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Treasury Dept.: Economic Fury Targets Iran Shadow Banking Facilitators
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued the following news release on April 28, 2026:* * *
Economic Fury Targets Iran Shadow Banking Facilitators
Today, as part of Economic Fury, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 35 entities and individuals that oversee Iran's shadow banking architecture, facilitating the movement of the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars tied to sanctions evasion and Iran's sponsorship of terrorism. These networks allow Iran's armed forces--including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued the following news release on April 28, 2026: * * * Economic Fury Targets Iran Shadow Banking Facilitators Today, as part of Economic Fury, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 35 entities and individuals that oversee Iran's shadow banking architecture, facilitating the movement of the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars tied to sanctions evasion and Iran's sponsorship of terrorism. These networks allow Iran's armed forces--including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps(IRGC)--to access the international financial system to receive payment for illicit oil sales, purchase sensitive components for missiles and other weapons systems, and transfer money to Iran's terrorist proxies.
"Iran's shadow banking system serves as a critical financial lifeline for its armed forces, enabling activities that disrupt global trade and fuel violence across the Middle East," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. "Illicit funds funneled through this network support the regime's ongoing terrorist operations, posing a direct threat to U.S. personnel, regional allies, and the global economy. Financial institutions are on notice: Any institution that facilitates or engages with these networks is at risk of severe consequences."
Today's action is being taken pursuant to E.O. 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran's financial sector, and E.O. 13224, as amended, a counterterrorism authority. These designations build on OFAC's January 15, 2026 shadow banking action, which targeted the rahbar networks of Bank Melli and Bank-e Shahr (Shahr Bank).
Today's designations expose and disrupt the Iranian regime's mechanisms for receiving payments for oil and other commodities, thereby increasing costs and reducing revenue for the regime's destabilizing activities, and exposes individuals involved in facilitating the regime's abuse of the international financial system.
This action is in furtherance of the President's National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), which undergirds Treasury's continued campaign of maximum economic pressure against Iran's shadow banking, money laundering, and sanctions evasion networks. Since February 2025, OFAC has sanctioned approximately 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft as part of this campaign.
Alongside today's action, OFAC is issuing firm guidance to warn about the significant sanctions exposure related to making "toll" payments to the Government of Iran or the IRGC for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. These payments create sanctions risk for U.S. and non-U.S. persons, including financial institutions. For further information, please see FAQ 1249.
shahr bank rahbar network
Iranian banks cut off from the international financial system rely on private companies known as "rahbars," which manage thousands of overseas shell companies used to execute payments for Iranian imports and exports. These rahbars use shell company accounts held at foreign banks in key financial jurisdictions to aid sanctioned Iranian banks in illicitly accessing the formal international financial system. The rahbar companies closely coordinate with Iranian exchange houses and a myriad of front companies in multiple jurisdictions to facilitate payments for Iran's sanctioned trade, including on behalf of the IRGC, Iran's Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), Iran's National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), and other sanctioned entities.
Farab Soroush Afagh Qeshm Company (FSAQ), the rahbar company for Shahr Bank, oversees the movement of funds for Shahr Bank's clients via a network of foreign front companies. One such company, the U.S.-sanctioned HMS Trading FZE (HMS Trading), acts on behalf of Shahr Bank and its rahbar FSAQ to facilitate Iranian oil shipments on behalf of Iran's state oil companies and security services. HMS Trading and its sanctioned Iran-based sister company, Tejarat Hermes Energy Qeshm Company, are responsible for financing, providing guarantees, and facilitating payments to oil producers or their nominated third parties. This enables Iranian oil sales for Iranian state oil producers and brokers such as NIOC, Triliance Petrochemical Company, and Sepehr Energy Jahan, a front company for the AFGS. FSAQ employee and foreign exchange market expert Sorayya Mehri Hajibaba has facilitated FSAQ money transfers since at least mid-2023. Iran-based shadow banking official Seyyed Mohammed Mehdi Al Ghafur works with employees from Shahr Bank, FSAQ, and their network of front companies and exchange houses to launder money on behalf of Shahr Bank.
FSAQ, via HMS Trading, uses a host of front companies in multiple jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom (UK)-based Shuqun LTD, to enable its work. Through 2024, Shuqun LTD transferred over $70 million worth of payments for Iranian crude oil and oil distillates on behalf of NIOC. Shuqun LTD is owned by Filipino-national Janelyn Eusebio Emperador, who owns two other UK-based front companies, Sanovo LTD and Qianza LTD.
Farab Soroush Afagh Qeshm Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy. Sorayya Mehri Hajibaba and Seyyed Mohammed Mehdi Al Ghafur are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Farab Soroush Afagh Qeshm Company. Shuqun LTD and Janelyn Eusebio Emperador are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. Sanovo LTD and Qianza LTD are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Janelyn Eusebio Emperador.
RAHBAR COMPANIES and affiliated banks
OFAC is taking additional actions against the rahbar companies of multiple sanctioned Iranian banks, including the Supreme Leader's Office-controlled Bank Sina and military-affiliated Bank Sepah, a key provider of financing for Iran's ballistic missile program, which continues to threaten the interests of the United States and its allies. OFAC is designating the following rahbar companies pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy. The companies are affiliated with the corresponding Iranian financial institutions listed below:
Rahbar Company ... Corresponding Iranian Bank
Khavar Tejarat Arka Kish Company ... Eghtesad Novin Bank
Naghsh Simorgh Sahand LLC ... Parsian Bank
Karmaniya Tejarat Asar Kish Company ... Tourism Bank
Aku Tejarat Ravizh Kish Company ... Bank Sina
Rahbar Tejari Setareh Taban Kish Company ... Bank Sepah
Tejarat Sarir Afrooz Kish Company ... Bank Mellat
On October 8, 2020, OFAC designated Eghtesad Novin Bank and Tourism Bank pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy. On October 16, 2018, OFAC designated Parsian Bank and Bank Sina pursuant to E.O. 13224 for assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, Andisheh Mehvaran Investment Company. On October 16, 2018, OFAC designated Bank Mellat pursuant to E.O. 13224 for assisting, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, Mehr Eqtesad Bank. On November 5, 2018, OFAC designated Bank Sepah pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.
