organizational success. It is an asset that any competent management team must deploy for effective and prudent stewardship of available resources. This is particularly true at NIH, because the consequences of ignoring institutional expertise can endanger lives. In addition, the ecosystem of NIH grant funding is large and complex because it must address a wide variety of needs for the health research enterprise. These include filling research gaps with specific funding opportunities and projects, supporting shared research resources and infrastructure, training the research workforce, and supporting entrepreneurship through the small business programs. As such, developing and implementing effective policies at NIH depends on institutional knowledge that cannot be improvised. The staff who implement, administer, and oversee this ecosystem carry decades of scientific and administrative experience.
Since January 2025, Director Bhattacharya, HHS, DOGE, and OMB have in multiple instances envisioned, developed, and implemented changes without staff input, forcing staff to execute flawed and often conflicting policies that cause harm. These instances involve political disruption of peer and programmatic review without staff consultation, even though peer review is mandated by the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 6A). This has led to extensive delays, termination or non-awarding of grants for health research, disrupting taxpayer investments intended to benefit the American public. The cost of the mismanagement of NIH's best asset--its trained and experienced staff and consultants--is uninformed decisions, foreseeable error, and inconsistent or inappropriate implementation of policies. Such exclusion of institutional knowledge inevitably results in foreseeable harm as well as wasted time, effort and resources. The ultimate impact of this mismanagement falls disproportionately on those least able to weather it, such as patients and participants in abruptly terminated studies (as discussed in Concern 3) and early career scientists losing funding just as their work begins to bear fruit (as discussed in Concern 4). In biomedical science, technology development and human health, the consequences of these process failures are catastrophic.
Examples
Termination appeals denied without (or against) Scientific Program Officer consultation.
When grants were terminated under new policies and practices beginning in 2025, grantees were able to submit an appeal to justify the merit and appropriateness of their science. These appeals were seldom successful, and were often denied without input from relevant scientific staff. When input from relevant staff was sought, it was often disregarded. Disregarding the scientific judgement of scientific staff with appropriate expertise has been a common practice under Director Bhattacharya, as discussed in Concern 1.
Ill-considered changes to the management of peer review. Over the last 18 months, a number of changes have been imposed on the peer review process at NIH, without the input of knowledgeable peer review staff. These changes include consolidation of institute and center peer review branches into CSR, which impedes nuanced review of specific funding opportunities tailored to address the unique needs of the research communities supported by individual institutes and centers. In addition, NIH no longer requires study sections to reflect "diversity with respect to the geographic distribution, gender, race, and ethnicity of the membership," despite statutory requirements that such committees be balanced with respect to the U.S. population. Changes to the Early Career Reviewer program eliminating smaller workloads designed to enable junior investigators to more easily transition to full-scale review may impede participation in peer review by this next generation. The termination or reduction of benefits to scientists who volunteer on advisory committees and study sections, including the elimination of continuous submission and the narrowing of the window of qualifying service for late submission, undermines service in peer review and impedes the recruitment of reviewers.
In addition to these policies being implemented without staff input, these changes occurred without expert input from the Center for Scientific Review Advisory Council that would typically offer guidance to the director of CSR, because the council was recently disbanded. The cumulative effect of these changes undermine rigorous and fair peer review of research applications submitted to NIH.
NIH mandated a 50% rate of multiyear funding (MYF) without staff input. As discussed in Concern 4, MYF pays the full cost of a grant award upfront, reducing the impact of the NIH budget. In addition, MYF reduces the ability for NIH staff to effectively oversee awards, as further funds cannot be withheld should studies fail to achieve study objectives or reach critical milestones such as adequate participant recruitment. The MYF mandate has also been particularly damaging to clinical trials. NIH is not considering clinical trials for MYF because they involve human study participants and require annual oversight for safety and productivity.
Because these studies still count against the 50% directive, clinical trial applications face the dual obstacles of funding decreases and de-prioritization of non-MYF awards. This may lead to a decrease in federal investment in clinical trials, which seek to bring new therapies and treatment approaches to patients with chronic and life-threatening diseases.
Recommendations
* Solicit input from staff with relevant experience and knowledge before adopting any new policy or processes. NIH staff understand the consequences of process change and can identify foreseeable harms before implementation. Routine incorporation of staff input, through working groups, pilot testing and structured review, would prevent many of the avoidable disruptions documented in this report (Concerns 4, 6 and 7).
* Ensure new policies are deployed with appropriate support, training, and mechanisms of adequate implementation. Policies implemented on extremely rapid timelines, without staff consultation or preparation, are bound to produce unnecessary disruption and harm.
Concern 7: Cumbersome and shifting processes are wasting resources and harming health
Why It Matters
Some who have reached government via Silicon Valley suggest that moving fast and breaking things enables innovation, but the approach can have serious adverse consequences, especially when applied to clinical research where human health, safety, and lives are at stake.
NIH is not a startup; its mission represents a compounding investment where the returns depend on stability. Effective scientific administration benefits from stable, predictable, and proportionate processes.
Yet, under HHS Secretary Kennedy and Director Bhattacharya, NIH has imposed arbitrary, ill-conceived, and cumbersome administrative burdens. These have often been launched abruptly without preparation, support, training, or mechanisms for adequate implementation. In some cases, policies are reversed, revised, and altered multiple times within mere weeks, creating uncertainty, instability, and waste. When administrative requirements are poorly thought through, implemented without adequate preparation or expert input (as discussed in Concern 6), or changed repeatedly without adequate notice or guidance, unnecessary costs fall on the shoulders of NIH staff, scientists, and the public. Derailing the careers and research pathways built with NIH funding represents an enormous self-inflicted waste of technological and scientific capacity, all to the detriment of American innovation and health.
Examples
Escalating administrative burden on program officers and principal investigators. Many of the administrative policies being implemented suffer from flaws, inconsistencies, and contradictions, requiring continual changes in methods and processes. The increased burden from these shifting policies undermines NIH staff's ability to carry out mission critical activities.
Every hour a grants manager, program officer, review officer, or scientist spends navigating the shifting and erratic changes in policy and bureaucracy is an hour not spent advising investigators, identifying scientific gaps, enabling peer review, or advancing research.
Cumulatively, the time and effort lost to implementing and correcting flawed policies delays discoveries and wastes taxpayer investment. In addition, increased burden without benefit drives staff attrition and lowers the attractiveness of the federal government as an employer, exacerbating staffing problems (as discussed in Concern 5). Examples include:
* A cumbersome screening process for ideological alignment has slowed the pace of grant awards. As discussed in Concern 2, the screening process uses a "computational text analysis tool" to scan for a discriminatory set of terms, flag grants as "misaligned" with new administration priorities, and launch scientifically unnecessary cycles of "renegotiation." The time required to manage active NIH grants has increased significantly, forcing staff, grantees, and institutions to focus on paperwork rather than fostering good science. Moreover, this lengthy process risks NIH's ability to obligate its Congressionally appropriated funds before the end of the fiscal year, as required by law.
* Barriers to supply procurement interrupts access to critical lab resources, impeding cutting edge and unique intramural NIH research. All purchasing orders above $15,000 now must go through a lengthy, centralized process that takes so long it effectively functions as an arbitrary limit on essential laboratory tools and resources.
Backlogs and arbitrary deadlines being imposed for purchase orders further impede obtaining needed equipment and resources, including inability to purchase new instruments and a lack of instrument service contracts to maintain and/or repair current instruments.
* Idiosyncratic travel policies interrupted critical work. These shifting policies prevented scientific staff from exchanging knowledge at conferences and program staff from overseeing NIH scientific investments. In early 2025, travel was almost entirely banned. Travel policies were changed multiple times in a year, with seemingly arbitrary approval or disapproval from political appointees, changes in advance notice, and procedures.
* Changes to performance evaluations, an annual regulatory requirement for NIH staff (5 CFR 430.201-430.210), were implemented off cycle, temporarily halting the entire process. These changes doubled the time required by supervisors and employees to complete the appraisal process, while restricting the range of evaluation outcomes.
* * *
(Continues with Part 3 of 3)
* * *
Original text here: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ginexi-Written-Testimony.pdf
Coordinated Party Expenditures - Policy Background Topic of White Paper From CRS
WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF13270) by American national government specialist R. Sam Garrett.
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Coordinated Party Expenditures: Policy Background
On June 30, 2026, in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission (NRSC v. FEC), the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated federal statutory limits on a type of political party spending known as coordinated party expenditures. This CRS In Focus provides brief policy background on coordinated party expenditures and now-invalidated ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF13270) by American national government specialist R. Sam Garrett. Here are excerpts: * * * Coordinated Party Expenditures: Policy Background On June 30, 2026, in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission (NRSC v. FEC), the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated federal statutory limits on a type of political party spending known as coordinated party expenditures. This CRS In Focus provides brief policy background on coordinated party expenditures and now-invalidatedstatutory limits. Potential campaign finance implications, discussed briefly, appear to be in flux. Another CRS product, cited below, provides legal analysis that is beyond the scope of this In Focus.
What Are Coordinated Party Expenditures?
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) provides political parties with three major options for providing financial support to House, Senate, and presidential candidates: (1) contributions, (2) coordinated expenditures, and (3) independent expenditures. Party committees may contribute no more than $5,000 per candidate, per election to candidate campaigns. Independent expenditures (IEs), which may not be coordinated with candidates, are not subject to limits. Coordinated expenditures, which apply during the general-election phase of the campaign, allow parties to buy goods or services on behalf of a campaign, and to discuss those expenditures with the campaign. Coordinated expenditures typically fund purchases such as political advertising or polling.
Now-Invalidated Statutory Limits on Coordinated Party Expenditures
For historical reference, this section briefly discusses the now-invalidated statutory limits on coordinated party expenditures. A formula specified in FECA sets state-specific limits based on office sought, a state's voting-age population (VAP), and the consumer price index. The FEC announces annual inflation adjustments to these limits. For 2026, parties could make coordinated expenditures up to the following amounts:
* $130,600 for House candidates in single-district states;
* $65,300 for House candidates in multiple-district states; and
* amounts between $130,600 and approximately $4.1 million, depending on state population, for Senate candidates.
Parties also may make coordinated expenditures on behalf of their presidential nominees. In the most recent presidential election, 2024, the national limit was approximately $32.4 million.
State party committees may authorize their national counterparts to make coordinated party expenditures on their behalf (or vice versa). If such agreements exist, the national party, for example, could assume the spending limit for a state party, in which case the national party could spend up to its own limit and up to the state party's limit.
Recent Coordinated Expenditures and IEs by the Two Major Parties, and Potential Implications
Some observers have argued that unlimited coordinated expenditures could help parties compete with the financial influence of super PACs or other entities making IEs. Others counter that unlimited coordinated expenditures could increase corruption risks in party fundraising. Because the 2026 election cycle is already well underway, it is possible that practical implications from the ruling could be more substantial in the 2028 election cycle and beyond.
* * *
Figure 1. Fundraising by the Democratic Party and by the Republican Party, 2016-2024
Source: CRS figure from data in FEC Party Table 1.
Note: Data are subject to future amendments.
* * *
Figure 1 shows the state of fundraising for the major parties for the 2016 through 2024 cycles. In the most recent completed election cycles, the Democratic Party raised larger amounts than did the Republican Party in 2022 and 2024. In calendar year 2025 (not shown in the figure), Republican party committees outraised Democratic party committees ($420.4 million compared with $407.7 million). Republican committees also held more cash on hand at the end of 2025 ($184.1 million compared with $124.3 million). Unless Congress were to amend limits on contributions to parties, unlimited coordinated party expenditures, in and of themselves, would not change the amount of money that parties are permitted to raise.
Parties could choose to spend some amounts previously dedicated to IEs on coordinated expenditures. As Figure 2 below shows, and as might be expected given the unlimited nature of IEs, both parties chose to make far larger amounts of IEs rather than of coordinated expenditures in the 2016 through 2024 election cycles. During the 2024 cycle, Democratic parties spent more than twice as much on IEs (approximately $118.6 million) than did Republican party committees (approximately $58.6 million).
* * *
Figure 2. Coordinated Party Expenditures and Independent Expenditures by the Democratic Party and by the Republican Party, 2016-2024
Source: CRS figure from data in FEC Party Table 1.
Note: Data are subject to future amendments.
* * *
Party committees were reportedly reconsidering their operations in the immediate aftermath of NRSC v. FEC. For example, on June 30, the NRSC announced that it was "sunsetting its traditional [IE] unit" and would shift some activities to coordinated expenditures.
Both spending options - coordinated and independent - would appear to retain unique characteristics, and the two options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Parties might continue to choose IEs if they wish not to consult with campaigns, such as to distance campaigns from purchases that might be controversial (e.g., for political advertising attacking opponents). Coordinated expenditures could be more attractive for parties if they view such spending as more strategically or financially efficient than IEs. Unlimited coordinated expenditures might also provide parties with additional resources to compete against independent expenditures from super PACs or other "outside" groups. It is also possible that the ability to make unlimited coordinated expenditures could obligate candidates to adopt parties' preferred campaign strategies as a condition of such spending. Depending on one's perspective, such an outcome might be viewed as strengthening parties as institutions, or as weakening the candidate-centered nature of modern campaigns.
Another potential implication concerns political advertising purchases. Some media accounts have noted that unlimited coordinated party expenditures could essentially provide parties and their nominees with cheaper access to broadcast advertising time if such purchases were made as coordinated party expenditures, using a provision known as the lowest unit charge (LUC, also called the lowest unit rate). Candidates may purchase such broadcast advertising time at the most favorable rates provided to commercial advertisers for the same class of time. It is unclear whether that scenario will develop, and litigation regarding the LUC, which is beyond the scope of this In Focus, is ongoing.
Other implications for parties, donors, and campaigns remain to be seen, and could develop in unexpected ways over time. Potential questions include whether donors might change their giving preferences; whether parties will change their fundraising strategies (e.g., through joint fundraising committees that permit participating entities to share resources in permissible amounts); and how super PACs or other groups might respond if parties take on increased financial roles in campaigns.
Potential Policy Considerations for Congress
Legislation concerning coordinated party expenditure limits has been introduced in recent Congresses, although it has not been a major focus of legislative activity. Some such proposals (e.g., H.R. 4563 and H.R. 4472 in the 118th Congress) would have repealed the statutory limits. Other bills (e.g., H.R. 9354 in the 119th Congress and H.R. 8572 and S. 2344 in the 118th Congress) would have addressed coordinated party expenditures in the context of proposed public financing programs.
Those who wish to maintain the status quo might choose not to pursue any legislative change, or to codify the NRSC ruling by amending FECA to remove the references to existing limits. If Congress wanted to permit parties to raise additional amounts in response to unlimited coordinated expenditures, it could amend FECA's contribution limits. Limits also could be lowered if Congress determined that a greater corruption risk in party fundraising exists post-NRSC. Coordinated party expenditures are already disclosed in reports filed with the FEC; Congress also could consider new or different disclosure requirements. Congress also could consider a constitutional amendment providing greater authority to regulate political fundraising and spending generally. Several such amendments have been introduced in recent Congresses (e.g., H.J.Res. 121, H.J.Res. 122, S.J.Res. 43, and S.J.Res. 78 in the 119th Congress).
Additional Reading
For background on the Supreme Court case invalidating coordinated party expenditure limits, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11358, Campaign Finance: Supreme Court Scheduled to Consider Constitutionality of Coordinated Party Expenditure Limits, by L. Paige Whitaker.
For additional discussion of campaign finance policy, see CRS Report R41542, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
Parts of this In Focus are adapted from archived CRS Report RS22644, Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett and L. Paige Whitaker.
* * *
The white paper is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13270/IF13270.3.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Coordinated Party Expenditures: Policy Background
On June 30, 2026, in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission (NRSC v. FEC), the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated federal statutory limits on a type of political party spending known as coordinated party expenditures. This CRS In Focus provides brief policy background on coordinated party expenditures and now-invalidated ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF13270) by American national government specialist R. Sam Garrett. Here are excerpts: * * * Coordinated Party Expenditures: Policy Background On June 30, 2026, in National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission (NRSC v. FEC), the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated federal statutory limits on a type of political party spending known as coordinated party expenditures. This CRS In Focus provides brief policy background on coordinated party expenditures and now-invalidatedstatutory limits. Potential campaign finance implications, discussed briefly, appear to be in flux. Another CRS product, cited below, provides legal analysis that is beyond the scope of this In Focus.
What Are Coordinated Party Expenditures?
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) provides political parties with three major options for providing financial support to House, Senate, and presidential candidates: (1) contributions, (2) coordinated expenditures, and (3) independent expenditures. Party committees may contribute no more than $5,000 per candidate, per election to candidate campaigns. Independent expenditures (IEs), which may not be coordinated with candidates, are not subject to limits. Coordinated expenditures, which apply during the general-election phase of the campaign, allow parties to buy goods or services on behalf of a campaign, and to discuss those expenditures with the campaign. Coordinated expenditures typically fund purchases such as political advertising or polling.
Now-Invalidated Statutory Limits on Coordinated Party Expenditures
For historical reference, this section briefly discusses the now-invalidated statutory limits on coordinated party expenditures. A formula specified in FECA sets state-specific limits based on office sought, a state's voting-age population (VAP), and the consumer price index. The FEC announces annual inflation adjustments to these limits. For 2026, parties could make coordinated expenditures up to the following amounts:
* $130,600 for House candidates in single-district states;
* $65,300 for House candidates in multiple-district states; and
* amounts between $130,600 and approximately $4.1 million, depending on state population, for Senate candidates.
Parties also may make coordinated expenditures on behalf of their presidential nominees. In the most recent presidential election, 2024, the national limit was approximately $32.4 million.
State party committees may authorize their national counterparts to make coordinated party expenditures on their behalf (or vice versa). If such agreements exist, the national party, for example, could assume the spending limit for a state party, in which case the national party could spend up to its own limit and up to the state party's limit.
Recent Coordinated Expenditures and IEs by the Two Major Parties, and Potential Implications
Some observers have argued that unlimited coordinated expenditures could help parties compete with the financial influence of super PACs or other entities making IEs. Others counter that unlimited coordinated expenditures could increase corruption risks in party fundraising. Because the 2026 election cycle is already well underway, it is possible that practical implications from the ruling could be more substantial in the 2028 election cycle and beyond.
* * *
Figure 1. Fundraising by the Democratic Party and by the Republican Party, 2016-2024
Source: CRS figure from data in FEC Party Table 1.
Note: Data are subject to future amendments.
* * *
Figure 1 shows the state of fundraising for the major parties for the 2016 through 2024 cycles. In the most recent completed election cycles, the Democratic Party raised larger amounts than did the Republican Party in 2022 and 2024. In calendar year 2025 (not shown in the figure), Republican party committees outraised Democratic party committees ($420.4 million compared with $407.7 million). Republican committees also held more cash on hand at the end of 2025 ($184.1 million compared with $124.3 million). Unless Congress were to amend limits on contributions to parties, unlimited coordinated party expenditures, in and of themselves, would not change the amount of money that parties are permitted to raise.
Parties could choose to spend some amounts previously dedicated to IEs on coordinated expenditures. As Figure 2 below shows, and as might be expected given the unlimited nature of IEs, both parties chose to make far larger amounts of IEs rather than of coordinated expenditures in the 2016 through 2024 election cycles. During the 2024 cycle, Democratic parties spent more than twice as much on IEs (approximately $118.6 million) than did Republican party committees (approximately $58.6 million).
* * *
Figure 2. Coordinated Party Expenditures and Independent Expenditures by the Democratic Party and by the Republican Party, 2016-2024
Source: CRS figure from data in FEC Party Table 1.
Note: Data are subject to future amendments.
* * *
Party committees were reportedly reconsidering their operations in the immediate aftermath of NRSC v. FEC. For example, on June 30, the NRSC announced that it was "sunsetting its traditional [IE] unit" and would shift some activities to coordinated expenditures.
Both spending options - coordinated and independent - would appear to retain unique characteristics, and the two options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Parties might continue to choose IEs if they wish not to consult with campaigns, such as to distance campaigns from purchases that might be controversial (e.g., for political advertising attacking opponents). Coordinated expenditures could be more attractive for parties if they view such spending as more strategically or financially efficient than IEs. Unlimited coordinated expenditures might also provide parties with additional resources to compete against independent expenditures from super PACs or other "outside" groups. It is also possible that the ability to make unlimited coordinated expenditures could obligate candidates to adopt parties' preferred campaign strategies as a condition of such spending. Depending on one's perspective, such an outcome might be viewed as strengthening parties as institutions, or as weakening the candidate-centered nature of modern campaigns.
Another potential implication concerns political advertising purchases. Some media accounts have noted that unlimited coordinated party expenditures could essentially provide parties and their nominees with cheaper access to broadcast advertising time if such purchases were made as coordinated party expenditures, using a provision known as the lowest unit charge (LUC, also called the lowest unit rate). Candidates may purchase such broadcast advertising time at the most favorable rates provided to commercial advertisers for the same class of time. It is unclear whether that scenario will develop, and litigation regarding the LUC, which is beyond the scope of this In Focus, is ongoing.
Other implications for parties, donors, and campaigns remain to be seen, and could develop in unexpected ways over time. Potential questions include whether donors might change their giving preferences; whether parties will change their fundraising strategies (e.g., through joint fundraising committees that permit participating entities to share resources in permissible amounts); and how super PACs or other groups might respond if parties take on increased financial roles in campaigns.
Potential Policy Considerations for Congress
Legislation concerning coordinated party expenditure limits has been introduced in recent Congresses, although it has not been a major focus of legislative activity. Some such proposals (e.g., H.R. 4563 and H.R. 4472 in the 118th Congress) would have repealed the statutory limits. Other bills (e.g., H.R. 9354 in the 119th Congress and H.R. 8572 and S. 2344 in the 118th Congress) would have addressed coordinated party expenditures in the context of proposed public financing programs.
Those who wish to maintain the status quo might choose not to pursue any legislative change, or to codify the NRSC ruling by amending FECA to remove the references to existing limits. If Congress wanted to permit parties to raise additional amounts in response to unlimited coordinated expenditures, it could amend FECA's contribution limits. Limits also could be lowered if Congress determined that a greater corruption risk in party fundraising exists post-NRSC. Coordinated party expenditures are already disclosed in reports filed with the FEC; Congress also could consider new or different disclosure requirements. Congress also could consider a constitutional amendment providing greater authority to regulate political fundraising and spending generally. Several such amendments have been introduced in recent Congresses (e.g., H.J.Res. 121, H.J.Res. 122, S.J.Res. 43, and S.J.Res. 78 in the 119th Congress).
Additional Reading
For background on the Supreme Court case invalidating coordinated party expenditure limits, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11358, Campaign Finance: Supreme Court Scheduled to Consider Constitutionality of Coordinated Party Expenditure Limits, by L. Paige Whitaker.
For additional discussion of campaign finance policy, see CRS Report R41542, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
Parts of this In Focus are adapted from archived CRS Report RS22644, Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett and L. Paige Whitaker.
* * *
The white paper is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13270/IF13270.3.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
Health Research Scientist Ginexi Testifies Before House Oversight & Government Reform Committee (Part 3 of 3)
WASHINGTON, July 17 -- The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets released the following testimony by Elizabeth Ginexi, health research scientist and former scientific program official at the National Institutes of Health, from a June 30, 2026, hearing entitled "Mind Control and Accountability: Uncovering the Truth of the CIA's MKULTRA Project":
* * *
(Continued from Part 2 of 3)
Three policy changes on foreign subawards in rapid succession, with no scientific rationale. The disruption to foreign subawards, discussed in Concern 8, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets released the following testimony by Elizabeth Ginexi, health research scientist and former scientific program official at the National Institutes of Health, from a June 30, 2026, hearing entitled "Mind Control and Accountability: Uncovering the Truth of the CIA's MKULTRA Project": * * * (Continued from Part 2 of 3) Three policy changes on foreign subawards in rapid succession, with no scientific rationale. The disruption to foreign subawards, discussed in Concern 8,illustrates how policy changes waste the resources of both NIH staff and the investigators they support. On May 1, 2025, NIH banned all foreign subawards. Less than three months later on July 18, 2025, when the fully predictable impact and harms of abrupt trial terminations occurred, NIH created a limited mechanism to maintain foreign subawards for grants involving human research participants. The "final" policy announcing the PF5 multi-project award, released in January 2026, was followed by two more modifications. This PF5 mechanism represents a more complex, burdensome, administrative structure for investigators and NIH staff alike, requiring separately managed project components with distinct budgets, timelines, and reporting requirements. These abrupt and repeated changes required program officers across NIH to assess and reassess foreign grant components, contact and recontact affected investigators, and determine again and again whether and how those components could be restructured or terminated. For investigators, the changes required immediate removal of international collaborators, who in many cases provided unique expertise, equipment, data, or patient populations, from funded projects. The cumulative effect has been a significant waste of administrative labor: program officers, grant managers, and investigators were required to analyze their portfolios, notify collaborators, modify grant structures, and prepare documentation at least three times in response to shifting requirements. Scientists abroad who had been removed from U.S. grants, sometimes disrupting multi-year studies at critical stages, could not simply be reinstated. Some collaborations were permanently lost. The scientific investments embedded in those partnerships, funded by years of prior NIH awards, were partially or wholly forfeited.
The waste of terminated science. The costs associated with the loss of value, scientific knowledge, technological capacity, and lives resulting from termination of NIH grants will likely never be accurately established. As discussed in Concern 1, NIH terminated 5,522 grants in 2025. Each terminated study may be a cure or technology that will never manifest, and each abandoned study participant is a person left without hope. Terminating a grant or contract before it can deliver results does not "save costs;" it throws prior funding down the drain. What we know is that the costs are large and growing, and the current lack of respect for patients, study participants, staff and taxpayer dollars needs to end.
Recommendations
* Eliminate unnecessary and redundant layers of political review and justifications.
After two levels of review for scientific merit, evaluation of relevance to the institute or center's mission by program staff, and financial and policy review by grants management, the addition of non-scientific and political layers of review introduces political bias, unnecessary process and wasted resources. The costs (in dollars, time, lives, and public health) of any new policy must be estimated and considered before deployment.
* Issue transparent, publicly available guidance. Researchers and the majority of NIH staff do not have access to the criteria (if any) that determine travel approvals, enable timely purchase of laboratory equipment and resources, or inform which grants get terminated, flagged or approved. Similarly, the evolving list of "misaligned terms" that will trigger "renegotiation" are not provided to most staff or the public. The inconsistency and lack of transparency wastes time, energy and resources.
* Return decision making authority to experts (e.g., program officers, scientific review officers, grants management staff) with the appropriate statutory guardrails. These staff are charged by law with stewarding public funds for science, and possess the relevant scientific and administrative expertise to do so. This recommendation includes safeguarding the input of NIH scientific staff with expertise in relevant research areas on funding decisions, as recommended in Concern 1. Restoring their delegated authority, proven through the years to be productive, effective, and accountable, will significantly reduce waste and opportunities for abuse.
* Conduct and publish an audit of the administrative costs, liabilities accrued, and expertise lost as a result of the turbulent 2025-2026 policy changes. Transparent accounting of wasted expenditures and efforts, participant harms, legal liabilities, lost capacity and institutional knowledge at NIH (and across the nation) will document the true cost of the "move fast and break things" approach and inform targeted corrective action. Congress should commission the Government Accountability Office, as a trusted independent entity, to produce and disseminate such analysis.
