Federal Executive Branch
Here's a look at documents from the U.S. Executive Branch
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Treasury IG: Audit of Airline Worker Support Extension Certification - STS Aviation Services - Tank Tigers, Inc.
WASHINGTON, May 25 -- The Treasury Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. OIG-26-030) on May 8, 2026 entitled "Audit of Airline Worker Support Extension Certification - STS Aviation Services - Tank Tigers, Inc. ."
Here are the results in brief:
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We found that STS, a contractor, reported correct information for five of six sections reviewed on its PSP2 Application. These sections are: (1) Recipient Information, (2) Eligibility Questions, (3) Company Information, (4) Affiliates, and (5) Certification. We also found that STS reported incorrect information in the Determining
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WASHINGTON, May 25 -- The Treasury Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. OIG-26-030) on May 8, 2026 entitled "Audit of Airline Worker Support Extension Certification - STS Aviation Services - Tank Tigers, Inc. ."
Here are the results in brief:
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We found that STS, a contractor, reported correct information for five of six sections reviewed on its PSP2 Application. These sections are: (1) Recipient Information, (2) Eligibility Questions, (3) Company Information, (4) Affiliates, and (5) Certification. We also found that STS reported incorrect information in the DeterminingAwardable Amount section. Specifically, the company included $ in unsupported health insurance for its benefit amount; however, the unsupported benefit was entirely offset by differences between the actual salaries and wages and the requested amount, resulting in a variance of $ . Overall, STS understated its requested amount by $458,580. Therefore, we are not making a recommendation.
As part of our reporting process, we provided STS management with an opportunity to comment on a draft of this report. In a written response, STS management stated they have reviewed the report and agreed with the results. STS management's response, in its entirety, is included as appendix 2 of this report.
In a written response, Treasury management noted that STS understated its awardable amount; therefore no amounts are owed back to Treasury. Additionally, Treasury management appreciates the work on this engagement and looks forward to working with the OIG to protect the integrity of the PSP and other recovery programs. Treasury management's response, in its entirety, is included as appendix 3 of this report.
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The report is posted at: https://oig.treasury.gov/system/files/2026-05/Audit-of-Airline-Worker-Support-Extension-Certification---STS-Aviation-Services---Locked.pdf
Interior IG: Former Bingo Hall Manager Embezzled From Alaska Native Organization
WASHINGTON, May 25 (TNSLrpt) -- The Interior Inspector General issued the following report (No. 24-0092) on April 2, 2026 entitled "Summary: Former Bingo Hall Manager Embezzled from Alaska Native Organization."
Here is the summary:
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The OIG investigated allegations that Mesepa Tagovailoa, the former Manager of Chena Bingo in Fairbanks, Alaska, embezzled funds from the tribally operated gaming establishment. We substantiated these allegations. We found that between 2019 and 2023, while working as Chena Bingo's Manager, Tagovailoa embezzled approximately $1.1 million by entering false refunds
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WASHINGTON, May 25 (TNSLrpt) -- The Interior Inspector General issued the following report (No. 24-0092) on April 2, 2026 entitled "Summary: Former Bingo Hall Manager Embezzled from Alaska Native Organization."
Here is the summary:
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The OIG investigated allegations that Mesepa Tagovailoa, the former Manager of Chena Bingo in Fairbanks, Alaska, embezzled funds from the tribally operated gaming establishment. We substantiated these allegations. We found that between 2019 and 2023, while working as Chena Bingo's Manager, Tagovailoa embezzled approximately $1.1 million by entering false refundsinto the establishment's gaming register system and stealing the cash refunds for personal use.
The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Alaska prosecuted this case. On June 5, 2024, Tagovailoa entered into a pre-indictment plea agreement and pleaded guilty to one count of 18 U.S.C Sec. 1163, Embezzlement and Theft from an Indian Tribal Organization. On June 18, 2025, the court sentenced Tagovailoa to nine months of imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. On January 12, 2026, Tagovailoa was ordered to pay $300,000 in restitution to Chena Bingo.
