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U.S. Forces Conduct Strikes Targeting Al-Shabaab
STUTTGART-MOEHRINGEN, Germany, Jan. 17 -- The U.S. Africa Command issued the following news release on Jan. 15, 2026:* * *
U.S. Forces Conduct Strikes Targeting al-Shabaab
In coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) conducted an airstrike targeting al-Shabaab on Jan. 14, 2026.
The airstrike occurred in the vicinity of Lower Shabelle, Somalia, approximately 55 km southwest of Mogadishu.
AFRICOM, alongside the Federal Government of Somalia and Somali Armed Forces, continues to take action to degrade al-Shabaab's ability to threaten the U.S. Homeland, ... Show Full Article STUTTGART-MOEHRINGEN, Germany, Jan. 17 -- The U.S. Africa Command issued the following news release on Jan. 15, 2026: * * * U.S. Forces Conduct Strikes Targeting al-Shabaab In coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) conducted an airstrike targeting al-Shabaab on Jan. 14, 2026. The airstrike occurred in the vicinity of Lower Shabelle, Somalia, approximately 55 km southwest of Mogadishu. AFRICOM, alongside the Federal Government of Somalia and Somali Armed Forces, continues to take action to degrade al-Shabaab's ability to threaten the U.S. Homeland,our forces, and our citizens abroad.
Specific details about units and assets will not be released to ensure continued operations security.
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Original text here: https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/36175/us-forces-conduct-strikes-targeting-al-shabaab
St. Louis County Man Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Drug Dealing
ST. LOUIS, Missouri, Jan. 17 -- The office of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri posted the following news release on Jan. 15, 2026:* * *
St. Louis County Man Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Drug Dealing
U.S. District Judge Henry E. Autrey on Thursday sentenced a man from St. Louis County, Missouri who sold fentanyl and other drugs to 15 years in prison.
Dennis M. Davis, 48, pleaded guilty in September to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute fentanyl. He admitted buying drugs from a Mexican source of supply and then returning ... Show Full Article ST. LOUIS, Missouri, Jan. 17 -- The office of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri posted the following news release on Jan. 15, 2026: * * * St. Louis County Man Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Drug Dealing U.S. District Judge Henry E. Autrey on Thursday sentenced a man from St. Louis County, Missouri who sold fentanyl and other drugs to 15 years in prison. Dennis M. Davis, 48, pleaded guilty in September to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute fentanyl. He admitted buying drugs from a Mexican source of supply and then returningsome of the drug proceeds to a courier.
On Oct. 6, 2023, investigators conducted a court-approved search of Davis' home in St. Louis County and found fentanyl, three handguns and $6,679 in cash. At a stash house in St. Louis used by Davis, they found a money counter, scales, kilograms of fentanyl and other drugs, four rifles and a handgun.
"Dennis Davis had enough fentanyl in his stash house to kill every single resident in the city of St. Louis," Drug Enforcement Administration St. Louis Field Division Special Agent in Charge Michael Davis said. "He was a threat to our city, pushing poisons, destroying lives and all the while lining his pockets with proceeds. Today's sentencing demonstrates that this type of behavior will not be tolerated in our city, our state or our nation."
"This case is another example of good task force work fueled by cooperation between both local and federal law enforcement agencies," said IRS-CI St. Louis Special Agent in Charge William Steenson. "IRS-CI's role in narcotics investigations is to follow the money so we can disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations. We're proud to provide our financial expertise as we work alongside our law enforcement partners to bring criminals to justice."
The Drug Enforcement Administration, IRS - Criminal Investigations, the St. Louis County Police Department and the U.S. Marshals investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney James Delworth prosecuted the case.
This effort is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach.
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Original text here: https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmo/pr/st-louis-county-man-sentenced-15-years-prison-drug-dealing
Olympus Expands Voluntary Recall for ViziShot 2 FLEX EBUS -TBNA Needles
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration issued the following recall notice:* * *
Olympus Expands Voluntary Recall for ViziShot 2 FLEX (19G) EBUS -TBNA Needles
Summary
Company Announcement Date: January 16, 2026
FDA Publish Date: January 16, 2026
Product Type: Medical Devices
Reason for Announcement: Device & Drug Safety - Defect
Company Name: Olympus Corporation
Brand Name: Olympus
Product Description: ViziShot 2 FLEX (19G) EBUS -TBNA needles
Company Announcement
CENTER VALLEY, Pa., (January 16, 2026) -- Olympus Corporation ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration issued the following recall notice: * * * Olympus Expands Voluntary Recall for ViziShot 2 FLEX (19G) EBUS -TBNA Needles Summary Company Announcement Date: January 16, 2026 FDA Publish Date: January 16, 2026 Product Type: Medical Devices Reason for Announcement: Device & Drug Safety - Defect Company Name: Olympus Corporation Brand Name: Olympus Product Description: ViziShot 2 FLEX (19G) EBUS -TBNA needles Company Announcement CENTER VALLEY, Pa., (January 16, 2026) -- Olympus Corporationhas announced the expansion of a previous global medical device removal action for ViziShot 2 FLEX (19G) EBUS -TBNA needles ("ViziShot 2 FLEX") after receiving and investigating complaints of device components ejecting or detaching during procedures. The complaints included adverse event reports of patient injury and one death. This expanded action includes all lots of the ViziShot 2 FLEX needles and supersedes the August 2025 notice in which only certain lots of the device were being recalled.
Potential consequences of a detached component of the ViziShot 2 FLEX include the risk of unintended device components within the tracheobronchial tree that may require bronchoscopic extraction or surgical removal.
Since the August 2025 notice, internal investigations of complaints identified additional contributing factors to hypotube component ejection including device heat-shrink material degradation and use errors, which affect all lots of the ViziShot 2 FLEX device. The device heat-shrink material that seals the needle can degrade during clinical use and may result in difficulty in extracting or expelling samples, fluid leakage, impaired needle deployment or retraction, or breakage of device components.
Users are directed to cease use immediately and quarantine all ViziShot 2 FLEX devices. Customers have been instructed to return the affected devices to Olympus by following the instructions provided in the removal action communication. Patient safety is our top priority.
The ViziShot 2 FLEX is designed to be used with ultrasound endoscopes for ultrasound guided fine needle aspiration and fine needle biopsy of submucosal and extramural lesions of the tracheobronchial tree.
Other EBUS-TBNA needles are not affected by this action.
Adverse reactions or quality problems experienced with the use of this product may be reported to the FDA's MedWatch program online: https://www.fda.gov/safety/medwatch-fda-safety-information-and-adverse-event-reporting-program/reporting-serious-problems-fda.
