Featured Stories
NASA IG: NASA's Management of Programs and Projects After Mission Termination--Canceled or Repurposed Artemis Campaign Systems
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. ML-26-002) June 24, 2026 entitled "NASA's Management of Programs and Projects after Mission Termination--Canceled or Repurposed Artemis Campaign Systems."
Here are excerpts:
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TO: Lori Glaze, Acting Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate
SUBJECT: Interim Memorandum, NASA's Management of Programs and Projects after Mission Termination--Canceled or Repurposed Artemis Campaign Systems (Report No. ML-26-002; Assignment No. A-26-06-00-SARD)
The Office of Inspector
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. ML-26-002) June 24, 2026 entitled "NASA's Management of Programs and Projects after Mission Termination--Canceled or Repurposed Artemis Campaign Systems."
Here are excerpts:
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TO: Lori Glaze, Acting Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate
SUBJECT: Interim Memorandum, NASA's Management of Programs and Projects after Mission Termination--Canceled or Repurposed Artemis Campaign Systems (Report No. ML-26-002; Assignment No. A-26-06-00-SARD)
The Office of InspectorGeneral (OIG) initiated an audit in March 2026 examining NASA's management of developed assets for programs and projects terminated prior to launch or operations. Within the scope of this audit are four Artemis systems--with a combined current contract value of $5.9 billion-- that the Agency recently announced plans to cancel or repurpose: the Space Launch System (SLS) Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), SLS Universal Stage Adapter (USA), Mobile Launcher 2 (ML-2), and Gateway's Habitation and Logistics Outpost (HALO). Collectively, these four systems have experienced billions of dollars in cost increases and years of schedule delays.
In February 2026, NASA announced that it was reformulating the Artemis campaign in accordance with the President's National Space Policy to return American astronauts to the Moon and establish an enduring lunar presence.1 To this end, the Agency intends to increase its cadence of missions by standardizing the SLS two-stage, heavy-lift rocket and adding a new mission to low Earth orbit before sending astronauts to the Moon's surface in 2028. To achieve its goal of one crewed lunar landing mission per year, NASA is no longer planning to upgrade the SLS to a more powerful configuration utilizing the EUS, USA, and ML-2. Further, rather than utilizing the Gateway as a staging location for lunar surface missions, NASA plans to shift its efforts to building a permanent Moon base.
Given the substantial investment, evolving changes to the Artemis campaign, and urgency of the current fiscal year budget cycle, we are issuing this interim memorandum to document the cost, schedule, and development posture of these systems as well as the projected cost and schedule to complete them if NASA had not reformulated the Artemis campaign. These projections are not intended to serve as comprehensive cost and schedule estimates. Rather, they illustrate potential outcomes based on available historical cost and schedule data provided by NASA. Details about our methodology and associated limitations are outlined in Enclosure I. We believe the timely dissemination of this information will be valuable for the Agency, Administration, Congress, and the public as NASA contemplates the future of Artemis.
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View full report here: https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/nasas-management-of-programs-and-projects-after-mission-termination-canceled-or-repurposed-artemis-campaign-systems/
NASA IG: NASA's Launch Infrastructure
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. IG-26-010) on June 22, 2026 entitled "NASA's Launch Infrastructure."
Here are the results in brief:
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Why We Performed This Audit
NASA relies on large and highly complex facilities and infrastructure to launch missions from its primary launch complexes at Kennedy Space Center (Kennedy) in Florida and Wallops Flight Facility (Wallops) in Virginia. NASA infrastructure, such as launch pads, utility systems, and transportation networks, is used by commercial industry, the Department of Defense, and
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. IG-26-010) on June 22, 2026 entitled "NASA's Launch Infrastructure."
Here are the results in brief:
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Why We Performed This Audit
NASA relies on large and highly complex facilities and infrastructure to launch missions from its primary launch complexes at Kennedy Space Center (Kennedy) in Florida and Wallops Flight Facility (Wallops) in Virginia. NASA infrastructure, such as launch pads, utility systems, and transportation networks, is used by commercial industry, the Department of Defense, andthe Agency to transport, process, and launch various sized rockets, both crewed and uncrewed, to multiple regions of space ranging from the immediate vicinity of Earth to distant parts of the solar system.