Iran's shadow banking system relies on key individuals and banking experts to carry out its illicit financial and sanctions evasion operations. Many of these individuals have direct ties to sanctioned Iranian banks themselves. For example, FSAQ's chairman is the previously designated Hossein Yaghoobi, also known as Hossein Yaghoubi Miab, who was designated on November 20, 2018 for his role in providing support to the external operations arm of the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), while serving as the Central Bank of Iran's Vice Governor for International Affairs.
Ehsan Moslehi and Ehsan Saidi Nasab serve on the board of directors of Khavar Tejarat Arka Kish Company as managing director/chairman and vice chairman, respectively. Ehsan Moslehi and Ehsan Saidi Nasab are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Khavar Tejarat Arka Kish Company.
Mahmud Tadayyon serves as the chairman of the board of Naghsh Simorgh Sahand, while Abdolazim Ghanbarian acts as its managing director and vice chairman. Hamid Reza Ramazan serves as a board member. Mahmud Tadayyon, Abdolazim Ghanbarian, and Hamid Reza Ramazan are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Naghsh Simorgh Sahand LLC.
Alireza Kahkoui acts as the managing director and a member of the board of directors of Tejari Setareh Taban Kish Company. Amir Hosseini serves as its chairman. Ali Reza Kahkoui and Amir Hosseini are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
Fahim Maleki serves as the managing director and a member of the board of directors of Tejarat Sarir Afrooz Kish Company. Maryam Anbardaran acts as its chairman. Fahim Maleki and Maryam Anbardaran are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Tejarat Sarir Afrooz Kish Company.
Vahid Falahatkari acts as the chairman of the board of directors of Karmaniya Tejarat Asar Kish Company. Masoud Kavousi serves as the managing director and a member of the board of directors. Vahid Falahatkari and Masoud Kavousi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Karmaniya Tejarat Asar Kish Company.
Morteza Ali Bakhshi works as the managing director and a member of the board of directors of Aku Tejarat Ravizh Kish Company. Samad Vafayi Qushchi is the chairman, and Majid Shashaeh is the vice chairman of the board of directors. Morteza Ali Bakhshi, Samad Vafayi Qushchi, and Majid Shashaeh are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
BANK MELLI SHADOW bankING network
Bank Melli's rahbar network, run by OFAC-sanctioned, Iran-based rahbar company Nikan Pezhvak Aria Kish Company (Nikan Pezhvak), processes billions of dollars' worth of transactions for NIOC, the IRGC, and the Central Bank of Iran, among others. Nikan Pezhvak utilizes multiple front companies to facilitate these transactions, including Fratello Carbone Trading Limited, another front company, which has transferred more than $20 million dollars on behalf of NIOC.
RQI Commodity HK Limited is associated with Bank Melli. Gasolix International Corporation Limited has been used on multiple occasions to move NIOC proceeds. Globenture Limited and Redwing Global Limited are front companies that operate as part of the clandestine banking network operated by Bank Melli. And Nooseb Trade Limited, formerly known as Besoon Trade Limitedm is associated with Bank Melli and Parsian Bank and has been used on multiple occasions to receive petroleum or petroleum-product related payments.
Fratello Carbone Trading Limited, RQI Commodity HK Limited, Gasolix International Corporation Limited, Globenture Limited, Redwing Global Limited, and Nooseb Trade Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy.
OFAC is also taking action against two front companies operating within Iran's clandestine banking system, Nix Energy Limited and Tai Lung Trading Limited. Nix Energy and Tai Lung Trading Limited have been used by Iranian exchange houses, including sanctioned exchange house Sadaf Exchange, to transfer millions of dollars on behalf of sanctioned Iranian entities as part of Iran's shadow banking system.
Nix Energy Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy. Tai Lung Trading Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Sadaf Exchange.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
All property and interests in property of the persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC's enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN's whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC's guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
Click here for more information on the persons designated and any property identified as blocked property today (https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260428).
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Original text here: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0477
NTSB Names New Directors of Highway Safety and Research and Engineering Offices
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The National Transportation Safety Board issued the following news release on April 28, 2026:* * *
NTSB Names New Directors of Highway Safety and Research and Engineering Offices
The NTSB announced Tuesday the promotion of Dave Helson to director of the agency's Office of Highway Safety and named Akbar Sultan as the director of the Office of Research and Engineering.
The highway safety office investigates crashes on U.S. roadways that have significant safety implications nationwide, highlight national safety issues or generate high interest because of emerging technologies.
The ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The National Transportation Safety Board issued the following news release on April 28, 2026: * * * NTSB Names New Directors of Highway Safety and Research and Engineering Offices The NTSB announced Tuesday the promotion of Dave Helson to director of the agency's Office of Highway Safety and named Akbar Sultan as the director of the Office of Research and Engineering. The highway safety office investigates crashes on U.S. roadways that have significant safety implications nationwide, highlight national safety issues or generate high interest because of emerging technologies. Theresearch and engineering office provides scientific and technical expertise for NTSB accident investigations in all modes of transportation. It is responsible for downloading and analyzing flight recorders and other electronic devices, metallurgy, fire research and creating computer animations and simulations of crash sequences.