For information on how to identify affected product, U.S. customers can contact the Olympus Technical Assistance Center (TAC) at 1-800-848-9024, Option 1, Monday-Friday between 7:00 AM and 8:00 PM ET. U.S. customers can report a problem with the device to TAC by phone, or by email at complaints@olympus.com.
For information on how to identify affected product, U.S. customers can contact the Olympus Technical Assistance Center (TAC) at 1-800-848-9024, Option 1, Monday-Friday between 7:00 AM and 8:00 PM ET. U.S. customers can report a problem with the device to TAC by phone, or by email at complaints@olympus.com.
Link to Original Press Release (https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/olympus-issues-voluntary-recall-specific-lots-vizishot-2-flex-19g-ebus-tbna-needles)
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Original text here: https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/olympus-expands-voluntary-recall-vizishot-2-flex-19g-ebus-tbna-needles
Fed: Spillovers of LSAPs on Banks in the Euro Area
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 (TNSres) -- The Federal Reserve issued the following white paper abstract (No. 2026-005) on Jan. 16, 2026, by Marco Graziano, Marius Koechlin and Andreas Tischbirek entitled "The Spillovers of LSAPs on Banks in the Euro Area."* * *
Spillovers of LSAPs on Banks in the Euro Area
Abstract:
We study the spillovers of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) in the U.S. on financial intermediation in the euro area using bank-level supervisory data and high-frequency identified policy surprises. Our detailed panel data permit us to trace the impact of LSAPs through bank balance sheets. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 (TNSres) -- The Federal Reserve issued the following white paper abstract (No. 2026-005) on Jan. 16, 2026, by Marco Graziano, Marius Koechlin and Andreas Tischbirek entitled "The Spillovers of LSAPs on Banks in the Euro Area." * * * Spillovers of LSAPs on Banks in the Euro Area Abstract: We study the spillovers of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) in the U.S. on financial intermediation in the euro area using bank-level supervisory data and high-frequency identified policy surprises. Our detailed panel data permit us to trace the impact of LSAPs through bank balance sheets.We find that the Federal Reserve affects credit provision in the euro area through a channel that we refer to as the "international bank capital channel'' of unconventional monetary policy. In response to an LSAP shock that leads to a steepening of the U.S. Treasury yield curve, the Treasury positions of euro area banks shrink, capital ratios worsen, and banks that are less well capitalized contract their lending relative to banks that are better capitalized. Our results are consistent with an important role of revaluation effects, imperfect risk hedging, and credit as an adjustment margin for banks in the proximity of regulatory capital constraints.
Keywords: Large-Scale Asset Purchases, International Spillovers, Global Financial Cycle, Credit Channel of Monetary Policy, U.S. Treasury Yield Curve, Exchange Rates
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2026.005
PDF: Full Paper (https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2026005pap.pdf)
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Disclaimer: The economic research that is linked from this page represents the views of the authors and does not indicate concurrence either by other members of the Board's staff or by the Board of Governors. The economic research and their conclusions are often preliminary and are circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The Board values having a staff that conducts research on a wide range of economic topics and that explores a diverse array of perspectives on those topics. The resulting conversations in academia, the economic policy community, and the broader public are important to sharpening our collective thinking.
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View full text here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/the-spillovers-of-lsaps-on-banks-in-the-euro-area.htm
[Category: Fed]
Fed: Lessons From Brexit on the Effects of Trade Disintegration
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Federal Reserve issued the following Fed Notes article:* * *
Lessons from Brexit on the Effects of Trade Disintegration/1
Florencia Airaudo/2, Johannes Fleck/3, and Kevin Vega/4
Recent U.S. trade policy changes have rekindled interest in Brexit, as it represents one of the few instances in which another large advanced economy implemented substantial trade policy changes. In this note, we answer two questions: How similar were trade policy adjustments in Brexit to U.S. trade policy changes of 2025? What were the short- and long-run effects of Brexit on the U.K. economy? ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Federal Reserve issued the following Fed Notes article: * * * Lessons from Brexit on the Effects of Trade Disintegration/1 Florencia Airaudo/2, Johannes Fleck/3, and Kevin Vega/4 Recent U.S. trade policy changes have rekindled interest in Brexit, as it represents one of the few instances in which another large advanced economy implemented substantial trade policy changes. In this note, we answer two questions: How similar were trade policy adjustments in Brexit to U.S. trade policy changes of 2025? What were the short- and long-run effects of Brexit on the U.K. economy?To answer the first question, we compare Brexit and recent U.S. policy changes along three dimensions: tariffs, non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and policy uncertainty. To answer the second question, we present stylized facts on U.K. macroeconomic performance before and after the Brexit referendum and summarize findings from the broader academic literature on the mechanisms through which Brexit affected the economy. These findings are not meant to provide predictions for the long-run effects of tariffs on the U.S. economy, but they do illustrate that it can take time for some of the effects of trade policy changes to show through.
1. UK then, US now?
Effective tariff rates
Brexit was set in motion by the referendum on June 23, 2016, in which a narrow majority voted for the U.K. to leave the EU. Through subsequent negotiations, various U.K. governments worked on designing a post-EU trade framework and uncertainty about future trading arrangements remained elevated during this process. The U.K. formally left the EU on January 31, 2020, but remained within the single market and customs union during a transition period until December 2020 and then entered a new regime under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) in January 2021. For trade with EU members, the TCA preserved zero tariffs and quotas on goods meeting rules-of-origin requirements. However, leaving the EU customs union meant the U.K. temporarily lost access to the EU's trade agreements with third countries, increasing effective tariff rates for some imports. Yet, as illustrated in Figure 1, subsequent unilateral tariff reforms and new trade agreements reduced average tariff rates, particularly following the introduction of the U.K. Global Tariff in 2021, which unilaterally reduced most-favored nation tariff rates on many imports.
Figure 1. Effective U.K. and U.S. Tariff Rates
In contrast, U.S. trade policy changes in 2025 were implemented rapidly through cascading tariff increases which eventually applied to all trading partners. Starting in February, the administration announced universal tariff rate increases on some of its main trading partners (Canada, Mexico, and China). On April 2, 2025, it followed up with country-specific "reciprocal" tariff rate hikes applied to virtually all trading partners. While exemptions and bilateral agreements have since partially reversed rates, the average U.S. tariff rate remains notably higher than in recent years and far above historical norms. As shown in Figure 1, it is currently projected to settle at 14.4 percent for 2025, compared with only 2.4 percent in 2024.