NASA faces challenges as its launch facilities and support infrastructure have aged and do not often have the capacity to meet increasing mission demands. Kennedy's main launch facilities and support infrastructure were built in the 1960s for the Apollo Program, which were later modified to support the Space Shuttle Program that ended in 2011. Today, these facilities are becoming increasingly dated and lack the capacity to meet the demands of the burgeoning commercial space industry. Wallops faces similar challenges as the Facility dates back to the 1940s, and in the coming years NASA intends to increase the number of launches from Wallops by more than 150 percent. NASA is actively working to address these issues by investing in upgrades and expansions, including developing new launch pads, upgrading utility and transportation networks, and creating dedicated areas for commercial operations. However, progress has been slow as the Agency struggles with declining construction and maintentance budgets and statutory funding barriers that prevent commercial partners from contributing equitably to projects.
In this audit, we assessed the state of NASA's launch infrastructure and its ability to meet mission needs. To complete this work, we analyzed past and projected launches supported by Kennedy and Wallops; reports and data on the condition of launch infrastructure; and budgets, agreements, and financial data related to how the Agency pays for and maintains launch infrastructure. We also conducted site visits at Kennedy and Wallops to view launch infrastructure and hold discussions with NASA officials and government and commercial partners.
What We Found
NASA's launch infrastructure is dated and lacks the capacity to meet the growing demands of the Agency and government and commercial partners. The number of launches supported by Kennedy and Wallops has increased dramatically since 2020 and is projected to grow even further by 2030 due to a surge in commercial launches. The growing number of projected launches from Kennedy and Wallops could eventually outpace each site's capacity to support the launches. Based on current launch projections, Kennedy and Wallops are expected to operate near capacity in the 2028 to 2029 time frame. At Kennedy, demand for super heavy-lift launch vehicles for NASA and Department of Defense missions is driving the need for additional launch pads that can accommodate these vehicles, but locations for new launch pads are limited and will require extensive time and resources to develop. Wallops is pursuing upgrades to enhance operational efficiency, which could increase launch capacity, while conducting a study to assess the impact of increasing the number of annual launches at the Facility.
At Kennedy, common use launch infrastructure that the Center and government and commercial partners use to provide electrical power, gas supply and distribution, and transportation to launch pads is in poor condition and lacks the capacity to support growing needs. Critical electrical power distribution infrastructure is being used beyond its design life and needs to be upgraded. A failure of any portion of the electrical power distribution system could severely impact launches and lead to delays that could last for extended periods of time. In addition, existing infrastructure for the provision of nitrogen and helium gases to the launch pads is insufficient to simultaneously support multiple users leading to major scheduling challenges and potential delays. Lastly, Kennedy's roadway and bridge infrastructure was largely constructed in the 1960s and was not designed to accommodate the volume, frequency, and weight of modern heavy transport operations. Roadways and bridges are in marginal to poor condition and are expected to receive further strain as launch rates increase and generate approximately 19,000 additional truck trips annually to transport flight hardware, propellants, and related materials. Wallops does not face the same challenges with its common use launch infrastructure due to recent upgrades.
NASA has struggled to maintain and upgrade the Agency's launch infrastructure due to declining construction and maintenance budgets, as well as statutory funding barriers and cost recovery practices that prevent commercial partners from contributing equitably to infrastructure projects. Over the last 5 years, the budgets NASA uses to fund construction projects and perform maintenance on launch-related infrastructure have decreased between 11 and 47 percent, when adjusting for inflation, delaying maintenance and upgrades to infrastructure. In addition, while approximately 70 percent of launches supported by NASA since 2020 have been commercial missions, significant statutory funding barriers prevent the Agency from receiving money directly from commercial partners for use of the Agency's launch infrastructure. NASA initiated efforts a decade ago to establish an Infrastructure Investment Fund that would allow the Agency to accept contributions from public and private entities for long-term, large-scale shared infrastructure projects. However, legislation authorizing such a fund has yet to pass. While Kennedy received $250 million for infrastructure improvements through the H.R.1 reconciliation bill, officials estimate the Center would need at least $1 billion to completely upgrade its launch infrastructure.
Lastly, NASA's cost recovery practices have limited the amount of funds collected from commercial partners for their use of the Agency's launch infrastructure. In some instances, the Agency's choice of agreements has limited the amount of funds that could have been collected for rent. In other instances, rates charged for indirect costs are often not sufficient to maintain or upgrade launch infrastructure. While NASA policy permits Other Approved Indirect Rates to be charged to commercial partners, Kennedy does not utilize this rate for common use launch infrastructure. In contrast, Wallops utilizes this rate for operational support and maintenance of facilities.
