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Inter-American Development Bank: Perceptions of Corruption and Preferences for Redistributive Policies - Evidence From a Survey Experiment in Latin America
WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "Perceptions of Corruption and Preferences for Redistributive Policies: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Latin America."
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Abstract
This study examines whether information about corruption and tax evasion changes perceived unfairness in the income distribution, perceived inequality of opportunity, and support for specific redistributive policies. Using a survey experiment administered in eight Latin American countries, we find that factual information ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "Perceptions of Corruption and Preferences for Redistributive Policies: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Latin America." Here are excerpts: * * * Abstract This study examines whether information about corruption and tax evasion changes perceived unfairness in the income distribution, perceived inequality of opportunity, and support for specific redistributive policies. Using a survey experiment administered in eight Latin American countries, we find that factual informationabout public corruption and elite tax evasion increases perceptions of unfairness and unequal opportunity. It also increases support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households. However, these effects do not extend to broader tax-financed redistribution: respondents do not become more supportive of raising corporate taxes, broadening the personal income tax, or increasing the VAT to finance social spending, nor do they become more supportive of expanding conditional cash transfers or non-contributory pensions through higher taxes. The results are consistent with trust limiting the translation of inequality concerns into support for broader tax-financed redistribution: the treatments increased perceived elite influence over government policy and reduced some measures of trust in public officials and firms.
Introduction
Latin America and the Caribbean is among the most unequal regions in the world, yet redistribution from the rich to the poor remains limited. This reflects political and institutional constraints, the limited effectiveness of redistributive policies, and possibly weak citizen demand for efficient redistribution. At the same time, Latin Americans widely perceive the income distribution as unfair and report high levels of government and elite corruption, contributing to low trust in both the public and private sectors (Busso et al., 2025). These perceptions are consistent with evidence that corruption in the region exceeds levels observed in the United States and Europe, and that government inefficiency and fraud waste substantial public resources.1 The coexistence of widespread perceived unfairness, high perceived corruption, and limited redistribution raises a central question: do corruption and tax-evasion information increase perceived unfairness while limiting support for broader tax-financed redistribution?
We examine this question using a survey experiment conducted in eight Latin American countries. The experiment exposes respondents to information about public corruption or elite tax evasion. The design allows us to assess whether this information increases perceived unfairness in the income distribution and perceived unequal opportunity, and whether these concerns translate into support for broader tax-financed redistribution.
The experiment covers more than 21,000 respondents from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. Online survey respondents were randomly assigned to a control group or to one of two treatment groups. Both treatments used factual prompts based on documented corruption and tax-evasion scandals in Latin America. The first treatment emphasized public corruption, including bribes paid to politicians and public officials to obtain public contracts. The second treatment emphasized elite tax evasion, including the use of offshore structures by wealthy individuals and corporations to hide assets and reduce tax liabilities. The experiment tests whether information that emphasizes public corruption or elite tax evasion has different effects on perceived unfairness and unequal opportunity, redistributive preferences over taxation and social spending, and trust in government and elites.
We find that both treatments increase perceived corruption and tax evasion. The corruption treatment has larger effects on perceptions that politicians and public officials take bribes, but both treatments increase perceptions that firms and rich individuals pay bribes to public officials. Both treatments also increase perceived income hidden from tax authorities by firms and rich individuals. This pattern suggests that respondents do not sharply separate public corruption from misconduct by firms and rich individuals.
The treatments also increase perceived unfairness and unequal opportunity. Treated respondents are more likely to view the income distribution as unfair. They are also more likely to perceive a larger gap in college-graduation opportunities between smart young people from poor and rich households.
The effects on redistributive preferences are more limited. Both treatments increase support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households. However, neither treatment increases support for broader tax-financed redistribution. Respondents do not become more supportive of raising corporate taxes, broadening the personal income tax, or increasing the VAT to finance social spending. Nor do they become more supportive of expanding conditional cash transfers or non-contributory pensions through higher taxes.
We also find that both treatments increase perceptions that firms and rich individuals influence government policy to obtain favorable laws and tax exemptions. The corruption treatment also reduces the belief that public officials and firms take the interests of people like the respondent into account; the tax-evasion treatment reduces this belief for firms. Taken together, the results suggest that information about corruption and tax evasion increases perceived unfairness and support for taxation at the top, but does not generate broader support for fiscal instruments that require taxation and government implementation. One interpretation is that respondents may doubt whether additional fiscal resources would be used effectively for redistributive purposes.
This paper contributes to the literature on corruption, inequality, and redistribution by showing that corruption and tax-evasion information can move different components of redistributive preferences in different directions. Prior work argues that corruption can make inequality appear less fair because it allows already privileged groups to obtain additional wealth and influence (Uslaner, 2017; Vallier, 2021). This view implies that exposure to corruption or elite tax evasion may increase support for redistribution from groups perceived as having benefited unfairly (Uslaner and Badescu, 2004; Helgason and Merola, 2022; Di-Tella and Macculoch, 2009; Grimalda and Pipke, 2021). Other work emphasizes an opposing force: corruption may lower support for tax-financed redistribution if it weakens trust in the government's ability to redistribute effectively (Hauk et al., 2022; Silva et al., 2016). We find that these forces operate at the same time and may counterbalance each other. Information about public corruption and elite tax evasion increases perceived unfairness and support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households, but does not increase support for broader tax-financed redistribution. This distinction is important because redistributive preferences are multidimensional: support for taxing high-income groups need not coincide with support for transfers or social spending targeted to low-income groups (Cavaille and Trump, 2015; Margalit and Raviv, 2024).
The paper also contributes to the literature using survey experiments to study redistributive preferences. Much of this work focuses on high-income countries and shows that beliefs about inequality, mobility, and relative income position are malleable, while policy preferences are harder to move (Alesina et al., 2023, 2018; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Stantcheva, 2021). Evidence from Latin America remains more limited, although prior work shows that correcting misperceptions about income position and tax incidence can affect support for redistribution (Cruces et al., 2013; Ardanaz et al., 2022). We provide experimental evidence from eight Latin American countries, where inequality, corruption, and low trust are salient features of the fiscal-policy environment. The closest paper to ours is Di-Tella et al. (2021), who show that trust in elites and government shapes preferences for taxation at the top in the United States. We extend this work by studying how information about public corruption and elite tax evasion affects perceived unfairness, perceived unequal opportunity, support for taxation at the top, support for broader tax-financed redistribution, and trust in government and elites in Latin America.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the data and measurement. Section 4 presents the two information treatments administered through the survey instrument. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the main findings and additional results. Section 7 concludes.
* * *
View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/perceptions-corruption-and-preferences-redistributive-policies-evidence-survey-experiment-latin
[Category: IADB]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Abstract
This study examines whether information about corruption and tax evasion changes perceived unfairness in the income distribution, perceived inequality of opportunity, and support for specific redistributive policies. Using a survey experiment administered in eight Latin American countries, we find that factual information ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "Perceptions of Corruption and Preferences for Redistributive Policies: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Latin America." Here are excerpts: * * * Abstract This study examines whether information about corruption and tax evasion changes perceived unfairness in the income distribution, perceived inequality of opportunity, and support for specific redistributive policies. Using a survey experiment administered in eight Latin American countries, we find that factual informationabout public corruption and elite tax evasion increases perceptions of unfairness and unequal opportunity. It also increases support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households. However, these effects do not extend to broader tax-financed redistribution: respondents do not become more supportive of raising corporate taxes, broadening the personal income tax, or increasing the VAT to finance social spending, nor do they become more supportive of expanding conditional cash transfers or non-contributory pensions through higher taxes. The results are consistent with trust limiting the translation of inequality concerns into support for broader tax-financed redistribution: the treatments increased perceived elite influence over government policy and reduced some measures of trust in public officials and firms.
Introduction
Latin America and the Caribbean is among the most unequal regions in the world, yet redistribution from the rich to the poor remains limited. This reflects political and institutional constraints, the limited effectiveness of redistributive policies, and possibly weak citizen demand for efficient redistribution. At the same time, Latin Americans widely perceive the income distribution as unfair and report high levels of government and elite corruption, contributing to low trust in both the public and private sectors (Busso et al., 2025). These perceptions are consistent with evidence that corruption in the region exceeds levels observed in the United States and Europe, and that government inefficiency and fraud waste substantial public resources.1 The coexistence of widespread perceived unfairness, high perceived corruption, and limited redistribution raises a central question: do corruption and tax-evasion information increase perceived unfairness while limiting support for broader tax-financed redistribution?
We examine this question using a survey experiment conducted in eight Latin American countries. The experiment exposes respondents to information about public corruption or elite tax evasion. The design allows us to assess whether this information increases perceived unfairness in the income distribution and perceived unequal opportunity, and whether these concerns translate into support for broader tax-financed redistribution.
The experiment covers more than 21,000 respondents from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. Online survey respondents were randomly assigned to a control group or to one of two treatment groups. Both treatments used factual prompts based on documented corruption and tax-evasion scandals in Latin America. The first treatment emphasized public corruption, including bribes paid to politicians and public officials to obtain public contracts. The second treatment emphasized elite tax evasion, including the use of offshore structures by wealthy individuals and corporations to hide assets and reduce tax liabilities. The experiment tests whether information that emphasizes public corruption or elite tax evasion has different effects on perceived unfairness and unequal opportunity, redistributive preferences over taxation and social spending, and trust in government and elites.
We find that both treatments increase perceived corruption and tax evasion. The corruption treatment has larger effects on perceptions that politicians and public officials take bribes, but both treatments increase perceptions that firms and rich individuals pay bribes to public officials. Both treatments also increase perceived income hidden from tax authorities by firms and rich individuals. This pattern suggests that respondents do not sharply separate public corruption from misconduct by firms and rich individuals.
The treatments also increase perceived unfairness and unequal opportunity. Treated respondents are more likely to view the income distribution as unfair. They are also more likely to perceive a larger gap in college-graduation opportunities between smart young people from poor and rich households.
The effects on redistributive preferences are more limited. Both treatments increase support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households. However, neither treatment increases support for broader tax-financed redistribution. Respondents do not become more supportive of raising corporate taxes, broadening the personal income tax, or increasing the VAT to finance social spending. Nor do they become more supportive of expanding conditional cash transfers or non-contributory pensions through higher taxes.