Non-tariff trade barriers
Brexit also introduced new NTBs to trade between the U.K. and EU, including customs declarations, rules-of-origin documentation, and regulatory conformity checks. These requirements do not appear in tariff schedules but impose real trade costs, particularly for perishable, just-in-time, or regulated goods. Studies estimate that Brexit-related NTBs increased U.K.-EU trade costs by approximately 2-12 percent in tariff-equivalent terms, with the largest increases observed for food products (Tamberi, 2024; Du and Shepotylo, 2022; Fusacchia et al., 2022)./5
In comparison, the most visible part of the U.S. trade policy changes of 2025 has been direct increases in import tariffs. At the same time, some of the trade agreements are aiming to reduce NTBs for U.S. exports. However, altering NTBs typically requires technical coordination, legal consultations, and legislative steps, making such changes take much more time to come into effect than tariff adjustments. This helps explain why negotiating and ratifying full-fledged trade agreements is usually a multi-year process, which contrasts with the rapid and unilateral implementation of the 2025 U.S. tariff measures. Notably, only a few countries--mostly in Southeast Asia--have committed to specific NTB reductions as part of recent trade agreements, while negotiations with major partners (Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, Korea, and the EU) have focused primarily on tariff changes and investment commitments./6
To summarize, Brexit did not result in a notable rise in U.K. import tariffs because many tariffs were kept constant or even reduced under the umbrella of new trade agreements. However, new NTBs increased trade costs substantially. By contrast, the U.S. implemented tariff increases on all trading partners, resulting in higher import costs. At the same time, there have been attempts to reduce NTBs through provisions in select trade agreements, aiming to reduce costs for U.S. exporters. But concrete reductions in this dimension are not yet prominent. In other words, trade costs increased for both the U.K. and the U.S. but the composition of these increases differed notably.
Trade policy uncertainty
Both Brexit and the 2025 U.S. tariff actions were associated with sharply elevated policy uncertainty. Although reform proposals had been discussed publicly for some time in both economies--through the Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential election campaigns-- the scale and scope of the eventual measures were not fully anticipated. In the U.K., the referendum result itself came as a surprise, and uncertainty evolved in stages, spanning the referendum, lengthy negotiations with the EU, the transition period, and the TCA's entry into force. As a result of this drawn-out process, uncertainty about actual policy changes lingered for a prolonged period. In contrast, following the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in November 2024, the public anticipated policy changes towards higher tariffs but was surprised by their magnitude and universality. Moreover, while uncertainty rose sharply ahead of the announcements, it remained elevated thereafter, as ongoing communications on unilateral tariff adjustments and bilateral negotiations reduced the predictability of further trade policy changes.
Figure 2 compares Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) indices for the U.K. and the U.S. (Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016). While both series reflect broader policy developments and global shocks in addition to trade policy changes, including the Covid-19 pandemic, they show clear differences in sensitivity to domestic events. In the U.K., uncertainty rose sharply in 2016 and around U.K.-EU negotiation milestones but remained largely contained domestically with limited spillovers to the U.S. index. In contrast, U.S. tariff announcements in 2025 generated visible spikes in both series; the U.S. index reached an all-time high in April 2025, with an index of 725, substantially exceeding the U.K. peak around the Brexit referendum, while the U.K. series also rose notably, reaching an index of 499, nearing referendum-era levels.
Figure 2. U.K. and U.S. Economic Policy Uncertainty Indices
To further evaluate international spillovers, Figure 3 shows the global Trade Policy Uncertainty Index (Caldara et al., 2020). The index rose sharply in early 2025, marking its highest recorded level, surpassing the peaks associated with Brexit and the 2018 U.S. tariff increases. This pattern suggests that the 2025 U.S. policy changes were perceived as a global shock to the trade policy environment, whereas Brexit was viewed primarily as a regional event.
Figure 3. Global Trade Policy Uncertainty index
2. The Economic Effects of Brexit
We now turn to investigating the effect of Brexit on the U.K. economy, with a focus on differences between short-run and long-run effects. We first present some stylized facts and then summarize additional findings from the broader literature that shed light on the economic mechanisms.
2.1. Stylized Facts
For the short-run, we compare a set of macroeconomic indicators in the first and second halves of 2016, that is, just before and after the Brexit referendum. For the long run, we compare averages for the decade before the referendum (2005-2015) with the eight years following it (2017-2025).
This approach highlights structural shifts associated with Brexit but abstracts from the fact that other (global) shocks also affected the U.K. economy over this period. To address this limitation, we compare changes in the same set of indicators for the U.S. and a number of other advanced foreign economies (AFE), namely Canada and the euro area. These are a natural control group to assess how Brexit shaped the U.K.'s economic trajectory as they did not implement comparable trade policy changes but were exposed to the same global shocks, such as the Covid-19 pandemic.
The top panel of Figure 4 displays GDP growth (left panel), inflation (middle panel) and equity prices (right panel) in the first and second halves of 2016. While GDP expanded faster in the U.S. and the AFEs in 2016H2 than in 2016H1, the U.K. experienced a notable slowdown between those two reference periods. Yet, its GDP growth rate remained positive in the two quarters immediately after the Brexit referendum. For inflation, all three economies experienced notably higher price growth in 2016H2 than in 2016H1. The U.K.'s increase was the largest, though not unusually large relative to the AFEs.
Figure 4. The aggregate, comparative effect of Brexit
Finally, while the days after the Brexit referendum saw a sharp decline in U.K. and global equity markets, these declines turned out to be short-lived, and the U.K. experienced the strongest increase in equity prices of all three economies. The rebound was likely supported by the sharp depreciation of sterling, which improved the earnings outlook for exporters and firms with substantial foreign-currency revenues (Breinlich et al., 2018). This is consistent with the notion that, after processing the surprising outcome of the referendum, markets showed some short-term optimism, particularly toward internationally exposed firms, and contemporaneous commentary raised the possibility of a more deregulated, business-oriented policy environment.
The bottom panel of Figure 4 provides evidence on the longer run changes, comparing average changes between 2005-2015 and 2017-2025. As shown by the left panel, all three economies grew more slowly in the years before Brexit, which were marked by the effect of the Great Financial Crisis starting in 2007. It also shows that the U.K. did not outperform any of the peer economies following the Brexit referendum. Instead, it fell further behind the U.S. growth rate and had about the same growth rate as the AFEs.
Inflation remained highest in the U.K. both before and after Brexit, and equity prices declined over the post-2017 period, in contrast to relatively stable or rising valuations in AFEs and the U.S. This stands in contrast to the short-term post-referendum increase in equity prices, suggesting that initial optimism gave way to more cautious market expectations as the longer-term implications of Brexit became clearer.