What we Recommended
To improve the condition and capacity of NASA's launch infrastructure to support current and future needs, we recommended the Kennedy Space Center Director (1) conduct a study to understand the effects of heavy vehicle traffic associated with sustained increases in launch-related transport activity on Kennedy roadways and establish a mitigation plan to address the impacts; (2) prioritize funding from the H.R.1 reconciliation bill to address common use launch infrastructure issues at Kennedy, including electrical power distribution, gas supply and distribution, and transportation infrastructure; and (3) assess the ability to charge an Other Approved Indirect Rate on reimbursable agreements for launch services that is dedicated to maintenance and upgrades of common use launch infrastructure.
We provided a draft of this report to NASA management who concurred with our recommendations and described planned actions to address them. We consider management's comments responsive; therefore, the recommendations are resolved and will be closed upon completion and verification of the proposed corrective actions.
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View full report here: https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/nasas-launch-infrastructure/
NASA IG: NASA's Compliance With the Payment Integrity Information Act for Fiscal Year 2025
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. IG-26-009) on June 17, 2026 entitled "NASA's Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act for Fiscal Year 2025."
Here are excerpts:
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TO: Sidney Schmidt, Acting Chief Financial Officer
SUBJECT: Final Memorandum, NASA's Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Report No. IG-26-009; Assignment No. A-26-03-00-FMD)
The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) was enacted to improve efforts to identify and reduce federal improper payments.1 The Act
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. IG-26-009) on June 17, 2026 entitled "NASA's Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act for Fiscal Year 2025."
Here are excerpts:
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TO: Sidney Schmidt, Acting Chief Financial Officer
SUBJECT: Final Memorandum, NASA's Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Report No. IG-26-009; Assignment No. A-26-03-00-FMD)
The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) was enacted to improve efforts to identify and reduce federal improper payments.1 The Actrequires federal agencies to (1) conduct program-specific risk assessments for each program or activity, (2) publish improper payment estimates for programs susceptible to significant improper payments, and (3) report on corrective actions to prevent and reduce improper payments. The Act also requires Inspectors General to evaluate compliance with PIIA and issue an annual report.
Improper payments are payments the federal government should not have made or made in an incorrect amount under statutory, contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable requirements. This includes overpayments, underpayments, duplicate payments, payments to ineligible recipients, and payments for ineligible goods or services and for goods or services not received.2 A payment is also considered improper if a discount was available but was not redeemed.
Our overall audit objective was to determine whether NASA complied with PIIA requirements for fiscal year (FY) 2025. To determine compliance, we evaluated NASA's risk assessment methodology. See Enclosure I for details of the audit's scope and methodology.
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View full report here: https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/nasas-compliance-with-the-payment-integrity-information-act-for-fiscal-year-2025/
NASA IG: NASA's Acquisition of Next-Generation Spacesuit Services
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. IG-26-006) on April 20, 2026 entitled "NASA's Acquisition of Next-Generation Spacesuit Services."
Here are excerpts:
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Why We Performed This Audit
Spacesuits are critical to NASA's operations in microgravity on the International Space Station (ISS) as well as its broader goals of returning humans to the Moon through the Artemis campaign and sending the first crew to Mars. Astronauts wear spacesuits as protection from the harsh environment of space when exploring outside of a spacecraft--activities
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSres) -- NASA Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. IG-26-006) on April 20, 2026 entitled "NASA's Acquisition of Next-Generation Spacesuit Services."
Here are excerpts:
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Why We Performed This Audit
Spacesuits are critical to NASA's operations in microgravity on the International Space Station (ISS) as well as its broader goals of returning humans to the Moon through the Artemis campaign and sending the first crew to Mars. Astronauts wear spacesuits as protection from the harsh environment of space when exploring outside of a spacecraft--activitiesknown as spacewalks. However, the Extravehicular Mobility Unit spacesuits that astronauts use on the ISS were designed over 50 years ago, have not undergone a major redesign in the last 20 years, and carry significant safety risks. Further, for Artemis missions on the lunar surface, astronauts will require an entirely new spacesuit with expanded capabilities. After several in-house and contractor-supported efforts failed to complete a flight-ready spacesuit, in May 2022, NASA awarded Exploration Extravehicular Activity Services (xEVAS) contracts to two providers--Axiom Space (Axiom) and Collins Aerospace (Collins)--to allow them to compete to provide next-generation spacesuits for use in microgravity on the ISS, on the lunar surface during Artemis missions, and during future space flight missions.