Concern 8: Disruption of global research is endangering people in the United States and around the world
Why It Matters
Global collaboration allows the scientific enterprise to transcend national borders and benefit from scale. Without meaningful international collaboration, NIH risks funding science that reflects a limited view of the most pressing health challenges facing research and patient communities. Research partnerships have always been critical to identifying cross-cutting scientific priorities and leveraging complementary expertise across research teams and national boundaries. Barriers to collaboration create roadblocks to developing solutions that are scalable, adaptable, and generalizable. International collaboration brings significant benefit to the U.S. scientific enterprise and the American public:
* Global scientific advances benefit the American public. Research conducted internationally with NIH funding greatly enhances understanding of and treatments for American health challenges including heart disease, Alzheimer's disease and diabetes.
* International disease models aid development of guidelines for healthcare in the United States. American startups and small businesses leverage global technology development. Global research helps ensure that research and treatments are reliable and reproducible. Basic, translational, and clinical research conducted outside of the United States improves our ability to identify and treat diseases among Americans, including service members deployed during peacetime or conflict.
* Infectious diseases do not respect international borders. Our planet's ecosystem is mobile and dynamic. Some diseases not common in the United States may be contracted and brought home by travelers, as occurred during the COVID pandemic.
The current Ebola outbreak is a timely reminder of this concern, though the risk to people in the United States remains low. In southern U.S. states, mosquitos increasingly transmit diseases such as malaria, dengue, zika, chikungunya and yellow fever that were not historically common in the United States. Due to climate change, the range of insects that carry these diseases are expanding in the United States, increasing rates of vector-borne disease. To protect Americans against future illness and death from infectious diseases, current research must be conducted where the diseases and disease-borne vectors exist now. Global science collaborations are critical for bringing evidence learned in the United States directly to people where an infectious disease (e.g., malaria) is more common.
* Rare diseases are difficult to study without including patients from around the world. Due to their low prevalence, rare diseases require global collaboration to conduct meaningful research. Often, the United States does not have enough cases of a rare disease to enable valid research to support biomarker development and treatment solutions. Rare diseases also require specialized expertise that is often scattered across the globe.
* Health care innovations are not limited to the United States. By engaging with researchers and health care workers in many countries, we can leverage innovations from other countries to improve U.S. healthcare. For example, the NIH Global Health Reciprocal Innovation project aims to explore how reciprocal innovation can help spread and scale health technologies, methodologies and strategies from low- and middle-income countries to address similar challenges in other regions, especially high-income countries. The International Cancer Benchmarking Research Partnership aims to measure, understand, and address causes of global differences in cancer incidence, survival, and death. Many studies leveraging global collaborations have led to key medical advances, including the Point-of-Care Research Technology Network (POCTRN).
* NIH already had strong protections in place for oversight of research taking place outside the United States. NIH has long monitored "foreign components" in grant applications and awards. These foreign collaborations are well documented by program staff and many require State Department clearance. In response to a 2023 GAO report, NIH furthered its oversight on foreign components, updating its Grants Policy Statement to increase oversight of subaward agreements and adding a validation step to require progress reports prior to funding.
Examples
Foreign collaborations have been interrupted and discouraged. On May 1, 2025, with no advance notice or opportunity for staff or public comment, NIH banned foreign subawards in all new and non-competing NIH grants, forcing scientists to remove long-standing collaborators from their grants [NOT-OD-25-104]. Some research projects were required to remove the foreign component entirely. For example, the Cancer Intervention and Surveillance Modeling Network (CISNET) was stopped, then redesigned, ending long-standing international collaborations. Other studies were able to change the foreign component into a supplemental award. Many faced termination. For clinical trials conducted abroad, this represented a substantial ethical concern, as discussed in Concern 3. Even though these concerns were easily foreseeable, it took NIH more than three months to release a new announcement (NOT-OD-25-130, July 18, 2025), creating a limited mechanism to maintain foreign subawards for grants involving human research participants. For nearly a year after the initial policy change, U.S. scientists not conducting clinical studies had no avenue to apply for grants with their non-U.S. collaborators [NOT-OD-25-104; PA-26-002]. While NIH now has a funding announcement for such collaborative projects that restructures foreign partners as direct NIH-administered components (PA-26-002), many previously funded and valuable international collaborative projects, including CISNET, do not fit its requirements. Further, the new mechanism is not expected to make its first awards until spring 2027, nearly two years after foreign subawards were banned. In addition, some countries are subject to a de facto ban on funding, despite the absence of any internal policy or public announcement. Prohibited countries are not shared publicly and may change without notice.
Foreign scientists in the United States are working in an increasingly hostile environment. International scientists are a critical part of scientific excellence in the United States. More than 30% of all Nobel laureates since 2000 solely affiliated with a U.S. institution were foreign born. Yet, the administration has intimidated foreign scientists at U.S. ports of entry, harassed and detained foreign scholars, and established higher barriers for visas, permanent residency and citizenship. Together, these policies have reduced enrollment of international students at U.S. institutions by 17%, striking a severe blow to the United States' most important trade balance asset, education. NIH has not been exempt from this hostility. Two leading infectious disease researchers, citizens of the Netherlands and Cameroon, were recently arrested in what has been described as "a political witch hunt." The brain drain of early-stage researchers, the next generation of scientists, as well as more experienced investigators is ongoing, with unpredictable consequences for the competitiveness of U.S. science and technology.
Recommendations
* Keep research international. Upon completion of training, many foreign scientists elect to stay in the United States and contribute to the biomedical research enterprise here, some return to their home nations to collaborate and share what they've learned. This is a win-win situation for the United States. Blanket restrictions on foreign collaboration based on nationality should be removed. Effective coordination with the U.S. Department of State and the Fogarty International Center should be implemented to streamline the visa process for trainees for the duration of their training period and for post-doctoral and early-stage investigators to allow them to remain active as they develop their research careers. To keep its leading international position, the U.S. scientific enterprise must continue to draw talent from around the world.
* Ensure all research participants, regardless of demographic background, identity or location, receive the respect, safety, and dignity they deserve for generously donating their time and bodies to research, as also noted in Concerns 2 and 3.
* Reaffirm NIH support for global collaboration, which helps the United States remain a leader in biomedical research.
* Provide NIH applicants and staff with appropriate guidance and instructions for the new PF5 mechanism for NIH funded international collaborations. While some useful information has been provided, both applicants and staff need more information on this new grant mechanism.
Concern 9: A culture of fear and low morale is eroding scientific integrity
Why it Matters
Despite Director Bhattacharya's frequent emphasis on the value of scientific dissent and transparency, NIH has become a hostile work environment marked by fear and low morale.
This environment was created from the beginning of the Trump administration and the arrival of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) in January 2025 and continues to this day.
Creation of this hostile work environment is intentional and perpetuated by leading government officials. Regarding federal employees, OMB Director Vought stated: "When they wake up in the morning, we want them to not want to go to work, because they are increasingly viewed as the villains. We want their funding to be shut down ... We want to put them in trauma." Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kennedy disparaged public health officials, saying "Public health agencies have not been honest." Secretary Kennedy also said that public health authorities should not be trusted, because "trusting the experts is not a feature of science or democracy, it's a feature of totalitarianism and of religion." Threats made to federal workers as well as actual harms, including the attack at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, may have been inspired by such villainization.
NIH Director Bhattacharya has also contributed to the low morale of employees by publicly stating that NIH has failed its mission and has lost public trust. He suggests that NIH staff are the cause of this alleged loss of trust, with no evidence or acknowledgement of how disinformation, factions, and political doublespeak have eroded trust. He obfuscates when asked about policies and practices that harm staff and their ability to encourage innovative, rigorous, and impactful research. In fact, Dr. Bhattacharya himself bears partial blame for the loss of trust in NIH. As Josh Bloom and Henry Miller said at the time of his nomination, "[Bhattacharya's] flawed views led to unnecessary suffering and eroded trust in science." Indeed, trust in NIH has declined since his arrival. Devaluing his staff's scientific expertise and dedication to the highest standards, Director Bhattacharya has sought unearned recognition for implementing "gold-standard science," when in fact, NIH has always conducted and supported the highest quality, peer-reviewed research.
This hostile work environment:
* Saps employees' energy and enthusiasm, threatening their ability to effectively carry out their duties and detracting from the NIH mission.
* Creates fear resulting in reduced collaboration, mistrust among colleagues, self-censorship, and "anticipatory obedience," as Discussed in Concern 1. The fear of speaking up in the face of waste and abuse is detrimental to the safety of patients, progress in science, and the health of the American people.
* Contributes to brain drain from NIH, as discussed in Concern 5. The mass exodus of experienced and excellent staff has created a loss of scientific and administrative expertise, institutional memory and experience-based knowledge. This includes departures of high-profile leadership with no explanation or farewell messages, some of whom had been targeted by the "DEI Watch List."
Abundant historical examples demonstrate that a culture of fear adversely affects science. For example, the Soviet Union's "Lysenkoism," wherein scientists were suppressed and persecuted, led to disastrous, famine-inducing agricultural policies. A culture of fear is antithetical to freedom of inquiry, which is necessary for conducting and funding rigorous and reproducible science.
Examples
Retaliation and targeting create a culture of fear. Although Dr. Bhattacharya professes to support unimpeded academic freedom and has made assurances not to retaliate against NIH staff for public dissent, his and the administration's actions towards NIH staff have not reflected these stated values. Early in 2025, memos from senior HHS leaders and unnamed HHS listservs set a tone of fear, for example by encouraging NIH staff to report on their colleagues for any ongoing DEI activities. Former institute and center directors Jeanne Marrazzo and Kathleen Neuzil, who wrote a whistleblower report to Congress, were placed on administrative leave and later fired from NIH. Over half of NIH institute and center leadership were dismissed, as well as many other excellent scientists and leaders across NIH, as discussed in Concern 4. In conjunction with public retirements of NIH workers, these purges showcase the significant environment of censorship, retaliation and low morale.
Bethesda Declaration signers have also experienced retaliation, including receiving censures from their superiors and being targeted with Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests from outside groups. Dr. Jenna Norton, a lead Bethesda Declaration organizer was abruptly placed on administrative leave for more than 5 months without any official explanation. However, an anonymous HHS official defamed her as a radical leftist claiming she was put on leave because she was criticizing the administration, and Director Bhattacharya falsely claimed she had previously been investigated by the NIH. Though NIH reinstated Dr. Norton in May 2026, NIH failed to acknowledge and be accountable for its actions. At sister agencies like FEMA and EPA, employees were put on leave after signing their own letters of dissent. Some were also reinstated in May.
The culture of fear may be heightened via OMB's recently implemented Schedule Policy/Career rule, as described in Concern 5. By removing civil employment protections from scientific grant-focused staff and civil servant managers such as Branch Chiefs and Division Directors, all staff continue to navigate uncertainty and the strong possibility of losing essential NIH colleagues. Such conversion of NIH career staff to "at-will" status undermines the independence of thought and sense of safety that enable honesty and excellence in the oversight and review of scientific grants and funding.
Disruptions to productivity reduce morale. As detailed in Concern 7, policy changes now routinely occur without input from staff. New policies are communicated poorly, sometimes not even in writing, leading to spotty and variable awareness, interpretation, and enforcement.
Similarly, unprecedented numbers of legal challenges and rulings against the administration's policies are followed by a lack of guidance on the implications of rulings.
As discussed in Concern 5, the loss of skilled scientists, grants management, administrative staff and other trusted colleagues through dismissals of probationary staff, reductions in force, and voluntary departures affects morale as well as efficiency, as staff need to to adopt shifting responsibilities. Added duties often overwhelm those who remain, who may lack expertise, training, or bandwidth for these new tasks.
Limitations and cancellations of NIH-led initiatives like Notices of Funding Opportunities (NOFOs) send a message to scientific staff that exploring and championing specific areas of science, which they were hired to do, is no longer a priority.
Despite the benefits of telework to recruiting and retaining staff, mandates requiring return-to-office five days a week add unnecessary burden, harm the mental/physical health of employees, and detract from job performance. Additionally, targeted challenges to reasonable accommodations for HHS staff further showcase the lack of regard or respect paid to NIH workers.
Recommendations
* Solicit input from staff and encourage sharing of scientific ideas-even if these ideas don't align with current agency priorities. Leadership assurance to staff that they can safely share ideas and voice concerns will help to mitigate the current climate of fear and self-censorship.
* Promote and encourage alternative ideas, debate, and respectful dissent, both in actions and in words.
* Allow experts to formally document opinions, including dissenting opinions for all actions, especially grant terminations, paused foreign collaboration, and actions that alter contents of grants in order to "align" with political review. Because there will be future liability, a clear and truthful record of how and by whom the decisions were made is essential.
* Re-instate the annual Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) and other assessments of employee satisfaction, with strong mechanisms of anonymity in place.
Leadership should share results and actively commit to addressing the feedback.
v Act instead of talk: Director Bhattacharya repeatedly claims that he wants to inspire a culture of dissent, and yet dissent or debate is meaningless when the leadership does not listen, consider, or have the willingness to change course based on feedback from staff (including institute and center directors). We would like to see concrete actions towards restoring the culture and morale for the remaining NIH staff.
Closing Statement
The mission of NIH is to seek fundamental knowledge about the nature and behavior of living systems and the application of that knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability. NIH must deliver on this mission through effective stewardship of taxpayer funding, which is appropriated by Congress. This report documents the ways in which NIH is grossly mismanaging taxpayer funds while failing to execute its congressionally enacted mission. Though we write this in our personal capacities, we write with the knowledge and expertise we hold through our collective experiences carrying out the NIH mission. One year ago, we were compelled to speak up. Since then, we have watched as Director Bhattacharya oversaw further damage to the infrastructure that allows NIH research to save lives. At the same time, we have seen our fellow Americans, visa-holders, naturalized citizens and domestic-born alike, rise up to support publicly funded, ethical, equitable health research. Collectively, we have decided that academic freedom and scientific excellence are non-negotiable. We will continue to support and defend the Constitution and the mission of NIH.
* * *
Original text here: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ginexi-Written-Testimony.pdf
* * *
(Continued from Part 2 of 3)
Three policy changes on foreign subawards in rapid succession, with no scientific rationale. The disruption to foreign subawards, discussed in Concern 8, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Task Force on the Declassification of Federal Secrets released the following testimony by Elizabeth Ginexi, health research scientist and former scientific program official at the National Institutes of Health, from a June 30, 2026, hearing entitled "Mind Control and Accountability: Uncovering the Truth of the CIA's MKULTRA Project": * * * (Continued from Part 2 of 3) Three policy changes on foreign subawards in rapid succession, with no scientific rationale. The disruption to foreign subawards, discussed in Concern 8,illustrates how policy changes waste the resources of both NIH staff and the investigators they support. On May 1, 2025, NIH banned all foreign subawards. Less than three months later on July 18, 2025, when the fully predictable impact and harms of abrupt trial terminations occurred, NIH created a limited mechanism to maintain foreign subawards for grants involving human research participants. The "final" policy announcing the PF5 multi-project award, released in January 2026, was followed by two more modifications. This PF5 mechanism represents a more complex, burdensome, administrative structure for investigators and NIH staff alike, requiring separately managed project components with distinct budgets, timelines, and reporting requirements. These abrupt and repeated changes required program officers across NIH to assess and reassess foreign grant components, contact and recontact affected investigators, and determine again and again whether and how those components could be restructured or terminated. For investigators, the changes required immediate removal of international collaborators, who in many cases provided unique expertise, equipment, data, or patient populations, from funded projects. The cumulative effect has been a significant waste of administrative labor: program officers, grant managers, and investigators were required to analyze their portfolios, notify collaborators, modify grant structures, and prepare documentation at least three times in response to shifting requirements. Scientists abroad who had been removed from U.S. grants, sometimes disrupting multi-year studies at critical stages, could not simply be reinstated. Some collaborations were permanently lost. The scientific investments embedded in those partnerships, funded by years of prior NIH awards, were partially or wholly forfeited.
The waste of terminated science. The costs associated with the loss of value, scientific knowledge, technological capacity, and lives resulting from termination of NIH grants will likely never be accurately established. As discussed in Concern 1, NIH terminated 5,522 grants in 2025. Each terminated study may be a cure or technology that will never manifest, and each abandoned study participant is a person left without hope. Terminating a grant or contract before it can deliver results does not "save costs;" it throws prior funding down the drain. What we know is that the costs are large and growing, and the current lack of respect for patients, study participants, staff and taxpayer dollars needs to end.
Recommendations
* Eliminate unnecessary and redundant layers of political review and justifications.
After two levels of review for scientific merit, evaluation of relevance to the institute or center's mission by program staff, and financial and policy review by grants management, the addition of non-scientific and political layers of review introduces political bias, unnecessary process and wasted resources. The costs (in dollars, time, lives, and public health) of any new policy must be estimated and considered before deployment.
* Issue transparent, publicly available guidance. Researchers and the majority of NIH staff do not have access to the criteria (if any) that determine travel approvals, enable timely purchase of laboratory equipment and resources, or inform which grants get terminated, flagged or approved. Similarly, the evolving list of "misaligned terms" that will trigger "renegotiation" are not provided to most staff or the public. The inconsistency and lack of transparency wastes time, energy and resources.
* Return decision making authority to experts (e.g., program officers, scientific review officers, grants management staff) with the appropriate statutory guardrails. These staff are charged by law with stewarding public funds for science, and possess the relevant scientific and administrative expertise to do so. This recommendation includes safeguarding the input of NIH scientific staff with expertise in relevant research areas on funding decisions, as recommended in Concern 1. Restoring their delegated authority, proven through the years to be productive, effective, and accountable, will significantly reduce waste and opportunities for abuse.
* Conduct and publish an audit of the administrative costs, liabilities accrued, and expertise lost as a result of the turbulent 2025-2026 policy changes. Transparent accounting of wasted expenditures and efforts, participant harms, legal liabilities, lost capacity and institutional knowledge at NIH (and across the nation) will document the true cost of the "move fast and break things" approach and inform targeted corrective action. Congress should commission the Government Accountability Office, as a trusted independent entity, to produce and disseminate such analysis.
Concern 8: Disruption of global research is endangering people in the United States and around the world
Why It Matters
Global collaboration allows the scientific enterprise to transcend national borders and benefit from scale. Without meaningful international collaboration, NIH risks funding science that reflects a limited view of the most pressing health challenges facing research and patient communities. Research partnerships have always been critical to identifying cross-cutting scientific priorities and leveraging complementary expertise across research teams and national boundaries. Barriers to collaboration create roadblocks to developing solutions that are scalable, adaptable, and generalizable. International collaboration brings significant benefit to the U.S. scientific enterprise and the American public:
* Global scientific advances benefit the American public. Research conducted internationally with NIH funding greatly enhances understanding of and treatments for American health challenges including heart disease, Alzheimer's disease and diabetes.
* International disease models aid development of guidelines for healthcare in the United States. American startups and small businesses leverage global technology development. Global research helps ensure that research and treatments are reliable and reproducible. Basic, translational, and clinical research conducted outside of the United States improves our ability to identify and treat diseases among Americans, including service members deployed during peacetime or conflict.
* Infectious diseases do not respect international borders. Our planet's ecosystem is mobile and dynamic. Some diseases not common in the United States may be contracted and brought home by travelers, as occurred during the COVID pandemic.
The current Ebola outbreak is a timely reminder of this concern, though the risk to people in the United States remains low. In southern U.S. states, mosquitos increasingly transmit diseases such as malaria, dengue, zika, chikungunya and yellow fever that were not historically common in the United States. Due to climate change, the range of insects that carry these diseases are expanding in the United States, increasing rates of vector-borne disease. To protect Americans against future illness and death from infectious diseases, current research must be conducted where the diseases and disease-borne vectors exist now. Global science collaborations are critical for bringing evidence learned in the United States directly to people where an infectious disease (e.g., malaria) is more common.
* Rare diseases are difficult to study without including patients from around the world. Due to their low prevalence, rare diseases require global collaboration to conduct meaningful research. Often, the United States does not have enough cases of a rare disease to enable valid research to support biomarker development and treatment solutions. Rare diseases also require specialized expertise that is often scattered across the globe.
* Health care innovations are not limited to the United States. By engaging with researchers and health care workers in many countries, we can leverage innovations from other countries to improve U.S. healthcare. For example, the NIH Global Health Reciprocal Innovation project aims to explore how reciprocal innovation can help spread and scale health technologies, methodologies and strategies from low- and middle-income countries to address similar challenges in other regions, especially high-income countries. The International Cancer Benchmarking Research Partnership aims to measure, understand, and address causes of global differences in cancer incidence, survival, and death. Many studies leveraging global collaborations have led to key medical advances, including the Point-of-Care Research Technology Network (POCTRN).
* NIH already had strong protections in place for oversight of research taking place outside the United States. NIH has long monitored "foreign components" in grant applications and awards. These foreign collaborations are well documented by program staff and many require State Department clearance. In response to a 2023 GAO report, NIH furthered its oversight on foreign components, updating its Grants Policy Statement to increase oversight of subaward agreements and adding a validation step to require progress reports prior to funding.
Examples
Foreign collaborations have been interrupted and discouraged. On May 1, 2025, with no advance notice or opportunity for staff or public comment, NIH banned foreign subawards in all new and non-competing NIH grants, forcing scientists to remove long-standing collaborators from their grants [NOT-OD-25-104]. Some research projects were required to remove the foreign component entirely. For example, the Cancer Intervention and Surveillance Modeling Network (CISNET) was stopped, then redesigned, ending long-standing international collaborations. Other studies were able to change the foreign component into a supplemental award. Many faced termination. For clinical trials conducted abroad, this represented a substantial ethical concern, as discussed in Concern 3. Even though these concerns were easily foreseeable, it took NIH more than three months to release a new announcement (NOT-OD-25-130, July 18, 2025), creating a limited mechanism to maintain foreign subawards for grants involving human research participants. For nearly a year after the initial policy change, U.S. scientists not conducting clinical studies had no avenue to apply for grants with their non-U.S. collaborators [NOT-OD-25-104; PA-26-002]. While NIH now has a funding announcement for such collaborative projects that restructures foreign partners as direct NIH-administered components (PA-26-002), many previously funded and valuable international collaborative projects, including CISNET, do not fit its requirements. Further, the new mechanism is not expected to make its first awards until spring 2027, nearly two years after foreign subawards were banned. In addition, some countries are subject to a de facto ban on funding, despite the absence of any internal policy or public announcement. Prohibited countries are not shared publicly and may change without notice.
Foreign scientists in the United States are working in an increasingly hostile environment. International scientists are a critical part of scientific excellence in the United States. More than 30% of all Nobel laureates since 2000 solely affiliated with a U.S. institution were foreign born. Yet, the administration has intimidated foreign scientists at U.S. ports of entry, harassed and detained foreign scholars, and established higher barriers for visas, permanent residency and citizenship. Together, these policies have reduced enrollment of international students at U.S. institutions by 17%, striking a severe blow to the United States' most important trade balance asset, education. NIH has not been exempt from this hostility. Two leading infectious disease researchers, citizens of the Netherlands and Cameroon, were recently arrested in what has been described as "a political witch hunt." The brain drain of early-stage researchers, the next generation of scientists, as well as more experienced investigators is ongoing, with unpredictable consequences for the competitiveness of U.S. science and technology.
Recommendations
* Keep research international. Upon completion of training, many foreign scientists elect to stay in the United States and contribute to the biomedical research enterprise here, some return to their home nations to collaborate and share what they've learned. This is a win-win situation for the United States. Blanket restrictions on foreign collaboration based on nationality should be removed. Effective coordination with the U.S. Department of State and the Fogarty International Center should be implemented to streamline the visa process for trainees for the duration of their training period and for post-doctoral and early-stage investigators to allow them to remain active as they develop their research careers. To keep its leading international position, the U.S. scientific enterprise must continue to draw talent from around the world.
* Ensure all research participants, regardless of demographic background, identity or location, receive the respect, safety, and dignity they deserve for generously donating their time and bodies to research, as also noted in Concerns 2 and 3.
* Reaffirm NIH support for global collaboration, which helps the United States remain a leader in biomedical research.
* Provide NIH applicants and staff with appropriate guidance and instructions for the new PF5 mechanism for NIH funded international collaborations. While some useful information has been provided, both applicants and staff need more information on this new grant mechanism.
Concern 9: A culture of fear and low morale is eroding scientific integrity
Why it Matters
Despite Director Bhattacharya's frequent emphasis on the value of scientific dissent and transparency, NIH has become a hostile work environment marked by fear and low morale.
This environment was created from the beginning of the Trump administration and the arrival of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) in January 2025 and continues to this day.
Creation of this hostile work environment is intentional and perpetuated by leading government officials. Regarding federal employees, OMB Director Vought stated: "When they wake up in the morning, we want them to not want to go to work, because they are increasingly viewed as the villains. We want their funding to be shut down ... We want to put them in trauma." Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kennedy disparaged public health officials, saying "Public health agencies have not been honest." Secretary Kennedy also said that public health authorities should not be trusted, because "trusting the experts is not a feature of science or democracy, it's a feature of totalitarianism and of religion." Threats made to federal workers as well as actual harms, including the attack at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, may have been inspired by such villainization.
NIH Director Bhattacharya has also contributed to the low morale of employees by publicly stating that NIH has failed its mission and has lost public trust. He suggests that NIH staff are the cause of this alleged loss of trust, with no evidence or acknowledgement of how disinformation, factions, and political doublespeak have eroded trust. He obfuscates when asked about policies and practices that harm staff and their ability to encourage innovative, rigorous, and impactful research. In fact, Dr. Bhattacharya himself bears partial blame for the loss of trust in NIH. As Josh Bloom and Henry Miller said at the time of his nomination, "[Bhattacharya's] flawed views led to unnecessary suffering and eroded trust in science." Indeed, trust in NIH has declined since his arrival. Devaluing his staff's scientific expertise and dedication to the highest standards, Director Bhattacharya has sought unearned recognition for implementing "gold-standard science," when in fact, NIH has always conducted and supported the highest quality, peer-reviewed research.
This hostile work environment:
* Saps employees' energy and enthusiasm, threatening their ability to effectively carry out their duties and detracting from the NIH mission.
* Creates fear resulting in reduced collaboration, mistrust among colleagues, self-censorship, and "anticipatory obedience," as Discussed in Concern 1. The fear of speaking up in the face of waste and abuse is detrimental to the safety of patients, progress in science, and the health of the American people.
* Contributes to brain drain from NIH, as discussed in Concern 5. The mass exodus of experienced and excellent staff has created a loss of scientific and administrative expertise, institutional memory and experience-based knowledge. This includes departures of high-profile leadership with no explanation or farewell messages, some of whom had been targeted by the "DEI Watch List."
Abundant historical examples demonstrate that a culture of fear adversely affects science. For example, the Soviet Union's "Lysenkoism," wherein scientists were suppressed and persecuted, led to disastrous, famine-inducing agricultural policies. A culture of fear is antithetical to freedom of inquiry, which is necessary for conducting and funding rigorous and reproducible science.
Examples
Retaliation and targeting create a culture of fear. Although Dr. Bhattacharya professes to support unimpeded academic freedom and has made assurances not to retaliate against NIH staff for public dissent, his and the administration's actions towards NIH staff have not reflected these stated values. Early in 2025, memos from senior HHS leaders and unnamed HHS listservs set a tone of fear, for example by encouraging NIH staff to report on their colleagues for any ongoing DEI activities. Former institute and center directors Jeanne Marrazzo and Kathleen Neuzil, who wrote a whistleblower report to Congress, were placed on administrative leave and later fired from NIH. Over half of NIH institute and center leadership were dismissed, as well as many other excellent scientists and leaders across NIH, as discussed in Concern 4. In conjunction with public retirements of NIH workers, these purges showcase the significant environment of censorship, retaliation and low morale.