We also find that both treatments increase perceptions that firms and rich individuals influence government policy to obtain favorable laws and tax exemptions. The corruption treatment also reduces the belief that public officials and firms take the interests of people like the respondent into account; the tax-evasion treatment reduces this belief for firms. Taken together, the results suggest that information about corruption and tax evasion increases perceived unfairness and support for taxation at the top, but does not generate broader support for fiscal instruments that require taxation and government implementation. One interpretation is that respondents may doubt whether additional fiscal resources would be used effectively for redistributive purposes.
This paper contributes to the literature on corruption, inequality, and redistribution by showing that corruption and tax-evasion information can move different components of redistributive preferences in different directions. Prior work argues that corruption can make inequality appear less fair because it allows already privileged groups to obtain additional wealth and influence (Uslaner, 2017; Vallier, 2021). This view implies that exposure to corruption or elite tax evasion may increase support for redistribution from groups perceived as having benefited unfairly (Uslaner and Badescu, 2004; Helgason and Merola, 2022; Di-Tella and Macculoch, 2009; Grimalda and Pipke, 2021). Other work emphasizes an opposing force: corruption may lower support for tax-financed redistribution if it weakens trust in the government's ability to redistribute effectively (Hauk et al., 2022; Silva et al., 2016). We find that these forces operate at the same time and may counterbalance each other. Information about public corruption and elite tax evasion increases perceived unfairness and support for taxing rich households relative to middle-class households, but does not increase support for broader tax-financed redistribution. This distinction is important because redistributive preferences are multidimensional: support for taxing high-income groups need not coincide with support for transfers or social spending targeted to low-income groups (Cavaille and Trump, 2015; Margalit and Raviv, 2024).
The paper also contributes to the literature using survey experiments to study redistributive preferences. Much of this work focuses on high-income countries and shows that beliefs about inequality, mobility, and relative income position are malleable, while policy preferences are harder to move (Alesina et al., 2023, 2018; Kuziemko et al., 2015; Stantcheva, 2021). Evidence from Latin America remains more limited, although prior work shows that correcting misperceptions about income position and tax incidence can affect support for redistribution (Cruces et al., 2013; Ardanaz et al., 2022). We provide experimental evidence from eight Latin American countries, where inequality, corruption, and low trust are salient features of the fiscal-policy environment. The closest paper to ours is Di-Tella et al. (2021), who show that trust in elites and government shapes preferences for taxation at the top in the United States. We extend this work by studying how information about public corruption and elite tax evasion affects perceived unfairness, perceived unequal opportunity, support for taxation at the top, support for broader tax-financed redistribution, and trust in government and elites in Latin America.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework. Section 3 describes the data and measurement. Section 4 presents the two information treatments administered through the survey instrument. Section 5 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 6 presents the main findings and additional results. Section 7 concludes.
* * *
View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/perceptions-corruption-and-preferences-redistributive-policies-evidence-survey-experiment-latin
[Category: IADB]
Inter-American Development Bank: Keeping Heads Above Water - Evidence From a Labor Retention Scheme in Response to Floods in Brazil
WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "Keeping Heads Above Water: Evidence from a Labor Retention Scheme in Response to Floods in Brazil."
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Abstract
We study the labor market effects of a major flood disaster in Brazil and whether a temporary labor-retention scheme--Programa Emergencial de Apoio Financeiro (PEAF)--mitigated these effects by providing wage subsidies while requiring firms to retain covered workers. Drawing on administrative data, we use a matched event-study design that ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "Keeping Heads Above Water: Evidence from a Labor Retention Scheme in Response to Floods in Brazil." Here are excerpts: * * * Abstract We study the labor market effects of a major flood disaster in Brazil and whether a temporary labor-retention scheme--Programa Emergencial de Apoio Financeiro (PEAF)--mitigated these effects by providing wage subsidies while requiring firms to retain covered workers. Drawing on administrative data, we use a matched event-study design thatcompares workers in flood-affected establishments with and without PEAF coverage to matched workers in non-affected establishments. Direct flood exposure reduced formal employment among unprotected workers by about 2 percentage points and increased job switching, indicating rapid reallocation to other formal employers. PEAF increased employment by 2.4 percentage points relative to the counterfactual of flood exposure without program protection. It also reduced reliance on unemployment insurance, consistent with its effect on employment retention. Earnings effects are more nuanced: PEAF mitigated unconditional earnings losses through employment preservation, but earnings among retained workers declined, consistent with downward compensation adjustment within continuing jobs. Effects are concentrated in very small establishments and in sectors more exposed to disruption. The results show that labor-retention schemes can preserve employment after climate disasters, but that need not imply full income protection, a difference that is central to the design of policies aimed at mitigating the economic consequences of climate shocks.
Introduction
The world is currently witnessing intensified climate change and global warming, driven by continued increases in carbon emissions. Emissions between 2010 and 2019 accounted for more than 40% of total emissions accumulated since 1850 (IPCC, 2023). Rising temperatures disrupt the atmosphere, oceans, and biosphere, increasing the frequency and severity of extreme weather events (Rodell & Li, 2023). Consistent with this trend, 2023 to 2025 were the three most disaster-intensive years on record (CRED & USAID, 2025; Delforge et al., 2026). Climate disasters generate severe economic impacts, particularly in developing countries, reducing GDP levels and growth and acting as negative labor market shocks (Ferreira, 2024). Employment and income losses are typical consequences of destructive extreme weather events, and evidence from Latin America shows that informality, income, and sector of employment shape workers' vulnerability to disasters (Otero-Cort'es & Bohorquez-Penuela, 2020; Wagner, 2025; Xie, 2024).
As extreme weather events become more frequent and severe, understanding the resilience of labor markets to sudden disruptions has become an increasingly urgent research question. Central to this debate are the magnitude and persistence of employment and income losses caused by climate shocks, and whether policy interventions can mitigate these losses, particularly among economically vulnerable workers. One possible response is the use of labor-retention schemes (LRSs)--such as furloughs, short-time work arrangements, and wage subsidies--which aim to preserve employment relationships during temporary covariate shocks. These policies expanded substantially during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in Western Europe (Giupponi, Landais, & Lapeyre, 2022). Yet credible evidence on their effectiveness after climate disasters remains limited.
This paper addresses this gap by studying a major flood disaster in Brazil followed by the adoption of a labor-retention policy. Starting in late April 2024, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil's southernmost state, experienced floods of unprecedented intensity, the largest disaster in the state's recorded history. Extreme rainfall caused widespread destruction of homes, businesses, and industrial facilities and forced approximately 600,000 people into displacement or temporary shelters (Tebaldi, 2025). Immediate economic losses were estimated at USD 17.3 billion (IDB, 2024). In response, the federal government launched the Emergency Program for Financial Assistance (Programa Emergencial de Apoio Financeiro, or PEAF), a two-month program requiring employers to retain covered workers for four months--two months during which a wage subsidy was paid and the subsequent two months.
We investigate both the labor market consequences of direct flood exposure and the extent to which PEAF mitigated these impacts by preserving employment relationships and workers' earnings. To do so, we combine Brazil's matched employer-employee dataset with geospatial flood maps, PEAF administrative records, and social-protection registries. These data allow us to construct a monthly panel tracking workers through December 2024. We implement a matched event-study design that partitions workers into three groups: workers in non-affected establishments, workers in flood-affected establishments not covered by PEAF, and workers in flood-affected establishments covered by PEAF. We use coarsened exact matching to balance these groups on a rich set of baseline worker and establishment covariates. This design allows us to estimate the effect of direct flood exposure among unprotected workers and the extent to which PEAF mitigated that effect within a unified empirical framework. The internal validity of our research design is supported by flat pre-trends in the event-study specifications across all outcomes we examine, both for affected untreated workers and for PEAF-treated workers relative to their matched non-affected controls. The results are also robust to specifications that absorb time-varying shocks associated with the baseline covariate profiles used in the matching procedure and robust to the exclusion of comparison workers who may have been indirectly affected by the floods through local spillovers or general-equilibrium effects.
We find that direct flood exposure generated persistent employment losses among unprotected workers. By the end of 2024, formal employment had fallen by about 2.2 percentage points among workers not covered by PEAF. This net employment loss masks a larger disruption to workers' baseline employment relationships. Job switching increased by about 2 percentage points by the end of the period, implying that separations from baseline employers increased by roughly 4 percentage points. Thus, a substantial share of the disruption to original worker-firm matches was absorbed by rapid reallocation to other formal employers. PEAF largely offset the remaining employment loss. Workers in PEAF-covered establishments experienced no average decline in formal employment, and the estimated program effect is 2.4 percentage points relative to the counterfactual of being flood exposed without program protection. This pattern is consistent with the design of the program, which conditioned transfers on the preservation of covered employment relationships.
The earnings results are more nuanced. Among unprotected workers, direct flood exposure reduced unconditional earnings by 2.1% on average. This decline appears to be driven primarily by the net loss of formal employment documented above. Conditional on positive earnings, the effect is much smaller, at 0.8%, indicating that workers who remained formally employed or who rapidly reallocated to another formal job experienced only modest earnings losses on average. PEAF only partially mitigated the earnings losses by preserving employment. Relative to the counterfactual of being flood exposed without program protection, it increased unconditional earnings by about 1.1%. However, the program did not fully protect pay among workers who remained employed. Conditional on positive earnings, PEAF-treated workers experienced larger declines, with earnings falling by 1.3% on average and by around 3% in some post-flood months. This pattern suggests that covered establishments maintained formal job links while adjusting compensation downward among retained workers, likely through variable components of pay.
The floods also increased workers' reliance on the social-protection system, although the effects on noncontributory benefits are modest. Among unprotected affected workers, registration in CadUnico, Brazil's national registry for low-income households, increased ' by 0.2 percentage points, while transfers from Bolsa Fam'ilia, the country's flagship conditional cash transfer program, increased by R$1.12. Both effects correspond to about 4% of the respective baseline control means. Similar effects for PEAF-treated workers imply that PEAF did not meaningfully affect this margin, which likely reflects the broader postdisaster mobilization to register affected households in social programs. The effects on unemployment insurance are larger and more directly connected to the employment losses. Unprotected affected workers became 1.1 percentage points more likely to receive unemployment insurance and received R$19.43 more in monthly benefits, both roughly 28% of the post-flood control mean. PEAF moved these outcomes in the opposite direction: Relative to unprotected affected workers, the program reduced unemployment insurance receipt by 1.9 percentage points and benefits by R$34.17.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation helps benchmark these magnitudes against the scale of the intervention. PEAF paid two minimum-wage transfers, totaling R$2,824 per covered worker. Our estimates imply that the program reduced unemployment-insurance payments by about R$34 per worker-month. In addition, using the estimated 1.1% effect on unconditional earnings and average monthly earnings in the control group, PEAF preserved roughly R$32 in labor earnings per worker-month. Cumulated over the April- December window, these directly measured short-run gains amount to about R$600 per covered worker, well below the transfer cost. This comparison is necessarily partial, as it excludes potentially important benefits from preserving worker-firm matches, avoiding search and training costs, and preserving the tax base. It also reflects only the short-run horizon observed in this version of the paper.