"The NTSB's strength is its people, and Dave Helson and Akbar Sultan exemplify the dedication and expertise that drive our safety mission forward," Chair Jennifer Homendy said. "Their experience in investigations, transportation safety, and emerging technologies will further the NTSB's work to improve safety and prevent future accidents."
Dave Helson
Helson joined the NTSB in 2008 as an operational factors investigator in the Office of Aviation Safety and has held several leadership roles including senior air safety investigator, senior aviation accident investigator in the Air Carrier and Space Investigations Division and most recently, as the deputy director of the Office of Aviation Safety.
Before joining the NTSB, Helson held leadership roles in the commercial aviation industry including initial cadre check airman, fleet manager, supervisor of training, FAA aircrew program designee and instructor and check airman. He also flew as a line captain and first officer in airline and charter operations. Helson earned a bachelor's degree in aeronautical technology from Arizona State University.
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Akbar Sultan
Sultan joins the NTSB with 26 years of experience at NASA where his work focused on aviation safety and the development and national implementation of advanced air traffic control technologies. Most recently he served as director of NASA's Airspace Operations and Safety Program.
While at NASA, Sultan oversaw cross-functional teams across four research centers, leading advanced work in aviation safety, predictive safety analytics, autonomy, airspace operations, and the integration of emerging technologies like advanced air mobility and uncrewed aircraft systems. He spearheaded NASA's "Sky for All" midcentury vision to create scalable, adaptive systems for an increasingly complex national airspace. Akbar also played a key role in aviation collaboration, co-leading NASA-FAA Research Transition Teams to move major technologies into FAA implementation and representing NASA on multiple national aviation safety and advisory committees.
Sultan is an associate fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and a fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society. He earned two bachelor's degrees from University of California, Davis in mechanical engineering and aeronautical science and a master's degree in aerospace engineering from San Jose State University.
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To report an incident/accident or if you are a public safety agency, please call 1-844-373-9922 or 202-314-6290 to speak to a Watch Officer at the NTSB Response Operations Center (ROC) in Washington, DC (24/7).
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Original text here: https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20260428.aspx
NIH Research Points to New Therapeutic Opportunities for Retinal Diseases
BETHESDA, Maryland, April 29 (TNSjou) -- The National Eye Institute issued the following news:* * *
NIH research points to new therapeutic opportunities for retinal diseases
Study links glucose metabolism to epigenetic and gene expression changes in the retina
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National Eye Institute (NEI) scientists have found that the way the retina metabolizes glucose directly controls which genes get switched on and off in light-sensing photoreceptors. The findings suggest that metabolic disruptions seen in aging and disease may directly destabilize the gene expression needed to keep photoreceptors healthy, ... Show Full Article BETHESDA, Maryland, April 29 (TNSjou) -- The National Eye Institute issued the following news: * * * NIH research points to new therapeutic opportunities for retinal diseases Study links glucose metabolism to epigenetic and gene expression changes in the retina * National Eye Institute (NEI) scientists have found that the way the retina metabolizes glucose directly controls which genes get switched on and off in light-sensing photoreceptors. The findings suggest that metabolic disruptions seen in aging and disease may directly destabilize the gene expression needed to keep photoreceptors healthy,opening new avenues for treating retinal diseases such as age-related macular degeneration (AMD), a leading cause of vision loss. The work is published in PLoS Genetics.
"We show that glucose metabolism controls expression of critical photoreceptor genes by epigenome changes," said the study's principal investigator, Anand Swaroop, Ph.D., chief of the Retinal Development, Genetics and Therapy Section at the NEI, part of the National Institutes of Health.
Retinal photoreceptors depend on the availability of glucose for energy as well as for structural maintenance. On a daily basis, discs on the outer segment tips of photoreceptors get replaced, which helps the cell remain healthy.
For the study, the researchers leveraged the fact that lactate, a byproduct of glucose metabolism, chemically tags the DNA-packaging proteins (called histones) in photoreceptor cells. A specific molecular tag, called H3K18 lactylation (H3K18La), rises and falls in direct response to how much glucose the retina is metabolizing, acting as a live and dynamic readout of the metabolic state and expression of vision-related genes.
Studying mouse retinas at multiple stages of development, the researchers measured glycolysis, the process that converts glucose to lactate, while also mapping the precise locations of H3K18La tags across the entire genome.
They confirmed the presence of H3K18La tags to actual changes in gene expression by growing isolated mouse retinas in dishes, exposing them to either extra glucose or a drug that blocks glycolysis, and measured how both the molecular tags and gene expression responded.
The results were clear and consistent: more glucose meant more lactate, more H3K18La tagging, and higher expression of genes critical for vision, including those involved in light detection, photoreceptor development and maintenance.
Blocking glycolysis had the opposite effect, stripping away the tags and broadly suppressing gene expression. The team also found that H3K18La tags cluster at the control switches of genes alongside another known activating mark, H3K27Ac, and that the tagged regions are recognized by a specific family of regulatory regions of proteins, suggesting this is a precise, targeted system rather than a general metabolic side effect.
"Future studies will examine how H3K18La patterns change during aging and in disease models of AMD and diabetic retinopathy. We also plan to test whether dietary interventions that affect glucose metabolism can influence these epigenetic marks in a meaningful way," said the study's first author, Mohita Gaur, Ph.D., a postdoctoral fellow in the NEI Retinal Development, Genetics and Therapy Section.