To illustrate in more detail how views on the economic effect of Brexit evolved, we now turn to an examination of changes in market forecasts of economic activity in the U.K. In Figure 5, we show the mean Consensus Economics projections from 2015 to 2019 for U.K. annual GDP growth at horizons ranging from the same year to 10 years ahead. For ease of exposition, we focus on the 2025 horizon, for which we have forecasts from all vintages. We find that projections immediately following the referendum (from late 2016), anticipated modest short run GDP losses and a relatively quick return to trend growth. Notably, these short run forecasts were revised slightly upward in 2017, suggesting that initial disruptions appeared limited or slow to materialize.
Figure 5. UK GDP Growth Forecast
However, subsequent vintages shifted steadily downward, both for short and long run horizons, indicating that forecasters came to view the negative effects of Brexit on economic activity as more persistent than initially expected. For instance, while the GDP growth rate in 2025 was projected at 2.3 percent in 2015, it was revised downward to 1.6 percent in 2019. This evolution in forecasts is consistent with data that became available at the time, showing that Brexit effects materialized gradually through weaker investment, slower productivity growth, and adjustments in trading relationships rather than through a sharp but short-lived immediate contraction./7
In summary, our review of macro data suggests that Brexit did not generate an immediate and severe decline in the U.K. economy. GDP growth slowed and inflation rose modestly in the short term, while equity prices recovered quickly and ended the referendum year on an optimistic note. Over time, however, outcomes softened: growth disappointed and underperformed relative to the U.S., equity prices trended downward, and forecasters lowered long-run expectations for U.K. economic capacity.
2.2. Further Evidence from the Broader Literature on Brexit Effects and Transmission Mechanisms
Several other studies provide additional insights into how Brexit effects materialized, and through which channels they accumulated over time. Although the focus of our analysis is the trade dimension, it is important to recognize that Brexit encompassed broader structural changes with far-reaching macroeconomic implications. For example, the U.K.'s withdrawal from the EU also resulted in the end of free labor movement and the introduction of a new skills-based immigration system./8 Moreover, it resulted in the exit from common EU frameworks such as the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy. Moreover, the U.K. lost access to the EU's financial passporting regime, a change with important consequences for cross-border financial services./9 These non-trade policy changes are important to understand Brexit effects reported in the literature.
Timing of effects
A central finding in the literature is that Brexit effects emerged gradually. Bloom et al. (2025) estimate that by 2025 Brexit had reduced U.K. GDP by 6-8 percent, investment by 12-18 percent, employment by 3-4 percent, and productivity by 3-4 percent, magnitudes far larger than early projections. McGrattan and Waddle (2020) similarly find sizeable, long-run GDP losses in a general equilibrium framework. Complementing the descriptive evidence presented above, these estimates reinforce that Brexit effects were minor in the short run but accumulated meaningfully over time, implying that modest short run effects did not preclude larger longer-run consequences.
Uncertainty and investment
The early Brexit phase was shaped strongly by policy uncertainty. Lipinska and Orak (2020) show that heightened uncertainty lowered GDP by about 2.1 percent over the following three years, driven mainly by depressed business investment. Bloom et al. (2019) document that investment fell around 11 percent over 2016-2019 and that firm-level productivity declined 2-5 percent as management attention shifted to contingency planning. Born et al. (2019) show that these effects intensified over time: using a synthetic control, they find the output gap widened gradually, reaching 1.7-2.5 percent by end-2018, consistent with weak investment translating into capacity constraints and the temporary offset from sterling depreciation gradually fading.
Trade
Brexit trade dynamics evolved in phases. Freeman et al. (2022) find no evidence of pre-2016 front-loading effects on EU imports, consistent with the unexpected "Leave" result. However, trade data show marked stockpiling ahead of the March 2019 and January 2021 deadlines, with sharp spikes in EU imports. After the TCA took effect, Gasiorek and Tamberi (2023) find that U.K. goods exports to the EU fell sharply in January 2021 but recovered quickly, whereas imports remained persistently depressed throughout 2021. By 2024, U.K. goods exports to the EU were still 18 percent below their 2019 level in real terms, while services exports exceeded pre-Brexit levels (Ward and Webb, 2025). Adjustment on the extensive margin--firms dropping EU products--proved particularly persistent (Freeman et al. 2022), especially among smaller exporters unable to absorb fixed compliance costs.
Productivity
Several studies link weak U.K. productivity outcomes following Brexit to reduced capital formation and supply-chain reconfiguration. Bloom et al. (2025) attribute part of the productivity decline to reduced investment in physical and intangible capital, with the largest losses concentrated in manufacturing sectors integrated into complex supply chains. Firms also reconfigured their market access strategies: Breinlich et al. (2020) document a 17 percent increase in outward foreign direct investment (FDI) to EU countries as firms established subsidiaries to circumvent new barriers--investment that would otherwise have expanded U.K. capacity./10
Inflation
While Brexit did not result in a broad-based inflation surge, it generated persistent price pressures in exposed sectors. Bakker et al. (2023) find that food products with high EU import dependence experienced around 8 percentage points more cumulative inflation between December 2019 and March 2023 than they would have in the absence of Brexit. These effects were entirely driven by products facing high NTBs, especially those subject to sanitary and phytosanitary controls, while low-NTB products showed no significant price differential. This pattern underscores how regulatory frictions generate highly uneven price effects.
3. Conclusion
The Brexit referendum of 2016 and the U.S. trade reforms of 2025 represent major trade policy changes. In both cases, the initial announcements came as a surprise and were followed by increases in policy uncertainty. However, the design of policy reforms diverged: in the U.K., tariff changes were minor while NTBs rose substantially, whereas the U.S. reforms focus explicitly on increasing tariffs. Still, both resulted in notable increases in trade costs. Moreover, Brexit unfolded gradually through multi-year negotiations and phased implementation, while U.S. tariff measures were implemented rapidly with many details emerging only ex-post. Finally, Brexit was largely viewed as a regional event, whereas the 2025 U.S. trade policy changes have generated a more visible global imprint.
Market and forecast reactions to the Brexit referendum highlight how economic adjustments to trade policy shocks evolve over time. Equity markets recovered quickly after the referendum, but the U.K.'s economic performance softened over the subsequent years. Economic forecasts also changed gradually: early projections anticipated short-run disruption with limited persistence, but long run expectations were revised downward as evidence mounted of slower investment and productivity growth. Consistent with this, research suggests that these longer-run effects reflect gradual adjustments in supply chains and trade patterns due to the structural changes resulting from Brexit.
All told, the Brexit experience indicates that large trade policy shifts can influence economic outcomes gradually and manifest over long-time horizons.
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References
Bakker, J. D., Datta, N., Davies, R., & De Lyon, J. (2023). Brexit and consumer food prices: 2023 update (CEP Brexit Analysis No. 18). Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics.