Finally, we show that average effects mask substantial heterogeneity across establishments. Employment losses are especially large among workers attached to very small establishments: In establishments with four or fewer employees, flood exposure without PEAF reduced employment by 6.7 percentage points. PEAF was also most protective in this group, implying a program effect of about 8 percentage points relative to unprotected affected workers. We also find meaningful heterogeneity across sectors, with larger untreated employment losses in construction, manufacturing, and commerce than in services, and PEAF mitigated losses across these sectors. By contrast, heterogeneity across worker characteristics is less systematic. While some differences appear across wage and education groups, they do not map cleanly into a single worker-level vulnerability gradient. Overall, the incidence of employment losses and the protective effects of PEAF appear to be shaped primarily by the characteristics of affected establishments, especially firm size and sector.
Taken together, the results point to a more nuanced view of postdisaster labor market adjustment. Even among unprotected workers, the employment losses caused by the floods were partly offset by rapid reallocation to other formal employers. This adjustment was not enough to prevent a persistent decline in employment, but it indicates that local labor markets absorbed part of the shock through worker mobility. PEAF further reduced these short-run employment losses, with the strongest effects in the firms and sectors in which untreated workers were most exposed. At the same time, preserving employment relationships did not fully insure workers against earnings losses. PEAF mitigated unconditional earnings losses by keeping workers formally employed, but earnings among retained workers still declined. This suggests an important policy lesson: Labor-retention schemes can be effective at preventing separations after climate disasters, but their design must also consider whether firms can adjust compensation along dimensions not directly covered by retention requirements. Our evidence is short run; a longer horizon will be important to assess whether unprotected workers continue to recover through reallocation and whether preserved matches translate into more persistent gains.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the labor market effects of natural disasters and the role of labor-retention schemes. Section 3 provides institutional background on the 2024 Rio Grande do Sul floods and the PEAF program. Section 4 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results, discusses robustness checks, and reports heterogeneity analyses. Section 6 concludes.
* * *
View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/keeping-heads-above-water-evidence-labor-retention-scheme-response-floods-brazil
[Category: IADB]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Abstract
We study the labor market effects of a major flood disaster in Brazil and whether a temporary labor-retention scheme--Programa Emergencial de Apoio Financeiro (PEAF)--mitigated these effects by providing wage subsidies while requiring firms to retain covered workers. Drawing on administrative data, we use a matched event-study design that ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "Keeping Heads Above Water: Evidence from a Labor Retention Scheme in Response to Floods in Brazil." Here are excerpts: * * * Abstract We study the labor market effects of a major flood disaster in Brazil and whether a temporary labor-retention scheme--Programa Emergencial de Apoio Financeiro (PEAF)--mitigated these effects by providing wage subsidies while requiring firms to retain covered workers. Drawing on administrative data, we use a matched event-study design thatcompares workers in flood-affected establishments with and without PEAF coverage to matched workers in non-affected establishments. Direct flood exposure reduced formal employment among unprotected workers by about 2 percentage points and increased job switching, indicating rapid reallocation to other formal employers. PEAF increased employment by 2.4 percentage points relative to the counterfactual of flood exposure without program protection. It also reduced reliance on unemployment insurance, consistent with its effect on employment retention. Earnings effects are more nuanced: PEAF mitigated unconditional earnings losses through employment preservation, but earnings among retained workers declined, consistent with downward compensation adjustment within continuing jobs. Effects are concentrated in very small establishments and in sectors more exposed to disruption. The results show that labor-retention schemes can preserve employment after climate disasters, but that need not imply full income protection, a difference that is central to the design of policies aimed at mitigating the economic consequences of climate shocks.
Introduction
The world is currently witnessing intensified climate change and global warming, driven by continued increases in carbon emissions. Emissions between 2010 and 2019 accounted for more than 40% of total emissions accumulated since 1850 (IPCC, 2023). Rising temperatures disrupt the atmosphere, oceans, and biosphere, increasing the frequency and severity of extreme weather events (Rodell & Li, 2023). Consistent with this trend, 2023 to 2025 were the three most disaster-intensive years on record (CRED & USAID, 2025; Delforge et al., 2026). Climate disasters generate severe economic impacts, particularly in developing countries, reducing GDP levels and growth and acting as negative labor market shocks (Ferreira, 2024). Employment and income losses are typical consequences of destructive extreme weather events, and evidence from Latin America shows that informality, income, and sector of employment shape workers' vulnerability to disasters (Otero-Cort'es & Bohorquez-Penuela, 2020; Wagner, 2025; Xie, 2024).
As extreme weather events become more frequent and severe, understanding the resilience of labor markets to sudden disruptions has become an increasingly urgent research question. Central to this debate are the magnitude and persistence of employment and income losses caused by climate shocks, and whether policy interventions can mitigate these losses, particularly among economically vulnerable workers. One possible response is the use of labor-retention schemes (LRSs)--such as furloughs, short-time work arrangements, and wage subsidies--which aim to preserve employment relationships during temporary covariate shocks. These policies expanded substantially during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially in Western Europe (Giupponi, Landais, & Lapeyre, 2022). Yet credible evidence on their effectiveness after climate disasters remains limited.
This paper addresses this gap by studying a major flood disaster in Brazil followed by the adoption of a labor-retention policy. Starting in late April 2024, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil's southernmost state, experienced floods of unprecedented intensity, the largest disaster in the state's recorded history. Extreme rainfall caused widespread destruction of homes, businesses, and industrial facilities and forced approximately 600,000 people into displacement or temporary shelters (Tebaldi, 2025). Immediate economic losses were estimated at USD 17.3 billion (IDB, 2024). In response, the federal government launched the Emergency Program for Financial Assistance (Programa Emergencial de Apoio Financeiro, or PEAF), a two-month program requiring employers to retain covered workers for four months--two months during which a wage subsidy was paid and the subsequent two months.
We investigate both the labor market consequences of direct flood exposure and the extent to which PEAF mitigated these impacts by preserving employment relationships and workers' earnings. To do so, we combine Brazil's matched employer-employee dataset with geospatial flood maps, PEAF administrative records, and social-protection registries. These data allow us to construct a monthly panel tracking workers through December 2024. We implement a matched event-study design that partitions workers into three groups: workers in non-affected establishments, workers in flood-affected establishments not covered by PEAF, and workers in flood-affected establishments covered by PEAF. We use coarsened exact matching to balance these groups on a rich set of baseline worker and establishment covariates. This design allows us to estimate the effect of direct flood exposure among unprotected workers and the extent to which PEAF mitigated that effect within a unified empirical framework. The internal validity of our research design is supported by flat pre-trends in the event-study specifications across all outcomes we examine, both for affected untreated workers and for PEAF-treated workers relative to their matched non-affected controls. The results are also robust to specifications that absorb time-varying shocks associated with the baseline covariate profiles used in the matching procedure and robust to the exclusion of comparison workers who may have been indirectly affected by the floods through local spillovers or general-equilibrium effects.
We find that direct flood exposure generated persistent employment losses among unprotected workers. By the end of 2024, formal employment had fallen by about 2.2 percentage points among workers not covered by PEAF. This net employment loss masks a larger disruption to workers' baseline employment relationships. Job switching increased by about 2 percentage points by the end of the period, implying that separations from baseline employers increased by roughly 4 percentage points. Thus, a substantial share of the disruption to original worker-firm matches was absorbed by rapid reallocation to other formal employers. PEAF largely offset the remaining employment loss. Workers in PEAF-covered establishments experienced no average decline in formal employment, and the estimated program effect is 2.4 percentage points relative to the counterfactual of being flood exposed without program protection. This pattern is consistent with the design of the program, which conditioned transfers on the preservation of covered employment relationships.
The earnings results are more nuanced. Among unprotected workers, direct flood exposure reduced unconditional earnings by 2.1% on average. This decline appears to be driven primarily by the net loss of formal employment documented above. Conditional on positive earnings, the effect is much smaller, at 0.8%, indicating that workers who remained formally employed or who rapidly reallocated to another formal job experienced only modest earnings losses on average. PEAF only partially mitigated the earnings losses by preserving employment. Relative to the counterfactual of being flood exposed without program protection, it increased unconditional earnings by about 1.1%. However, the program did not fully protect pay among workers who remained employed. Conditional on positive earnings, PEAF-treated workers experienced larger declines, with earnings falling by 1.3% on average and by around 3% in some post-flood months. This pattern suggests that covered establishments maintained formal job links while adjusting compensation downward among retained workers, likely through variable components of pay.
The floods also increased workers' reliance on the social-protection system, although the effects on noncontributory benefits are modest. Among unprotected affected workers, registration in CadUnico, Brazil's national registry for low-income households, increased ' by 0.2 percentage points, while transfers from Bolsa Fam'ilia, the country's flagship conditional cash transfer program, increased by R$1.12. Both effects correspond to about 4% of the respective baseline control means. Similar effects for PEAF-treated workers imply that PEAF did not meaningfully affect this margin, which likely reflects the broader postdisaster mobilization to register affected households in social programs. The effects on unemployment insurance are larger and more directly connected to the employment losses. Unprotected affected workers became 1.1 percentage points more likely to receive unemployment insurance and received R$19.43 more in monthly benefits, both roughly 28% of the post-flood control mean. PEAF moved these outcomes in the opposite direction: Relative to unprotected affected workers, the program reduced unemployment insurance receipt by 1.9 percentage points and benefits by R$34.17.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation helps benchmark these magnitudes against the scale of the intervention. PEAF paid two minimum-wage transfers, totaling R$2,824 per covered worker. Our estimates imply that the program reduced unemployment-insurance payments by about R$34 per worker-month. In addition, using the estimated 1.1% effect on unconditional earnings and average monthly earnings in the control group, PEAF preserved roughly R$32 in labor earnings per worker-month. Cumulated over the April- December window, these directly measured short-run gains amount to about R$600 per covered worker, well below the transfer cost. This comparison is necessarily partial, as it excludes potentially important benefits from preserving worker-firm matches, avoiding search and training costs, and preserving the tax base. It also reflects only the short-run horizon observed in this version of the paper.