The research was funded by the NEI Intramural Research Program.
Reference:
Gaur M, Brooks MJ, Liang X, Jiang K, Kumari A, English MA, et al. (2026) Lactate and histone H3K18 lactylation are associated with metabolic control of gene expression in the retina. PLoS Genet 22(4): e1012100. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgen.1012100
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Original text here: https://www.nei.nih.gov/research-and-training/research-news/nih-research-points-new-therapeutic-opportunities-retinal-diseases
Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Visits Naval War College
NEWPORT, Rhode Island, April 29 -- The Naval War College issued the following news on April 28, 2026:* * *
Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Visits Naval War College
Ambassador of Japan to the United States Shigeo Yamada visited the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island, on April 20, 2026.
The ambassador toured the campus and met with NWC Chief of Staff Capt. Peter Halvorsen and Dean of International Programs Robert Winneg, among other war college leaders and subject matter experts.
Yamada was accompanied by the Consul General of Japan in Boston Seiichiro Takahishi, and came ... Show Full Article NEWPORT, Rhode Island, April 29 -- The Naval War College issued the following news on April 28, 2026: * * * Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Visits Naval War College Ambassador of Japan to the United States Shigeo Yamada visited the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island, on April 20, 2026. The ambassador toured the campus and met with NWC Chief of Staff Capt. Peter Halvorsen and Dean of International Programs Robert Winneg, among other war college leaders and subject matter experts. Yamada was accompanied by the Consul General of Japan in Boston Seiichiro Takahishi, and cameless than a year after a September visit by Vice Adm. Ishimaki Yoshiyasu, president of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Command and Staff College.
"(The Naval War College) is a cornerstone of our maritime cooperation, having educated many JMSDF leaders, including several former Chiefs of Staff," said Yamada on social media after the visit. "These professional and personal bonds are vital to ensuring a strong Japan-U.S. alliance."
Each year, the college welcomes between 100 and 150 foreign officers to the U.S. from around the world to study strategy, warfare, decision making, and operational art. Since creating a program for international officers in 1956, the NWC has more than 5,500 international alumni from 145 countries worldwide.
There have been 138 NWC graduates from Japan over the past 70 years, including 80 who reached a flag officer rank - such as admiral or general - and 16 who became chief of staff of the JMSDF, including the current Chief of Staff, Adm. Akira Saito.
NWC International Programs Department offerings include the 11-month in-residence Naval Command College and Naval Staff College programs, for senior-level and mid-career international officers, respectively, as well as the concentrated five-month Maritime Security & Governance Course and the 11-week International Maritime Staff Operators Course.
Established in 1884, NWC informs today's decision-makers and educates tomorrow's leaders by providing educational experiences and learning opportunities that develop their ability to anticipate and prepare strategically for the future, strengthen the foundations of peace, and create a decisive warfighting advantage.
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Original text here: https://usnwc.edu/News-and-Events/News/Japanese-Ambassador-to-the-US-Visits-Naval-War-College
FEMA Provides More Than $67 Million to Support Survivors Through State-Led Crisis Counseling, Case Management Programs Across Nine States
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency issued the following news release:* * *
FEMA Provides More Than $67 Million to Support Survivors Through State-Led Crisis Counseling, Case Management Programs Across Nine States
FEMA approved more than $67 million in funding to support state-managed Crisis Counseling Programs and Disaster Case Management Programs in nine states following federally declared disasters. These funds help individuals, families and communities address urgent emotional, mental health and long-term recovery needs after ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency issued the following news release: * * * FEMA Provides More Than $67 Million to Support Survivors Through State-Led Crisis Counseling, Case Management Programs Across Nine States FEMA approved more than $67 million in funding to support state-managed Crisis Counseling Programs and Disaster Case Management Programs in nine states following federally declared disasters. These funds help individuals, families and communities address urgent emotional, mental health and long-term recovery needs aftera disaster.
These recovery programs are designed, led and managed by the states. FEMA provides funding and technical assistance, while states work with local partners to deliver services that meet the needs of survivors in their communities.
Specifically, about $46.6 million supports state-managed Disaster Case Management services. Through these programs, case managers work one-on-one with survivors to assess unmet needs, develop a personalized recovery plan and coordinate available resources so households can move toward long-term stability and independence.
In addition, more than $20.8 million supports state-led Crisis Counseling Program services. These funds pay for local responders and outreach workers who help survivors manage disaster-related stress, cope with grief and loss, and connect to mental health and community resources.
FEMA will continue to work closely with Alaska, Kentucky, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin to support individuals and communities throughout state-led recovery efforts.
For more information on FEMA-funded, state-managed recovery programs, visit fema.gov/assistance/individual/disaster-survivors.