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., & Davis, S. J. (2016). Measuring economic policy uncertainty. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131(4), 1593-1636. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw024
Bloom, N., Bunn, P., Chen, S., Mizen, P., Smietanka, P., & Thwaites, G. (2019). The impact of Brexit on UK firms (NBER Working Paper No. 26218) (PDF). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bloom, N., Bunn, P., Mizen, P., Smietanka, P., & Thwaites, G. (2025). The economic impact of Brexit (NBER Working Paper No. 34459 (PDF)). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Born, B., Muller, G. J., Schularick, M., & Sedlacek, P. (2019). The costs of economic nationalism: Evidence from the Brexit experiment. Economic Journal, 129(623), 2722-2744. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uez020
Breinlich, H., Leromain, E., Novy, D., & Sampson, T. (2020). Voting with their money: Brexit and outward investment by UK firms. European Economic Review, 124, 103400. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103400
Breinlich, H., Leromain, E., Novy, D., Sampson, T., & Usman, A. (2018). The economic effects of Brexit: Evidence from the stock market. Fiscal Studies, 39(4), 581-623. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-5890.12175
Caldara, D., Iacoviello, M., Molligo, P., Prestipino, A., & Raffo, A. (2020). The economic effects of trade policy uncertainty. Journal of Monetary Economics, 109, 38-59. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393219302004
Du, J., & Shepotylo, O. (2022). TCA, non-tariff measures and UK trade (ERC Research Paper No. 98) (PDF). Enterprise Research Centre.
Freeman, R., Manova, K., Prayer, T., & Sampson, T. (2022). Unravelling deep integration: UK trade in the wake of Brexit (CEP Discussion Paper No. 1847) (PDF). Centre for Economic Performance.
Fusacchia, I., Salvatici, L., & Winters, L. A. (2022). The consequences of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement for the UK's international trade. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 38(1), 27-49. https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article/38/1/27/6514752.
Gasiorek, M., & Tamberi, N. (2023). The effects of leaving the EU on the geography of UK trade. Economic Policy, Volume 38, 116, 707-764. https://academic.oup.com/economicpolicy/article/38/116/707/7146499
Lipinska, A., & Orak, M. (2020). Real Effects of Uncertainty: Evidence from Brexit (FEDS Notes). Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
McGrattan, E. R., & Waddle, A. (2020). The impact of Brexit on foreign investment and production. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 12(1), 76-103.
Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2024, Box 2.3. https://obr.uk/box/net-migration-forecast-and-its-impact-on-the-economy/
Tamberi, N. (2024). The welfare effects of leaving the EU: A first ex-post assessment. Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy.
Ward, D., & Webb, M. (2025). Statistics on UK-EU trade: Trade data and recent trends. House of Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 April 2025.
Appendix
A: Macroeconomic indicators: Full comparison table
The Macro Effects of Brexit
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1./ We thank Logan Lewis and the Boards' Trade and Quantitative Studies Section for help with understanding U.S. non-tariff barriers to trade and Shaghil Ahmed for comments. Return to text
2./ Economist. Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Florencia.S.Airaudo@frb.gov. Return to text
3./ Senior Economist. Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Johannes.Fleck@frb.gov. Return to text
4./ Research Assistant, Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Kevin.Vega@frb.gov. Return to text
5./ Estimates vary by sector and method. Tamberi (2024) uses a gravity framework and finds that the TCA raised bilateral trade costs by about 1.7 percent for U.K. exports to the EU and 5.3 percent for EU exports to the U.K., which, given the TCA's zero tariffs, are best interpreted as NTB-type increases. Fusacchia et al. (2022) calibrate the TCA as adding about 8 percentage points of NTB trade costs on average for U.K.-EU goods trade (around 12 to 13 percentage points once border costs and rules of origin are included), with substantial sectoral variation, and especially large values for food. Du and Shepotylo (2022) estimate substantial ad valorem equivalents for sanitary and phytosanitary measures and technical barriers, often above 10 percent in some sectors. Return to text
6./ For example, despite multiple rounds of negotiations spanning three years, the U.S. and EU ultimately failed to conclude the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) trade agreement. While progress on reducing mutual tariff rates was made early on, different views on NTBs, in particular regarding food standards, could not be resolved and are considered one of the main reasons why the trade agreement ultimately fell through. Return to text
7./ Table A in the appendix reports the numerical values of the indicators shown in Figure 4 as well as additional indicators (unemployment rate, policy interest rate, bond interest rate, and the exchange rate). Return to text
8./ Using data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), the Office for Budget Responsibility (2024), shows that the number of EU immigrants has been declining since 2015 and even turned negative in the latest years, reflecting net emigration of this group. Yet, this change was accompanied by a surge in immigrants from non-EU countries, such as India and Pakistan, which resulted in a strong increase of net inflows under the U.K's post Brexit immigration system. Return to text
9./ Under the EU's financial passporting regime, firms authorized to operate in one EU or euro area member state could provide financial services across the single market without obtaining separate licenses in each country. The U.K.'s departure from this framework significantly curtailed market access for U.K.-based financial institutions. Return to text
10./ Breinlich et al. (2020) use a synthetic control method to construct a no-Brexit counterfactual and show that, by March 2019, the Leave vote had led to roughly a 17% increase in the number of UK outward investment transactions in the remaining EU member states, while outward investment to non-EU OECD countries was essentially unaffected. Return to text
Please cite this note as:
Airaudo, Florencia, Johannes Fleck, and Kevin Vega (2026). "Lessons from Brexit on the Effects of Trade Disintegration," FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 16, 2026, https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.3984.
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Disclaimer: FEDS Notes are articles in which Board staff offer their own views and present analysis on a range of topics in economics and finance. These articles are shorter and less technically oriented than FEDS Working Papers and IFDP papers.
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Original text here: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/lessons-from-brexit-on-the-effects-of-trade-disintegration-20260116.html
FEC Issues Digest for Week of Jan. 12-16, 2026
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest:* * *
Commission meetings and hearings
No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week.
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Litigation
Bernegger v. FEC (Case No. 25-4559) On December 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the Commission failed to act on the Plaintiff's administrative complaint during the statutory timeframe.
Giffords v. FEC (Case No. 25-5188) On January 13, Appellants National Rifle Association ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 -- The Federal Election Commission issued the following weekly digest: * * * Commission meetings and hearings No open meetings or executive sessions were scheduled this week. * * * Litigation Bernegger v. FEC (Case No. 25-4559) On December 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that the Commission failed to act on the Plaintiff's administrative complaint during the statutory timeframe. Giffords v. FEC (Case No. 25-5188) On January 13, Appellants National Rifle Associationof America and the National Rifle Association Political Victory Fund filed a Brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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Reports Due in 2026
The Commission has posted the 2026 Congressional Pre-Election Reporting Dates. Reporting schedules for all filers in 2026 are also available.