Finally, we show that average effects mask substantial heterogeneity across establishments. Employment losses are especially large among workers attached to very small establishments: In establishments with four or fewer employees, flood exposure without PEAF reduced employment by 6.7 percentage points. PEAF was also most protective in this group, implying a program effect of about 8 percentage points relative to unprotected affected workers. We also find meaningful heterogeneity across sectors, with larger untreated employment losses in construction, manufacturing, and commerce than in services, and PEAF mitigated losses across these sectors. By contrast, heterogeneity across worker characteristics is less systematic. While some differences appear across wage and education groups, they do not map cleanly into a single worker-level vulnerability gradient. Overall, the incidence of employment losses and the protective effects of PEAF appear to be shaped primarily by the characteristics of affected establishments, especially firm size and sector.
Taken together, the results point to a more nuanced view of postdisaster labor market adjustment. Even among unprotected workers, the employment losses caused by the floods were partly offset by rapid reallocation to other formal employers. This adjustment was not enough to prevent a persistent decline in employment, but it indicates that local labor markets absorbed part of the shock through worker mobility. PEAF further reduced these short-run employment losses, with the strongest effects in the firms and sectors in which untreated workers were most exposed. At the same time, preserving employment relationships did not fully insure workers against earnings losses. PEAF mitigated unconditional earnings losses by keeping workers formally employed, but earnings among retained workers still declined. This suggests an important policy lesson: Labor-retention schemes can be effective at preventing separations after climate disasters, but their design must also consider whether firms can adjust compensation along dimensions not directly covered by retention requirements. Our evidence is short run; a longer horizon will be important to assess whether unprotected workers continue to recover through reallocation and whether preserved matches translate into more persistent gains.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the labor market effects of natural disasters and the role of labor-retention schemes. Section 3 provides institutional background on the 2024 Rio Grande do Sul floods and the PEAF program. Section 4 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results, discusses robustness checks, and reports heterogeneity analyses. Section 6 concludes.
* * *
View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/keeping-heads-above-water-evidence-labor-retention-scheme-response-floods-brazil
[Category: IADB]
Inter-American Development Bank: Does Storing Pay Off? Evidence From a Counterfactual Regression Discontinuity of Colombia's Paddy Rice Storage Incentive (2013-2025)
WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "Does Storing Pay Off? Evidence from a Counterfactual Regression Discontinuity of Colombia's Paddy Rice Storage Incentive (2013-2025)."
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Abstract:
Agricultural price stabilization policies are widely used to protect farmers from market volatility, yet their long-term consequences for production incentives and market efficiency remain poorly understood. This paper provides the first causal evaluation of Colombia's Dry Paddy Rice Storage Incentive ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "Does Storing Pay Off? Evidence from a Counterfactual Regression Discontinuity of Colombia's Paddy Rice Storage Incentive (2013-2025)." Here are excerpts: * * * Abstract: Agricultural price stabilization policies are widely used to protect farmers from market volatility, yet their long-term consequences for production incentives and market efficiency remain poorly understood. This paper provides the first causal evaluation of Colombia's Dry Paddy Rice Storage IncentiveProgram, examining whether short-term price stabilization generated unintended distortions throughout the rice value chain. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design combined with Regression Kink Design on monthly data from 2013- 2025, we estimate the program's effects on producer prices, farm revenues, production decisions, and consumer price transmission. The results show that the program achieved its primary objective of mitigating seasonal price declines and increasing producers' short term revenues. However, these gains came at the cost of altered production incentives. Higher expected returns encouraged additional planting, contributing to oversupply in subsequent harvests and reinforcing dependence on recurrent government intervention. While the program stabilized producer prices, it also weakened price transmission to consumers, limiting broader welfare gains and reducing market efficiency. These findings reveal a fundamental trade-off inherent in commodity price stabilization policies: interventions that effectively protect farmers in the short run may simultaneously create incentives that undermine long-run market adjustment and fiscal sustainability. Beyond the Colombian case, the study contributes causal evidence to the broader debate on agricultural stabilization policies in developing economies and highlights the importance of complementing temporary market support with investments that enhance productivity, competitiveness, and structural resilience.
Introduction
Rice is part of the basic food basket that constitutes food security around the world. According to information from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), rice is the main source of calories for approximately half of the world's population; furthermore, it is considered a staple food in at least 34 countries. Similarly, the cultivation and sale of rice is one of the main sources of employment and income for at least 2 billion people around the world.
In Colombia, the national rice production in 2023 reached approximately 2.8 million tons, making it the second-largest rice producer in Latin America and the Caribbean (FAO, 2023). Furthermore, more than 98% of Colombian households include rice in their daily diet, with a per capita consumption of 56.7 kg per person per year (2023), well above the regional average (FAO, 2023). Given these indicators, ensuring sustainable production and efficient supply chains are key to meeting a demand that is both affordable and fundamental to national food security. Besides, in terms of the production chain, rice has three specific links and five specific stages, as follows:
* Paddy rice production activities: In this first step, farmers grow rice for sale, generally in the form of green paddy rice, meaning this rice is normally sold without undergoing a cleaning and drying process. This step encompasses the stages of input procurement and primary production.
* Green paddy rice processing activities: In the second step, processing agents purchase green paddy rice from agricultural producers and proceed to clean, dry, store, and transform it into white rice, brown rice, or other by-products for marketing. In this step, not only is value added to the initial product, but its composition is also changed; to obtain one kilogram of white rice, approximately 1.68 kilos of green paddy rice are required, since the drying, cleaning, and polishing processes reduce the weight ( Fedesarrollo, 2022). This step includes the processing and storage stages.
* Distribution and marketing activities: This last link considers distribution channels such as: i) selling white rice in bulk at the plant gate to wholesalers and distributors, who then sell it to retailers in supply centers; and ii) companies that have their own brand, which is already recognized by the end consumer, can distribute it to different points of sale, using their own means or through marketers and distributors. This link includes the distribution and marketing stages.
On the other hand, rice cultivation in Colombia presents three particularities that compromise its sustainability, which is why conventional policy instruments undertake multiple production and marketing efforts to ensure the grain supply. These are:
1. Highly seasonal production. The main planting is concentrated during the first half of the year (March-May), coinciding with the onset of the rainy season, while the secondary planting extends between June and September (Cadena Torres, Cuello Perez, Romero Ferrer, & Perez Cantero, 2021).. Furthermore, approximately 37% of the total planted area corresponds to the first half of the year and 63% to the second half, confirming the seasonal concentration of production (Escobar Fernandez, 2025).
2. Climate-sensitive production. In Colombia, rice production is particularly vulnerable to climate factors due to the coexistence of irrigated and rainfed systems. This structural duality means that in some areas of the country, excessive irrigation can lead to aquifer depletion, while in others, rainfed systems suffer direct production losses (low yields) due to exposure to extreme weather events such as droughts (UPRA, 2022).
3. Highly perishable production. Freshly harvested rice often reaches a moisture content above 20%, making it especially vulnerable to mold damage, degradation, and pest attacks if not dried within 2 to 3 days (Juganas, Regalado, & Ramos, 2023). In many cases, post-harvest losses can reach 20%, especially in areas where farmers lack efficient drying systems or adequate storage infrastructure ( (Ibrahim, 2018). In Colombia, rice is mainly sold fresh to the mills, which then proceed to dry and store it, making the harvest season a critical moment, as up to 70% of yearly production is sold during that period.
Against this backdrop, this paper evaluates the Colombian Paddy Rice Storage Incentive Program through a regression discontinuity design to estimate its effects on producer prices, farmers' income, production decisions, and price transmission. Beyond determining whether the program achieves its immediate objective of stabilizing prices, the analysis also examines the broader trade-offs associated with this type of intervention, including its implications for market efficiency, production incentives, and the long-term competitiveness of the rice sector. By doing so, this study contributes not only to the literature on agricultural price stabilization policies but also to the broader debate on how governments can balance short-term income protection with long-term structural transformation and fiscal sustainability.
* * *
View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/does-storing-pay-evidence-counterfactual-regression-discontinuity-colombias-paddy-rice-storage
[Category: IADB]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Abstract:
Agricultural price stabilization policies are widely used to protect farmers from market volatility, yet their long-term consequences for production incentives and market efficiency remain poorly understood. This paper provides the first causal evaluation of Colombia's Dry Paddy Rice Storage Incentive ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "Does Storing Pay Off? Evidence from a Counterfactual Regression Discontinuity of Colombia's Paddy Rice Storage Incentive (2013-2025)." Here are excerpts: * * * Abstract: Agricultural price stabilization policies are widely used to protect farmers from market volatility, yet their long-term consequences for production incentives and market efficiency remain poorly understood. This paper provides the first causal evaluation of Colombia's Dry Paddy Rice Storage IncentiveProgram, examining whether short-term price stabilization generated unintended distortions throughout the rice value chain. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design combined with Regression Kink Design on monthly data from 2013- 2025, we estimate the program's effects on producer prices, farm revenues, production decisions, and consumer price transmission. The results show that the program achieved its primary objective of mitigating seasonal price declines and increasing producers' short term revenues. However, these gains came at the cost of altered production incentives. Higher expected returns encouraged additional planting, contributing to oversupply in subsequent harvests and reinforcing dependence on recurrent government intervention. While the program stabilized producer prices, it also weakened price transmission to consumers, limiting broader welfare gains and reducing market efficiency. These findings reveal a fundamental trade-off inherent in commodity price stabilization policies: interventions that effectively protect farmers in the short run may simultaneously create incentives that undermine long-run market adjustment and fiscal sustainability. Beyond the Colombian case, the study contributes causal evidence to the broader debate on agricultural stabilization policies in developing economies and highlights the importance of complementing temporary market support with investments that enhance productivity, competitiveness, and structural resilience.