Bethesda Declaration signers have also experienced retaliation, including receiving censures from their superiors and being targeted with Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests from outside groups. Dr. Jenna Norton, a lead Bethesda Declaration organizer was abruptly placed on administrative leave for more than 5 months without any official explanation. However, an anonymous HHS official defamed her as a radical leftist claiming she was put on leave because she was criticizing the administration, and Director Bhattacharya falsely claimed she had previously been investigated by the NIH. Though NIH reinstated Dr. Norton in May 2026, NIH failed to acknowledge and be accountable for its actions. At sister agencies like FEMA and EPA, employees were put on leave after signing their own letters of dissent. Some were also reinstated in May.
The culture of fear may be heightened via OMB's recently implemented Schedule Policy/Career rule, as described in Concern 5. By removing civil employment protections from scientific grant-focused staff and civil servant managers such as Branch Chiefs and Division Directors, all staff continue to navigate uncertainty and the strong possibility of losing essential NIH colleagues. Such conversion of NIH career staff to "at-will" status undermines the independence of thought and sense of safety that enable honesty and excellence in the oversight and review of scientific grants and funding.
Disruptions to productivity reduce morale. As detailed in Concern 7, policy changes now routinely occur without input from staff. New policies are communicated poorly, sometimes not even in writing, leading to spotty and variable awareness, interpretation, and enforcement.
Similarly, unprecedented numbers of legal challenges and rulings against the administration's policies are followed by a lack of guidance on the implications of rulings.
As discussed in Concern 5, the loss of skilled scientists, grants management, administrative staff and other trusted colleagues through dismissals of probationary staff, reductions in force, and voluntary departures affects morale as well as efficiency, as staff need to to adopt shifting responsibilities. Added duties often overwhelm those who remain, who may lack expertise, training, or bandwidth for these new tasks.
Limitations and cancellations of NIH-led initiatives like Notices of Funding Opportunities (NOFOs) send a message to scientific staff that exploring and championing specific areas of science, which they were hired to do, is no longer a priority.
Despite the benefits of telework to recruiting and retaining staff, mandates requiring return-to-office five days a week add unnecessary burden, harm the mental/physical health of employees, and detract from job performance. Additionally, targeted challenges to reasonable accommodations for HHS staff further showcase the lack of regard or respect paid to NIH workers.
Recommendations
* Solicit input from staff and encourage sharing of scientific ideas-even if these ideas don't align with current agency priorities. Leadership assurance to staff that they can safely share ideas and voice concerns will help to mitigate the current climate of fear and self-censorship.
* Promote and encourage alternative ideas, debate, and respectful dissent, both in actions and in words.
* Allow experts to formally document opinions, including dissenting opinions for all actions, especially grant terminations, paused foreign collaboration, and actions that alter contents of grants in order to "align" with political review. Because there will be future liability, a clear and truthful record of how and by whom the decisions were made is essential.
* Re-instate the annual Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) and other assessments of employee satisfaction, with strong mechanisms of anonymity in place.
Leadership should share results and actively commit to addressing the feedback.
v Act instead of talk: Director Bhattacharya repeatedly claims that he wants to inspire a culture of dissent, and yet dissent or debate is meaningless when the leadership does not listen, consider, or have the willingness to change course based on feedback from staff (including institute and center directors). We would like to see concrete actions towards restoring the culture and morale for the remaining NIH staff.
Closing Statement
The mission of NIH is to seek fundamental knowledge about the nature and behavior of living systems and the application of that knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability. NIH must deliver on this mission through effective stewardship of taxpayer funding, which is appropriated by Congress. This report documents the ways in which NIH is grossly mismanaging taxpayer funds while failing to execute its congressionally enacted mission. Though we write this in our personal capacities, we write with the knowledge and expertise we hold through our collective experiences carrying out the NIH mission. One year ago, we were compelled to speak up. Since then, we have watched as Director Bhattacharya oversaw further damage to the infrastructure that allows NIH research to save lives. At the same time, we have seen our fellow Americans, visa-holders, naturalized citizens and domestic-born alike, rise up to support publicly funded, ethical, equitable health research. Collectively, we have decided that academic freedom and scientific excellence are non-negotiable. We will continue to support and defend the Constitution and the mission of NIH.
* * *
Original text here: https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ginexi-Written-Testimony.pdf
Gallego Energy and Water Bills Advance in Senate Committees
WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Ruben Gallego, D-Arizona, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026:
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Gallego Energy and Water Bills Advance in Senate Committees
Two of Senator Ruben Gallego (D-AZ)'s bills aimed at conserving Arizona's water and boosting clean energy production received committee consideration today.
"Arizona is facing historic drought conditions and soaring energy costs; we need innovative solutions to tackle these problems, and that's exactly what my bills being considered today are about," said Senator Gallego. "I'm glad to see both of them advance and look forward ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Ruben Gallego, D-Arizona, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026: * * * Gallego Energy and Water Bills Advance in Senate Committees Two of Senator Ruben Gallego (D-AZ)'s bills aimed at conserving Arizona's water and boosting clean energy production received committee consideration today. "Arizona is facing historic drought conditions and soaring energy costs; we need innovative solutions to tackle these problems, and that's exactly what my bills being considered today are about," said Senator Gallego. "I'm glad to see both of them advance and look forwardto continuing to work to see them become law."
Language from Senator Gallego's bipartisan Water Infrastructure Modernization Act was included in the Water Resources Development Act of 2026, which passed out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee unanimously this morning. The legislation would incentivize community water systems to purchase and implement new water technologies, including those that can monitor water loss and contamination in real time, integrate artificial intelligence, identify infrastructure failures, and promote aquifer recharge.
Additionally, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee's Subcommittee on Public Lands, Forests, and Mining held a hearing on Senator Gallego's Geothermal Cost-Recovery Authority Act, legislation that would strengthen the federal geothermal permitting program by ensuring the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has the resources it needs to process applications quickly and efficiently. The hearing, which provides an opportunity to hear from expert witnesses on legislation pending before the committee, is a critical step in advancing the legislation.
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Original text here: https://www.gallego.senate.gov/news/press-releases/gallego-energy-and-water-bills-advance-in-senate-committees/
* * *
Gallego Energy and Water Bills Advance in Senate Committees
Two of Senator Ruben Gallego (D-AZ)'s bills aimed at conserving Arizona's water and boosting clean energy production received committee consideration today.
"Arizona is facing historic drought conditions and soaring energy costs; we need innovative solutions to tackle these problems, and that's exactly what my bills being considered today are about," said Senator Gallego. "I'm glad to see both of them advance and look forward ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Ruben Gallego, D-Arizona, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026: * * * Gallego Energy and Water Bills Advance in Senate Committees Two of Senator Ruben Gallego (D-AZ)'s bills aimed at conserving Arizona's water and boosting clean energy production received committee consideration today. "Arizona is facing historic drought conditions and soaring energy costs; we need innovative solutions to tackle these problems, and that's exactly what my bills being considered today are about," said Senator Gallego. "I'm glad to see both of them advance and look forwardto continuing to work to see them become law."
Language from Senator Gallego's bipartisan Water Infrastructure Modernization Act was included in the Water Resources Development Act of 2026, which passed out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee unanimously this morning. The legislation would incentivize community water systems to purchase and implement new water technologies, including those that can monitor water loss and contamination in real time, integrate artificial intelligence, identify infrastructure failures, and promote aquifer recharge.
Additionally, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee's Subcommittee on Public Lands, Forests, and Mining held a hearing on Senator Gallego's Geothermal Cost-Recovery Authority Act, legislation that would strengthen the federal geothermal permitting program by ensuring the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has the resources it needs to process applications quickly and efficiently. The hearing, which provides an opportunity to hear from expert witnesses on legislation pending before the committee, is a critical step in advancing the legislation.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.gallego.senate.gov/news/press-releases/gallego-energy-and-water-bills-advance-in-senate-committees/
At Budget Markup, Ranking Member Boyle Slams Republicans' "America Last" Budget
WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Rep. Brendan Boyle, D-Pennsylvania, ranking member of the House Budget Committee, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026:
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At Budget Markup, Ranking Member Boyle Slams Republicans' "America Last" Budget
Congressman Brendan F. Boyle (PA-02), Ranking Member of the House Budget Committee, slammed Republicans' "America Last" budget that wastes tens of billions of taxpayer dollars on Trump's disastrous Iran war and does nothing to lower costs. In his opening statement, Boyle blasted House Republicans for taking no action to improve the lives of the American ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Rep. Brendan Boyle, D-Pennsylvania, ranking member of the House Budget Committee, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026: * * * At Budget Markup, Ranking Member Boyle Slams Republicans' "America Last" Budget Congressman Brendan F. Boyle (PA-02), Ranking Member of the House Budget Committee, slammed Republicans' "America Last" budget that wastes tens of billions of taxpayer dollars on Trump's disastrous Iran war and does nothing to lower costs. In his opening statement, Boyle blasted House Republicans for taking no action to improve the lives of the Americanpeople.
Democratic amendments from today's markup will be available here (https://democrats-budget.house.gov/AmericaLastAmendments) as they are introduced.
A transcript as delivered is below.
Ranking Member Boyle's remarks as delivered:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wasn't planning on starting like this, but listening to you talk reminded me of one of the things I used to love to do when my daughter was younger. She's 12 now, but when she was much younger, I would love to read her fairy tale stories. And I would try to come up with the most imaginative, wildest, most creative fairy tale I could come up with.
Mr. Chairman, I give you credit, the fairy tale you just told was so imaginative, I could never come up with something as wild. So, I'm going to instead, in the 12 minutes that I have, attempt to stick to the facts, of what are actually in the Republican Reconciliation 3.0, "America Last."
You know, as divisive as the 2024 election may have been, one thing that actually both Democrats and Republicans agreed on, the Democratic nominee for president and Republican nominee for president both agreed on, the polls were overwhelmingly clear: The top issue for the American people was affordability.
The costs post-pandemic had gone too high, that America had become unaffordable, and that campaign was about who would lower costs. President Trump ran around my state of Pennsylvania, more than any other state in the union, promising to lower costs, and I quote his exact words, "I will lower costs on day one."
Here we are more than 18 months later. Are costs any lower? Of course not. In fact, they are through the roof. And they are through the roof specifically because of failed Trump-Republican policies. First, the Trump tariff taxes. They have dramatically increased costs on the American people. Because of the Trump tariff taxes, the average American household paid nearly $1,700 more last year for goods than they did the year before, directly attributable to the Trump tariff taxes.
That was last year. What does President Trump and his Republican allies in Congress come up with this year? A reckless, idiotic preemptive war on Iran. Gas prices were $2.98 a gallon nationally on February 28th, the day before the war began. Within 30 days, they rose more than 50 percent and indeed are now still more than 40 percent higher than what they were a few months ago.
But it's not just gas prices. It's food prices. It's the prices for consumer goods. On and on we go. Now, you might think, given that the top issue in the 2024 election was affordability, and that the top issue today is affordability, you might think the majority would want to spend time in a reconciliation bill addressing the number one issue on voters' minds.
I can tell you, 47 pages in their bill, 6,560 words, and not one word on bringing down costs for the American people. Not one word. Instead, we have tens of billions of dollars for the most unpopular war in American history. So, over the last 18 months, we have seen where Republicans' priorities are: trillions of dollars in tax cuts for billionaires, tens of billions of dollars for war, and absolutely nothing for the American people.
Now, one of the other facets of the chairman's fairy tale on Donald Trump was to make him sound like he's George Washington and Abe Lincoln rolled into one. If this president was doing that well, then geez, I guess his poll ratings must be through the roof. The American people must be overjoyed. So let's take a look at the president's report card.
Let's see who the people believe in this argument. Trump's handling of the economy, according to Fox News, 31 percent of the American people approve, 68 percent disapprove. Trump's handling of inflation, 27 percent approve, 73 percent disapproval, the worst numbers since the Carter presidency. Trend on the economy, 17 percent of the American people think it's getting better, 53 percent think it's getting worse.
There's more polling data here I could cite. It's the same exact story. By an overwhelming margin, two to one, even three to one, the American people know that this is a failed presidency, and this has been a failed Republican majority. He promised to lower costs on day one. He hasn't done that.
In fact, he's not even trying. So this side will stand proudly united in opposition. If there is ever an attempt from the other side to actually address the affordability crisis in this country, then you will have willing partners who want to work with you. But it is quite clear from the last reconciliation, as well as this reconciliation, we have a president and a majority who couldn't care less about the affordability crisis facing this country.
With that, I yield back.
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Original text here: https://democrats-budget.house.gov/news/press-releases/budget-markup-ranking-member-boyle-slams-republicans-america-last-budget
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At Budget Markup, Ranking Member Boyle Slams Republicans' "America Last" Budget
Congressman Brendan F. Boyle (PA-02), Ranking Member of the House Budget Committee, slammed Republicans' "America Last" budget that wastes tens of billions of taxpayer dollars on Trump's disastrous Iran war and does nothing to lower costs. In his opening statement, Boyle blasted House Republicans for taking no action to improve the lives of the American ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Rep. Brendan Boyle, D-Pennsylvania, ranking member of the House Budget Committee, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026: * * * At Budget Markup, Ranking Member Boyle Slams Republicans' "America Last" Budget Congressman Brendan F. Boyle (PA-02), Ranking Member of the House Budget Committee, slammed Republicans' "America Last" budget that wastes tens of billions of taxpayer dollars on Trump's disastrous Iran war and does nothing to lower costs. In his opening statement, Boyle blasted House Republicans for taking no action to improve the lives of the Americanpeople.
Democratic amendments from today's markup will be available here (https://democrats-budget.house.gov/AmericaLastAmendments) as they are introduced.
A transcript as delivered is below.
Ranking Member Boyle's remarks as delivered:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wasn't planning on starting like this, but listening to you talk reminded me of one of the things I used to love to do when my daughter was younger. She's 12 now, but when she was much younger, I would love to read her fairy tale stories. And I would try to come up with the most imaginative, wildest, most creative fairy tale I could come up with.
Mr. Chairman, I give you credit, the fairy tale you just told was so imaginative, I could never come up with something as wild. So, I'm going to instead, in the 12 minutes that I have, attempt to stick to the facts, of what are actually in the Republican Reconciliation 3.0, "America Last."
You know, as divisive as the 2024 election may have been, one thing that actually both Democrats and Republicans agreed on, the Democratic nominee for president and Republican nominee for president both agreed on, the polls were overwhelmingly clear: The top issue for the American people was affordability.
The costs post-pandemic had gone too high, that America had become unaffordable, and that campaign was about who would lower costs. President Trump ran around my state of Pennsylvania, more than any other state in the union, promising to lower costs, and I quote his exact words, "I will lower costs on day one."
Here we are more than 18 months later. Are costs any lower? Of course not. In fact, they are through the roof. And they are through the roof specifically because of failed Trump-Republican policies. First, the Trump tariff taxes. They have dramatically increased costs on the American people. Because of the Trump tariff taxes, the average American household paid nearly $1,700 more last year for goods than they did the year before, directly attributable to the Trump tariff taxes.
That was last year. What does President Trump and his Republican allies in Congress come up with this year? A reckless, idiotic preemptive war on Iran. Gas prices were $2.98 a gallon nationally on February 28th, the day before the war began. Within 30 days, they rose more than 50 percent and indeed are now still more than 40 percent higher than what they were a few months ago.
But it's not just gas prices. It's food prices. It's the prices for consumer goods. On and on we go. Now, you might think, given that the top issue in the 2024 election was affordability, and that the top issue today is affordability, you might think the majority would want to spend time in a reconciliation bill addressing the number one issue on voters' minds.
I can tell you, 47 pages in their bill, 6,560 words, and not one word on bringing down costs for the American people. Not one word. Instead, we have tens of billions of dollars for the most unpopular war in American history. So, over the last 18 months, we have seen where Republicans' priorities are: trillions of dollars in tax cuts for billionaires, tens of billions of dollars for war, and absolutely nothing for the American people.
Now, one of the other facets of the chairman's fairy tale on Donald Trump was to make him sound like he's George Washington and Abe Lincoln rolled into one. If this president was doing that well, then geez, I guess his poll ratings must be through the roof. The American people must be overjoyed. So let's take a look at the president's report card.
Let's see who the people believe in this argument. Trump's handling of the economy, according to Fox News, 31 percent of the American people approve, 68 percent disapprove. Trump's handling of inflation, 27 percent approve, 73 percent disapproval, the worst numbers since the Carter presidency. Trend on the economy, 17 percent of the American people think it's getting better, 53 percent think it's getting worse.
There's more polling data here I could cite. It's the same exact story. By an overwhelming margin, two to one, even three to one, the American people know that this is a failed presidency, and this has been a failed Republican majority. He promised to lower costs on day one. He hasn't done that.
In fact, he's not even trying. So this side will stand proudly united in opposition. If there is ever an attempt from the other side to actually address the affordability crisis in this country, then you will have willing partners who want to work with you. But it is quite clear from the last reconciliation, as well as this reconciliation, we have a president and a majority who couldn't care less about the affordability crisis facing this country.
With that, I yield back.
* * *
Original text here: https://democrats-budget.house.gov/news/press-releases/budget-markup-ranking-member-boyle-slams-republicans-america-last-budget
Appearances by Sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices at Congressional Committee & Subcommittee Hearings - 1/1/1960 to 7/15/2026 Topic of White Paper From CRS
WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following Insight white paper (No. IN12155) by American national government analyst Barry J. McMillion and senior research librarian Jennifer E. Manning.
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Appearances by Sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices at Congressional Committee and Subcommittee Hearings (1/1/1960 to 7/15/2026)
This Insight provides historical information and analysis related to appearances by sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices at congressional committee and subcommittee hearings during the period January 1, 1960, through ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following Insight white paper (No. IN12155) by American national government analyst Barry J. McMillion and senior research librarian Jennifer E. Manning. Here are excerpts: * * * Appearances by Sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices at Congressional Committee and Subcommittee Hearings (1/1/1960 to 7/15/2026) This Insight provides historical information and analysis related to appearances by sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices at congressional committee and subcommittee hearings during the period January 1, 1960, throughJuly 15, 2026 (confirmation hearings are excluded from the analysis). Congressional hearings are used, generally, by committees and subcommittees "to obtain information and opinions on proposed legislation, conduct an investigation, or evaluate/oversee the activities of a government department." Hearings "may also be purely exploratory in nature, providing testimony and data about topics of current interest."
It has not been uncommon, at least since 1960, for sitting Supreme Court Justices to appear at congressional committee and subcommittee hearings. Justices made such appearances at least once every year from 1960 through 2011. Most recently, on July 14, 2026, Supreme Court Justices appeared at subcommittee hearings in both the House and Senate, when Justices Elena Kagan and Amy Coney Barrett testified about the Supreme Court's budget request for FY2027.
Prior to these appearances, Supreme Court Justices last appeared at a House hearing in 2019, when Justices Samuel Alito and Elena Kagan testified before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) about the Supreme Court's budget request for FY2020. Sitting Justices last appeared at a Senate hearing in 2011, when Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding their views about the constitutional role of federal judges.
The data presented below were compiled from information collected by CRS using ProQuest Congressional. When searching ProQuest Congressional to compile the information provided below, CRS searched for each Justice's name in the "witness" field for congressional hearings, as well as for his or her name in the full text of hearing transcripts for the 1960 to 2026 period. The search of the full text transcripts revealed instances of hearings when Justices appeared before House and Senate committees, but which were not identified by ProQuest Congressional as instances of Justices appearing as committee witnesses. There may be additional instances of Justices appearing before congressional committees that were not identified using the methodology described above.
How many appearances did Supreme Court Justices make at committee or subcommittee hearings from January 1, 1960, through July 15, 2026?
CRS identified 95 committee or subcommittee hearings held from January 1, 1960, through July 15, 2026, that included an appearance by at least one sitting Supreme Court Justice. Of the 95 hearings, 65 (68%) were held by a House committee or subcommittee and 30 (32%) were held by a Senate committee or subcommittee. CRS identified no instance of a sitting Justice appearing before a joint committee.
Collectively, the 95 committee and subcommittee hearings during this period featured a total of 179 appearances by sitting Supreme Court Justices (most hearings included appearances by at least two Justices). By chamber, this included 122 appearances in the House and 57 appearances in the Senate.
Of the 24 Justices who have served on the Court since 1960, excluding those currently serving, 15 (63%) appeared at a congressional committee or subcommittee hearing on at least one occasion. Among these 15 Justices, 11 made five or more appearances during this period.
Of the nine current Justices, four (44%) have appeared at a committee or subcommittee hearing on at least one occasion. Specifically, Justice Clarence Thomas has appeared 13 times, last appearing in 2010; Justice Samuel Alito has appeared twice, last appearing in 2019; Justice Elena Kagan has appeared three times, last appearing in 2026; and Justice Amy Coney Barrett has appeared twice, last appearing in 2026.
Figure 1 shows the total number of appearances made by specific Justices at committee and subcommittee hearings from January 1, 1960, through July 15, 2026, as well as a breakdown of each Justice's appearances in each chamber. The figure also indicates the last year a Justice appeared before a congressional committee or subcommittee while still serving on the Court.
As shown by the figure, Justice Byron White made the greatest number of total appearances before congressional committees and subcommittees (24), followed by Justices Anthony Kennedy (23) and Sandra Day O'Connor (21). Justice Kennedy made the greatest number of appearances in the House, while Justices O'Connor and White made the greatest number of appearances in the Senate.
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Figure 1. Number of Appearances by Sitting Supreme Court Justices at Congressional Committee and Subcommittee Hearings
* * *
In how many years during this period did Supreme Court Justices appear before congressional committees or subcommittees?
Overall, from January 1, 1960, through July 15, 2026, a sitting Supreme Court Justice appeared at a House or Senate committee or subcommittee hearing in 56 of the 67 years during this period (including 2026). Notably, a sitting Justice appeared at a hearing for 52 consecutive years, from 1960 through 2011. In contrast, CRS did not identify any such appearances by a sitting Justice in either chamber for 11 of the past 15 years (there were no appearances in 2012, 2014, or during the periods 2016-2018 and 2020-2025).
Additionally, there was a steep decline in appearances by sitting Justices at committee or subcommittee hearings in the Senate after 2000. Of the 30 Senate committee or subcommittee hearings for which a sitting Justice appeared, 26 (87%) occurred prior to 2000. The four post-2000 appearances by sitting Justices at a Senate committee or subcommittee hearing occurred in 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2026.
Prior to 2000, appearances by sitting Justices at committee and subcommittee hearings in the Senate were more common - specifically, such appearances occurred in 1964, 1967 to 1970 (four consecutive years), 1972 to 1974 (three consecutive years), 1978 to 1987 (10 consecutive years), 1989 to 1992 (four consecutive years), 1994, and 1996 to 1998 (three consecutive years).
Before which congressional committees and subcommittees did Supreme Court Justices appear?
Of the 179 appearances by sitting Justices from January 1, 1960, through July 15, 2026, 165 (92%) were before either the House or Senate Appropriations Committee (most commonly, before an appropriations subcommittee).
While most appearances by sitting Justices since 1960 have been in the context of the Court's annual appropriations request, the questions posed to the Justices during appropriations hearings have not been limited solely to the Court's request. For example, Justices have been asked questions related to why the Supreme Court itself has not adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct, how the judiciary handles workplace misconduct issues, and the confirmation process for federal judges.
Appearances prior to 1960 may have been less tied to the Court's annual appropriations request. As noted by Senator Leahy in 2011, an appearance by Justice Kennedy before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2007 reflected "a tradition of Justices testifying before Congress on matters other than their appropriations requests, a tradition which included appearances by Chief Justice Taft and Chief Justice Hughes in the 1920s and '30s, as well as by Justice Jackson in 1941."
* * *
The white paper is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12155/IN12155.2.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Appearances by Sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices at Congressional Committee and Subcommittee Hearings (1/1/1960 to 7/15/2026)
This Insight provides historical information and analysis related to appearances by sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices at congressional committee and subcommittee hearings during the period January 1, 1960, through ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following Insight white paper (No. IN12155) by American national government analyst Barry J. McMillion and senior research librarian Jennifer E. Manning. Here are excerpts: * * * Appearances by Sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices at Congressional Committee and Subcommittee Hearings (1/1/1960 to 7/15/2026) This Insight provides historical information and analysis related to appearances by sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices at congressional committee and subcommittee hearings during the period January 1, 1960, throughJuly 15, 2026 (confirmation hearings are excluded from the analysis). Congressional hearings are used, generally, by committees and subcommittees "to obtain information and opinions on proposed legislation, conduct an investigation, or evaluate/oversee the activities of a government department." Hearings "may also be purely exploratory in nature, providing testimony and data about topics of current interest."
It has not been uncommon, at least since 1960, for sitting Supreme Court Justices to appear at congressional committee and subcommittee hearings. Justices made such appearances at least once every year from 1960 through 2011. Most recently, on July 14, 2026, Supreme Court Justices appeared at subcommittee hearings in both the House and Senate, when Justices Elena Kagan and Amy Coney Barrett testified about the Supreme Court's budget request for FY2027.
Prior to these appearances, Supreme Court Justices last appeared at a House hearing in 2019, when Justices Samuel Alito and Elena Kagan testified before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) about the Supreme Court's budget request for FY2020. Sitting Justices last appeared at a Senate hearing in 2011, when Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding their views about the constitutional role of federal judges.
The data presented below were compiled from information collected by CRS using ProQuest Congressional. When searching ProQuest Congressional to compile the information provided below, CRS searched for each Justice's name in the "witness" field for congressional hearings, as well as for his or her name in the full text of hearing transcripts for the 1960 to 2026 period. The search of the full text transcripts revealed instances of hearings when Justices appeared before House and Senate committees, but which were not identified by ProQuest Congressional as instances of Justices appearing as committee witnesses. There may be additional instances of Justices appearing before congressional committees that were not identified using the methodology described above.
How many appearances did Supreme Court Justices make at committee or subcommittee hearings from January 1, 1960, through July 15, 2026?
CRS identified 95 committee or subcommittee hearings held from January 1, 1960, through July 15, 2026, that included an appearance by at least one sitting Supreme Court Justice. Of the 95 hearings, 65 (68%) were held by a House committee or subcommittee and 30 (32%) were held by a Senate committee or subcommittee. CRS identified no instance of a sitting Justice appearing before a joint committee.
Collectively, the 95 committee and subcommittee hearings during this period featured a total of 179 appearances by sitting Supreme Court Justices (most hearings included appearances by at least two Justices). By chamber, this included 122 appearances in the House and 57 appearances in the Senate.
Of the 24 Justices who have served on the Court since 1960, excluding those currently serving, 15 (63%) appeared at a congressional committee or subcommittee hearing on at least one occasion. Among these 15 Justices, 11 made five or more appearances during this period.
Of the nine current Justices, four (44%) have appeared at a committee or subcommittee hearing on at least one occasion. Specifically, Justice Clarence Thomas has appeared 13 times, last appearing in 2010; Justice Samuel Alito has appeared twice, last appearing in 2019; Justice Elena Kagan has appeared three times, last appearing in 2026; and Justice Amy Coney Barrett has appeared twice, last appearing in 2026.
Figure 1 shows the total number of appearances made by specific Justices at committee and subcommittee hearings from January 1, 1960, through July 15, 2026, as well as a breakdown of each Justice's appearances in each chamber. The figure also indicates the last year a Justice appeared before a congressional committee or subcommittee while still serving on the Court.
As shown by the figure, Justice Byron White made the greatest number of total appearances before congressional committees and subcommittees (24), followed by Justices Anthony Kennedy (23) and Sandra Day O'Connor (21). Justice Kennedy made the greatest number of appearances in the House, while Justices O'Connor and White made the greatest number of appearances in the Senate.
* * *
Figure 1. Number of Appearances by Sitting Supreme Court Justices at Congressional Committee and Subcommittee Hearings
* * *
In how many years during this period did Supreme Court Justices appear before congressional committees or subcommittees?