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Outreach
On January 14, the Commission hosted Year-End Reporting and FECFile webinars for PACs and party committees.
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Election Dates
The Commission has posted a list of 2026 Congressional Primary Dates.
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Upcoming educational opportunities
January 21, 2026: The Commission is scheduled to host Year-End Reporting and FECFile webinars for candidate committees.
February 17-18, 2026: The Commission is scheduled to host a webinar for candidate committees.
For more information on upcoming training opportunities, see the Commission's Trainings page.
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Upcoming reporting due dates
January 31, 2026: Year-End Reports are due. For more information, see the 2026 Quarterly and Monthly Reporting schedules.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the Special Runoff Election in the 18th District of Texas, scheduled for January 31, 2026.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the New Jersey 11th District Special Primary Election, scheduled for February 5, 2026, and the Special General Election, scheduled for April 16, 2026.
The Commission has posted filing information regarding the Georgia 14th District Special General Election, scheduled for March 10, 2026, and Special Runoff Election (if necessary), scheduled for April 7, 2026.
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Additional research materials
Contribution Limits: In addition to the current limits, the Commission has posted an archive of contribution limits that were in effect going back to the 1975-1976 election cycles.
Federal election results are available. The data was compiled from the official vote totals published by state election offices.
FEC Notify: Want to be notified by email when campaign finance reports are received by the agency? Sign up here.
The Combined Federal State Disclosure and Election Directory is available. This publication identifies the federal and state agencies responsible for the disclosure of campaign finances, lobbying, personal finances, public financing, candidates on the ballot, election results, spending on state initiatives, and other financial filings.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Tax Checkoff Chart provides information on balance of the Fund, monthly deposits into the Fund reported by the Department of the Treasury, payments from the Fund as certified by the FEC, and participation rates of taxpayers as reported by the Internal Revenue Service. For more information on the Presidential Public Funding Program, see the Public Funding of Presidential Elections page.
The FEC Record is available as a continuously updated online news source.
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Original text here: https://www.fec.gov/updates/week-of-january-12-16-2026/
BLS Issues Report on Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment November 2025
WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 (TNSLrpt) -- Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment November 2025 - A report from U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics - Jan. 16, 2026 (26 pages)* * *
Unemployment rates were higher in November than a year earlier in 259 of the 387 metropolitan areas, lower in 100 areas, and unchanged in 28 areas, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. A total of 44 areas had jobless rates of less than 3.0 percent and 8 areas had rates of at least 8.0 percent. Nonfarm payroll employment increased over the year in 8 metropolitan areas, decreased in 2 areas, ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, Jan. 17 (TNSLrpt) -- Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment November 2025 - A report from U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics - Jan. 16, 2026 (26 pages) * * * Unemployment rates were higher in November than a year earlier in 259 of the 387 metropolitan areas, lower in 100 areas, and unchanged in 28 areas, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. A total of 44 areas had jobless rates of less than 3.0 percent and 8 areas had rates of at least 8.0 percent. Nonfarm payroll employment increased over the year in 8 metropolitan areas, decreased in 2 areas,and was essentially unchanged in 377 areas. The national unemployment rate in November was 4.3 percent, not seasonally adjusted, up from 4.0 percent a year earlier.
This news release presents statistics from two monthly programs. The civilian labor force and unemployment data are based on the same concepts and definitions as those used for the national household survey estimates. These data pertain to people by where they reside. The employment data are from an establishment survey that measures nonfarm employment, hours, and earnings by industry. These data pertain to jobs on payrolls defined by where the establishments are located. For more information about the concepts and statistical methodologies used by these two programs, see the Technical Note.
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Federal Government Shutdown
Publication of November 2025 data was delayed because of a lapse in federal appropriations (from October 1 through November 12). Both the household and establishment surveys required additional data collection and processing time in November. BLS did not publish an October 2025 Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment news release.
For more information, see the additional notes about the impact of the shutdown on the household survey and the establishment survey at the end of this news release.
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Metropolitan Area Unemployment (Not Seasonally Adjusted)
In November, Sioux Falls, SD-MN, had the lowest unemployment rate, 2.0 percent, followed by Rapid City, SD, 2.1 percent. El Centro, CA, had the highest rate, 20.0 percent. A total of 224 areas had November jobless rates below the U.S. rate of 4.3 percent, 156 areas had rates above it, and 7 areas had rates equal to that of the nation. (See table 1 and map 1.)
The largest over-the-year unemployment rate increase in November occurred in Wildwood-The Villages, FL (+3.0 percentage points). Fifty other areas had rate increases of at least 1.0 percentage point. Kokomo, IN, had the largest over-the-year rate decrease in November (-4.2 percentage points). Sixteen other areas had rate declines of at least 1.0 percentage point.
Of the 56 metropolitan areas with a 2020 Census population of 1 million or more, Urban Honolulu, HI, had the lowest jobless rate in November, 2.3 percent. Fresno, CA, had the highest rate, 8.1 percent. Thirty-nine large areas had over-the-year unemployment rate increases, 12 had decreases, and 5 had no change. The largest rate increase occurred in Jacksonville, FL (+1.6 percentage points). The largest jobless rate decline occurred in Denver-Aurora-Centennial, CO (-1.0 percentage point).
Metropolitan Division Unemployment (Not Seasonally Adjusted)
Thirteen of the most populous metropolitan areas are made up of 37 metropolitan divisions, which are essentially separately identifiable employment centers. In November, Montgomery County-Bucks County-Chester County, PA, and Rockingham County-Strafford County, NH, had the lowest division unemployment rates, 3.1 percent each. Detroit-Dearborn-Livonia, MI, had the highest rate among the divisions, 6.2 percent, followed by Washington, DC-MD, 6.1 percent. (See table 2.)
In November, 32 metropolitan divisions had over-the-year unemployment rate increases, 3 had decreases, and 2 had no change. The largest increase occurred in Washington, DC-MD (+2.1 percentage points), followed by Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ (+2.0 points). Nine other divisions had rate increases of at least 1.0 percentage point. The largest unemployment rate decline from November 2024 occurred in Lake County-Porter County-Jasper County, IN (-1.2 percentage points).
Metropolitan Area Nonfarm Employment (Not Seasonally Adjusted)
In November 2025, nonfarm payroll employment increased over the year in 8 metropolitan areas, decreased in 2 areas, and was essentially unchanged in 377 areas. The largest over-the-year employment increases occurred in New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ (+86,800), Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD (+40,400), and Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC (+37,800). The largest over-the-year percentage gains in employment occurred in Rochester, MN (+6.1 percent), Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR (+3.8 percent), and Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC (+3.7 percent). Employment decreased over the year in Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV (-48,500, or -1.4 percent), and Bozeman, MT (-3,500, or -4.7 percent). (See table 3 and map 2.)