Introduction
Rice is part of the basic food basket that constitutes food security around the world. According to information from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), rice is the main source of calories for approximately half of the world's population; furthermore, it is considered a staple food in at least 34 countries. Similarly, the cultivation and sale of rice is one of the main sources of employment and income for at least 2 billion people around the world.
In Colombia, the national rice production in 2023 reached approximately 2.8 million tons, making it the second-largest rice producer in Latin America and the Caribbean (FAO, 2023). Furthermore, more than 98% of Colombian households include rice in their daily diet, with a per capita consumption of 56.7 kg per person per year (2023), well above the regional average (FAO, 2023). Given these indicators, ensuring sustainable production and efficient supply chains are key to meeting a demand that is both affordable and fundamental to national food security. Besides, in terms of the production chain, rice has three specific links and five specific stages, as follows:
* Paddy rice production activities: In this first step, farmers grow rice for sale, generally in the form of green paddy rice, meaning this rice is normally sold without undergoing a cleaning and drying process. This step encompasses the stages of input procurement and primary production.
* Green paddy rice processing activities: In the second step, processing agents purchase green paddy rice from agricultural producers and proceed to clean, dry, store, and transform it into white rice, brown rice, or other by-products for marketing. In this step, not only is value added to the initial product, but its composition is also changed; to obtain one kilogram of white rice, approximately 1.68 kilos of green paddy rice are required, since the drying, cleaning, and polishing processes reduce the weight ( Fedesarrollo, 2022). This step includes the processing and storage stages.
* Distribution and marketing activities: This last link considers distribution channels such as: i) selling white rice in bulk at the plant gate to wholesalers and distributors, who then sell it to retailers in supply centers; and ii) companies that have their own brand, which is already recognized by the end consumer, can distribute it to different points of sale, using their own means or through marketers and distributors. This link includes the distribution and marketing stages.
On the other hand, rice cultivation in Colombia presents three particularities that compromise its sustainability, which is why conventional policy instruments undertake multiple production and marketing efforts to ensure the grain supply. These are:
1. Highly seasonal production. The main planting is concentrated during the first half of the year (March-May), coinciding with the onset of the rainy season, while the secondary planting extends between June and September (Cadena Torres, Cuello Perez, Romero Ferrer, & Perez Cantero, 2021).. Furthermore, approximately 37% of the total planted area corresponds to the first half of the year and 63% to the second half, confirming the seasonal concentration of production (Escobar Fernandez, 2025).
2. Climate-sensitive production. In Colombia, rice production is particularly vulnerable to climate factors due to the coexistence of irrigated and rainfed systems. This structural duality means that in some areas of the country, excessive irrigation can lead to aquifer depletion, while in others, rainfed systems suffer direct production losses (low yields) due to exposure to extreme weather events such as droughts (UPRA, 2022).
3. Highly perishable production. Freshly harvested rice often reaches a moisture content above 20%, making it especially vulnerable to mold damage, degradation, and pest attacks if not dried within 2 to 3 days (Juganas, Regalado, & Ramos, 2023). In many cases, post-harvest losses can reach 20%, especially in areas where farmers lack efficient drying systems or adequate storage infrastructure ( (Ibrahim, 2018). In Colombia, rice is mainly sold fresh to the mills, which then proceed to dry and store it, making the harvest season a critical moment, as up to 70% of yearly production is sold during that period.
Against this backdrop, this paper evaluates the Colombian Paddy Rice Storage Incentive Program through a regression discontinuity design to estimate its effects on producer prices, farmers' income, production decisions, and price transmission. Beyond determining whether the program achieves its immediate objective of stabilizing prices, the analysis also examines the broader trade-offs associated with this type of intervention, including its implications for market efficiency, production incentives, and the long-term competitiveness of the rice sector. By doing so, this study contributes not only to the literature on agricultural price stabilization policies but also to the broader debate on how governments can balance short-term income protection with long-term structural transformation and fiscal sustainability.
* * *
View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/does-storing-pay-evidence-counterfactual-regression-discontinuity-colombias-paddy-rice-storage
[Category: IADB]
Inter-American Development Bank: AI and Judicial Productivity - The Impact of MIDAS on the Courts of Fortaleza, Brazil
WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "AI and Judicial Productivity: The Impact of MIDAS on the Courts of Fortaleza, Brazil."
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Abstract
This paper presents preliminary results from a pilot study conducted in the courts of Ceara, Brazil. The study evaluates the impact of introducing a tool that uses natural language processing and machine learning techniques to cluster judicial acts by textual similarity on clerk productivity, measured as the number of case files a clerk can produce ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "AI and Judicial Productivity: The Impact of MIDAS on the Courts of Fortaleza, Brazil." Here are excerpts: * * * Abstract This paper presents preliminary results from a pilot study conducted in the courts of Ceara, Brazil. The study evaluates the impact of introducing a tool that uses natural language processing and machine learning techniques to cluster judicial acts by textual similarity on clerk productivity, measured as the number of case files a clerk can producein a day. Estimates indicate that treatment-group clerks produced approximately 10 more case files per day than control-group clerks, a statistically significant difference equivalent to a 37% increase relative to the control group mean. The results are robust to the exclusion of outlier observations and exceptionally productive clerks.
Introduction
Estimates from 2019 indicated that around 1.5 billion individuals were unable to resolve their legal problems, despite living in contexts with a functioning justice system and institutions (World Justice Project, 2019). In Brazil, the State Justice system closed 2025 with nearly 58 million pending judicial processes, despite having adjudicated and closed more than 30 million during that year1. In the state of Ceara alone, the state Court of Justice (TJCE) received 692,630 new judicial processes and ended the year with more than one million pending.2
These backlogs are not merely an administrative problem, as the efficiency of the judicial system has significant economic repercussions. The literature shows that delays in resolving judicial proceedings hamper contract enforcement and insolvency resolution, generating a negative effect on firms' credit and investment (Djankov et al., 2008; Ponticelli and Alencar, 2016; Visaria, 2009; Chemin, 2012). Similarly, reductions in judicial processing times have been associated with greater entrepreneurship (Chemin, 2009), firm performance (Chakraborty, 2016), and the country's economic growth and development (Amirapu, 2021; Djankov et al., 2025). The need to increase judicial productivity becomes even more relevant in a context in which artificial intelligence tools are also reducing the costs of access to justice and potentially increasing the volume of litigation faced by courts (Shah and Levy, 2026).
This paper analyzes whether providing judicial clerks with a tool based on natural language processing (NLP) that clusters similar rulings, allowing them to process cases in batches rather than one by one, increases their daily productivity relative to the traditional workflow. To this end, we carried out a pilot study to examine the consequences of introducing the MIDAS system (Mecanismo Identificador de Actos Similares -- Similar Acts Identification Mechanism) at the First-Degree Judicial Secretariat (SEJUD) of the Court of Justice of Ceara (TJCE), Brazil3. MIDAS is a tool that uses NLP and machine learning techniques to cluster judicial rulings by textual similarity. Whereas in the traditional workflow clerks must prepare each case file one by one, with MIDAS clerks can prepare multiple case files at once, thereby reducing the average time per case and increasing total output volume. This increase in productivity should, in principle, contribute to reducing the backlog, to the extent that it does not simply shift the bottleneck to another stage of the judicial process.
The study was conducted between June and August 2025 within the framework of the Modernization Program for the Judiciary of the State of Ceara (PROMOJUD), with support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The study compared the daily productivity of 62 clerks assigned to two groups: a treatment group that processed case files with the support of MIDAS, and a control group that followed the traditional workflow. The central element of the design was randomization at the level of the ruling or judicial act: within each cluster generated by the system, rulings were randomly reordered using a Python script, and a fraction was extracted to be processed individually by the control group. This mechanism ensures that the judicial acts assigned to both groups come from the same pool of rulings and are comparable in their observable and unobservable characteristics in expectation.
The results indicate that treatment-group clerks produced on average 10 more case files per day than control-group clerks, a statistically significant difference equivalent to a 37% increase relative to the control group mean. Furthermore, these results are robust to the exclusion of potentially outlying observations, which reinforces the robustness of the conclusions. In terms of workload, our estimates suggest that access to the tool reduces case file preparation time from approximately 16 to 12 minutes per case file, a gain of 4 minutes per case that, accumulated over the workday, allows clerks to process one-third more case files in the same amount of time. Furthermore, the tool appears to expand the right tail of the productivity distribution: days on which a clerk analyzes more than 100 case files are notably more frequent among those who used MIDAS. However, since the treatment group included both clerks with full adherence to the system and clerks with partial exposure, the estimated effects should be interpreted as a lower bound on the tool's true impact.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the use of artificial intelligence to improve efficiency in the judicial sector (Aidid and Alarie, 2023; Casey and Niblett, 2019; Volokh, 2019). Prior studies have shown how these tools can be used to automate routine tasks, such as analyzing and processing evidence, conducting investigations, and classifying legal documents (de Oliveira and Nascimento, 2021; Oliveira and Sperandio Nascimento, 2025; Razmetaeva and Razmetaev, 2021; Solovey et al., 2025), allowing court staff to devote more time to other activities (Alarie et al., 2018; Borgesano et al., 2025). The literature also highlights their potential to assist in judicial decision-making and, in some cases, to partially substitute judges' functions (Chen et al., 2022; Volokh, 2019). Some countries already report productivity gains derived from their use, including Argentina and Brazil (de Sousa et al., 2022; OECD, 2025). Our study contributes to this growing body of research by being, to our knowledge, the first to estimate the impact of an NLP-based clustering tool on judicial staff productivity through a pilot study with randomization at the level of the judicial act.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes how the intervention works, the MIDAS system, and its position within the Judicial Secretariat's workflow. Section 3 then presents the study design, while Section 4 describes the data used. Section 5 presents the preliminary results of the pilot study, as well as the lessons that should be considered in future studies. Finally, Section 6 discusses the study's main methodological limitations and concludes the paper.