Overall, from January 1, 1960, through July 15, 2026, a sitting Supreme Court Justice appeared at a House or Senate committee or subcommittee hearing in 56 of the 67 years during this period (including 2026). Notably, a sitting Justice appeared at a hearing for 52 consecutive years, from 1960 through 2011. In contrast, CRS did not identify any such appearances by a sitting Justice in either chamber for 11 of the past 15 years (there were no appearances in 2012, 2014, or during the periods 2016-2018 and 2020-2025).
Additionally, there was a steep decline in appearances by sitting Justices at committee or subcommittee hearings in the Senate after 2000. Of the 30 Senate committee or subcommittee hearings for which a sitting Justice appeared, 26 (87%) occurred prior to 2000. The four post-2000 appearances by sitting Justices at a Senate committee or subcommittee hearing occurred in 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2026.
Prior to 2000, appearances by sitting Justices at committee and subcommittee hearings in the Senate were more common - specifically, such appearances occurred in 1964, 1967 to 1970 (four consecutive years), 1972 to 1974 (three consecutive years), 1978 to 1987 (10 consecutive years), 1989 to 1992 (four consecutive years), 1994, and 1996 to 1998 (three consecutive years).
Before which congressional committees and subcommittees did Supreme Court Justices appear?
Of the 179 appearances by sitting Justices from January 1, 1960, through July 15, 2026, 165 (92%) were before either the House or Senate Appropriations Committee (most commonly, before an appropriations subcommittee).
While most appearances by sitting Justices since 1960 have been in the context of the Court's annual appropriations request, the questions posed to the Justices during appropriations hearings have not been limited solely to the Court's request. For example, Justices have been asked questions related to why the Supreme Court itself has not adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct, how the judiciary handles workplace misconduct issues, and the confirmation process for federal judges.
Appearances prior to 1960 may have been less tied to the Court's annual appropriations request. As noted by Senator Leahy in 2011, an appearance by Justice Kennedy before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2007 reflected "a tradition of Justices testifying before Congress on matters other than their appropriations requests, a tradition which included appearances by Chief Justice Taft and Chief Justice Hughes in the 1920s and '30s, as well as by Justice Jackson in 1941."
* * *
The white paper is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12155/IN12155.2.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
ALSOBROOKS: RUSSELL VOUGHT HAS TRAUMATIZED OUR CIVIL SERVANTS AND DESTROYED THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Angela Alsobrooks, D-Maryland, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026:
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ALSOBROOKS: RUSSELL VOUGHT HAS TRAUMATIZED OUR CIVIL SERVANTS AND DESTROYED THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
Today, Senator Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, questioned Russell Vought, Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) during the hearing "The CFPB Semi-Annual Report: A New Day at the CFPB Through Reform."
"The 160,000 federal employees in my state - these are the patriots ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Angela Alsobrooks, D-Maryland, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026: * * * ALSOBROOKS: RUSSELL VOUGHT HAS TRAUMATIZED OUR CIVIL SERVANTS AND DESTROYED THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Today, Senator Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, questioned Russell Vought, Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) during the hearing "The CFPB Semi-Annual Report: A New Day at the CFPB Through Reform." "The 160,000 federal employees in my state - these are the patriotsof our country who have worked for decades. They did not care whether the president is a Democrat or Republican. They are here to serve the American people, and they will not forget how they were treated, and neither will I. In fact, one Marylander who lost his federal job said the following, 'I can't tell you how terrifying it is to be a parent of two children faced with the thought that you cannot provide for your family.' So, I ask you, is that the kind of trauma you were talking about? Did you intend to sow terror for parents who need to provide for their families?" said Senator Alsobrooks.
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Original text here: https://www.alsobrooks.senate.gov/news/press-releases/alsobrooks-russell-vought-has-traumatized-our-civil-servants-and-destroyed-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/
* * *
ALSOBROOKS: RUSSELL VOUGHT HAS TRAUMATIZED OUR CIVIL SERVANTS AND DESTROYED THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
Today, Senator Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, questioned Russell Vought, Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) during the hearing "The CFPB Semi-Annual Report: A New Day at the CFPB Through Reform."
"The 160,000 federal employees in my state - these are the patriots ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Angela Alsobrooks, D-Maryland, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026: * * * ALSOBROOKS: RUSSELL VOUGHT HAS TRAUMATIZED OUR CIVIL SERVANTS AND DESTROYED THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Today, Senator Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, questioned Russell Vought, Acting Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) during the hearing "The CFPB Semi-Annual Report: A New Day at the CFPB Through Reform." "The 160,000 federal employees in my state - these are the patriotsof our country who have worked for decades. They did not care whether the president is a Democrat or Republican. They are here to serve the American people, and they will not forget how they were treated, and neither will I. In fact, one Marylander who lost his federal job said the following, 'I can't tell you how terrifying it is to be a parent of two children faced with the thought that you cannot provide for your family.' So, I ask you, is that the kind of trauma you were talking about? Did you intend to sow terror for parents who need to provide for their families?" said Senator Alsobrooks.
* * *
Original text here: https://www.alsobrooks.senate.gov/news/press-releases/alsobrooks-russell-vought-has-traumatized-our-civil-servants-and-destroyed-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/
ALSOBROOKS: KEITH SONDERLING IS THE WRONG PICK TO BE LABOR SEC
WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Angela Alsobrooks, D-Maryland, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026:
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ALSOBROOKS: KEITH SONDERLING IS THE WRONG PICK TO BE LABOR SEC
Today, Senator Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP), questioned Keith Sonderling, nominee for Secretary of Labor.
"When we last met and had our last exchange, it was in February, and it was at that time that I asked you a question about whether collective bargaining agreements were legally enforceable. You shared with me that you were unfamiliar ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Angela Alsobrooks, D-Maryland, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026: * * * ALSOBROOKS: KEITH SONDERLING IS THE WRONG PICK TO BE LABOR SEC Today, Senator Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP), questioned Keith Sonderling, nominee for Secretary of Labor. "When we last met and had our last exchange, it was in February, and it was at that time that I asked you a question about whether collective bargaining agreements were legally enforceable. You shared with me that you were unfamiliarwith the collective bargaining process, and in fact, went on to say this was basically above your pay grade and outside your area of expertise, and that you would 'rely on career experts' to work on those issues. And in the weeks that followed our exchange, I was horrified to see this Administration took successive action and steps to undermine the [collective bargaining agreement]'s and to hurt federal workers, and it started with the Executive Order removing collective bargaining rights for large portions of the federal workforce. It is so disturbing to me and really a horrible twist of fate that we are now faced with your nomination, a person who I have seen aid and abet this President's protracted campaign against federal workers' rights," said Senator Alsobrooks.
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Original text here: https://www.alsobrooks.senate.gov/news/press-releases/alsobrooks-keith-sonderling-is-the-wrong-pick-to-be-labor-sec/
* * *
ALSOBROOKS: KEITH SONDERLING IS THE WRONG PICK TO BE LABOR SEC
Today, Senator Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP), questioned Keith Sonderling, nominee for Secretary of Labor.
"When we last met and had our last exchange, it was in February, and it was at that time that I asked you a question about whether collective bargaining agreements were legally enforceable. You shared with me that you were unfamiliar ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Angela Alsobrooks, D-Maryland, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026: * * * ALSOBROOKS: KEITH SONDERLING IS THE WRONG PICK TO BE LABOR SEC Today, Senator Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.), member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP), questioned Keith Sonderling, nominee for Secretary of Labor. "When we last met and had our last exchange, it was in February, and it was at that time that I asked you a question about whether collective bargaining agreements were legally enforceable. You shared with me that you were unfamiliarwith the collective bargaining process, and in fact, went on to say this was basically above your pay grade and outside your area of expertise, and that you would 'rely on career experts' to work on those issues. And in the weeks that followed our exchange, I was horrified to see this Administration took successive action and steps to undermine the [collective bargaining agreement]'s and to hurt federal workers, and it started with the Executive Order removing collective bargaining rights for large portions of the federal workforce. It is so disturbing to me and really a horrible twist of fate that we are now faced with your nomination, a person who I have seen aid and abet this President's protracted campaign against federal workers' rights," said Senator Alsobrooks.
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Original text here: https://www.alsobrooks.senate.gov/news/press-releases/alsobrooks-keith-sonderling-is-the-wrong-pick-to-be-labor-sec/
Forward-Funded Federal Education Programs Topic of CRS Report
WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. R49030) on July 13, 2026, entitled "Forward-Funded Federal Education Programs - Frequently Asked Questions" by education policy specialist Rebecca R. Skinner and legislative attorney Sean Stiff.
Here are excerpts:
* * *
SUMMARY
In the annual appropriations process, Congress elects to make appropriations for certain federal education programs, in part, on a forward-funded basis. Programs funded in this manner receive appropriations in an appropriations act that become available during the last ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. R49030) on July 13, 2026, entitled "Forward-Funded Federal Education Programs - Frequently Asked Questions" by education policy specialist Rebecca R. Skinner and legislative attorney Sean Stiff. Here are excerpts: * * * SUMMARY In the annual appropriations process, Congress elects to make appropriations for certain federal education programs, in part, on a forward-funded basis. Programs funded in this manner receive appropriations in an appropriations act that become available during the lastquarter of the fiscal year (i.e., on July 1) and remain available in the next fiscal year. Such programs also may receive an additional amount of funds as advance appropriations, which are provided in one fiscal year's appropriations act but do not become available to the agency until a following fiscal year. Thus, a single appropriations act funds particular education programs, but those funds become available to the U.S. Department of Education (ED) on a staggered basis for distribution to state grantees.
For the forward-funded component of these programs, ED has had a long-standing practice of making those funds available to state grantees for obligation on the same day that the funds become available to ED, namely on July 1. For FY2025, ED departed from this practice and did not release forward funds on July 1. The affected programs include those authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), particularly
* ESEA Title I-C: Education of Migratory Children,
* ESEA Title II-A: Supporting Effective Instruction,
* ESEA Title III-A: English Language Acquisition,
* ESEA Title IV-A: Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants,
* ESEA Title IV-B: 21st Century Community Learning Centers,
* WIOA Title II: Adult Basic and Literacy Education State Grants, and
* WIOA Title II: Integrated English Literacy and Civics Education State Grants.
ED alerted states in a June 30, 2025, email that the funds would not be made available under the affected programs on July 1. The email indicated that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was conducting a programmatic review of the funds, in part to ensure that grantees spent funds in accordance with the President's priorities. ED eventually made funds under the ESEA Title IV-B program available to states on July 21. Funds for the remaining affected programs were released on July 30.
Congress addressed the timing of ED's release of forward funds for FY2026 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75), which provides appropriations for ED. The act includes a new general provision (Division B, Title III, Sec.312) requiring the Secretary of Education to award formula grant funding for specified programs "on the date such funds become available for obligation" to ED. This provision applies to formula grant programs authorized by the ESEA, the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act, and the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act that received appropriations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026. It applies both to forward funding for these programs available on July 1, 2026, as well as advance appropriations that become available on October 1, 2026.
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Contents
Introduction ... 1
When does funding become available to ED for federal education programs that provide formula grants? ... 2
Which federal education programs receive forward funds, advance appropriations, or both? ... 2
How has ED distributed forward funds in the past? ... 4
Which forward-funded federal education programs did not receive forward funds on July 1, 2025? ... 4
What amount of funding did affected programs receive for FY2025? ... 5
What did ED say about its decision not to make funds available for the affected programs? ... 7
When and under what circumstances did ED release funds for the affected programs? ... 8
What "guardrails" did ED place on funding for the affected programs? ... 10
What were potential practical implications of ED not making funds available under the affected programs? ... 10
Did ED also delay the allocation of FY2025 advance appropriations for affected programs? ... 11
How does the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, address ED's release of FY2026 appropriations for affected programs? ... 11
Tables
Table 1. Method by Which Appropriations Are Provided to Selected Programs Administered by ED ... 3
Table 2. Appropriations for Programs Administered by the U.S. Department of Education for Which FY2025 Funds Were Not Made Available on July 1, 2025 ... 5
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Introduction
Congress typically funds certain federal education programs with a different appropriations model than it most commonly uses in regular appropriations acts. Most federal programs funded in such regular acts receive appropriations that become available for obligation to the relevant agency on the first day of the fiscal year covered by the act./1
Thus, funds appropriated in acts making regular appropriations for FY2025 most commonly became available to agencies on the first day of the fiscal year, October 1, 2024.
For certain federal education programs, Congress instead provides the Department of Education (ED) with a combination of forward funds and, in some cases, advance appropriations. Both types of appropriations do not become available on the first day of the fiscal year for which the appropriations act provides funding, instead becoming available later in the fiscal year. Forward funds become available on the first day of the last quarter of the fiscal year, July 1./2
Advance appropriations become available on the first day of the subsequent fiscal year./3
ED's long-standing practice has been to make such federal education funds available to state grantees on the same day that the funds become available to ED itself./4
Thus, for the forward-funded component of relevant ED appropriations, the department's long-standing practice has been to make the funds available to state grantees on July 1. ED departed from that practice in FY2025, citing a programmatic review of the funds by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)./5
Following litigation brought by states, school districts, and others, ED ultimately agreed to release the funds by late July.
Congress has since legislated on the timing of ED's release of forward funds for FY2026 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75), which provides appropriations for ED. The act includes a new general provision (Division B, Title III, Sec.312) requiring the Secretary of Education to award formula grant funding for specified programs "on the date such funds become available for obligation" to ED.
This report answers frequently asked questions regarding ED's forward- and advance-funded education programs. It discusses the funding structure of those programs, ED's historical approach to the release of such funds, and its approach to funds release in 2025. The report also discusses recently enacted legislation addressing the timing of ED's release of forward or advance funds.
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1 See 1 U.S.C. Sec.105 (stipulating that the style and title of an appropriations act include the statement that the act makes appropriations "for the year ending September 30" of a calendar year).
2 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, p. 56 September 1, 2005, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-05-734sp (hereinafter referred to as GAO Glossary).
3 GAO Glossary, p. 56.
4 CRS examined data available through USAspending.gov for FY2008 through FY2024 to determine when ED initially obligated funds to states under the programs for which funds were withheld while OMB conducted a programmatic review. That analysis revealed that ED has traditionally made forward funds available to states for obligation and expenditure under these programs on July 1 of each fiscal year with few exceptions. Funds for other entities (e.g., outlying areas, Bureau of Indian Education) may have been made available later.
5 For more information, see the FAQ titled "What did ED say about its decision not to make funds available for the affected programs?".
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When does funding become available to ED for federal education programs that provide formula grants?
The federal government's fiscal year starts on October 1 of one calendar year and ends on September 30 of the following calendar year./6
A federal fiscal year is identified by the calendar year in which it ends./7
For example, FY2025 began on October 1, 2024, and ended on September 30, 2025./8
Funding for federal programs provided through the annual appropriations process typically becomes available for obligation by a federal agency on the first day of the fiscal year for which the act makes appropriations. Thus, acts making appropriations for FY2025 typically provided funds that first became available to federal agencies for obligation on October 1, 2024./9
Certain fund types used in regular appropriations acts depart from this first-day-of-the-fiscal-year model of availability. Programs supported with forward funds are appropriated amounts that become available in the last quarter of a fiscal year./10
For example, FY2025 forward funds became available during FY2025, but not until July 1, 2025, or later. Forward funds may remain available to the agency concerned through at least part of the following fiscal year./11
In addition, some federal programs are funded in the annual appropriations process with advance appropriations. Advance appropriations are enacted one or more fiscal years prior to when they first become available for obligation by a federal agency./12
For example, if an FY2024 appropriations bill included advance appropriations, the funds would not have become available until, at the earliest, October 1, 2024 (i.e., the first day of FY2025)./13
Which federal education programs receive forward funds, advance appropriations, or both?
Congress provides forward funding to many elementary and secondary education programs to allow additional time for school officials to develop budgets in advance of the school year and to better align federal appropriations with the fiscal year used by many school districts, which typically runs from July 1 to June 30./14
Congress provides some of these forward-funded programs with advance appropriations, with such funds becoming available to ED on the first day of the subsequent fiscal year (i.e., October 1).
Table 1 provides examples of elementary and secondary education programs administered by ED that typically receive forward funds, advance appropriations, or both in the annual appropriations process, as well as adult education programs that receive forward funds, advance appropriations, or both.
* * *
6 31 U.S.C. Sec.1102.
7 1 U.S.C. Sec.105.
8 31 U.S.C. Sec.1102.
9 1 U.S.C. Sec.105.
10 GAO Glossary, p. 56.
11 GAO Glossary, p. 56.
12 GAO Glossary, p. 8.
13 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, P.L. 118-42, div. A, tit. II, 138 Stat. 5, 41 (appropriating amounts for the Veterans Health Administration Medical Services account, all of which became available on the first day of FY2025).
14 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 46 of 50 states have fiscal years that run from July 1 to July 30 (NCSL, Almost All States Began New Fiscal Year with Enacted Budgets, July 7, 2025, https://www.ncsl.org/press-room/details/almost-all-states-began-new-fiscal-year-with-enacted-budgets). The District of Columbia follows the federal fiscal year (DC Fiscal Policy Institute, A Resident's Guide to the DC Budget, February 7, 2024, https://www.dcfpi.org/all/a-residents-guide-to-the-dc-budget/). Puerto Rico's fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30 (National Association of State Budget Officers, Puerto Rico, https://www.nasbo.org/mainsite/resources/proposed-enacted-budgets/puertorico-budget).
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Table 1. Method by Which Appropriations Are Provided to Selected Programs
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) using data available from the U.S. Department of Education, FY2025 Justifications of Appropriations Estimates to the Congress, March 2024, https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget25/justifications/index.html.
Notes: ESEA = Elementary and Secondary Education Act; IDEA = Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; Perkins CTE = Perkins Career and Technical Education Act; WIOA = Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act.
* * *
How has ED distributed forward funds in the past?
CRS examined data available from USAspending.gov for FY2008 through FY2024 to determine when ED initially obligated funds to states under the programs for which funds were, in FY2025, withheld while OMB conducted a programmatic review. That analysis revealed that ED has traditionally made forward funds available to states for obligation and expenditure under these programs on July 1 of each fiscal year, with few exceptions./15
Funds for other entities (e.g., outlying areas and the Bureau of Indian Education) may have been made available later.
Which forward-funded federal education programs did not receive forward funds on July 1, 2025?
The timing of ED's release of certain FY2025 forward funds departed from the traditional release schedule noted above. On July 1, 2025, ED did not make available to states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the outlying areas,/16 or the Bureau of Indian Education FY2025 forward funds for the following programs authorized by the ESEA:/17
* Title I-C: Education of Migratory Children,
* Title II-A: Supporting Effective Instruction,
* Title III-A: English Language Acquisition,
* Title IV-A: Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants, and
* Title IV-B: 21st Century Community Learning Centers (21st CCLC).
ED also did not make forward funds available on July 1, 2025, to states, the District of Columbia, or Puerto Rico/18 for formula grants/19 under two adult education programs authorized by Title II of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA): the Adult Basic and Literacy Education State Grants and the Integrated English Literacy and Civics Education State Grants. For purposes of this report, these ESEA and adult education programs are collectively referred to as the affected programs. FY2025 funds for the affected programs were primarily for use during the 2025-2026 school year.
* * *
15 For example, in 2017, July 1 fell on a Saturday. Data in USAspending.gov indicates that ESEA Title II-A and Title IV-B grants were first made available for obligation by states on July 3, 2017.
16 The outlying areas include American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
17 For more information about ESEA programs, see CRS Report R45977, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as Amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA): A Primer (Feb. 12, 2024). The Department of Education Justifications of Appropriation Estimates to the Congress indicate whether a program is forward funded. More specifically, the FY2026 ED Justifications include information about the following affected programs being forward funded is available as follows: Education of Migratory Children (https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-education-disadvantaged-110143.pdf#page=34), Supporting Effective Instruction (https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-school-improvement-programs-110158.pdf#page=11), English Language Acquisition (https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-english-language-acquisition-110146.pdf#page=8), Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants (https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-school-improvement-programs-110158.pdf#page=58), and 21st CCLC (https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-school-improvement-programs-110158.pdf#page=16). The FY2026 ED Justifications do not discuss how the adult education programs receive funds, but the FY2025 ED justifications state that the programs are forward funded: Adult Basic and Literacy Education State Grants and Integrated English Literacy and Civics Education State Grants (https://www.ed.gov/sites/ed/files/about/overview/budget/budget25/justifications/o-ctae.pdf#page=23).
18 The outlying areas and Palau receive funds under the Adult Basic and Literacy Education State Grants program but do not receive funds under the Integrated English Literacy and Civics Education State Grants program.
19 ED also awards competitive grants under the Adult Basic and Literacy Education State Grants for the Pacific Region program (WIOA, Sec.211(e)).
* * *
Funds under these programs can be used for various purposes, such as educator professional development, summer programs, after-school programs, and adult education./20
In ED's FY2026 and FY2027 budget requests,/21 the Administration proposed the consolidation of the ESEA Title II-A, Title IV-A, and Title IV-B programs into a new block grant program that would allow funds to continue to be used for the same purposes as under current law, albeit with added flexibility via the pooling together of funds from additional ESEA programs. The Administration has proposed that the other affected programs be eliminated./22
What amount of funding did affected programs receive for FY2025?
ED's delay in releasing FY2025 forward funds affected billions in FY2025 forward funds. Table 2 details FY2025 appropriations levels for the affected programs. As discussed below, ED had flexibility with respect to determining the amount of appropriations provided to some of the affected programs but provided the same amount of funding for these programs in FY2025 as was provided in FY2024./23
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20 For more information about the ESEA programs, see CRS Report R45977, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as Amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA): A Primer (2024). For more information about the adult education programs, see CRS Report R43789, Adult Education and Family Literacy Act: Major Statutory Provisions (2014).
21 U.S. Department of Education, School Improvement Programs: Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Request, 2025, p. 64, https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-school-improvement-programs-110158.pdf#page=65; and U.S. Department of Education, Education for the Disadvantaged: Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Request, 2026, p. 27, https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2027-congressional-justification-education-disadvantaged-113537.pdf#page=28.
22 For example, see U.S. Department of Education, Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Summary, 2026, https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2027-budget-summary-113552.pdf; and U.S. Department of Labor, FY2027 Congressional Budget Justification: Employment and Training Administration, Training and Employment Services, 2026, p. 30, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/general/budget/2027/CBJ-2027-V1-02.pdf#page=34. The U.S. Department of Education is assisting ED in operating adult education programs through an Interagency Agreement (IAA). For more information about the IAA, see https://www.ed.gov/media/document/ed-and-dol-interagency-agreement-octae-partnership-may-12-2025-and-september-12-2025-addendum-113001.pdf.
23 For more information, see U.S. Department of Education, FY2026 Department of Education Justifications of Appropriation Estimates to the Congress, 2025, https://www.ed.gov/about/ed-overview/annual-performance-reports/budget/budget-requests/fy-2026-department-of-education-justifications-of-appropriation-estimates-congress.
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Table 2. Appropriations for Programs Administered by the U.S. Department of Education for Which FY2025 Funds Were Not Made Available on July 1, 2025
Source: Prepared by CRS using U.S. Department of Education, Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Summary, https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2027-budget-summary-113552.pdf.
Notes: ESEA = Elementary and Secondary Education Act; WIOA = Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act.
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In March 2025, Congress enacted a full-year continuing resolution (CR) for FY2025 (the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 [P.L. 119-4]), which generally makes appropriations for FY2025 at levels contained in the prior year's appropriations acts, including the Department of Education Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47, Division D)./24 The FY2024 appropriations act did not specify in statute precise funding amounts for every program that ED administers. Instead, it was accompanied by an explanatory statement that included a funding table, which delineated funding levels that Congress intended ED to provide to certain programs from a single appropriated amount made for the purpose of two or more such programs./25 No similar explanatory statement accompanied the full-year CR for FY2025.
The ESEA formula grant programs for which ED did not make funds available on July 1, 2025, receive appropriations under three different headings in ED's appropriations act. The Title I-C program is funded under the "Education for the Disadvantaged" heading./26 While statutory language specified amounts for several programs funded in this heading that were not affected by the withholding, it did not include a specific amount that was set aside for the Title I-C program. Rather, the appropriation provided funds for the program by stating that amounts in the heading were available "for carrying out title I" of the ESEA, which includes the Title I-C program./27
The Title II-A, Title IV-A, and Title IV-B programs are funded under the "School Improvement Programs" heading. The FY2024 appropriations act provided $5.8 billion for this heading, including $1.7 billion in advance appropriations./28 While the heading did not specify a funding level for the Title II-A program, it stated that the amount appropriated for the Title IV-A program was $1.4 billion and the amount for the Title IV-B program was $1.3 billion./29 The FY2025 full-year CR continued these levels./30 Similar to the Title I-C program, the statutory language indicated that funds are provided "for carrying out school improvement activities authorized by ... part A of title II" of the ESEA, among other activities, but did not provide a specific appropriations level for the Title II-A program./31
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24 P.L. 119-4 Sec.1101(a)(8), 139 Stat. 10, 11.
25 The explanatory statement for the ED appropriations act is available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20240318/Division%20D%20LHHS.pdf#page=75.
26 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 681-82.
27 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 681-82.
28 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 682-83.
29 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 683.
30 P.L. 119-4 Sec.1101(a)(8), 139 Stat. 10, 11.
31 P.L. 118-47 , 138 Stat. 682-83.
* * *
The Title III-A program is funded under the "English Language Acquisition" heading./32 The FY2024 appropriations act specified a funding level of $890 million for the program./33 The FY2025 full-year CR continued this level for FY2025./34
The WIOA Title II programs are funded under the "Career, Technical, and Adult Education" heading./35 A total of $2.2 billion was provided for programs in this heading, including forward funds and advance appropriations, but the FY2024 appropriations act did not detail a specific amount of funding for the affected adult education programs./36 The statute instead appropriated a total dollar amount for career and technical education programs and adult education programs, collectively, without specifying the amount of that total that individual programs are to receive./37
What did ED say about its decision not to make funds available for the affected programs?
On June 30, 2025, ED sent the following email to states:
'Given the change in Administrations, the Department is reviewing the FY 2025 funding for the [Title I-C, II-A, III-A, IV-A, IV-B] grant program(s), and decisions have not yet been made concerning submissions and awards for this upcoming academic year. Accordingly, the Department will not be issuing Grant Award Notifications obligating funds for these programs on July 1 prior to completing that review. The Department remains committed to ensuring taxpayer resources are spent in accordance with the President's priorities and the Department's statutory responsibilities.'/38
ED separately informed congressional staff that funds for the affected programs would be withheld./39 ED's congressional notification referred all questions about the affected programs to OMB./40
In a statement made to an education news outlet, OMB said that its initial findings from its programmatic review "show that many of these grant programs have been grossly misused to subsidize a radical leftwing agenda."/41 In discussing the affected programs at a press event in July 2025, OMB Director Vought told reporters that the affected funds were currently "under programmatic review" and claimed that the programs were "riddled" with "critical race theory funding."/42
* * *
32 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 684.
33 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 684.
34 P.L. 119-4, Sec.1101(a)(8), 139 Stat. 10.
35 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 687.
36 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 687.
37 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 687.
38 See Plaintiff States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19-20, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329, (D.R.I. July 14, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60020/gov.uscourts.rid.60020.2.0.pdf.
39 Ibid. at 19.
40 Ibid.
41 Kara Arundel, "States sue Trump administration over frozen K-12 funds," K-12 Dive, July 14, 2025, https://www.k12dive.com/news/states-sue-over-frozen-education-funds-Linda-McMahon-Trump-OMB/752995/.