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Original text here: https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20260428/fema-provides-more-67-million-support-survivors-through-state-led-crisis
FDA Center for Drug Evaluation & Research Issues Warning Letter to Foshan Miwei Cosmetics
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration issued the following warning letter to Foshan Miwei Cosmetics Co. Ltd. from its Center for Drug Evaluation and Research:* * *
Recipient: Mr. Zhong Muqi, Chief Executive Officer, Foshan Miwei Cosmetics Co., Ltd., 801 & 802, Building 9, Baofa Jewellry Industry Centre, No. 1 Feicui Road, Yang'e Village Committee, Lunjiao Town, Shunde Qu Foshan Shi Guangdong Sheng, China
Issuing Office: Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), United States
Warning Letter 320-26-70
Dear Mr. Muqi:
The ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration issued the following warning letter to Foshan Miwei Cosmetics Co. Ltd. from its Center for Drug Evaluation and Research: * * * Recipient: Mr. Zhong Muqi, Chief Executive Officer, Foshan Miwei Cosmetics Co., Ltd., 801 & 802, Building 9, Baofa Jewellry Industry Centre, No. 1 Feicui Road, Yang'e Village Committee, Lunjiao Town, Shunde Qu Foshan Shi Guangdong Sheng, China Issuing Office: Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), United States Warning Letter 320-26-70 Dear Mr. Muqi: TheUnited States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspected your drug manufacturing facility, Foshan Miwei Cosmetics Co., Ltd., FEI 3017118698, located at 801 & 802, Building 9, Baofa Jewellery Industry Centre, No. 1, Feicui Road, Yang'e Village Committee, Lunjiao Town, Shunde District, Foshan City, Guangdong Province, from October 20 to 24, 2025.
This warning letter summarizes significant violations of Current Good Manufacturing Practice (CGMP) regulations for finished pharmaceuticals. See Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), parts 210 and 211 (21 CFR parts 210 and 211).
Because your methods, facilities, or controls for manufacturing, processing, packing, or holding do not conform to CGMP, your drug products are adulterated within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B).
In addition, Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer are unapproved new drugs introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce in violation of sections 505(a) and 301(d) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), 21 U.S.C. 355(a) and 331(d). Introduction or delivery for introduction of such products into interstate commerce is prohibited under sections 301(d) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 331(d).
Furthermore, Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer are misbranded under 502(a), 502(f)(1), and 502(ee) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 352(a), (f)(1), and (ee). Introduction or delivery for introduction of such products into interstate commerce is prohibited under sections 301(a) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 331(a). These violations are described in more detail below.
We reviewed your November 7, 2025 response to our Form FDA 483 in detail and acknowledge receipt of your subsequent correspondence.
During our inspection, our investigator observed specific violations including, but not limited to, the following.
CGMP Violations
1. Your firm failed to have, for each batch of drug product, appropriate laboratory determination of satisfactory conformance to final specifications for the drug product, including the identity and strength of each active ingredient, prior to release. Your firm also failed to conduct, for each batch of drug product, appropriate laboratory testing, as necessary, required to be free of objectionable microorganisms (21 CFR 211.165(a) and 211.165(b)).
Your firm manufactures over-the-counter (OTC) (b)(4) drug products. You did not test your drug products for the strength of each active ingredient prior to release and distribution. You also failed to conduct adequate microbiological testing for each batch of your OTC (b)(4) drug products. For example, your certificates of analysis (COAs) for (b)(4) batch (b)(4) and (b)(4) batch (b)(4) lacked active ingredient assay values and results for specified microorganisms.
Full release testing, including for identity, strength, impurities, and microbiological limits, must be performed prior to drug product release and distribution.
In response to this letter, provide:
* A list of chemical and microbial specifications, including test methods, used to analyze each batch of your drug products before a batch disposition decision.
* An action plan and timelines for conducting full chemical and microbiological testing of retain samples to determine the quality of all batches of drug product distributed to the United States that are within expiry as of the date of this letter.
* A summary of all results obtained from testing retain samples from each batch. If such testing reveals substandard quality drug products, take rapid corrective actions, such as notifying customers and product recalls.
* A comprehensive independent assessment of your laboratory practices, procedures, methods, equipment, documentation, and analyst competencies. Based on this review, provide a detailed plan to remediate and evaluate the effectiveness of your laboratory system.
2. Your firm failed to test samples of each component for identity and conformity with all appropriate written specifications for purity, strength, and quality. Your firm also failed to validate and establish the reliability of your component supplier's test analyses at appropriate intervals. Your firm also failed to conduct microbiological testing before use of each lot of a component with potential for objectionable microbiological contamination in light of its intended use (21 CFR 211.84(d)(1) and 211.84(d)(2)) and (21 CFR 211.84(d)(6)).
Active Ingredients and Components at Risk for (b)(4) Contamination
You failed to perform adequate identity testing of each component lot used in the manufacture of your drug products including your active pharmaceutical ingredients, such as (b)(4). Additionally, your firm failed to perform adequate identity testing of each shipment of each lot of incoming components at high risk of (b)(4) contamination. For example, your firm's in-house raw material report for (b)(4) lot (b)(4), used to manufacture (b)(4) batch number (b)(4), lacked data for identity, (b)(4) limits. Furthermore, you relied on your suppliers' COAs without establishing the reliability of each of your component supplier's test analysis at appropriate intervals.
Identity testing for (b)(4) and certain other high-risk drug components includes a limit test in the United States Pharmacopeia (USP) to ensure that the component meets the relevant safety limits for levels of (b)(4). Because you did not perform identity testing on each shipment of each lot using the USP identification test that detects these hazardous impurities, you failed to ensure the acceptability of this component for use in the manufacture of your drug products.
The use of ingredients contaminated with (b)(4) has resulted in various lethal poisoning incidents in humans worldwide. See FDA's guidance document (b)(4)
(b)(4) Used as a Component in Drug Products
Your firm failed to adequately monitor (b)(4) and the microbiological quality of (b)(4) used as a component in drug product manufacturing. (b)(4) must be suitable for its intended use and routinely tested to ensure ongoing conformance with appropriate chemical and microbiological attributes.
In your response, you state that you will establish raw material specifications, testing of all incoming materials, a supplier qualification procedure, and a microbial control program for your (b)(4) system.