This is a summary of an investigative report we issued to the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
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The report is posted at: https://www.doioig.gov/reports/investigation/summary-former-bingo-hall-manager-embezzled-alaska-native-organization
Homeland Security IG: DHS Wildfire Sensors Did Not Consistently Detect Fires and Provide Early Warning
WASHINGTON, May 25 (TNSLrpt) -- The Homeland Security Inspector General issued the following report (No. OIG-26-05) on April 27, 2026 entitled "DHS Wildfire Sensors Did Not Consistently Detect Fires and Provide Early Warning."
Here are excerpts:
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Why We Did This Audit
Wildfires across the United States are frequent, costly, and dangerous. DHS helps prepare the Nation to respond quickly and decisively during catastrophic incidents.
We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which DHS' sensor technology detects wildfires and alerts partners and the public to provide advance notice
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WASHINGTON, May 25 (TNSLrpt) -- The Homeland Security Inspector General issued the following report (No. OIG-26-05) on April 27, 2026 entitled "DHS Wildfire Sensors Did Not Consistently Detect Fires and Provide Early Warning."
Here are excerpts:
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Why We Did This Audit
Wildfires across the United States are frequent, costly, and dangerous. DHS helps prepare the Nation to respond quickly and decisively during catastrophic incidents.
We conducted this audit to determine the extent to which DHS' sensor technology detects wildfires and alerts partners and the public to provide advance noticeto reduce loss of life and property.
What We Found
From 2020 through 2024, the Department of Homeland Security, through the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), contracted with N5 Sensors, Inc. (N5) to develop and deploy wildfire detection sensors that did not consistently detect fires or alert state and local partners to aid response efforts. Failure to detect wildfires early and notify first responders can result in the increased loss of life and property, and otherwise avoidable costs associated with rebuilding damaged communities.
Both technological limitations and environmental factors caused wildfire sensor issues. The wildfire sensors required additional training and operational data to improve AI algorithms for fire detection. Wind speed and direction also negatively impacted the performance of wildfire sensors.
S&T's contract with N5 ended on December 31, 2024. As of April 2025, the S&T had no plans to further fund wildfire sensor detection technologies.
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The report is posted at: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2026-04/OIG-26-05-Apr26.pdf
HUD IG: Underestimated Rising Property Charges for an Estimated 1,237 HECM Borrowers
WASHINGTON, May 25 (TNSLrpt) -- The Department of Housing and Urban Development Inspector General issued the following report (No. 2026-KC-0003) on May 05, 2026 entitled "HUD Underestimated Rising Property Charges for an Estimated 1,237 HECM Borrowers."
Here are excerpts:
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We conducted an audit on the effectiveness of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program's Life Expectancy Set Asides (LESA). The LESA is a set aside portion of the HECM mortgage that makes property tax, hazard insurance, and flood insurance payments on
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WASHINGTON, May 25 (TNSLrpt) -- The Department of Housing and Urban Development Inspector General issued the following report (No. 2026-KC-0003) on May 05, 2026 entitled "HUD Underestimated Rising Property Charges for an Estimated 1,237 HECM Borrowers."
Here are excerpts:
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We conducted an audit on the effectiveness of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program's Life Expectancy Set Asides (LESA). The LESA is a set aside portion of the HECM mortgage that makes property tax, hazard insurance, and flood insurance payments onbehalf of certain financially vulnerable borrowers. While not guaranteed, the LESA funds are intended to last for the full duration of the borrower's life expectancy. We initiated this audit because of recent federal reporting on rising nationwide property tax and hazard insurance costs, paid for by LESA funds. Our audit objective was to determine whether LESAs were meeting the intent of the program for financially vulnerable borrowers.