Under xEVAS, NASA will purchase spacewalking services, essentially renting the spacesuits from the providers, following an initial demonstration of the lunar suit during an Artemis lunar landing mission and the microgravity suit on the ISS. These firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity, milestone-based contracts have a current combined maximum value of $3.1 billion and allow the providers to compete for task orders for missions to provide the full scope of NASA's spacewalking needs. NASA selected two providers in order to promote competition and ensure redundancy. However, in June 2024, NASA and Collins mutually agreed to descope the company's xEVAS task orders citing an inability to meet the agreed-upon schedule, leaving NASA reliant on Axiom as the single provider.
In this audit we examined NASA's management of next-generation spacesuits for the ISS Program and Artemis campaign. Specifically, we examined (1) the extent to which NASA is meeting its cost, schedule, and performance goals for the xEVAS effort and (2) whether NASA's service-based acquisition strategy for xEVAS addresses the requirements of the ISS Program and Artemis campaign. To complete this audit, we performed work at NASA Headquarters and Johnson Space Center and interviewed officials from NASA and various contractors. We also issued an anonymous survey to over 70 individuals from NASA and industry involved in spacesuit development, maintenance, management, or use to gain a wider perspective of the status, challenges, and risks associated with the xEVAS effort.
What We Found
NASA faces challenges in ensuring next-generation spacesuits are available to meet the Agency's current schedules for the Artemis lunar landing mission in 2028 and prior to the ISS's decommissioning in 2030. NASA's original schedules to demonstrate the lunar and microgravity spacesuits in 2025 and 2026, respectively, were overly optimistic and ultimately proved unachievable, as evidenced by delays of at least a year and a half for both spacesuits. Based on our analysis, if Axiom experiences design and testing delays in line with the historical average for recent space flight programs, the Artemis and ISS demonstrations may not occur until 2031.
NASA's choice to use a firm-fixed-price, service-based acquisition strategy for xEVAS aligns with the Agency's strategic decision to shift the risk of cost overruns to the contractor, as well as help foster a commercial space economy. However, in this case, the firm-fixed-price contract approach conflicted with the developmental nature of nextgeneration spacesuits, which carry higher levels of technical, financial, and schedule risk. Further, NASA's attempt to replicate other space flight service-based acquisitions by "renting" spacewalking services from a provider was risky because there was no commercial market for spacesuits prior to the xEVAS effort. Moreover, overly burdensome requirements like requiring offerors to bid on both microgravity and lunar spacesuits further constrained an already limited pool of applicants that were capable of and interested in developing new suits. In our judgment, while firm-fixedprice and service-based contracts can be viable options for certain NASA procurements, applying that approach to a developmental effort like xEVAS introduced its own set of risks to achieving NASA's goals.
Following the awards to Axiom and Collins, NASA took risky contract management actions--with mixed results--to promote competition between the providers and ensure spacesuit redundancy. NASA sole-sourced a task order to Collins, approved partial milestone payments to Axiom and Collins, and awarded "cross-over" task orders to both providers. Despite NASA's efforts to retain both providers, Collins' inability to meet its contractual requirements led to the mutual decision to descope its task orders from the contract just 2 years after the contract was awarded. Collins' descope from xEVAS negated the competition and redundancy sought by the Agency, leaving NASA with only one xEVAS spacesuit provider.
To ensure Axiom's success in developing both the microgravity and lunar spacesuits, NASA is taking proactive risk mitigation measures by identifying potential supply chain issues, increasing the amount of spacesuit testing, and leveraging additional government collaboration. However, if Axiom cannot satisfy its contractual requirements in a timely or cost-effective manner, then NASA could be forced to continue using the problematic EMUs throughout the life of the ISS and significantly adjust its lunar plans. While the xEVAS contracts include a clause that allows other contractors to submit proposals at any time, NASA officials do not believe that adding another provider at this time would help the Agency achieve its immediate ISS and Artemis goals. Regardless, we identified multiple companies that are developing capabilities that could reintroduce competition for NASA's spacewalking needs in the longer-term.
Moving forward, if the Agency seeks additional providers, it must apply the appropriate lessons learned from the xEVAS procurement, as well as contend with spacesuit compatibility concerns, and adjust its strategy accordingly. A more suitable acquisition strategy can help NASA attract the investment necessary to move toward a more robust commercial space economy.