Your response is inadequate because it lacks sufficient details on the remediation of your incoming materials testing program. It also does not include a retrospective review, analysis, and risk assessment for distributed drug products within expiry.
In response to this letter, provide:
* A commitment to provide (b)(4) test results, no later than 30 calendar days from the date of this letter, from testing retains for all lots of high-risk drug components used in the manufacture of drug products. Alternatively, if a retain of a component lot is unavailable, perform retain sample testing of all implicated finished drug product batches for the presence of (b)(4).
* A full risk assessment for drug products that are within expiry which contain any ingredient at risk for (b)(4) contamination (including, but not limited to, (b)(4)). Take prompt and appropriate actions to determine the safety of all lots of the component(s) and any related drug product that could contain (b)(4), including customer notifications and product recalls for any contaminated lots. Identify additional appropriate corrective actions and preventive actions (CAPA) that secure supply chains in the future, including, but not limited to, ensuring that all incoming raw material lots are from fully qualified manufacturers and free from unsafe impurities. Detail these actions in your response to this letter.
* A description of how you will test each component lot for conformity with all appropriate specifications for identity, strength, quality, and purity. If you intend to accept any results from your supplier's COA instead of testing each component lot for strength, quality, and purity, specify how you will robustly establish the reliability of your supplier's results through initial validation as well as periodic revalidation. In addition, include a commitment to always conduct at least one specific identity test for each incoming component lot. In the case of (b)(4), and certain additional high-risk components we note that this includes the performance of (b)(4).
* A comprehensive, independent review of your material system, including but not limited to:
o evaluating all suppliers of materials (components, containers, and closures) to determine if they are reliable and appropriately qualified
o an assessment of all materials to determine whether they are consistently of acceptable quality
o a review to ensure assigned expiration or retest dates are appropriate (supported by data)
o adequacy of the supplier qualification program, and its selection, qualification, and disqualification provisions
* Based on a thorough review, provide a summary of your systems CAPA to remediate the vendor qualification program and prevent use of unsuitable components, containers and closures
* The chemical and microbiological quality control specifications you use to test and release each incoming lot of component for use in manufacturing.
* A summary of results obtained from testing all components to evaluate the reliability of the COA from each component manufacturer. Include your SOP that describes this COA validation program.
* A summary of your program for qualifying and overseeing contract facilities that test the drug products you manufacture.
* A procedure governing your program for ongoing control and monitoring that ensures your (b)(4) system consistently produces (b)(4) that meets (b)(4), USP monograph specifications and appropriate microbial limits.
3. Your firm failed to establish and follow a written testing program designed to assess the stability characteristics of drug products and to use results of stability testing to determine appropriate storage conditions and expiration dates (21 CFR 211.166(a)).
Your firm failed to establish an adequate stability program with data demonstrating that the drug products remain acceptable throughout the labeled expiry date. For example, you assigned (b)(4) expiration dates to (b)(4) batch (b)(4), (b)(4) batch (b)(4), and (b)(4) batch (b)(4) without initiating stability testing.
Without appropriate stability studies, you lack sufficient scientific evidence to support that your drug products retain their quality attributes throughout the labeled expiry period or determine appropriate storage conditions for your drug products.
In your response, you state that you will begin stability studies. Your response is inadequate because it lacks sufficient detail describing your stability program procedures and protocols, or equipment for these studies.
In response to this letter, provide:
* A comprehensive assessment and CAPA plan to ensure the adequacy of your stability program. Your remediated program should include, but not be limited to:
o Stability-indicating methods
o Stability studies for each drug product in its marketed container-closure system before distribution is permitted
o An ongoing program in which representative batches of each product are added each year to the program to determine if the shelf-life claim remains valid
o Detailed definition of the specific attributes to be tested at each station (timepoint)
o All procedures that describe these and other elements of your remediated stability program.
4. Your firm failed to establish written responsibilities and procedures applicable to the quality control unit and to follow such written procedures (21 CFR 211.22(d)).
You lacked an adequate quality unit (QU) to provide oversight for the manufacture of your drug products. For example, you did not review, approve, or implement procedures for critical quality operations such as handling non-conformances, change control, training management, and handling out-of-specification events.
In your response, you commit to establishing and implementing quality oversight procedures.
Your response is inadequate. Although you commit to addressing the observations, your response lacks sufficient details about the systemic remediations needed for your QU and your quality system.
In response to this letter, provide:
* A comprehensive assessment and remediation plan to ensure your QU is given the authority and resources to effectively function. The assessment should also include, but not be limited to:
o A determination of whether procedures used by your firm are robust and appropriate
o Provisions for QU oversight throughout your operations to evaluate adherence to appropriate practices
o A complete and final review of each batch and its related information before the QU disposition decision
o Oversight and approval of investigations and discharging of all other QU duties to ensure identity, strength, quality, and purity of all products
CGMP Consultant Recommended
Based upon the nature of the violations we identified at your firm, you should engage a consultant qualified as set forth in 21 CFR 211.34 to assist your firm in meeting CGMP requirements. The qualified consultant should also perform a comprehensive six-system audit/1 of your entire operation for CGMP compliance and evaluate the completion and efficacy of your corrective actions and preventive actions before you pursue resolution of your firm's compliance status with FDA.
Your use of a consultant does not relieve your firm's obligation to comply with CGMP. Your firm's executive management remains responsible for resolving all deficiencies and systemic flaws to ensure ongoing CGMP compliance.