* * *
View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/ai-and-judicial-productivity-impact-midas-courts-fortaleza-brazil
[Category: IADB]
Here are excerpts:
* * *
Abstract
This paper presents preliminary results from a pilot study conducted in the courts of Ceara, Brazil. The study evaluates the impact of introducing a tool that uses natural language processing and machine learning techniques to cluster judicial acts by textual similarity on clerk productivity, measured as the number of case files a clerk can produce ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 (TNSLrpt) -- The Inter-American Development Bank issued the following white paper on July 2026, entitled "AI and Judicial Productivity: The Impact of MIDAS on the Courts of Fortaleza, Brazil." Here are excerpts: * * * Abstract This paper presents preliminary results from a pilot study conducted in the courts of Ceara, Brazil. The study evaluates the impact of introducing a tool that uses natural language processing and machine learning techniques to cluster judicial acts by textual similarity on clerk productivity, measured as the number of case files a clerk can producein a day. Estimates indicate that treatment-group clerks produced approximately 10 more case files per day than control-group clerks, a statistically significant difference equivalent to a 37% increase relative to the control group mean. The results are robust to the exclusion of outlier observations and exceptionally productive clerks.
Introduction
Estimates from 2019 indicated that around 1.5 billion individuals were unable to resolve their legal problems, despite living in contexts with a functioning justice system and institutions (World Justice Project, 2019). In Brazil, the State Justice system closed 2025 with nearly 58 million pending judicial processes, despite having adjudicated and closed more than 30 million during that year1. In the state of Ceara alone, the state Court of Justice (TJCE) received 692,630 new judicial processes and ended the year with more than one million pending.2
These backlogs are not merely an administrative problem, as the efficiency of the judicial system has significant economic repercussions. The literature shows that delays in resolving judicial proceedings hamper contract enforcement and insolvency resolution, generating a negative effect on firms' credit and investment (Djankov et al., 2008; Ponticelli and Alencar, 2016; Visaria, 2009; Chemin, 2012). Similarly, reductions in judicial processing times have been associated with greater entrepreneurship (Chemin, 2009), firm performance (Chakraborty, 2016), and the country's economic growth and development (Amirapu, 2021; Djankov et al., 2025). The need to increase judicial productivity becomes even more relevant in a context in which artificial intelligence tools are also reducing the costs of access to justice and potentially increasing the volume of litigation faced by courts (Shah and Levy, 2026).
This paper analyzes whether providing judicial clerks with a tool based on natural language processing (NLP) that clusters similar rulings, allowing them to process cases in batches rather than one by one, increases their daily productivity relative to the traditional workflow. To this end, we carried out a pilot study to examine the consequences of introducing the MIDAS system (Mecanismo Identificador de Actos Similares -- Similar Acts Identification Mechanism) at the First-Degree Judicial Secretariat (SEJUD) of the Court of Justice of Ceara (TJCE), Brazil3. MIDAS is a tool that uses NLP and machine learning techniques to cluster judicial rulings by textual similarity. Whereas in the traditional workflow clerks must prepare each case file one by one, with MIDAS clerks can prepare multiple case files at once, thereby reducing the average time per case and increasing total output volume. This increase in productivity should, in principle, contribute to reducing the backlog, to the extent that it does not simply shift the bottleneck to another stage of the judicial process.
The study was conducted between June and August 2025 within the framework of the Modernization Program for the Judiciary of the State of Ceara (PROMOJUD), with support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The study compared the daily productivity of 62 clerks assigned to two groups: a treatment group that processed case files with the support of MIDAS, and a control group that followed the traditional workflow. The central element of the design was randomization at the level of the ruling or judicial act: within each cluster generated by the system, rulings were randomly reordered using a Python script, and a fraction was extracted to be processed individually by the control group. This mechanism ensures that the judicial acts assigned to both groups come from the same pool of rulings and are comparable in their observable and unobservable characteristics in expectation.
The results indicate that treatment-group clerks produced on average 10 more case files per day than control-group clerks, a statistically significant difference equivalent to a 37% increase relative to the control group mean. Furthermore, these results are robust to the exclusion of potentially outlying observations, which reinforces the robustness of the conclusions. In terms of workload, our estimates suggest that access to the tool reduces case file preparation time from approximately 16 to 12 minutes per case file, a gain of 4 minutes per case that, accumulated over the workday, allows clerks to process one-third more case files in the same amount of time. Furthermore, the tool appears to expand the right tail of the productivity distribution: days on which a clerk analyzes more than 100 case files are notably more frequent among those who used MIDAS. However, since the treatment group included both clerks with full adherence to the system and clerks with partial exposure, the estimated effects should be interpreted as a lower bound on the tool's true impact.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the use of artificial intelligence to improve efficiency in the judicial sector (Aidid and Alarie, 2023; Casey and Niblett, 2019; Volokh, 2019). Prior studies have shown how these tools can be used to automate routine tasks, such as analyzing and processing evidence, conducting investigations, and classifying legal documents (de Oliveira and Nascimento, 2021; Oliveira and Sperandio Nascimento, 2025; Razmetaeva and Razmetaev, 2021; Solovey et al., 2025), allowing court staff to devote more time to other activities (Alarie et al., 2018; Borgesano et al., 2025). The literature also highlights their potential to assist in judicial decision-making and, in some cases, to partially substitute judges' functions (Chen et al., 2022; Volokh, 2019). Some countries already report productivity gains derived from their use, including Argentina and Brazil (de Sousa et al., 2022; OECD, 2025). Our study contributes to this growing body of research by being, to our knowledge, the first to estimate the impact of an NLP-based clustering tool on judicial staff productivity through a pilot study with randomization at the level of the judicial act.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes how the intervention works, the MIDAS system, and its position within the Judicial Secretariat's workflow. Section 3 then presents the study design, while Section 4 describes the data used. Section 5 presents the preliminary results of the pilot study, as well as the lessons that should be considered in future studies. Finally, Section 6 discusses the study's main methodological limitations and concludes the paper.
* * *
View full text here: https://publications.iadb.org/en/ai-and-judicial-productivity-impact-midas-courts-fortaleza-brazil
[Category: IADB]
ICYMI - Fox News: Battle over federal courthouses erupts as GSA warns against giving judiciary more control
WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 -- The General Services Administration issued the following news release:
* * *
ICYMI - Fox News: Battle over federal courthouses erupts as GSA warns against giving judiciary more control
*
GSA says past judicial oversight left one Alabama courthouse facing millions in repairs and serious safety hazards
Article by Bonny Chu
Published on Fox News
EXCLUSIVE: The agency overseeing U.S. courthouses is pushing back against a new bill that would give the judicial branch more property control, arguing that the judiciary has a history of mismanaging its buildings at a cost of ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 -- The General Services Administration issued the following news release: * * * ICYMI - Fox News: Battle over federal courthouses erupts as GSA warns against giving judiciary more control * GSA says past judicial oversight left one Alabama courthouse facing millions in repairs and serious safety hazards Article by Bonny Chu Published on Fox News EXCLUSIVE: The agency overseeing U.S. courthouses is pushing back against a new bill that would give the judicial branch more property control, arguing that the judiciary has a history of mismanaging its buildings at a cost oftens of millions of dollars to American taxpayers.
The General Services Administration (GSA), which serves as the real estate manager for most federal courthouse space, said the bill would allow the judiciary to assume real property authority over buildings in up to 10 federal judicial districts from the GSA, including responsibility for repairing and maintaining facilities.
The bill, the Judicial Space and Facilities Management Effectiveness Act, was introduced July 30 by U.S. senators Dick Durbin, D-Ill.; Kevin Cramer, R-N.D.; and John Boozman, R-Ark. Proponents of the bill argue that U.S. courts will be better at maintaining their own judicial facilities.
However, pointing to a 1988 pilot program that placed three courthouses under judiciary oversight, the GSA said two of the three participating courthouses ended their participation after unforeseen repair costs exceeded typical daily maintenance budgets.
Only one courthouse, the Hugo Black Federal Courthouse in Birmingham, Alabama, remained under the judiciary, the agency said.
The building reportedly deteriorated significantly and accumulated $57.7 million in delinquent maintenance costs. An analysis revealed extensive safety hazards, including improper chemical storage, inoperable elevator emergency phones and poorly maintained fire protection systems, among other issues, according to the GSA.
According to a 2024 evaluation report of the Hugo Black building, the courthouse experienced significant systemic deterioration and required nearly $19 million in repairs and maintenance while under judicial oversight. Of those costs, almost 83% were categorized as top-priority repairs that needed to be addressed immediately or within one to two years.
"The facility's unique repair needs reflect poor maintenance practices that have shortened the useful life of expensive, critical systems, including elevators, chiller plants, and boilers," the agency said.
Despite holding autonomy over the courthouse, the judiciary repeatedly turned to the GSA for technical assistance with complex repairs, the agency added. For instance, the judiciary reportedly relied on GSA service contract templates to assist with its own contracting needs.
During a 2013 budget hearing on the U.S. courthouses, Judge Julia S. Gibbons characterized the repair responsibilities as a "significant cost liability to the Judiciary's budget" that "veers dramatically from our core mission to deliver justice," the agency said.
Due to these financial and operational strains, the Judicial Conference reportedly endorsed ending the judiciary's pilot program in September 2005 "as a cost-savings measure," the GSA said.
Separately, the GSA said it successfully completed construction on the new U.S. courthouse in Huntsville, Alabama, in 2024. The project was completed $7 million under budget and features state-of-the-art security, energy efficiency and operations technology.
The GSA also pointed to its maintenance backlog, saying a "broken congressional authorization and appropriations process" has contributed to delays and funding shortfalls. The agency said GSA Administrator Edward Forst has already made unprecedented efforts to address the backlog.
"The fundamental issue at hand is outdated congressional funding and approval rules," Forst said. "I'm leading an unprecedented effort to reimagine federal building management by raising the prospectus threshold and expanding access to the Federal Buildings Fund with support from 22 cabinet members and agency heads. Those changes -not Judiciary management -are what's necessary to remediate and renew America's federal facilities and courthouses."
Forst further claimed the agency is "the most experienced and efficient building manager in the federal government."
"Multiple Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies show that breaking our model apart would not make courthouse projects faster, cheaper or better-built. It would make them more fragmented, more expensive, less accountable and less safe," Forst said.
GAO has separately found that congressional funding constraints have contributed to deferred maintenance in federal buildings and has cautioned that transferring real property authority to the Judiciary would not itself provide additional funding and would require sufficient real property expertise.
"Trials and audits have shown that the Judiciary struggles with basic upkeep and maintenance of their facilities, doesn't effectively utilize its vast space, and is not equipped with the financial resources or expertise to manage their own buildings," GSA added.
Defending the branch's capability, an Administrative Office spokesperson argued that basic facilities' upkeep is inherently tied to their work and that "the courts have a long history of managing complex business operations, such as budgets, finances, and information technology.