Over the year, nonfarm employment increased in 4 metropolitan areas with a 2020 Census population of 1 million or more, decreased in 1 area, and was essentially unchanged in 51 areas. The largest over-the-year percentage increase in employment in these large metropolitan areas occurred in Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC (+2.7 percent), followed by NashvilleDavidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN (+1.7 percent), and Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD (+1.3 percent). The over-the-year decrease in employment occurred in Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV (-1.4 percent).
Metropolitan Division Nonfarm Employment (Not Seasonally Adjusted)
In November, nonfarm payroll employment increased over the year in 1 metropolitan division, decreased in 1 division, and was essentially unchanged in 35 divisions. The over-the-year increase in employment among the metropolitan divisions occurred in New York-Jersey CityWhite Plains, NY-NJ (+59,500, or +0.9 percent). The over-the-year decrease in employment occurred in Washington, DC-MD (-29,400, or -2.5 percent). (See table 4.)
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The State Employment and Unemployment news release for December 2025 is scheduled to be released on Tuesday, January 27, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. (ET). The Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment news release for December 2025 is scheduled to be released on Wednesday, February 4, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. (ET).
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Household Survey Estimates and the Federal Government Shutdown
There are no household survey estimates for October 2025. Household survey data, which provide the primary inputs to the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program, were not collected for October 2025 due to the lapse in appropriations and were not collected retroactively. The November reference period was the week that contained the 12th of the month, a typical reference week. Collection of November data began a day late due to the shutdown and was extended to provide more time for contacting households around the Thanksgiving holiday. The November response rate was lower than usual at 64.0 percent, with response rates at the state level ranging from 47.2 percent to 82.8 percent.
The lack of October 2025 data required an adjustment to the statistical weighting process. In the household survey, composite estimation relies on data from the previous month as an input to developing statistical weights for the current month's data. Without October data, the composite weighting formula was adjusted by shifting previously-collected data forward 1 month.
In the household survey, people are considered employed if they did any work at all for pay or profit during the survey reference week or were temporarily absent from their jobs or businesses. The lapse in appropriations lasted from October 1 through November 12, 2025. The survey reference week was November 9 through 15. Because the government reopened before the end of the November reference week, federal government workers were counted as employed in the household survey.
It is not possible to precisely quantify the effect of the federal government shutdown on household survey estimates for November 2025.
Additional information about the impact of the shutdown on the household survey is available online at www.bls.gov/cps/methods/2025-federal-government-shutdown-impact-cps.htm.
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Establishment Survey Estimates and the Federal Government Shutdown
This news release includes the final establishment survey estimates for both September and October 2025, and the preliminary estimates for November. The collection periods for October and November estimates were extended.
October estimates include data that businesses self-reported electronically during the shutdown and data collected after the resumption of government operations in November. The collection rates for October and November are higher than usual as a result of the extended collection periods.
There was no change to the reference period for October or November; it remained the pay period that includes the 12th of the month. There were no changes to seasonal adjustment or estimation methodology.
The September data are final estimates and incorporate routine revisions.
In the establishment survey, businesses and government agencies report the number of people on payrolls during the pay period that includes the 12th of the month. Individuals who work or receive pay for any part of the pay period are defined as employed. Federal employees on furlough during the federal government shutdown were considered employed in the establishment survey because they worked or received pay, even if later than usual, for the pay period that included the 12th of the month. Other workers (including federal contractors) who did not work or receive pay during the federal government shutdown were not counted among the employed.
It is not possible to precisely quantify the total impact of the federal government shutdown on payroll employment estimates for October and November 2025.
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Upcoming Changes to the Establishment Survey Birth-Death Model Effective with the release of January 2026 data, the establishment survey will change the birthdeath model by incorporating current sample information each month. The change follows the same methodology applied to the April through October 2024 forecasts during the 2024 postbenchmark period (see question 9 in the CES Birth-Death Model Frequently Asked Questions page at www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cesbdqa.htm).
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Technical Note
This news release presents civilian labor force and unemployment data from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program (tables 1 and 2) for 387 metropolitan statistical areas, plus 6 areas in Puerto Rico. Estimates for 37 metropolitan divisions also are presented. Nonfarm payroll employment estimates from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) program (tables 3 and 4) are provided for the same areas. State estimates were previously published in the State Employment and Unemployment news release and are republished in this news release for ease of reference. The LAUS and CES programs are both federal-state cooperative endeavors.
Civilian labor force and unemployment--from the LAUS program
Definitions. The civilian labor force and unemployment data are based on the same concepts and definitions as those used for the official national estimates obtained from the Current Population Survey (CPS), a sample survey of households that is conducted for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) by the U.S. Census Bureau. The LAUS program measures employed people and unemployed people on a placeof-residence basis. The universe for each is the civilian noninstitutional population 16 years of age and older. Employed people are those who did any work at all for pay or profit in the reference week (typically the week including the 12th of the month) or worked 15 hours or more without pay in a family business or farm, plus those not working who had a job from which they were temporarily absent, whether or not paid, for such reasons as labor-management dispute, illness, or vacation. Unemployed people are those who were not employed during the reference week (based on the definition above), had actively looked for a job sometime in the 4-week period ending with the reference week, and were currently available for work; people on layoff expecting recall need not be looking for work to be counted as unemployed. The civilian labor force is the sum of employed and unemployed people. The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed as a percent of the civilian labor force.
Method of estimation. Estimates for states, the District of Columbia, the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale metropolitan division, and New York City are produced using time-series models with real-time benchmarking to national CPS totals. Model-based estimates are also produced for the following areas and their respective balances: the ChicagoNaperville-Schaumburg, IL Metropolitan Division; Cleveland, OH Metropolitan Statistical Area; Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI Metropolitan Statistical Area; Miami-Miami BeachKendall, FL Metropolitan Division; and Seattle-TacomaBellevue, WA Metropolitan Statistical Area. Modeling improves the statistical basis of the estimation for these areas and provides important tools for analysis, such as measures of errors and seasonally adjusted series. For all other substate areas in this news release, estimates are prepared through indirect estimation procedures using a building-block approach. Estimates of employed people, which are based largely on "place of work" estimates from the CES program, are adjusted to refer to place of residence as used in the CPS. Unemployment estimates are aggregates of people previously employed in industries covered by state Unemployment Insurance (UI) laws and entrants to the labor force from the CPS. The substate estimates of employment and unemployment, which geographically exhaust the entire state, are adjusted proportionally to ensure that they add to the independently estimated model-based area totals. A detailed description of the estimation procedures is available from BLS upon request.