Unapproved New Drugs and Misbranded Drug Violations
Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer products are "drugs" as defined by section 201(g)(1)(B) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 321(g)(1)(B), because they are intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, and/or under section 201(g)(1)(C) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 321(g)(1)(C), because they are intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.
Examples from product labeling provide evidence of intended uses (as defined in 21 CFR 201.128) of these products include, but may not be limited to, the following:
Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream
"SPF 30...Drug Facts...Uses...Helps prevent sunburn...PLANT-BASED STEM CELLS: Improves texture, fine lines, and skin tone by restoring cells natural balance pH. Promotes collagen production...SODIUM HYALURONATE:...It repairs and protects youthful skin cells...Vitamins B5, C, ...B5 binds moisture to skin cells, which plumps and firms the skin, and erases fine lines...C...promotes collagen production..." [from product label]
inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer
"SPF 15...Drug Facts... Use... Helps prevent sunburn...To aide in the protection against harmful UV rays...VITAMIN B3 can reduce hyperpigmentation, & inflammation" [from product label]
Unapproved New Drug Violations
Based on the above labeling evidence, your Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer are drug products intended for use as over-the-counter (OTC) sunscreen drug products. As described below, these OTC drug products are unapproved new drugs marketed in violation of sections 505(a) and 301(d) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 355(a) and 331(d).
In general, a drug product is a "new drug" within the meaning of section 201(p) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 321(p), if it is not generally recognized as safe and effective (GRASE) for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in its labeling. With certain exceptions not applicable here, a new drug may not be introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate commerce without an approved application from FDA in effect, as described in section 505(a) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 355(a), unless it is lawfully marketed under section 505G of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C 355h. No FDA-approved applications pursuant to section 505 of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 355, are in effect for any of the drug products identified above.
Under section 505G of the FD&C Act, certain nonprescription drugs marketed without an approved application --commonly referred to as "OTC monograph drugs"--may be legally marketed if they meet applicable requirements. With respect to nonprescription (OTC) sunscreen drug products, in order to be GRASE and not new drugs, the product must, among other things, conform to the conditions of use set forth in the applicable OTC monograph(s). Nonprescription (OTC) sunscreen drug products are addressed in the "Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use" (M020)/2.
However, Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer sunscreen products described above do not comply with conditions specified in M020 for the reasons below.
As labeled, "Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream" includes the active ingredients Plant-Based Stem Cells, Sodium Hyaluronate, and Vitamins B and C that are not permitted active ingredients under M020.10. CFR 201.66(b)(2) defines "active ingredient" to mean "any component that is intended to furnish pharmacological activity or other direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or to affect the structure or any function of the body of humans." Although the product label does not specifically list Plant-Based Stem Cells, Sodium Hyaluronate, and Vitamins B and C as active ingredients in the Drug Facts, the product labeling makes claims such as "PLANT-BASED STEM CELLS: Improves texture, fine lines, and skin tone by restoring cells natural balance pH. Promotes collagen production...SODIUM HYALURONATE:...It repairs and protects youthful skin cells...Vitamins B5, C, ...B5 binds moisture to skin cells, which plumps and firms the skin, and erases fine lines...C...promotes collagen production..." which demonstrate that these are "active ingredients" in your sunscreen products because they are intended to furnish pharmacological activity.
In addition, as labeled, "inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer" includes the active ingredient VITAMIN B3 that is not a permitted active ingredient under M020.10. Although the product label does not specifically list VITAMIN B3 as an active ingredient in the Drug Facts panel for "inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer," label claims such as "VITAMIN B3 can reduce hyperpigmentation, & inflammation" demonstrate that this is an "active ingredient" in your sunscreen product because it is intended to furnish pharmacological activity.
Thus, your Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer sunscreen products identified above do not comply with the conditions set forth in M020 and have not otherwise been found GRASE./3 Accordingly, these products are new drugs within the meaning of section 201(p) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 321(p), and there is no basis under section 505G of the FD&C Act in which these products would be legally marketed without an approved application. Because there are no applications in effect for these products, the Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer sunscreen products are unapproved new drugs.
The introduction or delivery for introduction of unapproved new drug products into interstate commerce violates sections 505(a) and 301(d) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 355(a) and 331(d).
Misbranded Drug Violations
Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer are misbranded under section 502(a) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 352(a), because the labeling for these products are false or misleading for several reasons. First, the labeling for Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream identifies Plant-Based Stem Cells, Sodium Hyaluronate, Vitamins B, and C as inactive ingredients but represents these ingredients as having purported active pharmacological properties. Similarly, labeling for inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer identifies Vitamin B3 as an inactive ingredient but represents this ingredient as having purported active pharmacological properties. Even if Plant-Based Stem Cells, Sodium Hyaluronate, Vitamins B, C, and B3 could be considered inactive ingredients in these products, the prominent featuring of these substances on the product labeling causes these products to be misbranded under section 502(a) of the FD&C Act, which deems a drug to be misbranded if its labeling is "false or misleading in any particular," and under 21 CFR 201.10(c)(4)./4 Under 21 CFR 201.10(c)(4), "[t]he labeling of a drug may be misleading by reason . . . [of] the featuring in the labeling of inert or inactive ingredients in a manner that creates an impression of value greater than their true functional role in the formulation."