What We Recommended
To improve management of the Agency's next-generation spacesuits, we recommended the Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate (1) seek industry input on current xEVAS contract requirements to maintain competition as needed in the future and (2) develop a plan to establish interoperability standards between Artemis lunar vehicles and spacesuits.
We provided a draft of this report to NASA management who concurred with our recommendations and described planned actions to address them. We consider management's comments responsive; therefore, the recommendations are resolved and will be closed upon completion and verification of the proposed corrective actions.
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View full report here: https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/nasas-acquisition-of-next-generation-spacesuit-services/
Federal Housing Finance Agency IG: 'FHFA's Controls Over Legal Service Payments Were Generally Effective But Did Not Ensure Compliance With All Contractual Requirements'
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. AUD-2026-001) on Feb. 17, 2026 entitled "FHFA's Controls Over Legal Service Payments Were Generally Effective But Did Not Ensure Compliance With All Contractual Requirements".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA or Agency) procures litigation assistance and consulting services from external law firms on a variety of matters. FHFA paid approximately $15.5 million for contracted legal services from April 2024 through March
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. AUD-2026-001) on Feb. 17, 2026 entitled "FHFA's Controls Over Legal Service Payments Were Generally Effective But Did Not Ensure Compliance With All Contractual Requirements".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA or Agency) procures litigation assistance and consulting services from external law firms on a variety of matters. FHFA paid approximately $15.5 million for contracted legal services from April 2024 through March2025 (scope period of this audit).
We conducted this audit to determine whether FHFA implemented effective controls to ensure that payments for legal services were made in accordance with applicable federal laws and regulations, policies and procedures, and contractual requirements.
RESULTS
We determined that FHFA's controls over payments for legal services were generally effective. That is, payments were made in accordance with applicable federal laws and regulations, policies and procedures. However, we noted instances in which controls did not effectively ensure compliance with contractual requirements. In one instance, we identified a legal services invoice that reflected incorrect billing rates and was paid in an incorrect amount. FHFA identified a second invoice with the same billing rate error. Combined, these two invoices resulted in overpayments in September 2024 of approximately $5,208 for contracted legal services during our audit scope (see Appendix II for Schedule of Questioned Costs). In both instances, the Invoice Approver did not ensure that the billed amount met contract specifications. Furthermore, neither the FHFA's Oversight Procedures for Invoice and Payment Procedures nor the training materials specifically mention or outline procedures for validating billing rates. Accordingly, we question costs related to overpayments of $5,208 that violated the contract's terms governing the expenditure of funds. When the Invoice Approver does not ensure the billed amount meets contract specifications, overpayments may continue to occur, resulting in waste of Agency funds.
We also found two instances in which FHFA did not perform control procedures designed to prevent future late payments. We further determined that FHFA's Oversight Procedures for Invoice and Payment Procedures did not define the timeframes for performing such controls. Delayed follow-up increases the risk of repeated late payments and unnecessary costs.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We made six recommendations to address our two findings. In a written response, FHFA management agreed with our recommendations.
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The report is posted at: https://www.fhfaoig.gov/AuditsAndEvaluations/fhfas-controls-over-legal-service-payments-were-generally-effective-did-not
Federal Housing Finance Agency IG: 'FHFA Continues to Monitor and Assess Adequacy of Fannie Mae's Allowance for Loan Losses in Its Multifamily Line of Business'
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following evaluation report (No. EVL-2026-001) on Jan. 6, 2026 entitled "FHFA Continues to Monitor and Assess the Adequacy of Fannie Mae's Allowance for Loan Losses in Its Multifamily Line of Business".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
Fannie Mae provides liquidity to the mortgage market by purchasing and securitizing multifamily mortgage loans. Each quarter, Fannie Mae develops an allowance for loan losses, which is an estimate of loans that Fannie Mae does not expect to collect, and
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following evaluation report (No. EVL-2026-001) on Jan. 6, 2026 entitled "FHFA Continues to Monitor and Assess the Adequacy of Fannie Mae's Allowance for Loan Losses in Its Multifamily Line of Business".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
Fannie Mae provides liquidity to the mortgage market by purchasing and securitizing multifamily mortgage loans. Each quarter, Fannie Mae develops an allowance for loan losses, which is an estimate of loans that Fannie Mae does not expect to collect, andsets aside funds to cover expected losses. In its 2024 annual report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Fannie Mae disclosed that it set aside $752 million to cover such losses. Fannie Mae included potential losses from mortgage fraud in its multifamily business in its allowance for loan losses.