42 Cameron Joseph, "As Congress codifies government cuts, Russell Vought promises more to come," Christian Science Monitor, July 17, 2025, https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/monitor_breakfast/2025/0717/russell-vought-trump-congress-budget.
* * *
When and under what circumstances did ED release funds for the affected programs?
Data available from USAspending.gov show that ED initially made forward funds available to states under all the affected programs by July 30, 2025./43
According to a July 18, 2025, news report, a senior Trump Administration official indicated that OMB had completed its review of the 21st CCLC funds and would be releasing affected funds./44 The official also reportedly said that "guardrails" had been put into place to ensure that the funds would not be used a manner that violated any executive orders./45 ED released the funds to states on July 21./46 The email notifying 21st CCLC grant recipients that the funds were being released also noted that the Grant Award Notification (GAN) would include additional "condition[s] to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations."/47 The email stated that no decision had been made regarding the other affected programs.
On July 25, reports indicated that OMB had completed its programmatic review and that ED would release funds for the remaining affected programs the following week./48 A CRS analysis of available data found that ED made funds for the remaining affected programs available to states on July 30./49
ED released the forward funds during a time when it faced litigation from two sets of plaintiffs affected by the withholding. In the first case, filed on July 14, 2025, 24 states and the District of Columbia (state plaintiffs) sued President Trump, ED, and OMB in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island./50 The lawsuit contested the Administration's withholding of funds for the affected programs. The state plaintiffs urged the court to issue a preliminary injunction to "make the appropriated funds for the Impacted Programs available to Plaintiff States."/51
* * *
43 See footnote 4.
44 Juan Perez Jr., "In partial reversal, Trump administration opts to release some federal education money to states," Politico, July 18, 2025, https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/07/trump-administration-release-federal-money-summer-school-00462639.
45 Perez Jr., "In partial reversal, Trump administration opts to release some federal education money to states," Politico, July 18, 2025.
46 OMB had not released the results of its programmatic review nor had OMB or ED issued any statements regarding the release of the funds under the remaining program as of the cover date of this report. See footnote 4 for information about the release of funds.
47 Complaint at 24, No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. July 21, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.1.0.pdf.
48 For example, see Linda Jacobson, "Education Dept. Lifts Freeze on Remaining Federal Funds," The 74, July 25, 2025, https://www.the74million.org/article/education-dept-lifts-freeze-on-remaining-federal-funds/; Juan Perez Jr., "Trump administration moves to release billions in federal cash," Politico, July 25, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/25/trump-administration-moves-to-release-billions-in-federal-education-cash-00477213; and Office of the Attorney General, Connecticut, "State Of Connecticut Secures Major Win as U.S. Education Department Restores Previously Withheld Funding," press release, August 5, 2025, https://portal.ct.gov/ag/press-releases/2025-press-releases/connecticut-secures-major-win-as-us-education-department-restores-previously-withheld-funding.
49 See footnote 4.
50 Complaint, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. July 14, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60020/gov.uscourts.rid.60020.1.0.pdf.
51 Plaintiff States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. July 14, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60020/gov.uscourts.rid.60020.2.0.pdf.
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In support of this request, the state plaintiffs argued that ED regulations required ED to make funds for state-administered formula grant programs available to states for obligation on the same day that those funds become available to ED. In particular, the state plaintiffs claimed that ED had previously approved their state plans for ESEA purposes./52 As a result, the state plaintiffs contended that 34 C.F.R. Sec.76.703(d) stipulated that "the State may begin to obligate funds" for such programs "on the date that the funds are first available for obligation by the Secretary," which, for the FY2025 forward funds, would have been July 1./53
The federal government defendants did not respond to these preliminary injunction arguments. Prior to the federal government's response deadline, on August 5, 2025, the district court granted the state plaintiffs' motion to withdraw their preliminary injunction request./54 Later that month, on August 25, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint after reaching agreement on disposition of the FY2025 funds./55 The parties' August 25, 2025, agreement, or stipulation, confirms that ED made FY2025 forward funds available to states./56 On September 12, 2025, the district court granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss, ending the state plaintiff litigation./57
Separately, on July 21, a group of school districts and others (school district plaintiffs) sued ED and OMB, also in the Rhode Island federal district court. The school district plaintiffs argued that the failure to make forward funds available was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and was agency action unlawfully withheld or delayed, all in alleged violation of the Administrative Procedure Act./58 The school district plaintiffs initially sought a nationwide preliminary injunction but,/59like the state plaintiffs, withdrew their request once ED represented that it had "disbursed all outstanding [forward] funds."/60Also like the state plaintiffs, the parties in the school district litigation jointly moved to dismiss the case upon the same stipulation that ED and the state plaintiffs reached in the separate lawsuit./61 On September 12, 2025, the district court granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss, ending the school district plaintiff litigation./62
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52 Ibid. at 32.
53 34 C.F.R. Sec.76.703(d).
54 Text Order Granting Plaintiff States' Motion to Withdraw Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70791182/state-of-california-v-mcmahon/.
55 Joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Without Prejudice Subject to the Parties' Stipulation, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60020/gov.uscourts.rid.60020.58.0.pdf.
56 Ibid. at 2. As discussed above, the stipulation also recited that ED "intend[ed] to make the Second Tranche of funds" - that is, FY2025 advance appropriations - "available on or about October 1, 2025, but no later than October 3, 2025." Ibid. at 2-3. See "Did ED also delay the allocation of FY2025 advance appropriations for affected programs?" 57 See Text Order, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. Sept. 12, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70791182/state-of-california-v-mcmahon/.
58 See Complaint, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. July 21, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.1.0.pdf.
59 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction & to Preliminarily Set Aside & Stay Agency Action, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. July 21, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.9.1.pdf.
60 Plaintiffs' Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. Aug. 4, 2025), http://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.21.0.pdf.
61 Joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Without Prejudice Subject to the Parties' Stipulation, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.22.0.pdf.
62 See Text Order, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. Sept. 12, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70873172/anchorage-school-district-v-us-department-of-education/.
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What "guardrails" did ED place on funding for the affected programs?
ED created an attachment - the Governmentwide Administrative Statutory and National Policy Requirements for U.S. Department of Education Awards - that accompanied the GANs for at least some of the affected programs./63 The document was dated July 25, 2025, and is also referred to as the "Formula GAN Attachment." It lists the federal laws and policies that may apply to awards. As part of this document, ED included the following condition, which ED stated was applicable to all grantees:
'Grantees must not use federal funds under this project in any manner that violates the United States Constitution, Title VI or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d et seq. or 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq.), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1681 et seq.), section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 794), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 12131 et seq.), the Boy Scouts of America Equal Access Act of 2001 (20 U.S.C. Sec. 7905), section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1011f), or other applicable federal law. To the extent that a grantee uses grant funds for such unallowable activities, the Department intends to take appropriate enforcement action including under section 451 of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA), which may include the recovery of funds under section 452 of GEPA.'/64
The Formula GAN Attachment included information about financial assistance general certifications and representations./65 It also contained a chart that summarized various requirements that grantees must meet (e.g., conflict of interest, lobbying disclosures, subaward reporting, wage protections), a description of each requirement, and the laws and policies associated with each requirement./66
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63 A copy of the attachment was provided to CRS by ED on July 31, 2025. The document is available to congressional clients from the authors of this CRS report.
64 20 U.S.C. Sec.1234.
65 This section of the document provides information about registering in the System for Award Management and the requirement that grantees agree to the Financial Assistance General Certifications and Representations that are binding on every award.
66 See pp. 7-12 of the Formula GAN Attachment.
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What were potential practical implications of ED not making funds available under the affected programs?
ED's decision to not make funds available to grantees under the affected programs on July 1 may have created challenges for planning, staffing, and programming for the summer and upcoming school year. For example, the state plaintiffs alleged in their motion for preliminary injunction that because
'many school systems have summer programs supported by federal funds, and because the school year begins just a few weeks after July 1 in many districts, the States' ability to start drawing down funds and to make these funds available to LEAs on or around July 1 is critical. Without access to these funds, States and LEAs run a serious risk of accruing budgeted expenses without the federal funds to meet those expenses, and they face difficulties meeting federal reporting and monitoring requirements that help ensure federal funds are being utilized properly and effectively.'/67
The federal defendants did not respond to these allegations concerning the effect of ED's funding delay because prior to their deadline for responding to the state plaintiffs' motion, the district court granted the state plaintiffs' motion to withdraw their injunction request./68 The parties subsequently settled their dispute, and the district court granted their joint motion to dismiss the litigation./69
Did ED also delay the allocation of FY2025 advance appropriations for affected programs?
ED has traditionally made advance appropriations available to states for obligation on the same date that they become available to ED for obligation, that is, October 1 of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which they were appropriated./70 As part of the stipulation it reached to resolve the civil actions brought by the state and school district plaintiffs, ED agreed to "make the Second Tranche of funds for the Impacted Programs" - that is, the FY2025 advance appropriations - "available to the Plaintiffs through issuance of GANs on or about October 1, 2025, for the Impacted Programs without any new conditions or restrictions beyond those specified in the [forward funds] GANs."/71 This agreement applied only to the affected programs and only for FY2025 funds./72 It did not address advance appropriations provided for other programs administered by ED, nor did it apply to subsequent fiscal years./73
How does the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, address ED's release of FY2026 appropriations for affected programs?
On February 3, 2026, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75). Division B of the act provides appropriations for ED and continues to provide forward funds, advance appropriations, or both for programs affected by the 2025 temporary withholding. In other words, the act does not alter the approach that Congress took in FY2025 when specifying when funds for these programs become available to ED for obligation.
The act includes a new general provision that addresses the timing of ED's release of funds for programs affected by the 2025 temporary withholding as well as other programs administered by ED. Section 312 of Division B requires the Secretary of Education to award formula grant funding for specified programs "on the date such funds become available for obligation."/74 This provision applies to formula grant programs authorized by the ESEA, the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act, and the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act for which funds were appropriated in the appropriations act./75 This provision applies to FY2026 forward funding available on July 1, 2026, and FY2026 advance appropriations included in the act that become available on October 1, 2026./76
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67 Plaintiff States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. July 14, 2025), p. 18, https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60020/gov.uscourts.rid.60020.2.0.pdf. The motion includes additional information about the "harms from the ED Funding Freeze" in Part C of the Factual Background section. In addition, eligible private school students and staff may receive services and support under some of the affected ESEA programs in accordance with equitable services provisions. See CRS Report R46907, Equitable Services for Private School Students and Staff and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.
68 Text Order Granting Plaintiff States' Motion to Withdraw Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70791182/state-of-california-v-mcmahon/.
69 See Text Order, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. Sept. 12, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70791182/state-of-california-v-mcmahon/.
70 See footnote 4.
71 Joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Without Prejudice Subject to the Parties' Stipulation at 2-3, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.22.0.pdf.
72 Joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Without Prejudice Subject to the Parties' Stipulation at 2-3, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.22.0.pdf.
73 For example, the Title I-A program authorized by the ESEA and Grants to States program authorized by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Part B receive advance appropriations.
74 P.L. 119-75, div. B, Sec.312, 140 Stat. 173, 306.
75 P.L. 119-75, div. B, Sec.312, 140 Stat. 173, 306.
76 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, includes advance appropriations for the Title I-A program and Supporting Effective Instruction State Grants program (Title II-A), which are authorized by the ESEA, as well as for the Basic State Grants program authorized by the Perkins Career and Technical Education Act.
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The report is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49030/R49030.1.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
Here are excerpts:
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SUMMARY
In the annual appropriations process, Congress elects to make appropriations for certain federal education programs, in part, on a forward-funded basis. Programs funded in this manner receive appropriations in an appropriations act that become available during the last ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. R49030) on July 13, 2026, entitled "Forward-Funded Federal Education Programs - Frequently Asked Questions" by education policy specialist Rebecca R. Skinner and legislative attorney Sean Stiff. Here are excerpts: * * * SUMMARY In the annual appropriations process, Congress elects to make appropriations for certain federal education programs, in part, on a forward-funded basis. Programs funded in this manner receive appropriations in an appropriations act that become available during the lastquarter of the fiscal year (i.e., on July 1) and remain available in the next fiscal year. Such programs also may receive an additional amount of funds as advance appropriations, which are provided in one fiscal year's appropriations act but do not become available to the agency until a following fiscal year. Thus, a single appropriations act funds particular education programs, but those funds become available to the U.S. Department of Education (ED) on a staggered basis for distribution to state grantees.
For the forward-funded component of these programs, ED has had a long-standing practice of making those funds available to state grantees for obligation on the same day that the funds become available to ED, namely on July 1. For FY2025, ED departed from this practice and did not release forward funds on July 1. The affected programs include those authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), particularly
* ESEA Title I-C: Education of Migratory Children,
* ESEA Title II-A: Supporting Effective Instruction,
* ESEA Title III-A: English Language Acquisition,
* ESEA Title IV-A: Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants,
* ESEA Title IV-B: 21st Century Community Learning Centers,
* WIOA Title II: Adult Basic and Literacy Education State Grants, and
* WIOA Title II: Integrated English Literacy and Civics Education State Grants.
ED alerted states in a June 30, 2025, email that the funds would not be made available under the affected programs on July 1. The email indicated that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was conducting a programmatic review of the funds, in part to ensure that grantees spent funds in accordance with the President's priorities. ED eventually made funds under the ESEA Title IV-B program available to states on July 21. Funds for the remaining affected programs were released on July 30.
Congress addressed the timing of ED's release of forward funds for FY2026 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75), which provides appropriations for ED. The act includes a new general provision (Division B, Title III, Sec.312) requiring the Secretary of Education to award formula grant funding for specified programs "on the date such funds become available for obligation" to ED. This provision applies to formula grant programs authorized by the ESEA, the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act, and the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act that received appropriations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026. It applies both to forward funding for these programs available on July 1, 2026, as well as advance appropriations that become available on October 1, 2026.
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Contents
Introduction ... 1
When does funding become available to ED for federal education programs that provide formula grants? ... 2
Which federal education programs receive forward funds, advance appropriations, or both? ... 2
How has ED distributed forward funds in the past? ... 4
Which forward-funded federal education programs did not receive forward funds on July 1, 2025? ... 4
What amount of funding did affected programs receive for FY2025? ... 5
What did ED say about its decision not to make funds available for the affected programs? ... 7
When and under what circumstances did ED release funds for the affected programs? ... 8
What "guardrails" did ED place on funding for the affected programs? ... 10
What were potential practical implications of ED not making funds available under the affected programs? ... 10
Did ED also delay the allocation of FY2025 advance appropriations for affected programs? ... 11
How does the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, address ED's release of FY2026 appropriations for affected programs? ... 11
Tables
Table 1. Method by Which Appropriations Are Provided to Selected Programs Administered by ED ... 3
Table 2. Appropriations for Programs Administered by the U.S. Department of Education for Which FY2025 Funds Were Not Made Available on July 1, 2025 ... 5
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Introduction
Congress typically funds certain federal education programs with a different appropriations model than it most commonly uses in regular appropriations acts. Most federal programs funded in such regular acts receive appropriations that become available for obligation to the relevant agency on the first day of the fiscal year covered by the act./1
Thus, funds appropriated in acts making regular appropriations for FY2025 most commonly became available to agencies on the first day of the fiscal year, October 1, 2024.
For certain federal education programs, Congress instead provides the Department of Education (ED) with a combination of forward funds and, in some cases, advance appropriations. Both types of appropriations do not become available on the first day of the fiscal year for which the appropriations act provides funding, instead becoming available later in the fiscal year. Forward funds become available on the first day of the last quarter of the fiscal year, July 1./2
Advance appropriations become available on the first day of the subsequent fiscal year./3
ED's long-standing practice has been to make such federal education funds available to state grantees on the same day that the funds become available to ED itself./4
Thus, for the forward-funded component of relevant ED appropriations, the department's long-standing practice has been to make the funds available to state grantees on July 1. ED departed from that practice in FY2025, citing a programmatic review of the funds by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)./5
Following litigation brought by states, school districts, and others, ED ultimately agreed to release the funds by late July.
Congress has since legislated on the timing of ED's release of forward funds for FY2026 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75), which provides appropriations for ED. The act includes a new general provision (Division B, Title III, Sec.312) requiring the Secretary of Education to award formula grant funding for specified programs "on the date such funds become available for obligation" to ED.
This report answers frequently asked questions regarding ED's forward- and advance-funded education programs. It discusses the funding structure of those programs, ED's historical approach to the release of such funds, and its approach to funds release in 2025. The report also discusses recently enacted legislation addressing the timing of ED's release of forward or advance funds.
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1 See 1 U.S.C. Sec.105 (stipulating that the style and title of an appropriations act include the statement that the act makes appropriations "for the year ending September 30" of a calendar year).
2 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process, p. 56 September 1, 2005, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-05-734sp (hereinafter referred to as GAO Glossary).
3 GAO Glossary, p. 56.
4 CRS examined data available through USAspending.gov for FY2008 through FY2024 to determine when ED initially obligated funds to states under the programs for which funds were withheld while OMB conducted a programmatic review. That analysis revealed that ED has traditionally made forward funds available to states for obligation and expenditure under these programs on July 1 of each fiscal year with few exceptions. Funds for other entities (e.g., outlying areas, Bureau of Indian Education) may have been made available later.
5 For more information, see the FAQ titled "What did ED say about its decision not to make funds available for the affected programs?".
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When does funding become available to ED for federal education programs that provide formula grants?
The federal government's fiscal year starts on October 1 of one calendar year and ends on September 30 of the following calendar year./6
A federal fiscal year is identified by the calendar year in which it ends./7
For example, FY2025 began on October 1, 2024, and ended on September 30, 2025./8
Funding for federal programs provided through the annual appropriations process typically becomes available for obligation by a federal agency on the first day of the fiscal year for which the act makes appropriations. Thus, acts making appropriations for FY2025 typically provided funds that first became available to federal agencies for obligation on October 1, 2024./9
Certain fund types used in regular appropriations acts depart from this first-day-of-the-fiscal-year model of availability. Programs supported with forward funds are appropriated amounts that become available in the last quarter of a fiscal year./10
For example, FY2025 forward funds became available during FY2025, but not until July 1, 2025, or later. Forward funds may remain available to the agency concerned through at least part of the following fiscal year./11
In addition, some federal programs are funded in the annual appropriations process with advance appropriations. Advance appropriations are enacted one or more fiscal years prior to when they first become available for obligation by a federal agency./12
For example, if an FY2024 appropriations bill included advance appropriations, the funds would not have become available until, at the earliest, October 1, 2024 (i.e., the first day of FY2025)./13
Which federal education programs receive forward funds, advance appropriations, or both?
Congress provides forward funding to many elementary and secondary education programs to allow additional time for school officials to develop budgets in advance of the school year and to better align federal appropriations with the fiscal year used by many school districts, which typically runs from July 1 to June 30./14
Congress provides some of these forward-funded programs with advance appropriations, with such funds becoming available to ED on the first day of the subsequent fiscal year (i.e., October 1).
Table 1 provides examples of elementary and secondary education programs administered by ED that typically receive forward funds, advance appropriations, or both in the annual appropriations process, as well as adult education programs that receive forward funds, advance appropriations, or both.
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6 31 U.S.C. Sec.1102.
7 1 U.S.C. Sec.105.
8 31 U.S.C. Sec.1102.
9 1 U.S.C. Sec.105.
10 GAO Glossary, p. 56.
11 GAO Glossary, p. 56.
12 GAO Glossary, p. 8.
13 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, P.L. 118-42, div. A, tit. II, 138 Stat. 5, 41 (appropriating amounts for the Veterans Health Administration Medical Services account, all of which became available on the first day of FY2025).
14 According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 46 of 50 states have fiscal years that run from July 1 to July 30 (NCSL, Almost All States Began New Fiscal Year with Enacted Budgets, July 7, 2025, https://www.ncsl.org/press-room/details/almost-all-states-began-new-fiscal-year-with-enacted-budgets). The District of Columbia follows the federal fiscal year (DC Fiscal Policy Institute, A Resident's Guide to the DC Budget, February 7, 2024, https://www.dcfpi.org/all/a-residents-guide-to-the-dc-budget/). Puerto Rico's fiscal year runs from July 1 to June 30 (National Association of State Budget Officers, Puerto Rico, https://www.nasbo.org/mainsite/resources/proposed-enacted-budgets/puertorico-budget).
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Table 1. Method by Which Appropriations Are Provided to Selected Programs
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) using data available from the U.S. Department of Education, FY2025 Justifications of Appropriations Estimates to the Congress, March 2024, https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget25/justifications/index.html.
Notes: ESEA = Elementary and Secondary Education Act; IDEA = Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; Perkins CTE = Perkins Career and Technical Education Act; WIOA = Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act.
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How has ED distributed forward funds in the past?
CRS examined data available from USAspending.gov for FY2008 through FY2024 to determine when ED initially obligated funds to states under the programs for which funds were, in FY2025, withheld while OMB conducted a programmatic review. That analysis revealed that ED has traditionally made forward funds available to states for obligation and expenditure under these programs on July 1 of each fiscal year, with few exceptions./15
Funds for other entities (e.g., outlying areas and the Bureau of Indian Education) may have been made available later.
Which forward-funded federal education programs did not receive forward funds on July 1, 2025?
The timing of ED's release of certain FY2025 forward funds departed from the traditional release schedule noted above. On July 1, 2025, ED did not make available to states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the outlying areas,/16 or the Bureau of Indian Education FY2025 forward funds for the following programs authorized by the ESEA:/17
* Title I-C: Education of Migratory Children,
* Title II-A: Supporting Effective Instruction,
* Title III-A: English Language Acquisition,
* Title IV-A: Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants, and
* Title IV-B: 21st Century Community Learning Centers (21st CCLC).
ED also did not make forward funds available on July 1, 2025, to states, the District of Columbia, or Puerto Rico/18 for formula grants/19 under two adult education programs authorized by Title II of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA): the Adult Basic and Literacy Education State Grants and the Integrated English Literacy and Civics Education State Grants. For purposes of this report, these ESEA and adult education programs are collectively referred to as the affected programs. FY2025 funds for the affected programs were primarily for use during the 2025-2026 school year.
* * *
15 For example, in 2017, July 1 fell on a Saturday. Data in USAspending.gov indicates that ESEA Title II-A and Title IV-B grants were first made available for obligation by states on July 3, 2017.
16 The outlying areas include American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
17 For more information about ESEA programs, see CRS Report R45977, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as Amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA): A Primer (Feb. 12, 2024). The Department of Education Justifications of Appropriation Estimates to the Congress indicate whether a program is forward funded. More specifically, the FY2026 ED Justifications include information about the following affected programs being forward funded is available as follows: Education of Migratory Children (https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-education-disadvantaged-110143.pdf#page=34), Supporting Effective Instruction (https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-school-improvement-programs-110158.pdf#page=11), English Language Acquisition (https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-english-language-acquisition-110146.pdf#page=8), Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants (https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-school-improvement-programs-110158.pdf#page=58), and 21st CCLC (https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-school-improvement-programs-110158.pdf#page=16). The FY2026 ED Justifications do not discuss how the adult education programs receive funds, but the FY2025 ED justifications state that the programs are forward funded: Adult Basic and Literacy Education State Grants and Integrated English Literacy and Civics Education State Grants (https://www.ed.gov/sites/ed/files/about/overview/budget/budget25/justifications/o-ctae.pdf#page=23).
18 The outlying areas and Palau receive funds under the Adult Basic and Literacy Education State Grants program but do not receive funds under the Integrated English Literacy and Civics Education State Grants program.
19 ED also awards competitive grants under the Adult Basic and Literacy Education State Grants for the Pacific Region program (WIOA, Sec.211(e)).
* * *
Funds under these programs can be used for various purposes, such as educator professional development, summer programs, after-school programs, and adult education./20
In ED's FY2026 and FY2027 budget requests,/21 the Administration proposed the consolidation of the ESEA Title II-A, Title IV-A, and Title IV-B programs into a new block grant program that would allow funds to continue to be used for the same purposes as under current law, albeit with added flexibility via the pooling together of funds from additional ESEA programs. The Administration has proposed that the other affected programs be eliminated./22
What amount of funding did affected programs receive for FY2025?
ED's delay in releasing FY2025 forward funds affected billions in FY2025 forward funds. Table 2 details FY2025 appropriations levels for the affected programs. As discussed below, ED had flexibility with respect to determining the amount of appropriations provided to some of the affected programs but provided the same amount of funding for these programs in FY2025 as was provided in FY2024./23
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20 For more information about the ESEA programs, see CRS Report R45977, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as Amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA): A Primer (2024). For more information about the adult education programs, see CRS Report R43789, Adult Education and Family Literacy Act: Major Statutory Provisions (2014).
21 U.S. Department of Education, School Improvement Programs: Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Request, 2025, p. 64, https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2026-congressional-justification-school-improvement-programs-110158.pdf#page=65; and U.S. Department of Education, Education for the Disadvantaged: Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Request, 2026, p. 27, https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2027-congressional-justification-education-disadvantaged-113537.pdf#page=28.
22 For example, see U.S. Department of Education, Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Summary, 2026, https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2027-budget-summary-113552.pdf; and U.S. Department of Labor, FY2027 Congressional Budget Justification: Employment and Training Administration, Training and Employment Services, 2026, p. 30, https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/general/budget/2027/CBJ-2027-V1-02.pdf#page=34. The U.S. Department of Education is assisting ED in operating adult education programs through an Interagency Agreement (IAA). For more information about the IAA, see https://www.ed.gov/media/document/ed-and-dol-interagency-agreement-octae-partnership-may-12-2025-and-september-12-2025-addendum-113001.pdf.
23 For more information, see U.S. Department of Education, FY2026 Department of Education Justifications of Appropriation Estimates to the Congress, 2025, https://www.ed.gov/about/ed-overview/annual-performance-reports/budget/budget-requests/fy-2026-department-of-education-justifications-of-appropriation-estimates-congress.
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Table 2. Appropriations for Programs Administered by the U.S. Department of Education for Which FY2025 Funds Were Not Made Available on July 1, 2025
Source: Prepared by CRS using U.S. Department of Education, Fiscal Year 2027 Budget Summary, https://www.ed.gov/media/document/fy-2027-budget-summary-113552.pdf.
Notes: ESEA = Elementary and Secondary Education Act; WIOA = Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act.
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In March 2025, Congress enacted a full-year continuing resolution (CR) for FY2025 (the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 [P.L. 119-4]), which generally makes appropriations for FY2025 at levels contained in the prior year's appropriations acts, including the Department of Education Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47, Division D)./24 The FY2024 appropriations act did not specify in statute precise funding amounts for every program that ED administers. Instead, it was accompanied by an explanatory statement that included a funding table, which delineated funding levels that Congress intended ED to provide to certain programs from a single appropriated amount made for the purpose of two or more such programs./25 No similar explanatory statement accompanied the full-year CR for FY2025.
The ESEA formula grant programs for which ED did not make funds available on July 1, 2025, receive appropriations under three different headings in ED's appropriations act. The Title I-C program is funded under the "Education for the Disadvantaged" heading./26 While statutory language specified amounts for several programs funded in this heading that were not affected by the withholding, it did not include a specific amount that was set aside for the Title I-C program. Rather, the appropriation provided funds for the program by stating that amounts in the heading were available "for carrying out title I" of the ESEA, which includes the Title I-C program./27
The Title II-A, Title IV-A, and Title IV-B programs are funded under the "School Improvement Programs" heading. The FY2024 appropriations act provided $5.8 billion for this heading, including $1.7 billion in advance appropriations./28 While the heading did not specify a funding level for the Title II-A program, it stated that the amount appropriated for the Title IV-A program was $1.4 billion and the amount for the Title IV-B program was $1.3 billion./29 The FY2025 full-year CR continued these levels./30 Similar to the Title I-C program, the statutory language indicated that funds are provided "for carrying out school improvement activities authorized by ... part A of title II" of the ESEA, among other activities, but did not provide a specific appropriations level for the Title II-A program./31
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24 P.L. 119-4 Sec.1101(a)(8), 139 Stat. 10, 11.