We found an estimated 1,237 HECM borrowers will need to begin making property charge payments out of pocket because their LESAs will deplete in significantly less time than HUD estimated they would last. This occurred because HUD did not evaluate whether LESA calculations were effective or whether LESAs would be available for the borrowers' estimated life expectancy. If borrowers cannot make these property charge payments out of pocket, their HECM loans would default, resulting in a projected loss of $258 million to HUD.
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The report is posted at: https://www.hudoig.gov/reports-publications/report/hud-underestimated-rising-property-charges-estimated-1237-hecm
HUD IG: HUDUSER System Had Exploitable IT Security Weaknesses
WASHINGTON, May 25 (TNSLrpt) -- The Department of Housing and Urban Development Inspector General issued the following report (No. 2026-OE-0002) on May 08, 2026 entitled "The HUDUSER System Had Exploitable IT Security Weaknesses."
Here are excerpts:
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The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an evaluation of the operational effectiveness of information technology (IT) security controls for the HUDUSER system, which is operated by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research (PD&R). The OIG identified four significant weaknesses
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WASHINGTON, May 25 (TNSLrpt) -- The Department of Housing and Urban Development Inspector General issued the following report (No. 2026-OE-0002) on May 08, 2026 entitled "The HUDUSER System Had Exploitable IT Security Weaknesses."
Here are excerpts:
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The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an evaluation of the operational effectiveness of information technology (IT) security controls for the HUDUSER system, which is operated by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research (PD&R). The OIG identified four significant weaknessesinvolving website security, underscoring the need to strengthen technical security controls.
To address these findings, we provide eight new recommendations, which will be formally tracked by our office. These recommendations are designed to enhance HUD's IT security posture by preventing web-based threats from exploiting the HUDUSER system, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. The OIG has determined that this report contains sensitive information and is therefore not appropriate for public disclosure.
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The report is posted at: https://www.hudoig.gov/reports-publications/report/huduser-system-had-exploitable-it-security-weaknesses
HHS IG Issues Advisory Opinion No. 26-10
WASHINGTON, May 25 -- The Health and Human Services Inspector General posted the following advisory opinion (No. 26-10) on May 18, 2026:
Here are excerpts:
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Issued: May 13, 2026
Posted: May 18, 2026
Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 26-10 (Unfavorable)
Dear [redacted]:
The Office ofInspector General ("OIG") is writing in response to your request for an advisory opinion on behalf of [redacted] ("Requestor"), an orthopedic medical technology company, regarding Requestor's proposal to enter into agreements with individuals-often physicianswho would provide consulting services for its product
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WASHINGTON, May 25 -- The Health and Human Services Inspector General posted the following advisory opinion (No. 26-10) on May 18, 2026:
Here are excerpts:
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Issued: May 13, 2026
Posted: May 18, 2026
Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 26-10 (Unfavorable)
Dear [redacted]:
The Office ofInspector General ("OIG") is writing in response to your request for an advisory opinion on behalf of [redacted] ("Requestor"), an orthopedic medical technology company, regarding Requestor's proposal to enter into agreements with individuals-often physicianswho would provide consulting services for its productlines (the "Proposed Arrangement").
Specifically, you have inquired whether the Proposed Arrangement, if undertaken, would constitute grounds for the imposition of sanctions under the exclusion authority at section 1128(b)(7) of the Social Security Act (the "Act") or the civil monetary penalty provision at section 1128A(a)(7) of the Act, as those sections relate to the commission of acts described in section 1128B(b) of the Act (the "Federal anti-kickback statute").
Requestor has certified that all of the information provided in the request, including all supplemental submissions, is true and correct and constitutes a complete description of the relevant facts and agreements among the parties in connection with the Proposed Arrangement, and we have relied solely on the facts and information Requestor provided. We have not undertaken an independent investigation of the certified facts and information presented to us by Requestor. This advisory opinion is limited to the relevant facts presented to us by Requestor in connection with the Proposed Arrangement.