"Maintaining a safe, functional environment is essential to the administration of justice," the spokesperson said.
"Starting with the proposed pilot program, the Judiciary has the capacity to make property management decisions that better serve the public and the courts."
About GSA: GSA provides centralized procurement and shared services for the federal government, managing approximately 360 million rentable square feet, overseeing over $126 billion in products and services via federal contracts, and delivering technology services to millions of people across dozens of federal agencies. GSA's mission is to deliver exceptional customer experience and value in real estate, acquisition, and technology. To address nearly $50 billion in delinquent maintenance, GSA is leading a coalition of every cabinet agency and many federal leaders urgently advocating for full Federal Buildings Fund access and raising the prospectus threshold from $3.96 million to $75 million. For more information, visit GSA.gov and follow @USGSA.
Contact
press@gsa.gov
***
Original text here: https://www.gsa.gov/about-gsa/newsroom/news-releases/icymi-fox-news-battle-over-federal-courthouses-erupts-as-gsa-warns-against-08212026
* * *
ICYMI - Fox News: Battle over federal courthouses erupts as GSA warns against giving judiciary more control
*
GSA says past judicial oversight left one Alabama courthouse facing millions in repairs and serious safety hazards
Article by Bonny Chu
Published on Fox News
EXCLUSIVE: The agency overseeing U.S. courthouses is pushing back against a new bill that would give the judicial branch more property control, arguing that the judiciary has a history of mismanaging its buildings at a cost of ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 -- The General Services Administration issued the following news release: * * * ICYMI - Fox News: Battle over federal courthouses erupts as GSA warns against giving judiciary more control * GSA says past judicial oversight left one Alabama courthouse facing millions in repairs and serious safety hazards Article by Bonny Chu Published on Fox News EXCLUSIVE: The agency overseeing U.S. courthouses is pushing back against a new bill that would give the judicial branch more property control, arguing that the judiciary has a history of mismanaging its buildings at a cost oftens of millions of dollars to American taxpayers.
The General Services Administration (GSA), which serves as the real estate manager for most federal courthouse space, said the bill would allow the judiciary to assume real property authority over buildings in up to 10 federal judicial districts from the GSA, including responsibility for repairing and maintaining facilities.
The bill, the Judicial Space and Facilities Management Effectiveness Act, was introduced July 30 by U.S. senators Dick Durbin, D-Ill.; Kevin Cramer, R-N.D.; and John Boozman, R-Ark. Proponents of the bill argue that U.S. courts will be better at maintaining their own judicial facilities.
However, pointing to a 1988 pilot program that placed three courthouses under judiciary oversight, the GSA said two of the three participating courthouses ended their participation after unforeseen repair costs exceeded typical daily maintenance budgets.
Only one courthouse, the Hugo Black Federal Courthouse in Birmingham, Alabama, remained under the judiciary, the agency said.
The building reportedly deteriorated significantly and accumulated $57.7 million in delinquent maintenance costs. An analysis revealed extensive safety hazards, including improper chemical storage, inoperable elevator emergency phones and poorly maintained fire protection systems, among other issues, according to the GSA.
According to a 2024 evaluation report of the Hugo Black building, the courthouse experienced significant systemic deterioration and required nearly $19 million in repairs and maintenance while under judicial oversight. Of those costs, almost 83% were categorized as top-priority repairs that needed to be addressed immediately or within one to two years.
"The facility's unique repair needs reflect poor maintenance practices that have shortened the useful life of expensive, critical systems, including elevators, chiller plants, and boilers," the agency said.
Despite holding autonomy over the courthouse, the judiciary repeatedly turned to the GSA for technical assistance with complex repairs, the agency added. For instance, the judiciary reportedly relied on GSA service contract templates to assist with its own contracting needs.
During a 2013 budget hearing on the U.S. courthouses, Judge Julia S. Gibbons characterized the repair responsibilities as a "significant cost liability to the Judiciary's budget" that "veers dramatically from our core mission to deliver justice," the agency said.
Due to these financial and operational strains, the Judicial Conference reportedly endorsed ending the judiciary's pilot program in September 2005 "as a cost-savings measure," the GSA said.
Separately, the GSA said it successfully completed construction on the new U.S. courthouse in Huntsville, Alabama, in 2024. The project was completed $7 million under budget and features state-of-the-art security, energy efficiency and operations technology.
The GSA also pointed to its maintenance backlog, saying a "broken congressional authorization and appropriations process" has contributed to delays and funding shortfalls. The agency said GSA Administrator Edward Forst has already made unprecedented efforts to address the backlog.
"The fundamental issue at hand is outdated congressional funding and approval rules," Forst said. "I'm leading an unprecedented effort to reimagine federal building management by raising the prospectus threshold and expanding access to the Federal Buildings Fund with support from 22 cabinet members and agency heads. Those changes -not Judiciary management -are what's necessary to remediate and renew America's federal facilities and courthouses."
Forst further claimed the agency is "the most experienced and efficient building manager in the federal government."
"Multiple Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies show that breaking our model apart would not make courthouse projects faster, cheaper or better-built. It would make them more fragmented, more expensive, less accountable and less safe," Forst said.
GAO has separately found that congressional funding constraints have contributed to deferred maintenance in federal buildings and has cautioned that transferring real property authority to the Judiciary would not itself provide additional funding and would require sufficient real property expertise.
"Trials and audits have shown that the Judiciary struggles with basic upkeep and maintenance of their facilities, doesn't effectively utilize its vast space, and is not equipped with the financial resources or expertise to manage their own buildings," GSA added.
Defending the branch's capability, an Administrative Office spokesperson argued that basic facilities' upkeep is inherently tied to their work and that "the courts have a long history of managing complex business operations, such as budgets, finances, and information technology.
"Maintaining a safe, functional environment is essential to the administration of justice," the spokesperson said.
"Starting with the proposed pilot program, the Judiciary has the capacity to make property management decisions that better serve the public and the courts."
About GSA: GSA provides centralized procurement and shared services for the federal government, managing approximately 360 million rentable square feet, overseeing over $126 billion in products and services via federal contracts, and delivering technology services to millions of people across dozens of federal agencies. GSA's mission is to deliver exceptional customer experience and value in real estate, acquisition, and technology. To address nearly $50 billion in delinquent maintenance, GSA is leading a coalition of every cabinet agency and many federal leaders urgently advocating for full Federal Buildings Fund access and raising the prospectus threshold from $3.96 million to $75 million. For more information, visit GSA.gov and follow @USGSA.
Contact
press@gsa.gov
***
Original text here: https://www.gsa.gov/about-gsa/newsroom/news-releases/icymi-fox-news-battle-over-federal-courthouses-erupts-as-gsa-warns-against-08212026
EPA Releases New Guidance to Reduce Lead Exposure in Drinking Water, Protect American Children
WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 -- The Environmental Protection Agency issued the following news release:
* * *
EPA Releases New Guidance to Reduce Lead Exposure in Drinking Water, Protect American Children
*
WASHINGTON - Today, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released guidance to help drinking water systems that are working to keep their communities safe from lead. This guidance advances the agency's commitment to clear and plain language communication while sharing information, definitions, and useful examples to help water systems comply with lead pipe replacement requirements of the Lead ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 -- The Environmental Protection Agency issued the following news release: * * * EPA Releases New Guidance to Reduce Lead Exposure in Drinking Water, Protect American Children * WASHINGTON - Today, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released guidance to help drinking water systems that are working to keep their communities safe from lead. This guidance advances the agency's commitment to clear and plain language communication while sharing information, definitions, and useful examples to help water systems comply with lead pipe replacement requirements of the Leadand Copper Rule. Reducing exposure to lead-a powerful neurotoxin that is especially dangerous to children-advances the Trump EPA's commitment to Making America Healthy Again.
"The agency's efforts to reduce lead in drinking water started under the first Trump Administration and continue today under Administrator Zeldin's leadership," said EPA Assistant Administrator for Water Jess Kramer. "EPA is committed to supporting local water systems as they identify and remove lead pipes. Today, we are providing practical, clear, and plain language guidance clarifying existing federal requirements. This action complements federal funding and technical assistance in a holistic approach."
EPA is releasing two documents, Access Tips and Service Line Inventory Tips, to provide practical information to help water systems and states implement the Lead and Copper Rule Improvements (LCRI). In April 2026, EPA sought the public's input on these two Tips documents and EPA considered the comments received in the development of these final resources.
EPA is taking on lead in drinking water holistically, including prioritizing collaboration, practical implementation, and communication. The agency recently published a revamped lead website, found at epa.gov/lead, including a new StoryMap about Lead and Children's Health. The streamlined website allows parents and caregivers, contractors, health care professionals, and other users to quickly find critical information on how to prevent exposures from lead. This is one of many actions being undertaken by EPA under the government-wide Federal Lead Action Plan, which was launched in President Trump's first term as a blueprint for reducing lead exposure through collaboration among federal agencies.
Releasing this new resource is yet another example of the Trump EPA working to ensure that all Americans can rely on clean and safe drinking water. They complement the agency's robust technical assistance effort - Real Water TA. Real Water TA focuses on hands on assistance for communities and water systems working to address water infrastructure challenges or funding needs. EPA also supports state and local efforts to upgrade and maintain water infrastructure with funding opportunities. This year, EPA announced nearly $3 billion in funding for lead pipe identification and removal.
Background
There is no safe level of lead. Lead pipes, when present, are the primary source of lead in drinking water. EPA is committed to using every tool available to protect all Americans from lead in drinking water. The 2024 Lead and Copper Rule Improvements (LCRI) builds on the strong foundation of the first Trump Administration's 2021 Lead and Copper Rule Revisions to achieve this goal. First promulgated in 1991, the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR) regulates lead and copper in public drinking water systems.
***
Original text here: https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-releases-new-guidance-reduce-lead-exposure-drinking-water-protect-american
* * *
EPA Releases New Guidance to Reduce Lead Exposure in Drinking Water, Protect American Children
*
WASHINGTON - Today, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released guidance to help drinking water systems that are working to keep their communities safe from lead. This guidance advances the agency's commitment to clear and plain language communication while sharing information, definitions, and useful examples to help water systems comply with lead pipe replacement requirements of the Lead ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Aug. 21 -- The Environmental Protection Agency issued the following news release: * * * EPA Releases New Guidance to Reduce Lead Exposure in Drinking Water, Protect American Children * WASHINGTON - Today, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released guidance to help drinking water systems that are working to keep their communities safe from lead. This guidance advances the agency's commitment to clear and plain language communication while sharing information, definitions, and useful examples to help water systems comply with lead pipe replacement requirements of the Leadand Copper Rule. Reducing exposure to lead-a powerful neurotoxin that is especially dangerous to children-advances the Trump EPA's commitment to Making America Healthy Again.