25 The explanatory statement for the ED appropriations act is available at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20240318/Division%20D%20LHHS.pdf#page=75.
26 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 681-82.
27 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 681-82.
28 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 682-83.
29 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 683.
30 P.L. 119-4 Sec.1101(a)(8), 139 Stat. 10, 11.
31 P.L. 118-47 , 138 Stat. 682-83.
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The Title III-A program is funded under the "English Language Acquisition" heading./32 The FY2024 appropriations act specified a funding level of $890 million for the program./33 The FY2025 full-year CR continued this level for FY2025./34
The WIOA Title II programs are funded under the "Career, Technical, and Adult Education" heading./35 A total of $2.2 billion was provided for programs in this heading, including forward funds and advance appropriations, but the FY2024 appropriations act did not detail a specific amount of funding for the affected adult education programs./36 The statute instead appropriated a total dollar amount for career and technical education programs and adult education programs, collectively, without specifying the amount of that total that individual programs are to receive./37
What did ED say about its decision not to make funds available for the affected programs?
On June 30, 2025, ED sent the following email to states:
'Given the change in Administrations, the Department is reviewing the FY 2025 funding for the [Title I-C, II-A, III-A, IV-A, IV-B] grant program(s), and decisions have not yet been made concerning submissions and awards for this upcoming academic year. Accordingly, the Department will not be issuing Grant Award Notifications obligating funds for these programs on July 1 prior to completing that review. The Department remains committed to ensuring taxpayer resources are spent in accordance with the President's priorities and the Department's statutory responsibilities.'/38
ED separately informed congressional staff that funds for the affected programs would be withheld./39 ED's congressional notification referred all questions about the affected programs to OMB./40
In a statement made to an education news outlet, OMB said that its initial findings from its programmatic review "show that many of these grant programs have been grossly misused to subsidize a radical leftwing agenda."/41 In discussing the affected programs at a press event in July 2025, OMB Director Vought told reporters that the affected funds were currently "under programmatic review" and claimed that the programs were "riddled" with "critical race theory funding."/42
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32 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 684.
33 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 684.
34 P.L. 119-4, Sec.1101(a)(8), 139 Stat. 10.
35 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 687.
36 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 687.
37 P.L. 118-47, 138 Stat. 687.
38 See Plaintiff States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19-20, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329, (D.R.I. July 14, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60020/gov.uscourts.rid.60020.2.0.pdf.
39 Ibid. at 19.
40 Ibid.
41 Kara Arundel, "States sue Trump administration over frozen K-12 funds," K-12 Dive, July 14, 2025, https://www.k12dive.com/news/states-sue-over-frozen-education-funds-Linda-McMahon-Trump-OMB/752995/.
42 Cameron Joseph, "As Congress codifies government cuts, Russell Vought promises more to come," Christian Science Monitor, July 17, 2025, https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/monitor_breakfast/2025/0717/russell-vought-trump-congress-budget.
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When and under what circumstances did ED release funds for the affected programs?
Data available from USAspending.gov show that ED initially made forward funds available to states under all the affected programs by July 30, 2025./43
According to a July 18, 2025, news report, a senior Trump Administration official indicated that OMB had completed its review of the 21st CCLC funds and would be releasing affected funds./44 The official also reportedly said that "guardrails" had been put into place to ensure that the funds would not be used a manner that violated any executive orders./45 ED released the funds to states on July 21./46 The email notifying 21st CCLC grant recipients that the funds were being released also noted that the Grant Award Notification (GAN) would include additional "condition[s] to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations."/47 The email stated that no decision had been made regarding the other affected programs.
On July 25, reports indicated that OMB had completed its programmatic review and that ED would release funds for the remaining affected programs the following week./48 A CRS analysis of available data found that ED made funds for the remaining affected programs available to states on July 30./49
ED released the forward funds during a time when it faced litigation from two sets of plaintiffs affected by the withholding. In the first case, filed on July 14, 2025, 24 states and the District of Columbia (state plaintiffs) sued President Trump, ED, and OMB in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island./50 The lawsuit contested the Administration's withholding of funds for the affected programs. The state plaintiffs urged the court to issue a preliminary injunction to "make the appropriated funds for the Impacted Programs available to Plaintiff States."/51
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43 See footnote 4.
44 Juan Perez Jr., "In partial reversal, Trump administration opts to release some federal education money to states," Politico, July 18, 2025, https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/07/trump-administration-release-federal-money-summer-school-00462639.
45 Perez Jr., "In partial reversal, Trump administration opts to release some federal education money to states," Politico, July 18, 2025.
46 OMB had not released the results of its programmatic review nor had OMB or ED issued any statements regarding the release of the funds under the remaining program as of the cover date of this report. See footnote 4 for information about the release of funds.
47 Complaint at 24, No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. July 21, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.1.0.pdf.
48 For example, see Linda Jacobson, "Education Dept. Lifts Freeze on Remaining Federal Funds," The 74, July 25, 2025, https://www.the74million.org/article/education-dept-lifts-freeze-on-remaining-federal-funds/; Juan Perez Jr., "Trump administration moves to release billions in federal cash," Politico, July 25, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/25/trump-administration-moves-to-release-billions-in-federal-education-cash-00477213; and Office of the Attorney General, Connecticut, "State Of Connecticut Secures Major Win as U.S. Education Department Restores Previously Withheld Funding," press release, August 5, 2025, https://portal.ct.gov/ag/press-releases/2025-press-releases/connecticut-secures-major-win-as-us-education-department-restores-previously-withheld-funding.
49 See footnote 4.
50 Complaint, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. July 14, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60020/gov.uscourts.rid.60020.1.0.pdf.
51 Plaintiff States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. July 14, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60020/gov.uscourts.rid.60020.2.0.pdf.
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In support of this request, the state plaintiffs argued that ED regulations required ED to make funds for state-administered formula grant programs available to states for obligation on the same day that those funds become available to ED. In particular, the state plaintiffs claimed that ED had previously approved their state plans for ESEA purposes./52 As a result, the state plaintiffs contended that 34 C.F.R. Sec.76.703(d) stipulated that "the State may begin to obligate funds" for such programs "on the date that the funds are first available for obligation by the Secretary," which, for the FY2025 forward funds, would have been July 1./53
The federal government defendants did not respond to these preliminary injunction arguments. Prior to the federal government's response deadline, on August 5, 2025, the district court granted the state plaintiffs' motion to withdraw their preliminary injunction request./54 Later that month, on August 25, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint after reaching agreement on disposition of the FY2025 funds./55 The parties' August 25, 2025, agreement, or stipulation, confirms that ED made FY2025 forward funds available to states./56 On September 12, 2025, the district court granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss, ending the state plaintiff litigation./57
Separately, on July 21, a group of school districts and others (school district plaintiffs) sued ED and OMB, also in the Rhode Island federal district court. The school district plaintiffs argued that the failure to make forward funds available was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and was agency action unlawfully withheld or delayed, all in alleged violation of the Administrative Procedure Act./58 The school district plaintiffs initially sought a nationwide preliminary injunction but,/59like the state plaintiffs, withdrew their request once ED represented that it had "disbursed all outstanding [forward] funds."/60Also like the state plaintiffs, the parties in the school district litigation jointly moved to dismiss the case upon the same stipulation that ED and the state plaintiffs reached in the separate lawsuit./61 On September 12, 2025, the district court granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss, ending the school district plaintiff litigation./62
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52 Ibid. at 32.
53 34 C.F.R. Sec.76.703(d).
54 Text Order Granting Plaintiff States' Motion to Withdraw Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70791182/state-of-california-v-mcmahon/.
55 Joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Without Prejudice Subject to the Parties' Stipulation, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60020/gov.uscourts.rid.60020.58.0.pdf.
56 Ibid. at 2. As discussed above, the stipulation also recited that ED "intend[ed] to make the Second Tranche of funds" - that is, FY2025 advance appropriations - "available on or about October 1, 2025, but no later than October 3, 2025." Ibid. at 2-3. See "Did ED also delay the allocation of FY2025 advance appropriations for affected programs?" 57 See Text Order, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. Sept. 12, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70791182/state-of-california-v-mcmahon/.
58 See Complaint, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. July 21, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.1.0.pdf.
59 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction & to Preliminarily Set Aside & Stay Agency Action, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. July 21, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.9.1.pdf.
60 Plaintiffs' Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. Aug. 4, 2025), http://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.21.0.pdf.
61 Joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Without Prejudice Subject to the Parties' Stipulation, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.22.0.pdf.
62 See Text Order, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. Sept. 12, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70873172/anchorage-school-district-v-us-department-of-education/.
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What "guardrails" did ED place on funding for the affected programs?
ED created an attachment - the Governmentwide Administrative Statutory and National Policy Requirements for U.S. Department of Education Awards - that accompanied the GANs for at least some of the affected programs./63 The document was dated July 25, 2025, and is also referred to as the "Formula GAN Attachment." It lists the federal laws and policies that may apply to awards. As part of this document, ED included the following condition, which ED stated was applicable to all grantees:
'Grantees must not use federal funds under this project in any manner that violates the United States Constitution, Title VI or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d et seq. or 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq.), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1681 et seq.), section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 794), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 12131 et seq.), the Boy Scouts of America Equal Access Act of 2001 (20 U.S.C. Sec. 7905), section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1011f), or other applicable federal law. To the extent that a grantee uses grant funds for such unallowable activities, the Department intends to take appropriate enforcement action including under section 451 of the General Education Provisions Act (GEPA), which may include the recovery of funds under section 452 of GEPA.'/64
The Formula GAN Attachment included information about financial assistance general certifications and representations./65 It also contained a chart that summarized various requirements that grantees must meet (e.g., conflict of interest, lobbying disclosures, subaward reporting, wage protections), a description of each requirement, and the laws and policies associated with each requirement./66
* * *
63 A copy of the attachment was provided to CRS by ED on July 31, 2025. The document is available to congressional clients from the authors of this CRS report.
64 20 U.S.C. Sec.1234.
65 This section of the document provides information about registering in the System for Award Management and the requirement that grantees agree to the Financial Assistance General Certifications and Representations that are binding on every award.
66 See pp. 7-12 of the Formula GAN Attachment.
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What were potential practical implications of ED not making funds available under the affected programs?
ED's decision to not make funds available to grantees under the affected programs on July 1 may have created challenges for planning, staffing, and programming for the summer and upcoming school year. For example, the state plaintiffs alleged in their motion for preliminary injunction that because
'many school systems have summer programs supported by federal funds, and because the school year begins just a few weeks after July 1 in many districts, the States' ability to start drawing down funds and to make these funds available to LEAs on or around July 1 is critical. Without access to these funds, States and LEAs run a serious risk of accruing budgeted expenses without the federal funds to meet those expenses, and they face difficulties meeting federal reporting and monitoring requirements that help ensure federal funds are being utilized properly and effectively.'/67
The federal defendants did not respond to these allegations concerning the effect of ED's funding delay because prior to their deadline for responding to the state plaintiffs' motion, the district court granted the state plaintiffs' motion to withdraw their injunction request./68 The parties subsequently settled their dispute, and the district court granted their joint motion to dismiss the litigation./69
Did ED also delay the allocation of FY2025 advance appropriations for affected programs?
ED has traditionally made advance appropriations available to states for obligation on the same date that they become available to ED for obligation, that is, October 1 of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which they were appropriated./70 As part of the stipulation it reached to resolve the civil actions brought by the state and school district plaintiffs, ED agreed to "make the Second Tranche of funds for the Impacted Programs" - that is, the FY2025 advance appropriations - "available to the Plaintiffs through issuance of GANs on or about October 1, 2025, for the Impacted Programs without any new conditions or restrictions beyond those specified in the [forward funds] GANs."/71 This agreement applied only to the affected programs and only for FY2025 funds./72 It did not address advance appropriations provided for other programs administered by ED, nor did it apply to subsequent fiscal years./73
How does the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, address ED's release of FY2026 appropriations for affected programs?
On February 3, 2026, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75). Division B of the act provides appropriations for ED and continues to provide forward funds, advance appropriations, or both for programs affected by the 2025 temporary withholding. In other words, the act does not alter the approach that Congress took in FY2025 when specifying when funds for these programs become available to ED for obligation.
The act includes a new general provision that addresses the timing of ED's release of funds for programs affected by the 2025 temporary withholding as well as other programs administered by ED. Section 312 of Division B requires the Secretary of Education to award formula grant funding for specified programs "on the date such funds become available for obligation."/74 This provision applies to formula grant programs authorized by the ESEA, the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act, and the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act for which funds were appropriated in the appropriations act./75 This provision applies to FY2026 forward funding available on July 1, 2026, and FY2026 advance appropriations included in the act that become available on October 1, 2026./76
* * *
67 Plaintiff States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. July 14, 2025), p. 18, https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60020/gov.uscourts.rid.60020.2.0.pdf. The motion includes additional information about the "harms from the ED Funding Freeze" in Part C of the Factual Background section. In addition, eligible private school students and staff may receive services and support under some of the affected ESEA programs in accordance with equitable services provisions. See CRS Report R46907, Equitable Services for Private School Students and Staff and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.
68 Text Order Granting Plaintiff States' Motion to Withdraw Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70791182/state-of-california-v-mcmahon/.
69 See Text Order, California v. McMahon, No. 1:25-cv-00329 (D.R.I. Sept. 12, 2025), https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/70791182/state-of-california-v-mcmahon/.
70 See footnote 4.
71 Joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Without Prejudice Subject to the Parties' Stipulation at 2-3, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.22.0.pdf.
72 Joint Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Without Prejudice Subject to the Parties' Stipulation at 2-3, Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 1:25-cv-00347 (D.R.I. Aug. 25, 2025), https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.rid.60062/gov.uscourts.rid.60062.22.0.pdf.
73 For example, the Title I-A program authorized by the ESEA and Grants to States program authorized by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Part B receive advance appropriations.
74 P.L. 119-75, div. B, Sec.312, 140 Stat. 173, 306.
75 P.L. 119-75, div. B, Sec.312, 140 Stat. 173, 306.
76 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, includes advance appropriations for the Title I-A program and Supporting Effective Instruction State Grants program (Title II-A), which are authorized by the ESEA, as well as for the Basic State Grants program authorized by the Perkins Career and Technical Education Act.
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The report is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R49030/R49030.1.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
Durbin Delivers Opening Statement Ahead Of Outside Witness Panel For President Trump's Nominee to be Attorney General, Todd Blanche
WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Richard J. Durbin, D-Illinois, ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026:
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Durbin Delivers Opening Statement Ahead Of Outside Witness Panel For President Trump's Nominee To Be Attorney General, Todd Blanche
U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, today delivered an opening statement ahead of the Senate Judiciary Committee's outside witness panel for the nomination of Todd Blanche, President Trump's pick to be Attorney General of the United States. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Richard J. Durbin, D-Illinois, ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026: * * * Durbin Delivers Opening Statement Ahead Of Outside Witness Panel For President Trump's Nominee To Be Attorney General, Todd Blanche U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, today delivered an opening statement ahead of the Senate Judiciary Committee's outside witness panel for the nomination of Todd Blanche, President Trump's pick to be Attorney General of the United States.Durbin also introduced the Democratic witnesses: Liz Oyer and Dani Bensky.
Ms. Oyer served as the Justice Department Pardon Attorney, a nonpolitical position, until she was fired in March 2025 by then-Deputy AG Blanche for refusing to rubberstamp restoring gun ownership rights to Mel Gibson, a convicted domestic abuser.
Ms. Bensky is a survivor of Jeffrey Epstein's abuse whose name and intimate details of her abuse were included in the released files, despite multiple attempts to have the Justice Department redact her information.
Key quotes from Durbin's opening statement:
"Yesterday's hearing I can't easily forget in this room. Because I asked a question of Mr. Todd Blanche about the opportunity he had to meet with victims of Jeffrey Epstein. I asked him the same question the night before in my office. And he said, 'Oh I'll meet with anybody to talk about this.' So I thought it was an easy question. Will you meet with those who are here today, the 10 or 12 survivors of Jeffrey Epstein? And he said no. He would not meet with them... That is incredible."
"After the hearing, I met them. I will never forget that meeting... Try to imagine, if you will, one of these young women saying to me, 'Jeffrey Epstein abused me when I was 13 years old'... 13 years old. Visualize in your own family a daughter or granddaughter 13 years of age who was a victim of this sexual predator. Should she at least have a moment with the Attorney General to tell her story? Is that too much to ask? Apparently it was."
"I don't believe a single member of the United States Senate would vote for this nominee after meeting with these survivors."
"Secondly, let me tell you what. I guess I was born in a different era from this President and the people around him. But I kind of understood going into public life that if you wanted to get rich, this was the wrong job. You're supposed to take this job to serve the public, make enough money to get by, but not get rich. How did the President do in the first year of his second term? $1.4 billion added to his income from... cryptocurrency."
"Why is that even relevant to this conversation? Because the President opposed the cryptocurrency idea for years, switched his position, and then Mr. Blanche changed the federal [approach to prosecution] for cryptocurrency [enforcement]... To lessen the regulation of an industry which generates [a] $1.4 billion windfall for the President of the United States and money for the person who was Acting Attorney General is just plain wrong--just plain wrong. All the excuses in the world don't make a difference."
"And I'll tell you, that one document that he signed [IRS immunity]... Imagine if you will if you've ever heard of this, the President, his family, and his businesses, because of the document signed by Todd Blanche, because of that have no liability for any tax crimes they ever committed before the date of that document. No criminal liability."
"Every single one of us in this room has to obey the law, that is the basics in a democracy like ours. And when it comes to tax crimes, the same applies. Now there is an exception in the eyes of Todd Blanche and that exception is the President of the United States, his family, and his businesses. That is just plain wrong. This man should not be Attorney General."
Key quotes from Durbin's introduction of the Democratic witnesses:
"The first minority witness is Dani Bensky. I met her yesterday. Ms. Bensky is a choreographer and dance educator. She is also a survivor of abuse by convicted sex traffickers Jeffrey Epstein to whom she was trafficked when she was 17 years old."
"Ms. Bensky will tell us how due to the carelessness of the Justice Department, graphic details of her abuse as well as her identity were released many times despite her efforts to redact her information. She says that, 'she won't stop fighting till the world is safer.' I thank her for her courage."
"My second witness is Elizabeth Oyer... She was the Justice Department Pardon Attorney until March 2025. She oversaw the pardon office now run by the failed nominee and MAGA extremist Ed Martin. Prior to her service in the Justice Department, Ms. Oyer was an assistant federal public defender in Maryland and a litigation partner at Mayer Brown. She is a graduate of Harvard Law School and the illustrious Georgetown University."
"She will tell us how her former office has devolved into a pay-to-play operation with mega donors jumping ahead of legitimate pardon candidates often without proper vetting--the height of corruption."
"How do we know this? Ms. Oyer was fired by Mr. Blanche just days after he took office for refusing to restore gun ownership rights to one of the President's personal friends, convicted domestic abuser and actor Mel Gibson."
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Original text here: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/dem/releases/durbin-delivers-opening-statement-ahead-of-outside-witness-panel-for-president-trumps-nominee-to-be-attorney-general-todd-blanche
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Durbin Delivers Opening Statement Ahead Of Outside Witness Panel For President Trump's Nominee To Be Attorney General, Todd Blanche
U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, today delivered an opening statement ahead of the Senate Judiciary Committee's outside witness panel for the nomination of Todd Blanche, President Trump's pick to be Attorney General of the United States. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 -- Sen. Richard J. Durbin, D-Illinois, ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, issued the following news release on July 16, 2026: * * * Durbin Delivers Opening Statement Ahead Of Outside Witness Panel For President Trump's Nominee To Be Attorney General, Todd Blanche U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, today delivered an opening statement ahead of the Senate Judiciary Committee's outside witness panel for the nomination of Todd Blanche, President Trump's pick to be Attorney General of the United States.Durbin also introduced the Democratic witnesses: Liz Oyer and Dani Bensky.
Ms. Oyer served as the Justice Department Pardon Attorney, a nonpolitical position, until she was fired in March 2025 by then-Deputy AG Blanche for refusing to rubberstamp restoring gun ownership rights to Mel Gibson, a convicted domestic abuser.
Ms. Bensky is a survivor of Jeffrey Epstein's abuse whose name and intimate details of her abuse were included in the released files, despite multiple attempts to have the Justice Department redact her information.
Key quotes from Durbin's opening statement:
"Yesterday's hearing I can't easily forget in this room. Because I asked a question of Mr. Todd Blanche about the opportunity he had to meet with victims of Jeffrey Epstein. I asked him the same question the night before in my office. And he said, 'Oh I'll meet with anybody to talk about this.' So I thought it was an easy question. Will you meet with those who are here today, the 10 or 12 survivors of Jeffrey Epstein? And he said no. He would not meet with them... That is incredible."
"After the hearing, I met them. I will never forget that meeting... Try to imagine, if you will, one of these young women saying to me, 'Jeffrey Epstein abused me when I was 13 years old'... 13 years old. Visualize in your own family a daughter or granddaughter 13 years of age who was a victim of this sexual predator. Should she at least have a moment with the Attorney General to tell her story? Is that too much to ask? Apparently it was."
"I don't believe a single member of the United States Senate would vote for this nominee after meeting with these survivors."
"Secondly, let me tell you what. I guess I was born in a different era from this President and the people around him. But I kind of understood going into public life that if you wanted to get rich, this was the wrong job. You're supposed to take this job to serve the public, make enough money to get by, but not get rich. How did the President do in the first year of his second term? $1.4 billion added to his income from... cryptocurrency."
"Why is that even relevant to this conversation? Because the President opposed the cryptocurrency idea for years, switched his position, and then Mr. Blanche changed the federal [approach to prosecution] for cryptocurrency [enforcement]... To lessen the regulation of an industry which generates [a] $1.4 billion windfall for the President of the United States and money for the person who was Acting Attorney General is just plain wrong--just plain wrong. All the excuses in the world don't make a difference."
"And I'll tell you, that one document that he signed [IRS immunity]... Imagine if you will if you've ever heard of this, the President, his family, and his businesses, because of the document signed by Todd Blanche, because of that have no liability for any tax crimes they ever committed before the date of that document. No criminal liability."
"Every single one of us in this room has to obey the law, that is the basics in a democracy like ours. And when it comes to tax crimes, the same applies. Now there is an exception in the eyes of Todd Blanche and that exception is the President of the United States, his family, and his businesses. That is just plain wrong. This man should not be Attorney General."
Key quotes from Durbin's introduction of the Democratic witnesses:
"The first minority witness is Dani Bensky. I met her yesterday. Ms. Bensky is a choreographer and dance educator. She is also a survivor of abuse by convicted sex traffickers Jeffrey Epstein to whom she was trafficked when she was 17 years old."
"Ms. Bensky will tell us how due to the carelessness of the Justice Department, graphic details of her abuse as well as her identity were released many times despite her efforts to redact her information. She says that, 'she won't stop fighting till the world is safer.' I thank her for her courage."
"My second witness is Elizabeth Oyer... She was the Justice Department Pardon Attorney until March 2025. She oversaw the pardon office now run by the failed nominee and MAGA extremist Ed Martin. Prior to her service in the Justice Department, Ms. Oyer was an assistant federal public defender in Maryland and a litigation partner at Mayer Brown. She is a graduate of Harvard Law School and the illustrious Georgetown University."
"She will tell us how her former office has devolved into a pay-to-play operation with mega donors jumping ahead of legitimate pardon candidates often without proper vetting--the height of corruption."
"How do we know this? Ms. Oyer was fired by Mr. Blanche just days after he took office for refusing to restore gun ownership rights to one of the President's personal friends, convicted domestic abuser and actor Mel Gibson."
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Original text here: https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/dem/releases/durbin-delivers-opening-statement-ahead-of-outside-witness-panel-for-president-trumps-nominee-to-be-attorney-general-todd-blanche
DOD Contractors & Efforts to Mitigate Foreign Influence Topic of CRS Report
WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. R48110) on July 14, 2026, entitled "Department of Defense Contractors and Efforts to Mitigate Foreign Influence" by defense policy analyst Alexandra G. Neenan:
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SUMMARY
Some U.S. firms, including some Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, receive foreign investment or have other ties to foreign entities, including foreign firms and foreign governments. DOD is "using a secondary Department of War designation," under Executive Order (E.O) 14347, dated September 5, 2025. Some DOD contractors' ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. R48110) on July 14, 2026, entitled "Department of Defense Contractors and Efforts to Mitigate Foreign Influence" by defense policy analyst Alexandra G. Neenan: * * * SUMMARY Some U.S. firms, including some Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, receive foreign investment or have other ties to foreign entities, including foreign firms and foreign governments. DOD is "using a secondary Department of War designation," under Executive Order (E.O) 14347, dated September 5, 2025. Some DOD contractors'foreign connections could include connections such as ownership, investment, supplier or producer relationships, or production overseas. These ties may pose a risk to U.S. national security, especially when firms are performing work of a sensitive or classified nature and have relationships with adversarial countries.
DOD's Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) is responsible for mitigating potential risks that may arise from foreign investment or foreign ties to DOD contractors. Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) is a term that DOD uses to describe a condition in which a U.S. entity's foreign connections are believed to pose a risk of compromise of or unauthorized access to classified U.S. national security information.
In the last 15 years, Congress and DOD have taken several approaches to change laws and regulations to mitigate concerns about possible foreign malign influence on DOD contractors. Congress may consider changing statutory definitions to further address such concerns by broadening the scope of contract types subject to surveillance and mitigation. It may also consider tasking DOD to expand or centralize some of its pre-existing foreign influence mitigation programs. Congress might also consider reducing foreign influence mitigation efforts in the interest of allowing more entrants into the DOD contract market.
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Contents
Introduction ... 1
Issues for Congress ... 1
Background ... 1
Statute and Regulation ... 1
Title 10, U.S. Code ... 2
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) ... 2
Selected Laws Related to Foreign Influence and DOD Contractors ... 2
Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 115-91 ... 3
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232 ... 3
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, P.L. 116-283 ... 4
Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA, P.L. 117-81 ... 5
James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263 ... 5
Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA, P.L. 118-31 ... 6
Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, P.L. 118-159 ... 6
Fiscal Year 2026 NDAA, P.L. 119-60 ... 7
Other Efforts to Mitigate Foreign Influence of DOD Contractors ... 7
National Industrial Security Program (NISP) ... 7
Technology Protection Programs ... 8
Agency-Specific DOD Foreign Influence Mitigation Programs ... 8
Foreign Ties to Fundamental Research ... 9
Mitigating Foreign Influence for Small Businesses ... 9
Issues for Congress ... 10
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Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress concerning the potential risk of foreign, particularly adversarial government, influence on Department of Defense (DOD) contractors./1
DOD is "using a secondary Department of War designation," under Executive Order (E.O)14347, dated September 5, 2025./2
This report also provides an overview of legislative activity over the last ten years on this topic, as well as selected current DOD efforts to mitigate unwanted foreign influence of contractors.
Issues for Congress
Some oversight issues for Congress regarding foreign influence and DOD contracting include whether or not to amend statutory requirements banning or limiting certain companies with ties to adversarial governments from being awarded certain categories of DOD contracts. Congress may consider whether or not to require DOD to take action to further mitigate the potential risk of foreign influence in contracting. Congress may also consider taking no action or scaling back its current foreign influence mitigation efforts.