This evaluation assessed the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA or Agency) oversight of Fannie Mae's multifamily allowance for loan losses, including the amounts set aside for expected losses due to fraud for the 2022, 2023, and 2024 examination cycles.
RESULTS
We determined that Fannie Mae adjusted its allowance for loan losses to address suspected fraud found in its multifamily book of business. We also concluded that FHFA has taken supervisory action to examine and assess Fannie Mae's multifamily allowance for loan losses, including fraud risk in its multifamily book of business. FHFA's Division of Enterprise Regulation (DER) reviewed and assessed the allowance each quarter and did not question the adequacy of the allowance. DER also determined that Fannie Mae's earnings were
Fannie Mae is taking actions to address an increase in suspected multifamily fraud detected in 2023 and 2024. Those actions include enhancing mechanisms for reporting potential fraud, addressing property condition issues, conducting additional training, clarifying guidelines, and exercising its contractual remedies with lenders.
Lastly, we identified an issue that did not rise to the level of a finding but deserves FHFA's consideration. We noted that DER determined that certain Fannie Mae practices . Although DER addressed those practices through examination findings, and management is currently implementing a remediation plan, DER did not communicate to Fannie Mae that the practices . Given that a could result in an enforcement action, DER should consider taking appropriate steps to ensure it puts Fannie Mae (or Freddie Mac) on notice of any such failure in the future.
We made no recommendations in this report.
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The report is posted at: https://www.fhfaoig.gov/sites/default/files/EVL-2026-001_redacted.pdf
Federal Housing Finance Agency IG: 'DBR's Quality Control Program Did Not Detect a Documentation Deficiency in Its Oversight of FHLBank System's Information Security and Cybersecurity Risk Management'
WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. AUD-2026-003) on May 13, 2026 entitled "DBR's Quality Control Program Did Not Detect a Documentation Deficiency in Its Oversight of the FHLBank System's Information Security and Cybersecurity Risk Management".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
Each Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) and the Office of Finance (collectively, the FHLBank System) relies heavily on information systems and other technology to conduct and manage business. The FHLBank System needs to
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WASHINGTON, June 27 (TNSrep) -- The Federal Housing Finance Agency Inspector General issued the following audit report (No. AUD-2026-003) on May 13, 2026 entitled "DBR's Quality Control Program Did Not Detect a Documentation Deficiency in Its Oversight of the FHLBank System's Information Security and Cybersecurity Risk Management".
Here is the executive summary:
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PURPOSE
Each Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) and the Office of Finance (collectively, the FHLBank System) relies heavily on information systems and other technology to conduct and manage business. The FHLBank System needs toprotect the information technology assets and data under its control and manage cybersecurity risks - intentional and unintentional acts that may jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information technology assets and data.
As part of our ongoing oversight of the Division of Federal Home Loan Bank Regulation's (DBR) supervision of the FHLBank System, we performed this audit to assess whether DBR provided sufficient oversight of the FHLBank System's information security and cybersecurity risk management.
RESULTS
We determined that DBR provided sufficient oversight of the FHLBank System's information security and cybersecurity risk management. Specifically, we concluded that DBR designed examination guidance that provided examiners with the worksteps needed to provide such oversight. DBR examiners performed risk-based examinations of information security and cybersecurity risk management for the four examinations in our sample and generally documented their supervisory conclusions in accordance with DBR's workpaper standards. DBR also issued information security and cybersecurity-related Matters Requiring Attention (MRA); monitored the FHLBanks' progress to resolve deficiencies indentified in the MRAs; and closed MRAs, as appropriate, in accordance with its guidance. Overall, we found that DBR examiners were qualified and had the relevant experience to perform the Information Security Management workprogram examinations.
Although DBR provided sufficient oversight of the FHLBank System's information security and cybersecurity risk management, we found that DBR's quality control program did not detect and correct an instance in which the examiner analysis supporting a supervisory conclusion was not documented in the examination workpapers. The risk of incorrect supervisory conclusions increases when DBR's quality control program does not detect and correct examination workpaper deficiencies.
RECOMMENDATION
We made one recommendation to address our finding. In a written response, FHFA management agreed with our recommendation.
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The report is posted at: https://www.fhfaoig.gov/AuditsAndEvaluations/dbrs-quality-control-program-did-not-detect-documentation-deficiency-its