"The agency's efforts to reduce lead in drinking water started under the first Trump Administration and continue today under Administrator Zeldin's leadership," said EPA Assistant Administrator for Water Jess Kramer. "EPA is committed to supporting local water systems as they identify and remove lead pipes. Today, we are providing practical, clear, and plain language guidance clarifying existing federal requirements. This action complements federal funding and technical assistance in a holistic approach."
EPA is releasing two documents, Access Tips and Service Line Inventory Tips, to provide practical information to help water systems and states implement the Lead and Copper Rule Improvements (LCRI). In April 2026, EPA sought the public's input on these two Tips documents and EPA considered the comments received in the development of these final resources.
EPA is taking on lead in drinking water holistically, including prioritizing collaboration, practical implementation, and communication. The agency recently published a revamped lead website, found at epa.gov/lead, including a new StoryMap about Lead and Children's Health. The streamlined website allows parents and caregivers, contractors, health care professionals, and other users to quickly find critical information on how to prevent exposures from lead. This is one of many actions being undertaken by EPA under the government-wide Federal Lead Action Plan, which was launched in President Trump's first term as a blueprint for reducing lead exposure through collaboration among federal agencies.
Releasing this new resource is yet another example of the Trump EPA working to ensure that all Americans can rely on clean and safe drinking water. They complement the agency's robust technical assistance effort - Real Water TA. Real Water TA focuses on hands on assistance for communities and water systems working to address water infrastructure challenges or funding needs. EPA also supports state and local efforts to upgrade and maintain water infrastructure with funding opportunities. This year, EPA announced nearly $3 billion in funding for lead pipe identification and removal.
Background
There is no safe level of lead. Lead pipes, when present, are the primary source of lead in drinking water. EPA is committed to using every tool available to protect all Americans from lead in drinking water. The 2024 Lead and Copper Rule Improvements (LCRI) builds on the strong foundation of the first Trump Administration's 2021 Lead and Copper Rule Revisions to achieve this goal. First promulgated in 1991, the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR) regulates lead and copper in public drinking water systems.
***
Original text here: https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-releases-new-guidance-reduce-lead-exposure-drinking-water-protect-american
Community First August 2026 Newsletter
CHICAGO, Illinois, Aug. 21 -- The Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, a district bank in the Federal Home Loan Bank System, posted the following news:
* * *
Community First August 2026 Newsletter
*
$1 Million AHP Grant Supports 48 New Affordable Homes in Northbrook
FHLBank Chicago and Village Bank & Trust, a Wintrust Community Bank, celebrated the opening of Poupard Place, a new 48-unit affordable and supportive housing development in Northbrook, Illinois.
Supported by a $1 million Affordable Housing Program (AHP) grant awarded in partnership with Village Bank & Trust and Housing Opportunity ... Show Full Article CHICAGO, Illinois, Aug. 21 -- The Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, a district bank in the Federal Home Loan Bank System, posted the following news: * * * Community First August 2026 Newsletter * $1 Million AHP Grant Supports 48 New Affordable Homes in Northbrook FHLBank Chicago and Village Bank & Trust, a Wintrust Community Bank, celebrated the opening of Poupard Place, a new 48-unit affordable and supportive housing development in Northbrook, Illinois. Supported by a $1 million Affordable Housing Program (AHP) grant awarded in partnership with Village Bank & Trust and Housing OpportunityDevelopment Corporation, Poupard Place expands access to affordable housing for individuals and families, including those with disabilities, in Chicago's northern suburbs.
FHLBank Chicago will announce its 2026 AHP General Fund awards this fall.
Read the Poupard Place story -
Additional $17 Million Committed to 2026 Downpayment Plus(r) Programs
As part of our continued commitment to supporting affordable housing, we've committed an additional $17 million to our 2026 Downpayment Plus(r) (DPP(r)) Program, bringing total funding this year to $48 million.
The additional funding expands our members' capacity to help more income-eligible homebuyers across Illinois and Wisconsin overcome down payment and closing cost barriers through forgivable grant assistance.
Through the first half of 2026, participating members have already disbursed more than $19 million in DPP funding to support over 2,000 homebuyers. We're proud to continue working alongside our members to expand access to homeownership across our district.
Read the full announcement -
MPF(r) Habitat for Humanity(r) Program Funding Increased to $3 Million
We've increased the available subsidy for the MPF(r) Habitat for Humanity(r) Program to $3 million to expand affordable homeownership opportunities. The program's member limit has also increased from $1 million to $2 million in unpaid principal balance.
These enhancements reflect strong member interest in the program and provide participating financial institutions with more opportunity to deliver eligible Habitat loans through the MPF Program. They create additional capacity for approved member financial institutions to provide below-market mortgage financing to eligible homebuyers working with Habitat for Humanity affiliates across Illinois and Wisconsin.
Read the full announcement -
Nominations Open for FHLBank Chicago's Community Investment Advisory Council
FHLBank Chicago is now accepting nominations to its Community Investment Advisory Council. Nominations opened August 19 and will be accepted through 5:00 p.m. CT on September 16, 2026.
The Advisory Council is comprised of affordable housing and/or community lending leaders residing in Illinois or Wisconsin and meets at least quarterly with representatives from FHLBank Chicago's Board of Directors and leadership team to advise on opportunities for FHLBank Chicago to maximize the impact of its community investment activities. Advisory Council members are appointed by FHLBank Chicago's Board of Directors to serve three-year terms. Employees of FHLBank Chicago member institutions are ineligible to serve on the Advisory Council.
To nominate an individual to the Advisory Council, or to self-nominate, please complete and submit the 2027 Nomination Form. Contact Community Investment at 312.565.5824 or ci@fhlbc.com with any questions.
Community Advance: More Savings. More Impact.
Beginning Aug. 24, members can access larger Community Advance discounts to support affordable housing, economic development and community investment initiatives. The discount for eligible activities will double from 50 basis points to 100 basis points, and the per-member interest rate subsidy limit will increase to $400,000.
Want to learn more? Watch a recording of our Aug. 13 webinar or review our Frequently Asked Questions for more information.
***
Original text here: https://www.fhlbc.com/news/news-detail/2026/08/21/community-first-august-2026-newsletter
* * *
Community First August 2026 Newsletter
*
$1 Million AHP Grant Supports 48 New Affordable Homes in Northbrook
FHLBank Chicago and Village Bank & Trust, a Wintrust Community Bank, celebrated the opening of Poupard Place, a new 48-unit affordable and supportive housing development in Northbrook, Illinois.
Supported by a $1 million Affordable Housing Program (AHP) grant awarded in partnership with Village Bank & Trust and Housing Opportunity ... Show Full Article CHICAGO, Illinois, Aug. 21 -- The Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, a district bank in the Federal Home Loan Bank System, posted the following news: * * * Community First August 2026 Newsletter * $1 Million AHP Grant Supports 48 New Affordable Homes in Northbrook FHLBank Chicago and Village Bank & Trust, a Wintrust Community Bank, celebrated the opening of Poupard Place, a new 48-unit affordable and supportive housing development in Northbrook, Illinois. Supported by a $1 million Affordable Housing Program (AHP) grant awarded in partnership with Village Bank & Trust and Housing OpportunityDevelopment Corporation, Poupard Place expands access to affordable housing for individuals and families, including those with disabilities, in Chicago's northern suburbs.
FHLBank Chicago will announce its 2026 AHP General Fund awards this fall.
Read the Poupard Place story -
Additional $17 Million Committed to 2026 Downpayment Plus(r) Programs
As part of our continued commitment to supporting affordable housing, we've committed an additional $17 million to our 2026 Downpayment Plus(r) (DPP(r)) Program, bringing total funding this year to $48 million.
The additional funding expands our members' capacity to help more income-eligible homebuyers across Illinois and Wisconsin overcome down payment and closing cost barriers through forgivable grant assistance.
Through the first half of 2026, participating members have already disbursed more than $19 million in DPP funding to support over 2,000 homebuyers. We're proud to continue working alongside our members to expand access to homeownership across our district.
Read the full announcement -
MPF(r) Habitat for Humanity(r) Program Funding Increased to $3 Million
We've increased the available subsidy for the MPF(r) Habitat for Humanity(r) Program to $3 million to expand affordable homeownership opportunities. The program's member limit has also increased from $1 million to $2 million in unpaid principal balance.
These enhancements reflect strong member interest in the program and provide participating financial institutions with more opportunity to deliver eligible Habitat loans through the MPF Program. They create additional capacity for approved member financial institutions to provide below-market mortgage financing to eligible homebuyers working with Habitat for Humanity affiliates across Illinois and Wisconsin.
Read the full announcement -
Nominations Open for FHLBank Chicago's Community Investment Advisory Council
FHLBank Chicago is now accepting nominations to its Community Investment Advisory Council. Nominations opened August 19 and will be accepted through 5:00 p.m. CT on September 16, 2026.
The Advisory Council is comprised of affordable housing and/or community lending leaders residing in Illinois or Wisconsin and meets at least quarterly with representatives from FHLBank Chicago's Board of Directors and leadership team to advise on opportunities for FHLBank Chicago to maximize the impact of its community investment activities. Advisory Council members are appointed by FHLBank Chicago's Board of Directors to serve three-year terms. Employees of FHLBank Chicago member institutions are ineligible to serve on the Advisory Council.
To nominate an individual to the Advisory Council, or to self-nominate, please complete and submit the 2027 Nomination Form. Contact Community Investment at 312.565.5824 or ci@fhlbc.com with any questions.
Community Advance: More Savings. More Impact.
Beginning Aug. 24, members can access larger Community Advance discounts to support affordable housing, economic development and community investment initiatives. The discount for eligible activities will double from 50 basis points to 100 basis points, and the per-member interest rate subsidy limit will increase to $400,000.
Want to learn more? Watch a recording of our Aug. 13 webinar or review our Frequently Asked Questions for more information.
***
Original text here: https://www.fhlbc.com/news/news-detail/2026/08/21/community-first-august-2026-newsletter