Background
Foreign direct investment in the United States, including the ownership or control, direct or indirect, by a foreign entity of U.S.-based firms, has generally increased over the past 15 years./3
Some U.S. firms, including some Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, receive foreign investment or have other ties to foreign entities, including foreign firms and foreign governments. Some DOD contractors' foreign connections could include ties such as ownership, investment, supplier or producer relationships, or production overseas. These ties may pose a risk to U.S. national security, especially when those performing work of a sensitive or classified nature have potential ties (such as foreign ownership and control) to adversarial countries.
DOD's Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) is responsible for mitigating potential risks that may arise from foreign investment and foreign ties to DOD contractors. According to DCSA, Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) occurs "whenever a foreign interest has the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, and whether or not exercisable, to direct or decide matters affecting the management or operations of that company in a manner which may result in unauthorized access to classified information or may adversely affect the performance of classified contracts."/4
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1 CRS In Focus IF10600, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Contractors, by Alexandra G. Neenan.
2 Executive Order 14347, "Restoring the United States Department of War," September 5, 2025, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/10/2025-17508/restoring-the-united-states-department-of-war.
3 For more information about foreign direct investment in the broader U.S. economy, see CRS In Focus IF10636, Foreign Direct Investment: Background and Issues, by Shayerah I. Akhtar and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
4 Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, "Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence," https://www.dcsa.mil/Industrial-Security/Entity-Vetting-Facility-Clearances-FOCI/Foreign-Ownership-Control-or-Influence/.
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Statute and Regulation
DOD contracting-related statutes are covered in Titles 10 and 41 of the U.S. Code. Title 41 addresses federal procurement in general and its provisions apply to DOD unless otherwise specified in Title 10. Title 10 addresses DOD procurement specifically. The procurement provisions in Titles 41 and 10 are implemented by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the DOD-specific FAR supplement, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)./5
Over the last 15 years, Congress and DOD have taken several approaches to change laws and regulations to further mitigate FOCI concerns with regard to DOD contractors. One method Congress and DOD have used to mitigate FOCI risks is to require in statute that only a U.S.-owned company may provide certain types of goods or services and that DOD may not purchase such goods from companies with ties to certain countries. The way that DOD and Congress have defined such restrictions and categories has varied over time. Legislation over the last 15 years has added new types of goods or services to these lists and some observers have proposed that this list be further expanded.
Title 10, U.S. Code
Various sections of Title 10 include prohibitions on DOD's procurement of certain categories of goods and services from companies that have ties to certain countries or entities that could pose a risk to U.S. national security. Additionally, several sections in Title 10 include specific procedures that DOD is to follow to reduce the risk of foreign influence. Many of these provisions stem from legislation enacted over the last 15 years, particularly sections that specifically call out concerns regarding the government and military of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The following section provides an overview of selected laws and legislation aimed at mitigating the potential risk of foreign influence in DOD contracting.
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
DOD ultimately implements many of the Title 10 provisions that stem from legislative action in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The DFARS, the DOD-specific supplement to the FAR, does not contain blanket restrictions on foreign entities' investment or other forms of involvement with DOD contractors. However, the DFARS does include restrictions on the acquisition of some items from certain companies. For example, one portion of the DFARS outlines a prohibition on some items from companies that have known ties to the PRC military./6
Selected Laws Related to Foreign Influence and DOD Contractors
The following sections present selected laws related to the potential risk of foreign influence in DOD contracting. Several provisions impose federal procurement restrictions on selected categories of technologies produced by certain companies and produced by other companies owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the governments of adversarial countries. Additionally, some provisions address certain goods and services produced by certain PRC government-affiliated entities, such as the Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei)./7
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5 Additional information about the FAR can be found in CRS Report R42826, The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by David H. Carpenter, Matthew D. Trout, and Dominick A. FiorentinoFor additional information, congressional clients may contact Dominick Fiorentino.
6 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Sec.252.225-7007.
7 For more information on U.S. restrictions on Huawei technologies specifically, see CRS Report R47012, U.S. Restrictions on Huawei Technologies: National Security, Foreign Policy, and Economic Interests, by Jill C. Gallagher.
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Many of these provisions were enacted at the same time that the U.S. government began to characterize its sometimes-tense relations with countries such as the PRC and the Russian Federation (Russia) as a great power competition (GPC). During this time, both Congress and the executive branch identified foreign influence, supply chain risks, and risks involving DOD contractors as part of GPC.
Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 115-91
Section 1656 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required that the Secretary of Defense submit to the congressional defense committees an assessment of the extent to which DOD relied on certain categories of telecommunications equipment that were produced or provided by certain foreign-affiliated entities (including Huawei) to fulfill nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense missions./8
This provision allowed DOD to submit waivers for this requirement on a case-by-case basis, but required that these waivers be submitted by the Secretary of Defense and not be delegated to lower levels of authority, which suggests a high level of importance, because many categories of acquisition requirements may often be waived at lower component levels.
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232
Section 889 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232), imposed federal procurement restrictions on certain telecommunications and video surveillance goods and services from several companies affiliated with the PRC, including the Huawei Technologies Company and the ZTE Corporation. This prohibition applies to DOD, and includes a prohibition on loans and grants, in addition to contracting. The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council issued several interim rules implementing this statute beginning in 2019, including detailed requirements for DOD, as well as other covered agencies./9
This restriction was implemented in the DFARS in Section 252.204-7018 and includes waiver requirements and procedures should a DOD entity need to work with a contractor using covered equipment.
Defense industry groups protested the timeline, intensity, and complexity of this requirement in 2020, the originally planned time of its implementation. For example, a representative of the Professional Services Council, an advocacy group for federal service contractors, said that "the potential impact under the statute could affect nearly every contractor and subcontractor across the entire federal government," and that there were "consequences that reach beyond prime contractors."/10
Other commentators raised concerns about the lack of clarity concerning applicability of the new requirements for subcontractors./11
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8 P.L. 115-91, Sec.1656. Defense committees, as defined in 10 U.S.C., Sec.101(a)(16), are the Senate Armed Services Committee, House Armed Services Committee, Senate Appropriations Committee, and the House Appropriations Committee.
9 84 Federal Register 40216, at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/13/2019-17201/federal-acquisition-regulation-prohibition-on-contracting-for-certain-telecommunications-and-video. 85 Federal Register 42665, at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/14/2020-15293/federal-acquisition-regulation-prohibition-on-contracting-with-entities-using-certain.
10 Joe Gould, "U.S. Government's Huawei Ban Moving Too Fast, Contractors Say," Defense News, July 9, 2020.
11 Scott S. Sheffler, "Section 889, The "Huawei Ban" in Federal Contracts: General Scope and Considerations," (2020), at https://www.feldesman.com/section-889-the-huawei-ban-in-federal-contracts-general-scope-and-considerations/.
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In August 2020, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) granted DOD a temporary waiver to address some of these concerns and "to provide time to review the full details of the rule implementation using additional information from DOD," according to a statement from DOD./12
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, P.L. 116-283
Section 819 of the FY2021 NDAA amended a note in Title 10 of the U.S. Code requiring DOD to "require reports and conduct examinations" of covered contractors "to assess compliance" related to FOCI mitigation efforts./13
The provision also required that DOD develop "procedures for appropriately responding to changes in covered contractor of subcontractor beneficial ownership status based on changes in disclosures of their beneficial ownership and whether they are under FOCI."/14
This requirement was part of a broader initiative that began in the FY2020 NDAA to modernize DOD's acquisition processes and ensure integrity of the U.S. defense industrial base./15
According to DOD, its Acquisition Technology and Information Team was tasked in 2021 with drafting the proposed DFARS rule partially implementing this provision; its report due date, including responses to public comments, was extended to July 2026./16
Section 1260H of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) required that DOD "identify each entity the Secretary [of Defense] determines, based on the most recent information available, is operating directly or indirectly in the United States or any of its territories and possessions, that is a Chinese military company." This provision included a definition of "Chinese military company," and what it calls "military-civil fusion contributor," which includes a more expansive definition of ties to the PRC military and government beyond companies with explicit ties to the PRC military./17
Beyond ties to the People's Liberation Army or the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, a "military-civil fusion contributor" may have ties to organizations such as the PRC's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology or "entities that advertise on national, provincial, and nongovernmental military equipment procurement platforms in the People's Republic of China."/18
DOD is to submit this information annually to the Armed Services Committees and publish an unclassified version of its list in the Federal Register until 2030./19
The most recent version of DOD's notice of designation of Chinese Military Companies was released on June 8, 2026, in accordance with this legislation's statutory reporting requirements./20
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12 Department of Defense, "Ellen M. Lord, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Briefs Media at the Pentagon," press release, August 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2319990/ellen-m-lord-undersecretary-of-defense-for-acquisition-and-sustainment-briefs-m/.
13 P.L. 116-283, Sec.819. The NDAA references a note in 10 U.S.C. Sec.2509, but the portion of Title 10 in question has since been renumbered and can be located in 10 U.S.C. Sec.4819.
14 P.L. 116-283, Sec.819.
15 P.L. 116-92, Sec.845.
16 DOD, "Open DFARS Cases," April 2024, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/opencases/dfarscasenum/dfars.pdf#page=11.
17 P.L. 116-283(d)(2).
18 P.L. 116-283(d)(2).
19 P.L. 116-283(b).
20 Department of Defense, "Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States in Accordance with Section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283, Section 126H, as amended (codified at 10 U.S.C. Sec.113, note)), June 2026, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jun/08/2003945537/-1/-1/1/ENTITIES-IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES-IN-ACCORDANCE-WITH-SECTION-1260H.PDF.
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Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA, P.L. 117-81
Section 855 of the FY2022 NDAA tasked DOD with requiring that certain contractors and subcontractors disclose if they have employees "who will perform work in the People's Republic of China on a covered contract."/21 Per the provision, contract funding is be withheld until this information is provided to DOD, potentially making enforcement of this amendment easier by incentivizing contractors to provide this information expeditiously./22 Additionally, DOD is to provide semi-annual briefings to congressional defense committees summarizing the information it finds from such disclosures./23 While not an explicit restriction of DOD contractors that work in the PRC, this additional information may support security and contracting officers when conducting due diligence.
The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council implemented this statutory provision in May 2026, when it amended a portion of the DFARS that addressed DOD contract solicitation provisions./24
James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263
Section 5949 of the FY2023 NDAA imposed restrictions on the procurement of goods or services that include components from semiconductor companies with links to certain countries, with a focus on concerns about the PRC and specific PRC companies./25 It also imposed a restriction on the procurement of goods and services for "a critical system" that "uses" components from these covered semiconductor companies./26 The final version of the legislation changed the word "use[s]" to "include[s]," which some analysts assert represented a less strict, "scaled back" version of the originally proposed legislation./27 This change came after reported pushback from multiple industry and trade groups, including several defense industry groups./28
Similar to earlier NDAA provisions, this legislation also allows an executive agency head to waive, for two years, the prohibition if "no compliant product or service is available to be procured as, and when, needed at United States market prices or a price that is not considered prohibitively expensive," and if "such waiver could not reasonably be expected to compromise the critical national security interests of the United States."/29
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21 P.L. 117-81, Sec.855.
22 P.L. 117-81, Sec.855.
23 P.L. 117-81, Sec.855.
24 DFARS, Sec.252.225-7058.
25 P.L. 117-263, Sec.5949. For more information on Chinese influence in the semiconductor industry, see CRS Report R46767, China's New Semiconductor Policies: Issues for Congress, by Karen M. Sutter; CRS Report R47558, Semiconductors and the CHIPS Act: The Global Context, by Karen M. Sutter, Emily G. Blevins, and Yong W. Kwon; and CRS In Focus IF12958, Section 301 and China: Mature-Node Semiconductors, by Karen M. Sutter.
26 P.L. 117-263, Sec.5949.
27 Alexandra Alper, "U.S. Lawmakers Ease Planned Curbs on Chinese Chips amid Corporate Pushback," Reuters, December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-lawmakers-ease-proposed-curbs-chinese-chips-amid-corporate-pushback-2022-12-06/.
28 Alexandra Alper, "U.S. Lawmakers Ease Planned Curbs on Chinese Chips amid Corporate Pushback," Reuters, December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-lawmakers-ease-proposed-curbs-chinese-chips-amid-corporate-pushback-2022-12-06/.
29 Alexandra Alper, "U.S. Lawmakers Ease Planned Curbs on Chinese Chips amid Corporate Pushback," Reuters, December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-lawmakers-ease-proposed-curbs-chinese-chips-amid-corporate-pushback-2022-12-06/.
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In the Joint Explanatory Statement, the defense committees noted that
'the intent of Congress in advancing this proposal is that, in serving federal supply chains, Federal contract recipients and their suppliers (including domestic and foreign subsidiaries, affiliates, distributors, and intermediaries) should not utilize companies connected to foreign countries of concern that threaten national security, such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp, and ChangXin Memory Technologies, or any other company identified under this section (including any affiliate, subsidiary, successor, distributor, or intermediary thereof). Furthermore, we believe that for the purposes of waivers that may be issued under this section, critical national security interests of the United States may include protecting the Nation's economic security and its technological competitiveness relative to strategic competitors ... the intent of this provision is to include both contractors and suppliers, to the extent possible under the Federal Acquisition Regulation.'/30
This provision received mixed reactions from outside groups. Some pro-commerce advocacy groups praised the provision, saying that it would "[protect] against Chinese cyber threats and any dependence on China for our critical infrastructure and defense capabilities."/31 Other commentators have noted that the prohibitions may be onerous for potential DOD contractors, saying that contractors may need "dedicated supply chain security personnel who are going to be responsible for all of the regulations that are coming out in this area."/32
Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA, P.L. 118-31
Section 812 of the FY2024 NDAA increased statutory requirements for consulting service contractors who confirm they do not have conflicts of interest, including contracts, with foreign entities, including entities with connections to the governments of the PRC or the Russian Federation./33 Contractors found to have conflicts of interest with covered entities would be subject to additional surveillance./34 DOD implemented this provision when it amended the DFARS to create a new section, "Prohibition Relating to Conflicts of Interest in Consulting Services - Certification."/35
Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, P.L. 118-159
The Joint Explanatory Statement for the FY2025 NDAA required that DOD provide to the defense committees a briefing on "the foreign capital disclosure requirements" of DOD organizations "that routinely engage with commercial entities backed by private equity or venture capital funds."/36
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30 Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, pp. 703-704, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fy23_ndaa_joint_explanatory_statement.pdf.
31 American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce, letter to Congress, November 2022, at https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000184-a64c-d1d1-ad8d-af7d115d0000.
32 Justin Doubleday, "New Rule Sets Stage for Banning Risky Technologies from Government Supply Chains," Federal News Network, October 2023, at https://federalnewsnetwork.com/acquisition-policy/2023/10/new-rule-sets-stage-for-banning-risky-technologies-from-government-supply-chains/.
33 P.L. 118-31.
34 P.L. 118-31.
35 DFARS, Sec.252.209-7012.
36 Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, pp. 37-38, at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20241209/FY25%20NDAA%20JOINT%20EXPLANATORY%20MATERIAL%20FINAL.pdf.
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Fiscal Year 2026 NDAA, P.L. 119-60
Section 838 of the FY2026 NDAA required that DOD identify and conduct a risk assessment of "all critical infrastructure that relies on materials or components the origin of which is a foreign entity of concern."/37 DOD is then to provide the defense committees a classified briefing on its findings and plans to address any concerns it identified, including "success stories or case studies of Departmental actions to mitigate foreign entity of concern-related risks."/38
Section 842 created a new statutory prohibition on DOD's procurement of "advanced batteries composed of material from certain foreign sources."/39 This restriction is to take effect in 2028 and allows for exceptions, including commercially available batteries used in equipment maintenance and batteries used for research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E)./40
Other Efforts to Mitigate Foreign Influence of DOD Contractors
Beyond the statutory and regulatory measures detailed above, DOD maintains other programs that aim to mitigate the risks, extent of, and impact of foreign influence in DOD contracting. Some of these programs - such as the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) - protect certain categories of contracts, such as classified contracts, while other programs aim to protect certain components of DOD, such as science and technology programs.
In addition to DOD-specific requirements and programs, DOD contractors must also follow U.S. export control regulations and decisions, which apply to all U.S. firms. The U.S. Department of Commerce maintains a control list of dual use technologies, which have both civilian and military uses and are subject to export controls. The Commerce Department (DOC) also maintains lists of entities that U.S. government agencies have found pose proliferation or foreign policy concerns and require additional licensing requirements or restrictions./41
National Industrial Security Program (NISP)
The NISP applies to contractors that have access to classified information and/or perform classified contracts. It has specific restrictions for contractors regarding FOCI. The NISP was established in 1993 by Executive Order (E.O.) 12829, "The National Industrial Security Program," with the intent to "safeguard Federal Government classified information that is released to contractors, licensees, and grantees of the United States Government."/42 The E.O. states that the NISP "shall serve as a single, integrated, cohesive industrial security program to protect classified information and to preserve our Nation's economic and technological interests."/43
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37 P.L. 119-60 Sec.838(a)(1).
38 P.L. 119-60 Sec.838(f)(3)(B).
39 P.L. 119-60. Sec.842(a). 10 U.S.C. Sec.4865.
40 P.L. 119-60 Sec.842(a).
41 U.S. Department of Commerce, "Commerce Control List," at https://www.bis.gov/regulations/ear/interactive-commerce-control-list?isExpanded=&category=&keyword=.
42 Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program," January 1993, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1993-01-11/pdf/WCPD-1993-01-11-Pg17.pdf.
43 Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program," January 1993.
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NISP regulations outline specific FOCI mitigation procedures for contractors that possess security clearances, including the NISP Operating Manual (NISPOM), located in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). The NISPOM requires that cleared contractors report to DOD any FOCI, including foreign classified contracts and "loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified information."/44
The NISPOM specifies that the requirements for a "classified contract" (including FOCI-related procedures) are also "applicable to all phases of precontract, license or grant activity, including solicitations (bids, quotations, and proposals), pre-contract negotiations, post-contract activity, or other government contracting activity (GCA) programs or projects which require access to classified information by a contractor."/45 Additionally, DCSA has specific requirements for contractor and subcontractor facility clearances to ensure the protection of classified information./46
According to the NISPOM, when the cognizant security agency has "determined that an entity is under FOCI, the primary consideration will be the protection of classified information" and the cognizant security agency will "take whatever action is necessary to protect classified information."/47
Technology Protection Programs
Data-sharing and intellectual property-related requirements and provisions for DOD contracts are typically contract-specific. A 2021 update to Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.83 Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage established policy for science and technology (S&T) managers to protect DOD innovation./48 The DODI states that DOD contractors and contractor facilities "are at risk of attacks by state and non-state threat actors."/49 The DODI also tasks S&T managers and "lead systems engineers" with developing "risk informed protection planning and management of their technology ... to mitigate adversary impacts."/50
Agency-Specific DOD Foreign Influence Mitigation Programs
In addition to DOD's department-wide FOCI efforts, some DOD offices or agencies also maintain their own programs or efforts to mitigate the potential impact of foreign influence for contractors or other nongovernmental partners. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has its own Fundamental Research Risk-Based Security Review Program (FRRBS), which addresses academic partners for DARPA-funded research./51 Congress might consider whether to require DOD to assess this program, whether it could be integrated into other programs or organizations, or whether it is sufficient.
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44 32 C.F.R. Part 117, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-32/subtitle-A/chapter-I/subchapter-D/part-117.
45 32 C.F.R. Part 117, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM).
46 Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, "Facility Clearances," at https://www.dcsa.mil/Industrial-Security/Entity-Vetting-Facility-Clearances-FOCI/Facility-Clearances/.
47 Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, "Facility Clearances."
48 U.S. Department of Defense, "Instruction 5000.83: Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," May 2021, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500083p.pdf.
49 U.S. Department of Defense, "Instruction 5000.83: Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," May 2021, p. 11.
50 U.S. Department of Defense, "Instruction 5000.83: Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," May 2021, p. 11.
51 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, "Frequently Asked Questions," https://www.darpa.mil/sites/default/files/attachment/2025-01/darpa-fundamental-research-risk-based-review-faqs.pdf.
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Foreign Ties to Fundamental Research
Similarly, in 2023, DOD announced efforts to protect DOD-funded research at educational institutes, including issuing a "Policy for Risk-Based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research."/52 Congress may consider studying or requiring a study of the potential efficacy of a similar initiative aimed at uncleared contractors that would specifically focus on foreign influence using a risk-based framework.
Mitigating Foreign Influence for Small Businesses
Understanding the potential risk of foreign influence on small businesses has been a concern for DOD, as smaller companies may lack the resources for protection from foreign influence efforts./53
Small businesses that provide unique or innovative technologies are at particular risk of foreign influence efforts, as are companies that struggle to obtain financing. In 2020, DOD established the Trusted Capital Digital Marketplace program, which connects vetted trusted capital providers and investors with qualifying domestic companies DOD deems "vital" to the DIB./54 This program was intended to allow DOD contractors to have access to funding that is safe from FOCI risk and "limit foreign access to critical technology."/55 Then-Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord cited "adversarial capital," or investment funding from countries of concern, "whether that be in terms of intellectual property or whether that be technology development or manufacturing," as a driving factor for creating the program./56
These concerns have remained salient as DOD has sought to work more with the small business community, and technology start ups. In 2023, DOD released a Small Business Strategy that aimed to bring small businesses, including nontraditional vendors, into the defense industrial base./57 According to DOD strategy, mitigating the potential negative effects of foreign influence is "arguably [one of] the most pressing issues faced by small businesses," as adversaries may find small firms to be an easier target for espionage, cyber threats, or intellectual property (IP) theft./58
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52 Department of Defense, "Policy for Risk-Based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research," June 2023, https://basicresearch.defense.gov/Portals/61/Documents/Academic%20Research%20Security%20Page/Policy%20on%20Risk-Based%20Security%20Reviews%20of%20Fundamental%20Research_June%208%202023%20(2)%201.pdf?ver=9HXS_MMhHURBl85vhiI0Dg%3D%3D.
53 For more information on DOD and its relationship with small business contractors, see CRS Report R45576, An Overview of Small Business Contracting, by R. Corinne Blackford.
54 U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Announces Establishment of the Trusted Capital Digital Marketplace," January 2021, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2470485/department-of-defense-announces-establishment-of-the-trusted-capital-digital-ma/.
55 U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Announces Establishment of the Trusted Capital Digital Marketplace," January 2021.
56 Hudson Institute, "Transcript: Competing with Great Powers at the 'Speed of Relevance': A Conversation with Ellen Lord," December 2020, at https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/transcript-competing-with-great-powers-at-the-speed-of-relevance-a-conversation-with-ellen-lord.
57 U.S. Department of Defense, "Small Business Strategy," January 2023, at https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jan/26/2003150429/-1/-1/0/SMALL-BUSINESS-STRATEGY.PDF.
58 U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD Increases Efforts to Bring Small Businesses into Defense Industrial Base," press release, March 2023, at https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3339784/dod-increases-efforts-to-bring-small-businesses-into-defense-industrial-base/.
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Issues for Congress
Congress may consider taking no action, taking legislative action, or directing DOD to take action to further mitigate the potential risk of foreign influence with its contractors. Actions available to Congress include the following:
* Title 10, U.S.C. and Foreign Ownership Limitations. Congress might consider whether or not to amend Title 10 of the U.S. Code to broaden the categories of goods or services subject to oversight, or named as covered items. Several portions of Title 10 include prohibitions of DOD contracting with companies affiliated with certain countries for certain goods or services, generally goods or services related to sensitive military capabilities (e.g., nuclear command, control, and communications, or satellite services).
* DOD Definitions of Foreign Influence. Congress might consider whether or not to require DOD to clarify or standardize its guidance language about foreign influence. According to the NISPOM, "factors relating to the entity, relevant foreign interests, and the government of such foreign interests, as appropriate, will be considered in the aggregate to determine whether an applicant entity is under FOCI."/59 The NISPOM lists several factors of "source, extent, and nature of FOCI," including a record of espionage, and "whether foreign interests hold a majority or minority position in the entity."/60 The current description of the assessment criteria does not elaborate on what factors are considered the most critical or how security officers define and identify these factors.
* Centralizing Foreign Influence Mitigation Efforts. Congress might consider whether certain mitigation programs that are currently limited in scope or implemented by a DOD component could be implemented across the department. Some agencies within DOD have their own foreign influence mitigation programs.
* Conflict of Interest Mitigation. Congress might additionally consider whether to require DOD to implement agency-wide conflict of interest mitigation programs. A 2021 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that DOD lacked an agency-wide process for identifying conflicts of interest for grant awards. The report noted that, during its interview process, DOD and the Department of Energy told GAO that "they are working on developing agency-wide conflict of interest policies," but reportedly it is not certain if progress on these policies has been made./61
* Requiring Leadership Ownership of Foreign Influence Mitigation Efforts. DOD instructions and policies, such as its "Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," delegate responsibility for protecting DOD IP to the S&T mangers and lead systems engineers./62 Congress may consider requiring that this responsibility reside at higher levels of DOD leadership to require streamlined reporting and accountability structures.
* Providing Continued or Increased Oversight of Current Efforts. Congress may also consider increasing its oversight of DOD IP protection policies and protocols, including additional reporting requirements, providing DOD program managers with additional resources, which could support a centralized reporting information database, or providing additional funding to support foreign influence mitigation efforts with regard to unclassified contracts. Alternatively, Congress may consider maintaining the level of oversight it exercises, or decreasing it, thus allowing DOD to develop its own policies and exercise more autonomy on this matter.
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59 32 C.F.R. Part 117, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-32/subtitle-A/chapter-I/subchapter-D/part-117.
60 32 C.F.R. Part 117, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-32/subtitle-A/chapter-I/subchapter-D/part-117.
61 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Agencies Need to Enhance Policies to Address Foreign Influence, 21-130, December 2020, p.7. at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-130.pdf.
62 Department of Defense, "Instruction 5000.83: Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," May 2021, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500083p.pdf, p. 1.
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The report is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48110/R48110.4.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]
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SUMMARY
Some U.S. firms, including some Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, receive foreign investment or have other ties to foreign entities, including foreign firms and foreign governments. DOD is "using a secondary Department of War designation," under Executive Order (E.O) 14347, dated September 5, 2025. Some DOD contractors' ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, July 17 (TNSLrpt) -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following report (No. R48110) on July 14, 2026, entitled "Department of Defense Contractors and Efforts to Mitigate Foreign Influence" by defense policy analyst Alexandra G. Neenan: * * * SUMMARY Some U.S. firms, including some Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, receive foreign investment or have other ties to foreign entities, including foreign firms and foreign governments. DOD is "using a secondary Department of War designation," under Executive Order (E.O) 14347, dated September 5, 2025. Some DOD contractors'foreign connections could include connections such as ownership, investment, supplier or producer relationships, or production overseas. These ties may pose a risk to U.S. national security, especially when firms are performing work of a sensitive or classified nature and have relationships with adversarial countries.
DOD's Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) is responsible for mitigating potential risks that may arise from foreign investment or foreign ties to DOD contractors. Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) is a term that DOD uses to describe a condition in which a U.S. entity's foreign connections are believed to pose a risk of compromise of or unauthorized access to classified U.S. national security information.
In the last 15 years, Congress and DOD have taken several approaches to change laws and regulations to mitigate concerns about possible foreign malign influence on DOD contractors. Congress may consider changing statutory definitions to further address such concerns by broadening the scope of contract types subject to surveillance and mitigation. It may also consider tasking DOD to expand or centralize some of its pre-existing foreign influence mitigation programs. Congress might also consider reducing foreign influence mitigation efforts in the interest of allowing more entrants into the DOD contract market.