Furthermore, your Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer sunscreen products are further misbranded under section 502(f)(1) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 352(f)(1), because their labeling does not bear adequate directions for use. Here, the directions set forth in M020.50(e) are required for a sunscreen drug product to be legally marketed under section 505G of the FD&C Act. This monograph labeling also falls within the scope of the directions described in section 502(f)(1) of the FD&C Act. Your Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer fails to include "[bullet] apply [select one of the following: `Liberally' or `generously'] [and, as an option: `And evenly'] 15 minutes before sun exposure" and "[bullet] children under 6 months of age: Ask a doctor" as required under M020.50(e)(1)(ii) and (iv) and fails to include "[bullet] reapply at least every 2 hours [bullet] use a water resistant sunscreen if swimming or sweating" as required under M020.50(e)(4). The omission of these monograph directions from your products' labeling renders them misbranded under section 502(f)(1).
In addition, Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer are also misbranded under section 502(ee) because as nonprescription drugs subject to section 505G of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 355h, these products do not comply with the requirements for marketing under that section and are not the subject of an application approved under section 505 of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 355.
The introduction or delivery for introduction of a misbranded drug into interstate commerce violates section 301(a) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 331(a).
Conclusion
The violations cited in this letter are not intended to be an all-inclusive list of violations that exist at your facility. You are responsible for investigating and determining the causes of any violations and for preventing their recurrence or the occurrence of other violations.
FDA placed all drugs and drug products offered for import into the United States from your firm on Import Alert 66-40 on February 13, 2026.
Correct any violations promptly. FDA may withhold approval of new applications or supplements listing your firm as a drug manufacturer until any violations are completely addressed and we confirm your compliance with CGMP. We may re-inspect to verify that you have completed corrective actions to any violations.
Failure to address any violations may also result in the FDA continuing to refuse admission of articles manufactured at Foshan Miwei Cosmetics Co., Ltd., 801 & 802, Building 9, Baofa Jewellery Industry Centre, No. 1, Feicui Road, Yang'e Village Committee, Lunjiao Town, Shunde District, Foshan City, into the United States under section 801(a)(3) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 381(a)(3). Articles under this authority that appear to be adulterated or misbranded may be detained or refused admission, in that the methods and controls used in their manufacture do not appear to conform to CGMP within the meaning of section 501(a)(2)(B) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 351(a)(2)(B) and are misbranded under section 502 of the FD&C Act, respectively.
This letter notifies you of our findings and provides you an opportunity to address the above deficiencies. After you receive this letter, respond to this office in writing within 15 working days. Specify what you have done to address any violations and to prevent their recurrence. In response to this letter, you may provide additional information for our consideration as we continue to assess your activities and practices. If you cannot complete corrective actions within 15 working days, state your reasons for delay and your schedule for completion.
Send your electronic reply to CDER-OC-OMQ-Communications@fda.hhs.gov. Identify your response with FEI 3017118698 and ATTN: Marisa Heayn.
Sincerely,
/S/ Francis Godwin, Director, Office of Manufacturing Quality, Office of Compliance, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
/S/ Tina Smith, Captain, U.S. Public Health Service, Director, Office of Unapproved Drugs & Labeling Compliance, Office of Compliance, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
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Footnotes:
1/ i.e. Quality System, Facilities & Equipment System, Materials System, Production System, Packaging & Labeling System, and Laboratory Control System per FDA's guidance document.
2/ M020, in the final administrative order, Over-the-Counter Monograph M020: Sunscreen Drug Products for OTC Human Use, reflects the conditions in the relevant final order established and in effect under section 505G. See Order ID OTC000034, available at FDA's website OTC Monographs@FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/omuf/.
3/ FDA is not aware of any adequate and well-controlled clinical trials in the published literature that support a determination that "Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream" and "inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer" products are GRASE for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in their labeling, nor has FDA determined these drug products to be GRASE pursuant to an order issued under section 505G(b).
4/ Additionally, Trust MD SPF 30 Stem Cell Face Cream also prominently features vitamin E on the labeling and inBlair Elevate SPF 15 Moisturizer also prominently features collagen peptides on the labeling that creates an impression of value greater than its functional role in the formulation that further causes these products to be misbranded under section 502(a) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 352(a).
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Original text here: https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/foshan-miwei-cosmetics-co-ltd-722272-04202026
6 Nations Issue Joint Statement Reaffirming Panama's Sovereignty Against External Threats
WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The U.S. State Department issued the following joint statement on April 28, 2026, with Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago in support of Panama's sovereignty against external threats:* * *
We, the nations of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States, standing together in our shared mission to secure our hemisphere, reaffirm that the freedom of our region is non-negotiable. We are monitoring with vigilance China's targeted economic pressure and the recent actions that have affected Panama-flagged vessels. ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, April 29 -- The U.S. State Department issued the following joint statement on April 28, 2026, with Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago in support of Panama's sovereignty against external threats: * * * We, the nations of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States, standing together in our shared mission to secure our hemisphere, reaffirm that the freedom of our region is non-negotiable. We are monitoring with vigilance China's targeted economic pressure and the recent actions that have affected Panama-flagged vessels.These actions--following the decision of Panama's independent Supreme Court regarding the Balboa and Cristobal terminals--are a blatant attempt to politicize maritime trade and infringe on the sovereignty of the nations of our hemisphere.
Panama is a pillar of our maritime trading system, and as such must remain free from any undue external pressure. Any attempts to undermine Panama's sovereignty are a threat to us all.
We stand in solidarity with Panama. Through our renewed commitment to peace, security, and Hemispheric cooperation, we remain dedicated to facing all threats to ensure the Americas remain a region of freedom, security, and prosperity.
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Original text here: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/04/joint-statement-in-support-of-panamas-sovereignty-between-the-united-states-of-america-bolivia-costa-rica-guyana-paraguay-and-trinidad-and-tobago/