Based on the relevant facts certified in your request for an advisory opinion and supplemental submissions, we conclude that the Proposed Arrangement, if undertaken, would generate prohibited remuneration under the Federal anti-kickback statute, if the requisite intent were present, which would constitute grounds for the imposition of sanctions under sections 1128A(a)(7) and 1128(b)(7) of the Act.
This advisory opinion may not be relied on by any person1 other than Requestor, has no applicability to any arrangements other than the Proposed Arrangement, and is further qualified as set out in Part IV below and in 42 C.F .R. Part 1008.
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The advisory opinion is posted at: https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/advisory-opinions/26-10/
DOD IG: Audit of Cyber Vulnerabilities Impacting Department of the Air Force Defense Critical Infrastructure
WASHINGTON, May 25 (TNSLrpt) -- The Defense Inspector General issued the following report (No. DOWIG-2026-083) on May 13, 2026 entitled "Audit of Cyber Vulnerabilities Impacting Department of the Air Force Defense Critical Infrastructure."
Here are the results in brief:
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Objective
The objective of this audit was to assess the progress made by the Department of the Air Force (DAF) in mitigating the Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) cybersecurity vulnerabilities identified during DoD assessments conducted in response to Section 1650 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017.
Background
DCI
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WASHINGTON, May 25 (TNSLrpt) -- The Defense Inspector General issued the following report (No. DOWIG-2026-083) on May 13, 2026 entitled "Audit of Cyber Vulnerabilities Impacting Department of the Air Force Defense Critical Infrastructure."
Here are the results in brief:
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Objective
The objective of this audit was to assess the progress made by the Department of the Air Force (DAF) in mitigating the Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) cybersecurity vulnerabilities identified during DoD assessments conducted in response to Section 1650 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2017.
Background
DCIis any DoW asset of such extraordinary importance to the DoW and Armed Forces that its incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on the DoW's ability to fulfill its mission.
Finding
The DAF made progress in mitigating cybersecurity vulnerabilities identified during Section 1650 assessments at the five installations we visited but additional actions are needed. Of the risk vulnerabilities in the sample we reviewed, DAF officials:
* mitigated risk) vulnerabilities;
* partially mitigated risk) vulnerabilities;
* had plans in place to mitigate risk) vulnerabilities; and
* did not take action to mitigate risk) vulnerabilities.
Although DAF officials prioritized the identified vulnerabilities, they did not take action to mitigate some vulnerabilities identified during Section 1650 assessments because all five installations lacked staff with cybersecurity expertise to mitigate the vulnerabilities.
In addition to the vulnerabilities in our sample, DAF officials stated that they did not take action for risk vulnerabilities at other DAF installations. DAF officials did not take action for these vulnerabilities or ensure responsible officials were aware of the vulnerabilities because they misunderstood the scope of the assessments.
These vulnerabilities, if left unmitigated, provide adversaries and malicious actors with opportunities to adversely affect critical missions or functions and the DAF's ability to deploy, support, and sustain military forces worldwide.
Since June 2025, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Security Agency, and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency have reported that Iranianaffiliated cyber actors and hacktivist groups are aggressively targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, which further emphasizes the DAF's need to take corrective actions to minimize the threat that adversaries and other malicious actors pose to DCI.
Recommendations
Among other recommendations, we recommended that the Director of Civil Engineers, in coordination with Air Force Civil Engineer Control Systems, Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC), Cyber Resiliency Office for Control Systems, and installation officials immediately notify non-AFCEC components of the vulnerabilities identified during Section 1650 assessments that affect their control systems and develop and implement a process to verify that corrective actions were taken to mitigate those cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
Management Comments and Our Response
The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection, responding for the Director of Civil Engineers, agreed with and provided planned actions for all recommendations; therefore, they are resolved but open. We will close the recommendations once we verify that management has implemented the agreed-upon actions. Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of the recommendations.
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The report is posted at: https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/4486841/audit-of-cyber-vulnerabilities-impacting-department-of-the-air-force-defense-cr/