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Contents
Introduction ... 1
Issues for Congress ... 1
Background ... 1
Statute and Regulation ... 1
Title 10, U.S. Code ... 2
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) ... 2
Selected Laws Related to Foreign Influence and DOD Contractors ... 2
Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 115-91 ... 3
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232 ... 3
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, P.L. 116-283 ... 4
Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA, P.L. 117-81 ... 5
James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263 ... 5
Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA, P.L. 118-31 ... 6
Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, P.L. 118-159 ... 6
Fiscal Year 2026 NDAA, P.L. 119-60 ... 7
Other Efforts to Mitigate Foreign Influence of DOD Contractors ... 7
National Industrial Security Program (NISP) ... 7
Technology Protection Programs ... 8
Agency-Specific DOD Foreign Influence Mitigation Programs ... 8
Foreign Ties to Fundamental Research ... 9
Mitigating Foreign Influence for Small Businesses ... 9
Issues for Congress ... 10
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Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress concerning the potential risk of foreign, particularly adversarial government, influence on Department of Defense (DOD) contractors./1
DOD is "using a secondary Department of War designation," under Executive Order (E.O)14347, dated September 5, 2025./2
This report also provides an overview of legislative activity over the last ten years on this topic, as well as selected current DOD efforts to mitigate unwanted foreign influence of contractors.
Issues for Congress
Some oversight issues for Congress regarding foreign influence and DOD contracting include whether or not to amend statutory requirements banning or limiting certain companies with ties to adversarial governments from being awarded certain categories of DOD contracts. Congress may consider whether or not to require DOD to take action to further mitigate the potential risk of foreign influence in contracting. Congress may also consider taking no action or scaling back its current foreign influence mitigation efforts.
Background
Foreign direct investment in the United States, including the ownership or control, direct or indirect, by a foreign entity of U.S.-based firms, has generally increased over the past 15 years./3
Some U.S. firms, including some Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, receive foreign investment or have other ties to foreign entities, including foreign firms and foreign governments. Some DOD contractors' foreign connections could include ties such as ownership, investment, supplier or producer relationships, or production overseas. These ties may pose a risk to U.S. national security, especially when those performing work of a sensitive or classified nature have potential ties (such as foreign ownership and control) to adversarial countries.
DOD's Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) is responsible for mitigating potential risks that may arise from foreign investment and foreign ties to DOD contractors. According to DCSA, Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) occurs "whenever a foreign interest has the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, and whether or not exercisable, to direct or decide matters affecting the management or operations of that company in a manner which may result in unauthorized access to classified information or may adversely affect the performance of classified contracts."/4
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1 CRS In Focus IF10600, Defense Primer: Department of Defense Contractors, by Alexandra G. Neenan.
2 Executive Order 14347, "Restoring the United States Department of War," September 5, 2025, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/10/2025-17508/restoring-the-united-states-department-of-war.
3 For more information about foreign direct investment in the broader U.S. economy, see CRS In Focus IF10636, Foreign Direct Investment: Background and Issues, by Shayerah I. Akhtar and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.
4 Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, "Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence," https://www.dcsa.mil/Industrial-Security/Entity-Vetting-Facility-Clearances-FOCI/Foreign-Ownership-Control-or-Influence/.
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Statute and Regulation
DOD contracting-related statutes are covered in Titles 10 and 41 of the U.S. Code. Title 41 addresses federal procurement in general and its provisions apply to DOD unless otherwise specified in Title 10. Title 10 addresses DOD procurement specifically. The procurement provisions in Titles 41 and 10 are implemented by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the DOD-specific FAR supplement, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)./5
Over the last 15 years, Congress and DOD have taken several approaches to change laws and regulations to further mitigate FOCI concerns with regard to DOD contractors. One method Congress and DOD have used to mitigate FOCI risks is to require in statute that only a U.S.-owned company may provide certain types of goods or services and that DOD may not purchase such goods from companies with ties to certain countries. The way that DOD and Congress have defined such restrictions and categories has varied over time. Legislation over the last 15 years has added new types of goods or services to these lists and some observers have proposed that this list be further expanded.
Title 10, U.S. Code
Various sections of Title 10 include prohibitions on DOD's procurement of certain categories of goods and services from companies that have ties to certain countries or entities that could pose a risk to U.S. national security. Additionally, several sections in Title 10 include specific procedures that DOD is to follow to reduce the risk of foreign influence. Many of these provisions stem from legislation enacted over the last 15 years, particularly sections that specifically call out concerns regarding the government and military of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The following section provides an overview of selected laws and legislation aimed at mitigating the potential risk of foreign influence in DOD contracting.
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
DOD ultimately implements many of the Title 10 provisions that stem from legislative action in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The DFARS, the DOD-specific supplement to the FAR, does not contain blanket restrictions on foreign entities' investment or other forms of involvement with DOD contractors. However, the DFARS does include restrictions on the acquisition of some items from certain companies. For example, one portion of the DFARS outlines a prohibition on some items from companies that have known ties to the PRC military./6
Selected Laws Related to Foreign Influence and DOD Contractors
The following sections present selected laws related to the potential risk of foreign influence in DOD contracting. Several provisions impose federal procurement restrictions on selected categories of technologies produced by certain companies and produced by other companies owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the governments of adversarial countries. Additionally, some provisions address certain goods and services produced by certain PRC government-affiliated entities, such as the Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei)./7
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5 Additional information about the FAR can be found in CRS Report R42826, The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by David H. Carpenter, Matthew D. Trout, and Dominick A. FiorentinoFor additional information, congressional clients may contact Dominick Fiorentino.
6 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Sec.252.225-7007.
7 For more information on U.S. restrictions on Huawei technologies specifically, see CRS Report R47012, U.S. Restrictions on Huawei Technologies: National Security, Foreign Policy, and Economic Interests, by Jill C. Gallagher.
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Many of these provisions were enacted at the same time that the U.S. government began to characterize its sometimes-tense relations with countries such as the PRC and the Russian Federation (Russia) as a great power competition (GPC). During this time, both Congress and the executive branch identified foreign influence, supply chain risks, and risks involving DOD contractors as part of GPC.
Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), P.L. 115-91
Section 1656 of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required that the Secretary of Defense submit to the congressional defense committees an assessment of the extent to which DOD relied on certain categories of telecommunications equipment that were produced or provided by certain foreign-affiliated entities (including Huawei) to fulfill nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense missions./8
This provision allowed DOD to submit waivers for this requirement on a case-by-case basis, but required that these waivers be submitted by the Secretary of Defense and not be delegated to lower levels of authority, which suggests a high level of importance, because many categories of acquisition requirements may often be waived at lower component levels.
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232
Section 889 of the FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232), imposed federal procurement restrictions on certain telecommunications and video surveillance goods and services from several companies affiliated with the PRC, including the Huawei Technologies Company and the ZTE Corporation. This prohibition applies to DOD, and includes a prohibition on loans and grants, in addition to contracting. The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council issued several interim rules implementing this statute beginning in 2019, including detailed requirements for DOD, as well as other covered agencies./9
This restriction was implemented in the DFARS in Section 252.204-7018 and includes waiver requirements and procedures should a DOD entity need to work with a contractor using covered equipment.
Defense industry groups protested the timeline, intensity, and complexity of this requirement in 2020, the originally planned time of its implementation. For example, a representative of the Professional Services Council, an advocacy group for federal service contractors, said that "the potential impact under the statute could affect nearly every contractor and subcontractor across the entire federal government," and that there were "consequences that reach beyond prime contractors."/10
Other commentators raised concerns about the lack of clarity concerning applicability of the new requirements for subcontractors./11
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8 P.L. 115-91, Sec.1656. Defense committees, as defined in 10 U.S.C., Sec.101(a)(16), are the Senate Armed Services Committee, House Armed Services Committee, Senate Appropriations Committee, and the House Appropriations Committee.
9 84 Federal Register 40216, at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/13/2019-17201/federal-acquisition-regulation-prohibition-on-contracting-for-certain-telecommunications-and-video. 85 Federal Register 42665, at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/14/2020-15293/federal-acquisition-regulation-prohibition-on-contracting-with-entities-using-certain.
10 Joe Gould, "U.S. Government's Huawei Ban Moving Too Fast, Contractors Say," Defense News, July 9, 2020.
11 Scott S. Sheffler, "Section 889, The "Huawei Ban" in Federal Contracts: General Scope and Considerations," (2020), at https://www.feldesman.com/section-889-the-huawei-ban-in-federal-contracts-general-scope-and-considerations/.
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In August 2020, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) granted DOD a temporary waiver to address some of these concerns and "to provide time to review the full details of the rule implementation using additional information from DOD," according to a statement from DOD./12
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, P.L. 116-283
Section 819 of the FY2021 NDAA amended a note in Title 10 of the U.S. Code requiring DOD to "require reports and conduct examinations" of covered contractors "to assess compliance" related to FOCI mitigation efforts./13
The provision also required that DOD develop "procedures for appropriately responding to changes in covered contractor of subcontractor beneficial ownership status based on changes in disclosures of their beneficial ownership and whether they are under FOCI."/14
This requirement was part of a broader initiative that began in the FY2020 NDAA to modernize DOD's acquisition processes and ensure integrity of the U.S. defense industrial base./15
According to DOD, its Acquisition Technology and Information Team was tasked in 2021 with drafting the proposed DFARS rule partially implementing this provision; its report due date, including responses to public comments, was extended to July 2026./16
Section 1260H of the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) required that DOD "identify each entity the Secretary [of Defense] determines, based on the most recent information available, is operating directly or indirectly in the United States or any of its territories and possessions, that is a Chinese military company." This provision included a definition of "Chinese military company," and what it calls "military-civil fusion contributor," which includes a more expansive definition of ties to the PRC military and government beyond companies with explicit ties to the PRC military./17
Beyond ties to the People's Liberation Army or the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, a "military-civil fusion contributor" may have ties to organizations such as the PRC's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology or "entities that advertise on national, provincial, and nongovernmental military equipment procurement platforms in the People's Republic of China."/18
DOD is to submit this information annually to the Armed Services Committees and publish an unclassified version of its list in the Federal Register until 2030./19
The most recent version of DOD's notice of designation of Chinese Military Companies was released on June 8, 2026, in accordance with this legislation's statutory reporting requirements./20
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12 Department of Defense, "Ellen M. Lord, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Briefs Media at the Pentagon," press release, August 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2319990/ellen-m-lord-undersecretary-of-defense-for-acquisition-and-sustainment-briefs-m/.
13 P.L. 116-283, Sec.819. The NDAA references a note in 10 U.S.C. Sec.2509, but the portion of Title 10 in question has since been renumbered and can be located in 10 U.S.C. Sec.4819.
14 P.L. 116-283, Sec.819.
15 P.L. 116-92, Sec.845.
16 DOD, "Open DFARS Cases," April 2024, at https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/opencases/dfarscasenum/dfars.pdf#page=11.
17 P.L. 116-283(d)(2).
18 P.L. 116-283(d)(2).
19 P.L. 116-283(b).
20 Department of Defense, "Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States in Accordance with Section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283, Section 126H, as amended (codified at 10 U.S.C. Sec.113, note)), June 2026, https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jun/08/2003945537/-1/-1/1/ENTITIES-IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES-IN-ACCORDANCE-WITH-SECTION-1260H.PDF.
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Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA, P.L. 117-81
Section 855 of the FY2022 NDAA tasked DOD with requiring that certain contractors and subcontractors disclose if they have employees "who will perform work in the People's Republic of China on a covered contract."/21 Per the provision, contract funding is be withheld until this information is provided to DOD, potentially making enforcement of this amendment easier by incentivizing contractors to provide this information expeditiously./22 Additionally, DOD is to provide semi-annual briefings to congressional defense committees summarizing the information it finds from such disclosures./23 While not an explicit restriction of DOD contractors that work in the PRC, this additional information may support security and contracting officers when conducting due diligence.
The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council implemented this statutory provision in May 2026, when it amended a portion of the DFARS that addressed DOD contract solicitation provisions./24
James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L. 117-263
Section 5949 of the FY2023 NDAA imposed restrictions on the procurement of goods or services that include components from semiconductor companies with links to certain countries, with a focus on concerns about the PRC and specific PRC companies./25 It also imposed a restriction on the procurement of goods and services for "a critical system" that "uses" components from these covered semiconductor companies./26 The final version of the legislation changed the word "use[s]" to "include[s]," which some analysts assert represented a less strict, "scaled back" version of the originally proposed legislation./27 This change came after reported pushback from multiple industry and trade groups, including several defense industry groups./28
Similar to earlier NDAA provisions, this legislation also allows an executive agency head to waive, for two years, the prohibition if "no compliant product or service is available to be procured as, and when, needed at United States market prices or a price that is not considered prohibitively expensive," and if "such waiver could not reasonably be expected to compromise the critical national security interests of the United States."/29
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21 P.L. 117-81, Sec.855.
22 P.L. 117-81, Sec.855.
23 P.L. 117-81, Sec.855.
24 DFARS, Sec.252.225-7058.
25 P.L. 117-263, Sec.5949. For more information on Chinese influence in the semiconductor industry, see CRS Report R46767, China's New Semiconductor Policies: Issues for Congress, by Karen M. Sutter; CRS Report R47558, Semiconductors and the CHIPS Act: The Global Context, by Karen M. Sutter, Emily G. Blevins, and Yong W. Kwon; and CRS In Focus IF12958, Section 301 and China: Mature-Node Semiconductors, by Karen M. Sutter.
26 P.L. 117-263, Sec.5949.
27 Alexandra Alper, "U.S. Lawmakers Ease Planned Curbs on Chinese Chips amid Corporate Pushback," Reuters, December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-lawmakers-ease-proposed-curbs-chinese-chips-amid-corporate-pushback-2022-12-06/.
28 Alexandra Alper, "U.S. Lawmakers Ease Planned Curbs on Chinese Chips amid Corporate Pushback," Reuters, December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-lawmakers-ease-proposed-curbs-chinese-chips-amid-corporate-pushback-2022-12-06/.
29 Alexandra Alper, "U.S. Lawmakers Ease Planned Curbs on Chinese Chips amid Corporate Pushback," Reuters, December 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-lawmakers-ease-proposed-curbs-chinese-chips-amid-corporate-pushback-2022-12-06/.
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In the Joint Explanatory Statement, the defense committees noted that
'the intent of Congress in advancing this proposal is that, in serving federal supply chains, Federal contract recipients and their suppliers (including domestic and foreign subsidiaries, affiliates, distributors, and intermediaries) should not utilize companies connected to foreign countries of concern that threaten national security, such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp, and ChangXin Memory Technologies, or any other company identified under this section (including any affiliate, subsidiary, successor, distributor, or intermediary thereof). Furthermore, we believe that for the purposes of waivers that may be issued under this section, critical national security interests of the United States may include protecting the Nation's economic security and its technological competitiveness relative to strategic competitors ... the intent of this provision is to include both contractors and suppliers, to the extent possible under the Federal Acquisition Regulation.'/30
This provision received mixed reactions from outside groups. Some pro-commerce advocacy groups praised the provision, saying that it would "[protect] against Chinese cyber threats and any dependence on China for our critical infrastructure and defense capabilities."/31 Other commentators have noted that the prohibitions may be onerous for potential DOD contractors, saying that contractors may need "dedicated supply chain security personnel who are going to be responsible for all of the regulations that are coming out in this area."/32
Fiscal Year 2024 NDAA, P.L. 118-31
Section 812 of the FY2024 NDAA increased statutory requirements for consulting service contractors who confirm they do not have conflicts of interest, including contracts, with foreign entities, including entities with connections to the governments of the PRC or the Russian Federation./33 Contractors found to have conflicts of interest with covered entities would be subject to additional surveillance./34 DOD implemented this provision when it amended the DFARS to create a new section, "Prohibition Relating to Conflicts of Interest in Consulting Services - Certification."/35
Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA, P.L. 118-159
The Joint Explanatory Statement for the FY2025 NDAA required that DOD provide to the defense committees a briefing on "the foreign capital disclosure requirements" of DOD organizations "that routinely engage with commercial entities backed by private equity or venture capital funds."/36
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30 Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, pp. 703-704, at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fy23_ndaa_joint_explanatory_statement.pdf.
31 American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce, letter to Congress, November 2022, at https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000184-a64c-d1d1-ad8d-af7d115d0000.
32 Justin Doubleday, "New Rule Sets Stage for Banning Risky Technologies from Government Supply Chains," Federal News Network, October 2023, at https://federalnewsnetwork.com/acquisition-policy/2023/10/new-rule-sets-stage-for-banning-risky-technologies-from-government-supply-chains/.
33 P.L. 118-31.
34 P.L. 118-31.
35 DFARS, Sec.252.209-7012.
36 Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, pp. 37-38, at https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20241209/FY25%20NDAA%20JOINT%20EXPLANATORY%20MATERIAL%20FINAL.pdf.
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Fiscal Year 2026 NDAA, P.L. 119-60
Section 838 of the FY2026 NDAA required that DOD identify and conduct a risk assessment of "all critical infrastructure that relies on materials or components the origin of which is a foreign entity of concern."/37 DOD is then to provide the defense committees a classified briefing on its findings and plans to address any concerns it identified, including "success stories or case studies of Departmental actions to mitigate foreign entity of concern-related risks."/38
Section 842 created a new statutory prohibition on DOD's procurement of "advanced batteries composed of material from certain foreign sources."/39 This restriction is to take effect in 2028 and allows for exceptions, including commercially available batteries used in equipment maintenance and batteries used for research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E)./40
Other Efforts to Mitigate Foreign Influence of DOD Contractors
Beyond the statutory and regulatory measures detailed above, DOD maintains other programs that aim to mitigate the risks, extent of, and impact of foreign influence in DOD contracting. Some of these programs - such as the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) - protect certain categories of contracts, such as classified contracts, while other programs aim to protect certain components of DOD, such as science and technology programs.
In addition to DOD-specific requirements and programs, DOD contractors must also follow U.S. export control regulations and decisions, which apply to all U.S. firms. The U.S. Department of Commerce maintains a control list of dual use technologies, which have both civilian and military uses and are subject to export controls. The Commerce Department (DOC) also maintains lists of entities that U.S. government agencies have found pose proliferation or foreign policy concerns and require additional licensing requirements or restrictions./41
National Industrial Security Program (NISP)
The NISP applies to contractors that have access to classified information and/or perform classified contracts. It has specific restrictions for contractors regarding FOCI. The NISP was established in 1993 by Executive Order (E.O.) 12829, "The National Industrial Security Program," with the intent to "safeguard Federal Government classified information that is released to contractors, licensees, and grantees of the United States Government."/42 The E.O. states that the NISP "shall serve as a single, integrated, cohesive industrial security program to protect classified information and to preserve our Nation's economic and technological interests."/43
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37 P.L. 119-60 Sec.838(a)(1).
38 P.L. 119-60 Sec.838(f)(3)(B).
39 P.L. 119-60. Sec.842(a). 10 U.S.C. Sec.4865.
40 P.L. 119-60 Sec.842(a).
41 U.S. Department of Commerce, "Commerce Control List," at https://www.bis.gov/regulations/ear/interactive-commerce-control-list?isExpanded=&category=&keyword=.
42 Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program," January 1993, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1993-01-11/pdf/WCPD-1993-01-11-Pg17.pdf.
43 Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program," January 1993.
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NISP regulations outline specific FOCI mitigation procedures for contractors that possess security clearances, including the NISP Operating Manual (NISPOM), located in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). The NISPOM requires that cleared contractors report to DOD any FOCI, including foreign classified contracts and "loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified information."/44
The NISPOM specifies that the requirements for a "classified contract" (including FOCI-related procedures) are also "applicable to all phases of precontract, license or grant activity, including solicitations (bids, quotations, and proposals), pre-contract negotiations, post-contract activity, or other government contracting activity (GCA) programs or projects which require access to classified information by a contractor."/45 Additionally, DCSA has specific requirements for contractor and subcontractor facility clearances to ensure the protection of classified information./46
According to the NISPOM, when the cognizant security agency has "determined that an entity is under FOCI, the primary consideration will be the protection of classified information" and the cognizant security agency will "take whatever action is necessary to protect classified information."/47
Technology Protection Programs
Data-sharing and intellectual property-related requirements and provisions for DOD contracts are typically contract-specific. A 2021 update to Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.83 Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage established policy for science and technology (S&T) managers to protect DOD innovation./48 The DODI states that DOD contractors and contractor facilities "are at risk of attacks by state and non-state threat actors."/49 The DODI also tasks S&T managers and "lead systems engineers" with developing "risk informed protection planning and management of their technology ... to mitigate adversary impacts."/50
Agency-Specific DOD Foreign Influence Mitigation Programs
In addition to DOD's department-wide FOCI efforts, some DOD offices or agencies also maintain their own programs or efforts to mitigate the potential impact of foreign influence for contractors or other nongovernmental partners. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has its own Fundamental Research Risk-Based Security Review Program (FRRBS), which addresses academic partners for DARPA-funded research./51 Congress might consider whether to require DOD to assess this program, whether it could be integrated into other programs or organizations, or whether it is sufficient.
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44 32 C.F.R. Part 117, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-32/subtitle-A/chapter-I/subchapter-D/part-117.
45 32 C.F.R. Part 117, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM).
46 Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, "Facility Clearances," at https://www.dcsa.mil/Industrial-Security/Entity-Vetting-Facility-Clearances-FOCI/Facility-Clearances/.
47 Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, "Facility Clearances."
48 U.S. Department of Defense, "Instruction 5000.83: Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," May 2021, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500083p.pdf.
49 U.S. Department of Defense, "Instruction 5000.83: Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," May 2021, p. 11.
50 U.S. Department of Defense, "Instruction 5000.83: Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," May 2021, p. 11.
51 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, "Frequently Asked Questions," https://www.darpa.mil/sites/default/files/attachment/2025-01/darpa-fundamental-research-risk-based-review-faqs.pdf.
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Foreign Ties to Fundamental Research
Similarly, in 2023, DOD announced efforts to protect DOD-funded research at educational institutes, including issuing a "Policy for Risk-Based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research."/52 Congress may consider studying or requiring a study of the potential efficacy of a similar initiative aimed at uncleared contractors that would specifically focus on foreign influence using a risk-based framework.
Mitigating Foreign Influence for Small Businesses
Understanding the potential risk of foreign influence on small businesses has been a concern for DOD, as smaller companies may lack the resources for protection from foreign influence efforts./53
Small businesses that provide unique or innovative technologies are at particular risk of foreign influence efforts, as are companies that struggle to obtain financing. In 2020, DOD established the Trusted Capital Digital Marketplace program, which connects vetted trusted capital providers and investors with qualifying domestic companies DOD deems "vital" to the DIB./54 This program was intended to allow DOD contractors to have access to funding that is safe from FOCI risk and "limit foreign access to critical technology."/55 Then-Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord cited "adversarial capital," or investment funding from countries of concern, "whether that be in terms of intellectual property or whether that be technology development or manufacturing," as a driving factor for creating the program./56
These concerns have remained salient as DOD has sought to work more with the small business community, and technology start ups. In 2023, DOD released a Small Business Strategy that aimed to bring small businesses, including nontraditional vendors, into the defense industrial base./57 According to DOD strategy, mitigating the potential negative effects of foreign influence is "arguably [one of] the most pressing issues faced by small businesses," as adversaries may find small firms to be an easier target for espionage, cyber threats, or intellectual property (IP) theft./58
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52 Department of Defense, "Policy for Risk-Based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research," June 2023, https://basicresearch.defense.gov/Portals/61/Documents/Academic%20Research%20Security%20Page/Policy%20on%20Risk-Based%20Security%20Reviews%20of%20Fundamental%20Research_June%208%202023%20(2)%201.pdf?ver=9HXS_MMhHURBl85vhiI0Dg%3D%3D.
53 For more information on DOD and its relationship with small business contractors, see CRS Report R45576, An Overview of Small Business Contracting, by R. Corinne Blackford.
54 U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Announces Establishment of the Trusted Capital Digital Marketplace," January 2021, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2470485/department-of-defense-announces-establishment-of-the-trusted-capital-digital-ma/.
55 U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Announces Establishment of the Trusted Capital Digital Marketplace," January 2021.
56 Hudson Institute, "Transcript: Competing with Great Powers at the 'Speed of Relevance': A Conversation with Ellen Lord," December 2020, at https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/transcript-competing-with-great-powers-at-the-speed-of-relevance-a-conversation-with-ellen-lord.
57 U.S. Department of Defense, "Small Business Strategy," January 2023, at https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jan/26/2003150429/-1/-1/0/SMALL-BUSINESS-STRATEGY.PDF.
58 U.S. Department of Defense, "DOD Increases Efforts to Bring Small Businesses into Defense Industrial Base," press release, March 2023, at https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3339784/dod-increases-efforts-to-bring-small-businesses-into-defense-industrial-base/.
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Issues for Congress
Congress may consider taking no action, taking legislative action, or directing DOD to take action to further mitigate the potential risk of foreign influence with its contractors. Actions available to Congress include the following:
* Title 10, U.S.C. and Foreign Ownership Limitations. Congress might consider whether or not to amend Title 10 of the U.S. Code to broaden the categories of goods or services subject to oversight, or named as covered items. Several portions of Title 10 include prohibitions of DOD contracting with companies affiliated with certain countries for certain goods or services, generally goods or services related to sensitive military capabilities (e.g., nuclear command, control, and communications, or satellite services).
* DOD Definitions of Foreign Influence. Congress might consider whether or not to require DOD to clarify or standardize its guidance language about foreign influence. According to the NISPOM, "factors relating to the entity, relevant foreign interests, and the government of such foreign interests, as appropriate, will be considered in the aggregate to determine whether an applicant entity is under FOCI."/59 The NISPOM lists several factors of "source, extent, and nature of FOCI," including a record of espionage, and "whether foreign interests hold a majority or minority position in the entity."/60 The current description of the assessment criteria does not elaborate on what factors are considered the most critical or how security officers define and identify these factors.
* Centralizing Foreign Influence Mitigation Efforts. Congress might consider whether certain mitigation programs that are currently limited in scope or implemented by a DOD component could be implemented across the department. Some agencies within DOD have their own foreign influence mitigation programs.
* Conflict of Interest Mitigation. Congress might additionally consider whether to require DOD to implement agency-wide conflict of interest mitigation programs. A 2021 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that DOD lacked an agency-wide process for identifying conflicts of interest for grant awards. The report noted that, during its interview process, DOD and the Department of Energy told GAO that "they are working on developing agency-wide conflict of interest policies," but reportedly it is not certain if progress on these policies has been made./61
* Requiring Leadership Ownership of Foreign Influence Mitigation Efforts. DOD instructions and policies, such as its "Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," delegate responsibility for protecting DOD IP to the S&T mangers and lead systems engineers./62 Congress may consider requiring that this responsibility reside at higher levels of DOD leadership to require streamlined reporting and accountability structures.
* Providing Continued or Increased Oversight of Current Efforts. Congress may also consider increasing its oversight of DOD IP protection policies and protocols, including additional reporting requirements, providing DOD program managers with additional resources, which could support a centralized reporting information database, or providing additional funding to support foreign influence mitigation efforts with regard to unclassified contracts. Alternatively, Congress may consider maintaining the level of oversight it exercises, or decreasing it, thus allowing DOD to develop its own policies and exercise more autonomy on this matter.
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59 32 C.F.R. Part 117, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-32/subtitle-A/chapter-I/subchapter-D/part-117.
60 32 C.F.R. Part 117, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-32/subtitle-A/chapter-I/subchapter-D/part-117.
61 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Agencies Need to Enhance Policies to Address Foreign Influence, 21-130, December 2020, p.7. at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-130.pdf.
62 Department of Defense, "Instruction 5000.83: Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological Advantage," May 2021, at https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500083p.pdf, p. 1.
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The report is posted at: https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48110/R48110.4.pdf
[Category: CRSCRS]