Annual revisions. Civilian labor force and unemployment data shown for the prior year reflect adjustments made at the beginning of each year, usually implemented with the issuance of January estimates. The adjusted model-based estimates typically reflect updated population data from the U.S. Census Bureau, any revisions in other input data sources, and model re-estimation. All substate estimates then are reestimated using updated inputs and adjusted to add to the revised model-based totals. In early 2025, implementation of synthetic intercensal population estimates for states and the 2020-based delineations for federal statistical areas necessitated the replacement of substate estimates back to their series beginnings. For more information, see www.bls.gov/lau/geography-and-data-changes-in-2025.htm.
Employment--from the CES program
Definitions. Employment data refer to people on establishment payrolls who receive pay for any part of the pay period that includesthe 12th of the month. People are counted at their place of work rather than at their place of residence; those appearing on more than one payroll are counted on each payroll. Industries are classified on the basis of their principal activity in accordance with the 2022 version of the North American Industry Classification System.
Method of estimation. CES State and Area employment
data are produced using several estimation procedures. Where possible, these data are produced using a "weighted link relative" estimation technique in which a ratio of current month weighted employment to that of the previous-month weighted employment is computed from a sample of establishments reporting for both months. The estimates of employment for the current month are then obtained by multiplying these ratios by the previous month's employment estimates. The weighted link relative technique is utilized for data series where the sample size meets certain statistical criteria. For some employment series, the estimates are produced with a model that uses direct sample estimates (described above) combined with other regressors to compensate for smaller sample sizes.
Annual revisions. Employment estimates are adjusted annually to a complete count of jobs, called benchmarks, derived principally from tax reports that are submitted by employers who are covered under state unemployment insurance (UI) laws. The benchmark information is used to adjust the monthly estimates between the new benchmark and the preceding one and also to establish the level of employment for the new benchmark month. Thus, the benchmarking process establishes the level of employment, and the sample is used to measure the month-to-month changes in the level for the subsequent months. Information on recent benchmark revisions is available online at www.bls.gov/web/laus/benchmark.pdf.
Seasonal adjustment. Payroll employment data are seasonally adjusted for states, metropolitan areas, and metropolitan divisions at the total nonfarm level. For states, data are seasonally adjusted at the supersector level as well. Revisions to historical data for the most recent 5 years are made once a year, coincident with annual benchmark adjustments.
Payroll employment data are seasonally adjusted concurrently, using all available estimates, including those for the current month, to develop sample-based seasonal factors. Concurrent sample-based factors are created every month for the current month's preliminary estimate as well as the previous month's final estimate.
Reliability of the estimates
The estimates presented in this news release are based on sample surveys, administrative data, and modeling and, thus, are subject to sampling and other types of errors. Sampling error is a measure of sampling variability--that is, variation that occurs by chance because a sample rather than the entire population is surveyed. Survey data also are subject to nonsampling errors, such as those which can be introduced into the data collection and processing operations. Estimates not directly derived from sample surveys are subject to additional errors resulting from the specific estimation processes used. The sums of individual items may not always equal the totals shown in the same tables because of rounding.
Use of error measures
Civilian labor force and unemployment estimates. Measures of sampling error are not available for metropolitan areas or metropolitan divisions. Model-based error measures for states are available on the BLS website at www.bls.gov/lau/lastderr.htm. Measures of nonsampling error are not available for the areas contained in this news release.
Employment estimates. Changes in metropolitan area nonfarm payroll employment are cited in the analysis of this news release only if they have been determined to be statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level. Measures of sampling error for the total nonfarm employment series are available for metropolitan areas and metropolitan divisions at www.bls.gov/web/laus/790stderr.htm. Measures of sampling error for more detailed series at the area and division level are available upon request. Measures of sampling error for states at the supersector level and for the private service providing, goods-producing, total private and total nonfarm levels are available on the BLS website at www.bls.gov/web/laus/790stderr.htm.
Area definitions
The substate area data published in this news release reflect the delineations issued by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget on July 21, 2023. A detailed list of the geographic definitions is available online at www.bls.gov/lau/lausmsa.htm.
Additional information
Estimates of unadjusted and seasonally adjusted civilian labor force and unemployment data for states and seven substate areas are available in the news release State Employment and Unemployment. Estimates of civilian labor force and unemployment for all states, metropolitan areas, counties, cities with a population of 25,000 or more, and other areas used in the administration of various federal economic assistance programs are available online at www.bls.gov/lau/. Employment data from the CES program for states and metropolitan areas are available on the BLS website at www.bls.gov/sae/.
If you are deaf, hard of hearing, or have a speech disability, please dial 7-1-1 to access telecommunications relay services.
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LABOR FORCE DATA NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED
Table 1. Civilian labor force and unemployment by state and metropolitan area
Table 1. Civilian labor force and unemployment by state and metropolitan area -- Continued
Table 1. Civilian labor force and unemployment by state and metropolitan area -- Continued
Table 1. Civilian labor force and unemployment by state and metropolitan area -- Continued
Table 1. Civilian labor force and unemployment by state and metropolitan area -- Continued
Table 1. Civilian labor force and unemployment by state and metropolitan area -- Continued
Table 1. Civilian labor force and unemployment by state and metropolitan area -- Continued
Table 2. Civilian labor force and unemployment by state, selected metropolitan area, and metropolitan division
ESTABLISHMENT DATA NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED
Table 3. Employees on nonfarm payrolls by state and metropolitan area, not seasonally adjusted
Table 3. Employees on nonfarm payrolls by state and metropolitan area, not seasonally adjusted -- Continued
Table 3. Employees on nonfarm payrolls by state and metropolitan area, not seasonally adjusted -- Continued
Table 3. Employees on nonfarm payrolls by state and metropolitan area, not seasonally adjusted -- Continued
Table 3. Employees on nonfarm payrolls by state and metropolitan area, not seasonally adjusted -- Continued
Table 3. Employees on nonfarm payrolls by state and metropolitan area, not seasonally adjusted -- Continued
Table 3. Employees on nonfarm payrolls by state and metropolitan area, not seasonally adjusted -- Continued
Table 3. Employees on nonfarm payrolls by state and metropolitan area, not seasonally adjusted -- Continued
Table 4. Employees on nonfarm payrolls by state, selected metropolitan area, and metropolitan division, not seasonally adjusted1
Map 1. Unemployment rates for metropolitan areas, not seasonally adjusted, November 2025
Map 2. Over-the-year percentage change in employment, by metropolitan area, not seasonally adjusted, November 2025
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View original text plus charts and tables here: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/metro.pdf